Sunteți pe pagina 1din 24

DOD GEN-20

DA Pam 360-518
NAVPERS
AFP

15214
190-3-3

NAVMC

ARMED

FORCES

INFORMATION

AND

EDUCATION

DEPARTMENT

2608

OF DEFENSE

Literally

translated,

means

Vietnamese

Cong

employ

taught

Viet

and those

Communist

Cong

with

to call the

words

or weapons,

liberation

of

Vietnam.

military

and

civilian

Viet

of South
Cong

components

also
of the

(VC)

who are Viet

arsenal

A Viet Cong is a man, woman,

fighter,

Republic

phrase

Communist,

the whole

and violence.
a tough

the

of deceit
or child-

for what

he is

Front

or

Front

for

of

South

followers

they serve-but

Vietnamese

oppression

Liberation

To its deluded

NFLSVN).

is the government
of South

the

by the

the

Front

to the vast majority

it is an instrument

manipulated

Vietnam,

of terror

Communists

and

of North

Vietnam.

Vietnam-the
applies

National

to the
(the

The
within

Viet

Cong,

the

Republic

the Communist
of

Vietnam,

Liberation
has

Army

expanded

its

.._..4---

-3

numbers

enormously,

ties.

so-called

Its

despite
main

increasingly

force

has

heavy

grown

10,000men in 1960 to over 65,000.Several


RED

CH

of

the

North

Hanoi

Vietnamese

South

Vietnam

of

forces

in the

buildup

many are armed

with

wear

helmets

uniforms,

scarves
The

strength

of

as rapidly.

guerrillas

and

their

home

success

militia,

irregulars
black

still

support,
tion

of

the Communist

Vietnamese

support

most often
secret

the latter.

agents

the people
.:

....a

even

of South

though

and

arsenals.

the

pay taxes

This is an impressive

and

Millions

to the militia

an estimated

is the

schools

out of friendship

they may also pay taxes

Government.

the rule of

the Front

operates

Vietnam

also
guide,

enforcing

It

Due largely

of the Party,

(worn

organizations.

areas in which

the Front

the

traditional

for the libera-

possible

in the countryside,

factories

Cong

They

recruits

government.

clothing

peasant

also make
Front

Viet

the

of

to the

before,

uniforms).

and provide
They

are substantial

hospitals,

noir,

not

100,000

vicinity

than

Vietnamese

Party

effective

trained

fatigue

has

are essential

calico

of the local puppet

There
only

the

the

reinforce,

dictates

and to the whole

as

movement.

in the

force

wear

regulars

guerrillas

hamlets,

and

companies

more than

based

even

and regiments.

and

armed

pajamas

the

mostly

and

and

isolated

Cong

by

regulars,
weapons

or steel,

The estimated

villages

Better

As befits

to battalions

Viet

sent

Communist

imported
From

about

regiments

been

of the

of wicker

the

of the main

effort.

THAILAND

south.

late-model

have grown

increased

have

as part

for unit identification.

their formations

by

Army

into

casual-

from

and the

one-fourth
to the

of

or fear,
of

Front,

to the legitimate

record

for a shadow

government.
Initial
What

makes

so significant
assets,
tactics,

(of
and

munists
capacity.
few

the Viet Cong


they

had

subversion),
the

moral

throughout
They

thousand

support

of

the world.

experienced

hand,

in

a well-proven

knowledge
their

They

had no substantial

by Government

On the other

with so little in material

a belief
a thorough

100,000 supporters-mostly
visited

and their way of warfare

is that they started

although

doctrine

Resources

fellow

of its
Com-

had no industrial

armed

forces,

only a

guerrillas,

and

perhaps

in

areas

seldom

remote

representatives.
the Viet Cong

had hidden

stores

of weapons
and ammunition
left over from the war
against the French.
They had many trained and dedicated Communists
to provide leadership,
and access to
the resources
of the Communist
regime in the North.

Vietnam
type

as a whole

of warfare

is very

the Viet

side of this long,

narrow

river

seacoast

On

delta,
the

and

other

are

secret

and

is swamp
useful

government.
and

giving
troop

ground

transport

railroad

or the

limited

all very

easy to sabotage

The

people

who

basic

more

to

well

suited

and undemanding.

soldiers,

of
a

of rice
streams.
coastal

of highways,

munist
racial

and

(even

portant,

the false

kind

accustomed

ideals

of

relatives,

but it is better

the

friends

(or

non-enemies)

this

one for an enemy


friends

to treat

your

Com-

same

basic

he is in uni-

unless
Moreover,

his

men.

it is extremely

you.

and

Asia

sacrifice

fighting

at

for mistaking

far
of its

and South,
reason

an enemy

years

of communism).

excellent

this

do not

known

of great

non-Communist-share
For

is

in Southeast

people-North

child on the water buffalo


to this

has

capable

make them

shooting

recognition

They

Vietnam
known

mini-

philosophy

in the 2,000-plus
are

to identify
or

Their

and aggressive,

Vietnamese

difficult

his

peace

background.

form

yet

Vietnamese

qualities

The

and an absolute

fatalistic
or

war than

These

rations,

comforts.

for an ideal

or ambush.
are rice farmers,

war

meager

material

as energetic

overthrow
and

of

history.

or for-

an abundance

network

and

with

Much

mangrove

canals

like

other

are covered

would

Sea.

Cambodia.

must use the single

are equally
of them

essentially

three
and

movements.

by myriad

Modern

plateau,

ideal concealment

or mountain,

to those

On one
China

with

work,

to hard
mum

undeveloped,

Laos,

The delta produces

is crisscrossed

of war-most

South

rugged,

rain forest,

the coastline
est, equally

is the

China,

installations

for the

strip of mountains,

areas of the interior

dense tropical

ideal

is waging.

frontiers

countries-Communist
Substantial

Cong

the

mountainous

largely

nearly

makes

most

im-

makes him,

enemies.

The

may be a Viet Cong spyhim

as a friend

in case of

doubt.

