torts & damages
casis
INTRODUCTION
NAGUIAT V NLRC (National
Organization of Workingmen and
Galang)
269 SCRA 565
PANGANIBAN; March 13, 1997
NATURE
Special civil action in the Supreme Court, certiorari
FACTS
- Clark Field Taxi, Inc. held a concessionaire’s contract
with the Army Air Force Exchange Services for the
operation of taxi services within Clark Air Base. Sergio
Naguiat was the president of CFTI while Antolin Naguiat
was its vice president. Like Naguiat Enterprises, Inc.
which was a trading firm, it was also a family-owned
corporation.
- Respondents were employed by the CFTI as taxicab
drivers.
> They were required to pay a daily boundary fee of
US$26.50 (for those on duty from 1AM-12N) or US$27
(for those on duty from 12N to 12 MN)
> Incidental expenses were maintained by the
drivers (including gasoline expenses).
> Drivers worked 3-4 times a week depending on the
availability of vehicles and earned no less than
US$15.00 a day. In excess of that amount, they had
to make cash deposits to the company which they
could withdraw every fifteen days.
- AAFES was dissolved because of the phase-out of the
military bases in Clark and the services of the
respondents were officially terminated on November
26, 1991.
- AAFES Taxi Drivers Association, the drivers union, and
CFTI held negotiations as regards separation benefits.
They arrived at an agreement that the separated
drivers would be given P500 for ever year as severance
pay. Most of the drivers accepted this but some
refused to do so.
- Those who did not accept the initial severance pay
disaffiliated themselves with drivers union and through
the National Organization of Workingmen, they filed a
complaint against Sergio Naguiat under the name and
style Naguiat Enterprises, AAFES and AAFES union.
- The labor arbiter ordered the petitioner to pay the
drivers P1,200 for every year of service for
humanitarian consideration, setting aside the earlier
agreement between the CFTI and the drivers union. It
A2010 -1-
also rejected the idea that the CFTI was forced to close
it business due to great financial losses and lose
opportunity since at the time of its closure it was
profitably earning. The labor arbiter however did not
award separation pay because to “impose a monetary
obligation to an employer whose profitable business
was abruptly shot (sic) shot down by force majeur
would be unfair and unjust.”
- The NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter
after respondents appealed by granting separation pay
to the private respondents. It said that half of the
monthly salary should be US$120 which should be paid
in Philippine pesos. Naguiat Enterprieses should be
joined with Sergio and Antolin Naguiat as jointly and
severally liable.
Petitioners’ Claim:
- Petitioners claim that the cessation of the business
was due to the great financial losses and lost business
opportunity when Clark Air Base was phased out due to
the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement
and the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo.
- They admitted that CFTI had agreed with the drivers
union to grant the taxi drivers separation pay
equivalent to P500 for every year of service.
- They allege that Sergio and Antolin Naguiat were
denied due process beause the petitioners were not
furnished copies of the appeal to the NLRC.
- They also allege that NOWM cannot make legal
representation in behalf of the respondents because
the latter should be bound by the decision of the
drivers union.
Respondents’ Comments:
- The drivers alleged that they were employees of
Naguiat Enterprises although their individual
applications were approved by CFTI. They claimed to
have been assigned to Naguiat Enterprises after having
been hired by CFTO and that Naguia Enterprises
managed, controlled and supervised their employment.
- They averred that they should be entitled to
separation pay based on their latest daily earnings or
US$15 for working 16 days a month.
ISSUES
1. WON the NLRC acted in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in granting separation pay
2. WON NOWM was authorized to represent the private
respondents
3. WON Naguiat Enterprieses, Sergio Naguiat and
Antolin Naguiat were liable
4. WON Sergio and Antolin Naguiat were denied due
process
HELD
prof.
1. NO, the NLRC did not act in excess of jurisdiction or
with abuse of discretion.
Ratio Findings of fact of administrative bodies and
quasi-judicial bodies are afforded great respect by the
Court and are binding except when there is a showing
of grave abuse of discretion or the decision was arrived
at arbitrarily.
Reasoning
- Respondents showed that their monthly take home
pay amounted to no less than $240 and this was not
disputed by petitioners.
- There is no record or evidence which shows that the
closure of the taxi business was brought about by great
financial losses no thanks to the Pinatubo eruption. It
was rather brought about by the closure of the military
bases.
- Art. 283 of the CC provides that separation pay shall
be equivalent to 1 month pay or at least ½ month pay
for every year of service, whichever is higher. The
NLRC ruling was correct in terms of US$120 as the
computed separation pay.
2. Petitioners can no longer question the authority of
NOWM and are held in estoppel.
Reasoning
- NOWM was already representing the respondents
before the labor arbiter and the petitioners did not
assail their juridical personality then.
- Petitioners also acknowledged before the Court that
the taxi drivers are themselves parties in the case.
3. Naguiat Enterprises is not liable, Antolin Naguiat is
not personally liable whereas Sergio Naguiat is
solidarily liable.
- Re: Naguiat Enterprises’ liability
Reasoning
- The respondents were regular employees of CFTI who
received wages on a boundary basis. They offered no
evidence that Naguiat Enterprises managed,
supervised and controlled their employment. They
instead submitted documents which had to do with
CFTI, not Naguiat Enterprises.
- Labor-only contractors are those where 1) the person
supplying workers to the employer does no have
substantial capital or investment in the form of tools or
machinery and 2) the workers recruited and placed by
such person are performing activities which are directly
related to the principal business of the employer.
- Independent contractors are those who exercise
independent employment, contracting to do a piece of
work according to their own methods without being
subject to the control of their employer except as to the
result of their work.
- Sergio Naguiat was a stockholder and director of
Naguiat Enterprises but, in supervising the taxi drivers
torts & damages
and determining their employment terms, he was
carrying out his responsibility as president of CFTI.
- Naguiat Enterprises was in the trading business while
CFTI was in the taxi business.
- The Constitution of the CFTI-AAFES Taxi Drivers
Association states that the members of the union are
employees of CFTI and for collective and bargaining
purposes, the employer is also CFTI.
- Re: Antolin Naguiat’s liability
Reasoning
- Although he carried the title of general manager, it
has not been shown that he had acted in such capacity.
- No evidence on the extent of his participation in the
management or operation of the business was
proferred.
- Re: Sergio Naguiat’s liability
Ratio A director or officer may be held solidarly liable
with a corporation by a specific provision of law
because a corporation, being a juridical entity, may act
only through its directors and officers. Obligations
incurred by them, acting as such corporation agents,
are not theirs but the direct accountabilities of the
corporation they represent. In the absence of definite
proof of who clearly are the officers of the corporation,
the assumption falls on the President of the
corporation.
Reasoning
- In his capacity as President, Sergio Naguiat cannot be
exonerated.
- An employer is defined to be any person acting in the
interest of an employer, directly or indirectly.
- Case in point is A.C. Ransom Labor Union CCLU vs.
NLRC held that the identified employer A.C. Ransom
Corporation, being an artificial person, must have an
officer and in the absence of proof, the president is
assumed to be the head of the corporation.
- Both CFTI and Naguiat Enterprises were close family
corporations owned by the same family. To the extent
that stockholders are actively engaged in the
management or business affairs of a close corporation,
the stockholders shall be held to strict fiduciary duties
to each other and among themselves. Said
stockholders shall be liable for corporate torts unless
the corporation has obtained reasonably adequate
liability insurance.
> Nothing in the records indicate that CFTI obtained
reasonable adequate liability insurance.
> Jurisprudence is wanting in the definition of
corporate tort. Tort essentially consists in the
violation of a right given or the omission of a duty
imposed by law. Tort is a breach of legal duty.
> Art. 238 mandates the employer to grant
separation pay to employees in case of cessation of
operations or closure of the business not due to
A2010 -2-
serious business losses or financial reverses which is
the condition on this case.
4. There was no denial of due process.
Reasoning
- Even if the individual Naguiats were not impleaded as
parties of the complaint, they could still be held liable
because of jurisprudence (A.C. Ransom case).
- Both also voluntarily submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter when they filed a
position paper.
DISPOSITION The petition is partly granted. 1) CFTI
and Sergio Naguiat are ordered to pay jointly and
severally the individual respondents of US$120 for
every year of service and 2) Naguiat Enterprises and
Antolin Naguiat are absolved from liability.
BARREDO V GARCIA
BOCOBO; July 8, 1942
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- from CA, holding Fausto Barredo liable for damages
for death pf Faustino Garcia caused by negligence of
Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by Fausto
Barredo
- May 3, 1936 – in road between Malabon and Navotas,
head-on collision between taxi of Malate Taxicab and
carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis thereby causing
overturning of the carretela and the eventual death of
Garcia, 16-yo boy and one of the passengers
- Fontanilla convicted in CFI and affirmed by CA and
separate civil action is reserved
- Parents of Garcia filed action against Barredo as sole
proprietor of Malate Taxicab as employer of Fontanilla
- CFI and CA awarded damages bec Fontanilla’s
negligence apparent as he was driving on the wrong
side of the road and at a high speed
> no proof he exercised diligence of a good father of
the family as Barredo is careless in employing
(selection and supervision) Fontanilla who had been
caught several times for violation of Automobile Law
and speeding
> CA applied A1903CC that makes inapplicable civil
liability arising from crime bec this is under obligations
arising from wrongful act or negligent acts or omissions
punishable by law
- Barredo’s defense is that his liability rests on RPC TF
liability only subsidiary and bec no civil action against
Fontanilla TF he too cannot be held responsible
ISSUE
WON parents of Garcia may bring separate civil action
against Barredo making him primarily liable and
prof. casis
directly responsible under A1903CC as employer of
Fontanilla
HELD
YES
- There are two actions available for parents of Garcia.
One is under the A100RPC wherein the employer is only
subsidiarily liable for the damages arising from the
crime thereby first exhausting the properties of
Fontanilla. The other action is under A1903CC (quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana) wherein as the negligent
employer of Fontanilla, Barredo is held primarily liable
subject to proving that he exercising diligence of a
good father of the family. The parents simply took the
action under the Civil Code as it is more practical to get
damages from the employer bec he has more money to
give than Fontanilla who is yet to serve his sentence.
Obiter
Difference bet Crime and Quasi-delict
1) crimes – public interest; quasi-delict – only private
interest
2) Penal code punishes or corrects criminal acts; Civil
Code by means of indemnification merely repairs the
damage
3) delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts; crimes are
only punished if there is a penal law; quasi-delicts
include any kind of fault or negligence intervenes
NOTE: not all violations of penal law produce civil
responsibility
e.g. contravention of ordinances, violation of game
laws, infraction of rules of traffic when nobody is hurt
4) crime – guilt beyond reasonable doubt; civil – mere
preponderance of evidence
- Presumptions:
1) injury is caused by servant or employee, there
instantly arises presumption of negligence of master or
employer in selection, in supervision or both
2) presumption is juris tantum not juris et de jure TF
may be rebutted by proving exercise of diligence of a
good father of the family
- basis of civil law liability: not respondent superior bu
the relationship of pater familias
- motor accidents – need of stressing and accentuating
the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles
ELCANO V HILL
77 SCRA 98
BARREDO; May 26, 1977
NATURE
Appeal from an order of the CFI Quezon City
FACTS
torts & damages
- Reginald Hill, a minor yet married at the time of
occurrence, was criminally prosecuted for the killing of
Agapito Elcano (son of Pedro), and was acquitted for
“lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.”
- Pedro Elcano filed a complaint for recovery of
damages from Reginald and his father Atty Marvin. CFI
dismissed it.
ISSUES
1. WON the civil action for damages is barred by the
acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the
action for civil liability was not reversed
2. WON Article 2180 (2nd and last par) of the CC can be
applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the fact that
at the time of the occurrence, Reginald, though a
minor, living with and getting subsistence from his
father, was already legally married
HELD
1. NO
-The acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has
not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that
acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
-Barredo v Garcia (dual character—civil and criminal
— of fault or negligence as a source of obligation):
"The above case is pertinent because it shows that the
same act may come under both the Penal Code and the
Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was
unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have
been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was
held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that
it was the employer and not the employee who was
being sued."
"It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case
could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because
his negligence causing the death of the child was
punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear
instance of the same act of negligence being a proper
subject matter either of a criminal action with its
consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an
entirely separate and independent civil action for fault
or negligence under article 1402 of the Civil Code.
Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a
cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has
been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a
negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been
prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case aria for
which, after un a conviction, he could have been sued
for this civil liability arising from his crime.”
-Culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in
character or in violation of a penal law, whether
voluntary or negligent.
-ART 1162: "Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall
be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of
A2010 -3-
this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More
precisely, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
"ART 277. Responsibility for fault or negligence under
the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising front negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant."
- According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing
provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling,
is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the
exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The
former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter
is a 'culpa aquilian' or quasi-delict, of ancient origin,
having always had its own foundation and individuality,
separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction
between criminal negligence and 'culpa extra-
contractual' or 'cuasi-delito' has been sustained by
decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained
as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an
outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the
proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of
criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or
not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not
for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for
damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But
said article forestalls a double recovery,"
- Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to
literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same
argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that
upholds "the spirit that giveth life" rather than that
which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker
should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that me preliminary chapter on human
relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the
separability and independence of liability in a civil
action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29
to 12) from the civil responsibility arising from crime
fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in
a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c),
Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it’s
"more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and
justice, and more in harmony with modern progress", to
hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers
to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
- Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality
only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary.
prof. casis
- Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia,
that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent
acts which may be punishable by law.
2. YES (but…)
- Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald. (However,
inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age,
as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has
become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.)
- While it is true that parental authority is terminated
upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code),
and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by
the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also
clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by
marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by
voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority
over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to
administer his property as though he was of age, but he
cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real
property without the consent of his father or mother, or
guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
- Under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by
article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company."
- In the instant case, it is not controverted that
Reginald, although married, was living with his father
and getting subsistence from him at the time of the
occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald
was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a
situation which is not unusual.
- It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa,
the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of
parents with their offending child under Article 2180 is
that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their
minor children in order to prevent them from causing
damage to third persons.
- On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399,
in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage
may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the
assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation
does not carry with it freedom to enter into
transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial
litigation. And surely, killing someone else invites
judicial action.
CINCO V CANONOY
90 SCRA 369
torts & damages A2010 -4- prof. casis
Melencio-Herrera; May 31, 1979 proceed independently of the criminal claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed
prosecution, and shall require only a to be married; neither sought the consent of her
preponderance of evidence. parents nor forced her to live in his apt.; did not
NATURE
- Petitioner’s cause of action is based on quasi- maltreat her but only told her to stop coming to his
Petition for review on certiorari
delict. The concept of quasi-delict, as enunciated in place after having discovered that she stole his money
Art 2176 of the Civil Code, is so broad that in and passport. He also prayed for 25,000 as moral
FACTS
includes not only injuries to persons but also damages plus misc. expenses.
- Cinco filed on Feb 25, 19701 a complaint for recovery
damage to property. It makes no distinction - The RTC, applying Art. 21 CC decided in favor of
of damages on account of a vehicular accident
between “damage to persons” on the one hand private respondent. Petitioner was thus ordered to pay
involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by
and “damage to property” on the other. The word Php 20,000 as moral damages and 3,000 pesos atty’s.
Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and
damage is used in two concepts: the “harm” done fees plus litigation expenses. Petitioner appealed this
Carlos Pepito.
and “reparation” for the harm done. And with decision to respondent CA, contending that the trial
- Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the
respect to “harm” it is plain that it includes both court erred in not dismissing the case for lack of factual
driver Romeo Hilot arising from the same accident.
injuries to person and property since “harm” is not and legal basis and in ordering him to pay moral
- At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private
limited to personal but also to property injuries. damages, atty’s fees, etc.
respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending
DISPOSITION Writ of Certiorari granted. - Respondent CA promulgated the challenged decision
the final determination of the criminal suit.
affirming in toto the trial court’s ruling which prompted
- The City Court of Mandaue ordered the suspension of
Baksh to file this petition for certiorari, raising the
the civil case. Petitioner’s MFR having been denied, he BAKSH V CA (Gonzales)
single issue of WON Art. 21 applies to this case.
elevated the matter on Certiorari to the CFI Cebu., 219 SCRA 115
which in turn dismissed the petition.
DAVIDE, JR; Feb.19, 1993 ISSUE
Plaintiff’s claims:
WON damages may be recovered for a breach of
- it was the fault r negligence of the driver in the
promise to marry on the basis of Art.21 of the Civil
operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which
NATURE Code
caused the collision.
- Damages were sustained by petitioner because of the Appeal by certiorari to review and set aside the CA
decision which affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision HELD
collision
1. YES
- There was a direct causal connection between the
FACTS Ratio In a breach of promise to marry where the
damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of
- Private respondent Marilou Gonzales (MG) filed a woman is a victim of moral seduction, Art. 21 may be
private respondents.
complaint for damages against petitioner Gashem applied.
Respondents’ Comments:
Shookat Baksh for the alleged violation of their Reasoning
- They observed due diligence in the selection and
agreement to get married. - Where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the
supervision of employees, particularly of Romeo Hilot.
**MG’s allegations in the complaint: proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
- That she is a 22 yr. old Filipina, single, of good moral woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
ISSUE
character and respected reputation in her community. becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
WON there can be an independent civil action for
- That Baksh is an Iranian citizen, residing in Dagupan, unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in
damage to property during the pendency of the
and is an exchange student taking up medicine at the reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
criminal action
Lyceum in Dagupan. promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device
- That Baksh later courted and proposed to marry her. to entice or inveigle to accept him and to obtain her
HELD
MG accepted his love on the condition that they would consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
YES
get married. They later agreed to get married at the damages pursuant to Art.21 not because of such
- Liability being predicated on quasi-delict, the civil
end of the school semester. Petitioner had visited MG’s promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit
case may proceed as a separate and independent civil
parents to secure their approval of the marriage. Baksh behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
action, as specifically provided for in Art 2177 of the
later forced MG to live with him. A week before the reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential
Civil Code.
filing of the complaint, petitioner started maltreating however, that such injury should have been committed
- The separate and independent civil action for quasi-
her even threatening to kill her and as a result of such in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
delict is also clearly recognized in sec 2, Rule 111 of
maltreatment, she sustained injuries. A day before the policy.
the Rules of Court:
filing of the complaint, Baksh repudiated their marriage - In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was
Sec 2. Independent civil action. – In the cases
agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations
prvided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of
and that he is already married to someone in Bacolod. of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her
the Civil Code f the Philippines, an independent
She prayed for payment for damages amounting to Php surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live
civil action entirely separate and distinct from
45,000 plus additional costs. with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would
the criminal action, may be brought by the
- Baksh answered with a counterclaim, admitting only keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
injured party during the pendency of the criminal
the personal circumstances of the parties in the deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
case, provided the right is reserved as required
complaint but denied the rest of the allegations. He parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
in the preceding section. Such civil action shall
torts & damages
preparatory to their supposed marriage. In short, the
private respondent surrendered her virginity, the
cherished possession of every single Filipina, not
because of lust but because of moral seduction. The
petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction
punished under either Art.337 or Art.338 of the RPC
because the private respondent was above 18 years of
age at the time of the seduction.
- Moreover, it is the rule in this jurisdiction that
appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings
as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having
heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to
observe closely their deportment and manner of
testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked
facts of substance or value which, if considered, might
affect the result of the case. Petitioner has miserably
failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial
courts had overlooked any fact of substance or value
which could alter the result of the case.
**Obiter: on Torts and Quasi-delicts
- The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry
per se is not an actionable wrong. Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil
Code the provisions that would have made it so. The
reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate
Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We
quote:
“The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That
breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been
definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia.
The history of breach of promise suits in the United
States and in England has shown that no other action
lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women
and unscrupulous men...”
- This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a
provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the
concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books.
- As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
“But the Code Commission has gone farther than the
sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive
law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually suffered
material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed
it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in
the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
“Art.21 Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.”
A2010 -5-
“An example will illustrate the purview of the
foregoing norm: 'A' seduces the nineteen-year old
daughter of 'X.' A promise of marriage either has not
been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes
pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as
the girl is above 18 yrs of age. Neither can any civil
action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.
Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been
committed, and although the girl and her family have
suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her
parents cannot bring any action for damages. But
under the proposed article, she and her parents would
have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the foregoing
rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which
it is impossible for human foresight to provide for
specifically in the statutes.”
- Art.2176 CC, which defines a quasi-delict, is limited to
negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of
willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish
legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept
while torts is an Anglo-American or common law
concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana
because it includes not only negligence, but intentional
criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false
imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the
Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission
responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional
and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be
governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent
acts or omissions are to be covered by Art.2176 CC. In
between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts
which, in the absence of Art.21, would have been
beyond redress. Thus, Art.21 fills that vacuum. It is
even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20
of the Civil Code, Art.21 has greatly broadened the
scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much
more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American
law on torts.
DISPOSITION finding no reversible error in the
challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED
PEOPLE V BALLESTEROS
285 SCRA 438
ROMERO; January 29, 1998
NATURE
An appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court
finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder, qualified by treachery.
FACTS
prof. casis
- evening of May 28, 1991, Carmelo Agliam, his half-
brother Eduardo Tolentino, Ronnel Tolentino, Vidal
Agliam, his brother Jerry Agliam, Robert Cacal,
Raymundo Bangi and Marcial Barid converged at a
carinderia owned by Ronnel Tolentino. They proceeded
to attend a dance but did not stay long because they
sensed some hostility from Cesar Galo and his
companions who were giving them dagger looks. In
order to avoid trouble, especially during the festivity,
they decided to head for home instead of reacting to
the perceived provocation of Galo and his companions.
- The group had barely left when their owner jeep was
fired upon from the rear. Vidal Agliam was able to jump
out from the jeep and landed just beside it, scurried to
the side of the road and hid in the ricefield. His
younger brother Jerry also managed to jump out, but
was shot in the stomach and died. Carmelo Agliam,
Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino sustained injuries.
Eduardo Tolentino was not even able to move from his
seat and was hit with a bullet which punctured his right
kidney which caused his death.
- Based upon the affidavits of Carmelo and Vidal
Agliam, warrants for the arrest of Ballesteros, Galo and
Bulusan were issued. - All pleaded not guilty. Paraffin
tests conducted on Galo and Ballesteros produced
positive results. Bulusan was not tested for nitrates.
- In his testimony, Galo claimed that he did not even
talk to Bulusan or any of his companions. Having been
found with gunpowder residue in his hands, Galo
attempted to exculpate himself from the results by
confessing that he had been a cigarette smoker for the
past ten years and had, in fact, just consumed eight
cigarette sticks prior to the test., and that his hand may
have been contaminated by a nitrogenous compound,
the source of which is urine. Lastly, he said that he was
not even present at the crime scene
- Ballesteros interposed the defense of alibi, that he
went to a nearby store to purchase some cigarettes.
He returned home and cleaned his garlic bulbs before
retiring at 9:00 o’clock. The next morning, he busied
himself with some chores, which included fertilizing his
pepper plants with sulfate. He handled the fertilizers
without gloves. He said that he uses his left hand in
lighting cigarettes and he had no motive to kill the
victims.
- Bulusan echoed the defense of alibi of Galo and
Ballesteros
- The trial court found the three accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery,
and ordered them to pay jointly and solidarily:
1. The heirs of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in
the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the
amount of P20,000.00, and actual damages in the
amount of P35,755.00, with interest;
torts & damages
2. The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino, Sr.,
compensatory damages in the amount of P50,000.00,
moral damages in the amount of P20,000.00, and
actual damages in the total amount of P61,785.00, with
interest;
3. Carmelo Agliam, actual damages in the amount of
P2,003.40, and moral damages in the amount of
P10,000.00, with interest;
4. Vidal Agliam Jr., Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino,
moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00 each, with
interest.
5. The costs.
ISSUES
1. WON the trial court was correct in finding accused-
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt
2. WON the Court correctly ruled in finding that the
offense was qualified by treachery
3. WON the Court was correct in the award of damages
to the heirs of the victims
HELD
1. YES
Ratio Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by
law to convict a person of a criminal charge. The doubt
to the benefit of which an accused is entitled in a
criminal trial is a reasonable doubt, not a whimsical or
fanciful doubt based on imagined but wholly
improbable possibilities and unsupported by evidence.
Reasonable doubt is that engendered by an
investigation of the whole proof and inability, after such
investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the
certainty of guilt.
Reasoning
- In their testimonies, Carmelo and Vidal Agliam both
described the area to be well illumined by the
moon. Considering the luminescence of the moon and
the proximity between them, the victims could
distinctly identify their assailants. Also, the constant
interaction between them through the years (in the
buying and selling of cattle and Bulusan was a
classmate of Vidal) would necessarily lead to familiarity
with each other such that, at the very least, one would
have been able to recognize the other easily
- That accused-appellants had no motive in
perpetrating the offense is irrelevant. Motive is the
moving power which impels one to action for a definite
result. Intent, on the other hand, is the purpose to use
a particular means to effect such result. The
prosecution need not prove motive on the part of the
accused when the latter has been positively identified
as the author of the crime.
- on their excuses regarding the source of the
gunpowder traces found on their hands: Experts
confirm the possibility that cigarettes, fertilizers and
A2010 -6-
urine may leave traces of nitrates, but these are
minimal and, unlike those found in gunpowder, may be
washed off with tap water.
- on the defense of alibi: for the defense of alibi to
prosper, the accused must prove, not only that he was
at some other place at the time of the commission of
the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate
vicinity. This accused-appellants failed to satisfactorily
prove. Positive identification prevails over denials and
alibis.
- None of them attempted to corroborate their alibi
through the testimony of witnesses. In fact, they never
attempted to present as witnesses those who could
have testified to having seen them elsewhere on the
night in question.
2. YES
Ratio The requisites of treachery are twofold: (1) (t)hat
at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; and (2) that the offender
consciously adopted the particular means, method or
form of attack employed by him.
Reasoning
- Here, it is obvious that the accused-appellants had
sufficient opportunity to reflect on their heinous plan.
The facts show that the attack was well-planned and
not merely a result of the impulsiveness of the
offenders. Manifestations of their evil designs were
already apparent as early as the time of the dance.
They were well-armed and approached the homebound
victims, totally unaware of their presence, from
behind. There was no opportunity for the latter to
defend themselves
3. YES
Ratio Damages may be defined as the pecuniary
compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury
sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary
consequences which the law imposes for the breach of
some duty or the violation of some right. Actual or
compensatory damages are those awarded in
satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury
sustained, whereas moral damages may be invoked
when the complainant has experienced mental anguish,
serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral shock and so
forth, and had furthermore shown that these were the
proximate result of the offender’s wrongful act or
omission.
Reasoning
- In granting actual or compensatory damages, the
party making a claim for such must present the best
evidence available, viz., receipts, vouchers, and the
like, as corroborated by his testimony. Here, the claim
for actual damages by the heirs of the victims is not
controverted, the same having been fully substantiated
by receipts accumulated by them and presented to the
prof. casis
court. Therefore, the award of actual damages is
proper. However, the order granting compensatory
damages to the heirs of Jerry Agliam and Eduardo
Tolentino Sr. must be amended. Consistent with the
policy of this Court, the amount of P 50,000.00 is given
to the heirs of the victims by way of indemnity, and not
as compensatory damages. As regards moral damages,
the amount of psychological pain, damage and injury
caused to the heirs of the victims, although
inestimable, may be determined by the trial court in its
discretion. Hence, we see no reason to disturb its
findings as to this matter.
DISPOSITION The decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
CUSTODIO V CA (Heirs Of Mabasa)
253 SCRA 483
REGALADO; February 9, 1996
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA
FACTS
- The plaintiff-appellee Mabasa owns a parcel of land
with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at
Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro
Manila. As access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiff's
property, there are 2 possible passageways. The first
passageway is approximately one meter wide and is
about 20m distant from Mabasa's residence to P.
Burgos St. Such path is passing in between the row of
houses of defendants. The second passageway is about
3m in width. In passing thru said passageway, a less
than a meter wide path through the septic tank and
with 5-6m in length, has to be traversed.
- When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there
were tenants occupying the remises and who were
acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However,
sometime in February, 1982, one of said tenants
vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went
to see the premises, he saw that there had been built
an adobe fence in the first passageway making it
narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first
constructed by defendants Santoses along their
property which is also along the first passageway.
Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and
even extended said fence in such a way that the entire
passageway was enclosed. And it was then that the
remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area.
Defendant Cristina Santos testified that she
constructed said fence because there was an incident
when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled
by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along
the first passageway. She also mentioned some other
torts & damages
inconveniences of having at the front of her house a
pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk
and would bang their doors and windows. Some of their
footwear were even lost.
- TC ordered (a) defendant-appellants Custodios and
Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access — ingress
and egress, to the public street; (b) the plaintiff to pay
defendants Custodios and Santoses P8,000 as
indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.
- Private respondents, went to CA raising the sole issue
of WON lower court erred in not awarding damages in
their favor. CA affirming TC judgment with modification,
awarding damages to plaintiffs (P65K as actual
damages, P30K as moral damages and P10K as
exemplary damages). Mfr denied. Hence this appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON the grant of right of way to herein private
respondents is proper
2. WON CA erred in awarding damages to plaintiff-
appellee Mabasa
HELD
1. Ratio Whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an
appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain
from the appellate court any affirmative relief other
than what was granted in the decision of the lower
court
Reasoning
- Petitioners are already barred from raising the same.
Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court
a quo granting private respondents the right of way,
hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the
adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment
of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of propriety
of the grant of right of way has already been laid to
rest.
2. YES
Ratio There is no cause of action for acts done by one
person (in this case, upon his own property) in a lawful
and proper manner, although such acts incidentally
cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as
such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria.
Reasoning
[1] To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be
both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the
defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff
therefrom.
[2] Obiter: There is a material distinction between
damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a
legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which
results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in
those instances in which the loss or harm was not the
A2010 -7-
result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are
often called damnum absque injuria.
[3] In order that the law will give redress for an act
causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but
wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. The injury
must result from a breach of duty or a legal wrong.
[4] In this case, although there was damage, there was
no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private
respondents, petitioners could not be said to have
violated the principle of abuse of right (Art.21 CC)
[5] The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within
their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners,
hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to
enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations
than those established by law. It is within the right of
petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their
property (See Art.430 CC).
DISPOSITION The appealed decision of CA is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the trial
court is REINSTATED.
THE CONCEPT OF QUASI-
DELICT
GARCIA V FLORIDO
[CITATION]
ANTONIO; [DATE]
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Misamis Occidental, dismissing
petitioners' action for damages against respondents,
Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, "without
prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction
of the defendants in the criminal case filed by the Chief
of Police of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte", and
from the order of said Court dated January 21, 1972,
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
FACTS
- On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia,
Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, together with
his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco,
bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a PU car
with plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated
by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by
respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a roundtrip from
Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of
attending a conference of chiefs of government
hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and
prof. casis
bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. 7 at
Zamboanga City.
- At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a
slight curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in
Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte,
said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus (No.
25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71 owned and operated
by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by
defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid
collision, petitioners sustained various physical injuries
which necessitated their medical treatment and
hospitalization.
- Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the
passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving
their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless,
grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross
violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the
safety of the passengers aboard the PU car, petitioners,
German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester
Francisco, filed on September 1, 1971 with respondent
Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental an action
for damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against the private
respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the
PU car and the passenger bus that figured in the
collision, with prayer for preliminary attachment.
- The principal argument advanced by Mactan Inc. et. al
to in a motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had
no cause of action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days
before the filing of the present action for damages,
respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case
No. 4960 of the Municipal Court of Sindangan,
Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaint filed by the Chief
of Police and that, with the filing of the aforesaid
criminal case, no civil action could be filed subsequent
thereto unless the criminal case has been finally
adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court, and, therefore, the filing of the instant civil
action is premature, because the liability of the
employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until
after final judgment has been rendered finding the
driver, Pedro Tumala, guilty of negligence; that Art. 33
of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art 33
applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or
homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of the
driver.
- The lower court sustained Mactan Inc. et. Al. and
dismissed the complaint
ISSUES
1. WON the lower court erred in dismissing the
complaint for damages on the ground that since no
express reservation was made by the complainants, the
civil aspect of the criminal case would have to be
determined only after the termination of the criminal
case
torts & damages
2. WON the lower court erred in saying that the action
is not based on quasi-delict since the allegations of the
complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any
assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or
regulations and because of the prayer in the complaint
asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and
severally liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary
damages
. by the institution of the civil action even before
HELD
1. YES
Ratio An action based on quasi-delict may be
maintained independently from a criminal action. By
instituting a civil action based on a quasi-delict, a
complainant may be deemed to abandon his/her right
to press recovery for damages in the criminal case.
Reasoning
- In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners
never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the
Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much
less has the said criminal action been terminated either
by conviction or acquittal of said accused.
- It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the
present civil action for damages, petitioners have in
effect abandoned their right to press recovery for
damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead
to recover them in the present civil case.
- As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability
of private respondents to the former has ceased to be
involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an
offended party loses his right to intervene in the
prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has
waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to
institute, but also when he has actually instituted the
civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in
the criminal case has disappeared.
- As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent
act causing damages may produce a civil liability
arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or
culpa extracontractual. The former is a violation of the
criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
independent negligence, having always had its own
foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of
the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil
action based upon quasi-delict may proceed
independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal
negligence and regardless of the result of the latter.
Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with
reference to . . . Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code
is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles,
for these articles were drafted . . . and are intended to
constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in
what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is
procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized
amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34
A2010 -8-
of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the
reservation required in the proviso."
- But in whatever way We view the institution of
the civil action for recovery of damages under
quasi-delict by petitioners, whether as one that
should be governed by the provisions of Section
2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require
reservation by the injured party considering that
the commencement of the trial of the criminal
case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their
right to intervene therein, or one where
reservation to file the civil action need not be
made, for the reason that the law itself (Article
33 of the Civil Code) already makes the
reservation and the failure of the offended party
to do so does not bar him from bringing the
action, under the peculiar circumstances of the
case, We find no legal justification for
respondent court's order of dismissal.
2. YES, because the action in fact satisfies the elements
of quasi-delict.
Ratio An action shall be deemed to be based on a
quasi-delict when all the essential averments under
Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present,
namely:
a) act or omission of the private respondents;
b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due
care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by
respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of
the bus with the passenger car;
c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by
petitioners as a result of the collision;
d) existence of direct causal connection between the
damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of
private respondents; and
e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations
between the parties.
Reasoning
- The circumstance that the complaint alleged that
respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver
drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless, grossly
negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic
rules and without due regard to the safety of the
passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract from
the nature and character of the action, as one based on
culpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic rules is merely
descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for
the protection of the interests of others, that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury on
petitioners. Certainly excessive speed in violation of
traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. Since the
same negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal
action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court
prof. casis
(Criminal Case No. 4960) and the civil action by
petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on the
drivers' negligence in both complaints would
substantially be the same. It should be emphasized that
the same negligent act causing damages may produce
a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the
Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict
or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the
New Civil Code. This distinction has been amply
explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et all (73 Phil. 607,
620-621).
- It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule
111 of the Revised Rules of Court which became
effective on January 1, 1964, in the cases provided for
by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct
from the civil action, may be instituted by the injured
party during the pendency of the criminal case,
provided said party has reserved his right to institute it
separately, but it should be noted, however, that
neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time
limit when such reservation shall be made.
SEPARATE OPINION
BARREDO [concur]
- Article 2176 and 2177 definitely create a civil liability
distinct and different from the civil action arising from
the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal
Code. Since Civil Case No. 2850 is predicated on the
above civil code articles and not on the civil liability
imposed by the Revised Penal Code, I cannot see why a
reservation had to be made in the criminal case. As to
the specific mention of Article 2177 in Section 2 of the
Rule 111, it is my considered view that the latter
provision is inoperative, it being substantive in
character and is not within the power of the Supreme
Court to promulgate, and even if it were not
substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its
inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the
legislature superseding the Rules of 1940.
- Besides, the actual filing of Civil Case No. 2850 should
be deemed as the reservation required, there being no
showing that prejudice could be caused by doing so.
- Accordingly, I concur in the judgment reversing the
order of dismissal of the trial court in order that Civil
Case No. 2850 may proceed, subject to the limitation
mentioned in the last sentence of Article 2177 of the
Civil Code, which means that of the two possible
judgments, the injured party is entitled
exclusively to the bigger one.
ANDAMO V IAC (Missionaries Of Our
Lady Of La Salette, Inc)
torts & damages A2010 -9- prof. casis
191 SCRA 195 quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict
proceed independently of the criminal case or culpa aquiliana.
FERNAN; November 6, 1990
- It must be stressed that the use of one's property is
HELD not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code
NATURE
Ratio YES. As held in In Azucena vs. Potenciano, in provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely independent thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a
of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON
FACTS
of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual
- Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo
than this, for to subordinate the civil action and reciprocal duties which require that each must use
are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga
contemplated in the said articles to the result of the his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to
(Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of
criminal prosecution — whether it be conviction or infringe upon the rights and interests of others.
private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La
acquittal — would render meaningless the independent Although we recognize the right of an owner to build
Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
character of the civil action and the clear injunction in structures on his land, such structures must be so
- Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths
Article 31, that his action may proceed independently constructed and maintained using all reasonable care
and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were
of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining
constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded
of the latter." landowners and can withstand the usual and expected
petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown,
Reasoning forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or
damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away
- A careful examination of the complaint shows that the damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person,
costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and
civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or
their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and
Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi- damage suffered.
exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the - Article 2176 1of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability
- In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action
plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or on a person for damage caused by his act or omission
against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo
some other person for whose acts he must respond; constituting fault or negligence.
Mallillin, officers and directors of respondent
and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the - Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or
corporation, for destruction by means of inundation
fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by
under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
incurred by the plaintiff. law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
- On February 22, 1983, petitioners filed a civil case for
- The waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of separate civil action lies against the offender in a
preliminary injunction against respondent corporation.
petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections
connection between the act of building these and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
on the land.
waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is
- On April 26, 1984, the trial court issued an order
Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence actually charged also criminally), to recover damages
suspending further hearings in the civil case until after
which may be the basis for the recovery of damages. on both scores, and would be entitled in such
judgment in the related Criminal Case. And later on
- In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, the Court applied eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
dismissed the Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, as the
Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil
held that "any person who without due authority - The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article
case was still unresolved.The decision was based on
constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or 21772 of the Civil Code. According to the Report of the
Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which
communication between a creek or a lake and a river, Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at
provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the
thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who, first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary
same offense may be instituted separately, but after
like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil
the criminal action has been commenced the civil
enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal
action cannot be instituted until final judgment has
payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the law, while the latter is a distinct and independent
been rendered in the criminal action."
injured party. negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict,
- Petitioners appealed from that order to the
- While the property involved in the cited case belonged of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation
Intermediate Appellate Court.
to the public domain and the property subject of the and individuality, separate from criminal negligence.
- On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court
instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that
affirmed the order of the trial court. A motion for
petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that 1
reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the
petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
Appellate Court . there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
ISSUE
complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the provisions of this chapter.
WON a corporation, which has built through its agents, 2
petitioners, the act or omission of respondent
waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an
and the causal connection between the act and the negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation
under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on
torts & damages
Such distinction between criminal negligence and
"culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been
sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ...
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court
held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate
legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime —
a distinction exists between the civil liability arising
from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or
culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing
damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime
under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-
delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.
Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal
case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of
course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has
declared that the fact from which the civil action arose
did not exist, in which case the extinction of the
criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the
civil liability.
TAYLOR V MANILA ELECTRIC
16 PHIL 8
CARSON; March 22, 1910
NATURE
An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and
other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by
his father, his nearest relative.
FACTS
- The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the
operation of a street railway and an electric light
system in the city of Manila. The plaintiff, David Taylor,
was at the time when he received the injuries
complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical
engineer, more mature than the average boy of his
age, and having considerable aptitude and training in
mechanics.
- On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy
named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age,
crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the
purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the
defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder
for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr.
Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled
apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the
unusual interest which both seem to have taken in
machinery, spent some time in wandering about the
company's premises.
- After watching the operation of the travelling crane
used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked
across the open space in the neighborhood of the place
A2010 - 10 -
where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes
from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or
thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground.
They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting
charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a
considerable explosive power. they opened one of the
caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a
yellowish substance they got matches, and David held
the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the
contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less
serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the boys
proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap,
became frightened and started to run away, received a
slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and
wounded, and David was struck in the face by several
particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his
right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its
removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for
his wounds.
- The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose
how the caps came to be on the defendant's premises,
nor how long they had been there when the boys found
them.
- No measures seems to have been adopted by the
defendant company to prohibit or prevent visitors from
entering and walking about its premises unattended,
when they felt disposed so to do.
- The trial court's decision, awarding damages to the
plaintiff, upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil
Code read together with articles 1902, 1903, and 1908
of that code.
ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by
contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit acts and
omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or
negligence occurs.
ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission
causes damage to another when there is fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so
done.
ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding
article is demandable, not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom
they should be responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the
mother, is liable for the damages caused by the
minors who live with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise
are equally liable for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which
the latter may be employed or on account of their
duties.
The liability referred to in this article shall cease
when the persons mentioned therein prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to avoid the damage.
prof. casis
ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the
damage caused —
1 By the explosion of machines which may not have
been cared for with due diligence, and for kindling of
explosive substances which may not have been
placed in a safe and proper place.
- Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his
appeal strictly upon his contention that the facts
proven at the trial do not established the liability of the
defendant company under the provisions of these
articles.
ISSUE
WON the defendants negligence is the proximate cause
of plaintiff's injuries
HELD
NO
- We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of
this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the
caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate
cause of the injury received by the plaintiff.
- We agree with counsel for appellant that under the
Civil Code, as under the generally accepted doctrine in
the United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that
under consideration, in order to establish his right to a
recovery, must establish by competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant
personally, or some person for whose acts it must
respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the
negligence and the damage.
- These proposition are, of course, elementary, and do
not admit of discussion, the real difficulty arising in the
application of these principles to the particular facts
developed in the case under consideration.
- It is clear that the accident could not have happened
and not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the
point where they were found, or if their owner had
exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate
place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not
have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and
convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises,
and strolled around thereon without the express
permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up
and carried away the property of the defendant which
he found on its premises, and had he not thereafter
deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a
match to its contents.
- But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of
plaintiff's youth and inexperience, his entry upon
defendant company's premises, and the intervention of
his action between the negligent act of defendant in
leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the
torts & damages
accident which resulted in his injury should not be held
to have contributed in any wise to the accident, which
should be deemed to be the direct result of defendant's
negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place
where they were found by the plaintiff, and this latter
the proximate cause of the accident which occasioned
the injuries sustained by him.
- In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies
on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last
resort in the United States in the cases known as the
"Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases based
thereon.
- As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (17 Wall. (84 U.
S.), 657), wherein the principal question was whether a
railroad company was liable for in injury received by an
infant while upon its premises, from idle curiosity, or for
purposes of amusement, if such injury was, under
circumstances, attributable to the negligence of the
company), the principles on which these cases turn are
that "while a railroad company is not bound to the
same degree of care in regard to mere strangers who
are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to
passengers conveyed by it, it is not exempt from
responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from
its negligence or from its tortious acts;" and that "the
conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged
by the same rule which governs that of adult. While it is
the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him
to recover damages for an injury resulting from the
fault or negligence of another he must himself have
been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an
infant of tender years. The care and caution required of
a child is according to his maturity and capacity only,
and this is to be determined in each case by the
circumstances of the case."
- The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs.
Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply
criticized in several courts. But the doctrine of the case
is controlling in our jurisdiction.
- This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and
necessity, and neither is contention that a man has a
right to do what will with his own property or that
children should be kept under the care of their parents
or guardians, so as to prevent their entering on the
premises of others is of sufficient weight to put in
doubt.
- But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon
defendant's property without defendant's express
invitation or permission would not have relieved
defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there
by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury
were attributable to the negligence of the defendant,
we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of
this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the
caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate
A2010 - 11 -
cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which
therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to
the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other
hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting
open the detonating cap and putting match to its
contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and
of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and
that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible
for the injuries thus incurred. Plaintiff contends, upon
the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that
because of plaintiff's youth the intervention of his
action between the negligent act of the defendant in
leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the
explosion which resulted in his injury should not be held
to have contributed in any wise to the accident; and it
is because we can not agree with this proposition,
although we accept the doctrine of the Turntable and
Torpedo cases, that we have thought proper to discuss
and to consider that doctrine at length in this decision.
- In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident
was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both
mentally and physically than the average boy of his
age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to
earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days
after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses
throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to
take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no
room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness
stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap
with which he was amusing himself.
- True, he may not have known and probably did not
know the precise nature of the explosion which might
be expected from the ignition of the contents of the
cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant
injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a
more or less dangerous explosion might be expected
from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and
knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far
to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he
exercised such and "care and caution" as might
reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or
anyone else should be held civilly responsible for
injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had
sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of
the danger to which he exposed himself when he put
the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui
juris in the sense that his age and his experience
qualified him to understand and appreciate the
necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution
which would have avoided the injury which resulted
from his own deliberate act; and that the injury
incurred by him must be held to have been the direct
and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act,
so that while it may be true that these injuries would
prof. casis
not have been incurred but for the negligence act of
the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the
proximate and principal cause of the accident which
inflicted the injury.
TAYAG V ALCANTARA
98 SCRA 723
CONCEPCION; July 23, 1980
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari the order of CFI Tarlac
(dismissing petition for damages)
FACTS
- Pedro Tayag was riding a motorcycle when he was
bumped by a Philippine Rabbit Bus, driven by Romeo
Villa, which caused his instantaneous death. Pending
the criminal case against the driver, the heirs of Tayag
instituted a civil action to recover damages from the
company (Phil Rabbit Bus Inc) and the driver. In turn,
the company and driver filed a motion to suspend trial
of the civil case on the ground that the criminal case
was still pending. Judge Alcantara granted this motion.
- In the criminal case, the driver as acquitted based on
reasonable doubt. The company and driver then filed
for dismissal of the civil case on the ground that the
heirs do not have a cause of action because of the
acquittal. Judge Alcantara granted this and dismissed
the civil case.
ISSUE
WON Judge Alcantara correctly dismissed the civil case
on the ground of no cause of action due to the acquittal
of the driver
HELD
1. NO
Ratio The petitioners' cause of action being based on
a quasi-delict, the acquittal of the driver of the crime
charged is not a bar to the prosecution for damages
based on quasi-delict
Reasoning
- Art. 31, NCC provides: “When the civil action is based
on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter”
- Evidently, this provision refers to a civil action based
on an obligation arising from quasi-delict. The
complaint itself shows that the claim was based on
quasi-delit, viz:
“6. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lino, Inc., has
failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a
torts & damages
family in the selection and supervision of its
employees, particularly defendant Romeo Villa y
Cunanan. Otherwise, the accident in question which
resulted in the death of Pedro Tayag, Sr. and damage
to his property would not have occurred;”
All the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action
are present:
(1) act or omission constituting fault /negligence on the
part of respondent
(2) damage caused by the said act or omission
(3) direct causal relation between the damage and the
act or omission and
(4) no preexisting contractual relation between the
parties.
Citing Elcano v Hill: a separate civil action lies against
the offender in a criminal act, WON he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that
offended party is not allowed to recover damages on
both scores
DISPOSITION petition granted. Order of CFI Tarlac set
aside, case REMANDED to lower court for further
proceedings.
SEPARATE OPINION
AQUINO [concur]
- I concur because petitioners' action for damages is
based on article 2177 of the Civil Code, under which
according to the Code Commission, "acquittal from an
accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability from
criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana".
Article 33 of the Civil Code also justifies the petitioners'
independent civil action for damages since the term
"physical injuries" therein embraces death (Dyogi vs.
Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).
- Moreover, the acquittal of Romeo Villa was based on
reasonable doubt. The petitioners, as plaintiffs in the
civil case, can amend their complaint and base their
action also on article 29 NCC which allows an
independent civil action for damages in case of
acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt.
- The requirement in section 2, Rule III of the Rules of
Court that there should be a reservation in the criminal
cases of the right to institute an independent civil
action is contrary to law.
PEOPLE V LIGON
152 SCRA 419
YAP; July 29, 1987
A2010 - 12 -
NATURE
Appeal from the judgment of the RTC Manila
FACTS
- February 17, 1986, RTC convicted Fernando Gabat, of
Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua where he robbed and killed Jose Rosales y
Ortiz, a seventeen-year old working student who was
earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. He was
allegedly robbed of his cigarette box containing
cigarettes worth P300.00 more or less. Rogelio
Ligon,the co-accused, was never apprehended and is
still at large.
- October 23, 1983 - at about 6:10 p.m. Gabat, was
riding in a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father
and driven by the other accused, Ligon which was
coming from España Street going towards the direction
of Quiapo. At the intersection of Quezon Boulevard and
Lerma Street before turning left towards the underpass
at C.M. Recto Avenue, they stopped. While waiting,
Gabat beckoned a cigarette vendor, Rosales to buy
some cigarettes from him. Rosales approached the
Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of cigarettes. While
this transaction was occurring, the traffic light changed
to green, and the Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon
suddenly moved forward. As to what precisely
happened between Gabat and Rosales at the
crucial moment, and immediately thereafter, is
the subject of conflicting versions by the
prosecution and the defense. It is not controverted,
however, that as the Kombi continued to speed towards
Quiapo, Rosales clung to the window of the Kombi
but apparently lost his grip and fell down on the
pavement. Rosales was rushed by some bystanders to
the Philippine General Hospital, where he was treated
for multiple physical injuries and was confined thereat
until his death on October 30, 1983.
- Following close behind (about 3 meters) the Kombi at
the time of the incident was a taxicab driven by
Castillo. He was traveling on the same lane in a slightly
oblique position. The Kombi did not stop after the
victim fell down on the pavement near the foot of the
underpass, Castillo pursued it as it sped towards Roxas
Boulevard, beeping his horn to make the driver stop.
When they reached the Luneta near the Rizal
monument, Castillo saw an owner-type jeep with two
persons in it. He sought their assistance in chasing the
Kombi, telling them "nakaaksidente ng tao." The two
men in the jeep joined the chase and at the intersection
of Vito Cruz and Roxas Boulevard, Castillo was able to
overtake the Kombi when the traffic light turned red.
He immediately blocked the Kombi while the jeep
pulled up right behind it. The two men on board the
jeep turned out to be police officers, Patrolmen
Leonardo Pugao and Peter Ignacio. They drew their
prof. casis
guns and told the driver, Rogelio Ligon, and his
companion, Fernando Gabat, to alight from the Kombi.
It was found out that there was a third person inside
the Kombi, a certain Rodolfo Primicias who was
sleeping at the rear seat.
- The three were all brought by the police officers to the
Western Police District and turned over to Pfc. Fermin
Payuan. The taxicab driver, Prudencio Castillo, also
went along with them. Payuan also prepared a Traffic
Accident Report, dated October 23, 1983.6 Fernando
Gabat and Rodolfo Primicias were released early
morning the following day, but Rogelio Ligon was
detained and turned over to the City Fiscal's Office for
further investigation.
- December 6, 1983 - Investigating Fiscal Cantos, filed
an information against Rogelio Ligon charging him with
Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence.
- October 31, 1983 - an autopsy was conducted by the
medico-legal officer of NBI which stated the cause of
death of Rosales as "pneumonia hypostatic, bilateral,
secondary to traumatic injuries of the head."
- June 28, 1984 - Assistant Fiscal Cantos filed another
information against Rogelio Ligon and Fernando Gabat
for Robbery with Homicide based on a Supplemental
Affidavit of Prudencio Castillo and a joint affidavit of
Armando Espino and Romeo Castil, cigarette vendors,
who allegedly witnessed the incident . These affidavits
were already prepared and merely sworn to before
Fiscal Cantos on January 17, 1984.
- prosecution tried to establish, through the sole
testimony of the taxicab driver that Gabat grabbed the
box of cigarettes from Rosales and pried loose the
latter's hand from the window of the Kombi, resulting in
the latter falling down and hitting the pavement.
- The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's
version, stating that there can be no doubt that Gabat
forcibly took or grabbed the cigarette box from Rosales
because, otherwise, there could be no reason for the
latter to run after the Kombi and hang on to its window.
The court also believed Castillo's testimony that Gabat
forcibly removed or pried off the right hand of Rosales
from the windowsill of the Kombi, otherwise, the latter
could not have fallen down, having already been able
to balance himself on the stepboard.
- On the other hand, the trial court dismissed as
incredible the testimony of Gabat that the cigarette
vendor placed the cigarette box on the windowsill of
the Kombi, holding it with his left hand, while he was
trying to get from his pocket the change for the 5peso
bill of Gabat. The court said that it is of common
knowledge that cigarette vendors plying their trade in
the streets do not let go of their cigarette box; no
vendor lets go of his precious box of cigarettes in order
to change a peso bill given by a customer.
torts & damages
ISSUE
WON the prosecution’s set of facts should be given
credence
HELD
NO
- a careful review of the record shows that certain
material facts and circumstances had been overlooked
by the trial court which, if taken into account, would
alter the result of the case in that they would introduce
an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the
accused to acquittal.
- While the prosecution witness, Castillo, may be a
disinterested witness with no motive, according to the
court a quo, "other than to see that justice be done,"
his testimony, even if not tainted with bias, is not
entirely free from doubt because his observation of the
event could have been faulty or mistaken. The taxicab
which Castillo was driving was lower in height
compared to the Kombi in which Gabat was riding-a
fact admitted by Castillo at the trial.
- Judicial notice may also be taken of the fact that the
rear windshield of the 1978 Volkswagon Kombi is on
the upper portion, occupying approximately one-third
(1/3) of the rear end of the vehicle, thus making it
visually difficult for Castillo to observe clearly what
transpired inside the Kombi at the front end where
Gabat was seated. These are circumstances which
must be taken into consideration in evaluating Castillo's
testimony as to what exactly happened between Gabat
and the cigarette vendor during that crucial moment
before the latter fell down. As the taxicab was right
behind the Kombi, following it at a distance of about
three meters, Castillo's line of vision was partially
obstructed by the back part of the Kombi. His testimony
that he saw Gabat grab the cigarette box from Rosales
and forcibly pry loose the latter's hand from the
windowsill of the Kombi is thus subject to a reasonable
doubt, specially considering that this occurrence
happened in just a matter of seconds, and both
vehicles during that time were moving fast in the
traffic.
- Considering the above circumstances, the Court is not
convinced with moral certainty that the guilt of the
accused Fernando Gabat has been established beyond
reasonable doubt. In our view, the quantum of proof
necessary to sustain Gabat's conviction of so serious a
crime as robbery with homicide has not been met in
this case. He is therefore entitled to acquittal on
reasonable doubt.
- However, it does not follow that a person who is not
criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While the
guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be
established beyond reasonable doubt, only a
A2010 - 13 -
preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action
for damages.
- Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the
acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not
necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same
act or omission, has been explained by the Code
Commission as follows:
"The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a
criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one
of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system.
It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage
of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the
accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as
the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal
offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability
cannot be demanded.
"This is one of those cases where confused thinking
leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences.
Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation
between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to
determine the logical result of the distinction. The two
liabilities are separate and distinct from each other,
One affects the social order and the other, private
rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the
offender while the other is for reparation of damages
suffered by the aggrieved party. The two
responsibilities are so different from each other that
article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads
thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action
arising from a crime; but the public action for the
imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be
extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the
purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the
accused, the offense should be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying
the complaining party, why should the offense also be
proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or
violation of every private right to be proved only by a
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the
aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful
act is also punishable by the criminal law?
DISPOSITION Appellant acquitted for the crime of
robbery and homicide, but sentenced to indemnify the
heirs of Jose Rosales y Ortiz.
PADILLA V CA (Vergara)
129 SCRA 558
GUTIERREZ; [date]
NATURE
Petition of rcertiorari to revies the decision of the Court
of Appeals
prof. casis
FACTS
- Petitioners, on or about February 8, 1964, went to the
public market to execute an alleged order of the Mayor
to clear the public market of stalls which were
considered as nuisance per se. The stall of one Antonio
Vergara was demolished pursuant to this order. In the
process however the stock in trade and certain
furniture of Vergara were lost and destroyed.
- The petitioners were found guilty of grave coercion
after trial at the CFI and were sentenced to five months
and one day imprisonment and ordered to pay fines.
- On appeal, the CA reversed the findings of the CFI and
acquitted the appellants based on reasonable doubt but
nonetheless ordered them to pay P9,600.00 as actual
damages. The decision of the CA was based on the fact
that the petitioners were charged with coercion when
they should have been more appropriately charged
with crime against person. Hence, the crime of grave
coercion was not proved in accordance with the law.
- The petitioner filed the appeal to the SC questioning
the grant of actual damages despite a no guilty verdict.
ISSUE
WON the CA committed a reversible error in requiring
the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the
complainants after acquitting them from the criminal
charge
HELD
NO
- The SC, quoting Section 3 (C) of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court and various jurisprudence including PNB vs
Catipon, De Guzman vs Alvia, held that extinction of
the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of
the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in the final judgment that the facts from
which the civil action might arise did not exist. In the
case at bar, the judgment of not guilty was based on
reasonable doubt. Since the standard of proof to be
used in civil cases is preponderance of evidence, the
court express a finding that the defendants’ offenses
are civil in nature.
- The Court also tackled the provision of Article 29 of
the Civil Code to clarify whether a separate civil action
is required when the accused in a criminal prosecution
is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. The SC took the
position that the said provision merely emphasizes that
a civil action for damages is not precluded by an
acquittal for the same criminal act. The acquittal
extinguishes the criminal liability but not the civil
liability particularly if the finding is not guilty based on
reasonable ground.
torts & damages
CRUZ V CA (UMALI)
282 SCRA 188
FRANCISCO; 1997
NATURE
Civil action for damages in a medical malpractice suit.
FACTS
- Rowena Umali De Ocampo accompanied her mother
to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital. Prior
to March 22, 1991, Lydia was examined by the
petitioner who found a "myoma" in her uterus, and
scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March
23, 1991.
- Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the
evening of March 22, 1991 as the latter was to be
operated on the next day at 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon. According to Rowena, she noticed that the
clinic was untidy and the window and the floor were
very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant for a rag
to wipe the window and the floor with. Because of the
untidy state of the clinic, Rowena tried to persuade her
mother not to proceed with the operation.
- The following day, Rowena asked the petitioner if the
operation could be postponed. The petitioner called
Lydia into her office and the two had a conversation.
Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told her
that she must be operated on as scheduled.
- Rowena and her other relatives waited outside the
operating room while Lydia underwent operation. While
they were waiting, Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating
room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules
which Rowena's sister immediately bought. About one
hour had passed when Dr. Ercillo came out again this
time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. They bought
type "A" blood and the same was brought by the
attendant into the operating room.
- After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner informed
them that the operation was finished. The operating
staff then went inside the petitioner's clinic to take their
snacks. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia was brought
out of the operating room in a stretcher and the
petitioner asked Rowena and the other relatives to buy
additional blood for Lydia. Unfortunately, they were not
able to comply with petitioner's order as there was no
more type "A" blood available in the blood bank.
- Thereafter, a person arrived to donate blood which
was later transfused to Lydia. Rowena then noticed her
mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping
for breath. Apparently the oxygen supply had run out
and Rowena's husband together with the driver of the
accused had to go to the San Pablo District Hospital to
get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen
A2010 - 14 -
as soon as it arrived.
- At around 10pm, she went into shock and her blood
pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia's unstable condition
necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo District
Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and
further examined. The transfer to the San Pablo City
District Hospital was without the prior consent of
Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found
out about the intended transfer only when an
ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo
District Hospital. Rowena and her other relatives then
boarded a tricycle and followed the ambulance.
- Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital,
she was wheeled into the operating room and the
petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated on her because
there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision.
The attending physicians summoned Dr. Bartolome
Angeles, head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology
Department of the San Pablo District Hospital.
However, when Dr. Angeles arrived, Lydia was already
in shock and possibly dead as her blood pressure was
already 0/0. While petitioner was closing the abdominal
wall, the patient died. Her death certificate states
"shock" as the immediate cause of death and
"Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the
antecedent cause.
ISSUE
WON the circumstances are sufficient to sustain a
judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
HELD
NO
- The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the
offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or
the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be
without malice; (4) that material damage results from
the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
offender, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition,
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.
- WON has committed an "inexcusable lack of
precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be
determined according to the standard of care observed
by other members of the profession in good standing
under similar circumstances bearing in mind the
advanced state of the profession at the time of
treatment or the present state of medical science.
- For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the
requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his
patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert
opinion. The deference of courts to the expert opinion
prof. casis
of qualified physicians stems from its realization that
the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen
in most instances are incapable of intelligently
evaluating. Expert testimony should have been offered
to prove that the circumstances cited by the courts
below are constitutive of conduct falling below the
standard of care employed by other physicians in good
standing when performing the same operation. It must
be remembered that when the qualifications of a
physician are admitted, as in the instant case, there is
an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes
the necessary precaution and employs the best of his
knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, unless
the contrary is sufficiently established. This
presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion which is so
sadly lacking in the case at bench.
- Even without expert testimony, that petitioner was
recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a
surgeon, no cogent proof exists that any of these
circumstances caused petitioner's death. Thus, the
absence of the fourth element of reckless imprudence:
that the injury to the person or property was a
consequence of the reckless imprudence.
- In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff
has the burden of establishing appellant's negligence
and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there
must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the
surgeon as well as a casual connection of such breach
and the resulting death of his patient.
PHIL. RABBIT V PEOPLE
[citation]
PANGANIBAN; April 14, 2004
NATURE
Petition for Review
FACTS
- Napoleon Macadangdang was found guilty and
convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and
damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years,
and to pay damages. But in the event the the accused
becoems insolvent, Phil. Rabbit will be held liable for
the civil liabilities. But admittedly, the accused jumped
bail and remained at large.
ISSUE
WON an employer, who dutifully participated in the
defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the
judgment of conviction independently of the accused
HELD
torts & damages
NO
- The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal
unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the
court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from
notice of the judgment against them. While at large,
they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are
deemed to have waived the appeal. In the case before
us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to
surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed
to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the
judgment against him has become final and executory.
- After a judgment has become final, vested rights are
acquired by the winning party. If the proper losing
party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, then the former has the correlative
right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.
- In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-
employee, it participated in the proceedings before the
RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer was
deprived of due process. It might have lost its right to
appeal, but it was not denied its day in court. In fact, it
can be said that by jumping bail, the accused-
employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the
right to appeal.
- On Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment:
- Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated
civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the
latter’s insolvency.
- To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in
a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or
defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court.
By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final
criminal conviction of their employees without the
latter’s consent would also result in improperly
amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
- The decision convicting an employee in a criminal
case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not
only with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also
with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer
cannot be separated from that of the employee.
DISPOSITION Petition is hereby DENIED, and the
assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
CANGCO V MANILA RAILROAD CO
38 Phil 768
FISHER; October 14, 1918
NATURE
An appeal from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance disallowing the claim of the plaintiff for P1,000
against the estate of the deceased James P. McElroy.
A2010 - 15 -
FACTS
- Jose Cangco, was employed by Manila Railroad
Company as clerk. He lived in San Mateo, Rizal, located
upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and in
coming daily by train to the company's office in the city
of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by
the company, which entitled him to ride upon the
company's trains free of charge.
- January 20, 1915, the plaintiff was returning home by
rail from his daily labors; and as the train drew up to
the station in San Mateo the plaintiff while making his
exit through the door, took his position upon the steps
of the coach.
- On the side of the train where passengers alight at the
San Mateo station there is a cement platform which
begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance
away from the company's office and extends along in
front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the
length of several coaches. As the train slowed down
another passenger, Emilio Zuniga, also an employee of
the railroad company, got off the same car, alighting
safely at the point where the platform begins to rise
from the level of the ground. When Jose Cangco
stepped off, one or both of his feet came in contact
with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet
slipped from under him and he fell violently on the
platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and
was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm
was badly crushed and lacerated. After the plaintiff
alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly
six meters before it came to a full stop.
- The accident occurred on a dark night, and the train
station was lit dimly by a single light located some
distance away, objects on the platform where the
accident occurred were difficult to discern, especially to
a person emerging from a lighted car.
- The sack of melons on the platform is because it was
the customary season for harvesting these melons and
a large lot had been brought to the station for shipment
to the market. This row of sacks was so placed that
there was a space of only about two feet between the
sacks of melons and the edge of the platform; and it is
clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact
that his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the
moment he stepped upon the platform. His statement
that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is
readily to be credited.
- The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an
unconscious condition, and with serious injuries. He
was immediately brought to a hospital where an
examination was made and his arm was amputated.
The plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where
a second operation was performed and the member
was again amputated higher up near the shoulder.
Expenses reached the sum of P790.25 in the form of
prof. casis
medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in
connection with the process of his curation.
- August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the
CFI Manilato recover damages of the defendant
company, founding his action upon the negligence of
the servants and employees of the defendant in placing
the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving
them so placed as to be a menace to the security of
passenger alighting from the company's trains. At the
hearing in the CFI, the trial judge, found the facts
substantially as above stated, and although negligence
was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact
that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct
passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless,
the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in
alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded
from recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in
favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff
appealed.
ISSUE
WON there was contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff
HELD
NO
Ratio In determining the question of contributory
negligence in performing such act - that is to say,
whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly -
the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger
are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of
the passenger, and should be considered.
Reasoning
- The employees of the railroad company were guilty of
negligence in piling these sacks on the platform. Their
presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from
the train; and that they constituted an effective legal
cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It follows
that the defendant company is liable for the damage
unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own
contributory negligence.
- The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is
the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to
respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered
arises from the breach of that contract by reason of the
failure of defendant to exercise due care in its
performance.
- Its liability is direct and immediate, imposed by
article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by
proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and
supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not
applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only
to extra-contractual obligations
- In commenting upon article 1093, Manresa clearly
points out the difference between "culpa, substantive
torts & damages
and independent, which of itself constitutes the source
of an obligation between persons not formerly
connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an
"accident in the performance of an obligation already
existing . . .."
- In the Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. the court
was made to rest squarely upon the proposition that
article 1903 is not applicable to acts of negligence
which constitute the breach of a contract.
- Under the Spanish law, in cases imposed upon
employers with respect to damages due to the
negligence of their employees to persons to whom they
are not bound by contract, such is not based upon the
principle of respondent superior - but upon the principle
announced in article 1902 which imposes upon all
persons who by their fault or negligence, do injury to
another, the obligation of making good the damage
caused.
- The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is
always based upon a voluntary act or omission which,
without willful intent, but by mere negligence or
inattention, has caused damage to another. A master
who exercises all possible care in the selection of his
servant, taking into consideration the qualifications
they should possess for the discharge of the duties
which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs
them with equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to
third persons to whom he is bound by no contractual
ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of
the negligence of his servants, even within the scope of
their employment, such third persons suffer damage.
Article 1903 presumes negligence, but that
presumption is refutable.
- In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, an action is brought
upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability of the
defendant to respond for the damage caused by the
carelessness of his employee while acting within the
scope of his employment The Court, after citing the last
paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, said: (1)
That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the
part of the master or employer either in the selection of
the servant or employee, or in supervision over him
after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is
juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently,
may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in
selection and supervision he has exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved from
liability.
- Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-
contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obligation
has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual
A2010 - 16 -
duties which civilized society imposes upon its
members, or which arise from these relations, other
than contractual, of certain members of society to
others, generally embraced in the concept of status.
The legal rights of each member of society constitute
the measure of the corresponding legal duties, which
the existence of those rights imposes upon all other
members of society. The breach of these general duties
whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention, if
productive of injury, gives rise to an obligation to
indemnify the injured party. The fundamental
distinction between obligations of this character and
those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact
that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the
wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which
creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual
relations the vinculum exists independently of the
breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties
when entering into the contractual relation.
- The railroad company's defense involves the
assumption that even granting that the negligent
conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon
the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation
to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its
trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury
suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory
negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to
a complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of
comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case,
if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own
negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant,
whereas if the accident was caused by defendant's
negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely
contributed to his injury, the damages should be
apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if
defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.
- The Court is of the opinion that the correct doctrine
relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's
work on Negligence:
"The test by which to determine whether the passenger
has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight
from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or
reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an
ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition
of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger
acted under the circumstances disclosed by the
evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the
care which may or should be used by the prudent man
generally, but the care which a man of ordinary
prudence would use under similar circumstances, to
avoid injury."
- In considering the probability of contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff the following
circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform
was constructed upon a level higher than that of the
prof. casis
roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance
from the steps of the car to the spot where the
alighting passenger would place his feet on the
platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk
incident to stepping off. The cement platform also
assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on
which to alight. The plaintiff was possessed of the vigor
and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means
so risky for him to get off while the train was yet
moving as the same act would have been in an aged or
feeble person. The place was perfectly familiar to the
plaintiff, as it was his daily custom to get on and off the
train at this station. There could be no uncertainty in
his mind with regard either to the length of the step
which he was required to take or the character of the
platform where he was alighting. It is the Court’s
conclusion that the conduct of the plaintiff in
undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly
under way was not characterized by imprudence and
that therefore he was not guilty of contributory
negligence.
DISPOSITION The decision of the lower court is
reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for
the sum of P3,290.25, and for the costs of both
instances.
SEPARATE OPINION
MALCOLM, [dissent]
- With one sentence in the majority decision, we are of
full accord, namely, "It may be admitted that had
plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop
before alighting, the particular injury suffered by him
could not have occurred." With the general rule relative
to a passenger's contributory negligence, we are
likewise in full accord, namely, "An attempt to alight
from a moving train is negligence per se." Adding these
two points together, we have the logical result - the
Manila Railroad Co. should be absolved from the
complaint, and judgment affirmed.
FORES V MIRANDA
[citation]
REYES, J.B.L.; March 4, 1959
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals
FACTS
- Respondent was one of the passengers on a jeepney
driven by Eugenio Luga. While the vehicle was
descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive rate of
torts & damages
speed, the driver lost control thereof, causing it to
swerve and to hit the bridge wall. The accident
occurred on the morning of March 22, 1953. Five of the
passengers were injured, including the respondent who
suffered a fracture of the upper right humerus. He was
taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital for
treatment, and later was subjected to a series of
operations; the first on May 23, 1953, when wire loops
were wound around the broken bones and screwed into
place; a second, effected to insert a metal splint, and a
third one to remove such splint. At the time of the trial,
it appears that respondent had not yet recovered the
use of his right arm.
- The driver was charged with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a
plea of guilty was sentenced accordingly.
ISSUE
WON the defendant is entitled to moral damages
HELD
NO.
Ratio Moral damages are not recoverable in damage
actions predicated on a breach of the contract of
transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the
new Civil Code, which provide as follows:
"ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal
ground for awarding moral damages if the court should
find that, under the circumstance, such damages are
justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith."
Reasoning
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of
transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e.,
wanton or deliberately injurious conduct, is essential to
justify an award of moral damages; and
(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered
included in the description term "analogous cases"
used in Art. 2219; not only because Art. 2220
specifically provides for the damages that are caused
by contractual breach, but because the definition of
quasi-delict in Act. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes
the cases where there is a "preexisting contractual
relation between the parties."
"ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission caused
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pro-existing contractual
A2010 - 17 -
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provision of this Chapter."
- In sum the rule is:
Delict (breach of contract)
Gen. Rule: no moral damages
- Reason: the advantageous position of a party suing a
carrier for breach of the contract of transportation
explains, to some extent, the limitation imposed by the
new Code on the amount of the recovery. The action for
breach of contract imposes on the defendant carrier a
presumption of liability upon mere proof of injury to the
passenger; that latter is relieved from the duty to
establish the fault of the carrier, or of his employees,
and the burden is placed on the carrier to prove the it
was due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure
(Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil., 768 777).
Moreover, the carrier, unlike in suits for quasi-delict,
may not escape liability by proving that it has exercised
due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees
- Exception: with moral damages if:
• defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith
• result in the death of a passenger in which case
Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly
subject to the rule of Art. 2206, that entitles the
spouse, descendants and ascendants of the
deceased passenger to "demand moral damages
for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased"
- The difference in conditions, defenses and proof, as
well as the codal concept of quasi-delict as essentially
extra contractual negligence, compel us to differentiate
between action ex contractu, and actions quasi ex
delicto, and prevent us from viewing the action for
breach of contract as simultaneously embodying an
action on tort.
DISPOSITION The decision of the Court of Appeals is
modified by eliminating the award of P5.000.00 by way
of moral damages
M.H. RAKES V THE ATLANTIC, GULF
AND PACIFIC COMPANY
7 Phil 359
TRACEY; January 23, 1907
NATURE
Action for damages
FACTS
- the plaintiff, Rakes, one of a group of 8 African-
American laborers in the employment of defendant,
Atlantic, was at work transporting iron rails from the
harbor in Manila. The men were hauling the rails on 2
hand cars, some behind or at it sides and some pulling
prof. casis
the cars in the front by a rope. At one point, the track
sagged, the tie broke, the car canted and the rails slid
off and caught the plaintiff who was walking by the
car’s side, breaking his leg, which was later amputated
at the knee.
- the plaintiff’s witness alleged that a noticeable
depression in the track had appeared after a typhoon.
This was reported to the foreman, Mckenna, but it had
not been proven that Atlantic inspected the track or
had any proper system of inspection. Also, there were
no side guards on the cars to keep the rails from
slipping off.
- However, the company’s officers and 3 of the workers
testified that there was a general prohibition frequently
made known to all against walking by the side of cars.
As Rakes was walking along the car’s side when the
accident occurred, he was found to have contributed in
some degree to the injury inflicted, although not as the
primary cause.
- Atlantic contends that the remedy for injury through
negligence lies only in a criminal action against the
official directly responsible and that the employer be
held only subsidiarily liable.
ISSUES
1. WON Atlantic is only subsidiarily liable
2. WON there was contributory negligence on the part
of petitioner and if so, WON it bars him from recovery
HELD
1. NO
- By virtue of culpa contractual, Atlantic may be held
primarily liable as it failed in its duty to provide safe
appliances for the use of its employees. Petitioner need
not file charges with the foreman to claim damages
from Atlantic; a criminal action is not a requisite for the
enforcement of a civil action.
2. YES
- Petitioner had walked along the side of the car despite
a prohibition to do so by the foreman. However, the
contributory negligence of the party injured will not
defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant
might, by the exercise of reasonable care and
prudence, have avoided the consequences of the
injured party's negligence. Petitioner’s negligence
contributed only to his own injury and not to the
principal occurrence—it was merely an element to the
damage caused upon him. Had it been otherwise, “…
parties being mutually in fault, there can be no
appointment of damages. The law has no scales to
determine in such cases whose wrongdoing weighed
most in the compound that occasioned the mischief”
(Railroad v Norton). In this case, petitioner may recover
from the defendant, less a sum deemed suitable
equivalent for his own imprudence.
torts & damages
- Damages are awarded to petitioner at Php5,000,
deducting Php 2,500, the amount fairly attributable to
his own negligence.
SEPARATE OPINION
WILLARD AND CARSON [dissent]
-the negligence of the defendant alone was insufficient
to cause the accident—it also required the negligence
of the plaintiff. Because of this, plaintiff should not be
afforded relief
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
V CA
241 SCRA 671
VITUG; February 23, 1995
NATURE
Petition for review
FACTS
- In October 1986, Luis A. Luna applied for, and was
accorded, a FAREASTCARD issued by petitioner Far East
Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC") at its Pasig Branch.
Upon his request, the bank also issued a supplemental
card to Clarita S. Luna.
- In August 1988, Clarita lost her credit card. FEBTC was
forthwith informed. In order to replace the lost card,
Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. In cases of this
nature, the bank's internal security procedures and
policy would appear to be- to meanwhile so record the
lost card, along with the principal card, as a "Hot Card"
or "Cancelled Card" in its master file.
- On 06 October 1988, Luis tendered a despedida lunch
for a close friend, a Fil-Am, and another guest at the
Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel Intercon Manila.
To pay for the lunch, Luis presented his FAREASTCARD
to the attending waiter who promptly had it verified
through a telephone call to the bank's Credit Card
Department. Since the card was not honored, Luis was
forced to pay in cash the bill amounting to P588.13.
Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by this incident.
- In a letter, dated 11 Oct. 1988, Luis Luna, through
counsel, demanded from FEBTC the payment of
damages. Adrian V. Festejo, a VP of the bank,
expressed the bank's apologies to Luis in his letter
which stated that: In cases when a card is reported to
our office as lost, FAREASTCARD undertakes the
necessary action to avert its unauthorized use to
protect its cardholders. However, it failed to inform him
about its security policy. Furthermore, an overzealous
employee of the Bank's Credit Card Department did not
consider the possibility that it may have been him who
A2010 - 18 -
was presenting the card at that time (for which reason,
the unfortunate incident occurred).
- Festejo also sent a letter to the Manager of the Bahia
Rooftop Restaurant to assure the latter that Luis was a
"very valued clients" of FEBTC. William Anthony King,
F&B Manager of the Intercon, wrote back to say that
the credibility of Luis had never been "in question." A
copy of this reply was sent to Luis by Festejo.
- Still evidently feeling aggrieved, Luis filed a complaint
for damages with the RTC of Pasig against FEBTC.
- On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig ordered FEBTC to
pay private respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral
damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c)
P20,000.00 attorney's fees.
- On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court
affirmed the decision of the trial court.Its motion for
reconsideration having been denied by the appellate
court, FEBTC has come to this Court with this petition
for review.
ISSUE
WON the petitioner is entitled to moral and exemplary
damages
HELD
NO
- In culpa contractual, moral damages may be
recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted
in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract.
The Civil Code provides:
- Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal
ground for awarding moral damages if the court should
find that, under the circumstances, such damages are
justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith.
- Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not
simple, negligence. Exceptionally, in a contract of
carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case of
death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is
presumed ) of the common carrier.
- Concededly, the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting
to personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation.
Nothing in the findings of the trial court and the
appellate court, however, can sufficiently indicate any
deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to
private respondents. Neither could FEBTC's negligence
in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered
so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith.
- Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional
design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or
moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of
negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a
state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design
or ill will.
prof. casis
- Article 21 states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
- Article 21 of the Code, it should be observed,
contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. Thus,
even if we are to assume that the provision could
properly relate to a breach of contract, its application
can be warranted only when the defendant's disregard
of his contractual obligation is so deliberate as to
approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less
worse than fraud or bad faith. Most importantly, Article
21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in human
relations that clearly must, in any case, give way to the
specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code
authorizing the grant of moral damages in culpa
contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or
bad faith.
- Fores vs. Miranda explained with great clarity the
predominance that we should give to Article 2220 in
contractual relations; we quote:
Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the
respondent, the same must be discarded. We have
repeatedly ruled that moral damages are not
recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach
of the contract of transportation, in view of Articles
2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code, which provide as
follows:
- Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
xxx xxx xxx
- Art. 2220. Wilful injury to property may be a legal
ground for awarding moral damages if the court should
find that, under the circumstances, such damages are
justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith.
- By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it
immediately becomes apparent that:
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of
transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e.,
wanton or deliberately injurious conduct, is essential to
justify an award of moral damages; and
(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered
included in the descriptive term "analogous cases"
used in Art. 2219; not only because Art. 2220
specifically provides for the damages that are caused
contractual breach, but because the definition of quasi-
delict in Art. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the
cases where there is a "preexisitng contractual
relations between the parties."
torts & damages
- Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
The exception to the basic rule of damages now under
consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a
passenger, in which case Article 1764 makes the
common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art.
2206, that entitles the spouse, descendants and
ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the
death of the deceased. But the exceptional rule of Art.
1764 makes it all the more evident that where the
injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not
recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was
guilty of malice or bad faith. We think it is clear that the
mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per
se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad
faith on the part of the carrier; and in the case at bar
there is no other evidence of such malice to support the
award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals. To
award moral damages for breach of contract, therefore,
without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the
defendant, as required by Art. 2220, would be to violate
the clear provisions of the law, and constitute
unwarranted judicial legislation.
xxx xxx xxx
- The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice in
the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and
negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental
in our law to be ignored (Arts. 1170-1172); their
consequences being clearly differentiated by the Code.
- Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the
damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith
is liable shall be those that are the natural and
probable consequences of the breach of the obligation,
and which the parties have foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was
constituted.
- In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude,
the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which
may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance
of the obligation.
- It is to be presumed, in the absence of statutory
provision to the contrary, that this difference was in the
mind of the lawmakers when in Art. 2220 they limited
recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in
bad faith. It is true that negligence may be occasionally
so gross as to amount to malice; but the fact must be
shown in evidence, and a carrier's bad faith is not to be
lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract
was breached through negligence of the carrier's
employees.
A2010 - 19 -
- The Court has not in the process overlooked another
rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a
contract that might thereby permit the application of
applicable principles on tort even where there is a pre-
existing contract between the plaintiff and the
defendant This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve
private respondents' case for it can aptly govern only
where the act or omission complained of would
constitute an actionable tort independently of the
contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be
deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be
stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract
between two parties, an act or omission can
nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the
fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar
to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case.
Here, private respondents' damage claim is predicated
solely on their contractual relationship; without such
agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot
by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action
or as an independent actionable tort.
- Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are
intended to serve as an example or as correction for
the public good in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages (Art. 2229, Civil
Code. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages are
imposed when the crime is committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances (Art. 2230, Civil Code). In
quasi-delicts, such damages are granted if the
defendant is shown to have been so guilty of gross
negligence as to approximate malice. In contracts and
quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary
damages if the defendant is found to have acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner (Art. 2232, Civil Code).
- Given the above premises and the factual
circumstances here obtaining, it would also be just as
arduous to sustain the exemplary damages granted by
the courts below.
- Nevertheless, the bank's failure, even perhaps
inadvertent, to honor its credit card issued to private
respondent Luis should entitle him to recover a
measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of
the Civil Code providing thusly:
- Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order
that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
- Reasonable attorney's fees may be recovered where
the court deems such recovery to be just and equitable
(Art. 2208, Civil Code). We see no issue of sound
discretion on the part of the appellate court in allowing
the award thereof by the trial court.
prof. casis
DISPOSITION The appealed decision is MODIFIED by
deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages to
private respondents; in its stead, petitioner is ordered
to pay private respondent Luis A. Luna an amount of
P5,000.00 by way of nominal damages. In all other
respects, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
AIR FRANCE V CA (Carrascoso, Et. Al)
18 SCRA 155
SANCHEZ; September 28, 1966
NATURE
PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the
Court of Appeals.
FACTS
- Carrascoso, a civil engineer, left Manila for Lourdes w/
48 other Filipino pilgrims. Air France, through PAL,
issued plaintiff a “first class” round trip airplane ticket
from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok,
Carrascoso traveled in “first class” but at Bangkok, the
Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to
vacate the 'first class' seat that he was occupying
because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento,
there was a 'white man', who, the Manager
alleged, had a 'better right' to the seat. When
asked to vacate his 'first class' seat, the plaintiff,
as was to be expected, refused, and told
defendant's Manager that his seat would be
taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued,
and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, many of the
Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class;
when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a
hot discussion with the white man [manager], they
came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr.
Carrascoso to give his seat to the 'white man; and
plaintiff reluctantly gave his 'first class' seat in the
plane."
- both TC and CA decided in favor of Carrascoso
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON the CA failed to make a complete findings of
fact on all the issues properly laid before it, and if such,
WON the Court could review the questions of fact
Substantive
2. WON Carrascoso was entitled to the “first class” seat
he claims, as proved by written documents (tickets…)
3. WON Carrascoso was entitled to moral damages,
when his action is planted upon breach of contract and
thus, there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith
which the CA allegedly failed to find
torts & damages
4. WON moral damages could be recovered from Air
France, granted that their employee was accused of the
tortuous act
5. WON damages are proper in a breach contract
6. WON the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso
regarding the account made by the air-carrier’s purser
is admissible in evidence as hearsay
7. WON Carrascoso was entitled to exemplary damages
8. WON Carrascoso was entitled to attorney’s fees
9. WON the amounts awarded to Carrascoso was
excessive
HELD
1. NO, NO
Ratio A decision is not to be so clogged with details
such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long
as the decision of the Court of Appeals, contains the
necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it. is no error
for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific
finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the
defense"."The mere failure to specify (in the decision)
the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for
refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the
same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of
law and the Constitution"; "only questions of law may
be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of
the Court of Appeals.
Obiter.
- Constitution mandates that a judgment
determining the merits of the case shall state
"clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based" and that "Every decision of the
Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings
of fact on all issues properly raised before".xxx
The law, however, solely insists that a decision state
the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's
conclusion is drawn.
- FINDINGS OF FACT: "the written statement of the
ultimate facts as found by the court and essential to
support the decision and judgment rendered
thereon".16 They consist of the court's "conclusions
with respect to the determinative facts in issue"
- QUESTION OF LAW: one which does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties
2. YES, the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first
class ticket without any reservation whatever.
Ratio .A written document speaks a uniform language;
that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If
only to achieve stability in the relations between
passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so
issued is desirable.
Reasoning
- Petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent
the true and complete intent and agreement of the
A2010 - 20 -
parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have
confirmed reservations for first class on any specific
flight, although he had tourist class protection; that,
accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no
guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that
such would depend upon the availability of first class
seats. However, CA held that Air France should know
whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or
not. The trial court also accepted as evidence the
written documents submitted by Carrasco and even the
testimony of the air-carrier’s employees attested that
indeed, Carrasco was issued a “first class ticket”.
- If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder
is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the
fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein
confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow
of the hands of an airline.
-Also, when Carrascoso was asked to confirm his seat in
Bangkok, he was granted the “first class” seat. If there
had been no seat, and if the “white man” had a better
right to the seat, then why did they confirm Carrasco
his seat?
3. YES
Ratio. It is (therefore) unnecessary to inquire as to
whether or not there is sufficient averment in the
complaint to justify an award for moral damages.
Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the
evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the
evidence is not even required.
Reasoning
- There was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class
passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-
Teheran leg; Second, said contract was breached when
petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at
Bangkok; and Third, there was bad faith when
petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave
his first class accommodation berth "after he was
already seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class,
by reason of which he suffered inconvenience,
embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him
mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and
social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.
- Air France did not present evidence that the “white
man” made a prior reservation, nor proved that the
“white man” had “better right” over the seat; also, if
the manager’s actions could be justified, they should
have presented the manager to testify in court – but
they did not do so
- The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from
enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he
imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from
his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to
go to the tourist class compartment-just to give way to
another passenger whose right thereto has not been
prof. casis
established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of
course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different
from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith"
contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest
or ill will or for ulterior purposes
4. YES
- The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act
of its employees need not. be essayed. For the willful
malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his
employer, must answer.
5. YES
- Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso, is one attended
with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's. action as
we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion.
This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner-air
carrier-a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
(note: it was held that it was a case of quasi-delict even
though it was a breach of contract)
Ratio A contract to transport passengers is quite
different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation.43 And is, because of the relation which an air-
carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly
with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of
the comforts and I advantages it offers. The contract of
air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended
with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the
carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an
action for damages.
Reasoning
- Passengers do not contract merely for transportation.
They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities
and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any
rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees
towards a passenger gives the latter an action for
damages against the carrier.
6. YES, if forms part of the res gestae
Ratio. Testimony of the entry does not come within the
proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony
is admissible.
- also…From a reading of the transcript just quoted,
when the dialogue happened, the impact of the
startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be
felt. The excitement had not as yet died down.
Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as
part of the res gestae. For, they grow "out of the
nervous excitement and mental and physical condition
of the declarant".
Reasoning
- Carrascoso testified that the purser of the air-carrier
made an entry in his notebooks reading "First class
torts & damages
passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against
his will, and that the captain refused to intervene". The
petitioner contents that it should not be admitted as
evidence, as it was only hearsay. However, the subject
of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Also,
the said entry was made outside the Philippines and by
an employee of petitioner. It would have been easy for
Air France to contradict Carrascoso’s testimony if they
had presented the purser.
7. YES
Ratio The Civil Code gives the Court ample power to
grant exemplary damages-in contracts and quasi-
contracts. The only condition is that defendant should
have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner".
Reasoning
- The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso
from his first class seat fits into this legal precept
8. YES
Ratio. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a
similar Judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can
be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just
and equitable that attorneys' fees be given.\
9. NO
Ratio. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily
with the trial court. The dictates of good sense suggest
that we give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts
and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.
DISPOSITION On balance, we, say that the judgment
of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from 'reversible
error. We accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs
against petitioner.
PSBA V CA
[citation]
PADILLA; February 4, 1992
NATURE
Petition to review the decision of Court of Appeals.
FACTS
- A stabbing incident on August 30, 1985 which caused
the death of Carlitos Bautista on the premises of the
Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA)
prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the
Manila RTC. It was established that his assailants were
not members of the school’s academic community but
were outsiders.
- The suit impleaded PSBA, its President, VP, Treasure,
Chief of Security and Assistant Chief of Security. It
sought to adjudge them liable for the victim’s death
due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack
of security precautions.
A2010 - 21 -
- Defendants (now petitioners) sought to have the suit
dismissed alleging that since they are presumably sued
under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states
no cause of action against them since academic
institutions, like PSBA, are beyond the ambit of that
rule.
- Respondent Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
And the MFR was similarly dealt with. Petitioners the
assailed the trial court’s dispositions before the
respondent appellate court which affirmed the trial
court’s ruling.
ISSUE
WON respondent court is correct in denying dismissal
of the case
HELD
Ratio Although a school may not be liable under Art.
2180 on quasi-delicts, it may still be liable under the
law on contracts.
Reasoning
- The case should be tried on its merits. But respondent
court’s premise is incorrect. It is expressly mentioned in
Art. 2180 that the liability arises from acts done by
pupils or students of the institution. In this sense, PSBA
is not liable. But when an academic institution accepts
students for enrollment, the school makes itself
responsible in providing their students with an
atmosphere that is conducive for learning. Certainly, no
student can absorb the intricacies of physics or explore
the realm of arts when bullets are flying or where there
looms around the school premises a constant threat to
life and limb.
DISPOSITION the foregoing premises considered, the
petition is DENIED. The Court of origin is hereby
ordered to continue proceedings consistent wit this
ruling of the Court. Costs against the petitioners.
SYQUIA V CA (Mla Memorial Park)
217 SCRA 624
CAMPOS, JR.; January 27, 1993
NATURE
Petition for review of CA decision dismissing Syquia
family’s complaint for damages against Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. (Mla Memorial)
FACTS
- Juan SYQUIA, father of the deceased Vicente Syquia,
authorized and instructed the defendant to inter the
remains of deceased.
- After about a month, preparatory to transferring the
remains to a newly purchased family plot also at the
prof. casis
same cemetery, the concrete vault encasing the coffin
of the deceased was removed from its niche
underground. As the concrete vault was being raised to
the surface, the Syquias discovered that the vault had a
hole approx 3 in. in diameter near the bottom and it
appeared that water drained out of the hole.
- Pursuant to an authority granted by the Municipal
Court of Parañaque, they caused the opening of the
concrete vault and discovered that:
(a) the interior walls showed evidence of total flooding;
(b) coffin was entirely damaged by water, filth and silt
causing the wooden parts to separate and to crack the
viewing glass panel located directly above the head
and torso of the deceased;
(c) entire lining of coffin, clothing of the deceased, and
the exposed parts of the deceased's remains were
damaged and soiled.
- SYQUIAS base their claim for damages against Mla
Memorial on either: (1) breach of its obligation to
deliver a defect-free concrete vault;
(2) gross negligence in failing to seal the concrete
vault (Art. 2176)
- Whatever kind of negligence it has committed, MLA
MEMORIAL is deemed to be liable for desecrating the
grave of the dead.
Trial Court’s Ruling
- Contract between the parties did not guarantee that
the cement vault would be waterproof.
- No quasi-delict because the defendant was not guilty
of any fault or negligence, and because there was a
pre-existing contractual relation between the Syquias
and Mla Memorial.
- The father himself, Juan Syquia, chose the gravesite
despite knowing that said area had to be constantly
sprinkled with water to keep the grass green and that
water would eventually seep through the vault.
- The act of boring a hole in the vault was necessary so
as to prevent the vault from floating away.
- CA affirmed judgment of dismissal; MFR was also
denied.
ISSUES
1. WON Mla Memorial breached its contract with
petitioners,
or alternatively
2. WON it can be liable for culpa aquiliana
HELD
1. NO
Ratio Parties are bound by the terms of their contract,
which is the law between them. A contracting party
cannot incur a liability more than what is expressly
specified in his undertaking. It cannot be extended by
implication, beyond the terms of the contract. (RCBC v
CA)
torts & damages
Reasoning
- They entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale
and Certificate of Perpetual Care." Mla Memorial bound
itself to provide the concrete box to be sent in the
interment.
- Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of MLA
MEMORIAL provides that: “Every earth interment shall
be made enclosed in a concrete box, or in an outer wall
of stone, brick or concrete, the actual installment of
which shall be made by the employees of the
Association.” Pursuant to this, a concrete vault was
installed and after the burial, the vault was covered by
a cement lid.
- Syquias claim that there was a breach of contract
because it was stated in the brochures that “lot may
hold single or double internment underground in sealed
concrete vault."
- "Sealed" meant "closed." Standard dictionaries define
seal as any of various closures or fastenings that
cannot be opened without rupture and that serve as a
check against tampering or unauthorized opening.
- "Sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof". When
the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt
as to the intention of the contracting parties, then the
literal meaning of the stipulation shall control.
2. NO
Ratio Negligence is defined by law as the "omission of
that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of
the persons, of the time and of the place." In the
absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the
contrary, the diligence to be observed in the
performance of the obligation is that which is expected
of a good father of a family.
Reasoning
- Although a pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa
aquiliana, circumstances of the case do not show
negligence. The reason for the boring of the hole was
explained by Henry Flores, Interment Foreman, who
said that: “When the vault was placed on the grave a
hole was placed on the vault so that water could come
into the vault because it was raining heavily then
because the vault has no hole the vault will float and
the grave would be filled with water.”
- Private respondent has exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in preventing the accumulation
of water inside the vault which would have resulted in
the caving in of earth around the grave. Finding no
evidence of negligence, there is no reason to award
damages.
Dispositive CA decision affirmed in toto.
A2010 - 22 -
NEGLIGENCE
PICART V SMITH
[citation]
STREET; March 15, 1918
NATURE
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of La Union
FACTS
- On December 12, 1912, plaintiff was riding on his
pony over the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La
Union.
- Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant
approached from the opposite direction in an
automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve
miles per hour.
- As the defendant neared the bridge he saw the
plaintiff and blew his horn to give warning of his
approach.
- He continued his course and after he had taken the
bridge, he gave two more successive blasts, as it
appeared to him that the man on horseback before him
was not observing the rule of the road.
- The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard
the warning signals.
- However, given the novelty of the apparition and the
rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up
against the railing on the right side of the bridge
instead of going to the left.
- He did this because he thought he did not have
sufficient time to get over to the other side.
- As the automobile approached, the defendant guided
it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road
for the machine.
- In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman
would move to the other side.
- The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider
had made no sign for the automobile to stop.
- Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the
defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet
some distance away or slowing down, continued to
approach directly toward the horse without diminution
of speed.
- When he had gotten quite near, there being then no
possibility of the horse getting across to the other side,
the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the
right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing
where it as then standing; but in so doing the
automobile passed in such close proximity to the
animal that it became frightened and turned its body
across the bridge with its head toward the railing.
prof. casis
- In so doing, it was struck on the hock of the left hind
leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken.
- The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some
violence.
- As a result of its injuries the horse died.
- The plaintiff received contusions which caused
temporary unconsciousness and required medical
attention for several days.
- CFI absolved defendant from liability
- Hence, the appeal
ISSUE
WON the defendant, in maneuvering his car in the
manner above described, was guilty of negligence that
would give rise to a civil obligation to repair the
damage done
HELD
YES
- As the defendant started across the bridge, he had
the right to assume that the horse and the rider would
pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward
the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his
eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a
moment have perceived that it was too late for the
horse to cross with safety in front of the moving
vehicle.
- In the nature of things this change of situation
occurred while the automobile was yet some distance
away; and from this moment it was no longer within the
power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by
going to a place of greater safety.
- The control of the situation had then passed entirely
to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his
car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no
other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and
pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the
danger of collision.
- The defendant ran straight on until he was almost
upon the horse. He was, the court thinks, deceived into
doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet
exhibited fright.
- But in view of the known nature of horses, there was
an appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was
unacquainted with automobiles, he might get excited
and jump under the conditions which here confronted
him.
- When the defendant exposed the horse and
rider to this danger, he was, in our opinion,
negligent in the eye of the law.
- The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would
torts & damages
have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence.
- The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed
to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet
paterfamilias of the Roman law.
- The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of
the actor in the situation before him. The law considers
what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in
the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
- The question as to what would constitute the conduct
of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be
always determined in the light of human experience
and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
Could a prudent man, in the case under
consideration, foresee harm as a result of the
course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of
the actor to take precautions to guard against
that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of
this prevision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist.
- Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for
determining the existence of negligence in a given case
is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a
prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor
would have foreseen that an effect harmful to
another was sufficiently probable to warrant his
foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences.
- Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in
the present case, negligence is clearly established. A
prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant,
would have recognized that the course which he was
pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore
have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as
reasonable consequence of that course. Under these
circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the
duty to guard against the threatened harm.
- The plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he
was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself
on the wrong side of the road. It will be noted however,
that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the
defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by
an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the
law is that the person who has the last fair chance
to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other
party.
DISPOSITION Appealed decision is reversed.
TAYLOR V MANILA RAILROAD
A2010 - 23 -
[citation]
CARSON; March 22, 1910
NATURE
An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and
other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by
his father, his nearest relative.
FACTS
- The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the
operation of a street railway and an electric light
system in the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated
at the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River
within the city of Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor.
The power plant may be reached by boat or by crossing
a footbridge, impassable for vehicles, at the westerly
end of the island.
- The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the same time when
he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age,
the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than
the average boy of his age, and having considerable
aptitude and training in mechanics.
- On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy
named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age,
crossed the footbridge of the Isla del Provisor, for the
purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the
defendant, who had promised to make them a cylinder
for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr.
Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled
apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the
unusual interest which both seem to have taken in
machinery, spent some time in wandering about the
company's premises. The visit made on a Sunday
afternoon, and it does not appear that they saw or
spoke to anyone after leaving the power house where
they had asked for Mr. Murphy.
- After watching the operation of the traveling crane
used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked
across the open space in the neighborhood of the place
where the company dumped the cinders and ashes
from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or
thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground.
These caps are approximately of the size and
appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has
attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it
may be discharged by the use of electricity. They are
intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of
dynamite, and have in themselves considerable
explosive power. After some discussion as to the
ownership of caps, and their right to take them, the
boys picked up all they could find, hung them of a stick,
of which each took one end, and carried them home.
After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl
named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all
prof. casis
three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The boys
then made a series of experiments with the caps. They
thrust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket
and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap
with a stone and failed. Manuel looked for a hammer,
but could not find one. They then opened one of the
caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a
yellowish substance they got matches, and David held
the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the
contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less
serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who, when the boys
proposed purring a match to the contents of the cap,
became frightened and started to run away, received a
slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and
wounded, and David was struck in the face by several
particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his
right eye to such an extent as to necessitate its
removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for
his wounds.
- The Defendant Company’s defense that the caps were
under the duty of independent contractors deserves
scant consideration since these workers have been
under the supervision of one of the company’s
foremen.
- Plaintiff Taylor appears to have rested his case, as did
the trial judge his decision in plaintiff's favor, upon the
provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read
together with articles 1902, 1903, and 1908 of that
Code.
- "ART. 1089. Obligations are created by law, by
contracts, by quasi—contracts, and by illicit acts and
omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or
negligence occurs."
- "ART. 1902. Any person who by an act or omission
causes damage to another when there is fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so
done.
- "ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the
preceding article is demandable, not only for personal
acts and omission, but also for those of the persons for
whom they should be responsible.
- "The father, and on his death or incapacity the
mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors
who alive with them.
xxx xxx xxx
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprises
are equally liable for the damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter may be employed or on account of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when
the persons mentioned therein prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to avoid the damage."
torts & damages
- "ART. 1908.The owners shall be also be liable for the
damages caused —"1. By the explosion of
machines which may not have been cared for with due
diligence, and for kindling of explosive substance which
may not have been placed in a safe and proper place."
- In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relied
on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last
result in the United States in the cases known as the
"Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases based
thereon.In the typical cases, the question involved has
been whether a railroad company is liable for an injury
received by an infant of tender years, who from mere
idle curiosity, or for purposes of amusement, enters
upon the railroad company's premises, at a place
where the railroad company's premises, at a place
where the railroad company knew, or had a good
reason to suppose, children who would likely to come,
and there found explosive signal torpedoes left
exposed by the railroad company's employees, one of
which when carried away by the visitor, exploded and
injured him; or where such infant found upon the
premises a dangerous machine, such as a turntable left
in such condition as to make it probable that children in
playing with it would be exposed to accident or injury
therefrom and where the infant did in fact suffer injury
in playing with such machine.
In these, and in a great variety of similar cases, the
great weight of authority holds the owner of the
premises liable.
- As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout ( 17 Wall. (84
U.S.), 657), (wherein the principal question was
whether a railroad company was liable for an injury
received by an infant while upon its premises, from idle
curiosity, or for purposed of amusement, if such injury
was, under the circumstances, attributable to the
negligence of the company), the principles on which
these cases turn are that "while railroad company is not
bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere
strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it
owes to passengers conveyed by it, it is not exempt
from responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising
from its negligence or from its tortious acts;" and that
"the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be
judged by the same rule which governs that of an adult.
While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to
entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting
from the fault or negligence of another he must himself
have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard
to an infant of tender years. The care and caution
required of a child is according to his maturity and
capacity only, and this is to be determined in such case
by the circumstances of the case."
- The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs.
Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply
criticized in severally state courts, saying that (1) That
A2010 - 24 -
the owner of land is not liable to trespassers thereon
for injuries sustained by them, not due to his wanton or
willful acts; (2) that no exception to this rule exists in
favor of children who are injured by dangerous
machinery naturally calculated to attract them to the
premises; (3) that an invitation of license to cross the
premises of another can not be predicated on the mere
fact that no steps have been taken to interfere with
such practice; (4) that there is no difference between
children and adults of an invitation or a license to enter
upon another's premises. However, after an exhaustive
and critical analysis and review of may of the adjudged
cases, both English and America, formally declared that
it adhered "to the principles announced in the case of
Railroad Co. vs. Stout." Chief Justice Cooley, voicing the
opinion of the supreme court of Michigan, in the case of
Powers vs. Marlow, said that: “Children, wherever they
go, must be expected to act upon childlike instincts and
impulses; and others who are chargeable with a duty of
care and caution toward them must calculate upon this,
and take precautions accordingly. If they leave exposed
to the observation of children anything which would be
tempting to them, and which they in their immature
judgment might naturally suppose they were at liberty
to handle or play with, they should expect that liberty
to be taken."
- The owners of premises, therefore, whereon things
attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the
public are expressively or impliedly permitted to enter
to or upon which the owner knows or ought to know
children are likely to roam about for pastime and in
play, "must calculate upon this, and take precautions
accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises
can not be heard to say that because the child has
entered upon his premises without his express
permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes
no duty or obligation whatever. The owner's failure to
take reasonable precautions to prevent the child form
entering premises at a place where he knows or ought
to know that children are accustomed to roam about or
to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely
to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied
license to enter, and where the child does not enter
under such conditions the owner's failure to make
reasonable precaution to guard the child against the
injury from unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon
such premises by the owner, is clearly a breach of duty,
a negligent omission, for which he may and should be
held responsible, if the child is actually injured, without
other fault on its part than that it had entered on the
premises of a stranger without his express invitation or
permission. To hold otherwise would be expose to all
the children in the community to unknown perils and
unnecessary danger at the whim of the owners or
prof. casis
occupants of land upon which they might naturally and
reasonably be expected to enter.
ISSUE
1. WON the defendant’s negligence was the proximate
cause of the injuries, making the company liable
HELD
1. NO
- Just because the kids trespassed doesn’t mean that
the company is not liable for anything bad that might
happen to them. However, we also have to look at the
proximate cause and the maturity of the plaintiff if it
was his negligence that contributed to the principal
occurrence of the tragedy. In the case at bar, the Court
said that it is of the opinion that under all the
circumstances of this case the negligence of the
defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises
was not the proximate cause of the injury received by
the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly
speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the
defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied
that plaintiff's action in cutting open the detonating cap
and putting a match to its contents was the proximate
cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries
inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant,
therefore, is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus
incurred. "While it is the general rule in regard to an
adult that entitle him to recover damages for an injury
resulting from the fault or negligence of another he
must himself have been free from fault, such is not the
rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and
caution required of a child is according to his maturity
and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each
case by the circumstance of the case."
- As regards the maturity of the child, this has to be
examined on a case-to-case basis. In the case at bar,
plaintiff at the time of the accident was well—grown
youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically
than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as
a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a
mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was
incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he
was exceptionally well qualified to take care. The
evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that,
despite his denials on the witness stands, he well knew
the explosive character of the cap with which he was
amusing himself. The series of experiments made by
him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as
described by the little girl who was present, admit of no
other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by
the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode
it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his
endeavors brought about by the applications of a
match to the contents of the cap, show clearly that he
torts & damages
knew what he was about. Nor can there be any
reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that
the explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact
that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was with him at
the time when he put the match to the contents of the
cap, became frightened and ran away.
- We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus
stated, the immediate cause of the explosion , the
accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was his own
act of putting a match to the contents of the cap, and
that having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as
one of its determining factors, he can not recover."
DISPOSITION The petition is DISMISSED.
JARCO MARKETING CORP V CA
(AGUILAR)
DAVIDE; December 21, 1999
FACTS
- Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of
Syvel's Department Store, Makati City. Petitioners
Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the
store's branch manager, operations manager, and
supervisor, respectively. Private respondents are
spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar.
- On May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the 2nd
flr or Syvel’s Dept. Store. Criselda momentarily let go of
her daughter’s hand to sign her credit card slip at the
payment and verification counter. She suddenly felt a
gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind
her and saw her daughter on the floor, pinned by the
gift-wrapping counter. Zhieneth was crying and
screaming for help. Criselda was able to ask people to
help her and bring her daughter to the hospital.
- She was operated on immediately at the hospital.
Gonzales, a former employee of Syvel’s Dept Store who
helped bring Zhieneth to the hospital, heard her tell the
doctor that she “nothing. I did not come near the
counter and the counter just fell on me,” when asked
“what did you do?” She died 14 days later, on the
hospital bed. She was 6 years old. The cause of her
death was attributed to the injuries she sustained.
- After the burial of their daughter, the Aguilars
demanded from the petitioners the reimbursement of
hospital and medical bills, and wake and funeral
expenses. Petitioners refused to pay. So the Aguilars
filed a complaint for damages wherein they sought the
payment of P157,522.86 for actual damages, P300,000
for moral damages, P20,000 for attorney's fees and an
unspecified amount for loss of income and exemplary
damages.
- RTC – for Jarco Marketing Corp, et al. RTC mfr – for the
Aguilars. CA and CA mfr – for the Aguilars.
A2010 - 25 -
- Jarco Mktg Corp, et al’s side: Criselda was
negligent in taking care of her daughter for allowing her
to roam freely. Zhieneth was guilty of contributory
negligence because she tried to climb the counter. The
counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong base
and was used without incident for the past 15 years. It
was deliberately placed at a corner to avoid such
accidents. The testimony of two former employees,
Gonzales and Guevarra, should not be believed
because he might have ill feelings towards petitioners.
The testimony of the present employees (that Zhieneth
climbed the counter so it fell) should instead be
believed.
- The Aguilars’ side: While in the dept store,
Criselda never let go of her daughter except to sign the
credit card slip. Gonzales testified that the gift
wrapping counter was right beside the verification
counter where Criselda was signing. Both Gonzales and
Guevarra testified to the structural instability and
shakiness of the counter which is in the shape of and
inverted “L,” with a base smaller than the top. The
protruding part of the counter was at the costumer
side. They both had informed management (while they
were still working there) that the counter should be
nailed to the floor. The management did nothing.
ISSUE
1. WON the incident is accident or attributable to
negligence
2. If negligence, who was negligent?
HELD
1. NEGLIGENCE.
- An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which
no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is "a
fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event
happening without any human agency, or if happening
wholly or partly through human agency, an event which
under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by
the person to whom it happens."
- On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something
which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
Negligence is "the failure to observe, for the protection
of the interest of another person, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury."
- Accident and negligence are intrinsically
contradictory; one cannot exist with the other. Accident
occurs when the person concerned is exercising
ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any
person and which could not have been prevented by
any means suggested by common prudence.
prof. casis
- The test in determining the existence of negligence is
enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v. Smith,
thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent
act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinary prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
- Gonzales’ testimony about what Zhieneth said to the
doctor should be accepted because at the time she said
it, she was in so much pain and she answered right
away. This means she wasn’t making it up. It is
axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain
or suffering and statements made to a physician are
generally considered declarations and admissions. All
that is required for their admissibility as part of the res
gestae is that they be made or uttered under the
influence of a startling event before the declarant had
the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed
by the person who testified in court. Under the
circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for
ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme
pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with
her life. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales'
testimony on the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no
act that facilitated her tragic death. Sadly, petitioners
did, through their negligence or omission to secure or
make stable the counter's base.
2. JARCO MKTG, ET AL.
- Petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were
personally informed of the danger posed by the
unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete
action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of
the store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and
ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as
confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed
to discharge the due diligence required of a good father
of a family.
No contributory negligence from Zhieneth
- The conclusive presumption favors children below
nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of
contributory negligence. In our jurisdiction, a person
under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to
have acted without discernment, and is, on that
account, exempt from criminal liability. The same
presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability
obtains in a case of a person over nine and under
fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has
acted with discernment. Since negligence may be a
felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a
condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child
under nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively
presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the
presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for
negligence in the case of a child over nine but under
fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one, under our law.
