G.R. No. 203984 June 18, 2014 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA, Accused-Appellant

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 203984
June 18, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the January 1 7, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 04069, affirming in toto the July 23, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City, Branch 127, finding accused-appellant Medario Calantiao y Dimalanta (Calantiao)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
1
On November 13, 2003, Calantiao was charged before the RTC of violation of Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 in an Information, the pertinent portion of which reads: That on or about the
11th day of November, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two (2) bricks of dried
marijuana fruiting tops with a total weight of 997 .9 grams, knowing the same to be a dangerous
drug.
3
The facts, as synthesized by the RTC and adopted by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION
On November 13, 2003[,] at around 5:30 x x x in the afternoon, while PO1 NELSON MARIANO and
PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ were on duty, a certain EDWIN LOJERA arrived at their office and asked
for police assistance regarding a shooting incident. Per report of the latter, it appears that while
driving a towing truck and traversing along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City, he had a traffic dispute
(gitgitan) with a white taxi cab prompting him to follow said vehicle until they reached along 8th
Avenue Street corner C-3 Road, Caloocan City. Thereat, the passengers of said taxi cab, one of
them was accused Calantiao, alighted and fired their guns. Surprised, Lojera could not do anything
but continued his driving until he reached a police station nearby where he reported the incident.
The police officers on duty then were PO1 NELSON MARIANO and PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ.
PO1 Mariano testified that they immediately responded to said complaint by proceeding to 5th
Avenue corner 8th Street, Caloocan City where they found the white taxi. While approaching said
vehicle, two armed men alighted therefrom, fired their guns towards them (police officers) and ran
away. PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased them but they were subdued. PO1 Mariano recovered
from Calantiao a black bag containing two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops and a magazine
of super 38 stainless with ammos, while PO3 Ramirez recovered from Calantiaos companion [a] .38
revolver.
The suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over to SPO3 PABLO TEMENA, police
investigator at Bagong Barrio Police Station for investigation. Thereat, PO1 Mariano marked the
bricks of marijuana contained in a black bag with his initials, "NM". Thereafter, said specimen were
forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. The result of the examination
conducted by P/SINSP. JESSSE DELA ROSA revealed that the same was positive for marijuana, a
dangerous drug.
The foregoing testimony of PO1 MARIANO was corroborated by PO3 RAMIREZ who testified that
he personally saw those bricks of marijuana confiscated from the accused. He confirmed that he
was with PO1 Mariano when they apprehended said accused and his companion and testified that
while PO1 Mariano recovered from the accused a black bag containing marijuana, on his part, he
confiscated from accuseds companion a .38 revolver.
MR. CRISENDO AMANSEC, the driver of the taxi where the suspects boarded was also presented
in open court and testified as to what he knows about the incident. He confirmed that on that date,
two (2) persons boarded on his taxi and upon reaching C-3 Road, they alighted and fired three (3)
shots and ran away.
Aside from the oral testimonies of the witnesses, the prosecution also offered the following
documentary evidence to boost their charge against the accused:
Exh. "A" Request for Laboratory Examination dated November 12, 2003
Exh. "B" Physical Sciences Report No. D-1423-03 dated November 12, 2003
Exh. "C-1" Picture of First brick of marijuana fruiting tops
Exh. "C-2" Picture of Second brick of marijuana fruiting tops
Exh. "D" Referral Slip dated November 12, 2003
Exh. "E" Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated November 12, 2003 of PO3 Eduardo
Ramirez and PO1 Nelson Mariano
Exh. "E-1" Their respective signatures
Exh. "F" Sinumpaang Salaysay of Crisendo Amansec (Erroneously marked as Exh. "E")
EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENSE
The accused offered a different version of the story. According to his testimony, this instant case
originated from a traffic mishap where the taxi he and his companion Rommel Reyes were riding
almost collided with another car. Reyes then opened the window and made a "fuck you" sign against
the persons on board of that car. That prompted the latter to chase them and when they were caught
in a traffic jam, PO1 Nelson Mariano, one of the persons on board of that other car alighted and
kicked their taxi. Calantiao and Reyes alighted and PO1 Mariano slapped the latter and uttered,
"Putang ina mo bakit mo ako pinakyu hindi mo ba ako kilala?" Said police officer poked his gun
again[st] Reyes and when Calantiao tried to grab it, the gun fired. Calantiao and Reyes were then
handcuffed and were brought to the police station. Thereat, they were subjected to body frisking and
their wallets and money were taken. PO1 Mariano then prepared some documents and informed
them that they will be charged for drugs. A newspaper containing marijuana was shown to them and
said police officer told them that it would be sufficient evidence against them. They were detained
and subjected to medical examination before they were submitted for inquest at the prosecutors
office.
4
Ruling of the RTC

On July 23, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision giving credence to the prosecutions case. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused MEDARIO
CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the offense of Violation of
Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165, for illegally possessing997.9 grams of marijuana fruiting tops.
Henceforth, this Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00).
5
In convicting Calantiao, the RTC held that the illegal drug seized was admissible in evidence as it
was discovered during a body search after Calantiao was caught in flagrante delicto of possessing a
gun and firing at the police officers. Moreover, the RTC found all the elements of the offense to have
been duly established by the prosecution.
6
Aggrieved, Calantiao appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, assigning the following errors:
7
I
THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 11, ARTICLE II,
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE ALLEGEDLY
SEIZED ITEMS ARE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
II
THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICERS PATENT NON-COMPLIANCE WITHTHE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS.
III

DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE THE PROPER CHAIN OF
CUSTODY OF THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS.
8
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals found no reason to overturn Calantiaos conviction. It found that there was
sufficient reason to justify a warrantless arrest, as the police officers were acting on a legitimate
complaint and had a reasonable suspicion that the persons identified at the scene were the
perpetrators of the offense. Likewise, the Court of Appeals held that the search and subsequent
seizure of the marijuana in question was lawful and valid, being incidental to a lawful arrest. Finding
that all the elements of the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs to be present and duly
proven, the Court of Appeals, on January 17, 2012, promulgated its Decision, affirming in toto the
RTCs ruling.
9
10
Undaunted, Calantiao is now before this Court praying for an acquittal, adding the following
arguments in support of his position:
First, the plain view doctrine is not an exception to a search incident to a valid warrantless arrest.
xxxx
Second, Calantiao did not waive the inadmissibility of the seized items.
xxxx
Finally, the seized items custodial chain is broken.
11
In essence, Calantiao is questioning the admissibility of the marijuana found in his possession, as
evidence against him on the grounds of either it was discovered via an illegal search, or because its
custodial chain was broken.
Ruling of this Court
This Court finds no merit in Calantiaos arguments.
Search and Seizure of
Marijuana valid
This Court cannot subscribe to Calantiaos contention that the marijuana in his possession cannot be
admitted as evidence against him because it was illegally discovered and seized, not having been
within the apprehending officers "plain view."
12
Searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Section 13.Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of
an offense without a search warrant.
The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is "to protect the
arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed
weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach." It is therefore a
reasonable exercise of the States police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the injury that may
be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed
by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of the
evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee.
13
In People v. Valeroso, this Court had the occasion to reiterate the permissible reach of a valid
warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, viz:
14
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in
order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.
Otherwise, the officers safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition,
it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the
arrestees person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to
conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area
within the latters reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous
weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The
phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who
is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the
person arrested. (Citations omitted.)
In Valeroso, however, the Court held that the evidence searched and seized from him could not be
used against him because they were discovered in a room, different from where he was being
detained, and was in a locked cabinet. Thus, the area searched could not be considered as one
within his immediate control that he could take any weapon or destroy any evidence against him.
15
In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiaos possession and within his
immediate control. He could have easily taken any weapon from the bag or dumped it to destroy the
evidence inside it. As the black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiaos possession, it was
within the permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly conduct a warrantless
search.
Calantiaos argument that the marijuana cannot be used as evidence against him because its
discovery was in violation of the Plain View Doctrine, is misplaced.
The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspects person and premises under his
immediate control. This is so because "[o]bjects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to
be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence." "The
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused,
but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object x x x. [It] serves to supplement
the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to
lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed
against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure."
16
17
The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiaos situation because the police officers
purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently come across the
black bag, which was in Calantiaos possession; they deliberately opened it, as part of the search
incident to Calantiaos lawful arrest.
Inventory and Chain of
Custody of Evidence
Calantiao claims that even if the search and seizure were validly effected, the marijuana is still
inadmissible as evidence against him for failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the rules
on chain of custody, as the item was marked at the police station.
18
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9165 provide as follows:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
Its Implementing Rules and Regulations state:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at
the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court has held that the failure to strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, such as immediately marking seized drugs, will not automatically impair the integrity of chain
of custody because what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
19
Section 21 and its IRR do not even mention "marking." What they require are (1) physical inventory,
and (2) taking of photographs. As this Court held in People v. Ocfemia :
20
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of
"marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon
apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and photography when these activities
are undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of
custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items to truly ensure that they are the same
items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence should be done (1) in
the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.
The prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana from the time the
police officers confiscated it, to the time it was turned over to the investigating officer, up to the time it
was brought to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination. This Court has no reason to
overrule the RTC and the Court of Appeals, which both found the chain of custody of the seized
drugs to have not been broken so as to render the marijuana seized from Calantiao inadmissible in
evidence.
21
Furthermore, unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of the evidence,
the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved will remain. The burden of
showing the foregoing to overcome the presumption that the police officers handled the seized drugs
with regularity, and that they properly discharged their duties is on Calantiao. Unfortunately,
Calantiao failed to discharge such burden.
22
It is worthy to note that these arguments were only raised by Calantiao on his appeal. He himself
admits this. His theory, from the very beginning, was that he did not do it, and that he was being
23
framed for having offended the police officers. Simply put, his defense tactic was one of denial and
frame-up. However, those defenses have always been frowned upon by the Court, to wit:
The defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it
can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of
Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with
strong and convincing evidence. In the cases before us, appellant failed to present sufficient
evidence in support of his claims. Aside from his self-serving assertions, no plausible proof was
presented to bolster his allegations.
24
Hence, as Calantiao failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the apprehending officers
were stirred by illicit motive or failed to properly perform their duties, their testimonies deserve full
faith and credit.
25
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the January 17, 2012 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04069.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 203984
June 18, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the January 1 7, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 04069, affirming in toto the July 23, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City, Branch 127, finding accused-appellant Medario Calantiao y Dimalanta (Calantiao)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the
1
On November 13, 2003, Calantiao was charged before the RTC of violation of Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 in an Information, the pertinent portion of which reads: That on or about the
11th day of November, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two (2) bricks of dried
marijuana fruiting tops with a total weight of 997 .9 grams, knowing the same to be a dangerous
drug.
3
The facts, as synthesized by the RTC and adopted by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION

On November 13, 2003[,] at around 5:30 x x x in the afternoon, while PO1 NELSON MARIANO and
PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ were on duty, a certain EDWIN LOJERA arrived at their office and asked
for police assistance regarding a shooting incident. Per report of the latter, it appears that while
driving a towing truck and traversing along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City, he had a traffic dispute
(gitgitan) with a white taxi cab prompting him to follow said vehicle until they reached along 8th
Avenue Street corner C-3 Road, Caloocan City. Thereat, the passengers of said taxi cab, one of
them was accused Calantiao, alighted and fired their guns. Surprised, Lojera could not do anything
but continued his driving until he reached a police station nearby where he reported the incident.
The police officers on duty then were PO1 NELSON MARIANO and PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ.
PO1 Mariano testified that they immediately responded to said complaint by proceeding to 5th
Avenue corner 8th Street, Caloocan City where they found the white taxi. While approaching said
vehicle, two armed men alighted therefrom, fired their guns towards them (police officers) and ran
away. PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased them but they were subdued. PO1 Mariano recovered
from Calantiao a black bag containing two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops and a magazine
of super 38 stainless with ammos, while PO3 Ramirez recovered from Calantiaos companion [a] .38
revolver.
The suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over to SPO3 PABLO TEMENA, police
investigator at Bagong Barrio Police Station for investigation. Thereat, PO1 Mariano marked the
bricks of marijuana contained in a black bag with his initials, "NM". Thereafter, said specimen were
forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. The result of the examination
conducted by P/SINSP. JESSSE DELA ROSA revealed that the same was positive for marijuana, a
dangerous drug.
The foregoing testimony of PO1 MARIANO was corroborated by PO3 RAMIREZ who testified that
he personally saw those bricks of marijuana confiscated from the accused. He confirmed that he
was with PO1 Mariano when they apprehended said accused and his companion and testified that
while PO1 Mariano recovered from the accused a black bag containing marijuana, on his part, he
confiscated from accuseds companion a .38 revolver.
MR. CRISENDO AMANSEC, the driver of the taxi where the suspects boarded was also presented
in open court and testified as to what he knows about the incident. He confirmed that on that date,
two (2) persons boarded on his taxi and upon reaching C-3 Road, they alighted and fired three (3)
shots and ran away.
Aside from the oral testimonies of the witnesses, the prosecution also offered the following
documentary evidence to boost their charge against the accused:
Exh. "A" Request for Laboratory Examination dated November 12, 2003
Exh. "B" Physical Sciences Report No. D-1423-03 dated November 12, 2003
Exh. "C-1" Picture of First brick of marijuana fruiting tops
Exh. "C-2" Picture of Second brick of marijuana fruiting tops

Exh. "D" Referral Slip dated November 12, 2003
Exh. "E" Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated November 12, 2003 of PO3 Eduardo
Ramirez and PO1 Nelson Mariano
Exh. "E-1" Their respective signatures
Exh. "F" Sinumpaang Salaysay of Crisendo Amansec (Erroneously marked as Exh. "E")
EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENSE
The accused offered a different version of the story. According to his testimony, this instant case
originated from a traffic mishap where the taxi he and his companion Rommel Reyes were riding
almost collided with another car. Reyes then opened the window and made a "fuck you" sign against
the persons on board of that car. That prompted the latter to chase them and when they were caught
in a traffic jam, PO1 Nelson Mariano, one of the persons on board of that other car alighted and
kicked their taxi. Calantiao and Reyes alighted and PO1 Mariano slapped the latter and uttered,
"Putang ina mo bakit mo ako pinakyu hindi mo ba ako kilala?" Said police officer poked his gun
again[st] Reyes and when Calantiao tried to grab it, the gun fired. Calantiao and Reyes were then
handcuffed and were brought to the police station. Thereat, they were subjected to body frisking and
their wallets and money were taken. PO1 Mariano then prepared some documents and informed
them that they will be charged for drugs. A newspaper containing marijuana was shown to them and
said police officer told them that it would be sufficient evidence against them. They were detained
and subjected to medical examination before they were submitted for inquest at the prosecutors
office.
4
Ruling of the RTC

On July 23, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision giving credence to the prosecutions case. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused MEDARIO
CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the offense of Violation of
Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165, for illegally possessing997.9 grams of marijuana fruiting tops.
Henceforth, this Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00).
5
In convicting Calantiao, the RTC held that the illegal drug seized was admissible in evidence as it
was discovered during a body search after Calantiao was caught in flagrante delicto of possessing a
gun and firing at the police officers. Moreover, the RTC found all the elements of the offense to have
been duly established by the prosecution.
6
Aggrieved, Calantiao appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, assigning the following errors:
7
I
THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 11, ARTICLE II,
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE ALLEGEDLY
SEIZED ITEMS ARE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
II
DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICERS PATENT NON-COMPLIANCE WITHTHE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS.
III
DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE THE PROPER CHAIN OF
CUSTODY OF THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS.
8
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals found no reason to overturn Calantiaos conviction. It found that there was
sufficient reason to justify a warrantless arrest, as the police officers were acting on a legitimate
complaint and had a reasonable suspicion that the persons identified at the scene were the
perpetrators of the offense. Likewise, the Court of Appeals held that the search and subsequent
seizure of the marijuana in question was lawful and valid, being incidental to a lawful arrest. Finding
that all the elements of the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs to be present and duly
proven, the Court of Appeals, on January 17, 2012, promulgated its Decision, affirming in toto the
RTCs ruling.
9
10
Undaunted, Calantiao is now before this Court praying for an acquittal, adding the following
arguments in support of his position:
First, the plain view doctrine is not an exception to a search incident to a valid warrantless arrest.
xxxx
Second, Calantiao did not waive the inadmissibility of the seized items.
xxxx
Finally, the seized items custodial chain is broken.
11
In essence, Calantiao is questioning the admissibility of the marijuana found in his possession, as
evidence against him on the grounds of either it was discovered via an illegal search, or because its
custodial chain was broken.
Ruling of this Court