Finally,
the Vietnamese
Communists-North
and
South-were
united in their determination
to use whatever means were necessary to bring the whole country
under Communist
domination.
Without
massive U.S.
and free world support,
South Vietnam
might already
have been
As

added

in

conventional

armed

might

came

obvious

South

could

began

after

sending

infiltrators

that

of

Communist

fight

their

numbers

arms,

than

have

was

experiencing

was

undergoing

great

edly facilitated

(RVNAF),

have

increased

equipment

Cong.
its

at a pace

However,

greatest

while

growth,

in

of South Vietnam
stress

These

the growth

and ammuthe so-called

Forces

their

political

of administration.

other

(DRV).

1963 and 1964, the free Government


changes

key

and

weapons

support,

the Viet

The

to assume
China

Armed
we

far greater

the

of infiltrators,

Vietnam,

of Vietnam

and improved

in

Hanoi

North

North

the

Front

Vietnam

Communist

freedom

its
it be-

by land and sea.

in the

of Vietnam

for

When
force,

have supplied

Republic

The Republic

of

stream

through

expanded

military

Vietnam

trained

countries

side

started.

without

leadership.

Democratic

each
had

Republic

a growing

primarily

whose

the

into South
were

positions

wars,

the war

not be taken

and supplies

nition,

to the list of lost countries.

and

factors

frequent

have undoubt-

of the Front,

but they have

not stunted
the growth
of the RVNAF,
nor shaken
their determination
to resist Communist
aggression
and
preserve

the freedom

and independence

The success of an unconventional


government
from

build

the people

up by Communist
and the resources

to destroy,

is cause

the reasons

for this,

tacks,

or they

Viet

Cong
five

or literally,
three

support

cannot

Yet

the

tional

Viet

man
war

actually

be

such at-

again.

"10 feet

thousands

understand

tall,

on the
Nor

average
is he

of Viet Cong

attributed
RVNAF

The
either

every

entirely

an

desert
year.
to the

have received

from abroad.
Cong

who

under

to the average

has

conditions

orthodox

of his country

developed

is capable

of waging
that

soldier.

Cong and his way of warfare


thing

and

in height.

he receives-the

far more assistance


fighting

being

inches

must

again

is not

largely

to defeat

to the side of the Government

effectiveness

outside

how

be repeated
man

direction,

of a state they seek


We

and learn

fanatic-many

or go over
His

will

feet

incredible

for concern.

fighting

figuratively
only

of the country.

army and a shadow

would

into

a kind

of

an unconvenseem

To understand

hopeless
the Viet

one must first know

some-

and his background.


7

Roughly

40

Chi Minh,
of Vietnam
paign

take
to

began

the

leadership

and

independence

was

later
force

(League

in 1940,

that

for

the

time

Independence

launched

an

eight-year

struggle

they returned

in 1945.

Like the later Viet


start-but

formidable

defeats
Bien

had nearly

number
in

Phu

the Viet

than the Viet Cong

the Viet Minh


an equal

Cong,

they became

and

unable

solve

Viet

Vietnam),
against
grew

the

from

and much more

regulars

The

battles
to

Minh

are today.

160,000

of militia.

conventional

larger

the

of

soon

Viet-

a coalition
was

French
a modest

for

Communist

This

which

after

dominating

control,

formed.

of

Japanese

Communists

Under

Communist
was

the

near.

step

in the

a part

the

all of Indochina,

believed

cam-

first

was

When

the fall of France


alike

their

Their

Vietnam

Ho

Republic

the leadership

time.

and occupying

independence

under

planning

Asia.

rule.

at

nationalists

namese

Communists

Southeast

French

in after

the French

Minh

North,

over

Indochina

moved

the

of the Democratic

was to seek to seize

opposition
French

ago,

president

in the

to

in Vietnam

and

years

now

French,

By mid-1954
and perhaps
stunned

such

as that

the

problems

by

at Dien
of

the

new kind

of war waged

to negotiate.
in the summer
of Great
was

half,

controlled

Democratic
Under
to move
to move
lowed.
the

the

the

of

terms

of

to whichever
Nearly
south

the

of

Minh

army,
of

or

northern

the

so-called

free

southern

agreement,

Com-

an opportunity

of the divided

people,

Viet-

The

of Vietnam.

were given

to freedom

thousands

the

armistice

half

war-torn

became
Republic

a million

90,000

Some

Viet

Union,
parallel.

Vietnam;

independent

and anti-Communists

preferred.

Tens

17th

by Communists,

Republic

became

munists

at the

ready

in Geneva

over by representatives

and the Soviet

divided

were

conference

of 1954, presided

Britain

nam

half

by the Viet Minh,

At an international

country

they

from

the North

were

during

the brief

period

mostly

future

Communists

men

recruits,
and

able
al-

and boys of
went

north.

sizable

stocks

of arms and ammunition

were left in the South to assure

an ultimate

takeover.

Communist

i .

The 17th parallel


political
Geneva
ballot

was not intended

or

territorial

agreed

on

to be held

a free

This

would

themselves

their

political

the

country.
with

winning

The

the election.
doubted

and because

the possibility

proper

international

more

for

reunify
populous

were confident

tion.
still

for

the

Such
welcome,

munist
tion.

means

Occasional

ism seemed
emphasis

been

to say how

vigorously

and openly

vote

in

not have been

supervision.

Communists

After
a stronger

1956
effort

and expanding

the

Stronger

comrades

Communists

in the South.
their

personnel

Measures

began

to prepare

Viet
for

in the

reorganizing

force

there,

military

militia.

both

and

Cong
of

the

own

terrorism

was

and
It

2,000

In 1959 it was decided

much
alarmed

impoverished

by
and

Cong

their
em-

the prosperity
dictatorship.
in 1958,

intensified
regulars

to act more

by the impatient

how
between

year the Viet

the main

Government.

decision

were

contrast

and their

than

and

coali-

acts of terror-

of subversion

legal

their

who

anti-corn-

but initially

was influenced

North

of that

more

the

South

soluwould

neutralist

and other

much

by the obvious

by the end

This meant

undermine

in

strongly

on a campaign

is difficult

would

the

a controlled

and proper,

was not held because

to

a political

the Communists

assassinations

propaganda

of the South
Adopts

with

necessary
had

to achieve
which

replacing

Government

barrassed
Hanoi

struggle

a solution,

of

of an honest

the election

by secret

to decide

it would

in the

state control,

The election

the North
under

and

at

at the end of

the people

future,

political,

delegates

election

Vietnam

Communists

the South
held

allow

their police

The

general

throughout

two years.