The rule, therefore, is that a child under nine years of
torts & damages
age must be conclusively presumed incapable of
contributory negligence as a matter of law. (Sangco)
- Even if we attribute contributory negligence to
ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the
counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept
petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and
sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old
could not have caused the counter to collapse. The
physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court
and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on
record reveal that it was not durable after all. Shaped
like an-inverted "L" the counter was heavy, huge, and
its top laden with formica. It protruded towards the
customer waiting area and its base was not secured.
No contributory negligence from Criselda
- CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any
contributory negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to
CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand. CRISELDA
momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch
when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise
moment, it was reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to
let go of her child. Further, at time ZHIENETH was
pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away
from her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was
just four meters away from CRISELDA. The time and
distance were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her
mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to
impress upon us. She even admitted to the doctor who
treated her at the hospital that she did not do anything;
the counter just fell on her.
Disposition The instant petition is DENIED and the
challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED
MAGTIBAY V TIANGCO
74 Phil 756
BOCOBO; February 28, 1944
NATURE
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance
Batangas
FACTS
- Defendant-appellant Tiangco, a minor under 18 years
of age, pleaded guilty to an information for homicide
through reckless negligence in that he had recklessly
driven an automobile and thereby caused the death of
Magtibay, of whom plaintiffs-appellees are the lawful
heirs. The Court of First Instance (CFI) Batangas found
Tiangco guilty as charged, but as he was under 18
years of age, the sentence was suspended, and he was
committed to the care and custody of Atty. Abaya, until
Tiangco would reach his majority, subject to the
supervision of the Superintendent of Public Schools of
A2010 - 26 -
the Province. Subsequently, Abaya, in view of Tiangco’s
good conduct recommended the dismissal of the case.
The CFI dismissed the criminal case, but reserved such
right as the heirs of the deceased might have to
recover damages in a civil action against said Tiangco.
Accordingly, the civil action in the instant case was filed
against defendant-appellant for damages in the sum of
P2,000 for the death of Magtibay. The CFI gave
judgment for plaintiffs for P2,000 as damages. Hence
this appeal.
ISSUE
WON the suspension of the sentence under Art. 80 of
the RPC, after appellant had pleaded guilty, exonerated
him from the crime charged
HELD
NO
- The suspension of the sentence under Art.80 of the
Revised Penal Code, after appellant herein had pleaded
guilty, did not wipe out his guilt, but merely put off the
imposition of the corresponding penalty, in order to
give the delinquent minor a chance to be reformed.
When, therefore, after he had observed good conduct,
the criminal case was dismissed, this did not mean that
he was exonerated from the crime charged, but simply
that he would suffer no penalty. Nor did such dismissal
of the criminal case obliterate his civil liability for
damages. Liability of an infant for his torts is imposed
as a mode, not of punishment, but of compensation. If
property has been destroyed or other loss occasioned
by a wrongful act, it is just that the loss should upon
the estate of the wrongdoer rather than that of a
guiltless person, and that without reference to the
question of moral guilt. Consequently, for every
tortuous act of violence or other pure tort, the infant
tort-feasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person
in the same manner and to the same extent as an
adult.
DISPOSITION Judgment affirmed.
DEL ROSARIO V MANILA ELECTRIC CO.
57 PHIL 478
STREET; November 5, 1932
FACTS
***This action was instituted by Julian del Rosario for
the purpose of recovering damages from Meralco for
the death of his son, Alberto, resulting from a shock
from a wire used by the defendant for the transmission
of electricity.
- Aug 4, 1930 – 2pm: a wire used by the defendant on
Dimas- Alang St for the purpose of conducting
prof. casis
electricity used in lighting the City of Manila and its
suburbs.
- Jose Noguera saw that the wire was burning and its
connections smoking. One of the ends of the wire fell to
the ground among some shrubbery close to the way.
- As soon as Noguera took cognizance of the trouble, he
stepped into a garage which was located nearby and
asked Jose Soco to telephone the Malabon station of
MERALCO that an electrical wire was burning at that
place.
- Soco transmitted the message at 2.25 p.m. and
received answer from the station to the effect that they
would send an inspector.
- At the time that message was sent the wire had not
yet parted, but from the testimony of Demetrio Bingao,
one of the witnesses for the defense, it is clear that the
end of the wire was on the ground shortly after 3 p.m.
- At 4 p. m. the neighborhood school was dismissed and
the children went home.
- Alberto del Rosario, 9 yrs old, who was a few paces
ahead of his classmates, Jose Salvador and Saturnino
Endrina, all members of the second grade in the public
school.
- As the three neared the place where the wire was
down, Saturnino made a motion as if it touch it.
- Jose, who happened to be the son of an electrician,
knew never to touch a broken electrical wire (as his dad
told him so!)- stopped Saturnino- telling him that the
wire might be charged.
- Saturnino yielded to this admonition and stopped, but
Alberto, who was somewhat ahead, said, “I have for
some time been in the habit of touching wires”.
- Jose rejoined that he should into touch wires as they
carry a current, but Alberto, no doubt feeling that he
was challenged in the matter, put out his index finger
and touch the wire.
- He immediately fell face downwards, exclaiming "Ay!
madre".
- The end of the wire remained in contact with his body
which fell near the post.
- A crowd soon collected, and some one cut the wire
and disengaged the body. Upon being taken to St.
Luke's Hospital the child was pronounced dead.
- The wire was an ordinary number 6 triple braid
weather proof wire, such as is commonly used by the
defendant company for the purpose of conducting
electricity for lighting.
- The wire was cased in the usual covering, but this had
been burned off for some distance from the point
where the wire parted.
- The engineer of the company says that it was
customary for the company to make a special
inspection of these wires at least once in six months,
and that all of the company's inspectors were
torts & damages
required in their daily rounds to keep a lookout
for trouble of this kind.
- There is nothing in the record indicating any particular
cause for the parting of the wire.l
ISSUE
WON Manila Electric is liable
HELD
YES
Reasoning
- When notice was received at the Malabon station at
2.25 p. m., somebody should have been dispatched to
the scene of the trouble at once, or other measures
taken to guard the point of danger; but more than an 1
½ hours passed before anyone from MERALCO
appeared on the scene, and in the meantime Alberto
had been claimed as a victim.
- The mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution
of Jose (8 yrs old), doesn’t alter the case.
- But even supposing that contributory negligence
could in some measure be properly imputed to the
deceased, such negligence would not be wholly fatal to
the right of action in this case, not having been the
determining cause of the accident. (Rakes vs.
Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil., 359.)
- With respect to the amount of damages recoverable,
Julian is entitled to recover P250 for expenses
incurred in connection with the death and burial of
the boy.
- Citing Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Company: Julian
should recover the sum of P1,000 as general
damages for loss of service.
Disposition judgment reversed
SEPARATE OPINION
ABAD SANTOS [concur in part and
dissent in part]
- He concurs that MERALCO is held liable for the death
of Alberto, but dissents in so far as the decision allows
the recovery of the father of the sum of P1,250 only as
damages. It should be P 2250.
- His reasoning: It is well settled in this jurisdiction that
an action will lie to recover damages for death caused
by the wrongful act. (Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil.,
821.)
- In criminal cases- indemnity to the heirs of the
deceased is equivalent to P1,000
- Whatever may be the reasons for the rule followed in
criminal cases, I am of the opinion that those reasons
do not obtain in fixing the amount of the damages
recoverable in the present case.
A2010 - 27 -
- The indemnity allowed in criminal case is merely
incidental to the main object sought, which is the
punishment of the guilty party.
- In a civil action, the principal object is the
recovery of damages for wrongful death; and
where, as in this case, the defendant is a corporation,
not subject to criminal prosecution for the act
complained of, the question assumes a vastly different
aspect.
- There should be a distinction between the civil liability
of an ordinary person who, by wrongful act, has caused
the death of another; and the civil liability of a
corporation, organized primarily for profit, which has
caused the death of a person by failure to exercise due
care in the prosecution of its business.
- The liability of such a corporation for damages must
be regarded as a part of the risks which it assumes
when it undertakes to promote its own business; and
just as it is entitled to earn adequate profits from its
business, so it should be made adequately to
compensate those who have suffered damage by its
negligence.
YLARDE V AQUINO
[citation]
GANCAYCO; July 29, 1988
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- Soriano was principal. Aquino was a teacher. The
school was littered with concrete blocks. Teacher
Banez started burying them. Aquino gathered 18 male
pupils to help. He ordered them to dig. Work was
unfinished.
- Ff day, Aquino called 4 of the 18 to continue. Aquino
continued digging while the pupils remained inside the
pit throwing out the loose soil. Aquino left the children
to level the loose soil and borrowed a key from Banez.
Aquino told the kids not to touch the stone.
- 3 of the 4 kids jumped into the pit. The remaining
Abaga jumped on the concrete block causing it to slide
down. 2 were able to escape but student Ylarde
sustained injuries. 3 days later he died.
Parents filed suit against Aquino and Soriano. Lower
court dismissed and CA affirmed and said child Ylarde
was negligent.
ISSUE
WON Aquino and Soriano can be held liable for
damages
HELD
prof. casis
- Principal Soriano cannot be held liable, being head of
academic school and not school of arts and trades, in
line with Amadora case and Art 2180 of Civil Code. It is
only the teacher who should answer for torts
committed by their students. Besides, Soriano did not
order the digging.
- Based on Article 2180, Aquino can be held liable.
However, petition is based on Article 2176. Did the
acts/omissions of Aquino cause the death of Ylarde?
Yes. He is liable for damages. The work required adult
laborers. He required the children to remain in the pit
after they finished digging. He ordered them to level
the soil when a huge stone was at brink of falling. He
went to another place and left the kids.
- Left by themselves, IT WAS BUT NATURAL FOR THE
CHILDREN TO PLAY AROUND. IN RULING THAT YLARDE
WAS IMPRUDENT, THE LOWER COURT DID NOT
CONSIDER HIS AGE AND MATURITY. A MINOR SHOULD
NOT BE HELD TO THE SAME DEGREE OF CARE AS AN
ADULT.
- Aquino also said the digging was part of Work
Education. This is unacceptable. Work is too
dangerous and it was not even in the lesson plan.
CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO V
PHILIPPINE MOTORS CORPORATION
[citation]
STREET; November 3, 1930
NATURE
Appeal from decision of the CFI
FACTS
- Cranston was the representative of the plaintiff in
Manila and plaintiff was the registered owner of the
motor schooner Gwendoline.
- Cranston decided to have the engine on the
Gwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a
crude oil burner. He had a conference with Quest, Phil.
Motors manager, who agreed to do the job, with the
understanding that payment should be made upon
completion of the work.
- The work was begun and conducted under the
supervision of Quest, chiefly by a mechanic whom
Quest took with him to the boat. Quest had the
assistance of the members of the crew of the
Gwendoline, who had been directed by Cranston to
place themselves under Quest's directions.
- Upon preliminary inspection of the engine, Quest
concluded that a new carburetor was needed and thus
installed a Zenith carburetor. The engine was tried with
gasoline and the result was satisfactory. The next
problem was to introduce into the carburetor the baser
fuel, consisting of a low grade of oil mixed with
torts & damages
distillate. A temporary tank to contain the mixture was
placed on deck above and at a short distance from the
compartment covering the engine. This tank was
connected with the carburetor by a piece of tubing,
which was apparently not well fitted at the point where
it was connected with the tank. The fuel mixture leaked
from the tank and dripped sown into the engine
compartment. The new fuel line and that already in use
between the gasoline tank and carburetor were so fixed
that it was possible to change from the gasoline fuel to
the mixed fuel. This arrangement enables the operator
to start the engine on gasoline and then, after the
engine had been operating for a few moments, to
switch to the new fuel supply.
- It was observed that the carburetor was flooding, and
that the gasoline, or other fuel, was trickling freely from
the lower part to the carburetor to the floor. This fact
was called to Quest's attention, but he said that, when
the engine had gotten to running well, the flooding
would disappear.
- The boat was taken out into the bay for a trial run.
The engine stopped a few times during the first part of
the course, owing to the use of an improper mixture of
fuel. In the course of the trial, Quest remained outside
of the engine compartment and occupied himself with
making distillate, with a view to ascertaining what
proportion of the two elements would give best results
in the engine.
- As the boat was coming in from this run, the engine
stopped, and connection again had to be made with the
gasoline line to get a new start. After this had been
done the mechanic, or engineer, switched to the tube
connecting with the new mixture. A moment later a
back fire occurred in the cylinder chamber. This caused
a flame to shoot back into the carburetor, and instantly
the carburetor and adjacent parts were covered with a
mass of flames, which the members of the crew were
unable to subdue. The salvage from, the wreck, when
sold, brought only the sum of P150. The value of the
boat, before the accident occured, as the court found,
was P10,000.
- CFI gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff to recover
of the defendant the sum of P9,850, with interest at 6
per centum per annum from the date of the filing of the
complaint, until satisfaction of the judgment, with
costs.
ISSUE
WON the loss of the boat is chargeable to the
negligence and lack of skill of Quest
HELD
YES
Ratio When a person holds himself out as being
competent to do things requiring professional skill, he
A2010 - 28 -
will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the
care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular
work which he attempts to do.
Reasoning
- The temporary tank in which the mixture was
prepared was apparently at too great an elevation from
the carburetor, so that when the fuel line was opened,
the hydrostatic pressure in the carburetor was greater
than the delicate parts of the carburetor could sustain.
This was the cause of the flooding of the carburetor;
and the result was that; when the back fire occurred,
the external parts of the carburetor, already saturated
with gasoline, burst into flames, whence the fire was
quickly communicated to the highly inflammable
material near-by. The leak along the pipe line and the
flooding of the carburetor had created a dangerous
situation, which a prudent mechanic, versed in repairs
of this nature, would have taken precautions to avoid.
The back fire may have been due either to the fact that
the spark was too advanced or the fuel improperly
mixed.
- Proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in
fixing the engines of automobiles and tractors, but it
does not appear that he was experienced in the doing
of similar work on boats. Possibly the dripping of the
mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of the
carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate
impression of the danger of fire. Quest did not use the
skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily
expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats. There
was here, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy
antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this
constitutes negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline
may be said to have resulted from accident, but this
accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It
would not have occured but for Quest's carelessness or
lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the injury
was accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free
from blame.
- The trial judge seems to have proceeded on the idea
that, inasmuch as Quest had control of the Gwendoline
during the experimental run, the defendant corporation
was in the position of a bailee and that, as a
consequence, the burden of proof was on the
defendant to exculpate itself from responsibility by
proving that the accident was not due to the fault of
Quest. As a rule workmen who make repairs on a ship
in its owner's yard, or a mechanic who repairs a coach
without taking it to his shop, are not bailees, and their
rights and liabilities are determined by the general
rules of law, under their contract. The true bailee
acquires possession and what is usually spoken of as
special property in the chattel bailed. As a consequence
of such possession and special property, the bailee is
given a lien for his compensation. These ideas seem to
prof. casis
be incompatible with the situation now under
consideration.
- This action was instituted about two years after the
accident had occured, and after Quest had ceased to
be manager and had gone back to the US. Upon these
facts, the defendant bases the contention that the
action should be considered stale. It is sufficient reply
to say that the action was brought within the period
limited by the statute of limitations and the situation is
not one where the defense of laches can be properly
invoked.
DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from affirmed.
UNITED STATES V PINEDA
37 Phil 456
MALCOLM; January 22, 1918
NATURE
Appeal requiring a construction and an application, for
the first time, of the penal provisions of the Pharmacy
Law.
FACTS
- Santiago Pineda is a registered pharmacist of long
standing and the owner of a drug store located at Calle
Santo Cristo, Manila. Feliciano Santos, having some
sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription
obtained from Dr. Richardson, and which on other
occasions Santos had given to his horses with good
results, at Pineda's drug store for filling. The
prescription read: "clorato de potasa - 120 gramos - en
seis papelitos de 20 gramos, para caballo." Under the
supervision of Pineda, the prescription was prepared
and returned to Santos in the form of six papers
marked, "Botica Pineda - Clorato potasa - 120.00 - en
seis papeles - Para caballo- Sto. Cristo , Binondo,
Manila." Santos, under the belief that he had
purchased the potassium chlorate which he had asked
for, put two of the packages in water and gave the
doses to two of his sick horses. Another package was
mixed with water for another horse, but was not used.
The two horses, to which had been given the
preparation, died shortly afterwards. Santos,
thereupon, took the three remaining packages to the
Bureau of Science for examination. Drs. Peña and
Darjuan, of the Bureau of Science, found that the
packages contained not potassium chlorate but barium
chlorate. At the instance of Santos, the two chemists
also went to the drug store of the defendant and
bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was
found to be barium chlorate. (Barium chlorate, it should
be noted, is a poison; potassium chlorate is not.) Dr.
Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed an autopsy on
the horses, and found that death was the result of
torts & damages
poisoning.
ISSUES
1. WON the lower court erred in admitting the
testimony of the chemist Peña and Darjuan as to their
purchase of potassium chlorate at the drug store of the
accused, which proved to be barium chlorate
2. WON the lower court erred in finding that the
substance sold by the accused to Feliciano Santos was
barium chlorate and not potassium chlorate
3. WON the lower court erred in finding that the
accused has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of an infraction of the Pharmacy Law, Act No.
597, section 17, as amended
HELD
1. NO
Ratio On the trial of a criminal case where the question
relates to the tendency of certain testimony to throw
light upon a particular fact, or to explain the conduct of
a particular person, there is a certain discretion on the
part of the trial judge which a court of errors will not
interfere with, unless it manifestly appear that the
testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the question
at issue, and is calculated to prejudice the accused.
Reasoning
- What appellant is relying on is the maxim res inter
alios acta. As a general rule, the evidence of other
offenses committed by a defendant is inadmissible.
But appellant has confused this maxim and this rule
with certain exceptions thereto. The effort is not to
convict the accused of a second offense. Nor is there
an attempt to draw the mind away from the point at
issue and thus to prejudice defendant's case. The
purpose is to ascertain defendant's knowledge and
intent, and to fix his negligence. If the defendant has
on more than one occasion performed similar acts,
accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence
is intensified and fraudulent intent may even be
established. It has been said that there is no better
evidence of negligence than the frequency of
accidents.
2. NO
Reasoning The proof demonstrates the contrary.
3. NO
Ratio In view of the tremendous and imminent danger
to the public from the careless sale of poisons and
medicines, we do not deem it too rigid a rule to hold
that the law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one
drug for another whether it be through negligence or
mistake.
Reasoning
- The care required must be commensurate with the
danger involved, and the skill employed must
correspond with the superior knowledge of the
A2010 - 29 -
business which the law demands.
- Turning to the law, certain points therein as bearing
on our present facts must be admitted. Thus, defendant
is a pharmacist. As a pharmacist, he is made
responsible for the quality of all drugs and poisons
which he sells. And finally it is provided that it shall be
unlawful for him to sell any drug or poison under any
"fraudulent name." It is the word "fraudulent" which
has given the court trouble. What did the Legislature
intend to convey by this restrictive adjective?
- Were we to adhere to the technical definition of fraud
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to convict any
druggist of a violation of the law. The prosecution
would have to prove to a reasonable degree of
certainty that the druggist made a material
representation; that it was false; that when he made it
he knew that it was false or made it recklessly without
any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion;
that he made it with the intention that it should be
acted upon by the purchaser; that the purchaser acted
in reliance upon it, and that the purchaser suffered
injury. Such a construction with a literal following of
well-known principles on the subject of fraud would
strip the law of at least much of its force. It would leave
the innocent purchaser of drugs, who must blindly trust
in the good faith and vigilance of the pharmacist, at the
mercy of any unscrupulous vendor. We should not,
therefore, without good reason so devitalize the law.
- The rule of caveat emptor cannot apply to the
purchase and sale of drugs. The vendor and the vendee
do not stand at arms length as in ordinary transactions.
An imperative duty is on the druggist to take
precautions to prevent death or serious injury to
anyone who relies on his absolute honesty and peculiar
learning. The nature of drugs is such that examination
would not avail the purchaser any thing. It would be
idle mockery for the customer to make an examination
of a compound of which he can know nothing.
Consequently, it must be that the druggist warrants
that he will deliver the drug called for.
- Remembering particularly the care and skill which are
expected of druggists, that in some jurisdictions they
are liable even for their mistake and in others have the
burden placed upon them to establish that they were
not negligent, it cannot be that the Philippine
Legislature intended to use the word "fraudulent" in all
its strictness. A plea of accident and mistake cannot
excuse for they cannot take place unless there be
wanton and criminal carelessness and neglect. How the
misfortune occurs is unimportant, if under all the
circumstances the fact of occurrence is attributable to
the druggist as a legal fault. Rather considering the
responsibility for the quality of drugs which the law
imposes on druggists and the position of the word
"fraudulent" in juxtaposition to "name," what is made
prof. casis
unlawful is the giving of a false name to the drug asked
for. This view is borne out by the Spanish translation,
which we are permitted to consult to explain the
English text. In the Spanish "supuesto" is used, and this
word is certainly not synonymous with "fraudulent."
The usual badges of fraud, falsity, deception, and injury
must be present - but not scienter.
Dispositive Judgment of the lower court, sentencing
the defendant to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs, is affirmed with the costs of this instance against
the appellant, without prejudice to any civil action
which may be instituted.
BPI V CA
216 SCRA 51
GUTIERREZ; November 26, 1992
FACTS
- In the afternoon of October 9, 1981, a person
purporting to be Eligia G. Fernando, who had a money
market placement as evidenced by a promissory note
with a maturity date of November 11, 1981 and a
maturity value of P2,462,243.19, called BPI's Money
Market Department. The caller wanted to preterminate
the placement, but Reginaldo Eustaquio, Dealer Trainee
in BPI's Money Market Department, told her "trading
time" was over for the day, which was a Friday, and
suggested that she call again the following week. The
promissory note the caller wanted to preterminate was
a roll-over of an earlier 50-day money market
placement that had matured on September 24, 1981.
- Later that afternoon, Eustaquio conveyed the request
for pretermination to the officer who before had
handled Eligia G. Fernando's account, Penelope Bulan,
but Eustaquio was left to attend to the pretermination
process.
- On October 12, 1981, the caller of the previous Friday
followed up with Eustaquio, merely by phone again, on
the pretermination of the placement. Although not
familiar with the voice of the real Eligia G. Fernando,
Eustaquio "made certain" that the caller was the real
Eligia G. Fernando by "verifying" that the details the
caller gave about the placement tallied with the details
in "the ledger/folder" of the account. Eustaquio knew
the real Eligia G. Fernando to be the Treasurer of
Philippine American Life Insurance Company
(Philamlife) since he was handling Philamlife's
corporate money market account. But neither
Eustaquio nor Bulan who originally handled Fernando's
account, nor anybody else at BPI, bothered to call up
Fernando at her Philamlife office to verify the request
for pretermination.
torts & damages
- Informed that the placement would yield less than the
maturity value because of its pretermination, the caller
insisted on the pretermination just the same and asked
that two checks be issued for the proceeds, one for
P1,800,000.00 and the second for the balance, and that
the checks be delivered to her office at Philamlife.
Eustaquio, thus, proceeded to prepare the "purchase
order slip" for the requested pretermination as required
by office procedure, and from his desk, the papers,
following the processing route, passed through the
position analyst, securities clerk, verifier clerk and
documentation clerk, before the two cashier's checks,
nos. 021759 and 021760 for P1,800,000.00 and
P613,215.16, respectively, both payable to Eligia G.
Fernando, covering the preterminated placement, were
prepared. The two cashier's checks, together with the
papers consisting of the money market placement was
to be preterminated and the promissory note (No.
35623) to be preterminated, were sent to Gerlanda E.
de Castro and Celestino Sampiton, Jr., Manager and
Administrative Assistant, respectively, in BPI's Treasury
Operations Department, both authorized signatories for
BPI, who signed the two checks that very morning.
Thereafter, the checks went to the dispatcher for
delivery.
- Later in the same morning, however, the same caller
changed the delivery instructions; instead of the checks
being delivered to her office at Philamlife, she would
herself pick up the checks or send her niece, Rosemarie
Fernando, to pick them up. Eustaquio then told her that
if it were her niece who was going to get the checks,
her niece would have to being a written authorization
from her to pick up the checks. This telephone
conversation ended with the caller's statement that
"definitely" it would be her niece, Rosemarie Fernando,
who would pick up the checks. Thus, Eustaquio had to
hurriedly go to the dispatcher, Bernardo Laderas, to tell
him of the new delivery instructions for the checks; in
fact, he changed the delivery instruction on the
purchase order slip, writing thereon "Rosemarie
Fernando release only with authority to pick up.”
- It was, in fact Rosemarie Fernando who got the two
checks from the dispatcher, as shown by the delivery
receipt. As it turned out, the same person
impersonated both Eligia G. Fernando and Rosemarie
Fernando. Although the checks represented the
termination proceeds of Eligia G. Fernando's
placement, not just a roll-over of the placement, the
dispatcher failed to get or to require the surrender of
the promissory note evidencing the placement. There is
also no showing that Eligia G. Fernando's purported
signature on the letter requesting the pretermination
and the latter authorizing Rosemarie Fernando to pick
up the two checks, both of which letters were
presumably handed to the dispatcher by Rosemarie
A2010 - 30 -
Fernando, was compared or verified with Eligia G.
Fernando's signature in BPI's file. Such purported
signature has been established to be forged although it
has a "close similarity" to the real signature of Eligia G.
Fernando. In the afternoon of October 13, 1981, a
woman who represented herself to be Eligia G.
Fernando applied at China Banking Corporation's Head
Office for the opening of a current account. She was
accompanied and introduced to Emily Sylianco Cuaso,
Cash Supervisor, by Antonio Concepcion whom Cuaso
knew to have opened, earlier that year, an account
upon the introduction of Valentin Co, a long-standing
"valued client" of CBC. What Cuaso indicated in the
application form, however, was that the new client was
introduced by Valentin Co, and with her initials on the
form signifying her approval, she referred the
application to the New Accounts Section for processing.
As finally proceeds, the application form shows the
signature of "Eligia G. Fernando", "her" date of birth,
sex, civil status, nationality, occupation ("business
woman"), tax account number, and initial deposit of
P10,000.00. This final approval of the new current
account is indicated on the application form by the
initials of Regina G. Dy, Cashier, who did not interview
the new client but affixed her initials on the application
form after reviewing it.
- On October 14, 1981, the woman holding herself out
as Eligia G. Fernando deposited the two checks in
controversy with Current Account No. 126310-3. Her
endorsement on the two checks was found to conform
with the depositor's specimen signature. CBC's
guaranty of prior endorsements and/or lack of
endorsement was then stamped on the two checks,
which CBC forthwith sent to clearing and which BPI
cleared on the same day.
- Two days after, withdrawals began on Current
Account No. 26310-3: On October 16, 1981, by means
of Check No. 240005 dated the same day for
P1,000,000.00, payable to "cash", which the woman
holding herself out as Eligia G. Fernando encashed over
the counter, and Check No. 240003 dated October 15,
1981 for P48,500.00, payable to "cash" which was
received through clearing from PNB Pasay Branch; on
October 19, 1981, by means of Check No. 240006
dated the same day for P1,000,000.00, payable to
"cash," which the woman identifying herself as Eligia G.
Fernando encashed over the counter; on October 22,
1981, by means of Check No. 240007 dated the same
day for P370,000.00, payable to "cash" which the
woman herself also encashed over the counter; and on
November 4, 1981, by means of Check No. 240001
dated November 3, 1981 for P4,100.00, payable to
"cash," which was received through clearing from Far
East Bank. The last withdrawal on November 4, 1981
prof. casis
left Current Account No. 26310-3 with a balance of only
P571.61.
- On November 11, 1981, the maturity date of Eligia G.
Fernado's money market placement with BPI, the real
Eligia G. Fernando went to BPI for the roll-over of her
placement. She disclaimed having preterminated her
placement on October 12, 1981. She executed an
affidavit stating that while she was the payee of the
two checks in controversy, she never received nor
endorsed them and that her purported signature on the
back of the checks was not hers but forged. With her
surrender of the original of the promissory note (No.
35623 with maturity value of P2,462,243.19)
evidencing the placement which matured that day, BPI
issued her a new promissory note (No. 40314 with
maturity date of December 23, 1981 and maturity
value of P2,500.266.77) to evidence a roll-over of the
placement.
- On November 12, 1981, supported by Eligia G.
Fernando's affidavit, BPI returned the two checks in
controversy to CBC for the reason "Payee's
endorsement forged". CBC, in turn, returned the checks
for reason "Beyond Clearing Time". These incidents led
to the filing of this case with the Arbitration Committee.
- The Arbitration Committee ruled in favor of BPI and
ordered CBC to pay the former the amount of
P1,206,607.58 with interest thereon at 12% per annum
from August 12, 1983.
- However, upon CBC’s motion for reconsideration, the
Board of Directors of the PCHC reversed the Arbitration
Committee's decision and dismissed the complaint of
BPI while ordering it to pay CBC the sum of
P1,206,607.58.
- BPI then filed a petition for review with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati who dismissed said petition but
modified the award by including a provision for
attorney’s fees in favor of CBC, among others.
- The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision.
ISSUES
1. WON the collecting bank has absolute liability on a
warranty of the validity of all prior endorsements
stamped at the back of the checks
2. In the event that the payee's signature is forged,
WON the drawer/drawee bank (in this case BPI) may
claim reimbursement from the collecting bank which
earlier paid the proceeds of the checks after the same
checks were cleared
HELD
1. NO
- BPI contends that respondent CBC's clear warranty
that "all prior endorsements and/or lack of
endorsements guaranteed" stamped at the back of the
torts & damages
checks was an unrestrictive clearing guaranty that all
prior endorsements in the checks are genuine. Under
this premise petitioner BPI asserts that the presenting
or collecting bank, respondent CBC, had an
unquestioned liability when it turned out that the
payee's signature on the checks were forged. With
these circumstances, petitioner BPI maintains that
considerations of relative negligence become totally
irrelevant.
- In presenting the checks for clearing and for payment,
the collecting bank made an express guarantee on the
validity of "all prior endorsements." Thus, stamped at
the back of the checks are the clear warranty: ALL
PRIOR ENDORSEMENTS AND/OR LACK OF
ENDORSEMENTS GUARANTEED. Without such warranty,
the drawee bank would not have paid on the checks.
No amount of legal jargon can reverse the clear
meaning of the warranty. As the warranty has proven
to be false and inaccurate, the defendant is liable for
any damage arising out of the falsity of its
representation.
- Apropos the matter of forgery in endorsements, this
Court has emphasized that the collecting bank or last
endorser generally suffers the loss because it has the
duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prior
endorsements considering that the act of presenting
the check for payment to the drawee is an assertion
that the party making the presentment has done its
duty to ascertain the genuineness of the endorsements.
If the drawee-bank discovers that the signature of the
payee was forged after it has paid the amount of the
check to the holder thereof, it can recover the amount
paid from the collecting bank. However, the point that
comes uppermost is whether the drawee bank was
negligent in failing to discover the alteration or the
forgery.
- The general rule under Section 23 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law is to the effect that a forged signature
is "wholly inoperative", and payment made "through or
under such signature" is ineffectual or does not
discharge the instrument. The exception to this rule is
when the party relying in the forgery is "precluded from
setting up the forgery or want of authority. In this
jurisdiction we recognize negligence of the party
invoking forgery as an exception to the general rule.
- In the present petition the payee's names in the
checks were forged. Following the general rule, the
checks are "wholly inoperative" and of no effect.
However, the underlying circumstances of the case
show that the general rule on forgery is not applicable.
The issue as to who between the parties should bear
the loss in the payment of the forged checks
necessities the determination of the rights and
liabilities of the parties involved in the controversy in
relation to the forged checks.
A2010 - 31 -
- The records show that petitioner BPI as drawee bank
and respondent CBC as representing or collecting bank
were both negligent resulting in the encashment of the
forged checks.
- The Arbitration Committee in its decision analyzed the
negligence of the employees of petitioner BPI involved
in the processing of the pre-termination of Eligia G.
Fernando's money market placement and in the
issuance and delivery of the subject checks in this wise:
a) The impostor could have been readily unmasked by
a mere telephone call, which nobody in BPI bothered to
make to Eligia G. Fernando, a vice-president of
Philamlife; b) The officer who used to handle Eligia G.
Fernando's account did not do anything about the
account's pre-termination; c) Again no verification
appears to have been made on Eligia G. Fernando's
purported signature on the letter requesting the pre-
termination and the letter authorizing her niece to pick-
up the checks, yet, her signature was in BPI's file; and
d) Another step that could have foiled the fraud, but
which BPI neglected to take, was requiring before the
two checks in controversy were delivered, the
surrender of the promissory note evidencing the money
market placement that was supposedly pre-terminated.
The Arbitration Committee, however, belittled
petitioner BPI's negligence compared to that of
respondent CBC which it declared as graver and the
proximate cause of the loss of the subject checks to the
impostor who impersonated Eligia G. Fernando.
- The PCHC Board of Directors, however, stated that
“these withdrawals, without any further showing that
the CBC employees ‘had actual knowledge of the
infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts’ (Sec. 56,
Negotiable Instruments Law) that their action in
accepting their checks for deposit and allowing the
withdrawals against the same ‘amounted to bad faith’
cannot be considered as basis for holding CBC liable.”
- Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of
pesos. By the very nature of their work the degree of
responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of
their employees and officials is far greater than those
of ordinary clerks and employees. For obvious reasons,
the banks are expected to exercise the highest degree
of diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees.
- In the present case, there is no question that the
banks were negligent in the selection and supervision
of their employees. The Arbitration Committee, the
PCHC Board of Directors and the lower court, however
disagree in the evaluation of the degree of negligence
of the banks. While the Arbitration Committee declared
the negligence of respondent CBC graver, the PCHC
Board of Directors and the lower courts declared that
petitioner BPI's negligence was graver. To the extent
that the degree of negligence is equated to the
prof. casis
proximate cause of the loss, we rule that the issue as to
whose negligence is graver is relevant. No matter how
many justifications both banks present to avoid
responsibility, they cannot erase the fact that they
were both guilty in not exercising extraordinary
diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees.
2. NO
- The next issue hinges on whose negligence was the
proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks
by an impostor. Petitioner BPI insists that the doctrine
of last clear chance should have been applied
considering the circumstances of this case. Under this
doctrine, where both parties were negligent and such
negligence were not contemporaneous, the person who
has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm
and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences,
without reference to the prior negligence of the other
party.
- Applying these principles, petitioner BPI's reliance on
the doctrine of last clear chance to clear it from liability
is not well-taken. CBC had no prior notice of the fraud
perpetrated by BPI's employees on the pretermination
of Eligia G. Fernando's money market placement.
Moreover, Fernando is not a depositor of CBC. Hence, a
comparison of the signature of Eligia G. Fernando with
that of the impostor Eligia G. Fernando, which
respondent CBC did, could not have resulted in the
discovery of the fraud. Hence, respondent CBC had no
way to discover the fraud at all. In fact the records fail
to show that respondent CBC had knowledge, actual or
implied, of the fraud perpetrated by the impostor and
the employees of BPI.
- BPI further argues that the acts and omissions of
respondent CBC are the cause "that set into motion the
actual and continuous sequence of events that
produced the injury and without which the result would
not have occurred." Petitioner BPI anchors its argument
on its stance that there was "a gap, a hiatus, an
interval between the issuance and delivery of said
checks by petitioner BPI to the impostor and their
actual payment of CBC to the impostor. Petitioner BPI
points out that the gap of one (1) day that elapsed from
its issuance and delivery of the checks to the impostor
is material on the issue of proximate cause. At this
stage, according to petitioner BPI, there was yet no loss
and the impostor could have decided to desist from
completing the same plan and could have held to the
checks without negotiating them.
- Petitioner BPI's contention that CBC alone should bear
the loss must fail. The gap of one (1) day between the
issuance and delivery of the checks bearing the
impostor's name as payee and the impostor's
negotiating the said forged checks by opening an
account and depositing the same with respondent CBC
torts & damages
is not controlling. It is not unnatural or unexpected that
after taking the risk of impersonating Eligia G.
Fernando with the connivance of BPI's employees, the
impostor would complete her deception by encashing
the forged checks. There is therefore, greater reason to
rule that the proximate cause of the payment of the
forged checks by an impostor was due to the
negligence of petitioner BPI. This finding,
notwithstanding, we are not inclined to rule that
petitioner BPI must solely bear the loss of
P2,413,215.16, the total amount of the two (2) forged
checks. Due care on the part of CBC could have
prevented any loss.
- The Court cannot ignore the fact that the CBC
employees closed their eyes to the suspicious
circumstances of huge over-the-counter withdrawals
made immediately after the account was opened. The
opening of the account itself was accompanied by
inexplicable acts clearly showing negligence. And while
we do not apply the last clear chance doctrine as
controlling in this case, still the CBC employees had
ample opportunity to avoid the harm which befell both
CBC and BPI. They let the opportunity slip by when the
ordinary prudence expected of bank employees would
have sufficed to seize it.
- Both banks were negligent in the selection and
supervision of their employees resulting in the
encashment of the forged checks by an impostor. Both
banks were not able to overcome the presumption of
negligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees. It was the gross negligence of the
employees of both banks which resulted in the fraud
and the subsequent loss. While it is true that petitioner
BPI's negligence may have been the proximate cause of
the loss, respondent CBC's negligence contributed
equally to the success of the impostor in encashing the
proceeds of the forged checks. Under these
circumstances, we apply Article 2179 of the Civil Code
to the effect that while respondent CBC may recover its
losses, such losses are subject to mitigation by the
courts.
Disposition The questioned Decision and Resolution
are MODIFIED. BPI shall be responsible for 60% while
CBC shall share 40% of the loss of P2,413,215.16
E.M. WRIGHT V MANILA ELECTRIC R.R.
& LIGHT CO.
28 Phil 122
MORELAND; October 1, 1914
NATURE
An action to recover damages for injuries sustained in
an accident
A2010 - 32 -
FACTS
- Defendant Manila Electric is a corporation engaged in
operating an electric street railway
- Plaintiff’s residence in Caloocan fronts on the street
along which defendant’s tracks run. To enter his
premises from the street, plaintiff must cross
defendant’s tracks.
- One night, plaintiff drove home in a calesa and, in
crossing the tracks to enter his premises, the horse
stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, throwing the
plaintiff from the vehicle and causing injuries
- At the point where plaintiff crossed the tracks, the
rails were above-gruond, and the ties upon which the
rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their
depth out of the ground, making the tops of the rails
some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of the
street.
- It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in
maintaining its tracks, but defendant claims the
plaintiff was also negligent in that he was so
intoxicated, and such intoxication was the primary
cause of the accident
- Trial court held that both parties were negligent, but
that plaintiff’s negligence was not as great as
defendant’s, awarded plaintiff P1,000.
ISSUE
WON the negligence of plaintiff contributed to the
“principal occurrence” or “only to his own injury.” (If
the former, he cannot recover; if the latter, the trial
court was correct in apportioning damages)
HELD
NO
Ratio Intoxication in itself is not negligence. It is but a
circumstance to be considered with the other evidence
tending to prove negligence.
Reasoning
- Intoxication in itself is not negligence, and no facts,
other than the fact that Wright was intoxicated, are
stated which warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff
was negligent. The conclusion that if he had been sober
he would not have been injured is not warranted by the
facts as found. It is impossible to say that a sober man
would not have fallen from the vehicle under the
conditions described.
- A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the
rails but a portion of the ties themselves aboveground,
stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling,
the vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as
to break a wheel, might be sufficient to throw a person
from the vehicle no matter what his condition; and to
conclude that, under such circumstances, a sober man
would not have fallen while a drunken man did, is to
prof. casis
draw a conclusion which enters the realm of
speculation and guesswork.
DISPOSITION Plaintiff not negligent. No facts to merit
a higher award of damages to plaintiff.
US V BAGGAY
20 PHIL 142
TORRES; September 1, 1911
NATURE
Appeal by the defendant from the judgment rendered
on April 28, 1910, whereby he was declared exempt
from criminal liability but was obliged to indemnify the
heirs if the murdered woman, Bil-liingan, in the sum of
P1,000, to pay the costs in the case and to be confined
in an institution for the insane until further order of the
court.
FACTS
- About the 4th of October, 1909, several persons were
assembled in the defendant's house in the township of
Penarrubia, Abra, Province of Ilocos Sur, for the
purpose of holding a song service called "buni"
according to the Tinguian custom, when he, the non-
Christian Baggay, without provocation suddenly
attacked the woman Bil-liingan with a bolo, inflicting a
serious wound on her head from which she expired
immediately; and with the same bolo he like wise
inflicted various wounds on the women named
Calabayan, Agueng, Quisamay, Calapini, and on his
own mother, named Dioalan.
- For this reason the provincial fiscal filed a complaint
in the court of Ilocos Sur, dated February 15, charging
the non-Christian Baggay, jr., with murder, because of
the violent death of the woman Bil-liingan. This cause
was instituted separately from the other, No. 1109, for
lesiones. After trial and proof that the defendant was
suffering from mental aberration, the judge on April 28
rendered the judgment cited above, whereupon the
defendant's counsel appealed to this court.
ISSUE
WON an insane person, exempt from criminal liability
can still be civilly liable
HELD
YES
Ratio Civil liability accompanies criminal liability,
because every person liable criminally for a crime or
misdemeanor is also liable for reparation of damage
and for indemnification of the harm done, but there
may be civil liability because of acts ordinarily
punishable, although the law has declared their
perpetrators exempt from criminal liability.
torts & damages
Reasoning
- Such is the case of a lunatic or insane person who, in
spite of his irresponsibility on account of the deplorable
condition of his deranged mind, is still reasonably and
justly liable with his property for the consequences of
his acts, even though they be performed unwittingly,
for the reason that his fellows ought not to suffer for
the disastrous results of his harmful acts more than is
necessary, in spite of his unfortunate condition. Law
and society are under obligation to protect him during
his illness and so when he is declared to be liable with
his property for reparation and indemnification, he is
still entitled to the benefit of what is necessary for his
decent maintenance, but this protection does not
exclude liability for damage caused to those who may
have the misfortune to suffer the consequences of his
acts.
- Article 17 of the Penal Code states:
Every person criminally liable for a crime or
misdemeanor is also civilly liable.
- Article 18 of the same code says:
The exemption from criminal liability declared in Nos.
1, 2, 3, 7, and 10 of article 8 does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced,
subject to the following:
(1) In cases 1, 2, and 3, the persons who are civilly
liable for acts committed by a lunatic or imbecile, or
a person under 9 years of age, or over this age and
under 15, who has not acted with the exercise of
judgment, are those who have them under their
authority, legal guardianship or power, unless they
prove that there was no blame or negligence on their
part.
Should there be no person having them under his
authority, legal guardian, or power, if such person be
insolvent, the said lunatics, imbeciles, or minors shall
answer with their own property, excepting that part
which is exempted for their support in accordance
with the civil law.
DISPOSITION Therefore, the judgment appealed from
being in accordance with law, affirmation thereof is
proper, and it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant.
AMEDO V RIO
[citation]
CONCEPCION; May 24, 1954
FACTS
- This case was instituted on October 18, 1950. In her
original complaint, plaintiff Elena Amedo sought to
collect from defendant Rio y Olabarrieta, Inc., the sum
of P2,038.40 as compensation for the death of her son,
Filomeno Managuit, who worked for the defendant as a
A2010 - 33 -
seaman of the M/S Pilar II. The main allegation of said
original complaint was:
“That on May 27, 1949 at about 11:30 o'clock in the
morning, while the deceased Filomeno Managuit was
on board M/S "Pilar II" as such seaman, he jumped into
the water to retrieve a 2-peso bill belonging to him, and
as a consequence of which, he was drowned.”
- this however was dismissed due to lack of a cause of
action which defendant filed stating that the allegation
does not show that the death of plaintiff's son was due
to an "accident arising out of and in the course of
employment,".
- she was allowed to file an amended complaint which
was remanded to the trial court.
- her amended complaint stated: “That on May 27,
1949, at or about 11:30 o'clock in the morning while
the said Filomeno Managuit was in the course of his
employment, performing his duties as such ordinary
seaman on defendant's M/S "Pilar II", which was
anchored then about 1 1/2 miles from the seashore of
Arceli Dumarang, Palawan, his two-peso bill was blown
by the breeze into the sea and in his effort to retrieve
the same from the waters he was drowned.
ISSUE
WON Amedo could claim compensation from employer
Rio
HELD
NO
- Plaintiff’s basis for appeal is the Workmen’s
Compensation Act. Sections 2 and 4 of which:
Sec. 2. Grounds for compensation. — When any
employee receives a personal injury from any accident
arising out of and in the course of the employment, or
contracts any illness directly caused by such
employment, or the result of the nature of such
employment, his employer shall pay compensation in
the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified.
Sec. 4. Injuries not covered. — Compensation shall not
be allowed for injuries caused (1) by the voluntary
intent of the employee to inflict such injury upon
himself or another person; (2) by drunkenness on the
part of the laborer who had the accident; (3) by
notorious negligence of the same.
- from these provisions three conditions are essential to
hold an employer liable. These are: (1) the accident
must arise out of the employment; (2) it must happen
in the course of the employment; and (3) it must not be
caused by the "notorious negligence" of the employee.
Point in question is whether the accident was
committed under these 3 conditions
- "The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause
of the accident and are descriptive of its character,
while the words `in the course of' refer to the time,
prof. casis
place, and circumstances under which the accident
takes place
- it may be conceded that the death of Filomeno took
place "in the course of" his employment, in that it
happened at the "time" when, and at the "place"
where-according to the amended complaint-he was
working. However, the accident which produced this
tragic result did not "arise out of" his employment. The
blowing of his 2-peso bill may have grown out of, or
arisen from, his employment. It was the result of a risk
peculiar to his work as a seaman or incidental to such
work. But, his death was the consequence of his
decision to jump into the water to retrieve said bill. The
hazardous nature of this act was not due specially to
the nature of his employment. It was a risk to which
any person on board the M/S Pilar II, such as a
passenger thereof or an ordinary visitor, would have
been exposed had he, likewise, jumped into the sea, as
Filomeno had.
- was the accident caused by Filomeno’s “notorious
negligence”?
- "notorious negligence" has been held to be
tantamount to "gross negligence", which, in turn, has
been defined as follows:
- By gross negligence is meant "such entire want of
care as to raise a presumption that the person in fault
is conscious of the probable consequences of
carelessness, and is indifferent, or worse, to the danger
of injury to person or property of others." (Wall vs.
Cameron [1882] 6 Colo., 275; see, also, The Law
Governing Labor Disputes in the Philippines by
Francisco, 2nd ed., p. 877.)
- It cannot be denied that in jumping into the sea, one
mile and a half from the seashore of Arceli, Dumarang,
Palawan, Filomeno failed to exercise "even slight care
and diligence," that he displayed a "reckless disregard
of the safety" of his person, that he could not have
been but conscious of the probable consequences" of
his carelessness and that he was "indifferent, or worse,
to the danger of injury.
- case provides for other jurisprudence which describe
instances of gross negligence attributable to employee
(see case).
- this is distinguishable from cases wherein the act
done is not dangerous per se such as when an
employee drops a cigarette on the pavement and picks
it up. So, also, if, while Filomeno Managuit was working,
his 2-peso bill merely fell from his pocket, and as he
picked up the bill from the floor something accidentally
fell upon him and injured him, he would surely be
entitled to compensation, his act being obviously
innocent.
- since the act done by Filomeno was dangerous, his
accident could be attributed to his gross negligence.
torts & damages A2010 - 34 - prof. casis
MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS V - Mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride not function with my many attempts. I have (sic) found
thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. It couldn't be, out later that the fluid pipe on the rear right was cut
WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION
because transportation by truck is not dangerous per that's why the breaks did not function.”
COMMISSION se. - Plaintiff points to the negligence of the defendant
99 PHIL 48 - Although the employer prohibited its employees to driver while Isidro points to the driver of parked truck
BENGZON; June 30, 1956 ride the haulage trucks, its violation does not constitute as negligent, and says that absent such proof of care, it
negligence per se, but it may be an evidence of would, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, evoke
negligence. the presumption of negligence on the part of the driver
NATURE
- Under the circumstance, however, it cannot be of the parked cargo truck as well as his helper, the
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the WCC
declared negligence because the proibition had nothing petitioner herein, who was fixing the flat tire of the said
to do with the personal safety of the riders. truck.
FACTS
- Notorious negligence means the same as gross
- A truck driven by Procopio Macunat, belonging to
negligence which implies "conscious indifferenece to ISSUES
Marinduque, turned over and hit a coconut tree
consequences", "pursuing a course of conduct which 1. WON defendant driver Serrano was negligent
resulting in the death of Pedro Mamador and injury to
would naturally and probably result in injury". 2. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this
the other laborers.
Disposition Award for compensation by WCC affirmed case
- Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and was
sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. He
has paid nothing, however, to the latter. LAYUGAN V IAC HELD
1 NO
- Deceased’s wife now seeks compensation by 167 SCRA 363
- (Procedural) Ratio Findings of fact are entitled to
Marinduque as the employer. SARMIENTO; November 14, 1968 great respect and will not ordinarily be disturbed by
this Court unless it falls down under the exceptions
ISSUE
NATURE provided by the Court to merit review of the facts.
1. WON Mamador has a right to compensation by
Petition for review on certiorari of IAC decision Reasoning
Marinduque
- This is a question of fact. But this case is an exception
2. WON there was notorious negligence by the
FACTS since: 1) the finding are grounded entirely on
deceased for having violated the employer’s prohibition
- Plaintiff Pedro Layugan testified that while in speculation, surmise, or conjecture; 2) the inference
to ride haulage trucks
Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, he and a companion were made is manifestly mistaken, 3) the judgment is based
repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked on misapprehension of facts; 4) CA findings are
along the right side of the National Highway. contrary to those of the trial court; 5) the said findings
Defendant's truck driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was evidence on which they are based; and 6) when the
injured and hospitalized. Due to said injuries, his left leg findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
HELD
was amputated so he had to use crutches to walk. the absence of evidence and are contradicted on
1. YES
- Defendant Godofredo Isidro admitted his ownership of record. Hence, SC entertained review of the factual
- Petitioner alleges that the criminal case sentencing
the vehicle involved in the accident driven by Daniel question.
Macunat to indemnify the heirs of the deceased was a
Serrano. Defendant said that the plaintiff was merely a - (Substantive) Ratio The test by which to determine
suit for damages against a third person, thereby having
bystander, not a truck helper being a brother-in-law law the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
the effect of releasing the employer from liability.
of the driver of said truck; that the truck allegedly stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the
- The criminal case, however, was not a suit for
being repaired was parked, occupying almost half of alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
damages against third persons because the heirs did
the right lane towards Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, right caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have
not intervene therein and they have not received the
after the curve; that the proximate cause of the used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
indemnity ordered by the court.
incident was the failure of the driver of the parked truck negligence.
- At any rate, even if the case was against a third
in installing the early warning device, Reasoning
person, the court already decided in Nava vs. Inchausti
- Daniel Serrano, defendant driver, said that he knew [1] Negligence defined. Negligence is the omission to
that criminal prosection of the "other person" does not
the responsibilities of a driver; that before leaving, he do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
affect the liability of the employer.
checked the truck. The truck owner used to instruct him considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
- Petitioner also contends that the amicable settlement
to be careful in driving. He bumped the truck being human affairs, would do, or the doing of something
entered into by Mamador's widow and Macunat barred
repaired by Pedro Layugan, plaintiff, while the same which a prudent and reasonable man would not do
the widow's claim against the employer because she
was at a stop position. From the evidence presented, it [2] Applying the definition and the test, it is clear that
has already elected one of the remedies.
has been established clearly that the injuries sustained the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been
- This contention cannot be sustained because what the
by the plaintiff was caused by defendant's driver, established by clear and convincing evidence. Whether
widow waived was the offender's criminal proscution
Daniel Serrano. Serrano also testified that, “When I was cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the
and not all civil action for damages.
a few meters away, I saw the truck which was loaded shoulder of the road is immaterial taking into account
2. NO
with round logs. I stepped on my foot brakes but it did the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene
torts & damages
lamp placed 3-4m from the back of the truck. But
despite this warning, the Isuzu truck driven by Serrano,
still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a
direct consequence of such accident Layugan sustained
injuries on his left forearm and left foot.
2. NO
Note that for our purposes this was not raised as an
issue in this case. Therefore this only Obiter Dicta. But
as far as we’re concerned and relevant to our
discussion in the outline, I formulated it in an issue-
type. This is what the Court actually said in the case to
prove its just obiter, and its relevant to the main issue
on negligence: “At this juncture, it may be enlightening
and helpful in the proper resolution of the issue of
negligence to examine the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur.
“ private respondents.
Obiter
[1] What is the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur? Two ways
to put it:
(a) This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which
causes injury is shown to be under the management of
the defendant, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who
have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation
by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of
care, and
(b) According to Black’s Law dictionary, “Res ipsa
loquitur. The thing speaks for itself Rebuttable
presumption or inference that defendant was negligent,
which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing
injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the
accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in
absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of
evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer
may be inferred from mere fact that accident happened
provided character of accident and circumstances
attending it lead reasonably to belief that in absence of
negligence it would not have occurred and that thing
which caused injury is shown to have been under
management and control of alleged wrongdoer.”
[2] In our jurisdiction, and the way we apply it in cases,
particularly in the law of negligence: Res ipsa loquitur
as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of
negligence which recognizes that prima facie
negligence may be established without direct proof and
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.
The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely
a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The
doctrine merely determines and regulates what shall be
prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden
of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care.
The doctrine can be invoked when and only when,
under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is
absent and not readily available. So, it is inapplicable
A2010 - 35 -
where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents
evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is
the cause of the injury, or where there’s direct
evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all
the facts and circumstances attendant on the
occurrence clearly appear. And once the actual cause
of injury is established beyond controversy, no
presumptions will be involved and the doctrine
becomes inapplicable when the circumstances show
that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably
be made, whatever the source of the evidence.
In this case it is inapplicable because it was established
by clear and convincing evidence the negligence of the
defendant driver.
Disposition Petition GRANTED with costs against
RAMOS V CA
[citation]
KAPUNAN; December 29, 1999
NATURE
Petition For Certiorari
FACTS
- In the case at bar, the Court is called upon to rule
whether a surgeon, an anesthesiologist and a hospital
should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose
condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy.
- Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was a robust woman except for
occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains
allegedly caused by the presence of a stone in her gall
bladder she was as normal as any other woman.
Because the discomforts somehow interfered with her
normal ways, she sought professional advice. She was
advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a
stone in her gall bladdershe underwent a series of
examinations which included blood and urine tests
which indicated she was fit for surgery. She and her
husband Rogelio met for the first time Dr. Orlino
Hozaka, one of the defendants in this case, on June 10,
1985. They agreed that their date at the operating
table at the De Los Santos Medical Center, would be on
June 17, 1985 at 9:00 A.M.. Dr. Hosaka decided that
she should undergo a “cholecystectomy” operation
after examining the documents presented to him.
Rogelio E. Ramos, however, asked Dr. Hosaka to look
for a good anesthesiologist. Dr. Hosaka, in turn,
assured Rogelio that he will get a good
anesthesiologist. She was admitted in the hospital and
was with her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, who was the
Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical
Center, was also there for moral support. After praying,
she was given injections. At the operating room,
prof. casis
Herminda saw about two or three nurses and Dr.
Perfecta Gutierrez, the other defendant, who was to
administer anesthesia. Although not a member of the
hospital staff, Herminda introduced herself as Dean of
the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center
who was to provide moral support to the patient, to
them. Herminda was allowed to stay inside the
operating room.
- Hours later at about 12:15 P.M., Herminda Cruz, who
was inside the operating room with the patient, heard
somebody say that “Dr. Hosaka is already here.” She
then saw people inside the operating room “moving,
doing this and that, [and] preparing the patient for the
operation”. As she held the hand of Erlinda Ramos, she
then saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the hapless patient.
She thereafter heard Dr. Gutierrez say, “ang hirap ma-
intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki
ang tiyan” (id., p. 17). Because of the remarks of Dra.
Gutierrez, she focused her attention on what Dr.
Gutierrez was doing. She thereafter noticed bluish
discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of the
hapless Erlinda even as Dr. Hosaka approached her.
She then heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone
to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist. After Dr.
Calderon arrived at the operating room, she saw this
anesthesiologist trying to intubate the patient. The
patient’s nailbed became bluish and the patient was
placed in a trendelenburg position. Immediately
thereafter, she went out of the operating room, and she
told Rogelio E. Ramos “that something wrong was x x x
happening”. Dr. Calderon was then able to intubate the
patient.
- Herminda Cruz immediately rushed back, and saw
that the patient was still in trendelenburg position. At
almost 3:00 P.M. of that fateful day, she saw the
patient taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU).
- Doctors Gutierrez and Hosaka were also asked by the
hospital to explain what happened to the patient. The
doctors explained that the patient had bronchospasm.
Erlinda Ramos stayed for about four months in the
hospital, she incurred hospital bills amounting to
P93,542.25. She has been in a comatose condition.
After being discharged from the hospital, she has been
staying in their residence, still needing constant
medical attention, with her husband Rogelio incurring a
monthly expense ranging from P8,000.00 to
P10,000.00. She was also diagnosed to be suffering
from “diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage”.
- Petitioners filed a civil case for damages with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against herein
private respondents alleging negligence in the
management and care of Erlinda Ramos.
- During the trial, both parties presented evidence as to
the possible cause of Erlinda’s injury. Plaintiff
presented the testimonies of Dean Herminda Cruz and
torts & damages
Dr. Mariano Gavino to prove that the damage sustained
by Erlinda was due to lack of oxygen in her brain
caused by the faulty management of her airway by
private respondents during the anesthesia phase. On
the other hand, private respondents primarily relied on
the expert testimony of Dr. Eduardo Jamora, a
pulmonologist, to the effect that the cause of brain
damage was Erlinda’s allergic reaction to the
anesthetic agent, Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal).
- Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners. Court of Appeals reversed.
- The decision of the Court of Appeals was received on
9 June 1995 by petitioner Rogelio Ramos who was
mistakenly addressed as “Atty. Rogelio Ramos.” No
copy of the decision, however, was sent nor received
by the Coronel Law Office, then counsel on record of
petitioners. Rogelio referred the decision of the
appellate court to a new lawyer, Atty. Ligsay, only on
20 June 1995, or four (4) days before the expiration of
the reglementary period for filing a motion for
reconsideration. On the same day, Atty. Ligsay, filed
with the appellate court a motion for extension of time
to file a motion for reconsideration. The motion for
reconsideration was submitted on 4 July 1995.
However, the appellate court denied the motion for
extension of time in its Resolution dated 25 July 1995.
Meanwhile petitioners engaged the services of another
counsel, Atty. Sillano, to replace Atty. Ligsay. Atty.
Sillano filed on 7 August 1995 a motion to admit the
motion for reconsideration contending that the period
to file the appropriate pleading on the assailed decision
had not yet commenced to run as the Division Clerk of
Court of the Court of Appeals had not yet served a copy
thereof to the counsel on record. Despite this
explanation, the appellate court still denied the motion
to admit the motion for reconsideration of petitioners in
its Resolution, dated 29 March 1996, primarily on the
ground that the fifteen-day (15) period for filing a
motion for reconsideration had already expired.
- A copy of the above resolution was received by Atty.
Sillano on 11 April 1996. The next day, or on 12 April
1996, Atty. Sillano filed before this Court a motion for
extension of time to file the present petition for
certiorari under Rule 45. The Court granted the motion
for extension of time and gave petitioners additional
thirty (30) days after the expiration of the fifteen-day
(15) period counted from the receipt of the resolution
of the Court of Appeals within which to submit the
petition. The due date fell on 27 May 1996. The
petition was filed on 9 May 1996, well within the
extended period given by the Court.
ISSUES
1. WON it should be dismissed for being filed later than
allowable 15 day period for the filing of the Motion for
A2010 - 36 -
Reconsideration
2. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable
3. WON the Court of Appeals erred in finding that
private respondents were not negligent in the care of
Erlinda during the anesthesia phase of the operation
and, if in the affirmative, whether the alleged
negligence was the proximate cause of Erlinda’s
comatose condition. Corollary thereto, we shall also
determine if the Court of Appeals erred in relying on
the testimonies of the witnesses for the private
respondents
4. What is the cost for the damages
HELD
1. NO
- A careful review of the records reveals that the reason
behind the delay in filing the motion for reconsideration
is attributable to the fact that the decision of the Court
of Appeals was not sent to then counsel on record of
petitioners, the Coronel Law Office. In fact, a copy of
the decision of the appellate court was instead sent to
and received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos on 9 June
1995 wherein he was mistakenly addressed as Atty.
Rogelio Ramos. Based on the other communications
received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos, the appellate
court apparently mistook him for the counsel on record.
Thus, no copy of the decision of the appellate court was
furnished to the counsel on record. Petitioner, not
being a lawyer and unaware of the prescriptive period
for filing a motion for reconsideration, referred the
same to a legal counsel only on 20 June 1995.
- It is elementary that when a party is represented by
counsel, all notices should be sent to the party’s lawyer
at his given address. With a few exceptions, notice to a
litigant without notice to his counsel on record is no
notice at all. In the present case, since a copy of the
decision of the appellate court was not sent to the
counsel on record of petitioner, there can be no
sufficient notice to speak of. Hence, the delay in the
filing of the motion for reconsideration cannot be taken
against petitioner. Moreover, since the Court of
Appeals already issued a second Resolution, dated 29
March 1996, which superseded the earlier resolution
issued on 25 July 1995, and denied the motion for
reconsideration of petitioner, we believe that the
receipt of the former should be considered in
determining the timeliness of the filing of the present
petition. Based on this, the petition before us was
submitted on time.
2. YES
- We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in
the case at bar. As will hereinafter be explained, the
damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a
scheduled gall bladder operation presents a case for
the application of res ipsa loquitur.
prof. casis
- Considering that a sound and unaffected member of
the body (the brain) is injured or destroyed while the
patient is unconscious and under the immediate and
exclusive control of the physicians, we hold that a
practical administration of justice dictates the
application of res ipsa loquitur. Upon these facts and
under these circumstances the Court would be able to
say, as a matter of common knowledge and
observation, if negligence attended the management
and care of the patient. Moreover, the liability of the
physicians and the hospital in this case is not
predicated upon an alleged failure to secure the desired
results of an operation nor on an alleged lack of skill in
the diagnosis or treatment as in fact no operation or
treatment was ever performed on Erlinda. Thus, upon
all these initial determination a case is made out for the
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
- Nonetheless, in holding that res ipsa loquitur is
available to the present case we are not saying that the
doctrine is applicable in any and all cases where injury
occurs to a patient while under anesthesia, or to any
and all anesthesia cases. Each case must be viewed in
its own light and scrutinized in order to be within the
res ipsa loquitur coverage.
- Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally
means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.”
The phrase “res ipsa loquitur” is a maxim for the rule
that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with
the surrounding circumstances, may permit an
inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make
out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an
explanation. Where the thing which caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the management of
the defendant or his servants and the accident is such
as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those
who have its management or control use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose
from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care.
- The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a
recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of
common knowledge and experience, the very nature of
certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of
negligence on the part of the person who controls the
instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of
some explanation by the defendant who is charged with
negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of
ordinary human experience and on the basis of such
experience or common knowledge, negligence may be
deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident
itself. Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction
with the doctrine of common knowledge.
- However, much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is
not a rule of substantive law and, as such, does not
torts & damages
create or constitute an independent or separate ground
of liability. Instead, it is considered as merely
evidentiary or in the nature of a procedural rule. It is
regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere procedural
convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and
relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific
proof of negligence. In other words, mere invocation
and application of the doctrine does not dispense with
the requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a
step in the process of such proof, permitting the
plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident,
enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the
doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of
negligence, and to thereby place on the defendant the
burden of going forward with the proof. Still, before
resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the following
requisites must be satisfactorily shown:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not
occur in the absence of someone’s negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which
would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
- In the above requisites, the fundamental element is
the “control of the instrumentality” which caused the
damage. Such element of control must be shown to be
within the dominion of the defendant. In order to have
the benefit of the rule, a plaintiff, in addition to proving
injury or damage, must show a situation where it is
applicable, and must establish that the essential
elements of the doctrine were present in a particular
incident.
- In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the
court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon
proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of
expert testimony, where the court from its fund of
common knowledge can determine the proper standard
of care. Where common knowledge and experience
teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to
the patient if due care had been exercised, an
inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without
medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show
not only what occurred but how and why it occurred.
When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient
must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or
omission complained of and the injury sustained while
under the custody and management of the defendant
without need to produce expert medical testimony to
establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa
loquitur is allowed because there is no other way,
under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the
patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.
- It does not automatically apply to all cases of medical
negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof
A2010 - 37 -
to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the
ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or
ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to
be cautiously applied, depending upon the
circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to
situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able
to say, as a matter of common knowledge and
observation, that the consequences of professional
care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed
if due care had been exercised. A distinction must be
made between the failure to secure results, and the
occurrence of something more unusual and not
ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered
followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that
particular practice. It must be conceded that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in
a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the
merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The
physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to
explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or
why any particular scientific treatment did not produce
the desired result. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not
available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is
that the desired result of an operation or treatment was
not accomplished. The real question, therefore, is
whether or not in the process of the operation any
extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the
routine performance occurred which is beyond the
regular scope of customary professional activity in such
operations, which, if unexplained would themselves
reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent
cause or causes of the untoward consequence. If there
was such extraneous interventions, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is
called upon to explain the matter, by evidence of
exculpation, if he could.
3. YES
- The CA commited a reversible error. Private
respondents were unable to disprove the presumption
of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and
their negligence was the proximate cause of her
piteous condition.
- Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient.
In the case at bar, respondent Dra. Gutierrez admitted
that she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the
operation itself, on 17 June 1985. Before this date, no
prior consultations with, or pre-operative evaluation of
Erlinda was done by her. Until the day of the operation,
respondent Dra. Gutierrez was unaware of the
physiological make-up and needs of Erlinda. She was
likewise not properly informed of the possible
difficulties she would face during the administration of
anesthesia to Erlinda. Respondent Dra. Gutierrez’ act
of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour
before the scheduled operative procedure was,
prof. casis
therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and
professional irresponsibility. The measures cautioning
prudence and vigilance in dealing with human lives lie
at the core of the physician’s centuries-old Hippocratic
Oath. Her failure to follow this medical procedure is,
therefore, a clear indicia of her negligence.
- Private respondents repeatedly hammered the view
that the cerebral anoxia which led to Erlinda’s coma
was due to bronchospasm mediated by her allergic
response to the drug, Thiopental Sodium, introduced
into her system. Towards this end, they presented Dr.
Jamora, a Fellow of the Philippine College of Physicians
and Diplomate of the Philippine Specialty Board of
Internal Medicine, who advanced private respondents'
theory that the oxygen deprivation which led to anoxic
encephalopathy, was due to an unpredictable drug
reaction to the short-acting barbiturate. We find the
theory of private respondents unacceptable.
- First of all, Dr. Jamora cannot be considered an
authority in the field of anesthesiology simply because
he is not an anesthesiologist. Since Dr. Jamora is a
pulmonologist, he could not have been capable of
properly enlightening the court about anesthesia
practice and procedure and their complications. Dr.
Jamora is likewise not an allergologist and could not
therefore properly advance expert opinion on allergic-
mediated processes. Moreover, he is not a
pharmacologist and, as such, could not have been
capable, as an expert would, of explaining to the court
the pharmacologic and toxic effects of the supposed
culprit, Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal).
- An anesthetic accident caused by a rare drug-induced
bronchospasm properly falls within the fields of
anesthesia, internal medicine-allergy, and clinical
pharmacology. The resulting anoxic encephalopathy
belongs to the field of neurology. On the basis of the
foregoing transcript, in which the pulmonologist himself
admitted that he could not testify about the drug with
medical authority, it is clear that the appellate court
erred in giving weight to Dr. Jamora’s testimony as an
expert in the administration of Thiopental Sodium.
- Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. An
injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a
failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in
the case, that the act or omission played a substantial
part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or
damage; and that the injury or damage was either a
direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of
the act or omission. It is the dominant, moving or
producing cause.
- Respondent Dr. Hosaka’s negligence can be found in
his failure to exercise the proper authority (as the
torts & damages
“captain” of the operative team) in not determining if
his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia
protocols. In fact, no evidence on record exists to show
that respondent Dr. Hosaka verified if respondent Dra.
Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. Furthermore,
it does not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had
scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at
the same time as Erlinda’s cholecystectomy, and was in
fact over three hours late for the latter’s operation.
Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with
his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.
This indicates that he was remiss in his professional
duties towards his patient. Thus, he shares equal
responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda’s
condition.
- We now discuss the responsibility of the hospital in
this particular incident. The unique practice (among
private hospitals) of filling up specialist staff with
attending and visiting “consultants,” who are allegedly
not hospital employees, presents problems in
apportioning responsibility for negligence in medical
malpractice cases. However, the difficulty is only more
apparent than real.
- In the first place, hospitals exercise significant control
in the hiring and firing of consultants and in the
conduct of their work within the hospital premises.
Doctors who apply for “consultant” slots, visiting or
attending, are required to submit proof of completion of
residency, their educational qualifications; generally,
evidence of accreditation by the appropriate board
(diplomate), evidence of fellowship in most cases, and
references. These requirements are carefully
scrutinized by members of the hospital administration
or by a review committee set up by the hospital who
either accept or reject the application. This is
particularly true with respondent hospital.
- After a physician is accepted, either as a visiting or
attending consultant, he is normally required to attend
clinico-pathological conferences, conduct bedside
rounds for clerks, interns and residents, moderate
grand rounds and patient audits and perform other
tasks and responsibilities, for the privilege of being able
to maintain a clinic in the hospital, and/or for the
privilege of admitting patients into the hospital. In
addition to these, the physician’s performance as a
specialist is generally evaluated by a peer review
committee on the basis of mortality and morbidity
statistics, and feedback from patients, nurses, interns
and residents. A consultant remiss in his duties, or a
consultant who regularly falls short of the minimum
standards acceptable to the hospital or its peer review
committee, is normally politely terminated.
- In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and
exercise real control over their attending and visiting
“consultant” staff. While “consultants” are not,
A2010 - 38 -
technically employees, a point which respondent
hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the
patient’s condition, the control exercised, the hiring,
and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the
important hallmarks of an employer-employee
relationship, with the exception of the payment of
wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact
exists, the control test is determining. Accordingly, on
the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose
of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases,
an employer-employee relationship in effect exists
between hospitals and their attending and visiting
physicians. This being the case, the question now
arises as to whether or not respondent hospital is
solidarily liable with respondent doctors for petitioner’s
condition.
- The basis for holding an employer solidarily
responsible for the negligence of its employee is found
in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a
person accountable not only for his own acts but also
for those of others based on the former’s responsibility
under a relationship of patria potestas. Such
responsibility ceases when the persons or entity
concerned prove that they have observed the diligence
of a good father of the family to prevent damage. In
other words, while the burden of proving negligence
rests on the plaintiffs, once negligence is shown, the
burden shifts to the respondents (parent, guardian,
teacher or employer) who should prove that they
observed the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
- In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a
general denial of its responsibility over respondent
physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the hiring and supervision of the latter. It failed to
adduce evidence with regard to the degree of
supervision which it exercised over its physicians. In
neglecting to offer such proof, or proof of a similar
nature, respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge
its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180.
Having failed to do this, respondent hospital is
consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians
for Erlinda’s condition.
- Upon these disquisitions we hold that private
respondents are solidarily liable for damages under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
4. Given these considerations, the amount of actual
damages recoverable in suits arising from negligence
should at least reflect the correct minimum cost of
proper care, not the cost of the care the family is
usually compelled to undertake at home to avoid
bankruptcy.
- Art. 2199. - Except as provided by law or by
prof. casis
stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by
him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is
referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
- Our rules on actual or compensatory damages
generally assume that at the time of litigation, the
injury suffered as a consequence of an act of
negligence has been completed and that the cost can
be liquidated. However, these provisions neglect to
take into account those situations, as in this case,
where the resulting injury might be continuing and
possible future complications directly arising from the
injury, while certain to occur, are difficult to predict.
- In these cases, the amount of damages which should
be awarded, if they are to adequately and correctly
respond to the injury caused, should be one which
compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved,
up to the time of trial; and one which would meet
pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which could
not, from the nature of the case, be made with
certainty. In other words, temperate damages can and
should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory
damages in instances where the injury is chronic and
continuing. And because of the unique nature of such
cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual and
temperate damages are provided for. The reason is
that these damages cover two distinct phases.
- As it would not be equitable - and certainly not in the
best interests of the administration of justice - for the
victim in such cases to constantly come before the
courts and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to
the compensatory damages previously awarded -
temperate damages are appropriate. The amount
given as temperate damages, though to a certain
extent speculative, should take into account the cost of
proper care.
- In the instant case, petitioners were able to provide
only home-based nursing care for a comatose patient
who has remained in that condition for over a decade.
Having premised our award for compensatory damages
on the amount provided by petitioners at the onset of
litigation, it would be now much more in step with the
interests of justice if the value awarded for temperate
damages would allow petitioners to provide optimal
care for their loved one in a facility which generally
specializes in such care. They should not be compelled
by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at
home without the aid of professionals, for anything less
would be grossly inadequate. Under the
circumstances, an award of P1,500,000.00 in
temperate damages would therefore be reasonable.
- Meanwhile, the actual physical, emotional and
financial cost of the care of petitioner would be virtually
impossible to quantify. Even the temperate damages
herein awarded would be inadequate if petitioner’s
torts & damages
condition remains unchanged for the next ten years.
- The husband and the children, all petitioners in this
case, will have to live with the day to day uncertainty of
the patient’s illness, knowing any hope of recovery is
close to nil. They have fashioned their daily lives
around the nursing care of petitioner, altering their long
term goals to take into account their life with a
comatose patient. They, not the respondents, are
charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the
victim. The family’s moral injury and suffering in this
case is clearly a real one. For the foregoing reasons, an
award of P2,000,000.00 in moral damages would be
appropriate.
- Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the
amount of P100,000.00 are hereby awarded.
Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we
are of the opinion that attorney’s fees valued at
P100,000.00 are likewise proper.
DISPOSITION the decision and resolution of the
appellate court appealed from are hereby modified so
as to award in favor of petitioners, and solidarily
against private respondents the following: 1)
P1,352,000.00 as actual damages computed as of the
date of promulgation of this decision plus a monthly
payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner
Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2)
P2,000,000.00 as moral damages, 3) P1,500,000.00 as
temperate damages; 4) P100,000.00 each as
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees; and, 5) the
costs of the suit.
BATIQUIN V CA (Villegas)
258 SCRA 334
DAVIDE; July 5, 1996
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals
FACTS
- Mrs. Villegas submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal
care as the latter's private patient sometime before
September 21, 1988. In the morning of September 21,
1988 Dr. Batiquin, along with other physicians and
nurses, performed a caesarian operation on Mrs.
Villegas and successfully delivered the latter’s baby.
- After leaving the hospital, Mrs. Villegas began to
suffer abdominal pains and complained of being
feverish. She also gradually lost her appetite, so she
consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who
prescribed for her certain medicines. However, the
pains still kept recurring. She then consulted Dr. Ma.
Salud Kho. After examining her, Dr Kho suggested that
Mrs. Villegas submit to another surgery.
A2010 - 39 -
- When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas
she found whitish-yellow discharge inside, an ovarian
cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave
out pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece of
rubber material on the right side of the uterus,
embedded on the ovarian cyst. The piece of rubber
appeared to be a part of a rubber glove. This was the
cause of all of the infection of the ovaries and
consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs.
Villegas
- The piece of rubber allegedly found was not presented
in court, and Dr. Kho testified that she sent it to a
pathologist in Cebu City for examination. Aside from Dr.
Kho's testimony, the evidence which mentioned the
piece of rubber are a Medical Certificate, a Progress
Record, an Anesthesia Record, a Nurse's Record, and a
Physician's Discharge Summary. The trial court,
however, regarded these documentary evidence as
mere hearsay, "there being no showing that the person
or persons who prepared them are deceased or unable
to testify on the facts therein stated
- There was also doubts as to the whereabouts of the
piece of rubber, as 2 versions arose from Dr. Kho’s
testimony: 1) that it was sent to the Pathologist in Cebu
as testified to in Court by Dr. Kho and (2) that Dr. Kho
threw it away as told by her to Defendant. The failure of
the Plaintiffs to reconcile these two different versions
served only to weaken their claim against Defendant
Batiquin. The trial court ruled in favor of the
defendants. The CA reversed the decision.
ISSUES
Procedural
WON the court can review questions of fact
Substantive
WON Dr. Batiquin is liable
HELD
Procedural
YES
- While the rule is that only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari, there are
exceptions, among which are when the factual findings
of the trial court and the appellate court conflict, when
the appealed decision is clearly contradicted by the
evidence on record, or when the appellate court
misapprehended the facts
Substantive
- The focal point of the appeal is Dr. Kho’s testimony.
There were inconsistencies within her own testimony,
which led to the different decision of the RTC and CA.
The CA was correct in saying that the trial court erred
when it isolated the disputed portion of Dr. Kho’s
prof. casis
testimony and did not consider it with other portions of
Dr. Kho’s testimony. Also, the phrase relied upon by the
trial court does not negate the fact that Dr. Kho saw a
piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas'
abdomen, and that she sent it to a laboratory and then
to Cebu City for examination by a pathologist.
Furthermore, Dr. Kho's knowledge of the piece of
rubber could not be based on other than first hand
knowledge for, as she asserted before the trial court.
- It is also worth noting that the trial court paid heed to
Dr. Batiquin’s testimony, that there was neither any
tear on Dr. Batiquin's gloves after the operation nor
blood smears on her hands upon removing her gloves.
But the trial court failed to recognized that these were
mere denials or negative testimonies. Well-settled is
the rule that positive testimony is stronger than
negative testimony.
- While the petitioners claim that contradictions and
falsities punctured Dr. Kho's testimony, a reading of the
said testimony reveals no such infirmity and establishes
Dr. Kho as a credible witness. Dr. Kho was frank
throughout her turn on the witness stand.
Furthermore, no motive to state any untruth was ever
imputed against Dr. Kho, leaving her trustworthiness
unimpaired. The trial court's following declaration
shows that while it was critical of the lack of care with
which Dr. Kho handled the piece of rubber, it was not
prepared to doubt Dr. Kho's credibility, thus only
supporting out appraisal of Dr. Kho's trustworthiness.
- Considering that we have assessed Dr. Kho to be a
credible witness, her positive testimony prevails over
the negative testimony in favor of the petitioners. As
such, the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore.
- This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which
causes injury is shown to be under the management of
the defendant, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who
have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation
by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of
care."
- In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to
the doctrine are present. First, the entire proceedings
of the cesarean section were under the exclusive
control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the private
respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the
actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object
finding its way into private respondent Villegas' body,
which, needless to say, does not occur unless through
the intervention of negligence. Second, since aside
from the cesarean section, private respondent Villegas
underwent no other operation which could have caused
the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it
stands to reason that such could only have been a by-
product of the cesarean section performed by Dr.
torts & damages
Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to
overcome the presumption of negligence arising from
resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is
therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of
rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen and for
all the adverse effects thereof
DISPOSITION Decision affirmed
D.M. CONSUNJI V CA
KAPUNAN; April 20, 2001
NATURE
Appeal from CA affirming decision of RTC ordering
defendant D.M. Consunji, Inc. to pay damages to
plaintiff Maria J. Juego
FACTS
- At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a
construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors
from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.
Investigation disclosed that while victim Jose A. Juego
together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo were
performing their work on board a steel platform with
plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four
corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when
suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to
connect the chain block with the platform came loose
causing the whole platform assembly and the victim to
fall down to the basement of the elevator core of the
building under construction, save his 2 companions
who luckily jumped out for safety.
- On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the
RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages against D.M.
Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other
defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits
from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC
rendered a decision in favor of the widow. On appeal by
D. M. Consunji, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC
in toto.
ISSUES
1. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to
prove petitioner’s negligence
2. WON respondent is precluded from recovering
damages under the Civil Code
HELD
1. YES
Ratio As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be
established without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of negligence. It is based in
part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of
A2010 - 40 -
the instrumentality which causes the injury either
knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has
no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to
allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the
proof of the happening of the accident in order to
establish negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of
necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not
readily available, provided the following requisites are
present:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily
occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the
injury was under the exclusive control of the person
charged with negligence; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a
building to the basement while performing work in a
construction site unless someone is negligent; thus, the
first requisite is present. As explained earlier, the
construction site with all its paraphernalia and human
resources that likely caused the injury is under the
exclusive control and management of appellant; thus,
the second requisite is also present. No contributory
negligence was attributed to the appellee’s deceased
husband; thus, the last requisite is also present. A
reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s
negligence arises. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite
any evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of
negligence arising from the application of res ipsa
loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the
incident.
2. NO
Ratio Claimants may invoke either the Workmen’s
Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code,
subject to the consequence that the choice of one
remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance
of compensation under the remedy chosen will
preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other
remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has
already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on
the basis of supervening facts or developments
occurring after he opted for the first remedy. The
choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results
in a waiver by election. Waiver requires a knowledge of
the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with
an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is
made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on
the record or by the evidence. There is no showing that
private respondent knew of the remedies available to
her when the claim before the ECC was filed. On the
prof. casis
contrary, private respondent testified that she was not
aware of her rights.
DISPOSITION The case is REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City to determine whether the
award decreed in its decision is more than that of the
ECC, whereupon payments already made to private
respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be
deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision
of the CA is AFFIRMED.
MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V REMONQUILLO
99 PHIL 117
MONTEMAYOR; May 18, 1956
NATURE
Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the
Court of Appeals.
FACTS
- August 22, 1950: Efren Magno went to the house of
Antonio Peñaloza, hid stepbrother, on Rodriguez Lanuza
St, Manila, to repair a leaking “media agua.” The
“media agua” was just below the window of the third
story.
- Standing on said “media agua”, Magno received from
his son thru the window a 3’x6’ galvanized iron sheet to
cover the leaking portion. The lower end of the iron
sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the
Manila Electric Company parallel to the media agua and
2 ½ feet from it, causing his death by electrocution.
- his widow and children filed suit to recover damages
from the company. Trial court rendered judgment in
their favor. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
- The electric wire in question was an exposed,
uninsulated primary wire stretched between poles pm
the street and carrying a charge of 3600 volts. It was
installed there some two years ago before Peñaloza’s
house was constructed. During the construction of said
house a similar incident took place, with less tragic
consequences. The owner of the house complained to
defendant about the danger which the wire presented,
and defendant moved one end of the wire farther from
the house by means of a brace, but left the other end
where it was.
- Regulations of the City required that “all wires be kept
three feet from the building.”
- There was no insulation that could have rendered it
safe, because there is no insulation material in
commercial use for such kind of wire (according to
appellant, and this was not refuted).
Petitioner’s Claim
- Owner of the house exceeded the limit for the
construction of the “media agua” (17% more).
Respondent’s Comment
torts & damages
Owner was given final permit despite the excess of the
“media agua”.
ISSUE
WON Manila Electric is guilty of negligence.
HELD
NO
- It was the victim who was guilty of negligence
Ratio the liability of electric companies for damages or
personal injury is governed by the rules of negligence,
nevertheless such companies are not insurers of the
safety of the public.
Reasoning
- The death of Magno was primarily caused by his own
negligence, and in some measure by the too close
proximity of the “media agua” to the electric wire of
the company by reason of the violation of the original
permit given by the city and the subsequent approval
of said illegal construction of the “media agua.” Had
the house owner followed the terms of the permit given
him by the city for the construction of his
“media agua”, the distance from the wires to the edge
of said “media agua” would have been 3ft and 11 3/8
inches.
- The company cannot be expected to be always on the
lookout for any illegal construction which reduces the
distance between its wires and said construction, and
to change the installation of its wires so as to preserve
said distance.
- The violation of the permit for the construction was
not the direct cause of the accident. It merely
contributed to it. The real cause of the accident or
death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno
himself. It is to be presumed that due to his age and
experience he was qualified to do so. He had training
and experience for the job. He could not have been
entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger
lurking in them.
- To hold the defendant liable in damages for the death
of Magno, such supposed negligence of the company
must have been the proximate and principal cause of
the accident.
Disposition The appealed decision of the CA is
reversed, and complaint against the Company
dismissed.
BERNARDO V LEGASPI
29 Phil 12
MORELAND; December 23, 1914
NATURE
A2010 - 41 -
Appeal from a judgment of CFI Manila dismissing the
complaint on the merits filed in an action to recover
damages for injuries
FACTS
- Due to a collision between the respective automobiles
of Bernardo and Legaspi, the former filed an action to
recover damages for injuries sustained by his car which
he alleged were by reason of Legaspi's negligence in
causing said collision.
Legaspi, on the other hand, filed a cross-complaint
alleging it was Bernardo's fault. He also asks for
damages.
- The lower court found upon the evidence that both
the plaintiff and the defendant were negligent in
handling their automobiles and that said negligence
was of such a character and extent on the part of both
as to prevent either from recovering.
ISSUE
WON the parties may recover damages
HELD
1. NO
- Where two automobiles, going in opposite directions,
collide on turning a street corner, and it appears from
the evidence and is found by the trial court that the
drivers thereof were equally negligent and contributed
equally to the principal occurrence as determining
causes thereof, neither can recover of the other for
damages suffered.
BERNAL V HOUSE
54 PHIL 327
MALCOLM; January 30, 1930
FACTS
- Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion
Bernal went to Tacloban, Leyte to attend the
procession of Holy Friday.
- After the procession, they, accompanied by two other
persons, passed along a public street named Gran
Capitan.
- The little girl was allowed to get a short distance in
advance of her mother and her friends.
- While in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric &
Ice Plant, Ltd., an automobile appeared on which
frightened the child. She turned to run, but fell into
the street gutter. At that time there was hot water
in this gutter or ditch coming from the Electric Ice
Plant of J.V. House.
- When the mother and her companions reached the
child, they found her face downward in the hot
water.
prof. casis
- The girl was taken to the provincial hospital. Despite
his efforts, the child died that same night.
- It was certified that the cause of death was "Burns,
3rd Degree, whole Body", and that the contributory
causes were "Congestion of the Brain and visceras
of the chest & abdomen.”
- The defense was that the hot water was permitted to
flow down the side of the street Gran Captain with
the knowledge and consent of the authorities; that
the cause of death was other than the hot water;
and that in the death the plaintiffs contributed by
their own fault and negligence.
- The trial judge, however, after examination of the
evidence presented by the defendants, failed to
sustain their theory of the case, except as to the
last mentioned special defense. He nevertheless
was led to order the dismissal of the action
because of the contributory negligence of the
plaintiffs.
ISSUE
WON the action should be dismissed due to the
contributory negligence of the plaintiffs
HELD
NO
- The death of the child was the result of fault and
negligence in permitting hot water to flow through the
public streets, there to endanger the lives of passers-by
who were unfortunately enough to fall into it
- The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on
the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening
when the religious procession was held.
- There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to
run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No
one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile
appearing and of a frightened child running and falling
into a ditch filled with hot water.
- The doctrines announced in the much debated case of
Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907], 7 Phil.,
359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again
be enforced. The contributory negligence of the
child and her mother, if any, does not operate as
a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could
only result in reduction of the damages.
DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from was in part be
reversed and in the court of origin another judgment
was issued in favor of Fortunata Enverso and against
J.V. House for the amount of P1,000, and for the costs
of both instances.
SEPARATE OPINION
torts & damages A2010 - 42 - prof. casis
NO ceiling. Such defects could have been easily discovered
- Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in
ROMUALDEZ [dissent]
theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed
- Even taking the finding that the defendant by its
founded on facts because its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate
negligence helped to bring about the accident which
Ong, admitted that "he could not give any reason why inspection of the premises before the date of the
resulted in the death of the child Purificacion Bernal,
the ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a accident.
plaintiff, by negligence, contributed to that most
defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse - That the structural designs and plans of the building
regrettable result.
was indeed caused by force majeure. That Mr. Ong were duly approved by the City Engineer and the
- Judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
could not offer any explanation does not imply force building permits and certificate of occupancy were
majeure. issued do not at all prove that there were no defects in
GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION - Definitions of force majeure as cited in Pons y the construction, especially as regards the ceiling,
V CHATTO Compañia vs. La Compañia Maritima: considering that no testimony was offered to prove that
210 SCRA 18 1. Blackstone, in his Commentaries on English Law: it was ever inspected at all.
Inevitable accident or casualty; an accident produced - It is settled that:
DAVIDE JR.; June 16, 1992 by any physical cause which is irresistible; such as The owner or proprietor of a place of public
lightning. tempest, perils of the sea, inundation, or amusement impliedly warrants that the premises,
FACTS
earthquake; the sudden illness or death of a person. appliances and amusement devices are safe for
- Plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old
2. Escriche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y the purpose for which they are designed, the
daughter, Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the movie
Jurisprudenci,: doctrine being subject to no other exception or
"Mother Dear" at Superama I theater, owned by
The event which we could neither foresee nor resist; as qualification than that he does not contract against
defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation.
for example, the lightning stroke, hail, inundation, unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or
- Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the
hurricane, public enemy, attack by robbers; Vis major reasonable means.
ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was
est, says Cayo, ea quae consilio humano neque - This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that:
plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued.
provideri neque vitari potest. Accident and mitigating Where a patron of a theater or other place of public
- Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under
circumstances. amusement is injured, and the thing that caused
the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out
3. Bouvier: Any accident due to natural cause, directly the injury is wholly and exclusively under the
to the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital
exclusively without human intervention, such as could control and management of the defendant, and the
where they were confined and treated for one (1) day.
not have been prevented by any kind of oversight, accident is such as in the ordinary course of events
- The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital.
pains and care reasonably to have been expected. would not have happened if proper care had been
Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from
4. Corkburn, chief justice, in a well considered English exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or
June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from
case, said that were a captain uses all the known permits of an inference of negligence on the part
June 5 to 11.
means to which prudent and experienced captains of the defendant.
- Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and
ordinarily have recourse, he does all that can be - That presumption or inference was not overcome by
dizziness, plaintiff went to Illinois, USA in July 1982 for
reasonably required of him; and if, under such the petitioner.
further treatment. She was treated at the Cook County
circumstances, he is overpowered by storm or other - Even assuming that the cause of the collapse was due
Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in the U.S. for
natural agency, he is within the rule which gives to force majeure, petitioner would still be liable
about three (3) months during which time she had to
immunity from the effects of such vis major. The term because it was guilty of negligence, which the trial
return to the Cook County Hospital five (5) or, six (6)
generally applies, broadly speaking, to natural court denominated as gross. As gleaned from Bouvier's
times.
accidents, such as those caused by lightning, definition of and Cockburn's elucidation on force
- Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the
earthquake, tempests, public enemy ,etc. majeure for one to be exempt from any liability
collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to
-The real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the because of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he
force majeure. It maintained that its theater did not
cause or reason is that either he did not actually should not have been guilty of negligence.
suffer from any structural or construction defect.
conduct the investigation or that he isincompetent. He Disposition Judgment was denying the instant
- The trial court awarded actual or compensatory and
is not an engineer, but an architect who had not even petition with costs against petitioner.
moral damages and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs.
passed the government's examination.
- Respondent Court found the appeal later filed to be
- Verily, post-incident investigation cannot be
without merit. PLDT V CA (SPS ESTEBAN)
considered as material to the present proceedings.
- Its motion for reconsideration of the decision having
What is significant is the finding of the trial court, REGALADO; September 29, 1989
been denied by the respondent Court, petitioner filed
affirmed by the respondent Court, that the collapse was [CITATION]
the petition in the SC.
due to construction defects. There was no evidence
offered to overturn this finding. NATURE
ISSUE
- The building was constructed barely 4 years prior to Petition for certiorari to review the resolution of the
WON the collapse of the ceiling was caused by force
the accident in question. It was not shown that any of Court of Appeals.
majeur
the causes denominates as force majeure obtained
immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the FACTS
HELD
torts & damages
- July 30, 1968 – Jeep of Esteban spouses ran over a
mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an
excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the
installation of its underground conduit system. The
complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban
failed to notice the open trench which was left
uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the
lack of any warning light or signs.
- Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her
arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her
cheek, while the respondent husband suffered cut lips.
In addition, the windshield of the jeep was shattered.
- PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention
that the injuries sustained by respondent spouses were
the result of their own negligence and that the entity
which should be held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte
and Company, an independent contractor which
undertook the said construction work.
- TC ruled in favor of Esteban spouses whereas the CA
reversed the ruling.
ISSUE
WON the Esteban spouses can claim damages from
PLDT
HELD
NO
Ratio A person claiming damages for the negligence of
another has the burden of proving the existence of
such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts
constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively
established by competent evidence.
Reasoning
- The accident was due to the lack of diligence of
respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to
negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT.
> Jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson
Street. If it had remained on that inside lane, it would
not have hit the accident mound
> That plaintiffs’ jeep was on the inside lane before it
swerved to hit the ACCIDENT MOUND could have
been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson
Street to the south of the ACCIDEN MOUND.
> Plaintiffs’ jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an
hour as plaintiff husband claimed. At that speed, he
could have braked the vehicle the moment it struck
the ACCIDENT MOUND.
> If the accident did not happen because the jeep
was running quite fast on the inside lane and for
some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to
the right and had to climb over the ACCIDENT
MOUND, then plaintiff husband had not exercised
the deligence of a good father of a family to avoid
the accident.
A2010 - 43 -
- The above findings clearly show that the negligence of
respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory
to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very
cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its
determining factors, and thereby precludes their right
to recover damages.
Disposition resolutions of respondent CA, dated
March 11, 1990 and September 3, 1980, are hereby
SET ASIDE, Its original decision, promulgated on
September 25, 1979, is hereby REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED.
GENOBIAGON V CA (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILS)
178 SCRA 422
GRIÑO-AQUINO; October 22, 1957
NATURE
Petition for review of the CA’s decision affirming the
conviction of the petitioner of the crime of homicide
thru reckless imprudence.
FACTS
- On Dec 31, 1959, at about 7:30 PM, a rig driven by
Genobiagon bumped an old woman who was crossing
the street. The appellant's rig was following another at
a distance of two meters. The old woman started to
cross when the first rig was approaching her, but as
appellant's vehicle was going so fast not only because
of the steep down-grade of the road, but also because
he was trying to overtake the rig ahead of him, the
appellant's rig bumped the old woman, who fell at the
middle of the road. The appellant continued to drive on,
but a by-stander Mangyao saw the incident and
shouted at the appellant to stop. He ran after appellant
when the latter refused to stop. Overtaking the
appellant, Mangyao asked him why he bumped the old
woman and his answer was, 'it was the old woman that
bumped him.' The appellant went back to the place
where the old woman was struck by his rig. The old
woman was unconscious. She was then loaded in a jeep
and brought to the hospital where she died 3 hours
later.
- Genobiagon was convicted of homicide thru reckless
imprudence. CA affirmed
- Genobiagon claims CA erred in not finding that the
reckless negligence of the victim was the proximate
cause of the accident which led to her death
ISSUES
WON contributory negligence can be used as defense
by Genobiagon
HELD
prof. casis
NO
- The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if
any, does not exonerate the accused.
- "The defense of contributory negligence does not
apply in criminal cases committed through reckless
imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of
another to evade the effects of his own negligence
(People vs. Orbeta, CA-G.R. No. 321, March 29, 1947)."
(People vs. Quiñones, 44 O.G. 1520)
Disposition the appealed decision is affirmed with
modification as to the civil liability of the petitioner
which is hereby increased to P30,000. Costs against
petitioner.
RAKES V ATLANTIC
[CITATION]
[PONENTE]
NATURE
Action for damages
FACTS
- The plaintiff, Rakes, one of a group of 8 African-
American laborers in the employment of defendant,
Atlantic, was at work transporting iron rails from the
harbor in Manila. The men were hauling the rails on 2
hand cars, some behind or at it sides and some pulling
the cars in the front by a rope. At one point, the track
sagged, the tie broke, the car canted and the rails slid
off and caught the plaintiff who was walking by the
car’s side, breaking his leg, which was later amputated
at the knee.
- The plaintiff’s witness alleged that a noticeable
depression in the track had appeared after a typhoon.
This was reported to the foreman, Mckenna, but it had
not been proven that Atlantic inspected the track or
had any proper system of inspection. Also, there were
no side guards on the cars to keep the rails from
slipping off.
- However, the company’s officers and 3 of the workers
testified that there was a general prohibition frequently
made known to all against walking by the side of cars.
As Rakes was walking along the car’s side when the
accident occurred, he was found to have contributed in
some degree to the injury inflicted, although not as the
primary cause.
- Atlantic contends that the remedy for injury through
negligence lies only in a criminal action against the
official directly responsible and that the employer be
held only subsidiarily liable.
ISSUE
WON there was contributory negligence on the part of
petitioner
torts & damages
HELD
YES
- Petitioner had walked along the side of the car despite
a prohibition to do so by the foreman.
-The negligence of the injured person contributing to
his injury but not being one of the determining causes
of the principal accident, does not operate as a bar to
recovery, but only in reduction of his damages. Each
party is chargeable with damages in proportion to his
fault.
- Trial court assessed that damages to plaintiff amount
to PhP5,000. SC deducted PhP2,500, the amount fairly
attributable to his own negligence.
SEPARATE OPINION
WILLARD AND CARSON [dissent]
- the negligence of the defendant alone was insufficient
to cause the accident—it also required the negligence
of the plaintiff. Because of this, plaintiff should not be
afforded relief
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE V CA
(ROMMEL’S MARKETING CORP.)
269 SCRA 695
HERMOSISIMA JR; March 14, 1997
NATURE
Petition for review challenging the CA decision affirming
the RTC decision in a civil case
FACTS
- the case stems from a complaint filed by Rommel’s
Marketing Corporation (RMC) to recover from the
former Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) the sum of
P304,979.74 representing various deposits it had made
in its current account with the bank but which were not
credited, and were instead deposited to the account of
one Bienvenido Cotas, allegedly due to the gross and
inexcusable negligence of the petitioner bank.
ISSUE
What is the proximate cause of the loss, to the tune of
P304,979.74, suffered by the private respondent RMC
— petitioner bank's negligence or that of private
respondent's?
HELD
- The proximate cause of the loss was the negligent act
of the bank, thru its teller Ms. Azucena Mabayad, in
validating the deposit slips, both original and duplicate,
presented by Ms. Yabut to Ms. Mabayad,
A2010 - 44 -
notwithstanding the fact that one of the deposit slips
was not completely accomplished.
Ratio Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter
Reasoning
- There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
- In the case at bench, there is no dispute as to the
damage suffered by the private respondent. Negligence
is the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable
man would do.
- Test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he
is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts
the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary
conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of
the actor in the situation before him. The law considers
what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in
the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
- Applying the above test, it appears that the bank's
teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in
validating, officially stamping and signing all the
deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut,
despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not
completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed
procedure of the bank with respect to the proper
validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate, as
testified to by Ms. Mabayad herself.
- The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily
required by the bank in accepting deposits should not
relieve the petitioner bank of responsibility. The odd
circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked
one vital information — that of the name of the account
holder — should have already put Ms. Mabayad on
guard. Rather than readily validating the incomplete
duplicate copy, she should have proceeded more
cautiously by being more probing as to the true reason
why the name of the account holder in the duplicate
prof. casis
slip was left blank while that in the original was filled
up. She should not have been so naive in accepting
hook, line and sinker the too shallow excuse of Ms.
Irene Yabut to the effect that since the duplicate copy
was only for her personal record, she would simply fill
up the blank space later on. 11 A "reasonable man of
ordinary prudence" 12 would not have given credence to
such explanation and would have insisted that the
space left blank be filled up as a condition for
validation. Unfortunately, this was not how bank teller
Mabayad proceeded thus resulting in huge losses to the
private respondent.
- Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms.
Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its
lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad.
In the testimony of Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager
of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner, to the effect that,
while he ordered the investigation of the incident, he
never came to know that blank deposit slips were
validated in total disregard of the bank's validation
procedures.
- It was in fact only when he testified in this case in
February, 1983, or after the lapse of more than seven
(7) years counted from the period when the funds in
question were deposited in plaintiff's accounts (May,
1975 to July, 1976) that bank manager Bonifacio
admittedly became aware of the practice of his teller
Mabayad of validating blank deposit slips. Undoubtedly,
this is gross, wanton, and inexcusable negligence in the
appellant bank's supervision of its employees.
- It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad,
coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the
selection and supervision of its bank teller, which was
the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private
respondent, and not the latter's act of entrusting cash
to a dishonest employee, as insisted by the petitioners.
- Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each
case upon mixed considerations of logic, common
sense, policy and precedent. Bank of the Phil. Islands v.
Court of Appeals, 17 defines proximate cause as "that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. . . ." In this case, absent the act of Ms.
Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete
duplicate copy of the deposit slip, Ms. Irene Yabut
would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her
fraudulent scheme with impunity.
- LAST CLEAR CHANCE: under the doctrine of "last clear
chance" (also referred to, at times as "supervening
negligence" or as "discovered peril"), petitioner bank
was indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in
essence, states that where both parties are negligent,
but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time
than that of the other, or when it is impossible to
torts & damages
determine whose fault or negligence should be
attributed to the incident, the one who had the last
clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and
failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences
thereof. The rule would also mean that an antecedent
negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery
of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a
defense against liability sought by another, if the latter,
who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Here,
assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in
entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus
providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the
company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot
be denied that the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had
the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by
its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-
imposed validation procedure.
- In the case of banks, the degree of diligence required
is more than that of a good father of a family.
Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship
with their depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the
accounts of their clients with the highest degree of
care.
- The foregoing notwithstanding, it cannot be denied
that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent
in not checking its monthly statements of account. Had
it done so, the company would have been alerted to the
series of frauds being committed against RMC by its
secretary. The damage would definitely not have
ballooned to such an amount if only RMC, particularly
Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little vigilance in
their financial affairs. This omission by RMC amounts to
contributory negligence which shall mitigate the
damages that may be awarded to the private
respondent 23 under A2179 CC, to wit:
. . . When the plaintiff's own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was
only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
In view of this, we believe that the demands of
substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the
damage on a 60-40 ratio. Thus, 40% of the damage
awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the
award of P25,000.00 attorney's fees, shall be borne by
private respondent RMC; only the balance of 60%
needs to be paid by the petitioners. The award of
attorney's fees shall be borne exclusively by the
petitioner.
Disposition the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals is modified by reducing the amount of actual
damages private respondent is entitled to by 40%.
A2010 - 45 -
Petitioners may recover from Ms. Azucena Mabayad the
amount they would pay the private respondent. Private
respondent shall have recourse against Ms. Irene
Yabut. In all other respects, the appellate court's
decision is AFFIRMED.
SEPARATE OPINION
PADILLA [dissent]
- It seems that an innocent bank teller is being unduly
burdened with what should fall on Ms. Irene Yabut,
RMC's own employee, who should have been charged
with estafa or estafa through falsification of private
document. Why is RMC insulating Ms. Irene Yabut from
liability when in fact she orchestrated the entire fraud
on RMC, her employer?
- Going back to Yabut's modus operandi, it is not
disputed that each time Yabut would transact business
with PBC's tellers, she would accomplish two (2) copies
of the current account deposit slip. PBC's deposit slip,
as issued in 1975, had two parts. The upper part was
called the depositor's stub and the lower part was
called the bank copy. Both parts were detachable from
each other. The deposit slip was prepared and signed
by the depositor or his representative, who indicated
therein the current account number to which the
deposit was to be credited, the name of the depositor
or current account holder, the date of the deposit, and
the amount of the deposit either in cash or in checks.
- Since Yabut deposited money in cash, the usual bank
procedure then was for the teller to count whether the
cash deposit tallied with the amount written down by
the depositor in the deposit slip. If it did, then the teller
proceeded to verify whether the current account
number matched with the current account name as
written in the deposit slip.
- In the earlier days before the age of full
computerization, a bank normally maintained a ledger
which served as a repository of accounts to which
debits and credits resulting from transactions with the
bank were posted from books of original entry. Thus, it
was only after the transaction was posted in the ledger
that the teller proceeded to machine validate the
deposit slip and then affix his signature or initial to
serve as proof of the completed transaction.
- It should be noted that the teller validated the
depositor's stub in the upper portion and the bank copy
on the lower portion on both the original and duplicate
copies of the deposit slips presented by Yabut. The
teller, however, detached the validated depositor's stub
on the original deposit slip and allowed Yabut to retain
the whole validated duplicate deposit slip that bore the
same account number as the original deposit slip, but
with the account name purposely left blank by Yabut,
on the assumption that it would serve no other purpose
prof. casis
but for a personal record to complement the original
validated depositor's stub.
- Thus, when Yabut wrote the name of RMC on the
blank account name on the validated duplicate copy of
the deposit slip, tampered with its account number, and
superimposed RMC's account number, said act only
served to cover-up the loss already caused by her to
RMC, or after the deposit slip was validated by the
teller in favor of Yabut's husband. Stated otherwise,
when there is a clear evidence of tampering with any of
the material entries in a deposit slip, the genuineness
and due execution of the document become an issue in
resolving whether or not the transaction had been fair
and regular and whether the ordinary course of
business had been followed by the bank.
- The legal or proximate cause of RMC's loss was when
Yabut, its employee, deposited the money of RMC in
her husband's name and account number instead of
that of RMC, the rightful owner of such deposited funds.
Precisely, it was the criminal act of Yabut that directly
caused damage to RMC, her employer, not the
validation of the deposit slip by the teller as the deposit
slip was made out by Yabut in her husband's name and
to his account.
- LAST CLEAR CHANCE: As for the doctrine of "last clear
chance," it is my considered view that the doctrine
assumes that the negligence of the defendant was
subsequent to the negligence of the plaintiff and the
same must be the proximate cause of the injury. In
short, there must be a last and a clear chance, not a
last possible chance, to avoid the accident or injury. It
must have been a chance as would have enabled a
reasonably prudent man in like position to have acted
effectively to avoid the injury and the resulting damage
to himself.
- In the case at bar, the bank was not remiss in its duty
of sending monthly bank statements to private
respondent RMC so that any error or discrepancy in the
entries therein could be brought to the bank's attention
at the earliest opportunity. Private respondent failed to
examine these bank statements not because it was
prevented by some cause in not doing so, but because
it was purposely negligent as it admitted that it does
not normally check bank statements given by banks.
- It was private respondent who had the last and clear
chance to prevent any further misappropriation by
Yabut had it only reviewed the status of its current
accounts on the bank statements sent to it monthly or
regularly. Since a sizable amount of cash was entrusted
to Yabut, private respondent should, at least, have
taken ordinary care of its concerns, as what the law
presumes. Its negligence, therefore, is not contributory
but the immediate and proximate cause of its injury.
JUNTILLA V FONTANAR
torts & damages
136 SCRA 624
GUITERREZ JR; May 31, 1985
NATURE
Petition to review the decision of CFI of Cebu
FACTS
- Petitioner Roberto Juntilla was sitting a the front seat
of a jeepney (driven by one Berfol Camoro, registered
under the franchise of Clemente Fontanar, but actually
owned by Fernando Banzon) when its right rear tire
exploded causing it to turn turtle. Plaintiff was thrown
out of the vehicle and lost consciousness upon landing
on the ground. When he came back to his senses, he
found that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm,
injuries on his left arm, right thigh and on his back and
also found this “Omega” wrist watch was lost. He went
to Danao city and upon arrival there he entered the
City Hospital to attend to his injuries and asked his
father-in-law to go to site of the accident to look for his
watch but the watch was nowhere to be found.
- Petitioner then filed a civil case for breach of contract
with damages before the City Court of Cebu against
Fontanar, Banzon, and Camoro, who filed their answer,
alleging that the accident was beyond their control
taking into account that the tire that exploded was
newly bought and slightly used at the time it blew up.
- City Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner.
The respondents then appealed to the CFI of Cebu,
which reversed the judgment upon a finding that the
accident in question was due to a fortuitous event.
Petitioner’s MFR was denied, hence this appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON the CFI erred in absolving the carrier from any
liability upon a finding that the tire blow out is a
fortuitous event
2. WON the accident was due to a fortuitous event
HELD
1. YES
- The CFI relied on the ruling of the CA in Rodriguez v
Red Line Transportation Co., that “a tire blow-out does
not constitute negligence unless the tire was already
old and should not have been used at all.” This
conclusion is based on a misapprehension of overall
facts. In La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. v De Jesus,
et al, We held that, “ not only are the rulings of the CA
in Rodriguez v Red Line Trans. Co. not binding on this
Court but they were also based on considerations quite
different from those that obtain in the case at bar.” In
the case at bar, there are specific acts of negligence on
the part of the respondents. The records show that the
passenger jeepney turned turtle and jumped into a
A2010 - 46 -
ditch immediately after its right rear tire exploded. The
evidence shows that the passenger jeepney was
running at a very fast speed before the accident. We
agree with the observation of the petitioner that a
public utility jeep running at a regular and safe speed
will not jump into a ditch when its right rear tire blows
up. There is also evidence to show that the passenger
jeepney was overloaded at the time of the accident.
The petitioner stated that there were 3 passengers in
the front seat and 14 in the rear.
- While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still
good because the grooves of the tire were still visible,
this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a
fortuitous event. No evidence was presented to show
that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or
that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to
compensate for any conditions liable to cause
accidents. The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could
have been caused by too much air pressure injected
into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was
overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident.
2. NO
Ratio A caso fortuito (fortuitous event) presents the
following essential characteristics:
1. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply
with his obligation, must be independent of the human
will
2. It must be impossible to foresee the even which
constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it
must be impossible to avoid
3. The occurrence must be such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner
4. The obligor (debtor) must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting
to the creditor
Reasoning
- In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and
unexpected occurrence was not independent of the
human will. The accident was caused either through the
negligence of the driver or because of mechanical
defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach their
drivers not to overload their vehicles not to exceed safe
and legal speed limits and to know the correct
measures to take when a tire blows up thus insuring
the safety of passengers at all times.
- Relative to the contingency of mechanical defects, we
held in Necesito, et al. v. Paras, et al, that: “The
preponderance of authority is in favor of the doctrine
that a passenger is entitled to recover damages from a
carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an
appliance purchased from a manufacturer, whenever it
appears that the defect would have been discovered by
the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which
prof. casis
under the circumstances was incumbent upon it. with
regard to inspection and application of the necessary
tests. For the purposes of this doctrine, the
manufacturer is considered as being in law the agent or
servant of the carrier, as far as regards the work of
constructing the appliance. According to this theory,
the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the
carrier from liability.
