U.S.

Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board ofImmigration Appeals
Office of the Clerk
5/07 leesburg Pike, Suite 2000
Falls Church. Virginia 2204/

OHS/ICE Office of Chief Counsel - TUS

P .0. Box 25158
Phoenix, AZ 85002

Name: MORA-CORONA, CUAHUTEMOC

A 205-403-701

Date of this notice: 3/23/2016

Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.
Sincerely,

DonnL C

t1./v\.)

Donna Carr
Chief Clerk
Enclosure
Panel Members:
Grant, Edward R.
Guendelsberger, John
O'Leary, Brian M.

Userteam: Docket

For more unpublished BIA decisions, visit

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Cite as: Cuahutemoc Mora-Coronoa, A205 403 701 (BIA March 23, 2016)

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Mejia, Patricia G.
The Law Office of Patricia G. Mejia, PC
228 West Elm Street
Tucson, AZ 85705

U.S. Department of Justice

Decision ofthe Board oflmmigration Appeals

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Falis Church, Virginia 22041

File: A205 403 701 - Tucson, AZ

Date:

In re: CUAHUTEMOC MORA-CORONA

MAR "(..

,..

APPEAL
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Patricia G. Mejia, Esquire
APPLICATION:

Voluntary departure

The respondent, a native and citizen of Mexico, appeals from the Immigration Judge's
decision dated June 19, 2015, which denied in the exercise of discretion, the respondent's request
for voluntary departure prior to the conclusion of proceedings. We review Immigration Judges'
findings of fact for clear error, but questions of law, discretion, and judgment, and all other
issues in appeals, de novo. See 8 C.F.R. 1003.l(d)(3)(i), (ii). The appeal will be sustained.
The respondent argues on appeal that the Immigration Judge erred in denying such relief.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has not filed a response to the appeal. Upon
review, we do not agree with the Immigration Judge's discretionary decision to deny voluntary
departure. The respondent has lived in the United States for over 18 years, has significant family
ties in this country, and has a long employment history. Accordingly, under the totality of the
circumstances, the Immigration Judge's discretionary determination is reversed, and the request
for voluntary departure will be granted in discretion.
ORDER: The appeal is sustained.
FURTHER ORDER: The outstanding order of removal is withdrawn and in lieu of an order
of removal and conditioned upon compliance with the provisions of the statute, the respondent is
permitted to voluntarily depart from the United States, without expense to the Government,
within 60 days from the date of this order or any extension beyond that time as may be granted
by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). See section 240B(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229c(a); see also 8 C.F.R. 1240.26(c), (f). In the event the
respondent fails to voluntarily depart the United States, the respondent shall be removed as
provided in the Immigration Judge's order.
FURTHER ORDER: The respondent must post a voluntary departure bond in the amount of
$500 with the Field Office Director within IO business days of the date of this order. If the bond
is not posted within 10 business days, the order of voluntary departure is automatically vacated
on the following business day, and the respondent is ordered removed as provided by the
Immigration Judge's order.
FURTHER ORDER: The respondent must provide to the DHS appropriate travel
documentation, sufficient to assure lawful entry into the country to which the respondent is
Cite as: Cuahutemoc Mora-Coronoa, A205 403 701 (BIA March 23, 2016)

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

'

A205 403 701

departing, within 30 days of this order or within any extension beyond that time as may be
granted by the DHS.

WARNING: If the respondent files a motion to reopen or reconsider prior to the expiration
of the voluntary departure period set forth above, the grant of voluntary departure is
automatically terminated; the period allowed for voluntary departure is not stayed, tolled, or
extended. If the grant of voluntary departure is automatically terminated upon the filing of a
motion, the penalties for failure to depart under section 240B(d) of the Act shall not apply. See
8 C.F.R. 1240.26(e)(l ).
WARNING: If, prior to departing the United States, the respondent files any judicial
challenge to this administratively final order, such as a petition for review pursuant to section
242 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1252, the grant of voluntary departure is automatically terminated, and
the alternate order of removal shall immediately take effect. However, if the respondent files a
petition for review and then departs the United States within 30 days of such filing, the
respondent will not be deemed to have departed under an order of removal if the alien provides
to the DHS such evidence of his or her departure that the Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Field Office Director of the DHS may require and provides evidence DHS deems sufficient that
he or she has remained outside of the United States. The penalties for failure to depart under
section 240B(d) of the Act shall not apply to an alien who files a petition for review,
notwithstanding any period of time that he or she remains in the United States while the petition
for review is pending. See 8 C.F.R. 1240.26(i).