North,

to be a permanent

boundary.

had

supplemented

that the political

and

an armed
by

struggle
9

must

be aided

began

by a major

in 1960,

regimental

with

armed

the

headquarters

effort.

Open

overrunning

warfare

of an RVNAF

Sup on 20 January.

at Trang

The Lao Dong


its Third
tended

Creates

Congress

rebellion

in Hanoi

acted to establish

ing and formalizing

control

ethnic

religious

groups

to impart

the

in

public

to set up

The
effort

to conquer
Committee

The Reunification
controls

who

infiltrate

Intelligence

into

activities
The
the

merged

original

the

Communists

directs,

from

Vietnams

Lao

the
Dong

into

the

In

of

a central
Research

munist

activity

highest

Communist

administrative
the

Viet

Office
brain

in the South
Party

headquarters
Minh,

for

South

been

Vietnam

coordinates

all Com-

and all relations

and

in

have

government

with

the

echelons

in

Vietnam.

In South Vietnam

itself, the Communists

a show of legitimacy
Liberation
quarters
presidium,
committee

of
level,

through

South
the

which

Vietnam.
Front

take
Party

At the

has a central
their

of the Peoples

the Communist

have created

the National

orders

for the

national

head-

committee

from

Revolutional

in South

Front

Vietnam.

Party

the

and
control

(PRP)-

central

the

in

the extent

and

make

it

organiza-

PRP

were

all

were made

in the North,

committee

sets policy and

Next
30

and organization

(persuasion

in the

provincial

headquarters,

and propaganda)

are responsible

are 7 zone headquarters,

in the

of the men

Central

Front

crea-

(PRP)

counterpart

of the 3 interzone

and training.

in Hanoi-the

Central

consists

trination

addition,

central

hierarchy

govern-

for the Liberation


Command

was the

Party

of several

of

decreed

The next level in the Communist-dominated

of the Northern

an elaborate
intelligence
network
and directs the extensive undercover

This

ing.

ugitpvop

High

already

for admission

for planning

and which

South.

from

national

determine

the

Communist

The Fronts

also is responsible

guidance

Front

members

for the PRPs

strategy.

out

of the

the

government,

of this was to screen


is composed

an-

for

in September.

deception

but qualifications

broad

maps

Front

met

they

the Lao Dong Party.

controls,

ultimately

Congress

domination

less strict than

Front.

training

inherited

(COSVN).

10

The

Communists,

of the Viet Cong.


two

South,

North

tions.

of legitimacy

Communist

Vietnam

the manifestoes

Revolutionary

The object
the Front

for the military

organization

Agency-maintains
in South Vietnam

Peoples

that

All control

and the Military

is responsible

the

all major

There

a shadow

act of Communist

of

appear

of Vietnam.

Commission

Another

South

of the National

Party

of

by

and military

North

issued

Communist

claiming

and

Saigon.

Vietnam,

liberation

Cong political

which

the National

South Vietnam,
North

of

Party,

South

faithfully

tion

and to represent

in Hanoi

Viet

of

of life
of

of

formation

the necessary

Liberation

military-comes

(Communist)
ment

the illusion

the Republic

and

Central

for

activities,

regime

the entire

-political

struggle

a National

Communist

and supplies

operation

and about to be taken,

movement

decided

which

northwest

the

the South.

Viet Cong

people,

taken

forest

Liberation

of a local

of it.

a true

and

the

by the

at the same time simplify-

of being

an oppressed

At-

all over Vietnam,

the appearance

while

To give the whole

to actions

from

held

1960.

in September

representatives

in the South,

appearance

Party of Vietnam

of individuals

all walks

nounced

Screen

(Communist)

by Party

the Congress

a group

virtually

in
Hanoi

1960,

In December
to represent

Fronts

Under

the interzone

which
structure

committees-its

for political

are their

buildFront
which
policy
indoc-

headquarters
sub-offices.

are the approximately


chief

operating

units.

These

committees

direct

the Communists
propaganda

the South Vietnamese


the

central

assign

the

of course,
sent down

In

addition-and

to

this

Communists-

the

Viet

Cong

and cells in South

and villages

make

spiderweb

spread

land.

dominated

In

the

units

free of Government

interference

political

struggle,

local Viet

or guerrilla

Cong

tasks

they

In the areas controlled


under

Viet

Cong-

as they carry out their


and

train

men

for

and carry out the military

by the legitimate

Government,

and grass-level

front members

cover

to overthrow

or

they are in the open,

are assigned.

of course, the Communists


remain

part

like an evil shadow

recruit

units,

Vietnams

up the largest

liberated,

areas of South Vietnam,

so-called

efforts

of

The committees,

duties

committees

towns,

of the Communist

must

and

support

levels the orders

for the provincial-level

military

Fronts

their

associations

indoctrination

in their provinces.

districts,
over

their

committee.

role

operating
The

people.

to subordinate

is a major
they

liberation

and to gain the often-unwitting

also transmit
from

the

use to spread

and

work

in secret

the Government

in their

of the Republic

of

Vietnam.
Since the Communists

are using

tion

Front

to camouflage

ties,

their

Peoples

organization
from

the

The
with

military

arm

the war
struggle,
forces

ganization

primary

at least

action,

the

forces

must conform

to political

(Viet

is a fighting

centralized
must

with

and men,
that

of the

level,

South

and
a

Cong

aggression

Vietnam.

booklet

the

inferiors

that organization

obeying

and that

or-

Army
must

be

superiors-

the armys

political

unity between

cadres

out that

action

these

three

is subordinated

principles
to political

army

is united,

with

the army.

united

continuous

maintain

political

political

units.

indoctrinators

The

Viet

armed

forces

Vietnams

soldier

take him
not highly
The

is engaged
name
(GPA).

has

the

armys

so-called

officer

are assigned

are the political

to

watchdogs

Liberation

Army.