- It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of a
common carrier's legal liability is the contract of
carriage, and by entering into the said contract, it binds
itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person, with a due regard
for all the circumstances. The records show that this
obligation was not met by the respondents.
Disposition Decision appealed from is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Decision of City Court is REINSTATED
HERNANDEZ V COMMISSION ON AUDIT
179 SCRA 39
CRUZ; November 6, 1989
NATURE
A petition to reverse Commission on Audit’s denial of
relief
FACTS
- Teodoro M. Hernandez was the officer-in-charge and
special disbursing officer of the Ternate Beach Project
of the Philippine Tourism Authority in Cavite. He went
to the main office in Manila to encash 2 checks
covering the wages of the employees and the operating
expenses of the Project. He estimated that the money
would be available by 10am and that he would be back
in Ternate by about 2pm of the same day. However, the
processing of the checks was completed only at 3pm.
The petitioner decided nevertheless to encash them
because the Project employees would be waiting for
their pay the following day. And so, he collected the
cash value of the checks. The petitioner had two
choices: (1) return to Cavite that same afternoon and
arrive there in the early evening; or (2) take the money
with him to his house in Marilao, Bulacan, spend the
night there, and leave for Ternate the following
morning. He opted for the second, thinking it the safer
one. He took a passenger jeep bound for his house in
Bulacan. It was while the vehicle was along EDSA that
two persons with knives boarded and forcibly took the
money he was carrying. Hernandez, after the initial
shock, immediately followed in desperate pursuit. He
caught up with Virgilio Alvarez and overcame him after
a scuffle. Alvarez was subsequently charged with
robbery and pleaded guilty. But the hold-upper who
torts & damages
escaped is still at large and the stolen money he took
with him has not been recovered.
- the petitioner, invoking the foregoing facts, filed a
request for relief from money accountability under
Section 638 of the Revised Administrative Code.3
- however, the Commission on Audit, through then
Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, jr. denied the
petitioner's request, observing inter alia:
In the instant case, the loss of the P10,175.00 under
the accountability of Mr. Hernandez can be attributed
to his negligence because had he brought the cash
proceeds of the checks (replenishment fund) to the
Beach Park in Ternate immediately after encashment
for safekeeping in his office, which is the normal
procedure in the handling of public funds, the loss of
said cash thru robbery could have been aborted.
- In the petition at bar, Hernandez claims that the
respondent COA acted with grave abuse of discretion in
denying him relief and in holding him negligent for the
loss of the stolen money. He avers he has done only
what any reasonable man would have done and should
not be held accountable for a fortuitous event
over which he had no control.
- On his decision to take the money home that
afternoon instead of returning directly to Ternate, he
says that the first course was more prudent as he saw
it, if only because his home in Marilao was much nearer
than his office in Ternate; that the likelihood of robbery
during the time in question was stronger in Ternate
than in Marilao; that what happened was a fortuitous
event that could not have reasonably been foreseen,
especially on that busy highway.
- then Solicitor-General argued that Hernandez was
negligent in the safekeeping of the stolen funds. Later,
however, his successor sided with the petitioner,
agreeing that Hernandez had not committed any
negligence or, assuming he was guilty of contributory
negligence, had made up for it with his efforts to
retrieve the money and his capture of one of the
robbers, who was eventually convicted.
- COA insists that the petitioner should not be relieved
from his money accountability because it was his own
negligence that led to the loss of the cash he had
sought to take not to Ternate but to Marilao. Its
3 Petition for Review
Section 638. Credit for loss occurring in transit or due to casualty —
Notice to Auditor. — When a loss of government funds or property occurs
while the same is in transit or is caused by fire, theft, or other casualty,
the officer accountable therefor or having custody thereof shall
immediately notify the Auditor General, or the provincial auditor,
according as a matter is within the original jurisdiction of the one or the
other, and within thirty days or such longer period as the Auditor, or
provincial auditor, may in the particular case allow, shall present his
application for relief, with the available evidence in support thereof. An
officer who fails to comply with this requirement shall not be relieved of
liability or allowed credit for any such loss in the settlement of his
accounts.
A2010 - 47 -
contention is that the petitioner should not have
encashed the checks as the hour was already late and
he knew he could not return to Ternate before nightfall.
The memo concludes that in deciding to take the
money with him to Marilao after imprudently
withdrawing it from the main office, the petitioner was
assuming a risk from which he cannot now be excused
after the loss of the money as a result of the robbery to
which it was unreasonably exposed.
ISSUE
WON petitioner’s acts are so tainted with negligence or
recklessness as to justify the denial of the petitioner's
request for relief from accountability for the stolen
money
HELD
NO
- This was undoubtedly a fortuitous event covered by
the said provisions, something that could not have
been reasonably foreseen although it could have
happened, and did. For most of us, all we can rely on is
a reasoned conjecture of what might happen, based on
common sense and our own experiences, or our
intuition, if you will, and without any mystic ability to
peer into the future. So it was with the petitioner.
- It is true that the petitioner miscalculated, but the
Court feels he should not be blamed for that. The
decision he made seemed logical at that time and was
one that could be expected of a reasonable and
prudent person.
Disposition The petitioner is entitled to be relieved
from accountability for the money forcibly taken from
him. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED.
GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION
V CHATTO
210 SCRA 18
DAVIDE JR; June 16, 1992
NATURE
FACTS
- In the afternoon of June 4, 1982 Gloria E. Chatto, and
her 15-year old daughter, Lina Delza E. Chatto went to
see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater,
owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation.
They bought balcony tickets but even then were unable
to find seats considering the number of people
patronizing the movie. Hardly ten (10) minutes after
prof. casis
entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony
collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and
pandemonium ensued. Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs
managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as
they were able to get out to the street they walked the
nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and
treated for one (1) day.
- The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital.
Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from
June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from
June 5 to 11. Per Medico Legal Certificate (Exh, "C")
issued by Dr. Ernesto G. Brion, plaintiff Lina Delza
Chatto suffered the following injuries:
- Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the
collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to
force majeure. It maintained that its theater did not
suffer from any structural or construction defect.
ISSUES
1. WON Jesus Lim Ong’s investigation maybe given
weight in the trial
2. WON the collapse was due to force majeure
HELD
1. NO
- there was no authoritative investigation conducted by
impartial civil and structural engineers on the cause of
the collapse of the theater's ceiling, Jesus Lim Ong is
not an engineer, He is a graduate of architecture from
the St. Louie University in Baguio City. It does not
appear he has passed the government examination for
architects. In fine, the ignorance of Mr. Ong about the
cause of the collapse of the ceiling of their theater
cannot be equated, as an act, of God. To sustain that
proposition is to introduce sacrilege in our
jurisprudence.
2. NO
- Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the
theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even
founded on facts because its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim
Ong, admitted that "he could not give any reason why
the ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a
defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse
was indeed caused by force majeure. It could not have
collapsed without a cause. That Mr. Ong could not offer
any explanation does not imply force majeure.
Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the
collapse if indeed it were due to force majeure. To Our
mind, the real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain
the cause or reason is that either he did not actually
conduct the investigation or that he is, as the
respondent Court impliedly held, incompetent. He is not
an engineer, but an architect who had not even passed
the government's examination. Verily, post-incident
investigation cannot be considered as material to the
torts & damages
present proceedings. What is significant is the finding
of the trial court, affirmed by the respondent Court,
that the collapse was due to construction defects.
There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding.
The building was constructed barely four (4) years prior
to the accident in question. It was not shown that any
of the causes denominates as force majeure obtained
immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the
ceiling. Such defects could have been easily discovered
if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in
keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed
by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate
inspection of the premises before the date of the
accident. His answers to the leading questions on
inspection disclosed neither the exact dates of said.
inspection nor the nature and extent of the same. That
the structural designs and plans of the building were
duly approved by the City Engineer and the building
permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not
at all prove that there were no defects in the
construction, especially as regards the ceiling,
considering that no testimony was offered to prove that
it was ever inspected at all.
- It is settled that - The owner or proprietor of a place of
public amusement impliedly warrants that the
premises, appliances and amusement devices are safe
for the purpose for which they are designed, the
doctrine being subject to no other exception or
qualification than that he does not contract against
unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or
reasonable means.
- This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that -
Where a patron of a theater or other place of public
amusement is injured, and the thing that caused the
injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and
management of the defendant, and the accident is
such as in the ordinary course of events would not have
happened if proper care had been exercised, its
occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an
inference of negligence on the part of the defendant.
Disposition judgment is hereby rendered DENYING
the instant petition with costs against petitioner.
SERVANDO V PHILIPPINE STEAM
NAVIGATION CO
117 SCRA 832
ESCOLIN; 1982
NATURE
This appeal, originally brought to the Court of Appeals,
seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Cases Nos. 7354
and 7428, declaring appellant Philippine Steam
Navigation liable for damages for the loss of the
A2010 - 48 -
appellees' cargoes as a result of a fire which gutted the
Bureau of Customs' warehouse in Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental.
FACTS
- On November 6, 1963, appellees Clara Uy Bico and
Amparo Servando loaded on board the appellant's
vessel for carriage from Manila to Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental several cargoes (cavans of rice, colored
papers, toys etc) as evidenced by the corresponding
bills of lading issued by the appellant. Upon arrival of
the vessel at Pulupandan, in the morning of November
18, 1963, the cargoes were discharged, complete and
in good order, unto the warehouse of the Bureau of
Customs. At about 2:00 in the afternoon of the same
day, said warehouse was razed by a fire of unknown
origin, destroying appellees' cargoes. Before the fire,
however, appellee Uy Bico was able to take delivery of
907 cavans of rice Appellees' claims for the value of
said goods were rejected by the appellant.
- On the bases of the foregoing facts, the lower court
rendered a decision, ordering Philippine Steam to pay
for damages. The court a quo held that the delivery of
the shipment in question to the warehouse of the
Bureau of Customs is not the delivery contemplated by
Article 1736; and since the burning of the warehouse
occurred before actual or constructive delivery of the
goods to the appellees, the loss is chargeable against
the appellant.
Philippine Steam on the other hand relies on the
following:
Clause 14. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or
damage to shipments billed 'owner's risk' unless such
loss or damage is due to negligence of carrier. Nor
shall carrier be responsible for loss or damage
caused by force majeure, dangers or accidents of the
sea or other waters; war; public enemies; . . . fire . ...
ISSUE
WON the above stipulation validly limits the liability of
the shipowner in this case
HELD
YES
Ratio The parties may stipulate anything in the
contract for so long as the stipulation is not contrary to
law, morals, public policy. The stipulation which merely
iterates the principle of caso fortuito is for all intents
and purposes valid.
Reasoning
- We sustain the validity of the above stipulation; there
is nothing therein that is contrary to law, morals or
public policy.
- Appellees would contend that the above stipulation
does not bind them because it was printed in fine
prof. casis
letters on the back-of the bills of lading; and that they
did not sign the same. This argument overlooks the
pronouncement of this Court in Ong Yiu vs. Court of
Appeals, promulgated June 29, 1979, 3 where the Court
held that while it may be true that petitioner had not
signed the plane ticket , he is nevertheless bound by
the provisions thereof. 'Such provisions have been held
to be a part of the contract of carriage, and valid and
binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's
lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation'. It is what
is known as a contract of 'adhesion', in regards which it
has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein one
party imposes a ready made form of contract on the
other, as the plane ticket in the case at bar, are
contracts not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres
to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he
adheres, he gives his consent." (Tolentino, Civil Code,
Vol. IV, 1962 Ed., p. 462, citing Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
Lawyer's Journal, Jan. 31, 1951, p. 49).
- Besides, the agreement contained in the above
quoted Clause 14 is a mere iteration of the basic
principle of law written in Article 1 1 7 4 of the Civil
Code4 Thus, where fortuitous event or force majeure is
the immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the
obligor is exempt from liability for non-performance.
The Partidas, the antecedent of Article 1174 of the Civil
Code, defines 'caso fortuito' as 'an event that takes
place by accident and could not have been foreseen.
Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected
fire, shipwreck, violence of robbers.'
- In its dissertation of the phrase 'caso fortuito' the
Enciclopedia Juridicada Espanola 5 says: "In a legal
sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a
'caso fortuito' presents the following essential
characteristics: (1) the cause of the unforeseen and
unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor
to comply with his obligation, must be independent of
the human will; (2) it must be impossible to foresee the
event which constitutes the 'caso fortuito', or if it can
be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (3) the
occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner;
and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation
in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the
creditor." In the case at bar, the burning of the customs
warehouse was an extraordinary event which happened
independently of the will of the appellant. The latter
could not have foreseen the event.
4
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those
events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable.
torts & damages
- There is nothing in the record to show that appellant
carrier ,incurred in delay in the performance of its
obligation. It appears that appellant had not only
notified appellees of the arrival of their shipment, but
had demanded that the same be withdrawn. In fact,
pursuant to such demand, appellee Uy Bico had taken
delivery of 907 cavans of rice before the burning of the
warehouse.
Nor can the appellant or its employees be charged with
negligence. The storage of the goods in the Customs
warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by the
appellees was undoubtedly made with their knowledge
and consent. Since the warehouse belonged to and was
maintained by the government, it would be unfair to
impute negligence to the appellant, the latter having no
control whatsoever over the same.
Disposition judgment appealed from is hereby set
aside.
SEPARATE OPINION
AQUINO [concur]
- I concur. Under article 1738 of the Civil Code "the
extraordinary liability of the common carrier continues
to be operative even during the time the goods are
stored in the warehouse of the carrier at the place of
destination, until the consignee has been advised of the
arrival of the goods and has had reasonable
opportunity thereafter to remove them or otherwise
dispose of them".
- From the time the goods in question were deposited
in the Bureau of Customs' warehouse in the morning of
their arrival up to two o' clock in the afternoon of the
same day, when the warehouse was burned, Amparo C.
Servando and Clara Uy Bico, the consignees, had
reasonable opportunity to remove the goods. Clara had
removed more than one-half of the rice consigned to
her. Moreover, the shipping company had no more
control and responsibility over the goods after they
were deposited in the customs warehouse by the
arrastre and stevedoring operator. No amount of
extraordinary diligence on the part of the carrier could
have prevented the loss of the goods by fire which was
of accidental origin.
NATIONAL POWER CORP V CA (RAYO
ET AL)
DAVIDE JR; May 21, 1993
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court
A2010 - 49 -
FACTS
- When the water level in the Angat dam went beyond
the allowable limit at the height of typhoon Kading NPC
opened three of the dam’s spillways to release the
excess water in the dam. This however caused the
inundation of the banks of the Angat river which caused
persons and animals to drown and properties to be
washed away.
- The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent
release by the defendants of water through the
spillways of the Angst Dam (Hydroelectric Plant).
Plaintiffs claim:
- NPC operated and maintained a multi-purpose
hydroelectric plant in the Angat River
- despite the defendants' knowledge of the impending
entry of typhoon "Kading," they failed to exercise due
diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam
- when the said water level went beyond the maximum
allowable limit at the height of the typhoon, the
defendants suddenly, negligently and recklessly
opened three (3) of the dam's spillways, thereby
releasing a large amount of water which inundated the
banks of the Angat River causing the death of members
of the household of the plaintiffs, together with their
animals
Respondents comments:
- NPC exercised due care, diligence and prudence in the
operation and maintenance of the hydroelectric plant
- NPC exercised the diligence of a good father in the
selection of its employees
- written notices were sent to the different
municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein
about the impending release of a large volume of water
with the onset of typhoon "Kading" and advising them
to take the necessary Precautions
- the water released during the typhoon was needed to
prevent the collapse of the dam and avoid greater
damage to people and property
- in spite of the precautions undertaken and the
diligence exercised, they could still not contain or
control the flood that resulted
- the damages incurred by the private respondents
were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure and
are in the nature and character of damnum absque
injuria.
ISSUES
1. WON NPC was guilty of negligence
2. WON (applying the ruling of NAkpil & Sons v. CA)
NPC is liable given that the inundation was caused by
force majeure
HELD
1. YES
- A similar case entitled National Power Corporation, et
al. vs, Court of Appeals, et al.," involving the very same
prof. casis
incident subject of the instant petition. The court there
declared that the proximate cause of the loss and
damage sustained by the plaintiffs therein--who were
similarly situated as the private respondents herein-
was the negligence of the petitioners,
- on the basis of its meticulous analysis and evaluation
of the evidence a dduced by the parties in the cases
subject of CA-G.R. CV Nos. 27290-93, public respondent
found as conclusively established that indeed, the
petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident
lack of foresight, imprudence and negligence in the
management and operation of Angat Dam," and that
"the extent of the opening of the spillways, and the
magnitude of the water released, are all but products of
defendants-appellees headlessness, slovenliness, and
carelessness."and that the 24 October 1978 'early
warning notice" supposedly sent to the affected
municipalities, the same notice involved in the case at
bar, was insufficient.
2. YES
- given that NPC is guilty of negligence. Juan F. Nakipil
& Sons vs. Court of Appeals is still good law as far as
the concurrent liability of an obligor in the case of force
majeure is concerned.
- In the Nakpil case it was held that "To exempt the
obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil
Code, for a breach of an obligation due to an 'act of
God,' the following must concur: (a) the cause of the
breach of the obligation must be independent of the
will of the debtor, (b) the event must be either
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be
such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill
his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor
must be free from any participation in, or aggravation
of the injury to the creditor. Thus, if upon the
happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there
concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or
violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of
the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil
Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor
cannot escape liability.
- The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine
strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned
exclusively by the violence of nature and all human
agencies are, to be excluded from creating or entering
into the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the
cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in
part the result of the participation of man whether it be
from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the
whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it were, and
removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God.
(1 Corpus Juris, pp. 1174-1175).
Disposition Petition dismissed.
SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE V CA
torts & damages A2010 - 50 - prof. casis
PURISIMA; July 10, 1998 to their house rendered the same uninhabitable, forcing cannot be invoked for the protection of a person who
them to stay temporarily in others’ houses. And so has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to
they sought to recover from petitioner P117,116.00, as forestall its possible adverse consequences. When a
NATURE
actual damages, P1,000,000.00, as moral damages, person’s negligence concurs with an act of God in
Petition for review seeking to set aside the Decision
P300,000.00, as exemplary damages and P100,000.00, producing damage or injury to another, such person is
promulgated on July 31, 1996, and Resolution dated
for and as attorney’s fees; plus costs. not exempt from liability by showing that the
September 12, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in “Juanita
- In its Answer, petitioner averred that subject school immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury
de Jesus vda. de Dimaano, et al. vs. Southeastern
building had withstood several devastating typhoons was a fortuitous event. When the effect is found to be
College, Inc.”, which reduced the moral damages
and other calamities in the past, without its roofing or partly the result of the participation of man – whether it
awarded below from P1,000,000.00 to P200,000.00.
any portion thereof giving way; that it has not been be from active intervention, or neglect, or failure to act
The Resolution under attack denied petitioner’s motion
remiss in its responsibility to see to it that said school – the whole occurrence is hereby humanized, and
for reconsideration.
building, which houses school children, faculty removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
members, and employees, is “in tip-top condition”; and - After a thorough study and evaluation of the evidence
FACTS
furthermore, typhoon “Saling” was “an act of God and on record, this Court believes otherwise,
- Private respondents are owners of a house at 326
therefore beyond human control” such that petitioner notwithstanding the general rule that factual findings
College Road, Pasay City, while petitioner owns a four-
cannot be answerable for the damages wrought by the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
storey school building along the same College Road.
thereby, absent any negligence on its part. appellate court, are binding and conclusive upon this
On October 11, 1989, at about 6:30 in the morning, a
- The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals gave Court. After a careful scrutiny of the records and the
powerful typhoon “Saling” hit Metro Manila. Buffeted
credence to the ocular inspection made by the city pleadings submitted by the parties, we find exception
by very strong winds, the roof of petitioner’s building
engineer. Thus, this appeal. to this rule and hold that the lower courts
was partly ripped off and blown away, landing on and
misappreciated the evidence proffered.
destroying portions of the roofing of private
ISSUES - There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a
respondents’ house. After the typhoon had passed, an
WON the damage on the roof of the building of private fortuitous event, a natural occurrence which may be
ocular inspection of the destroyed buildings was
respondents resulting from the impact of the falling foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of
conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city
portions of the school building’s roof ripped off by the foresight, diligence or care. In order to be exempt
building official, Engr. Jesus L. Reyna. Pertinent aspects
strong winds of typhoon “Saling”, was, within legal from liability arising from any adverse consequence
of the latter’s Reporti[5] dated October 18, 1989 stated,
contemplation, due to fortuitous event engendered thereby, there should have been no human
as follows:
HELD participation amounting to a negligent act. In other
“5. One of the factors that may have led to this
YES words, the person seeking exoneration from liability
calamitous event is the formation of the buildings in
- Petitioner cannot be held liable for the damages must not be guilty of negligence. Negligence, as
the area and the general direction of the wind.
suffered by the private respondents. This conclusion commonly understood, is conduct which naturally or
Situated in the peripheral lot is an almost U-shaped
finds support in Article 1174 of the Civil Code, which reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others. It
formation of 4-storey building. Thus, with the strong
provides: may be the failure to observe that degree of care,
winds having a westerly direction, the general
“Art 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
formation of the buildings becomes a big funnel-like
the law, or when it is otherwise declared by justly demand,v[17] or the omission to do something
structure, the one situated along College Road,
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation which a prudent and reasonable man, guided by
receiving the heaviest impact of the strong winds.
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
Hence, there are portions of the roofing, those
responsible for those events which could not be human affairs, would do. From these premises, we
located on both ends of the building, which remained
foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were proceed to determine whether petitioner was negligent,
intact after the storm.
inevitable.” such that if it were not, the damage caused to private
6. Another factor and perhaps the most likely reason
- The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is respondents’ house could have been avoided?
for the dislodging of the roofings structural trusses is
found in the Partidas which defines it as “an event - At the outset, it bears emphasizing that a person
the improper anchorage of the said trusses to the
which takes place by accident and could not have been claiming damages for the negligence of another has the
roof beams. The 1/2” diameter steel bars embedded
foreseen.”iii[9] Escriche elaborates it as “an unexpected burden of proving the existence of fault or negligence
on the concrete roof beams which serve as truss
event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor causative of his injury or loss. The facts constitutive of
anchorage are not bolted nor nailed to the trusses.
resisted.” Civilist Arturo M. Tolentino adds that negligence must be affirmatively established by
Still, there are other steel bars which were not even
“[f]ortuitous events may be produced by two general competent evidence,vi[19] not merely by presumptions
bent to the trusses, thus, those trusses are not
causes: (1) by nature, such as earthquakes, storms, and conclusions without basis in fact. Private
anchored at all to the roof beams.”
floods, epidemics, fires, etc. and (2) by the act of man, respondents, in establishing the culpability of
- It then recommended that “to avoid any further loss
such as an armed invasion, attack by bandits, petitioner, merely relied on the aforementioned report
and damage to lives, limbs and property of persons
governmental prohibitions, robbery, etc.”iv submitted by a team which made an ocular inspection
living in the vicinity,” the fourth floor of subject school
- In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person of petitioner’s school building after the typhoon. As the
building be declared as a “structural hazard.”
from liability, it is necessary that he be free from any term imparts, an ocular inspection is one by means of
- In their Complaintii[6] before the Regional Trial Court of
previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which actual sight or viewing.vii[20] What is visual to the eye
Pasay City, Branch 117, for damages based on culpa
the loss may have been occasioned.. An act of God though, is not always reflective of the real cause
aquiliana, private respondents alleged that the damage
torts & damages
behind. For instance, one who hears a gunshot and
then sees a wounded person, cannot always definitely
conclude that a third person shot the victim. It could
have been self-inflicted or caused accidentally by a
stray bullet. The relationship of cause and effect must
be clearly shown.
- In the present case, other than the said ocular
inspection, no investigation was conducted to
determine the real cause of the partial unroofing of
petitioner’s school building. Private respondents did
not even show that the plans, specifications and
design of said school building were deficient and
defective. Neither did they prove any substantial
deviation from the approved plans and specifications.
Nor did they conclusively establish that the
construction of such building was basically flawed.
- Moreover, the city building official, who has been in
the city government service since 1974, admitted in
open court that no complaint regarding any defect on
the same structure has ever been lodged before his
office prior to the institution of the case at bench. It is
a matter of judicial notice that typhoons are common
occurrences in this country. If subject school building’s
roofing was not firmly anchored to its trusses,
obviously, it could not have withstood long years and
several typhoons even stronger than “Saling.”
- In light of the foregoing, we find no clear and
convincing evidence to sustain the judgment of the
appellate court. We thus hold that petitioner has not
been shown negligent or at fault regarding the
construction and maintenance of its school building in
question and that typhoon “Saling” was the proximate
cause of the damage suffered by private respondents’
house.
AFIALDA V HISOLE
85 Phil 67
REYES; November 29, 1949
NATURE
Appeal from judgment of CFI Iloilo
FACTS
- This is an action for damages arising from injury
caused by an animal. Loreto Afialda was the caretaker
of the carabaos of spouses Hisole. While tending the
animals, he was “gored by one of them and later died
as consequence of his injuries.” The action was filed by
the sister of Loreto, and contended that the mishap was
due neither to Loreto’s own fault nor to force majeure.
A2010 - 51 -
- She uses Art.1905, CC (now Art.2183 ) as ground for5
the liability:
“The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the
same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if
such animal should escape from him or stray away.
“This liability shall cease only in case the damage
should arise from force majeure or from the fault of
the person who may have suffered it.”
- Spouses moved for dismissal for lack of cause of
action, which the CFI granted. Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE
WON the owner of the animal is liable when the
damage is caused to its caretaker (as opposed to a
stranger)
HELD
1. NO
Ratio It was the caretaker's business to try to prevent
the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone,
including himself. And being injured by the animal
under those circumstances was one of the risks of the
occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for
which he must take the consequences.
Reasoning
- The lower court took the view that under the
abovequoted provision of the CC, the owner of an
animal is answerable only for damages caused to a
stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker
of the animal the owner would be liable of fault under
article 1902 only if he had been negligent or at the
same code.
- Claiming that the lower court was in error, plaintiff
contends that art. 1905 does not distinguish between
damage caused to a stranger and damage caused to
the caretaker and makes the owner liable whether or
not he has been negligent or at fault.
- The distinction (between stranger and caretaker) is
important. For the statute names the possessor or user
of the animal as the person liable for “any damages it
may cause” and this for the obvious reason that the
possessor or user has the custody and control of the
animal and is therefore the one in a position to prevent
it from causing damage.
- In the present case, the animal was in the custody
and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid
for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's
business to try to prevent the animal from causing
injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And
being injured by the animal under those circumstances
was one of the risks of the occupation which he had
5 the left palm of the deceased, there was a hollow
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the
same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may
escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage
should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has
suffered damage.
prof. casis
voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the
consequences.
- On the other hand, if action is to be based on Art.
1902, it is essential that there be fault or negligence on
the part of the defendants as owners of the animal that
caused the damage. But the complaint contains no
allegation on those points.
- In a decision of the Spanish SC, cited by Manresa, the
death of an employee who was bitten by a feline which
his master had asked him to take to his establishment
was by said tribunal declared to be “a veritable
accident of labor” which should come under the labor
laws rather than under article 1905, CC. The present
action, however, is not brought under labor laws in
effect, but under Art.1905.
Disposition Judgment AFFIRMED.
ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY V
CA (LUIS ET AL)
179 SCRA 5
PARAS; November 6, 1989
FACTS
- 5- 6AM June 29, 1967 - strong typhoon "Gening" in
Ilocos Norte brought floods and heavy rain. Isabel Lao
Juan, (Nana Belen) went to her store, Five Sisters
Emporium, to look after the merchandise to see if they
were damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood, Juan
suddenly screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the
water. Her companions, two girls (sales girlls)
attempted to help, but were afraid because they saw
an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in
snake-like fashion in the water. Yabes, the son-in law,
upon hearing the electrocution of his mother-in-law,
passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request the police
to ask Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut
off the electric current. The body was recovered about
two meters from an electric post.
- 4AM June 29, 1967- Engineer Juan, Power Plant
Engineer of NPC at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant,
noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter which
indicated such abnormalities as grounded or short-
circuited lines.
- 6-6:30AM June 29, 1967- he set out of the Laoag NPC
Compound on an inspection and saw grounded and
disconnected lines. Electric lines were hanging from the
posts to the ground. When he went to INELCO office, he
could not see any INELCO lineman.
- Engr. Juan attempted to resuscitate Nana Belen but
his efforts proved futile. Rigor mortis was setting in. On
wound. In the afternoon, the dangling wire was no
longer there.
torts & damages
- Dr. Castro examined the body and noted that the skin
was grayish or cyanotic, which indicated death by
electrocution. On the left palm, the doctor found an
"electrically charged wound" or a first degree burn.
About the base of the thumb on the left hand was a
burned wound. The cause of' death was ,'circulatory
shock electrocution"
- In defense and exculpation, INELCO presented the
testimonies of its officers and employees, which sought
to prove that (1) on and even before June 29, 1967 the
electric service system of the INELCO in the whole
franchise area did not suffer from any defect that might
constitute a hazard to life and property. (2) The service
lines and devices had been newly-installed prior to the
date in question. (3) Also, safety devices were installed
to prevent and avoid injuries to persons and damage to
property in case of natural calamities such as floods,
typhoons, fire and others. (4) 12 linesmen are charged
with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of
the areas respectively assigned to them. (5) They also
presented own medical expert and said that cyanosis
could not have been the noted 3 hours after the death
because it is only manifest in live persons. (6) Lastly,
the deceased could have died simply either by
drowning or by electrocution due to negligence
attributable only to herself and not to INELCO because
of the installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting
a wire from the main house to the iron gate and fence
of steel matting, thus, charging the latter with electric
current whenever the switch is on. The switch must
have been left on, hence, causing the deceased's
electrocution when she tried to open her gate that early
morning of June 29, 1967
- CFI: awarded P25,000 moral damages; P45,000 attys
fees
- CA: P30,229.45 in actual damages (i.e., P12,000 for
the victim's death and P18,229.45 for funeral
expenses); P50,000 in compensatory damages,
computed in accordance with the formula set in the
Villa-Rey Transit case (31 SCRA 511) with the base of
P15,000 as average annual income of the deceased;
P10,000 in exemplary damages; P3,000 attorney's fees
ISSUE
WON the legal principle of "assumption of risk" bars
private respondents from collecting damages from
INELCO
HELD
NO
Ratio The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by
petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. It is
imperative to note the surrounding circumstances
which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a
roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified by
A2010 - 52 -
the salesgirls, the deceased went to the Five Star
Emporium "to see to it that the goods were not
flooded." As such, shall We punish her for exercising
her right to protect her property from the floods by
imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that
she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not.
For it has been held that a person is excused from the
force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a
known danger he must abide by the consequences, if
an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property
of another is in peril, or when he seeks to rescue his
endangered property. Clearly, an emergency was at
hand as the deceased's property, a source of her
livelihood, was faced with an impending loss.
Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal
incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right
to be without regard to INELCO’s consent as she was on
her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private
respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from
recovering damages as a result of the death caused by
INELCO’s negligence
Reasoning
- INELCO can be exonerated from liability since
typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. While it is
true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of
God for which no person may be held responsible, it
was not said eventuality which directly caused the
victim's death. It was through the intervention of
petitioner's negligence that death took place.
- In times of calamities such as the one which occurred
in Laoag City on the night of June 28 until the early
hours of June 29, 1967, extraordinary diligence requires
a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent
or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or
limb. The evidence does not show that defendant did
that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that there
were no men (linemen or otherwise) policing the area,
nor even manning its office.
- INELCO was negligent in seeing that no harm is done
to the general public"... considering that electricity is
an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care
required of electric companies must be commensurate
with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of
exercising this high degree of diligence and care
extends to every place where persons have a right to
be" The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it
may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that
the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event.
"When an act of God combines or concurs with the
negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the
defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted
but for his own negligent conduct or omission"
Disposition CA decision, except for the slight
modification that actual damages be increased to
P48,229.45, is AFFIRMED.
prof. casis
RAMOS V PEPSI COLA
19 SCRA 289
1967
NATURE
Appeal from a CA decision
FACTS
- The facts with regard the accident that Andres
Bonifacio caused is not in the case. The Court limited
its ruling on the decision of the CA to absolve
defendant Pepsi Cola from liability under Article 21806
of the Civil Code. There was, however, a finding that
Bonifacio was in fact negligent.
- The petiton for appeal questioned the testimony of
one Anasco with regard the process and procedures
followed by Pepsi in the hiring and supervision of its
drivers. The SC ruled that the issue brought before it
with regard the credibility of Anasco is one of fact and
not of law. It went on to stay that the CA is a better
judge of the facts.
ISSUE
WON Pepsi Cola is liable under the doctrine of vicarious
liability
HELD
NO
- The Court ruled that based on the evidence and
testimonies presented during the trial, Pepsi Cola
exercised the due diligence of a good father in the
hiring and supervision of its drivers. This being the
case, the Company is relieved of any responsibility
from the accident.
Reasoning
- In its ruling, the court citing its ruling on Bahia as
follows:
“ From this article (2180) two things are apparent:
(1) that when an injury is caused by the negligence
of a servant or employee there instantly arise a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the
part of the employer or master either n the selection
of the servant or employee, or in the supervision
over him after the selection, or both, and
6
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible,
…
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
…
The responsibility treated of this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
torts & damages
(2) that they presumption is juris tantum ( so much
or so little of law) and not juris et de jure (of law and
from law), and consequently may be rebutted .
- It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in the selection and
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of
a good father of the family, the presumption is
overcome and he is relieved from liability.
- It was shown in this case that Pesi Cola did not merely
satisfy itself that Bonifacio possessed a driver’s license.
A background check was done and he was required to
submit various clearances, previous experience, and
medical records. He was also made to undergo both
theoretical and practical driving tests prior to being
hired as driver. In terms of the aspect of supervision,
the petitioners raised no questions. Given this, the
proof called for under Article 2180 to show diligence of
a good father of a family has been met.
Disposition Decision of the CA is affirmed.
METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORP V CA
(CUSTODIA)
223 SCRA 521
REGALADO; June 21, 1993
FACTS
- At about six o'clock in the morning of August 28,
1979, plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio boarded as a
paying passenger a public utility jeepney, then driven
by defendant Agudo Calebag and owned by his co-
defendant Victorino Lamayo, bound for her work, where
she then worked as a machine operator earning P16.25
a day.
- While the jeepney was travelling at a fast clip along
DBP Avenue, Bicutan, Taguig, another fast moving
vehicle, a Metro Manila Transit Corp. (MMTC) bus driven
by defendant Godofredo C. Leonardo was negotiating
Honeydew Road, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila bound
for its terminal at Bicutan.
- As both vehicles approached the intersection of DBP
Avenue and Honeydew Road they failed to slow down
and slacken their speed; neither did they blow their
horns to warn approaching vehicles. As a consequence,
a collision between them occurred, the passenger
jeepney ramming the left side portion of the MMTC bus.
The collision impact caused plaintiff-appellant Nenita
Custodio to hit the front windshield of the passenger
jeepney and (she) was thrown out therefrom, falling
onto the pavement unconscious with serious physical
injuries.
- She was brought to the Medical City Hospital where
she regained consciousness only after one (1) week.
Thereat, she was confined for twenty-four (24) days,
A2010 - 53 -
and as a consequence, she was unable to work for
three and one half months (31/2).
- A complaint for damages was filed by herein private
respondent, who being then a minor was assisted by
her parents, against all of therein named defendants
following their refusal to pay the expenses incurred by
the former as a result of the collision.
- Said defendants denied all the material allegations in
the complaint and pointed an accusing finger at each
other as being the party at fault. Further, herein
petitioner MMTC, a government-owned corporation and
one of the defendants in the court a quo, along with its
driver, Godofredo Leonardo, contrarily averred in its
answer with cross-claim and counterclaim that the
MMTC bus was driven in a prudent and careful manner
by driver Leonardo and that it was the passenger
jeepney which was driven recklessly considering that it
hit the left middle portion of the MMTC bus, and that it
was defendant Lamayo, the owner of the jeepney and
employer of driver Calebag, who failed to exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees
and should thus be held solidarily liable for damages
caused to the MMTC bus through the fault and
negligence of its employees.
- Defendant Victorino Lamayo alleged that the damages
suffered by therein plaintiff should be borne by
defendants MMTC and its driver, Godofredo Leonardo,
because the latter's negligence was the sole and
proximate cause of the accident and that MMTC failed
to exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees.
ISSUES
1. WON the oral testimonies of witnesses even without
the presentation documentary evidence, prove that
driver Leonardo had complied with all the hiring and
clearance requirements and had undergone all
trainings, tests and examinations preparatory to actual
employment, and that said positive testimonies spell
out the rigid procedure for screening of job applicants
and the supervision of its employees in the field
2. WON petitioner exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees
HELD
1. While there is no rule which requires that
testimonial evidence, to hold sway, must be
corroborated by documentary evidence, or even
subject evidence for that matter, inasmuch as the
witnesses' testimonies dwelt on mere generalities, we
cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive
proof that there was observance of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees.
- Petitioner's attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris
familias in the selection and supervision of employees
prof. casis
through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to
buttress the same with any other evidence, object or
documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased
nature of the testimony.
- It is procedurally required for each party in a case to
prove his own affirmative assertion by the degree of
evidence required by law. The party, whether plaintiff
or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of the issue
has the burden of presenting at the trial such amount
of evidence required by law to obtain a favorable
judgment. It is entirely within each of the parties
discretion, consonant with the theory of the case it or
he seeks to advance and subject to such procedural
strategy followed thereby, to present all available
evidence at its or his disposal in the manner which may
be deemed necessary and beneficial to prove its or his
position, provided only that the same shall measure up
to the quantum of evidence required by law. In making
proof in its or his case, it is paramount that the best
and most complete evidence be formally entered.
- Whether or not the diligence of a good father of a
family has been observed by petitioner is a matter of
proof which under the circumstances in the case at bar
has not been clearly established. It is not felt by the
Court that there is enough evidence on record as would
overturn the presumption of negligence, and for failure
to submit all evidence within its control, assuming the
putative existence thereof, petitioner MMTC must suffer
the consequences of its own inaction and indifference.
2. In any event, we do not find the evidence presented
by petitioner sufficiently convincing to prove the
diligence of a good father of a family, which for an
employer doctrinally translates into its observance of
due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees but which mandate, to use an oft-quoted
phrase, is more often honored in the breach than in the
observance.
- Petitioner attempted to essay in detail the company's
procedure for screening job applicants and supervising
its employees in the field, through the testimonies of
Milagros Garbo, as its training officer, and Christian
Bautista, as its transport supervisor, both of whom
naturally and expectedly testified for MMTC.
- Their statements strike us as both presumptuous and
in the nature of petitio principii, couched in generalities
and shorn of any supporting evidence to boost their
verity.
- The case at bar is clearly within the coverage of
Article 2176 and 2177, in relation to Article 2180, of the
Civil Code provisions on quasi-delicts as all the
elements thereof are present, to wit: (1) damages
suffered by the plaintiff, (2) fault or negligence of the
defendant or some other person for whose act he must
respond, and (3) the connection of cause and effect
between fault or negligence of the defendant and the
torts & damages
damages incurred by plaintiff. It is to be noted that
petitioner was originally sued as employer of driver
Leonardo under Article 2180.
- Article 2180 applicable only where there is an
employer-employee relationship, although it is not
necessary that the employer be engaged in business or
industry. Employer is liable for torts committed by his
employees within the scope of their assigned tasks.
But, it is necessary first to establish the employment
relationship. Once this is done, the plaintiff must show,
to hold the employer liable, that the employee was
acting within the scope of his assigned task when the
tort complained of was committed. It is only then that
the defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to
interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection
and supervision of employees. The diligence of a good
father of a family required to be observed by employers
to prevent damages under Article 2180 refers to due
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees
in order to protect the public.
- With the allegation and subsequent proof of
negligence against the defendant driver and of an
employer-employee relation between him and his co-
defendant MMTC in this instance, the case in
undoubtedly based on a quasi-delict under Article 2180.
When the employee causes damage due to his own
negligence while performing his own duties, there
arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer
is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of
the diligence of a good father of a family. For failure to
rebut such legal presumption of negligence in the
selection and supervision of employees, the employer
is likewise responsible for damages, the basis of the
liability being the relationship of pater familias or on
the employer's own negligence.
- Due diligence in the supervision of employees
includes the formulation of suitable rules and
regulations for the guidance of employees and the
issuance of proper instructions intended for the
protection of the public and persons with whom the
employer has relations through his or its employees
and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures
upon employees in case of breach or as may be
warranted to ensure the performance of acts
indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their
employer.
- In order that the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees may be
deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to
emptily invoke the existence of said company
guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the
negligence of the employee gives rise to the
presumption of negligence on the part of the employer,
the latter has the burden of proving that it has been
A2010 - 54 -
diligent not only in the selection of employees but also
in the actual supervision of their work.
- Finally, we believe that respondent court acted in the
exercise of sound discretion when it affirmed the trial
court's award, without requiring the payment of
interest thereon as an item of damages just because of
delay in the determination thereof, especially since
private respondent did not specifically pray therefor in
her complaint. Article 2211 of the Civil Code provides
that in quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the damages
may be awarded in the discretion of the court, and not
as a matter of right.
KRAMER VS CA (TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING
LINES)
178 SCRA 289
GANCAYCO; October 13, 1989
FACTS
- The F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by Ernesto
Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way
from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near
Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured
in a collision with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia
Philippines owned byTrans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As
a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank,
taking with it its fish catch.
- The Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea
and its fish catch was due to the negligence of the
employees of Trans-Asia. The Kramers instituted a
Complaint for damages against the private respondent
before Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court in Pasay
City. Trans-Asia filed a motion seeking the dismissal of
the Complaint on the ground of prescription. He
argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, the
prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for
damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime
collision is four years. He maintained that the
petitioners should have filed their Complaint within four
years from the date when their cause of action accrued,
i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took
place, and that accordingly, the Complaint filed on May
30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year
prescriptive period.
Petitioner’s claim:
- that maritime collisions have peculiarities and
characteristics which only persons with special skill,
training and experience like the members of the Board
of Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve
- that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled
by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause
of action accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date when
the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of
the M/V Asia Philippines had become final, and that the
prof. casis
four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the
Civil Code should be computed from the said date.
ISSUE
WON a Complaint for damages instituted by the
petitioners against the private respondent arising from
a marine collision is barred by presciption
HELD
YES
- Under A1146 CC, an action based upon a quasi-delict
must be instituted within four (4) years. The
prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict
is committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia, this Court ruled
that in an action for damages arising from the collision
of two (2) trucks, the action being based on a quasi-
delict, the four (4) year prescriptive period must be
counted from the day of the collision.
- In Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans
Administration, this Court held: The right of action
accrues when there exists a cause of action, which
consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of
defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the
right of the plaintiff ... It is only when the last element
occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a
cause of action has arisen. From the foregoing ruling, it
is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted
when the last element occurs or takes place, that is,
the time of the commission of an act or omission
violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time
when the cause of action arises. It is therefore clear
that in this action for damages arising from the collision
of 2 vessels the 4 year prescriptive period must be
counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved
party need not wait for a determination by an
administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that
the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of
the other party before he can file an action for
damages. Immediately after the collision the aggrieved
party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such
negligence or fault of the owners, agents or personnel
of the other vessel. Thus, the respondent court
correctly found that the action of petitioner has
prescribed. The collision occurred on April 8, 1976. The
complaint for damages was filed in court only on May
30, 1 985, was beyond the 4 year prescriptive period.
Disposition petition is dismissed.
ALLIED BANKING V CA (YUJUICO)
178 SCRA 526
GANCAYCO; October 13, 1989
torts & damages
NATURE
Petition seeking the reversal of the decision of CA in
"Joselito Z. Yujuico vs. Hon. Domingo D. Panis, RTC
Judge of Manila and Allied Banking Corp.,"1 and the
resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the said decision.
FACTS
- Mar 25, 1977 - Respondent Yujuico, a ranking officer
in General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) and a
member of the family owning control of the said bank,
obtained a loan from the said institution in the amount
of 500K. Private respondent issued a promissory note in
favor of GENBANK.
- March 25, 1977 – the Monetary Board of the Central
Bank issued a resolution forbidding GENBANK from
doing business in the Phil. It was followed by another
resolution ordering the liquidation of GENBANK.
- In the Memorandum of Agreement between Allied
Banking Corp (Allied) and Amulfo Aurellano as
liquidator of GENBANK, Allied acquired all the assets
and assumed the liabilityies of GENBANK, including the
receivable due from Yujuico.
- Yujuico failed to comply with his obligation prompting
Allied to file a complaint for the collection of a sum of
money before the CFI Manila (now RTC).
- First case: CA affirmed RTC decision in a special
proceeding finding that the liquidation of GENBANK was
made in bad faith. This decision declared as null and
void the liquidation of GENBANK. It was then that
Yujuico filed the third party complaint to transfer
liability for the default imputed against him by the
petitioner to the proposed third-party7 defendants
because of their tortious acts which prevented him
from performing his obligations.
- Second and current proceeding (1987) – Yujuico filed
a motion to admit Ammended/Supplemental Answer
and a Third Party Complaint to impead the Central Bank
and Aurellano as third-party defendants. The complaint
alleged that by reason of the tortuous interference by
the CB with the affairs of GENBANK, he was prevented
from performing his obligation such that he should not
be held liable thereon. RTC Judge Mintu denied the
third-party complaint but admitted the
amended/supplemental answer. The case was re-
raffled where presiding Judge Panis reiterated the order
7 BATACLAN V MEDINA
A third-party complaint is a procedural device whereby a "third-party"
who is neither a party nor privy to the act or deed complained of by the
plaintiff, may be brought into the case with leave of court, by the
defendant, who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce against such third-
party defendant a right for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any
other relief, in respect of the plaintiffs claim. The third party complaint is
independent of, separate and distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint.
A2010 - 55 -
made by Judge Mintu. Both parties filed for motions of
partial reconsideration, which were both denied.
- CA, in a petition for certiorari questioning the denied
motions, rendered a decision nullifying the RTC order.
The RTC judge was found to be in grave abuse of
discretion and was ordered to admit the third-party
complaint.
- Petitioner claims that the cause of action alleged in
the third-party complaint has already prescribed. Being
founded on what was termed as "tortious interference,"
petitioner asserts that under the CC on quasi-delict" the
action against third-party defendants should have been
filed within four (4) years from the date the cause of
action accrued. On the theory that the cause of action
accrued on March 25, 1977, the date when the
Monetary Board ordered GENBANK to desist from doing
business in the Philippines, petitioner maintains that
the claim should have been filed at the latest on March
25, 1981. On the other hand, private respondent relies
on the "Doctrine of Relations" or "Relations Back
Doctrine" to support his claim that the cause of action
as against the proposed third-party defendant accrued
only on December 12,1986 when the decision in CA
(first case)became final and executory. It is contended
that while the third party complaint was filed only on
June 17,1987, it must be deemed to have been
instituted on February 7, 1979 when the complaint in
the case was filed.
ISSUE
1. WON there was ground to admit the third-party
complaint
2. WON the cause of action under the third-party
complaint prescribed
HELD
1. YES
- The first instance is allowable and should be allowed if
it will help in clarifying in a single proceeding the
multifarious issues involved arising from a single
transaction.
- The judgment of the CA in its first decision is the
substantive basis of private respondent's proposed
third-party complaint. There is merit in private
respondent's position that if held liable on the
promissory note, they are seeking, by means of the
third-party complaint, to transfer unto the third-party
defendants liability on the note by reason of the illegal
liquidation of GENBANK which was the basis for the
assignment of the promissory note. If there was any
confusion at all on the ground/s alleged in the third-
party complaint, it was the claim of third-party plaintiff
for other damages in addition to any amount which he
may be called upon to pay under the original complaint.
While these allegations in the proposed third-party
prof. casis
complaint may cause delay in the disposition of the
main suit, it cannot be outrightly asserted that it would
not serve any purpose.
- The tests to determine whether the claim for
indemnity in a third-party claim is "in respect of plaintiff
's claim" are: (a) whether it arises out of the same
transaction on which the plaintiff's claim is based, or
whether the third-party's claim, although arising out of
another or different contract or transaction, is
connected with the plaintiffs claim; (b) whether the
third-party defendant would be liable to the plaintiff or
to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiffs claim
against the original defendant, although the third-party
defendant's liability arises out of another transaction;
or (c) whether the third-party defendant may assert
any defense which the third-party plaintiff has, or may
have against plaintiffs claim. (Capayas v CFI Albay)
The claim of third-party plaintiff, private respondent
herein, can be accommodated under tests (a) and (b)
abovementioned.
2. YES
- The action for damages instituted by private
respondent arising from the quasidelict or alleged
"tortious interference" should be filed within four 4
years from the day the cause of action accrued.
- It is from the date of the act or omission violative of
the right of a party when the cause of action arises and
it is from this date that the prescriptive period must be
reckoned. (Español vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans
Admistration)
- While the third party complaint in this case may be
admitted as above discussed, since the cause of action
accrued on March 25, 1980 when the Monetary Board
ordered the GENBANK to desist from doing business in
the Philippines while the third party complaint was filed
only on June 17, 1987, consequently, the action has
prescribed. The third party complaint should not be
admitted.
Disposition petition is GRANTED. The decision of CA
denying the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner are hereby reversed and set aside and
declared null and void, and another judgment is hereby
rendered sustaining the orders of the RTC denying the
admission of the third party complaint
CAUSATION
102 PHIL 181
MONTEMAYOR; October 22, 1957
FACTS
torts & damages
- Juan Bataclan rode Bus No. 30 of the Medina
Transportation, driven by Saylon, shortly after
midnight. While the bus was running very fast on a
highway, one of the front tires burst. The bus fell into a
canal and turned turtle. Four passengers could not get
out, including Bataclan. It appeared that gasoline
began to leak from the overturned bus. Ten men came
to help. One of them carried a torch and when he
approached the bus, a fierce fire started, burning the
four passengers trapped inside.
- The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate
cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning
of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus,
including himself and his co-passengers who were
unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started,
Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical
injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so
damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the
physical injuries suffered by him.
ISSUES
What is the proximate cause of death of the four
passengers?
HELD
The proximate cause of death is the overturning of the
bus.
- see definition of proximate cause under A1
- It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus
overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing
him physical injuries, "If through some event,
unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is
set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen
after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the
passenger is burned to death, one might still contend
that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and
not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present
case and under the circumstances obtaining in the
same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate
cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of
the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle
turned not only on 'Its side but completely on its back,
the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men
with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help,
made not only by the passengers, but most probably,
by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that
because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning),
the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and coming
as they did from a rural area where lanterns and
flashlights were not available, they had to use a torch,
the most handy and available; and what was more
natural than that said rescuers should innocently
approach the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and
effect the rescue requested from them. In other words,
A2010 - 56 -
the coming of the men with the torch was to be
expected and was a natural sequence of the
overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its
passengers and the call for outside help. What is more,
the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to
the negligence of the carrier, through its driver and its
conductor. According to the witnesses, the driver and
the conductor were on the road walking back and forth.
They, or at least, the driver should and must have
known that in the position in which the overturned bus
was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the
gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the
bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled,
specially over a large area, can be smelt and detected
-even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor
the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken
steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch
too near the bus.
-(I guess this case says, if not for the overturning of the
bus… then the leak and the fire wouldn’t have
happened)
FERNANDO V CA (City of Davao)
208 SCRA 714
MEDIALDEA; May 8, 1992
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public
Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of
Property for the re-emptying of the septic tank of
Agdao. Invitations to bid for cleaning out the tanks
were issued, which was won by Bascon. However,
before the date they were to work, one of the bidders,
Bertulano, and four other companions including an
Alberto Fernando were found dead inside the septic
tank. The City Engineer’s office, upon investigation,
found that the men entered without clearance or
consent of the market master. They apparently did the
re-emptying as the tank was nearly empty. The autopsy
showed that the victims died of asphyxia caused by
lack of oxygen supply in the body. Their lungs had burst
due to their intake of toxic sulfide gas produced from
the waste matter in said tank.
*Di nakalagay sa case, pero mukhang kinasuhan ni
Sofia Fernando yung Davao City for negligence in a
previous case dahil namatay yung asawa nya
- Upon dismissal of the case by the TC, petitioners
appealed to then IAC (now CA) which set aside the
judgment and rendered a new one, granting the
families of the deceased men P30k each in
prof. casis
compensatory damages, P20k each as moral damages
and P10k for attorney’s fees.
- Both parties filed their separate MFRs; the CA
rendered an amended decision granting Davao City’s
MFR, dismissing the case. Hence this petition.
ISSUES
1. WON Davao City is guilty of negligence
2. WON such negligence is the proximate cause of the
deaths of the victims
HELD
1. NO
- Although public respondent had been remiss in its
duty to re-empty the tank annually (for almost 20
years), such negligence was not a continuing one. Upon
learning from the market master about the need to
clean said tank, it immediately responded by issuing
invitations to bid for such service. Public respondent
lost no time in taking up remedial measures to meet
the situation. Also, public respondent’s failure to empty
the tank had not caused any sanitary accidents despite
its proximity to several homes and the public market as
it was covered in lead and was air-tight. In fact, the
public toilet connected to it was used several times
daily all those years, and all those people have
remained unscathed which is ironically evidenced by
the petitioner’s witnesses. The only indication that the
tank was full was when water began to leak, and even
then no reports of casualties from gas poising emerged.
- Petitioners in fussing over the lack of ventilation in the
tanks backfired as their witnesses were no experts.
Neither did they present competent evidence to
corroborate their testimonies and rebut the city
government engineer Alindada’s testimony that safety
requirements for the tank had been complied with.
- The Court also does not agree with petitioner’s
contention that warning signs of noxious gas should be
placed around the area of the toilets and septic tank.
As defined in Art 694 of the NCC, they are not
nuisances per se which would necessitate warning
signs for the protection of the public.
- Petitioner’s contention that the market master should
have been supervising the area of the tank is also
untenable. Work on the tank was still forthcoming since
the awarding to the winning bidder was yet to be made
by the Committee on Awards—hence, there was
nothing to supervise.
2. NO
- Proximate cause is defined as that cause which in
natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. To
be entitled to damages, one must prove under Art 2179
of the NCC that the defendant’s negligence was the
torts & damages
proximate cause of the injury. A test for such a
relationship is given in Taylor v Manila Electric Railroad
and Light Co. which states that a distinction must be
made between the accident and the injury, between
the event itself, without which there could have been
no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering
into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own
proper hurt.
- A toxic gas leakage could only have happened by
opening the tank’s cover. The accident is thus of the
victims’ own doing—an ordinarily prudent person
should be aware of the attended risks of cleaning out
the tank. This was especially true for the victim,
Bertulano, since he was an old hand to septic services
and is expected to know the hazards of the job. The
victims’ failure to take precautionary measures for their
safety was the proximate cause of the accident.
- When a person holds himself out as being competent
to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held
liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and
skill required in what he attempts to do. As the CA
observed, the victims would not have died, had they
not opened the tank which they were not authorized to
open in the first place. They find it illogical that the
septic tank which had been around since the 50’s
would be the proximate cause of an accident which
occurred only 20 years later, especially since no other
deaths or injuries related to the tank had ever
occurred.
Disposition amended decision of the CA is AFFIRMED
URBANO V IAC
157 SCRA 1
GUTIERREZ JR; January 7, 1988
NATURE
Petition to review the decision of the then IAC
FACTS
ON oct. 23, 1980, Marcelo Javier was hacked by the
Filomeno Urbano using a bolo. As a result of which,
Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm.
On November 14, 1981, which was the 22nd day after
the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very
serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier
had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo
Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that
the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus
toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in
Javier's palm which could have been infected by
tetanus. On November 15, 1980, Javier died in the
hospital.
A2010 - 57 -
- In an information, Urbano was charged with the crime
of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of
Dagupan City.
- The trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. The
lower courts held that Javier's death was the natural
and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. He
was sentenced accordingly.
- The then IAC affirmed the conviction of Urbano on
appeal.
- Appellant alleges that the proximate cause of the
victim's death was due to his own negligence in going
back to work without his wound being properly healed,
and that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals
in the first week of November, 1980. He states that the
proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due
to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no
tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with
tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm
and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands
exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus
germs.
ISSUE
WON there was an efficient intervening cause from the
time Javier was wounded until his death which would
exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death
HELD
YES.
- The case involves the application of Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal
liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing
a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to
this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for
acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the
natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom."
- The record is clear that - The evidence on record
does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by
Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the
infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms
that the wound, which was already healing at the time
Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment,
somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to
when the wound was infected is not clear from the
record.
- PROXIMATE CAUSE "that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred."And more
comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
prof. casis
probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at
the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom."
- The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time
between injury and the appearance of unmistakable
symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80
percent of patients become symptomatic within 14
days. A short incubation period indicates severe
disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days
of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.
- Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as
restlessness, irritability, and headache are encountered
occasionally, but the commonest presenting complaints
are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and
difficulty swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives
way to rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty
opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the
commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible
for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more
muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized,
and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The
intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite
variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local
signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury.
In the vast majority, however, most muscles are
involved to some degree, and the signs and symptoms
encountered depend upon the major muscle groups
affected.
- Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of
the first symptom, an interval referred to as the onset
time. As in the case of the incubation period, a short
onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms
are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli
arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and
causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of
muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both
painful and dangerous. As the disease progresses,
minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense
and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency.
Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic
contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent
adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to
irreversible central nervous system damage and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of
at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6
days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is
absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild.
Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter
incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked,
dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but
ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The
criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation
torts & damages
time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe
trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged,
generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of
Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005;
Emphasis supplied)
- Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to
tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the
incubation period of the disease.
- In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised
wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo
which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took
place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on
November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of
tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following
day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the
appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the
time, it is more medically probable that Javier should
have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus
because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the
22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14
days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the
onset time should have been more than six days.
Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset
time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time
Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the
severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet
present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been
infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's
death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus
2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the
direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the
accused caused the victim's death must convince a
rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that
the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was
wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
- Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the
wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent
infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with
tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's
death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.
- A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of
an action if such remote cause did nothing more than
furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of
the injury, even though such injury would not have
A2010 - 58 -
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no
danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act
or defective condition sets into operation the instances
which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause
DISPOSITION :. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the
crime of homicide.
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC.
(CARBONEL) VS. IAC (DIONISIO)
148 SCRA 353
FELICIANO, MARCH 10, 1987
NATURE
Petition for review
FACTS
-About 1:30 am, Leonardo Dionisio (DIONISIO) was
driving home (he lived in Bangkal, Makati) from
cocktails/dinner meeting with his boss where he had
taken “a shot or two” of liquor. He had just crossed the
intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Sts.
At Bangkal, Makati (not far from his home) and was
proceeding down General Lacuna Street without
headlights when he hit a dump truck owned by Phoenix
Construction Inc. (PHOENIX), which was parked on the
right hand side of General Lacuna Street (DIONISIO’s
lane). The dump truck was parked askew in such a
manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking
the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor
any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set
anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump
truck had earlier that evening been driven home by
petitioner Armando U. Carbonel (CARBONEL), its
regular driver, with the permission of his employer
PHOENIX, in view of work scheduled to be carried out
early the following morning, DIONISIO claimed that he
tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left
but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump
truck. As a result of the collision, DIONISIO suffered
some physical injuries including some permanent facial
scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold
bridge dentures.
DIONISIO’s claim: the legal and proximate cause of his
injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel
had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his
employer Phoenix
PHOENIX + CARBONEL’s claim: the proximate cause of
Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving
fast at the time of the accident, while under the
influence of liquor, without his headlights on and
prof. casis
without a curfew pass; if there was negligence in the
manner in which the dump truck was parked, that
negligence was merely a "passive and static condition"
and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness
constituted an intervening, efficient cause
determinative of the accident and the injuries he
sustained.
TC: in favor of Dionisio, awarded damages in favor of
Dionisio
IAC: in favor of Dionisio, reduced the damages awarded
ISSUES
Factual issues: (court discussed this to administer
substantial justice without remanding the case to the
lower court – since both TC and IAC did not consider
defenses set by petitioners)
1. WON private respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass
valid and effective for that eventful night
2. WON Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just
before the collision with the dump truck;
3. WON Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's
headlights before contact with the dump truck
4. WON Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the
accident.
Substantial Issues:
5. WON the legal and proximate cause of the accident
and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent
manner in which the dump truck was parked
a. WON the driver’s negligence was merely a "passive
and static condition" and that Dionisio's negligence
was an "efficient intervening cause," and that
consequently Dionisio's negligence must be
regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the
accident rather than the earlier negligence of
Carbonel
b. WON the court, based on the “last clear chance”
doctrine, should hold Dionisio alone responsible for
his accident
6. WON Phoenix has successfully proven that they
exercised due care in the selection and supervision of
the dump truck driver
7. WON the amount of damages awarded should be
modified
HELD
FACTUAL
1. NO. none was found with Dionisio. He was not able
to produce any curfew pass during the trial. (It is
important to determine if he had a curfew pass to shed
light to the 2nd and 3rd factual issues)
-Testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who had taken
DIONISIO to Makati Med testified that none was found
with Dionisio. Although Dionisio offered a certification
attesting that he did have a valid curfew pass, the
torts & damages
certification did not specify any serial number or date
or period of effectivity of the supposed curfew pass.
2. YES. Testimony of Patrolman Cuyno attesting that
people gathered at the scene of the accident told him
that Dionisio’s Car was MOVING FAST and that he DID
NOT have its HEADLIGTS ON.
Ratio. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno is admissible
not under the official records exception to the hearsay
rule but rather as part of the res gestae. Testimonial
evidence under this exception to the hearsay rule
consists of excited utterances made on the occasion of
an occurrence or event sufficiently startling in nature
so as to render inoperative the normal reflective
thought processes of the observer and hence made as
a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event, and
not the result of reflective thought.
-Dionisio claimed that he was traveling at 30kph and
had just crossed the intersection of General Santos and
General Lacuna Streets and had started to accelerate
when his headlights failed just before the collision took
place. He also asserts that Patrolman Cuyno’s
testimony was hearsay and did not fall within any of the
recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule since the
facts he testified to were not acquired by him through
official information and had not been given by the
informants pursuant to any duty to do so.
-BUT: an automobile speeding down a street and
suddenly smashing into a stationary object in the dead
of night is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke
spontaneous, rather than reflective, reactions from
observers who happened to be around at that time. The
testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible
as part of the res gestae and should have been
considered by the trial court. Clearly, substantial weight
should have been ascribed to such testimony, even
though it did not, as it could not, have purported to
describe quantitatively the precise velocity at which
Dionisio was travelling just before impact with the
Phoenix dump truck.
3. YES. Phoenix’s theory more credible than Dionisio’s.
DIONISIO’S CLAIM: he had his headlights on but that, at
the crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if
convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although
he succeeded in switching his lights on again at
"bright" split seconds before contact with the dump
truck
PHOENIX’s CLAIM: Dionisio purposely shut off his
headlights even before he reached the intersection so
as not to be detected by the police in the police
precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew
was not far away from the intersection (less than 200m
away).
4. NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE
ANYTHING.
A2010 - 59 -
EVIDENCE PRESENTED: Patrolman Cuyno attested that
Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken to
Makati med + Dionisio admitted he had taken “a shot
or two”
- not enough evidence to show how much liquor
Dionisio had in fact taken and the effects of that upon
his physical faculties or upon his judgment or mental
alertness. "One shot or two" of hard liquor may affect
different people differently.
SUBSTANTIAL
5. YES. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump
track was a natural and foreseeable consequence of
the truck driver's negligence. Private respondent
Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the
"immediate and proximate cause" of the injury
remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that
consequently respondent Dionisio may recover
damages though such damages are subject to
mitigation by the courts
a. NO. Besides, this argument had no validity under
our jurisdiction and even in the United States, the
distinctions between" cause" and "condition" have
already been "almost entirely discredited.
- the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive
and static condition" was rather an indispensable and
efficient cause; Dionisio's negligence, although
later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence
and therefore closer to the accident, was not an
efficient intervening or independent cause. The
petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private
respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to
impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had
created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an
independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it
were, the chain of causation in fact between the
improper parking of the dump truck and the accident,
nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability.
FROM PROF. PROSSER AND KEETON: "Cause and condition.
Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active
"cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon
which that cause operated If the defendant has created only a
passive static condition which made the damage possible, the
defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of
causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents
which have played an important part in producing the result, it
is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and
passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case
the latter am the result of other active forces which have gone
before. The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises
creates a "condition," but the act may be culpable because of
the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the gasoline, the
condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as the
spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant has
created, the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the
lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition"
remains static will not necessarily affect liability; one who digs
a trench in the highway may still be liable to another who falls
prof. casis
into it a month afterward. "Cause" and "condition" still find
occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction
is now almost entirely discredited So far as it has any
validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces
set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a
position of apparent safety. and some new force intervenes.
But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between
"cause" and "condition" which is important, but the
nature of the risk and the character of the intervening
cause."
"Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause
is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be
anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to
anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant
may be negligent, among other reasons, because of failure to
guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for
that reason Thus one who sets a fire may be required to
foresee that an ordinary, usual and customary wind arising
later will spread it beyond the defendant's own property, and
therefore to take precautions to prevent that event. The person
who leaves the combustible or explosive material exposed in a
public place may foresee the risk of fire from some
independent source. x x x In all of these cases there is an
intervening cause combining with the defendant's
conduct to produce the result and in each case the
defendant's negligence consists in failure to protect the
plaintiff against that very risk.
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability
by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important
part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected
the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable
intervening forces are within the scope of the original risk,
and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are
quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly
in this category will not supersede the defendant's
responsibility.
Thus it has been held that a defendant will be required to
anticipate the usual weather of the vicinity, including all
ordinary forces of nature such as usual wind or rain, or snow or
frost or fog or even lightning; that one who leaves an
obstruction on the road or a railroad track should foresee that a
vehicle or a train will run into it; x x x.
The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention
of the foreseeable negligence of others. x x x [T]he standard
of reasonable conduct may require the defendant to
protect the plaintiff against 'that occasional negligence
which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life, and
therefore to be anticipated.' Thus, a defendant who blocks
the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where
the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic
becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even
though the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an
automobile on the highway without lights at night is not
relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it
--"
b. NO. The last clear chance doctrine of the common
law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs.
Smith but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what
extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what
role, if any, the common law last clear chance
torts & damages
doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the
common law concept of contributory negligence
as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff,
has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article
2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
-The relative location in the continuum of time of the
plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or
omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may
be taken into account. Of more fundamental
importance are the nature of the negligent act or
omission of each party and the character and gravity of
the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of
the community.
ON LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE: The historical
function of that doctrine in the common law was to
mitigate the harshness of another common law
doctrine or rule-that of contributory negligence. The
common law rule of contributory negligence prevented
any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also
negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was
relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or
omission of the defendant. The common law notion of
last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to
a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that
the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the
casualty and failed to do so.
6. NO. The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its
track driver to bring the dump truck to his home
whenever there was work to be done early the
following morning, when coupled with the failure to
show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the
manner in which the dump truck is parked when away
from company premises, is an affirmative showing of
culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.
7. YES. Taking into account the comparative
negligence ot DIONISIO and the petitioners, the
demands of substantial justice are satisfied by
allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio.
As to the other awards of damages, sustain.
20% of the damages awarded by the respondent
appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees
and costs, shall be home by private respondent
Dionisio; only the balance of 800% needs to be paid by
petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarily
liable therefor to the former. The award of
exemplary damages and attorney's fees and
costs shall be home exclusively by the
petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to
reimbursement from Carbonel.
Disposition. WHEREFORE, the decision of the
respondent appellate court is modified by reducing the
A2010 - 60 -
aggregate amount of compensatory damages, loss of
expected income and moral damages private
respondent Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such
amount. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
PILIPINAS BANK V CA (REYES)
234 SCRA 435
PUNO; July 25, 1994
NATURE
- Petition for review of CA decision
FACTS
- FLORENCIO REYES issued two postdated checks.
These are for WINNER INDUSTRIAL CORP. in amount of
P21T due Oct.10, 1979 and for Vicente TUI in amount of
P11.4T due Oct.12.
- To cover the face value of the checks, he requested
PCIB Money Shop's manager to effect the withdrawal of
P32T from his savings account and have it deposited
with his current account with PILIPINAS BANK.
- PILIPINAS BANK’S Current Account Bookkeeper made
an error in depositing the amount: he thought it was for
a certain FLORENCIO AMADOR. He, thus, posted the
deposit in the latter's account not noticing that the
depositor's surname in the deposit slip was REYES.
- On Oct.11, the Oct.10 check in favor of WINNER
INDUSTRIAL was presented for payment. Since the
ledger of Florencio REYES indicated that his account
had only a balance of P4,078.43, it was dishonored and
the payee was advised to try it for next clearing.
- It was redeposited but was again dishonored. The
same thing happened to the Oct.12 check. The payee
then demanded a cash payment of the check’s face
value which REYES did if only to save his name.
- Furious, he immediately proceeded to the bank and
urged an immediate verification of his account. That
was only when they noticed the error.
RTC: ordered petitioner to pay P200T compensatory
damages, P100T moral damages, P25T attorney’s fees,
as well as costs of suit.
CA: modified amount to just P50T moral damages and
P25T attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
ISSUE
WON Art.21798 of NCC is applicable
HELD
8 care by providing the area of the diggings all necessary
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of
the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
prof. casis
NO
- For it to apply, it must be established that private
respondent's own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury.
Definition of Proximate Cause: "any cause which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the result
complained of and without which would not have
occurred and from which it ought to have been
foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of
ordinary case that the injury complained of or some
similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural and
probable consequence."
Reasoning The proximate cause of the injury is the
negligence of petitioner's employee in erroneously
posting the cash deposit of private respondent in the
name of another depositor who had a similar first
name.
- The bank employee is deemed to have failed to
exercise the degree of care required in the
performance of his duties.
Dispositive Petition denied.
QUEZON CITY V DACARA
PANGANIBAN; JUNE 15, 2005
NATURE
Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
-On February 28, 1988 at about 1:00 A.M., Fulgencio
Dacara, Jr., owner of ’87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan,
while driving the said vehicle, rammed into a pile of
earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon
City, which was then being repaired by the Quezon City
government.
-As a result, Dacara, Jr. allegedly sustained bodily
injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for
it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth.
-Indemnification was sought from the city government,
which however, yielded negative results.
-Fulgencio P. Dacara, for and in behalf of his minor son,
filed a Complaint for damages against Quezon City and
Engr. Ramir Tiamzon.
-Defendants admitted the occurrence of the incident
but alleged that the subject diggings was provided with
a mound of soil and barricaded with reflectorized traffic
paint with sticks placed before or after it which was
visible during the incident.
-In short, defendants claimed that they exercised due
measures to avoid accident, and that the reason why
Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into the diggings was precisely
torts & damages
because of the latter’s negligence and failure to
exercise due care.
-RTC ruled in favor of Dacara, ordering the defendants
to indemnify the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand
pesos as actual/compensatory damages, P10,000.00 as
moral damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees and other costs of suit.
-Upon appeal, CA agreed with the RTC’s finding that
petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the
damage suffered by respondent.
-Hence, this Petition
ISSUES
1. WON petitioner’s negligence is the
proximate cause of the incident
2. WON moral damages are recoverable
3. WON exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees are recoverable
HELD
1. Yes.
-Proximate cause is defined as any cause that
produces injury in a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, such that the result would not have
occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is
determined from the facts of each case, upon a
combined consideration of logic, common sense,
policy and precedent.
-What really caused the subject vehicle to turn turtle is
a factual issue that this Court cannot pass upon, absent
any whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment by
the lower courts or an ample showing that they lacked
any basis for their conclusions.
-The unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their
factual ascertainment that petitioners’ negligence was
the proximate cause of the accident bars us from
supplanting their findings and substituting these with
our own.
-That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate
cause of the accident was aptly discussed in the lower
court’s finding:
“Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the
accident of February 28, 1988 which caused almost the
life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. when his car
turned turtle was the existence of a pile of earth from a
digging done relative to the base failure at Matahimik
Street nary a lighting device or a reflectorized
barricade or sign perhaps which could have served as
an adequate warning to motorists especially during the
thick of the night where darkness is pervasive. Contrary
to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that
there were signs, gasera which was buried so that its
light could not be blown off by the wind and barricade,
none was ever presented to stress the point that
A2010 - 61 -
sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were
placed. If indeed signs were placed thereat, how then
could it be explained that according to the report even
of the policeman, none was found at the scene of the
accident.
-“The provisions of Article 21899 of the New Civil Code
capsulizes the responsibility of the city government
relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since
it exercises the control and supervision over the same.
Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory
provision is tantamount to negligence which renders
the City government liable
-Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio Jr. was
driving at the speed of 60 kilometers per hour (kph)
when he met the accident. This speed was allegedly
well above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on
“city streets with light traffic,” as provided under the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code Thus, petitioners
assert that Fulgencio Jr., having violated a traffic
regulation, should be presumed negligent pursuant to
Article 2185 of the Civil Code.
-These matters were, however, not raised by
petitioners at any time during the trial. It is evident
from the records that they brought up for the first time
in their Motion for Reconsideration.
-It is too late in the day for them to raise this new
issue. To consider their belatedly raised arguments at
this stage of the proceedings would trample on the
basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process.
-Indeed, both the trial and the appellate courts’
findings, which are amply substantiated by the
evidence on record, clearly point to petitioners’
negligence as the proximate cause of the damages
suffered by respondent’s car. No adequate reason has
been given to overturn this factual conclusion.
2. No.
-To award moral damages, a court must be satisfied
with proof of the following requisites: (1) an injury--
whether physical, mental, or psychological--clearly
sustained by the claimant; (2) a culpable act or
omission factually established; (3) a wrongful act or
omission of the defendant as the proximate cause of
the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award
of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in
Article 2219.
-Article 2219(2) specifically allows moral damages to be
recovered for quasi-delicts, provided that the act or
omission caused physical injuries. There can be no
recovery of moral damages unless the quasi-delict
resulted in physical injury.
9
. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the
death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
works under their control or supervision.
prof. casis
-In the present case, the Complaint alleged that
respondent’s son Fulgencio Jr. sustained physical
injuries.
-It is apparent from the Decisions of the trial and the
appellate courts, however, that no other evidence (such
as a medical certificate or proof of medical expenses)
was presented to prove Fulgencio Jr.’s bare assertion of
physical injury. Thus, there was no credible proof that
would justify an award of moral damages based on
Article 2219(2) of the Civil Code.
-Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are
designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury
unjustly inflicted on a person.
-Well-settled is the rule that moral damages cannot be
awarded in the absence of proof of physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, or similar injury. The award of moral
damages must be solidly anchored on a definite
showing that respondent actually experienced
emotional and mental sufferings.
3. Yes.
-Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter
of right; they can be awarded only after claimants have
shown their entitlement to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages.
-In the case before us, respondent sufficiently proved
before the courts a quo that petitioners’ negligence
was the proximate cause of the incident, thereby
establishing his right to actual or compensatory
damages. He has adduced adequate proof to justify his
claim for the damages caused his car.
-Article 2231 of the Civil Code mandates that in cases
of quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be recovered
if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
-Gross negligence means such utter want of care as to
raise a presumption that the persons at fault must have
been conscious of the probable consequences of their
carelessness, and that they must have nevertheless
been indifferent (or worse) to the danger of injury to
the person or property of others. The negligence must
amount to a reckless disregard for the safety of persons
or property.
-Such a circumstance obtains in the instant case.
-The facts of the case show a complete disregard by
petitioners of any adverse consequence of their failure
to install even a single warning device at the area
under renovation.
-Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary
damages may be imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good. The award of these
torts & damages
damages is meant to be a deterrent to socially
deleterious actions.
Dispositive
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with
the modification that the award of moral damages is
deleted.
GABETO V. ARANETA
42 Phil 252. October 17, 1921 Street
Facts:
Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a
carromata near Plaza Gay, in the City of Iloilo, with a
view to going to a cockpit on Calle Ledesma in the
same City. When the driver of the carromata had
turned his horse and started in the direction indicated,
the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stepped out into the
street, and laying his hands on the reins, stopped the
horse, at the same time protesting to the driver that he
himself had called this carromata first. The driver, one
Julio Pagnaya, replied to the effect that he had not
heard or seen the call of Araneta, and that he had
taken up the two passengers then in the carromata as
the first who had offered employment. At or about the
same time Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to
free the horse from the control of Agaton Araneta, in
order that the vehicle might pass on. Owing, however,
to the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to
the rottenness of the material of which it was made,
the bit came out of the horse's mouth; and it became
necessary for the driver to get out, which he did, in
order to fix the bridle. The horse was then pulled over
to near the curb, by one or the other — it makes no
difference which — and Pagnaya tried to fix the bridle.
While he was thus engaged, the horse, being
free from the control of the bit, became disturbed and
moved forward, in doing which he pulled one of the
wheels of the carromata up on the sidewalk and pushed
Julio Pagnaya over. After going a few yards further the
side of the carromata struck a police telephone box
which was fixed to a post on the sidewalk, upon which
the box came down with a crash and frightened the
horse to such an extent that he set out at full speed up
the street.
Meanwhile one of the passengers, to wit.
Basilio Ilano, had alighted while the carromata was as
yet alongside the sidewalk; but the other, Proceso
Gayetano, had unfortunately retained his seat, and
after the runaway horse had proceeded up the street to
a point in front of the Mission Hospital, the said
Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and in so doing
received injuries from which he soon died.
A2010 - 62 -
This action was brought by Consolacion
Gabeto, in her own right as widow of Proceso Gayetano,
and as guardian ad litem of the three children, Conchita
Gayetano, Rosita Gayetano, and Fermin Gayetano, for
the purpose of recovering damages incurred by the
plaintiff as a result of the death of the said Proceso
Gayetano, supposedly caused by the wrongful act of
the defendant Agaton Araneta.
Judge awarded damages to the widow to which
decision Araneta appealed.
Issue: WON the stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta
in the middle of the street was too remote from the
accident that presently ensued to be considered the
legal or proximate cause thereof
Held: NO. The evidence indicates that the bridle was
old, and the leather of which it was made was probably
so weak as to be easily broken. it was Julio who jerked
the rein, thereby causing the bit to come out of the
horse's mouth; and Julio, after alighting, led the horse
over to the curb, and proceeded to fix the bridle; and
that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off,
when the horse, feeling himself free from control,
started to go away.
Disposition: Judgment is REVERSED.
URBANO V IAC (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES)
157 SCRA 1
GUTIERREZ; January 7, 1988
Nature : This is a petition to review the decision of the
then Intermediate Appellate Court
Facts:When Filomeno Urbano found the place where
he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the
irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed he went
to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier
admitted that he was the one responsible for what
happened. Urbano then got angry and demanded that
Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them
ensued. Urbano hacked Javier hitting him on the right
palm of his hand . Javier who was then unarmed ran
away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who
hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the
back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said
leg.
On November 14,1980, Javier was rushed to the
Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition.
Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr.
Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier
found that the latter's serious condition was caused by
tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing
prof. casis
wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected
by tetanus.
On November 15, 1980 Javier died in the hospital.
Appellant’s claim:
-there was an efficient cause which supervened from
the time the deceased was wounded to the time of his
death
-the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to
his own negligence in going back to work without his
wound being properly healed, and lately, that he went
to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of
November, 1980
- Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks
he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants
with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful
elements like tetanus germs.
ISSUE:
WON there was an efficient intervening cause from the
time Javier was wounded until his death which would
exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death
HELD:
Yes. The medical findings lead us to a distinct
possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus
was an efficient intervening cause later or between the
time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The
infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the
crime.
Reasoning:
-The case involves the application of Article 410 of the
Revised Penal Code.
-The evidence on record does not clearly show that the
wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at
the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence
merely confirms that the wound, which was already
healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the
fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus
However, as to when the wound was infected is not
clear from the record.
-In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181),
we adopted the following definition of proximate cause:
"x x x A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is
found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American
Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffsappellants in their brief.
It is as follows:
"x x x 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would
10
Art. 4. Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing
a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended x x x." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is
criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for
all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom
torts & damages
not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground
to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.'
(at pp. 185-186)
-The court looked into the nature of tetanus to
determine the cause
-Medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found
inside a man's body depends on the incubation period
of the disease.
- Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right
palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in
hacking him. This incident took place on October 23,
1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he
suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and
muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980,
he died.
If,therefore,the wound of Javier inflicted by the
appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the
time, it is more medically probable that Javier should
have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus
because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the
22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14
days after the infliction of the wound.
-Therefore, the onset time should have been more than
six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from
the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at
the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant,
the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet
present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been
infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's
death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus
2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The medical findings lead us to a distinct possibility
that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an
efficient intervening cause later or between the time
Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The
infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the
crime.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the
direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas,
supra)
As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remaquillo, et al.
(99 Phil. 118).
A2010 - 63 -
"'A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of
an action if such remote cause did nothing more than
furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of
the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no
danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act
or defective condition sets into operation the
circumstances, which result in injury because of the
prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause. '(45 C.J. pp. 931-
932)." (at p. 125)
FAR EAST SHIPPING CO V CA (PPA)
297 SCRA 30
REGALADO; October 1, 1998
NATURE
Review on certiorari the CA decision affirming TC
decision holding FESC and Gavino solidarily liable
FACTS
- On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under
the flagship of the USSR, owned and operated by the
Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the
Port of Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia at
about 7:00 o'clock in the morning. The vessel was
assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its
berthing space. Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked
by the Philippine Port Authority to supervise the
berthing of the vessel. Appellant Senen Gavino was
assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association
(MPA) to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe
berthing of the vessel to Berth No. 4.
- Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine
anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the
master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him.
After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the
particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted
anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded
to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and
the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers.
- When the vessel reached the landmark (the big
church by the Tondo North Harbor) one-half mile from
the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the
vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier,
Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed
the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The
left anchor, with 2 shackles, were dropped. However,
the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of
prof. casis
the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued
between the crew members. A brief conference ensued
between Kavankov and the crew members. When
Gavino inquired what was all the commotion about,
Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to it.
- After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold,
he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was
then on the pier apron noticed that the vessel was
approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed
that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter
gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and
additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the
vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing
considerable damage to the pier. The vessel sustained
damage too. Kavankov filed his sea protest. Gavino
submitted his report to the Chief Pilot who referred the
report to the Philippine Ports Authority. Abellana
likewise submitted his report of the incident.
- The rehabilitation of the damaged pier cost the
Philippine Ports Authority the amount of P1,126,132.25.
PERTINENT RULES on PILOTAGE
- The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District
which is under compulsory pilotage pursuant to Section
8, Article III of Philippine Ports Authority Administrative
Order No. 03-85:
SEC. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service. — For
entering a harbor and anchoring thereat, or passing
through rivers or straits within a pilotage district, as
well as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf, or
shifting from one berth or another, every vessel
engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be
under compulsory pilotage.
- In case of compulsory pilotage, the respective duties
and responsibilities of the compulsory pilot and the
master have been specified by the same regulation:
SEC. 11. Control of vessels and liability for
damage. — On compulsory pilotage grounds, the
Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be
responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to
life and property at ports due to his negligence or
fault. He can only be absolved from liability if the
accident is caused by force majeure or natural
calamities provided he has exercised prudence and
extra diligence to prevent or minimize damage.
The Master shall retain overall command of the
vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can
countermand or overrule the order or command of
the Harbor Pilot on board. In such event, any damage
caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by
reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall
be the responsibility and liability of the registered
owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to
recourse against said Master
Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel
or its pilots shall be determined by competent
torts & damages
authority in appropriate proceedings in the light of
the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
SEC. 32. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or
Pilots' Association. — The duties and responsibilities
of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction
of a vessel from the time he assumes his work as a
pilot thereof until he leaves it anchored or berthed
safely; Provided, however, that his responsibility shall
cease at the moment the Master neglects or refuses
to carry out his order.
- Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 issued
twenty years earlier likewise provided in Chapter I
thereof for the responsibilities of pilots:
Par. XXXIX. — A Pilot shall be held responsible for
the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes
control thereof until he leaves it anchored free from
shoal; Provided, That his responsibility shall cease at
the moment the master neglects or refuses to carry
out his instructions.
xxx xxx xxx
Par. XLIV. — Pilots shall properly and safely secure
or anchor vessels under their control when requested
to do so by the master of such vessels.
ISSUE
WON both the pilot and the master were negligent
HELD
YES.
- The SC started by saying that in a collision between a
stationary object and a moving object, there is a
presumption of fault against the moving object (based
on common sense and logic). It then went on to
determine who between the pilot and the master was
negligent.
PILOT
- A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and
licensed, to conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or in
certain waters. He is an expert who’s supposed to know
the seabed, etc. that a master of a ship may not know
because the pilot is familiar with the port. He is charged
to perform his duties with extraordinary care because
the safety of people and property on the vessel and on
the dock are at stake.
- Capt. Gavino was found to be negligent. The court
found that his reaction time (4 minutes) to the anchor
not holding ground and the vessel still going too fast
was too slow. As an expert he should’ve been reacting
quickly to any such happenings.
MASTER
- In compulsory pilotage, the pilot momentarily
becomes the master of the vessel. The master,
however may intervene or countermand the pilot if he
A2010 - 64 -
deems there is danger to the vessel because of the
incompetence of the pilot or if the pilot is drunk.
- Based on Capt. Kavankov’s testimony, he never
sensed the any danger even when the anchor didn’t
hold and they were approaching the dock too fast. He
blindly trusted the pilot. This is negligence on his part.
He was right beside the pilot during the docking, so he
could see and hear everything that the pilot was seeing
and hearing.
- The master’s negligence translates to
unseaworthiness of the vessel, and in turn means
negligence on the part of FESC.
CONCURRENT TORTFEASORS
- As a general rule, that negligence in order to render a
person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It
is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or
more efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the
proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where
several causes combine to produce injuries, person is
not relieved from liability because he is responsible for
only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence
of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have resulted to as
great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable
to the person injured. It is no defense to one of the
concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have
resulted from his negligence alone, without the
negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent
tortfeasor. Where several causes producing an injury
are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without
which the injury would not have happened, the injury
may be attributed to all or any of the causes and
recovery may be had against any or all of the
responsible persons although under the circumstances
of the case, it may appear that one of them was more
culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured
person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases
to be a proximate cause merely because it does not
exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer
is responsible for the entire result and is liable as
though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
- There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors
whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable
for the total damage. Where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more
persons, although acting independently, are in
combination the direct and proximate cause of a single
injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in
what proportion each contributed to the injury and
either of them is responsible for the whole injury.
Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or
damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors
and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under
Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
prof. casis
Disposition Petition denied. CA affirmed. Capt. Gavino
and FESC are solidarily liable.
SABIDO AND LAGUNDA V CUSTODIO, ET
AL
17 SCRA 1088
CONCEPCION; August 31, 1966
NATURE
Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the
Court of Appeals
FACTS
In Barrio Halang, , two trucks, one driven by Mudales
and belonging to Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company, and
the other driven by Lagunda and owned by Prospero
Sabido, going in opposite directions met each other in a
road curve. Custodia, LTB bus passenger who was
riding on the running board as truck was full of
passengers, was sideswiped by the truck driven by
Lagunda. As a result, Custodio was injured and died.
To avoid any liability, Lagunda and Sabido throw all the
blame on Mudales. However, Makabuhay, widoy of
Custodio, testified that the 6 x 6 truck was running fast
when it met the LTB Bus. And Lagunda had time and
opportunity to avoid the mishap if he had been
sufficiently careful and cautious because the two trucks
never collided with each other. By simply swerving to
the right side of the road, the 6 x 6 truck could have
avoided hitting Custodio.
The sideswiping of the deceased and his two fellow
passengers took place on broad daylight at about 9:30
in the morning of June 9, 1955 when the LTB bus with
full load to passengers was negotiating a sharp curve of
a bumpy and sliding downward a slope, whereas the six
by six truck was climbing up with no cargoes or
passengers on board but for three helpers, owner
Sabido and driver Lagunda (tsn. 308-309, Mendoza).
LTB passengers had testified to the effect that the 6 x 6
cargo truck was running at a fast rate of speed. Driver
Lagunda admitted that three passengers rode on the
running board of the bus when his vehicle was still at a
distance of 5 or 7 meters from the bus. Despite the
presence of a shallow canal on the right side of the
road which he could pass over with ease, Lagunda did
not avert the accident simply because to use his own
language the canal "is not a passage of trucks.
Based upon these facts, the Court of First Instance of
Laguna and the Court of Appeals concluded that the
Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. — hereinafter referred to as
the carrier — and its driver Mudales (none of whom has
torts & damages
appealed), had violated the contract of carriage with
Agripino Custodio, whereas petitioners Sabido and
Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict, by reason of
which all of them were held solidarity liable.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioners were guilty of negligence
2. WON petitioners should be held solidarily liable with
the carrier and its driver
HELD
1. YES. The views of the Court of Appeals on the speed
of the truck and its location at the time of the accident
are in the nature of findings of fact, which we cannot
disturb in a petition for review by certiorari, such as the
one at bar. At any rate, the correctness of said findings
is borne out by the very testimony of petitioner
Lagunda to the effect that he saw the passengers riding
on the running board of the bus while the same was
still five or seven meters away from the truck driven by
him. Indeed, the distance between the two vehicles was
such that he could have avoided sideswiping said
passengers if his truck were not running at a great
speed.
Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is
independent, in its execution, of the negligence of the
truck driver and its owner, both acts of negligence are
the proximate cause of the death of Agripino Custodio.
In fact, the negligence of the first two would not have
produced this result without the negligence of
petitioners' herein. What is more, petitioners'
negligence was the last, in point of time, for Custodio
was on the running board of the carrier's bus sometime
before petitioners' truck came from the opposite
direction, so that, in this sense, petitioners' truck had
the last clear chance.
2. YES. Where the carrier bus and its driver were clearly
guilty of contributory negligence for having allowed a
passenger to ride on the running board of the bus, and
where the driver of the other vehicle was also guilty of
contributory negligence, because that vehicle was
running at a considerable speed despite the fact that it
was negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of being
close to its right side of the road, it was driven on its
middle portion thereof and so near the passenger bus
coming from the opposite as to sideswipe a passenger
on its running board, the owners of the two vehicles are
liable solidarily for the death of the passenger, although
the liability of one arises from a breach of contract,
whereas that of the other springs from a quasi-delict.
Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or
omission of two or more persons, although acting
independently of each other, are, in combination, the
A2010 - 65 -
direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third
person, and it is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury, either is
responsible for the whole injury, even though his act
alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the
same damage might have resulted from the acts of the
other tort-feasor.
Dispositive Judgment affirmed.
VDA. DE BATACLAN VS. MEDINA
102 PHIL 181
MONTEMAYOR; October 22, 1957
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Cavite
FACTS
- Shortly after midnight, a bus of the Medina
Transportation, operated by its owner defendant
Mariano Medina under a certificate of public
convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its
way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur,
Conrado Saylon. There were about 18 passengers,
including the driver and conductor.
- At about 2am, while the bus was running within the
jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst
and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal
or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle.
- the three passengers Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan
and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva,
could not get out of the overturned bus.
- Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up
to the road, heard groans and moans from inside the
bus. Calls or shouts for help were made to the houses
in the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten
men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of
bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with
petroleum. These men presumably approach the
overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire
started, burning and all but consuming the bus,
including the 4 passengers trapped inside it. It would
appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to
leak and escape from the gasoline tank.
- That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed
passengers inside the bus were removed and duly
identified that of Bataclan. His widow, Salud Villanueva
brought the present suit to recover from Mariano
Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150.
- the CFI awarded P1,000 plus P600 as attorney's fee,
plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried
by Bataclan
prof. casis
ISSUES
1. WON there was negligence on the part of the
defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon, thus
making him liable.
2. WON the the proximate cause of the death of
Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather,
the fire that burned the bus.
HELD
1. NO.
Ratio There is evidence to show that at the time of the
blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one
of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that
according to the testimony of the witnesses, including
that of the defense, from the point where one of the
front tires burst up to the canal where the bus
overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of
about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out,
must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus,
but because of the velocity at which the bus must have
been running, its momentum carried it over a distance
of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned
turtle.
Reasoning Our new Civil Code amply provides for the
responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and
their goods.11
2. YES
Ratio Tthe proximate legal cause is that acting first
and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the
final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground
to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
Reasoning under the circumstances obtaining in the
case, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate
cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the
reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side
but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline
from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that
the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in
response to the call for help, made not only by the
passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was dark
(about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a
light with them, and coming as they did from a rural
11
ART. 1733
ART. 1755
ART. 1759
ART. 1763
torts & damages
area where lanterns and flashlights were not available;
and what was more natural than that said rescuers
should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the
aid and effect the rescue requested from them. Neither
the driver nor the conductor would appear to have
cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to
bring the lighted torch too near the bus.
- According to the evidence, one of the passengers
who, because of the injuries suffered by her, was
hospitalized, and while in the hospital, she was visited
by the defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of
his visit, she overheard him speaking to one of his bus
inspectors, telling said inspector to have the tires of the
bus changed immediately because they were already
old, and that as a matter of fact, he had been telling
the driver to change the said tires, but that the driver
did not follow his instructions. If this be true, it goes to
prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not
taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety of
his passengers
- The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate
cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning
of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus,
including himself and his co-passengers who were
unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started,
Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical
injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so
damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the
physical injuries suffered by him.
- In the public interest the prosecution of said erring
driver should be pursued, this, not only as a matter of
justice, but for the promotion of the safety of
passengers on public utility buses.
Note: This case was under the heading “but for”.
I don’t know if the italicized phrases are
pertinent, but these were the only ones that
contained “but for”.
DISPOSITION
In view of the foregoing, with the
modification that the damages awarded by
the trial court are increased to P6,000 and
P800, for the death of Bataclan and for the
attorney's fees, respectively.
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC v.
IAC & CASIANO PASCUA, ET AL.,
189 SCRA 158
MEDIALDEA/August 30, 1990
NATURE: CERTIORARI
FACTS:
A2010 - 66 -
- This case is for recovery of damages for the 3 jeepney
passengers who died as a result of the collision
between the Phil. Rabbit’s bus driven by Tomas delos
Reyes and the jeepney driven by Tranquilino Manalo.
- Other passengers of the jeepney sustained physical
injuries.
- It was said that upon reaching a certain barrio, the
jeepney’s right rear wheel detached which caused it to
run in an unbalanced position.
-Manalo stepped on the brake, as a result of which, the
jeepney which was then running on the eastern lane
(its right of way) made a U-turn, invading and
eventually stopping on the western lane of the road in
such a manner that the jeepney's front faced the south
(from where it came) and its rear faced the north
(towards where it was going).
-The jeepney practically occupied and blocked the
greater portion of the western lane, which is the right of
way of vehicles coming from the north, among which
was Bus No. 753 of Rabbit
- Almost at the time when the jeepney made a sudden
U-turn and encroached on the western lane of the
highway, or after stopping for a couple of minutes, the
bus bumped from behind the right rear portion of the
jeepney which resulted in the said deaths and injuries.
- At the time and in the vicinity of the accident, there
were no vehicles following the jeepney, neither were
there oncoming vehicles except the bus. The weather
condition of that day was fair.
- A criminal complaint against the two drivers for
Multiple Homicide.
- Manalo was eventually convicted and was imprisoned.
The case against delos Reyes was dismissed for lack of
sufficient evidence.
***As regards the damages.
- Three cases were filed and in all 3 the spouses
(owners of the jeepney) Mangune and Carreon,
(jeepney driver)Manalo, Rabbit and (Rabbit’s
driver)delos Reyes were all impleaded as defendants.
- Plaintiffs anchored their suits against spouses
Mangune and Carreon and Manalo on their contractual
liability.
- As against Rabbit and delos Reyes, plaintiffs based
their suits on their culpability for a quasi-delict.
- Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. (the
insurer of the jeepney) was also impleaded as
additional defendant in the civil case filed by the
Pascuas.
- Damages sought to be claimed in the 3 cases were for
medical expenses, burial expenses, loss of wages, for
exemplary damages, moral damages and attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation.
- Rabbit filed a cross-claim for attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation.
prof. casis
- On the other hand, spouses Mangune and Carreon
filed a cross-claim for the repair of the jeepney and for
its non-use during the period of repairs.
- TC: found the couple and Manalo to be NEGLIGENT
and held that there was a breach of the contract of
carriage with their passengers; ordered them to pay
the damages. Filriters was jointly and severally liable as
it was the jeepney’s insurer. Rabbit was to be paid by
the jeepney party for actual damages.
- IAC reversed this ruling in the sense that it found
delos Reyes to be negligent; ordered to pay jointly and
severally with Rabbit the plaintiffs; Applied primarily (1)
the doctrine of last clear chance, (2) the presumption
that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle
guilty and the cause of the accident unless contradicted
by other evidence, and (3) the substantial factor test to
conclude that delos Reyes was negligent.
ISSUE: WON THE JEEPNEY OWNERS AND ITS DRIVER
ARE LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES AND DEATH SUFFERED
BY THE PASSENGERS OF THE JEEPNEY
HELD: YES. BUT ONLY THE SPOUSES AND FILRITERS
ARE LIABLE.
REASONING:
TC WAS CORRECT IN APPRECIATING THE FF FACTS
CONCERNING MANALO’S NEGLIGENCE.
(1) That the unrebutted testimony of his passenger
Caridad Pascua that the Mangune jeepney was "running
fast" that his passengers cautioned driver Manalo to
slow down but did not heed the warning
(2) The likewise unrebutted testimony of Police
Investigator Tacpal of the San Manuel (Tarlac) Police
who found that the tracks of the jeepney ran on the
Eastern shoulder (outside the concrete paved road)
until it returned to the concrete road at a sharp angle,
crossing the Eastern lane and the (imaginary) center
line and encroaching fully into the western lane where
the collision took place as evidenced by the point of
impact;
(3) The observation of witness Police Corporal Cacalda
also of the San Manuel Police that the path of the
jeepney they found on the road \was shown by skid
marks which he described as "scratches on the road
caused by the iron of the jeep, after its wheel was
removed;"
(4) His conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide
and Multiple Serious Physical Injuries with Damage to
Property thru Reckless Imprudence by the CFI of Tarlac,
as a result of the collision, and his commitment to
prison and service of his sentence
(5) The application of the doctrine of res-ipsa loquitar
attesting to the circumstance that the collision occured
on the right of way of the Phil. Rabbit Bus.
SC:
torts & damages
-The principle about "the last clear" chance would call
for application in a suit between the owners and drivers
of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a
passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to
enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be
inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the
jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other
driver was likewise guilty of negligence. (Anuran, et al.
v. Buño et al.)
-On the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of
another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident,
unless contradicted by other evidence: would have
been correct were it not for the undisputed fact that the
U-turn made by the jeepney was abrupt. Delos Reyes
could not have anticipated the sudden U-turn executed
by Manalo.
***With regard to the substantial factor test:
- The IAC held that
“. . . It is the rule under the substantial factor
test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial
factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact
that the actor neither foresaw nor should have
foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in
which it occurred does not prevent him from
being liable (Restatement, Torts, 2d).
Here, We find defendant bus running at a fast
speed when the accident occurred and did not even
make the slightest effort to avoid the accident, . . . .
The bus driver's conduct is thus a substantial factor in
bringing about harm to the passengers of the jeepney,
not only because he was driving fast and did not even
attempt to avoid the mishap but also because it was
the bus which was the physical force which brought
about the injury and death to the passengers of the
jeepney.”
-The speed of the bus was even calculated by the IAC.
But the SC was not convinced. It cannot be said that
the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the
accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90
kilometers per hour, assuming such calculation to be
correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed in
highways.
- Delos Reyes cannot be faulted for not having avoided
the collision because as was shown, the jeepney left a
skid mark of about 45 meters, measured from the time
its right rear wheel was detached up to the point of
collision.
- Delos Reyes admitted that he was running more or
less 50 kph at the time of the accident. Using this
speed, delos Reyes covered the distance of 45 meters
in 3.24 seconds. If We adopt the speed of 80 kilometers
per hour, delos Reyes would have covered that
A2010 - 67 -
distance in only 2.025 seconds. Verily, he had little time
to react to the situation.
- To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask
too much from him. Aside from the time element
involved, there were no options available to him.
- Also, It was shown by the pictures that driver delos
Reyes veered his Rabbit bus to the right attempt to
avoid hitting the Mangune's jeepney. That it was not
successful in fully clearing the Mangune jeepney as its
(Rabbit's) left front hit said jeepney must have been
due to limitations of space and time.
- That delos Reyes of the Rabbit bus could also have
swerved to its left (eastern lane) to avoid bumping the
Mangune jeepney which was then on the western lane:
Under such a situation, he would run the greater risk of
running smack in the Mangune jeepney either head on
or broadside as the jeepney then was abruptly making
a U-turn.
-SC: The proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune and
Carreon. They all failed to exercise the
precautions that are needed precisely pro hac
vice.
- In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or
is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault
or to have acted negligently, and this disputable
presumption may only be overcome by evidence that
he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed
in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code 2
or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to
a fortuitous event 3 (Lasam v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657).
- To escape liability, defendants Mangune and Carreon
offered to show thru their witness Natalio Navarro, an
alleged mechanic, that he periodically checks and
maintains the jeepney of said defendants, the last on
Dec. 23, the day before the collision, which included
the tightening of the bolts. This notwithstanding the
right rear wheel of the vehicle was detached while in
transit. As to the cause thereof no evidence was
offered. Said defendant did not even attempt to
explain, much less establish, it to be one caused by a
caso fortuito. . . .
-In any event, "[i]n an action for damages against the
carrier for his failure to safely carry his passenger to his
destination, an accident caused either by defects in the
automobile or through the negligence of its driver, is
not a caso fortuito which would avoid the carriers
liability for damages (Son v. Cebu Autobus Company,
94 Phil. 892 citing Lasam, et al. v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil.
657; Necesito, etc. v. Paras, et al., 104 Phil. 75).
***On the sole liability of the Jeepney Owners
(excluding Manalo)
prof. casis
-the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the
passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the
carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the
passenger, even if such breach be due to the
negligence of his driver (Viluan v. CA, et al., April 29,
1966, 16 SCRA 742).
- if the driver is to be held jointly and severally liable
with the carrier, that would make the carrier's liability
personal, contradictory to the explicit provision of A
2181 of the NCC.
DISPOSITION: TC’ S DECISION WAS REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED BUT MODIFICATION THAT ONLY THE COUPLE
AND THE FILRITERS GUARANTY ASSURANCE CORP. INC
WERE LIABLE. AFFIRMED TOO THE AMOUNT OF
DAMAGES BUT MODIFIED THE INDEMNITY FOR LOSS OF
LIFE FROM 3K (AS PER A1746 TO A2206 NCC) TO 30K.
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION INC v IAC
(DIONISIO)
148 SCRA 353
FELICIANO; Mar 10, 1987
Nature:
Petition to review the decision of the IAC
Facts:
- at about 1:30 am on November 15 1975, Leonardo
Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-and-
dinner meeting with his boss. Dionisio had taken "a
shot or two" of liquor.
- Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just
crossed an intersection when his car headlights (in
his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his
headlights on "bright" and saw a Ford dump truck
about 21/2meters away from his car.
- The dump truck, owned by and registered in the
name of Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was
parked on the right hand side of the street (i.e., on
the right hand side of a person facing in the same
direction toward which Dionisio's car was
proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic. It was
parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such
a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly
blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no
lights or any so-called "early warning" reflector
devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or
rear.
- The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven
home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular
driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix,
in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the
following morning.
torts & damages
- Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by
swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his
car smashed into the dump truck.
- As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some
physical injuries including some permanent facial
scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold
bridge dentures.
- Trial court ruled in favor of Dionisio. IAC affirmed the
lower court’s ruling, with modification on award of
damages.
Petitioners’comments
- the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own
recklessness in driving fast at the time of the
accident, while under the influence of liquor, without
his headlights on and without a curfew pass.
- if there was negligence in the manner in which the
dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely
a "passive and static condition" and that private
respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an
intervening, efficient cause determinative of the
accident and the injuries he sustained. (NOTE: this
was the contention of petitioners which SC noted in is
decision)
Private respondent’s comments
- the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the
negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the
dump truck entrusted to him by his employer
Phoenix
Issue:
WON the proximate cause of the accident was
Dionisio’s negligence (driving faster than he should
have, and without headlights) or the negligence of the
driver in parking the truck.
Held:
- it is the driver’s negligence. (see previous digest)
- ON CAUSE v CONDITION (under IV A 3c, page 5 of
outline)
- petitioners' arguments are drawn from a reading of
some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the
United States. These arguments, however, do not
have any validity in this jurisdiction.
- Even in the United States, the distinctions between"
cause" and "condition" have already been "almost
entirely discredited." Professors Prosser and Keeton
make this quite clear:
“Many courts have sought to distinguish
between the active "cause" of the harm and
the existing "conditions" upon which that
cause operated. If the defendant has created
only a passive static condition which made the
damage possible, the defendant is said not to
be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is
A2010 - 68 -
concerned, in the sense of necessary
antecedents which have played an important
part in producing the result, it is quite
impossible to distinguish between active
forces and passive situations, particularly
since, as is invariably the case the latter (is)
the result of other active forces which have
gone before. The defendant who spills gasoline
about the premises creates a "condition," but
the act may be culpable because of the
danger of fire. When a spark ignites the
gasoline, the condition has done quite as
much to bring about the fire as the spark; and
since that is the very risk which the defendant
has created, the defendant will not escape
responsibility. Even the lapse of a considerable
time during which the "condition" remains
static will not necessarily affect liability; one
who digs a trench in the highway may still be
liable to another who falls into it a month
afterward. "Cause" and "condition" still find
occasional mention in the decisions; but the
distinction is now almost entirely discredited.
So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer
to the type of case where the forces set in
operation by the defendant have come to rest
in a position of apparent safety, and some new
force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is
not the distinction between "cause" and
"condition" which is important, but the nature
of the risk and the character of the intervening
cause."
- the truck driver's negligence, far from being a
"passive and static condition", was an indispensable
and efficient cause. The collision would not have
occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew
without any warning lights or reflector devices. The
improper parking of the dump truck created an
unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down
that street and for having so created this risk, the
truck driver must be held responsible.
Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time
than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer
to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or
independent cause. What the petitioners describe as an
"intervening cause" was only a foreseeable
consequence of the risk created by the truck driver’s
negligence
MANILA ELECTRIC v REMOQUILLO
99 PHIL 117
MONTEMAYOR; May 18, 1956
prof. casis
NATURE
Review by certiorari of a CA decision
FACTS
- Efren Magno went to his stepbrother’s 3-story house
to fix a leaking “media agua,” (downspout). He climbed
up to the media agua which was just below the 3 rd floor
window and stood on it to receive a galvanized iron
sheet through the said window. After grabbing hold of
the sheet, he turned around and a portion of the iron
sheet he was holding came into contact with an electric
wire of Manila Electric Company (the Company) strung
2.5 ft parallel to the edge of the media agua,
electrocuting him and killing him.
- His widow and children filed a suit to recover damages
from the company and the TC rendered judgment in
their favor. The Company appealed to the CA, which
affirmed the judgment. It is this CA decision the
Company now seeks to appeal.
ISSUE
WON the Company’s negligence in the installation and
maintenance of its wires was the proximate cause of
the death
HELD
No. It merely provided the condition from which the
cause arose (it set the stage for the cause of the injury
to occur).
Ratio A prior and remote cause (which furnishes the
condition or gives rise to the occasion by which an
injury was made possible) cannot be the basis of an
action if a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient
cause of the injury intervenes between such prior and
remote cause and the injury.
If no danger existed in the condition except because
of the independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act
or defective condition sets into operation the
circumstances which result in injury because of the
prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause.
Reasoning We fail to see how the Company could be
held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence.
To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause
of the electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently
a remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent
act of Magno in turning around and swinging the
galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution,
such as looking back toward the street and at the wire
to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the
latter's length of 6 feet.
- The real cause of the accident or death was the
reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. When he
was called by his stepbrother to repair the media agua
torts & damages
just below the third story window, it is to be presumed
that due to his age and experience he was qualified to
do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter and had
had training and experience for the job. So, he could
not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and
the danger lurking in them. But unfortunately, in the
instant case, his training and experience failed him,
and forgetting where he was standing, holding the 6-ft
iron sheet with both hands and at arms length,
evidently without looking, and throwing all prudence
and discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging
his arms with the motion of his body, thereby causing
his own electrocution.
Disposition CA decision reversed. Complaint against
company dismissed
RODRIGUEZA V. MANILA RAILROAD
COMPANY
STREET; November 19, 1921
NATURE
Appeal from judgment of CFI
FACTS
Rodrigueza et al seek damages fr fire kindled by sparks
fr a locomotive engine. The fire was communicated to
four houses nearby. All of these houses were of light
construction, except that of Rodrigueza which was of
strong materials. Plaintiffs say that the company failed
to supervise their employees properly and was
negligent in allowing locomotive to operate without
smokestack protection for arresting sparks. They also
say that the sparks were produced by an inferior fuel
used by the company – Bataan coal.
Defense said Rodigueza’s house stood partly within
limits of land owned by company. Rodrigueza didn’t
mind the warnings from the company. His house’s
materials included nipa and cogon, this indicates
contributory negligence on his part.
Trial judge decided against Manila Railroad, which
appealed.
ISSUE
WON damage was caused by Rodrigueza’s contributory
negligence
HELD
Yes.
- Manila Railroad’s defense is not a bar to recovery by
the other plaintiffs.
- There was no proof that Rodrigueza unlawfully
intruded upon company’s property. His house was
there before the railroad company’s property. He may
be at risk for fire, but should not bear loss if the fire
A2010 - 69 -
resulted from the company’s negligence.
- The PROXIMATE AND ONLY CAUSE of the damage was
the negligent act of the company. That Rodrigueza’s
house was near was an ANTECEDENT CONDITION but
that can’t be imputed to him as CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE because that condition was not created by
himself and because his house remained by the
toleration and consent of company and because even if
the house was improperly there, company had no right
to negligently destroy it. The company could have
removed the house through its power of eminent
domain.