This Court finds no merit in Calantiaos arguments.
Search and Seizure of
Marijuana valid
This Court cannot subscribe to Calantiaos contention that the marijuana in his possession cannot be
admitted as evidence against him because it was illegally discovered and seized, not having been
within the apprehending officers "plain view."
12
Searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Section 13.Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of
an offense without a search warrant.
The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is "to protect the
arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed
weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach." It is therefore a
reasonable exercise of the States police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the injury that may
be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed
by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of the
evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee.
13
In People v. Valeroso, this Court had the occasion to reiterate the permissible reach of a valid
warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, viz:
14
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in
order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.
Otherwise, the officers safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition,
it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the
arrestees person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to
conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area
within the latters reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous
weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The
phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who
is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the
person arrested. (Citations omitted.)
In Valeroso, however, the Court held that the evidence searched and seized from him could not be
used against him because they were discovered in a room, different from where he was being
detained, and was in a locked cabinet. Thus, the area searched could not be considered as one
within his immediate control that he could take any weapon or destroy any evidence against him.
15
In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiaos possession and within his
immediate control. He could have easily taken any weapon from the bag or dumped it to destroy the
evidence inside it. As the black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiaos possession, it was
within the permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly conduct a warrantless
search.
Calantiaos argument that the marijuana cannot be used as evidence against him because its
discovery was in violation of the Plain View Doctrine, is misplaced.
The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspects person and premises under his
immediate control. This is so because "[o]bjects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to
be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence." "The
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused,
but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object x x x. [It] serves to supplement
the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to
lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed
against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure."
16
17
The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiaos situation because the police officers
purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently come across the
black bag, which was in Calantiaos possession; they deliberately opened it, as part of the search
incident to Calantiaos lawful arrest.
Inventory and Chain of
Custody of Evidence
Calantiao claims that even if the search and seizure were validly effected, the marijuana is still
inadmissible as evidence against him for failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the rules
on chain of custody, as the item was marked at the police station.
18
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9165 provide as follows:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
Its Implementing Rules and Regulations state:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at
the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court has held that the failure to strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, such as immediately marking seized drugs, will not automatically impair the integrity of chain
of custody because what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
19
Section 21 and its IRR do not even mention "marking." What they require are (1) physical inventory,
and (2) taking of photographs. As this Court held in People v. Ocfemia :
20
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of
"marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon
apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and photography when these activities
are undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of
custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items to truly ensure that they are the same
items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence should be done (1) in
the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.
The prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana from the time the
police officers confiscated it, to the time it was turned over to the investigating officer, up to the time it
was brought to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination. This Court has no reason to
21
overrule the RTC and the Court of Appeals, which both found the chain of custody of the seized
drugs to have not been broken so as to render the marijuana seized from Calantiao inadmissible in
evidence.
Furthermore, unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of the evidence,
the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved will remain. The burden of
showing the foregoing to overcome the presumption that the police officers handled the seized drugs
with regularity, and that they properly discharged their duties is on Calantiao. Unfortunately,
Calantiao failed to discharge such burden.
22
It is worthy to note that these arguments were only raised by Calantiao on his appeal. He himself
admits this. His theory, from the very beginning, was that he did not do it, and that he was being
framed for having offended the police officers. Simply put, his defense tactic was one of denial and
frame-up. However, those defenses have always been frowned upon by the Court, to wit:
23
The defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it
can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of
Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with
strong and convincing evidence. In the cases before us, appellant failed to present sufficient
evidence in support of his claims. Aside from his self-serving assertions, no plausible proof was
presented to bolster his allegations.
24
Hence, as Calantiao failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the apprehending officers
were stirred by illicit motive or failed to properly perform their duties, their testimonies deserve full
faith and credit.
25
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the January 17, 2012 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04069.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 208170, August 20, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PETRUS YAU A.K.A. JOHN
AND RICKY AND SUSANA YAU Y SUMOGBA A.K.A. SUSAN, AccusedAppellants.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the September 7, 2012 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03446, which affirmed the December 14, 2007
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, Mandaluyong City (RTC), in
Criminal Case No. MC-04-7923.
The RTC found accused-appellant Petrus Yau (Petrus) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal
detention, as defined and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, (R.A. No. 7659), and convicted accusedappellant Susana Yau y Sumogba (Susana) as an accomplice to the commission of
the same crime.
The Facts
Petrus and Susana were charged with the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom in the
Information,3 dated February 13, 2004, the accusatory portion of which reads:.
That on or about January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 P.M. in the vicinity of Shoemart
Mega Mall, Mandaluyong City, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, with the use of a sleeping substance, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and take away ALASTAIR
JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM in the following manner, to wit: while said ALASTAIR
JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM was on board a white Toyota taxi cab with plate number
PVD-115 being driven by the above-named accused Petrus Yau a.k.a. John and
Ricky and the taxi cab was travelling along Epifanio Delos Santos (EDSA) Avenue,
he suddenly fell unconscious and upon regaining consciousness he was already
handcuffed and in chains inside a house located at B23, L2, Ponsettia St., Camilla
Sorrento Homes, Panapaan IV, Bacoor, Cavite, where he was kept for twenty two
(22) days, which house is owned by accused Susana Yau y Sumogba and while
therein he was maltreated; that ransom in the amount of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND
DOLLARS (US$600,000.00) and TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php20,000.00) for each
day of detention was demanded in exchange for his safe release until he was finally
rescued on February 11, 2004, by PACER operatives of the Philippine National Police.
CONTRARY TO LAW.chanrobleslaw
Version of the Prosecution
In the Appellees Brief,4 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented the
following narration of the kidnapping:.
On January 20, 2004, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, private complainant Alastair
Onglingswam, who is a practicing lawyer and businessman from the United States,
went out of Makati Shangrila Hotel, where he was billeted, and hailed a white Toyota
taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 to take him from the said hotel to Virra Mall
Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. While the said taxicab was plying along
EDSA, and within the vicinity of SM Megamall, private complainant received a phone
call from his associate Kelly Wei in Hong Kong. He noted that while he was on the
phone conversing with his associate, appellant Petrus Yau, whom he noted to have
short black hair, a moustache and gold framed eyeglasses, would from time to time
turn to him and talk as if he was also being spoken to. Thereafter, he felt groggy
and decided to hang-up his phone. He no longer knew what transpired except that
when he woke up lying down, his head was already covered with a plastic bag and
he was handcuffed and chained.
When private complainant complained that the handcuffs were too tight, a man who
was wearing a red mask and introduced himself as John approached him and
removed the plastic bag from his head and loosened his handcuff. John informed
him that he was being kidnapped for ransom and that he will be allowed to make
phone calls to his family and friends. Hours later, John returned with telephony
equipment, tape recorder, phone and a special antennae cap for the cellphone. With
these equipment, private complainant was allowed to call his girlfriend and father
and asked them for the PIN of his ATM cards and for money, however, with
instructions not to inform them that he was kidnapped. A day after, he was told by
his captor to call his girlfriend and father to tell them that he was still alive as well
as to reveal to them that he was kidnapped for ransom and his kidnappers were
demanding Six Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$600,000.00) as ransom and Twenty
Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00) a day as room and board fee.
The private complainants family, girlfriend (Iris Chau) and friends received a text
message purportedly from the former informing them that he was kidnapped and
ransom for his liberty was demanded.
On January 21, 2004, the family of the victim informed the United States Embassy in
Manila about the situation and a meeting with the representatives of the Philippine
National Police was arranged.
Subsequently, Chau received an email from the purported kidnapper demanding
US$2,000.00. Chau then wired US$1,000.00, upon instructions, to Ong Kwai Ping
thru Metro Bank and Trust Company. Likewise, private complainants brother Aaron
Onglingswam made eight (8) deposits to Ong Kwai Pings account in Metro Bank,
amounting to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00), to ensure his
brothers safety and eventual release.
During private complainants twenty-two (22) days of captivity, while he was
allowed to communicate with his family almost daily to prove that he was still alive
and was served with meals almost five times a day either by John or the other
accused Susan Yau, he was also maltreated i.e. beaten with sticks, made to laydown biting a piece of wood which was made as target for a rifle.
On February 10, 2004, the PACER received information that a taxi with plate number
PVD 115 plying along Bacoor was victimizing passengers. Upon instructions of
P/Supt. Isagani Nerez, members of the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response
Task Force (PACER) were ordered to proceed to Bacoor, Cavite to look for Toyota
Corolla White Taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115.
On February 11, 2004, at around 4:00 oclock in the morning, the PACER group
proceeded to Bacoor and positioned themselves along Aguinaldo Highway under the
overpass fronting SM Bacoor. Not having caught sight of the taxi, after three hours,
the group moved to a different location along the Aguinaldo Highway where they
were able to chance upon the said vehicle. Thus, they followed it, then flagged it
down and approached the driver. The driver was asked to scroll down his window
and was told that the vehicle was being used to victimize foreign nationals.
Appellant did not offer to make any comment. Hence, this prompted the officers to
ask for his name and since he answered that he was Petrus Yau, a British national,
they asked him for his drivers license and car registration but appellant was not
able to produce any. Since he could not produce any drivers license and car
registration, they were supposed to bring him to the police station for investigation,
however, when shown a picture of private complainant and asked if he knew him,
he answered that the man is being kept in his house. He was immediately informed
that he was being placed under arrest for kidnapping private complainant Alastair
Onglingswam after being informed of his constitutional rights. Thereafter,
appellants cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and Sony Erickson were confiscated. Upon
instructions of P/Supt. Nerez, [appellant] was brought to the parking lot of SM City
Bacoor for a possible rescue operations of the victim.
Appellant led the team to his house and after opening the gate of his residence, he
was led back to the police car. The rest of the members of PACER proceeded inside
the house and found a man sitting on the floor chained and handcuffed. The man
later identified himself as Alastair Onglingswam.
During the trial of the case, private complainant positively identified Petrus Yau as
his captor and the taxi driver. Test conducted by the United States Federal Bureau of
Investigation reveals that the DNA found in the mask used by private complainants
captor matched that of appellant Petrus Yau. 5
Version of the Defense
Petrus and Susana denied the accusation, and stated the following in their Brief 6 to
substantiate their claim of innocence:.
Accused Petrus Yau denied having committed the crime. He averred that the
supposed kidnap victim coordinated with the police to set up the subject case
against him and his family. He is a British national. He had been in the Philippines
for many times since he was 14 years old. He came to the country in July 2001 for a
vacation and had not left since then. On September 2001, he got married to Susana
Yau. Prior thereto, he was in Singapore running some businesses.
On January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon (the date and time the
victim was kidnapped), Petrus Yau was at home sleeping.
On February 11, 2004 (the date the victim was allegedly rescued) at around 8:30
9:00 oclock in the morning, he went to his wife Susana in her shop and got money
to be deposited to the Asia Trust Bank. He parked his car outside the bank. After he
alighted from his car, three (3) men bigger than him held his hands: one (1) of them
held his neck. They pushed him inside their van. They tied his hands with packing
tape, covered his eyes with the same tape, and his head with a plastic bag. They
kicked and beat him until he became unconscious.
When he regained consciousness, he was inside an air-conditioned room. His hands
were handcuffed and he felt very cold because his body was wet. His head was still
being covered. He shouted asking where he was. People came in and he heard them
talking in Tagalog. They kicked him for about twenty (20) seconds. Later, he was
made to sit, as he was lying on the floor. He said that he could not see anything,
thus, someone removed the cover of his head. They accused him of being a
kidnapper, to which he replied that he was not. He pleaded to them to allow him to
make a call to the British Embassy, his friends and his wife, but to no avail.
When he was taken into custody, he had his wedding ring, watch and a waist bag
containing his British passport, alien certificate, drivers license, Asia Trust bankbook
in the name of Susana Yau, ATM Cards (in his name) of Metrobank, PCI Equitable
Bank and Banco de Oro, VISA Card, and some cash given to him by his wife . He lost
those personal properties.
After four (4) to five (5) hours, he was transferred to another room without a
window. The following day, he was brought to and detained at the PACER Custodial
Center.
Petrus Yau can speak English but he is better in the Chinese language, both
Mandarin and Cantonese. He bought the taxi he was driving in August 2003 for
Eighty Five Thousand Pesos (Php85,000.00) for personal use and/or for resale. It had
a defective engine (usually overheats), without an aircon and cannot travel for long
journey. He does not drive a taxi to earn a living. He had police friends who told him
that he cannot drive a taxi as an occupation since his drivers license is nonprofessional.
Sometime on June 2003, he and his wife Susana had a heated argument over his
womanizing. Hence, she decided to live separately from him (though she was
pregnant at that time) and moved to another house (Block 5, Lot 4, Tulip Street,
Andrea Village, Bacoor, Cavite). Sometimes, she would visit him.
Petrus claimed that his house does not have a basement, contrary to the victims
testimony that he was placed in the basement. He was not in his house when the
police officers allegedly rescued the kidnapped victim. He left his house in good
condition in the morning before his arrest. The white Toyota Corolla taxi he was
driving had markings of faded grey, not black, as claimed by Alastair.
During the inquest proceedings, Petrus Yau was not assisted by a counsel and was
not informed of his constitutional rights.
Susana Sumogba Yau denied the accusation that she was in the company of the
kidnapper every time the latter served Alastairs food (lunch and dinner). She is
legally married to Petrus Yau. They have two (2) children named Charlie and Vivian.
On February 11, 2004, she lived at Block 5, Lot 4, Tulips Street, Andrea Village,
Bacoor, Cavite, while Petrus Yau lived at Block 23, Lot 2, Ponsettia Street, Sorrento
Town Homes, Bacoor, Cavite, with his girlfriend. Susana and Petrus were separated
since June 2003.
On February 11, 2004, she called him to pick up the amount of Php7,000.00
(earnings of her sari-sari store) and to deposit it in her account at Asia Trust Bank.
She would request Petrus to do such errand for her as she does not trust her
househelp. Petrus came to her at around 7:00 oclock in the morning. At around
11:00 oclock a.m. of the same day, four (4) to five (5) policemen arrived at her
residence and told her to come with them to the hospital where Petrus was brought
because he met a vehicular accident along Aguinaldo Highway.
Susana, together with her children and helpers, went with them, and rode in their
van. They, however, were not brought to the hospital but to an office. Thereat,
Susana saw her husband (almost dead) inside a small room with a one-way mirror.
She was not able to talk to him. She, together with her children and helpers, were
detained for three (3) days inside a small room. After three (3) days, her children
and helpers were released and they went home. At that time, she was not provided
with the assistance of a counsel.
Susana stated that her husbands name is Petrus Yau. He is not known either as
John or Ong Kwai Ping. He is engaged in the business of buying cars for resale. They
owned three (3) houses and lots, all registered in her name. At the time she was
taken into custody by the police, she had with her Five Thousand Pesos cash, Allied
Bank passbook and ATM Cards (Allied Bank and Asia Trust Bank), VISA card,
passport, wedding ring, necklace and cellphone, which were taken away by persons
whom she does not know.7
The Ruling of the RTC