Liberation

Army,

The other

Peoples

Army

forces

consist

Cong

in

far from

whose

almost

who

is a part-

duties

do not

In addition,

he is

politically.

name

the Popular

The paramilitary

military

his community.

indoctrinated

(PAVN).

of two basic elements,

a local civilian

or guerrilla,

half comprises

of Vietnam

and the full military.

is generally

Fronts

originally

They

people

of the army

the

or commissars,

in all Vietnam.

the paramilitary,
time

orientation
over

the

is about one half of the total Communist

North

Cong

that

political

of the Fronts

Cong,

South Vietnam

Viet

and

control

officers,

Cong

The Viet

on the

army and therefore

and

all Viet

the army and the people.

pointed

military

Viet

political

declared

maintaining

and between

booklet

that

are closely

corps,

Communists

lines; that the Liberation

be discipline;

tasks are fundamental,

lowest

the

in the name of the

indoctrination

of its armed

into

to be primarily

duty
that

to Liberate

Front

Cong)

Vietnam

by the Communists

Movement

A 64-page

insure

that

on the Front

at all organizational

the Vietnamese

in South
the

to the

found

Since

is to support

conducted

National

The

to

Party
and

integrated

the very top

representatives

political

there

committee

is completely

from

military

highly

structure,

To insure

of the Front.

consider

being

activi-

level.

structure

levels

Front

central

Libera-

(Communist)

keeps a tight control

top-level

military

Front

the

apparatus

provincial

the National

anti-Government

Revolutionary

parallels

Communist

their

for

its

Army.

exclusively

been

expanded

At the

hamlet

paramilitary
However,
in guerrilla

to Guerrilla
level,

the GPA

force

was

since this force


warfare,
Popular
unit

the
Army

is either
11

formed, and
. ._. per_

rely

primarily

they are dependent

.1

on local populations,
ward

supply

need

weapons,
attack

of their

tactics.

ammunition,

support

cant simply

to a depot.

Instead,

or other

a Government

Since

logistical

their commanders

requisitions

they

on guerrilla

for much

military

base or unit

for-

when

they

hardware

and try to cap-

ture what they want.


The

Regional

gionals,
tees,

Forces,

are units

which

activities.

provide

leadership

and

Force operates

or Re-

district

commit-

direct

pretty

their

much in one

area.

The

elite units

of the so-called

the battalions

of the Main

the

Hard

name

of

fiberboard
gional

helmets

Forces

and

provincial

level

tary operations

and

because

the

metal

from

food

or

the Re-

paramilitary

guerrillas.

These

committees

at the

range

farther

of the Main

1965 there

of
them

are

acquired

by the Front

Force,

have to perform

producing

Army

have

afield

in their

than do the units of the Regional

As members
dont

They

distinguish

the

are directed

Liberation

Force.

Hats

that

battalions

Cong

Territorials

by Front

their

A Regional

general

also called

established

the

Hard

non-military

or transporting

were over 65,000

Hat

work,

supplies.

miliForces.
Viet

such as

By the end of

of these

Hard

Hats fight-

ing in South Vietnam.


This

organization

of command
military

practice

of command
Gongs

political
Communist

at the top

top

pattern

a direct

the

military

at lower

chain

the Viet

conforms

strong

chain

to orthodox

However,

structure
of

and operations

and

in contrast

to bottom.

and military

Communist

all levels,

cumbersome

and slow,

of establishing

from

classic
with

seems

indirect

central
level

to the
authority

decentralized,

Party

control

over the government

and political

control

over

the military

at
at all

levels.
The

Although
the

1960s,

those

paigns

of

units

also

serve

Viet Congs full military


The Viet Gongs
into
Force.
army

two

types-the

They
units.

as manpower

full military
Regional
units

for

the

element
Forces

are

also is divided
and

the

Main

like orthodox

self-contained,

not

uni-

He

except

those

who

were

were

policeman,

late

the victims

assassination,
well

aware

of cadres-trained,

the countryside

Operates

immediately

was on in the

terrorism,

leaders

A cadres

are not set up or operated


Their

pools

units.

war

Vietnam

thousands
munist
guerrilla

few,

realized

rural

Cadre-How

and military

1950s

affected,
and

early

of the savage

cam-

and
of it.

kidnapping

dedicated,

hard-core

officers-who

fanned

to win support

for the insurgent

role can be described

as a combination

and propagandist.

Front

in the countryside

operate

is graphically

hamlets
described

in

So too were

He is the Party
and villages.
by one of them,

the

Comout in
forces.
priest,
and the

How they
Captain

Lam.
13

We seek to do three things. The first is to drive a


wedge between the people and their government-to
make the people hate their government, and the Americans. Our second objective is to get people to join our
(VC) armed forces. The third is to persuade them
to increase their production of food, and give the increase to us.
Our cadre go into each village to study the situation and the people. Once they know the people and
their problems, our cadre can explain how these problems are the fault of the government,
and how the
people can achieve their ambitions by following us. In
this way we make the people hate their government, and
can destroy the government in their village. Then we
guide them in forming their own government
(under
our control) and in organizing their own armed forces,
which of course are our auxiliaries.
Of course we cannot do this right away in those
villages and districts where the government is strong.
There we concentrate on educating people politically
to hate their government, and on forming both open
and secret organizations which can support us, or embarrass the government.
Every little bit helps. Any
voluntary action of the people, from organized protests
to simply slowing down on work ordered by the government, is a clear gain for us.
Our cadre live in the village, or, if this is not safe,
very close by. They appeal to the ideals, the patriotism,
and the emotions of each individual according to his
situation, and try to recruit him for the cause. If a person is arrested by government forces we try to contact
him as soon as he is released, sympathize with him,
arouse his hatred of the government, and recruit him.
Many times we bring hungry, tired troops into a village
so that the people may see how we are suffering for
them, and arouse their sympathy. We try in every
possible way to create hatred for the government and
the Americans, to separate the people from the government and to make them see that we are their only
hope.
Today, with the increase in Viet Cong forces, more
emphasis is placed on terror and murder (destroying
the village government)
and less on persuasion.
Organizing and involving everyone possible in a maximum
effort, coupled with incessant propaganda, is still emphasized as essential to Viet Cong success.