MCKEE v IAC, TAYAG
211 SCRA 517
DAVIDE; July 16, 1992
NATURE
Appeal from decision of the IAC
FACTS
- A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck
owned by private respondents, and driven by Ruben
Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The
collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh
McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to
George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli
Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.
- When the northbound Ford Escort was about 10
meters away from the southern approach of the bridge,
two boys suddenly darted from the right side of the
road and into the lane of the car. Jose Koh blew the
horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the
lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of
the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to
return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car
collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the
lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the
said bridge.
- Two civil cases were filed on Jan 31, 1977.
- On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben
Galang with the crime of "Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and
Damage to Property" was filed with the trial court.
- Judge Capulong found Galang guilty of the criminal
charge and ordered him to pay damages. Galang
appealed to IAC. IAC affirmed decision.
- Judge Castaneda dismissed the 2 civil cases and
awarded private respondents moral damages and
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fee. Petitioners
appealed to IAC. In its consolidated decision of the civil
cases, it reversed the ruling of the trial court and
ordered the defendants to pay damages. The decision
is anchored principally on the findings that it was
prof. casis
Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which
caused the accident. The appellate court further said
that the law presumes negligence on the part of the
defendants, as employers of Galang, in the selection
and supervision of the latter; it was further asserted
that these defendants did not allege in their Answers
the defense of having exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in selecting and supervising the said
employee.
- In an MFR, the decision for the consolidated civil cases
was reversed. Hence this petition.
ISSUES
WON respondent Court's findings in its challenged
resolution are supported by evidence or are based on
mere speculations, conjectures and presumptions.
HELD
YES
- Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court of
Appeals may be set aside when such findings are not
supported by the evidence or when the trial court failed
to consider the material facts which would have led to a
conclusion different from what was stated in its
judgment.
- The respondent Court held that the fact that the car
improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that the
collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the
presumption that the driver of the car, Jose Koh, was
negligent. On the basis of this presumed negligence,
IAC immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh's
negligence that was the immediate and proximate
cause of the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction
as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows
that the car swerved into the truck's lane because as it
approached the southern end of the bridge, two boys
darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the
lane of the car.
- Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do
- The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he
is guilty of negligence.
- Using the test, no negligence can be imputed to Jose
Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would
have tried to avoid running over the two boys by
swerving the car away from where they were even if
this would mean entering the opposite lane.
torts & damages
- Moreover, under what is known as the emergency
rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of
danger, and is required to act without time to consider
the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails
to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about
by his own negligence.
- Assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it
cannot be said that his negligence was the proximate
cause of the collision. Proximate cause has been
defined as: that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred; the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately
or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of
the cause which first acted, under such circumstances
that the person responsible for the first event should,
as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act
or default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom.
- Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at
all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events,
it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual
injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a
sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the
truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy.
The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not
have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the
emergency signals given by the former to slow down
and give the car an opportunity to go back into its
proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to
the far right of the road, which was the proper
precautionary measure under the given circumstances,
the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car.
- The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the
records. He himself said that his truck was running at
30 miles (48 km) per hour along the bridge while the
maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30
kph. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person
driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of
the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
- Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of
last clear chance finds application here. Last clear
chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that
the contributory negligence of the party injured will not
defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the
defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care
A2010 - 70 -
and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the
negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the
person who had the last clear chance to avoid the
mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences thereof.
- Last clear chance: The doctrine is that the negligence
of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the
negligence of the defendant where it appears that the
defendant, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences
to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's
negligence. The doctrine of last clear chance means
that even though a person's own acts may have placed
him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the
injured person is entitled to recovery. a person who has
the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an
accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his
opponent or that of a third person imputed to the
opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident. The practical import of
the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable
to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has
been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he,
aware of the plaintiff's peril, or according to some
authorities, should have been aware of it in the
reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact an
opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an
accident.
- As employers of the truck driver, the private
respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages.
The presumption that they are negligent flows from the
negligence of their employee. That presumption,
however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their
only possible defense is that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage. The answers of the private respondents in the
civil cases did not interpose this defense. Neither did
they attempt to prove it.
On the separate civil and criminal actions
- The civil cases, which were for the recovery of civil
liability arising from a quasi-delict under Article 2176 in
relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, were filed
ahead of criminal case. They were eventually
consolidated for joint trial. The records do not indicate
any attempt on the part of the parties, and it may
therefore be reasonably concluded that none was
made, to consolidate criminal case with the civil cases,
or vice-versa.
- Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which seeks
to avoid a multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression
and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets to
simplify the work of the trial court, or in short, attain
justice with the least expense to the parties litigants,
would have easily sustained a consolidation, thereby
prof. casis
preventing the unseeming, if no ludicrous, spectacle of
two judges appreciating, according to their respective
orientation, perception and perhaps even prejudice, the
same facts differently, and thereafter rendering
conflicting decisions. Such was what happened in this
case.
- The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a
quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. In the case of independent civil actions under the
new Civil Code, the result of the criminal case, whether
acquittal or conviction, would be entirely irrelevant to
the civil action. What remains to be the most important
consideration as to why the decision in the criminal
case should not be considered in this appeal is the fact
that private respondents were not parties therein.
Dispositive Petition granted. Assailed decision set
aside while its original is REINSTATED, subject to the
modification that the indemnity for death is increased
from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for the death of
Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee
TEAGUE VS. FERNANDEZ
51 SCRA 181
MAKALINTAL; June 4, 1973
FACTS
- The Realistic Institute, owned and operated by
Mercedes M. Teague, was a vocational school for hair
and beauty culture situated on the second floor of the
Gil-Armi Building, a two-storey, semi-concrete edifice
located at the comer of Quezon Boulevard and Soler
Street, Quiapo, Manila. The second floor was
unpartitioned, had a total area of about 400 square
meters, and although it had only one stairway, of about
1.50 meters in width, it had eight windows, each of
which was provided with two fire-escape ladders, and
the presence of each of the fire exits was indicated on
the wall.
- In the afternoon of October 24, 1955, a fire broke out
in a store for surplus materials located about ten
meters away from the institute. Soler Street lay
between that store and the institute. Upon seeing the
fire, some of the students in the Realistic Institute
shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter, a panic ensued.
Four instructresses and six assistant instructresses of
the institute were present and they, together with the
registrar, tried to calm down the students, who
numbered about 180 at the time, telling them not to be
afraid because the Gil-Armi Building would not get
burned as it is made of concrete, and that the fire was
anyway, across the street. They told the students not to
rush out but just to go down the stairway two by two, or
to use the fire-escapes. The panic, however, could not
torts & damages
be subdued and the students kept on rushing and
pushing their way through the stairs, thereby causing
stampede. No part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire.
But, after the panic was over, four students, including
Lourdes Fernandez, sister of plaintiffs, were found dead
and several others injured on account of the stampede.
- The CFI of Manila found for the defendant and
dismissed the case. The plaintiffs appealed to the CA,
which by a divided vote of 3 to 2 (a special division of
five members having been constituted) rendered a
judgment of reversal and sentenced the defendant to
pay damages to the plaintiffs in the sum of P11,000,
plus interest at the legal rate from the date the
complaint was filed.
- The CA declared that Teague was negligent and that
such negligence was the proximate cause of the death
of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of negligence is
based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section
491 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had
not been complied with in connection with the
construction and use of the Gil-Armi building. This
provision reads as follows:
"Sec. 491. Fireproof partitions, exits and stairways - All
buildings and separate sections of buildings or
buildings otherwise known as accessorias having less
than three stories, having one or more persons
domiciled therein either temporarily or permanently,
and all public or quasipublic buildings having less than
three stories, such as hospitals, sanitarium, schools,
reformatories, places of human detention, assembly
halls, clubs, restaurants or panciterias, and the like,
shall be provided with at least two unobstructed
stairways of not less than one meter and twenty
centimeters in width and an inclination of not less than
forty degrees from the perpendicular, in case of large
buildings more than two stairways shall likewise be
provided when required by the chief of the fire
department, said stairways shall be placed as far apart
as possible."
The alleged violation of the ordinance consisted is that
the second storey of the building had only one
stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at least 1.2
meters each, although at the time of the fire the owner
of the building had a second stairway under
construction.
ISSUES
1. WON Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the
City of Manila refers only to public buildings and hence
did not apply to the Gil-Armi building which was of
private ownership
2. WON the ordinance devolved upon the owners of the
building and therefore it is they and not the petitioner,
who is a mere lessee, who should be liable for the
violation
A2010 - 71 -
3. WON the failure to comply with the requirement of
the ordinance was the proximate cause of the death of
Lourdes Fernandez
HELD
1. NO.
Ratio it is not ownership which determines the
character of buildings subject to its requirements, but
rather the use or the purpose for which a particular
building, is utilized.
Reasoning Thus the same may be privately owned,
but if it is devoted to any one of the purposes
mentioned in the ordinance - for instance as a school,
which the Realistic Institute precisely was - then the
building is within the coverage of the ordinance. Indeed
the requirement that such a building should have two
(2) separate stairways instead of only one (1) has no
relevance or reasonable relation to the fact of
ownership, but does have such relation to the use or
purpose for which the building is devoted.
2. NO.
Reasoning It was the use of the building for school
purposes which brought the same within the coverage
of the ordinance; and it was the petitioner and not the
owners who were responsible for such use.
3. YES.
Ratio The violation of a statute or ordinance is not
rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the
intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the
accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the
very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended
to prevent.
Reasoning The proximate legal cause is that acting
first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
settling other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of
the cause which first acted, under such circumstances
that the person responsible for the first event should,
as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act
or default that an injury to some person might probably
result there from. [Citing Bataclan v Medina]
- The petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted
in the death of Lourdes Fernandez as follows: (1)
violation of ordinance; (2) fire at a neighboring place;
(3) shouts of "Fire!, Fire!"; (4) panic in the Institute; (5)
stampede; and (6) injuries and death. The violation of
the ordinance, it is argued, was only a remote cause,
and cannot be the basis of liability since there
intervened a number of independent causes which
produced the injury complained of.
prof. casis
- A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of
an action if such remote cause did nothing more than
furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of
the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no
danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act
or defective condition sets into operation the
circumstances which result in injury because of the
prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause. [Citing MERALCO v
Remoquillo]
- According to the petitioner "the events of fire, panic
and stampede were independent causes with no causal
connection at all with the violation of the ordinance."
The weakness in the argument springs from a faulty
juxtaposition of the events which formed a chain and
resulted in the injury. It is true that the petitioner's non-
compliance with the ordinance in question was ahead
of and prior to the other events in point of time, in the
sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the
building. But the violation was a continuing one, since
the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to
prevent a specific situation which would pose a danger
to the occupants of the building. That situation was
undue overcrowding in case it should become
necessary to evacuate the building, which, it could be
reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under
emergency conditions if there was only one stairway
available. It is true that in this particular case there
would have been no overcrowding in the single
stairway if there had not been a fire in the
neighborhood which caused the students to panic and
rush headlong for the stairs in order to go down. But it
was precisely such contingencies or events that the
authors of the ordinance had in mind, for under normal
conditions one stairway would be adequate for the
occupants of the building.
- To consider the violation of the ordinance as the
proximate cause of the injury does not portray the
situation in its true perspective; it would be more
accurate to say that the overcrowding at the stairway
was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what
the ordinance intended to prevent by requiring that
there be two stairways instead of only one. Under the
doctrine of the cases cited by the respondents, the
principle of proximate cause applies to such violation.
Dispositive Decision appealed from is affirmed.
PICART V SMITH
STREET; March 15, 1918
torts & damages
NATURE
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of La Union
FACTS
 On December 12, 1912, plaintiff was riding on
his pony over the Carlatan Bridge, at San
Fernando, La Union.
 Before he had gotten half way across, the
defendant approached from the opposite direction
in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or
twelve miles per hour.
 As the defendant neared the bridge he saw
the plaintiff and blew his horn to give warning of
his approach.
 He continued his course and after he had
taken the bridge, he gave two more successive
blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on
horseback before him was not observing the rule of
the road.
 The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and
heard the warning signals.
 However, given the novelty of the apparition
and the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the
pony closely up against the railing on the right side
of the bridge instead of going to the left.
 He did this because he thought he did not
have sufficient time to get over to the other side.
 As the automobile approached, the defendant
guided it toward his left, that being the proper side
of the road for the machine.
 In so doing the defendant assumed that the
horseman would move to the other side.
 The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and
the rider had made no sign for the automobile to
stop.
 Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the
defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet
some distance away or slowing down, continued to
approach directly toward the horse without
diminution of speed.
 When he had gotten quite near, there being
then no possibility of the horse getting across to
the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car
sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse
alongside of the railing where it as then standing;
but in so doing the automobile passed in such
close proximity to the animal that it became
frightened and turned its body across the bridge
with its head toward the railing.
 In so doing, it was struck on the hock of the
left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb
was broken.
A2010 - 72 -
 The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with
some violence.
 As a result of its injuries the horse died.
 The plaintiff received contusions which caused
temporary unconsciousness and required medical
attention for several days.
 CFI absolved defendant from liability
 Hence, the appeal
ISSUE
WON the defendant, in maneuvering his car in the
manner above described, was guilty of negligence that
would give rise to a civil obligation to repair the
damage done
Ratio: The person who has the last fair chance to
avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other
part.
HELD
Yes.
 As the defendant started across the bridge, he
had the right to assume that the horse and the
rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he
moved toward the center of the bridge it was
demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be
done; and he must in a moment have perceived
that it was too late for the horse to cross with
safety in front of the moving vehicle.
 In the nature of things this change of situation
occurred while the automobile was yet some
distance away; and from this moment it was no
longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape
being run down by going to a place of greater
safety.
 The control of the situation had then passed
entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either
to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing
that there were no other persons on the bridge, to
take the other side and pass sufficiently far away
from the horse to avoid the danger of collision.
 The defendant ran straight on until he was
almost upon the horse. He was, the court thinks,
deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse
had not yet exhibited fright.
 But in view of the known nature of horses,
there was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in
question was unacquainted with automobiles, he
might get excited and jump under the conditions
which here confronted him.
prof. casis
 When the defendant exposed the horse and
rider to this danger, he was, in our opinion,
negligent in the eye of the law.
 The test by which to determine the
existence of negligence in a particular case
may be stated as follows: Did the defendant
in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.
 The law here in effect adopts the standard
supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct
of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law.
 The existence of negligence in a given case is
not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him.
The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability
by that.
 The question as to what would constitute the
conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must
of course be always determined in the light of
human experience and in view of the facts
involved in the particular case. Could a prudent
man, in the case under consideration, foresee
harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If
so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions
to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight
of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion
born of this prevision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist.
Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for

determining the existence of negligence in a given
case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a
prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would
have foreseen that an effect harmful to another
was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing
conduct or guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the

defendant in the present case, negligence is
clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the
position of the defendant, would have recognized
that the course which he was pursuing was fraught
with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm
to the horse and the rider as reasonable
consequence of that course. Under these
circumstances the law imposed on the defendant
the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
 The plaintiff himself was not free from fault,
for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in
planting himself on the wrong side of the road. It
will be noted however, that the negligent acts of
torts & damages
the two parties were not contemporaneous, since
the negligence of the defendant succeeded the
negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable
interval. Under these circumstances the law is that
the person who has the last fair chance to avoid
the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other
party.
Dispositive: Appealed decision is reversed.
BUSTAMANTE V CA (DEL PILAR AND
MONTESIANO)
193 SCRA 603
MEDIALDEA; February 6, 1991
NATURE: petition for certiorari to review decision of CA
FACTS: a truck and a passenger bus sideswept each
other, causing the deaths of the passengers of the bus.
This is the way the collision happened:
The bus, driven by Susulin, was traversing an inclined
road when the driver saw from 30 meters away an
approaching truck (driven by Montesiano), going very
fast and the front wheels wiggling. The bus driver also
observed that the truck was heading towards his lane.
Not minding this circumstance due to his belief that the
truck driver was merely joking, Susulin shifted from 4th
to 3rd gear in order to give more power and speed to
the bus, which was ascending the inclined part of the
road, in order to overtake a Kubota hand tractor being
pushed by a person along the shoulder of the highway.
While the bus was in the process of overtaking or
passing the hand tractor and the truck was approaching
the bus, the two vehicles sideswiped each other at each
other's left side.
The heirs of the victims filed for damages. The RTC
awarded damages, saying that the negligent acts of
both drivers were the cause of the accident, thus their
liability must be solidary. The driver and owner of the
truck appealed to the CA, which was denied at first, but
was granted on MFR, absolving the defendants based
on the doctrine of last clear chance, saying that the bus
driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident,
and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the
same.
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA was correct in absolving the driver and
owner of the truck (answered by WON CA correctly
applied the doctrine of last clear chance)
A2010 - 73 -
HELD:
1. NO
Ratio: The doctrine of last clear chance applies only
between the negligent parties. It does not apply in a
case wherein a victim (who is an outsider to the cause
of the accident) demands liability from the negligent
parties.
Reasoning: The doctrine of last clear chance, stated
broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not
preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant
where it appears that the defendant, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided
injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding
the plaintiff’s negligence. In other words, the doctrine
of last clear chance means that even though a person's
own acts may have placed him in a position of peril,
and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to
recovery. As the doctrine is usually stated, a person
who has the last clear chance or opportunity of
avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent
acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed
to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible
for the consequences of the accident (Sangco).
A negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent
plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly
negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the
plaintiff's peril, or according to some authorities, should
have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due
case, had in fact an opportunity later than that of the
plaintiff to avoid an accident (Am. Jur).
As against 3rd persons, a negligent actor can’t defend
by saying that another had negligently failed to take
action which would have avoided injury.
Disposition: Petition GRANTED. Defendants Del Pilar
and Montesiano ordered to pay damages with other
defendants
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION INC V IAC
(DIONISIO)
148 SCRA 353
FELICIANO; March 10, 1987
NATURE
PETITION for review of the decision of the IAC
FACTS
- 130AM 15 November 1975 - Leonardo Dionisio, driving
his Volkswagen car, was on his way home to Makati
from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss
where had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Crossing the
intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos
Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, when
his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He
switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he
prof. casis
saw a Ford dump truck looming some 21/2meters away
from his car. The dump truck, owned and registered by
Phoenix Construction Inc. was parked askew (partly
blocking the way of oncoming traffic) on the right hand
side of General Lacuna Street facing the oncoming
traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early
warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump
truck. The dump truck had earlier that evening been
driven home by Carbonel, its regular driver. Dionisio
claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving
his car to the left but it was too late and his car
smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the
collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries
including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous
breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
- Dionisio commenced an action for damages claiming
that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was
the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the
dump truck. Phoenix and Carbonel countered that the
proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own
recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident,
while under the influence of liquor, without his
headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also
sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the
selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.
- CFI: in favor of Dionisio
- IAC: affirmed TC but modified amounts
ISSUE
(obiter) WON last clear chance doctrine should be
applied therefore exculpating Phoenix from paying any
damages
HELD
NO
- We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence
was "only contributory," that the "immediate and
proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck
driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such
damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article
2179, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Obiter
- Phoenix and Carbonel also ask us to apply what they
refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The theory
here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck
driver was negligent, private respondent Dionisio had
the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and
hence his injuries, and that Dionisio having failed to
take that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries
alone. The last clear chance doctrine of the common
law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs.
Smith but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what
extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The historical function of that doctrine in
torts & damages
the common law was to mitigate the harshness of
another common law doctrine or rule-that of
contributory negligence. The common law rule of
contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all
by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the
plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared
with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. The
common law notion of last clear chance permitted
courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also
been negligent provided that the defendant had the
last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do
so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any,
the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play
in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of
contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery
by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been
in A2179 CC
- Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear
chance" that may be extracted from its common law
matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence
cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not
believe so. Under A2179, the task of a court, in
technical terms, is to determine whose negligence-the
plaintiff's or the defendant's-was the legal or proximate
cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even
primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the
petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last"
or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative location in
the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the
defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of
the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of
more fundamental importance are the nature of the
negligent act or omission of each party and the
character and gravity of the risks created by such act
or omission for the rest of the community. The
petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his
employer) should be absolved from responsibility for
his own prior negligence because the unfortunate
plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which
had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely
created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or
omission, To accept this proposition is to come too
close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law
that a man must respond for the forseeable
consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our
law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and
burdens of living in society and to allocate them among
the members of society. To accept the petitioners'
proposition must tend to weaken the very bonds of
society.
Disposition CA decision is modified by reducing the
aggregate amount of compensatory damages, loss of
expected income and moral damages Dionisio is
entitled to by 20% of such amount
A2010 - 74 -
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE v CA
(LIPANA)
269 SCRA 695
HERMOSISIMA; March 14, 1997
Nature:
Petition to review decision of CA
Facts:
- Rommel's Marketing Corporation (RMC), represented
by its President and General Manager Romeo Lipana,
filed a complaint to recover from the former Philippine
Bank of Commerce (PBC), now absorbed by the
Philippine Commercial International Bank, P304, 979.74
representing various deposits RMC made in its current
account with said bank. The amount was not credited
to RMC’s account but was instead deposited to the
account of one Bienvenido Cotas.
- RMC maintained two separate current accounts with
the Pasig Branch of PBC in connection with its business
of selling appliances.
- From May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, petitioner Romeo
Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form
of cash totalling P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene
Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds in the
current accounts of RMC with PBC. It turned out,
however, that these deposits, on all occasions, were
not credited to RMC's account but were instead
deposited to Account No. 53-01734-7 of Yabut's
husband, Bienvenido Cotas who likewise maintains an
account with the same bank.
- During this period, petitioner bank had been regularly
furnishing private respondent with monthly statements
showing its current accounts balances. Unfortunately, it
had never been the practice of Romeo Lipana to check
these monthly statements of account reposing
complete trust and confidence on petitioner bank.
-Irene Yabut would accomplish two copies of the
deposit slip, an original and a duplicate. The original
showed the name of her husband as depositor and his
current account number. On the duplicate copy was
written the account number of her husband but the
name of the account holder was left blank. PBC's teller,
Azucena Mabayad, would, however, validate and stamp
both the original and the duplicate of these deposit
slips retaining only the original copy despite the lack of
information on the duplicate slip. The second copy was
kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for record purposes. After
validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in
the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change
the account number written thereon, which is that of
her husband's, and make it appear to be RMC's account
number. With the daily remittance records also
prepared by Ms. Yabut and submitted to private
prof. casis
respondent RMC together with the validated duplicate
slips with the latter's name and account number, she
made her company believe that all the while the
amounts she deposited were being credited to its
account when, in truth and in fact, they were being
deposited by her and credited by the petitioner bank in
the account of Cotas.
- Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC
demanded from petitioner bank the return of its
money, but as its demand went unheeded, it filed a
collection suit before RTC Pasig, which found petitioner
bank negligent and ordered the bank and Mabayad to
pay RMC jointly and severally P304,979.72, plus
damages, attornet’s fees and costs of suit.
- CA affirmed, but modified the award of damages.
Issue:
Whether the proximate cause of the loss, to the tune of
P304,979.74, suffered by the private respondent RMC is
petitioner bank's negligence or that of private
respondent's.
Held:
It was the negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled
by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection
and supervision of its bank teller, which was the
proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private
respondent.
- There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
- Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would do.
- Picart v. Smith. The test by which to determine
the existence of negligence in a particular case:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act
use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law
here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be
supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet
paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of
negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the
situation before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines
liability by that.
torts & damages
- the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was
negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing
all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms.
Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy
was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-
imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the
proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate.
- Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms.
Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its
lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad.
- Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each
case upon mixed considerations of logic, common
sense, policy and precedent. Proximate cause is "that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. . . ." In this case, absent the act of Ms.
Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete
duplicate copy of the deposit slip, Ms. Irene Yabut
would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her
fraudulent scheme with impunity.
- Furthermore, under the doctrine of "last clear
chance" (also referred to, at times as "supervening
negligence" or as "discovered peril"), petitioner bank
was indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in
essence, states that where both parties are negligent,
but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time
than that of the other, or when it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence should be
attributed to the incident, the one who had the last
clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and
failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences
thereof. Stated differently, the rule would also mean
that an antecedent negligence of a person does not
preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening
negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought
by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance,
could have avoided the impending harm by the
exercise of due diligence. Here, assuming that private
respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a
dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the
opportunity to defraud the company, as advanced by
the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the
petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear
opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client,
simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed
validation procedure.
- While it is true that had private respondent checked
the monthly statements of account sent by the
petitioner bank to RMC, the latter would have
discovered the loss early on, such cannot be used by
the petitioners to escape liability. This omission on the
part of the private respondent does not change the fact
that were it not for the wanton and reckless negligence
of the petitioners' employee in validating the
A2010 - 75 -
incomplete duplicate deposit slips presented by Ms.
Irene Yabut, the loss would not have occurred.
Considering, however, that the fraud was committed in
a span of more than one (1) year covering various
deposits, common human experience dictates that the
same would not have been possible without any form of
collusion between Ms. Yabut and bank teller Mabayad.
Ms. Mabayad was negligent in the performance of her
duties as bank teller nonetheless.
- it cannot be denied that private respondent was
likewise negligent in not checking its monthly
statements of account. Had it done so, the company
would have been alerted to the series of frauds being
committed against RMC by its secretary. The damage
would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount
if only RMC, particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised
even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. This
omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence
which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded
to the private respondent under Article 2179 of the
New Civil Code
Disposition CA decision modified. The demands of
substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the
damage on a 60-40 ratio. Thus, 40% of the damage
awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the
award of P25,000.00 attorney's fees, shall be borne by
private respondent RMC; only the balance of 60%
needs to be paid by the petitioners. The award of
attorney's fees shall be borne exclusively by the
petitioners.
PADILLA [dissent]
- the doctrine of "last clear chance" assumes that the
negligence of the defendant was subsequent to the
negligence of the plaintiff and the same must be the
proximate cause of the injury. In short, there must be a
last and a clear chance, not a last possible chance, to
avoid the accident or injury. It must have been a
chance as would have enabled a reasonably prudent
man in like position to have acted effectively to avoid
the injury and the resulting damage to himself.
- the bank was not remiss in its duty of sending
monthly bank statements to private respondent RMC so
that any error or discrepancy in the entries therein
could be brought to the bank's attention at the earliest
opportunity. Private respondent failed to examine these
bank statements not because it was prevented by
some cause in not doing so, but because it was
purposely negligent as it admitted that it does not
normally check bank statements given by banks. It was
private respondent who had the last and clear chance
to prevent any further misappropriation by Yabut had it
only reviewed the status of its current accounts on the
bank statement sent to it monthly or regularly. Since a
prof. casis
sizable amount of cash was entrusted to Yabut, private
respondent should, at least, have taken care of its
concerns, as what the law presumes. Its negligence,
therefore, is not contributory but the immediate and
proximate cause of its injury.
GLAN PEOPLE’S LUMBER AND
HARDWARE V IAC (VDA. DE CALIBO and
kids)
GR No.70493
NARVASA; May 18, 1989
NATURE
Petition for certiorari praying for a reversal of the
judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court which, it
is claimed, ignored or ran counter to the established
facts.
FACTS
- Engineer Orlando T. Calibo, Agripino Roranes, and
Maximo Patos were on the jeep owned by the Bacnotan
Consolidated Industries, Inc., with Calibo at the wheel,
as it approached from the South Lizada Bridge going
towards the direction of Davao City at about 1:45 in the
afternoon of July 4,1979. At about that time, the cargo
track, loaded with cement bags, GI sheets, plywood,
driven by defendant Paul Zacarias y Infants, coming
from the opposite direction of Davao City and bound for
Glan, South Cotabato, had just crossed said bridge. At
about 59 yards after crossing the bridge, the cargo
truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of which
Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and Patos
sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt. As a
result of the impact, the left side of the truck was
slightly damaged while the left side of the jeep,
including its fender and hood, was extensively
damaged. After the impact, the jeep fell and rested on
its right side on the asphalted road a few meters to the
rear of the truck, while the truck stopped on its wheels
on the road.
- On November 27, 1979, the instant case for damages
was filed by the surviving spouse and children of the
late Engineer Calibo who are residents of Tagbilaran
City against the driver and owners of the cargo truck.
- Trial Court dismissed the complaint (and
defendants' counterclaim) "for insufficiency of
evidence." The circumstances leading to the conclusion
just mentioned:
1. Moments before its collission with the truck being
operated by Zacarias, the jeep of the deceased Calibo
was "zigzagging."
2. Unlike Zacarias who readily submitted himself to
investigation by the police, Calibo's companions who
suffered injuries on account of the collision, refused to
torts & damages
be so investigated or give statements to the police
officers. This, plus Roranes' waiver of the right to
institute criminal proceedings against Zacarias, and the
fact that indeed no criminal case was ever instituted in
Court against Zacarias, were "telling indications that
they did not attribute the happening to defendant
Zacarias' negligence or fault."
3. Roranes' testimony, given in plaintiffs' behalf, was
"not as clear and detailed as that of Zacarias," and was
"uncertain and even contradicted by the physical facts
and the police investigators Dimaano and Esparcia."
4. That there were skid marks left by the truck's tires at
the scene, and none by the jeep, demonstrates that the
driver of the truck had applied the brakes and the
jeep's driver had not; and that the jeep had on impact
fallen on its right side is indication that it was running
at high speed.
5. Even if it be considered that there was some
antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias shortly
before the collision, in that he had caused his truck to
run some 25 centimeters to the left of the center of the
road, Engr. Calibo had the last clear chance of avoiding
the accident because he still had ample room in his
own lane to steer clear of the truck, or he could simply
have braked to a full stop.
- IAC reversed TC. It found Zacarias to be
negligent on the basis of the following circumstances,
to wit:
1) "the truck driven by defendant Zacarias occupied the
lane of the jeep when the collision occurred,' and
although Zacarias saw the jeep from a distance of
about 150 meters, he "did not drive his truck back to
his lane in order to avoid collision with the oncoming
jeep . . .;" what is worse, "the truck driver suddenly
applied his brakes even as he knew that he was still
within the lane of the jeep;" had both vehicles stayed in
their respective lanes, the collision would never have
occurred, they would have passed "along side each
other safely;"
2) Zacarias had no license at the time; what he handed
to Pfc. Esparcia, on the latter's demand, was the
'driver's license of his co-driver Leonardo Baricuatro;"
3) the waiver of the right to file criminal charges
against Zacarias should not be taken against "plaintiffs"
Roranes and Patos who had the right, under the law, to
opt merely to bring a civil suit.
ISSUES
WON respondent court is correct in reversing the
decision of trial court.
HELD
NO.
Ratio The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as
valid and complete a defense to accident liability.
(Picart v Smith)
A2010 - 76 -
Reasoning Both drivers, as the Appellate Court found,
had had a full view of each other's vehicle from a
distance of one hundred fifty meters. Both vehicles
were travelling at a speed of approximately thirty
kilometers per hour. The private respondents have
admitted that the truck was already at a full stop when
the jeep plowed into it. And they have not seen fit to
deny or impugn petitioners' imputation that they also
admitted the truck had been brought to a stop while
the jeep was still thirty meters away. From these facts
the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of
the jeep had what judicial doctrine has
appropriately called the last clear chance to
avoid the accident, while still at that distance of
thirty meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn
or swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of
which he had sufficient time to do while running at a
speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. In those
circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of
avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right to
expect, as the Appellate Court would have it, the truck
to swerve and leave him a clear path.
-Picart v Smith:
The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge. Seeing an
automobile ahead he improperly pulled his horse over
to the railing on the right. The driver of the automobile,
however guided his car toward the plaintiff without
diminution of speed until he was only few feet away. He
then turned to the right but passed so closely to the
horse that the latter being frightened, jumped around
and was killed by the passing car. . . . .
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not
free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the
road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was
also negligent; and in such case the problem always is
to discover which agent is immediately and directly
responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of
the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the
negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence
of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has the
last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails
to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
Dispositive WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of
the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby REVERSED,
and the complaint against herein petitioners in Civil
Case No. 3283 of the Court of First Instance of Bohol,
Branch IV, is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
Voting Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea,
JJ., concur.
prof. casis
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC v
CAR BASCOS BAESA
179 SCRA 384
CORTES J.: November 1989
FACTS:
At about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of June 12, 1981,
the spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their
children Harold Jim, Marceline and Maricar, together
with spouses David Ico and Fe O. Ico with their son
Erwin Ico and seven other persons, were aboard a
passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic at Malalam
River, Ilagan, Isabela, to celebrate the fifth wedding
anniversary of Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa.
-
Upon reaching the highway, the jeepney turned right
and proceeded to MaIalam, River at a speed of about
20 kph. While they were proceeding towards Malalam
River, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on its
regular route to Manila, encroached on the jeepney's
lane while negotiating a curve, and collided with it.
- David Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa
and their children, Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa,
died while the rest of the passengers suffered injuries.
The jeepney was extensively damaged. After the
accident the driver of the PANTRANCO Bus, Ambrosio
Ramirez, boarded a car and proceeded to Santiago,
Isabela. From that time on up to the present, Ramirez
has never been seen and has apparently remained in
hiding.
- Maricar Baesa through her guardian Francisca O.
Bascos and Fe O. Ico for herself and for her minor
children, filed separate actions for damages arising
from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO. Other victims
settled with Bus Company.
-PANTRANCO, aside from pointing to the late David
Ico's alleged negligence as the proximate cause of the
accident, invoked the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its driver, Ambrosio
Ramirez
-TC ruled against PANTRANCO and ordered them to
pay damages.
-Pantranco appealed the decision. Appeal dismissed for
lack of merit
ISSUE:
WON PANTRANCO is liable for damages.
HELD: YES
-Petitioner claims that under the circumstances of the
case, it was the driver of the passenger jeepney who
had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and was
therefore negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable
care and competence his then existing opportunity to
avoid the harm.
torts & damages
-petitioner claims that the original negligence of its
driver was not the proximate cause of the accident and
that the sole proximate cause was the supervening
negligence of the jeepney driver David Ico in failing to
avoid the accident
- The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means
that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a
recovery for the negligence of defendant where it
appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care
and prudence, might have avoided injurious
consequences to claimant notwithstanding his
negligence.
-The doctrine applies only in a situation where the
plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence
but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to
avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made
liable for all the consequences of the accident
notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff
- The above contention of petitioner is manifestly
devoid of merit. Contrary to the petitioner's contention,
the doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application
in this case
- Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the doctrine of
"last clear chance" finds no application in this case. For
the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show
that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity
to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the
peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been
aware of it
- In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney
driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. When
he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was
encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve
the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he
must have assumed that the bus driver will return the
bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney
approaching from the opposite direction.
- Moreover, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals found that at the time of the accident the
Pantranco bus was speeding towards Manila. At the
time David Ico must have realized that the bus was not
returning to its own lane, it was already too late to
swerve the jeepney to his right to prevent an accident.
- This Court has held that the last clear chance doctrine
"can never apply where the party charged is required
to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be
avoided by the application of all means at hand after
the peril is or should have been discovered"
- Petitioner likewise insists that David Ico was negligent
in failing to observe Section 43 (c), Article III Chapter IV
of Republic Act No. 4136** which provides that the
driver of a vehicle entering a through highway or a stop
intersection shall yield the right of way to all vehicles
approaching in either direction on such through
highway.
A2010 - 77 -
-Petitioner's misplaced reliance on the aforesaid law is
readily apparent in this case. The cited law itself
provides that it applies only to vehicles entering a
through highway or a stop intersection. At the time of
the accident, the jeepney had already crossed the
intersection and was on its way to Malalam River
-On the issue of its liability as an employer, petitioner
claims that it had observed the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage, conformably to
the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
-When an injury is caused by the negligence of an
employee, there instantly arises a presumption that the
employer has been negligent either in the selection of
his employees or in the supervision over their acts.
Although this presumption is only a disputable
presumption which could be overcome by proof of
diligence of a good father of a family, this Court
believes that the evidence submitted by the defendant
to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family iti the case of Ramirez, as a company driver
is far from sufficient
ANURAN V BUÑO
17 SCRA 224
BENGZON, May 20, 1966
NATURE: Petition for Review by certiorari of CA
decision.
FACTS
- On January 12, 1958, a passenger jeepney was parked
on the road to Taal, Batangas. Buño, driver of said
jeepney stopped his vehicle in order to allow one of his
passengers to alight. But he parked his jeepney in such
a way that ½ of its width (the left wheels) was on the
asphalted pavement of the road and the other half, on
the right shoulder of the said road. A motor truck
speeding along, negligently bumped it from behind,
which such violence that three of its passengers died,
even as 2 other passengers suffered injuries that
required their confinement at the Provincial Hospital for
many days.
- Suits were instituted by the representatives of the
dead and the injured, to recover consequently damages
against the drivers and the owners of the trucks and
also against the driver and the owners of the jeepney.
- CFI Batangas absolved the driver of the jeepney and
its owners, but it required the truck driver and the
owners o make compensation. Plaintiffs appealed to the
CA insisting that the driver and the owners of the
jeepney should also be made liable for damages.
ISSUE
WON the driver and owners of the jeepney should also
be made liable.
HELD
prof. casis
YES. An error of law was committed in releasing the
jeepney from liability. It must be remembered that the
obligation of the carrier to transport its passengers
safely is such that the New Civil Code requires “utmost
diligence” from the carriers (Art. 1755) who are
“presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they have observed
extraordinary diligence” (Art. 1756). In this instance,
this legal presumption of negligence is confirmed by
the CA’s finding that jeepney driver in question was at
fault in parking the vehicle improperly. It must follow
that the driver – and the owners – of the jeepney must
answer for injuries to its passengers.
Obiter on Application of Principle of Last Clear Chance:
The principle about the “last clear chance” applies in a
suit between the owners and drivers of the two
colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger
demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its
contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to
exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its
owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise
guilty of negligence. This principle does not apply in
this case.
DISPOSITION: Judgment modified.
CANLAS V, CA
Purisima; February 28, 2000
Nature
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Facts
-Sometime in August, 1982, Osmundo S. Canlas, and
Vicente Mañosca, decided to venture in business and to
raise the capital needed therefor. The former then
executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing the
latter to mortgage two parcels of land situated in San
Dionisio, (BF Homes) Paranaque, Metro Manila, each lot
with semi-concrete residential house in the name of the
SPS Canlas. Osmundo Canlas agreed to sell the said
parcels of land to Vicente Mañosca, for and in
consideration of P850,000.00, P500,000.00 of which
payable within one week, and the balance of
P350,000.00 to serve as his (Osmundo's) investment in
the business. Thus, Osmundo Canlas delivered to
Vicente Mañosca the transfer certificates of title of the
parcels of land involved. Vicente Mañosca, as his part
of the transaction, issued two postdated checks in favor
of Osmundo Canlas in the amounts of P40,000.00 and
P460,000.00, respectively, but it turned out that the
check covering the bigger amount was not sufficiently
funded.
-On September 3, 1982, Vicente Mañosca was able to
mortgage the same parcels of land for P100,000.00 to a
torts & damages
certain Attorney Manuel Magno, with the help of
impostors who misrepresented themselves as the
spouses, Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas. On
September 29, 1982, private respondent Vicente
Mañosca was granted a loan by the respondent Asian
Savings Bank (ASB) in the amount of P500,000.00, with
the use of subject parcels of land as security, and with
the involvement of the same impostors who again
introduced themselves as the Canlas spouses. When
the loan it extended was not paid, respondent bank
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage.
-On January 15, 1983, Osmundo Canlas wrote a letter
informing the respondent bank that the execution of
subject mortgage over the two parcels of land in
question was without their (Canlas spouses) authority,
and request that steps be taken to annul and/or revoke
the questioned mortgage. On January 18, 1983,
petitioner Osmundo Canlas also wrote the office of
Sheriff Maximo O. Contreras, asking that the auction
sale scheduled on February 3, 1983 be cancelled or
held in abeyance. But respondents Maximo C.
Contreras and Asian Savings Bank refused to heed
petitioner Canlas' stance and proceeded with the
scheduled auction sale.
-Consequently, on February 3, 1983 the herein
petitioners instituted the present case for annulment of
deed of real estate mortgage with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; and on May
23, 1983, the trial court issued an Order restraining the
respondent sheriff from issuing the corresponding
Certificate of Sheriff's Sale.For failure to file his answer,
despite several motions for extension of time for the
filing thereof, Vicente Mañosca was declared in default.
Lower court a quo came out with a decision annulling
subject deed of mortgage and disposing. Asian Savings
Bank appealed to the Court of Appeals and CA reversed
the lower court decision.
Issue/s and Held
WON CA erred in holding that the mortgage is valid
Settled is the rule that a contract of mortgage
must be constituted only by the absolute owner
on the property mortgaged; a mortgage,
constituted by an impostor is void. Considering
that it was established indubitably that the
contract of mortgage sued upon was entered into
and signed by impostors who misrepresented
themselves as the spouses Osmundo Canlas and
Angelina Canlas, the Court is of the ineluctible
conclusion and finding that subject contract of
mortgage is a complete nullity.
WON ASB must incur the resulting loss
A2010 - 78 -
Yes. The doctrine of last clear chance is
applicable, the respondent bank must suffer the
resulting loss. In essence, the doctrine of last
clear chance is to the effect that where both
parties are negligent but the negligent act of one
is appreciably later in point of time than that of
the other, or where it is impossible to determine
whose fault or negligence brought about the
occurrence of the incident, the one who had the
last clear opportunity to avoid the impending
harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the
consequences arising therefrom. Stated
differently, the rule is that the antecedent
negligence of a person does not preclude
recovery of damages caused by the supervening
negligence of the latter, who had the last fair
chance to prevent the impending harm by the
exercise of due diligence.
In the case under consideration, from the evidence on
hand it can be gleaned unerringly that respondent bank
did not observe the requisite diligence in ascertaining
or verifying the real identity of the couple who
introduced themselves as the spouses Osmundo Canlas
and Angelina Canlas. It is worthy to note that not even
a single identification card was exhibited by the said
impostors to show their true identity; and yet, the bank
acted on their representations simply on the basis of
the residence certificates bearing signatures which
tended to match the signatures affixed on a previous
deed of mortgage to a certain Atty. Magno, covering
the same parcels of land in question.
Applying Art. 1173 It could be said that the degree of
diligence required of banks is more than that of a good
father of a family in keeping with their responsibility to
exercise the necessary care and prudence in dealing
even on a registered or titled property. The business of
a bank is affected with public interest, holding in trust
the money of the depositors, which bank deposits the
bank should guard against loss due to negligence or
bad faith, by reason of which the bank would be denied
the protective mantle of the land registration law,
accorded only to purchasers or mortgagees for value
and in good faith.
Evidently, the efforts exerted by the bank to verify the
identity of the couple posing as Osmundo Canlas and
Angelina Canlas fell short of the responsibility of the
bank to observe more than the diligence of a good
father of a family. The negligence of respondent bank
was magnified by the fact that the previous deed of
mortgage (which was used as the basis for checking
the genuineness of the signatures of the supposed
Canlas spouses) did not bear the tax account number
of the spouses, as well as the Community Tax
Certificate of Angelina Canlas. But such fact
prof. casis
notwithstanding, the bank did not require the impostors
to submit additional proof of their true identity.
For not observing the degree of diligence required of
banking institutions, whose business is impressed with
public interest, respondent Asian Savings Bank has to
bear the loss sued upon.
Disposition
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the Decision
of the Court of Appeals, dated September 30, 1993, in
CA-G.R. CV No. 25242 SET ASIDE. The Decision of
Branch 59 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in
Civil Case No. M-028 is hereby REINSTATED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
CONSOLIDATED BANK V CA (L.C.DIAZ
AND CO.)
GR No. 138569
CARPIO; September 11, 2003
NATURE
Review of the decision of the CA
FACTS
- LC Diaz is a professional partnership engaged in
accounting. On 14 August 1991, LC diaz, thru its
cashier, instructed their messenger, Calapre, to deposit
money in Solidbank. Calapre then deposited in
Solidbank. Since the transaction took time and Calapre
had to make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Allied
Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank. When he
came back, the teller told him that somebody else got
the passbook. The next day, it was learned that 300k
was withdrawn from the account.
- An information for estafa was filed against one of their
messengers (Ilagan) and one Roscoe Verdazola. LC
Diaz demanded SolidBank the return of their money.
The latter refused and a case for recovery of a sum of
money was filed against them
- TC applied rules on savings account written on the
passbook. The rules state that “possession of this book
shall raise the presumption of ownership and any
payment or payments made by the bank upon the
production of the said book and entry therein of the
withdrawal shall have the same effect as if made to the
depositor personally.” Also, they applied the rule that
the holder of the passport is presumed the owner. It
was also held that Solidbank did not have any
participation in the custody and care of the passbook
and as such, their act was not the proximate cause of
the loss. The proximate cause was LC Diaz’ negligence.
torts & damages
- CA revered. It ruled that Solidbank’s negligence was
the proximate cause. It applied the provision on the CC
on quasi delicts and found that the requisite elements
were present. They found that the teller made no
inquiry upon the withdrawal of 300k. The teller could
have called up LC Diaz since the amount being drawn
was significant. The appellate court ruled that while
L.C. Diaz was also negligent in entrusting its deposits to
its messenger and its messenger in leaving the
passbook with the teller, Solidbank could not escape
liability because of the doctrine of “last clear chance.”
Solidbank could have averted the injury suffered by L.C.
Diaz had it called up L.C. Diaz to verify the withdrawal.
ISSUES
WON Solidbank was liable
HELD
- For breach of the savings deposit agreement due to
negligence, or culpa contractual, the bank is liable to its
depositor.
- When the passbook is in the possession of Solidbank’s
tellers during withdrawals, the law imposes on
Solidbank and its tellers an even higher degree of
diligence in safeguarding the passbook. Likewise,
Solidbank’s tellers must exercise a high degree of
diligence in insuring that they return the passbook only
to the depositor or his authorized representative
- In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach
of contract, there is a presumption that the defendant
was at fault or negligent. The burden is on the
defendant to prove that he was not at fault or
negligent. Solidbank failed to discharge this burden.
(they could have presented the teller to whom the
passbook was left, but they didn’t)
- L.C. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in
the hands of the impostor. Solidbank was in possession
of the passbook while it was processing the deposit.
After completion of the transaction, Solidbank had the
contractual obligation to return the passbook only to
Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz.
SolidBank’s negligence in returning the passbook was
the proximate cause.
- The doctrine of last clear chance states that where
both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one
is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence
caused the loss, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is
chargeable with the loss. Stated differently, the
antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not
preclude him from recovering damages caused by the
supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the
last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the
exercise of due diligence.
A2010 - 79 -
- We do not apply the doctrine of last clear
chance to the present case. Solidbank is liable for
breach of contract due to negligence in the
performance of its contractual obligation to L.C. Diaz.
This is a case of culpa contractual, where neither the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear
chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the
defendant from liability. Such contributory negligence
or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely serves to
reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but
does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of
contract.
DISPOSITIVE
Decision affirmed, modification only to damages
ENGADA V CA
QUISUMBING, J.: June 20, 2003
NATURE
Petition for review seeking the reversal of the decision
of the CA which affirmed with modification the
judgment of the RTC of Iloilo City
FACTS
- On November 29, 1989, at about 1:30 in the
afternoon, Edwin Iran was driving a blue Toyota
Tamaraw jeepney bound for Iloilo City. On board was
Sheila Seyan, the registered owner of the Tamaraw.
The Tamaraw passengers allegedly saw from the
opposite direction a speeding Isuzu pick-up, driven by
petitioner Rogelio Engada. When it was just a few
meters away from the Tamaraw, the Isuzu pick-up’s
right signal light flashed, at the same time, it swerved
to its left, encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw
and headed towards a head-on collision course with it.
Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid the pick-up. Iran
swerved to his left but the pick-up also swerved to its
right. Thus, the pick-up collided with the Tamaraw,
hitting the latter at its right front passenger side. The
impact caused the head and chassis of the Tamaraw to
separate from its body. Seyan was thrown out of the
Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield. Seyan incurred
P130,000 in medical expenses. The Toyota Tamaraw
jeepney ended up in the junk heap. Its total loss was
computed at P80,000.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioner’s negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident
HELD
1. YES. Ratio It is a settled rule that a driver
abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of
prof. casis
overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has
the duty to see to it that the road is clear and he should
not proceed if he cannot do so in safety. For failing to
observe the duty of diligence and care imposed on
drivers of vehicles abandoning their lane, petitioner
must be held liable. Iran could not be faulted when in
his attempt to avoid the pick-up, he swerved to his left.
Petitioner’s acts had put Iran in an emergency situation
which forced him to act quickly. An individual who
suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is
required to act without much time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to
undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency
was brought by his own negligence.
Reasoning The doctrine of last clear chance states
that a person who has the last clear chance or
opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding
the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law
solely responsible for the consequences of the
accident. But what has been shown is the presence of
an emergency and the proper application of the
emergency rule. There was no clear chance to speak of.
Iran swerved to the left only to avoid petitioner’s pick-
up, which was already on a head to head position going
against Iran’s Tamaraw jeepney immediately before the
vehicles collided. No convincing proof was adduced by
petitioner that Iran could have avoided a head-on
collision.
Dispositive
The appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
STRICT LIABILITY
VESTIL V IAC (UY)
179 SCRA 47
CRUZ; December 6, 1989
NATURE
Petition to reinstate the decision of the Appellate Court.
FACTS
- July 29, 1975: Theness was bitten by a dog while she
was playing with a child of the petitioners in the house
of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil.
She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where
she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the
forehead.” She was discharged after nine days but was
re-admitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva."
The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died.
torts & damages
The cause of death was certified as broncho-
pneumonia.
- Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of
rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that
asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused
her death, was a complication of rabies
- Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages,
alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the
possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually
killed their daughter.
- Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu sustained the defendants. IAC found that the
Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog
and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the
Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog.
- On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court
finds that the link between the dog bites and the
certified cause of death has been satisfactorily
established.
Petitioners’ Claim
The Vestils are liable for the death of Theness, since
they own the dog that bit her.
Respondents’ Comments
The dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda,
that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one
had witnessed it bite Theness.
ISSUE
WON the Vestils are liable for the damage caused by
the dog.
HELD
Ratio The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the
Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the
presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of
the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural
equity and on the principle of social interest that he
who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or
service must answer for the damage which such animal
may cause.
Reasoning
ART. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever
may make use of the same is responsible for the
damage which it may cause, although it may escape or
be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the
damage should come from force majeure or from the
fault of the person who has suffered damage.
- While it is true that she is not really the owner of the
house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate,
there is no doubt that she and her husband were its
possessors at the time of the incident in question.
- There is evidence showing that she and her family
regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly.
A2010 - 80 -
- Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of
rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that
asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused
her death, was a complication of rabies. The Court finds
that the link between the dog bites and the certified
cause of death has been satisfactorily established.
- It does not matter that the dog was tame and was
merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law
does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even
tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the
alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness
was only three years old at the time she was attacked
and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have
done to the animal.
- Obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is
not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of
vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing
the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the
principle of social interest that he who possesses
animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer
for the damage which such animal may cause.
DISPOSITION
The Court approves the time.
DINGCONG vs. KANAAN
72 Phil. 14; G.R. No. L-47033
AVANCEÑA; April 25, 1941
NATURE
Petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA
FACTS
-The brothers Loreto and Jose Dingcong rented the
house of Emilia Saenz (in Jose Ma. Basa Street of the
City of Iloilo) and established the Central Hotel. Among
the hotel's guests is Francisco Echevarria, paying P30 a
month, and occupying room no. 10 of said hotel.
Kanaan, on the other hand, occupies the ground floor of
the hotel and established his "American Bazaar"
dedicated to the purchase and sale of articles and
merchandise.
-Around 11pm of 19 September 1933, Echevarria, when
retiring to bed, carelessly left the faucet open that with
only an ordinary basin without drainage. That time, the
pipes of the hotel were under repair; the water run off
the pipes and spilled to the ground, wetting the articles
and merchandise of the "American Bazaar," causing a
loss which the CFI sets at P1,089.61.
-The Kanaans (Halim, Nasri and Michael), representing
the establishment "American Bazaar," thereafter filed
this complaint for damages against Loreto Dingcong,
Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria.
prof. casis
-CFI held Francisco Echevarria liable, and acquitted Jose
Dingcong. CA reversed and declared Jose Dingcong
responsible, sentencing him to pay the plaintiffs
damages.
ISSUE
WON Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria are liable
for damages
HELD
YES.
-Francisco Echevarria, the hotel guest, is liable for
being the one who directly, by his negligence in leaving
open the faucet, caused the water to spill to the
ground and wet the articles and merchandise of the
plaintiffs.
-Jose Dingcong, being a co-renter and manager of the
hotel, with complete possession of the house, must also
be responsible for the damages caused. He failed to
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to
prevent these damages, despite his power and
authority to cause the repair of the pipes.
Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed, with the
costs against apellant.
AFABLE V SINGER SEWING MACHINE
COMPANY
58 PHIL 14
VICKERS; March 6, 1933
NATURE
Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila
FACTS
- Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a collector for the Singer
Sewing Machine Company in the district of San
Francisco del Monte, outside of the limits of the City of
Manila, and he was supposed to be residing in his
district according to the records of the company.
- One Sunday afternoon, Leopoldo Madlangbayan while
riding a bicycle was run over and fatally injured at the
corner of O'Donnel and Zurbaran streets in the City of
Manila by a truck driven by Vitaliano Sumoay.
- It appears that Madlangbayan had moved to Teodora
Alonso St. in Manila without notifying the company, and
that at the time of his death he was returning home
after making some collections in San Francisco del
Monte.
- According to the practice of the company, if collectors
made collections on Sunday they were required to
deliver the amount collected to the company the next
morning.
- The widow and children of Leopoldo Madlangbayan
brought an action to recover from the defendant
torts & damages
corporation under Act No. 3428, as amended by Act.
No. 3812, P100 for burial expenses and P1,745.12 for
compensation.
- Plaintiffs' complaint was subsequently amended, and
they sought to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act
No. 3428 fifty per cent of P16.78 for 208 weeks of
P1,745.12 plus P100 for burial expenses.
- Defendant as special defenses alleged that Leopoldo
Madlangbayan at the time that he sustained the
injuries resulting in his death was violating an
ordinance of the City of Manila which prohibits work on
Sunday; and that Act No. 3428, as amended, is
unconstitutional and void because it denies the
defendant the equal protection of the law, and impairs
the obligation of the contract between the defendant
and Leopoldo Madlangbayan, and deprives the Courts
of First Instance of their probate jurisdiction over the
estate of deceased persons and nullifies Chapters XXIX,
XXX, XXXI, XXXII, XXXIII, and XXXIV of the Civil Code
Procedure and related articles of the Civil Code.
ISSUE
WON the employer is liable to pay the employee’s
heirs.
RULING
NO.
- As the deceased Leopoldo Madlangbayan was killed
on November 16, 1930 and Act No. 3812 was not
approved until December 8, 1930, it is apparent that
the law which is applicable is Act No. 3428, section 23
of which reads as follows:
When any employee receives a personal injury
from any accident due to in the pursuance of the
employment, or contracts any illness directly
caused by such employment or the result of the
nature of such employment, his employer shall pay
compensation in the sums and to the persons
hereinafter specified.
- The accident which caused the death of the employee
was not due to and in pursuance of his employment.
- At the time that he was over by the truck Leopoldo
Madlangbayan was not in the pursuance of his
employment with the defendant corporation, but was
on his way home after he had finished his work for the
day and had left the territory where he was authorized
to take collections for the defendant.
- The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental
injuries which might happen to an employee while in
the course of the employment", and as a general rule
an employee is not entitled to recover from personal
injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him
while going to or returning from his place of
employment, because such an accident does no arise
out of and in the course of his employment.
A2010 - 81 - prof. casis
- The phrase "due to and in the pursuance of" used in DAVIDE, JR.; October 18, 1993
section 2 of Act No. 3428 was changed in Act No. 3812
to "arising out of and in the course of". Discussing this
NATURE
phrase, the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Mueller Construction Co. vs. Industrial Board, said:
Court of Appeals
The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or
cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its
FACTS
character, while the words "in the course of" refer
- Lydia Geronimo was engaged in the business of
to the time, place, and circumstances under which
selling food and drinks to children in the Kindergarten
the accident takes place. By the use of these words
Wonderland Canteen located in Dagupan.
it was not the intention of the legislature to make
- August 12, 1989 - A group of parents complained that
the employer an insurer against all accidental
they found fibrous material in the bottles of Coke and
injuries which might happen to an employee while
Sprite that their children bought from Geronimo’s store.
in the course of the employment, but only for such
Geronimo examined her stock of softdrinks and found
injuries arising from or growing out of the risks
that there were indeed fibrous materials in the
peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope of
unopened soda bottles. She brought the bottles to the
the workman's employment of incidental to such
Department of Health office in their region and was
employment, and accidents in which it is possible
informed that the soda samples she sent were
to trace the injury to some risk or hazard to which
adulterated.
the employee is exposed in a special degree by
- Because of this, Geronimo’s sales plummeted with her
reason of such employment. Risks to which all
regular sales of 10 cases day dwindling to about 2 or 3
persons similarly situated are equally exposed and
cases. Her losses amounted to P200 to P300 a day
not traceable in some special degree to the
which later on forced her to close down her business on
particular employment are excluded.
December 12, 1989.
- If the deceased had been killed while going from
- She demanded payment of damages from plaintiff
house to house in San Francisco del Monte in the
Coca-Cola but the latter did not accede to her
pursuance of his employment, the plaintiffs would
demands.
undoubtedly have the right, prima facie, to recover.
- The trial court ruled in favor of Coca-Cola, stating that
- In the case at bar the deceased was going from work
the complaint was based on a contract and not a quasi-
in his own conveyance.
delict because of pre-existing relation between the
- Furthermore, it appears that the deceased had never
parties. Thus the complaint should have been filed
notified the defendant corporation of his removal from
within 6 months from the delivery of the thing sold.
San Francisco del Monte of Manila, and that the
- The trial court however annulled the questioned
company did not know that he was living in Manila on
orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct further
the day of the accident; that the defendant company
proceedings in the civil case. According to the CA: “the
did not require its employees to work on Sunday, or
allegations in the complaint plainly show that it is an
furnish or require its agents to use bicycles.
action for damages arising from respondent’s act of
- These are additional reasons for holding that the
recklessly and negligently manufacturing adulterated
accident was not due to and pursuance of the
food items intended to be sol for public consumption.”
employment of the deceased. If the deceased saw fit to
It also noted that the availability of an action for breach
change his residence from San Francisco del Monte to
of warranty does not bar an action for torts in a sale of
Manila and to make use a bicycle in going back and
defective goods.
forth, he did so at his own risk, as the defendant
Petitioners’ Claim:
company did not furnish him a bicycle or require him to
- Coca-Cola moved to dismiss the complaint on the
use one; and if he made collections on Sunday, he did
grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies
not do so in pursuance of his employment, and his
and prescription.
employer is not liable for any injury sustained by him.
- Since the complaint is for breach of warranty (under
A1561, CC), it should have been brought within 6
DISPOSITION The decision appealed from was affirmed,
months from the delivery of the goods.
with the costs against the appellants.
Respondents’ Comments:
- Geronimo alleges that her complaint is one for
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS V CA damages which does not involve an administrative
(GERONIMO) action.
227 SCRA 292
torts & damages
- Her cause of action is based on an injury to plaintiff’s
right which can be brought within 4 years (based on
A1146, CC).
ISSUE
WON the complaint is founded on a quasi-delict and
pursuant to A1146(12), CC, the action prescribes in 4
years
HELD
YES
Reasoning
- The vendee’s remedies against a vendor with respect
to the warranties against hidden defects or
encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to
those prescribed in A1567. The vendee may also ask
for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or
fraud in which case the ordinary rule on obligations
shall be applicable.
- Under American law, the liabilities of the
manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may
be based on negligence, breach of warranty, tort or
other grounds.
DISPOSITION The instant petition is denied for lack of
merit.
GILCHRIST v CUDDY
29 Phil 542
TRENT; February 18, 1915
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the CFI
FACTS
-Cuddy was the owner of the film “Zigomar”. Gilchrist
was the owner of a theatre in Iloilo. They entered into a
contract whereby Cuddy leased to Gilchrist the
Zigomar” for exhibition in his theatre for a week for
P125.
- Cuddy returned the money already paid by Gilchrist
days before the delivery date so that he can lease the
film to Espejo and Zaldarriaga instead and receive P350
for the film for the same period.
- Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance against
Cuddy, Espejo and Zaldarriaga. He also prayed for
damages against Espejo and Zaldarriaga for interfering
with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy.
ISSUE
WON Espejo and Zaldarriaga is liable for interfering
with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not
knowing at the time the identity of the parties
A2010 - 82 -
HELD
YES
- Appellants have the legal liability for interfering with
the contract and causing its breach. This liability arises
from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations
to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist.
- Article 1902 of the Civil Code provides that a person
who, by act or omission causes damage to another
when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to
pay for the damage done. There is nothing in this
article which requires as a condition precedent to the
liability of the tortfeasor that he must know the identity
of a person to whom he causes damage. No such
knowledge is required in order that the injured party
may recover for the damages suffered.
DISPOSITION Judgment affirmed
SON PING BUN vs CA (Tek Hua)
GR No. 120554
Quisumbing; September 21, 1999
NATURE
Appeal on certiorari for review of CA decision
FACTS
- In 1963, Tek hua Trading, through its Managing
Director So Pek Giok, entered into a lease agreement
with D.C. Chuan covering four stalls in Binondo. The
contracts were initially for one year but after expiry of
the same, they continued on a month to month basis.
In 1976, Tek Hua was dissolved with the original
members forming a new corporation, Tek Hua
Enterprises with Manuel Tiong as one of the
incorporators.
- So Ping Bun, on the death of his grandfather, So Pek
Giok, occupied the same stalls under the business
name, Trendsetter Marketing.
- In 1989, the lessor, DC Chuan sent a letter to Tek Hua
advising it of a 25% increase in rent effective
September 1, 1989. A further rent increase of 30%
effective January 1, 1990 was implemented. Enclosed in
both letters were new lease contracts for signing. While
the letters contained a statement that the leases will be
terminated if the contracts were not signed, the same
were not rescinded.
- In 1991, Tiong wrote a letter to So Ping Bun asking
him to vacate the four stalls as the same were going to
be used by them. Instead of vacating the stalls, So was
able to secure lease agreements from DC Chuan.
prof. casis
- Tek Hua filed an injunction and an action for
nullification of the contracts between Trendsetter and
DC Chuan. The lower Court ruled in favor of Tek Hua.
The CA, on appeal, upheld the trial court. Both the trial
court and the CA awarded legal fees only.
ISSUE
- WON So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous interference
of contract
HELD-
- Yes. A duty which the law on torts is concerned with is
respect for the property of others, and a cause of action
ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful
interference by one party of the enjoyment of the other
of his private property. In the case at bar, petitioner,
Trendsetter asked DC Chuan to execute lease contracts
in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived
respondent of the latter’s property right.
Reasoning-
- Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from
injury, and damges are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. One
becomes liable in an action for damages for a
nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the
private use and enjoyment of asset if
a) the other has property rights and privileges
with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with;
b) the invasion is substantial;
c) the defendant’s conduct is a legal cause of
the invasion;
d) the invasion is either intentional and
unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under
the general negligence rules.
- On the other hand, the elemts of tort interference are
a) existence of a valid contract
b) knowledge on the part of the third party of
its existence
c) interference of the third party is without
legal justification or
excuse
- Since there were existing lease contracts between Tek
Hua and DC Chuan, Tek Hua in fact had property rights
over the leased stalls. The action of Trendsetter in
asking DC Chuan to execute the contracts in their favor
was unlawful interference.
torts & damages
- The SC handled the question of whether the
interference may be justified considering that So acted
solely for the purpose of furthering his own financial or
economic interest. It stated that it is sufficient that the
impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest
rather than in wrongful motives to conclude that So
was not a malicious interferer. Nothing on the record
imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on the
part of So. Hence the lack of malice precludes the
award of damages.
- The provision in the Civil Code with regard tortuous
interference is Article 1314 which states that “ any
third party who induces another to violate his contract
shall be liable for damages to the other contracting
party”. The Court ratiocinated that the recovery of
legal fees is in the concept of actual or compensatory
damages as provided in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
In this casse, due to defendant’s action of interference,
plaintiff was forced to seek relief through the Court snd
thereby incur expenses to protect his interests. The
Court, however, found the award exorbitant. It was
reduced to Pesos 100,000.00
Disposition –
Petition denied. CA decision affirmed subject to the
modified award of attorney’s fees.
GUILATCO v CITY OF DAGUPAN
171 SCRA 382
SARMIENTO; Mar 21, 1989
Nature:
Petition for Certiorari to review the decision of CA
Facts:
- on July 25, 1978, Florentina Guilatco, a court
interpreter, accidentally fell into a manhole while she
was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk
at Perez Blvd. Her right leg was fractured, due to
which she was hospitalized, operated on, and
confined.
- She averred that she suffered mental and physical
pain, and that she has difficulty in locomotion. She
has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter (at
the time of filing of complaint) and thus lost income.
She also lost weight, and she is no longer her former
jovial self. Moreover, she has been unable to perform
her religious, social, and other activities which she
used to do prior to the incident.
- Police confirmed existence of the manhole, which
was partially covered by a concrete flower pot by
leaving a gaping hole about 2 ft long by 1 ½ feet
wide or 42 cm wide by 75 cm long by 150 cm deep.
A2010 - 83 -
- City Engineer of Dagupan Alfredo Tangco admitted
that the manhole is owned by the National
Government and the sidewalk on which they are
found along Perez Blvd. are also owned by the
National Government. He said that he supervises the
maintenance of said manholes and sees to it that
they are properly covered, and the job is specifically
done by his subordinates.
- Trial court ordered the city to pay Guilatco actual,
moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees.
CA reversed the lower court’s ruling on the ground
that no evidence was presented to prove that City of
Dagupan had control or supervision over Perez Blvd.
- City contends that Perez Blvd is a national road that
is not under the control or supervision of the City of
Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach to the city.
Issue
WON control or supervision over a national road by the
City of Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to
answer for damages in accordance with article 2189
CC.
Held
YES
- The liability of private corporations for damages
arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the
defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil
Code as follows:
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and
municipalities shall be liable for damages for
the death of, or injuries suffered by, any
person by reason of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other public works under their control or
supervision.
- It is not even necessary for the defective road or
street to belong to the province, city or municipality
for liability to attach. The article only requires that
either control or supervision is exercised over the
defective road or street.
- In this case, control or supervision is provided for in
the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the
City Engineer.
- The charter only lays down general rules regulating
that liability of the city. On the other hand, article
2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from
“defective streets, public buildings and other public
works.”
On Damages awarded
- Actual damages of P10000 reduced to proven
expenses of P8053.65. The trial court should not
have rounded off the amount. The court can not rely
on “speculation, conjecture or guess work as to the
amount.
prof. casis
- Moral damages of P150000 is excessive and is
reduced to P20000. Guilatco’s handicap was not
permanent and disabled her only during her
treatment which lasted for one year.
- Exemplary damages of P50000 reduced to P10000.
- Award of P7420 as lost income for one year, plus
P450 bonus remain the same
- P3000 as attorney’s fees remain the same
Disposition Petition granted. CA decision reversed and
set aside, decision of trial court reinstated with
modification.
PERSONS LIABLE
WORCESTER v OCAMPO
22 PHIL 42
Johnson; Feb. 27, 1912
NATURE
Appeal from judgment of CFI
FACTS
- Plaintiff Dean Worcester, member of the Civil
Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the
Interior of the Insular Government commenced an
action against defendants Ocampo, Kalaw, Santos,
Reyes, Aguilar, Liquete, Palma, Arellano, Jose, Lichauco,
Barretto and Cansipit (owners, directors, writers,
editors and administrators of a certain newspaper
known as “El Renacimiento” or “Muling Pagsilang”) for
the purpose of recovering damages resulting from an
alleged libelous publication.
- The editorial “Birds of Prey” was alleged to have
incited the Filipino people into believing that plaintiff
was a vile despot and a corrupt person, unworthy of the
position which he held. The said editorial alluded to him
as an eagle that surprises and devours, a vulture that
gorges himself on dead and rotten meat, an owl that
affects a petulant omniscience, and a vampire that
sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it
bloodless.
- After hearing the evidence adduced during trial, the
judge of the CFI rendered judgment in favor of
petitioner, holding all the defendants (except for Reyes,
Aguilar and Liquete who were found to be editors but in
a subordinate position and found to have merely acted
under the direction of their superiors) liable jointly and
severally for sustained damages on account of
petitioner’s wounded feelings, mental suffering and
injuries to his standing and reputation in the sum of
P35,000 as well as P25,000 as punitive damages.
torts & damages
- This judgment prompted defendants to appeal to the
SC, claiming that the CFI committed several errors in
rendering said judgment among which was that the
lower court committed an error in rendering a judgment
jointly and severally against the defendants.
ISSUE
WON the defendants, regardless of their participation in
the commission of the actual tort, may be held jointly
and severally liable as joint tortfeasors
HELD
YES.
Ratio Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who
command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission
of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for
their benefit.
Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the
tort which they commit. They are each liable as
principals, to the same extent and in the same manner
as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves.
***If several persons jointly commit a tort, the plaintiff
or person injured, has his election to sue all or some of
the parties jointly, or one of them separately, because
tort is in its nature a separate act of each individual.
Reasoning Defendants fail to recognize that the basis
of the present action is a tort. They fail to recognize the
universal doctrine that each joint tortfeasor is not only
individually liable for the tort in which he participates,
but is also jointly liable with his tortfeasors. The
defendants might have been sued separately for the
commission of the tort. They might have sued jointly
and severally, as they were. It is not necessary that the
cooperation should be a direct, corporeal act. **note:
Ponente used examples of torts as held under common
law** (In a case of assault and battery committed by
various persons, under the common law, all are
principals). So also is the person who counsels, aids, or
assists in any way the commission of a wrong. Under
the common law, he who aided, assisted or counseled,
in any way the commission of a crime, was as much a
principal as he who inflicted or committed the actual
tort.
- Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the
tort which they commit. The person injured may sue all
of them, or any number less than all. Each is liable for
the whole damage caused by all, and altogether jointly
liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one
sued alone, that the others who participated in the
wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants; nor
is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort
was insignificant as compared with that of the others.
- The courts during the trial may find that some of the
alleged joint tortfeasors are liable and that others are
A2010 - 84 - prof. casis
not liable. The courts may release some for lack of MORELAND; March 28, 1914
evidence while condemning others of the alleged tort.
And this is true even though they are charged jointly
NATURE
and severally. However, in this case, the lower court,
Appeal from the judgment of trial court finding for the
committed no error in rendering a joint and several
defendant
judgment against the defendants. As recognized by
Section 6 of Act 277 of the Philippine Commission:
FACTS
“Every author, editor, or proprietor * * * is chargeable
- The plaintiff-appellant, Chapman, desired to board a
with the publication of any words in any part * * * or
certain "San Marcelino" car coming from Sta. Ana and
number of each newspaper, as fully as if he were the
bound for Manila. Being told by his friend that the car
author of the same.
was approaching, he immediately, and somewhat
Disposition Judgment of the lower court modified.
hurriedly, passed into the street for the purpose of
Ocampo, Kalaw, Palma, Arellano, Jose, Lichauco,
signaling and boarding the car. The car was a closed
Barretto, and Cansipit held jointly and severally liable
one, the entrance being from the front or the rear
for the sum of P25, 000 with interest at 6%. Santos
platform. Plaintiff attempted to board the front platform
absolved from any liability.
but, seeing that he could not reach it without extra
exertion, stopped beside the car, facing toward the rear
ARELLANO, C.J. and MAPA, J. [concurring]
platform, and waited for it to come abreast of him in
- We concur, except with reference to the liability
order to board. While in this position he was struck
imposed upon Lichauco. The real owner and founder,
from behind and run over by the defendant's
Ocampo, explicitly stated that the other so-called
(Underwood) automobile.
founders subscribed and paid sums of money to aid the
- The defendant entered Calle Herran at Calle
paper but as to Lichauco, he offered to contribute, but
Peñafrancia in his automobile driven by his chauffeur, a
did not carry out his offer and in fact paid nothing. It is
competent driver. A street car bound from Manila to
incomprehensible how one could claim the right or title
Sta. Ana being immediately in front of him, he followed
to share the earnings or profits of a company when he
along behind it. Just before reaching the scene of the
had put no capital into it, neither is it comprehensible
accident the street car which was following took the
how one could share in the losses thereof, and still less
switch (there was a single-track street-car line running
incur liability for damages on account of some act of
along Calle Herran, with occasional switches to allow
the said company, an unrestricted liability to the extent
cars to meet and pass each other)- that is, went off the
of all his property, as though he were a regular general
main line to the left upon the switch lying alongside of
partner when he was not such.
the main track. Thereupon the defendant either kept
straight ahead on the main street-car track or a bit to
TORRES [dissenting in part]
the right. The car which the plaintiff intended to board
- I concur in regard to the defendants Ocampo and
was on the main line and bound in an opposite
Kalaw, but dissent as regards Palma, Arellano, Jose,
direction to that in which the defendant was going.
Lichauco, Barretto, and Cansipit for they had neither
When the front of the "San Marcelino" car was almost in
direct nor indirect participation in the act that gave rise
front of the defendant's automobile, defendant's driver
to the present suit for damages, nor were they owners
suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over the
or proprietors of the newspaper, its press or other
plaintiff.
equipment. They were donors who merely contributed
- The judgment of the trial court was for defendant.
a sum of money, as a genuine gift, for the purpose of
founding, editing, and issuing the said newspaper, it is
ISSUE
improper to deduce that the contributors formed a
WON Underwood is responsible for the negligence of
company of either a civil or commercial nature.
his driver.
- After Ocampo had accepted the various amounts
proffered, the donors ceased to be the owners of and
HELD
surrendered all right to the money donated and to the
NO.
objects that were acquired therewith. Therefore they
Ratio An owner who sits in his automobile or other
can not incur, jointly and severally with the director and
vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation
manager.
of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after
he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them
CHAPMAN V UNDERWOOD and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes
27 Phil 374 himself responsible for such acts. On the other hand, if
the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without
torts & damages
the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent
the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates
the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although
present herein at5 the time the act was committed, is
not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefore.
The act complained of must be continued in the
presence or the owner for such a length of time that
the owner by his acquiescence, makes his driver’s act
his own.
Reasoning Defendant's driver was guilty of negligence
in running upon and over the plaintiff. He was passing
an oncoming car upon the wrong side.
- The plaintiff needed only to watch for cars coming
from his right, as they were the only ones under the law
permitted to pass upon that side of the street car.
- in the case of Johnson vs. David, the driver does not
fall within the list of persons in Art.1903 of the Civil
Code for whose acts the defendant would be
responsible.
Although in the David case the owner of the vehicle
was not present at the time the alleged negligent acts
were committed by the driver, the same rule applies
where the owner is present, unless the negligent act of
the driver are continued for such a length of time as to
give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe
them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom.
- it appears with fair clearness that the interval
between the turning out to meet and pass the street
car and the happening of the accident was so small as
not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the
negligence of the driver.
DISPOSITION
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
CAEDO V YU KHE THAI
GR NO. L-20392
MAKALINTAL; December 18, 1968
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the CFI of
Iloilo
FACTS
- Bernardo is the driver of Yu Khe Thai. He was
driving the latter’s Cadillac along highway 54. On
the other side of the road, Caedo was driving his
Mercury car. He was with his family.
- A carretela was in front of the Cadillac.
Bernardo did not see the carretela from afar.
When he approached the carritela, he decided to
overtake it even though he had already seen the
A2010 - 85 -
car of the Caedos’ approaching from the opposite
lane. As he did so the curved end of his car's
right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the
rig's left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it
along as the car skidded obliquely to the other
lane, where it collided with the oncoming vehicle.
- The Caedos were injured. They filed a suit for
recovery of damages against Bernardo and Yu
Khe Thai. The CFI ruled in favor of the Caedos
and held Bernardo and Yu solidarily liable.
ISSUES
WON Yu Khe Thai should be held solidarily liable
as Bernardo’s employer
HELD
No.
- Bernardo had no record of any traffic violation.
No negligence of having employed him maybe
imputed to his master.
- Negligence on the employer’s part, if any, must
be sought in the immediate setting,, that is, in his
failure to detain the driver from pursuing a
course which not only gave him clear notice of
the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it.
- No negligence can be imputed. The car was
running at a reasonable speed. The road was
wide and open. There was no reason for Yu to be
specially alert. He had reason to rely on the skill
of his driver. The time element was such that
there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe
Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the
driver accordingly.
- The law does not require that a person must
possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency
either in the mechanics of driving or in the
observance of traffic rules before he may own a
motor vehicle. The test of his intelligence, within
the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do
that which the evidence of his own senses tells
him he should do in order to avoid the accident.
And as far as perception is concerned, absent a
minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that
appears to be fraught with danger to one
passenger may appear to be entirely safe and
commonplace to another
DISPOSITIVE
prof. casis
Decision modified. Yu Khe Thai is free from
liability
CAEDO v. YU KHE THAI
GR No. L-20392
MAKALINTAL; December 18, 1968
FACTS
- Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his way from
his home in Quezon City to the airport, where his son
Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro.
With them in the car were Mrs. Caedo and three
daughters. Coming from the opposite direction was the
Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo
at the wheel, taking the owner from his Parañaque
home to Wack Wack.
- The two cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds,
considering the condition of the road and the absence
of traffic — the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per
hour, and the Cadillac at approximately 48 to 56
kilometers. Their headlights were mutually noticeable
from a distance. Ahead of the Cadillac, going in the
same direction, was a caretella owned by a certain
Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another horse
by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical
post on the right side and held at the other end by
Pedro's son, Julian Bautista.
- Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the
rig when he saw it in front of him, only eight meters
away. This is the first clear indication of his negligence.
The carretela was provided with two lights, one on each
side, and they should have given him sufficient warning
to take the necessary precautions. And even if he did
not notice the lights, as he claimed later on at the trial,
the carretela should anyway have been visible to him
from afar if he had been careful, as it must have been
in the beam of his headlights for a considerable while.
- In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own
lane from the opposite direction. Bernardo, instead of
slowing down or stopping altogether behind the
carretela until that lane was clear, veered to the left in
order to pass. As he did so the curved end of his car's
right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's
left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it along as the
car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it
collided with the oncoming vehicle. On his part Caedo
had seen the Cadillac on its own lane; he slackened his
speed, judged the distances in relation to the carretela
and concluded that the Cadillac would wait behind.
Bernardo, however, decided to take a gamble — beat
the Mercury to the point where it would be in line with
the carretela, or else squeeze in between them in any
case. It was a risky maneuver either way, and the risk
should have been quite obvious.
torts & damages
- It was already too late to apply the brakes when
Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters in front of
him, and so he had to swerve to the left in spite of the
presence of the oncoming car on the opposite lane. As
it was, the clearance Bernardo gave for his car's right
side was insufficient. Its rear bumper, as already
stated, caught the wheel of the carretela and wrenched
it loose. Caedo, confronted with the unexpected
situation, tried to avoid the collision at the last moment
by going farther to the right, but was unsuccessful. The
photographs taken at the scene show that the right
wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the
road at the moment of impact.
ISSUE
1. WON defendant Rafael Bernardo is liable for the
accident.
2. If YES, WON his employer, defendant Yu Khe Thai, is
solidarily liable with him.
HELD
1. YES. There is no doubt at all that the collision was
directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's negligence and
that he must be held liable for the damages suffered by
the plaintiffs.
2. NO. If the causative factor was the driver's
negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is
likewise held liable if he could have prevented the
mishap by the exercise of due diligence.
- The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not
respondent superior but rather the relationship of
paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the
negligence of the servant, if known to the master and
susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own
negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent
injury or damage.
- The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of
the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily
subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and
inflexible standard of diligence as are professional
drivers.
- The law does not require that a person must possess a
certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the
mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic
rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of
his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is
his omission to do that which the evidence of his own
senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the
accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent
a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that
appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger
may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to
another. Were the law to require a uniform standard of
perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by
A2010 - 86 -
car owners who, by -their very inadequacies, have real
need of drivers' services, would be effectively
proscribed.
- Rafael Bernardo had no record of violation of traffic
laws and regulations. No negligence for having
employed him at all may be imputed to his master.
Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be
sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of
the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver
from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear
notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon
it. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed.
The car was not running at an unreasonable speed. The
road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early
morning. There was no reason for the car owner to be
in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely on
the skill and experience of his driver. The time element
was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for
Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the
driver accordingly.
DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from is modified in
the sense of declaring defendant-appellant Yu Khe Thai
free from liability, and is otherwise affirmed with
respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo, with costs
against the latter.
SABINA EXCONDE vs. DELFIN CAPUNO
and DANTE CAPUNO
G.R. No. L-10068-70 June 29, 1957
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
FACTS
Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of
double homicide through reckless imprudence for the
death of Isidoro Caperiña and Amado Ticzon on March
31, 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
During the trial, Sabina Exconde, as mother of the
deceased Isidoro Caperiña, reserved her right to bring a
separate civil action for damages against the accused.
After trial, Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime
charged and, on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision. Dante Capuno was only fifteen (15) years
old when he committed the crime.
In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the
present action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante
Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of
P2,959.00 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperiña.
Defendants set up the defense that if any one should
be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperiña, he is
Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the
time of the accident, the former was not under the
control, supervision and custody of the latter. This
prof. casis
defense was sustained by the lower court and, as a
consequence, it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay
the damages claimed in the complaint. From this
decision, plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals but
the case was certified to the Supreme Court on the
ground that the appeal only involves questions of law.
It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy
Scouts Organization and a student of the Balintawak
Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San
Pablo and on March 31, 1949 he attended a parade in
honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of
the city school's supervisor. From the school Dante,
with other students, boarded a jeep and when the same
started to run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it
while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone
far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its
passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidoro Caperiña, died
as a consequence. It further appears that Delfin
Capuno, father of Dante, was not with his son at the
time of the accident, nor did he know that his son was
going to attend a parade. He only came to know it
when his son told him after the accident that he
attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher.
Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable
for the damages in question jointly and severally with
his son Dante because at the time the latter committed
the negligent act which resulted in the death of the
victim, he was a minor and was then living with his
father, and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed,
the civil liability of the father is evident. And so, plaintiff
contends, the lower court erred in relieving the father
from liability.
ISSUE
Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly
liable, jointly and severally with his son Dante, for
damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña
caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno.
RULING
YES.12
12
The case involves an interpretation of Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil
Code, paragraph 1 and 5, (school’s liability versus parental liability) which
provides:
"ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is
enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom another is responsible.
The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable
for any damages caused by the minor children who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages
caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody."
torts & damages
RATIO
Parents shall be liable for the tortious conduct of their
minor children living with them although at the time of
the tort, the children were under the direct control or
supervision of an academic institution. (THIS IS A
LANDMARK DOCTRINE, WHICH WAS LATER MODIFIED
BY J CRUZ IN AMADORA VS. COURT OF APPEALS)
REASONING
The provision “Teachers or directors of arts and
trades are liable for any damages caused by their
pupils or apprentices while they are under their
custody", only applies to an institution of arts and
trades and not to any academic educational institution.
Dante Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak
Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular
activity, he attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose
Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor.
And it was in connection with that parade that Dante
boarded a jeep with some companions and while
driving it, the accident occurred. In the circumstances,
it is clear that neither the head of that school, nor the
city school's supervisor, could be held liable for the
negligent act of Dante because he was not then a
student of an institution of arts and trades as provided
for by law.
The civil liability which the law impose upon the father,
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for
any damages that may be caused by the minor children
who live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary
consequence of the parental authority they exercise
over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of
supporting them, keeping them in their company,
educating them and instructing them in proportion to
their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the
"right to correct and punish them in moderation"
(Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only
way by which they can relieve themselves of this
liability is if they prove that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage (Article 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil
Code). This defendants failed to prove.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified in
the sense that defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante
Capuno shall pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, the
sum of P2,959.00 as damages, and the costs of action.
REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:
A2010 - 87 -
I believe we should affirm the judgment relieving
the father of liability. I can see no sound reason for
limiting Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code to teachers of
arts and trades and not to academic ones. What
substantial difference is there between them in so far
as concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over
their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an
academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching
that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of
third persons, so long as they are in a position to
exercise authority and supervision over the pupil. In my
opinion, in the phrase "teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades" used in Art. 1903 of
the old Civil Code, the words "arts and trades" does not
qualify "teachers" but only "heads of establishments".
The phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent
terms "preceptores y artesanos" used in the Italian and
French Civil Codes.
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the
presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa
in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are
supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their
authority, it would seem clear that where the parent
places the child under the effective authority of the
teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the
one answerable for the torts committed while under his
custody, for the very reason that the parent is not
supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school
nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher
while the child is under instruction. And if there is no
authority, there can be no responsibility.
I submit that the father should not be held liable for a
tort that he was in no way able to prevent, and which
he had every right to assume the school authorities
would avoid. Having proved that he entrusted his child
to the custody of school authorities that were
competent to exercise vigilance over him, the father
has rebutted the presumption of Art. 1903 and the
burden of proof shifted to the claimant to show actual
negligence on the part of the parent in order to render
him liable.
Padilla and Reyes, A., JJ., concur.
SALEN V. BALCE
FUELLAS V. CADANO
Nature: Appeal from the Decision of the Trial Court
making defendant therein, now appellant Agapito
Fuellas, the father of the minor who caused the injuries
prof. casis
to Pepito Cadano, also a minor, liable under Art. 2180
of the new Civil Code for damages.
Facts: Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of
defendant-appellant Agapito Fuellas, were both 13
years old, on September 16, 1954. They were
classmates at St. Mary's High School, Dansalan City.
They had a quarrel that lead to Pepito’s injury, his right
arm was broken after Rico pushed him on the ground.
It is contended that in the decision of the
Court of Appeals, the petitioner-appellant was ordered
to pay damages for the deliberate injury caused by his
son; that the said court held the petitioner liable
pursuant to par. 2 of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, in
connection with Art. 2176 of the same Code; that
according to the last article, the act of the minor must
be one wherein "fault or negligence" is present; and
that there being no fault or negligence on the part of
petitioner-appellant's minor son, but deliberate intent,
the above mentioned articles are not applicable, for the
existence of deliberate intent in the commission of an
act negatives the presence of fault or negligence in its
commission. Appellant, therefore, submits that the
appellate Court erred in holding him liable for damages
for the deliberate criminal act of his minor son.
Issue: WON the father is liable civilly for the criminal
act of his son?
Held: Yes. In an earlier case (Exconde vs. Capuno, et
al., G.R. No. L-10132, prom. June 29, 1957), holding the
defendants jointly and severally liable with his minor
son Dante for damages, arising from the criminal act
committed by the latter, this tribunal gave the following
reasons for the rule: —
The civil liability which the law imposes
upon the father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, for any
damages that may be caused by the
minor children who live with them, is
obvious. This is a necessary consequence
of the parental authority they exercise
over them which imposes upon the
parents the "duty of supporting them,
keeping them in their company,
educating them in proportion to their
means", while on the other hand, gives
them the "right to correct and punish
them in moderation" (Arts. 134 and 135,
Spanish Civil Code). The only way by
which they can relieve themselves of this
liability is if they prove that they
exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage
(Art. 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil
Code). This, defendants failed to prove.
torts & damages
In another case, Salen and Salbanera vs. Jose Balce, the
defendant Balce was the father of a minor Gumersindo
Balce, below 18 years of age who was living with him.
Gumersindo was found guilty of homicide for having
killed Carlos Salen, minor son of plaintiffs. The trial
court rendered judgment dismissing the case, stating
that the civil liability of the minor son of defendant
arising from his criminal liability must be determined
under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and not
under Art. 2180 of the new Civil Code. In reversing the
decision, this tribunal held: —
It is true that under Art. 101 of the Revised
Penal Code, a father is made civilly liable for
the acts committed by his son only if the latter
is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of
age, or over 9 but under 15 years of age, who
acts without discernment, unless it appears
that there is no fault or negligence on his part.
This is because a son who commits the act
under any of those conditions is by law
exempt from criminal liability (Article 12,
subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, Revised Penal Code).
The idea is not to leave the act entirely
unpunished but to attach certain civil liability
to the person who has the delinquent minor
under his legal authority or control. But a
minor over 15 who acts with discernment is
not exempt from criminal liability, for which
reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary
liability of his parents should he stand
convicted. In that case, resort should be had to
the general law which is our Civil Code.
The particular law that governs this case
is Article 2180, the pertinent portion of
which provides: "The father and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother,
are responsible for damages caused by
the minor children who live in their
company." To hold that this provision
does not apply to the instant case
because it only covers obligations which
arise from quasi-delicts and not
obligations which arise from criminal
offenses, would result in the absurdity
that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the father or
mother may stand subsidiarily liable for
the damage caused by his or her son, no
liability would attach if the damage is
caused with criminal intent. Verily, the
void apparently exists in the Revised
Penal Code is subserved by this
particular provision of our Civil Code, as
may be gleaned from some recent
A2010 - 88 -
decisions of this Court which cover equal
or identical cases.
Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of
Appeals on the basis of the evidence submitted therein
by both parties, independently of the criminal case. And
responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176
upon which the action in the present case was
instituted, is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from fault of negligence under the Penal
Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the reasons
behind the law as heretofore stated, any discussion as
to the minor's criminal responsibility is of no moment.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the petition is dismissed, the decision
appealed from is affirmed
GUTIERREZ VS GUTIERREZ
MALCOLM; September 23, 1931
Nature:
an action brought by the plaintiff in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against the five defendants, to
recover damages in the amount of P10,000, for
physical injuries suffered as a result of an automobile
accident.
Facts:
A passenger truck and an automobile of private
ownership collided while attempting to pass each other
on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road in the
municipality of Las Piñas, Province of Rizal. The truck
was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco, and was
owned by Saturnino Cortez. The automobile was being
operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18 years of age,
and was owned by Bonifacio's father and mother, Mr.
and Mrs. Manuel Gutierrez. At the time of the collision,
the father was not in the car, but the mother, together
will several other members of the Gutierrez family,
seven in all, were accommodated therein. Narcisso
Gutierrez was a passenger of the bus. He had a
fracture on his right leg.
It was conceded that the collision was caused
by negligence pure and simple. But, Narcisso Gutierrez
blames both the bus and the car while the truck blames
the car and the car in turn blames the truck.
the youth Bonifacio was in incompetent
chauffeur, that he was driving at an excessive rate of
speed, and that, on approaching the bridge and the
truck, he lost his head and so contributed by his
negligence to the accident. The guaranty given by the
father at the time the son was granted a license to
operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for
the acts of his son. Based on these facts, pursuant to
the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the
prof. casis
father alone and not the minor or the mother, would be
liable for the damages caused by the minor.
Issue:
1. WON the father of Bonifacio (car) is liable.
2. WON the owner of the truck is liable.
Held:
1. Yes. In the United States, it is uniformly held
that the head of a house, the owner of an
automobile, who maintains it for the general
use of his family is liable for its negligent
operation by one of his children, whom he
designates or permits to run it, where the car
is occupied and being used at the time of the
injury for the pleasure of other members of the
owner's family than the child driving it. The
theory of the law is that the running of the
machine by a child to carry other members of
the family is within the scope of the owner's
business, so that he is liable for the negligence
of the child because of the relationship of
master and servant.
2. Yes. The liability of Saturnino Cortez, the
owner of the truck, and of his chauffeur
Abelardo Velasco rests on a different basis,
namely, that of contract. The reason for this
conclusion reaches to the findings of the trial
court concerning the position of the truck on
the bridge, the speed in operating the
machine, and the lack of care employed by the
chauffeur. In its broader aspects, the case is
one of two drivers approaching a narrow
bridge from opposite directions, with neither
being willing to slow up and give the right of
way to the other, with the inevitable result of a
collision and an accident
Disposition
In consonance with the foregoing rulings, the judgment
appealed from will be modified, and the plaintiff will
have judgment in his favor against the defendants
Manuel Gutierrez, Abelardo Velasco, and Saturnino
Cortez, jointly and severally, for the sum of P5,000, and
the costs of both instances.
RODRIGUEZ-LUNA V IAC (DELA ROSA)
135 SCRA 242
ABAD SANTOS; February 28, 1985
NATURE: Petition to review a decision of CA
FACTS: Roberto Luna, a businessman, was killed in a
vehicular collision (between Luna, driving a gokart, and
torts & damages
Luis dela Rosa, 13 years old, driving a Toyota car
without a license) at a gokart practice area.
Heirs of Luna brought a suit for damages against Luis
and his father, which the CFI ruled in favor of the
Lunas, awarding P1,650,000 as unearned net earnings
of Luna, P12,000 compensatory damages, and P50,000
for loss of his companionship (come on!!), with legal
interest from date of the decision, and attorney’s fees
of P50,000 (no interest mentioned). (Note: father and
son solidarily liable for damages.)
The Dela Rosas appealed in the CA, which affirmed in
toto the RTC. In a MFR filed by the Dela Rosas, the CA
modified the decision, this time reducing the unearned
income to P450,000. Both parties filed separate
petitions for review in the SC.
Petition of the Dela Rosas was denied for lack of merit.
The instant petition is the one filed by Lunas,
contending that the CA erred in reducing the award for
unearned income, and that the award for atty’s fees
should include legal interest.
Pending the decision, the SC came out with a resolution
ordering the Dela Rosas, in the interest of justice (since
the death took place in 1970, and 15 years after the
process of litigation is still not over), to pay the Lunas
P450,000 for unearned net earnings, P12,000
compensatory damages, P50,000 for loss of
companionship, all with legal interest, and atty’s fees of
P50,000, within 30 days.
The Dela Rosas failed to pay the amounts, saying that
they had no cash money. The writ of execution
produced only a nominal amount. In the meantime, Luis
is already of age, married, with 2 kids, and living in
Spain but only causally employed (“His compensation is
hardly enough to support his family. He has no assets
of his own as yet”).
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA erred in reducing the unearned income
2. WON the award for atty’s fees should have legal
interest
HELD:
1. YES
Ratio: The reduction of the award of net unearned
earnings had no basis, thus is void.
Reasoning: the RTC based its computation of the net
unearned earnings on 2 factors: life expectancy of the
deceased of another 30 years, and an annual net
income of P55,000 (P75,000 gross income less P20,000
personal expenses).
In coming out with the life expectancy, RTC considered
the age and health of the deceased. However, the CA
modified this by factoring in the “engagement of Luna
in car racing,” thus lowering the life expectancy to only
10 years.
A2010 - 89 -
WRT to the gross income, RTC considered the various
positions the deceased held at the time of his death,
and the trend of his earnings over the span of his last
few years, thus coming up with a potential gross
income of P75,000. However, the CA increased the
annual personal expenses to P30,000, due to the
escalating gasoline expenses, thus lowering the net
annual unearned income to P45,000.
CA erred in ruling that the engagement with car racing
reduced the life expectancy. There is nothing on record
that supports the claim that the car racing was a
dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life
expectancy. “That Luna was engaged in go-kart racing
is the correct statement but then go-kart racing cannot
be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are
extremely low slung, low powered vehicles, only
slightly larger than foot-pedaled four wheeled
conveyances. It was error on the part of the CA to have
disturbed the determination of the RTC which it had
previously affirmed.”
Also, it was an error to increase the expenses without
increasing the gross income. “It stands to reason that if
his annual personal expenses should increase because
of the ‘escalating price of gas which is a key
expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social standing’ [a
statement which lacks complete basis], it would not be
unreasonable to suppose that his income would also
increase considering the manifold sources thereof”
2. YES
Ratio: The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept
of damages in a quasi-delict case and under the
circumstances, interest as part thereof may be
adjudicated at the discretion of the court.
(The atty’s fees should accrue interest from the date of
filing of the compliant.)
Obiter:
The Dela Rosas invoke the ruling in Elcano v Hilll, where
the court held that A2180 applied to Atty. Hill
nothwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of his
son, but since the son had attained majority, as a
matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill became
merely subsidiarily to that of his son. The Dela Rosas
now invoke that the father should also be held only
subsidiarily.
To this contention, the court is “unwilling to apply
equity instead of strict law because to do so will not
serve the ends of justice. Luis is abroad and beyond the
reach of Philippine Courts. Also, he has no property in
the Phils or elsewhere.”
Disposition: resolution of CA SET ASIDE, reinstating
the earlier decision with slight modification regarding
the award of atty’s fees.
prof. casis
LIBI V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT (SPS GOTIONG)
214 SCRA 16
REGALADO; September 18,1992
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court.
FACTS
- respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie
Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable incident
which took place and from which she died on January
14,1979, was an 18-year old first year commerce
student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while
petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a
minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his
aforesaid parents, and who also died in the same event
on the same date.
- More than 2 years before their deaths, Julie Ann
Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until
December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up with Wendell
after she found him to be sadistic and irresponsible.
- January, 1979 - Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with
demands for reconciliation but the Julie refused,
prompting him to resort to threats against her. In order
to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best
friend, Malou Alfonso
- January 14,1979 - Julie and Wendell died from a single
gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm licensed
under Cresencio Libi, father of Wendell
- both set of parents came up with versions of the story
Gotiongs:
> Wendell caused her death by shooting her and
thereafter turning the gun on himself to commit suicide
Libis:
> an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have
displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a
narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics
Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendell's death and
then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and
thereby avoid identification
- CFI Cebu: Gotiongs filed civil case against the
parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the
latter's vicarious liability under A2180 CC. CFI
dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of the
evidence.
- IAC: CFI decision set aside and found Libis
subsidiarily liable
ISSUE
WON A2180 CC is applicable in making Libi’s liable for
vicarious liability
torts & damages
HELD
YES
Ratio The diligence of a good father of a family
required by law in a parent and child relationship
consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and
supervision of the child. Had the defendants-appellees
been diligent in supervising the activities of their son,
Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his reach, they
could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann
Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are liable under A2180
CC.
Reasoning
- undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the
absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound
at the point of entry of the bullet. It should be
emphasized, however, that this is not the only
circumstance to be taken into account in the
determination of whether it was suicide or not as the
body was cleaned already in the funeral parlor
- Amelita Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her
husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a
safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom.
Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety
deposit box and Amelita's key is always in her bag, all
of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never
seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun. She
admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun
was no longer in the safety deposit box. We,
accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts that
petitioner spouses had really been exercising the
diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking
the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten hold
thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box
was negligently left lying around or he had free access
to the bag of his mother where the other key was.
- A2180': The subsidiary liability of parents for
damages caused by their minor children imposed by
A2180 CC covers obligations wising from both quasi-
delicts and criminal offenses.'
- BUT Liability is not subsidiary BUT primary
> if the liability of the parents for crimes and QDs of
their minor children is subsidiary, they they can neither
invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense
that they acted with the diligence of a good father of
the family to prevent damages. But if the liability id
direct and primary, the diligence would constitute a
valid substantial defense. HENCE, LIABILITY OF
PARENTS FOR QDS OF THEIR MINOR KIDS AS
CONTEMPLATED IN A2180 ID PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY
> applying A2194 (solidary liability of joint tortfeasors)
the parent is also solidarily liable with the child. THE
LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR FELONIES IS LIKEWISE
PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY. A101 RPC SAYS SO
> RULES:
A2010 - 90 -
+ for civil liability from crimes committed by minors
under the legal authority and control or who live in the
company of the parents: PRIMARY
= premised on A101 RPC fot damages ex delicto by
kids 9 or under or 9-15 but without discernment
= premised on A2180 CC for kids 9-15 with
discernment or 15-21 (now 18)
+ liability effected against father or mother? BOTH
PARENTS AND THOSE WHO EXERCISE PARENTAL
AUHTORITY OVER THE MINOR
= youth welfare code
= FC: responsibility of parents
+ for civil liability arising from QDs committed by
minors: same rules in A2180 and A2182
Disposition Instant petition is DENIED and the
assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED
TAMARGO vs CA (Rubio, Bundoc)
209 SCRA 518
Feliciano, J; 1992
NATURE
Appeal for review of CA decision
FACTS
- On October 20, 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then aged
ten, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing
injuries which resulted in her death. He was charged
with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide but was
acquitted and exempted from criminal liability ob the
ground that he had acted without discernment. The
adopting and natural parents of Jennifer filed a civil
complaint for damages against the parents of Bundoc.
- The parents of Adelberto claimed that they are not the
indispensable party in the action as their son adopted
by the spouses Rapisura on November 18, 1982 via an
adoption decree granted by the CFI of Ilocos Sur. The
trial Court agreed with the respondents and dismissed
the complaint.
- The case contained procedural questions which were
raised in the appeal. The SC however decided to hear
the appeal based on substantial justice.
ISSUE
- WON the spouses Bundoc were indispensable party to
the tort action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
HELD-
- Yes. The Court held that parental authority did not
retroactively transfer to and vested in the adopting
prof. casis
parents at the time the shooting incident occurred. The
adopting parents had no actual or physical custody of
Adelberto at the time of the incident as they were then
in the US were they live. To do so and hold them liable
for the tortious act when be unfair and unconscionable.
Reasoning-
- The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on
quasi-delict against him under Article 2176. However,
because of his minority, the provision of Article 2180
would be applicable. Article 2180 reads “ the obligation
imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible… The father and,
incase of his death or incapacity, the mother are
responsible for the damages caused by the children
who live in their company… The responsibility treated
of in this Article shall cease when the person herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage.
- The principle of parental liability is designated as
vicarious liability or the doctrine of imputed liability
under the Anglo-American tort law. Thus, under this
doctrine, a person is not only liable for torts committed
by him also torts committed by others with whom he
has a certain relationship and for whom he is
responsibility. Thus parental liability is made a natural
or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities
of the parents which include the instructing, controlling,
and disciplining of the child. The presumption under law
is that when a child under their care commits a
tortuous act the parents were negligent in the
performance of these duties and responsibilities. As
stated, sufficient proof can be presented to overcome
this presumption.
Disposition –
Petition granted. Decision set aside.
MERCADO v. COURT OF APPEALS AND
QUISUMBING
L-14342
LABRADOR; May 30, 1960
NATURE
This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of
Appeals
FACTS
- Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. is the son of
his co-plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L.
Quisumbing, while Augusto Mercado is the son of
defendant-appellee Ciriaco L. Mercado, Manuel
torts & damages
Quisumbing, Jr. and Augusto Mercado were classmates
in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon, Quezon City.
- A "pitogo", which figures prominently in this case,
may be described as an empty nutshell used by
children as a piggy bank. On February 22, 1956,
Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr.
quarrelled over a "pitogo". As a result, Augusto
wounded Manuel, Jr. on the right cheek with a piece of
razor.
ISSUES
1. WON the teacher or head of the school should be
held responsible instead of the of the father since the
incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent
occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time)
2. WON the moral damages fixed at P2,000 are
excessive.
HELD
1. NO. The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, upon which petitioner rests his claim that the
school where his son was studying should be made
liable, is as follows:
ART. 2180. . . .
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of
arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody.
- It would be seem that the clause "so long as they
remain in their custody," contemplates a situation
where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such
that the control, direction and influence on the pupil
supersedes those of the parents. In these
circumstances the control or influence over the conduct
and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and
mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility
for the torts of the pupil.
- Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar;
the pupils appear to go to school during school hours
and go back to their homes with their parents after
school is over. The situation contemplated in the last
paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply, nor does
paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father or
mother responsible for the damages caused by their
minor children.
2. YES. It is possible that the Court of Appeals may
have considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or
guilty, of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries, within
the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219. Even if we
assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a
quasi-delict when it imposed the moral damages, yet
the facts found by said court indicate that Augusto's
resentment, which motivated the assault, was
A2010 - 91 -
occasioned by the fact that Manuel, Jr. had tried to
intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to
get "his pitogo from Renato." It is, therefore, apparent
that the proximate cause of the injury caused to
Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own fault or negligence
for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get
the pitogo from another boy. (Art. 2179, Civil Code.)
After considering all the facts as found by the Court of
Appeals, we find that none of the cases mentioned in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which authorizes the
grant of moral damages, was shown to have existed.
Consequently, the grant of moral damages is not
justified.
PALISOC VS. BRILLANTES
41 SCRA 548
TEEHANKEE; October 4, 1971
NATURE
An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law
from a decision of the CFI Manila.
FACTS
- Palisoc spouses as parents of their 16-year old son,
Dominador Palisoc, and a student in automotive
mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute filed the
action below for damages arising from the death of
their son at the hands of a fellow student, defendant
Virgilio L. Daffon, at the laboratory room of the said
Institute.
- the deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant
Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates, and one afternoon,
they, together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz
were in the laboratory room located on the ground
floor. At that time the classes were in recess. Desiderio
Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a machine
while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at
them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc
was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark
Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in
retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face,
which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach.
Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but
Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until
Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him
to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted.
First aid was administered to him but he was not
revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital. He
never regained consciousness; finally he died.
- Defendants were: Antonio C. Brillantes, at the time
when the incident occurred was a member of the Board
of Directors of the institute; Teodosio Valenton, the
president thereof; Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of
prof. casis
the class to which the deceased belonged; and Virgilio
L. Daffon, a fellow student of the deceased.
- At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a
single proprietorship, but lately, it was duly
incorporated.
- the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the
quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
- The trial court, however, absolved from liability the
three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical
Institute, in this wise:
“In the opinion of the Court, this article(art.2180) of the
Code is not applicable to the case at bar, since this
contemplates the situation where the control or
influence of the teachers and heads of school
establishments over the conduct and actions by the
pupil supersedes those of the parents...The clause "so
long as they remain in their custody" contemplated a
situation where the pupil lives and boards with the
teacher, such that the control or influence on the pupil
supersedes those of the parents...There is no evidence
that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his
teacher or the other defendant officials of the school.”
ISSUE
WON the school officials are jointly and severally liable
as tortfeasors with Daffon.
HELD
a. YES (head and teacher of the Manila Technical
Institute, Valenton and Quibulue, respectively)
Ratio The rationale of such liability of school heads and
teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and
students, so long as they remain in their custody, is
that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils
and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to
"exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of
the child." In the law of torts, the governing principle is
that the protective custody of the school heads and
teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the
parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well
as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision
of the students' activities during the whole time that
they are at attendance in the school, including recess
time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to
protect the students in their custody from dangers and
hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including
injuries that some student themselves may inflict
willfully or through negligence on their fellow students.
Reasoning
- The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly
on the Court's dictum in Mercado vs. Court of Appeals,
that "(I)t would seem that the clause "so long as they
remain in their custody," contemplates a situation
where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such
that the control, direction and influence. It is true that
torts & damages
under the law abovequoted, teachers or directors of
arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by
their pupils or apprentices while they are under their
custody, but this provision only applies to an institution
of arts and trades and not to any academic educational
institution"
- phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the
students) remain in their custody" means the
protective and supervisory custody that the school and
its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and
students for as long as they are at attendance in the
school, including recess time. There is nothing in the
law that requires that for such liability to attach the
pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live
and board in the school, as erroneously held by the
lower court, and the dicta in Mercado on which it relied,
must now be deemed to have been set aside by the
present decision.
- At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they
relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with
the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by
"(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage." In the light of
the factual findings of the lower court's decision, said
defendants failed to prove such exemption from
liability.
b. NO (Brillantes as a mere member of the school's
board of directors and the school) itself cannot be held
similarly liable, since it has not been properly
impleaded as party defendant
- the school had been incorporated since and therefore
the school itself, as thus incorporated, should have
been brought in as party defendant.
DISPOSITION
The judgment appealed from is modified so as to
provide as follows: .
1. Sentencing the Daffon, Valenton and Quibulue jointly
and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased
Dominador Palisoc (a) P12,000.00 for the death of
Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and
compensatory expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral,
damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of earning power and
(e) P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs of this
action in both instances; 2. absolving defendant
Antonio C. Brillantes from the complaint; and 3.
dismissing defendants' counterclaims. .
REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring:
-I would like to clarify that the argument of the
dissenting opinion of the effect that the responsibility of
teachers and school officers under Articles 2180 should
be limited to pupils who are minors is not in accord with
the plain text of the law.
A2010 - 92 -
- Examination of the article shows that where the
responsibility prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts
during minority, the article expressly so provides, as in
the case of the parents and of the guardians. It is
natural to expect that if the law had intended to
similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the other
categories of persons enumerated in the article, it
would have expressly so stated. The fact that it has not
done so indicates an intent that the liability be not
restricted to the case of persons under age. Further, it
is not without significance that
- finally, that while in the case of parents and
guardians, their authority and supervision over the
children and wards end by law upon the latter reaching
majority age, the authority and custodial supervision
over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter.
MAKALINTAL, J., dissenting:
- I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down
by this Court in Mercado v. Court of Appeals. I think it is
highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results,
considering the size of the enrollment in many of our
educational institutions, academic and non-academic,
as well as the temper, attitudes and often destructive
activism of the students, to hold their teachers and/or
the administrative heads of the schools directly liable
for torts committed by them.
- It would demand responsibility without commensurate
authority, rendering teachers and school heads open to
damage suits for causes beyond their power to control.
- one other factor constrains me to dissent. The opinion
of the majority states: "Here, the parents of the student
at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since
Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic
incident." Note that for parental responsibility to arise
the children must be minors who live in their
company...it stands to reason that (1) the clause "so
long as they remain in their custody" as used in
reference to teachers and school heads should be
equated with the phrase "who live in their company" as
used in reference to parents; and (2) that just as
parents are not responsible for damages caused by
their children who are no longer minors, so should
teachers and school heads be exempt from liability for
the tortious acts of their students in the same age
category.
AMADORA VS CA (COLLEGIO DE SAN
JOSE-RECOLLETOS)
160 SCRA 315
CRUZ; April 15, 1988
Facts:
prof. casis
It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about to
graduate at the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes. Alfredo
went to the school to submit his “Report in Physic”.
While they were in the auditorium of their school,
hewas shot to death by his classmate Pablito Daffon.
ISSUE:
WON Art 2180 is applicable.
Held:
Yes. Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools, academic or
non-academic. Teachers are liable for acts of their
student except where the school is technical in nature
(arts and trade establishment) in which case the head
thereof shall be answerable.
“There is really no substantial difference distinction
between the academic and non-academic schools in so
far as torts committed by their students are concerned.