In its judgment, dated December 14, 2007, the RTC convicted Petrus Yau, as
principal, of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention, and
Susana Yau, as an accomplice to the commission thereof. The RTC found the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible and sufficient, with their versions
of the incident dovetailing with each other even on minor details. It observed that
Petrus failed to rebut his positive identification by the victim, Alastair and his
brother Aaron John Onglingswam (Aaron John), with whom he talked for several
times over the phone. It stated that the circumstantial evidence proffered by the
prosecution had adequately reinforced its theory that Petrus was the perpetrator of
the heinous act.
With respect to Susana, the RTC wrote that she was positively identified by Alastair
as the Filipino woman who fed him or accompanied Petrus in bringing him food
during his 22 days of captivity and, for said reason, should be held liable as an
accomplice.
The RTC rejected the twin defenses of alibi and frame-up submitted by Petrus and
Susana because the same were unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
The dispositive portion of the said decision states:.
WHEREFORE, this court renders judgment finding the accused Petrus Yau GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom
and serious illegal detention and pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the prison term of RECLUSION PERPETUA. The court also finds
the accused Susana Yau GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as accomplice to the
commission of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention and
applying to her the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law wherein her
minimum penalty shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree of the
imposable penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL which is prision mayor, she is hereby
therefore sentenced to suffer the prison term of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of PRISION MAYOR MINIMUM AS MINIMUM to TWELVE (12) YEARS and TEN (10)
MONTHS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL MINIMUM AS MAXIMUM. Accused are credited in
full of the preventive imprisonment they have already served in confinement.
Further, both accused are sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, the victim
ALASTAIR JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM actual damages of Two Hundred Seventy Three
Thousand and One Hundred Thirty Two Pesos (P273, 132.00) plus interest from the
filing of the information until full payment, moral damages of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00), and exemplary damages of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00).
SO ORDERED.8
Unfazed, Petrus and Susana appealed the RTC judgment of conviction before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed the conviction of Petrus and Susana. 9 The appellate court likewise
lent credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who were able to
establish with certitude the commission of the crime and the identities of the
culprits thereof.
Hence, this appeal.
ASSIGNED ERRORS:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED AND AS SUCH, THE PIECES OF
OBJECT EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED ARE INADMISSIBLE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS POSITIVE
IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS THE ALLEGED
KIDNAPPER.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.10
Susana insisted that the trial court erred: 1] in not giving credence to her claim that
she was living separately with her husband, Petrus Yau; 2] in not considering that
she was not mentioned in the sworn statement executed by Alastair, dated February
12, 2004, even when said victim was asked if there was another person assisting
Petrus in the perpetration of the crime; 3] in not considering the Resolution of the
Department of Justice, dated February 13, 2004, finding probable cause against her
because she is the registered owner of the house where Alastair was held captive
and not because she served food on the victim; and 4] in convicting her as an
accomplice.11cralawred
On September 11, 2013, the Court issued a resolution 12 notifying the parties that
they could file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desire. The People of
the Philippines, represented by the OSG, opted not to file any supplemental brief,
maintaining its positions and arguments in its brief earlier filed in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 03446.13 Petrus filed his Supplemental Brief14 on December 27, 2013 in
amplification of his arguments raised in his brief filed before the CA.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Encapsulated, the issues herein focus on: (a) the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses; (b) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to prove the commission
of kidnapping for ransom and the identity of the culprits thereof; and (c) the degree
of responsibility of each accused-appellant for the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
Worth reiterating on the issue of the credibility of the witnesses is the ruling of the
Court in People v. Maxion15 that:.
The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of witness, which is
best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such
question, having heard the witness and observed his demeanor, conduct, and
attitude under grueling examination. These are the most significant factors in
evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the
face of conflicting testimonies. Through its observations during the entire
proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable
discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to believe. Verily, findings
of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts
or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case. 16
It has been an established rule in appellate review that the trial courts factual
findings, such as its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative
weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the factual findings, are
accorded great respect and have even conclusive effect. Such factual findings and
conclusions assume even greater weight when they are affirmed by the
CA.17cralawred
In the case at bench, the RTC gave more weight and credence to the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses compared to those of the accused-appellants. After a
judicious review of the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to
deviate from the factual findings of the RTC and the CA, and their respective
assessment and calibration of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
In every criminal case, the task of the prosecution is always two-fold, that is, (1) to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged; and (2) to
establish with the same quantum of proof the identity of the person or persons
responsible therefor, because, even if the commission of the crime is a given, there
can be no conviction without the identity of the malefactor being likewise clearly
ascertained.18 Here, the prosecution was able to satisfactorily discharge this burden.
Victim Alastair positively identified Petrus as the driver of the white Toyota Corolla
taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115 which he boarded before he lost consciousness on
the afternoon of January 20, 2004. He claimed that while he was conversing with his
business associate Kelly Wei over his phone inside the taxicab, Petrus would turn his
face towards him, from time to time, and would talk as if he was being spoken to.
Alastair claimed that he had a good look and an ample opportunity to remember the
facial features of the driver as to be able to recognize and identify him in court. It is
the most natural reaction for victims of crimes to strive to remember the faces of
their accosters and the manner in which the craven acts are committed. 19cralawred
Alastair also recognized the voice behind the red mask used by his kidnapper as
belonging to Petrus. It was established that from the first to the twentieth day of
Alastairs captivity, his kidnapper would meet him five times a day and would talk to
him for an hour, thus, enabling him to remember the culprits voice which had a
unique tone and noticeable Chinese accent. Alastair declared with certainty that it
was the voice of Petrus. Witness Aaron John insisted that the person who introduced
himself as Ong Kwai Ping and with whom he had talked over the phone for three
weeks, demanding necessity money and ransom for the release of his brother
Alastair, was Petrus because of the distinct tone of his voice with Chinese accent.
There was no showing that Alastair and Aaron John had any ill motive to falsely
testify against Petrus. As a rule, absent any evidence showing any reason or motive
for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such improper
motive exists, and their testimonies are, thus, worthy of full faith and
credit.20cralawred
Further, the prosecution presented credible and sufficient pieces of circumstantial
evidence that led to the inescapable and reasonable conclusion that Petrus
committed the crime charged. The settled rule is that a judgment of conviction
based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the following requisites
concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances
is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 21 The corollary rule is
that the circumstances proven must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to
one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person.22cralawred
The combination of the following established facts and circumstances affirm the
findings of guilt by the RTC and the CA:.
1] The victim was rescued by the police inside the house owned by Petrus and
Susana, located at Block 23, Lot 2, Ponsettia St., Camella Sorrento Homes, Bacoor,
Cavite;.
2] The Toyota Corolla white taxicab bearing Plate No. PVD 115, which the victim
recalled boarding in going to Virra Mall Greenhills Shopping Center on the afternoon
of January 20, 2004 and where he lost consciousness, was found in the possession
of the accused-appellant Petrus on February 11, 2004;.
3] The drivers license of Petrus and an ATM card in the name of Ong Kwai Ping were
recovered inside the Toyota Corolla taxicab of Petrus Yau;.
4] In the house where the victim was rescued, the following evidence were found:
one (1) chain with padlock; handcuffs; short broken chain; checkered pajama; black
blazer; one (1) Onesimus black coat; two (2) video camera cartridges, one showing
the victim in lying down position and family footages, and the other one labeled
sex scandal; eight (8) pieces of cellphones; notebook; two (2) Talk n Tex SIM cards;
Globe SIM card; two (2) Transfer Certificates of Title for two pieces of land in Bacoor,
Cavite, under the name of Susana Sumogba; original copy of the Official Receipts
and Certificate of Registration of a Suzuki 1993 motorcycle bearing Plate No.
2M9748; business license and mayors permit issued to Susana Yau; marriage
contract of Petrus Yau and Susana Yau; birth certificate of Susana Sumogba; birth
certificates of their children; ACR of Petrus Yau; Meralco bills; Asia Trust deposit
slips; five ATM deposit slips; and PLDT bills;.
5] Two (2) cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and a Sony Erickson were found in the
possession of Petrus. Incidentally, it was reported that the owner of the QTEK
Palmtop cellphone was a certain Jasper Beltran, also a kidnapped victim whose
whereabouts had not been known yet; andChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
6] The DNA examination on the red mask worn by the kidnapper that was recovered
inside the house and on the buccal swab taken from Petrus showed that both DNA
profiles matched.23
The Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that the foregoing pieces
of circumstantial evidence, when analyzed and taken together, definitely lead to no
other conclusion than that Petrus was the author of the kidnapping for ransom.
When viewed as a whole, the prosecution evidence effectively established his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
The elements of Kidnapping For Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended
by R.A. No. 7659, are as follows: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the
victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive
of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim. 24cralawred
All of the foregoing elements were duly established by the testimonial and
documentary evidences for the prosecution in the case at bench. First, Petrus is a
private individual. Second, Petrus kidnapped Alastair by using sleeping substance
which rendered the latter unconscious while inside a taxicab driven by the said
accused-appellant. Third, Petrus took and detained Alastair inside the house owned
by him and Susana Yau in Bacoor, Cavite, where said victim was handcuffed and
chained, and hence, deprived of his liberty. Fourth, Alastair was taken against his
will. And fifth, Petrus made demands for the delivery of a ransom in the amount of
US$600,000.00 for the release of the victim.
Anent the criminal liability of each accused-appellant, there is no doubt that Petrus
is liable as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Susana, on the other
hand, is liable only as an accomplice to the crime as correctly found by the lower
courts. It must be emphasized that there was no evidence indubitably proving that
Susana participated in the decision to commit the criminal act. The only evidence
the prosecution had against her was the testimony of Alastair to the effect that he
remembered her as the woman who gave food to him or who accompanied his
kidnapper whenever he would bring food to him every breakfast, lunch and dinner.
Jurisprudence25 is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with Article 18
of the RPC, in order that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1)
that there be a community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the
principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that
he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention
of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious
way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and
those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.
In the case at bench, Susana knew of the criminal design of her husband, Petrus,
but she kept quiet and never reported the incident to the police authorities. Instead,
she stayed with Petrus inside the house and gave food to the victim or accompanied
her husband when he brought food to the victim. Susana not only countenanced
Petrus illegal act, but also supplied him with material and moral aid. It has been
held that being present and giving moral support when a crime is being committed
make a person responsible as an accomplice in the crime committed. 26 As keenly
observed by the RTC, the act of giving food by Susana to the victim was not
essential and indispensable for the perpetration of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom but merely an expression of sympathy or feeling of support to her
husband.27 Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in People v. De Vera,28
where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be
considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a principal.
Alastairs positive identification of Susana is not in any bit prejudiced by his failure
to mention her name in his sworn statement, dated February 12, 2004. It is wellsettled that affidavits, being ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often
inaccurate, but do not really detract from the credibility of witnesses. 29 Oftentimes,
the allegations contained in affidavits involved mere passive mention of details
anchored entirely on the investigators questions. The discrepancies between a
sworn statement and a testimony in court do not outrightly justify the acquittal of
an accused, as testimonial evidence carries more weight than an
affidavit.30 Testimonies given during the trial are more exact and elaborate. Besides,
sworn statements are often executed when an affiants mental faculties are not in
such a state as to afford the affiant a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident
which transpired.31cralawred
Given the overwhelming picture of their complicity in the crime, this Court cannot
accept the defenses of alibi and frame-up interposed by the accused-appellants.
Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to prove.
Alibi must be proven by the accused with clear and convincing evidence; otherwise
it cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters. 32 The defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably
viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted but is difficult to
prove. In order to prosper, the defense of frame-up must be proven by the accused
with clear and convincing evidence. 33 Apart from their bare allegations, no
competent and independent evidence was adduced by the accused-appellants to
substantiate their twin defenses of alibi and frame-up and, thus, remain self-serving
and do not merit any evidentiary value. More importantly, nowhere in the records
does it show of any dubious reasons or improper motive that could have impelled
the prosecution witnesses, particularly victim Alastair Onglingswam, to falsely
testify and fabricate documentary or object evidence just to implicate accusedappellants in such a heinous crime as kidnapping for ransom. Their only motive was
to see to it that the kidnapper be brought to justice and sentenced with the
appropriate penalty.
As a last-ditch effort to exculpate themselves from any criminal culpability, the
accused-appellants questioned the legality of their warrantless arrests. This too
must fail.
Any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court
of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely raised before he
enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. 34 The accusedappellants never objected to or questioned the legality of their warrantless arrests
or the acquisition of jurisdiction by the RTC over their persons before they entered
their respective pleas to the kidnapping for ransom charge. Considering this lapse
and coupled with their full and active participation in the trial of the case, accusedappellants were deemed to have waived any objection to their warrantless arrests.
The accused-appellants voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC thereby
curing whatever defects that might have attended their arrest. It bears stressing
that the legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over their
persons.35 Their warrantless arrests cannot, by themselves, be the bases of their
acquittal.
Even assuming arguendo that the accused-appellants made a timely objection to
their warrantless arrests, jurisprudence is replete with rulings that support the view
that their conviction was proper despite being illegally arrested without a warrant.
In People v. Manlulu,36 the Court ruled that the illegality of the warrantless arrest
cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on
record point to their culpability. Indeed, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint after a trial free from error.37cralawred
With respect to the penalty, the Court finds that the RTC was correct in imposing the
penalty ofreclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole against Petrus as principal
in the charge of kidnapping for ransom in view of R.A. No. 9346, prohibiting the
death penalty. Also, the Court finds that the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and ten (10) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, meted out against Susana, an accomplice, to
be proper.
The Court also sustains the RTC in awarding actual damages in the amount of
P273,132.00 plus interest committed from the filing of the information until fully
paid. As regards the moral damages against the accused-appellants, the Court finds
the award of P1,000,000.00 to be exorbitant. Hence, the same is being reduced to
P200,000.00, as the reasonable compensation for the ignominy and sufferings that
Alastair and his family endured because of the accused-appellants inhumane acts
of detaining him in handcuffs and chains, and mentally torturing him and his family
to raise the ransom money. The fact that they suffered the trauma from mental,
physical and psychological ordeal which constitutes the basis for moral damages
under Article 2219 of the Civil Code is too obvious to still require its recital at the
trial through the superfluity of a testimonial charade. The Court also finds the award
of exemplary damages to be in order in view of the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of demand for ransom, and to serve as an example and deterrence for
the public good. The Court, however, reduces the amount from P200,000.00 to
P100,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 38cralawred
The RTC, however, erred in ruling that Susana was solidarily liable with Petrus for
the payment of damages. This is an erroneous apportionment of the damages
awarded because it does not take into account the difference in the nature and
degree of participation between the principal, Petrus, and the accomplice, Susana.
The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros39 is instructive on the
apportionment of civil liabilities among all the accused-appellants. The entire
amount of the civil liabilities should be apportioned among all those who cooperated
in the commission of the crime according to the degrees of their liability, respective
responsibilities and actual participation. Accordingly, Petrus should shoulder a
greater share in the total amount of damages than Susana who was adjudged only
as an accomplice.
In fine, the accused-appellants are ordered to pay the victim, Alastair Onglingswam
actual damages in the amount of P273,132.00; moral damages in the amount of
P200,000.00; and exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00, or a total
amount of P573,132.00. Taking into consideration the degree of their participation,
the principal, Petrus, should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the
damages (P573,132.00 x 2/3) or P382,088.00; and the accomplice, Susana, should
be ordered to pay the remaining one-third (1/3) or P191,044.00. Specifically, Petrus
shall be liable for actual damages in the amount of P182,088.00; moral damages in
the amount of P133,333.33; and exemplary damages in the amount of P66,666.67;
and Susana for the amount of P91,044.00 as actual damages; P66,666.67 as moral
damages; and P33,333.33 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the September 7, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 03446 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellants
Petrus Yau and Susana Yau y Sumogba are ordered to pay the victim Alastair Joseph
Onglingswam moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and exemplary
damages in the amount of P100,000.00. The award of actual damages in the
amount of P273,132.00 is maintained. The civil liabilities of the accused-appellants
shall be apportioned as follows:.
1] Petrus Yau is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of P182,088.00;
moral damages in the amount of P133,333.33; and exemplary damages in the
amount of P66,666.67; andChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
2] Susana Yau y Sumogba is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of
P91,044.00, moral damages in the amount of ?66,666.67 and exemplary damages
in the amount of P33,333.33.
SO ORDERED
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 205015
November 19, 2014
MA. MIMIE CRESCENCIO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This case stemmed from Ma. Mimie Crescencio's (petitioner) conviction for violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines (Forestry Code), as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277, rendered by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofTalibon, Bohol, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No. 96-27, on August 12,
2008. The Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 01162, dismissed the appeal in its
Resolution dated April 15, 2011 for failure to serve a copy of the Appellants Brief to the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG). The CA, in its Resolution dated November 19, 2012, also denied the
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said resolution.
1
The Facts
Acting on an information that there was a stockpile of lumber or forest products in the vicinity of the
house of the petitioner, Eufemio Abaniel (Abaniel), the Chief of the ForestProtection Unit of
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) - Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office, Talibon, Bohol, together with Forest Rangers Urcino Butal (Butal), Alfredo Bastasa
and Celso Ramos (Ramos) went to the petitioners house at Balico, Talibon, Bohol on March 15,
1994 at 3:00 p.m. Upon arriving thereat, they saw forest products lying under the house of the
petitioner and at the shoreline about two meters away from the petitioners house. As the DENR
personnel tried to investigate from the neighborhood as to who was the owner of the lumber, the
petitioner admitted its ownership. Thereafter, the DENR personnel entered the premises of the
petitioners house without a search warrant.
7
Upon inspection, 24 pieces of magsihagonlumber, which is equivalent to 452 board feet, were
discovered. When the DENR personnel asked for documents to support the petitioners claim of
ownership, the latter showed to them Official Receipt No. 35053 issued by Pengavitor Enterprises
where she allegedly bought the said lumber. However, when the DENR personnel scaled the lumber,
they found out that the dimensions and the species of the lumber did not tally with the items
mentioned in the receipt. The said receipt showed that the petitioner bought 10 pieces of red lawaan
lumber with sizes 2x6x18 and 5 pieces with sizes 2x8x16 on March 13, 1994. On the other hand, the
lumber in the petitioners house, on March 15, 1994, was 24 pieces of magsihagonlumber of three
different sizes, to wit: 20 pieces 2x6x18; 3 pieces 2x8x18; and 1 piece 2x10x12.
8
Since the petitioner could not present any other receipt, Abaniel ordered the confiscation of the
lumber, asked for police assistance, and told the petitioner that they were going to transport the
confiscated lumber to the DENR office for safekeeping. Seizure Receipt No. 004157 and a
Statement Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber Being Confiscated, which showed
the value of the lumber to be 9,040.00, were issued to the petitioner. Forest Rangers Butal and
Ramos corroborated Abaniels testimony.
9
10
SPO1 Desiderio Garcia testified that upon the request of Abaniel for police assistance, he and PO3
Antonio Crescencio went to the house of the petitioner where they saw some lumberwhich was later
loaded on a cargo truck. Thereafter, they escorted the transport of the lumber to the DENR office in
San Roque, Talibon, Bohol.
11
On the other hand, the lone witness of the defense, Lolita Crescencio, admitted that the seized
lumber were owned by the petitioner but claimed that the latter bought it from Pengavitor Enterprises
of Trinidad, Bohol and from Java Marketing in Ubay, Bohol. However, the defense had only the
Official Receipt No. 35053 issued by Pengavitor Enterprises which, however, did not tally with the
forest products confiscated.
12
On May 17, 1994, the petitioner was charged by the Provincial Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, Bohol,
with violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. The Information alleged:
13
That on or about the 15th day of March, 1994, in the municipality of Talibon, Bohol, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to possess and
to gain for her own benefit, without any legal document as required under existing jurisprudence,
laws and regulations, and without any lawful authority under existing rules and regulation of DENR
Forest Management Sector, willfully, unlawfully and illegally possess and have under her custody
and control forest products consisting of twenty-four (24) pieces of magsihagon lumber with a
volume of 452 board feet and a total value of Nine Thousand Forty (P9,040.00) Pesos, Philippine
Currency; to the damage and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.
14
During the arraignment on July 15,1997, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged.Thereafter, trial ensued.
15
On August 12, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of the offense charged
and sentenced her to imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum to
eleven (11) years and six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayoras maximum. The
RTC also ordered the confiscation of the seized lumber owned by the petitioner.
16
17
As expected, the petitioner appealed the decision to the CA. However, in its Resolution dated April
15, 2011, the CA dismissed the appeal outright because the petitioner failed to furnish the OSG a
copy of the Appellants Brief in violation of the Rules of Court. The petitioner moved for
reconsideration but it was denied by the CA,in its Resolution dated November 19, 2012. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.
18
19
The Issue
The core issue to be resolved is whether or not the CAs dismissal of the appeal due to the
petitioners failureto serve a copy of the Appellants Brief to the OSG is proper, in view of the
attendant factual circumstances and in the interest of substantial justice.
Ruling of the Court
In this case, the petitioner asks for a relaxation of the rigid rules of technical procedure and submits
that the CA erred in dismissing her appeal purely on the basis of mere technicalities.
Confronted with issues of this nature, this Court is mindful of the policy of affording litigants the
amplest opportunity for the determination of their cases on the merits and of dispensing with
technicalities whenever compelling reasons so warrant or when the purpose of justice requires it.
20
The Court has constantly pronouncedthat "[t]he rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very
rigid,technical sense, for they have been adopted to help secure not override substantial justice.
For this reason, courts must proceed with caution so asnot to deprive a party of statutory appeal;
rather, they must ensure thatall litigants are granted the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
ventilation of their causes, free from the constraint of technicalities."
21
It is clear that without at all touching on the substantive aspects of the petitioners cause, the
appellate court opted not to decide the case on the merits. The subject of the appeal was the
decision of the RTC convicting the petitioner of violation of the Forestry Code and sentencing her to
suffer an imprisonment of no less than six (6) years to eleven (11) years.
In this case, there is nothing in the record that shows any deliberate intent on the part of the
petitioner to subvert and delay the final disposition of the case. In fact, when the petitioner learned
that her appeal was dismissed by the CA for failure to serve a copy of her Appellants Brief to the
OSG, she immediately confronted her previous counsel who denied having filed such brief. Asthe
petitioner was very much worried of being incarcerated, she asked her previous counsel to withdraw
from the case. Thus, the petitioner submits that the outright denial of her appeal is due to the
incompetence and ignorance of her former counsel who even lied about the fact thathe has indeed
filed an Appellants Brief.
As a general rule, the inadvertence of counsel cannot be considered as an adequate excuse as to
call for the appellate courts indulgence except: (a) where the reckless or gross negligence of
counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (b) when application of the rule will result in
outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or (c) where the interests of justice so require.
22
Here, the petitioner submits that the inadvertence of her counsel to serve a copy of the Appellants
Brief tothe OSG is a persuasive reason or a compelling justification to forego the Rules of Procedure
as the wanton recklessness or gross negligence of her counsel has deprived her of due process of
law which will result in the outright deprivation of her liberty.
In this regard, the Court agrees that the CA should have taken a liberal view of the rules and ruled
on the meritsof the appeal, especially when what is involved is no less than the petitioners liberty.
Nonetheless, even if the Court brushes aside the technicality issue, it will still find that the
prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the petitioners culpability.
In attempting to escape liability, the petitioner contends that: (a) she had the supporting documents
to show that she bought the questioned lumber from legitimate sources; and (b) the warrantless
search and seizure conducted by the DENR personnel was illegal and, thus, the items seized should
not have been admitted in evidence against her.
The Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Nonetheless, the constitutional prohibition
against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certainexceptions, one of which is seizure of
evidence in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer,
who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented
as evidence.
23
1wphi1
24
There is no question that the DENR personnel were not armed with a search warrant when they
went to the house of the petitioner. When the DENR personnel arrived at the petitioners house, the
lumbers were lying under the latters house and at the shoreline about two meters away from the
house of the petitioner. It isclear, therefore, that the said lumber is plainly exposed to sight. Hence,
the seizure of the lumber outside the petitioners house falls within the purview of the plain view
doctrine.
Besides, the DENR personnel had the authority to arrest the petitioner, even without a warrant.
Section 80 of the Forestry Code authorizes the forestry officer or employee of the DENR or any
personnel of the Philippine National Police to arrest, even without a warrant, any person who has
committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined by the Forestry Code and to
seize and confiscate the tools and equipment used in committing the offense orthe forest products
gathered or taken by the offender. Clearly, in the course ofsuch lawful intrusion, the DENR personnel
had inadvertently come across the lumber which evidently incriminated the petitioner.
25
The fact of possession by the petitioner of the 24 pieces of magsihagonlumber, as well as her
subsequent failure to produce the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations constitute criminal liability for violation of the Forestry Code. Under Section 68 of the
Forestry Code, there are two distinctand separate offenses punished, namely: (1) cutting, gathering,
collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable
or disposable public land, or from private land withoutany authority; and (2) possession of timber or
other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and
regulations.
26
In the second offense, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the
forest products are legal or not. Mere possession of forest products withoutthe proper documents
consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial
because the Forestry Code is a special law which considers mere possession of timber or other
forest products without the proper documentation as malum prohibitum.
27
In the present case, the magsihagonlumber were admittedly owned by the petitioner but
unfortunately no permit evidencing authority to possess said lumber was duly presented. Thus, the
Information correctly charged the petitioner with the second offense which is consummated by the
mere possession of forest products without the proper documents. The prosecution adduced several
documents to prove that the lumber was confiscated from the petitioner, namely: a Statement
Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber Being Confiscated on March 15, 1994, seizure
receipt, a photograph of the house of the petitioner, and a photograph of the confiscated lumber.
Moreso, the direct and affirmative testimony of the DENR personnel as state witnesses on the
circumstances surrounding the apprehension well establishes the petitioners liability.
As to the imposable penalty on the petitioner, the RTC imposed an indeterminate sentence of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twentyone (21) days of prision mayoras maximum.
The Court does not agree. This Court notes that the estimated value of the confiscated pieces of
lumber, as appearing in the Statement Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber Being
Confiscated is P9,040.00 which is alleged in the Information. However, except for the testimonies of
Abaniel and Butal that this amount is the estimate based on prevailing local price as stated in the
apprehension receipt they issued, the prosecution did not present any proof as tothe value of the
lumber.
Clearly, this evidence does not suffice. The Court had ruled that in order to prove the amount of the
property taken for fixing the penalty imposable against the accused under Article 309 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), the prosecution must present more than a mereuncorroborated "estimate" of
such fact. In the absence of independent and reliable corroboration of such estimate, courts may
either apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on
the attendant circumstances of the case. Hence, the lower court erred in finding that the value of
the confiscated lumber is P9,040.00 for no evidence of such value was established during the trial.
28
Accordingly, the Court imposes on the petitioner the minimum penalty under Article 309(6) of the
RPC, whichis arresto mayorin its minimum and medium periods. However, considering that violation
of Section 68 of the Forestry Code is punished as Qualified Theft under Article 310 in relation to
Article 309 of the RPC, the statutory penalty shall be increased by two degrees, that is, to prision
correccionalin its medium and maximum periods or within the range ofthree (3) years, six (6) months
and twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days, considering that there
are no attending mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the commission of the offense.
29
30
In accordance with current jurisprudence and taking into account the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the Court finds it proper to impose on the petitioner, in view of the circumstances obtaining here, the
penalty of frmr (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6)
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum. WHEREFORE, the Decision
on August 12, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Talibon, Bohol, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No.
96-27, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Ma. Mimie Crescencio is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four ( 4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum.
31
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 71092 September 30, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANACLETO Q. OLVIS, Acquitted, ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS and
DOMINADOR SORELA, accused-appellants.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court to Zamboanga Del Norte sitting in
Dipolog City. 1The case was certified to this Court on January 19, 1985 following the death sentences imposed on each of the three
accused-appellants, Romulo Villarojo, Leonardo Cademas, and Dominador Sorela (the accused first-named, Anacleto Olvis, was acquitted),
we exercised exclusive appellate jurisdiction. 3 With the

promulgation of the 1987 Charter, abolishing the death penalty and commuting death penalties already
imposed to reclusion perpetua 4 we, on May 14, 1987, issued a death penalty abolition
resolution requiring the three accused-appellants to file a statement, personally signed by them with the
assistance of counsel, stating whether or not they wished to continue with the case as a n appealed
case. 5 We have since observed this procedure with respect to all pending capital cases.
over which, under the Constitution then in force,
In compliance with our resolution, the three accused-appellants, on May 28, 1987, filed a statement
informing us that they desire to continue with this case as an appealed case. 6
This appeal stemmed from an information dated November 11, 1976 charging all four accused with
the murder of Discredit Bagon. The same reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses ANACLETO Q. OLVIS, as
principal by inducement, ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS and
DOMINADOR SORELA, as principals by direct participation, of the crime of murder,
committed as follows:
That in the evening on or about the 7th day of September 1975, in title Municipality of
Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, consprising and confederating with one another and acting
upon the direction and instruction of ANACLETO Q. OLVIS who mastermind the
bizarre plot and directly induced ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS
and DOMINADOR SORELA to execute the conspiracy and who, armed with boloes
and a hunting knife, with intent to kill by means of treachery and evident
premeditation, and for a consideration of a price or reward, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack and stab one DISCREDIT
BAGON, thereby inflicting upon him multiple inc. (hack) and stab wounds which
caused his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation and the generic aggravating circumstances of superior strength,
nighttime and in consideration of a price or reward. 7
xxx xxx xxx
The four accused entered Identical "not guilty" pleas.

After trial, the court a quo rendered the decision under appeal, the dispositive portion whereof reads
as follows:
FOREGOING CONSIDERED, and on the part of accused ANACLETO Q. OLVIS,
SR., there being no evidence, direct or indirect, whether testimonial, documentary or
physical evidence, that tend to establish his complicity in this case, said accused has
to be, as he hereby is, ACQUITTED.
On the part of the three (3) remaining accused ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO
CADEMAS, and DOMINADOR SORELA, the degree of moral, certainty establishing
their authorship of the crime is irreversibly positive. The three (3) accused conspired
and confederated with one another to successfully achieve their ghastly, evil ends.
Their guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Treachery and evident premeditation are qualifying circumstances in this case of
MURDER. But said offense was attended by the aggravating circumstances of
superior strength and nighttime. No mitigating circumstance has been shown to
offset the two (2) aggravating circumstances, as a consequence of which, the Court
hereby renders judgment sentencing the accused ROMULO VILLAROJO,
LEONARDO CADEMAS, and DOMINADOR SORELA, to suffer the maximum
penalty of DEATH.
SO ORDERED. 8
We come to the facts.
On September 9, 1975, Alfredo and Estrella Bagon, brother and sister, arrived at the local Integrated
National Police station of Barrio Polanco, in Zamboanga del Norte, to report their brother, Deosdedit
Bagon, missing. The station commander, Captain Ruperto Encabo, received their report.
Bagon had been in fact missing since two days before. He was last seen by his wife in the afternoon
of September 7, 1975, on his way home to Sitio Sebaca where they resided. She did three probable
places, but her efforts were in vain.
It was Captain Encabo himself who led a search party to mount an inquiry. As a matter of police
procedure, the team headed off to Sitio Sebaca to question possible witnesses. There, Captain
Encabo's men chanced upon an unnamed volunteer, who informed them that Deosdedit Bagon was
last seen together with Dominador Sorela, one of the accused herein.
Encabo then instructed one of his patrolmen to pick up Sorela.
Sorela bore several scratches on his face, neck and arms when the police found him. According to
him, he sustained those wounds while clearing his ricefield. Apparently unconvinced. Captain
Encabo had Sorela take them to the ricefield where he sustained his injuries. But half way there,
Sorela illegally broke down, and, in what would apparently crack the case for the police, admitted
having participated in the killing of the missing Bagon. By then, the police of Polanco knew that they
had a murder case in their hands. Sorela allegedly confessed having been with Deosdedit Bagon, a
friend of his, in the evening of September 7, 1976 in Sitio Sebaca after some marketing. They were
met by Romulo Villarojo and Leonardo Cademas, Sorela's co-accused herein and likewise friends of
the deceased, who led them to a secluded place in the ricefields. It does not appear from the records
how the three were able to have the deceased join them.
It was then that Villarojo allegedly attacked Bagon with a bolo, hacking him at several parts of the
body until he, Bagon, was dead. Moments later, Sorela fled, running into thick cogon grasses where
he suffered facial and bodily scratches.
The police soon picked up Villarojo and Cademas. Together with Sorela, they were turned over to
the custody of Captain Encabo.
The police thereafter made the three re-enact the crime. Patrolman Dionisio Capito directed Sorela
to lead them to the grounds where Discredit Bagon was supposed to have been buried. But it was
Villarojo who escorted them to a watery spot somewhere in the ricefields, where the sack-covered,
decomposing cadaver of Bagon lay in a shallow grave.
The actual exhumation of the body of the victim was witnessed by Polanco policemen and Civilian
Home Defense Forces volunteers, numbering about thirty. The body was transported to the Polanco
municipal hand the following day, September 10, 1975. It was displayed, morbidly, in front of the
building where Mrs. Catalina Bagon, widow of the deceased, and her four children viewed it. The
exhumation, as well as the transfer of Bagon's cadaver, were captured by the lens of a
photographer. (Exhibits "I", "J", "K", its "L", "M", and "N").
The "ceremonies" continued in the parish church of the Polanco, where the body of the victim was
transferred. It was laid on the altar, in full public view. Again the proceedings were recorded by the
camera of a photographer. (Exhibits "R", "S".)
But it was only later on that the body itself was uncovered from the sack that had concealed it.
(Exhibits "T", "U", "VIP.) Thereupon, it was readied for autopsy.
The necropsy report prepared by the provincial health officer disclosed that the deceased suffered
twelve stab and hack wounds, six of which were determined to be fatal.
In the re-enactment, the suspects, the three accused herein, demonstrated how the victim was
boloed to death. Exhibit "Y," a photograph, shows the appellant Villarojo in the posture of raising a
bolo as if to strike another, while Solero and Cademas look on. Exhibit "X", another photograph,
portrays Villarojo in the act of concealing the murder weapon behind a banana tree, apparently after
having done the victim in.
The investigation yielded several effects of the offense: a twenty-inch long bolo, the shovel used to
inter the victim's remains, a nylon rope with which the dead body was tied, and the sack itself.
Initial findings of investigators disclosed that the threesome of Solero, Villarojo, and Cademas
executed Discredit Bagon on orders of Anacleto Olvis, then Polanco municipal mayor, for a reward of
P3,000.00 each.
While in custody, the three executed five separate written confessions each. The first confessions
were taken on September 9, 1975 in the local Philippine Constabulary headquarters. The second
were made before the Polanco police. On September 18, 1975, the three accused reiterated the
same confessions before the National Bureau of Investigation Dipolog City sub-office. On
September 21, 1975 and September 25, 1975, they executed two confessions more, again before
the Philippine Constabulary and the police of Polanco.
In their confessions of September 9, 1975, September 14, 1975, September 21, 1975, and
September 25, 1975, the said accused again pointed to the then accused Anacleto Olvis as principal
by inducement, who allegedly promised them a reward of P3,000.00 each.
In their confessions of September 18, 1975, sworn before agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation, however, they categorically denied Olvis' involvement in the knowing. We note that the
three were transported to the Dipolog City NBI sub-office following a request on September 10, 1975
by Mrs. Diolinda O. Adaro daughter of Olvis, and upon complaint by her of harassment against her
father by his supposed political enemies.
Based on these subsequent statements, the court a quo rendered separate verdicts on the three
accused on the one hand, and Anacleto Olvis on the other. As earlier stated Olvis was acquitted,
while the three were all sentenced to die for the crime of murder.
In acquitting Olvis, the trial court rejected the three accused's earlier confessions pointing to him as
the mastermind, and denied the admissibility thereof insofar as far as he was concerned. It rejected
claims of witnesses that the three accused-appellants would carry out Olvis' alleged order to kill
Bagon upon an offer of a reward when in fact no money changed hands. It likewise noted that Olvis
had, two days after the murder, been in Cebu City, and who, upon arriving in Dipolog City, was in fact
informed by the Philippine Constabulary that he was a "wanted" man, "to which said accused (Olvis)
meekly complied" 9 (that is, he assented, ambiguously, to the remark). According to the court, this was
inconsistent with a guilty mind.
The court repudiated claims that Olvis had motives to do away with the deceased arising from
alleged attempts on his (Olvis') part to eject the deceased from his landholding (the deceased having
been a tenant of his), the case in fact having reached the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform. It
dismissed insinuations that his children had a score to settle with the victim, who had earlier brought
a physical injuries suit against the former, that case having been dismissed. It observed,
furthermore, that he was not questioned by the police after the killing, notwithstanding efforts by the
three herein accused-appellants to implicate him. It relied, finally, on the retraction of the accused
themselves, absolving Olvis of any liability. It was satisfied, overall, that he had a "clean bill of
health" 10 in connection with the murder case.
With the acquittal of Olvis, we are left with the murder cases against the three accused-appellants.
The accused-appellants subsequently repudiated their alleged confessions in open court alleging
threats by the Polanco investigators of physical harm if they refused to "cooperate" in the solution of
the case. They likewise alleged that they were instructed by the Polanco police investigators to
implicate Anacieto Olvis in the case. They insisted on their innocence. The acused Romulo Villarojo
averred, specifically, that it was the deceased who had sought to kill him, for which he acted in selfdefense.
The murder of Deosdedit Bagon was witnessed by no other person. The police of Polanco had but
the three accused-appellants' statements to support its claiming. The fundamental issue then is
whether or not these statements, as any extrajudicial confession confronting us, can stand up in
court.
We hold that, based on the recorded evidence, the three accused-appellants' extrajudicial
confessions are inadmissible in evidence.
It was on May 7, 1987 that we promulgated People v. Decierdo.11 In that decision, we laid down the rule with
respect to extrajudicial confessions:
xxx xxx xxx

... Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The
defendant, may waive effectuation of indicates in any manner and at any stage of the
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no
questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he
does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him The mere fact that
he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own
does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until
he has converted with an attorney and thereafter consent to be questioned.
xxx xxx xxx
In People v. Duero, we added:
xxx xxx xxx
At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first
be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent.
For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to make them
aware of the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise.
More important, such a warning is an absolute pre-requisite in overcoming the
inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere
Further, the warning will show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to
recognize his privilege should he choose to exercise it . . .
The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation
that anything said can and WW be used against the individual in court. This warning
is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the
consequences of foregoing it . . .
An individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer. While such
request affirmatively secures his right to have one, his failure to ask for a lawyer does
not constitute a waiver. No effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation
can be recognized unless specifically made after the warnings we here delineate
have been given. The accused who does not know his rights and therefore does not
make a request may be the person who most needs Counsel
If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of counsel before any
interrogation occurs, the authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny his request on
the basis that the individual does not have or cannot afford a retained attorney . . .
In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this
system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with
an attorney, but also that ff. he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him
...
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear, If the individual
indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to
remain silent, the interrogation impose cease. . . If the individual cannot obtain an
attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to policy, they must
respect his decision to remain silent . . .
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is
taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incriminate tion and his
right to retained or appointed counsel ... 12
xxx xxx xxx
Like the Decierdo confessions, the confessions in the case at bar suffer from a Constitutional
infirmity. In their supposed statements dated September 9, 14, and 21, 1975, the accused-appellants
were not assisted by counsel when they "waived" their rights to counsel. As we said in Decierdo, the
lack of counsel "makes [those] statement[s], in contemplation of law, 'involuntary,' even if it were
otherwise voluntary, technically." 13
With reset to the confessions of September 18, 197 5, while it is stated therein that this Office had
just requested the services of Atty. NARVARO VELAR NAVARRO of the Citizens Legal Assistance
Office, Department of Justice, Dipolog District Office, are you wining to accept the legal assistance of
Atty. NAVARRO to handle your case, 14 the same nonetheless call for a similar rejection. There is nothing there that would
show that Atty. Navarro was the accused-appellants' counsel of choice (specifically, the appellant Romulo Villarojo who admitted therein
having been the bolo-wielder). On the contrary, it is clear therefrom that Atty. Navarro was summoned by the NBI. He cannot therefore be
said to have been acting on behalf of the accused-appellants when he lent his presence at the confession proceedings. What we said
in People v. Galit, 15 applies with like force here:
No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel

engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the
court upon petition either of the dead 16 trainee himself or by anyone on his
behalf. 16
We cast aside, for the same reason, the confessions of September 25, 1975.
But the accused-appellants were denied their right to counsel not once, but twice. We refer to the
forced re-enactment of the crime the three accused were made to perform shortly after their
apprehension.
Forced re-enactments, like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban against selfincrimination. The 1973 Constitution, the Charter prevailing at the time of the proceedings below,
says:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
17
This constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection against testimonial compulsion,
18 but this
has since been extended to any evidence "communicative in nature" 19 acquired under circumstances of duress. Essentially, the right is
meant to "avoid and prohibit positively the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of competing a person, in a criminal
This was the lesson learned from the

ancient days of the inquisition in which accusation was equivalent to guilt. 21 Thus, an act, whether
testimonial or passive, that would amount to disclosure of incriminatory facts is covered by the inhibition
of the Constitution.
or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction."
20
This should be distinguished, parenthetically, from mechanical acts the accused is made to execute
not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple
observation. This includes requiring the accused to submit to a test to extract virus from his
body, 22 or compelling him to expectorate morphine from his mouth 23 or making her submit to a pregnancy
test 24 or a footprinting test, 25 or requiring him to take part in a police lineup in certain cases." In each
case, the accused does not speak his guilt. It is not a prerequisite therefore that he be provided with the
guiding hand of counsel.
But a forced re-enactment is quite another thing. Here, the accused is not merely required to exhibit
some physical characteristics; by and large, he is made to admit criminal responsibility against his
will. It is a police procedure just as condemnable as an uncounselled confession.
Accordingly, we hold that all evidence based on such a re-enactment to be in violation of the
Constitution and hence, incompetent evidence.
It should be furthermore observed that the three accused-appellants were in police custody when
they took part in the re-enactment in question. It is under such circumstances that the Constitution
holds a strict application. As for the accused Dominador Sorela, we cannot accept the trial judge's
finding that he acted "with unexpected spontaneity" 27 when he allegedly "spilled the beans 28 before the
law enforcers on September 9, 1975. What is to be borne in mind is that Sorela was himself under
custody. Any statement he might have made thereafter is therefore subject to the Constitutional guaranty.
By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way. 29
We indeed doubt whether Sorela's admissions, under the circumstances, were truly his voluntary
statementsChavez v. Court of Appeals 30 tells us:
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of
violence; it may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates
to overbear his will disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his
capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion
"tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant. 31
In such a case, he should have been provided with counsel.
Indeed, the three accused-appellants had languished in jail for one year and two months before the
information was filed, and only after they had gone to court on an application for habeas corpus. For
if the authorities truly had a case in their hands, we are puzzled why they, the accused, had to be
made to suffer preventive imprisonment for quite an enormous length of time.
What is more, there are striking aspects in the case that we find distressing. For one, there was no
trace of grief upon the faces of the deceased's bereaved relatives, more so his widow and children,
upon witnessing his cadaver-wrapped in a sack and all although it was supposedly the first time
that they saw his remains after two days of frantic search. 32 Exhibits "K", "L", "M", "N", and "R", for
another, depict the deceased's relatives in fixed poses, while the deceased's corpse lay in the
foreground. 33
Moreover, the victim was transferred to the municipal hand building and then subsequently, to the
parish church, again, for a photographing session unusual procedure when the perfunctory
police procedure should have been to bring the corpse to the health officer for autopsy.
It was in fact only on September 10, 1975 that Discredit Bagon's remains were unwrapped, at the
parish church at that, as if pursuant to a script or as part of some eerie ceremony.
To the mind of, this Court, the disposition of the case was characterized by unusual grandstanding,
for reasons as yet unclear to us. It leaves us with an uncomfortable impression that each scene was
an act in some contrived tragedy.
We likewise find the authorities' haste in securing the accused Anacleto Olvis' acquittal, at the
expense of the present three accused, quite disconcerting. It should be noted that the three
appellants had initially implicated Olvis as the mastermind. Yet, Olvis was never invited for the usual
questioning.
To us, there is more to Exhibit "20," the request to transfer Olvis' case to the jurisdiction of the
National Bureau of Investigation for reinvestigation, than meets the eye. As it happened, happily for
Olvis, the three accused-appellants while under NBI custody, retracted their earlier statements
indicting him as a co-conspirator. Why the NBI should intervene in the case when the Polanco police
had apparently "solved" it, is, in the first place, suspicious enough, but why the three appellants
should, in an instant, make a turn-about there leaves us even more disturbed.
While we do not challenge the verdict by acquittal rendered in favor of Olvis, for it is not within our
power to overturn acquittals, 34 what is our concern is the apparent design to use three ill-lettered
peasants, 35 the three herein accused, as fall guys in an evident network of political intrigue.
Still, we are not prepared to hand down a judgment of acquittal upon all the three accusedappellants.
In his counter-affidavit, 36 marked as Exhibit "44-A" for the defense, the accused Romulo Villarojo
admitted hacking the victim to death with a bolo. He stressed, however, that he did so in selfdefense. He
pulled out a hunting knife in order to stab me and in order also to defend my body, I hack[ed] him." 37 He
completely absolved his co-accused Dominador Sorela and Leonardo Cademas from any liability.
Villarojo's admission inflicting the fatal wounds upon the deceased is binding on him.
our business to see whether his defense can stand scrutiny.
38
But it is still
The records will disclose that the deceased suffered twelve assorted wounds caused by a sharp
instrument. The assault severed his right hand and left his head almost separated from his body.
This indicates a serious intent to kill, rather than self-defense. 39
In finding that Villarojo did take the life of the victim, we cannot, however, appreciate superior
strength or nocturnity. These qualifying circumstances were considered by the court a quo on the
basis of the extrajudicial statements executed by the accused, statements we reject for the reasons
earlier discussed. In the absence of any other proof, the severity and number of wounds sustained
by the deceased are not, by themselves, sufficient proof to warrant the appreciation of the generic
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Hence, Villarojo should be liable for plain
homicide.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered modifying the Decision dated November 30, 1984. The
accused-appellants Leonardo Cademas and Dominador Sorela are ACQUITTED on the ground of
reasonable doubt. The accused-appellant Romulo Villarojo is found guilty of homicide, and is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum, to fourteen years, eight months, and one day ofreclusion temporal, as maximum. He is
furthermore ordered to indemnify the heirs of Discredit Bagon in the sum of P30,000.00. No special
pronouncement as to costs.
Yap (Chairman), Paras and Padilla JJ, concur.o
G.R. No. 188133
July 7, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
OLIVER RENATO EDAO y EBDANE, Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this appeal the challenge to the October 16, 2008 Decision1 and the December 23,
2008 resolution2of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01142. The challenged CA
decision affirmed the April 22, 2004 joint decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 103,
Quezon City, finding appellant Oliver Renato Edafio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002), and imposing on him the penalty of life imprisonment. The assailed resolution, on the other
hand, denied the appellant's motion for reconsideration.
BACKGROUND FACTS
The prosecution charged the appellant and Godofredo Siochi with violation of Section 11, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165 under two separate Informations, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-111200 and
Q-02-112104.
The appellant and Siochi pleaded not guilty to the charge on arraignment. Joint trial on the merits
followed.
The prosecution presented, as its witnesses, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Aylin Casignia and Police
Officer (PO) 3 Elmer Corbe. The appellant, Siochi and Ruben Forteza took the witness stand for the
defense.
The evidence for the prosecution established that on the evening of August 6, 2002, members of the
Metro Manila Drugs Enforcement Group, composed of PO3 Corbe, PO3 Nelson Javier, PO3 Dennis
Padpad, PO3 Marcelo Alcancia, Jr., together with a female informant, went to the parking area of
McDonalds, West Avenue to conduct an entrapment operation against a certain alias "Nato." 4
At around 7:00 p.m., the appellant arrived on board a space wagon driven by Siochi.5 The informant
approached the appellant and talked to him inside the vehicle. Afterwards, the informant waved at
PO3 Corbe.6 When PO3 Corbe was approaching the appellant, the latter went out of the vehicle and
ran away. PO3 Corbe, PO3 Padpad and PO3 Alcancia chased the appellant; PO3 Corbe was able to
grab the appellant, causing the latter to fall on the ground. PO3 Corbe recovered a "knot-tied"
transparent plastic bag from the appellants right hand, while PO3 Alcancia seized a gun tucked in
the appellants waist. The other members of the police arrested Siochi. Thereafter, the police brought
the appellant, Siochi and the seized items to the police station for investigation. 7
P/Insp. Casignia, the Forensic Chemical Officer of the Western Police District Crime Laboratory,
examinedthe seized items and found them positive for the presence of shabu. 8
The appellant, for his part, testified that at around 4:00 p.m. on August 6, 2002, he called Siochi on
the phone, and informed him that the motorbike starter the latter needed was already available. 9 On
the same day, Vanessa Paduada called the appellant, and asked for the directions to McDonalds,
West Avenue.10 At around 6:00 p.m., Siochi and Ruben arrived at the gate of Philam Homes on
board a space wagon. The appellant met them at the subdivision gate, and showed the starter to
Siochi. Thereafter, Vanessa called on the appellants cellular phone. The appellant then boarded the
vehicle, and told Siochi that he would just talk to a person at McDonalds. 11 When the space wagon
arrived at McDonalds, the appellant alighted from the vehicle and proceeded towards the
restaurants entrance. Afterwards, Vanessa called him from inside a parked car. The appellant
approached Vanessa who, for her part, alighted from the car. Vanessa told the appellant to get inside
the cars rear. The appellant did as instructed; Vanessa went to the front passenger seat, beside a
male driver.12 Immediately after, the male driver alighted from the vehicle and entered the cars rear.
The appellant went out of the car, but the male driver followed him and grabbed his hand. The
appellant resisted, and wrestled with the driver along West Avenue. During this commotion, the
appellant heard a gunfire; four (4) persons approached him, and then tied his hands with a masking
tape.13 The police placed him on board a pick-up truck, and then brought him to Bicutan. In Bicutan,
the police brought him to the interrogation room, where they punched him and placed a plastic on his
head.14
In its joint decision dated April 22, 2004, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession of shabu under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. It also ordered him to pay a P500,000.00 fine.
The RTC, however, acquitted Siochi on the ground of reasonable doubt.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. The CA found PO3 Corbe to be a credible
witness. The CA also found the appellants warrantless arrest to be valid; it explained that the
appellants act of running when PO3 Corbe was approaching him reinforced the latters suspicion
that "something was amiss."15
The CA added that strict compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not required as
long asthe integrity of the seized item had been ensured. It further held that the police officers were
presumed to have regularly performed their official duties.
Finally, the CA held that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of illegal possession
of shabu.
The appellant moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution dated
December 23, 2008.
In his brief16 and supplemental brief,17 the appellant essentially alleged that PO3 Corbes testimony
was "vague and equivocal;"18 it lacked details on how the appellant was lured to sell shabu to the
informant, and how the entrapment operation had been planned. The appellant also argued that his
warrantless arrest was illegal since he was not committing any crime when the police arrested him.
He also claimed that the police did not mark and photograph the seized items, and that there was a
broken chain of custody over the confiscated drugs.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with the argument that the testimony of PO3
Corbe was clear and convincing; the inconsistencies in his court testimony pertained only to minor
details. It also claimed that the appellants arrest was valid, and the seized shabu was admissible in
evidence. Finally, the OSG maintained that there was no break in the chain of custody over the
seized plastic bag containing shabu.19
THE COURTS RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to ACQUIT the appellant.
Warrantless arrest invalid; seized items inadmissible
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. This is known an arrest in
flagrante delicto.20
"For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delictoto be valid, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done
in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer." 21
In the present case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that could be properly
attributed to the appellant to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Corbe that he (appellant) had just
committed, was actually committing, or was attempting to commit a crime. In fact, PO3 Corbe
testified that the appellant and the informant were just talking with each otherwhen he approached
them. For clarity and certainty, we reproduce PO3 Corbes court testimony dated February 21, 2003,
thus:
ATTY. RENATO SARMIENTO:
Q: You and the informant were not able to approach Nato because he sense[d] that you are (sic) a
policeman?
PO3 CORBE:
A: Our informant first approached Renato Edano[,] and they talked but when he (sic) called me,
Renato run (sic), sir.
Q: You said tinawag ka[,] who was that that call (sic) you?
A: Team informant, sir.
xxxx
Q: How did she call you?
A: She waived (sic) her had (sic), sir.
Q: What was she doing?
A: She was talking to Alias Nato[,] sir.
Q: Did you hear what they are talking? (sic)
A: I was still in the car[.] I was not able to hear[,] sir.
Q: How would you know that they are talking, Mr. Witness? (sic)
A: I could see them, sir.
Q: What did you see?
A: They were talking, sir.
Q: They were not exchanging stuff and money, Mr. witness?
A: Not yet, sir.
Q: While talking[,] the female informant call[ed] you, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.22 (emphases ours)
As testified to by PO3 Corbe himself, the appellant and the informant were just talking to each other;
there was no exchange of money and drugs when he approached the car. Notably,while it is true that
the informant waved at PO3 Corbe, the latter admitted that this was not the pre-arranged signal to
signify that the sale of drugs had been consummated. PO3 Corbe also admitted on crossexamination that he had no personal knowledge on whether there was a prohibited drug and gun
inside the space wagon when he approached it.
That the appellant attempted to run away when PO3 Corbe approached him is irrelevant and cannot
by itself be construed as adequate to charge the police officer with personal knowledge that the
appellant had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal
activity.
As the Court explained in People v. Villareal:23
Furthermore, appellants act of darting away when PO3 de Leon approached him should not be
construed against him. Flight per seis not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed
to ones consciousness of guilt.It is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances, for
even in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons for flight, including fear of retribution for
speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses,and fear of being wrongfully apprehended
as a guilty party.Thus, appellants attempt to run away from PO3 de Leon is susceptible of various
explanations; it could easily have meant guilt just as it could likewise signify innocence. 24
In other words, trying to run awaywhen no crime has been overtly committed, and without more,
cannot be evidence of guilt.
Considering that the appellants warrantless arrest was unlawful, the search and seizure that
resulted from it was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag containing white crystalline
substances seized from him is inadmissible in evidence, having comefrom an invalid search and
seizure.
Corpus delicti not proved with moral
certainty
Even granting, for the sake ofargument, that the appellants warrantless arrest was valid, the latters
acquittal is still in order due to the prosecutions failure to establish the evidence of the corpus
delictiwith moral certainty.
We stress that "[t]he existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua nonfor conviction for the
illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs, it being the verycorpus delictiof the crimes." 25 Thus,
the evidence of the corpus delictimust be established beyond reasonable doubt.
In the present case, the various lapses enumerated and discussed below committed by the
police in the handling, safekeeping and custody over the seized drug tainted the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu.
First, we find it highly unusual and irregular that the police officers would let the appellant mark the
drugs seized from him, instead of doing the marking themselves. To directly quote from the records:
ATTY. SARMIENTO:
Q: This item was not marked at the place allegedly where you apprehended the suspect at
McDonalds, West Avenue, Quezon City, am I correct to say that?
PO3 CORBE:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You are also required not only tomark it but to put your initial to it, my question did you place your
initial in this evidence? (sic)
A: No, sir.
Q: You did not, Mr. Witness?
A: No, sir.
Q: You were also required to put the date of apprehension, being the arresting officer, did you put the
date in this evidence, Mr. Witness?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why did you not do that, Mr. Witness?
A: What I remembered there is an initial of the accused, sir.
Q: Who put the initial, Mr. Witness?
A: He was the one, sir.
Q: At your station?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You did not put your initial?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why did you not put your initial?
A: I was not able to put sir.26 (emphases ours)
Marking, as used in drug cases, means the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseurbuyerof his/her initials and signature on the item/s seized. "Consistency with the "chain of custody"
rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items - to truly ensure that they are the same items that
enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence - should be done (1) in the presence
of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation." 27 The Court clarified in People v.
Resurreccion28 that marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest
police station or office of the apprehending team. Thus, while marking of the seized drugs at the
police station is permitted, the marking should be done by the police, and not by the accused. The
appellants participation inthe marking procedure should only be as a witness. Why the police failed
to do a basic police procedure truly baffles us.
We also point out that per the testimony of P/Insp. Casignia, the Forensic Chemical Officer, the
police forwarded two (2) plastic bags containing white crystalline substances to the crime laboratory
for examination one marked with the initials "OR" and the other marked with "GS." Both plastic
bags were used asevidence against the appellant. The records, however, did not indicate who
marked the plastic bag with "GS," who witnessed this marking, and whenthis marking had been
made. As with the bag that had been marked "OR," we express doubts on whether the plastic bag
containing white crystalline substances marked as "GS" was the same plastic bag taken from the
appellants co-accused, Siochi.
Second, the police did not inventory or photograph the seized drugs, whether at the place of
confiscation or at the police station.1avvphi1 These omissions were admitted by the prosecution
during pre-trial.29
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21, paragraph
1,Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof[.] [emphases ours]
This is implemented by Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations(IRR) of
R.A. No. 9165, which reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]
[emphasis ours]
To be sure, Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying with the express
requirements under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, i.e.,"non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]"This saving clause, however, applies only
where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses and thereafter explained the cited justifiable
grounds, and when the prosecution established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence seized had been preserved.30
These conditions were not met in the present case, as the prosecution did not even attempt to offer
any justification for its failure to follow the prescribed procedures in the handling and safekeeping of
the seized items. "We stress that it is the prosecution who has the positive duty to establish that
earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under Section 21[a] of
R.A. No. 9165, or that there was a justifiable ground for failing to do so." 31 The Court cannot simply
presume what these justifications are.
Although the Court has recognized that minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. No. 9165
would not automatically exonerate an accused, we have also declared that when there is gross
disregard of the procedural safeguards prescribed inthe substantive law (R.A. No. 9165), serious
uncertainty is generated about the identity of the seized items that the prosecution presented in
evidence. This doubt cannot be remedied by simply invoking the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties, for a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural
safeguards effectively produces an irregularity in the performance of official duties. 32
In sum, we hold that the appellants acquittal is in order since the shabu purportedly seized from him
is inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Corollarily, the
prosecution's failure to comply with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of
custody requirement of this Act, compromised the identity of the item seized, leading to the failure to
adequately prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the October 16, 2008 decision
and the December 23, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01142.
Appellant Oliver Renato Edao y Ebdane is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention
unless he is otherwise legally confined for another cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for
immediate implementation.1wphi1 The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report
the action he has taken to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 205741
July 23, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appeliee,