14

The

nearly

half

million

men

up the civil and military


army

and

its shadow

are as diverse
tion

and

as those

Perhaps
from

are incessantly

told,

and

they

do,

everything

Cong.

knowledge,

and

caused

to repeat,

mittee

and later a District

anywhere.

District

the

they

the

and their

in some of their own state-

hard

the story of Captain


the

core,

advantage
which

of

backbone

the

welcomes

by the

of the

return

One of the real

movement,

Governments
the

Chieu

to loyalty

Hoi

later,

struggle
munist

in Central

Vietnam

because

they

said

the French

Party.

As

that

in

country.
In 1960, I was

1954,

I joined

Officer,
after

promoted

Minh.

I swear I am prepared
to

my

namese

last

I went

the

division

to Senior

2.
ers,

I swear

and

without

gerous.
retreat
4.
true

aggression

to obey

absolutely

them
to

go

5.
secret

and
wealthy,

my

and

secrets

units
of

in

to

for

Finally

Vietnam.

to

make

orders

from

my

people
even

combat

if

6.

accurately.

at all

complaint

is hard

better
the

seeking

shape

to

make

people

like

their

lives

even

and

five

other

young

the Government

but that

men,
would

if we came with

they

taken

other

in

the

enemy

and

not

the

name

to work

be

I will

torture.

not

I will

br:bed

by

the

unity

to

love

of

cooperatively

with

reveal

any

remain

in-

faithful

enemy.
my

them

friends

in

in combat

my
and

times.

I swear
are

by

inhuman

never

to

maintain

damaged

and

protect

or captured

my

weapons.

by the

ensuring

enemy.

into

American
Vietnam

a
im-

demo-

do

I swear

three

tect,

that

things

and

help

inconvenience

in

and

my

relationships

eschew

three

the

people;

the

people.

to

indulge

I will
I

will

with

things.
not
do

the

people

I will

respect,

steal

from,

threaten,

all

things

to

win

I will
pronor
their

confidence.
organizational

the

would

never

myself

invading

They

the poor

sacrificed

in the village

under

Revolution
I swec~r

9.
and

if

even

as myself,

8.

or don-

will

strong.

preserve

I swear

to the

and

fear,

The
Cong

OF HONOR

without
life

in a main

May 1960.

people.

me,

us away for the army,

unit

without

leader

until

that they were good men

and

take

command-

promptly,

told

and

of Sergeant

taxes.

if we stayed

formation

Vietnam

squad

collect

that

will

Viet-

the words

and

to the poor

they

for the people,

but the Viet

struggled

if

in the Com-

my village,

and wanted

they

live in

so I did.

to defend

loved

two

to see

was to join the forces

who

to give rights

colonialism,

order

the

battling

servants,

plans,

other

all

thing

a 31-year-old

at night

I began

live in the South

fighting

I was a farmer

to come

but after

I lost my faith

them,

OATH

Cong,

the way the people

consider

controlled

North

CONG

in or-

very

tell us, and we believed

involved.

fight

soldier

I swear to

Long,

battalion:

7.

all

discouraged

learn

their

in

for

of suffering

to

revolutionary

cratic,

firmly

forward

regardless

Anh

us, that

and

of the

successful

of Vietnam,

By way of contrast,

united.

wholeheartedly,

fght

becoming
will

I swear

perialists

all

and

and

I sweclr

of the Republic

of the

Captain,

imperialism,

democratic

executing
3.

against

traitors,

independent,

to sacrifice

breath

in the

the Com-

VIET
1.

Two

a11 leaders

should,

its Political

my company

fight

that the only right

used

in 1947, when

years old, to join the Viet

against

claim that we were

force

misled

[Secretary

between

munist

and
Com-

were

in governments,

decided

nearly

Commissar

and the way they would

Government

I left my village
years

the change

After

destination

of the Province

the Viet

not for this war.

Vo

program

of those

expanding

it were

he took

Communists.

I was eighteen

with

Lam.

and

the North

Viet

ments.
Consider

years,

and

my

member

We

the real difference

reasons

supporting

Committee).

ganizing

apart

the South.

I reached

in motiva-

of their diversity,

is found

liberate

travelling

at first a political

that sets them

including

to go to help

months

became

Front,

is the way in which

The best illustrations

common

six

the National

thing

Vietnamese

for

ordered

and government

important

fellow

make
Cong

in origin

of any army

the most

their

government,
divergent

who

of the Viet

and women

components

name

revolutionary

of
units.

secrecy,
my

unit

and

commander,

to

keep
and

10.
dier
Army

I swear

of

the
or

Revolution,

and

in

self-criticism,

never

to

harm

to

be

either

a
the

model

sol-

Liberation

Vietnam.

15

them

for

a week

guerrillas

of training

and defend

but then

go to a long

training

course.

training

camp,

the

months

and then

I soon
hard,

could

but

the

that

cadre

gloriously,

splendidly.

kept

that

I accepted

this.

three-man

must

I knew

We

studied

every

we

prepared

I had

was

been

die

of

us

to

night

the

Government

district

outpost.

South,

they gave
to hide

The

Viet

Cong

force

came

and

to help

I stayed
from

with

them

Eventually
my family,

Government
A few

for four years, fighting

I could
and

no longer

so I ran

stand

away

in many

being

and

me a gun,

and

When

the

After

the

said that

a RVNAF

but they found


Viet

Scholar

or street

tion-of

away

joined

the

side.
more

now

further

illustrate

the

diver-

urchin,

me

that

force, because otherwise


my mothers
I was

farming

drafted

my group

join

the

the Viet Cong might

district

of a hero,

haps

burn down

officer

in the

{Peoples

me, gave
US

down

but

Army

last year

not

help

to liberate

Now

here.

training,

is

when

posed

are reviewed

Viet-

and he is told by his leader

asked

be.

the South,

I did

want

I am in a transporta-

to become

a soldier

it would

disgrace

I used to get drunk


criticized

several

I was ashamed

my comrades

and sleep

times

and

but the

After

Viet

too late, and after

did not reform

orders

from

my

superiors

2.