The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over
the student under their control and supervision,
whatever the nature of the school where he is
teaching”. “x x x x The distinction no longer obtains at
present. x x x “
The student is in the custody of the school authorities
as long as he is under the control and influence of the
school and within its premises, whether the semester
has not ended, or has ended or has not yet begun. The
term “custody” signifies that the student is within the
control and influence of the school authorities. The
teacher in charge is the one designated by the dean,
principal, or other administrative superior to exercise
supervision over the pupils or students in the specific
classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not
necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher is
physically present and in a position to prevent it.
Thus, for injuries caused by the student, the teacher
and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort
was committed within the premises of the school at any
time when its authority could be validly exercised over
him.
In any event, the school may be held to answer for the
acts of its teacher or the head thereof under the
general principle of respondent superior, but it may
exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had
exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias. Such
defense they had taken necessary precautions to
prevent the injury complained of and thus be
exonerated from liability imposed by Art 2180.
Basis of teacher’s vicarious liability is, as such, they
acting in Loco Parentis (in place of parents). However
torts & damages
teachers are not expected to have the same measure
of responsibility as that imposed on parent for their
influence over the child is not equal in degree. x x x
The parent can instill more lasting discipline more
lasting disciple on the child than the teacher and so
should be held to a greater accountability than the
teacher or the head for the tort committed by the child.
As the teacher was not shown to have been negligent
nor the school remised in the discharged of their duties,
they were exonerated of liability.
(Note – the court view on increasing students activism
likely causing violence resulting to injuries, in or out of
the school premises – J. Guttierez, Jr concurringly said
many student x x x view some teachers as part of the
bourgeois and or reactionary group whose advice on
behavior deportment and other non-academic matters
is not only resented but actively rejected. It seems
most unfair to hold teacher liable on a presumption
juris tantum of negligence for acts of students even
under circumstances where strictly speaking there
could be no in loco parentis relationship.
The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this case has
outlived its purpose. The court cannot make law, it can
only apply the law with its imperfections. However the
court can suggest that such a law should be amended
or repealed.
PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY)
160 SCRA 785
PARAS; April 25, 1988
NATURE
Petition for certiorari under RA5440 praying that
judgment be rendered setting aside the questioned
order dismissing the complaint as against the
respondent school and denying the reconsideration of
the questioned order of dismissal.
FACTS
- A group of students walking inside Araneta University
were accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim
students led by Abdul Karin Madidis alias “Teng”.
Petitioner (Reynaldo) was subsequently stabbed by
Teng requiring him to be hospitalized and to undergo
surgery.
- Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Teng
and Arante University based on Art 2190 CC
- Respondent school filed a MTD claiming that the
provision only applies to vocational schools and not to
academic institutions. They also claim that the civil
liability in this case arose from a crime, which they did
A2010 - 93 -
not commit. Since it was a civil case, respondent school
claims that a demand should have been made by the
plaintiff rendering it premature to bring an action for
damages against respondent school. MTD was granted
by the CA.
- Petitioner mover to reconsider the Order of Dismissal.
Motion was denied due to insufficient justification to
disturb ruling.
ISSUE
WON the Art 2180 CC13 applies to academic institutions
HELD
It is unnecessary to answer the issue. What the
petitioner wants to know is WON the school or the
university itself is liable. The answer is no since the
provision speaks of “teachers or heads”
Dispositive
WHEREFORE, this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
YLARDE vs. AQUINO
GANCAYCO; 1988 July 29
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of
the Gabaldon Primary School and private respondent
Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. At that time, the
school was littered with several concrete blocks which
were remnants of the old school shop that was
destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the huge
stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren,
another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez stated
burying them all by himself.
Deciding to help his colleague, private respondent
Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils,
aged ten to eleven. Being their teacher-in-charge, he
ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in
order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried.
The work was left unfinished. The following day, also
after classes, private respondent Aquino called four of
the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging.
These four pupils ---- Reynaldo Alonso, Fransico
Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde, dug until
the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters
deep. At this point, private respondent Aquino alone
13
"Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so
long as they remain in their custody."
prof. casis
continued digging while the pupils remained inside the
pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about
by the digging.
When the depth was right enough to accommodate the
concrete block, private respondent Aquino and his four
pupils got out of the hole. Then, said private
respondent left the children to level the loose soil
around the open hole while he went to see Banez who
was about thirty meters away. Private respondent
wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school
workroom where he could get some rope. Before
leaving, private respondent Aquino allegedly told the
children "not to touch the stone."
A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left,
three of the four kids, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde,
playfully jumped into the pit. Then, without any warning
at all, the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the
concrete block causing it to slide down towards the
opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble
out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for
Ylarde, the concrete block caught him before he could
get out, pinning him to the wall in a standing position.
As a result thereof, Ylarde sustained injuries and died
three (3) days later.
Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for
damages against both private respondents Aquino and
Soriano. The lower court dismissed the complaint on
the following grounds: (1) that the digging done by the
pupils is in line with their course called Work Education;
(2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very
cautious person; and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was
due to his own reckless imprudence.
ISSUE
WON whether or not under Article 2176 and Article
2180 of the Civil Code, both private respondents can be
held liable for damages.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter."
On the other hand, the applicable provision of Article
2180 states:
"Art. 2180. . . .
torts & damages
xxx xxx xxx
"Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody."
HELD
Only Aquino, the teacher, is liable.
Ratio: As regards the principal, We hold that he
cannot be made responsible for the death of the child
Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and
not a school of arts and trades.
Reasoning:
This is in line with the Court’s ruling in Amadora vs.
Court of Appeals, wherein this Court thoroughly
discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an
academic school who should be answerable for torts
committed by their students. This Court went on to say
that in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of
the school who can be held liable.
Ratio: Private respondent Aquino can be held liable
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-
charge of the children for being negligent in his
supervision over them and his failure to take the
necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their
persons.
Reasoning:
(1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual
laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to
eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton
concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous
task;
(2) required the children to remain inside the pit even
after they had finished digging, knowing that the huge
block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or
kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the
perilous area;
(3) ordered them to level the soil around the
excavation when it was so apparent that the huge
stone was at the brink of falling;
(4) went to a place where he would not be able to
check on the children's safety; and (5) left the children
close to the excavation, an obviously attractive
nuisance.
(6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent, it is
evident that the lower court did not consider his age
and maturity. This should not be the case. The degree
of care required to be exercised must vary with the
capacity of the person endangered to care for himself.
A minor should not be held to the same degree of care
as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according
to the average conduct of persons of his age and
experience. The standard of conduct to which a child
A2010 - 94 -
must conform for his own protection is that degree of
care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age,
capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under
the same or similar circumstances. Bearing this in
mind, We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless
imprudence.
DISPOSITION
Granted.
SALVOSA v. IAC (CASTRO)
166 SCRA 274
PADILLA, J.: October 5, 1988
FACTS
Jimmy Abon, a commerce student of Baguio Colleges
Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed armorer of the
BCF ROTC (under the control of AFP) was convicted of
the crime of Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro, a
student of the University of Baguio on 3 March 1977, at
around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF. BCF is
both an academic and arts and trade Union and the
ROTC Unit was under the control of AFP.
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for
damages, impleading Jimmy B. Abon, Roberto C. Ungos
(ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and
Chairman of the Board of BCF), Jesus Salvosa
(Executive Vice President of BCF), Libertad D. Quetolio
(Dean of the College of Education and Executive
Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation
Inc. as party defendants.
After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a decision, (1)
sentencing defendants Jimmy B. Abon, Benjamin
Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc., jointly
and severally, to pay private respondents, as heirs of
Napoleon Castro; (2) absolving the other defendants;
and (3) dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for
lack of merit.
ISSUE
WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy
B. Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B.
Abon.
HELD
NO. Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been
"at attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF,
when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore,
petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be
held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages
resulting from his acts.
Ratio:
prof. casis
Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the
Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades are hable for "damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody." The rationale of such liability
is that so long as the student remains in the custody of
a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco
parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to
exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the
[student]." Likewise, "the phrase used in [Art. 2180 —
'so long as (the students) remain in their custody
means the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over the
pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time."
Reasoning:
a. The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by the
CA. According to the CA, while it is true that Abon was
not attending any class or school function at the time
of the shooting incident, which was at about 8 o'clock in
the evening; but considering that Abon was employed
as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC
unit, he must have been attending night classes and
therefore that hour in the evening was just about
dismissal time for him or soon thereafter. The time
interval is safely within the "recess time" that the trial
court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case,
supra. In line with the case of Palisoc, 17 a student not
"at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess"
thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the
phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a
situation of temporary adjournment of school activities
where the student still remains within call of his mentor
and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or
the area within which the school activity is conducted.
Recess by its nature does not include dismissal.
Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the
premises of a school without more does not constitute
"attending school" or being in the "protective and
supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in
the law.
b. Jimmy B. Abon was supposed to be working in the
armory with definite instructions from his superior, the
ROTC Commandant, when he shot Napoleon Castro.
ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v
CA(Castillo/Cadiz)
194 SCRA 340
Paras, J.: Feb. 25, 1991
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the CA
FACTS
torts & damages
-Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student at St.
Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan
Beach, Quezon. His parents didn’t allow him to go due
to short notice but directed him to bring food to the
teachers for the picnic and go straight home. However,
he was persuaded by his teachers to go and later
drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher.
-his parents filed a complaint against St. Francis HS,
represented by its principal, Illumin, and several
teachers for damages incurred from the death of their
son, contending that it occurred due to petitioners’
failure to exercise proper diligence of a good father of
the family. The TC found against the teachers as they
had failed to exercise diligence by not testing the
waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to
swim. Also, the male teachers who were to watch over
the kids were not even in the area as they went off
drinking. The TC dismissed the case against the
principal and the teacher Cadorna as the former had
not consented to the picnic which was not school
sanctioned, and as the latter had her own class to
supervise then and was not actually invited.
-Both parties appealed to the CA. On the issue of the
liability of St. Francis HS and the Illumin, the CA held
that both are liable under Article 2176 taken together
with the 1st, 4th, and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180.
They cannot escape liability simply because it wasn’t
an “extra-curricular activity of the HS”. From the
evidence, it was shown that the principal had known of
the picnic from its planning stage and merely
acquiesced to the holding of the event. As such, under
Article 2180, both are jointly and severally liable w/ the
teachers for the damages incurred as the negligence of
the employees (teachers) gives rise to the presumption
of negligence on the part of the owner/manager (St.
Francis and the principal). Petitioners contend that the
victim’s parents failed to prove by evidence that they
didn’t give their son consent to join the picnic. The
Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the
existence of their liability. Also, 2 of the teachers who
arrived after the drowning were absolved from liability
as they had satisfactorily explained their lateness and
thus could not be said to have participated in the
negligence attributed to the other teachers. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE
(1) WON there was negligence attributable to the
defendants
(2) WON Art. 2180, in relation to 2176 is applicable
(3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is
proper
HELD
A2010 - 95 -
(1) NO. Petitioners are neither guilty of their own
negligence or the negligence of people under them. At
the outset, it should be noted that the victim’s parents
allowed their son to join the picnic as evidenced by a
mental and physical cross examination.
-Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the
picnic does not show acquiescence or consent to it. If
the CA’s findings are to be upheld, employers will be
forever exposed to the risk and danger of being hailed
to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of
their employees even if such acts or omissions are
committed while they are not in the performance of
their duties.
-No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as
the presumption is overthrown by proof that they
exercised diligence of a good father of the family. In
fact, 2 P.E. teachers were invited as they were scout
masters and had knowledge in First Aid and swimming.
Life savers were brought in the event of such an
accident. The records also show that the 2 P.E. teachers
did all that was humanly possible to save the victim.
(2) NO. The CA erred in applying Art. 2180, particularly
par 4. For an employer to be held liable for the
negligence of his employee, the act or omission which
caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while
an employee was in the performance of his assigned
task. In the case at bar, the teachers were not in actual
performance of their duties as the picnic was a purely
private affair and not a school sanctioned activity.
(3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had
exercised the diligence required of them, no moral or
exemplary damages under Art. 2177 may be awarded
in favor of respondent spouses.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision
is SET ASIDE
PSBA v CA (BENITEZ/BAUTISTA)
205 SCRA 729
Padilla, J.: Feb. 4, 1992
FACTS
-Carlitos Bautista, enrolled in the 3rd year commerce
course of PSBA, was stabbed and killed while on
campus by assailants who were from outside the
school’s academic community. This prompted his
parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w/ Judge
Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA
and its corporate officers, alleging negligence,
recklessness and lack of security precautions, means
and methods before, during and after the attack of the
victim.
-PSBA sought to dismiss the case, alleging that since
they were presumably sued under Art 2180, there was
prof. casis
no cause of action since academic institutions are not
subject to the said provision.
-A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were
denied by the TC, yielding the same results upon
appeal with the CA. Hence this petition.
ISSUES
(1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176
and 2180
HELD
(1) NO. Because the circumstances of the present case
evince a contractual relation between the parties, the
rules on quasi-delict do not really govern; but the court
has repeatedly held that the liability for a tort may still
exist even when there is a contract.
-Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroad:”… the mere fact
that a person is bound to another by contract does not
relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such
person. When such a contractual relation exists the
obligor may break the contract under such conditions
that the same act which constitutes a breach of the
contract would have constituted the source of an extra-
contractual obligation had no contract existed between
the parties”
-Using the test in Cangco, a contractual relation is a
condition sine qua non to PSBA’s liability; hence, any
finding of negligence would generally give rise to a
breach of contractual obligation only.
-When an academic institution accepts a student for
enrollment, a contract is established between them,
resulting in a bilateral obligation. The school is obliged
to provide the student with an education, along with a
safe atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of
imparting knowledge. In turn, the student abides by the
school’s academic requirements and observes its rules
and regulations. However, a school cannot be an
insurer for its students against all risks; one can only
expect it to employ the degree of diligence required by
the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the
circumstances of persons, time and place.
- In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to
whether the contract was breached due to PSBA’s
negligence in providing proper security measures. At
this stage, the proceedings have yet to commence on
the substance of the private respondent’s complaint
and the record is bereft of all material facts which only
the TC can determine.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of
origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings
consistent with this ruling of the Court. Costs
against the petitioners.
SOLIMAN, JR. V JUDGE TUAZON
209 SCAR 47
torts & damages
FELICIANO, J; May 18, 1992
NATURE
Civil complaint for damages
FACTS
- On August 13, 1982, while the plaintiff Maximo
Soliman, Jr., a student of the defendant Republic
Central Colleges (RCC), was in the campus premises
thereof, the defendant, Jimmy Solomon, who was then
in the premises of said school performing his duties as
security guard under the employment of defendant R.L.
Security Agency, Inc., without any provocation, shot the
plaintiff on the abdomen. The plaintiff was confined in a
hospital, and as per doctor's opinion, he may not be
able to attend to his regular classes and will be
incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a
duration of from three to four months. Petitioner,
represented by his guardian, filed a civil complaint for
damages against RCC, RL Security Agency and
Solomon,
- RCC filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the
complaint stated no cause of action against it. It argued
that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained
by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the
employer of the security guard Solomon, and hence
was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon. It
further argued that Article 2180, 7th paragraph, of the
Civil Code did not apply, since said paragraph holds
teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, while security guard Jimmy Solomon
was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the school.
- Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCC’s
motion to dismiss. Petitioner’s MFR was denied, Hence,
this appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180,
as well as those of Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil
Code
2. WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis
in law, for the injury sustained by petitioner
HELD
1. NO
- Under Art. 2180, the obligation to respond for
damage inflicted by one against another by fault or
negligence exists not only for one's own act or
omission, but also for acts or omissions of a person for
whom one is by law responsible. Among the persons
held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of
another person are the following:
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helper, acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
A2010 - 96 -
xxx xxx xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils, their students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.
- The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for
holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of
security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman, Jr. RCC
was not the employer of Solomon. The employer of
Solomon was the R.L. Security Agency Inc., while the
school was the client of the latter. It is settled that
where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and
assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards,
the agency is the employer of such guards or
watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts
committed by the security guards attaches to the
employer agency, and not to the clients of such
agency. There being no employer-employee
relationship between RCC and Solomon, petitioner
cannot impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for the
acts of Solomon.
- Since there is no question that Solomon was not a
pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges, he
being in fact an employee of the R.L. Security Agency
Inc., the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180
of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing
liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon.
- The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil
Code invoked by petitioner are as follows:
Art. 349. The following persons shall exercise
substitute parental authority:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Teachers and professors;
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to
apprentices;
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 350. The persons named in the preceding article
shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct
of the child.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 352. The relations between teacher and pupil,
professor and student are fixed by government
regulations and those of each school or institution. In
no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced.
The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best
potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or
student."
- In Palisoc v. Brillantes, the Court held the owner and
president of a school of arts and trades known as the
Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages for
the death of Palisoc, a student of that Institute, which
resulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon, another
student of the Institute. It will be seen that the facts of
Palisoc v. Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th
prof. casis
paragraph of Article 2180, quoted above; but those
facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the
instant case.
- Persons exercising substitute parental authority are
made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third
person by the child or person subject to such substitute
parental authority. In the instant case, Solomon who
committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to
petitioner, was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the
Republic Central Colleges; the school had no substitute
parental authority over Solomon.
2. YES
- In the case of PSBA v CA, the Court held that Article
2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a
student had been injured by one who was an outsider
or by one over whom the school did not exercise any
custody or control or supervision. At the same time,
however, the court stressed that an implied contract
may be held to be established between a school which
accepts students for enrollment, on the one hand, and
the students who are enrolled, on the other hand,
which contract results in obligations for both parties. It
held: When an academic institution accepts students
for enrollment, there is established a contract between
them, resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are
bound to comply with. For its part, the school
undertakes to provide the student with an education
that would presumably suffice to equip him with the
necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or
a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants
to abide by the school's academic requirements and
observe its rules and regulations.Institutions of learning
must also meet the implicit or 'built-in' obligation of
providing their students with an atmosphere that
promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking
of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can
absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics
or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences
when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air
or where there looms around the school premises a
constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school
must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain
peace and order within the campus premises and to
prevent the breakdown thereof.
- It was also pointed out in said case that: "In the
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however,
there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between
school and Bautista had been breached thru the
former's negligence in providing proper security
measures. This would be for the trial court to
determine. And, even if there be a finding of
negligence, the same could give rise generally to a
breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of
Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not
be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence
torts & damages
becomes material only because of the contractual
relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a
contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the
school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot
exist independently of the contract, unless the
negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in
Article 21 of the Civil Code.
- In the PSBA case, the trial court had denied the
school's motion to dismiss the complaint against it, and
both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial court's
order. In the case at bar, the court a quo granted the
motion to dismiss filed by RCC, upon the assumption
that petitioner's cause of action was based, and could
have been based, only on Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
As PSBA, however, states, acts which are tortious or
allegedly tortious in character may at the same time
constitute breach of a contractual or other legal
obligation. Respondent trial judge was in serious error
when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause
of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. Respondent trial judge should not have
granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have,
in the interest of justice, allowed petitioner to prove
acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu
or ex lege on the part of RCC.
Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition, to
treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its
answer, and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order
granting the motion to dismiss the case.This case is
REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings.
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY VS. CARPITANOS
PARDO, February 6, 2002
NATURE
Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution
denying MFR
FACTS
(this case was already assigned in PFR)
-Sherwin Carpitanos, together with James Daniel II
(then 15, driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in
possession and was driving the jeep, Grandson of
Vivencio Villanueva - the owner of the jeep) and other
companions were on their way to an enrollment drive
for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle.
It was found out that the steering wheel guide was
detached. Carpitanos sued the school, James Daniel II,
his parents, and Vivencio Villanueva.
-TC: absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II, held
parents and school liable
-CA: school liable under A218 and 219, FC, finding that
school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle
without a teacher accompanying them.
A2010 - 97 -
ISSUE (regarding liability of St. Mary’s Academy)
WON St. Mary’s Academy should be held liable for
death of Sherwin Carpitanos, and therefore, liable for
damages
HELD
NO. The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy
was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the
remote cause and the injury, there intervened the
negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
Ratio. For the school to be liable, it must be shown
that the ‘injury for which recovery is sought must be
the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the
connection between the negligence and the injury must
be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken
by intervening efficient causes.
Reasoning. The Carpitanos failed to prove that the
negligence of the school was the proximate cause of
the death of the victim.
-The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of
James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of
Vivencio Villanueva.
-Respondents did not present any evidence to show
that the proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless
driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is
unfounded.
-There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed
the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of
respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva
was in possession and in control of the jeep, and was in
fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the
jeep.
-Liability for the accident, whether caused by the
negligence of the minor driver or mechanical
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep,
must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. The
negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a
remote cause of the accident. Between the remote
cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence
of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep.Considering that the
negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent
Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St.
Mary’s Academy had no control, and which was the
proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be
held liable for the death resulting from such accident.
- It is not the school, but the registered owner of the
vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for
the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
Disposition. WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and
SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18]
and that of the trial court.[19] The Court remands the
prof. casis
case to the trial court for determination of the liability
of defendants, excluding petitioner St. Mary’s Academy,
Dipolog City. No costs. SO ORDERED.
PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM
FORWARDERS
63 SCRA 231
AQUINO; March 25, 1975
NATURE
Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision
FACTS
- PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix PANGALANGAN
filed a complaint for damages in an action based on
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN
FORWARDERS, Inc., its manager BALINGIT and the
driver, PINEDA.
- It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight
TRUCK, owned by Phil-Am, along the nat’l highway at
Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the BUS
driven by Pangalangan, owned by Phil Rabbit.
Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was
damaged and could not be used for 79 days. This
deprived the company of earnings of about P8,600.
- Among the defenses interposed by the defendants
was that Balingit was not Pineda's employer. Balingit
moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on
the ground that the bus company and the bus driver
had no cause of action against him.
- CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the
ground that he was not the manager of an
establishment contemplated in Art.2180 CC.
- In the appeal, the bus company also argued that Phil-
Am is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out
of its capital stock with a par value of P41,200, Balingit
and his wife had subscribed P40T. This implied that the
veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-
Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one
and the same civil personality. But this was not alleged
in their complaint.*
ISSUE
WON the terms "employers" and "owners and
managers of an establishment or enterprise" used in
Art. 2180 NCC (Art.1903 OCC) embrace the manager of
a corporation owning a truck
(this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue!)
HELD
NO
Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of
Establishments: Art.2180 uses the term
torts & damages
"manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) to
mean "employer.”
- Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no
tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on
Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.,
in connection with the vehicular accident because he
himself may be regarded as an employee or
dependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders,
Inc.
* This issue was not raised in the lower court so it
would be unfair to allow them to do so now. The case
has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in
the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a
personality separate and distinct from that of the
Balingit spouses.
Dispositive Lower court’s order of dismissal is
AFFIRMED.
PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA)
273 SCRA 562
DAVIDE; June 17, 1997
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA
FACTS
-Civil Case No. 373 was an action against herein
petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of
Ramon A. Acuesta
-Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were
guilty of gross negligence, recklessness, violation of
traffic rules and regulations, abandonment of victim,
and attempt to escape from a crime
Private Respondents’ Version
-In the early morning of March 24, 1990, about 6:00
o’clock, the victim Ramon A. Acuesta was riding in his
easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street
-On the Magsaysay Blvd., defendant Philtranco Service
Enterprises, Inc. (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No. 4025
driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by
some persons in order to start its engine.
-The Magsaysay Blvd. runs perpendicular to Gomez St.
and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the
general direction of the said Gomez Street.
-As the bus was pushed, its engine started thereby the
bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at
the time when Ramon A. Acuesta who was still riding on
his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus.
-As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly
and suddenly, its running motion was also enhanced by
the said functioning engine, thereby the subject bus
bumped on the victim Ramon A. Acuesta who, as a
result thereof fell and, thereafter, was run over by the
said bus.
A2010 - 98 -
Petitioner’s Version
-Manilhig, in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City,
warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few
rounds within the city proper of Calbayog.
-While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising
along Gomez Street, the victim, who was biking
towards the same direction as the bus, suddenly
overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of
the road.
-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as
Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn, the
victim was bumped from behind and run over by the
bus.
-Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employees, including petitioner
Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had
undergone months of rigid training before he was hired.
-Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence
of the victim in overtaking two tricycles, without taking
precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear,
which caused the death of the victim
**Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents
-Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court, and denied MFR
-Hence, this appeal
∗
ISSUE
WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with
Manilhig for damages
HELD
Yes.
-Civil Case No. 373 is an action for damages based on
quasi-delict under Article 217614 and 218015 of the Civil

(limited to that involved in the outline)
14
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter
15
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
xxxxxxxxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
xxxxxxxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxxxxxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage
prof. casis
Code against petitioner Manilhig and his employer,
petitioner Philtranco, respectively.
-We have consistently held that the liability of the
registered owner of a public service vehicle, like
petitioner Philtranco, for damages arising from
the tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct,
and joint and several or solidary with the driver.
As to solidarity, Article 2194 expressly provides:
the responsibility of two or more persons who
are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
-Since the employer's liability is primary, direct and
solidary, its only recourse if the judgment for damages
is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its
employee who committed the fault or negligence which
gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. Article
2181 of the Civil Code provides: Whoever pays for the
damage caused by his dependents or employees may
recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in
satisfaction of the claim.
Disposition
Appealed decision is affirmed. (with regard to this
issue)
CASTILEX V. VASQUEZ
Dec. 21, 1999. Davide
Facts: At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo
So Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around
Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. He was traveling counter-
clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but
without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also
only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time.
Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad [was a] manager
of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered
owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-
794. On the same date and time, Abad drove the said
company car out of a parking lot but instead of going
around the Osmeña rotunda he made a short cut
against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his
route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St.
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and
the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing
severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his vehicle
and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital
and later to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. Vasquez died
at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. It was there that Abad
signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party
(Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital
bills, professional fees and other incidental charges
Vasquez may incur.
torts & damages
After the police authorities had conducted the
investigation of the accident, a Criminal Case was filed
against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for
failure to prosecute. So, the present action for damages
was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So
Vasquez, parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez,
against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial
Corporation. In the same action, Cebu Doctor's Hospital
intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical
expense given to Romeo So Vasquez.
Issue: WON an employer may be held vicariously liable
for the death resulting from the negligent operation by
a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle.
Held: Castilez is absolved from any liability. The
negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance.
Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but
claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and
subsequent death caused by ABAD.
Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article
2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances
where the employer is not engaged in business or
industry. Since it is engaged in the business of
manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not
covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth
paragraph should apply. Petitioner's interpretation of
the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The phrase "even
though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry" found in the fifth paragraph should be
interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the
employer to be engaged in any business or industry to
be liable for the negligence of his employee who is
acting within the scope of his assigned task.
A distinction must be made between the two
provisions to determine what is applicable. Both
provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to
owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to employers in
general, whether or not engaged in any business or
industry. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of
employees committed either in the service of the
branches or on the occasion of their functions, while
the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of
employees acting within the scope of their assigned
task. The latter is an expansion of the former in both
employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of
employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in
a business or industry, are covered so long as they
were acting within the scope of their assigned task,
even though committed neither in the service of the
branches nor on the occasion of their functions. For,
admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different hats.
They perform functions which are beyond their office,
title or designation but which, nevertheless, are still
A2010 - 99 -
within the call of duty.This court has applied the fifth
paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged
in a business or industry such as truck operators and
banks. The Court of Appeals cannot, therefore, be
faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of
the Civil Code to this case. Under the fifth paragraph of
Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business
or industry, an employer is liable for the torts
committed by employees within the scope of his
assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the
employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the
plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that
the employee was acting within the scope of his
assigned task when the tort complained of was
committed. It is only then that the employer may find it
necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in
the selection and supervision of the employee.
It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production
Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort
occurrence. As to whether he was acting within the
scope of his assigned task is a question of fact, which
the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in
the affirmative.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the
rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
entitled to great respect, and even finality at times.
This rule is, however, subject to exceptions such as
when the conclusion is grounded on speculations,
surmises, or conjectures. Such exception obtain in the
present case to warrant review by this Court of the
finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was
driving petitioner's vehicle he was acting within the
scope of his duties as a manager.
On the issue of whether the private
respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD
was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks,
ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness, testified
that at the time of the incident, he was driving a
company-issued vehicle, registered under the name of
petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where he
had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after
having done overtime work for the petitioner. No
absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will
furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether
at a given moment, an employee is engaged in his
employer's business in the operation of a motor
vehicle, so as to fix liability upon the employer because
of the employee's action or inaction; but rather, the
result varies with each state of facts. The court a quo
and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the
driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is
within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the
time and circumstances. The SC does not agree. The
mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the
time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to
prof. casis
charge petitioner with liability for the negligent
operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was
operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his
employment. It used the principles in American
Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the injuries
inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of
an employer's motor vehicle:
I. Operation of Employer's Motor
Vehicle in Going to or from Meals
It has been held that an employee who uses
his employer's vehicle in going from his work to a place
where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a
meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his
employment in the absence of evidence of some
special business benefit to the employer. Evidence that
by using the employer's vehicle to go to and from
meals, an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off
and so devote more time to the performance of his
duties supports the findings that an employee is acting
within the scope of his employment while so driving the
vehicle.
II. Operation of Employer's Vehicle in
Going to or from Work
In the same vein, traveling to and from the
place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or
concern of the employee, and not a part of his services
to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some special
benefit to the employer other than the mere
performance of the services available at the place
where he is needed, the employee is not acting within
the scope of his employment even though he uses his
employer's motor vehicle. 14 cda
The employer may, however, be liable where
he derives some special benefit from having the
employee drive home in the employer's vehicle as
when the employer benefits from having the employee
at work earlier and, presumably, spending more time at
his actual duties. Where the employee's duties require
him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or
hours of work, or to go to and from his home to various
outside places of work, and his employer furnishes him
with a vehicle to use in his work, the courts have
frequently applied what has been called the "special
errand" or "roving commission" rule, under which it can
be found that the employee continues in the service of
his employer until he actually reaches home. However,
even if the employee be deemed to be acting within
the scope of his employment in going to or from work in
his employer's vehicle, the employer is not liable for his
negligence where at the time of the accident, the
employee has left the direct route to his work or back
home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own.
III. Use of Employer's Vehicle Outside
Regular Working Hours
torts & damages
An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an
employee for the latter's personal use outside of
regular working hours is generally not liable for the
employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during
the period of permissive use, even where the employer
contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle
will be used by the employee for personal as well as
business purposes and there is some incidental benefit
to the employer. Even where the employee's personal
purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished
and he has started the return trip to his house where
the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he
has not resumed his employment, and the employer is
not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the
vehicle during the return trip.
The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are
applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the
doctrine of respondeat superior, not on the principle of
bonus pater familias as in ours. Whether the fault or
negligence of the employee is conclusive on his
employer as in American law or jurisprudence, or
merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of
negligence on the part of the employer as in ours, it is
indispensable that the employee was acting in his
employer's business or within the scope of his assigned
task. ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was
carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his
duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It
was then about 2:00 a.m., way beyond the normal
working hours. ABAD's working day had ended; his
overtime work had already been completed. His being
at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a
"haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and
addicts," had no connection to petitioner's business;
neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager.
Rather, using his service vehicle even for personal
purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the
perks attached to his position.
FILAMER V IAC
212 SCRA 637
GUTIERREZ SR; August 17, 1992
NATURE
Motion for Reconsideration
FACTS
- Funtecha is a scholar of FCI. He is also employed as a
janitor. The president of FCI is Agustin Masa. Agustin
has a son, Allan, who is the school bus (bus na jeepney)
driver. Allan lives with his dad. Funtecha also lives in
the president’s house free of charge while a student at
FCI.
A2010 - 100 -
- It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to
bring the kids home, then go back to the school, then
go home in the school jeep. He is allowed to bring
home the jeep because in the morning he’s supposed
to fetch the kids and bring them to school.
- One night, Funtecha wanted to drive home. He has a
student license. After a dangerous curb, and seeing
that the road was clear, Allan let Funtecha drive. Then
there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with
glaring lights. Funtecha swerved right and hit the
pedestrian Kapunan. Kapunan was walking in his lane
in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung
tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians). The jeep
had only one functioning headlight that night.
- TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan. SC reversed,
saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by
Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an
authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be
directly and primarily answerable.
ISSUE
WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep
can be held liable
HELD
YES
- Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the
school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside
is an act in furtherance of the interest of the
petitioner-school. Allan's job demands that he drive
home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students
in the morning of the next school day.
- It is indubitable under the circumstances that the
school president had knowledge that the jeep was
routinely driven home for the said purpose. Moreover, it
is not improbable that the school president also had
knowledge of Funtecha's possession of a student
driver's license and his desire to undergo driving
lessons during the time that he was not in his
classrooms.
- In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home
in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha definitely
was not, having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for
the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own"
but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep
was intended by the petitioner school. The act of
Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one
done for and in behalf of his employer for which
act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility
by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his
janitorial duties. The clause "within the scope of their
assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption
of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an
employee, in furtherance of the interests of the
employer or for the account of the employer at the time
prof. casis
of the infliction of the injury or damage. Even if
somehow, the employee driving the vehicle derived
some benefit from the act, the existence of a
presumptive liability of the employer is determined by
answering the question of whether or not the servant
was at the time of the accident performing any act in
furtherance of his master's business.
- Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI. He need
not have an official appointment for a driver's position
in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for
his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act
of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit
of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not
the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his
janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the
burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that
there was negligence on its part either in the selection
of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over
him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its
having exercised the required diligence of a good
father of a family over its employees Funtecha and
Allan. There were no rules and regulations prohibiting
the use of the school jeep by persons other than the
driver. There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI
over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep.
- The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages
for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which
Funtecha drove the vehicle. In the absence of evidence
that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the supervision of its
employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious
liability for acts or omissions of its employees. The
liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary
and solidary. However, the employer shall have
recourse against the negligent employee for whatever
damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.
NPC v CA (PHESCO INC.)
294 CRA 209
ROMERO; August 14, 1998
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- On July 22, 1979, a convoy of four dump trucks
owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left
Marawi City bound for Iligan City. Unfortunately,
enroute to its destination, one of the trucks driven by
Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a
Toyota Tamaraw. The incident resulted in the death of
three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw, as well as
physical injuries to seventeen other passengers.
torts & damages
- The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages
against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a
contractor of NPC with the main duty of supplying
workers and technicians for the latter's projects, but in
this case it was alleged that they own the dump
trucks).
- The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of
any liability. PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which reversed the trial court's judgment absolving
PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages.
ISSUE
WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba, driver of the dump
truck, which should be solidarily liable for the damages
to the victims
HELD
YES
- In the provisions of the "Memorandum of
Understanding" entered into by PHESCO and NPC, we
are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in "labor
only" contracting. In a "labor only" contract, the person
acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent
or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to
the workers in the same manner and to the same
extent as if they had been directly employed by him.
Finding that a contractor was a "labor-only" contractor
is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee
relationship existed between the owner (principal
contractor) and the "labor-only" contractor, including
the latter's workers.
- Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides:
"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry."
- In this regard, NPC's liability is direct, primary and
solidary with PHESCO and the driver. Of course, NPC, if
the judgment for damages is satisfied by it, shall have
recourse against PHESCO and the driver who
committed the negligence which gave rise to the
action.
DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed.
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY &
RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE
NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR
NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY
AGENCY
VITUG, J/February 6, 2003
397 SCRA 75
A2010 - 101 -
NATURE: APPEAL from CA’s DECISION
- 14 Oct 1993, about 730pm, Nicanor Navidad, then
drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a
"token" (representing payment of the fare).
- While Navidad was standing on the platform near the
LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard
assigned to the area approached Navidad.
- A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two
apparently ensued that led to a fist fight.
- No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how
the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the
first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks.
- At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train,
operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in.
Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was
killed instantaneously.
- Marjorie Navidad (Nicanor’s widow), along with their
children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito
Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit
Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the
death of her husband.
- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad
and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent.
Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that
it had exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its security guards.
- The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while
Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting evidence,
filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to
prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task.
- TC: Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the
Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter
to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following:
"a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00; 2) Compensatory
damages of P443,520.00; 3) Indemnity for the death of
Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00; b) Moral
damages of P50,000.00; c) Attorney’s fees of P20,000;
d) Costs of suit.
- TC: dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and
Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit.
-Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals.
- CA: exonerated Prudent from any liability for the
death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the
LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the
following amounts:
a) P44,830.00 as actual damages; b) P50,000.00 as
nominal damages; c) P50,000.00 as moral damages; d)
P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased;
and e) P20,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees.
-CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not
have then as yet boarded the train, a contract of
carriage theretofore had already existed when the
victim entered the place where passengers were
supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the
corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent
prof. casis
from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing
to link the security agency to the death of Navidad. It
said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted
fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely
established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of
his having been hit by the train owned and managed by
the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman. The
appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to
present expert evidence to establish the fact that the
application of emergency brakes could not have
stopped the train.
- CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in its
resolution of 10 October 2000.
ISSUES:
WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR
THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.
WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO
ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE
FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD
LRTA’s CLAIMS:
-Escartin’s assault upon Navidad, which caused the
latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a stranger that
could not have been foreseen or prevented.
- NO employer-employee relationship between Roman
and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being
an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA.
Navidads Contention:
- A contract of carriage was deemed created from the
moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and
entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to
all the rights and protection under a contractual
relation, and that the appellate court had correctly held
LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in
failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed
upon a common carrier.
HELD:
1. NO. The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract
of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim
arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its
failure to exercise the high diligence required of the
common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to
ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose
to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services
of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the
task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved
of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
- PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort
under the provisions of Article 217612 and related
provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180,13 of the
Civil Code. (But there wasn’t any evidence shown that
linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC)
torts & damages
The premise, however, for the employer’s liability is
negligence or fault on the part of the employee.
- Once such fault is established, the employer can then
be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris
tantum that the employer failed to exercise
diligentissimi patris families in the selection and
supervision of its employees. The liability is primary
and can only be negated by showing due diligence in
the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual
matter that has not been shown.
- A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and
when the same act or omission causes the injury, one
resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa
aquiliana, Article 219414 of the Civil Code can well
apply.
- In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a
contract, where tort is that which breaches the
contract. Stated differently, when an act which
constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had
no contract existed between the parties, the contract
can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby
allowing the rules on tort to apply.
2. YES.
There is no showing that Rodolfo Roman himself is
guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also be
absolved from liability as Prudent is. Needless to say,
the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not
itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman;
thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault
or negligence.
REASONING:
- Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier,
both from the nature of its business and for reasons of
public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising
utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers.
- The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common
carrier for death of or injury to its passengers, provides:
"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to
carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to
passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."
"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for
the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees,
although such employees may have acted beyond the
scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of
the common carriers.
A2010 - 102 -
"This liability of the common carriers does not
cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees."
"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible
for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the
willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of
strangers, if the common carrier’s employees through
the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
family could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission."
-The law requires common carriers to carry passengers
safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons with due regard for all circumstances.
- Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its
passengers so obligates it not only during the course of
the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its
premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to
the contract of carriage
- The statutory provisions render a common carrier
liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through
the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on
account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers
or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees
through the exercise of due diligence could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission.
- In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed
to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple
proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to
still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of
its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to
prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or
to force majeure. In the absence of satisfactory
explanation by the carrier on how the accident
occurred, which LRTA and Roman, according to the CA,
have failed to show, the presumption would be that it
has been at fault, an exception from the general rule
that negligence must be proved.
DISPOSITION: CA’S DECISION AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal
damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman
is absolved from liability. No costs.
______________
12
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
13
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
prof. casis
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors
or incapacitated persons who are under their authority
and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused
by their employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter are employed or on the occasion of
their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts
through a special agent, but not when the damage has
been caused by the official to whom the task done
properly pertains, in which case what is provided in
article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage.
14
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons
who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
MCKEE V IAC (TAYAG & MANALO)
221 SCRA 517
Davide, Jr.; July 16, 1992
NATURE
- Petition to review the resolution of the CA
FACTS
- On January 8, 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along
MacArthur Highway, Pampanga, a head-on-collision
took place between an International cargo truck,
Loadstar, owned by private respondents, Jaime Tayag
and Rosalina Manalo, and driven by Ruben Galang, and
a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The collision
resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim McKee and
Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George McKee,
Christopher McKee and Araceli McKee, all passengers of
the Ford Escort.
- Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck,
which was loaded with 200 cavans of rice weighing
about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from
Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was
bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other hand,
was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando.
torts & damages
When the northbound car was about 10 meters away
from the southern approach of the bridge, 2 boys
suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into
the lane of the car. The boys were moving back and
forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the
other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the
car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the
truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car,
applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return
to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with
the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck,
which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge.
- Please see first Mckee digest for details on the
collision.
- Civil cases for damages based on quasi-delict were
filed as a result of a vehicular accident.
ISSUE
WON the owners of the cargo truck (Tayag and Manalo)
are liable for the resulting damages
HELD
YES
- The Court rules that it was the truck driver's
negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the
collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the
collision. As employers of the truck driver, Manalo and
Tayag are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages.
The presumption that they are negligent flows from the
negligence of their employee. That presumption,
however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their
only possible defense is that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage. Article 2180 reads as follows:
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage.
The diligence of a good father referred to means the
diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees.
- The answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases
Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this defense.
Neither did they attempt to prove it.
VALENZUELA v CA (LI and ALEXANDER
COMMERCIAL, INC.)
A2010 - 103 -
253 SCRA 303
KAPUNAN; February 7, 1996
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving when she realized
she had a flat tire. She parked along the sidewalk of
Aurora Blvd., put on her emergency lights, alighted
from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk.
She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car
pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the
tire when she was suddenly bumped by a car driven by
defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of
defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc.
- Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the
windshield of the car of the defendant, which was
destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled
out from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was
severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some
skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She
was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and
was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. She filed a
claim for damages against defendant.
- Li’s alibi was that he was driving at 55kph when he
was suddenly confronted with a speeding car coming
from the opposite direction. He instinctively swerved to
the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle,
and bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not see
because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking
lights or early warning device, and the area was poorly
lighted. Defendants counterclaimed for damages,
alleging that plaintiff was the one who was reckless or
negligent.
-RTC found Li and Alexander solidarily liable. CA
absolved Alexander.
ISSUE
1. WON Li was grossly negligent in driving the company
issued car
2. WON Valenzuela was guilty of contributory
negligence
3. WON Alexander Commercial is liable as Li’s employer
HELD
1. YES
- The average motorist alert to road conditions will have
no difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at
the speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the
visibility of the street, and the road conditions on a
principal metropolitan thoroughfare like Aurora
Boulevard, Li would have had ample time to react to
the changing conditions of the road if he were alert as
prof. casis
every driver should be to those conditions. Driving
exacts a more than usual toll on the senses.
Physiological "fight or flight" mechanisms are at work,
provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs,
alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc. Li's failure to react
in a manner which would have avoided the accident
could therefore have been only due to either or both of
the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a "very fast"
speed as testified by one of the witneses; and 2) that
he was under the influence of alcohol. Either factor
working independently would have diminished his
responsiveness to road conditions, since normally he
would have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela's
car, rather than be in a situation forcing him to
suddenly apply his brakes.
- Li was, therefore, negligent in driving his company-
issued Mitsubishi Lancer
2. NO
- Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm
he has suffered, which falls below the standard to
which he is required to conform for his own protection.
Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in
Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an individual who suddenly
finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to
act without much time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a
better solution, unless the emergency was brought by
his own negligence.
- While the emergency rule applies to those cases in
which reflective thought or the opportunity to
adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the
conduct which is required of an individual in such cases
is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the
event which absolutely negates thoroughful care, but
by the over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman
driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a
rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point
which is both convenient for her to do so and which is
not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to
run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or
turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely
find no one to help her.
- Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct
which creates an undue risk of harm to others. It is the
failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury.
3. YES
- Since important business transactions and decisions
may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and
under all kinds of guises, the provision for the unlimited
use of a company car therefore principally serves the
torts & damages
business and goodwill of a company and only
incidentally the private purposes of the individual who
actually uses the car, the managerial employee or
company sales agent. As such, in providing for a
company car for business use and/or for the purpose of
furthering the company's image, a company owes a
responsibility to the public to see to it that the
managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts
virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able
to use the company issue capably and responsibly.
- In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not
demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of the family in
entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were
made as to whether or not the company took the steps
necessary to determine or ascertain the driving
proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and
unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able
to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should
be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to
Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater
familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the
former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela during the accident.
DISPOSITION Judgment of RTC reinstated.
MERRITT v GOVERNMENT
34 Phil 311
TRENT; March 31, 1916
NATURE
Appeal from decision of the CFI
FACTS
- E. Merritt, riding on a motorcycle, was hit by the
General Hospital ambulance, which turned suddenly
and unexpectedly to Taft Avenue without sounding any
whistle or horn, in contravention of an ordinance and
the Motor Vehicle Act.
- Plaintiff was so severely injured. His leg showed a
contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that
made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the
fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable
readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves.
The patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a light
weakness in his eyes and in his mental condition. This
latter weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff
had to do any difficult mental labor, especially when he
attempted to use his money for mathematical
calculations.
- Witnesses testified that plaintiff’s physical and
mental condition before the accident was excellent. He
was one of the best contractors of wooden buildings.
A2010 - 104 -
He could not now earn even a half of the income that
he had secured for his work because he had lost 50 per
cent of his efficiency. He had to dissolve a partnership
that he had with an engineer and give up a contract for
the construction of a building.
- Trial court held that the collision was due solely on the
negligence of the chauffeur and awarded the plaintiff
the sum of P14, 741.
- Act No. 2457 was enacted. It states that “E. Merritt is
hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila against the Government
of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility
for the collision between his motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine
the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E.
Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the
Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby
authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the
behalf of the Government of said Islands, to defendant
said Government at the same.”
ISSUES
WON the government is liable for the damages
resulting from a tort committed by an agent or
employee of the government
HELD
NO
Ratio The State is only liable for the acts of its agents,
officers and employees when they act as special agents
within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903.
Reasoning
- In the United States the rule is that the state is not
liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents
whom it employs, except when expressly made so by
legislative enactment. The Government does not
undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the
officers or agents whom it employs, since that would
involve it in all its operations in endless
embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would
be subversive of the public interest.
- As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting
individuals to sue the state where the cause of action
arises out of either fort or contract, the rule is stated in
36 Cyc., 915, thus:
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its
immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its
liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in
his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not
previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to
enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to
the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense.
- Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
prof. casis
The state is liable in this sense when it acts
through a special agent, but not when the damage
should have been caused by the official to whom
properly it pertained to do the act performed, in
which case the provisions of the preceding article
shall be applicable.
- The obligation to indemnify for damages which a third
person causes to another by his fault or negligence is
based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15,
Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by his own fault
or negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the
third party who caused the damage. It follows
therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of
law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by
private individuals in consequence of acts performed by
its employees in the discharge of the functions
pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor
even negligence can be presumed on the part of the
state in the organization of branches of public service
and in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary,
we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on
its part in order that each branch of service serves the
general weal an that of private persons interested in its
operation. Between these latter and the state,
therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by
the civil law can arise except in a case where the state
acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and
contracting obligations.
- The Civil Code in chap 2, title 16, book 4, regulates
the obligations which arise out of fault or negligence;
and whereas in the first article thereof. No. 1902, where
the general principle is laid down that where a person
who by an act or omission causes damage to another
through fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair
the damage so done, reference is made to acts or
omissions of the persons who directly or indirectly
cause the damage, the following articles refers to this
persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those
who maintain fixed relations of authority and
superiority over the authors of the damage, because
the law presumes that in consequence of such relations
the evil caused by their own fault or negligence is
imputable to them. This legal presumption gives way to
proof, however, because, as held in the last paragraph
of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third persons
ceases when the persons mentioned in said article
prove that they employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the damage, and among
these persons, called upon to answer in a direct and
not a subsidiary manner, are found, in addition to the
mother or the father in a proper case, guardians and
owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise,
the state, but not always, except when it acts through
the agency of a special agent, doubtless because and
only in this case, the fault or negligence, which is the
torts & damages
original basis of this kind of objections, must be
presumed to lie with the state.
- Although in some cases the state might by virtue of
the general principle set forth in article 1902 respond
for all the damage that is occasioned to private parties
by orders or resolutions which by fault or negligence
are made by branches of the central administration
acting in the name and representation of the state itself
and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the
exercise of its executive powers, yet said article is not
applicable in the case of damages said to have been
occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official,
acting in the exercise of his powers, in proceedings to
enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing
by the owner of the property which they hold in
sublease.
- The responsibility of the state is limited by article
1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special
agent (one who receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his
office if he is a special official) so that in representation
of the state and being bound to act as an agent
thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This
concept does not apply to any executive agent who is
an employee of the acting administration and who on
his own responsibility performs the functions which are
inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which
are regulated by law and the regulations.
- The responsibility of the state is limited to that which
it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered
by a definite order or commission to perform some act
or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise
to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts
or omissions imputable to a public official charged with
some administrative or technical office who can be held
to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by
the law of civil responsibility.
- The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General
Hospital was not such an agent within the meaning of
paragraph 5 of article 1903
On the computation of damages
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741
and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a)
P5,000, the award awarded for permanent injuries, and
(b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of
wages during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated
from pursuing his occupation. We find nothing in the
record which would justify us in increasing the amount
of the first. As to the second, the record shows, and the
trial court so found, that the plaintiff's services as a
contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The court,
however, limited the time to 2months and 21 days,
which the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital.
In this we think there was error, because it was clearly
established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated
A2010 - 105 -
for a period of 6 months. The mere fact that he
remained in the hospital only 2 months and 21 days
while the remainder of the 6 months was spent in his
home, would not prevent recovery for the whole time.
We, therefore, find that the amount of damages
sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part,
is P18,075.
Dispositive Judgment appealed from reversed.
Whether the Government intends to make itself legally
liable for the amount of damages above set forth,
which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the
negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative
enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds
therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This
matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with
the courts.
ROSETE v AUDITOR GENERAL
81 Phil 453
FERIA; August 31, 1948
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the Insular Auditor
FACTS
- Jose Panlilio ignited his lighter near a drum into which
gasoline was being drained causing fire in the
warehouse of Emergency Control Administration (ECA,
a government agency).
- The fire destroyed the building owned by the
petitioner, thereby giving rise to this claim for damages
against Panlilio for his negligence and the officers of
ECA for storing gasoline in said warehouse contrary to
the provisions of ordinances of the City of Manila
(ordinance requires a license for storing flammable
substances, which ECA didn’t have).
- Insular Auditor dismissed the claim hence this appeal.
ISSUE
WON the government is liable for the damages
HELD
NO
- Art. 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
“Art. 1903. The obligation imposed in the
preceding article is enforceable not only for
personal acts and omission but also for those
persons for whom another is responsible.
xx
“The state is liable in this sense when it acts
through a special agent, but not when the
prof. casis
damage should have been caused by the
official to whom it properly pertained to do the
act performed, in which case the provisions of
the preceding article shall be applicable.”
- In the case of Merritt v. Government, the court held
the following:
“ ’… The state is not responsible for
the damage suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its
employees in the discharge of the functions
pertaining to their office… n relations of a
private nature governed by the civil law can
arise except in a case where the state acts as
a juridical person capable of acquiring rights
and contracting obligations.’
xx
“ ‘That the responsibility of the state
is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it
acts through a special agent (and a special
agent, in the sense in which these words are
employed, is one who receives a definite and
fixed order by the commission, foreign to the
exercise of duties of his office if he is a special
official) so that in representation of the state
and being bound to act as an agent thereof,
he executes the trust confided to him.
- There being no showing that whatever negligence
may be imputed to the ECA or its officers, was done by
a special agent, because the officers of the ECA did not
act as special agents of the government within the
above defined meaning of that wod in Article 1903 of
the Civil Code in storing gasoline in the warehouse of
ECA, the government is not responsible for damages
caused through such negligence.
- Although there is an act (Act No. 327) authorizing the
filing of claims against the government with the Insular
Auditor, and appeal by private persons or entities from
the latter’s decision to the Supreme Court, it does not
make any and all claims against the government
allowable, and the latter responsible for all claims.
DISPOSITION Decision appealed from is affirmed.
MENDOZA V. DE LEON
FONTANILLA V MALIAMAN and
NATIONAL IRRIGATION
ADMINSITRATION
194 SCRA 486
PARAS; February 27, 1991
torts & damages
NATURE
Resolution
FACTS
- The National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
maintains that it does not perform solely and
primarily proprietary functions, but is an agency of
the government tasked with governmental
functions, and is therefore not liable for the
tortuous act of its driver Garcia, who was not its
special agent.
o NIA believes this bases this on:
 PD 552 – amended some
provisions
of RA 3601 (the law which created the NIA)
 The case of Angat River Irrigation
System v. Angat River Workers’ Union
- Angat Case: Although the majority opinion declares
that the Angat System, like the NIA, exercised a
governmental function because the nature of its
powers and functions does not show that it was
intended to “bring to the Government any special
corporate benefit or pecuniary profit”, a strong
dissenting opinion held that Angat River system is
a government entity exercising proprietary
functions.
- The Angat dissenting opinion:
- Alegre protested the announced termination of his
employment. He argued that although his contract
did stipulate that the same would terminate on July
17, 1976, since his services were necessary and
desirable in the usual business of his employer,
and his employment had lasted for five years, he
had acquired the status of regular employee and
could not be removed except for valid cause.
- The employment contract of 1971 was executed
when the Labor Code of the Philippines had not yet
been promulgated, which came into effect some 3
years after the perfection of the contract.
ISSUE
WON the NIR is a government agency with a juridical
personality separate and distinct from the government,
thereby opening it up to the possibility that it may be
held liable for the damages caused by its driver, who
was not its special agent
HELD YES
Reasoning the functions of government have been
classified into governmental or constituent and
proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the
exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory;
A2010 - 106 -
the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary
functions and thus considered as optional.
The National Irrigation Administration was not created
for purposes of local government. While it may be true
that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the
government aimed at promoting public interest and
public welfare, such fact does not make the NIA
essentially and purely a "government-function"
corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of
"constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and
administering all national irrigation systems in the
Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation
projects." Certainly, the state and the community as a
whole are largely benefited by the services the agency
renders, but these functions are only incidental to the
principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of
lands.
NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate
personality separate and distinct from the government,
thus is governed by the Corporation Law. Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 3601 provides:
Sec. 1. Name and Domicile — A body corporate is
hereby created which shall be known as the National
Irrigation Administration. . . . which shall be organized
immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have
its principal seat of business in the City of Manila and
shall have representatives in all provinces, for the
proper conduct of its business. (Emphasis for
emphasis).
Besides, Section 2, subsection b of P.D. 552 provides
that:
(b) To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the
water from all irrigation systems constructed by or
under its administration, such fees or administration
charges as may be necessary to cover the cost of
operation, maintenance and insurance, and to recover
the cost of construction within a reasonable period of
time to the extent consistent with government policy;
to recover funds or portions thereof expended for the
construction and/or rehabilitation of communal
irrigation systems which funds shall accrue to a special
fund for irrigation development under section 2 hereof;
Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall
be preferred liens first, upon the land benefited, and
then on the crops raised thereon, which liens shall have
preference over all other liens except for taxes on the
land, and such preferred liens shall not be removed
until all fees or administration charges are paid or the
property is levied upon and sold by the National
Irrigation Administration for the satisfaction thereof. . . .
The same section also provides that NIA may sue and
be sued in court.
prof. casis
It has its own assets and liabilities. It also has corporate
powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors. Section
2, subsection (f):
(f) . . . and to transact such business, as are directly or
indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the
attainment of the above powers and objectives,
including the power to establish and maintain
subsidiaries, and in general, to exercise all the powers
of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as
they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
DISPOSITION We conclude that the National
Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a
juridical personality separate and distinct from the
government. It is not a mere agency of the government
but a corporate body performing proprietary functions.
Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused
by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special
agent.
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration dated
January 26, 1990 is DENIED WITH FINALITY. The
decision of this Court in G.R. No. 55963 and G.R. No.
61045 dated December 1, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED.
DISSENTING: PADILLA: to say that NIA has opened
itself to suit is one thing; to say that it is liable for
damages arising from tort committed by its employees,
is still another thing.
The state or a government agency performing
governmental functions may be held liable for tort
committed by its employees only when it acts through
a special agent.
CITY OF MANILA V TEOTICA
22 SCRA 267
CONCEPCION; January 29, 1968
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
FACTS
- Genaro N. Teotico, an accountant, was at the corner
of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila,
waiting for a jeep. After waiting 5 mins, he hailed a jeep
that came to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb
to board the jeep, and took a few steps, he fell inside a
manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head
hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and
causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid.
As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several
persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of
the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the
Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were
treated, after which he was taken home. In addition to
the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico
torts & damages
suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper
arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart from an
abrasion on the right infra-patella region. These injuries
and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus
injections administered to him in the hospital, required
further medical treatment by a private practitioner.
- Teotico filed with CFI Manila, a complaint which was,
subsequently, amended for damages against the City of
Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city
treasurer and chief of police.
- Defense pointed out that because of the lucrative
scrap iron business then prevailing, stealing of iron
catchbasin covers was rampant; that the Office of the
City Engineer has filed complaints in court resulting
from theft of said iron covers; that in order to prevent
such thefts, the city government has changed the
position and layout of catchbasins in the City by
constructing them under the sidewalks with concrete
cement covers and openings on the side of the gutter;
and that these changes had been undertaken by the
city from time to time whenever funds were available.
- CFI Manila sustained the theory of the defendants
and dismissed the amended complaint, without
costs.
- This decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, except insofar as the City of Manila is
concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages
in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00. Hence, this
appeal by the City of Manila.
- The first issue raised by the Manila is whether the
present case is governed by Section 4 of RA 409
(Charter of the City of Manila) reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or
injuries to persons or property arising from the failure
of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city
officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any
other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said
Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while
enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable
for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by,
any person by reason of defective conditions of road,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
works under their control or supervision.
- Manila maintains that the former provision should
prevail over the latter, because RA 409, is a special
law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila,
whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to
the entire Philippines.
ISSUES
WON City of Manila should be held liable for the
damages suffered by Teotica.
A2010 - 107 -
HELD
YES.
Ratio RA 409,sec.4 refers to liability arising from
negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof,
whereas Article 2189, CC governs liability due to
"defective streets," in particular. Since the present
action is based upon the alleged defective condition of
a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
Reasoning The assertion to the effect that said
Avenue is a national highway was made, for the first
time, in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of
the Court of Appeals. At any rate, under Article 2189 of
the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability
therein established to attach that the defective roads or
streets belong to the province, city or municipality from
which responsibility is exacted. What said article
requires is that the province, city or municipality have
either "control or supervision" over said street or road.
Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national
highway, this circumstance would not necessarily
detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of
Manila, under Republic Act 409.
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P.
Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of
the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of
negligence, in connection with the maintenance of said
road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in
the affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of said
Court thereon are not subject to our review.
Dispositive WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from
should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the City of Manila.
Voting Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.
ARANETA v JOYA
57 SCRA 59
CASTRO J.: May 24, 1974
FACTS:
-An employee of the Ace ADVERTISING Company was
sent to the States to pursue studies in television. When
asked about the expenses of the trip, respondent
answered that these were not shouldered by the
company and instead by other parties
-while abroad, he continued to receive his salaries in
the form of vouchers ordered and signed by respondent
Joya. The petitioner signed three of these checks. The
others were signed by either the respondent, or Vicente
Araneta (company treasurer) who put up part of the bill
connected with Taylor's trip and also handed him
letters for delivery in the United States. The Ace
prof. casis
Advertising disbursed P5,043.20, all told, on account of
Taylor's travel and studies
-the Ace Advertising filed a complaint with the court of
first instance of Manila against the respondent for
recovery of the total sum disbursed to Taylor, alleging
that the trip was made without its knowledge, authority
or ratification. The respondent, in his answer, denied
the charge and claimed that the trip was nonetheless
ratified by the company's board of directors, and that in
any event under the by-laws he had the discretion, as
general manager, to authorize the trip which was for
the company's benefit
-Joya also filed a 3rd party complaint against the two
Aranetas proving that they were involved in sending
Taylor abroad
-trial court rendered judgment ordering the respondent
to pay the Ace Advertising "the sum of P5,043.20 with
interest at the legal rate from August 23, 1954 until full
payment. 3rd party complaint dismissed
-CA affirmed however dismissal of 3rd party complaint
was reversed stating that Taylor's trip had been neither
authorized nor ratified by the company
-CA noted that based on the facts, both petitioners
knew and through their acts showed that they
approved of the trip. “…were also privy to the
unauthorized disbursement of the corporate moneys
jointly with the appellant; what had happened was in
truth and in fact a venture by them given their stamp of
approval; and as it was an unauthorized act of
expenditure of corporate funds, and it was these three
without whose acts the same could not have happened,
the juridical situation was a simple quasi-delict by them
committed upon the corporation, for which solidary
liability should have been imposed upon all in the first
place”
ISSUE:
WON petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict
HELD: Yes
- The petitioner's assertion that he signed the
questioned payroll checks in good faith has not been
substantiated, he in particular not having testified or
offered testimony to prove such claim. Upon the
contrary, in spite of his being a vice-president and
director of the Ace Advertising, the petitioner remained
passive, throughout the period of Taylor's stay abroad,
concerning the unauthorized disbursements of
corporate funds for the latter. This plus the fact that he
even approved thrice payroll checks for the payment of
Taylor's salary, demonstrate quite distinctly that the
petitioner neglected to perform his duties properly, to
the damage of the firm of which he was an officer.
torts & damages
-The fact that he was occupying a contractual position
at the Ace Advertising is of no moment. The existence
of a contract between the parties, as has been
repeatedly held by this Court, constitutes no bar to the
commission of a tort by one against the other and the
consequent recovery of damages
TORTS WITH
INDEPENDENT CIVIL
ACTION
LIM v DE LEON
G.R. No. L-22554
MARTIN; August 29, 1975
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the CFI
FACTS
- Plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto
Timbangcaya a motor launch named M/L "SAN
RAFAEL". A year later or on April 9, 1962 Alberto
Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale
Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him.
- After conducting a preliminary investigation, Fiscal
Francisco Ponce de Leon, in his capacity as Acting
Provincial Fiscal of Palawan, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Palawan the corresponding information for
Robbery with Force and Intimidation upon Persons
against Jikil Taha.
- June 15, 1962, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon
being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac,
Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan
requesting him to direct the detachment commander in
Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor
launch.
- Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the
Provincial Commander to impound the motor launch,
explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party,
plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court
from taking custody of the same. Upon order of the
Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee Orlando
Maddela, Detachment Commander of Balabac,
Palawan, seized the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL" from
plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it.
- Plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim pleaded with Orlando
Maddela to return the motor launch but the latter
refused. Likewise, Jikil Taha through his counsel made
representations with Fiscal Ponce de Leon to return the
A2010 - 108 -
seized property to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim but
Fiscal Ponce de Leon refused, on the ground that the
same was the subject of a criminal offense.
ISSUES
1. WON defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had
the power to order the seizure of the motor launch in
question without a warrant of search and seizure even
if the same was admittedly the corpus delicti of the
crime
2. WON defendants-appellees are civilly liable to
plaintiffs-appellants for damages allegedly suffered by
them granting that the seizure of the motor launch was
unlawful
HELD
1. NO
- Defendant-appellees admitted that when Orlando
Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim and
impounded the motor launch he was not armed with a
search warrant; that he effected the seizure of the
motor launch in the absence of and without the consent
of Delfin Lim. There can be no question that without the
proper search warrant, no public official has the right to
enter the premises of another without his consent for
the purpose of search and seizure. And since in the
present case defendants-appellees seized the motor
launch without a warrant, they have violated the
constitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against
unreasonable search and seizure.
2. YES
- Plaintiffs-appellants anchor their claim for damages
on Articles 32 and 2219 of the New Civil Code which
provide in part as follows:
"ART. 32.Any public officer or employee, or
any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person
shall be liable to the latter for damages.
xxx
"(9)The rights to be secure in one's person,
house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
xxx
"The indemnity shall include moral damages.
Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated."
"ART. 2219.Moral damages may be recovered
in the following and analogous cases:
xxx
"(6)Illegal search;
xxx
prof. casis
"(1)Acts and action referred to in Articles 21,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 36."
- Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose
constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is
entitled to actual and moral damages from the public
officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition,
exemplary damages may also be awarded.
DISPOSITION Decision appealed from is hereby
reversed and another one entered declaring the seizure
illegal and ordering defendant-appellee Fiscal Francisco
Ponce de Leon to pay to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim
the sum of P3,000.00 as actual damages, plus
P1,000.00 moral damages, and, in addition, P750.00 for
attorney's fees.
ABERCA V VER
G.R. No. L-69866
YAP; April 15, 1988
NATURE: Petition for certiorari
FACTS
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and
seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties
of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force
Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to
conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-
terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing
reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro
Manila,"
Plaintiffs’ allegations: That complying with said
order of Ver, elements of the TFM raided several places,
employing in most cases defectively issued judicial
search warrants; that during these raids, certain
members of the raiding party confiscated a number of
purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that
plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued
by the courts; that for some period after their arrest,
they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that
plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to
silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated
them employed threats, tortures and other forms of
violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory
information or confessions and in order to punish them;
that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were
part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly
extract information and incriminatory statements from
plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said
plans being previously known to and sanctioned by
defendants.
Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages of
P39,030; moral damages of at least P150K each or a
torts & damages
total of P3M; exemplary damages of at least P150K
each or a total of P3M; and attorney's fees not less than
P200K.
Respondents’ contentions: A motion to dismiss was
filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Sol-
Gen. Estelito Mendoza, alleging that (1) plaintiffs may
not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of
their detention in the guise of a damage suit because
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended;
(2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present
action, defendants are immune from liability for acts
done in the performance of their official duties; and (3)
the complaint states no cause of action against the
defendants.
ISSUES
1. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal
searches conducted by military personnel and other
violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution.
2. WON a superior officer under the notion of
respondent superior be answerable for damages, jointly
and severally with his subordinates, to the person
whose constitutional rights and liberties have been
violated.
3. WON trial court correct in dismissing the complaint
with respect to (dome of the) plaintiffs on the basis of
the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file MFR of the
court's resolution granting the respondent's motion to
dismiss
HELD
1. NO.
Ratio: The suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and
cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and
detention and other violations of their constitutional
rights. The suspension does not render valid an
otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended
is merely the right of the individual to seek release
from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a
speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Reasoning: [a] The purpose Art. 32 CC is to provide a
sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms
enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no
man may seek to violate those sacred rights with
impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and
political stress, when the temptation is strongest to
yield to the law of force rather than the force of law, it
is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic
rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be
sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands
of the ruling power. [b] The invocation of the doctrine
of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. It cannot
be construed as a blanket license or a roving
commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint,
A2010 - 109 -
to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties
of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by
the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme
law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian
or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.
[c] Art. 32 of CC which renders any public officer or
employee or any private individual liable in damages
for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of
another does not exempt the respondents from
responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability
under the said article, provided their acts or omissions
do not constitute a violation of the RPC or other penal
statute. [d] Even assuming that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends
petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest
and detention, it does not and cannot suspend their
rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because
of respondents' confiscation of their private belongings,
the violation of their right to remain silent and to
counsel and their right to protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures and against
torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.
2. NO
Ratio: Although the doctrine of respondent superior is
applicable to the case, as contended by respondents,
the decisive factor in this case is the language of Art.
32 CC. The law speaks of an officer or employee or
person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the
violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of
another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one
directly responsible) who must answer for damages
under Art. 32; the person indirectly responsible has also
to answer for the damages or injury caused to the
aggrieved party
Reasoning: [a] The doctrine of respondent superior
has been generally limited in its application to principal
and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and
employee) relationship. No such relationship exists
between superior officers of the military and their
subordinates. But in this case, Art. 32 governs. [b] By
this provision, the principle of accountability of public
officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning
and acquires a larger dimension. A superior have to
answer for the transgressions of his subordinates
against the constitutionally protected rights and
liberties of the citizen. Hence, Art. 32 of CC makes the
persons who are directly, as well as indirectly,
responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors. [c]
To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action,
only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others,
should be considered. For this purpose, the motion to
dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts
alleged in the complaint. [d] So, under the above
principles, it is difficult to justify the TC’s dismissal for
lack of cause of action the complaint against all the
prof. casis
defendants, except Maj.Aguinaldo and MSgt. Balaba.
The complaint contained allegations against all the
defendants which, if admitted hypothetically, would be
sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action
against all of them under Art. 32 of CC.
3. NO.
The body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the
motion was filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs. And this
must have been also the understanding of defendants'
counsel himself for when he filed his comment on the
motion, he furnished copies thereof, not just to the
lawyers who signed the motion, but to all the lawyers of
plaintiffs In filing the motion to set aside the resolution,
the signing attorneys did so on behalf of all the plaintiff.
They needed no specific authority to do that. The
authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a
party can be assumed, unless questioned or challenged
by the adverse party or the party concerned, which was
never done in this case.
DISPOSITION: Petition granted. Case remanded to the
respondent court for further proceedings.
SEPARATE OPINION:
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
- The Court's judgment at bar makes clear that all
persons, be they public officers or employees, or
members of the military or police force or private
individuals who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeat,
violate or in any manner impede or impair the
constitutional rights and civil liberties of another
person, stand liable and may be sued in court for
damages as provided in Art. 32 of CC.
- The case at bar specifically upholds and reinstates the
civil action for damages filed in the court below by
petitioners-plaintiffs for illegal searches conducted by
military personnel and other violations of their
constitutional rights and liberties. At the same time it
rejects the automatic application of the principle of
respondent superior or command responsibility that
would hold a superior officer jointly and severally
accountable for damages, including moral and
exemplary, with his subordinates who committed such
transgressions. However, the judgment gives the
caveat that a superior officer must not abdicate his
duty to properly supervise his subordinates for he runs
the risk of being held responsible for gross negligence
and of being held under the cited provision of the Civil
Code as indirectly and solidarily accountable with the
tortfeasor.
MHP GARMENTS, INC. vs. CA
PUNO; 22 September 1994
Nature
torts & damages
- Petition for Certiorari
Facts
-MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of
the Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell and
distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies,
badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum
Agreement, petitioner corporation was given the
authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the
prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout
uniforms and other scouting supplies."
-Sometime in October 1983, MHP received information
that private respondents Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol
Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy
Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority.
De Guzman, an employee of petitioner corporation, was
tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to
make a report of the Philippine Constabulary (PC). De
Guzman, Peñafiel, and two (2) other constabulary men
of the Reaction Force Battalion went to the stores of
respondents at the Marikina Public Market. Without any
warrant, they seized the boy and girl scouts pants,
dresses, and suits on display at respondents' stalls. The
seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private
respondents. The items were then turned over by
Captain Peñafiel to petitioner corporation for
safekeeping. A criminal complaint for unfair
competition was then filed against private respondents.
After a preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the private
respondents. He also ordered the return of the seized
items which was not immediately returned despite
demands. Private respondents had to go personally to
petitioners' place of business to recover their goods.
Even then, not all the seized items were turned. The
other items returned were of inferior quality. Private
respondent then filed a Civil Case against the
petitioners for sums of money and damages. The trial
court ruled for the private respondents. The decision
was appealed to the respondent court. It affirmed the
decision with modification
MHP filed a petition for certiorari before the SC.
Issue/s and Held
WON the search and seizure was legal
No. The evidence did not justify the warrantless search
and seizure of private respondents' goods. Petitioner
corporation received information that private
respondents were illegally selling Boy Scouts items and
paraphernalia in October 1983. The specific date and
time are not established in the evidence adduced by
the parties. De Guzman then made a surveillance of the
stores of private respondents. They reported to the
Philippine Constabulary and on October 25, 1983, the
raid was made on the stores of private respondents and
A2010 - 110 -
the supposed illicit goods were seized. The progression
of time between the receipt of the information and the
raid of the stores of private respondents shows there
was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding
party to apply for a judicial warrant. Despite the
sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and
seized the goods of private respondents. In doing so,
they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the
seizure would be proved to violate the right of private
respondents against unreasonable search and seizure.
The search and seizure were clearly illegal. There was
no probable cause for the seizure. Probable cause for a
search has been defined as "such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched." These facts and circumstances were not in
any way shown by the petitioners to justify their
warrantless search and seizure. Indeed, after a
preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal
dismissed their complaint for unfair competition and
later ordered the return of the seized goods.
WON MHP Garments is liable
Yes. The omission will not exculpate petitioners. The
respondent court correctly granted damages to private
respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in
transgressing the right of private respondents against
unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they
instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the
Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution
in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. The
raid was conducted with the active participation of their
employee. Larry de Guzman who did not lift a finger to
stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. By
standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he was
liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. So
with the petitioner corporation which even received for
safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the PC
raiding team and de Guzman, and refused to surrender
them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its
complaint for unfair competition. Secondly, Letter of
Instruction No. 1299 already directs all law
enforcement agencies of the Republic of the
Philippines, to apprehend immediately unauthorized
manufacturers and distributors of Scout paraphernalia,
upon proper application by the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines and/or Girl Scouts of the Philippines for
warrant of arrest and/or search warrant with a judge, or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by
law; and to impound the said paraphernalia to be used
as evidence in court or other appropriate administrative
body it orders the immediate and strict compliance with
the Instructions which the petitioners miserably failed
to do. And thirdly, they should have filed a third-party
prof. casis
complaint against the raiding team for contribution or
any other relief, in respect of respondents' claim for
Recovery of Sum of Money with Damages. Again, they
did not.
WON an award for moral damages should be
awarded
Yes. It is consistently ruled that moral damages are not
awarded to penalize the defendant but to compensate
the plaintiff for the injuries he may have suffered.
Conformably with our ruling in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon,
op. cit., moral damages can be awarded in the case at
bench. There can be no doubt that petitioners must
have suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety, and
wounded feelings due the tortious raid caused by
petitioners. Private respondents' avowals of
embarrassment and humiliation during the seizure of
their merchandise were supported by their testimonies.
The wantonness of the wrongful seizure justifies the
award of exemplary damages. It will also serve as a
stern reminder to all and sundry that the constitutional
protection against unreasonable search and seizure is a
virile reality and not a mere burst of rhetoric. The all
encompassing protection extends against intrusions
directly done both by government and indirectly by
private entities.
Disposition
IN VIEW WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. We impose a SIX
PERCENT (6%) interest from January 9, 1987 on the
TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) for the unreturned
twenty-six (26) pieces of girl scouts items and a
TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, in lieu of SIX
PERCENT (6%), on the said amount upon finality of this
Decision until the payment thereof. Costs against
petitioners.
MARCIA V CA (PAJE)
205 PHIL 147
RELOVA; January 27, 1983
NATURE
Petition for certiorari
FACTS
- Paje is a driver of a Victory Liner Bus
- His bus collided with the jeep driven by
Clemente Marcia, causing the latter’s death and
physical injuries to herein petitioners, Edgar
Marcia and Renato Yap
torts & damages
- Paje was charged with homicide and serious
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. A civil
case was also instituted against him by herein
petitioners for reckless imprudence and
negligence in driving the passenger bus.
- He was convicted in the criminal case in the
RTC. However, he was acquitted in the CA. The
CA ruled that criminal negligence is wanting and
that Paje was not even guilty of civil negligence,
for the case was of pure accident.
- The defendants presented the copy of said
criminal case to the court handling the civil case
against them. The civil case was dismissed.
ISSUES
WON the acquittal in the criminal case would
result to a dismissal in the civil case
HELD
YES
- The acquittal of the accused from the criminal
charge will not necessarily extinguish the civil
liability unless the court declares in the judgment
that the fact from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist.
- Petitioner also relies on Art 33 CC. However, the
said article speaks only of defamation, fraud and
physical injuries. The injuries suffered by herein
petitioners were alleged to be the result of
criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with
malice. Hence, no independent civil action for
damages may be instituted in connection
therewith. Otherwise stated, unless the act from
which the civil liability arises is declared to be
non-existent in the final judgment, the extinction
of the criminal liability will not carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability
DISPOSITIVE
Decision affirmed
MADEJA V CARO
ABAD SANTOS, J.: December 21, 1983
NATURE
Petition which seeks to set aside the order of the
respondent judge granting the defendant's motion to
dismiss
A2010 - 111 -
FACTS
- Dr. Eva A. Japzon is accused of homicide through
reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after
an appendectomy. The complaining witness is the
widow of the deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The
information states that: "The offended party Carmen L.
Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action
for damages."
- The criminal case still pending, Madeja sued Dr.
Japzon for damages in the same court. She alleged that
her husband died because of the gross negligence of
Dr. Japzon. The respondent judge granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss which invoked Section 3
(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads: "Sec.
3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. - In all cases
not included in the preceding section the following rules
shall be observed: (a) Criminal and civil actions arising
from the same offense may be instituted separately,
but after the criminal action has been commenced the
civil action can not be instituted until final judgment
has been rendered in the criminal action.". . .
ISSUES
1. WON an independent civil action may be filed during
the pendency of the criminal case
HELD
1. YES. Ratio Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the
applicable provision. The two enactments are quoted
hereinbelow:
"Sec, 2. Independent civil action. - … an independent
civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party
during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the
right is reserved as required in the preceding section.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. "
- "Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence."
Obiter - There are at least two things about Art. 33 of
the Civil Code which are worth noting, namely:
1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be
instituted is ex-delicto. This is manifest from the
provision which uses the expressions "criminal action"
and "criminal prosecution."
Tolentino says: "While the State is the complainant in
the criminal case, the injured individual is the one most
concerned because it is he who has suffered directly.
prof. casis
He should be permitted to demand reparation for the
wrong which peculiarly affects him."
2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic
sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in
the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical
injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted
homicide.
Dispositive
Petition is GRANTED; the order dismissing Civil Case
No. 141 is SET ASIDE
ARAFILES v PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS,
INC
CARPIO MORALES, J., March 25, 2004
NATURE
Petition for review of CA Deci
FACTS
(Consti II Case)
-Respondent Morales wrote an article for People’s
Journal Tonight based on the sworn statement in the
police blotter and interview of Emelita Despuig where
Despuig alleged that Arafiles raped her the month
before then attempted to rape her the night she filed a
complaint. Morales attempted to contact Arafiles but
since the latter’s office was still closed at that time
(past 12mn – he works for NIAS-PAGASA), he was not
able to do so.
-About a year following the published article, Arafiles
filed action for damages based on the alleged “grossly
malicious and overly sensationalized” report by Morales
which cast aspersions on his character, being the object
of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a
sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist.
-RTC: in favor of Arafiles
-CA: in favor of Morales, et. al. based on doctrine of fair
comment
ISSUE
WON the CA erred in holding that the publication of the
news item was not attended with malice to thus free
respondents of liability for damages
HELD
NO. Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a
good name and reputation, but we do not consider that
the respondents, under the circumstances of this case,
had violated said right or abused the freedom of the
press.
Ratio. The newspapers should be given such leeway
and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and
effectively perform their important role in our
torts & damages
democracy. In the preparation of stories, press
reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their
deadlines; and consistently with good faith and
reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to
a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or
imperfection in the choice of words.
Reasoning. First discussed applicable provisions (A33,
19, 21 NCC): Article 33 contemplates a civil action for
the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated
to the purely criminal aspect of the case. A civil
action for libel under this article shall be instituted and
prosecuted to final judgment and proved by
preponderance of evidence separately from and
entirely independent of the institution, pendency or
result of the criminal action because it is governed by
the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the
Revised Penal Code governing the criminal offense
charged and the civil liability arising therefrom.
-then discussed how to determine if a published work is
libelous: In actions for damages for libel, it is
axiomatic that the published work alleged to
contain libelous material must be examined and
viewed as a whole.
-then discussed the petitioner’s allegation that the
news item as a “malicious sensationalization” failed:
even though the police blotter only shows 1 count of
abduction and rape, respondent was present when
Emelita executed her sworn-statement where she
reported an abduction with rape and an abduction
incident (where no rape occurred, but was about to
happen) – so respondent’s article was not maliciously
sensationalized. The presentation of the news item
subject of petitioner’s complaint may have been in a
sensational manner, but it is not per se illegal.
Respondents could of course have been more
circumspect in their choice of words as the headline
and first seven paragraphs of the news item give the
impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually
committed the crimes complained of by Emelita. The
succeeding paragraphs (in which petitioner and
complainant Emelita were eventually identified)
sufficiently convey to the readers, however, that the
narration of events was only an account of what
Emelita had reported at the police headquarters.
-then mentioned doctrine: The newspapers should be
given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to
courageously and effectively perform their important
role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories,
press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with
their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and
reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to
a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or
imperfection in the choice of words.
Disposition. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DENIED. SO ORDERED
A2010 - 112 -
MVRS V ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL
G.R. No. 135306
BELLOSILLO; January 28, 2003
NATURE
Petition to review decision of CA
FACTS
- The ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHIL (IDCP), a
local federation of more than 70 Muslim religious orgs,
and some individual Muslims filed in the RTC Manila a
complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a
class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide
against MVRS PUBLICATIONS, et.al.
- Complaint alleged that what was published in BULGAR
was insulting and damaging to the Muslims; that these
words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was
not only published out of sheer ignorance but with
intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the
Muslims and Islam; that on account of these libelous
words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Phil
but the entire Muslim world, esp. every Muslim
individual in non-Muslim countries.
- MVRS claimed it was merely an expression of
belief/opinion and was published without malice. Also, it
did not mention respondents as object of the article,
hence, were not entitled to damages.
RTC dismissed: plaintiffs failed to establish their
cause of action since the persons allegedly defamed by
the article were not specifically identified.
CA reversed: it was "clear from the disputed article
that the defamation was directed to all adherents of
Islamic faith.”
ISSUE
1. WON elements of libel exist
2. WON the cause of action should rise from an
intentional tortuous act causing mental distress
HELD
1. NO.
Reasoning Defamation means the offense of injuring a
person's character, fame or reputation through false
and malicious statements. Words which are merely
insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se,
and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious,
ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do
not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in
the absence of an allegation for special damages.
2. NO.
The cause of action is libel.
Ratio Action arising from an intentional tortuous act
causing mental distress cannot be sustained in this
prof. casis
case, for such action is personal in nature, and since no
particular individual was identified in the disputed
article, such cause of action cannot be sustained.
Torts with independent civil action: DEFAMATION
An "emotional distress" tort action is personal in
nature; it is a civil action filed by an individual to
assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to
personal attacks on his character.
- The purported damage caused by the published
article falls under principle of relational harm - which
includes harm to social relationships in the community
in the form of defamation; as distinguished from the
principle of reactive harm - which includes injuries to
individual emotional tranquility in the form of an
infliction of emotional distress. The present case falls
within the application of the relational harm principle of
tort actions for defamation.
- To recover for this the plaintiff must show that: (a)
conduct of the defendant was intentional or in
reckless disregard of plaintiff; (b) conduct was
extreme and outrageous; (c) causal connection
between defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mental
distress; and, (d) the plaintiff's mental distress was
extreme and severe.
- Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must
prove more than mere worry, anxiety, embarrassment,
or anger. (AmJur)
Disposition Petition granted. Decision reversed.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG [concur]
- The present controversy stems from a civil action for
damages and not from a criminal complaint. CC
recognizes the possibility of such a civil action either
pursuant to Art 26, par. 4, to the effect that although
it may not constitute a criminal offense, “vexing or
humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs
xxx” can give rise to a cause of action for damages, or
to Art. 33 which provides that in case of defamation, a
civil complaint for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal case, may be brought by the
injured party.
- In the present case, the article relates to the entire
Muslim population and not just to the IDCP or to any of
the individual respondents. There is no direct reference
or allusion to the federation or any of its members, or
to any of the individual complainants. Respondents
scarcely can claim having been singled out for social
censure pointedly resulting in damages.
CARPIO [dissent]
- I dissent not because the newspaper article in
question is libelous, but because it constitutes an
torts & damages
intentional tortious act causing mental distress to those
whom private respondent IDCP represents.
- Both RTC and CA found the article insulting and
humiliating to Muslims, causing wounded feelings and
mental anguish to believers of Islam. This finding of fact
establishes that petitioners have inflicted on private
respondents an intentional wrongful act - humiliating
persons because of their religious beliefs.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ [dissent]
- Focal point of claim for damages: insult caused by the
article that the Muslims worship the pig as their God
which is absolutely contrary to their basic belief as
Muslims that there is only one God, and, that the
greatest sin in Islam is to worship things or persons
other than Allah.
- The article is not only an imputation of irreligious
conduct but also a downright misrepresentation of the
religious beliefs of Muslims. Liability for libel does not
depend on the intention of the defamer, but on the fact
of defamation.
SALTA V DE VEYRA
202 Phil 527
DE CASTRO; September 30, 1982
FACTS
- Two cases involving the same issue disposed of by
two judges in a manner directly in opposition of each
other. For a uniform ruling that would authoritatively
settle this regrettable conflict of opinion, the two cases
have been consolidated for a single decision.
- Salta was an employee of the PNB assigned as
Manager of the Malolos' branch. His duty was to grant
loans, or only to recommend the granting of loans,
depending on the amount of the loan applied for.
- In disregard of the pertinent rules, regulations and
policies of the respondent bank, Salta indiscriminately
granted certain loans mentioned in the complaints filed
by PNB, in manner characterized by negligence, fraud
and manifest partiality, and upon securities not
commensurate with the amount of the loans.
- PNB filed two civil actions to recover losses the bank
suffered (Civil Case No. 79583, Civil Case No. 88343).
With this the bank filed a criminal action against Salta,
for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
- Salta was acquitted in the criminal case, and filed
Motions to Dismiss in each of the two civil cases. It is in
the resolution of the motions to dismiss that Judges de
Veyra and Purisima of the CFI of Manila took
diametrically opposing views, the former denying the
motion, the latter granting it.
ISSUE
A2010 - 113 -
WON a decision of acquittal in a criminal case operates
to dismiss a separate civil action filed on the basis of
the same facts as alleged in the criminal case (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
HELD
NO.
Ratio The civil action permitted therein to be filed
separately from the criminal action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings "regardless
of the result of the latter." Acquittal in the criminal case
will not be an obstacle for the civil case to prosper
unless in the criminal case the Court makes a finding
that even civilly, the accused would not be liable.
Reasoning
ART 33.
In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
- The filing in this case of a civil action separate from
the criminal action is fully warranted under the
provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code. The
criminal case is for the prosecution of an offense the
main element of which is fraud, one of the kinds of
crime mentioned in the aforecited provision. Based on
the same acts for which the criminal action was filed,
the civil actions very clearly alleged fraud and
negligence as having given rise to the cause of action
averred in the complaints.
- The offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a
nature, unlike other offenses not mentioned, that they
may be made the subject of a separate civil action
because of the distinct separability of their respective
juridical cause or basis of action. This is clearly
illustrated in the case of swindling, a specie of an
offense committed by means of fraud, where the civil
case may be filed separately and proceed
independently of the criminal case, regardless of the
result of the latter.
- That there was fraud committed by the defendant in
granting the aforesaid loans which rendered him liable
for his acts, which fraud is positively and easily
identifiable in the manner and scheme aforementioned.
- JUSTICE JBL REYES: “…in the case of an independent
civil actions under the Civil Code, the result of the
criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction, would be
entirely irrelevant to the civil action. This seems to be
the spirit of the law when it decided to make these
actions `entirely separate and distinct' from the
criminal action. Hence in these cases, I think Rule 107
Sec. 1(d) does not apply.”
prof. casis
- It is significant to note that under Article 31 [11] of the
New Civil Code, it is made clear that the civil action
permitted therein to be filed separately from the
criminal action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings "regardless of the result of the
latter."
DISPOSITION
The decision of Justice De Veyra is affirmed.
PRUDENTIAL BANK V IAC (Philippine
Rayon Mills & Anacleto Chi)
216 SCRA 257
DAVIDE, JR.; G.R. No. 74886 December 8,
1992
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of IAC, which affirmed in toto
the decision of CFI Quezon City in a civil action instituted by the
petitioner for the recovery of a sum of money representing the
amount paid by it to the Nissho Company Ltd. of Japan for
textile machinery imported by the Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc.,
represented by co-defendant Anacleto R. Chi.
FACTS
-August 8, 1962: Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc. entered into a
contract with Nissho Co., Ltd. of Japan for the importation of
textile machineries under a five-year deferred payment plan. To
effect payment for said machineries, Phil. Rayon applied for
and was granted a commercial letter of credit with the
Prudential Bank and Trust Company in favor of Nissho. Against
this letter of credit, drafts were drawn and issued by Nissho,
which were all paid by the Prudential Bank through its
correspondent in Japan, the Bank of Tokyo, Ltd. As indicated
on their faces, two of these drafts were accepted by the Phil
Rayon through its president, Anacleto R. Chi, while the others
were not.
-Upon arrival of the machineries, the Prudential Bank indorsed
the shipping documents to the Phil Rayon which accepted
delivery of the same. To enable the Phil Rayon to take delivery
of the machineries, it executed, by prior arrangement with the
Prudential Bank, a trust receipt which was signed by Anacleto
R. Chi in his capacity as president of Phil Rayon.
-At the back of the trust receipt is a printed form to be
accomplished by two sureties who, by the very terms and
conditions thereof, were to be jointly and severally liable to the
Prudential Bank should the Phil Rayon fail to pay the total
amount or any portion of the drafts issued by Nissho and paid
for by Prudential Bank. The Phil Rayon was able to take
delivery of the textile machineries and installed the same at its
factory site at 69 Obudan Street, Quezon City.
-Sometime in 1967, the Phil Rayon ceased business operation.
On December 29, 1969, Phil Rayon's factory was leased by
Yupangco Cotton Mills for an annual rental of P200,000.00.
torts & damages
The lease was renewed on January 3, 1973. On January 5,
1974, all the textile machineries in the Phil Rayon's factory
were sold to AIC Development Corporation for P300,000.00.
-The obligation of the Phil Rayon arising from the letter of credit
and the trust receipt remained unpaid and unliquidated.
Repeated formal demands for the payment of the said trust
receipt yielded no result Hence, the present action for the
collection of the principal amount of P956,384.95 was filed on
October 3, 1974 against the Phil Rayon and Anacleto R. Chi.
Defendant’s Defenses lack of cause of action; prescription;
laches
Lower Court’s Ruling Both the CFI and the IAC ruled that
Philippine Rayon could be held liable for the two (2) drafts
because only these appear to have been accepted by the latter
after due presentment. The liability for the remaining ten (10)
drafts did not arise because the same were not presented for
acceptance. In short, both courts concluded that acceptance of
the drafts by Philippine Rayon was indispensable to make the
latter liable thereon.
ISSUES:
1. Whether presentment for acceptance of the drafts was
indispensable to make Philippine Rayon liable thereon;
2. Whether Philippine Rayon is liable on the basis of the trust
receipt;
3. Whether private respondent Chi is jointly and severally liable
with Philippine Rayon for the obligation sought to be enforced
3a. If not, WON he may be considered a guarantor
3b. If he is a guarantor, WON the case should have been
dismissed on the ground of lack of cause of action as there was
no prior exhaustion of Philippine Rayon's properties.
HELD:
1. NO. Presentment for acceptance is necessary only in the
cases expressly provided for in Section 143 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law (NIL). The parties herein agree, and the trial
court explicitly ruled, that the subject, drafts are sight drafts
which do not require presentment for acceptance. They are,
pursuant to Section 7 of the NIL, payable on demand. And even
if these were not sight drafts, thereby necessitating acceptance,
it would be the petitioner — and not Philippine Rayon — which
had to accept the same for the latter was not the drawee.
2. YES.
-And although it is true that the petitioner commenced a
criminal action for the violation of the Trust Receipts Law, no
legal obstacle prevented it from enforcing the civil liability
arising out of the trust, receipt in a separate civil action. Under
Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law, the failure of an
entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods,
documents or instruments covered by a trust receipt to the
extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appear in the
trust receipt or to return said goods, documents or instruments
if they were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the
terms of the trust receipt shall constitute the crime of estafa,
punishable under the provisions of Art.315, par. 1(b) of the
RPC.
A2010 - 114 -
-Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party in cases of
defamation, fraud and physical injuries. Estafa falls under
fraud.
3. NO. Private respondent Chi's signature in the dorsal portion
of the trust receipt did not bind him solidarily with Philippine
Rayon.
3a. YES. SC’s own reading of the questioned solidary guaranty
clause yields the conclusion that the obligation of Chi is only
that of a guarantor.
Reasoning Last sentence of the clause speaks of waiver of
exhaustion, which, nevertheless, is ineffective in this case
because the space therein for the party whose property may
not be exhausted was not filled up.
-The clause "we jointly and severally agree and undertake"
refers to the undertaking of the two (2) parties who are to sign it
or to the liability existing between themselves. It does not refer
to the undertaking between either one or both of them on the
one hand and the petitioner on the other with respect to the
liability described under the trust receipt. Elsewise stated, their
liability is not divisible as between them, i.e., it can be enforced
to its full extent against any one of them.
-Any doubt as to the import, or true intent of the solidary
guaranty clause should be resolved against the petitioner since
the trust receipt, together with the questioned solidary guaranty
clause, is a contract of adhesion which must be strictly
construed against the party responsible for its preparation.
-By his signing, Chi became the sole guarantor. The attestation
by witnesses and the acknowledgement before a notary public
are not required by law to make a party liable on the
instrument. Contracts shall be obligatory in whatever form they
may have been entered into, provided all the essential
requisites for their validity are present; however, when the law
requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be
valid or enforceable, or that it be proved in a certain way, that
requirement is absolute and indispensable. With respect to a
guaranty, which is a promise to answer for the debt or default of
another, the law merely requires that it, or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing. Otherwise, it would be
unenforceable unless ratified. While the acknowledgement of a
surety before a notary public is required to make the same a
public document, under Article 1358 of the Civil Code, a
contract of guaranty does not have to appear in a public
document.
-Reading Section 13 of PD No. 115: It is clear that if the
violation or offense is committed by a corporation, partnership,
association or other juridical entities, the penalty of
imprisonment shall be imposed upon the directors, officers,
employees or other officials or persons therein responsible for
the offense. However, it is these corporations, partnerships,
associations, etc, which are made liable for the civil liability
arising from the criminal offense.
-Since that violation of a trust receipt constitutes fraud
under Article 33 of the Civil Code, petitioner was acting
well within its rights in filing an independent civil action to
prof. casis
enforce the civil liability arising therefrom against
Philippine Rayon.
3b. NO. Excussion is not a condition sine qua non for the
institution of an action against a guarantor. There was nothing
procedurally objectionable in impleading private respondent Chi
as a co-defendant in the civil case for the collection of a sum of
money. As a matter of fact, Section 6, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court on permissive joinder of parties explicitly allows it.
-This is the equity rule relating to multifariousness. It is based
on trial convenience and is designed to permit the joinder of
plaintiffs or defendants whenever there is a common question
of law or fact. It will save the parties unnecessary work, trouble
and expense.
-However, Chi's liability is limited to the principal obligation in
the trust receipt plus all the accessories thereof including
judicial costs; with respect to the latter, he shall only be liable
for those costs incurred after being judicially required to pay.
Interest and damages, being accessories of the principal
obligation, should also be paid; these, however, shall run only
from the date of the filing of the complaint. Attorney's fees may
even be allowed in appropriate cases.
Disposition Petition granted. Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc.
declared liable on the 12 drafts in question and on the trust
receipt. Private respondent Anacleto R. Chi declared
secondarily liable on the trust receipt.
CAPUNO V PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING
COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES
MAKALINTAL; April 30, 1965
FACTS
- The case arose from a vehicular collision.
- Involved were a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by
Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno.
- The collision proved fatal to the latter as well as to his
passengers, the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina
Paras.
- Elordi was charged with triple homicide through
reckless imprudence in the CFI of Pampanga. The
information was subsequently amended to include
claims for damages by the heirs of the three victims.
- While the criminal case was pending, the Intestate
Estate of the Buan spouses and their heirs filed a civil
action, also for damages, in the CFI of Tarlac against
the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and
Jon Elordi.
- Included in the complaint was a claim for indemnity
in the sum of P2,623.00 allegedly paid by the Estate to
the heirs of Capuno under the Workmen's
Compensation Act.
-In the criminal case both the heirs of Capuno and the
Estate of were represented by their respective counsel
as private prosecutors: Attorney Ricardo Y. Navarro and
Attorneys Jose W. Diokno and Augusto M. Ilagan.
torts & damages
- In view of the filing of the civil action the accused Jon
Elordi moved to strike out the appearances of these
private prosecutors in the criminal case. Grounds for
the motion were (1) that as the Capuno heirs were
concerned, they no longer had any interest to protect in
the criminal case since they had already claimed and
received compensation for the death of their decedent;
and (2) that on the part of the Estate of Buan its right
to intervene in said case had been abated by the civil
action.
-The appearance and intervention of Attorneys Diokno
and Ilagan was disallowed by the Court and that of
Attorney Navarro was disallowed in an amending order.
No appeal was taken from either of the two orders.
- The parties in the civil case entered into a
"Compromise and Settlement." For P290,000.00 the
Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages, including
the claim for reimbursement of the sum of P2,623.00
previously paid to the heirs of Capuno "under the
Workmen's Compensation Act."
- The Court approved the compromise and accordingly
dismissed the case.
- At that time the criminal case was still pending;
judgment was rendered wherein the accused Elordi was
acquitted of the charges against him. Prior thereto,
herein appellants commenced a civil action for
damages against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of
the Philippines and Jon Elordi.
- This is the action which, upon appellees' motion, was
dismissed by the Court a quo in its order of February
29, 1960, from which order the present appeal has
been taken.
- The grounds upon which appellees based their motion
for dismissal and which the Court found to be "well
taken" were; (1) that the action had already prescribed;
and (2) that appellees had been released from
appellants' claim for damages by virtue of the payment
to the latter of the sum of P2,623.00 by the Buan Estate
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, which sum, in
turn, was sought to be recovered by the said Estate
from appellees in Civil Case No. 838 but finally settled
by them in their compromise.
ISSUE
WON the action had already prescribed.
RULING
YES.
- There can be no doubt that the present action is one
for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict, which
action must be instituted within four (4) years (Article
1146, Civil Code).
- Appellants originally sought to enforce their claim ex-
delicto, that is, under the provisions of the Penal Code,
when they intervened in the criminal case against Jon
A2010 - 115 -
Elordi. The information therein, it may be recalled, was
amended precisely to include an allegation concerning
damages suffered by the heirs of the victims of the
accident for which Elordi was being prosecuted.
- But appellants' intervention was subsequently
disallowed and they did not appeal from the Court's
order to the effect.
- And when they commenced the civil action on
September 26, 1958 the criminal case was still
pending, showing that appellants then chose to pursue
the remedy afforded by the Civil Code, for otherwise
that action would have been premature and in any
event would have been concluded by the subsequent
judgment of acquittal in the criminal case.
- In filing the civil action as they did appellants correctly
considered it as entirely independent of the criminal
action, pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code,
which read:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter.
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
- The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes
bodily injuries causing death. In other words, the civil
action for damages could have been commenced by
appellants immediately upon the death of their
decedent, Cipriano Capuno, and the same would not
have been stayed by the filing of the criminal action for
homicide through reckless imprudence. But the
complaint here was filed only on September 26, 1958,
or after the lapse of more than five years.
- The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants'
contention that the four-year period of prescription in
this case was interrupted by the filing of the criminal
action against Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had neither
waived the civil action nor reserved the right to
institute it separately. Such reservation was not then
necessary; without having made it they could file — as
in fact they did — a separate civil action even during
the pendency of the criminal case; and consequently,
as held in Paulan v. Sarabia, supra, "the institution of a
criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting
the institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict."
- As to whether or not Rule 111, Section 2, of the
Revised Rules of Court which requires the reservation
of the right to institute a separate and independent civil
action in the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33,
prof. casis
34, and 2177 of the Civil Code affects the question of
prescription, the said rule does not apply in the present
case.
DISPOSTIION The order appealed from was affirmed,
without costs.
CORPUS V PAJE
28 SCRA 1062
CAPISTRANO; July 31, 1969
NATURE
Direct appeal from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal
FACTS
- December 23, 1956 – Felardo Paje was driving a
Victory Liner bus. It collided with a jeepney driven by
Clemente Marcia in Lubao, Pampanga. As a result of
the collision, Marcia died while two other people were
physically injured.
- An information for homicide and double serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed
against Paje. Marcia’s heirs reserved their right to
institute a separate civil action against Paje. Paje was
later found guilty on November 7, 1960.
- November 21, 1961 – Pending Paje’s appeal, the
window and children of Marcia instituted the separate
civil action for damages arising from the accident
against Paje and Victory Liner, praying that the
defendants be jointly and severally liable.
- November 9, 1962 – Paje was acquitted by the
appellate court, saying that the collision was purely an
accident.
- December 29, 1962 – Paje filed a motion to dismiss
the civil action on the ground that his acquittal barred
the said action but the motion was denied.
Petitioners’ Claim
> The petitioners claim that the Lower Court erred in
acquitting Paje and that his acquittal was a bar to the
civil action. Quoting Chantangco vs. Abaroai: “It is true
that one of the plaintiffs in the present case reserved
whatever right he may have had to bring a civil action.
This was obviously of no avail, inasmuch as there
resulted a judgment for the defendant, and the plain
inference from the foregoing is that a verdict of
acquittal must carry with it exemption from civil
responsibility.”
Respondents’ Comments:
> At the pre-trial of the civil case, the defendants asked
the court to rule on their special defense that plaintiffs'
cause of action based upon a quasi-delict had
prescribed considering that the complaint was brought
four years and eleven months after the collision and
torts & damages
that according to Article 1144 of the Civil Code an
action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted
within four years. The lower court ruled that the action
had already prescribed.
ISSUE
WON the civil action against Paje can still prosper
despite his acquittal
HELD
NO
Ratio Criminal negligence, that is, reckless
imprudence, is not one of the three crimes mentioned
in Article 33 of the Civil Code which authorizes the
institution of an independent civil action, that is, of an
entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages,
which shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution and shall be proved only by a
preponderance of evidence. Thearticle mentions only
the crimes of defamation, fraud, (estafa) and physical
injuries.
Reasoning
- Although in the case of Dyogi vs. Yatco this Court held
that the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33 of
the Civil Code includes homicide, it is to be borne in
mind that the charge against Felardo Paje was for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, and not for
homicide and physical injuries.
- In People vs. Buan, the Court ruled that the “offense
of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the
negligent or careless act, not the result thereof.”
- Homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal
negligence comes under the general rule that the
acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar
to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act
notwithstanding that the injured party reserved.
- With regard to the issue of prescription, the Court
ruled that the action had indeed prescribed because
the prescription period was pegged at 4 years (A1146,
CC) and began to run on the day the quasi-delict was
committed.
Disposition PREMISES CONSIDERED, the order
appealed from is affirmed, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
MADEJA V CARO
211 PHIL 469
ABAD SANTOS; December 21, 1983
NATURE
A2010 - 116 -
Petition seeking to set aside the order of the CFI
dismissing the civil case against Japzon
FACTS
- DR. EVA A. JAPZON was accused of homicide through
reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after
an appendectomy.
- In the information, the offended party Carmen L.
Madeja reserved her right to file a separate civil action
for damages
- The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja
sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for damages, alleging that her
husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr.
Japzon.
- The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the
respondent judge granted on the basis of Section 3(a)
of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court16
ISSUE
WON a civil action for damages may be instituted
pending the resolution of a criminal case
HELD
YES
- Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to
Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision. A
- Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases
provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party during the pendency of the criminal case,
provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111,
Rules of Court.)
- Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. (Civil Code,)
Obiter
- There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil
Code which are worth noting, namely:
16
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not
included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed: (a)
Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted
separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil
action can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action. ...
prof. casis
1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be
instituted is ex-delicto. This is manifest from the
provision which uses the expressions "criminal
action" and "criminal prosecution."
2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a
generic sense. It is not the crime of physical
injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It
includes not only physical injuries but
consummated, frustrated and attempted
homicide.
- The Article in question uses the words 'defamation',
'fraud' and 'physical injuries.' Defamation and fraud are
used in their ordinary sense because there are no
specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using
these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so
that these two terms defamation and fraud must have
been used not to impart to them any technical meaning
in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense.
With this in mind, it is evident that the terms 'physical
injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense
as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is
difficult to believe that the Code Commission would
have used terms in the same article-some in their
general and another in its technical sense.
- In other words, the term 'physical injuries' should be
understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of
physical injuries, because the terms used with the
latter are general terms.
- In any case the Code Commission recommended that
the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the
civil action for assault and battery in American Law,
and this recommendation must hove been accepted by
the Legislature when it approved the article intact as
recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil
action for the bodily harm received by the complainant
similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the
Code Commission states, the civil action should lie
whether the offense committed is that of physical
injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide,
or even death" **(end of obiter)
- Corpus vs. Paje, which states that reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence is not
included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not
authoritative. Of eleven justices only nine took
part in the decision and four of them merely
concurred in the result.
Disposition Petition is granted; the order dismissing
Civil Case No. 141 is hereby set aside.
DULAY V CA (SAFEGUARD,
SUPERGUARD)
243 SCRA 220
BIDIN; April 3, 1995
torts & damages
FACTS
- Benigno Torzuela, , a security guard on duty at the
"Big Bang sa Alabang," and Atty. Napoleon Dulay had
an altercation. Torzuela shot and killed Atty. Dulay.
- Maria Benita Dulay, widow of Dulay, filed an action for
damages against Torzuela and Safeguard Investigation
and Security Co., Inc., (SAFEGUARD) and/or Superguard
Security Corp. (SUPERGUARD), alleged employers of
defendant Torzuela.
Respondent:
> that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the
scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of
shooting was committed w/ deliberate intent (dolo), the
civil liability is governed by Art 100 of the RPC.
> that a complaint for damages based on negligence
under Art 2176 (the one filed by petitioners) cannot lie,
since the civil liability under Art 2176 applies only to
quasi-offenses under Art 365 of the RPC.
> that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature
considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal
case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's
subsidiary liability.
> that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies
only to injuries intentionally committed (Marcia v
CA)
Petitioner
> the incident resulting in the death of Dulay was due
to the concurring negligence of the defendants.
Torzuela's wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm
issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or
SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause
of the injury, while the negligence of defendant
SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having
failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family in the supervision and control of its employee to
avoid the injury.
> that their cause of action against the private
respondents is based on their liability under Article
2180
> that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of
negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and
voluntary, citing Andamo v. IAC. Thus, Torzuela's act of
shooting Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable
under Art 2176
> that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also
actionable under Art 3317
and Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court18
17
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only
a preponderance of evidence
18
Rule 111.Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently - In
the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, the independent civil-action which has been reserved may
A2010 - 117 -
ISSUE
WON civil action can proceed independently of the
criminal action
HELD
YES
- Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
"Sec 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity
under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission of
the accused."
- It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil
action before the prosecution in the criminal action
presents evidence is even far better than a compliance
with the requirement of an express reservation. This is
precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case.
- The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has
already been construed to include bodily injuries
causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co;
Carandang v. Santiago). It is not the crime of physical
injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes
not only physical injuries but also consummated,
frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v.
Caro).
- Although in the Marcia case, it was held that no
independent civil action may be filed under Article 33
where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it
must be noted however, that Torzuela, the accused in
the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with
reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia
was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in
this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
INTENTIONAL TORTS
VELAYO V SHELL CO OF THE PHILS
100 PHIL 186
FELIX; October 31, 1956
NATURE
Appeal from a judgment of CFI Manila
be brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the
criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
prof. casis
FACTS
- Since the start of Commercial Air Line, Inc’s (CALI)
operations, its fuel needs were all supplied by Shell
Company of the P.I., Ltd, (Shell). Desmond Fitzgerald,
Shell’s Credit Manager was in charge of collecting
payment. Any extensions of term of payment, however,
had to be decided by Stephen Crawford and later by
Wildred Wooding
- As of August 1948, Shell’s books showed a balance of
P170,162.58 in its favor for goods it sold and delivered
to CALI. Shell had reasons to believe that the financial
condition of Shell was far from being satisfactory.
Alfonso Sycip, CALI”s President of Board of Directors,
offered to Fitzgerald CALI’s Douglas C-54 plane, which
was then in California. The offer was declined by
Crawford.
- Aug 6, 1948, management of CALI informally
convened its principal creditors in a luncheon, and
informed them that CALI was in a state of insolvency
and had to stop operation. Alexander Sycip, Secretary
of the Board of Directors of CALI, explained the
memorandum agreement executed by CALI with Phil Air
Lines Inc on Aug 4, regarding the proposed sale to PAL
of the aviation equipment of CALI. Alfredo Velayo,
Auditor of CALI, discussed the balance sheets of CALI.
The balance sheet made mention of the Douglas C-54
plane.
- There was a general understanding among all
creditors present on the desirability of consummating
the sale in favor of PAL. Then followed a discussion on
the payment of claims of creditors and the preferences
claimed for the accounts due to employees, the
Government, and the National Airports Corp. The other
creditors disputed such contention of preference. No
understanding was reached on the matter of
preference of payment and it was then generally
agreed that the matter be further studied by a working
committee to be formed. Mr. Fitzgerald of Shell, Atty.
Agcaoili of National Airports Corp., and Atty. Alexander
Sycip were appointed to the working committee.
- Those present in the meeting were of the unanimous
opinion that it would be advantageous not to present
suits against CALI but to strive for a fair pro-rata
division of its assets. The management of CALI
announced that in case of non-agreement of the
creditors, it would file insolvency proceedings.
- Aug 9, 1948, working committee discussed methods
of achieving objectives, which were to preserve the
assets of CALI and to study the way of making a fair
division of all the assets among the creditors. However,
negotiation on the division of assets was left pending.
- On the same day (Aug 9), Shell effected a telegraphic
transfer of all its credit against CALI to the American
Corporation Shell Oil Co., Inc., assigning its credit
amounting to $79,440. This was followed on Aug 10 by
torts & damages
a deed of assignment of credit amounting to
$85,081.29.
- Aug 12, 1948 American Shell Oil Co filed a complaint
against CALI in the Superior Court of the State of
California, USA, for the collection of assigned credit of
$79,440, and a writ of attachment was applied for and
issued against a C-54 plane. Sept 17, 1948 an
amended complaint was filed to recover assigned credit
of $85,081.29 and a supplemental attachment for a
higher sum against the C-54 plane, plus miscellaneous
personal properties.