2
Cite as: Cuahutemoc Mora-Coronoa, A205 403 701 (BIA March 23, 2016)

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

NOTICE: If the respondent fails to voluntarily depart the United States within the time
period specified, or any extensions granted by the DHS, the respondent shall be subject to a civil
penalty as provided by the regulations and the statute and shall be ineligible for a period of
10 years for any further relief under section 240B and sections 240A, 245, 248, and 249 of the
Act. See section 240B(d) of the Act.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION COURT
TUCSON, ARIZONA

In the Matter of
)
)
)
)

CUAHUTEMOC MORA-CORONA
RESPONDENT

IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

CHARGE:

Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the

Act): alien who is inadmissible as an alien present in the United
States who has not been properly admitted or paroled pursuant to
inspection.

APPLICATIONS:

Voluntary departure in accordance with Section 2408 of the Act.

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: PATRICIA G. MEJIA

ON BEHALF OF OHS: AMANDA FISCHER, Assistant Chief Counsel

DECISION AND ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION COURT

The respondent is an adult male alien and citizen of Mexico who was placed into
removal proceedings by the issuance of a Notice to Appear dated May 28, 2013. That
document was served upon the respondent on May 28, 2013, and has been admitted
into the Record of Proceedings as Exhibit 1.
At a prior hearing, respondent admitted the allegations contained therein and
based upon those admissions and the concession of removability, this Court sustained
1

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June 19, 2015

File: A205-403-701

the charge that the respondent is inadmissible and, therefore, removable from the
United States as an alien present in the United States without ever being properly

Following that determination, respondent designated Mexico as the country of

removal and the Court determined that there is no fear of returning to Mexico that is
cognizable under Section 208 or 241(b)(3) of the Act or Article 3 of the United Nations
Convention against Torture. Therefore, the Court concludes that the respondent fears
neither persecution nor torture by any entity, including a public official, in the country of
removal and further concludes that any application for asylum or any application for
restrictions on removal either under the Act or under the Convention against Torture is
not available.
The respondent is not eligible for any other forms of relief, including cancellation
of removal or adjustment of status and, therefore, is seeking voluntary departure
pursuant Section 2408 of the Act.
In accordance therewith, the Court has considered not only Exhibit 1, which is
the Notice to Appear, but has given substantial consideration to Exhibits 6-A and 7-A.
Exhibit 6-A is the Government's submission of documents and Exhibit 7-A is the
respondent's. In Exhibit 6-A we have the 1-213, which indicates that the respondent was
encountered in the Pima County Jail pursuant to his arrest by the Department of Public
Safety for the offense of driving under the influence. In Sub-exhibit B of 6-A we have
the NIB applicant detail which indicates a refusal of his applications for visas.
Sub-Exhibit 3 is the minute entry and order of judgment clearly indicating that the
respondent did plead guilty, with the dismissal of two other charges, and received a fine
of $490.50, as well as 180 days in jail, with 176 of those suspended. Respondent was
also, as part of his sentence, required to undergo certain treatments and did evidently
A205-403-701

June 19, 2015

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admitted or paroled pursuant to inspection.

complete those treatments successfully.