3.
4.
things
5.

I will

6.

I will

7.

When

would

men

are
of

primarily
which

under

all

which

It also

thinking.

the

maintained

through

is applied

to the mind

will

and

immediate

gives

every

lets the

This

constant

actions

cir-

8.

will

follow

cadre

the

cell

cri-

to the
program,

system

to every possible

All

things

(usually
unit.

are the principal

of the people

and

for

the people.
never

take

anything

from

the

people,

not

even

not put group


return

that

be polite
be fair

property

which

to my own

is borrowed,

to people,

and

staying

my own

9.

will

information
use.

make

restitution

for

house.

in

respect

just in buying
peoples

and

and

houses

love

treat

persons
them

as

unit secrets absolutely

will

encourage

and

will

never

disclose

or relatives.

the people

to struggle

and

support

the

Revolution.
11.

them.

selling.

I will

10.

keep

even to closest friends

12.
affection

will

be

alert

to

spies

close

to

and

will

report

all

suspicious

to my superiors.
I will
and

remain
love.

the

people

and

maintain

know

contributes

surveillance

and the heart

the slogan:

he

man

CODE OF DISCIPLINE

damaged.
I will

is an almost

three-man)

or thread.

I will
I will

and deed.

I was

cumstances.

needle

his

sup-

his own shortcomings

in thought

barred,

his

his reactions,

fight

there

Per-

by the group,

what his future

explain

and criticize

no holds

effectiveness

reinforced,

and discussed

of the

role.

units daily
In this, his

session.

and

to let off steam.

Appeals

the

confess

I was ban-

WET CONG
obey

with

what

But

ished from my unit.

1. I will

he must

every

chance

to desert,

in the cell.

this,

and weaknesses
tique,

Cong came and took me. Then


because

After

must publicly

I want to go home.
not

motives

this

is his

self-criticism
continued

and a

and protector

to forget

reminder

and

tion unit and have to carry 32 kilos of rice for 12 miles


every day.

effective

emotion,

to memorize

put him in the po-

a friend,

allowed

indoctrination
of (North)

me six weeks

if it would

and marched

North,

most

human

oath of honor

which

a patriot,

He is never
the

every

or farm

indoctrina-

is required

(a lo-point

indoctrination

house.

I was 20 the PAVN


nam}

I must

on

The soldier

code of discipline)

people.
told

came

me.

professional

playing

applied.

basic codes of conduct


sition

sity.
*My uncle

I must

company

Cong Discipline

discipline

constantly
12-point

statements

hamlet
troops.

attacked

them.

boy, they all tell the same story of relentless

battles.

so of

for the Government

I had

to save my life.

by two

others.

16

to the

ses-

belonged

cell, so that every man was watched

guerrilla.

One

I tried

fooled,

a village

told me I must watch

fight

I was an officer of the

to come

chief

battle

were
to

and had self-criticism


Each

day.

Cong

Vietnam.

ordered

I came.

I was

six

leader.

that

be

that

for

North

I was

course

for months

of a Viet

emphasizing

I am from
PAVN.

I must

I studied

as a squad

life

we

Although

sions almost

We marched

the

local

with them,

of my ability

where

was graduated

realized

become

We went

they told me that because

to reach

living

we

our village.

their

way in which the Viet Cong seeks to control


Regular
tesy,
phasis
appear
duty,

units

and

strict

is placed

employ

obedience
on making

to be voluntary.
if such

standard

normal

forms

is always

expected,

compliance
For

those

punishments

its members.

of military
with
who

cour-

but emregulations

fail

as public

in their
criticism,

extra

duty,

and brief

the penalty

is often

man feel a traitor


The
of
the

fear
less

individual

do not bring
in terms

and an outcast

from

of corporal
importance

confinement
discharge,
punishment
although

or his relatives.

either

that

reform,
make

the

the human

or death

seems

race.
to be

may be visited

on

It has been

said that the Viet

is told the reason


quently

for everything

and in greater

detail

the world.

Almost

the reasons

for his actions

Every proposed
it

and

bystanders,

by

the

than

more

any other

than

everyone

innocent

soldier

he is required

action is discussed

is taken-and

targets

certainly

Cong

probably

that he does more

fre-

soldier

in

soldier.

from all angles before


except

almost
gets

After

studying

studies

it from

the political

the

forces

Concerning

commented

on the bombing

the

and

of the

a blast

tary studies

benefactor
Captain
action
18

of all the people.


Lams

against

an

description
RVNAF

what

outpost

happens
is

after

recommended

and

to make

performs

perhaps
Once

the proposal,

all points

effects,

sure

his

Provincial

that

assigned

the

it to the head

Committee.

and the relative


RVNAF.

He then

Committee

capabilities
it to the

of the

Party.

it sound

Party Committee

especially
of our

If he approves

he presents

it and if he thinks

approve

I report

Affairs

of view, considering

of the

operation

ing of the whole


of

effort

word

Military

those

proposed

of the U. S. Embassy,

If a few people get killed from


it is a risk of the war.
The Front is the

incredible

the

of the Provincial

the

bystanders.

one Viet Cong

the

duties.

to explain

any other

concerned

shows
everyone

of

Secretary

The

Secre-

he calls a meet-

to study,

discuss,

and

the proposal.

proposal

is approved

by the

Party

Com-

haps

directs

some

will

approve

mittee
political,

this

and

is

take

from

difficulty

to

he is supposed

detail

when

and

necessary

laborers
dead,

to give

their

to carry

We

proper

bears

it

whether

an attack,

planned

and rehearsed

troops

out,

units

The

militia

to provide

off the
which

are

booty

and

will

comfort

of the rest.

seems fantastic,

out.

but account

A~zJ~ planned

operation,

or a raid on a hamlet,

in great

detail-and

then

moment

when

factor

doctrine

is explicit.

last

will

and

the morale

an ambush,

off at the

to do it, and

try to carry away all our

burial,

preparation

account

called

always

the

just what

force

units.

supplies,

and strengthen

Such detailed
after

main

and militia

them

families

the
the

if any,

will

on

will be planned

to guide

to carry

our dead,

depending

every man knows

where

prac-

This practice

a month,

of the action

the local force

always

begin

or an actual

to do, how he is supposed

Every

including

units

on a sandtable

until

Com-

favorable.

all

of the target.

days

of the target,

when.
meet

either

Party

if all conditions-

logistic-appear

replica

five

The

only

accomplished

for the attack,

stake-and-string

action.

the attack

military,

After
ticing

additional

some

is

often
has

changed.
Viet

Cong

marized
means

tactical

in four
Fast

Advance,

the Battlefield,

*.jr._
the Military

liminary
sends

Affairs

tasks among

a military

point

mock-up.