- Unaware of Shell’s assignment of credit, CALI on Aug
12, 1948 approved the memorandum agreement of
sale to PAL, and noted that “the Board had been trying
to reach an agreement with creditors… to prevent
insolvency proceedings, but so far no definite
agreement had been reached.”
- First week of Sept 1948, National Airports Corp
learned of Shell’s action in the US and hastened to file
its own complaint with attachment against CALI in the
CFI of Manila.
- Oct 7, 1948 CALI filed a petition for voluntary
insolvency. An order of insolvency was issued by the
court on the same day. Mr. Alfredo Velayo was
appointed Assignee in the proceedings.
- Velayo instituted case against Shell for the purpose of
securing writ of injunction restraining Shell from
prosecuting against CALI, and as an alternative, that
Shell be ordered to pay damages double the value of
the plane if the case in the US will defeat the
procurement of CALI of its plane.
- Dec 22, 1948, Court denied petition because
whether the conveyance of Shell’s credit was
fraudulent or not, the Phil court would not be in a
position to enforce its orders as against the American
corporation Shell Oil Co., Inc., which is outside the
jurisdiction of the Phils.
- Plaintiff confined his action to the recovery of
damages against Shell. Lower court dismissed the case.
Defendant’s Comments
> Assignment of credit in favor of American Shell was
for valuable consideration and made in accordance with
established commercial practices
> It has no interest in the case instituted by American
Shell, as they are separate and distinct corporations.
> Fitzgerald was merely invited to the luncheon-
meeting, without knowing the purpose for which it was
called. Fitzgerald could not have officially represented
Shell because authority resides on Crawford.
ISSUES
1. WON Shell Co., of the P.I. Ltd, taking advantage of
its knowledge of the existence of CALI’s airplane C-54
at California, USA, acted in bad faith and betrayed the
A2010 - 118 -
confidence and trust of other creditors of CALI present
in said meeting by affecting a hasty telegraphic
transfer of its credit to the American corporation Shell
Oil Company, Inc., thus defeating the purpose of the
informal meetings of CALI’s principal creditors and
depriving the plaintiff of the means of obtaining the
plane, or its value, to the detriment and prejudice of
other CALI creditors who were consequently deprived of
their share in the distribution of said value
2. WON by reason of said betrayal of confidence and
trust, Shell may be made to answer for the damages,
and if so, the amount of such damages
HELD
1. YES, Shell acted in bad faith.
- It is evident that Shell, upon learning the precarious
economic situation of CALI and that will all probability,
it could not get much of its outstanding credit because
of the preferred claims of other creditors, entirely
disregarded all moral inhibitory tenets.
- The telegraphic transfer made without knowledge and
at the back of other creditors of CALI may be a shrewd
and surprise move that enabled Shell to collect almost
all if not the entire amount of its credit, but the Court of
Justice (SC) cannot countenance such attitude at all,
and much less from a foreign corporation to the
detriment of Philippine Government and local business.
- Shell’s transfer of credit would have been justified
only if Fitzgerald had declined to take part in the
working committee and frankly and honestly informed
the other creditors present that he had no authority to
bind his principal and that the latter was to be left free
to collect its credit from CALI by whatever means his
principal deemed wise and were available to it. But
then, such information would have dissolved all
attempts to come to an amicable conciliation and would
have precipitated the filing of CALI’s voluntary
insolvency proceedings and nullified the intended
transfer of Shell’s credit to American Shell.
2. YES, Shell must answer for damages.
- Section 37 of the Insolvency Law states
Sec 37. If any person, before the assignment is
made, having notice of the commencement of the
proceedings in insolvency, or having reason to
believe that insolvency proceedings are about to be
commenced, embezzles or disposes of ay money,
goods, chattels, or effects of the insolvent, he is
chargeable therewith, and liable to an action by the
assignee for double the value of the property sought
to be embezzled or disposed of, to be received for
the benefit of the insolvent estate.
- There are doubts, however, as to the applicability of
this provision, as it is contented that what Shell really
disposed of was its own credit and not CALI’s property,
although this was practically the effect and result of the
prof. casis
scheme. The same result, however, may be achieved in
applying the provisions of the Civil Code.
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides
Art 19. Any person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due and observe honesty and good
faith.
- While Art 19 contains a mere declaration of principles,
such declaration is implemented by Article 21 of the
Civil Code, which states
Art 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
- Code Commission on Article 21: (it) would vouchsafe
adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight
to provide for specifically in the statutes. (It) is a
prudent earnest of justice in the face of the
impossibility of enumerating, one by one, all wrongs
which cause damage.
- If Article 23 of Civil Code goes as far as to provide that
“Even if an act or event causing damage to another’s
property was not due to the fault or negligence of the
defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if
through the act or event he was benefited.”, with much
more reason that Shell should be liable for indemnity
for acts it committed in bad faith and with betrayal of
confidence.
- Anent the argument that Civil Code provisions cannot
be applicable as they came into effect only on Aug 30,
1950, Art 2252 of Civil Code provides by implication
that when new provisions of the Code does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the old legislation, they may be given
retroactive effect. Shell did not have any vested or
acquired right to betray confidence of CALI or of its
creditors. Moreover, according to Art 2254 of Civil
Code, “no vested or acquired right can arise from acts
or omissions which are against the law or which infringe
upon the right of others.”
Disposition Shell is liable to pay plaintiff, for the
benefit of CALI and its creditors, compensatory
damages a sum equivalent to the value of the plane at
the time Shell assigned its credit to American Shell, and
another equal sum as exemplary damages.
VELAYO V SHELL CO OF THE PHILS
RESOLUTION
100 PHIL 207
FELIX; July 30, 1957
Defendant-appellee’s contentions
torts & damages
- It is not guilty of bad faith, it having done nothing but
to protect legitimately its own interest or credit against
the bad faith of its debtor, the insolvent CALI, under the
control of the latter’s president Alfonso Sycip
- The transfer of credit to its sister corporation in the US
did not prejudice the Government, because its claims
were fully paid, not caused any loss or injury to other
creditors, except the entities and groups controlled by
Alfonso Sycip.
It is not liable for exemplary damages because the
provisions of the new Civil Code on the matter are not
applicable to this case
- Plaintiff-appellant has no cause of action against it
and is not the real party in interest
- Plaintiff’s right of action was based and prosecuted in
the lower court under the provisions of the Insolvency
Law and consequently he is stopped from pursuing
another theory and is not entitled to damages under
the provisions of the new Civil Code.
HELD
- The facts on which Court based its conclusion that
Shell acted in bad faith are not and cannot be denied or
contradicted by defendant.
- There is no sensible reason for disturbing the finding
that Shell is liable for exemplary damages. The amount
of the award, however, may be modified.
- According to the Civil Code, exemplary or corrective
damages are imposed by way of example or correction
for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages, and that the
amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved,
for it is left to the sound discretion of the Court.
- Majority of the Court is of the opinion that the value of
the C-54 plane might result too high, and that
exemplary damages should not be left to speculation
but properly determined by a certain and fixed amount.
The amount of exemplary damages is thus modified,
and fixed at P25,000.
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V CA
(MORADA)
297 SCRA 469
QUISUMBING; October 8, 1998
NATURE
Petition for certiorari to annul and set aside CA
resolution and decision
FACTS
- Private respondent Milagros Morada was a flight
attendant of Petitioner Company. During a stop-over in
Jakarta, she went to a disco with 2 of her fellow crew
members Thamer and Allah (both surnamed Al-
A2010 - 119 -
Gazzawi) and had breakfast in their hotel room. While
there, Allah left and Thamer attempted to rape her. She
was saved by hotel security personnel who heard her
cries for help. She later filed a case against them. The
two were arrested and detained by Jakarta police.
When Morada returned to Jeddah (the base of
operations of petitioner), she was asked to go to Jakarta
to arrange for the release of the two men. She
proceeded to Jakarta but she refused to cooperate. She
was eventually allowed to return to Jeddah but barred
from Jakarta flights. The Indonesian authorities
eventually deported the 2 men, through the
intercession of the Saudi govt., after 2 weeks of
detention. They were put back in service while
respondent Morada was transferred to Manila.
- 2 years later, she was asked by her superiors to see
Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of Saudia, in
Jeddah. When they met, he brought her to the police
station where her passport was taken and she was
questioned about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy merely
stood as the police put pressure on her to drop the case
against the two men. Not until she agreed to do so did
the police return her passport and allowed her to catch
a later flight out of Jeddah.
- A year and a half later, she was again asked to go to
Jeddah to see Miniewy. When she did, a certain Khalid
of Saudia brought her to a Saudi court where she was
asked to sign a document written in Arabic. She was
told that it was necessary to close the case against
Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, she signed a
document to appear before the court a week later.
When the date of appearance came, she complied but
only after being assured by Saudia’s Manila manager
that the investigation was routinary and posed no
danger to her. She was brought before the court and
was interrogated by a Saudi judge and let go, however,
just as she was about to board a plane home, she was
told that she had been forbidden to take flight. She was
later told to remain in Jeddah and her passport was
again confiscated. A few days later, she was again
brought before the same court where the Saudi judge,
to her astonishment and shock, sentenced her to 5
months imprisonment and 286 lashes. Only then did
she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together
with Thamer and Allah for what happened in Jakarta.
The court found her guilty of adultery; going to a disco,
dancing and listening to music in violation of Islamic
laws; and socializing with the male crew, in
contravention of Islamic tradition.
- Facing conviction, she sought help from her employer,
petitioner Saudia but she was denied assistance of any
kind. She asked the Phil. Embassy to help her. Because
she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah
dismissed the case against her and allowed her to
leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila,
prof. casis
she was terminated from the service by Saudia without
being informed of the cause.
- She then filed a complaint for damages against Saudia
and Mr. Al-Balawi, its country manager. Saudia filed a
motion to dismiss raising the issues of lack of cause of
action and lack of jurisdiction. The RTC denied the
motion to dismiss by Saudia, as well as the subsequent
MFR. Saudia then filed petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction and/or TRO with the CA. The CA
issued a TRO prohibiting respondent judge from
conducting any proceeding unless otherwise directed.
The CA, however, in another resolution, denied Saudia’s
prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction.
Saudia then filed to the SC this instant petition.
However, during the pendency of this petition,
respondent CA rendered a decision that the Philippines
is an appropriate forum considering that the Amended
Complaint's basis for recovery of damages is Art.21 CC,
thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court.
ISSUES
1. WON Morada had a cause of action
2. Which law should govern (Phil. Law or Saudi Law)
HELD
1. YES
- She aptly predicated her cause of action on Art.19 and
Art.21 of the CC. As held in PNB v CA, “the aforecited
provisions on human relations were intended to expand
the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold no. of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically provide in the statutes.” Although Art.19
merely declares a principle of law, Art.21 gives flesh to
its provisions.
Reasoning
- After a careful study of the pleadings, We are
convinced that there is reasonable basis for private
respondent’s assertion that although she was already
working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on
the pretense that she would merely testify in an
investigation of the charges she made against the two
crew members for the attack on her person. As it
turned out, she was the one made to face trial for very
serious charges, including adultery and violation of
Islamic laws and tradition.
- There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim
that in “handing over” or “turning over” the person of
private respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner may
have acted beyond its duties as employer. Petitioner’s
purported act contributed to and amplified or even
proximately caused additional humiliation, misery and
suffering of private respondent. Petitioner thereby
allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and
torts & damages
prosecution of private respondent under the guise of
petitioner’s authority as employer, taking advantage of
the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As
purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged
conviction and imprisonment of Morada was wrongful.
But these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted
upon her person and reputation, for which petitioner
could be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or
redress for the wrongs done, once duly proven.
2. Philippine Law
Ratio Choice of law rules invariably consist of a factual
relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and
a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the
situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of
performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
Reasoning
- Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is
one involving torts, the “connecting factor” or “point of
contact” could be the place or places where the
tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And
applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find
that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort
(the place where the alleged tortious conduct took
place). This is because it is in the Philippines where
petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a
Filipina residing and working here. According to her,
she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the
exercise of its rights and in the performance of its
duties, “act with justice, give her due and observe
honesty and good faith.” Instead, petitioner failed to
protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of
the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no
moment. For in our view, what is important here is
the place where the over-all harm or the totality
of the alleged injury to the person, reputation,
social standing and human rights of complainant,
had lodged according to the private respondent. All
told, it is not without basis to identify the Phil. as the
situs of the alleged tort.
- In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort
liability, We find here an occasion to apply the “State of
the most significant relationship” rule, which should be
appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of
the case. In applying said principle to determine the
State which has the most significant relationship, the
following contacts are to be taken into account and
evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue: (A) the place where the
injury occurred; (B) the place where the conduct
causing the injury occurred; (C) the domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business
of the parties, and; (D) the place where the
relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
A2010 - 120 -
- As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that
the over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Phils.
There is likewise no question that private respondent is
a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a
resident foreign corporation engaged in international
air carriage business here. Thus, the “relationship”
between the parties was centered here.
Disposition petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. Civil
case entitled “Milagros Morada v Saudi Arabia Airlines”
REMANDED to RTC
GLOBE MACKAY V CA
176 SCRA 778
CORTES; August 25, 1989
NATURE
An appeal from the decision of CA
FACTS
- Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed
by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation as a purchasing agent and administrative
assistant to the engineering operations manager.
- GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and
other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several
thousands of pesos.
According to private respondent it was he who actually
discovered the anomalies and reported them to his
immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to
petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the
Executive VP and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.
- one day after Tobias made the report, Hendry
confronted him by stating that he was the number one
suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced
leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his
table drawers open, and to leave the office keys.
- when Tobias returned to work after the forced leave,
Hendry went up to him and called him a "crook" and a
"swindler." Tobias was then ordered to take a lie
detector test. He was also instructed to submit
specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for
examination by the police investigators to determine
his complicity in the anomalies.
- the Manila police investigators cleared Tobias of
participation in the anomalies.
- Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a
private investigator who submitted a report finding
Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that
further investigation was still to be conducted.
- Nevertheless, Hendry issued a memo suspending
Tobias from work preparatory to the filing of criminal
charges against him.
- the Police Chief Document Examiner, after
investigating other documents pertaining to the alleged
prof. casis
anomalous transactions, submitted a second laboratory
crime report reiterating his previous finding that the
handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the
checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent
transactions were not those of Tobias. The lie detector
tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results.
- Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating
Tobias from the anomalies petitioners filed a complaint
for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents, later amended to just estafa.
- Subsequently five other criminal complaints were filed
against Tobias, four of which were for estafa while the
fifth was for of Art.290 of' RPC (Discovering Secrets
Through Seizure of Correspondence).
- All of the 6 criminal complaints were dismissed by the
fiscal.
- In the meantime, Tobias received a notice from
petitioners that his employment has been terminated.
Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal.
- Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from
the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's decision
and dismissed the complaint. Tobias appealed the
Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the
President.
- Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the
Republic Telephone Company. However, petitioner
Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a
letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by
GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.
- Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on
alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive
acts of petitioners.
- Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify
during the hearings.
- The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Tobias by
ordering petitioners to pay him P80,000.00 as actual
damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00
as exemplary damages, P30,000.00 as attorney's fees,
and costs.
- CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
ISSUE
WON petitioners are liable for damages to private
respondent
HELD
YES
Ratio Art.19, known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
certain standards which must be observed not only in
the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance
of one's duties. These standards are the following: to
act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to
observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore,
torts & damages
recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in
their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself
legal because recognized or granted by law as such,
may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible.
Reasoning
- One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil
Code is the codification of "some basic principles that
are to be observed for the rightful relationship between
human beings and for the stability of the social order."
Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in
Article 19 which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.
- But while Art.19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the
maintenance of social order, it does not provide a
remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be
proper.
- Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a
violation of law, provides that:
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
- However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that
they did not violate any provision of law since they
were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss
private respondent. This does not, however, leave
private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of
the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
- In determining whether or not the principle of abuse
of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which
can be applied. The question of whether or not the
principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting
in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other
applicable provision of law, depends on the
circumstances of each case.
- the Court, after examining the record and considering
certain significant circumstances, finds that all
petitioners have indeed abused the right that they
invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for
which the latter must now be indemnified.
A2010 - 121 -
- An employer who harbors suspicions that an
employee has committed dishonesty might be justified
in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an
investigation and directing the employee to go on a
leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth
would also be expected from such employer. But the
high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners
was certainly uncalled for.
- The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern
of harassment during the investigations of Tobias
transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled
that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee
should not be confused with the manner in which the
right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If
the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is
liable for damages to the employee.
- Several other tortious acts were committed by
petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination
from work: Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by
telling him to just confess or else the company would
file a hundred more cases against him until he landed
in jail. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be
trusted."
- The threat unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the
various actions taken against Tobias. On the other
hand, the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as
Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a
"crook" and "swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias'
personal dignity
- The next tortious act committed by petitioners was
the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October
1974, stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE
MACKAY due to dishonesty. Tobias remained
unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further
damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise
be held liable for damages consistent with Article 2176
of the Civil Code.
- Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners
of six criminal complaints against Tobias. While sound
principles of justice and public policy dictate that
persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress
of wrongs and vindication of their rights, the right to
institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised
maliciously and in bad faith. Considering the haste in
which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that
they were filed during the pendency of the illegal
dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by
Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed
notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating
Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed
against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the eventual
dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no other
conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by
prof. casis
malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints
against Tobias.
- It must be underscored that petitioners have been
guilty of committing several actionable tortious acts.
Considering the extent of the damage wrought on
Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary to petitioners'
contention, the amount of damages awarded to Tobias
was reasonable under the circumstances.
- Petitioners still insist that the award of damages was
improper, invoking the principle of damnum absque
injuria. It is argued that "[t]he only probable actual
damage that private respondent could have suffered
was a direct result of his having been dismissed from
his employment, which was a valid and legal act of the
defendants-appellants. According to the principle of
damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not
constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a
legal wrong is not actionable. This principle finds no
application in this case. It bears repeating that even
granting that petitioners might have had the right to
dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which
that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for
which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover,
the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in
connection with the abusive manner in which he was
dismissed but was also the result of several other
quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.
- Petitioners next question the award of moral
damages. However, the Court has already ruled that
moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned
in Article 21 of said Code.
- Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned
by petitioners. The nature of the wrongful acts shown
to have been committed by petitioners against Tobias
is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages
to the latter.
Disposition petition is hereby DENIED and the
decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
ALBENSON V CA
BIDIN; January 11, 1993
NATURE
Petition assailing the decision of respondent CA which
modified the judgment of the RTC and ordered
petitioner to pay private respondent moral damages
and attorney's fees.
FACTS
- Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered
to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. the mild steel plates
torts & damages
which the latter ordered. As part payment thereof,
Albenson was given a check in the amount of P2,575.00
and drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks.
When presented for payment, the check was
dishonored for the reason "Account Closed."
- From the records of the SEC, Albenson discovered that
the president of Guaranteed, the recipient of the
unpaid mild steel plates, was one "Eugenio S. Baltao."
Upon further inquiry, Albenson was informed by the
Ministry of Trade and Industry that E.L. Woodworks, a
single proprietorship business, was registered in the
name of one "Eugenio Baltao". In addition, upon
verification with the drawee bank, Albenson was
advised that the signature appearing on the subject
check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao." After
obtaining the foregoing information, Albenson made an
extrajudicial demand upon private respondent Eugenio
S. Baltao to replace and/or make good the dishonored
check. However, private respondent has a namesake,
his son Eugenio Baltao III, who manages a business
establishment, E.L. Woodworks, with the very same
business address as Guaranteed.
- Assistant Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information
against Eugenio S. Baltao for Violation of BP 22. In filing
said information, Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had
given Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to submit
controverting evidence, but the latter failed to do so
and therefore, was deemed to have waived his right.
Baltao, claiming ignorance of the complaint against
him, immediately filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal
a motion for reinvestigation. Provincial Fiscal Mauro M.
Castro of Rizal reversed the finding of Fiscal Sumaway
and exonerated respondent Baltao. He found that the
signature on the check is not the signature of Eugenio
S. Baltao.
- Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case
against him, respondent Baltao filed before the RTC a
complaint for damages against herein petitioners
Albenson Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and
Benjamin Mendiona, its employee. In its decision, the
lower court observed that "the check is drawn against
the account of "E.L. Woodworks," not of Guaranteed
Industries of which plaintiff used to be President.
Guaranteed Industries had been inactive and had
ceased to exist as a corporation since 1975. . . The
possibility is that it was with Gene Baltao or Eugenio
Baltao III, a son of plaintiff, that the defendants may
have been dealing with . . ."
ISSUE
WON private respondent's cause of action is not one
based on malicious prosecution but one for abuse of
rights under Article 21 of the CC
HELD
A2010 - 122 -
NO
Ratio The question of whether or not the principle of
abuse of rights has been violated, resulting in damages
under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision
of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. The
elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the
following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the
general sanction for all other provisions of law which do
not especially provide for their own sanction. Thus,
anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the
exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to
another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered
thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores,
and has the following elements: 1) There is an act
which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good
custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is done
with intent to injure. There is a common element under
Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be
intentional.
Reasoning
- Petitioners could not be said to have violated the
principle of abuse of right. What prompted petitioners
to file the case for violation of BP 22 against private
respondent was their failure to collect the amountdue
on a bounced check which they honestly believed was
issued to them by private respondent. Private
respondent, however, did nothing to clarify the case of
mistaken identity at first hand. In the absence of a
wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral
damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse
result of an action does not per se make the action
wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of
damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a
penalty on the right to litigate. Considering that
Guaranteed, which received the goods in payment of
which the bouncing check was issued is owned by
respondent, petitioner acted in good faith and probable
cause in filing the complaint before the provincial fiscal.
The presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal
consequence, the absence of malice.
Disposition petition is GRANTED and the decision of
the CA is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
AMONOY V GUTIERREZ
351 SCRA 731
PANGANIBAN; 2001
FACTS
- Amonoy was the counsel of therein Francisca Catolos,
Agnes Catolos, Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso
Formilda. He won the case for them and charged
P27600 as attorney’s fees. As they were not able to
prof. casis
pay, his clients executed real estate mortgages on their
lands and the house thereon. Asuncion Pasamba died
on 24 February 1969 while Alfonso Fornilda passed
away on 2 July 1969. Among the heirs of the latter was
his daughter, plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez.
- Because his attorney’s fees thus secured by the two
lots were not paid, on 21 January 1970 Amonoy filed for
their foreclosure before the CFI of Pasig, Rizal. The
heirs opposed, contending that the attorney’s fees
charged were unconscionable and that the agreed sum
was only P11,695.92. But on 28 September 1972
judgment was rendered in favor of Amonoy requiring
the heirs to pay within 90 days the P27,600.00 secured
by the mortgage, P11,880.00 as value of the harvests,
and P9,645.00 as another round of attorney’s fees.
Failing in that, the two (2) lots would be sold at public
auction.
- They failed to pay. On 6 February 1973, the said lots
were foreclosed. Amonoy was the highest bidder in the
foreclosure sale. The heirs sought the annulment of the
auction sale. The case was dismissed by the CFI on 7
November 1977, and this was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals on 22 July 1981. Thereafter, the CFI on 25 July
1985 issued a Writ of Possession and pursuant to which
a notice to vacate was made on 26 August 1985. On
Amonoy’s motion of 24 April 1986, the Orders of
25 April 1986 and 6 May 1986 were issued for the
demolition of structures in the said lots,
including the house of the Gutierrez spouses.
- The Gutierrez spouses sought a restraining order from
the Supreme Court, which was granted by the same.
Upon a judgment on merits later on, Amonoy was
ordered to return said properties to the rightful owners.
But by the time the Supreme Court promulgated the
above-mentioned Decision, respondents’ house had
already been destroyed, supposedly in accordance with
a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower court.
- Thus, a Complaint for damages in connection with the
destruction of their house was filed by respondents
against petitioner before the RTC on December 15,
1989. In its January 27, 1993 Decision, the RTC
dismissed respondents’ suit. On appeal, the CA set
aside the lower court’s ruling and ordered petitioner to
pay respondents P250,000 as actual damages.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which
was also denied. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE
WON Amonoy may properly invoke damnum absque
injuria in this case since at the time of the demolition
he had color of authority over said properties
HELD
NO
torts & damages
Ratio Damnum absque injuria may not be invoked by
a person who claims to exercise a right but does so in
an abusive manner violative of Article 19 of the Civil
Code. Indeed, in the availment of one’s rights, one
must
Reasoning
- Petitioner invokes this legal precept in arguing that
he is not liable for the demolition of respondents’
house. He maintains that he was merely acting in
accordance with the Writ of Demolition ordered by the
RTC.
- We reject this submission. Damnum absque injuria
finds no application to this case.True, petitioner
commenced the demolition of respondents’ house on
May 30, 1986 under the authority of a Writ of
Demolition issued by the RTC. But the records show
that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining
the demolition of respondents’ house, was issued by
the Supreme Court on June 2, 1986. The CA also found,
based on the Certificate of Service of the Supreme
Court process server, that a copy of the TRO was
served on petitioner himself on June 4, 1986.
- Petitioner, however, did not heed the TRO of this
Court. We agree with the CA that he unlawfully
pursued the demolition of respondents’ house well until
the middle of 1987. Although the acts of petitioner
may have been legally justified at the outset, their
continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to
an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions
were tainted with bad faith. Had he not insisted on
completing the demolition, respondents would not have
suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the
RTC. Verily, his acts constituted not only an abuse of a
right, but an invalid exercise of a right that had been
suspended when he received the TRO from this Court
on June 4, 1986. By then, he was no longer entitled to
proceed with the demolition.
- A commentator on this topic explains:
“The exercise of a right ends when the right
disappears, and it disappears when it is abused,
especially to the prejudice of others. The mask of a
right without the spirit of justice which gives it life, is
repugnant to the modern concept of social law. It
cannot be said that a person exercises a right when
he unnecessarily prejudices another x x x. Over and
above the specific precepts of positive law are the
supreme norms of justice x x x; and he who violates
them violates the law. For this reason, it is not
permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others.”
- Article 19, known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
certain standards which may be observed not only in
the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance
of one’s duties. These standards are the following: to
act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to
A2010 - 123 -
observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore,
recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that
in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth
in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself
legal because recognized or granted by law as such,
may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with norms enshrined in Article 19 and results
in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible”
UE V JADER
325 SCRA 804
YNARES-SANTIAGO; February 17, 2000
FACTS
- Jader was enrolled in the UE College of Law from 1984
up to 1988. He failed to take the regular final
examination in Practice Court I for which he was given
an incomplete grade .He enrolled for the second
semester as fourth year law student .He filed an
application for the removal of the incomplete grade but
got a grade of five (5).
- In the mean time, his name appeared in the Tentative
List of Candidates for graduation with an annotation
regarding his deficiencies. His name also appeared in
the invitation for the graduation as one of the
candidates for graduation. At the foot of the list of the
names of the candidates there appeared however an
annotation saying that it was a tentative list and that
degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who
satisfactorily complete requirements as stated in the
University Bulletin . Jader attended the graduation and
brought his family with him. He thereafter prepared
himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of
absence without pay from his job and enrolled at the
pre-bar review class. Jader later learned of the
deficiency and he dropped his review class and was not
able to take the bar examination.
Consequently, he sued UE for damages.
- UE denied liability arguing that it never led
respondent to believe that he completed the
requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree when his
name was included in the tentative list of graduating
students.
- TC rendered judgment in favor of the Jader and
ordered UE to pay Jader P35,470.00
- CA Affirmed and added an award of P50,000.00 for
moral damages
- UE elevated the case to this Court on a petition for
review arguing that it has no liability to respondent
Romeo A. Jader, considering that the proximate and
immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred by
prof. casis
the latter arose out of his own negligence in not
verifying from the professor concerned the result of his
removal exam.
ISSUE
WON an educational institution may be held liable for
damages for misleading a student into believing that
the latter had satisfied all the requirements for
graduation when such is not the case
HELD
YES
- UE had a contractual obligation to inform his students
as to whether or not they have met all the
requirements for the conferment of a degree. Thus, UE
in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the
removal examination, particularly at a time when he
had already commenced preparing for the bar exams,
cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of
good faith must be sufficiently established for a
successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in
a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the
Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to
abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even
though the forms and technicalities of the law, together
with the absence of all information or belief of facts,
would render the transaction unconscientious.
- Considering that the institution of learning involved
herein is a university which is engaged in legal
education, it should have practiced what it inculcates in
its students, more specifically the principle of good
dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil
Code which states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
- Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts
by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.
- In civilized society, men must be able to assume that
others will do them no intended injury – that others will
commit no internal aggressions upon them; that their
fellowmen, when they act affirmatively will do so with
due care which the ordinary understanding and moral
sense of the community exacts and that those with
whom they deal in the general course of society will act
in good faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability
is justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized
society. Schools and professors cannot just take
torts & damages
students for granted and be indifferent to them, for
without the latter, the former are useless.
- Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the
students of their academic status and not wait for the
latter to inquire from the former. The conscious
indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the
person/persons who may be affected by his act or
omission can support a claim for damages. Want of
care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations
coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause
naturally calculated to produce them would make the
erring party liable. Petitioner ought to have known that
time was of the essence in the performance of its
obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot
feign ignorance that respondent will not prepare
himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the
immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B.
graduate. It failed to act seasonably. Petitioner cannot
just give out its student’s grades at any time because a
student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the
Supreme Court on the submission of requirements for
taking the bar. Petitioner’s liability arose from its failure
to promptly inform respondent of the result of an
examination and in misleading the latter into believing
that he had satisfied all requirements for the course.
- Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors
to justify its own negligence that led to the delayed
relay of information to respondent. When one of two
innocent parties must suffer, he through whose agency
the loss occurred must bear it. The modern tendency is
to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is
abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit. If mere
fault or negligence in one’s acts can make him liable for
damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason
should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person
should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate
exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with
prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with
negligence or abuse.
GARCIANO V CA
212 SCRA 436
GRIÑO-AQUINO; August 10, 1992
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals dismissing the complaint for damages filed by
the petitioner against the private respondents.
FACTS
- The petitioner was hired to teach during the 1981-82
school year in the Immaculate Concepcion Institute in
the Island of Camotes. On January 13, 1982, or before
the school year ended, she applied for an indefinite
A2010 - 124 -
leave of absence because her daughter was taking her
to Austria where her daughter was employed. The
application was recommended for approval by the
school principal, Emerito O. Labajo, and approved by
the President of the school's Board of Directors.
- On June 1, 1982, Emerito Labajo addressed a letter to
the petitioner through her husband, Sotero Garciano
(for she was still abroad), informing her of the decision
of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, the school's founder, concurred in
by the president of the Parent-Teachers Association
and the school faculty, to terminate her services as a
member of the teaching staff because of: (1) the
absence of any written contract of employment
between her and the school due to her refusal to sign
one; and (2) the difficulty of getting a substitute for her
on a temporary basis as no one would accept the
position without a written contract. Upon her return
from Austria in the later part of June, 1982, she
received the letter informing her that her services at
the Immaculate Concepcion Institute had been
terminated. She made inquiries from the school about
the matter and, on July 7, 1982, the members of the
Board of Directors of the school, with the exception of
Fr. Joseph Wiertz, signed a letter notifying her that she
was "reinstated to report and do your usual duties as
Classroom Teacher . . . effective July 5, 1982," and that
"any letter or notice of termination received by you
before this date has no sanction or authority by the
Board of Directors of this Institution, therefore it is
declared null and void."
- On July 9, 1982, the president, vice president,
secretary, and three members of the Board of
Directors, out of a membership of nine (9), resigned
their positions from the Board "for the reason that the
ICI Faculty, has reacted acidly to the Board's
deliberations for the reinstatement of Mrs. Esteria F.
Garciano, thereby questioning the integrity of the
Board's decision".
- On September 3, 1982, petitioner filed a complaint for
damages in the Regional Trial Court, Cebu, Branch XI,
against Fr. Wiertz, Emerito Labajo, and some members
of the faculty of the school for discrimination and unjust
and illegal dismissal.
ISSUE
WON the defendants prevented the petitioner from
reporting to the school and thus making them liable for
damages
HELD
NO
- The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that
petitioner's discontinuance from teaching was her own
choice. While the respondents admittedly wanted her
prof. casis
service terminated, they actually did nothing to
physically prevent her from reassuming her post, as
ordered by the school's Board of Directors. That the
school principal and Fr. Wiertz disagreed with the
Board's decision to retain her, and some teachers
allegedly threatened to resign en masse, even if true,
did not make them liable to her for damages. They
were simply exercising their right of free speech
or their right to dissent from the Board's
decision. Their acts were not contrary to law, morals,
good customs or public policy. They did not "illegally
dismiss" her for the Board's decision to retain her
prevailed. She was ordered to report for work on July 5,
1982, but she did not comply with that order.
Consequently, whatever loss she may have incurred in
the form of lost earnings was self-inflicted. Volenti non
fit injuria.
Ratio Liability for damages under Articles 19, 20 and
21 of the Civil Code arises only from unlawful, willful or
negligent acts that are contrary to law, or morals, good
customs or public policy.
BARONS MARKETING V CA (PHELPS
DODGE PHILS)
286 SCRA 96
KAPUNAN; February 9, 1998
NATURE
Petition for review decision of CA
FACTS
- Phelps Dodge appointed Barons Marketing as one of
its dealers of electrical wires and cables. As such
dealer, Barons was given 60 days credit for its
purchases of Phelp’s products.
- From Dec1986 to Aug1987, Barons purchased on
credit wires and cables worth P4.1m, which it in turn
supplied to MERALCO. In the sales invoice, it was
stipulated that an interest of 12% would be imposed,
plus 25% for atty’s fees and collection. On Sept1987,
Barons paid P300k (thereby leaving an unpaid account
of P3.8m). Phelps sent several demands, but Barons
still did not pay. It instead wrote Phelps requesting if it
could pay the outstanding account in monthly
installments of P500k plus 1% interest.
- Phelps, instead of responding to the request of
Barons, filed a complaint for recovery of the P3.8m plus
interest, and prayed for atty’s fees of 25% of the amt,
and exemplary damages amounting to P100k.
- Barons admitted the purchase of the wires and cables,
but disputed the amt claimed by Phelps. The RTC
rendered decision in favor of Phelps, ordering Barons to
pay the debt and interest of 12% and awarding 25% as
atty’s fees. CA affirmed (with modification, reducing
torts & damages
atty’s fees to 5%) Barons now assail the CA decision,
alleging that Phelps should have been held guilty of
“creditor’s abuse of rights”, and Barons should not be
liable for atty’s fees.
*note: Barons contends that Phelps abused its rights
when it rejected Barons’ offer to settle the debt in
installments
**right involved: right of a creditor to refuse partial
fulfillment of a prestation due to him
ISSUES
1. WON there was creditors’ abuse of rights in this case
2. WON Barons should be liable for interest and atty’s
fees
HELD
1. NO
Ratio there is no abuse of rights when there is no bad
faith nor intent to prejudice another. Also, the mere
exercise of a right cannot be said to be an abuse of
right.
Reasoning
- the law prescribes a "primordial limitation on all
rights" by setting certain standards that must be
observed in the exercise thereof. Thus, the inclusion of
Art.19 in the CC: Every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.
- To constitute abuse of rights, there must be bad faith
or intent to prejudice the plaintiff. Citing Tolentino:
There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is
exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring
another. When the objective of the actor is illegitimate,
the illicit act cannot be concealed under the guise of
exercising a right. xxx The exercise of a right must be
in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established, and must not be excessive or unduly
harsh; there must be no intention to injure another.
- In this case, bad faith on the part of Phelps was not
proved. More importantly, Phelps was driven by
legitimate reasons for rejecting Barons offer. It merely
wanted to avoid a situation wherein its cash position
would be compromised, making it harder for them to
pay its own obligations.
“Clearly, this (the request of Barons) would be
inimical to the interests of any enterprise, especially
a profit-oriented one like Phelps. It is plain to see that
what we have here is a mere exercise of rights, not
an abuse thereof.”
2. YES
Ratio the penal clause included in the contract should
be complied with in the event of breach.
Reasoning
- the contract expressly provided for the imposition of
the 12% interest plus 25% for attorney’s fees and
A2010 - 125 - prof. casis
collection, by way of penal clause. Thus, Barons is that unless he settles his outstanding account with the
bound to pay the said amounts. defendant within 5 days from receipt of the letter, his
- However, since 25% if P4.1m is almost P2m, this membership will be permanently cancelled
should be reduced to 10% for being manifestly - There is no showing that the plaintiff received this
exorbitant. Thus, atty’s fees should be reduced to 10% letter before December 8, 1989.
Disposition CA decision modified WRT atty’s fees but - December 12, 1989 – MARASIGAN requested that he
AFFIRMED in other respects be sent the exact billing due him as of December 15,
1989, to withhold the deposit of his postdated check
and that said check be returned to him because he had
BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION V CA
already instructed his bank to stop the payment
(MARASIGAN) because BPI violated their agreement that when
296 SCRA 260 MARASIGAN issued the check to cover his account
KAPUNAN; September 25, 1998 amounting to only P8,987.84 on the condition that BPI
will not suspend the effectivity of the card
- December 16, 1989 – MARASIGAN sent letter to the
FACTS
manager of FEBTC requesting the bank to stop the
- December 8, 1989 - Atty. Ricardo J. Marasigan’s
payment of the check
credit card was dishonored, the bill amounting to
- March 12, 1990 – MARASIGAN sent another letter
P735.32, by Café Adriatico when the he entertained
reminding the manager of FEBTC that he had long
some guests. One of his guests, Mary Ellen Ringler,
rescinded and cancelled whatever arrangement he
paid the bill by using her own credit card a Unibankard
entered into with BPI and requesting for his correct
- MARASIGAN was a complimentary member of BECC
billing, less the improper charges and penalties, and for
from February 1988 to February 1989 and was issued
an explanation within five (5) days from receipt thereof
Credit Card with a credit limit of P3,000.00 and with a
why his card was dishonored on December 8, 1989
monthly billing every 27th of the month His
despite assurance to the contrary by defendant's
membership was renewed for another year or until
personnel-in-charge, otherwise the necessary court
February 1990 and the credit limit was increased to
action shall be filed to hold defendant responsible for
P5,000.00.
the humiliation and embarrassment suffered by him
- MARASIGAN oftentimes exceeded his credit limits but
- March 21, 1990 - final demand by BPI requiring him
this was never taken against him by BPI and even his
to pay in full his overdue account, including stipulated
mode of paying his monthly bills in check was
fees and charges, within 5 days from receipt thereof or
tolerated.
face court action and also to replace the postdated
- October 1989 – statement amounting to P8,987.84
check with cash within the same period or face criminal
was not paid in due time. MARASIGAN admitted having
suit for violation of Bouncing Check Law
failed to pay his account because he was in Quezon
- April 5, 1990 – MARASIGAN demanded BPI compliance
attending to some professional and personal
with his request in his first letter dated March 12, 1990
commitments. He was informed that bpi was
within three (3) days from receipt, otherwise the
demanding immediate payment of his outstanding
plaintiff will file a case against them
account, was requiring him to issue a check for
- May 7, 1990 - MARASIGAN filed a complaint for
P15,000.00 which would include his future bills, and
damages against petitioner before the RTC Makati
was threatening to suspend his credit card.
- TC: ruled for MARASIGAN finding that BPI abused its
- MARASIGAN issued Far East Bank Check of
right in contravention of A19 CC ordering BPI to pay P
P15,000.00, postdated December 15, 1989 which was
100,000.00 as moral damages; P 50,000.00 as
received on November 23, 1989 by Tess Lorenzo, an
exemplary damages; and P 20,000.00 by way of
employee of the defendant who in turn gave to Jeng
attorney's fees.
Angeles, a co-employee who handles the account of the
- CA: AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION P50,000.00 as
plaintiff. The check remained in the custody of Jeng
moral damages: P25,000.00 as exemplary damages;
Angeles. Mr. Roberto Maniquiz, head of the collection
and P10,000.00 by way of attorney's fees.
department of defendant was formally informed of the
ISSUES
postdated check about a week later.
1. WON BPI abused its right to suspend the credit card
- November 28, 2989 - BPI served MARASIGAN a letter
2. WON MARASIGAN can recover moral damages
by ordinary mail informing him of the temporary
arising from the cancellation of his credit card by BPI
suspension of the privileges of his credit card and the
inclusion of his account number in their Caution List. He
HELD
was also told to refrain from further use of his credit
1. NO
card to avoid any inconvenience/embarrassment and
torts & damages
Ratio The agreement was for the immediate payment
of the outstanding account. A check is not considered
as cash especially when it is postdated sent to BPI.
Thus, the issuance of the postdated check was not
effective payment. BPI was therefore justified in
suspending his credit card. BPI did not capriciously and
arbitrarily canceled the use of the card.
Reasoning
- Under the terms and conditions of the credit card,
signed by MARASIGAN, any card with outstanding
balances after thirty (30) days from original
billing/statement shall automatically be suspended,
Any CARD with outstanding balances unpaid after
thirty (30) days from original billing/statement date
shall automatically be suspended and those with
accounts unpaid after sixty (60) days from said
original billing/statement date shall automatically be
cancelled without prejudice to BECC's right to
suspend or cancel any CARD any time and for
whatever reason.
- By his own admission MARASIGAN made no payment
within 30 days for his billing/statement dated 27
September 1989. Neither did he make payment for his
original billing/statement dated 27 October 1989.
Consequently as early as 28 October 1989 thirty days
from the non-payment of his billing dated 27
September 1989, BPI could automatically suspend his
credit card.
Ratio To find the existence of an abuse of right A19
the following elements must be present (1) There is a
legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith;
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Reasoning
- Good faith is presumed and the burden of proving bad
faith is on the party alleging it. As early as 28 October
1989, BPI could have suspended MARASIGAN’S card
outright. Instead, BPI allowed him to use his card for
several weeks.
Ratio The underlying basis for the award of tort
damages is the premise that an individual was injured
in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a
breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for
that breach before damages may be awarded; and the
breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of
the injury.
Reasoning
- Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is
the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and
damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the
loss or harm was not the results of a violation of a legal
duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne
by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy
for damages resulting from an act which does not
A2010 - 126 -
amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are
often called damnum absque
injuria
- It was petitioner's failure to settle his obligation which
caused the suspension of his credit card and
subsequent dishonor at Café Adriatico. He can not now
pass the blame to the petitioner for not notifying him of
the suspension of his card. As quoted earlier, the
application contained the stipulation that the petitioner
could automatically suspend a card whose billing has
not been paid for more than thirty days. Nowhere is it
stated in the terms and conditions of the application
that there is a need of notice before suspension may be
affected as private respondent claims.
2. NO
- MARASIGAN’S own negligence was the proximate
cause of his embarrassing and humiliating experience
in not reading the letter of notice of cancellation. The
award of damages by the CA is clearly unjustified.
RUIZ V SECRETARY
PAREDES; 1966
NATURE
Appeal from an order of the Manila CFI
FACTS
- Enrique Ruiz and Jose Herrera, both shareholders of
Allied Technilogists, Inc. filed an action against the
Secretary of National Defense and also against their
own company (together with Pablo Panlilio who is also a
shareholder of the company) in connection with the
15% retention fund withheld by the DND relating to the
construction of the Veterans Hospital. It turned out
that said retention was already released by the DND to
the Company. The Court then proceeded with the other
cause of action which was deemed to be the
controversy between Ruiz and Panlilio over the said
15%.
- As it turned out, the real issue was the credit as to the
architects of the building were. Under the contract and
all other documents relating to the construction of the
Veterans Hospital, the named architect was only
Panlilio. Ruiz and Herrera want to be recognized as
architects of the building also citing Article 21 of the
Civil Code as their base for he cause of action.
- The amended complaint of appellants claimed that
the non inclusion of their names as architects resulted
in their professional prestige and standing being
seriously impaired. Hence, they claim that even if the
retention fund was in act released, their pleas for
recognition as architects should have been heard by
the lower court.
prof. casis
ISSUE
WON the lower court erred in dismissing the case
HELD
NO
- The sole object of the appellants was to secure for
themselves recognition that they were co-architects of
the Veterans Hospital, together with Panlilio, so as to
enhance their standing and prestige. If this is so, there
is no need or necessity for a judicial declaration.
Prestige and recognition are bestowed on the deserving
even if there is no judicial declaration. On the other
hand no amount of declaration will help an incompetent
person achieve prestige and recognition. Article 21,
which was used as basis of the action, states;
“Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs, or public policy shall compensate the
latter for damages.”
- While the word “injury” may also refer to honor or
credit, the article envisions a situation where a person
has a legal right which was violated by another in a
manner contrary to morals, good custom, or public
policy. Hence it presupposes losses or injuries which
are suffered as a result of said violation. The pleadings
in this case do not show damages were ever asked or
alleged. - And under the facts and circumstances
obtaining, one cannot sustain the contention that the
failure or refusal to extend recognition was an act
contrary to morals, good custom, or public policy.
Disposition Petition denied. Order appealed from is
affirmed. he modified award of attorney’s fees.
ALBENSON V CA (BALTAO)
217 SCRA 16
BIDIN; January 11, 1993
NATURE
Appeal from decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
- Albenson Enterprises Corp. delivered to Guaranteed
Industries Inc. the mild steel plates which the latter
ordered. As part payment, Albenson was given a check
drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks.
- Check was dishonored for the reason “Account
closed.”
- Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed
was one Eugenio S. Baltao and that E.L. Woodworks
was registered in the name Eugenio Baltao. The
signature on the subject check belonged to Eugenio
Baltao.
- Albenson made an extrajudicial demand but Balbao
denied issuing the check. Thus, Albenson filed a
torts & damages
complaint against Eugenio S. Baltao for violation of BP
22.
- Asst. Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information
against Eugenio S. Baltao for Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22.
- Baltao filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion
for reinvestigation. It appears that private respondent
has a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III, who
manages E.L. Woodworks.
- Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Castro of Rizal reversed the
finding of Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated respondent
Baltao.
- Baltao filed before the RTC a complaint for damages
against Albenson Enterprises, its owner, and one
employee.
- Trial court granted Baltao’s claim for actual or
compensatory, moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and costs.
- CA modified by reducing the moral damages and the
attorney's fees awarded.
ISSUES
WON Baltao should be awarded damages (based on
malicious prosecution)
HELD
NO
- A party injured by the filing of a court case against
him, even if he is later on absolved, may file a case for
damages grounded either on the principle of abuse of
rights, or on malicious prosecution. In order that such a
case can prosper, however, the following three (3)
elements must be present, to wit: (1) The fact of the
prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was
himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally
terminated with an acquittal; (2) That in bringing the
action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause;
(3) The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal
malice
- To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be
proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister
design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was
initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his
charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the
mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for
prosecution does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution. Proof and motive that the institution of the
action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and
humiliate a person must be clearly and preponderantly
established to entitle the victims to damages
- Probable cause is the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief, in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged
was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
A2010 - 127 -
- An award of damages and attorney's fees is
unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith. If
damage results from a person's exercising his legal
rights, it is damnum absque injuria.
- Actual and compensatory damages are those
recoverable because of pecuniary loss — in business,
trade, property, profession, job or occupation — and
the same must be proved, otherwise, if the proof is
flimsy and unsubstantiated, no damages will be given
- In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of
fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded
and that the adverse result of an action does not per se
make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the
payment of damages, for the law could not have meant
to impose a penalty on the right to litigate
- Where there is no evidence of the other party having
acted in wanton, fraudulent or reckless, or oppressive
manner, neither may exemplary damages be awarded
Disposition Petition granted. CA decision reversed and
set aside
WASSMER V VELEZ
12 SCRA 648
BENGZON; December 24, 1964
FACTS
- Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following
their mutual promise of love, decided to get married
and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On
September 2, Velez left a note for Wassmer saying that
he has to postpone the wedding because his mother
opposes it.
- But the next day, he sent a telegram assuring
Wassmer that nothing has changed and he will return
soon. But Velez did not appear nor was he heard from
again.
- Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer
and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence
before the clerk of court as commissioner Judgment
was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff
P2,000 as actual damages; P25,000 as moral and
exemplary damages; P2,500 as attorney's fees; and the
costs.
ISSUE
WON Velez is liable for the cost of wedding
preparations spent by Wassmer
HELD
YES
- While mere breach of contract is not an actionable
wrong, Article 21 of the Civil Code says that when the
person willfully causes loss or injury contrary to good
custom, he shall compensate the latter for damages. It
prof. casis
is the abuse of right which can be a cause for moral
and material damages.
- The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff
and defendant applied for a license to contract
marriage, which was subsequently issued. Their
wedding was set. Invitations were printed and
distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The
bride-to-be's trousseau, party dresses and other
apparel for the important occasion were purchased.
Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were
prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was
bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received.
- This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry.
To formally set a wedding and go through all the
above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk
out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
- Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New
Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases
mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary
damages, defendant contends that the same could not
be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of
the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is
devoid of merit as under the above-narrated
circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a
"wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner."
P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is
deemed to be a reasonable award.
TANJANCO V SANTOS
REYES; December 17, 1966
NATURE
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals revoking
an order of the CFI dismissing appellant's action for
support and damages.
FACTS
- Apolonio Tanjanco courted Araceli Santos, both being
of adult age; that he expressed and professed his
undying love and affection for her who also in due time
reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in consideration
of his promise of marriage Araceli consented and
acceded to Tanjanco’s pleas for carnal knowledge.
Regularly until December 1959, through his
protestations of love and promises of marriage,
Tanjanco succeeded in having carnal access to Araceli,
as a result of which she conceived a child. Due to her
pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and social
humiliation, Araceli had to resign her job as secretary in
torts & damages
IBM Philippines, Inc. She became unable to support
herself and her baby and duer to Tanjanco's refusal to
marry her as promised, she suffered mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
and social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree
compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child
that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not less than
P430.00 a month for her support and that of her baby,
plus P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages,
plus P10,000.00 attorney's fees. CFI dismissed the
complaint. The Court of Appeals, entered judgment
setting aside the dismissal and directing the court of
origin to proceed with the case.
ISSUE
WON CS erred in reversing the CFI decision
HELD
YES
- In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action
for damages, under Article 21, the Court of Appeals
relied upon and quoted from the memorandum
submitted by the Code Commission where it stated,
“but the Code Commission has gone farther than the
sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive
law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually suffered
material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed
it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in
the proposed Civil Code the following rule: ART. 23.
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage." They gave an example  "A" seduces the
nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of
marriage either has not been made, or can not be
proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present
laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen
years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of
promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the
grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though
the girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral
damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action
for damages. But under the proposed article, she and
her parents would have such a right of action. The
Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the
example set forth in the Code Commission's
memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that
in law it is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a
breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially
the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse
of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the
woman has yielded. To constitute seduction there must
A2010 - 128 -
in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement
and the woman must yield because of the promise or
other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal
lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is
no seduction. She must be induced to depart from the
path of virtue by the use of some species of arts,
persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have
and do have that effect, and which result in her
ultimately submitting her person to the sexual
embraces of her seducer.
- And in American Jurisprudence: On the other hand, in
an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or
deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof
of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness
arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of the female,
and the defendant merely affords her the needed
opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been
emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases
would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and
would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of
adventuresses would be swift to profit.
- Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the
complaint. Over and above the partisan allegations,
the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958
to 1959, Araceli Santos, a woman of adult age,
maintained intimate sexual relations with Tanjanco,
with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is
here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had Araceli
been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively
because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of
the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his
embraces, much less for one year, without exacting
early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage,
and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon
finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his
promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made
under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of
action being alleged, no error was committed by the
Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint.
Disposition the decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and that of the Court of First Instance is
affirmed..
BAKSH V CA
219 SCRA 115
DAVIDE JR; February 19, 1993
NATURE
Appeal by certioriari to review and set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
prof. casis
- Private respondent, without the assistance of
counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint
2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged
violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges
in said complaint that: she is 22 years old, single,
Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner,
on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the
Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an
exchange student taking a medical course at the
Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before
20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to
marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that
they would get married; they therefore argued to get
married after the end of the school semester, which
was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the
private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage;
sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her
to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a
virgin before she began living with him; a week before
the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards
her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to
kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained
injuries, during a confrontation with a representative of
the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of
the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage
agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore
and; the petitioner is already married to someone living
in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for
judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages,
reimbursement for actual expenses, attorney's fees and
costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies
as may be just and equitable.
- In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner admitted
only the personal circumstances of the parties as
averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the
allegations either for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or
because the true facts are those alleged as his Special
and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he
never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married
with the private respondent; he neither sought the
consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to
live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only
told her to stop coming to his place because he
discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his
money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took
place with a representative of the barangay captain.
Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is
baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he
was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to
incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a
besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award for
miscellaneous expenses and moral damages.
torts & damages
- After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying
Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October
1989 a decision 5 favoring the private respondent.
The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter
damages and attorney's fees.
- The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings
and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private
respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a
woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who
readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner,
through machinations, deceit and false pretenses,
promised to marry private respondent, (d) because of
his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed
herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that
deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents
— in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions —
made some preparations for the wedding that was to
be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs
and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and
contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his
promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the
petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused
Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of
morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial
court gave full credit to the private respondent's
testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had
the temerity and courage to come to court and expose
her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule
if her claim was false.
- Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the
respondent Court of Appeals. Respondent Court
promulgated the challenged decision affirming in toto
the trial court's ruling. Unfazed by his second defeat,
petitioner filed the instant petition; he raises therein
the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil
Code applies to the case at bar.
- It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not
applicable because he had not committed any moral
wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public
policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage
to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated
her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking
Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring
the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not
conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and
culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with
Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he
had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure
to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of
his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim
Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four
wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial
court erred in ruling that he does not possess good
moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common
law wife" is now his legal wife as their marriage had
A2010 - 129 -
been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian
Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the
private respondent, petitioner claims that even if
responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in
relationship, the private respondent should also be
faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally,
petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be
assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to
the private respondent and had also promised to marry
her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the
special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of
promise is not actionable.
ISSUE
WON Art. 21 is applicable to the case at bar
HELD
YES
- The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry
per se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil
Code the provisions that would have made it so. This
notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision,
Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of
torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
- In light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21,
The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that where a
man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause
of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device
to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her
consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit
behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential,
however, that such injury should have been committed
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy. In the instant case, respondent Court found that
it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff
that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to
him and to live with him on the honest and sincere
belief that he would keep said promise, and it was
likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part
that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's
living-in with him preparatory to their supposed
marriage."
prof. casis
Disposition Petition denied
BUNAG V CA (CIRILO)
211 SCRA 441
REGALADO; July 10, 1992
NATURE
Petition for review from the decision of CA
FACTS
- Conrado Bunag, Jr brought Zenaida Cirilo to a hotel
where they had sex. Later that evening, Bunag brough
her to his grandmother’s house in Las Pinas where they
liver together as husband and wife for 21 days. During
that time, Bunag, Jr. and Cirilo applied for their
respective Marriage Licenses, but after leaving, Bunag
Jr withdrew his application. Cirilo contends that she was
abducted by Bunag Jr along with unidentified man and
brought her to the motel where she was raped. The
Court a quo adopted her evidence.
- The Court found that Cirilo and Bunag Jr were
sweethearts but for 2eeks before the alleged rape, they
had a quarrel. On the day of the said rape, Bunag jr
invited her for merienda to talk things over. Bunag Jr
came riding in a car with an unidentified man. Cirilo
rode in the passenger’s seat while Bunag Jr was driving.
When she noticed they were going the wrong way,
Cirilo protested but Bunag threatened her that he
would bump the car against the post if she made any
noise. They never got to the restaurant where they
were supposed to eat.
- She was then dragged by the 2 men in the hotel
where Bunag Jr deflowered her against her will and
consent.
- Bunag initially allowed her to go home but later
refused to consent and stated that he would only let
her go after they were married, so much so that she
promised not to make any scandal and to marry him.
they proceeded to Bunag’s grandmother’s house. That
night, Bunag Sr arrived and assured them that they
would apply for the ML the next day.
- After filing for the ML, they lived as husband and wife
for 21 days. Bunag then left and never returned. Cirilo
was ashamed when she went home and could not sleep
and eat because of the deception done against her by
Bunag, Jr.
- A complaint fro breach of promise to marry was filed
against Bunag Sr and Bunag Jr. The RTC upon finding
that she was forcibly abducted and raped Bunag Jr was
ordered to pay for P80K for moral damages, P20K for
exemplary damage, P20K by way of temperate
damage, and P10K for atty’s fees. Bunag Sr was
absolved from liability.
torts & damages
- Cirilo appealed on the disculpation of Bunag Sr’s
liability. While the Bunag’s assigned several errors in
the TC decision. CA dismissed the petitions and
affirmed judgment of RTC in toto.
- Bunag filed for the petition for review claiming that CA
failed to consider vital exhibits and testimonies and
error in the proper application of the law.
ISSUE
WON lower courts erred in granting damages for the
breach of promise to marry
HELD
Ratio A breach of promise to marry is not actionable
per se, except where the plaintiff incurred expenses for
the wedding and the necessary incidents therrof.
However, the award for moral damages is allowed in
cases specified and analogous to those provided in Art
2219 CC. Under Art 21 CC, in relation to Art 2219,
par10, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
damages.
Reasoning
- The court is constrained with the factual findings of
the lower courts.
- A breach of promise to marry has no standing in the
civil law, apart from the right to recover for money or
property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of
such promise.
- Under the circumstances in the case at bar, the
petitioner’s promising to marry Cirilo to evade criminal
liability constitutes acts contrary to morals and good
customs. These are grossly insensate and
reprehensible transgressions which warrant and justify
the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant
to Art 21 in relation to par 3 and 10, Art 2219, and Art
2229 and 2234 CC.
- Although TC granted damages on the basis of the
forcible abduction and rape even after the criminal
complaint’s dismissal, the extinction of the criminal
liability does not extinguish civil liability unless there is
a declaration of a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil case may arise did not exist. In the case,
only the fiscal made such dismissal of the criminal
complaint.
Disposition petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit, and the assailedjudgment and resolution are
hereby AFFIRMED.
CONSTANTINO V MENDEZ
BIDIN; May 14, 1992
NATURE
A2010 - 130 -
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- Petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an action for
acknowledgment, support and damages against private
respondent Ivan Mendez.
- In her complaint, Amelita Constantino alleges that
she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's Restaurant located at
Sta. Cruz, Manila, where she worked as a waitress; that
the day following their first meeting, Ivan invited
Amelita to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he was
billeted; that while dining, Ivan professed his love and
courted Amelita; that Amelita asked for time to think
about Ivan's proposal; that at about 11:00 o'clock in the
evening, Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home to which
the latter agreed, that on the pretext of getting
something, Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room
and through a promise of marriage succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with the latter; that after the
sexual contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a
married man; that they repeated their sexual contact in
the months of September and November, 1974,
whenever Ivan is in Manila, as a result of which Amelita
got pregnant; that her pleas for help and support fell on
deaf ears; that Amelita had no sexual relations with any
other man except Ivan who is the father of the child yet
to be born at the time of the filing of the complaint;
that because of her pregnancy, Amelita was forced to
leave her work as a waitress; that Ivan is a prosperous
businessman of Davao City with a monthly income of
P5,000 to P8,000.00. As relief, Amelita prayed for the
recognition of the unborn child, the payment of actual,
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees plus
costs.
ISSUE
WON Amelita can claim for damages which is based on
Articles 19 3 & 21 4 of the Civil Code on the theory that
through Ivan's promise of marriage, she surrendered
her virginity
HELD
NO
Ratio Mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis
for recovery. Damages could only be awarded if sexual
intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and
mutual desire.
Reasoning
- Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she
surrendered her womanhood. Had she been induced or
deceived because of a promise of marriage, she could
have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when
she was informed after their first sexual contact
sometime in August, 1974, that he was a married man.
Repeated sexual intercourse only indicates that passion
prof. casis
and not the alleged promise of marriage was the
moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.
QUIMIGUING V ICAO
34 SCRA 132
REYES; July 31, 1970
NATURE
Appeal on points of law from an order of the CFI
FACTS
- Appellant, Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued
her neighbor Icao with whom she had close and
confidential relations. The latter, although married,
succeeded in having sex with plaintiff several times by
force and intimidation and without her consent. She
became pregnant and despite efforts and drugs
(abortion pills?) supplied by defendant, she had to stop
studying. Hence, she claimed support of P120/mo.
- Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action as
the complaint did not allege the child had been born—
the motion was sustained. Plaintiff amended the
complaint but the TC ruled such was not allowable as
the original complaint averred no cause of action.
ISSUES
1. WON Quimiguing had a right to the support of the
child
2. WON Quimiguing is entitled to damages
HELD
1. YES
- A conceived, unborn child is given a provisional
personality by law and therefore has a right to support
from its progenitors, particularly Icao (Art. 40) and may
receive donations (Art. 742). Its being ignored by the
parent in his testament may result in preterition of a
forced heir that annuls the institution of the
testamentary heir, even if such child should be born
after the death of the testator (Art. 854)
2. YES
- For a married man to force a woman not his wife to
yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint)
constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim
that entitles her to claim compensation for damages
caused. As stated in Art. 21, “Any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for damage.” This is furthered by
Art. 2219 which provides compensation in cases of
seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.
- Hence, independent of the right to support of the
child, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for
damages; thus the order dismissing it for failure to
state a cause of action was doubly in error.
torts & damages
Disposition the orders under appeal are reversed and
set aside
PE V PE
5 SCRA 200
1962
FACTS
- Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita
PE, an unmarried woman 24 years of age. Defendant, a
married man, frequently visited Lolita’s house on the
pretext that he wanted her to teach him to pray the
rosary. They fell in love and conducted clandestine
trysts. When the parents learned about this, they
prohibited defendant from going to their house. The
affair continued just the same. On april 14, 1957, Lolita
disappeared from her brother’s house where she was
living. A note in the handwriting of the defendant was
found inside Lolita’s aparador. The present action was
instituted under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The lower
court dismissed the action. Hence, this appeal by the
plaintiffs
ISSUE
WON the defendant can be held liable under Article 21
HELD
YES
- The circumstances under which the defendant tried
to win Lolita’s affection cannot lead to any other
conclusion than that it was he who, through an
ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the
extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown
by the fact that defendant frequented the house of
Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him
how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his
visits to the latter’s family who allowed free access
because he was a collateral relative and was
considered as a member of the family, the two
eventually fell in love with each other and conducted
clandestine love affairs. Defendant continued his love
affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the
parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be
drawn from this chain of events than that the
defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever
strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of
Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her.
The wrong he had caused her and her family is indeed
immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married
man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita’s
family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the
New Civil Code.
A2010 - 131 -
QUE V IAC (NICOLAS)
169 SCRA 137
CRUZ; January 13, 1989
NATURE
Petition for review
FACTS
- Magtanggol Que is a dealer of canvass strollers while
Antonio Nicolas orders from him. The two had an
amicable business relation until 1975, when Nicolas
ordered strollers from Que, which were delivered, and
then issued 5 postdated checks in favor of Que. The
checks were dishonored, in accordance with Nicolas’
order to stop payment. After making demands for
payment, which Nicolas allegedly ignored. Que filed an
estafa case against Nicolas. The case was dismissed for
lack of merit.
- Nicolas then filed a case against Que for malicious
prosecution. He allegedly ordered that payment be
stopped because the goods delivered to him by Que
were defective and that Que allegedly refused to
replace them. Que on his part alleged that the said
defective products were only returned after he filed an
estafa case. TC ruled in favor of Que, IAC reversed.
ISSUE
WON Que had instituted a malicious prosecution of the
private respondent (WON the reversal made by IAC was
correct)
HELD
NO
- It is evident that the petitioner was not motivated by
ill feeling but only by an anxiety to protect his his rights
when he filed the criminal complaint for estafa with the
fiscal's office.
Ratio. One cannot be held liable in damages for
maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted
with probable cause.
Reasoning
-. 'Under the Spanish Law, the element of probable
cause was not treated separately from that of malice,
as under the American Law. When a complaint was laid
and there was probable cause to believe that the
person charged had committed the acts complained of,
although, as a matter of fact, he had not, the
complainant was fully protected, but not so much on
the theory of probable cause as on the ground that,
under such circumstances, there was no intent to
accuse falsely. If the charge, although false, was made
with an honest belief in its truth and justice, and there
were reasonable grounds on which such a belief could
prof. casis
be founded, the accusation could not be held to have
been false in the legal sense.
- To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be
proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister
design to vex and humiliate a person that it was
initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his
charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the
mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for
prosecution does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution (Manila Gas Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 100 SCRA 602)
- Nicolas issued 5 checks which Que cannot encash,
inspite of demands by the latter. Also, the goods which
were allegedly defective were not yet returned to Que
before the filing of the estafa case. Instead, Nicolas
kept the goods, did not demand for its repair. He just
stopped payment, without Que knowing that there were
defects in the goods he delivered. Therefore, from
Que’s point of view, the circumstances presented the
possibility that Nicolas might cheat him.
Disposition decision of the respondent court dated
March 12, 1984, is SET ASIDE and the amended
decision of the trial court dated February 21, 1979, is
REINSTATED as above modified. This decision is
immediately executory.
DRILON V CA (ADAZA)
270 SCRA 211
HERMOSISIMA JR; March 20, 1997
NATURE
Petition to reverse CA’s Resolutions
FACTS
- Gen Renato DE VILLA, Chief of Staff of the AFP,
requested the DOJ (headed by Sec Franklin DRILON) to
order the investigation of several individuals, including
private respondent ADAZA for their alleged
participation in the failed Dec 1989 coup d’etat.
- This was then referred for preliminary inquiry to the
Special Composite Team of Prosecutors who issued a
subpoena to the said individuals after finding sufficient
basis to continue the inquiry. The panel assigned to
conduct prelim investigation found that there was
probable cause to hold them for trial for the crime of
REBELLION WITH MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER.
Information was filed before RTC QC, with no
recommendation as to bail.
- Feeling aggrieved by the institution of these
proceedings against him, ADAZA filed a complaint for
damages and charged petitioners with engaging in a
deliberate, willful and malicious experimentation by
filing against him a charge of rebellion complexed with
murder and frustrated murder when petitioners were
torts & damages
fully aware of the non-existence of such crime in the
statute books.
- Petitioners filed MD since there was no valid cause of
action for this complaint for damages.
- RTC denied MD. MFR for Order of Denial was also
denied.
- CA also dismissed petition for certiorari and ordered
RTC judge to proceed with the trial of civil case filed by
ADAZA.
(In Adaza’s latest Comment, he maintained that his
claim before the trial court was merely a suit for
damages based on tort and NOT a suit for malicious
prosecution.)
ISSUES
1. WON complaint was a suit for damages for malicious
prosecution
2. WON petitioners are liable for malicious prosecution
HELD
1. YES
Definition of Malicious Prosecution:
- In American jurisdiction, it has been defined as-
“One begun in malice without probable cause to
believe the charges can be sustained. Instituted with
intention of injuring defendant and without probable
cause, and which terminates in favor of the person
prosecuted. For this injury an action on the case lies,
called the action of malicious prosecution.”
- In Philippine jurisdiction, it has been defined as-
“An action for damages brought by one against whom a
criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal
proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without
probable cause, after the termination of such
prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the
defendant therein. The gist of the action is the putting
of legal process in force, regularly, for the mere
purpose of vexation or injury.”
Reasoning
- Nowhere in his complaint filed with the trial court did
respondent Adaza allege that his action is one based on
tort. (Sec 3e of RA 3019) An examination of the records
would show that this latest posture as to the nature of
his cause of action is only being raised for the first time
on appeal. Such a change of theory cannot be allowed.
2. NO
Ratio In order for a malicious prosecution suit to
prosper, the plaintiff must prove these elements:
(a) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that
the defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the
action finally terminated with an acquittal;
(b) That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted
A2010 - 132 -
without probable cause; and
(c) That the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by
legal malice, that is by improper or sinister motive.
- The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for
malicious prosecution are found in the provisions of the
NCC [Art 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219
(8)].
Reasoning
- Judging from the face of the complaint itself filed by
Adaza, NONE of these requisites have been alleged,
thus rendering the complaint dismissible on the ground
of failure to state a cause of action.
(a) Insofar as Adaza’s Criminal Case is concerned, what
appears clear from the records only is that respondent
has been discharged on a writ of habeas corpus and
granted bail. This is not considered the termination of
the action contemplated under Philippine jurisdiction to
warrant the institution of a malicious prosecution suit
against those responsible for the filing of the
information against him.
(b) It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable for
maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has
acted with probable cause. The petitioners were of the
honest conviction that there was probable cause to
hold Adaza for trial.
(c) Suffice it to state that the presence of probable
cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of
malice.
Disposition Petition is GRANTED. Respondent Judge is
DIRECTED to take no further action on civil case except
to DISMISS it.
GLOBE MACKAY V CA
CORTES; August 25, 1989
NATURE
Certiorari
FACTS
- Globe Mackay found out an anomaly that has been
causing them to lose money, to which Tobias was the
number one suspect though he claimed he was the one
who reported it.
- The results of the investigations said that the
handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the
checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent
transactions were not those of -Tobias. The lie detector
tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results.
- Despite being cleared, complaints for estafa were filed
against Tobias. All of the six criminal complaints were
prof. casis
dismissed by the fiscal and MRs of Globe were denied
too.
- Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal upon
receiving the notice of his termination.
- LA: dismissed the complaint; NLRC- reversed; the
Secretary of Labor: reinstated the LA's decision which
Tobias appealed to the Office of the President.
- During the pendency of the appeal with said office,
petitioners and private respondent Tobias entered into
a compromise agreement regarding the latter's
complaint for illegal dismissal.
- Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the
Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO).
- However, Hendry, without being asked by
RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that
Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to
dishonesty.
- This led Tobias to file a civil case for damages
anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive,
and abusive acts of petitioners.
- RTC: rendered judgment in favor of Tobias by ordering
petitioners to pay him P80,000.00 as actual damages,
P200,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P30,000.00 as attorney's fees,
and costs.
- Both parties appealed. CA: affirmed the RTC decision
in toto, denied Globe’s MR.
ISSUE
WON there was malicious prosecution
HELD
YES
- Petitioners were not content with just dismissing
Tobias. There was malicious intent manifested through
the filing of the criminal cases as the case for illegal
dismissal was pending; Hendry’s threat of more suits
against Tobias; The filing of the cases despite the police
reports exculpating Tobias; and the eventual dismissal
of the cases. SC anchored its findings on TC’s finding
(re bad faith of Globe Mackay in filing the criminal
complaints against Tobias).
Reasoning
- Although Globe claims that they must not be
penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of
seeking justice by filing criminal complaints against an
employee who was their principal suspect in the
commission of forgeries and in the perpetration of
anomalous transactions which defrauded them of
substantial sums of money, “the right to institute
criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously
and in bad faith” [Ventura v. Bernabe, 38 SCRA 5871.]
- Yutuk V. Manila Electric Co.,[ 2 SCRA 337]: the Court
held that the right to file criminal complaints should not
be used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay
torts & damages
an indebtedness. To do so would be a clear perversion
of the function of the criminal processes and of the
courts of justice.
- Hawpia CA,[20 SCRA 536]: the Court upheld the
judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral
damages and attorney's fees after making a finding
that petitioner, with persistence, filed at least six
criminal complaints against respondent, all of which
were dismissed.
*Findings of bad faith (as per the TC):
> After the dismissal of the 4 cases and denial of the
MR by the Ministry of Justice, 2 cases were refiled
with the Judge Advocate General's Office of the AFP
to railroad Tobias’ arrest and detention in the military
stockade, but this was frustrated by a presidential
decree transferring criminal cases involving civilians
to the civil courts.
> Despite the clearing Tobias of participation or
involvement in the fraudulent transactions
complained of, despite the negative results of the lie
detector tests which Globe Mackay compelled him to
undergo, and although the police investigation was
"still under follow-up and a supplementary report will
be submitted after all the evidence has been
gathered," Globe Mackay hastily filed 6 criminal
cases with the city Fiscal's Office of Manila, 5 for
estafa thru falsification of commercial document and
1 for violation of A290 of the RPC (all of which were
dismissed), with one of the investigating fiscals, Asst.
Fiscal de Guia, commenting in one case that,
"Indeed, the haphazard way this case was
investigated is evident. Evident likewise is the flurry
and haste in the filing of this case against respondent
Tobias," there can be no mistaking that defendants
would not but be motivated by malicious and
unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause
damage to plaintiff.
Ratio To constitute malicious prosecution, there must
be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
design to vex and humiliate a person and that it was
initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the
charges were false and groundless [Manila Gas
Corporation v. CA, 100 SCRA 602]. Concededly, the
filing of a suit by itself, does not render a person liable
for malicious prosecution [Inhelder Corporation v. CA,
122 SCRA 576]. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the
criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of
damages for malicious prosecution if there is no
competent evidence to show that the complainant had
acted in bad faith [Sison v. David, 1 SCRA 60].
Disposition CA’s decision AFFIRMED.
ALBENSON V CA (BALTAO)
BIDIN; January 11, 1993
A2010 - 133 -
NATURE
Appeal from CA judgment modifying RTC’s decision as
regards amount to be paid
FACTS
- Albenson Enterprises delivered mild steel plates to
3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila. The delivery
was received by Guaranteed Industries, of which
Eugeneio Baltao was president; a check in the amount
of P2,575 was given as payment. Said check was
signed by a Eugenio Baltao, drawn against the account
of E.L. Woodworks.
- The check bounced. Albenson extrajudicially
demanded payment from Baltao. Baltao denied that it
was his signature on the check. Albenson filed case for
violation of BP22. Investigating fiscal found probable
cause and filed info with the RTC. Baltao appealed to
the Provincial Prosecutor. The provincial prosecutor
found out that something was amiss during the
investigation and upon reinvestigation, found no
probable cause. He told the trial fiscal to move for
dismissal.
- After the criminal case was dismissed, Baltao filed a
complaint for damages against Albenson because the
latter had unjustly filed a criminal case against him.
- IT TURNS OUT that E.L. Woodworks’ business address
was the same as Guaranteed Industries. ELW was
owned by Baltao’s son, who is his namesake.
- RTC granted actual (P133k), moral (P1M) and
exemplary damages (P200k), and atty’s fees (P100k).
CA modified by awarding only half of original moral
damages and atty’s fees.
ISSUE
WON Baltao is entitled to damages
HELD
NO
- An award of damages and attorney's fees is
unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith. If
damage results from a person's exercising his legal
rights, it is damnum absque injuria.
- ABUSE OF RIGHTS
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
certain standards which may be observed not only in
the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance
of one's duties. These standards are the following: to
act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to
observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore,
recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in
their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself
legal because recognized or granted by law as such,
prof. casis
may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. Although the requirements of each
provision is different, these three articles are all related
to each other.
"With this article (Article 21), combined with articles
19 and 20, the scope of our law on civil wrongs has
been very greatly broadened; it has become much
more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American
law on torts. It is now difficult to conceive of any
malevolent exercise of a right which could not be
checked by the application of these articles"
(Tolentino, 1 Civil Code of the Philippines 72).
- There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be
applied to determine whether or not the principle of
abuse of rights may be invoked. The question of
whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been
violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21
or other applicable provision of law, depends on the
circumstances of each case. (Globe Mackay Cable and
Radio Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778
[1989]).
- The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are
the following:
(1) There is a legal right or duty;
(2) which is exercised in bad faith;
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
- ACTS CONTRA BONUS MORES
Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and
has the following elements:
1) There is an act which is legal;
2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public
order, or public policy;
3) and it is done with intent to injure.
- Thus, under any of these three provisions of law, an
act which causes injury to another may be made the
basis for an award of damages.
- There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21,
and that is, the act must be intentional. However,
Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done
either "willfully", or "negligently". The trial court as well
as the respondent appellate court mistakenly lumped
these three articles together, and cited the same as the
bases for the award of damages.
- Albenson did not abuse its rights. The second and
third elements are not present. All they wanted was to
collect what is owed them. They believed Baltao was
really the one who issued the check because it was his
company who ordered and received the delivery. They
wrote to him. He replied by denying and telling them to
check the veracity of their claim. He didn’t tell them
that his son was his namesake and that the latter
torts & damages
operated a business in the same building. Albenson
acted in good faith and had probable cause in filing
their complaint against Baltao.
- There was no malicious prosecution. To constitute
malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the
prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex
and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated
deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges
were false and groundless. The presence of probable
cause means the absence of malice.
Disposition Petition granted. CA reversed and set
aside.
MANILA GAS CORPORATION V CA
(ONGSIP)
MAKASIAR; October 30, 1980
NATURE
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA
(treated as a special civil action)
FACTS
- On May 20, 1964, respondent Ongsip applied for gas
service connection with petitioner Manila Gas
Corporation.
- A burner gas was installed by petitioner's employees
in respondent's kitchen at his residence.
- On July 27, 1965, respondent Ongsip requested
petitioner to install additional appliances as well as
additional gas service connections in his 46-door Reyno
Apartment: petitioner installed two 20-gallon capacity
water storage heaters and two heavy-duty gas burners
and replaced the original gas meter with a bigger 50-
light capacity gas meter.
- The installations and connections were all done solely
by petitioner's employees.
- There was no significant change in the meter reading
despite additional installations, and on May and June
1966, no gas consumption was registered in the meter,
prompting petitioner to issue a 'meter order' with
instructions to change the gas meter in respondent's
residence.
- On August 17, 1966, petitioner's employees went to
Ongsip's place.
- Without notifying or informing respondent Ongsip,
they changed the gas meter and installed new tube
connections. Private respondent was then taking a nap,
but he was informed afterwards of what had taken
place by his houseboy.
- On that same afternoon, petitioner's employees
returned with a photographer who took pictures of the
premises. Ongsip inquired from Coronel why they were
taking pictures but the latter simply gave him a calling
card with instructions to go to his office. There, he was
A2010 - 134 -
informed about the existence of a by-pass valve or
"jumper" in the gas connection and that unless he gave
P3,000.00, he would be deported.
- Respondent Ongsip refused to give the money
- By the end of August, a reading was made on the new
meter and expectedly, it registered a sudden increase
in gas consumption.
-Thereafter, in October, 1966, a complaint for
qualified theft was filed by petitioner against
respondent Ongsip
- On February, 1967, pending investigation of the
criminal complaint, petitioner disconnected
respondent's gas service for alleged failure
and/or refusal to pay his gas consumptions from
July, 1965 to January, 1967.
- Subsequently, the complaint was dismissed
- On July 14, 1967, following the dismissal by the
investigating fiscal of the complaint for qualified
theft and the disconnection by petitioner of his
gas service, respondent Ongsip filed a complaint
for moral and exemplary damages against
petitioner Manila Gas Corporation based on two
causes of action, firstly: the malicious,
oppressive and malevolent filing of the criminal
complaint; and, secondly: the illegal closure of
respondent Ongsip's gas service connection
without court order and without notice of
warning.
- Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied
- On May 2, 1972, the trial court rendered its decision
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff:(1) P50,000.00 as
moral damages in the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION; (2)
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages in the FIRST CAUSE
OF ACTION; (3) P30,000.00 as moral damages in the
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION; (4) P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages in the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION;
(5) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and (6) the costs of
the suit.
- Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals
- CA affirmed the lower court’s decision in toto, hence,
this petition
ISSUE
WON the amount of moral and exemplary damages
awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of
appeals is excessive
HELD
YES
- Article 2217 of the Civil Code states that "moral
damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they
prof. casis
are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful
act or omission." On the other hand, Article 2229
provides that "exemplary or corrective damages are
imposed, by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition, to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages."
- The first cause of action, for which respondent Ongsip
was awarded moral and exemplary damages in the
amount of P50,000.00 and P10,000.00, respectively, is
predicated on Article 2219 of the Civil Code which
states that "moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cases: .. . (8) malicious
prosecution; .. .
- To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be
proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister
design to vex and humiliate a person that it was
initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his
charges were false and groundless.
- Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the
authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for
malicious prosecution.
- In the instant case, however, there is reason to
believe that there was malicious intent in the filing of
the complaint for qualified theft.
- As correctly observed by the trial court in its decision
—A significant fact brought about by the testimony of
Coronel himself is the total absence of immediate
accusation against Plaintiff right at the very moment
when the by-pass valve was allegedly discovered. Right
then and there Coronel should have told Plaintiff that
he was using a by-pass valve and in effect stealing gas
from Defendant. The circumstance was familiar to that
of catching a thief in flagrante delicto. But the truth is
that when Coronel and his men entered Plaintiff's
compound and made changes therein, Plaintiff was
sleeping. When Plaintiff woke up at four o'clock in the
afternoon, Coronel and his men had already made the
changes and had already gone. They returned however
at five o'clock, this time with a photographer. This was
the time when Plaintiff met Coronel. Here was then the
opportunity for Coronel to confront Plaintiff with the
allegedly discovered 'by-pass valve' and bluntly, even
brutally, tell him that there was thievery of gas. This,
Coronel did not do. .. .. ."
- It bears noting that when he was informed as to the
existence of a 'jumper' in his gas connection,
respondent Ongsip did not show any sign of fear or
remorse and did not yield to the threatening demand of
Coronel—this is the attitude of someone who knows
how to take a firm stand where his principles and rights
are concerned. To prove his innocence, he was even
willing to have his place excavated but petitioner would
not dare take the consequences. Besides, Delfin
Custodio, petitioner's own mechanical engineer,
testified that the second gas meter was replaced as
torts & damages
being defective because "some of its parts were worn
out and that it was not properly registering."
- Evidently, petitioner Manila Gas Corporation, in failing
to recover its lost revenue caused by the gas meter's
incorrect recording, sought to vindicate its financial loss
by filing the complaint for qualified theft against
respondent Ongsip knowing it to be false. It was
actually intended to vex and humiliate private
respondent and to blacken his reputation not only as a
businessman but also as a person. Qualified theft is a
serious offense indicating moral depravity in an
individual. To be accused of such crime without basis is
shocking and libelous. It stigmatized private respondent
causing him emotional depression and social
degradation. The fact that the complaint for qualified
theft was dismissed by the Pasay City fiscal is no
consolation. The damage had been done. Necessarily,
indemnification had to be made.
- The Court gives due consideration to respondent
Ongsip's social and financial status as a businessman
and the mental anguish he suffered as a result of the
false imputation. However, petitioner's financial
capability must also be considered. Petitioner is a
public utility corporation whose primary concern is
service to the people, the profit motive being merely
secondary. Under the circumstances, the award of
moral and exemplary damages should be reduced to
P25,000.00 and P5,000.00, respectively.
- Petitioner's act in disconnecting respondent Ongsip's
gas service without prior notice constitutes breach of
contract amounting to an independent tort. The
prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent to
cause additional mental and moral suffering to private
respondent. This is a clear violation of Article 21 of the
Civil Code.
- The award of moral damages is sanctioned by Article
2220 which provides that "willful injury to property may
be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the
court should find that, under the circumstances, such
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith"
- Respondent Ongsip's default in payment cannot be
utilized by petitioner to defeat or nullify the claim for
damages. At most, this circumstance can be considered
as a mitigating factor in ascertaining the amount of
damages to which respondent Ongsip is entitled. In
consequence thereof, We reduce the amount of moral
damages to P15,000.00 The award of P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages, on the other hand, is sustained,
being similarly warranted by Article 2234 of the Civil
Code as complemented by Article 2220.
Disposition Decision of CA modified as regards the
amount of damages.
A2010 - 135 -
PATRICIO V LEVISTE
PADILLA; April 26, 1989
FACTS
- Rafael Patricio, an ordained Catholic priest, and
actively engaged in social and civic affairs in Pilar,
Capiz, where he is residing, was appointed Director
General of the 1976 Religious and Municipal Town
Fiesta of Pilar, Capiz. While a benefit dance was on-
going in connection with the celebration of the town
fiesta, petitioner together with two (2) policemen were
posted near the gate of the public auditorium to check
on the assigned watchers of the gate. Private
respondent Bienvenido Bacalocos, President of the
Association of Barangay Captains of Pilar, Capiz and a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan, who was in a state
of drunkenness and standing near the same gate
together with his companions, struck a bottle of beer
on the table causing an injury on his hand which
started to bleed. Then, he approached petitioner in a
hostile manner and asked the latter if he had seen his
wounded hand, and before petitioner could respond,
private respondent, without provocation, hit petitioner's
face with his bloodied hand. As a consequence, a
commotion ensued and private respondent was
brought by the policemen to the municipal building. As
a result, Patricio filed a complaint for Slander by Deed.
the court ruled in favor of herein petitioner (as
complainant), holding private respondent liable to the
former for moral damages as a result of the physical
suffering, moral shock and social humiliation caused by
private respondent's act of hitting petitioner on the
face in public.
ISSUE
WON Patricio is entitled to damages for the humiliation
he experienced during the town fiesta
HELD
YES
- As to moral damages, An award of moral damages is
allowed in cases specified or analogous to those
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, to wit:
"ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in
the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical
injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious
acts.
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
prof. casis
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26,
27, 28, 29, 30 32, 34, and 35.
- Private respondent's contention that there was no bad
faith on his part in slapping petitioner on the face and
that the incident was merely accidental is not tenable.
It was established before the court a quo that there was
an existing feud between the families of both petitioner
and private respondent and that private respondent
slapped the petitioner without provocation in the
presence of several persons.
- The act of private respondent in hitting petitioner on
the face is contrary to morals and good customs and
caused the petitioner mental anguish, moral shock,
wounded feelings and social humiliation. Pursuant to
Art. 21 of the Civil Code in relation to par. (10) of Art.
2219 of the same Code, "any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
- In addition to the award of moral damages, exemplary
or corrective damages may be imposed upon herein
private respondent by way of example or correction for
the public good. The amount of exemplary damages
need not be proved where it is shown that plaintiff is
entitled to either moral, temperate or compensatory
damages
Disposition Decision in favor of Patricio.
GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET INC V
ESPINO
GUERRERO; December 28, 1979
NATURE
Certiorari from CA’s decision to grant P75k, P25k and
P5k to Espino for moral damages, exemplary damages
and atty’s fees.
FACTS
- Espino is a graduate Mechanical Engineer from U.P.
Class 1950, employed as an executive of Proctor &
Gamble Phils., Inc., a corporate manager incharge of
motoring and warehousing therein; honorably
discharged from the Philippine Army in 1946; a
Philippine government pensionado of the United States
for six months; member of the Philippine Veterans
Legion; author of articles published in the Manila
Sunday Times and Philippines Free Press; member of
the Knights of Columbus, Council No. 3713; son of the
late Jose Maria Espino, retired Minister, Department of
Foreign Affairs at the Philippine Embassy, Washington.
- One morning in 1970, he and his wife and their two
daughters went to shop at South Supermarket (owned
torts & damages
by Grand Union) in Makati. While his wife was shopping
for groceries, he went around the store and found a
cylindrical “rat-tail” file that he had wanted to buy for
his hobby. Because it was small, he didn’t put it in the
grocery cart because it might fall and get lost. He
instead held it in his hand. While still shopping, he and
his wife ran into his aunt’s maid. While they were
talking he stuck the file in his breast pocket, with a
good part of the merchandise exposed.
- He paid for the items in his wife’s cart; but he forgot
about the file in his pocket. On their way out, the guard
stopped him and told him he hadn’t paid for the file. He
apologized and said he had forgotten. He started
towards the cashier to pay; but the guard stopped him
and said they were to go to the back of the
supermarket. There, a report was made, where Espino
said that he just forgot that he placed it in his pocket
while talking to the maid and his wife. He was then
brought to the front of the grocery, near the cashiers to
a Mrs. Fandino. It was around 9am and the many
people were at the store.
- Fandino read the report and remarked: “Ano,nakaw
na naman ito.” Espino said he was going to pay for it.
Fandino replied: “That is all they say, the people whom
we cause not paying for the goods say . . . They all
intended to pay for the things that are found to them.”
Espino objected, saying he was a regular customer of
the supermarket. Espino took out a P5 bill to pay for the
P3.85 file. Fandino reached over and took the P5 bill
and said it was a fine. Espino and wife objected and
said that he was not a common criminal. Fandino said it
was a reward for guards who apprehend pilferers.
People started milling around and stared at Espino. He
was directed to get in line at the cashier to pay for the
file. All the time the people were staring at him. He was
totally embarrassed.
- After paying he and his wife walked out quickly. He
thought about going back that night to throw stones at
the supermarket; but decided to file a case. The CFI
dismissed. CA awarded him damages.
ISSUE
WON Espino is entitled to damages for the humiliation
he experienced at the supermarket
HELD
YES
- The false accusation charged against the private
respondent after detaining and interrogating him by the
uniformed guards and the mode and manner in which
he was subjected, shouting at him, imposing upon him
a fine, threatening to call the police and in the presence
and hearing of many people at the Supermarket which
brought and caused him humiliation and
embarrassment, sufficiently rendered the petitioners
A2010 - 136 -
liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation
to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Petitioners wilfully
caused loss or injury to private respondent in a manner
that was contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy. It is against morals, good customs and public
policy to humiliate, embarrass and degrade the dignity
of a person. Everyone must respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons (Article 26, Civil Code). And one
must act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith (Article 19, Civil Code).
- While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order
that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or
exemplary damages may be adjudicated, the
assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones,
is left to the discretion of the court, according to the
circumstances of each case (Art. 2216, New Civil Code).
The whole incident that befell respondent had arisen in
such a manner that was created unwittingly by his own
act of forgetting to pay for the file. It was his
forgetfulness in checking out the item and paying for it
that started the chain of events which led to his
embarrassment and humiliation, thereby causing him
mental anguish, wounded feelings and serious anxiety.
Yet, private respondent's act of omission contributed to
the occurrence of his injury or loss and such
contributory negligence is a factor which may reduce
the damages that private respondent may recover (Art.
2214, New Civil Code). Moreover, that many people
were present and they saw and heard the ensuing
interrogation and altercation appears to be simply a
matter of coincidence in a supermarket which is a
public place and the crowd of onlookers, hearers or
bystanders was not deliberately sought or called by
management to witness private respondent's
predicament. The Court does not believe that private
respondent was intentionally paraded in order to
humiliate or embarrass him because petitioner's
business depended for its success and patronage the
good will of the buying public which can only be
preserved and promoted by good public relations.
Disposition Petition denied. CA modified: moral
damages = P5k; atty’s fees = P2k. no exemplary
damages.
CARPIO V VALMONTE
438 SCRA 38
TINGA; September 9, 2004
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the
Court of Appeals
FACTS
prof. casis
- Respondent Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Del
Rosario and Sierra engaged her services for their
church wedding on 10 October 1996. At about 4:30
p.m. on that day, Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel
where the bride and her family were billeted. When she
arrived at Suite 326-A, several persons were already
there including the bride, the bride's parents and
relatives, the make-up artist and his assistant, the
official photographers, and the fashion designer.
Among those present was petitioner Carpio, an aunt of
the bride who was preparing to dress up for the
occasion.
- After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the
suite carrying the items needed for the wedding rites
and the gifts from the principal sponsors. She
proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the
reception was to be held. She paid the suppliers, gave
the meal allowance to the band, and went back to the
suite. Upon entering the suite, Valmonte noticed the
people staring at her. It was at this juncture that
petitioner allegedly uttered the following words to
Valmonte: “Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan
ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang ang
lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha.” Petitioner then
ordered one of the ladies to search Valmonte's bag. It
turned out that after Valmonte left the room to attend
to her duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of
jewelry which she placed inside the comfort room in a
paper bag were lost. The hotel security was called in to
help in the search. The bags and personal belongings of
all the people inside the room were searched. Valmonte
was allegedly bodily searched, interrogated and trailed
by a security guard throughout the evening. Later,
police officers arrived and interviewed all persons who
had access to the suite and fingerprinted them
including Valmonte. During all the time Valmonte was
being interrogated by the police officers, petitioner kept
on saying the words “Siya lang ang lumabas ng
kwarto.” Valmonte's car which was parked at the hotel
premises was also searched but the search yielded
nothing.
- A few days after the incident, petitioner received a
letter from Valmonte demanding a formal letter of
apology which she wanted to be circulated to the
newlyweds' relatives and guests to redeem her
smeared reputation as a result of petitioner's
imputations against her. Petitioner did not respond to
the letter. Thus, Valmonte filed a suit for damages
against her before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City, Branch 268. In her complaint, Valmonte
prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay actual, moral
and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.
- Responding to the complaint, petitioner denied having
uttered words or done any act to confront or single out
Valmonte during the investigation and claimed that
torts & damages
everything that transpired after the theft incident was
purely a police matter in which she had no
participation. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint and for the court to adjudge Valmonte liable
on her counterclaim.
- The trial court rendered its Decision dismissing
Valmonte's complaint for damages. It ruled that when
petitioner sought investigation for the loss of her
jewelry, she was merely exercising her right and if
damage results from a person exercising his legal right,
it is damnum absque injuria. It added that no proof was
presented by Valmonte to show that petitioner acted
maliciously and in bad faith in pointing to her as the
culprit. The court said that Valmonte failed to show that
she suffered serious anxiety, moral shock, social
humiliation, or that her reputation was besmirched due
to petitioner's wrongful act.
- Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging
that the trial court erred in finding that petitioner did
not slander her good name and reputation and in
disregarding the evidence she presented. The Court of
Appeals ruled differently. It opined that Valmonte has
clearly established that she was singled out by
petitioner as the one responsible for the loss of her
jewelry. The appellate court held that Valmonte's claim
for damages is not predicated on the fact that she was
subjected to body search and interrogation by the
police but rather petitioner's act of publicly accusing
her of taking the missing jewelry. It categorized
petitioner's utterance defamatory considering that it
imputed upon Valmonte the crime of theft. The court
concluded that petitioner's verbal assault upon
Valmonte was done with malice and in bad faith since it
was made in the presence of many people without any
solid proof except petitioner's suspicion. Such
unfounded accusation entitles Valmonte to an award of
moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 for she
was publicly humiliated, deeply insulted, and
embarrassed. However, the court found no sufficient
evidence to justify the award of actual damages.
- Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the
appellate court's conclusion that she publicly
humiliated respondent does not conform to the
evidence presented. She adds that even on the
assumption that she uttered the words complained of,
it was not shown that she did so with malice and in bad
faith.
ISSUE
WON petitioner had willfully caused injury to
respondent in a manner that is contrary to morals and
good customs
HELD
YES
A2010 - 137 -
- Petitioner's verbal reproach against respondent was
certainly uncalled for considering that by her own
account nobody knew that she brought such kind and
amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. This being the
case, she had no right to attack respondent with her
innuendos which were not merely inquisitive but
outrightly accusatory. By openly accusing respondent
as the only person who went out of the room before the
loss of the jewelry in the presence of all the guests
therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily
searched, petitioner virtually branded respondent as
the thief. True, petitioner had the right to ascertain the
identity of the malefactor, but to malign respondent
without an iota of proof that she was the one who
actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by any
standard or principle of law is impermissible. Petitioner
had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner
which is contrary to morals and good customs. Her
firmness and resolve to find her missing jewelry cannot
justify her acts toward respondent. She did not act with
justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other
purpose in mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly,
petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in
relation to Article 21 for which she should be held
accountable. A person should be protected only when
he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is
when he acts with prudence and good faith; but not
when he acts with negligence and abuse.
- Respondent is clearly entitled to an award of moral
damages. Moral damages may be awarded whenever
the defendant's wrongful act or omission is the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury in the cases specified or
analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code. Though no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary
in order that moral damages may be adjudicated,
courts are mandated to take into account all the
circumstances obtaining in the case and assess
damages according to their discretion. Worthy of note
is that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the
defendant, or to enrich a complainant, but to enable
the latter to obtain means, diversions or amusements
that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has
undergone, by reason of defendant's culpable action. In
any case, award of moral damages must be
proportionate to the sufferings inflicted. Considering
respondent's social standing, and the fact that her
profession is based primarily on trust reposed in her by
her clients, the seriousness of the imputations made by
petitioner has greatly tarnished her reputation and will
in one way or the other, affect her future dealings with
her clients, the award of P100,000.00 as moral
prof. casis
damages appears to be a fair and reasonable
assessment of respondent's damages.
Disposition Petition denied
QUISABA V STA. INES
CASTRO; August 30, 1974
NATURE
Special civil action for certiorari
FACTS
- Quisaba avers in his complaint that for 18 yrs prior to
his dismissal, he was in the employ of the defendant
corporation.
- That Robert Hyde instructed him to purchase logs for
the company's plant to which he refused on the ground
that the work of purchasing logs is inconsistent with his
position as internal auditor
- That on the following day Hyde informed him of his
temporary relief as internal auditor so that he could
carry out immediately the instructions thus given, and
he was warned that his failure to comply would be
considered a ground for his dismissal
- He pleaded for fairness but was instead demoted from
a position of dignity to a servile and menial job; that
the defendants did not reconsider their "clever and
subterfugial dismissal" of him which for all purposes
constituted a "constructive discharge;" and that
because of the said acts of the defendants, he suffered
mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock and social
humiliate on. The complaint does not pray for
reinstatement or payment of backwages.
- Sta Ines et al moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Davao CFI, asserting
that the proper forum is the NLRC established by
Presidential Decree No. 21.
- Quisaba opposed the motion;the NLRC's authorized
representative in Davao City opined that the NLRC no
power to award damages
- CFI granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that
the complaint basically involves an employee-employer
relationship.
ISSUE
WON a complaint for moral damages, exemplary
damages, termination pay and attorney's fees, arising
from an employer's constructive dismissal of an
employee, is exclusively cognizable by the regular
courts of justice or by the NLRC
HELD
torts & damages
NO
- The case at bar is intrinsically concerned with a civil
(not a labor) dispute. It has to do with an alleged
violation of Quisaba's rights as a member of society,
and does not involve an existing EE-ER relation within
the meaning of section 2(1) of LC. The complaint is thus
properly and exclusively cognizable by the regular
courts of justice, not by the National Labor Relations
Commission.
Reasoning
-The jurisdiction of the NLRC is defined by section 2 of
PD No. 21(AKA LC) which reads:
SEC. 2. The Commission shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the following.
(1) All matters involving employee employer relations
including all disputes and grievances which may
otherwise lead to strikes and lockouts under Republic
Act No. 875;
(2) All strikes overtaken by Proclamation No. 1081;
and
(3) All pending cases in the Bureau of Labor
Relations.
- Although the acts complained of seemingly appear to
constitute "matters involving employee-employer
relations" as Quisaba's dismissal was the severance of
a pre-existing employee-employer relation, his
complaint is grounded not on his dismissal per se as in
fact he does not ask for reinstatement or backwages,
but on the manner of his dismissal and the consequent
effects of such dismissal.
- Civil law consists of that "mass of precepts that
determine or regulate the relations ... that exist
between members of a society for the protection of
private interests. 3
- The "right" of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba
should not be confused with the manner in which the
right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom.
- If the dismissal was done anti-socially or oppressively,
as the complaint alleges, then the respondents violated
article 1701 of the Civil Code which prohibits acts of
oppression by either capital or labor against the other,
and article 21, which makes a person liable for
damages if he wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy, the sanction for which, by way of moral
damages, is provided in article 2219, no. 10.
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cages:
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, ....
Disposition CASE REMANDED to the CFI for further
proceedings in accordance with law.
A2010 - 138 - prof. casis
ISSUE
WON Labor Code has any relevance to the reliefs
sought by the plaintiffs
MEDINA V CASTRO-BARTOLOME HELD
NO
ABAD SANTOS; September 11, 1982
- Plaintiffs have not alleged any unfair labor practice.
Theirs is a simple action for damages for tortuous acts
FACTS allegedly committed by defendants. Governing statute
- This is a civil case filed by Medina and Ong against is Civil Code and not Labor Code.
Cosme de Aboitiz and Pepsi-cola Bottling. Medina was
the former Plant General Manager and Ong was the
former Plant Comptroller. De Aboitiz is President and SEPARATE OPINION
CEO of Pepsi-cola Bottling.
- Without provocation, De Aboitiz shouted at plaintiffs AQUINO [dissent]
in the presence of the plaintiffs’ subordinates, “GOD - In my opinion the dismissal of the civil action for
DAMN IT. YOU FUCKED ME UP. YOU SHUT UP! FUCK damages is correct because the claims of Medina and
YOU! YOU ARE BOTH SHIT TO ME! YOU ARE FIRED! Ong were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor
(Medina) YOU TOO ARE FIRED! (Ong)” Arbiter and the NLRC.
- Plaintiffs filed joint criminal complaint for oral - Medina and Ong should not split their cause of action
defamation. But after preliminary investigation, against Aboitiz and Pepsi-Cola.
complaint was dismissed allegedly because the
expression was not intended to slander but to express
anger. Deputy Minister of Justice issued resolution OTHER TORTS
sustaining complaint, reversing the resolution of the
Provincial Fiscal.
- It was alleged that the defendants dismissed the AMARO V SUMANGUIT
plaintiffs because of an alleged delay in the use of G.R. No. L-14986
promotional crowns when such delay was true with MAKALINTAL; July 31, 1962
respect to the other plants.
- The dismissal was effected on the very day that
NATURE
plaintiffs were awarded rings of loyalty to the Company,
Appeal from decision of CFI
five days before Christmas and on the day when the
employees' Christmas party was held in the Muntinlupa
FACTS
Plant, when plaintiffs went home that day and found
- October 5, 1958: Jose Amaro was assaulted and shot
their wives and children already dressed up for the
at near the city government building of Silay
party, they didn't know what to do and so they cried.
- The following day he, together with his father and his
- Motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack
witnesses, "went to the office of the defendant but
of jurisdiction was filed by the defendants. The trial
instead of obtaining assistance to their complaint they
court denied the motion because civil damage
were harassed and terrorized"
complaint is not based on employer-employee
-In view thereof, they "gave up and renounced their
relationship but on manner of dismissal. PD 1367
right and interest in the prosecution of the crime "
provides that Regional Directors shall not indorse and
- Upon advice of the City Mayor an investigation was
Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral or
conducted and as a result the city attorney of Silay was
other forms of damages, now under courts’ jurisdiction.
about to file or had already filed an information for
- Defendants filed second motion to dismiss because of
illegal discharge of firearm against the assailant
amendments to the Labor Code and PD No 1691. They
- Having finished the investigation of the crime
said the case arose from such employer-employee
complained of, the defendant chief of police is now
relationship, which under PD No 1691, is under
harassing the plaintiffs in their daily work, ordering
exclusive original jurisdiction of labor arbiter. The
them thru his police to appear in his office when he is
ruling with respect to defendants' first motion to
absent, and he is about to order the arrest of the
dismiss, therefore, no longer holds.
plaintiffs to take their signatures in prepared affidavits
- Motion to reconsider was filed but was denied.
exempting the police from any dereliction of duty in
their case against the perpetrator of the crime."
torts & damages
- Appellants filed suit for damages in the CFI of Negros
Occidental against the chief of police of the City of
Silay. Although not specifically alleged in the complaint,
it is admitted by both parties, as shown in their
respective briefs, that the action is predicated on
Articles 21 and/or 27 of the Civil Code.The complaint
was dismissed upon appellee's motion in the court
below on the ground that it does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
ISSUE
WON the case should have been dismissed
HELD
NO
Ratio An action should not be dismissed upon mere
ambiguity, indefiniteness or uncertainty, for these are
not grounds for a motion to dismiss, under Rule 8, but
rather for a bill of particulars according to Rule 16.
Reasoning
- The facts set out constitute an actionable dereliction
on appellee's part in the light of Article 27 of the Civil
Code, which states that
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss
because a public servant or employee refuses or
neglects, without just cause, to perform his official
duty may file an action for damages and other relief
against he latter, without prejudice to any
disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
- That appellants were "harrased and terrorized" may
be a conclusion of law and hence improperly pleaded.
Their claim for relief, however, is not based on the fact
of harassment and terrorization but on appellee's
refusal to give them assistance, which it was his duty to
do as an officer of the law. The requirement under the
aforesaid provision that such refusal must be "without
just cause" is implicit in the context of the allegation.
The statement of appellee's dereliction is repeated in a
subsequent paragraph of the complaint, where it is
alleged that "he is about to order the arrest of the
plaintiffs" to make them sign affidavits of exculpation in
favor of the policemen.
- All that the Rules require is that there be a showing by
a statement of ultimate facts, that the plaintiff has a
right and that such right has been violated by the
defendant.
- Moran: The real test of good pleading under the new
rules is whether the information given is sufficient to
enable the party to plead and prepare for trial. A legal
conclusion may serve the purpose of pleading as well
as anything else if it gives the proper information. If the
party wants more he may ask for more details in regard
to the particular matter that is stated too generally
A2010 - 139 - prof. casis
Disposition THE ORDER APPEALED from is set aside Times of April 15,1969 the following "NOTICE OF
and the case is remanded to the Court of origin for RECTIFICATION" in a space 4 by 3 inches:
further proceedings. Costs against appellee. "This will serve as a notice that our print ad 'Where
the Heart is' which appeared in the Manila Times
ST. LOUIS REALTY V ARAMIL issue of March 18, 1969 is a rectification of the same
ad that appeared in the Manila Times issues of
AQUINO; November 14, 1984
December 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969 wherein a
photo of the house of another Brookside Homeowner
FACTS
(Dr. Aramil-private respondent) was mistakenly used
- St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the
as a background for the featured homeowners the
permission of Arcadio S. Arcadio (but without
Arcadio family. The ad of March 18, 1969 shows the
permission of Doctor Aramil) in the issue of the Sunday
Arcadio family with their real house in the
Times of December 15, 1968 an advertisement with the
background, as was intended all along."
heading "WHERE THE HEART IS". Below that heading
- Judge Jose Leuterio observed that St. Louis Realty
was the photograph of the residence of Doctor Aramil
should have immediately published a rectification and
and the Arcadio family and then below the photograph
apology. He found that as a result of St. Louis Realty's
was the following write-up:
mistake, magnified by its utter lack of sincerity, Doctor
"Home is where the heart is. And the hearts of MR.
Aramil suffered mental anguish and his income was
AND MRS. ARCADIO S. ARCADIO and their family
reduced by about P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Moreover,
have been captured by BROOKSIDE HELLS [note:
there was violation of Aramil's right to privacy (Art. 26,
that’s not MY typo ha]. They used to rent a small 2-
Civil Code). The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as
bedroom house in a cramped neighborhood, sadly
actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and
inadequate and unwholesome for the needs of a
P2,000 as allomey's fees. St. Louis Realty appealed.
large family. They dream(ed) of a more pleasant
The CA affirmed. The CA reasoned that St. Louis Realty
place free from the din and dust of city life yet near
committed an actionable quasi-delict under Articles 21
all facilities. Plans took shape when they heard of
and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned
BROOKSIDE HELLS [again, not MY typo]. With thrift
advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did
and determination, they bought a lot and built their
not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who,
dream house . . . for P31,000. The Arcadios are now
naturally, was annoyed by that.
part of the friendly, thriving community of
BROOKSIDE HILLS [whew, there you are, no typo at
ISSUE
last]... a beautiful first-class subdivision planned for
WON the CA erred by ignoring certain facts and
wholesome family living."
resorting to surmises and conjectures hence its
- The same advertisement appeared in the Sunday
decision is contrary to law and the rulings of the SC
Times dated January 5, 1969. Doctor Aramil, a
neuropsychiatrist and a member of the faculty of the
HELD
U.E. Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital, noticed the
1. NO.
mistake. On that same date, he wrote St. Louis Realty a
Reasoning
letter of protest.
- St. Louis Realty argues that the case is not covered by
- The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer
Article 26 which provides that "every person shall
of St. Louis Realty in charge of advertising. He stopped
respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
publication of the advertisement. He contacted Doctor
mind of his neighbors and other persons". "Prying into
Aramil and offered his apologies. However, no
the privacy of another's residence" and "meddling with
rectification or apology was published.
or disturbing the private life or family relations of
- On February 20, 1969, Aramil's counsel demanded
another" and "similar acts, " "though they may not
from St. Louis Realty actual, moral and exemplary
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of
damages of P110,000. St. Louis Realty claimed that
action for damages, prevention and other relief."
there was an honest mistake and that if Aramil so
- The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned
desired, rectification would be published in the Manila
by Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code.
Times. It published in the issue of the Manila Times of
Article 2219 allows moral damages for acts and actions
March 18, 1969 a new advertisement with the Arcadio
mentioned in Article 26. [NOTE: see Art 2219 for the list
family and their real house. But it did not publish any
of cases where moral damages may be granted.] The
apology to Doctor Aramil and an explanation of the
acts and omissions of the firm fall under Article 26.
error.
- St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in
- On March 29, Aramil filed his complaint for damages.
mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely
St. Louis Realty published in the issue of the Manila
torts & damages
circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its
purpose, it never made any written apology and
explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a
cavalier "rectification." Persons, who know the
residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the
distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his
residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it
from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly
and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of
income and mental anguish.
Disposition Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
CONCEPCION V CA
DAMAGES
PEOPLE V BALLESTEROS
285 SCRA 438
ROMERO; January 29, 1998
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Bangui, Ilocos
Norte, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, as charged
under Article 248 of the RPC.
FACTS
- The information alleged that the accused with the use
of firearms caused the death of Eduardo Tolentino Sr.
and Jerry Agliam and inflicted gunshot wounds to Vidal
Agliam, Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel
Tolentino.
- The Supreme Court upheld the RTC’s decision as to
the guilt of the three accused, FELIPE BALLESTEROS,
CESAR GALO and ALVIN BULUSAN. This digest will focus
on the RTC’s award of damages which is relevant to our
recitation.
- As to damages, the RTC further sentenced them to
pay jointly and solidarily:
1. The heirs of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in
the amount of P50,000, moral damages in the amount
of P20,000, and actual damages in the amount of
P35,755, with interest;
2. The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino, Sr.,
compensatory damages in the amount of P50,000,
moral damages in the amount of P20,000, and actual
damages in the total amount of P61,785, with interest;
3. Carmelo Agliam, actual damages in the amount of
P2,003.40, and moral damages in the amount of
P10,000, with interest;
A2010 - 140 -
4. Vidal Agliam Jr., Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino,
moral damages in the amount of P5,000 each, with
interest.
5. The costs.
ISSUE
WON the trial court erred in the award of damages to
the victims’ heirs
HELD
1. NO
Ratio Damages may be defined as the pecuniary
compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury
sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary
consequences which the law imposes for the breach of
some duty or the violation of some right. Actual or
compensatory damages are those awarded in
satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury
sustained, whereas moral damages may be invoked
when the complainant has experienced mental anguish,
serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral shock and so
forth, and had furthermore shown that these were the
proximate result of the offender's wrongful act or
omission.