Looking at the alcohol report in the offense incident report, the Court does see

hours, 01 :24 in the morning, and then administered the HGN test at 01 :26. He arrested
the respondent at 01 :31. This is somewhat in contradiction to the respondent's
statement. He said the officer treated him badly, did not perform any tests and
immediately put him in handcuffs. Following that, the officer, in accordance with the
proper procedure, did draw blood from the respondent.
The initial observations of the officer indicate an individual who was driving
impaired and may be asleep at the wheel. The respondent was intermittently driving
slowly and then at times would speed up. When he was aware that the officer put the
lights on, even the respondent admits that he did speed up, but cannot give an
adequate explanation why. However, the Court would note that that episode did not last
very long. The officer indicates it was maybe ten seconds before the pickup slowed
down and came to a stop. The officer also indicates his contact with the individual and
that he did have to order the respondent to turn off the car twice. These are not unusual
characteristics of an individual who is intoxicated and the Court does not find them to be
aggravating circumstances with the exception of the speeding up after the initial
indication of contact by the officer.
The respondent indicated to the officer that he had four beers, but in Court today
admitted that it was really eight. However, he also indicates that he told the officer it
was eight. It is highly unlikely that an officer would put down less beers in a report in
which he is trying to justify the arrest of an individual than the number the respondent
actually told him. Therefore, the Court gives little credence to the respondent's
assertion that he told the officer he had eight beers. The Court gives great credence to

A205-403-701

June 19, 2015

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that the officer was very detailed, indicating that he stopped the respondent at 01:24

the respondent's assertion that he did have eight beers.

The Court has also of course looked at the respondent's Exhibit 7-A, which

Court also gives great consideration to the traffic survival school certificate of the
respondent and to the letters the respondent has received, including the letter from the
Center for Life Skills Development, LSD, dated March 6, 2014, indicating that the
respondent has completed 36 weeks of alcohol education and treatment that will be
based upon participation, notable changes in behavior and lifestyle. The English is not
very good, but the idea is that the respondent, based upon this education, would
engage in notable changes in his behavior and lifestyle.
There is also clear indication that the report was accepted and that the
respondent has substantial letters of support that he is a good father and an individual
who supports his family and a hard worker. He does not create problems at work or for
his friends and he is very well liked by his friends and family and he is always willing to
help out whomever for whatever is needed. The Court has given great weight to all of
the letters of support to the respondent, including the one that indicates he is one of the
best people I have ever met, which was from Mr. Mark Lopez.
What the Court has problems with is this. The respondent went to 36 weeks of
alcohol treatment. That is notable and it is important. However, after 36 weeks of
treatment he still drinks to excess. He will have six or seven beers. Admittedly, he
indicates that he will not drive and that he does not drive to work and goes to work with
a friend. However, the Court does not find that the respondent has learned his lesson
as asserted by his counsel and that he will continue to drink and, therefore, he is in
danger of repeating his abhorrent behavior in the future. Thus, the Court does not find
that the respondent is sufficiently rehabilitated to the point where he has attempted to

A205-403-701

June 19, 2015

tt ..LG.

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contain the fact that the respondent was arrested for DUI to the slightest degree. The

overcome his alcohol problem. He indicates to the Court that he intends to enroll
maybe Monday in an alcohol program, but that is ridiculous. The respondent is on his

granted. Thus, the Court cannot give great weight to the respondent's assertions. The
respondent should have been enrolled and have continued to enroll himself in alcohol
rehabilitation programs. including those that are made free to the community. Alcohols
Anonymous is available to any individual with an alcohol problem and the respondent
has not availed himself of that opportunity. Thus, he continues to drink and continues to
drink in excess and, therefore, remains a problem for the community and the citizens
with whom he comes in contact.
Therefore, based upon a totality of circumstances weighing both the positive,
which are substantial, and the negative factors, the Court finds that those negative
factors outweigh the positive factors and, therefore, will deny voluntary departure.
In accordance therewith the Court issues the following order:
ORDER
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the respondent's application for voluntary
departure is denied and the respondent shall be removed from the United States to
Mexico based upon the charge sustained in the Notice to Appear.

Please see the next page for electronic

signature

THOMAS MICHAEL O'LEARY

United States Immigration Judge

A205-403-701

i4

June 19, 2015

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way out of the United States one way or the other, even if voluntary departure had been

/Isl/
Irrunigration Judge THOMAS MICHAEL O'LEARY

A205-403-701

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

olearyt on September 3, 2015 at 7:08 PM GMT

June 19, 2015