The

the civilians

Committee

its three

a reconnaissance

divides

staffs.

the pre-

The Military

unit to study the objective

Fast

Staff

thorough
swift

and to prepare
a sandtable
Staff sends a cadre to contact

in the area, to learn

their

reaction

to the

preparation

action,

always feature

Attacks

maximum

and a secondary
a?zd a careful

usually

deployment

of

several

recent

attack.
It a 1so studies the morale of the
to see if they are mentally and emotionally
preIf they are not, the Political

[logistics)

Staff

removal

another

the leaders

reviews

if the

The Rear Services

civilians

including

can furnish

that needed

meeting.

If the majority
the

This

Affairs

will

for

Commit-

be attended

of the Committee

be made,

Provincial

the proposed

of

based on Slow

they report

Party
problem

deliberate

believes

to another

Committee,

which

and the solution

by

in the
that

efforts

In the past
avoid defensive
theless

on a primary

mutually

forces

have

to

been

and ambush

by

almost

supporting,
intercept

that may be brought

there

to entice

and

or

in.

In

indications

of

helicopter-borne

again

even

positions,

in case they
these

dikes
look

an ambush.

for defense,

separating
like canals.

especially

rice

are
fields

breaks
Where

in the so-called

Never-

with alternate

do decide

positions

seem to be merely

trenches

will permit,

prepare

Frequently

existing

placements

have usually sought to


they had the battlefield

that it was essentially

switch

a stand.
into

the Viet Cong


combat unless

they carefully

meet-

and per-

battles

followed

troops.

so organized

the Military

of all the units that will be involved

the attack should


of

out

and labor,

all this is done,

tee holds

ing

finds

Staff must take the

them.

of the dead and of any booty.

When

attack.

to prepare

food

This

Clearance

use of explosives

[proposed)

the necessary

Fast

on strongpoints

objective,

troops

measures

Assault,

Slow.

for any contingency,

is grasped.

any reinforcements

necessary

It is sum-

One

that is new or unusual in Viet Cong


once the basic principle
of careful,

ambush

pared.

Fast,

and Fast Withdrawal-all

There it little
tactical doctrine,

from

of view,
Political

Four

Preparation.
*a

mittee,

words:

to make

incorporated
so that

em-

in the walls,

and

the water

level

secret base areas,


19

elaborate

tunnels

are often

and for concealment


the Japanese

constructed,

from

in World

ground

War

both

for cover

and air forces.

II, the Viet Cong

Like

are tire-

less diggers.
Controlled

land

detonated

when

mines,

buried

a Government

have long been a favorite


method

of

destroying

opponents.
usually

mistake

psychological
civilians.

at

for

purpose,

and

spike-boards

are often

used

in preparing

placed

naturally

in the covered

of booby

Government

as Viet

this,

so they

their

only hope.

Even

though

Cong,

the

in proportion

corresponding

ously
than
a

drop

unexpected
poor

impairs
the

quick,

planning

actual

successful

these

same

than expected

achieved,

there

is a

and combat

effectiveness.

by Republic

of Vietnam

resistance

inflicted

is unsuccessful,

Cong

leaders
or months,

would

counteraction

and seri-

can

longer

warrant.

Only

overcome

this

effect.
Cong

Persuasion

Much is said about the Viet Cong use of terror, which


seems to be increasing.
This is natural as the pace of the
war steps up and support

requirements

grow

voluntary

Taxes

been

peatedly
tary
20

Cong

are faced

any government

The

contributions.
in some areas.

recruiting

Viet

every

Cong

effort

of Vietnam
the

been

used,

proves

have

faster

than

raised

re-

Draftees

must fill in as volun-

inadequate.

Terror-punishment

many

in

areas,

the

problems

of war-and

are

the

support

Armed

beginning,

made

of members

of the

Forces

as well as the sup-

Generally

similar

tactics

always

the benefits

have

to the

in-

moral and patriotic


worth of
Serve your country against
in allegiance.

such a shift
the American
because

from

emphasizing
the

in

in time

the

civilians.

and

it eventually

they succeed

the administrative

have,

of

but

as a result.

to secure

Republic

dividual

with

support

port

high

imperialists,

the Americans

they say.

Dont

be fooled

are more clever than the French;

motives

are the same, but they use you as

puppets.
The
keep

general
the

preference

Communists

whole

garrisons

seems

appropriate

to frighten

the

posts
area.

Not

not

by torture,

determined

when

it

resistance

or

infrequently

murdered

The dependents

Threats

does

often

they overwhelm

to punish
in the

soft-sell

killing,

will be brutally

to the others.
same fate.

for

from

of small

others

or two leaders

one

as an example

of the men may meet the

of reprisals

against

families

are some-

times used as well.


Within

the

last 6 years

major

program.

A favored

speaking

small

garrisons,

lives

for

have

mercy

their

Viet

as sisters

families

sake,
None

success.

to serenade
precious

imploring

of these

Homesickness

in the RVNAF,

is the use of girls

to save their
and

Vats

become

or mothers,

to them

cause of desertion

Bid

Congs

call it-has

practice

calling

on civilians.

had noticeable

the

as they

program--proselyting,

them

programs

has been

to
has

a major

and this has plagued

the Viet Cong as well.


Prisoners,
ploited,
poses.

to the

primarily
Thus,

guerrilla

Cong,

There

prisoners

were
and

to sign

documents

was reported

held-and

or three

for some

hamlets,

put
that

could

months

reeducation
or brutal,

in which

American

exhibited

pressure
be used

to get
for

in
them

worldwide

and then

released.