Reasoning
- In granting actual or compensatory damages, the
party making a claim for such must present the best
evidence available, viz., receipts, vouchers, and the
like, as corroborated by his testimony. Here, the claim
for actual damages by the heirs of the victims is not
controverted, the same having been fully substantiated
by receipts accumulated by them and presented to the
court. Therefore, the award of actual damages is
proper.
- However, the order granting compensatory damages
to the heirs of Jerry Agliam and Eduardo Tolentino Sr.
must be amended. Consistent with the policy of this
Court, the amount of P50,000 is given to the heirs of
the victims by way of indemnity, and not as
compensatory damages.
- As regards moral damages, the amount of
psychological pain, damage and injury caused to the
heirs of the victims, although inestimable, may be
determined by the trial court in its discretion. Hence,
we see no reason to disturb its findings as to this
matter.
Disposition Decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. No pronouncement as
to cost.
CUSTODIO V CA
ALGARRA V SANDEJAS
27 Phil 284
prof. casis
TRENT; March 24, 1914
NATURE
Civil action for personal injuries received from a
collision with the defendant’s automobile due to the
negligence of the defendant, who was driving the car.
The negligence is not questioned and this case involves
only the amount of damages which should be allowed.
FACTS
- The accident occurred on July 9, 1912.
- Because of injuries, plaintiff spent 10 days in the
hospital. The first 4-5 days he couldn’t leave his
bed. After being discharged, he received medical
attention from a private practitioner for several
days.
- Plaintiff testified that he had down no work since the
accident, that his earning capacity was P50/month
- He described himself as being well at the end of July;
the trial took place September 19
- Plaintiff sold distillery products and had about 20
regular customers who purchased in small
quantities, necessitating regular, frequent
deliveries
- It took him about 4 years to build up the business he
had at the time of the accident, and since the
accident, he only kept 4 of his regular customers.
- The lower court refused to allow him any
compensation for injury to his business due to his
enforced absence therefrom.
ISSUE
How to determine the amount of damages to award
plaintiff
HELD
Reasoning
- Actions for damages such as the case at bar are
based upon article 1902 of the Civil Code: "A person
who, by act or omission, causes damage to another
where there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to
repair the damage so done." Of this article, the
supreme court of Spain, in considering the indemnity
imposed by it, said: "It is undisputed that said
reparation, to be efficacious and substantial, must
rationally include the generic idea of complete
indemnity, such as is defined and explained in article
1106 of the said (Civil) Code."
- Art 1106. Indemnity for losses and damages includes
not only the amount of the loss which may have been
suffered, but also that of the profit which the creditor
may have failed to realize, reserving the provisions
contained in the following articles.
torts & damages
- Art 1107. The losses and damages for which a debtor
in good faith is liable, are those foreseen or which may
have been foreseen, at the time of constituting the
obligation, and which may be a necessary consequence
of its nonfulfillment.
- The rules for the measure of damages, once that
liability is determined: The Civil Code requires that the
defendant repair the damage caused by his fault or
negligence. No distinction is made therein between
damage caused maliciously and intentionally and
damages caused through mere negligence in so far as
the civil liability of the wrongdoer in concerned. Nor is
the defendant required to do more than repair the
damage done, or, in other words, to put the plaintiff in
the same position, so far as pecuniary compensation
can do so, that he would have been in had the damage
not been inflicted. In this respect there is a notable
difference between the two systems. Under the Anglo-
SAxon law, when malicious or willful intention to cause
the damage is an element of the defendant's act, it is
quite generally regarded as an aggravating
circumstance for which the plaintiff is entitled to more
than mere compensation for the injury inflicted. These
are called exemplary or punitive damages, and no
provision is made for them in article 1902 of the Civil
Code.
- article 1902 of the Civil Code requires that the
defendant repair the damage done. There is, however,
a world of difficulty in carrying out the legislative will in
this particular. The measure of damages is an ultimate
fact, to be determined from the evidence submitted to
the court. The complexity of human affairs is such that
two cases are seldom exactly alike, a thorough
discussion of each case may permit of their more or
less definite classification, and develop leading
principles which will be of great assistance to a court in
determining the question, not only of damages, but of
the prior one of negligence. As the Code is so indefinite
(even though from necessity) on the subject of
damages arising from fault or negligence, the bench
and bar should have access to and avail themselves of
those great, underlying principles which have been
gradually and conservatively developed and thoroughly
tested in Anglo-Saxon courts. A careful and intelligent
application of these principles should have a tendency
to prevent mistakes in the rulings of the court on the
evidence offered, and should assist in determining
damages, generally, with some degree of uniformity
- The case at bar involves actual incapacity of the
plaintiff for two months, and loss of the greater portion
of his business. As to the damages resulting from the
actual incapacity of the plaintiff to attend to his
business there is no question. They are, of course, to be
allowed on the basis of his earning capacity, which in
this case, is P50 per month. the difficult question in the
A2010 - 141 -
present case is to determine the damage which has
results to his business through his enforced absence. In
Sanz vs. Lavin Bros. (6 Phil. Rep., 299), this court, citing
numerous decisions of the supreme court of Spain, held
that evidence of damages "must rest upon satisfactory
proof of the existence in reality of the damages alleged
to have been suffered." But, while certainty is an
essential element of an award of damages, it need not
be a mathematical certainty. That this is true is
adduced not only from the personal injury cases from
the supreme court of Spain which we have discussed
above, but by many cases decided by this court,
reference to which has already been made. As stated in
Joyce on Damages, section 75, "But to deny the injured
party the right to recover any actual damages in cases
f torts because they are of such a nature a cannot be
thus certainly measured, would be to enable parties to
profit by and speculate upon their own wrongs; such is
not the law."
- As to the elements to be considered in estimating the
damage done to plaintiff's business by reason of his
accident, this same author, citing numerous authorities,
has the following to say: It is proper to consider the
business the plaintiff is engaged in, the nature and
extent of such business, the importance of his personal
oversight and superintendence in conducting it, and the
consequent loss arising from his inability to prosecure
it.
- The business of the present plaintiff required his
immediate supervision. All the profits derived
therefrom were wholly due to his own exertions. Nor
are his damages confined to the actual time during
which he was physically incapacitated for work, as is
the case of a person working for a stipulated daily or
monthly or yearly salary. As to persons whose labor is
thus compensated and who completely recover from
their injuries, the rule may be said to be that their
damages are confined to the duration of their enforced
absence from their occupation. But the present plaintiff
could not resume his work at the same profit he was
making when the accident occurred. He had built up an
establishing business which included some twenty
regular customers. These customers represented to
him a regular income. In addition to this he made sales
to other people who were not so regular in their
purchases. - But he could figure on making at least
some sales each month to others besides his regular
customers. Taken as a whole his average monthly
income from his business was about P50. As a result of
the accident, he lost all but four of his regular
customers and his receipts dwindled down to practically
nothing. Other agents had invaded his territory, and
upon becoming physically able to attend to his
business, he found that would be necessary to start
with practically no regular trade, and either win back
prof. casis
his old customers from his competitors or else secure
others. During this process of reestablishing his
patronage his income would necessarily be less than he
was making at the time of the accident and would
continue to be so for some time. Of course, if it could
be mathematically determined how much less he will
earn during this rebuilding process than he would have
earned if the accident had not occurred, that would be
the amount he would be entitled to in this action. But
manifestly this ideal compensation cannot be
ascertained. The question therefore resolves itself into
whether this damage to his business can be so nearly
ascertained as to justify a court in awarding any
amount whatever.
- When it is shown that a plaintiff's business is a going
concern with a fairly steady average profit on the
investment, it may be assumed that had the
interruption to the business through defendant's
wrongful act not occurred, it would have continued
producing this average income "so long as is usual with
things of that nature." When in addition to the previous
average income of the business it is further shown what
the reduced receipts of the business are immediately
after the cause of the interruption has been removed,
there can be no manner of doubt that a loss of profits
has resulted from the wrongful act of the defendant. In
the present case, we not only have the value of
plaintiff's business to him just prior to the accident, but
we also have its value to him after the accident. At the
trial, he testified that his wife had earned about fifteen
pesos during the two months that he was disabled.
That this almost total destruction of his business was
directly chargeable to defendant's wrongful act, there
can be no manner of doubt; and the mere fact that the
loss can not be ascertained with absolute accuracy, is
no reason for denying plaintiff's claim altogether. As
stated in one case, it would be a reproach to the law if
he could not recover damages at all. (Baldwin vs.
Marquez, 91 Ga., 404)
- We are of the opinion that the lower court had before
it sufficient evidence of the damage to plaintiff's
business in the way of prospective loss of profits to
justify it in calculating his damages as to his item. That
evidence has been properly elevated to this court of
review. Under section 496 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, we are authorized to enter final judgment or
direct a new trial, as may best subserve the ends of
justice. We are of the opinion that the evidence
presented as to the damage done to plaintiff's business
is credible and that it is sufficient and clear enough
upon which to base a judgment for damages. Plaintiff
having had four years' experience in selling goods on
commission, it must be presumed that he will be able
to rebuild his business to its former proportions; so that
at some time in the future his commissions will equal
torts & damages
those he was receiving when the accident occurred.
Aided by his experience, he should be able to rebuild
this business to its former proportions in much less
time than it took to establish it as it stood just prior to
the accident. One year should be sufficient time in
which to do this. The profits which plaintiff will receive
from the business in the course of its reconstruction will
gradually increase. The injury to plaintiff's business
begins where these profits leave off, and, as a
corollary, there is where defendant's liability begins.
Upon this basis, we fix the damages to plaintiff's
business at P250.
Disposition The judgment of the lower court is set
aside, and the plaintiff is awarded the following
damages; ten pesos for medical expenses; one hundred
pesos for the two months of his enforced absence from
his business; and two hundred and fifty pesos for the
damage done to his business in the way of loss of
profits, or a total of three hundred and sixty pesos. No
costs will be allowed in this instance.
PNOC V CA (MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING
CORPORATION)
297 SCRA 402
ROMERO; October 8, 1998
NATURE
Petition for certiorari on a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
FACTS
- In the early morning of September 21, 1977, the M/V
Maria Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent Maria
Efigenia Fishing Corporation, was navigating the waters
near Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to
Navotas, Metro Manila when it collided with the vessel
Petroparcel which at the time was owned by the Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation (LSC) but then subsequently
transferred to PNOC, causing the former to sink.
- Private respondent averred that M/V Maria Efigenia XV
had an actual value of P800,000.00 and that, after
deducting the insurance payment of P200,000.00, the
amount of P600,000.00 should likewise be claimed. The
amended complaint also alleged that inflation resulting
from the devaluation of the Philippine peso had
affected the replacement value of the hull of the vessel,
its equipment and its lost cargoes, such that there
should be a reasonable determination thereof.
Furthermore, on account of the sinking of the vessel,
private respondent supposedly incurred unrealized
profits and lost business opportunities that would
thereafter be proven.
- Lower court, on November 18, 1989 disposing of
Civil Case No. C-9457, rendered judgment in favor of
A2010 - 142 -
the plaintiff and against the defendant PNOC Shipping
& Transport Corporation, to pay the plaintiff:
a. The sum of P6,438,048.00 representing the value of
the fishing boat with interest from the date of the filing
of the complaint at the rate of 6% per annum;
b. The sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;
and
c. The costs of suit.
- The lower court concluded:
Evidently, the quotation of prices submitted by the
plaintiff relative to the replacement value of the
fishing boat and its equipments in the tune of
P6,438,048.00 which were lost due to the
recklessness and imprudence of the herein
defendants were not rebutted by the latter with
sufficient evidence. The defendants through their
sole witness Lorenzo Lazaro relied heavily on said
witness' bare claim that the amount afore-said is
excessive or bloated, but they did not bother at all to
present any documentary evidence to substantiate
such claim. Evidence to be believed must not only
proceed from the mouth of the credible witness, but
it must be credible in itself.
- Unsatisfied with the lower court's decision, petitioner
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which,
however, affirmed the same in toto on October 14,
1992. On petitioner's assertion that the award of
P6,438,048.00 was not convincingly proved by
competent and admissible evidence, the Court of
Appeals ruled that it was not necessary to qualify Del
Rosario as an expert witness because as the owner of
the lost vessel, "it was well within his knowledge and
competency to identify and determine the equipment
installed and the cargoes loaded" on the vessel.
ISSUE
WON respondent court’s award for damages is
appropriate
HELD
NO
Ratio A party is entitled to adequate compensation
only for such pecuniary loss actually suffered and duly
proved. Indeed, basic is the rule that to recover actual
damages, the amount of loss must not only be capable
of proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable
degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or
best evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof.
The claimant is duty-bound to point out specific facts
that afford a basis for measuring whatever
compensatory damages are borne. A court cannot
merely rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork
as to the fact and amount of damages as well as
hearsay or uncorroborated testimony whose truth is
suspect.
prof. casis
Reasoning
- Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or
compensatory damages are those awarded in
satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury
sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice
and are designed to repair the wrong that has been
done, to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to
impose a penalty. In actions based on torts or quasi-
delicts, actual damages include all the natural and
probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. There are two kinds of actual or
compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a
person already possesses (daño emergente), and
the other is the failure to receive as a benefit
that which would have pertained to him (lucro
cesante).
- Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of the
defendant the plaintiff is entitled to their value at the
time of destruction, that is, normally, the sum of money
which he would have to pay in the market for identical
or essentially similar goods, plus in a proper case
damages for the loss of use during the period before
replacement. In other words, in the case of profit-
earning chattels, what has to be assessed is the value
of the chattel to its owner as a going concern at the
time and place of the loss, and this means, at least in
the case of ships, that regard must be had to existing
and pending engagements,
- If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it
is in any case virtually certain of profitable
employment, then nothing can be added to that value
in respect of charters actually lost, for to do so would
be pro tanto to compensate the plaintiff twice over. On
the other hand, if the ship is valued without reference
to its actual future engagements and only in the light of
its profit-earning potentiality, then it may be necessary
to add to the value thus assessed the anticipated profit
on a charter or other engagement which it was unable
to fulfill
- What the court has to ascertain in each case is
the "capitalised value of the vessel as a profit-
earning machine not in the abstract but in view
of the actual circumstances," without, of course,
taking into account considerations which were
too remote at the time of the loss.
- Del Rosario's claim that private respondent incurred
losses in the total amount of P6,438,048.00 should be
admitted with extreme caution considering that,
because it was a bare assertion, it should be supported
by independent evidence. Moreover, because he was
the owner of private respondent corporation whatever
testimony he would give with regard to the value of the
lost vessel, its equipment and cargoes should be
viewed in the light of his self-interest therein.
torts & damages
Accordingly, as stated at the outset, damages may not
be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence.
- Nonetheless, the non-admissibility of said exhibits
does not mean that it totally deprives private
respondent of any redress for the loss of its vessel.
- Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation
arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or
omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in
every case where property right has been invaded.
Under Article 2223 of the Civil Code, "(t)he adjudication
of nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon
the right involved and all accessory questions, as
between the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs
and assigns."
- Actually, nominal damages are damages in name only
and not in fact. Where these are allowed, they are not
treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but simply
in recognition of the existence of a technical injury.
However, the amount to be awarded as nominal
damages shall be equal or at least commensurate to
the injury sustained by private respondent considering
the concept and purpose of such damages. The amount
of nominal damages to be awarded may also depend
on certain special reasons extant in the case.
- Applying now such principles to the instant case, we
have on record the fact that petitioner's vessel
Petroparcel was at fault as well as private respondent's
complaint claiming the amount of P692,680.00
representing the fishing nets, boat equipment and
cargoes that sunk with the M/V Maria Efigenia XV. In its
amended complaint, private respondent alleged that
the vessel had an actual value of P800,000.00 but it
had been paid insurance in the amount of P200,000.00
and, therefore, it claimed only the amount of
P600,000.00. Ordinarily, the receipt of insurance
payments should diminish the total value of the vessel
quoted by private respondent in his complaint
considering that such payment is causally related to
the loss for which it claimed compensation. This Court
believes that such allegations in the original and
amended complaints can be the basis for determination
of a fair amount of nominal damages inasmuch as a
complaint alleges the ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiffs cause of action. Private respondent should be
bound by its allegations on the amount of its claims.
Disposition the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals dated October 14, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No.
26680 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, Branch 121, is hereby MODIFIED insofar
as it awarded actual damages to private respondent
Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation in the amount of
P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary bases therefor.
Considering the fact, however, that: (1) technically
petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately,
was not adequately and properly proved, and (2) this
A2010 - 143 -
case has dragged on for almost two decades, we
believe that an award of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) in
favor of private respondent as and for nominal
damages is in order.
INTEGRATED PACKING V CA
DBP V CA (CUBA)
DAVIDE JR; January 5, 1998
FACTS
- Plaintiff Lydia Cuba is a grantee of a Fishpond Lease
Agreement. She obtained loans from DBP. As security
for said loans, plaintiff Lydia P. Cuba executed two
Deeds of Assignment of her Leasehold Rights.
- Plaintiff failed to pay her loan. Without foreclosure
proceedings, DBP appropriated the leasehold Rights of
Cuba over the fishpond in question. After which
defendant DBP, in turn, executed a Deed of Conditional
Sale of the Leasehold Rights in favor of plaintiff Lydia
Cuba over the same fishpond.
- In the negotiation for repurchase, plaintiff Lydia Cuba
addressed two letters to the Manager DBP, Dagupan
City thereafter accepted the offer to repurchase in a
letter addressed to CUBA.
- After the Deed of Conditional Sale was executed in
favor of Cuba, a new Fishpond Lease Agreement was
issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food .
- Cuba failed to pay the amortizations stipulated in the
Deed of Conditional Sale. After which she entered with
the DBP a temporary arrangement whereby in
consideration for the deferment of the Notarial
Rescission of Deed of Conditional Sale, plaintiff Lydia
Cuba promised to make certain payments as stated in
temporary Arrangement.
- DBP thereafter sent a Notice of Rescission thru
Notarial Act and which was received by Cuba. After the
Notice of Rescission, DBP took possession of the
Leasehold Rights of the fishpond in question;
- That after defendant DBP took possession of the
Leasehold Rights over the fishpond in question, DBP
thereafter executed a Deed of Conditional Sale in favor
of defendant Agripina Caperal.
- Thereafter, defendant Caperal was awarded Fishpond
Lease Agreement by the Ministry of Agriculture and
Food.
- CUBA filed complaint questioning the act of DBP in
appropriating to itself CUBA's leasehold rights over the
fishpond in question without foreclosure proceedings.
TC ruled in favor of petitioner and granted actual
damages in the amount of P1,067,500 representing
lost equipment and dead fish due to DBP’s forecloseure
of fishpond and ejectment of laborers.
prof. casis
- CA regarding damages granted ruled that CUBA was
not entitled to loss of profits for lack of evidence, but
agreed with the trial court as to the actual damages of
P1,067,500. It, however, deleted the amount of
exemplary damages and reduced the award of moral
damages from P100,000 to P50,000 and attorney's
fees, from P100.00 to P50,000
ISSUE
WON the damages granted to CUBA are valid
HELD
NO
- Article 2199 provides:
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly
proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages
- Actual or compensatory damages cannot be
presumed, but must be proved with reasonable degree
of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculations,
conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of
damages, but must depend upon competent proof that
they have been suffered by the injured party and on
the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount
thereof.
- In the present case, the trial court awarded in favor of
CUBA P1,067,500 as actual damages consisting of
P550,000 which represented the value of the alleged
lost articles of CUBA and P517,500 which represented
the value of the 230,000 pieces of bangus allegedly
stocked in 1979 when DBP first ejected CUBA from the
fishpond and the adjoining house.
- We find that the alleged loss of personal belongings
and equipment was not proved by clear evidence.
Other than the testimony of CUBA and her caretaker,
there was no proof as to the existence of those items
before DBP took over the fishpond in question. As
pointed out by DBP, there was no "inventory of the
alleged lost items before the loss which is normal in a
project which sometimes, if not most often, is left to the
care of other persons." Neither was a single receipt or
record of acquisition presented.
- in her complaint dated 17 May 1985, CUBA included
"losses of property" as among the damages resulting
from DBP's take-over of the fishpond. Yet, it was only in
September 1985 when she came to know of the alleged
loss of several articles. Such claim for "losses of
property," having been made before knowledge of the
alleged actual loss, was therefore speculative. The
alleged loss could have been a mere afterthought or
subterfuge to justify her claim for actual damages.
torts & damages
- With regard to the award of P517,000 representing
the value of the alleged 230,000 pieces of bangus
which died when DBP took possession of the fishpond in
March 1979, the same was not called for. Such loss was
not duly proved; besides, the claim therefor was
delayed unreasonably. From 1979 until after the filing
of her complaint in court in May 1985, CUBA did not
bring to the attention of DBP the alleged loss
- The award of actual damages should, therefore, be
struck down for lack of sufficient basis.
- In view however, of DBP's act of appropriating CUBA's
leasehold rights which was contrary to law and public
policy, as well as its false representation to the then
Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources that it
had "foreclosed the mortgage," an award of moral
damages in the amount of P50,000
- Exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of
P25,000 should likewise be awarded by way of example
or correction for the public good. 20 There being an
award of exemplary damages, attorney's fees are also
recoverable
FUENTES V CA
323 PHIL 508
BELLOSILLO; February 9, 1996
FACTS
- 24 June 1989 Julieto Malaspina was at a benefit dance
at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur. Petitioner
called Malaspina and placed his right arm on the
shoulder of the latter saying, "Before, I saw you with a
long hair but now you have a short hair. Suddenly
petitioner stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen with a
hunting knife. After muttering that Fuentes stabbed
him, he died.
- Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his
cousin Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., alias "Jonie" who knifed
Malaspina. He said that his cousin directly told him that
he stabbed the victim out of grudge.
- The Regional Trial Court of Prosperidad, Agusan del
Sur, found petitioner guilty of murder qualified by
treachery and imposed on him an indeterminate prison
term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum, to
indemnify the heirs of the victim Julieto Malaspina the
amount of P50,000.00 and to pay P8,300.00 as actual
damages plus costs. CA affirmed
A2010 - 144 -
ISSUE
1. WON appellate court erred when it held that
petitioner was positively and categorically identified as
the killer of Malaspina, in affirming the judgnment of
conviction
2. WON CA erred in holding petitioner liable for
damages to the heirs of the victim
HELD
1. NO
- Petitioner would make much of the alleged confession
of Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., since it is a declaration against
penal interest and therefore an exception to the
hearsay rule. One of the recognized exceptions to the
hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made
against interest
- There are three (3) essential requisites for the
admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the
declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the
declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the
declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it
improbable that a motive to falsify existed.
- we find that the declaration particularly against penal
interest attributed to Zoilo Fuentes Jr. is not admissible
in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule
- One striking feature that militates against the
acceptance of such a statement is its patent
untrustworthiness. Zoilo who is related to
accusedappellant had every motive to prevaricate
2. NO
- Petitioner maintains that assuming that he committed
the crime it is error to hold him answerable for
P8,300.00 as actual damages on the basis of the mere
testimony of the victim's sister, Angelina Serrano,
without any tangible document to support such claim.
- This is a valid point. In crimes and quasi-delict's, the
defendant is liable for all damages which are the
natural and probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of. To seek recovery for actual
damages it is essential that the injured party proves
the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of
certainty premised upon competent proof and on the
best evidence available.. Courts cannot simply rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining
the fact and amount of damages.
- The award by the court a quo of P8,300.00 as actual
damages is not supported by the evidence on record.
We have only the testimony of the victim's elder sister
stating that she incurred expenses of P8,300.00 in
connection with the death of Malaspina
- However, no proof of the actual damages was ever
presented in court. Of the expenses alleged to have
been incurred, the Court can only give credence to
those supported by receipts and which appear to have
been genuinely expended in connection with the death
prof. casis
of the victim. Since the actual amount was not
substantiated, the same cannot be granted
TALISAY SILAY V ASSOCIACION
247 SCRA 361
FELICIANO; August 15, 1995
NATURE
Petition to review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals reducing the award of damages granted by the
court a quo from approximately P15.4 million to only P1
million
FACTS
- On 15 February 1966, Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc.
("TSMC") and Talisay-Silay Industrial Cooperative
Association, Inc. ("TSICA") instituted an action for
damages against defendants Asociacion de Agricultores
de Talisay-Silay, Inc. ("AATSI"), et. al.
- On 4 March 1972, the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal rendered its decision condemning the defendants
jointly and severally to pay plaintiff Talisay-Silay
Industrial Cooperative Association the amount of
P6,609,714.32 and to plaintiff Talisay-Silay Milling Co.,
Inc. the sum of P8,802,612.89 with legal rate of interest
from the filing of the complaint until fully paid.
- The Court of Appeal rendered a decision affirming
with modification the decision of the court a quo by
reducing the amount of damages due plaintiffs-
appellees TSMC and TSICA from approximately P15.4
million to only P1 million.
ISSUE
WON the reduction of damages was proper
HELD
- In reducing the amount of damages awarded by the
court a quo to petitioners TSMC and TSICA from roughly
P15.4 million to only P1 million, the Court of Appeals,
citing Malayan Insurance Co.. Inc. v. Manila Port Service
reasoned that the reduction was dictated by the failure
or TSMC and TSICA to comply with Section 5, Rule 10 of
the Rule of Court, i.e., TSMC and TSICA's failure to
amend their complaint to conform to the evidence
presented during trial which showed that TSMC and
TSICA suffered damages amounting to more than P1
million by virtue of the illegal transfer of export sugar
quota from TSMC to FFMCI. We are unable to agree
with the Court of Appeals on this point.
- A court may rule and render judgment on the basis of
the evidence before it even though the relevant
pleading had not been previously amended, so long as
no surprise or prejudice is thereby caused to the
adverse party. Put a little differently, so long as the
torts & damages
basic requirements of fair play had been met, as where
litigants were given full opportunity to support their
respective contentions and to object to or refute each
other's evidence, the court may validly treat the
pleadings as if they had been amended to conform to
the evidence and proceed to adjudicate on the basis of
all the evidence before it.
- The record of the instant case shows that TSMC and
TSICA formally offered as evidence documents which
set out in detail the estimated unrealized income
suffered by TSMC and TSICA during four (4) consecutive
crop years, i.e., (CYs) 1964-1965, 1965-1966, 1966-
1967 and 1967-1968, the failure of realization being
attributed to the transfer by AATSI, et al. of their sugar
quota to FFMCI. These documents, along with the
corroborative testimony of one Ricardo Yapjoco, a
Certified Public Accountant and Internal Auditor of
TSMC, were the basis of the trial court's award of
P8,802,612.89 to TSMC and of P6,609,714.32 to TSICA.
It is noteworthy that the joint record on appeal reveals
that AATSI, et al. objected to the Offer of Evidence of
TSMC and TSICA not on the basis that such evidence
fell outside the scope of the issues as defined in the
pleadings as they then stood, but rather on the basis
that such evidence was "incompetent" and speculative
in character, i.e., as "being mere estimates prepared by
witness Yapjoco" and constituting merely his "opinion."
It should also be noted that the testimony of Mr.
Yapjoco was subjected to extensive cross-examination
by counsel for AATSI, et al. The trial court did not
expressly overrule AATSI, et al.'s objection to the Offer
of Evidence of TSMC and TSICA; it is nevertheless clear
that the trial court did not accord much weight to that
objection.
- The point that may be here underscored is that AATSI,
et al., having been given the opportunity and having in
fact been able to register their objections to the
evidence formally offered by TSMC and TSICA were not
in any way prejudiced by the discrepancy between the
allegations in the complaint filed and the propositions
which the evidence submitted by TSMC and TSICA
tended to establish. We conclude that the Court of
Appeals erred when it failed to treat the amended and
supplemental complaint of TSMC and TSICA as if such
complaint had in fact been amended to conform to the
evidence, and when it limited the damages due to
TSMC and TSICA to the amount prayed for in their
original complaint.
- A review of the damages actually awarded to TSMC
and TSICA by the trial court on the one hand and the
Court of Appeals on the other, reveals the need for a
more careful and thorough examination of the matter.
As earlier noted, the Court of Appeals' award of P1
million based simply on the amount set out in the
original complaint of TSMC and TSICA must be
A2010 - 145 -
discarded. Upon the other hand, the award by the trial
court of damages to TSMC and TSICA was arrived at
merely by totalling up the unrealized income sustained
by TSMC and TSICA over the relevant four (4) crop year
period:
- "Because on the refusal of the defendants planters to
return to TSMC, plaintiff TSMC [and TSICA] suffered an
unrealized profit; of P1,934,847.73 in 1964-65 while for
1965-66 crop year, in the amount of P3,033,301.16, for
1966-67 in the amount of P4,656,643.20, and for 1967-
1968, in the amount of P4,805,472.12.
- The plaintiff TSMC failed to realize P3,015,077.77 and
plaintiff TASICA failed to realize P6,609,714.32 or a
total of P9,624,792.09. In 1967-68 after the lease to
TASICA has expired, TSMC failed to realize a net income
of P4,805,514.12."
- We believe, in other words, that the figures and
computations utilized by the trial court in its award on
damages need further examination and refinement. For
instance, the award of damages rendered by the trial
court took into account the loss of income suffered by
TSMC and TSICA when AATSI, et al. transferred two (2)
of sugar quota: the "domestic quota" and the "export
quota." The consent of the sugar central was not
required for the validity of a transfer of the domestic
sugar quota. Accordingly, the transfer by AATSI, et al.
of their domestic sugar quota must be regarded as
valid and the loss of income attributable to the transfer
of such domestic sugar quota from TSMC and TSICA to
FFMCI must be deducted from the aggregate amount of
damages due to TSMC and TSICA. A second example:
Exhibits "P-1" and "W-1" embody figures relating to
"molasses." Molasses are a by-product of milled sugar,
whether that sugar be covered by a "domestic quota"
or by an "export quota." The amount of income lost
traceable to molasses that would have been extracted
from domestic sugar must be deducted from the
aggregate damages due to TSMC and TSICA.
Disposition Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals MODIFIED insofar as the award of actual
damages due Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. and Talisay-
Silay Industrial Cooperative Association, Inc. are
concerned. Subject to the rulings referred to herein,
this case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for the
determination, with all deliberate dispatch, of the
amount of damages due Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc.
and Talisay-Silay Industrial Cooperative Association,
Inc.
PNOC V CA
297 SCRA 402
ROMERO; October 8, 1998
NATURE
prof. casis
Petition for review on the decision of CA
FACTS
- M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent
Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation, collided with the
vessel Petroparcel which at the time was owned by the
Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC).
- After investigation was conducted by the Board of
Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard Commandant
Simeon N. Alejandro rendered a decision finding the
Petroparcel at fault. Based on this finding by the Board
and after unsuccessful demands on petitioner private
respondent sued the LSC and the Petroparcel captain,
Edgardo Doruelo, before the then Court of First
Instance of Caloocan City. In particular, private
respondent prayed for an award of P692,680.00,
allegedly representing the value of the fishing nets,
boat equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia XV.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, petitioner
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation sought to be
substituted in place of LSC as it had already acquired
ownership of the Petroparcel.
- Private respondent later sought the amendment of its
complaint on the ground that the original complaint
failed to plead for the recovery of the lost value of the
hull of M/V Maria Efigenia XV. Accordingly, in the
amended complaint, private respondent averred that
M/V Maria Efigenia XV had an actual value of
P800,000.00 and that, after deducting the insurance
payment of P200,000.00, the amount of P600,000.00
should likewise be claimed. Furthermore, on account of
the sinking of the vessel, private respondent
supposedly incurred unrealized profits and lost
business opportunities that would thereafter be proven.
- The lower court its decision in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant PNOC Shipping & Transport
Corporation, to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P6,438,048.00 representing the value of the fishing
boat with interest from the date of the filing of the
complaint at the rate of 6% per annum.
HELD
RE DAMAGE TO PROPERTY
- Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or
compensatory damages are those awarded in
satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury
sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice
and are designed to repair the wrong that has been
done, to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to
impose a penalty. In actions based on torts or quasi-
delicts, actual damages include all the natural and
probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. There are two kinds of actual or
torts & damages
compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a
person already possesses (daño emergente), and the
other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which
would have pertained to him (lucro cesante). Thus:
"Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of
the defendant the plaintiff is entitled to their value at
the time of destruction, that is, normally, the sum of
money which he would have to pay in the market for
identical or essentially similar goods, plus in a proper
case damages for the loss of use during the period
before replacement. In other words, in the case of
profit-earning chattels, what has to be assessed is
the value of the chattel to its owner as a going
concern at the time and place of the loss, and this
means, at least in the case of ships, that regard must
be had to existing and pending engagements.x x x.
x x x. If the market value of the ship reflects the fact
that it is in any case virtually certain of profitable
employment, then nothing can be added to that
value in respect of charters actually lost, for to do so
would be pro tanto to compensate the plaintiff twice
over. On the other hand, if the ship is valued without
reference to its actual future engagements and only
in the light of its profit-earning potentiality, then it
may be necessary to add to the value thus assessed
the anticipated profit on a charter or other
engagement which it was unable to fulfill. What the
court has to ascertain in each case is the `capitalised
value of the vessel as a profit-earning machine not in
the abstract but in view of the actual circumstances,'
without, of course, taking into account considerations
which were too remote at the time of the loss."
- Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation
arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or
omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in
every case where property right has been invaded.
[Arts. 2222 & 1157, Civil Code.] Under Article 2223 of
the Civil Code, "(t)he adjudication of nominal damages
shall preclude further contest upon the right involved
and all accessory questions, as between the parties to
the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns."
RAMOS V CA (DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL
CENTER, DR. HOSAKA)
321 SCRA 584
KAPUNAN; December 29, 1999
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the
Court of Appeals.
FACTS
- Erlinda Ramos, a 47-year old robust woman, was
advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a
A2010 - 146 -
stone in her gall bladder for occasional complaints of
discomfort due to pains she felt.
- She and her husband, Rogelio E. Ramos, met thru a
mutual doctor friend, Dr. Orlino Hosaka, one of the
defendants on June 10, 1985. The scheduled operation
would be on June 17, 1985 9AM at Delos Santos Medical
Center (DLSMC). When asked for an anesthesiologist,
Dr. Hosaka claimed he would get a good one without
giving a name.
- At around 7:30AM of June 17, she was prepared for
the operation by the hospital staff. Her sister-in-law,
Herminda Cruz, Dean of the College of Nursing of
Capitol Medical Center, was there and was allowed to
be in the operating room to give moral support. Cruz
saw 2 or 3 nurses and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, another
defendant, who administered the anesthesia. At
9:30AM, Dr. Hosaka was not yet in. Erlinda Ramos was
getting impatient. It was at almost 12NN when Dr.
Hosaka arrived. At 12:15AM when the operating room
was very busy, final preparations for the operation were
done.
- When the patient was being intubated, Cruz heard Dr.
Gutierrez say “Aang hirap maintubate nito, mali yata
ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan”. These
remarks made her look at what the Dr. was doing. She
then noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the
left hand of the hapless Erlinda even as Dr. Hosaka
approached her. Dr. Hosaka then ordered someone to
call for another anesthesiologist, Dr. Calderon. Dr.
Calderon came and was also trying to intubate the
patient. The patient was placed in a tredelenburg
position - a position where the head of the patient is
placed in a position lower than her feet which is an
indication that there is a decrease of blood supply to
the patient’s brain.
- Rogelio Ramos who was outside of the operating room
then saw a respiratory machine being rushed into the
O.R. At almost 3PM of that day, the patient was taken
to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU).
- Erlinda stayed at the ICU for a month. Four months
later, the patient was released from the hospital. She
has been brain damaged ever since, and comatose.
- Petitioners then filed a civil case for damages in Jan.
1986. Petitioners proved that the damage sustained by
Erlinda was due to lack of oxygen in her brain caused
by the faulty management of her airway by private
respondents during the anesthesia phase. Respondents
claimed that the damage was Erlinda’s allergic reaction
to the anesthetic agent, Thiopental Sodium (Penthonal).
RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. RTC awarded a
total of P632K (should be P616K) in compensatory
damages to the plaintiff, "subject to its being updated"
covering the period from 15 November 1985 up to 15
April 1992, based on monthly expenses for the care of
prof. casis
the patient estimated at P8K. CA overturned the
decision. Hence, this appeal.
(NOTE: See Crim Law 2 Digest re discourse on Res ipsa
loquitur and the negligence of Dr. Gutierrez, and Dr.
Hosaka. It was ruled in here that the surgeon, the
anesthesiologist and the hospital should be made liable
for the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient
scheduled for cholecystectomy or surgical excision of
the gall bladder)
ISSUE
WON the damages awarded by lower court was
inadequate
HELD
YES
- The amount of actual damages recoverable in suits
arising from negligence should at least reflect the
correct minimum cost of proper care, not the cost of
the care the family is usually compelled to undertake at
home to avoid bankruptcy. However, the provisions of
the Civil Code on actual or compensatory damages
present us with some difficulties.
Actual damages which may be claimed by the
plaintiff are those suffered by him as he has duly
proved. (A1299 CC19)
- Our rules on actual or compensatory damages
generally assume that at the time of litigation, the
injury suffered as a consequence of an act of
negligence has been completed and that the cost can
be liquidated. But these provisions neglect to take into
account those situations, as in this case, where the
resulting injury might be continuing and possible future
complications directly arising from the injury, while
certain to occur, are difficult to predict.
Other damages discussed:
- In these cases, the amount of damages which should
be awarded, if they are to adequately and correctly
respond to the injury caused, should be one which
compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved,
up to the time of trial; and one which would meet
pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which could
not, from the nature of the case, be made with
certainty. In other words, temperate damages can and
should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory
damages in instances where the injury is chronic and
continuing. And because of the unique nature of such
cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual and
temperate damages are provided for. The reason is
that these damages cover two distinct phases.
19
Art. 2199. — Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled
to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him
as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages.
torts & damages
- Moral damages: the actual physical, emotional and
financial cost of the care of petitioner which would be
virtually impossible to quantify. The husband and the
children will have to live with the day to day
uncertainty of the patient's illness, knowing any hope of
recovery is close to nil. They have fashioned their daily
lives around the nursing care of petitioner, altering
their long term goals to take into account their life with
a comatose patient. They are charged with the moral
responsibility of the care of the victim. The family's
moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real
one.
- Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages are
awarded considering the length and nature of the
instant suit.
Disposition Decision and resolution of the appellate
court appealed from are modified so as to award in
favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private
respondents the ff: 1) P1.352M as actual damages
computed as of the date of promulgation of this
decision plus a monthly payment of P8K up to the time
that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously
survives; 2) P2M as moral damages, 3) P1.5Mas
temperate damages; 4) P100K each as exemplary
damages and attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the
suit.
GATCHALIAN V DELIM
203 SCRA 126
FELICIANO; October 21, 1991
NATURE
Appeal from a decision of CA
FACTS
- In July 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded,
as a paying passenger, respondent's "Thames" mini
bus and on the way, while the bus was running along
the highway in Bauang, La Union, "a snapping sound"
was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and, shortly
thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on
the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle
and fell into a ditch. Several passengers, including
petitioner Gatchalian, were injured. They were promptly
taken the hospital for medical treatment. Upon medical
examination, petitioner was found to have sustained
physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead.
- While injured. passengers were confined in the
hospital, Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent, visited
them and later paid for their hospitalization and
medical expenses. She also gave petitioner P12 with
which to pay her transportation expense in going home
from the hospital. She also had the injured passengers,
including petitioner, sign an already prepared Joint
A2010 - 147 -
Affidavit which stated, among other things: That we are
no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil
against the said driver and owner of the said Thames,
because it was an accident and the said driver and
owner of the said Thames have gone to the extent of
helping us to be treated upon our injuries.
- Despite this document, petitioner Gathalian filed with
CFI La Union an action extra contractu to recover
compensatory and moral damages. Respondents’
defense was that vehicular mishap was due to force
majeure, and that petitioner had already been paid and
moreover had waived any right to institute any action
against him and his driver, when Gatchalian signed the
Joint Affidavit.
- TC ruled in favor of respondents because of the
waiver. CA reversed but affirmed TC in denying
petitioners claim for damages. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON there was a valid waiver to effect
relinquishment of any right of action on the oart of the
petitioner
2. WON private respondent Delim was able to prove
that he had exercised extraordinary diligence to
prevent the mishap
3. WON damages may be awarded petitioner
Gatchalian
HELD
1. NO
Ratio A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the
first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms
which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to
give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him.
A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person
when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly
evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such
person.
Reasoning
[1] Under the circumstances petitioner was still reeling
from the effects of the vehicular accident, having been
in the hospital for only 3 days, when the waiver/Joint
Affidavit was presented to her for signing; that while
reading it, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing
the other passengers who had also suffered injuries
sign the document, she too signed without bothering to
read it in its entirety. There is substantial doubt
whether petitioner fully understood it
[2] because what is involved here is the liability of a
common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in
respect of whose safety a common carrier must
exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe any
such purported waiver most strictly against the
common carrier. For a waiver to be valid and effective,
it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or
prof. casis
good customs. To uphold a supposed waiver of any
right to claim damages by an injured passenger, under
circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would
be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary
diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and
hence to render that standard unenforceable. Such
waiver is offensive to public policy.
2. NO
Ratio A duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in
protecting the safety of its passengers is imposed upon
a common carrier. In case of death or injuries to
passengers, a statutory presumption arises that the
common carrier was at fault or had acted negligently
"unless it proves that it [had] observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in A1733 and A1755. To
overcome this presumption, the common carrier must
slow to the court that it had exercised extraordinary
diligence to prevent the injuries. The standard of
extraordinary diligence imposed upon common carriers
is considerably more demanding than the standard of
ordinary.
Reasoning
- When a "snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one
part of the bus. One of the passengers cried out, "What
happened?" The driver replied, "That is only normal".
The driver did not stop to check if anything had gone
wrong with the bus. The driver's reply necessarily
indicated that the same "snapping sound" had been
heard in the bus on previous occasions. This meant that
the bus had not been checked physically or
mechanically to determine what was causing the
"snapping sound" which had occurred so frequently
that the driver had gotten accustomed to it. Force
majeure is no defense.
3. YES
- Compensatory and moral damages may be awarded.
[1] A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his
or her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished,
actual injury is suffered for which actual or
compensatory damages are due and assessable.
Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly
as possible in the condition that she was before the
mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the
woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her,
is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a
legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio ante.
Hence, compensatory damages is awarded, especially
to cover the petitioner’s expenses for the plastic
surgery.
[2] Moral damages may be awarded where gross
negligence on the part of the common carrier is shown.
18 Since we have earlier concluded that respondent
common carrier and his driver had been grossly
negligent in connection with the bus mishap which had
torts & damages
injured petitioner and other passengers, and recalling
the aggressive manuevers of respondent, through his
wife, to get the victims to waive their right to recover
damages even as they were still
Disposition CFI and CA decisions reversed and set
aside. Respondent ORDERED to pay petitioner
Gatchalian the ff. sums: 1) P15K as actual or
compensatory damages to cover the cost of plastic
surgery for the removal of the scar on petitioner's
forehead; 2) P30Kas moral damages; and 3) P1K as
atty's fees, the aggregate amount to bear interest at
the legal rate of 6% per annum counting from the
promulgation of this decision until full payment thereof.
PEOPLE V MANGAHAS
311 SCRA 384
GONZAGA-REYES; July 28, 1999
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court
FACTS
- Rodrigo Mangahas alias Mang Rudy was accused of
shooting and killing Rufino Gestala.
- Different witnesses came forward for the prosecution
Police Captain Florante Baltazar, the medico-legal
officer at the PC-INP, QC testified about the post-
mortem examination saying the victim sustained 3
gunshot wounds. He estimated the distance between
the assailant and the victim at more than 24 inches.
Diosdado Padios, said that while the two were drinking,
he saw Mangahas suddenly shoot Rufino Gestala, who
was then seated less than one meter away from the
former while he himself, was one meter away from the
two when the incident occurred. Renato Panoso the
best friend of Gestala said they had been conversing
for about four (4) minutes when Rudy Mangahas
arrived and offered a beer to each of them. They had
been drinking for only a short time when the accused
suddenly approached Rufino Gestala, pulled out a gun
and shot him. After the shooting and upon seeing
Gestala bloodied and clutching his chest, the witness
ran away in the direction of his house and reported the
matter to his uncle.
he saw witness Diosdado Padios but the latter did not
drink beer nor was he offered one as he was just
passing by. Trinidad Balatbat, was likewise presented
and she testified mainly on the expenses their family
incurred as a result of the death of the victim.
- Mangahas admitted that he shot the victim but
alleged that the killing was done in self-defense.
Mangahas narrated that on his way home from work to
check up on his lunch. When he was near the sari-sari
store of Tiangco, he was called by Renato Panoso who
was then talking with the victim Gestala. Gestala was
A2010 - 148 -
then sitting on the “pasimano” in front of the store
while Renato Panoso was standing on the other side.
When he approached them, Panoso got a gun from
behind his waist, showed it to the accused and offered
it to him saying, “Bilihin mo na lang ito, mahusay ito”,
to which the accused replied, “mahirap yan.” Gestala,
who was standing about one (1) meter away from them
suddenly raised his voice and said, “Putang-ina mo
mahusay naman yong isinasanla namin sa iyo ba’t
ayaw mong tanggapin?” In order to pacify them, he
offered them bottles of beer. After they had consumed
one-half of the bottles of beer, Gestala, who was then
about two meters away from him, said, “Putang-ina mo
ba’t ayaw mong tanggapin yon ay mahusay naman.”
Immediately thereafter, Gestala pulled out a gun from
the right side of his body, poked it at him and squeezed
the trigger. The gun did not fire however. The accused
then moved away from Gestala towards the
“pasimano” of the store and bumped Panoso. He was
able to take hold of the gun which was on the
“pasimano” of the store and he fired the same at
Gestala. The accused stressed that he fired only once
at Gestala as he was only defending himself and that
he threw away the gun which he used right after the
incident. After he fired at Gestala, the latter, still
carrying his gun, ran away towards the back portion of
the store. He himself ran way after the shooting
incident as he was confused and afraid of the group of
Gestala. When he had calmed down, he went to the
barangay hall of Barangay Tungkong Mangga to
surrender himself and explain his side but nobody was
there when he arrived. Upon returning to his house, he
was told that the group of Panoso had been looking for
him. Because of this threat on his life, he left the place
and went to his in-laws at Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Nestor
dela Rosa collaborated the accused’s account of the
incident.
- SP03 Mario Fernandez who testified on the procedures
undertaken by his police detachment in investigating
the shooting of Rufino Gestala.
- The Court a sided with plaintiff. Defendant filed an
MFR which was denied.
ISSUES
1. WON trial court erred in concluding that herein
accused-appellant failed to prove any basic element of
self-defense
2. WON treachery can be appreciated to qualify the
crime into murder
3. What is the correct amount for the indemnity
HELD
1. NO
- The Court has almost invariably ruled that the matter
of assigning value to the declaration of witnesses is
prof. casis
best done by trial courts which, unlike appellate courts,
can assess such testimony in the light of the demeanor,
conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial stage
and thus, unless cogent reasons are shown, the
findings of the trial court are accorded great respect
and credit.
- Accused’s defense is devoid of merit. At first, accused
put up the defense of alibi when the instant case was
being investigated by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Bulacan. Then, he sets up self-defense at
the trial on the merits of the case. These two defenses
are incompatible with each other. They do not at all
provide shield to the accused to ward off the
commission of the crime charged against him. Setting
up such contradictory defenses will lead to the
conclusion that the accused is confused of what
defense is for real. This being so, accused’s testimony
is wanting of credence at the outset. When accused
finally he adopts self-defense saying that the victim
pulled out a gun from his right side then poked it to the
accused, squeezed its trigger once but misfired.
Reacting to the situation, accused picked up the gun
from the “pasimano” of the store, fired it once to the
victim and then ran away from the scene of the
incident. Analyzing the testimony of the accused, the
inevitable conclusion would be that such testimony is
unreasonable and improbable. If the victim really
intended to kill the accused, it is natural for him, under
the situation, to squeeze the trigger of his gun not only
once if the first squeeze missed, but for several times
until his gun fired or to pick up the gun on the
“pasimano” of the store and use it instead in shooting
the accused. It is inconceivable also that the victim
would have to kill the accused just because the latter
refused to buy or accept as pledge the gun Renato
Panoso was offering to the accused. Incidentally, the
alleged gun of the victim was not presented in Court.
Likewise unbelievable is the claim of the accused that
he picked up the gun from the “pasimano” of the store
then shot the victim. At the moment of the incident,
accused was facing the store and 1 meter, more or
less, away from the victim who was sitting on the said
“pasimano” indicating that that the victim was nearer
to the gun on the “pasimano” than him. This being so,
the victim should have picked up the gun from the
“pasimano” ahead of the accused or should have
grappled for the gun taken by the accused after his gun
misfired at first squeeze of the trigger. This should
have been the natural reaction of the victim when his
life was placed in imminent danger after his gun
misfired. Moreover, it is strange why Renato Panoso a
best friend of the victim and who was much nearer to
the gun on the “pasimano” than the accused and the
victim did not react to the situation when the life of his
best friend was in imminent danger. It is likewise
torts & damages
strange why Renato Panoso should place and leave the
gun on the “pasimano” and then continued drinking
beer while the transaction on the gun has already been
through.
- Another doubt on the testimonies of the accused and
his witness Nestor dela Rosa lies on their claims that
the accused fired his gun only once. The victim
sustained 3 gunshot wounds of separate and different
entries and exits on his body. For a single shot to
produce those wounds is highly irreconcilable. Further,
the accused claimed as he demonstrated in open Court,
that while he was standing he pointed his gun towards
the victim at the level of his (accused’s) chest. The
accused and the victim were of the same height. If the
accused fired his gun in the position demonstrated, the
wounds would be through and through straight at the
level of the chest from the point of entry to the point of
exit. The 2 gunshot wounds of the victim were through
and through from his chest towards the lower exit at his
back, indicating that the position of the accused was
higher than that of the victim’s when the fatal shots
were fired. In other words, the allege position of the
accused is inconsistent with the location and direction
of the wounds. It is rather consistent with the
established facts that the accused was standing when
he shot the victim who was then sitting and facing him.
- By the same token, the corroborating testimony of
defense witness Nestor dela Rosa likewise lacks
credence. The fact that he could not identify or name
the person who pointed a gun to the accused and
squeezed its trigger once but misfired and other
persons in the group, even as he has already discussed
the incident with the accused, indicates that he was not
an eye witness to the incident.”
- It is doctrinal that the assessment of the credibility of
the witnesses is left largely to the trial court because of
its opportunity, unavailable to the appellate court, to
see witnesses on the stand and determine by their
conduct and demeanor whether they are testifying
truthfully or are simply lying. The determination of
credibility is the domain of the trail court, and the
matter of assigning values to the testimonies of the
witnesses is best performed by it; thus the evaluation
by the trial judge on the credibility of witnesses is well
nigh conclusive on this Court.
- Inconsistent defenses put up by the accused during
the preliminary investigation and trial of the case as
seen in the Sworn Statement and the trial testimony,
and again during the hearing for the MFR. He himself
by his own act of giving false testimony impeaches his
own testimony and the court is compelled to exclude it
from all consideration.
- Another factor which contributes further to the
doubtfulness of the veracity of the testimony of the
accused and his witness Nestor dela Rosa is their
A2010 - 149 -
insistence that accused-appellant shot the victim only
once. As stated by the medico-legal officer in his direct
examination, the victim sustained three (3) gunshot
wounds with three (3) different exit and entry points on
different parts of the victim’s body. The presence of
several gunshot wounds on the body of the victim is
physical evidence which eloquently refutes accused-
appellant’s allegation of self-defense. The location,
number and gravity of the wounds of the victim belie
appellant’s pretension that he acted in self-defense.
- A final indication of appellant’s guilt is his flight after
shooting. His claim that he fled because of the threats
allegedly made by the victim’s friends and relatives is
not sufficient reason for him not to surrender to the
police since the latter could have adequately protected
him if there were really threats to his life. Indeed, flight
strongly indicates a guilty mind and betrays the
existence of a guilty conscience.[58]
2. NO, there is no convincing evidence supports such a
finding.
- The eyewitnesses’ accounts were unclear in details,
and cannot fairly deduce that the means of execution
of the crime used by accused-appellant were
deliberately or consciously adopted or that the person
attacked had no opportunity to defend himself or
retaliate. The only proof that the attack was
treacherous is their bare testimonies that the accused-
appellant suddenly shot the victim. However, there is
no treachery where there is no evidence proving that
the accused consciously and deliberately adopted his
mode of attack to insure execution without risk to
himself - mere suddenness of attack would not, by
itself, constitute treachery. In fact, the circumstances
surrounding the case belie the trial court’s finding that
treachery was present. The shooting occurred in broad
daylight. The victim was openly conversing with
accused-appellant for several minutes before the
incident. The victim himself was with his best friend
who could have come to his aid at anytime. Verily, if
accused-appellant wanted to insure that no risk would
come to him, he could have chosen another time and
place to shoot the victim. The evidence then for the
prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt
the guilt of the accused for the crime of homicide only,
not murder. The penalty imposed for homicide in
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
temporal.
3. In conformity with prevailing jurisprudence, the trial
court correctly awarded the amount of P50,000.00 as
death indemnity to the heirs of the deceased. With
respect to the actual damages incurred by the relatives
of the deceased, we have previously held:
“Of the expenses allegedly incurred, the Court can
only give credence to those supported by receipt and
which appear to have been genuinely incurred in
prof. casis
connection with the death, wake, or burial of the
victim. Thus, the Court cannot take account of
receipts showing expenses incurred before the date
of slaying of the victim; those incurred after a
considerable lapse of time from the burial of the
victim and which do not have any relation to the
death, wake, or burial of the victim; those incurred
for purely aesthetic or social purposes, such as the
lining of the tomb of the victim…”
- Thus, from the evidence presented before the lower
court, we affirm the award of P14,590.00 for funeral
and burial expenses as these were properly supported
by receipts and proven during the trial of the case.
However, we reduce the amount awarded as actual
damages for food served during the burial of the victim
to P7,285.00 which cover only those expenses incurred
during the wake and vigil of the victim. The other
expenses relating to the 9th day, 40th day and 1st year
death anniversaries are deleted as these were incurred
after a considerable lapse of time from the burial of the
victim.
Disposition the appealed decision of the Regional
Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED, and the accused-
appellant is found GUILTY OF HOMICIDE and sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. Accused-appellant is further
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the death
indemnity of P50,000.00; and actual damages of
P21,875.00.
VICTORY LINER V HEIRS OF ANDRES
MALECDAN
MENDOZA; December 27, 2002
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals
FACTS
- Andres Malecdan, a 75 yr old farmer, was crossing the
National Highway. A Dalin bus stopped to allow him to
pass. However, a bus of the petitioner overtook the
Dalin bus and his Malecdan. Malecdan died.
- A suit was brought for damages against the bus
company. Judgment was rendered in favor of the heirs
of Malecdan. The court awarded them:
a. P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
b. P88,339.00 for actual damages;
c. P200,000.00 for moral damages;
d. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
e. Thirty percent (30%) as attorney’s fees of whatever
amount that can be collected by the plaintiff; and
torts & damages
f. The costs of the suit.
ISSUE
WON the court erred in the amount of damages
awarded
HELD
YES
- To justify an award of actual damages, there should
be proof of the actual amount of loss incurred in
connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim.
We cannot take into account receipts showing
expenses incurred some time after the burial of the
victim, such as expenses relating to the 9th day, 40th
day and 1st year death anniversaries.
- The award of P200,000.00 for moral damages should
likewise be reduced. The trial court found that the wife
and children of the deceased underwent “intense moral
suffering” as a result of the latter’s death. Under Art.
2206 of the Civil Code, the spouse, legitimate children
and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Under
the circumstances of this case an award of P100,000.00
would be in keeping with the purpose of the law in
allowing moral damages. (they only prayed for 100k in
the RTC, but RTC gave them 200k)
- On the other hand, the award of P50,000.00 for
indemnity is in accordance with current rulings of the
Court.
- Art. 2231 provides that exemplary damages may be
recovered in cases involving quasi-delicts if the
defendant acted with gross negligence. In this case,
petitioner’s driver Joson, Jr. was grossly negligent in
driving at such a high speed and overtaking another
vehicle. He did not even help the victim. The amount of
exemplary damages is proper
Disposition Decision affirmed with modification
QUIRANTE V IAC
REGALADO; January 31, 1989
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari seeking to set aside the judgment
of the IAC which found the petition for certiorari therein
meritorious
FACTS
- Dr. Indalecio Casasola (father of respondents) had a
contract with a building contractor named Norman
GUERRERO. The Philippine American General Insurance
Co. Inc. (PHILAMGEN, for short) acted as bondsman for
GUERRERO. In view of GUERRERO'S failure to perform
his part of the contract within the period specified, Dr.
Indalecio Casasola, thru his counsel, Atty. John
A2010 - 150 -
Quirante, sued both GUERRERO and PHILAMGEN before
the CFI of Manila for damages, with PHILAMGEN filing a
cross-claim against GUERRERO for indemnification.
- The CFI ruled in favor of the plaintiff by rescinding the
contract; ordering GUERRERO and PHILAMGEN to pay
the plaintiff actual, moral, and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees; ordering Guerrero alone to pay
liquidated damages of P300.00 a day from December
15, 1978 to July 16, 1979; and ordering PHILAMGEN to
pay the plaintiff the amount of the surety bond
equivalent to P120,000.00. In the meantime, on
November 16, 1981, Dr. Casasola died leaving his
widow and several children as survivors.
- Herein petitioner Quirante filed a motion in the trial
court for the confirmation of his attorney's fees.
According to him, there was an oral agreement
between him and the late Dr. Casasola with regard to
his attorney's fees, which was allegedly confirmed in
writing by the widow and the two daughters of the
deceased. The trial court granted the motion for
confirmation despite an opposition thereto.
ISSUE
WON petitioner may claim his attorney’s fees
HELD
NO
Ratio Since the main case from which the petitioner's
claims for their fees may arise has not yet become
final, the determination of the propriety of said fees
and the amount thereof should be held in abeyance.
This procedure gains added validity in the light of the
rule that the remedy for recovering attorney's fees as
an incident of the main action may be availed of only
when something is due to the client.
Reasoning
- Well settled is the rule that counsel's claim for
attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very
action in which the services in question have been
rendered, or in a separate action. What is being
claimed here as attorney's fees by petitioners is,
however, different from attorney's fees as an item of
damages provided for under Article 2208 of the CC,
wherein the award is made in favor of the litigant, not
of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the
judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for
attorney's fees by execution. Here, the petitioner's
claims are based on an alleged contract for professional
services, with them as the creditors and the private
respondents as the debtors. In filing the motion for
confirmation of attorney's fees, petitioners chose to
assert their claims in the same action. This is also a
proper remedy under our jurisprudence. Nevertheless,
we agree with the respondent court that the
confirmation of attorney's fees is premature. We take
prof. casis
exception to and reject that portion of the decision of
the respondent court which holds that the alleged
confirmation to attorney's fees should not adversely
affect the non-signatories thereto, since it is also
premised on the eventual grant of damages to the
Casasola family, hence the same objection of
prematurity obtains and such a holding may be pre-
emptive of factual and evidentiary matters that may be
presented for consideration by the trial court.
Disposition The decision of the respondent court is
hereby AFFIRMED.
CRISMINA GARMENTS V CA
CERRANO V TAN
38 Phil 392
FISHER; August 1, 1918
NATURE
An action by plaintiff for damages alleged to have been
caused by the breach of a contract for the hiring of a
casco.
FACTS
- During the month of January, 1916, Tan (defendant),
who was then the owner of casco No. 1033, rented it to
Cerrano (plaintiff) at a monthly rental of P70. Delivery
was made in Manila.
- Some time during the month of May, 1916, the Tan
notified Cerrano that in the following month it would be
necessary to send the casco to Malabon for repairs.
Cerrano then informed Tan that he would like to rent
the casco again after the repairs had been completed.
Defendant indicated that he was willing to rent it, but
would expect P80 a month for it.
- There was no agreement between the parties
concerning the length of time for which the hire of the
casco was to continue.
- One week before the end of the repair period Tan sold
the casco to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. J. Santos, the man
who had been employed by Cerrnao as patron of the
casco while it was in his possession, upon hearing that
it had been sold to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. went to the
office of the latter in Manila, and asked for employment
in the same capacity.
- Cerrano, claiming that he was entitled to the
possession of the casco under his contract with Tan
regardless of its sale to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. induced
Santos to refuse to take orders from the new owners.
Siy Cong Bieng & Co. was obliged to bring an action of
replevin against Santos for the recovery of the
possession of their casco.
- After the casco had been in possession of Santos for
three months, the replevin suit was submitted to the
torts & damages
court for decision upon a written stipulation in which it
was admitted that the casco was the property of Siy
Cong Bieng & Co. at the time of the suit was
commenced, and that the "illegal detention" of the
casco by Santos had caused damages to Siy Cong
Bieng & Co. in the sum of P457.98.
- Cerrano testified his average profit from other cascos
rented by him was P60 a month for each casco (P600
for 10 months supposedly).
Petitioner’s Claim
> It was agreed that he was to take the casco at the
increased rental.
> A contract for the rental of a casco, when made by
the owner, is deemed in the absence of an express
stipulation to the contrary, to run from the date of the
contract until the casco has to be docked for its annual
overhauling and repair (ten months).
Defendant’s Comments
> His offer to lease it at the higher rate was never
accepted.
> In the absence of an express stipulation regarding
the duration of the hire, duration is deemed to be from
month to month when a monthly rental is agreed upon.
> Cerrano’s claim of P60 profit does not furnish the
proper measure of damages, and that plaintiff's right is
limited to the recovery of the difference between the
contract price at which the casco was hired by him and
such higher rate as he might have been compelled to
pay for the hire of a similar casco in the open market to
take its place.
> It Cerrano’s responsibility to rent another casco
seeing that the one owned by Tan was already sold to
Siy Cong Bieng & Co. (thus mitigating his liability to pay
damages).
ISSUES
1. WON it was agreed between the plaintiff and
defendant that the casco was to be leased to the
former again after it had been repaired
2. What is the duration of the term
3. WON there is liability for damages, and to what
extent (mitigation of liability)
HELD
1. YES, there was an agreement for the subsequent
rental.
Reasoning
- It was understood between the parties that Cerrano
was to have it again at the increased rental as soon as
the contemplated repairs had been completed. That
such was the understanding is shown by the fact that
plaintiff paid for the towage of the casco to the dry
dock at Malabon; that he left his equipment in it; and
that his patron stayed with the casco in Malabon during
the time it was on the dock.
A2010 - 151 -
- The sale to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. was a breach of
contract between the Cerrano and Tan.
2. The period was for a monthly rental.
Ratio The reasonable presumption that one who
agrees to pay a monthly rent intends that his tenancy
is to endure for a like period, subject to indefinite tacit
renewals at the end of each month as long as the
arrangement is agreeable to both parties.
Reasoning
- When no definite agreement has been made
regarding its duration, the lease of a house is deemed
to have been made from day to day, from month to
month, or from year to year, according to whether a
daily, monthly, or yearly rent is to be paid.
3. YES, there is liability for damages, and there is no
mitigation of the liability.
Ratio Plaintiff is entitled to recover, as damages for the
breach of the contract by the defendant, the profit
which he would have been able to make had the
contract been performed. HOWEVER, It is a well-
recognized principle of law that damages resulting from
avoidable consequences of the breach of a contract or
other legal duty are not recoverable. It is the duty of
one injured by the unlawful act of another to take such
measures as prudent men usually take under such
circumstances to reduce the damages as much as
possible.
Reasoning
- By selling the casco to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. Tan
broke his contract with Cerrano and is responsible for
the damages caused by his failure to give plaintiff
possession of the casco for the term of one month.
- Article 1106 of the Civil Code establishes the rule that
prospective profits may be recovered as damages,
while article 1107 of the same Code provides that the
damages recoverable for the breach of obligations not
originating in fraud (dolo) are those which were or
might have been foreseen at the time the contract was
entered into.
- The injured party must produce the best evidence of
which his case is susceptible and if that evidence
warrants the inference that he has been damaged by
the loss of profits which he might with reasonable
certainty have anticipated but for the defendant's
wrongful act, he is entitled to recover.
- It is equally well-settled, however, that the burden of
proof rests upon the defendant to show that the
plaintiff might have reduced the damages. In this case
the defendant has made no effort whatever to show
that any other similar cascos were in fact available to
plaintiff, or the price at which he would have been able
to obtain the use of one. In the absence of evidence it
will not be presumed that plaintiff could have secured
another casco at the same price had he looked for one.
prof. casis
Disposition It is decreed that Cerrano recover from
Tan P50 as damages, and his costs in the Court of First
Instance.
KIERULF V CA (PANTRANCO NORTH
EXPRESS)
269 SCRA 433
PANGANIBAN; March 13, 1997
FACTS
- About 7:45 pm, 28 Feb 1987: a Pantranco bus was
traveling along EDSA from Congressional Avenue
towards Clover Leaf, Balintawak. Before it reached the
corner of Oliveros Drive, the driver lost control of the
bus, causing it to swerve to the left, and then to fly
over the center island occupying the east-bound lane of
EDSA. The front of the bus bumped the front portion of
an Isuzu pickup driven by Porfirio Legaspi, which was
moving along Congressional Avenue heading towards
Roosevelt Avenue.
- As a result, the points of contact of both vehicles were
damaged and physical injuries were inflicted on Legaspi
and his passenger Lucila Kierulf. The bus also hit and
injured a pedestrian who was then crossing EDSA.
- Despite the impact, said bus continued to move
forward and its front portion rammed against a Caltex
gasoline station, damaging its building and gasoline
dispensing equipment.
- As a consequence of the incident, Lucila suffered
injuries which required major surgeries and prolonged
treatment by specialists. Legaspi also suffered injuries.
The front portion of the pickup truck, owned by Spouses
Kierulf was smashed to pieces. (cost of repair
estimated at P107,583.50.)
- The victims of the vehicular mishap pray for an
increase in the award of damages, over and above
those granted by the appellate court. Victor, husband
of Lucila, claims compensation/damages for the loss of
his right to marital consortium which, according to him,
has been diminished due to the disfigurement suffered
by his wife.
- Pantranco asks for exoneration by invoking an alleged
fortuitous event as the cause of the mishap. They say
that while bus driven by Jose Malanum was cruising
along EDSA, a used engine differential accidentally and
suddenly dropped from a junk truck in front of the bus.
Said differential hit the underchassis of the bus,
throwing Malanum off his seat and making him lose
control of said bus. The bus swerved to the left, hit the
center island, and bumped the pickup of the spouses.
RTC CA request SC
LUCILA + amt
Actual 174,100 241,861 for lost 241,861
.77 .81 income .81
torts & damages A2010 - 152 - prof. casis
Moral 100,00. 200,000 1 Million 400,00 Rodriguez case , it was ruled that when a person is
20
- Exemplary damages are designed to permit the courts
00 .00 0.00 injured to the extent that he/she is no longer capable of to mould behavior that has socially deleterious
Exempl 10,00.0 100,000 500,000 200,00 giving love, affection, comfort and sexual relations to consequences, and its imposition is required by public
ary 0 .00 .00 0.00 his or her spouse, that spouse has suffered a direct and policy to suppress the wanton acts of an offender.
VICTOR real personal loss. The loss is immediate and However, it cannot be recovered as a matter of right. It
Actual 96,825. 96,825. 107,583 96,825. consequential rather than remote and unforeseeable; it is based entirely on the discretion of the court.
15 15 .50 15 is personal to the spouse and separate and distinct 5. For Lucila, NO.
LEGASP from that of the injured person. - CA already considered this when it stated that the
I 6,328.1 6,328.1 16,000. - Whether Rodriguez may be cited as authority to award of P25k included compensation for "mental
Actual 8 8 00 support the award of moral damages to Victor &/or anguish and emotional strain of not earning anything
Moral 10,000. 25,000. 100,000 50,000. Lucila Kierulf for "loss of consortium" cannot be with a family to support."
00 00 .00 00 properly considered in this case. Victor's claim, - Lucila's claim of loss of earning capacity has not been
Exempl 50,000. 50,000. although argued before CA, is not supported by the duly proven with ITRs. The alleged loss must be
ary 00 00 evidence on record. established by factual evidence for it partakes of actual
atty’s 25,000. 50,000. 50,000. 3. NO damages. A party is entitled to adequate compensation
fees 00 00 00 - The social and financial standing of a claimant of for such pecuniary loss actually suffered and duly
moral damages may be considered in awarding moral proved. Such damages, to be recoverable, must not
costs YES YES
+6% legal damages only if he or she was subjected to only be capable of proof, but must actually be shown
+
interest contemptuous conduct despite the offender's with a reasonable degree of certainty.
interest from date knowledge of his or her social and financial standing. - For Legaspi, YES. Pantranco failed to rebut the claim
of RTC
decision - But, it is still proper to award moral damages to Lucila of Legaspi that he had been incapacitated for 10
until actual for her physical sufferings, mental anguish, fright, months and that during said period he did not have any
payment serious anxiety and wounded feelings. She sustained income.
multiple injuries on the scalp, limbs and ribs. She lost 6. YES
ISSUES all her teeth. She had to undergo several corrective - SC takes judicial notice of the propensity of motor
How much moral, exemplary and actual damages are operations and treatments. She suffered sleepless repair shops to exaggerate their estimates. An estimate
victims of vehicular accidents entitled to? nights and shock as a consequence of the vehicular is not an actual expense incurred or to be incurred in
1. WON the bus driver was negligent and such accident. And it has taken 10yrs to prosecute the the repair. The reduction made by respondent court is
negligence (and not a fortuitous event) was the complaint and this appeal! reasonable considering that in this instance such
proximate cause of the accident 4. YES estimate was secured by the complainants themselves.
2. WON Victor’s claim for deprivation of the right to - in view of CA’s finding of gross negligence on the part Epilogue
marital consortium as a factor for the award of moral of Pantranco: "Public utility operators like the - In order that moral damages may be awarded, there
damages is proper defendant, have made a mockery of our laws, rules and must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental
3. WON social and financial standing of Lucila can be regulations governing operations of motor vehicles and anguish, fright and the like. While no proof of
considered in awarding moral damages have ignored either deliberately or through negligent pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral
4. WON exemplary damages should be awarded disregard of their duties to exercise extraordinary damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity
5. WON loss of earnings may be a component of degree of diligence for the safety of the travelling being left to the discretion of the court, it is
damages in this case public and their passengers." nevertheless essential that the claimant should
6. WON the 10% reduction of the estimated actual - Batangas Transportation Company vs. Caguimbal: "it satisfactorily show the existence of the factual basis of
damages on the pickup was proper is high time to impress effectively upon public utility damages and its causal connection to defendant's
operators the nature and extent of their responsibility acts.
in respect of the safety of their passengers and their - Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary
HELD duty to exercise greater care in the selection of drivers estimation, are in the category of an award designed to
1. Negligence and proximate cause are factual issues and conductors." compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and
which SC can not pass upon in the absence of conflict not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
between the findings of the trial court and the CA. -Francisco vs. GSIS: there must be clear testimony on
2. NO the anguish and other forms of mental suffering.
20
- For lack of factual basis, such claim of deprivation of Rodriguez involved a couple in their early 20s, who were married for - Cocoland Devt Corp vs. NLRC: additional facts must
the right to consortium cannot be ruled upon by this only 16 months and full of dreams of building a family of their own, when be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral
Court at this time. the husband was struck and almost paralyzed by a falling 600-pound
pipe. The wife testified how her life had deteriorated because her
damages under the Civil Code, these being, social
- Petitioners cited a California case, Rodriguez vs. husband became a lifelong invalid, confined to the home, bedridden and humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc., that
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, as authority for the claim in constant need of assistance for his bodily functions; and how her social, resulted therefrom.
of damages by reason of loss of marital consortium, i.e. recreational and sexual life had been severely restricted. It also deprived
her of the chance to bear their children. As a constant witness to her
- Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured
loss of conjugal fellowship and sexual relations. In the husband's pain, mental anguish and frustration, she was always nervous, party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that
tense, depressed and had trouble sleeping, eating and concentrating. will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has
Thus, the California court awarded her damages for loss of consortium.
torts & damages
undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable
action.
- Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible,
of the spiritual status quo ante; thus, it must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
- There is no hard and fast rule in determining the
proper amount. The yardstick: amount awarded should
not be so palpably and scandalously excessive as to
indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or
corruption on the part of the trial judge. Neither should
it be so little or so paltry that it rubs salt to the injury
already inflicted on plaintiffs.
VISAYAN SAWMILL V CA
219 SCRA 378
CALLEJO; January 17, 2005
NATURE
Petition for certiorari
FACTS
- ON may 1, 1983, Visayan Sawmill and RJH trading
entered into a sale of scrap iron located at the former’s
stockyard, subject to the condition that RJH will open a
letter of credit in favor of Visayan in the amount of
P250,000.
- Respondentf’s men started digging and gather scrap
iron in petitioner’s premises. On may 30, they were
asked to stop by the plaintiff in view of an alleged case
filed against respondent by a certain Albert Pursuelo.
This is howver denied by the petitioner who alleges that
on May 23, 1983, they sent a telegram to respondent
cancelling the contract of sale because of failure of the
latter to comply with the conditions thereof.
- On may 24, respondent informed petitioner that the
letter of credit was opened on may 12, 1983 but then
the transmittal was delayed.
- On may 26, the bank sent a letter to petitioner
informing that the letter of credit was opened in their
favor.
- On july 19, respondent sent a series of telegrams
stating that the case against him has been dismissed
and demanding that petitioner comply with the
contract. Respondent filed a complaint against
petitioner. RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondent.
(+P100,000 moral damages)
ISSUE
WON the Visayan Sawmill can be compelled to honor
the agreement
HELD
NO
A2010 - 153 -
- There was only a contract to sell, not a contract of
sale. The petitioner corporation's obligation to sell is
unequivocally subject to a positive suspensive
condition, i.e., the private respondent's opening,
making or indorsing of an irrevocable and unconditional
letter of credit. The former agreed to deliver the scrap
iron only upon payment of the purchase price by means
of an irrevocable and unconditional letter of credit.
Otherwise stated, the contract is not one of sale where
the buyer acquired ownership over the property subject
to the resolutory condition that the purchase price
would be paid after delivery. Thus, there was to be no
actual sale until the opening, making or indorsing of the
irrevocable and unconditional letter of credit. Since
what obtains in the case at bar is a mere promise to
sell, the failure of the private respondent to comply
with the positive suspensive condition cannot even be
considered a breach — casual or serious — but simply
an event that prevented the obligation of petitioner
corporation to convey title from acquiring binding force.
- In the instant case, not only did the private
respondent fail to open, make or indorse an irrevocable
and unconditional letter of credit on or before 15 May
1983 despite his earlier representation in his 24 May
1983 telegram that he had opened one on 12 May
1983, the letter of advice received by the petitioner
corporation on 26 May 1983 from the Bank of the
Philippine Islands Dumaguete City branch explicitly
makes reference to the opening on that date of a letter
of credit in favor of petitioner Ang Tay c/o Visayan
Sawmill Co. Inc., drawn without recourse on ARMACO-
MARSTEEL ALLOY CORPORATION and set to expire on
24 July 1983, which is indisputably not in accordance
with the stipulation in the contract signed by the
parties on at least three (3) counts: (1) it was not
opened, made or indorsed by the private respondent,
but by a corporation which is not a party to the
contract; (2) it was not opened with the bank agreed
upon; and (3) it is not irrevocable and unconditional, for
it is without recourse, it is set to expire on a specific
date and it stipulates certain conditions with respect to
shipment. In all probability, private respondent may
have sold the subject scrap iron to ARMACO-MARSTEEL
ALLOY CORPORATION, or otherwise assigned to it the
contract with the petitioners. Private respondent's
complaint fails to disclose the sudden entry into the
picture of this corporation.
- In relation to the outline, not really an issue in this
case:
This Court notes the palpably excessive and
unconscionable moral and exemplary damages
awarded by the trial court to the private respondent
despite a clear absence of any legal and factual basis
therefor. In contracts, such as in the instant case, moral
damages may be recovered if defendants acted
prof. casis
fraudulently and in bad faith, 16 while exemplary
damages may only be awarded if defendants acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner. 17 In the instant case, the refusal of the
petitioners to deliver the scrap iron was founded on the
non-fulfillment by the private respondent of a
suspensive condition. It cannot, therefore, be said that
the herein petitioners had acted fraudulently and in bad
faith or in a wanton, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner. What this Court stated in Inhelder Corp. vs.
Court of Appeals 18 needs to be stressed anew:
“At this juncture, it may not be amiss to remind
Trial Courts to guard against the award of
exhorbitant (sic) damages that are way out of
proportion to the environmental circumstances of a
case and which, time and again, this Court has
reduced or eliminated. Judicial discretion granted to
the Courts in the assessment of damages must
always be exercised with balanced restraint and
measured objectivity.”
- For, indeed, moral damages are emphatically not
intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of the
defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured
party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that
will serve to obviate the moral suffering he has
undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable
action. Its award is aimed at the restoration, within the
limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante,
and it must be proportional to the suffering inflicted.
Disposition Petition granted
COMPAÑIA MARITIMA V ALLIED FREE
WORKERS UNION
77 SCRA 24
AQUINO; May 24, 1977
FACTS
- Since the onset in 1954 of litigation between the
parties herein, this is the fifth case between them that
has been elevated to the Court
- The trial court awarded to the company of P450,000
as damages.
- The appellants contend that the trial court erred in
awarding to the company actual damages, amounting
to P450,000, moral damages, of P50,000 and attorney's
Considering of P20,000, and in holding that the four
officers of the union are solidarily liable for the said
damages.
- Appellants' counsel assailed the award of actual
damages, on the ground that the auditors' reports, on
which they were based, were hearsay.
ISSUE
WON the appellant’s assignment of error meritorious
torts & damages
HELD
YES
- The appellant’s assignment of error is meritorious, the
Court found after analyzing the nature of the damages,
awarded, how the same were computed, and the
trustworthiness of the company's evidence
- On the basis of the reports of the two accountants,
the damages, claimed by the complaint as a matter of
simple addition, does not reach the sum of P 450,000
fixed by the trial court. The damages, shown in the
accountants' reports and in the statement made by the
consignees. chief clerk (who did not testify) amount to
P349,245.37, or much less than P450,000.
- The company argues that the accountants' reports are
admissible in evidence because of the rule that "when
the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without
great loss-of time and the fact sought to be established
from them is oth the general result of the whole", the
original writings need not be produced (Sec. 2[e], Rule
130, Rules of Court).
- That rule cannot be applied in this case because the
voluminous character of the records, on which the
accountants' reports were based, was not duly
established.
- It is also a requisite for the application of the rule that
the records and accounts should be made accessible to
the adverse party so that the company, of the summary
may be tested on cross-examination
- What applies to this case is the general rule "that an
audit made by, or the testimony of, a private auditor, is
inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original
records, books of accounts, reports or the like".
- That general rule cannot be relaxed in this case
because the company failed to make a preliminary
showing as to the difficulty or impossibility attending
the production of the records in court and their
examination and analysis as evidence by the court.
Disposition The trial court's judgment declaring the
arrastre and stevedoring contract terminated,
permanently enjoining the union and its officials from
performing arrastre and stevedoring work for the
vessels of the Compañia Maritima, and dismissing
defendants' counterclaim was affirmed.
The lower court's award of damages, was reversed and
set aside. No costs.
MIRANDA-RIBAYA V BAUTISTA
95 SCRA 672
TEEHANKEE; January 28, 1980
FACTS
A2010 - 154 -
- Mrs. Niceta Miranda-Ribaya was engaged in the
pawnshop business in 1968 and in the buying and
selling of jewelry.
- Sometime before April 23, 1968 – Josefine Roco
Robles, one of her agents, informed her that millionaire
logger Marino Bautista was interested to buy big
diamond stones. Miranda-Ribaya went to visit Bautista
and at the sight of his huge house, she became
convinced that he indeed was as rich as Josefina had
portrayed him to be.
> Miranda-Ribaya then offend to sell to the Bautista
ten pieces of jewelry for the total amount of
P224,000. After some haggling (But I thought they
were rich!), Miranda-Ribaya settled for P222,000
(Para naman two thousand lang!).
> Miranda-Ribaya was paid through two Equitable
PCI cheques, one for P112,000 and the other for
P110,000. In return, she issued a voucher as
evidence of payment.
> The next day, Miranda-Ribaya went back to see
Bautista to request him to break up the P110,000
cheque into smaller amounts. She had to share
some of the money with Miss Gisioco who owned
some of the jewelry sold. She was then issued 4
Bank of America cheques with the following amounts:
P14,000, P84,000, P12,000 and P50,000.
- April 24, 1968 – Miranda-Ribaya sold four pieces of
jewelry to Bautista for P94,000 in Bautista’s office. She
was then issued four Bank of America checks
amounting to the total price of the pieces of jewelry.
She again issued another voucher as proof of payment.
- The original owners of some of the jewelry sold by
Miranda-Ribaya wanted to have them back so Miranda-
Ribaya went to Bautista’s house. She brought with her
three pieces of jewelry to be offered in exchange for
some of the jewelry she wanted to take back. Since his
wife and daughter were not home, Bautista requested
Miranda-Ribaya to leave the jewelry with him so he
could show the jewelry to his wife and daughter first.
- Bautista did not return the jewelry but instead sent
Miranda-Ribaya a P45,000 cheque as payment for the
three pieces of jewelry she left with him. She also
heard that these pieces of jewelry were given away by
Bautista as gifts.
- Miranda-Ribaya tried to contact Bautista when the
post-dated checks neared their maturity date but she
was unable to do so. Worse, when she deposited the
cheques, the bank dishonored them because the
accounts were closed.
- Following a hunch acquired from years of experience
as a pawnshop dealer, Miranda-Ribaya ran a check on
the different pawnshops in Manila and discovered that
most of the jewelry she had sold to Bautista were
pledged to different pawnshops.
prof. casis
- Bautista promised to settle his obligations with
Miranda-Ribaya but was unable to do so despite
repeated demands. He eventually surrendered the
pawnshop tickets to Miranda-Ribaya who was then able
to regain possession of the pawned pieces of jewelry.
She recomputed Bautista’s obligations and found that
he owed her P125,460.79, not including the amount
she had given to Gisioco.
- The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Miranda-
Ribaya but did not award damages to her for
insufficiency of evidence.
Respondents’ Comments:
> Bautista claimed he had acted "in utmost good faith"
and that damages in any concept could not be
assessed against them
> Neither did the appellate court look favorably upon
Miranda-Ribaya’s claim for damages, saying that
petitioner did not mention mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock in her
testimony. Neither could exemplary damages be
awarded because these damages cannot be recovered
as a matter of right and the appellate court was not
prepared to disturb the lower court's exercise of
discretion in this regard.
ISSUE
WON the award of moral and exemplary damages is
proper
HELD
YES
Ratio In order that moral damages may be awarded,
there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering,
mental anguish fright and the like. There must be clear
testimony on the mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and similar injuries. Plaintiff must
testify to his said injury and this should not merely be
inferred from certain proven facts.
Reasoning
- In her testimony, Miranda-Ribaya established that due
to respondents' deceitful and malevolent acts of
defraudation, she had suffered "extreme - anguish
(without using the word anguish) and "could not sleep
for three months," since she was forced to close her
pawnshop, sell some of her personal jewelry and
borrow money in order to pay off the owners of the
jewelry wrongfully acquired by respondents from her.
- Even if Miranda-Ribaya failed to use the precise legal
terms, it is sufficient that these exact terms have been
pleaded in the complaint and evidence has been
adduced, as cited above, amply supporting the
averments of the complaint.
- Having established the moral damages, petitioners
are also entitled to exemplary damages. The
torts & damages
wantonness and malevolence through which
respondents defrauded petitioners, deceitfully incurring
and then evading settlement of their just liability
certainly justifies the award of exemplary damages by
way of example and correction for the public good and
also to serve as a deterrent to the commission of
similar misdeeds by others, even if the transaction
were viewed as a breach of civil contract.
Disposition the decision of respondent court insofar
as it denies petitioners' claim for damages is hereby set
aside. In addition to the amounts awarded in the
affirmed judgment of the lower court, petitioners are
further awarded moral and exemplary damages
equivalent to twenty-five per cent (25%) of the
principal sum of P125,460.79 adjudged in their favor by
the lower court.
DEL ROSARIO V CA (METAL FORMING
CORP)
NARVASA; January 29, 1997
FACTS
- The Del Rosarios' charged Metal Forming Corp (MFC)
with a violation of Section 3 of Act No. 3740, "An Act to
Penalize Fraudulent Advertising, Mislabeling or
Misbranding of Any Product, Stocks, Bonds, etc”.
- MFC sold to the public roofing materials known as
"Banawe" shingles which they advertised to be
“structurally safe and strong”. Del Rosarios purchased
a quantity and had installed in their house. However
when typhoon Ruping came, portions of the roof were
blown away by strong winds and this also led to the
damage of the interior of their home.
- The spouses sought to recover from MFC, damages
resulting from the events, contending that aside from
the destruction of the roof of their house, injury was
also caused to its electrical wiring, ceiling, furtures,
walls, wall paper, wood parquet flooring and furniture.
The plaintiffs reckoned their actual damages at
P1,008,003.00 "representing the estimated cost of the
repair, restoration and/or replacement of the damaged
areas and items in plaintiffs' house and the cost of the
inspection conducted by the independent adjuster..."
They also prayed for an award to them of moral
damages in the sum of P3,000,000,00, exemplary
damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00, and
attorney's fees in the sum of P1,000,000.00.
ISSUE
WON the Del Rosario spouses are entitled to moral
damages
HELD
YES
A2010 - 155 -
- That MFC did in truth act with bad faith, in
flagrant breach of its express warranties made to
the general public and in wanton disregard of the
rights of the Del Rosarios who relied on those
warranties, is adequately demonstrated by the
recorded proofs. The law explicitly authorizes the
award of moral damages "in breaches of contract
where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith." There being, moreover, satisfactory
evidence of the psychological and mental trauma
actually suffered by the Del Rosarios, the grant
to them of moral damages is warranted. Over a
period of about a month. they experienced
"feelings of shock, helplessness, fear,
embarrassment and anger."
- As declared by this Court in Makabili v. Court of
Appeals, among other precedents:
It is essential. . . . in the award of damages that the
claimant must have satisfactorily proven during the
trial the existence of the factual basis of the
damages and its causal connection to defendant's
acts. This is so because moral damages though
incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the
category of an award designed to compensate the
claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose
a penalty on the wrongdoer (Enervida v. De la Torre,
55 SCRA 340 [1974.] and are allowable only when
specifically prayed for in the complaint. (San Miguel
Brewery, Inc. v. Magno, 21 SCRA 292 [1968])
- As reflected in the records of the case, the Court of
Appeals was in agreement with the findings of the trial
court that petitioners suffered anguish, embarrassment
and mental sufferings due to the failure of private
respondent to perform its obligation to petitioners.
- Its grant of moral and exemplary damages was
justified by the Trial Court as follows:
Form the evidence presented, plaintiffs' sufferings
have been duly and substantially proven by the
defendant's fraudulent actuation and breach of
warranty, and thereby entitled for the claim of
damages and litigation costs as enunciated by the
testimony of the plaintiff... that the damages to his
house caused sufferings and feelings of shock.
helplessness, fears, embarrassment and anger,
thereby entitling him to Moral Damages which should
be assessed at P500,000.00.
"The moral damages. . . . (are awarded) for
indemnity or reparation not punishment or
correction, that is, an award to entitle the injured
party to obtain means (of) diversions and
amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral
sufferings he has undergone by reason of
defendant's culpable action. (RNB Surety and Ins. Co.
v. IAC, G.R No. 64515, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA
745)."
prof. casis
- This Court also agrees with the Trial Court…
- However, the same statutory and jurisprudential
standards just mentioned dictate reduction of the
amounts of moral and exemplary damages fixed by the
Trial Court. … the moral damages awarded must be
commensurate with the loss or injury suffered.
RAAGAS v TRAYA
22 SCRA 839
CASTRO; Feb 27, 1968
FACTS
- spouses Raagas filed a complaint with the CFI Leyte
against spouses Traya and Bienvenido Canciller.
- Complaint alleges that on or about April 9, 1958, while
Canciller was "recklessly" driving a truck owned by the
Traya spouses, the vehicle ran over the Raagas' three-
year old son Regino, causing his instantaneous death.
Defendant’s Comments
> They specifically deny that Canciller was "driving
recklessly" at the time of the mishap, and assert that
the truck "was fully loaded and was running at a very
low speed and on the right side of the road"
> it was the child who "rushed from an unseen position
and bumped the truck so that he was hit by the left
rear tire of the said truck and died", and consequently
the defendants are not to blame for the accident which
was "entirely attributable to an unforeseen event" or
due to the fault of the child and negligence of his
parents;
> defendants-spouses have exercised due diligence in
the selection and supervision of their driver Canciller,
whom they hired in 1946 only after a thorough study of
his background as a truck driver; and that each time
they allowed him to drive it was only after a check of
his physical condition and the mechanical fitness of the
truck assigned to him.
Lower Court
> plaintiffs moved for a judgment on the pleadings,
upon the claim that the defendants' answer not only
"failed to tender an issue" but as well "admitted
material allegations" of the complaint. This motion was
set for hearing on June 18. On the previous day,
however, defendant’s counsel requested for
postponement as he was sick. The lower court denied
the request for lack of "proper notice to the adverse
party," and considered the case submitted for decision
upon the filing of the plaintiffs' memorandum.
- On June 24 it rendered a judgment on the pleadings,
condemning the defendants, jointly and severally, to
pay damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
- The lower court reasoned that
torts & damages
the denial of the charge of reckless driving "did not
affect the plaintiffs' positive allegation in their
complaint that the truck . . . did not have a current
year registration plate . . . for the year 1958 when
the accident occurred,"
"this failure . . . has the effect of admitting
hypothetically that they operated . . . the said car
without proper license . . . when the accident
occurred,"
"unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed
that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation (article 2185 CC)."
- The defendants appealed to CA, which certified the
case to SC because the issues raised are purely of law.
- NOTE: Section 10 of Rule 35 of the old Rules of Court
authorized a judgment on the pleadings “where an
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading.”
ISSUE
WON the court a quo acted correctly when it rendered
judgment on the pleadings
HELD
YES
- The plaintiffs' claim for actual, moral, nominal and
corrective damages, was controverted by the averment
in the answer to the effect that the defendants "have
no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations" as to such damages,
"the truth of the matter being that the death of Regino
Raagas was occasioned by an unforeseen event and/or
by the fault of the small boy Regino Raagas or his
parents." Such averment has the effect of tendering a
valid issue.
In a long line of cases, SC has consistently held that
even if the allegations regarding the amount of
damages in the complaint are not specifically denied
in the answer, such damages are not deemed
admitted.
in no uncertain terms that actual damages must be
proved, and that a court cannot rely on "speculation,
conjecture or guesswork" as to the fact and amount
of damages, but must depend on actual proof that
damages had been suffered and on evidence of the
actual amount.
although an allegation is not necessary in order that
moral damages may be awarded, "it is, nevertheless,
essential that the claimant satisfactorily prove
the existence of the factual basis of the
damage and its causal relation to defendant's
acts."
Disposition Case is remanded to the court of origin for
trial on the merits.
A2010 - 156 -
ENERVIDA v DELA TORRE
55 SCRA 339
ESGUERRA; January 28, 1974
NATURE
Appeal from judgment of CFI
FACTS
- Petitioner Roque Enervida filed a complaint against
defendant spouses Lauro and Rosa dela Torre, praying
that the deed of sale executed by his deceased father
over a parcel of land covered by a Homestead Patent
be declared null and void for having been executed
within the prohibited period of 5 years in violation of
Sec.118 of Commonwealth Act 141 (the Public Land
Law). He further prayed that he be allowed to
repurchase said parcel of land for being the legitimate
son and sole heir of his deceased father.
- Defendants filed their answer, stating that the
petitioner has no cause of action against them as his
father is still living; that petitioner is not the only son of
Ciriaco and that the sale of the property in question
was well beyond the 5 year prohibition period.
- During pre-trial, petitioner admitted the claims of the
defendants: his father was still living, that he has
siblings, and that the sale did not take place within the
prohibited period. The CFI, in view of such admissions,
dismissed Roque’s complaint and held that he had no
cause of action, no legal capacity to sue and that he is
prompted with malice and bad faith in alleging false
statements in his complaint. He was also ordered to
pay the defendants P2000 for actual, moral and
exemplary damages.
- Petitioner then filed an appeal to the CA which
certified the case to the SC as it involved purely a
question of law.
ISSUE
WON the award for moral damages by reason of the
unfounded civil action was proper
HELD
NO
Ratio Art.2219 enumerates the cases when moral
damages may be recovered. A clearly unfounded suit is
not included in the enumeration and cannot be basis
for an award of moral damages.
Reasoning
- It will be observed that unlike compensatory or actual
damages which are generally recoverable in tort cases
as long as there is satisfactory proof thereof (Art.
2202), the Code has chosen to enumerate the cases in
which moral damages may be recovered (Art. 2219).
prof. casis
- A like enumeration is made in regard to the recovery
of attorney's fees as an item of damage (Art. 2208). But
the two enumerations differ in the case of a clearly
unfounded suit, which is expressly mentioned in Art.
2208 (par. 4), as justifying an award of attorney's fees,
but is not included in the enumeration of Art.2219 in
respect to moral damages.
- Art. 2219 also provides that moral damages may be
awarded in “analogous cases” to those enumerated,
but we do not think the Code intended “a clearly
unfounded civil action or proceedings” to be one of
these analogous cases wherein moral damages may be
recovered, or it would have expressly mentioned it in
Art.2219, as it did in Art.2208; or else incorporated
Art.2208 by reference in Art.2219.
- Art.2219 specifically mentions “quasi-delicts causing
physical injuries,” as an instance when moral damages
may be allowed, thereby implying that all other quasi-
delicts not resulting in physical injuries are excluded,
excepting, the special torts referred to in Art.309, par.
9, Art.2219 and in Arts.21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34,
and 35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art.
2219).
- While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order
that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of
indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is,
nevertheless, essential that the claimant satisfactorily
prove the existence of the factual basis of the damage
(Art.2217) and its causal relation to the defendant’s
acts because moral damages, though incapable of
pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury
suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
- The trial court and the CA both seem to be of the
opinion that the mere fact that respondents were sued
without any legal foundation entitled them to an award
of moral damages, hence they made no definite finding
as to what the supposed moral damages suffered
consist of. Such a conclusion would make of moral
damages a penalty, which they are not, rather than a
compensation for actual injury suffered, which they are
intended to be. Moral damages, in other words, are not
corrective or exemplary damages.
Disposition the dismissal order is affirmed with
modification that only atty’s fees are awarded to
respondents.
PEOPLE V BUGAYONG
PANGANIBAN; December 2, 1998
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of RTC Baguio
FACTS
torts & damages
- Alberto Cauan and Leticia Yu Cauan were married and
had 3 children, ALBERT, HONEYLET and ARLENE, the
private complainant herein. The spouses separated.
Albert and Arlene stayed with their mother Leticia while
Honeylet stayed with her grandmother Anita Yu. Later,
Alberto and Leticia started living together with another
woman and another man respectively. Leticia
cohabited with the accused RODELIO BUGAYONG and
had a child, CATHERINE BUGAYONG.
- the accused RODELIO BUGAYONG had ARLENE hold
his penis inside the room he shared with Leticia. At
that time CATHERINE who was 6yrs. old was also inside
the same room and her father, the accused was letting
her sleep. Bugayong threatened to maim Arlene if she
did not hold his penis. When the penis was already
hard and stiff, he placed it inside the mouth of Arlene
and a white substance came out from the penis.
CATHERINE saw this incident.
- Arlene Cauan accompanied by her father Alberto
Cauan and her aunt Marilyn Yu, Carmelita Yu and Rosie
Yu went to the NBI to file a complaint.
- Arlene gave her sworn statement. Alberto Cauan also
gave his sworn statement.
- Arlene testified that her stepfather had been doing
the same act when she was still in Grade 3 and was
nine years old. She also said that there were occasions
when BUGAYONG played first with his penis then
touched her vagina with his penis until a white
substance came out of it and that was the time
BUGAYONG would pull back his penis. Arlene said that
the penis of BUGAYONG partly entered [her] vagina and
she got hurt.
- The trial court held that the accused raped the victim
in 1993, not in 1994. Notwithstanding the rather
encompassing allegation in the Information that the
crime was committed “before and until October 15,
1994,” the trial court ruled that it could legally convict
the accused for the crime committed in 1993. The
primordial consideration in determining the sufficiency
of the averment in the Information as to time is
whether the accused was accorded the opportunity to
prepare a defense. In this case, the trial court
observed that he was not so deprived. Furthermore, it
noted that the Information charged more than one
offense, but that the accused failed to interpose an
opposition.
- The Information charged appellant with statutory rape
committed “before and until October 15, 1994 xxx
several times.” In the instant appeal, accused asserts
that this allegation regarding the date of the
commission of the offense violated his constitutional
right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.”
- Appellant claims a violation of his constitutional right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the
A2010 - 157 -
accusation against him. He maintains that he was
unable to prepare properly for his defense or to
anticipate the evidence to be controverted
ISSUE
WON accused may be convicted of rape committed in
1993, under the present Information, which accused
him of committing the said crime “before and until
October 15, 1994 xxx several times.”
HELD
YES
Ratio Indeed, the determinative factor in the resolution
of the question involving a variance between allegation
and proof in respect of the date of the crime is the
element of surprise on the part of the accused and his
corollary inability to defend himself properly. The
records of this case belie appellant’s claim of surprise.
Reasoning
- It is doctrinal that the precise time of the commission
of an offense need not be alleged in the complaint or
information, unless time is an essential element of the
crime charged.
- If vagueness afflicted the aforementioned text of the
Information, it was cured by the victim’s Sworn
Statement, which was expressly made an integral part
of the Information. The victim categorically alleged
that she had been raped by appellant in 1993 when she
was in grade three
- Furthermore, appellant could not have been oblivious
to the victim’s Sworn Statement, for he requested and
was given an opportunity to rebut the same in his
Motion for Reinvestigation.
- It will be noted that appellant was charged with rape
committed “before and until October 15, 1994 xxx
several times.” Said acts are alleged in only one
Information which, as a general rule, is defective for
charging more than one offense. However, appellant
failed, within the prescribed period, to file such motion
on the ground of duplicity. He is thus deemed to have
waived the defect in the Information.
- appellant cannot be said to have been deprived of his
constitutional right to be informed of the accusation
against him. Despite the duplicitous nature of the
Information, he did not object to such defect.
Moreover, he was given the chance to defend himself in
court and to cross-examine the complainant.
- the Court rigorously examined the records and arrived
upon the conclusion that his guilt had been established
beyond reasonable doubt. The victim’s clear,
categorical and straightforward testimony indubitably
demonstrated the culpability of appellant for
the dastardly acts committed before and until October
15, 1994
- The foregoing shows that appellant sexually assaulted
complainant in 1993 when she was 10 years old. Thus,
prof. casis
the trial court correctly convicted him of statutory rape
under Article 335 (3) of the RPC. Moreover, appellant is
also guilty of acts of lasciviousness committed on
October 15, 1995.
- The trial court correctly awarded P50,000 as
indemnity ex delicto, an amount which is automatically
granted to the offended party without need of further
evidence other than the fact of the commission of rape.
- Consistent with recent jurisprudence, appellant should
also be ordered to pay the victim the additional amount
of P50,000 as moral damages. In People v. Prades, the
Court resolved that “moral damages may additionally
be awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in
such amount as the Court deems just, without the need
for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has
heretofore been the practice.”
Disposition The appeal is hereby DENIED and the
assailed Decision is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION
that Appellant Rodelio Bugayong is ordered to pay
Complainant Arlene Cauan P50,000 as indemnity and
the additional amount of P50,000 as moral damages.
FRANCISCO V GSIS
7 SCRA 577
REYES JBL; March 30, 1963
NATURE
Appeal by the Government Service Insurance System
from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
FACTS
- CFI ordered GSIS to abide by the terms of the contract
created by plaintiff's offer and its unconditional
acceptance, with costs against the GSIS. Trinidad J.
Francisco (plaintiff) appealed separately (L-18155),
because the trial court did not award the P535,000.00
damages and attorney's fees she claimed.
- October 10,1956: Trinidad J. Francisco mortgaged in
favor of Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) a
parcel of land containing an area of 18,232 square
meters, with twenty-one (21) bungalows, known as Vic-
Mari Compound. This was in consideration of a loan in
the amount of P400K, out of which the sum of
P336,100.00 was released to her.
- January 6, 1959: GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgage on the ground that up to that date Francisco
was in arrears on her monthly installments in the
amount of P52,000.00. Payments made by the plaintiff
at the time of foreclosure amounted to P130,000.00.
torts & damages
GSIS itself was the buyer of the property in the
foreclosure sale.
- February 20, 1959: the plaintiff's father, Atty. Vicente
J. Francisco, sent a letter to the general manager of the
defendant corporation, Mr. Rodolfo P. Andal, proposing
to “pay said amount of P30,000 to the GSIS if it would
agree that after such payment the foreclosure of my
daughter's mortgage would be set aside.” As for the
balance, Atty. Francisco proposed for GSIS to take over
the administration of the mortgaged property and to
collect the monthly installments, amounting to about
P5,000, until the balance is paid.
- February 20 1959: Atty. Francisco received a telegram
containing an approval of his request. It was signed by
Andal.
- February 28 1959: Atty. Francisco remitted to GSIS,
through Andal, a check for P30K. GSIS received the
amount of P30K, and issued an official receipt No.
1209874, dated 4 March 1959. It did not, however, take
over the administration of the compound (as was
proposed by Atty. Francisco).
- Remittances, all accompanied by letters,
corresponding to the months of March, April, May, and
June, 1960 and totalling P24,604.81 were also sent by
Francisco to GSIS from time to time, all of which were
received and duly receipted for.
- Then the System sent three (3) letters, one dated 29
January 1960, which was signed by its assistant general
manager, and the other two letters, dated 19 and 26
February 1960, respectively, which were signed by
Andal, asking the plaintiff for a proposal for the
payment of her indebtedness, since according to the
System the one-year period for redemption had
expired.
Respondent’s Comment
> The remittances previously made by Atty. Francisco
were allegedly not sufficient to pay off her daughter's
arrears, including attorney's fees incurred by the
defendant in foreclosing the mortgage.
ISSUES
1. WON the telegram generated a contract that is valid
and binding upon the parties
2. WON Francisco is entitled to damages (moral
damages in the outline)
HELD
1. YES, the contract is binding.
Ratio If a corporation knowingly permits one of its
officers, or any other agent, to do acts within the scope
of an apparent authority, and thus holds him out to the
public as possessing power to do those acts, the
corporation will, as against any one who has in good
faith dealt with the corporation through such agent, be
estopped from denying his authority
A2010 - 158 -
Reasoning
- GSIS does not disown the telegram, and even asserts
that it came from its offices, as may be gleaned from
the letter, dated 31 May 1960, to Atty. Francisco, and
signed "R. P. Andal, general manager by Leovigildo
Monasterial, legal counsel.”
- In remitting the payment of P30,000 advanced by her
father, Trinidad’s letter to Mr. Andal quoted verbatim
the telegram of acceptance Mr. Andal sent.
- Notwithstanding this notice, the defendant System
pocketed the amount, and kept silent about the
telegram not being in accordance with the true facts,
as it now alleges. This silence, taken together with the
unconditional acceptance of three other subsequent
remittances from plaintiff, constitutes in itself a binding
ratification of the original agreement.
2. NO, Francisco is not entitled to damages.
- The court a quo correctly refused to award such actual
or compensatory damages because it could not
determine with reasonable certainty the difference
between the offered price and the actual value of the
property.
- Without proof the Court cannot assume, or take
judicial notice, as suggested by the plaintiff, that the
practice of lending institutions in the country is to give
out as loan 60% of the actual value of the collateral.
- There was no error in the appealed decision in
denying moral damages, not only on account of the
plaintiff's failure to take the witness stand and testify to
her social humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety, etc.,
as the decision holds, but primarily because a breach of
contract like that of defendant, not being malicious or
fraudulent, does not warrant the award of moral
damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
ART. 2220
Disposition The appealed decision if affirmed, with
costs against GSIS.
EXPERT TRAVEL & TOURS INC V CA (LO)
VITUG; June 25, 1999
NATURE
Petitioner, Expertravel and Tours, Inc., seeks in the
instant petition for review on certiorari a modification of
the decision, dated 20 March 1997, of the Court of
Appeals affirming in toto the 07th November 1994
judgment of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 5) of
Manila declaring the instant suit DISMISSED, and
ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant Ricardo Lo moral
damages in the amount of P30,000.00; attorney's fees
in the amount of P10,000.00, and to pay the costs of
the suit.
FACTS
prof. casis
- On 07 October 1987, Expertravel & Tours, Inc.,
("Expertravel"), a domestic corporation engaged in the
travel agency business, issued to private respondent
Ricardo Lo four round-trip plane tickets for Hongkong,
together with hotel accommodations and transfers, for
a total cost of P39,677.20. Alleging that Lo had failed to
pay the amount due, Expertravel caused several
demands to be made. Since the demands were ignored
by Lo, Expertravel filed a court complaint for recovery
of the amount claimed plus damages.
- Respondent Lo explained, in his answer, that his
account with Expertravel had already been fully paid.
The outstanding account was remitted to Expertravel
through its then Chairperson, Ms. Ma. Rocio de Vega,
who was theretofore authorized to deal with the clients
of Expertravel. The payment was evidenced by a Monte
de Piedad Check No. 291559, dated 06 October 1987,
for P42,175.20 for which Ms. de Vega, in turn, issued
City Trust Check No. 417920 in favor of Expertravel for
the amount of P50,000.00, with the notation
"placement advance for Ricardo Lo, etc." Per its own
invoice, Expertravel received the sum on 10 October
1987.
- The trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, held
that the payment made by Lo was valid and binding on
petitioner Expertravel. Even on the assumption that Ms.
de Vega had not been specifically authorized by
Expertravel, both courts said, the fact that the amount
"delivered to the latter remain(ed) in its possession up
to the present, mean(t) that the amount redounded to
the benefit of petitioner Expertravel, in view of the
second paragraph of Article 1241 of the Civil Code to
the effect that payment made to a third person shall
also be valid in so far as it has redounded to the benefit
of the creditor."
ISSUE
WON moral damages be awarded for negligence or
quasi-delict that did not result to physical injury to the
offended party
HELD
NO
Ratio Moral damages are not punitive in nature but are
designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury
unjustly caused to a person. Although incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages, nevertheless,
must somehow be proportional to and in approximation
of the suffering inflicted. Such damages, to be
recoverable, must be the proximate result of a wrongful
act or omission the factual basis for which is
satisfactorily established by the aggrieved party.
torts & damages
- An award of moral damages would require certain
conditions to be met; to wit:
(1) First, there must be an injury, whether physical,
mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the
claimant;
(2) second, there must be a culpable act or omission
factually established;
(3) third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant
is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and (4) fourth, the award of damages is
predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219.
OTHER GROUNDS FOR THE AWARD OF MORAL
DAMAGES
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cases:
"1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
"2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
"3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious
acts;
"4) Adultery or concubinage;
"5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
"6) Illegal search;
"7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
"8) Malicious prosecution;
"9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
"10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26,
27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
"The parents of the female seduced, abducted,
raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this Article,
may also recover moral damages.
"The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers
and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9
of this Article, in the order named."
- Under the provisions of this law, in culpa contractual
or breach of contract, moral damages may be
recovered when the defendant acted in bad faith or
was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith)
or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation and,
exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract itself
is constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries. By
special rule in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206,
of the Civil Code, moral damages may also be awarded
in case the death of a passenger results from a breach
of carriage. In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict,
(a) when an act or omission causes physical injuries, or
(b) where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort, [In
this latter case, moral damages may be recovered even
in loss of or damage to property.] moral damages may
aptly be recovered.
- This rule also applies, as aforestated, to contracts
when breached by tort. In culpa criminal, moral
damages could be lawfully due when the accused is
found guilty of physical injuries, lascivious acts,
adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention,
illegal arrest, illegal search, or defamation. Malicious
A2010 - 159 -
prosecution can also give rise to a claim for moral
damages. The term "analogous cases," referred to in
Article 2219, following the ejusdem generis rule, must
be held similar to those expressly enumerated by the
law.
- Although the institution of a clearly unfounded civil
suit can at times be a legal justification for an award of
attorney's fees, [Article 2208(4), Civil Code; such filing,
however, has almost invariably been held not to be a
ground for an award of moral damages. The rationale
for the rule is that the law could not have meant to
impose a penalty on the right to litigate. The anguish
suffered by a person for having been made a defendant
in a civil suit would be no different from the usual worry
and anxiety suffered by anyone who is haled to court, a
situation that cannot by itself be a cogent reason for
the award of moral damages. If the rule were
otherwise, then moral damages must every time be
awarded in favor of the prevailing defendant against an
unsuccessful plaintiff.
- The Court confirms, once again, the foregoing rules.
Disposition petition is GRANTED and the award of
moral damages to respondent Ricardo Lo under the
assailed decision is DELETED. In its other aspects, the
appealed decision shall remain undisturbed. No costs.
MIJARES V CA (METRO DRUG INC)
271 SCRA 558
KAPUNAN; April 18, 1997
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- Dioscoro Lamenta, salesman/collector of Metro Manila
Drug Inc.
- Mijares as owners of Aklan Drug had been buying
pharmaceutical products from Metro Drug since 1976.
They had good record with Metro Drug.
- Editha Mijares, aside from being the operator of Aklan
Drug, was also an officer of the Ospital Ng Maynila
Consumers Cooperative, Inc., which became a
concessionaire of a small area right inside the hospital
compound and it operated a drugstore. Said drugstore
had some transactions with the plaintiff as supplier of
pharmaceutical products. Subsequently the
Cooperative was dissolved and it stopped operating.
Solomon Silverio, Jr. leased from the City of Manila the
site previously occupied by the Cooperative and put up
a drugstore on the same.
- Lamenta delivered pharmaceutical products to the
said store (8 times).
- The first to the seventh deliveries were received by
Luz Espares,the 8th delivery was received by Hilda
prof. casis
Rodrigona. Both were never the employees of the
defendants.