vs.
REYMAN ENDAYA y LAIG, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For review of this Court is the 11 May 2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 04872. The CA affirmed the conviction of Reyman Endaya y Laig (appellant) for the
offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of the prohibited drug methamphetamine
hyd.rochloride or shabu, respectively punishable under Section 5 and Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).
Antecedents
Appellant was charged under two separate informations filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Lipa City, Branch 12, with violation of Section 5 and Section 11, Article II ofR.A. No. 9165,
committed as follows:
Criminal Case No. 0098-2003
That on or about the 20th day of November, 2002, at about 7:00 oclock in the evening, at Barangay
2-A, Municipality of Mataasnakahoy, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without having been authorized by law, did then
and there willfully and unlawfully have in his possession, custody and control eight (8) small heatsealed transparent plastic sachets each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly
known as "shabu", having a total weight of 0.32 gram, a dangerous drug. 2
Criminal Case No. 0099-2003
That on or about the 20th day of November, 2002, at about 7:00 oclock in the evening, at Barangay
2-A, Municipality of Mataasnakahoy, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without having been authorized by law, did then
and there willfully and unlawfully sell, deliver and give away one (1) small heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu", weighing
0.04 gram, a dangerous drug.3
Prosecutions Version of the Events
On 11 November 2002, police operatives of Mataasnakahoy Police Station, acting on a report from a
barangay official that appellant is involved in illegal drug activities, conducted surveillance operations
on appellant. A week of surveillance confirmed the veracity of the report4 hence, on 20 November
2002, a team, composed of SPO4 Moriel Benedicto (SPO4 Benedicto), SPO3 Nestor
Babadilla(SPO3 Babadilla) and PO2 Edwin Chavez (PO2 Chavez), was formed to perform a buy-
bust operation against appellant.5 A civilian asset, armed with five(5) pieces of P100.00 bills as
marked money, acted as poseur-buyer.6
On board a car from Mataasnakahoy Police Station, the police operatives and the civilian asset
proceeded to the place of operation: the Golden Luck Beer Garden located at Barangay2-A,
Mataasnakahoy, Batangas. At a distance of about ten (10) to fifteen (15) meters from the beer
house, the civilian asset alighted from the vehicle and proceeded on foot to the establishment where
appellant was a regular customer. In the meantime, the buy-bust team positioned themselves ata
place outside the restaurant not far from where the civilian asset was. Appellant subsequently
arrived and approached the civilian asset, who was standing in front of the beer house. The two
talked for a while,7 after which, the police operatives saw the civilian asset hand the marked money
to appellant who, in turn, handed something to the former which later turned out to be a plastic
sachet containing shabu.8
After receiving the plastic sachet from appellant, the civilian asset made the pre-arranged signal of
touching his head to signify that the transaction had been completed. The police officers then
immediately approached appellant, introduced themselves as police officers and informed him that
he is under arrest for selling shabu.9Appellant was informed of his constitutional rights in
Tagalog10 and then frisked by SPO3 Babadilla and PO2 Chavez for any deadly weapon. During this
body search, SPO3 Babadilla recovered the marked money from appellant. 11 Meanwhile, the shabu
subject of the sale between appellant and the civilian asset was handed by the latter to PO2
Chavez.12
Appellant was forthwith brought to the Mataasnakahoy Police Station where police officers again
searched his body to look for an identification card. 13 This body search yielded another eight (8)
plastic sachets of shabu, found in his wallet by PO2 Chavez, who then marked them by writing a
figure "8" on each plastic sachet.14 The shabu subject of the buy-bust operation, on the other hand,
was marked by PO2 Chavez by writing the same figure "8" on the sachet but he added a distinctive
mark by burning the edges of the plastic sachet to distinguish it from the other eight sachets
confiscated from appellant.15 The team thereafter conducted an inventory of the items seized from
appellant in the presence of appellant, Clerk of Court Rogelio Binay of the Mataasnakahoy Municipal
Trial Court, Municipal Counselor Renato Tiquiz, BarangayCaptain Victorina Orosco, NGO
representative Olivia Macariola, Sangguniang Bayanmembers Romeo Laqui and Osea and media
representative Virgo Santiago, who all signed the receipt of property seized. 16 A photograph of
appellant and the seized items, together with the aforementioned witnesses was taken at the police
station.17 Finally, a letterrequest for laboratory examination, together with the marked sachets, was
transmitted to the Philippine National Police crime laboratory.18 The qualitative examination
conducted on the specimens yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. 19
Appellant denied the charges against him. He claimed that at around 7:00 in the evening of 20
November 2002, he was at home in Barangay Nangkaan, Mataasnakahoy, Batangas, watching TV
with his family. At around 9:00 in the evening, he left the house to go with a friend to the bus station
in Lipa City to fetch his friends sister. From the bus station, they proceeded to the GoldenLuck Beer
Garden.20 While drinking beer inside the establishment, two police officers, one of whom was SPO4
Benedicto, approached appellant and invited him togo out with them to the police car.21 Appellant
obliged, but as he was about to get into the car, SPO4 Benedicto punched him in the stomach and
pushed him inside the car. SPO3 Babadilla and PO2 Chavez then joined them. It was then,
according to appellant, when the police officers started their threats to kill him unless he reveals to
them the name of the drug pusher in the area. In reply to their threats, appellant told them that he did
not know anyone selling drugs.22
Appellant alleged that they drove around the municipality of Mataasnakahoy, circling it three times
before the police officers brought him to the police station. Before he was allowed to get off the car,
SPO3 Babadilla took his wallet and left it in the car. At the police station, he was immediately put in
jail but he was unable to ask the reason for his imprisonment because one of the police officers
punched him again.23 When he was subsequently taken out of his cell, the police officers led him to a
table where they showed him plastic sachets containing shabuallegedly found in his
wallet.24 Thereafter, the police officers took photographs of him and the items supposedly seized
from him, although he refused to be photographed. He was also made to signa document, which
later turned out to be the inventory of property seized, without allowing him to read the contents
thereof and without the assistance of a counsel. Neither did the police officers inform him of his
constitutional rights.25
Appellant claimed that he did not file a case against the police officers because he was already
incarcerated and, besides, he is ignorant of the procedure in the filing of cases. 26
The Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding that the prosecution was able to successfully prove the existence of the essential elements
ofillegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the trial court rendered a Decision 27 dated
22 October 2010, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, accused Reyman Endaya y Laig is convicted of the
offenses charged in these cases for violation of Section 5 (paragraph 1) and Section 11 (paragraph
3), both of Article II of Republic Act 9165 and is hereby sentenced to suffer:
a) Section 11 Imprisonment for a period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to
twenty (20) years as maximum and to pay a fine of P300,000.00 and;
b.) Section 5 Life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00.28
xxx
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court upon a finding that the prosecution was able to
establish, beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements of the crimes with which appellant was
charged,and consequently, his guilt.
The CA brushed aside the attempt of appellant to assail the credibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution, declaring that the inconsistencies in their respective testimonies, which appellant tried
to amplify, are too minor to adversely affect their credibility. More importantly, the identity of the
corpus delictiin this case was properly preserved and established by the prosecution, thereby
ascertaining the guilt of appellant. The CA, thus, held:
The inconsistencies allegedly committed by [SPO4] Benedicto and [PO2] Chavez will not save
[appellant] from conviction. To secure a reversal of the lower courts findings, the inconsistencies
should have pertained to the actual buy-bust itself, that crucial moment when [appellant] was caught
selling or in possession of shabu, not to peripheral matters. x x x
xxxx
To be sure, the discrepant statements alluded to by [appellant] were too minor to adversely affect the
credibility of the witnesses. Those discrepancies did not detract from the established fact of the
crimes charged against him. As the High Court held, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses
referring to minor details, and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not
impair their credibility.
In view of all the foregoing, this [c]ourt finds that [appellant] failed to overthrow the presumption of
regularity accorded the police officers in the performance of their official duty. He utterly failed to
prove that in testifying against him, these witnesses were motivated by reasons other than the duty
to curb the sale and possession of prohibited drugs and possession of drug paraphernalia. There is
no proof of any ill motive or odious intent on the part of the police authorities to impute falsely such a
serious crime to [appellant]. Thus, the [c]ourt will not allow the formers testimony to be overcome by
self-serving defenses.
xxxx
This Court likewise finds no merit in [appellants] contention that the prosecution failed to establish
the corpus delictiof the offense. Testimonies of prosecution witnesses convincingly stated that the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved by them. [SPO4]
Benedicto testified that he witnessed when their asset handed the shabu (which he bought from
appellant) to [PO2] Chavez. Thereafter, he saw [PO2] Chavez putmarkings on them. [PO2] Chavez
also attested that he marked the 1 sachet of shabu sold by [appellant] to their asset as well as the 8
sachets ofshabu confiscated from [appellant]. They eventually prepared a request for laboratory
examination. The Chemistry Report stated that all the specimens submitted by the apprehending
officers which bore the same markings gave positive result to the tests for the presence of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.
It is thus evident that the identities of the corpus delicti were properly preserved and established by
the prosecution. Besides, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is a
showing of bad faith, ill-will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. [Appellant], in this
case, has the burden to show that the evidence was tampered or meddled with to overcome a
presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and a presumption that public
officers properly discharged their duties. Needless to say, [appellant] failed to muster out such
burden.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed October 22, 2010 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Lipa City, in Criminal Cases Nos. 0098-2003 and 0099-2003
convicting Reyman Endaya y Laig for violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.29
In separate Manifestations dated 21 May 201330 and 13 June 2013,31 respectively, appellant and
appellee manifested their intention not to file a supplemental brief before this Court and to adopt the
respective briefs they filed before the CA.
The Issues
Appellant raised the following errors in his brief:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF
VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 11 AND 5 OF R.A. NO. 9165 NOTWITHSTANDING THE
PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE RECEIPT FOR PROPERTY SEIZED
WHICH THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS FORCED TO SIGN IN VIOLATION OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SACHETS OF SHABU ASEVIDENCE
AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit; hence, we sustain the judgment of conviction.
I
Appellants guilt for illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu was proven beyond reasonable doubt
The illegal sale of dangerous drugs is punishable under the first paragraph of Section 5 of R.A. No.
9165 as follows:
Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of

Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.- The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten
million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the
quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. (Emphasis supplied)
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential elements must be established:
(1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration for the sale;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material in the prosecution of
an illegal sale of dangerousdrugs is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation of the corpus delictiin court as evidence. 32 The commission of illegal sale
merely requires the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the moment the buyer
receives the drug from the seller. Aslong as a police officer or civilian asset went through the
operation as a buyer, whose offer was accepted by the appellant, followed by the delivery of the
dangerous drugs to the former, the crime is already consummated. In the case at bar, the
prosecution has amply proven all the elements of the drug sale with moral certainty.33
The records show that appellant was arrested in a legitimate buy-bust operation conducted after a
week of surveillance. The police officers comprising the buy-bust team positivelyidentified appellant
as the one who sold the plastic sachet of shabuto their civilian asset who, in turn, handed the
marked money to appellant. Both the sachet of shabuand the marked money were presented as
evidence in court. SPO4 Benedicto narrated in detail the transaction during his testimony before the
court. Thus:
xxxx
[PROSECUTOR] How was that preparation made to conduct a buybust operation?
[SPO4 BENEDICTO] We contacted our asset or informant so that he will be the one who will act as
the buyer from Reyman Endaya.
Q: What will be used by your asset in buying shabu from Reyman Endaya?
A: We gave him marked money, sir.
Q: How much was the marked money given to your asset to be used in the buy-bust operation?
A: P500.00, sir.
Q: In what denomination?
A: Five (5) pieces of P100.00 bills.
xxxx
Q: And in that buy-bust operation that you conducted x x x, you said that it was conducted around
6:00 oclock in the evening x x x. Who were involved in this buy-bust operation?
A: SPO4 Moriel Benedicto, SPO2 Nestor Babadilla, and PO2 Edwin Chavez.
Q: What will be your participation, the three of you?
A: We stood as the back-up of the poseur-buyer, sir.
Q: And your poseur-buyer, what will be his participation?
A: He will be the one to act as the buyer of shabu to [sic] Reyman Endaya, sir.
xxxx
Q: And after your asset proceeded to that place, where did you position yourselves?
A: We hid in a place not far from the place where the asset was positioned.
xxxx
Q: And when [appellant] approachedyour asset, what transpired between your asset and Reyman
Endaya if anything happened that time?
A: They talked for a while and as we could see it, they exchanged something, sir.
Q: Do you know what was given by your asset to Reyman Andaya?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was handed by your asset to Reyman Andaya?
A: He gave the money, sir.
Q: What money?
A: The marked money that we gave him, sir.
Q: How about Reyman Endaya? Do you know or do you have any inkling as to what he gave to your
asset?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was your inkling about what Reyman Endaya gave to your asset?
A: The shabu which our asset bought from him, sir.
Q: And after this exchange of marked money and the suspected shabu happened between your
asset and Reyman Endaya, what was done by your asset if anything was done by him?
A: As we have previously arranged, heheld his head as a sign that he has already purchased shabu,
sir.
Q: And after getting or seeing this pre-arranged signal to signify that your asset had already bought
shabu from Reyman Endaya, what action did you take?
A: We approached them and we introduced ourselves as policemen and we arrested him. 34
xxxx
The foregoing testimony was corroborated by PO2 Chavez on the witness stand:
[PROSECUTOR] What happened on that buy-bust operation that you conducted?
[SPO2 CHAVEZ] At 7:00 o clock in the evening, Reyman Endaya arrived and during that time, our
poseur buyer was already positioned and we did not hear their actual conversation but we saw when
the poseur buyer handed the marked money to Reyman Endaya and Reyman Endaya in turn
handed to our poseur buyer something and on [sic] that point, we saw our poseur buyer giving a
signal to us which means that he had already bought the shabu from Reyman Endaya.
Q: Where were you when your asset who acted as poseur buyer and Reyman Endaya were [doing]
this transaction?
A: We were hiding on [sic] a place which was near from [sic] the two, sir.
Q: How far were you actually from the two?
A: More or less five (5) meters, sir.
xxxx
Q: And when you saw your asset giving that signal, what did you do?
A: We ran towards them and we arrested Reyman Endaya for selling that shabu, sir.35
On the other hand, the pertinent provisions of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 on illegal possession of
dangerous drugs state that:
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a
fineranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00)
shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law,shall possess any dangerous drug
in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
xxxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be
graduated as follows:
xxxx
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from
Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if
the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine
or cocainehydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu", or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA, TMA, LSD,
GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having
any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less
than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.
For the successful prosecution of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following
requisites must concur: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object thatis identified to be
a prohibited or dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the drug.36
The foregoing elements were likewise convincingly established herein. When the police operatives
bodily searched appellant for his wallet at the police station, they found eight(8) plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance which, upon laboratory examination, turned out to be
shabu.The respective testimonies of SPO4 Benedicto and PO2 Chavez on the matter provide:
[PROSECUTOR] And after putting the person of Reyman Endaya under arrest and informing him of
the cause of his arrest and his constitutional rights, what else did you do in [sic] the person of
Reyman Endaya?
[SPO4 BENEDICTO] He was searched by our two companions, sir.
xxxx
Q: And did you come to know the result of this body search conducted by SPO3 Nestor Babadilla
and PO2 Edwin Chavez?
A: My companion SPO3 Nestor Babadilla was able to recover the marked money worth P5,000.00
(sic) which Reyman was still holding.
Q: What else was recovered from the person of Reyman Endaya if anything else was recovered
from him in the course of his body search?
A: In the place where we arrestedhim, those were the only items which we were able to recover from
him, sir.
Q: Why? After that body searchwas conducted, did you recover anything else from Reyman Endaya
in any other place?
A: When we brought him to the office, we recovered eight (8) plastic sachets of shabu in his wallet,
sir.37
[PROSECUTOR] How did it come about that you were able to recover eight (8) separate sachets of
shabu from the wallet of Reyman Andaya when you were already at the police station?
[PO2 CHAVEZ] Upon arrival at the police station, we turned him over to the police investigator and
we again searched his body and on [sic] his wallet, we found the eight (8) sachets of shabu, sir.38
Chain of custody unbroken;
identity of corpus delicti established
with moral certainty
Appellant argues that the arresting officers failed to comply with the requirements of Section 21,
paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 on the inventory of the items seized from him.According to
him, the inventory of the plastic sachet taken from him at the Golden Luck Beer Garden was not
completed immediately after his arrest and at the place where he was arrested; the same sachet of
shabusubject of the illegal sale was not marked at the time and place of his arrest, but only at the
police station; and there was no representative from the Department of Justice as the government
official present during the inventory was the Clerk of Court, who is a representative of the Supreme
Court and not of the Department of Justice. He insists that no less than strict compliance with the
provisions of R.A. No. 9165 is mandated by the law.
To ascertain that the illegal drugs presented in court are the ones actually seized from the accused,
the prosecution must show that: (a) the prescribed procedure under Section 21(1), Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 has been complied with or falls within the saving clause provided in Section 21(a), Article II
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165; and (b) there was an unbroken
link in the chain of custody with respect to the confiscated items.39 Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165
embodies the procedural safeguards intended to counter or prevent possible police abuses in cases
of buy-bust operations. The provision provides, in part:
Section 21.Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
PlantSources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
a copy thereof;
Compliance with the foregoing provisions, "especially the required physical inventory and
photograph of the seized drugs in the presence of the accused, the media, and responsible
government functionaries, would be clear evidence that the police had carried out a legitimate buybust operation."40
The records of this case clearly show that the foregoing requirements were complied with.
As mandated by the above-quoted provision of law, the apprehending team conducted a physical
inventory of the drugs confiscated from appellant, as evidenced by the "Receipt for Property
Seized"41 which was signed by representatives from the municipal trial court, a non-governmental
organization, the media, and three locally elected public officials, as proof that they were present
when the inventory was carried out. Likewise, a photograph 42 of the accused, together with the items
seized from him, and with the aforementioned representatives from the public and private sector as
witnesses, was taken at the police station. The physical inventory and taking of the photograph were
done after the confiscated items were marked by PO2 Chavez. Finally, within 24 hours from the time
the plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance were taken from appellant, the same were
forwarded to the regional crime laboratory office for qualitative examination where the specimens
tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.43
In view of the foregoing, the allegation of appellant that the apprehending officers failed to comply
with the mandates of Section 21, particularly paragraph 1, of R.A. No. 9165 has no basis. In addition
to this, jurisprudence states that "the phrase marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates
even marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team." 44 Hence, the fact that
the seized plastic sachets were marked at the police station only does not deviate from the elements
required in the preservation of the integrity of the seized drugs.
In any case, contrary to appellants claim, strict compliance with Section 21, Article II ofRA 9165 is
not necessary45"as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seizeditems are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team." Elaborating on the provisions of R.A. No. 9165,
Section 21 (a) of its IRR states:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant isserved; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
(Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this Court has, in many cases held that "while the chain of custody should ideally be perfect,
in reality it is not, as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.The most important
factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be
used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused."46
In People v. Salonga,47 we held that "it is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited
drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as
exhibit. Its identity must be established with unwavering exactitude for it to leadt o a finding of
guilt."48 That the substances which were sent to the crime laboratory and examined by the forensic
chemical officer and found to be shabu were the very same substances which the police officers
seized from appellant is proven by the following excerpts from the testimony of SPO4 Benedicto:
[PROS. SANDOVAL] Mr[.] witness you said that aside from the one heat sealed transparent plastic
sachet which accused Reyman Endaya y Laig sold to your poseur buyer in the evening of November
20, 2002 you also recovered eight (8) other sachets of shabu from him after his arrest if you will be
shown these nine (9) plastic sachets of shabu can you identify the same? [SPO4 BENEDICTO] Yes
sir.
Q: Can you distinguish in [sic] these nine (9) plastic sachets which one was the subject matter ofthe
buy bust operation and which of those was taken from the possession of the accused after his
arrest?
A: Yes sir
Q: How would you distinguish these specimens from each other?
A: My companion placed his markings on all the sachets sir.
Q: How about the one (1) plastic sachet which your poseur buyer was able to buy from Reyman
Endaya has it any distinguishing mark also after his arrest?
A: There is a distinguishing mark sir.
Q: What was the distinguishing mark?
A: The sachet of shabu which was confiscated in [sic] the buy bust operation was marked by burning
two ends of the plastic sachet, sir.
Q: If you will be shown this [sic] specimen[s] can you identify them?
A: Yes sir.
Q: x x x will you please look at these specimens Mr. Witness and tell this Honorable Court what
relation has the specimens to the eight (8) plastic sachets that were confiscated from accused
Reyman Endaya after his arrest?
A: These eight (8) sachets of shabu were confiscated when we searched him sir.
xxxx
Q: How about the plastic sachet which accused Reyman Endaya sold to your buyer in the buy bust
operation?
A: This sachet which was burned on both two (2) corners sir.49 (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing narration was again supported by the statements of PO2 Chavez in his testimony
dated 1 September 2004. Thus:
[PROSECUTOR] When you returnedto the police station after conducting the buy-bust operation, do
you know the whereabouts of that thing which was handed by Reyman Endaya to your poseur
buyer?
[PO2 CHAVEZ] Yes, sir.
Q: Where was it?
A: It is in my possession, sir.
Q: When did you take custody of that?
A: When we arrested Reyman Endayaat the place of the incident, he handed it to me, sir.
Q: Who handed that thing to you?
A: The poseur buyer, sir.
Q: What is that thing?
A: The item which he was able to buy, the shabu, sir.
xxxx
Q: How about the sachet of shabu which your asset was able to buy from Reyman Endaya and this
sachet of shabu which was handed to you at the place of the buy-bust operation. Can you identify
that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How about the other eight (8) sachets which you recovered from the wallet of Reyman Endaya at
the police station. Can you identify those eight (8) sachets?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: Can you tell the Court which one of these nine (9) sachets was the one bought by the poseur
buyer from Reyman Endaya?
A: This one, sir. (Witness pointing to the sachet of shabu which was previously marked as Exhibit H.)
Q; Why are you sure that this is the one that was bought by your poseur buyer from Reyman
Endaya?
A: I marked it and I burned a portion of the plastic sachet to distinguish this specimen fromthe other
sachets of shabu which were confiscated from them [sic], sir.
Q: Which is the burned portion in this sachet, Mr. Witness?
A: Here, sir. (Witness pointing tothe burned corner of the plastic sachet.)
xxxx
Q: How about the eight (8) sachets of shabu that were recovered by you from the wallet of Reyman
Endaya when you were already at the police station. Can you recognize those eight (8) sachets of
shabu?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I am showing to you these eight (8) sachets of shabu previously marked as Exhibits "I," "J," "K,"
"L," "M," "N," "O" and "P" during the testimony of SPO4 Muriel Benedicto. What relation has those
eight (8) sachets of shabu to those that you recovered from the wallet of Reyman Endaya?
A: Those are the shabu which I was able to confiscate from his wallet.
Q: Why do you say so?
A: Because of my initials, sir. (Witness pointing to the initials which appear to be a figure "8"on the
eight (8) sachets of shabu.
Q: In this sachet of shabu which your asset was able to buy from Reyman Endaya, do you have any
marking also here aside from the burned corner of the plastic sachet?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What is that?
A: Here, sir. (Witness pointing to the marking which appears to be a figure "8".) 50
(Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing testimonies categorically demonstrate that the evidence seized from appellant were
the same ones tested, introduced, and testified to in open court. Both SPO4 Benedicto and PO2
Chavez were able to identify the drugs with certainty when these were presented in court. In short,
there is no question as to the integrity of the evidence. 51
Finally, in order to prove the unbroken chain of custody of the prohibited drugs confiscated from
appellant, the respective testimonies of SPO4 Benedicto and PO2 Chavez establish that the plastic
sachet subject of the illegal sale was handed over by the civilian asset acting as poseur buyer to
PO2 Chavez while still at the crime scene. PO2 Chavez continued to be in possession of the same
until they reached the police station where he accomplished the marking thereof. The eight sachets
of shabu in the wallet of appellant, on the other hand, which were found by PO2 Chavez after bodily
searching the former at the police station, were likewise marked by PO2 Chavez. Once marked, the
itemswere turned over to the police investigator and thereafter, a letter-request together with the
marked sachets was forwarded to the crime laboratory for examination where the substances inside
the plastic sachets tested positive for shabu. These sachets, with their identifying marks still intact,
were then presented in court.
Based on the foregoing, the CA correctly ruled that the chain of custody was unbroken, thereby
ensuring the integrity of the corpus delicti. Unless appellant can show that there was bad faith, ill will,
or tampering with the evidence, the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been
preserved will be upheld. It is incumbent upon appellant to show that the foregoing circumstances
are attendant in this case to overcome the presumption that the police officers handled the seized
drugs with regularity, and that they properly performed their duties.52 As the CA correctly found,
appellant failed to discharge this burden.
II
Signature of appellant on "Receipt for Property Seized" IS inadmissible in evidence
Appellant contends that he was not assisted by a lawyer when he signed the "Receipt for Property
Seized; therefore, the document cannot be admitted in evidence against him as his act of signing
the same is a form of confession or admission.
We find merit in appellants contention. There is no showing in the records of this case that appellant
was assisted by a counsel when he signed the "Receipt for Property Seized."
It is settled that the signature of an accused in the receipt of property seized is inadmissible in
evidence if it was obtained without the assistance of counsel. The signature of the accused on such
a receipt is a declaration against his interest and a tacit admission of the crime charged; 53 hence, the
constitutional safeguard must be observed.
Nevertheless, as aptly found by the CA, while it is true that appellant signed the receipt of property
seized without the assistance of a counsel, the same only renders inadmissible the receipt
itself.54 Thus, according to the CA:
x x x the evidentiary value of the "Receipt of Property Seized" in the present circumstances is
irrelevant in light of the ample evidence proving [appellants] guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As [w]e
have earlier stated, the prosecution was able to prove that a valid buy-bust operation was conducted
to entrap [appellant]. The testimonies of the arresting police officers clearly established [the illegal
possession] and that the sale of shabu by [appellant] was consummated. The corpus delicti, which is
the shabu, [were] presented in court and confirmed by the other members of the buy-bust team and
they have acknowledged that they were the same drugs subject of that particular buy-bust operation
[and subsequent body search on [appellant].55
III
Sachets of shabu not fruits of poisonous tree; hence,
admissible in evidence against appellant
Appellant continued to crave for acquittal claiming that, assuming without conceding that he had in
factsold and possessed the plastic sachets of shabu, they cannot be admitted in evidence for being
fruits of a poisonous tree, having been obtained after an unlawful arrest and
search.1wphi1 Appellants insistence on the illegalityof his warrantless arrest lacks merit. Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court allows a warrantless arrest under any of the following circumstances:
Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In this case, the arrest of appellantwas effected under paragraph (a) or what is termed "in flagrante
delicto."56 For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delictounder paragraph (a) of
the afore-quoted Rule, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.57
Here, SPO4 Benedicto, SPO2 Babadilla, and PO2 Chavez personally witnessed the exchange
between appellant and the poseur-buyer of the marked money and the plastic sachet containing a
white crystalline substance which subsequently tested positive for shabu.At the time he was
arrested, therefore, appellant was clearly committing a crime in full view of the buy-bust team. As
held by the CA:
Because [appellant] had been caught in flagrante delictoby the apprehending police officers, they, as
the arresting officers were duty- bound to apprehend the culprit immediately and to search him for
anything that may be used as proof of the commission of the crime. The search, being an incident of
a lawful arrest, needed no warrant for its validity.58
IV
Penalties
Pursuant to Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the illegal sale of dangerous drugs is punishable
by life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00)
to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00), regardless of the quantity or purity of the drug involved.
However, since the imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited by R.A. No. 9346, 59 only the
penalties of life imprisonment and fine may be imposed. 60 The RTC and the CA, therefore, correctly
imposed the penalties of life imprisonment and a fine in the amount of P500,000.00 on appellant in
Criminal Case No. 0099-2003.
Illegal possession of dangerous drugs, on the other hand, is penalized under Section 11(3), Article II
of R.A. No. 9165 with imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one day to twenty(20) years, plus a fine
ranging from three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00) if the quantity involved is less than five grams.
Herein appellant was charged withand found to be guilty of illegal possession of eight (8) plastic
sachets of shabu having a total weight of 0.32 gram in Criminal Case No. 0098-2003. Following the
provisions of R.A. No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, "if
the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." 61 Hence, the RTC and
the CA properly sentenced appellant to suffer imprisonment of 12 years and one day, as minimum, to
20 years, asmaximum, and fined him P300,000.00, since the said penalties are within the range of
penalties prescribed by the law.62
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 04872 dated 11 May 2012 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 183345
September 17, 2014
MA. GRACIA HAO and DANNY HAO, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before this Court is the petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by
Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny Hao (petitioners). They seek the reversal of the Court of Appeals' (CA)
decision2 dated February 28, 2006 and resolution3 dated June 13, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86289.
These CA rulings affirmed the February 26, 20044 and July 26, 20045 orders of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, which respectively denied the petitioners' motion to defer arraignment and
motion to lift warrant of arrest.6
Factual Antecedents
On July 11, 2003 private complainant Manuel Dy y Awiten (Dy) filed a criminal complaint against the
petitioners and Victor Ngo (Ngo) for syndicated estafa penalized under Article 315(2)(a) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, in relation with Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1689. 7
Dy alleged that he was a long-time client of Asiatrust Bank, Binondo Branch where Ngo was the
manager. Because of their good business relationship, Dy took Ngos advice to deposit his money in
an investment house that will give a higher rate of return. Ngo then introduced him to Ma. Gracia
Hao (Gracia), also known as Mina Tan Hao, who presented herself as an officer of various reputable
companies and an incorporator of State Resources Development Corporation (State Resources), the
recommended company that can give Dy his higher investment return.8
Relying on Ngo and Gracias assurances, Dy initially invested in State Resources the approximate
amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). This initial investment earned the promised interests,
leading Dy, at the urging of Gracia, to increase his investment to almost One Hundred Million Pesos
(P100,000,000.00). Dy increased his investments through several checks he issued in the name of
State Resources.9 In return, Gracia also issued several checks to Dy representing his earnings for
his investment. Gracia issued checks in the total amount of One Hundred Fourteen Million, Two
Hundred Eighty Six Thousand, Eighty Six Pesos and Fourteen Centavos (P114,286,086.14). All
these checks10 were subsequently dishonored when Dy deposited them.
Dy sought the assistance of Ngo for the recovery of the amount of the dishonored checks. Ngo
promised assistance, but after a few months, Dy found out that Ngo already resigned from Asiatrust
Bank and could no longer be located. Hence, he confronted Gracia regarding the dishonored
checks. He eventually learned that Gracia invested his money in the construction and realty
business of Gracias husband, Danny Hao (Danny). Despite their promises to pay, the petitioners
never returned Dys money.
On July 17, 2003, Dy filed a supplemental affidavit to include in the criminal complaint Chester De
Joya, Allan Roxas, Samantha Roxas, Geraldine Chiong, and Lyn Ansuas all incorporators and/or
directors of State Resources.11
On the basis of Dys complaint12 and supplemental affidavit,13 the public prosecutor filed an
information14 for syndicated estafa against the petitioners and their six co-accused. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-219952 and was raffled to respondent RTC of Manila, Branch 40.
Judge Placido Marquez issued warrants of arrest against the petitioners and the other accused.
Consequently, petitioners immediately filed a motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift warrant
of arrest. In their twin motions, they invoked the absence of probable cause against them and the
pendency of their petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ). 15
In its February 26, 2004 order, the trial court denied the petitioners twin motions.16 The petitioners
moved for reconsideration but the trial court also denied this in its July 26, 2004 order. Consequently,
the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA.
The CAs Ruling
The CA affirmed the denial of the petitioners motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift warrant
of arrest.
In determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, a judge is mandated to
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. 17 The CA noted that
Judge Marquez only issued the warrants of arrest after his personal examination of the facts and
circumstances of the case. Since the judge complied with the Rules, the CA concluded that no grave
abuse of discretion could be attributed to him.18
In its decision, however, the CA opined that the evidence on record and the assertions in Dys
affidavits only show probable cause for the crime of simple estafa,not syndicated estafa. Under PD
No. 1689, in order for syndicated estafa to exist, the swindling must have been committed by five or
more persons, and the fraud must be against the general public or at least a group of persons. In his
complaint-affidavit, Dy merely stated that he relied on the petitioners false representations and was
defrauded into parting with his money, causing him damage.19 Since there was no evidence that
State Resources was formed to defraud the public in general or that it was used to solicit money
from other persons aside from Dy, then the offense charged should only be for simple estafa. 20
Nevertheless, the CA found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
warrants of arrest against the petitioners as there was still probable cause to believe that the
petitioners committed the crime of simple estafa.21
The Petition
The petitioners submit that an examination of Dys affidavits shows inconsistencies in his cited
factual circumstances. These inconsistencies, according to the petitioners, negate the existence of
probable cause against them for the crime charged.
The petitioners also contend that it was only Ngo who enticed Dy to invest his money. As early as
August 1995, State Resources had already been dissolved, thus negating the assertion that Dy
advanced funds for this corporation.22 They question the fact that it took Dy almost five years to file
his complaint despitehis allegation that he lost almost P100,000,000.00.23
Lastly, the petitioners claim that the warrants of arrest issued against them were null and void.
Contrary to the trial courts findings, the CA noted in the body of its decision, that PD 1689 was
inapplicable to their case. There was no evidence to show that State Resources was formed to solicit
funds not only from Dy but also from the general public. Since simple estafa and syndicated estafa
are two distinct offenses, then the warrants of arrest issued to petitioners were erroneous because
these warrants pertained to two different crimes.24
The Courts Ruling
We resolve to DENY the petition.
Procedural Consideration
We note that the present petition questions the CAs decision and resolution on the petition for
certiorari the petitioners filed with that court. At the CA, the petitioners imputed grave abuse of
discretion against the trial court for the denial of their twin motions to defer arraignment and to lift
warrant of arrest.
This situation is similar to the procedural issue we addressed in the case of Montoya v. Transmed
Manila Corporation25 where we faced the question of how to review a Rule 45 petition before us, a
CA decision made under Rule 65. We clarified in this cited case the kind of review that this Court
should undertake given the distinctions between the two remedies. In Rule 45, we consider the
correctness of the decision made by an inferior court. In contrast, a Rule 65 review focuses on
jurisdictional errors.
As in Montoya, we need to scrutinize the CA decision in the same context that the petition for
certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it. Thus, we need to examine the CA decision from the prism
of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial court and not on the basis of whether the trial courts denial of petitioners motions was
strictly legally correct. In question form, the question to ask is: did the CA correctly determine
whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motions to defer
arraignment and lift warrant of arrest?
Probable Cause for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest
Under the Constitution26 and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,27 a judge is mandated to
personally determine the existence of probable cause after his personal evaluation of the
prosecutors resolution and the supporting evidence for the crime charged. These provisions
command the judge to refrain from making a mindless acquiescence to the prosecutors findings and
to conduct his own examination of the facts and circumstances presented by both parties.
Section 5(a) of Rule 112, grants the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal complaint
or information. He may: a) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish
probable cause; b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; or c) order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt on the existence of
probable cause.28
In the present case, the trial court chose to issue warrants of arrest to the petitioners and their coaccused.To be valid, these warrants must have been issued after compliance with the requirement
that probable cause be personally determined by the judge. Notably at this stage, the judge is tasked
to merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused.In doing so, he need not
conduct a de novo hearing; he only needs to personally review the prosecutor's initial determination
and see if it is supported by substantial evidence. 29
The records showed that Judge Marquez made a personal determination of the existence of
probable cause to support the issuance of the warrants. The petitioners, in fact, did not present any
evidence to controvert this. As the trial court ruled in its February 26, 2004 order:
The non-arrest of all the accused or their refusal to surrender practically resulted in the suspension
of arraignment exceeding the sixty (60) days counted from the filing of co-accused De Joyas
motions, which may be considered a petition for review, and that of co-accused Spouses Haos own
petition for review. This is not to mention the delay in the resolution by the Department of Justice. On
the other hand, co-accused De Joyas motion to determine probable cause and co-accused Spouses
Haos motion to lift warrant of arrest have been rendered moot and academic with the issuance of
warrants of arrest by this presiding judge after his personal examination of the facts and
circumstances strong enough in themselves to support the belief that they are guilty of the crime that
in fact happened.30 [Emphasis ours]
Under this situation, we conclude that Judge Marquez did not arbitrarily issue the warrants of arrest
against the petitioners. As stated by him, the warrants were only issuedafter his personal evaluation
of the factual circumstances that led him to believe that there was probable cause to apprehend the
petitioners for their commission of a criminal offense.
Distinction between Executive and Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
In a criminal prosecution, probable cause is determined at two stages. The first is at the executive
level, where determination is made by the prosecutor during the preliminary investigation, before the
filing of the criminal information. The second is at the judicial level, undertaken by the judge before
the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
In the case at hand, the question before us relates to the judicial determination of probable cause. In
order to properly resolve if the CA erred in affirming the trial courts issuance of the warrants of arrest
against the petitioners, it is necessary to scrutinize the crime of estafa, whether committed as a
simple offense or through a syndicate.
The crime of swindling or estafa is covered by Articles 315-316 of the RPC. In these provisions, the
different modes by which estafa may be committed, as well as the corresponding penalties for each
are outlined. One of these modes is estafaby means of deceit. Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC defines
how this particular crime is perpetrated:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior toor
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business orimaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
Under this provision, estafa has the following elements: 1) the existence of a false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means; 2) the execution of the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; 3) the reliance by the
offended party on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, which induced him to part
withhis money or property; and 4) as a result, the offended party suffered damage. 31
As Dy alleged in his complaint-affidavit, Ngo and Gracia induced him to invest with State Resources
and promised him a higher rate of return.32 Because of his good business relationship with Ngo and
relying on Gracias attractive financial representations, Dy initially invested the approximate amount
of P10,000,000.00.
This first investment earned profits. Thus, Dy was enticed by Gracia to invest more so that he
eventually advanced almost P100,000,000.0033 with State Resources. Gracias succeeding checks
representing the earnings of his investments, however, were all dishonored upon deposit. 34 He
subsequently learned that the petitioners used his money for Dannys construction and realty
business.35 Despite repeated demands and the petitioners constant assurances to pay, they never
returned Dys invested money and its supposed earnings.36
These cited factual circumstances show the elements of estafaby means of deceit. The petitioners
inducedDy to invest in State Resources promising higher returns. But unknown to Dy, what occurred
was merely a ruse to secure his money to be used in Dannys construction and realty business. The
petitioners deceit became more blatant when they admitted in their petition that as early as August
1995, State Resources had already been dissolved. 37 This admission strengthens the conclusion
that the petitioners misrepresented facts regarding themselves and State Resources in order to
persuade Dy to part with his money for investment with an inexistent corporation.
These circumstances all serve as indicators of the petitioners deceit. "Deceit is the false
representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or
by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives or is intended to deceive
another, so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury."38
Thus, had it not been for the petitioners false representations and promises, Dy would not have
placed his money in State Resources, to his damage. These allegations cannot but lead us to the
conclusion that probable cause existed as basis to arrest the petitioners for the crime of estafa by
means of deceit.
We now address the issue of whether estafain this case was committed through a syndicate.
Under Section 1 of PD No. 1689,39 there is syndicated estafaif the following elements are present: 1)
estafaor other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC was committed; 2)
the estafaor swindling was committed by a syndicate of five or more persons; and 3) the fraud
resulted inthe misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks,
cooperatives, "samahang nayon[s]," or farmers associations or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.40
The factual circumstances of the present case show that the first and second elements of syndicated
estafaare present; there is probable cause for violation of Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC against the
petitioners. Moreover, in Dys supplemental complaint-affidavit, he alleged that the fraud perpetrated
against him was committed, not only by Ngo and the petitioners, but also by the other officers and
directors of State Resources. The number of the accused who allegedly participated in defrauding
Dy exceeded five, thus satisfying the requirement for the existence of a syndicate.
However, the third element of the crime is patently lacking. The funds fraudulently solicited by the
corporation must come from the general public. In the present case, no evidence was presented to
show that aside from Dy, the petitioners, through State Resources, also sought investments from
other people. Dy had no co-complainants alleging that they were also deceived to entrust their
money to State Resources. The general public element was not complied with. Thus, no syndicated
estafaallegedly took place, only simple estafa by means of deceit.
Despite this conclusion, we still hold that the CA did not err in affirming the trial courts denial ofthe
petitioners motion to lift warrant of arrest.
A warrant of arrest should be issued if the judge after personal evaluation of the facts and
circumstances is convinced that probable cause exists that an offense was committed.
Probable cause for the issuance ofa warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believethat an offense
was committed by the person sought to be arrested.41 This must be distinguished from the
prosecutors finding of probable cause which is for the filing of the proper criminal information.
Probable cause for warrant of arrest is determined to address the necessity of placing the accused
under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. 42
In People v. Castillo and Mejia,43 we explained the distinction between the two kinds of probable
cause determination:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive
determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that
properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether
probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as
defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial
authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that
function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a
correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court
itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy
himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge
cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.44 [Emphasis ours]
With our conclusion that probable cause existed for the crime of simple estafa and that the
petitioners have probably committed it, it follows that the issuance of the warrants of arrest against
the petitioners remains to be valid and proper. To allow them to go scot-free would defeat rather than
promote the purpose of a warrant of arrest, which is to put the accused in the courts custodyto avoid
his flight from the clutches of justice.
Moreover, we note that simple estafa and syndicated estafa are not two entirely different crimes.
Simple estafais a crime necessarily included in syndicated estafa. An offense is necessarily included
in another offense when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those
constituting the latter.45
Under this legal situation, only a formal amendment of the filed information under Section 14, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court46 is necessary; the warrants of arrest issued against the petitioners should
not be nullified since probable cause exists for simple estafa.
Suspension of Arraignment
Under Section 11(c), Rule 116of the Rules of Court, an arraignment may be suspended if there is a
petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor pending at either the DOJ, or the Office of the
President. However, such period of suspension should not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the
filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
As the petitioners alleged, they filed a petition for review with the DOJ on November 21, 2003. Since
this petition had not been resolved yet, they claimed that their arraignment should be suspended
indefinitely.
We emphasize that the right of an accused to have his arraignment suspended is not an unqualified
right.1wphi1 In Spouses Trinidad v. Ang,47 we explained that while the pendency of a petition for
review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the Rules limit the deferment of the
arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It
follows, therefore, that after the expiration of the 60-day period, the trial court is bound to arraign the
accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. 48
As the trial court found in its February 26, 2004 order, the DOJ's delay in resolving the petitioners'
petition for review had already exceeded 60 days. Since the suspension of the petitioners'
arraignment was already beyond the period allowed by the Rules, the petitioners' motion to suspend
completely lacks any legal basis.
As a final note, we observe that the resolution of this case had long been delayed because of the
petitioners' refusal to submit to the trial court's jurisdiction and their erroneous invocation of the
Rules in their favor. As there is probable cause for the petitioners' commission of a crime, their arrest
and arraignment should now ensue so that this case may properly proceed to trial, where the merits
of both the parties' evidence and allegations may be weighed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition and AFFIRM WITH
MODIFICATION the February 28, 2006 decision and June 13, 2008 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 86289. We hereby order that petitioners Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny Hao
be charged for simple estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and be
arraigned for this charge. The warrants of arrest issued stand.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 204589
November 19, 2014
RIZALDY SANCHEZ y CAJILI, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to reverse and set aside the July 25, 2012
Decision and the November 20, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No.
31742 filed by petitioner Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili (Sanchez), affirming the April 21, 2005 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20 (RTC), which convicted him for Violation of
Section 11, Article l l of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision
reads:
1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered convicting accused Rizaldy Sanchez y

Cajili of Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and hereby sentences him to
suffer imprisonment from twelve (12) to fifteen (15) years and to pay a fine of Php300,000.00. SO
ORDERED.
4
Sanchez was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in the Information, dated March 20, 2003, filed
before the RTC and docketed as Criminal Case No. 10745-03. The accusatory portion of the
Information indicting Sanchez reads:
5
That on or about the 19th day of March 2003, in the Municipality of Imus, Province of Cavite,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
control and custody, 0.1017 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu,"
a dangerous drug, in violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
When arraigned, Sanchez pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. During the pre-trial, the
prosecution and the defense stipulated on the existence and due execution of the following pieces of
evidence: 1] the request for laboratory examination; 2]certification issued by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI);3] Dangerous Drugs Report; and 4] transparent plastic sachet containing small
transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
6

The prosecutions version of the events as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG)in its Comment on the petition is as follows:
7
Around 2:50 pm of March 19, 2003, acting on the information that Jacinta Marciano, aka "Intang,"
was selling drugs to tricycle drivers, SPO1 Elmer Amposta, together with CSU Edmundo Hernandez,
CSU Jose Tagle, Jr., and CSU Samuel Monzon, was dispatched to Barangay Alapan 1-B, Imus,
Cavite to conduct an operation.
While at the place, the group waited for a tricycle going to, and coming from, the house of Jacinta.
After a few minutes, they spotted a tricycle carrying Rizaldy Sanchez coming out of the house. The
group chased the tricycle. After catching up with it, they requested Rizaldy to alight. It was then that
they noticed Rizaldy holding a match box.
SPO1 Amposta asked Rizaldy if he could see the contents of the match box. Rizaldy agreed. While
examining it, SPO1 Amposta found a small transparent plastic sachet which contained a white
crystalline substance. Suspecting that the substance was a regulated drug, the group accosted
Rizaldy and the tricycle driver. The group brought the two to the police station.
On March 20, 2003, Salud M. Rosales, a forensic chemist from the NBI, submitted a Certification
which reads:
This certifies that on the above date at 9:25 a.m. one PO1 Edgardo Nario of Imus, Mun. PS, PNP,
Imus, Cavite submitted to this office for laboratory examinations the following specimen/s to wit:
White crystalline substance contained in a small plastic sachet, marked "RSC," placed in a plastic
pack, marked "Mar. 19, 2003." (net wt. = 0.1017 gm)
Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen/s gave POSITIVE RESULTS for
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE.
Said specimen/s were allegedly confiscated from RIZALDY SANCHEZ y CAJILI and DARWIN
REYES y VILLARENTE.
Official report follows:
This certification was issued uponrequest for purpose of filing the case.