One American

executed

in June

1965 in reprisal

of a Viet Cong terrorist.

as

of an Asian

six months,

under

pur-

treated

anti-Communist

have been instances


held

to be ex-

psychological

by the standards

two

villages

propaganda,

and

are often

if not notoriously

released.

are objects

political

be expected

army-for

then,

execution

Viet
for

prisoners

well as could
and

Viet

Today,

afflict

and women,
If

for weeks

damage

Viet

has its disadvantages.

by Viet

effectiveness

by the

power.

losing voluntary

results,

use it unless

Viet

forces.

dis-

are heavier

attack
the

if the com-

planned,

to benefits

when

as

ourselves.

on carefully

in morale

serious

especially

indicates

if losses

Cong

and the dug-

to

us to protect

to

anticipate

the Viet

grateful

actions

fails,

in anti-

are likely
fully

are provoked

emphasis

important

by Government

often

helping

forces

for the civilians

shelled

are

most

the trenches

attacks

rehearsed

such an action

An

or

Viet Congs

forces,

would
the hun-

civilians

to support

protection

for

the

The villagers

forced

people

and

seen,

Their

implicate

Secondarily,

these

provocateurs

often

Government

is bombed

or not

foot-mines

or an ambush,

liberated,
meaning Viethave some value if a Viet

Cong.

feel

outs do provide

cussed,

simple

areas the ambushees

to fight there.
is to

actions.

treat them

The

from

explosive

trench-works

villages

really,

munity

or

complete

fastest

who

that

traps around

unit decides

function,

seizing

the

those

the Americans

Cong-controlled,
Cong

are mined,
political

seek.

Like the elaborate


dreds

their

uncooperative

for a battle

to produce
against

Viet Cong

targets

ranging

to

them,

discouraging
specific

traps,

and

is over

as warning

booby

deadfalls
being

least

some

such

Homemade

target

nonmilitary

or

highways

and an economical
or

Occasionally
by

in

seems
reacts

prisoner
for the

In little
forces
to

more

have

one

that

equipped,

than

grown
includes

highly

mere

their

shadow

in some
taxes

Communist
ercises

civil

on

Party,

of considerable

under

Party,

Democratic

Republic

of portable

war materials

army

North

well-

The

of engag-

duration.
grown

four

times

which
as much

Vietnam.

expanded

North

of Vietnam.

the

control

Vietnam-the

The

Substantial

have been brought

it exso-called

quantities
into South

by land

and

Vietnamese
Communist

As Viet

Confrom

substance,

South

Vietnam

its cover name of the Peoples

has
of

of

armed

capable
has

almost

Cong
guerrilla

uniformed,

of limited

Republic

behalf

of

organization

collects

the

Viet

regulars

operations

provinces

Revolutionary

regiments

to one

as does

the

an essentially

foot-mobile

ing in conventional
currently,

five years

from

buildup

Cong
directly

felt obliged

into

crease

their

other

their

influence.

spent

much

food

until

1964,

r,eillance
Most

to 10,000

1964

their

regular

their

have grown,

units.

the

civilians

to draft

They

rates of taxation
on

alone.

is continuing.

have

and inin areas

Logistics requirements
for food
have greatly increased.
Even regular

of their

may render
significant,

year

and capabilities

demands

as well as weapons
units

as 8,000

the

They have been forced

to redouble

under

in

in the South

resources

so have their liabilities.


teenagers

sea, as well

soldiers

time in producing

a practice

which

increased

their own
air

sur-

unprofitable.
and most

dangerous

for both sides,


21

the Viet Cong


peoples
introduction
forces
fails,

as well.

The

war

by their

Johnson

to achieve

armies

is a different
or

have joined
But

we must

solemn

the

is to conquer
to extend

the Asiatic

The

Cong

Vietnamese

kind

to

of war,
There

declarations.

are

mask

the

than

central

the South,

Viet

It

is

to defeat

dominion

Our military
achieving

progress
so long

in

that

enemy,

impossible

effort
the

American

power

but

and valiantly

to

predict

of Vietnam

nor is he

how

in Vietnam

is an essential

of

freedom,

country

for those goals.

long

it

and the United

his aggression.

war-torn

and

no tougher

to stopping

objectives

Viet-

Its goal

He is not a superman,

States are committed

in

by North
China.

of communism.

is a tough

his opponents.

invincible.

It is guided

by Communist

will take, but the Republic

Some

in the attack on their own Govlet this

it is spurred

stepped-up

and possible.

28, 1965.

and

Vietnamese

at times with understandable


not

fact that this is really war.


nam

a quick victory

of the free

on July

of South Vietnam,

grievances,

own

by

they say they are quite prepared

in Vietnam

marching

ernment.

scale of North

support

Vietnam

destroyed

for 10 or 20 years if necessary

President

citizens

22

to assure,

truly a South

being

If this effort

as our increasing

continue

no

of being
rapidly

equipment-and

is intended

said

is

on a growing

and

actions

pretense

army

which

element

peace,
has

and

fought

THE

SECRETARY

OF

DEFENSE

Washington

March 8, 1966
KNOW YOUR ENEMY: THE VIET CONG (DOD Gen-20)This official Department
of Defense publication is for the use of
personnel in the military Services.

By Order of the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force:
HAROLD K. JOHNSON,
Gene&, United States Army,
Official :

Chief of Staff.

J. C. LAMBERT,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

B. J. SEMMES, JR.,
Vice Admiral, United States Nav):
Chief of Naval Personnel.

J. P. MCCONNELL,
General, U.S. Air Force,
Official :

Chief of Staff,

R. J. PUGH,
Colonel, USAF,
Director of Administrative Services.

H. W. BUSE, JR.,
Lt. General, U.S. Marine Corps.
Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans amd
Programs).

:
To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-4
Air Force: X: One for every six active duty military members.
Marine Corps: MARCORPS:
Table 4, plus 7000-140 (5)

Distribution

Army:

7130/7150/7352/7587

requirement

for TROOP

TOPICS.

(1)

23

S-ar putea să vă placă și