- In partial payment of these receivables Solomon
Silverio, Jr. issued a check under the account name
Farmacia delos Remedios in the amount of P14,180.46,
which was subsequently dishonored on the ground of
insufficient fund.
- Metro Drug went after Mijares demanding full
redemption of the dishonored check and full payment
of outstanding account for P27,938.06.
- When Lamenta tried to collect from Editha Mijares for
the disputed claim, Editha Mijares referred him to Mr.
Silverio as the new operator and concessionaire of the
drugstore. She informed him verbally that they have no
more business inside the Ospital ng Maynila as the
cooperative drugstore has already stopped operations.
Despite said verbal notice, the demand telegram
addressed to Aklan Drug was still sent to Editha
Mijares. On Lamenta's follow-up of said telegram,
Editha Mijares again directed Lamenta to see Solomon
Silverio, the new owner of the drugstore.
- RTC: Complaint dismissed; plaintiff ordered to pay the
defendants P30,000.00 for moral damages and
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees
CA: Reversed
ISSUE
WON moral damages should be awarded to the Mijares
spouses (bec of malicious prosecution)
HELD
NO
- Settled in our jurisprudence is the rule that moral
damages cannot be recovered from a person who has
filed a complaint against another in good faith, or
without malice or bad faith (Philippine National Bank v.
Court of Appeals, 159 SCRA 433 [1988]; R & B Surety
and Insurance v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 129
SCRA 736 [1984]).
Reasoning
- Mijares spouses failed to show that private respondent
was motivated by bad faith when it instituted the action
for collection.
- In China Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals it
was held that Malicious prosecution, both in criminal
and civil cases, requires the presence of two elements,
to wit: a) malice; and b) absence of probable cause.
Moreover, there must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a
person, and that it was initiated deliberately knowing
that the charge was false and baseless (Manila Gas
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 602 [1980]).
- Mere filing of a suit does not render a person liable for
malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful, for
the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on
torts & damages
the right to litigate (Ponce v. Legaspi, 208 SCRA 377
[1992]; Saba v. Court of Appeals, 189 SCRA 50 [1990]);
Rubio v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]).
- Moral damages cannot be recovered from a person
who has filed a complaint against another in good faith,
or without malice or bad faith (Philippine National Bank
v. Court of Appeals, 159 SCRA 433 [1988]; R & B Surety
and Insurance v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 129
SCRA 736 [1984]).
- If damage results from the filing of the complaint, it is
damnum absque injuria (Ilocos Norte Electrical
Company v. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989]).
DE LA PEÑA V CA (TAN)
231 SCRA 456
BELLOSILLO; March 28, 1994
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of CA dismissing petitioner’s
action for reconveyance with damages against private
respondent.
FACTS
- Pantaleon De La Pena imputes fraud and
misrepresentation to private respondent Herotido Tan
in securing Free Patent No. (XI-6) 1326 and OCT No. P-
7923 over the same.
- Ciriaco Reducto was occupying a 24-hectare parcel of
land in Sulongvale, Sulop, Davao del Norte (previously
Padada, Tanwalang, Davao), designated as Lot No.
5714, for which he filed Homestead Application No.
192495 (E-100806) with the Bureau of Lands.
- However, another party also filed a Homestead
Application for the same.
- Ciriaco transferred his possessory rights over six (6)
hectares (later increased to eight [8]) of Lot 5714 to
petitioner Pantaleon de la Peña who thereafter entered
his appearance in the administrative case when the
portion transferred to him remained included in the
homestead applications of Ciriaco Reducto and
Potenciano Nazaret. After it was ascertained in a field
verification that petitioner had a better right to acquire
the portion claimed by him being its actual occupant
and cultivator, the Director of Lands directed petitioner
to apply for the portion himself within sixty (60) days
after its survey or else "lose his preferential right
thereto." However, no such application was filed.
- Meanwhile, on 7 March 1950, Ciriaco transferred his
rights over another 1 1/2-hectare portion of Lot 5714 to
Michael Doble who in turn sold his rights in 1956 to
Ricardo Tan, herein private respondent's father. The
portion sold to Michael Doble, and later on acquired by
Ricardo Tan, became the western boundary of de la
Peña's land.
A2010 - 160 -
- On 24 and 25 August 1970, a survey was conducted
and it was discovered that the land occupied by
petitioner was bigger by 3/4 of a hectare than what he
actually bought and paid for from Ciriaco. On the other
hand, the land ceded to Doble (later acquired by Tan)
was "very much smaller" than what he actually bought.
- Although the 3/4-hectare portion was part of the area
acquired by Doble in 1950, it was petitioner de la Peña
who cultivated the same without objection from Doble.
However, when Ricardo Tan acquired the lot on 2 March
1956, he built a fence to reclaim the portion, but
petitioner kept destroying it; hence, the start of a
boundary dispute.
- On 5 May 1975, Ricardo Tan transferred his rights
over Lot 5714-C to his son, private respondent Herotido
Tan, by means of "Affidavit of Relinquishment." But the
conflict over the 3/4-hectare portion continued. In an
effort to resolve the conflict, a relocation survey was
agreed upon except that the parties failed to agree on
a common surveyor. Consequently, each party had to
hire his own. Petitioner's surveyor conducted a
relocation survey on 18 April 1977, while respondent's
surveyor conducted his own five (5) days later. After it
was determined that the 3/4-hectare portion was
within Lot 5714-C of private respondent, the
latter built a fence around the property to
prevent petitioner from entering. The sugarcane
and bananas planted by petitioner were
destroyed in the process.
- On 29 April 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for
forcible entry against Ricardo Tan in the Municipal Trial
Court of Sulop. When it was discovered that private
respondent Herotido Tan was the registered owner of
Lot 5714-C under OCT No. P-7923 which was issued
pursuant to Free Patent No. (XI-6) 1326 dated 15
September 1975, the complaint was accordingly
amended to implead him.
- The MTC and CFI ruled in favor of petitioner and
ordered that possession be restored to the petitioner..
- On 18 July 1977, during the pendency of the forcible
entry case, petitioner instituted the present action for
reconveyance with damages against private
respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur
and Davao City.
-Petitioner alleged that private respondent fraudulently
registered the 3/4-hectare portion actually cultivated by
him when the former stated in his free patent
application that "the land applied for is not claimed or
occupied by any other person." In addition, petitioner
denied that a survey was conducted in 1970; if at all, it
was merely a "table survey." Incidentally, it was
discovered in the survey that the area of petitioner's
actual occupation exceeded that which he bought from
Ciriaco Reducto in 1946.
prof. casis
- After trial, the court rejected petitioner's denial of the
1970 Survey. Since the disputed 3/4-hectare portion
was not part of the area bought and paid for in 1946 by
petitioner, the latter was not entitled to reconveyance.
Petitioner was declared a mere trespasser and planter
in bad faith who was "enjoying freely the use of
government property" without even applying for the
same nor paying taxes thereon. His prayer for
P5,000.00 as actual damages for the sugarcane and
bananas destroyed on the disputed portion was denied.
Instead, private respondent's counterclaim was
granted and petitioner was ordered to pay
P6,000.00 in attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation, P15,000.00 for moral damages, and
the costs of the proceedings.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed decision
in toto.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioner has legal standing in the suit
2. WON the award for attorney's fees, moral damages
and expenses of litigation against the petitioner are
proper
HELD
1. NO
- Petitioner Pantaleon de la Peña has absolutely no
standing to institute the present suit for reconveyance.
2. NO
Ratio It is well-settled that reconveyance is a remedy
granted only to the owner of the property alleged to be
erroneously titled in another's name. In the case at
bench, petitioner does not claim to be the owner of the
disputed portion. Admittedly, what he has is only a
"preferential right" to acquire ownership thereof by
virtue of his actual occupation since January 1947.
However, petitioner's possession is not one that could
ripen into ownership. Title to alienable public lands can
be established through open, continuous, and exclusive
possession for at least thirty (30) years. It must be
noted that the dispute regarding the 3/4-hectare
portion started even before a free patent and OCT
could be issued to private respondent in 1975. As early
as 1956, the controversy already began between
petitioner and private respondent's father. Hence,
petitioner's possession falls short of the required
period. Not being the owner, petitioner cannot maintain
the present suit.
- An award for attorney's fees and moral damages on
the sole basis of an action later declared to be
unfounded in the absence of a deliberate intent to
cause prejudice to the other party is improper. The
right to litigate is so precious that a Penalty should not
be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously.
torts & damages
Disposition Affirmed, with the sole modification that
the award for attorney's fees, expenses of litigation,
and moral damages is DELETED.
J MARKETING V SIA
285 SCRA 580
FRANCISCO; January 29, 1998
NATURE
Appeal from decision of CA
FACTS
- J Marketing was company engaged in the business of
appliances and motorcycles. It received from Kawasaki
motors one brand new, color blue motorcycle, which
was stored in the company bodega. However (4 years
after receipt), the company found out that the
motorcycle was missing, and immediately reported this
to the police.
- The company’s representative, Caludac, tried to trace
the lost motorcycle to Felicidad SIa (defendant herein),
who brought a motorcycle from a Renato Pelande.
Allegedly, Caludac went to the house of Sia and
examined the chasis and motor numbers of the
motorcycle in his possession, and found out that the
chasis and motor numbers have been tampered with to
“jibe” with the chais and motor numbers of a
motorcycle previously purchased by Pelande from J
Mktg.
- When Caludac confronted Sia about the questionable
motorcycle, Sia refused to surrender possession of the
motorcycle and instead told Caludac “to file a case in
court”. Hence, J mktg filed a complaint for replevin
against Sia. Sia, in turn, filed a 3rd party complaint
against Pelante (which was subsequently declared in
default).
- RTC dismissed J mktg’s complaint but awarded
damages (moral and exemplary) and atty’s fees. CA
affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUE
WON award of moral and exemplary damages and
atty’s fees is proper
HELD
1. NO
Ratio No damages can be charged on those who may
exercise their rights in good faith, even if done
erroneously.
Reasoning
- A person's right to litigate should not be penalized by
holding him liable for damages. This is especially true
when the filing of the case is to enforce what he
A2010 - 161 -
believes to be his rightful claim against another
although found to be erroneous.
- J mktg precisely instituted the replevin case against
Sia based on the latter's own challenge to the former
that if they really had a right on the motorcycle, then
they should institute the necessary case in court. When
J mktg, through Caludac, did sue Sia, it cannot be said
that the institution of the replevin suit was tainted with
gross and evident bad faith or was done maliciously to
harass, embarrass, annoy or ridicule Sia.
- Moreover, the adverse result of an action - dismissal
of petitioner's complaint - does not per se make an act
unlawful and subject the actor to the payment of moral
damages. It is not a sound public policy to place a
premium on the right to litigate.
- The award of exemplary damages has likewise no
factual basis. It is a requisite that the act must be
accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton,
fraudulent or malevolent manner - circumstances which
are absent in this case. In addition, exemplary damages
cannot be awarded as the requisite element of
compensatory damages was not present.
- With respect to the attorney's fees, an adverse
decision does not ipso facto justify the award thereof to
the winning party. Everything points to the fact that
petitioner honestly thought that they had a good cause
of action, so that notwithstanding the dismissal of their
case, no attorney's fees can be granted to private
respondent.
- Considering that Sia claims to be the owner of the
motorcycle, J mktg was compelled to sue him. When Sia
"necessarily" became a party defendant no attorney's
fees and litigation expenses can automatically be
recovered even if he should win, as it is not the fact of
winning alone that entitles recovery of such items but
rather the attendance of special circumstances - the
enumerated exceptions in Article 2208 NCC.
- There being no bad faith reflected in petitioner's
persistence in pursuing its case, other than an
erroneous conviction of the righteousness of its cause,
attorney's fees cannot not be recovered as cost.
Disposition Decision of CA AFFIRMED
COMETA V CA (MACLI-ING ET AL)
301 SCRA 459
MENDOZA; December 29, 1999
FACTS
- 1989 > SITI and Cometa filed a criminal case against
Guevara for falsification of Public Documents (State
Investment House, Inc. vs. Reynaldo S. Guevara) The
basis of the aforesaid case is a forged Affidavit of
Undertaking with its application of a License to Sell its
townhouse units in the RSG Condominium-Gueventville
prof. casis
II. The signature therein purporting to be that of
Cometa is not Cometa’s signature.
- Consequently, a criminal information was filed against
Guevara in RTC Makati (People of the Philippines,
Plaintiff, vs. Reynaldo s. Guevara, Accused)
- Upon the filing of the information, a Warrant of Arrest
was issued against Guevara. Guevara posted the
necessary bail bond and the warrant for his arrest was
lifted.
- After the prosecution had rested its case, Guevara
filed a Motion to Dismiss on a Demurrer to the
Evidence, contending that all the evidence submitted
by the prosecution do not suffice to show that he had
committed the crime for which he has been accused
- March 26, 1992 - RTC Makati issued an order, granting
Guevara's Motion to Dismiss on a Demurrer to the
Evidence and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case
for falsification of public documents against him
- it is clear that the defendants had maliciously
prosecuted Guevara, to his and HBI's embarassment,
damage and prejudice. The criminal case filed by the
defendants against Guevara had absolutely no basis in
fact and in law. Quite clearly, defendants had filed the
aforesaid case with the sole intent of harassing and
pressuring Guevara, in his capacity as Chairman of
GIDC, to give in to their illicit and malicious desire to
appropriate the remaining unsold properties of GIDC
and/or to influence the appellate courts to decide in
their favor, their appeal of the lower court's decision in
the GIDC case.
ISSUE
WON requisites for malicious prosecution are present
HELD
YES
- a complaint for malicious prosecution states a cause
of action if it alleges the following:
(1) that the defendant was himself the prosecutor or
that at least the prosecution was instituted at his
instance;
(2) that the prosecution finally terminated in the
acquittal of the plaintiff;
(3) that in bringing the action the prosecutor acted
without probable cause; and
(4) that the prosecutor was actuated by malice, i.e. by
improper and sinister motives
- first TWO requisites are sufficiently alleged in the
complaint.
- the FOURTH requisite – malice in which a a general
averment is sufficient in view of Rule 8, §5 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure. Petitioners filed the criminal case for
the purpose of harassing and pressuring Guevarra, in
his capacity as chairman of Guevent Industrial
Development Corporation (GIDC), to give in to their
torts & damages
illicit and malicious desire to appropriate the remaining
unsold properties of the corporation, may be
considered sufficient.
- To be sure, lack of probable cause is an element
separate and distinct from that of malice. It follows,
therefore, that one cannot be held liable in damages for
maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted
with probable cause.
- Obviously, a determination that there was no probable
cause cannot be made to rest solely on the fact that
the trial court, acting on private respondent Guevarra's
demurrer to evidence, dismissed the criminal
prosecution, just as it cannot be made to turn on the
fact that the Department of Justice reversed the fiscal's
findings and ordered the criminal case against private
respondent Guevarra to be filed in court. The first
would transform all acquittals into veritable
countersuits for malicious prosecution. On the other
hand, the second would result in the dismissal of all
complaints for malicious prosecutions.
- Accordingly, the inquiry should be whether sufficient
facts are alleged showing that in bringing the criminal
action, the defendant in the civil action for malicious
prosecution acted without probable cause. This Court
has ruled that for purposes of malicious prosecution,
"probable cause" means "such facts and circumstances
as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting
on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for
which he was prosecuted." Buchanan v. Vda. de
Esteban. In this case, even if we consider the
allegations in the complaint as true, as well as the
order of the trial court annexed thereto, we do not find
the same sufficient to establish the absence of
probable cause.
- To prove that the subject UNDERTAKING (Exhibit "N")
is falsified, the prosecution presented the testimony of
complaining witness REYNALDO COMETA to prove that
as President of the STATE INVESTMENT he did not
execute the document of undertaking and thus, the
subject document (Exhibit "N") is falsified and his
signature thereat is not his signature. To corroborate
the testimony of COMETA, the NBI handwriting expert
LUZVIMINDA C. SABADO, submitted the questioned
Documents Report No. 278-688 dated 21 June 1988 to
show that the signature above the name of COMETA in
the subject undertaking (Exhibit "N") and the specimen
signatures of COMETA WERE not written by one and the
same person (Exhibit "Y").
- To prove that accused falsified and/or caused the
falsification of the subject undertaking (Exhibit "N"), the
prosecution presented the records of the HOUSING
BOARD which include the "Official Form" letter-
application (Exhibit "J") submitted by accused together
with the required documents enumerated therein which
A2010 - 162 -
supposedly included the undertaking to release
mortgage. The testimony of a HOUSING BOARD official,
Ms. Floredeliza Manuel was presented to testify as an
official of the HOUSING BOARD the standard procedure
is that the BOARD requires from applicants for authority
such as that applied for by accused, the following
requirements were quoted by the prosecution in page 5
of their OPPOSITION and reproduced hereunder:
- there is neither direct nor circumstantial evidence to
prove that accused is the author of this falsified
document
- trial court ruled that the evidence for the prosecution
did not establish "a prima facie case against accused
private private respondent Reynaldo Guevarra."
However, prima facie evidence is different from
probable cause. Prima facie evidence requires a degree
or quantum of proof greater than probable cause. "It
denotes evidence which, if unexplained or
uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain a prosecution or
establish the facts, as to counterbalance the
presumption of innocence and warrant the conviction of
the accused." On the other hand, probable cause for
the filing of an information merely means "reasonable
ground for belief in the existence of facts warranting
the proceedings complained of, or an apparent state of
facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry which
would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent man
to believe that the accused person has committed the
crime." What is needed to bring an action in court is
simply probable cause, not prima facie evidence. In the
terminology of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, what is
required for bringing a criminal action is only such
evidence as is sufficient to "engender a well founded
belief as to the facts of the commission of a crime and
the respondent's probable guilt thereof.
Disposition petitioners' motion for reconsideration is
GRANTED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED, and the complaint against petitioners is
DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of action.
INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE COMPANY V
BONDAD
PANGANIBAN; 2000
NATURE
Petition for review under Rule 45 assailing the decision
of the CA
FACTS
- The suit arose from a traffic incident which involved a
Sigma Galant car owned by one Grace Ladaw Morales,
a packed passenger jeepney driven by Ligorio Bondad
but owned by Pablo Bondad, and a BD Tansit bus driven
prof. casis
by Eduardo Mendoza. The incident happened at South
Expressway on December 17, 1984.
- Industrial Insurance brought suit against both the
drivers and owners of the passenger jeep and the bus
contending that they were the sole and proximate
cause of the damages done on their client’s Sigma
Gallant thru joint gross and wanton negligence,
careless, imprudence of the drivers and the owners’
failure to exercise the diligence required from them by
law in the selection and supervision of their respective
drivers.
- In their defense, the Bondads claimed that at the time
of the accident, their jeepney was on full stop on the
right shoulder of the road because of the flat tire. And
that there was therefore no fault or negligence on their
part.
- The trial court found in favor of the Bondads and
orderedthe petitioner to pay them actual, moral, and
exemplary damages. The CA affirmed the findings of
the trial court citing the investigation report made by
the policeman that the damage on the car of Morales
was caused by the DM bus and not by the jeepney of
the Bondads. It was concluded by the CA that based on
the evidence, the proximate cause of the damage to
the car was the negligence of the driver of the DM bus
and that the petitioner had no cause of action against
the Bondads. The CA agreed that the defendants were
entitled to their counterclaims in view of the fact that
the insurance company did not verify the facts before
impleading the defendants. Thus, the action brought
against them resulted not only in inconvenience but
also in unnecessary expenses, including expenses for
atorney’s fees. The CA reduced the damages that were
awarded.
- The petitioner’s filed this motion for review by the the
SC.
ISSUE
WON the award of moral and exemplary damages are
proper
HELD
YES
- In impleading the defendants, the petitioner clearly
acted in wanton disregard of the facts that were very
obvious. This carelessness and lack of diligence
destroyed their claim of good faith. While the court
uphelds the right of any person to litigate without fear
of penalty, this right should be exercised in good faith.
Reasoning
- As the defendants were compelled to hire the services
of a lawyer to defend themselves against the
unjustified suit, it is only proper that this cost be
shouldered by the petitioner.
torts & damages
- The award of moral damages was affirmed as it was
shown that the defendants suffered injury which sprung
from the unjustified act of the petitioner in bring the
suit. The SC clarified however that mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feeling, social humiliation are
not enough to grant moral damages. It said that it must
be shown that the acts, as in this case, must have been
tainted with bad faith or ill motives.
- The Award for exemplary damages, which are
imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good, was likewise affirmed due to the petitioner’s
conduct that needlessly dragged innocent bystanders
into an unfounded litigation.
Disposition Petition denied. Order appealed from is
affirmed.
TRIPLE EIGHT INTEGRATED SERVICES,
INC V NLRC
299 SCRA 608
ROMERO; December 3, 1998
NATURE
Petition for certiorari
FACTS
- In August 1992, private respondent Osdana was
recruited by petitioner for employment with the latter’s
principal, Gulf Catering Company (GCC), a firm based in
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Under the original
employment contract, Osdana was engaged to work as
“Food Server” for a period of thirty-six (36) months with
a salary of five hundred fifty Saudi rials.
- Osdana claims she was required by petitioner to pay a
total of P11,950.00 in placement fees and other
charges, for which no receipt was issued. She was
likewise asked to undergo a medical examination
conducted by the Philippine Medical Tests System, a
duly accredited clinic for overseas workers, which found
her to be “Fit of Employment.”
- Petitioner asked Osdana to sign another “Contractor-
Employee Agreement” which provided that she would
be employed as a waitress for twelve (12) months with
a salary of two hundred eighty US dollars ($280). It
was this employment agreement which was approved
by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA).
- Osdana left for Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and commenced
working for GCC. She was assigned to the College of
Public Administration of the Oleysha University and,
contrary to the terms and conditions of the
employment contract, was made to wash dishes,
cooking pots, and utensils, perform janitorial work and
other tasks which were unrelated to her job designation
as waitress. She was made to work a gruelling twelve-
A2010 - 163 -
hour shift, without overtime pay.
- Osdana suffered from numbness and pain in her arms.
The pain was such that she had to be confined at a
housing facility of GCC from June 18 to August 22,
1993, during which period, she was not paid her
salaries.
- Osdana was allowed to resume work, this time as
Food Server and Cook at the Hota Bani Tameem
Hospital, where she worked seven days a week from
August 22 to October 5, 1993. Again, she was not
compensated.
- Then, from October 6 to October 23, 1993, Osdana
was again confined for no apparent reason. During this
period, she was still not paid her salary.
- On October 24, 1993, she was re-assigned to the
Oleysha University to wash dishes and do other menial
tasks. Osdana worked long hours and under harsh
conditions. She was diagnosed as having Bilateral
Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, a condition precipitated by
activities requiring “repeated flexion, pronation, and
supination of the wrist and characterized by
excruciating pain and numbness in the arms.”
- Osdana underwent two surgical operations. Between
these operations, she was not given any work
assignments even if she was willing and able to do light
work in accordance with her doctor’s advice. Again,
Osdana was not paid any compensation for the
period between February to April 22, 1994.
- Osdana was discharged from the hospital on April 25,
1994. The medical report stated that “she had very
good improvement of the symptoms and she was
discharged on the second day of the operation.”
- Four days later, however, she was dismissed from
work, allegedly on the ground of illness. She was not
given any separation pay nor was she paid her salaries
for the periods when she was not allowed to work.
- Upon her return to the Philippines, Osdana sought the
help of petitioner, but to no avail. She was thus
constrained to file a complaint before the POEA.
ISSUES
WON NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion for the
following reasons: (a) ruling in favor of Osdana even if
there was no factual or legal basis for the award and,
(b) holding petitioner solely liable for her claims despite
the fact that its liability is joint and several with its
principal, GCC.
HELD
- The decisions of both the labor arbiter and the NLRC
were based mainly on the facts and allegations in
Osdana’s position paper and supporting documents.
We find these sufficient to constitute substantial
evidence to support the questioned decisions.
Generally, findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies
prof. casis
like the NLRC are accorded great respect and, at times,
even finality if supported by substantial evidence. This
Court, therefore, upholds the finding of herein public
respondents that the facts and the evidence on record
adduced by Osdana and taken in relation to the answer
of petitioner show that indeed there was breach of the
employment contract and illegal dismissal committed
by petitioner’s principal.
- Article 284 of the Labor Code is clear on the matter of
termination by reason of disease or illness, viz:
“Art. 284. Disease as a ground for termination – An
employer may terminate the services of an employee
who has been found to be suffering from any disease
and whose continued employment is prohibited by
law or prejudicial to his health as well as the health
of his co-employees: x x x.”
- Specifically, Section 8, Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides:
“Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal – Where
the employee suffers from a disease and his
continued employment is prohibited by law or
prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-
employees, the employer shall not terminate his
employment unless there is a certification by
competent public authority that the disease is of
such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be
cured within a period of six (6) months with proper
medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be
cured within the period, the employer shall not
terminate the employee but shall ask the employee
to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate such
employee to his former position immediately upon
the restoration of his normal health.”
- Viewed in the light of the foregoing provisions, the
manner by which Osdana was terminated was clearly in
violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules
and regulations. Osdana’s continued employment
despite her illness was not prohibited by law nor was
it prejudicial to her health, as well as that of her co-
employees. In fact, the medical report issued after her
second operation stated that “she had very good
improvement of the symptoms.” Besides, “Carpal
Tunnel Syndrome” is not a contagious disease.
- Petitioner has not presented any medical certificate or
similar document from a competent public health
authority in support of its claims. If, indeed, Osdana
was physically unfit to continue her employment, her
employer could have easily obtained a certification to
that effect from a competent public health authority in
Saudi Arabia, thereby heading off any complaint for
illegal dismissal. The requirement for a medical
certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot
be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the
unilateral and arbitrary determination by the employer
of the gravity or extent of the employee’s illness and
torts & damages
thus defeat the public policy on the protection of labor.
- As regards the monetary award of salaries for the
unexpired portion of the employment contract, unpaid
salaries and salary differential granted by public
respondents to Osdana, petitioner assails the same for
being contrary to law, evidence and existing
jurisprudence, all of which therefore constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.
- Although this contention is without merit, the award
for salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract
must, however, be reduced. Paragraph 5, Section 10 of
R.A. No. 8042, applies in this case, thus:
“In case of termination of overseas employment
without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by
law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at
twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for
the unexpired portion of his employment contract or
for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less.”
- While it would appear that the employment contract
approved by the POEA was only for a period of twelve
months, Osdana’s actual stint with the foreign principal
lasted for one year and seven-and-a-half months. It
may be inferred, therefore, that the employer renewed
her employment contract for another year. Thus, the
award for the unexpired portion of the contract should
have been US$1,260 (US$280 x 4 ½ months) or its
equivalent in Philippine pesos, not US$2,499 as
adjudged by the labor arbiter and affirmed by the
NLRC.
- As for the award for unpaid salaries and differential
amounting to US$1,076 representing seven months’
unpaid salaries and one month underpaid salary, the
same is proper because, as correctly pointed out by
Osdana, the “no work, no pay” rule relied upon by
petitioner does not apply in this case. In the first place,
the fact that she had not worked from June 18 to
August 22, 1993 and then from January 24 to April 29,
1994, was due to her illness which was clearly work-
related. Second, from August 23 to October 5, 1993,
Osdana actually worked as food server and cook for
seven days a week at the Hota Bani Tameem Hospital,
but was not paid any salary for the said period. Finally,
from October 6 to October 23, 1993, she was confined
to quarters and was not given any work for no reason
at all.
- With respect to the award of moral and exemplary
damages, the same is likewise proper but should be
reduced. Worth reiterating is the rule that moral
damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the
employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or
constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public
policy. Likewise, exemplary damages may be awarded
A2010 - 164 -
if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or
malevolent manner.
- Finally, petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion on
the part of public respondents for holding it solely liable
for the claims of Osdana despite the fact that its
liability with the principal is joint and several.
Petitioner misunderstands the decision in question. It
should be noted that contrary to petitioner’s
interpretation, the decision of the labor arbiter which
was affirmed by the NLRC did not really absolve the
foreign principal. Petitioner was the only one held
liable for Osdana’s monetary claims because it was the
only respondent named in the complaint and it does
not appear that petitioner took steps to have its
principal included as co-respondent. Thus, the POEA,
and later the labor arbiter, did not acquire jurisdiction
over the foreign principal.
PEOPLE V PIRAME
ARCONA V CA (PEOPLE)
YNARES-SANTIAGO; December 9, 2002
NATURE
Instant petition for review of the decision of the CA.
FACTS
- Carlos Arcona pleaded not guilty to a murder using
the justifying circumstance of self-defense. The
element of unlawful aggression by the victim was not
proven. He was convicted of murder with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. In this petition,
the Court affirmed CA decision but modified the
damages.
- Petitioner Carlos Arcona y Moban and his brother
Benito Arcona y Moban were charged with Murder and
Frustrated Murder in separate informations. Both
pleaded “not guilty”.
- At around 7:30 in the evening of June 27, 1986,
Napoleon Ong and Edgardo Talanquines were walking
on their way home after coming from a birthday party.
When they were near the house of Jerry Boston,
Edgardo heard a loud thud. He turned around saw
Napoleon slump to the ground. Suddenly, someone hit
Edgardo from behind with a piece of bamboo, causing
him to fall. He saw no one in the immediate premises
except petitioner. Edgardo then stood up and ran
towards the house of Cesar Umapas to ask for help.
- Prosecution witness Leo Zaragoza testified that he
was standing in front of Jerry Boston’ house, about 7
meters away, when he saw petitioner stab Napoleon.
- Napoleon died on the way to the hospital. The doctor
certified that the cause of death was the stab wound
sustained at the stomach area just above the waistline.
prof. casis
- Carlos voluntarily surrendered go the police.
- In his defense, Carlos alleged that he was walking
alone when he met Napoleon and Edgardo . Without
any provocation, Napoleon suddenly drew his bolo and
shouted, "Caloy, I will kill you!" Napoleon swung the
bolo at him twice but missed him. Petitioner then drew
out his knife and stabbed Napoleon. When he saw
Edgardo rushing towards him, he grabbed a piece of
bamboo from the newly constructed culvert and hit the
former on the left arm. Edgardo ran away. Carlos also
left the premises and went home. On the way, he met
his brother, Benito, and together they proceeded to
their house.
- TC convicted the Carlos Arcona of homicide, with the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and
acquitted him of attempted homicide. He was ordered
to pay indemnity of 30k for Napoleon’s death, 10K for
actual damages, and 10K as moral damages.
On the other hand, Benito Arcona was acquitted of
homicide and convicted of attempted homicide. He was
made to indemnify Edgardo the sum of 10K as actual
damages.
- Only Carlos appealed. CA affirmed the TC findings but
increased civil liability to 50K. Hence, this petition. He
maintains that it was self-defense.
ISSUES
1. WON all elements of self-defense were present
2. What are the proper damages to be rendered?
HELD
1. NO
- Unlawful aggression was not proven.
- When self-defense is invoked, the defendant has the
burden of proving that the killing was justified. Even if
the prosecution is weak, the case cannot be dismissed
because of the open admission of the killing.
- To prove self-defense, the accused must show with
clear and convincing evidence that:
(1) he is not the unlawful aggressor;
(2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part;
and
(3) he employed reasonable means to prevent or repel
the aggression.
- Self-defense is a question of fact. He failed to prove
that there was unlawful aggression of the part of the
victim. Although the bolo of Napoleon was unsheathed,
it does not conclude that there was unlawful
aggression. When Jerry Boston testified to hearing
someone say, “ Caloy, I will kill you”, he did not
categorically say it was Napoleon; and iIt was still
possible that he said it while being assaulted by Carlos.
It was not possible that Carlos escaped his alleged
ambush with out a scratch.
torts & damages
2. CA was correct in increasing civil indemnity to 50K
in line with existing jurisprudence. In cases of murder,
homicide, parricide and rape, civil indemnity in the
amount of 50K is automatically granted to the offended
party or his heirs in case of his death, without need of
further evidence other than the fact of the commission
of the crime.
- On the other hand, the award of moral damages (10K)
must be increased to 50K. As borne out by human
nature and experience, a violent death invariably and
necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on
the part of the victim’s family. It is inherently human to
suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved
one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing.
Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from
the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives
them forever of his love, affection and support, but
often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an
injustice has been done to them. For this reason, moral
damages must be awarded even in the absence of any
allegation and proof of the heirs’ emotional suffering.
- The award of actual damages in the amount of 10K
was not substantiated. Only those expenses which are
duly proven, or those that appear to have been
genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake
or burial of the victim, will be recognized in court. It
was deleted.
Disposition petition for review is DENIED. The
decision of CA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As
modified, petitioner is further ordered to pay the heirs
of the deceased moral damages in the increased
amount of 50KThe award of actual damages is deleted
for lack of factual and legal basis.
PNB V CA (FLORES)
266 SCRA 136
KAPUNAN; 1997 Jan 6
FACTS
- Flores is a prominent businessman, licensed and
engaged in the real estate business, buying and selling
houses and lots. Flores filed a complaint against PNB
when the appellant bank refused to honor his
Manager's Checks worth P1 Million because of the
alleged shortage in appellee's payment to the effect
that he had to go back and forth the bank to encash
said checks and that he lost a deal of a house for sale
in Baguio City worth P1 Million as he could not produce
said amount withheld by the appellant bank. Appellee
Flores further testified as to the effect of the incident
on his integrity as a businessman.
- Flores won in the suit and the LC awarded him P1M
moral damages andt P100,000.00 exemplary damages,
A2010 - 165 -
but was later reduced by the CA to P100,000.00 and
P25,000.00 respectively.
- PNB appealed from the decision, believing that no or
lower amount of damages should be awarded to Flores.
As a defense, PNB even attacked Flores’ character by
alluding to his alleged reputation as a “gambler and big
time casino player”. PNB asserted that “Flores used
the proceeds of the manager’s check on the gaming
table and not for purchase of a house.
ISSUE
WON the moral and exemplary damages should be
reduced
HELD
NO
- The SC even increased the moral and exemplary
damages awarded by CA by 50% (P200,000.00 and
P50,000.00 respectively).
Ratio There is no hard and fast rule in the
determination of what would be a fair amount of moral
damages, since each case must be governed by its own
peculiar circumstances.
- Article 2217 of the Civil Code recognizes that moral
damages which include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and
similar injury, are incapable of pecuniary estimation.
- As to exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil
Code provides that such damages may be imposed by
way of example or correction for the public good. While
exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter
of right, they need not be proved, although plaintiff
must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages before the court may consider
the question of whether or not exemplary damages
should be awarded.
FULE V CA (CRUZ, BELARMINO)
286 SCRA 698
ROMERO; March 23, 1998
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- Fule, a corporate secretary of the Rural Bank of
Alaminos (the Bank) by profession and jeweler on the
side, acquired a 10-hectare property in Rizal. The
former owner, Jacobe, had mortgaged it to the Bank for
a loan of 10k but it was later foreclosed and offered for
public auction upon his default.
- Petitioner asked Dichoso and Mendoza (the Agents) to
look for an interested buyer, and found one in private
prof. casis
respondent Dr. Cruz. At the time, petitioner had shown
interest in buying a pair of emerald-cut diamond
earrings from Dr. Cruz but never came to an agreed
price. Subsequently, negotiations for the barter of the
jewelry and the property ensued; upon the request of
Dr. Cruz, it was found by Atty. Belarmino that no barter
was feasible because the 1-year period of redemption
had not expired. To get over this legal impediment,
petitioner executed a deed of redemption on behalf of
Jacobe.
- Petitioner arrived at Belarmino’s residence with the
agents to execute a deed of absolute sale while Cruz
held on to the earrings. Petitioner issued a certification
stating the actual consideration of the sale was
Php200k and not Php80k as indicated in the deed.
Since the earrings were appraised at only Php160k, the
remaining 40k was to be paid later in cash. This was
done apparently to minimize the capital gains tax that
petitioner would have to shoulder. Petitioner headed for
the bank to meet up with Cruz and pick up the earrings.
When asked if the jewelry was ok, petitioner nodded to
express his satisfaction. Petitioner paid the agents
$300 and some pieces of jewelry, but not half of the
pair of earrings in question as previously promised.
- Later that evening, petitioner arrived at Belarmino’s
residence complaining the earrings were fake as
confirmed by a tester. Petitioner accused the agents of
deceiving him, which they denied. He nonetheless took
back the $300 and jewelry given them. After another
failed testing, the petitioner reported the matter to the
police where the agents also executed their sworn
statements.
- Petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC to declare
the contract of sale over the property null and void on
the ground of fraud and deceit. The lower court denied
the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction over the
deed as they found that the genuine pair of earrings
had been delivered by Cruz. The 2 hours before
petitioner’s complaint was considered unreasonable
delay, placing petitioner in estoppel. The Court
furthered that all elements of a valid contract were
present, namely a meeting of the minds, determinate
subject matter, and price certain. As the earrings had
been delivered and the contract of absolute sale
executed, the contract of barter or sale had been
consummated.
- The Court also finds that the plaintiff acted in bad,
awarding Cruz P300k as moral damages and P100k as
exemplary damages; Atty. Belarmino P250k as moral
damages and P150k as exemplary damages; and
granting both P25k each as attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses. A petition with the CA yielded the
same result, hence this petition.
ISSUE
torts & damages
WON the TC erred in awarding damages
HELD
NO
- In the instant case, the TC awarded damages
analogous to malicious prosecution under Article
2219(8) of the NCC for the following reasons:
- The malice with which petitioner filed the case is
apparent. As an experienced jeweler who thoroughly
examined the earrings himself and went so far as to
sketch them earlier, it is illogical that he would fail to
exert extra effort to check its genuineness at the
precise moment of the exchange. His acts thus failed to
accord with what an ordinary prudent man would have
done in the same situation.
- As an experienced businessman and banker, he was
shrewd enough to bloat the property’s price from 25k
to 75k only a few days after he had purchased it for a
far lower cost, the value of which still fell short of the
diamond earrings’ price.
- Also, it took him 2 hours of unexplained delay before
complaining the earrings were counterfeit—a period in
which anything could have happened while petitioner
was in possession of the jewelry.
- Given this, it would appear that the cause of action in
the instant case was contrived by the petitioner himself
in hopes of obtaining a favorable outcome in his
complaint to take the real jewelry, return a fake, and
get back the property. This is plain and simple, unjust
enrichment. All that considered, the damages prayed
for were reasonably proportionate to the sufferings
they underwent.
- Petitioner filed a malicious and unfounded case all the
while dragging down private respondents, whose
reputations had been soiled by petitioner’s coming to
court with unclean hands. Because of the falsity, malice
and baseless nature of the complaint, defendants were
compelled to litigate and are thus also entitled to the
awarding of attorney’s fees under Article 2208.
Disposition decision of the CA is AFFIRMED. Dr. Cruz,
however, is ordered to pay petitioner the balance of the
purchase price of Php40k
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC V CA
(PANTEJO)
275 SCRA 621
REGALADO; July 17, 1997
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari
FACTS
- On October 23, 1988, private respondent Pantejo,
then City Fiscal of Surigao City, boarded a PAL plane in
A2010 - 166 -
Manila and disembarked in Cebu City where he was
supposed to take his connecting flight to Surigao City.
However, due to typhoon Osang, the connecting flight
to Surigao City was cancelled.
- To accommodate the needs of its stranded
passengers, PAL initially gave out cash assistance of
P100.00 and, the next day, P200.00, for their expected
stay of two days in Cebu. Pantejo requested instead
that he be billeted in a hotel at PAL's expense because
he did not have cash with him at that time, but PAL
refused. Thus, respondent Pantejo was forced to seek
and accept the generosity of a co-passenger, an Engr.
Andoni Dumlao, and he shared a room with the latter at
Sky View Hotel with the promise to pay his share of the
expenses upon reaching Surigao.
- When the flight for Surigao was resumed, Pantejo
came to know that the hotel expenses of his co-
passengers were reimbursed by PAL. At this point,
Pantejo informed Oscar Jereza, PAL's Manager for
Departure Services at Mactan Airport and who was in
charge of cancelled flights, that he was going to sue
the airline for discriminating against him. It was only
then that Jereza offered to pay respondent Pantejo
P300 which, due to the ordeal and anguish he had
undergone, the latter decline. Thereafter, PAntejo filed
an action for damages against PAL.
- The RTC of Surigao City, rendered judgment against
PAL, ordering the latter to pay Pantejo P300 for actual
damages, P150,000 as moral damages, P100,000 as
exemplary damages, P15,000.00 as attorney's fees,
and 6% interest from the time of the filing of the
complaint until said amounts shall have been fully paid,
plus costs of suit.
- On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the court a
quo, but with the exclusion of the award of attorney's
fees and litigation expenses.
ISSUE
WON the lower courts erred in awarding damages in
favor of plaintiff
HELD
NO
- It must be emphasized that a contract to transport
passengers is quite different in kind and degree from
any other contractual relation, and this is because of
the relation which an air carrier sustain with the public.
Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It
invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages
it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore,
generates a relation attended with a public duty.
Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees
naturally could give ground for an action for damages.
- In ruling for Pantejo, both the RTC and the CA found
that PAL acted in bad faith in refusing to provide hotel
prof. casis
accommodations for Pantejo or to reimburse him for
hotel expenses incurred despite and in contrast to the
fact that other passengers were so favored.
Factors considered in computing damages
> PAL acted in bad faith in disregarding its duties as a
common carrier to its passengers and in discriminating
against Pantejo. It was even oblivious to the fact that
PAntejo was exposed to humiliation and
embarrassment especially because of his government
position and social prominence, which altogether
necessarily subjected him to ridicule, shame and
anguish. It remains uncontroverted that at the time of
the incident, herein respondent was then the City
Prosecutor of Surigao City, and that he is a member of
the Philippine Jaycee Senate, past Lt. Governor of the
Kiwanis Club of Surigao, a past Master of the Mount
Diwata Lodge of Free Masons of the Philippines,
member of the Philippine National Red Cross, Surigao
Chapter,
and past Chairman of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines,
Surigao del Norte Chapter.
- It is likewise claimed that the moral and exemplary
damages awarded to respondent Pantejo are excessive
and unwarranted on the ground that respondent is not
totally blameless because of his refusal to accept the
P100 cash assistance which was inceptively offered to
him. It bears emphasis that respondent Pantejo had
every right to make such refusal since it evidently could
not meet his needs and that was all that PAL claimed it
could offer.
- His refusal to accept the P300 proffered as an
afterthought when he threatened suit was justified by
his resentment when he belatedly found out that his co-
passengers were reimbursed for hotel expenses and he
was not. Worse, he would not even have known about it
were it not for a co-passenger who verbally told him
that she was reimbursed by the airline for hotel and
meal expenses. It may even be said that the amounts,
the time and the circumstances under which those
amounts were offered could not salve the moral
wounds inflicted by PAL on private respondent but even
approximated insult added to injury.
- The discriminatory act of petitioner against
respondent ineludibly makes the former liable for moral
damages under Article 21 in relation to Article 2219
(10) of the Civil Code. Such inattention to and lack of
care by petitioner airline for the interest of its
passengers who are entitled to its utmost
consideration, particularly as to their convenience,
amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to the
award of moral damages.
- Moral damages are emphatically not intended to
enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. They
are awarded only to allow the former to obtain means,
diversion, or amusements that will serve to alleviate
torts & damages
the moral suffering he has undergone due to the
defendant's culpable action and must, perforce, be
proportional to the suffering inflicted. However,
substantial damages do not translate into excessive
damages. Except for attorney's fees and costs of suit, it
will be noted that the Court of Appeals affirmed point
by point the factual findings of the lower court upon
which the award of damages had been based. We,
therefore, see no reason to modify the award of
damages made by the trial court.
- Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, we are
convinced that the awards for actual, moral and
exemplary damages granted in the judgment of
respondent court, for the reasons meticulously
analyzed and thoroughly explained in its decision, are
just and equitable. It is high time that the travelling
public is afforded protection and that the duties of
common carriers, long detailed in our previous laws
and jurisprudence and thereafter collated and
specifically catalogued in our Civil Code in 1950, be
enforced through appropriate sanctions.
VALENZUELA V CA
SUMALPONG V CA (PEOPLE)
268 SCRA 764
FRANCISCO, February 26, 1997
NATURE
Petition for review
FACTS
- Sumalpong shot the victim Ramos after the former
slapped the latter’s wife. Before this, Sumalpong called
upon the spouses then inquired regarding the identity
of those who stoned his house, then accused Ramos of
stoning his house. Ramos’ wife, Leonarda, remarked
that he should first confirm the information he received
before accusing anyone, then after this Sumalpong shot
Leonarda at the back of her head (though apparently,
Leonarda was not harmed) then Ramos rushed towards
Sumalpong who then shot Ramos twice but missed.
They wrestled and in the act, Sumalpong bit on Ramos’
ear, causing its mutilation.
- TC: Sumalpong convicted of attempted homicide.
Ramos awarded with P 16,800.00 for the loss of his
crops due to his failure to attend to his farmwork
because of the injuries inflicted upon him by the
petitioner, P2,000.00 for hospitalization expenses, and
P5,000.00 by way of moral damages.
- CA: affirm conviction, removed award for loss of crops
and hospitalization expenses, increased moral damages
to P10,000.00, and awarding nominal damages in the
same amount.
A2010 - 167 -
ISSUE
WON the increase in moral damages is warranted
HELD
YES
- Anent the increase in the amount of moral damages
awarded, suffice it to state that the nature of the
injuries and the degree of physical suffering endured by
the complainant warrants the same. The tragic incident
caused a mutilation of complainant's left ear and a
permanent scar on his right forearm. These injuries
have left indelible marks on the complainant's body
and will serve as a constant reminder of this traumatic
experience. (more discussion on the modification of
amount of nominal damages and moral damages when
it was not the issue appealed, rationalization for
deletion of actual and compensatory damages…)
Disposition the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
LOPEZ V PAN AM WORLD AIRWAYS
16 SCRA 431
BENGZON; March 30, 1966
FACTS
- Sen Fernando Lopez, his wife, his son-in-law, and his
daughter made reservations, through their agency, for
first class accommodations in the Tokyo – San
Francisco flight of PAN-AM. PAN-AM's SF head office
confirmed the reservations. First class tickets were
subsequently issued, with the total fare having been
fully paid before this.
- As scheduled, they left Manila and as soon as they
arrived in Tokyo, they contacted PAN-AM's Tokyo office
regarding their accommodations. For the given reason
that the first class seats were all booked up, PAN-AM's
Tokyo office informed them that they could not go in
that flight unless they took the tourist class. Due to
pressing engagements in the US, they were constrained
to take PAN-AM's flight as tourist passengers.
- Sen Lopez filed suit for damages alleging breach of
contracts in bad faith by defendant out of racial
prejudice against Orientals. He asked for P500T actual
and moral damages, P100T exemplary damages, P25T
attorney's fees plus costs.
- PAN-AM asserted that its failure to provide first class
accommodations to plaintiffs was due to honest error of
its employees. It interposed a counterclaim for atty's
fees of P25T.
- CFI Rizal decision: in favor of plaintiff and granted (a)
P100T, moral damages; (b) P20T, exemplary
damages; (c) P25T, atty's fees, and costs of the action.
prof. casis
- Plaintiffs filed MFR asking that moral damages be
increased to P400T and for 6% interest per annum on
amount to be granted.
- CFI modified decision: (a) P150T, moral damages; (b)
P25T, exemplary damages; with legal interest on both
from date of filing of complaint until paid; (c) P25T,
atty's fees; and costs of the action.
- Both appealed: PAN-AM contended that there was NO
bad faith; Lopez et al wanted a total of P650T as award
for damages.
ISSUES
1. WON there was bad faith on the part of PAN-AM
2. WON the amount of damages should be increased
HELD
1. YES
Reasoning
- Defendant — through its agents — first cancelled
plaintiffs, reservations by mistake and thereafter
deliberately and intentionally withheld from plaintiffs or
their travel agent such information. In so misleading
plaintiffs into purchasing first class tickets in the
conviction that they had confirmed reservations, when
in fact they had none, defendant wilfully and knowingly
placed itself into the position of having to breach its
contracts with plaintiffs should there be no last-minute
cancellation by other passengers before flight time, as
it turned out in this case. Bad faith means a breach of a
known duty through some motive of interest or ill-will.
- At any rate, granting all the mistakes advanced by the
defendant, there would at least be negligence so gross
and reckless as to amount to malice or bad faith.
2. YES
Ratio Moral damages are recoverable in breach of
contracts where the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith (Art. 2220). Exemplary or corrective damages
may be imposed by way of example or correction for
the public good, in breach of contract where the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner (Art. 2229, 2232). A
written contract for an attorney's services shall control
the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the
court to be unconscionable or unreasonable (Sec. 24,
Rule 138, ROC).
- Factors in determining Amount for Moral
Damages: The amount of damages awarded in this
appeal has been determined by adequately considering
the official, political, social, and financial standing of
the offended parties on one hand, and the business and
financial position of the offender on the other. The
present rate of exchange and the terms at which the
amount of damages awarded would approximately be
in U.S. dollars has also been considered.
(a) MORAL DAMAGES
torts & damages
- As a proximate result of defendant's breach in bad
faith of its contracts with plaintiffs, the latter suffered
social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety
and mental anguish. It may not be humiliating to travel
as tourist passengers; it is humiliating to be compelled
to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully to be
expected from the contractual undertaking.
- Sen Lopez was then Senate President Pro Tempore.
International carriers like defendant know the prestige
of such an office. For the Senate is not only the Upper
Chamber of the Philippine Congress, but the nation's
treaty-ratifying body. He was also former Vice-President
of the Philippines. (MD = P100T)
- Mrs. Maria Lopez, as wife of the Senator, shared his
prestige and therefore his humiliation. In addition she
suffered physical discomfort during the 13-hour trip;
her reason for going to the US was actually for medical
check-up and relaxation. The fact that the seating
spaces in the tourist class are quite narrower than in
first class will suffice to show that she indeed
experienced physical suffering during the trip. (MD =
P50T)
- Mr. and Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., were travelling
as immediate members of the family of Sen Lopez.
Even if they initially wanted to change their seat
reservations from first class to tourist class, they
eventually paid for first class seats. Hence, they also
suffered social humiliation. (MD = P25T each)
(b) EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
- In view of its nature, it should be imposed in such an
amount as to effectively deter similar breach of
contracts in the future by defendant or other airlines.
(ED = P75T)
(c) ATTORNEY’S FEES
- Record shows a written contract of services wherein
plaintiffs engaged the services of their counsel — Atty.
Francisco — and agreed to pay the sum of P25T upon
the termination of the case in the CFI, and another
P25T if case is appealed to the SC. This is reasonable
considering the subject matter of the present
controversy, the professional standing of the attorney
for plaintiffs-appellants, and the extent of the service
rendered by him.
Disposition Judgment appealed from is hereby
MODIFIED so as to award in favor of plaintiffs and
against defendant, the following:
(1) P200T as moral damages, divided among
plaintiffs;
(2) P75T as exemplary or corrective damages;
(3) Interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on
the moral and exemplary damages, from date of
amended CFI decision, until said damages are fully
paid;
(4) P50T as attorney's fees; and
(5) Costs of action. Counterclaim dismissed.
A2010 - 168 -
PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILS V CA
(SPS CHUA)
MELO; September 17, 2001
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision and
resolution of the CA
FACTS
- Sometime in April, 1982, respondent Salvador Chua
was offered by Mr. Jimmy Rojas, manager of Producers
Bank of the Philippines, to transfer his account from
Pacific Banking Corporation to herein petitioner bank.
- Respondent spouses opened and maintained
substantial savings and current deposits with, and
likewise obtained various loans from petitioner bank,
one of which was a loan for P2,000,000.00 which was
secured by a real estate mortgage and payable within a
period of three (3) years or from 1982 to 1985.
- On January 20, 1984, private respondents deposited
with petitioner bank the total sum of P960,000.00,
which was duly entered in private respondents' savings
account passbook.
- Petitioner bank failed to credit this deposit due to the
fact that its Branch Manager absconded with the
money of the bank's depositors.
- Consequently, petitioner bank dishonored the checks
drawn out by private respondents in favor of their
various creditors on the ground of insufficient funds,
despite the fact that at that time, the balance of private
respondents' deposit was in the amount of
P1,051,051.19.
- Private respondents requested for copies of their
ledgers covering their savings and current accounts,
but petitioner bank refused.
- Private respondents instituted on January 30, 1984 an
action for damages against petitioner bank
- On the other hand, petitioner bank filed with the City
Sheriff of Bacolod a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure
of the real estate
- Private respondents filed a complaint for injunction
and damages, alleging that the petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure was without basis and was instituted
maliciously in order to harass private respondents.
- On April 26, 1988, the trial court rendered its decision
on the latter case, in favor of the spouses Chua,
awarding the sum of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages,
and the sum of P250,000.00 as exemplary damages,
among others.
- On October 31, 1991, upon appeal by petitioner bank,
the Court of Appeals modified the decision—one of the
changes was the award of the sum of P500,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages.
prof. casis
- Petitioner moved for a consideration but the same
was denied, hence, this petition
ISSUE
WON the petitioner bank is liable for moral damages
HELD
YES
- Moral and exemplary damages may be awarded
without proof of pecuniary loss. In awarding such
damages, the court shall take into account the
circumstances obtaining in the case and assess
damages according to its discretion.
- As borne out by the record of this case, private
respondents are engaged in several businesses, such
as rice and corn trading, cement dealership, and
gasoline proprietorship. The dishonor of private
respondents' checks and the foreclosure initiated by
petitioner adversely affected the credit standing as well
as the business dealings of private respondents as their
suppliers discontinued credit lines resulting in the
collapse of their businesses.
- In the case of Leopoldo Araneta vs. Bank of America,
it was held that: "The financial credit of a businessman
is a prized and valuable asset, it being a significant part
of the foundation of his business. Any adverse
reflection thereon constitutes some financial loss to
him."
- The damage to private respondents' reputation and
social standing entitles them to moral damages. Article
2217, in relation to Article 2220, of the Civil Code
explicitly provides that "moral damages include
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury."
- Obviously, petitioner bank's wrongful act caused
serious anxiety, embarrassment, and humiliation to
private respondents for which they are entitled to
recover moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00
which we deem to be reasonable.
Disposition The decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed with modification only as to the award of
damages
STREBEL V FIGUERAS
96 PHIL 321
CONCEPCION; December 29, 1954
torts & damages
FACTS
- Strebel’s side: As a lessee of a lot situated in Santa
Mesa, Manila, plaintiff Strebel subleased part thereof to
the Standard Vacuum Oil Company; that the latter
constructed thereon a Mobilgas Station which was
operated by Eustaquio & Co., a partnership organized
by said plaintiff and one Primo Eustaquio, that, "out of
spite and with a view to the eventual acquisition of the
said property for himself and his men," defendant Jose
Figueras "tried all he could to built a drainage through"
the aforementioned property; that, in order to
accomplish this purpose, and, using his official and
political influence, defendant Figueras, then Under-
Secretary of Labor, caused. his co-defendant Cornelio
S. Ruperto, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, to prepare
an opinion which was signed by the City Fiscal, holding
that the City of Manila has a right to construct said
drainage, and, to this effect, make the necessary
excavations at the boundary line of said lot leased to
Strebel and the lot belonging to Figueras
- Plaintiff Strebel also claims that defendant Figueras
"by making use of his official and political connections,"
was able to induce the Secretary of Justice to transfer
temporarily, from the Bureau of Immigration to the
Bureau of Prisons, one Dr. Manuel Hernandez, the
husband of plaintiff's step daughter;
- Plaintiff asked Secretary Nepomuceno to mediate
between them and Under-Secretary of Labor to forget
about past family problems.
- Plaintiff later on claims that Figueras still didn’t forget
about the past and "making use of his official and
political influence," and with the cooperation of his
former secretary, defendant Cornelio S. Ruperto, an
Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, as well as "in connivance
with the Director of Labor" which office was then held
by defendant Felipe E. Jose, "and other employees in
the Department and Bureau of Labor," defendant
Figueras succeeded in securing the institution, against
plaintiff Strebel, and his partner, Primo Eustaquio, of
Criminal Case No. 11005 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, for allegedly compelling several employees
to work more than eight (8) hours a day, in violation of
Commonwealth Act No. 444, in relation to
Commonwealth Act No. 303, although before the filing
of the information "the defendants collectively and
singly knew that the allegations therein are false;" that
said criminal case was subsequently dismissed by the
Court of First Instance of Manila for failure of the
prosecution "to establish even a prima facie case
against the accused";
- Through the foregoing series of acts, the defendants
have "caused moral and mental suffering to the . . .
plaintiff, his wife, and his entire family, and damage to
his business in the amount of P15,000.00 besides
actual damages in the amount of P1,500.00 paid to his
A2010 - 169 -
attorney in defending himself from the malicious
charge,"
ISSUE
WON Plaintiff may recover damages for moral and
mental suffering
HELD
NO
- The plan to built said drainage was seemingly
abandoned before plaintiff's property rights could be
violated. There was nothing wrong, either legally or
morally, in the desire of Figueras to seek an outlet for
the water coming from his property. On the contrary, it
is required by the elementary principles of health and
sanitation. Besides, there is no allegation that any lot
other than that of plaintiff Strebel was better suited for
the purpose.
Neither could he have any arising from the
assignment of his wife's son-in-law from the Bureau of
Prisons - to which he had been previously assigned
temporarily to the Bureau of Immigration, for
1.The authority of the Secretary of Justice to make the
assignment in question and the validity thereof, under
said legal provision, are submitted. Hence, it is not
claimed that said officer may be held civilly liable for
the aforementioned assignment. This being the case,
how can such responsibility be exacted from Figueras
who, it is urged, merely instigated said assignment?
2.Even if we assumed the act complained of to be
wrong or to have caused injury, the right of action
hypotethically resulting therefrom, if any — on which
we need not, and do not, express any opinion — would
have accrued in favor of Dr. Hernandez — who is not
a party in the present action — not plaintiff
herein.
- "As a general rule, the right of recovery for mental
suffering resulting from bodily injuries is restricted to
the person who has suffered the bodily hurt, and there
can be no recovery for distress caused by sympathy for
another's suffering, or for fright due to a wrong against
a third person. So the anguish of mind arising as to the
safety of others who may be in personal peril from the
same cause cannot be taken into consideration.
- '. . . damages are not recoverable for fright or shock
even when sustained as result of wilful act, unless such
act was directed toward person or property or person
seeking recovery; hence plaintiff is not entitled to
recover against administratrix of sister's murderer for
fright or shock caused by viewing mutilated body of
murdered sister. The rule on this point, as stated in the
American Jurisprudence, is: "Injury or Wrong to
Another. — In law mental anguish is restricted as
a rule, to such mental pain or suffering as arises
from an injury or wrong to the person himself, as
prof. casis
distinguished from that form of mental suffering
which is the accompaniment of sympathy or
sorrow for another's suffering or which arises
from a contemplation of wrongs committed on
the person of another. Pursuant to the rule
stated, a husband or wife cannot recover for
mental suffering caused by his or her sympathy
for the other's suffering." It should be noted that
plaintiff is not even related to Dr. Hernandez. The
latter's wife is a daughter of Mrs. Strebel by a previous
marriage. Hence Dr. Hernandez is merely related by
affinity, not to Strebel, but to a relative by affinity of
said plaintiff.
- Another allegation made by plaintiffs in arguing their
cause of action to recover damages, they said that
"with a view to further injuring" him "and besmirching
his good name in the community and waging a
cleavage in the harmonious relation between Eustaquio
& Co. and its laborers," defendants Felipe E. Jose and
Cornelio S. Ruperto issued a press statement to the
effect that plaintiff Strebel and his partner, Eustaquio
had flagrantly violated the provisions of the Eight-Hour
Law and that said Criminal Case had been dismissed by
the court on a flimsy ground; and that this statement
had "caused moral and mental suffering to the herein
plaintiff and damage to his business in the amount of
P5,000.00," The Supreme Court said that this news
item mentions, neither the number of the case referred
to, nor the names of the persons accused therein.
Moreover, it merely contains a criticism of the action
taken by the court. The reference, therein imputed to
the Director of Labor, to the flagrant violation of the
eight-hour labor law by the accused, was a mere
reiteration of the theory of the Bureau of Labor, which
the prosecution had adopted by filing the information in
said case. Being a matter of court record, which had
been taken up at the hearing held publicly, and settled
in a decision already promulgated, said theory was
open for public consumption, and, hence, an allusion
thereto or statement thereof, in order to justify said
criticism, is not actionable.
- As regards the malicious prosecution point raised by
Strebel, by specific mandate of Article 2219 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, however, moral
damages may not be recovered in cases of crime
or tort, unless either results or causes "physical
injuries," which are lacking in the case at bar.
Although the same article permits recovery of said
damages in cases of malicious prosecution, this feature
of said provision may not be availed of by the plaintiff
herein, inasmuch as the acts set forth in the complaint
took place in 1949, or before said Code became
effective (laws shouldn’t have retroactive effect).
torts & damages
ABS-CBN V CA (REPUBLIC
BROADCASTING CORP, VIVA FILMS)
DAVIDE; January 21, 1999
FACTS
- ABS-CBN, by virtue of contract with VIVA, had an
exclusive right to exhibit some Viva films. ABS-CBN had
a right of first refusal. VIVA gave ABS-CBN 3 packages
(36 titles) to choose from. VP for ABS Charo Santos-
Concio wrote VIVA that they are not accepting the list
because there were only 10 titles there that they could
potentially purchase. ABS asked for another list, saying
they had quite an attractive offer to make.
- VIVA gave ABS a new list: 52 original movie titles
(never before aired on TV) and 104 reruns. VIVA’s
proposal was P60M (P30M cash, P30M TV spots) for 52
originals and 52 reruns.
- Del Rosario (VIVA’s rep) and Eugenio Lopez III had a
mtg re this in Tamarind Grill Restaurant. Accdg to
ABSCBN, the mtg culminated in Del Rosario accepting
ABSCBN’s offer of P35M for 52 of the films VIVA was
selling for P60M plus “Maging Sino Ka Man.”
- VIVA said this wasn’t their agreement and that they
refuse to sell anything less the 104-movie package for
P60M. In the meantime, RBS bought the 104-film
package (which included “Maging Sino Ka Man”) for
P60M. There were ads in the newspapers for the airing
of the movie on Channel 7.
- ABSCBN filed a case in RTC to enjoin RBS from airing
14 VIVA films, including Maging Sino Ka Man. RTC
granted a preliminary injunction; but lifted the same
after RBS put up a counterbond.
- ABSCBN filed a petition in the CA to challenge the
RTC decision. CA granted TRO, but eventually
dismissed ABSCBN’s petition and made them pay for
actual, moral and exemplary damages and atty’s fees
to RBS, and atty’s fees to VIVA.
ISSUE
WON RBS may recover damages from ABSCBN
HELD
NO
ACTUAL DAMAGES
- Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is
entitled to compensation for actual damages only for
such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly
proved. The indemnification shall comprehend not only
the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the
profits that the obligee failed to obtain. In contracts and
quasi-contracts the damages which may be awarded
are dependent on whether the obligor acted with good
faith or otherwise. In case of good faith, the damages
recoverable are those which are the natural and
A2010 - 170 -
probable consequences of the breach of the obligation
and which the parties have foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen at the time of the constitution of
the obligation. If the obligor acted with fraud, bad faith,
malice, or wanton attitude, he shall be responsible for
all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the
non-performance of the obligation. In crimes and quasi-
delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages
which are the natural and probable consequences of
the act or omission complained of, whether or not such
damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably
been foreseen by the defendant.
- Actual damages may likewise be recovered for loss
or impairment of earning capacity in cases of
temporary or permanent personal injury, or for injury to
the plaintiff's business standing or commercial credit.
- RBS claims actual damages based on Arts 19-21 for
the injunction for having to put up a counterbond. The
SC said that since ABS had not posted a bond and was
in fact still challenging it, RBS didn’t have to put up the
counterbond.
- RBS also claims actual damages for the
advertisements for the airing of “Maging Sino Ka Man.”
The SC said that ABS is not liable for lack of sufficient
basis. The prelim injunction was lifted by RTC upon RBS
paying the counterbond, and not on any legal and
factual basis.
ATTY’S FEES
- As regards attorney's fees, the law is clear that in
the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees may be
recovered as actual or compensatory damages under
any of the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of
the Civil Code.
- The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be
recovered as part of damages because of the policy
that no premium should be placed on the right to
litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a party
wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney's
fees under Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and
equitable justification. Even when a claimant is
compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his rights, still attorney's fees may
not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad
faith could be reflected in a party's persistence in a
case other than an erroneous conviction of the
righteousness of his cause.
MORAL DAMAGES
- Moral damages are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury
suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
The award is not meant to enrich the complainant at
the expense of the defendant, but to enable the injured
party to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that
will serve to obviate the moral suffering he has
undergone. It is aimed at the restoration, within the
prof. casis
limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante,
and should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
- The award of moral damages cannot be granted in
favor of a corporation because, being an artificial
person and having existence only in legal
contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no
senses. It cannot, therefore, experience physical
suffering and mental anguish which can be experienced
only by one having a nervous system. The award for
damages must be set aside, since RBS is a corporation.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
- These are imposed by way of example or correction
for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated, or compensatory damages. They are
recoverable in criminal cases as part of the civil liability
when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances; in quasi-delicts, if the
defendant acted with gross negligence; and in
contracts and quasi-contracts, if the defendant acted in
a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner.
- The claim of RBS against ABS-CBN is not based on
contract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict. The
claims for moral and exemplary damages can only be
based on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.
- Arts 19-21 have at their very core the common
element of malice or bad faith. Such intentional design
to do a wrongful act must be proved by evidence. Here,
ABSCBN was honestly convinced of the merits of its
cause after it had undergone serious negotiations
culminating in its formal submission of a draft contract.
Settled is the rule that the adverse result of an action
does not per se make the action wrongful and subject
the actor to damages, for the law could not have meant
to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. If damages
result from a person's exercise of a right, it is damnum
absque injuria.
Disposition Petition Granted. CA decision reversed,
except to unappealed award of Atty’s damages of Viva
Films.
NPC v PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC
369 SCRA 629
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; November 20, 2001
NATURE
Appeal by certioriari to review and set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
- The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) issued
invitations to bid for the supply and delivery of 120,000
metric tons of imported coal for its Batangas Coal-Fired
Thermal Power Plant in Calaca, Batangas. The Philipp
torts & damages
Brothers Oceanic, Inc. (PHIBRO) prequalified and was
allowed to participate as one of the bidders. After the
public bidding was conducted, PHIBRO's bid was
accepted. NAPOCOR's acceptance was conveyed in a
letter. PHIBRO sent word to NAPOCOR that industrial
disputes might soon plague Australia, the shipment's
point of origin, which could seriously hamper PHIBRO's
ability to supply the needed coal. PHIBRO again
apprised NAPOCOR of the situation in Australia,
particularly informing the latter that the ship owners
therein are not willing to load cargo unless a "strike-
free" clause is incorporated in the charter party or the
contract of carriage. In order to hasten the transfer of
coal, PHIBRO proposed to NAPOCOR that they equally
share the burden of a "strike-free" clause. NAPOCOR
refused.
- Subsequently, PHIBRO received from NAPOCOR a
confirmed and workable letter of credit. Instead of
delivering the coal on or before the thirtieth day after
receipt of the Letter of Credit, as agreed upon by the
parties in the July contract, PHIBRO effected its first
shipment only on November 17, 1987.
- Consequently, in October 1987, NAPOCOR once more
advertised for the delivery of coal to its Calaca thermal
plant. PHIBRO participated anew in this subsequent
bidding. On November 24, 1987, NAPOCOR
disapproved PHIBRO's application for pre-qualification
to bid for not meeting the minimum requirements.
Upon further inquiry, PHIBRO found that the real reason
for the disapproval was its purported failure to satisfy
NAPOCOR's demand for damages due to the delay in
the delivery of the first coal shipment.
- This prompted PHIBRO to file an action for damages
with application for injunction against NAPOCOR with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Makati City. In its
complaint, PHIBRO alleged that NAPOCOR's act of
disqualifying it in the October 1987 bidding and in all
subsequent biddings was tainted with malice and bad
faith. PHIBRO prayed for actual, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.
- In its answer, NAPOCOR averred that the strikes in
Australia could not be invoked as reason for the delay
in the delivery of coal because PHIBRO itself admitted
that as of July 28, 1987 those strikes had already
ceased. And, even assuming that the strikes were still
ongoing, PHIBRO should have shouldered the burden of
a "strike-free" clause because their contract was "C and
F Calaca, Batangas, Philippines," meaning, the cost and
freight from the point of origin until the point of
destination would be for the account of PHIBRO.
Furthermore, NAPOCOR claimed that due to PHIBRO's
failure to deliver the coal on time, it was compelled to
purchase coal from ASEA at a higher price. NAPOCOR
claimed for actual damages in the amount of
P12,436,185.73, representing the increase in the price
A2010 - 171 -
of coal, and a claim of P500,000.00 as litigation
expenses.
- Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The trial court
decided in favor of PHIBRO. Unsatisfied, NAPOCOR
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals rendered a Decision affirming in toto the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE
WON PHIBRO is entitled to damages
HELD
NO
- NAPOCOR was not bound under any contract to
approve PHIBRO's pre-qualification requirements. In
fact, NAPOCOR had expressly reserved its right to
reject bids. And where the government as advertiser,
availing itself of that right, makes its choice in rejecting
any or all bids, the losing bidder has no cause to
complain nor right to dispute that choice unless an
unfairness or injustice is shown.
- Owing to the discretionary character of the right
involved in this case, the propriety of NAPOCOR's act
should therefore be judged on the basis of the general
principles regulating human relations, the forefront
provision of which is Article 19 of the Civil Code which
provides that "every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith." Accordingly, a person will be protected
only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right,
that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith;
but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. 3
- NAPOCOR's act of disapproving PHIBRO's application
for pre-qualification to bid was without any intent to
injure or a purposive motive to perpetrate damage.
Apparently, NAPOCOR acted on the strong conviction
that PHIBRO had a "seriously-impaired" track record.
NAPOCOR cannot be faulted from believing so. We
cannot fault NAPOCOR if it mistook PHIBRO's
unexpected offer a mere attempt on the latter's part to
undercut ASEA or an indication of PHIBRO's
inconsistency. The circumstances warrant such
contemplation.
- One who acted pursuant to the sincere belief that
another willfully committed an act prejudicial to the
interest of the government cannot be considered to
have acted in bad faith. Bad faith has always been a
question of intention. It is that corrupt motive that
operates in the mind. As understood in law, it
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest
or ill-will or for ulterior purpose. While confined in the
realm of thought, its presence may be ascertained
through the party's actuation or through circumstantial
prof. casis
evidence. The circumstances under which NAPOCOR
disapproved PHIBRO's pre-qualification to bid do not
show an intention to cause damage to the latter. The
measure it adopted was one of self-protection.
Consequently, we cannot penalize NAPOCOR for the
course of action it took. NAPOCOR cannot be made
liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages.
- Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, the
amount of loss must not only be capable of proof but
must actually be proven with reasonable degree of
certainty, premised upon competent proof or best
evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof. A
court cannot merely rely on speculations, conjectures,
or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages.
Thus, while indemnification for damages shall
comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but
also that of the profits which the obligee failed to
obtain, it is imperative that the basis of the alleged
unearned profits is not too speculative and conjectural
as to show the actual damages which may be suffered
on a future period.
- The award of moral damages is likewise improper. To
reiterate, NAPOCOR did not act in bad faith. Moreover,
moral damages are not, as a general rule, granted to a
corporation. While it is true that besmirched reputation
is included in moral damages, it cannot cause mental
anguish to a corporation, unlike in the case of a natural
person, for a corporation has no reputation in the sense
that an individual has, and besides, it is inherently
impossible for a corporation to suffer mental anguish.
- Neither can we award exemplary damages under
Article 2234 of the Civil Code. Before the court may
consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded, the plaintiff must show
that he is entitled to moral, temperate, or
compensatory damages.
- This Court has also laid down the rule that in the
absence of stipulation, a winning party may be awarded
attorney's fees only in case plaintiff's action or
defendant's stand is so untenable as to amount to
gross and evident bad faith. This cannot be said of the
case at bar. NAPOCOR is justified in resisting PHIBRO's
claim for damages.
VENTANILLA V CENTENO
PADILLA; January 28, 1961
NATURE
APPEAL
FACTS
- Ventanilla instituted this action to recover damages
against his lawyer, Atty. Centeno for neglecting to
perfect within the reglementary period his (V) appeal
torts & damages
from an adverse judgment rendered by the CFI of
Manila.
- TC’s facts showed that the required appeal bond was
not filed by Atty. Centeno. The fact that the record on
appeal was admitted for filing is the best evidence that
Atty. Centeno had not in fact filed any appeal bond. The
record on appeal was disapproved because it was filed
out of time and no appeal bond had been filed by the
plaintiff.
- TC: rendered judgment in favor of V; ordered Centeno
to pay V the sum of P200 as nominal damages and the
costs.
- V appealed to the CA which certified the case to this
Court on the ground that only questions of law are
raised. The defendant did not appeal.
ISSUE
WON TC erred in not ordering the Centeno to pay him
actual or compensatory, moral, temperate or moderate,
and exemplary or corrective damages; in ordering
that only the sum of P200 be paid to him, and not
P2,000 as nominal damages; and in not ordering
that the sum of P500 as attorney's fee be paid as well.
HELD
NO
Reasoning
AS REGARDS ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES:
- V is not entitled to such damages as his basis is highly
speculative.
- A2199 NCC provides:
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly
proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages.
- Malonzo vs. Galang: He who claims actual or
compensatory damages must establish and prove by
competent evidence actual pecuniary loss.
- Ventanilla’s allegation that by Centeno’s negligence in
not paying the appeal bond of P60, V lost his chance to
recover from the defendants therein the sum of P4,000
and moral and actual damages, which V could have
recovered if the appeal had duly been perfected,
indicates that his claim for actual or compensatory
damages is highly speculative.
AS REGARDS MORAL DAMAGES:
- Since the VENTANILLA’S cause of action for recovery
of moral damages is not predicated upon any of those
specifically enumerated (under A2219, Arts. 21, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 on the chapter on human
relations (par. 10, Art. 2219) TC did not err in declining
to award moral damages to him
-V claims that he suffered mental anguish upon
learning that his appeal had not been perfected within
A2010 - 172 -
the reglementary period due to the Centeno's
negligence; serious anxiety upon learning that his
adversary had won by a mere technicality; besmirched
reputation for losing the opportunity to substantiate his
claim made while testifying in open court that he was
entitled to collect the sum of P4,000 and damages from
the defendants in civil No. 18833; and wounded
feelings for the Centeno’s failure to remain faithful to
his client and worthy of his trust and confidence. (SEE
A2217, 2219 AND 2220 NCC)
-Malonzo vs. Galang:
“. . .Art. 2219 specifically mentions "quasi-delicts
causing physical injuries," as an instance when moral
damages may be allowed, thereby implying that all
other quasi-delicts not resulting in physical injuries
are excluded (Strebel vs. Figueras, G.R. L-4722, Dec.
29, 1954), excepting, of course, the special torts
referred to in Art. 309 (par. 9, Art. 2219) and in Arts.
21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 on the chapter
on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219).
CONCERNING TEMPERATE OR MODERATE DAMAGES:
- Considering that he is not entitled to actual or
compensatory damages but has been awarded nominal
damages by the TC, such award precludes the recovery
of temperate or moderate damages, and so TC did not
err in refusing to award temperate or moderate
damages to the Ventanilla
AS REGARDS EXEMPLARY OR CORRECTIVE DAMAGES:
- It cannot be recovered as a matter of right and the
court will decide whether or not they should be
adjudicated, if the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
TC didn’t err in not giving any.
NOMINAL DAMAGES
- Considering the circumstances and the degree of
negligence committed by ATTY CENTENO in not
depositing on time the appeal bond and filing the
record on appeal within the extension period granted
by the court, which brought about the refusal by the
TCto allow the record on appeal, the amount of P200
awarded by the TC to VENTANILLA as nominal
damages may seem exiguous.
- Nevertheless, considering that nominal damages are
not for indemnification of loss suffered but for the
vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded;
and that even if the appeal in civil case No. 18833 had
been duly perfected, it was not an assurance that the
appellant would succeed in recovering the amount he
had claimed in his complaint, the amount of P2,000 the
appellant seeks to recover as nominal damages is
excessive.
- A2221 of NCC provides:
Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a
right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
prof. casis
recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered
by him.
- A2216; Del Castillo vs. Guerrero[1960]: The
assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion
of the court, according to the circumstances of the
case.
AS REGARDS ATTORNEY'S FEES:
- since the V's claim does not fall under any of those
enumerated in A2208 NCC, the V may not be compelled
to satisfy it.
Disposition TC’s judgment affirmed
ROBES-FRANCISCO REALTY V CFI AND
MILLAN
MUÑOZ-PALMA; October 30, 1978
FACTS
- Robes-Francisco Realty sold to Millan a parcel of land.
Millan complied and paid. She made repeated
demands to execute final deed of sale and for issuance
to her of TCT over the lot. Parties executed deed of
absolute sale. But corp failed to cause issuance of TCT
because title was included among properties of corp
mortgaged to GSIS to secure an obligation. Hence, a
complaint for specific performance and damages.
ISSUE
WON Robes-Francisco is liable for damages
HELD
YES
- Robes-Francisco is guilty of delay, amounting to non-
performance. It is liable for damages under Art 1170 of
CC.
- But Robes-Francisco contends that Millan is bound by
terms of provision and can’t recover more than what is
agreed upon. This argument is devoid of merit. We
would agree if the clause were to be a penal clause.
But this clause doesn’t convey any penalty.
- Unfortunately, vendee submitted her case below
without presenting evidence on actual damages
suffered by her.
- But it is obvious that right of vendee was violated by
petitioner and this entitles her at least to NOMINAL
DAMAGES.
- NOMINAL DAMAGES are not for indemnification of loss
suffered but for vindication or recognition of a right.
- NOMINAL DAMAGES are damages in name only and
not in fact, and are allowed simply in recognition of a
technical injury.
- P20,000.00 is excessive. The admitted fact that
petitioner corporation failed to convey a transfer
certificate of title to respondent Milian because the
torts & damages
subdivision property was mortgaged to the GSIS does
not in itself show that there was bad faith or fraud. Bad
faith is not to be presumed. Moreover, there was the
expectation of the vendor that arrangements were
possible for the GSIS to make partial releases of the
subdivision lots.
PEOPLE V GOPIO
346 SCRA 408
MENDOZA; November 29, 2000
NATURE
Appeal from Decision of RTC
FACTS
- Princess Millano, 10 years old, went to Agustin Gopio’s
store to buy cooking oil. However, it was closed. As
Millano was about to leave, Gopio called her. When she
came near him, he seized her, brought her inside his
empty house, brought her to his bedroom and raped
her. As she would not stop crying, he eventually let her
go.
- The victim rushed home. Although she felt intense
pain and was actually bleeding, she did not inform her
mother of what happened to her.
- Victim related that she was molested by Gopio in 2
other occasions in the same year. The first happened
when she went to her godsister’s house and found the
accused playing cards. She was about to leave when
she saw her godsister’s brother crying inside the room.
She went inside and the accused followed him, locked
the door and caressed her private parts. The second
instance was when the accused followed her on her
way to her grandfather’s house to get the pail
requested by her aunt.
- The victim did not confide to her family about these
incidents because she was very afraid of accused-
appellant and of what her parents would do to her.
Likewise, the victim was ashamed and worried that her
friends would spread the news regarding her
unfortunate experience.
- Victim’s mother testified about victim’s age. She also
said that after the incident, her daughter became
inattentive and withdrawn. Her daughter’s grades even
dropped. Subsequently, she brought the victim to the
Municipal Health Center because the latter has been
experiencing navel pains. This is when she discovered
that her child got raped. She presented receipts
covering medical, transportation, food, and other
expenses which she allegedly incurred on account of
the incident.
- Gopio denied allegations and said that he was in
Novaliches in May and June 1995 to sell fish. He claims
that there was animosity between their families which
A2010 - 173 - prof. casis
started when she failed to bring along victim’s mother the expenses incurred on account of the rape
to the market to sell fish. incident. In this case, only the laboratory fee
- RTC found Gopio guilty of statutory rape and ordered issued by the hospital amounting to P350 was
him to pay P3,727 as actual damages and P30,000 as duly receipted. The rest of the documents were
moral damages. merely a doctor’s prescription and a handwritten
list of food expenses.
ISSUES - Nevertheless, under Article 2221 of the Civil
1. WON accused-appellant was guilty beyond
Code, nominal damages are adjudicated in
reasonable doubt
order that the right of the plaintiff, which
2. WON award of damages was correct
has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, may be vindicated or
HELD
recognized, and not for the purpose of
1. YES
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by
- On alibi: Victim positively identified accused-appellant
him. As has been held, “whenever there has
as the perpetrator of the crime and categorically
been a violation of an ascertained legal
testified that she had been raped by accused-appellant.
right, although no actual damages resulted
When a rape victim’s testimony is straightforward and
or none are shown, the award of nominal
candid, unshaken by rigid cross-examination and
damages is proper.” In this case, the victim’s
unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its
family clearly incurred medical expenses due to
material points, the same must be given full faith and
the rape committed by accused-appellant. The
credit.
victim suffered from pains in her navel which
- On victim’s failure to immediately report incident: The
required her physical examination. An award of
victim’s delay in reporting the offense is not an
P2k as nominal damages is thus appropriate
indication of a fabricated charge. Victim feared that
under the circumstances.
accused-appellant would hurt her and her family and
that her friends would spread the news about her - Based on current rulings, the award of moral
plight. Had it not been for that medical examination, damages should be increased to P50k
the victim would not have told them about the rape irrespective of proof thereof.
committed by accused-appellant. This explains the
delay in reporting the crime in this case.
- In addition, the victim is entitled to the award of
P50k as civil indemnity which must be given even
- On failure of the information to indicate the
if there is neither allegation nor evidence
approximate time of the commission of the offense:
presented as basis therefore.
The phrase in the information, “that sometime in
Disposition RTC decision modified. Accused-appellant
1995. . .” has sufficiently apprised accused-appellant of
is ordered to pay the victim the amounts of P2k by way
the crime which he allegedly committed in 1995. It
of nominal damages, P50k as moral damages, and the
bears stressing that, in the case of rape, the date of
additional amount of P50k as civil indemnity, plus the
commission is not an essential element of the offense,
costs of the suit.
what is material being the occurrence thereof and not
the time of its commission. In any event, it is now too
late in the day to question the form or substance of the
information because when he entered his plea at his
arraignment, accused-appellant did not object to the
sufficiency of the information against him. ARMOVIT V CA (NORTHWEST AIRLINES)
- On irregularity of arrest: He failed to raise objections 184 SCRA 476
to his arrest at the earliest possible opportunity. The GANGAYCO; April 20, 1990
record shows that he voluntarily entered a plea of not
guilty when he was arraigned, thereby waiving his right FACTS
to question any irregularity in his arrest. - In October 1981, Dr. Herman Armovit and his family
2. NO decided to spend their Christmas holidays with relatives
- The award of actual damages must be deleted in and friends in the Philippines so they purchased from
the absence of proof required by Art. 2199 of the Northwest Airlines 3 round trip airline tickets from the
Civil Code. To be entitled to actual and US to Manila and back, plus 3 tickets for the rest of the
compensatory damages, there must be children, though not involved in the suit. Each ticket of
competent proof constituting evidence of the the petitioners which was in the handwriting of
actual amount thereof, such as receipts showing
torts & damages
Northwest’s tickets sales agent contains the following
entry on the Manila to Tokyo portion of the return flight:
"from Manila to Tokyo, NW flight 002, date 17 January,
time 10:30 AM Status, OK"
- On their return trip from Manila to the US scheduled
on January 17, 1982, they arrived at the check-in
counter of the airline at the Manila International Airport
at 9:15 in the morning, which is a good one hour and
fifteen minutes ahead of the 10:30 AM scheduled flight
time recited in their tickets. They were rudely informed
that they cannot be accommodated inasmuch as Flight
002 scheduled at 9:15 am was already taking off and
the 10:30 AM flight time entered in their plane tickets
was erroneous.
- Previous to the date of departure Armovit re-
confirmed their reservations through their
representative Ernesto Madriaga who personally
presented the 3 tickets at the airline’s Roxas Boulevard
office. The departure time in the 3 tickets was not
changed when re-confimed. Their names appeared in
the passenger manifest and confirmed as Passenger
Nos. 306, 307, and 308, Flight 002.
- Dr. Armovit protested in extreme agitation that
because of the bump-off he will not be able to keep his
appointments with his patients in the US. They suffered
anguish, wounded feelings, and serious anxiety day
and night of January 17th until the morning of January
18th when they were finally informed that seats will be
available for them on the flight that day.
- The RTC ruled in favor of the Armovits and ordered
Northwest to pay actual (P1,300), exemplary
(P1,100,000) and moral (P1,100,000) damages as well
as attorney’s fees. The CA affirmed but eliminated the
moral damages on the ground that petitioners did not
take the witness stand to testify on their social
humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, and that the
breach of contract was not malicious or fraudulent. It
also reduced the exemplary damages to P170,000.
Armovit’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE
WON the CA erred in deleting the award of moral
damages
HELD
1. NO.
Ratio A contract to transport passengers is quite
different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation. And this is because of the relation which an air
carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly
with the traveling public. It invites people to avail of the
comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air
carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with
a public duty, Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's
employees, naturally, could give ground for an action
A2010 - 174 -
for damages… Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation. They have the right to be treated by the
carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy
and due consideration. They are entitled to be
protected against personal misconduct, injurious
language, indignities and abuses from such employees.
So it is that any rude or discourteous conduct on the
part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter
an action for damages against the carrier. [Citing Air
France v Carrascoso]
Reasoning
- The gross negligence committed by Northwest in the
issuance of the tickets with entries as to the time of the
flight, the failure to correct such erroneous entries and
the manner by which petitioners were rudely informed
that they were bumped off are clear indicia of such
malice and bad faith and establish that Northwest
committed a breach of contract which entitles
petitioners to moral damages.
- The CA observed that the Armovits failed to take the
witness stand and testify on the matter. It overlooked
however, that their failure to appear in court to testify
was explained by them. The assassination of Senator
Benigno Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983 following the
year they were bumped off caused turmoil in the
country. This turmoil spilled over to the year 1984
when they were scheduled to testify. However, the
violent demonstrations in the country were
sensationalized in the U.S. media so they were advised
to refrain from returning to the Philippines at the time.
- Nevertheless, Atty. Raymund Armovit, brother of Dr.
Armovit, took the witness stand as he was with the
petitioners from the time they checked in up to the
time of their ultimate departure. He was a witness
when the check-in officer rudely informed the Armovits
that their flight had already taken off, while Dr. Armovit
remonstrated that their tickets reflected their flight
time to be 10:30 AM; that in anger and frustration, Dr.
Armovit told the said check-in-officer that he had to be
accommodated that morning so that he could attend to
all his appointments in the US; that Jacqueline Armovit
also complained about not being able to report for work
at the expiration of her leave of absence; that while the
Armovits had to accept Northwest's offer for hotel
accommodations at the Philippine Village Hotel so that
they could follow up and wait for their flight out of
Manila the following day, they did not use their meal
coupons because of the limitations thereon so they had
to spend for lunch, dinner, and breakfast in the sum of
P1,300 while waiting to be flown out of Manila; that Dr.
Armovit had to forego the professional fees for the
medical appointments he missed due to his inability to
take the January 17 flight; that the petitioners were
finally able to fly out of Manila on January 18, 1982, but
were assured of this flight only on the very morning of
prof. casis
that day, so that they experienced anxiety until they
were assured seats for that flight.
- No doubt Atty. Raymund Armovit's testimony
adequately and sufficiently established the serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation that
petitioners suffered upon having been bumped off.
However, considering that Northwest took care of their
accommodations while waiting and boarding them in
the flight back to the US, the following day, the Court
finds that the petitioners are entitled to moral damages
in the amount of P100,000 each.
- To provide an example for the public good, an award
of exemplary damages is also proper. The award of the
CA is adequate. Nevertheless, the deletion of the
nominal damages by the CA is well-taken since there is
an award of actual damages. Nominal damages cannot
co-exist with actual or compensatory damages.
Disposition Petition is granted. The judgment of the
CA is hereby modified such that Northwest shall pay
the following:
(a) actual damages in favor of Dr. Armovit in the sum of
P1,300 with interest at the legal rate from January 17,
1982;
(b) moral damages at P100,000 and exemplary
damages and P100,000 in favor of Dr. Armovit;
(c) moral damages of P100,000 and exemplary
damages of P50,000 in favor of Mrs. Dora Armovit;
(d) moral damages of P100,000 and exemplary
damages in the amount of P20,000 in favor of Miss
Jacqueline Armovit; and
(e) attorney's fees at 5% of the total awards, plus the
cost of suit.
FRANCISCO V FERRER
PLENO V CA (PHILIPPINE PAPER
PRODUCTS INC ET AL)
307 SCRA 675
GUTTIERREZ JR; May 9, 1988
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision which
modified the CFI decision in a vehicular accident case
and reduced by one half the award for temperate
damages, moral damages, and attorney’s fees from
P430,000 to P215,000. the awards for actual damages
in the amount of P48,244 and exemplary damages in
the amount of P50,000 were affirmed
FACTS
- Philippine Paper Products is the owner of a delivery
truck, and one of their drivers, Florante de Luna, in
a reckless and imprudent manner, by driving the
torts & damages
vehicle at a great speed, without taking any
precautions to avoid accidents, hit, bumped, and
sideswiped plaintiffs Volkswagen Delivery Van,
driven by plaintiff, causing the Van to swerve and
ram into the rear part of another truck
- As a result of the accident, plaintiff was hospitalized,
suffered injuries affecting his brain, acted beyond
normalcy at times
- Petitioner questioned the set off since there was no
call or notice for the payment of the unpaid
subscription, and that the alleged obligation is not
enforceable.
- The NLRC held that a stockholder who fails to pay his
unpaid subscription on call becomes a debtor of
the corporation and that the set-off of said
obligation against the wages and other due to
petitioner is not contrary to law, morals, public
policy
ISSUES
1.WON the employer's liability in quasi-delict
subsidiary
2. WON the appellant court was correct in reducing
the amount of damages awarded to the petitioner
HELD
1. NO
Reasoning
- We sustain the view of the petitioner that the ability
of an employer in quasi-delict is primary and solidary
and not subsidiary. This, we have ruled in a long line of
cases.
2. NO
Reasoning
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the awards of
damages. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, the appellate
court reduced the amount of temperate and moral
damages as well as the amount of attorney's fees on
the ground that the awards were "too high" .The award
of temperate damages was reduced by the appellate
court on the ground that the amount of P200,000.00 is
rather "too high" especially considering the fact that
the driver De Luna is a mere driver and defendant-
appellant Corporation is only subsidiarily liable thereof.
The award was reduced to P100,000.00.
- The award of temperate, moral, and exemplary
damages as well as attorney's fees lies upon the
discretion of the court based on the facts and
circumstances of each case.
- The court's discretion is, of course, subject to the
condition that the award for damages is not excessive
under the attendant facts and circumstance of the
case.
- Temperate damages are included within the context
of compensatory damages.
A2010 - 175 -
- In the case of moral damages, the yardstick shaould
be that the "amount awarded should not be palpably
and scandalously excessive" so as to indicate that it
was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on
the part of the trial court. The actual losses sustained
by the aggrieved parties and the gravity of the injuries
must be considered in arriving at reasonable levels
- The lower court's awards of damages are more
consonant with the factual circumstances of the instant
case.21 The trial court's findings of facts are clear and
well-developed. Each item of damages is adequately
supported by evidence on record. On the other hand,
21
The trial court based the amounts of damages awarded to the
petitioner on the following circumstances:
Coming now to the damages suffered by plaintiff Maximo Pleno, it is not
controverted that Pleno was hospitalized for about five months beginning
December 21, 1971, the day of the incident, up to May 9, 1972. While in
the hospital, he underwent several major operations on his legs and in
spite of Id operations, a deformity still resulted and that his left leg is
shorter than the right. The medical expenses, hospital bills and doctor's
is fees were properly exhibited and not rebutted by defendants. This being
the case, actual expenses of P48,244.08 may be awarded.
As to the loss or impairment of earning capacity, there is no doubt that
Pleno is an enterpreneur and the founder of his own corporation, the
Mayon Ceramics Corporation. It appears also that he is an industrious and
resourceful person with several projects in line and were it not for the
incident, might have pushed them through. On the day of the incident,
Pleno was driving homeward with geologist Langley after an ocular
inspection of the site of the Mayon Ceramics Corporation. His actual
income however has not been sufficiently established so that this Court
cannot award actual damages, but, an award of temperate or moderate
damages may still be made on loss or impairment of earning capacity.
That Pleno sustained a permanent deformity due to a shortened left leg
and that he also suffers from double vision in his left eye is also
established. Because of this, he suffers from some inferiority complex and
is no longer active in business as well as in social life. In similar cases as
in Borromeo v. Manila Electric Railroad Co., 44 Phil 165; Cordage, et al. v.
LTB Co., et al., L-11037, Dec. 29,1960, and in Araneta, et al. v. Arreglado,
et al., L-11394, Sept. 9, 1958, the proper award of damages were given.
There is also no doubt that due to the incident, Pleno underwent physical
suffering, mental anguish, fight, severe arudety and that he also
underwent several major operations. As previously stated, Pleno is the
founder of Mayon Ceramics Corporation, manufacturer of the now famous
Crown Lynn ceramic wares. He is a mechanical engineer and the
topnotcher of the professional examination for mechanical engineering in
1938. From the record, most if not all of his children excelled in academic
studies here and abroad. The suffering, both mental and physical, which
he experienced, the anxiety and fright that he underwent are sufficiently
proved, if not patent. He is therefore entitled to moral damages. Pleno is
also entitled to exemplary damages since it appears that gross negligence
was committed in the hiring of driver de Luna. In spite of his past record,
he was still hired by the corporation. As regards de Luna, the very fact
that he left the scene of the incident without assisting the victims and
without reporting to the authorities entitles an award of exemplary
damages, so as to serve as an example that in cases of accidents of this
kind, the drivers involved should not leave their victims behind but should
stop to assist the victims or if this is not possible, to report the matter
immediately to the authorities. That the corporation did not also report
the matter to the authorities and that their lawyer would attempt to bribe
the police officers in order that the incident would be kept a secret shows
that the corporation ratified the act of their employees and such act also
shows bad faith. Hence, Id corporation is able to pay exemplary damages.
The award of attorney's fees is also proper in this case considering the
circumstances and that it took more than five years of trial to finish this
case. Also, plaintiffs counsel prepared lengthy and exhausive
memorandum. (pp- 48-50, Amended Joint Record on Appeal)
prof. casis
there are no substantial reasons and no references to
any misimpressions of facts in the appellate decision.
The Court of Appeals has shown no sufficient reasons
for altering factual findings which appear correct. We,
therefore, affirm the lower court's awards of damages
and hold that the appellate court's reduction of the
amounts of temperate and moral damages is not
justified. However, we modify the award of attorney's
fees to P20,000.00 which we deem to be just and
equitable under the circumstances.
Disposition instant petition is GRANTED. The
questioned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig) in
Civil Case No. 16024 is AFFIRMED in all respects,
except for the award of attorney's fees which is
reduced to P20,000.00.
PEOPLE V SINGH
360 SCRA 404
BUENA; June 29, 2001
NATURE
Appellants Balwinder, Malkit, Mohinder and Dalvir, all
surnamed Singh, were convicted of the crime of Murder
in Criminal Case No. 8683 for killing Surinder Singh,
and Frustrated Murder in Criminal Cases No. 8682 for
stabbing Dilbag Singh. Each of them were sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for murder, and
the indeterminate penalty of 8 years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum, to twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum for
frustrated murder.
FACTS
- Dilbag Singh, private complainant for frustrated
murder in Criminal Case No. 8682, recounts that on
November 26, 1993, at around 7:30 in the morning
while he was cleaning his motorbike in front of the
Mendiola Apartment in Barangay Canlalay, Biñan,
Laguna, Dalvir, Balwinder, Gurmok, Jarnail, Amarjit,
Mohinder, Dial, Kuldip- all surnamed Singh-Johander
Singh Dhillon, and Malkit Singh Dhillon arrived,
shouting foul remarks in their native language and
demanding Surinder Singh to come out of the
apartment. When Surinder Singh came out of his
apartment, Dalvir Singh tried to stab him but Surinder
Singh was able to move away. Dalvir Singh told his
companions to hold Surinder Singh as he will kill him.
Thereafter, Dial Singh and Johinder Singh each held the
right and left arms of Surinder Singh, with Kuldip Singh
pushing Surinder Singh on his back. Dalvir Singh then
stabbed Surinder Singh, hitting him on the right side of
his stomach, and causing him to fall on the ground. Dial
Singh remarked that Surinder Singh failed to give
torts & damages
money and if others will likewise refuse, the same fate
will befall them. As Surinder Singh tried to get up,
Malkit Singh Dhillon and Jarnail Singh started hitting
him with lead pipes all over his body, while Johinder
Singh and Dial Singh punched and kicked Surinder.
Amarjit Singh, who was holding a gun, warned
everyone not to help Surinder Singh or else he will
shoot. Thereat, when all these things were going on,
private complainant Dilbag Singh tried to stop them but
Balwinder Singh stabbed him on the left side of his
back. Gurmok Singh likewise stabbed him with a bolo,
but he was not hit as he was able to move to one side.
After that, the ten (10) accused Indians left.
Dilbag Singh and Surinder Singh, both injured, were
brought to the Perpetual Help Hospital, Biñan, Laguna,
by Jaswinder Singh, Johinder Singh Gill, Balwinder Singh
Gill and Alwan Singh, for treatment. There, Surinder
Singh was pronounced dead on arrival.
- The events, according to appellants, happened in this
wise. Appellant Dalvir Singh testified that on November
26, 1993, at around 7:30 in the morning, he was
conducting his buy and sell business along Brgy.
Canlalay, Biñan, Laguna. While collecting from his
customers, he was accosted by Jaswinder, Dilbag and
Surinder Singh to stop at the corner of the street. When
he stopped, he alighted from his motorcycle. Jaswinder,
Dilbag and Surinder Singh accused him of squealing
their status to the immigration authorities. Then,
Jaswinder Singh punched him. Appellant Dalvir Singh
retaliated by slapping Jaswinder Singh afterwhich,
Jaswinder Singh, went inside his apartment to get a
pipe. When Surinder Singh was about to stab him, he
wrestled the knife from him and, in the process, private
complainant Dilbag Singh was stabbed on his back with
the same knife. As Dalvir Singh grappled for the
possession of the knife from Surinder Singh, both of
them fell down, with him landing on top of Surinder
Singh and that was the time when Surinder Singh was
stabbed on the right portion of his stomach. Then,
Surinder Singh lost his grip and appellant Dalvir Singh
was able to get hold of the knife. Appellant Dalvir Singh
was so nervous that he left the place on his motorcycle
while holding the knife. He threw the knife along the
highway of Biñan, Laguna.
- After trial, appellants were convicted of the crime
charged, thus –
"WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused Balwinder Singh,
Malkit Singh Dhillon, Mohinder Singh, Dalvir Singh
and Dial Singh having been established beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of frustrated murder
in Criminal Case No. 8282 and murder in Criminal
Case 8683 defined and penalized in Articles 248 and
250 of the Revised Penal Code, this Court hereby
sentences them (except Dial Singh who died during
A2010 - 176 -
the presentation of defense evidence on the main
case) as follows:
"Criminal Case No. 8682
"1. each to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of from eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum, to twelve (12) years
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum;
"2. jointly and severally, to pay private complainant
Dilbag Singh the amounts of P16,000 representing
his hospitalization and medical expenses, and
P30,000 for and as attorney’s fees; and
"3. jointly and severally, to pay the costs of suit.
"Criminal Case No. 8683
"1. each to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
"2. jointly and severally, to pay the heirs of Surinder
Singh the following sums:
a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b) P41,500.00 representing funeral, wake and
transportation expenses;
c) P5,760,000.00 for lost earnings/income;
d) P400.00 for hospitalization expenses;
e) P50,000.00 for moral damages; and
f) P500,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees; and
"3. jointly and severally, to pay the costs of suit.
"Since accused Jarnail Singh, Gurmok Singh, Amarjit
Singh, Johinder Singh and Kuldip Singh have
remained at-large to date, in order not to clog the
docket of this court, let the records of these two
cases be sent to the files and warrant be issued for
their immediate arrest.
ISSUE
WON the court a quo erred in awarding excessive
damages against accused-appellants
HELD
YES
Reasoning
- In Criminal Case No. 8682 for frustrated murder, the
trial court awarded private complainant Dilbag Singh
the amount of P16,000.00 representing his
hospitalization and medical expenses, and P 30,000.00
as attorney’s fees. For his hospitalization and medical
expenses, the receipts submitted to support said claim
amounted only to P370.50. Hence, private complainant
Dilbag Singh is entitled only to the said amount. The
award of attorney’s fees is hereby deleted.
Nonetheless, private complaint is entitled to moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for the suffering
he endured from appellants’ felonious acts.
- In Criminal Case No. 8683 for murder, the following
amount of actual damages were duly proven –
P16,500.00 funeral expenses and air ticket/freight of
the cadaver – $600.27. The amount of P400.00 for
hospitalization expenses should be deleted for not
prof. casis
being supported by evidence. The trial court’s award of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 moral
damages are affirmed. The award of P500,000.00 as
attorneys’ fees and P5,760,000 as compensation for
loss of earning capacity, are likewise deleted for lack of
basis. Awards for loss of earning capacity partake of
damages which must be proven not only by credible
and satisfactory evidence, but also by unbiased proof.
The testimony of Balwinder Singh Gill, first cousin of the
deceased, on the alleged income of the deceased while
in the Philippines, is not enough. The best evidence to
substantiate income earned by foreigners while in the
Philippines is the payment of taxes with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. Absent such proof, bare allegation is
insufficient. Nevertheless, considering that the definite
proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, and the fact
of loss has been established, appellants shall pay the
heirs of Surinder Singh temperate damages in the
amount of P200,000.00.
Obiter
- In lieu of actual damages which was not proven or
documented, temperate damages may be awarded
in a murder case. (People vs. dela Tongga)
Disposition in accordance with the foregoing
disquisition, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed subject to the following modifications-
1. In Criminal Case No. 8682 for frustrated murder,
appellants shall only be liable to pay –
a. P370.50 for hospitalization expenses;
b. P50,000.00, as moral damages, plus costs; and,
2. In Criminal Case No. 8683 for murder, in addition to
the civil indemnity, moral damages and attorney’s fees
awarded by the trial court, appellants shall pay-
a. P16,500.00, as funeral expenses;
b. $600.27, as air ticket/freight of the cadaver, to be
computed at the prevailing rate of exchange at the
time of the promulgation of this decision; and,
c. P200,000.00, as temperate damages, plus costs.
PEOPLE V PLAZO
350 SCRA 433
QUISUMBING; January 29, 2001
FACTS
- Leonor Fabula went out of her house to buy sugar
from a nearby store. There she saw her son Romeo
being beaten by Plazo for allegedly disclosing the
whereabouts of his (Plazo) brother who was wanted for
robbery in Manila.
- She tried to intervene but this was to no avail.
Eventually Romeo was able to escape. But he was
chased down by Plazo and stabbed many times the last
being a stab to the chest which led to his death.
torts & damages A2010 - 177 - prof. casis
Leonora then told people not to move her son as she PNB V CA damages resulting from the events just narrated,
was going to ask for help from policemen. contending that aside from the destruction of the roof
- on the other hand, Plazo stated that it was an act of of their house, injury was also caused to its electrical
self defense. He said that a he and his friend were DEL ROSARIO V CA (METAL FORMING wiring, ceiling, fixtures, walls, wall paper, wood parquet
lpaynig billiards when Romeo suddenly disrupted he CORP.) flooring and furniture. The Del Rosarios reckoned their
game. He was drunk and when being pacified got angry 267 SCRA 158 actual damages at P1,008,003. They also prayed for an
and chased Plazo with a bolo. Thy both fell and the bolo award to them of moral damages in the sum of
NARVASA; January 29, 1997
suddenly was imbedded in Romeo’s chest. P3,000,000; exemplary damages in the amount of
- Court found Plazo guilty of murder and made to pay P1,000,000; attorney's fees in the sum of P1,000,000.
NATURE
50,000 for moral damages, 15,712 for actual damages, - Trial Court awarded P500K as moral damages and
An appeal of a Decision of the Court of Appeals.
and 10,000 for moral damages P300K as exemplary damages.
- CA reversed decision of the trial court, holding that
FACTS
ISSUES there was no privity of contract.
- The Del Rosarios' complaint, filed on November 21,
1. WON Plazo is guilty of murder.
1990, charged Metal Forming Corp. (MFC) with violation
2. WON the 15,712 amount for actual damages is valid ISSUES
of Section 3 of Act No. 3740, "An Act to Penalize
1. WON there is a privity of contract between the
Fraudulent Advertising, Mislabeling or Misbranding of
HELD parties
Any Product, Stocks, Bonds, etc.” The complaint alleged
1. NO 2. WON upon the facts established by the evidence,
that:
- Plazo avers that the killing of Romeo Fabula was an MFC is answerable to the Del Rosarios for the damage
1) "in selling to the public roofing materials known
act of self –defense. He also questions the caused to the latter's residence when its roof, made of
'Banawe' shingles,** (MFC) made representations on
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police and shingles purchased from and installed by the former,
the durability of the product and sturdiness of its
Leonora Fabula was blown away by a typhoon (this case is under
installation” through massive advertisements in print
- Court held that inconsistencies were not substantial EXEMPLARY DAMAGES in the outline)
media and television (and) brochures ;"
enough as to affect the validity of the testimony.
2) the representations -- particularly those
Testimonies aren’t expected to be error-free. The HELD
characterizing the shingles as "STRUCTURALLY SAFE
inconsistencies pointed out by Plazo were not enough 1. YES, there is privity of contract between the Del
AND STRONG" and that the "BANAWE METAL TILE
to disprove the testimonies of the witnesses. Rosarios and MFC.
structure acts as a single unit against wind and storm
- his claim of self-defense was likewise unsupported. He Reasoning
pressure due to the strong hook action on its
wasn’t able to fulfill all the elements necessary for self- - At all times and with regard to the acquisition and
overlaps"-- "prompted the Del Rosarios to buy the
defense. The number of stab wounds was indicated that installation of the metal tiles or shingles, Puno was in
'Banawe' shingles and have them installed at their
the means employed was not necessary to repel the truth acting as contractor of the Del Rosarios and on
residence;"
aggression. their instructions. Ascertainment of the definite identity
3) "(b)arely two (2) months after completion of the
- However the circumstances qualifying the crime as of the person who actually ordered the shingles from
installation, portions of the roof of the Del Rosarios
murder were unsubstantiated. Premeditation and MFC is utterly inconsequential -- it might just as well
were blown away by strong wind brought about by
treachery were not proven as the elements for such have been a construction foreman, a trusted domestic,
typhoon "Ruping."
were not present. therefore the crime committed was or any friend or acquaintance of the Del Rosarios.
- The Office of the President found that:
not murder but homicide. - The tiles were delivered to the Del Rosarios and used
“one cannot efface the fundamental fact that MFC
2. NO in fabricating the roof of their home; it was the
acted in bad faith and/or with gross negligence in
- The trial court correctly awarded the amount of employees and workers of MFC who (a) delivered the
falling to deliver the necessary accessories for the
P50,000.00 as indemnity. However, the award of shingles or metal tiles to the construction site of the
proper installation of the structure and actually
actual damages in the amount of P15,712.00 was Del Rosarios' home, and (b) undertook and completed
installed inferior roofing materials at Del Rosario’s
based solely on the bare assertions of the mother of the installation thereof.
residence, in violation of the proper installation
the victim. The Court can only grant such amount for 2. YES , the Del Rosarios are entitled to moral and
procedure expressly specified in the former's brochures
expenses if they are supported by receipts. In the
and advertisements for installation, i.e., the metal tile exemplary damages.
absence thereof, no actual damages can be awarded.
attached to the roof panels should be two (2) self- Re: Actual damages –
However, in lieu of actual damages, temperate
drilling screws for one (1) metal cleat. However, instead - Actual or compensatory damages cannot be
damages under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code may be
of conforming with this procedure, MFC attached some presumed, but must be duly proved and proved with
recovered where it has been shown that the victim’s
of the metal cleats with this one (1)-inch ordinary nail reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on
family suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount
each and others were fastened with only one (10) wood speculations, conjectures or guesswork as to the fact
thereof cannot be proved with certainty
screw each. and amount of damages, but must depend upon
- We find the award of P15,000.00 as temperate
- MFC however declined to concede liability for the competent proof that they have (been) suffered and on
damages reasonable. Moral damages cannot be
other damages claimed by the Del Rosario Spouses to evidence of the actual amount thereof.
awarded in the absence of any evidence to support its
have been caused to the interior of their home. This - The report of Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc.
award
prompted the latter to commence a civil action against contains no statement whatever of the amount of the
MFC. The spouses sought to recover from MFC damage. Indeed, the testimony of Engineer Abril, the
torts & damages A2010 - 178 - prof. casis
representative of the Esteban Adjusters and Valuers,
Inc., is that his firm had been retained only to
determine the cause of the damage, not to estimate
and assess it.
Moral damages –
- Moral damages are awarded for indemnity or
reparation not punishment or correction, that is, an
award to entitle the injured party to obtain means (of)
diversions and amusement that will serve to alleviate
the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of
defendant's culpable action.
- That MFC did in truth act with bad faith, in flagrant
breach of its express warranties made to the general
public and in wanton disregard of the rights of the Del
Rosarios who relied on those warranties, is adequately
demonstrated by the recorded proofs. The law
explicitly authorizes the award of moral damages "in
breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith.
- Award of trial court of moral damages is reduced from
P500K to P100K.
Exemplary damages –
- Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that such
damages may be imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good. While exemplary
damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right,
they need not be proved, although plaintiff must show
that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory
damages before the court may consider the question of
whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded
Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one
party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent
against or as a negative incentive to curb socially
deleterious actions.
- Award of trial court of exemplary damages is reduced
from P300K to P50K.
Disposition Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
November 18, 1991 is REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED,
with the modification that the award of actual damages
and attorney's fees is deleted, and the moral and
exemplary damages awarded are reduced from
P500,000.00 to P100,000.00, and from P300,000.00 to
P50,000.00, respectively.
i

ii

iii

iv

vi

vii