In the present petition, Sanchez denied the accusation against him and presented a different version
of the events that transpired in the afternoon of March 19, 2003, to substantiate his claim of
innocence:
9
On 24 February 2005, the accused Rizaldy Sanchez took the witness stand. He testified that on the
date and time in question, he, together with a certain Darwin Reyes, were on their way home from
Brgy. Alapan, Imus, Cavite, where they transported a passenger, when their way was blocked by
four (4) armed men riding an owner-type jeepney. Without a word, the four men frisked him and
Darwin. He protested and asked what offense did they commit. The arresting officers told him that
they had just bought drugs from Alapan. He reasoned out that he merely transported a passenger
there but the policemen still accosted him and he was brought to the Imus Police Station where
hewas further investigated. The police officer, however, let DarwinReyes go. On cross-examination,
the accused admitted that it was the first time that he saw the police officers at the time he was
arrested. He also disclosed that he was previously charged with the same offense before Branch 90
of this court which was already dismissed, and that the police officers who testified in the said case
are not the same as those involved in this case.
10
The Ruling of the RTC

On April 21, 2005, the RTC rendered its decision finding that Sanchez was caught in flagrante
delicto,in actual possession of shabu. It stated that the police operatives had reasonable ground to
believe that Sanchez was in possession of the said dangerous drug and such suspicion was
confirmed when the match box Sanchez was carrying was found to contain shabu. The RTC lent
credence to the testimony of prosecution witness, SPO1 Elmer Amposta (SPO1 Amposta) because
there was no showing that he had been impelled by any ill motive to falsely testify against Sanchez.
The dispositive portion of which reads:
11
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered convicting accused Rizaldy Sanchez y

Cajili of Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and hereby sentences him to
suffer imprisonment from twelve (12) to fifteen (15) years and to pay a fine of Php300,000.00. SO
ORDERED.
12
Unfazed, Sanchez appealed the RTC judgment of conviction before the CA. He faulted the RTC for
giving undue weight on the testimony of SPO1 Amposta anchored merely on the presumption of
regularity in the performance of duty of the said arresting officer. He insisted that the prosecution
evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA found no cogent reason to reverse or modify the findings of facts and conclusions reached
by the RTC and, thus, upheld the conviction of the accused for violation of Section 11, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165. According to the CA, there was probable cause for the police officers to believe that
Sanchez was then and there committing a crime considering that he was seen leaving the residence
of a notorious drug dealer where, according to a tip they received, illegal drug activities were being
perpetrated. It concluded that the confiscation by the police operative of the subject narcotic from
Sanchez was pursuant to a valid search. The CA then went on to write that non-compliance by the
police officers on the requirements of Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, particularly
on the conduct of inventory and photograph of the seized drug, was not fatal to the prosecutions
causesince its integrity and evidentiary value had been duly preserved. The falloof the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite dated April 21,
2005 and Order dated October 1, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 10745-03 finding accused appellant
Rizaldy C. Sanchez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
13
Sanchez filed a motion for reconsideration of the July 25, 2012 Decision, but it was denied by the CA
in its November 20, 2012 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
Bewailing his conviction, Sanchez filed the present petition for "certiorari"under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court and anchored on the following
GROUNDS:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THAT ACCUSED WAS CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE
DELICTO, HENCE,A SEARCH WARRANT WAS NO LONGER NECESSARY; AND
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT HELD THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 21, PARAGRAPH 1, ARTICLE
II OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY RENDER THE SEIZED
ITEMS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
14
Sanchez insists on his acquittal. He argues that the warrantless arrest and search on him were
invalid due to the absence of probable cause on the part of the police officers to effect an in flagrante
delicto arrest under Section 15, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. He also contends that the failure of
the police operatives to comply with Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 renders the
seized item inadmissible in evidence and creates reasonable doubt on his guilt. By way of
Comment to the petition, the OSG prays for the affirmance of the challenged July 25, 2012 decision
of the CA. The OSG submits that the warrantless search and seizure of the subject narcotic were
justified under the plain view doctrine where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
15
The Courts Ruling

Preliminarily, the Court notes that this petition suffers from procedural infirmity. Under Section 1,
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the proper remedy to question the CA judgment, final order or
resolution, as in the present case, is a petition for review on certiorari, which would be but a
continuation of the appellate process over the original case. By filing a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65, Sanchez therefore clearly availed himself of the wrong remedy.
16
Be that as it may, the Court, in several cases before, had treated a petition for certiorari as a petition
for review under Rule 45, in accordance with the liberal spirit and in the interest of substantial justice,
particularly (1) if the petition was filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review;
(2) errors of judgment are averred; and (3) there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the
rules. The case at bench satisfies all the above requisites and, hence, there is ample justification to
treat this petition for certiorari as a petition for review. Besides, it is axiomatic that the nature of an
action is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition and the character of the relief
sought. Here, stripped of allegations of "grave abuse of discretion," the petition actually avers errors
of judgment rather than of jurisdiction, which are the appropriate subjects of a petition for review on
certiorari.
17
18
Going now into the substance of the petition, the Court finds the same to be impressed with merit.
Although it is true that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies
is entitled to great respect and not to be disturbed on appeal, this rule, however, is not a hard and
fast one. It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial court with regard to the credibility
of witnesses deserves the utmost respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the
prerogative, denied to appellate judges, of observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course of
their testimonies. But an exception exists if there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have
affected the case. After going over the records of the case at bench, the Court finds some facts of
weight and substance that have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court
which cast doubt on the guilt of Sanchez.
19
In sustaining the conviction of Sanchez, the CA ratiocinated that this was a clear case of an in
flagrante delicto arrest under paragraph (a) Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
In this regard, the CA wrote:
In the case at Bar, the acquisition of the regulated drug by the police officers qualifies as a valid
search following a lawful operation by the police officers. The law enforcers acted on the directive of
their superior based on an information that the owner of the residence where Sanchez came from
was a notorious drug dealer. As Sanchez was seen leaving the said residence, the law enforcers
had probable cause to stop Sanchez on the road since there was already a tip that illegal drugrelated activities were perpetrated in the place where he came from and seeing a match box held on
one hand, the police officers action were justified to inspect the same. The search therefore, is a
sound basis for the lawful seizure of the confiscated drug, arrest and conviction of Sanchez.
The case of People vs. Valdez (G.R. No. 127801, March 3, 1999) is instructive. In that case, the
police officers, by virtue of an information that a person having been previously described by the
informant, accosted Valdez and upon inspection of the bag he was carrying, the police officers found
the information given to them to be true as it yielded marijuana leaves hidden in the water jug and
lunch box inside Valdezs bag. The Supreme Court in affirming the trial courts ruling convicting
Valdez declared that:
In this case, appellant was caught in flagrante since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his
arrest. A crime was actually being committed by the appellant, thus, the search made upon his
personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (a) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a
warrantless search incident to lawful arrest. While it is true that SPO1 Mariano was not armed with a
search warrant when the search was conducted over the personal effects of appellant, nevertheless,
under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said police officer to
believe that appellant was then and there committing a crime. The cited case is akin to the
circumstances in the instant appeal as in this case, Sanchez, coming from the house of the identified
drug dealer, previously tipped by a concerned citizen, walked to a parked tricycle and sped towards
the direction of Kawit, Cavite. The search that gave way to the seizure of the match box containing
shabu was a reasonable course of event that led to the valid warrantless arrest since there was
sufficient probable cause for chasing the tricycle he was in. (Underscoring supplied)
1wphi1
A judicious examination of the evidence on record belies the findings and conclusions of the RTC
and the CA.
At the outset, it is observed that the CA confused the search incidental to a lawful arrest with the
stop-and-frisk principle, a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Albeit it did not
expressly state so, the CA labored under the confused view that one and the other were indistinct
and identical. That confused view guided the CA to wrongly affirm the petitioner's conviction. The
Court must clear this confusion and correct the error.
It is necessary to remind the RTC and the CA that the Terry stop- and-frisk search is entirely
different from and should not be confused with the search incidental to a lawful arrest envisioned
under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. The distinctions have been made
clear in Malacat v. Court of Appeals :
20
21
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made -- the process cannot be
reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the
arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and
seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the
crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of
escaping or committing violence.
xxxx
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own
or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment x x x x.
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop-andfrisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop-and-frisk." A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-andfrisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection,
which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior
even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is
not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer.
22
In the case at bench, neither the in flagrante delicto arrest nor the stop- and-frisk principle was
applicable to justify the warrantless search and seizure made by the police operatives on Sanchez.
An assiduous scrutiny of the factual backdrop of this case shows that the search and seizure on
Sanchez was unlawful. A portion of SPO1 Ampostas testimony on direct examination is revelatory,
viz:
Pros. Villarin:
Q: On March 19, 2003 at around 2:50 p.m., can you recall where were you?
A: Yes, Mam.
Q: Where were you? A: We were in Brgy. Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite.
Q: What were you doing at Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite? A: We were conducting an operation against
illegal drugs.
Q: Who were with you? A: CSU Edmundo Hernandez, CSU Jose Tagle, Jr. and CSU Samuel
Monzon.
Q: Was the operation upon the instruction of your Superior?

A: Our superior gave us the information that there were tricycle drivers buying drugs from "Intang" or
Jacinta Marciano.
Q: What did you do after that?
A: We waited for a tricycle who will go to the house of Jacinta Marciano.
Q: After that what did you do?
A: A tricycle with a passenger went to the house of "Intang" and when the passenger boarded the
tricycle, we chase[d] them.
Q: After that, what happened next?
A: When we were able to catch the tricycle, the tricycle driver and the passenger alighted from the
tricycle.
Q: What did you do after they alighted from the tricycle?
A: I saw the passenger holding a match box.
Q: What did you do after you saw the passenger holding a match box?
A: I asked him if I can see the contents of the match box.
Q: Did he allow you?
A: Yes, mam. He handed to me voluntarily the match box.
Court:
Q: Who, the driver or the passenger?
A: The passenger, sir.
Pros. Villarin:
Q: After that what did you find out?
A: I opened the match box and I found out that it contained a small transparent plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance.
23
A search as an incident to a lawfularrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It bears emphasis that
the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a
24
lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings; the process cannot be
reversed.
25
Here, the search preceded the arrest of Sanchez. There was no arrest prior to the conduct of the
search. Arrest is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of a person
into custody that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. Under Section 2, of
the same rule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his
voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. Even casting aside the
petitioners version and basing the resolution of this case on the general thrust of the prosecution
evidence, no arrest was effected by the police operatives upon the person of Sanchez before
conducting the search on him. It appears from the above quoted testimony of SPO1 Amposta that
after they caught up with the tricycle, its driver and the passenger, Sanchez, alighted from it; that he
noticed Sanchez holding a match box; and that he requested Sanchez if he could see the contents
of the match box, to which the petitioner acceded and handed it over to him. The arrest of Sanchez
was made only after the discovery by SPO1 Amposta of the shabu inside the match box. Evidently,
what happened in this case was that a search was first undertaken and then later an arrest was
effected based on the evidence produced by the search.
26
Even granting arguendo that Sanchez was arrested before the search, still the warrantless search
and seizure must be struck down as illegal because the warrantless arrest was unlawful. Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the basic rules on lawful warrantless arrests,
either by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actuallly committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
xxx
For warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 (in flagrante delicto arrest) to operate, two
elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting tocommit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or withinthe view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, paragraph (b) of
Section 5 (arrest effected in hot pursuit) requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an
offense has in fact just been committed and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts
27
indicating that the person to be apprehended has committed it. These elements would be lacking in
the case at bench.
The evidence on record reveals that no overt physical act could be properly attributed to Sanchez as
to rouse suspicion in the minds of the police operatives that he had just committed, was committing,
or was about to commit a crime. Sanchez was merely seen by the police operatives leaving the
residence of a known drug peddler, and boarding a tricycle that proceeded towards the direction of
Kawit, Cavite. Such acts cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Sanchez had
exhibited unusual or strange acts, or at the veryleast appeared suspicious, the same would not have
been considered overt acts in order for the police officers to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under
paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.
It has not been established either that the rigorous conditions set forth in paragraph (b) of Section 5
have been complied with in this warrantless arrest. When the police officers chased the tricycle, they
had no personal knowledge to believe that Sanchez bought shabu from the notorious drug dealer
and actually possessed the illegal drug when he boarded the tricycle. Probable cause has been held
to signify a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged. The police officers in this case had no inkling whatsoever as to what Sanchez
did inside the house of the known drug dealer. Besides, nowhere in the prosecution evidence does it
show that the drug dealer was conducting her nefarious drug activities inside her house so as to
warrant the police officers to draw a reasonable suspicion that Sanchez must have gotten shabu
from her and possessed the illegal drug when he came out of the house. In other words, there was
no overt manifestation on the part of Sanchez that he had just engaged in, was actually engaging in
or was attempting to engage in the criminal activity of illegal possession of shabu. Verily, probable
cause in thiscase was more imagined than real.
28
In the same vein, there could be no valid "stop-and-frisk" search in the case at bench. Elucidating on
what constitutes "stop-and-frisk" operation and how it is to be carried out, the Court in People v.
Chua wrote:
29
A stop and frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate
him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself
and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious
conduct, in order to check the latters outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The
apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officers
experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has
weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be emphasized that a search and
seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.
30
In this jurisdiction, what may be regarded as a genuine reason or a reasonable suspicion justifying a
Terry stop-and-frisk search had been sufficiently illustrated in two cases. In Manalili v. Court of
Appeals and People, a policeman chanced upon Manalili in front of the cemetery who appeared to
be "high" on drugs as he was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying
manner. Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen and when approached and
asked what he was holding in his hands, he tried to resist. When he showed his wallet, it contained
31
marijuana. The Court held that the policeman had sufficient reason to accost Manalili to determine if
he was actually "high" on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that the area
was a haven for drug addicts.
In People v. Solayao, the Court also found justifiable reason for the police to stop and frisk the
accused after considering the following circumstances: the drunken actuations of the accused and
his companions; the fact that his companions fled whenthey saw the policemen; and the fact that the
peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons where
roaming the vicinity. Seemingly, the common thread of these examples isthe presence of more than
one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal
activity. It was not so in the case at bench.
32
The Court does not find the totality of the circumstances described by SPO1 Amposta as sufficient to
incite a reasonable suspicion that would justify a stop-and-frisk search on Sanchez. Coming out from
the house of a drug pusher and boarding a tricycle, without more, were innocuous movements, and
by themselves alone could not give rise in the mind of an experienced and prudent police officer of
any belief that hehad shabu in his possession, or that he was probably committing a crime in the
presence of the officer. There was even no allegation that Sanchez left the house of the drug dealer
in haste or that he acted in any other suspicious manner. There was no showing either that he tried
toevade or outmaneuver his pursuers or that he attempted to flee when the police officers
approached him. Truly, his acts and the surrounding circumstances could not have engendered any
reasonable suspicion on the part of the police officers that a criminal activity had taken place or was
afoot.
In the recent case of People v. Cogaed, where not a single suspicious circumstance preceded the
search on the accused, the Court ruled that the questioned act of the police officer did not constitute
a valid stop-and-frisk operation. Cogaed was a mere passenger carrying a blue bag and a sack and
travelling aboard a jeepney. He did not exhibit any unusual or suspicious behavior sufficient to justify
the law enforcer in believing that he was engaged in a criminal activity. Worse, the assessment of
suspicion was made not by the police officer but by the jeepney driver, who signaled to the police
officer that Cogaed was "suspicious." In view of the illegality of the search and seizure, the 12,337.6
grams of marijuana confiscated from the accused was held as inadmissible.
33
The OSG characterizes the seizure of the subject shabu from Sanchez as seizure of evidence in
plain view. The Court disagrees.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain
view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search
of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure.
34
35
Measured against the foregoing standards, it is readily apparent that the seizure of the subject
shabu does notfall within the plain view exception. First, there was no valid intrusion. As already
discussed, Sanchez was illegally arrested. Second, subject shabu was not inadvertently discovered,
and third, it was not plainly exposed to sight. Here, the subject shabu was allegedly inside a match
box being thenheld by Sanchez and was not readily apparent or transparent to the police officers. In
fact, SPO1 Amposta had to demand from Sanchez the possession of the match box in order for him
to open it and examine its content. The shabu was not in plain view and its seizure without the
requisite search warrant is in violation of the law and the Constitution. In the light of the foregoing,
there being no lawful warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure, the shabu purportedly
seized from Sanchez is inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.
As the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the accused must be
acquitted and exonerated from the criminal charge of violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No.
9165.
Furthermore, the Court entertains doubts whether the shabu allegedly seized from Sanchez was the
very same item presented during the trial of this case. The Court notes that there wereseveral lapses
in the law enforcers handling of the seized item which, when taken collectively, render the standards
of chain of custody seriously breached.
Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. The function of the chain of custody
requirement is to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved,
so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed. Thus, the
chain of custody requirement has a two-fold purpose: (1) the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items, and (2) the removal of unnecessary doubts as to the identity of
the evidence.
36
37
38
In this case, the prosecution failed to account for each and every link in the chain of custody of the
shabu, from the moment it was allegedly confiscated up to the time it was presented before the court
as proof of the corpus delicti. The testimony of SPO 1 Amposta was limited to the fact that he placed
the marking "RSC" on the seized drug; and that he and the three other police officers brought
Sanchez and the subject shabu to their station and turned them over to their investigator. The
prosecution evidence did not disclose where the marking of the confiscated shabu took place and
who witnessed it. The evidence does not show who was in possession of the seized shabu from the
crime scene to the police station. A reading of the Certification, dated March 20, 2003, issued by
Forensic Chemist Salud Rosales shows that a certain PO I Edgardo Nario submitted the specimen
to the NBI for laboratory examination, but this piece of evidence does not establish the identity of the
police investigator to whom SPO 1 Amposta and his group turned over the seized shabu. The
identities of the person who received the specimen at the NBI laboratory and the person who had
the custody and safekeeping of the seized marijuana after it was chemically analyzed pending its
presentation in court were also not disclosed.
Given the procedural lapses pointed out above, a serious uncertainty hangs over the identity of the
seized shabu that the prosecution introduced in evidence. The prosecution failed to establish an
unbroken chain of custody, resulting in rendering the seizure and confiscation of the shabu open to
doubt and suspicion. Hence, the incriminatory evidence cannot pass judicial scrutiny.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed July 25, 2012 Decision and the November
20, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31742 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the
Court orders the immediate release of the petitioner, unless the latter is being lawfully held for
another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of his release, or reason for his continued
confinement, within ten (10) days from receipt of notice.
SO ORDERED.
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 202666
September 29, 2014
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,
vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an equally
powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in
which he balances the desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication of himself
to others, in light of the environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in which he
lives.
- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to
Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, otherwise known as the "Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data."
Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu
City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their habeas data petition.
1
The Facts
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during the
period material, graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City.
Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to
attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in
their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her
Facebook profile.
3
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STCs high school
department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting
themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they
knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe
Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.
Using STCs computers, Escuderos students logged in to their respective personal Facebook
accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne
drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets
of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. What is
more, Escuderos students claimed that there were times when access to or the availability of the
identified students photos was not confined to the girls Facebook friends, but were, in fact,
viewable by any Facebook user.
4
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her students Facebook page,
showed the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STCs Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action.
Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported
themselves in a manner proscribed by the schools Student Handbook, to wit:
1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;
2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;
4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;
5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains sexually
suggestive messages, language or symbols; and 6. Posing and uploading pictures on the
Internet that entail ample body exposure.
On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in question,
reported, as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STCs high school
principal and ICM Directress. They claimed that during the meeting, they were castigated and
verbally abused by the STC officials present in the conference, including Assistant Principal
Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed their
parents the following day that, as part of their penalty, they are barred from joining the
commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.
6
A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angelas mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a
Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB-38594. In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be enjoined from implementing
the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the commencement exercises.
7
On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the fray as
an intervenor. On March 28, 2012, defendants inCivil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their memorandum,
containing printed copies of the photographs in issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which
STC filed a motion for reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from
participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its
adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO remained unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB on the basis of the following considerations:
8
1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for posterity
before they changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday beach party;
2. The privacy setting of their childrens Facebook accounts was set at "Friends Only." They,
thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have known of
laws that safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have
known that the girls, whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and not
the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors were called "immoral" and were
punished outright;
4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced
without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the
photos and by subsequently showing them to STCs officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts
of petitioners children were intruded upon;
5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and
digital images happened at STCs Computer Laboratory; and
6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by
respondents through their memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection with Civil Case
No. CEB-38594. To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their
childrens privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas databe issued; (b) respondents
be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the
subjectdata before or at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be rendered
declaring all information, data, and digital images accessed, saved or stored, reproduced,
spread and used, to have been illegally obtained inviolation of the childrens right to privacy.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order dated July 5, 2012,
issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were directed to file
their verified written return, together with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from
service of the writ.
In time, respondents complied with the RTCs directive and filed their verified written return, laying
down the following grounds for the denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties
to file the petition; (b) petitioners are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not one
where a writ of habeas data may issue;and (d) there can be no violation of their right to privacy as
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. The
dispositive portion of the Decision pertinently states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the
minors right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
Moreover, the court a quoheld that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without
restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC
gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the implementation
of the schools policies and rules on discipline.
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section 19 of the
Rule on Habeas Data.
10
The Issues
The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of habeas datashould be
issued given the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point of
whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life,
liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is an independent
11
and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to
informational privacy. It seeks to protect a persons right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order
to achieve unlawful ends.
12
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individuals right to informational
privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas dataas "a procedure
designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age." The writ, however,
will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a
person.Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the
one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Thus, the existence of a persons right
to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the
privilege of the writ may be extended.
13
14
15
Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas
datapetition will not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar,this requisite begs this
question: given the nature of an online social network (OSN)(1) that it facilitates and promotes
real-time interaction among millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial barriers, bridging the
gap created by physical space; and (2) that any information uploaded in OSNs leavesan indelible
trace in the providers databases, which are outside the control of the end-usersis there a right to
informational privacy in OSN activities of its users? Before addressing this point, We must first
resolve the procedural issues in this case.
16
a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances
Contrary to respondents submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted solely for the purpose
of complementing the Writ of Amparoin cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Sec. 2. Who May File. Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However,
in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children
and parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth
civil degreeof consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding
paragraph. (emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a
variance of habeas data situations, would not have been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information
age." As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to the Rule preparedby the Committee on the Revision
of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo,
pointed out that:
17
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce ones
right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the violation
of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files in possession or in control of respondents. (emphasis Ours) Clearly then, the
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Datamay also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances.
18
b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information

Respondents contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being an entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only
against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the businessof gathering, storing, and collecting of
data. As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:
Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing
of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party. (emphasis Ours)
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas
data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or
entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of
collecting or storing data.
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To "engage" means
"to do or take part in something." It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in
pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or
storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such
undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature
of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such
will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.
19
To agree with respondents above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to a
very small group, i.e., private persons and entities whose business is data gathering and storage,
and in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ asan instrument designed to protect a
right which is easily violated in view of rapid advancements in the information and communications
technologya right which a great majority of the users of technology themselves are not capable of
protecting.
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core of the controversy.
The right to informational privacy on Facebook
a. The Right to Informational Privacy
The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements having
an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S.
Punos speech, The Common Right to Privacy, where he explained the three strands of the right to
privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional
privacy. Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to informational privacyusually
defined as the right of individuals to control information about themselves.
20
21
22
23
With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing nowadays, not
to mention each systems inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that
every individuals right to control said flow of information should be protected and that each
individual should have at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace. Several
commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree that given the
millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social Networking] environment, privacy is no longer grounded in
reasonable expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking."
24
It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies that
would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy possible
violations of the right to privacy. In the same vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision in
the landmark case, H v. W, promulgated on January30, 2013, recognized that "[t]he law has to take
into account the changing realities not only technologically but also socially or else it will lose
credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to
changing times, acting cautiously and with wisdom." Consistent with this, the Court, by developing
what may be viewed as the Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in effect, recognized that,
generally speaking, having an expectation of informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible
with engaging in cyberspace activities, including those that occur in OSNs.
25
26
The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs? Bear in mind
that informational privacy involves personal information. At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs
is socializingsharing a myriad of information, some of which would have otherwise remained
personal.
27
b. Facebooks Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN activities
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay connected
to other members of the same or different social media platform through the sharing of statuses,
photos, videos, among others, depending on the services provided by the site. It is akin to having a
room filled with millions of personal bulletin boards or "walls," the contents of which are under the
control of each and every user. In his or her bulletin board, a user/owner can post anythingfrom
text, to pictures, to music and videosaccess to which would depend on whether he or she allows
one, some or all of the other users to see his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN
phenomenon has paved the way to the creation of various social networking sites, includingthe one
involved in the case at bar, www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its developers,
people use "to stay connected with friends and family, to discover whats going on in the world, and
to share and express what matters to them."
28
Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending" another user. By sending a
"friend request," the user invites another to connect their accounts so that they can view any and all
"Public" and "Friends Only" posts of the other.Once the request is accepted, the link is established
and both users are permitted to view the other users "Public" or "Friends Only" posts, among others.
"Friending," therefore, allows the user to form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other users,
whereby the user gives his or her "Facebook friend" access to his or her profile and shares certain
information to the latter.
29
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with
different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a users profile as well as information
uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users
to "customize their privacy settings," but did so with this caveat: "Facebook states in its policies that,
although it makes every effort to protect a users information, these privacy settings are not
foolproof."
30
31
32
33
For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images(photos),
posted on his or her personal bulletin or "wall," except for the usersprofile picture and ID, by
selecting his or her desired privacy setting:
(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the users Facebook friends and their friends can view the
photo;
(b) Friends - only the users Facebook friends can view the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the
Facebook user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to broaden
or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among others, from
another users point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the
availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to "when and to what extent to disclose
facts about [themselves] and to put others in the position of receiving such confidences." Ideally,
the selected setting will be based on ones desire to interact with others, coupled with the opposing
34
need to withhold certain information as well as to regulate the spreading of his or her personal
information. Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users
can view that users particular post.
STC did not violate petitioners daughters right to privacy
Without these privacy settings, respondents contention that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in Facebook would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the case. It is through the
availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation that
only those to whomthey grant access to their profile will view the information they post or upload
thereto.
35
This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has a protected expectation of
privacy inall of his or her Facebook activities.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that
said user, in this case the children of petitioners,manifest the intention to keepcertain posts private,
through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this
intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSNs privacy tools. In other
words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation,in cyber world, of the users invocation of
his or her right to informational privacy.
36
37
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or
her post orprofile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily
accompanies said choice. Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such
that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information to his or her Facebook page
and sets its privacy level at "Only Me" or a custom list so that only the user or a chosen few can view
it, said photo would still be deemed public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photos
visibility and accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their
function but it would also disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or information
within the confines of his or her private space.
38
We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other Facebook users
and whether the disclosure was confidential in nature. In other words, did the minors limit the
disclosure of the photos such that the images were kept within their zones of privacy? This
determination is necessary in resolving the issue of whether the minors carved out a zone of privacy
when the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that the images will be protected against
unauthorized access and disclosure.
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their childrens privacy right being violated, insist that
Escudero intruded upon their childrens Facebook accounts, downloaded copies ofthe pictures and
showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the minors privacy since their Facebook
accounts, allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only Friends" setting safeguarded with a
password. Ultimately, they posit that their childrens disclosure was only limited since their profiles
were not open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who are not their Facebook
friends, including respondents, are barred from accessing said post without their knowledge and
39
consent. Aspetitioners children testified, it was Angelawho uploaded the subjectphotos which were
only viewable by the five of them, although who these five are do not appear on the records.
40
Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit that "my students showed me some pictures of
girls cladin brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed me that these are senior high school
[students] of STC, who are their friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are still many
other photos posted on the Facebook accounts of these girls. At the computer lab, these students
then logged into their Facebook account [sic], and accessed from there the various photographs x x
x. They even told me that there had been times when these photos were public i.e., not confined to
their friends in Facebook."
41
In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors testimonies for one key reason: failure to
question the students act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that the photos
were viewable only by the five of them. Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the
images were visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escuderos claim that the
other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus
deserving scant consideration.
42
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escuderos sworn account that her students, who
are the minors Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This
only goes to show that no special means to be able to viewthe allegedly private posts were ever
resorted to by Escuderos students, and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos
were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.
43
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be surmised that the
photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners
children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If suchwere the case, they cannot invoke
the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing pronouncement in US v.
Gines-Perez is most instructive:
44
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all
privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances suchas here, where the Defendant
did not employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page
or the photograph itself.
45
Also, United States v. Maxwell held that "[t]he more open the method of transmission is, the less
privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large inthe chat room or e-mail
that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."
46
That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the petitioners
contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this setting
still remain to be outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following:
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools
to interact and share in any conceivable way;"
47
(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers;
48
(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
(4) A users Facebook friend can "share" the formers post, or "tag" others who are not
Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only tohis or her own Facebook
friends.
49
50
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a posts or profile details privacy to "Friends" is no
assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the
source of the content. The users own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own
Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or
not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective
Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the
privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."
To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not Facebook friends.
If C, As Facebook friend, tags B in As post, which is set at "Friends," the initial audience of 100 (As
own Facebook friends) is dramatically increased to 300 (As 100 friends plus Bs 200 friends or the
public, depending upon Bs privacy setting). As a result, the audience who can view the post is
effectively expandedand to a very large extent.
This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebooks proclivity towards user
interaction and socialization rather than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of
individual user posts. In fact, it has been said that OSNs have facilitated their users self-tribute,
thereby resulting into the "democratization of fame." Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a
post, with visibility set at "Friends Only" cannot easily, more so automatically, be said to be "very
private," contrary to petitioners argument.
51
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students
Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion
since it was the minors Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere
recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the
information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said
posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither
the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the
images to Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced and
broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of
offensive disclosure was no more than the actuality that respondents appended said photographs in
their memorandum submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594. These
are not tantamount to a violation of the minors informational privacy rights, contrary to petitioners
assertion.
52
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the photos of
minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the
reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any
evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized Facebooks privacy settings to make the
photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject
of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have
an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the original uploader,
through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the users contact list has been screened to limit
access to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result may have been different, for in such
instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the
public at large or all the users friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.
On Cyber Responsibility
It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your childrens ears." This means that selfregulation on the part of OSN users and internet consumers ingeneral is the best means of avoiding
privacy rights violations. As a cyberspace communitymember, one has to be proactive in protecting
his or her own privacy. It is in this regard that many OSN users, especially minors, fail.Responsible
social networking or observance of the "netiquettes" on the part of teenagers has been the concern
of many due to the widespreadnotion that teenagers can sometimes go too far since they generally
lack the people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum.
53
54
55
56
57
Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber citizenship in its
curriculum to educate its students on proper online conduct may be mosttimely. Too, it is not only
STC but a number of schools and organizations have already deemed it important to include digital
literacy and good cyber citizenshipin their respective programs and curricula in view of the risks that
the children are exposed to every time they participate in online activities. Furthermore, considering
the complexity of the cyber world and its pervasiveness,as well as the dangers that these children
are wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the
participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their children about being a good digital
citizen is encouraged by these institutions and organizations. In fact, it is believed that "to limit such
risks, theres no substitute for parental involvement and supervision."
58
59
As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to
beresponsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, whenit enforced
the disciplinary actions specified in the Student Handbook, absenta showing that, in the process, it
violated the students rights.
OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever they engage
incyberspace activities. Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to control their privacy and to
exercise sound discretion regarding how much information about themselves they are willing to give
up. Internet consumers ought to be aware that, by entering or uploading any kind of data or
information online, they are automatically and inevitably making it permanently available online, the
perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of their control. Furthermore, and more importantly,
1wphi1
information, otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by
third parties who may or may not be allowed access to such.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and
activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding
relief from the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding
a right which they allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford
protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines of their
private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if
they desire to keep the information private, and to keep track of changes in the available privacy
settings, such as those of Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these
settings and the site's layout often.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights, We find no
cogent reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of the court a quo.
In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July 27,
2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby
AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 196005
October 1, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
CHARLIE FIELDAD, RYAN CORNISTA, and EDGAR PIMENTEL, Appellants.
DECISION
CARPIO, Acting C.J.:
The Case
On appeal is the Decision dated 22 October 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
03943, affirming with modification the Joint Decision dated 3 November 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan (trial court) in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053, U-10054, and U10055.
1
The Facts
Appellants Charlie Fieldad (Fieldad), Ryan Comista (Comista) and Edgar Pimentel (Pimentel) were
charged in conspiracy with others for the murder of two jail guards and for camapping.
The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10053 reads:
The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE FIELDAD, MIGUEL BUCCAT, JESUS GELIDO,
FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN CORNISTA, EDGAR PIMENTEL, FEDERICO DELIM, JEFFREY
ADVIENTO, GIL ESPEJO, RUBEN PASCUA, and ELMO MEJIA of the crime of Murder with the use
of unlicensed firearm committed as follows:
That on or about March 9, 1999 in the morning inside the BJMP Compound, Anonas, Urdaneta City,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused being detention
prisoners armed with an unlicensed firearm, with intentto kill, treachery, evident premeditation and
taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring with one another did then and there wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and feloniously grab, hold and shoot with said unlicensed firearm JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa
inflicting upon him multiple fatal gunshot wounds which caused his instant death, thereafter, accused
escaped from their detention, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said JO2 Reynaldo
Gamboa.
CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7956 and R.A. 8294. The
Information in Criminal Case No. U-10054 reads:
3
The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE FIELDAD, MIGUEL BUCCAT, JESUS GELIDO,
FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN CORNISTA, EDGAR PIMENTEL, FEDERICO DELIM, JEFFREY
ADVIENTO, GIL ESPEJO, RUBEN a.k.a. Joven, and ELMO MEJIA of the crime of Murder with the
use of unlicensed firearm committed as follows:
That on or about March 9, 1999 in the morning inside the BJMP Compound, Anonas, Urdaneta City,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused being detention
prisoners armed with an unlicensed firearm, with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation and
taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring with one another did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shoot with said unlicensed firearm JO1 JUAN BACOLOR, Jr. inflicting
upon him multiple fatal gunshot wounds which caused his instant death, thereafter, accused
escaped from their detention, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said JO1 Juan Bacolor, Jr.
CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7956 and R.A. 8294.
The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10055 reads:

The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE FIELDAD, FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN
CORNISTA, EDGAR PIMENTEL, and FEDERICO DELIM of the crime of carnapping committed as
follows:
That on or about March 9, 1999 at Brgy. Anonas, Urdaneta City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having just escaped from the BJMP Compound,
Anonas Urdaneta, in order to expedite their escape armed with unlicensed firearm with intent to
gain, conspiring with one another, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal,
and carry away one (1) Tamaraw Jeep with Plate No. CDY-255 belonging to Benjamin J. Bau[z]on
without the latters knowledge and consent, which accused used as a get away vehicle. CONTRARY
to R.A. 6539, as amended.
5
Upon arraignment, appellants pled not guilty.

The prosecution presented the testimonies of Jail Officer (JO) 2 Marlon Niturada, Dr. Constante
Parayno, Dr. Ramon Gonzales, Jr., Senior Police Officer (SPO) 4 Ernesto Gancea, Dionisio Badua,
Police Senior Inspector Philip Campti Pucay, PO3 Jimmy Garcia, PO3 Roberto Reyes, SPO1
Joselito Sagles, Pitz Dela Cruz, PO2 Danny Torres, Police Inspector Pamfilo Regis, Police Inspector
Reyland Malenab, Theresa Bacolor, Julie Gamboa, Benjamin Bauzon, JO1 Victor A. Sidayen,
Warden Romeo Jacaban, SPO4 Cirilo Lagmay and Col. Theresa Ann B. Cid.
The prosecution established that at around 7:00 a.m. on 9 March 1999, JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa
(JO2 Gamboa), JO1 Juan Bacolor, Jr. (JO1 Bacolor) and JO2 Marlon Niturada (JO2 Niturada) were
inside the nipa hut searching area near the main gate of the district jail. JO2 Gamboa summoned
inmate Dionisio Badua (Badua). JO2 Gamboa gave Badua the keys to the prison cells and
instructed the latter to open all the cells for the routine headcount.
Julius Chan (Chan) went to the nipa hut to ask JO2 Gamboa regarding the time of his hearing
scheduled for that day. While JO2 Gamboa and Chan were conversing, the telephone in the
administration building rang. JO2 Niturada ran from the nipa hut to the administration building to
answer the phone.
After the phone call, JO2 Niturada proceeded towards the basketball court. On his way there, he
turned his head towards the nipa hut and saw Chan place an arm on the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa,
who was seated, and shoot the latter with a short firearm. JO2 Gamboa fell.
Meanwhile, Fieldad and Cornista grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the possession of an armalite.
Cornista struck JO1 Bacolor at the back of the head, which caused the latter to fall down. Fieldad,
armed with JO2 Gamboas gun, shot JO1 Bacolor twice. Florante Leal (Leal) took the armalite from
JO1 Bacolor and shot at JO2 Niturada. JO2 Niturada returned fire with his .38 caliber handgun.
Cornista opened the main gate with keys taken from JO2 Gamboa. Twelve inmates went out the
main gate. After seeing the inmates run out, Badua padlocked the main gateand returned to his cell.
Once outside the jail compound, Fieldad, Leal, Cornista, and Pimentel boarded a parked Tamaraw
jeep with plate number CDY-255 belonging to Benjamin Bauzon, without the lattersknowledge and
consent. They picked up Federico Delim (Delim) and Chan along the way. Before they reached
Asingan, Pangasinan, the group alighted from the Tamaraw jeep and transferred to a Mazda pick-up
truck. When they reached San Miguel, Tarlac, the Mazda pick-up truck turned turtle. The group
abandoned the vehicle and ran towards a cane field. Police authorities surrounded the cane field
and arrested appellants and their companions.
Dr. Constante Parayno conducted anautopsy on the body of JO1 Bacolor, and concluded that the
death was caused by shock and hemorrhage due to gunshot wound of the right lung. Dr. Parayno
also testified that based on the injuries sustained by JO1 Bacolor, it was possible that the shooting
was preceded by a fight between the shooter and the victim.
Dr. Ramon Gonzales, Jr. conducted an autopsy on the body of JO2 Gamboa, and concluded that the
death was caused by cardiac tamponade due to the gunshot wound that damaged the heart.
Versions of Appellants
Appellants denied any criminal liability.
Fieldads Testimony
At around 6:00 in the morning on 9 March 1999, JO2 Gamboa brought Fieldad out of his cell and
ordered him to clean the administrative offices. After cleaning the offices, he was told to fix a vehicle
parked inside the jail compound. He needed to prop the vehicle on a jack, but he could not find the
jack handle. He went back toJO2 Gamboa, who was in the nipa hut with JO2 Niturada and JO1
Bacolor. JO2 Gamboa told him to look for Badua. When he came back with Badua, JO2 Gamboa
handed Badua the key of the jail compound. Badua went out of the compound, while Fieldad
continued to look for the jack handle.
While JO2 Niturada talked to him regarding the vehicle, Fieldad noticed Elmo Mejia (Mejia) and the
other inmates playing basketball. The ball rolled towards the nipa hut and Mejia went to retrieve it.
Then Fieldad heard gunshots from the direction of the nipa hut. JO2 Niturada got his gun and fired
towards the nipa hut. Fieldad got nervous and took cover in the outpost. He peeped through the
windows and saw Mejia pointing a firearm toward JO2 Niturada. He hid again when he heard the
exchange of fire between Mejia and JO2 Niturada. He went out of the outpost when he heard people
calling for help to push the parked vehicle. The vehicle did not start, and the people pushing it
dispersed. Intending to return to his cell, he followed JO2 Niturada, who was proceeding towards the
main building. However, JO2 Niturada pointed a gun towards him, so Fieldad ran away and took
cover.
While still inside the jail compound, Leal told Fieldad that he needed the latter to go with him.
Fieldad, along with other inmates, left the jail compound. He followed Leal to a Tamaraw jeep parked
outside. Leal pointed a long firearm toward Fieldad,and ordered the latter to drive the vehicle.
Frightened, Fieldad drove the vehicle. On their way, they picked up Delim and Chan.
Pimentels Testimony
At around 7:30 in the morning of 9 March 1999, Pimentel was allowed to go out of his cell. He
proceeded to the basketball court for the headcount. He heard two or three gunshots, but did not
immediately mind it because he was used to the guards firing their guns in the morning. When he
saw Leal with an armalite, running after and shooting at JO2 Niturada, Pimentel ran to a house
outside the jailcompound. He was afraid to go back to his cell because of the exchange of fire.
Inmates were running in different directions.
Leal arrived at the place where Pimentel was hiding, and motioned to the latter by pointing his
armalite downward several times. Pimentel approached Leal, who ordered him to remove the stone
blocking the tire of the jeep parked near the house. Pimentel obliged. Pimentel boarded the jeep
because Leal told him at gun point to do so. Fieldad drove the jeep. He did not notice who their other
companions were. Along the way, they passed a parked vehicle. Leal ordered everyone to alight
from the jeep, and to board the other vehicle. The vehicle turned turtle in Tarlac.
Cornistas Testimony
Cornista was 17 years old on 9 March 1999. Between 6:00 and 6:45 that morning, he was cleaning
the jail compound. He was shocked and confused when he heard three rapid gunfires followed by
consecutive gunfires coming from the direction of the nipa hut. JO2 Gamboa, JO1 Bacolor, Leal and
Mejia were at the nipa hut. Leal was chasing JO2 Niturada, both of them armed. Then he saw the jail
guards lying down. Out of fear, he ran towards the already opened main gate.
Cornista hid in a Tamaraw jeep parked behind the jail compound. Then he saw Leal, Fieldad and
Pimentel board the jeep. He tried to alight but Leal threatened to shoot him if he did. Fieldad drove
the Tamaraw jeep. Delim flagged the jeep down and boarded.Chan also joined them along the way.
Upon seeing a parked Mazda pick up, Leal ordered Fieldad to stop the jeep and the inmates to
transfer to the other vehicle. Fieldad also drove the Mazda pick up until it turned turtle in Tarlac.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. U-10053, accused Julius Chan, Charlie Fieldad and Ryan Cornista
are declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and each is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. They are also ordered to pay
the heirs of the deceased the amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php50,000.00 as
moral damages, Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages, Php47,845.00 as actual damages
and Php153,028.00 for loss of earning capacity.
Accused Jesus Gelido, Edgar Pimentel, Federico Delim, Jeffrey Adviento, Miguel Buccat and
Ruben Pascua are ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt.
2. In Criminal Case No. U-10054, accused Julius Chan, Charlie Fieldad and Ryan Cornista
are declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and each is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. They are also ordered to pay
the heirs of the deceased the amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php50,000.00 as
moral damages, Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages, Php87,349.45 for the actual
damages, and Php178,500.00 for the loss of earning capacity.
Accused Jesus Gelido, Edgar Pimentel, Federico Delim, Jeffrey Adviento, Miguel Buccat and
Ruben Pascua are ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt.
3. In Criminal Case No. U-10055, accused Charlie Fieldad, Edgar Pimentel and Ryan
Cornista are declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of CARNAPPING and
each is sentenced to suffer imprisonment from FOURTEEN YEARS AND EIGHT MONTHS
to SIXTEEN YEARS AND TWO MONTHS, and to pay nominal damages of Php15,000.00
and moral damages of Php25,000.00.
For insufficiency of evidence, accused Julius Chan and Federico Delim are ACQUITTED.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
Appeal was interposed only by Fieldad, Cornista and Pimentel since Chan had died. They assigned
the following errors:
7
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE
THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING CONSPIRACY AND TREACHERY IN
THE ALLEGED KILLINGS OF JO2 REYNALDO GAMBOA AND JO1 JUAN BACOLOR, JR.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE MINORITY OF THE
ACCUSED RYAN CORNISTA AT THE TIME THE ALLEGED CRIMES WERE COMMITTED.
IV
THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
TESTIMONIES.
8
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court only with respect to the penalties
imposed upon Cornista in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054, taking into account the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Joint Decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to the
penalties of imprisonment imposed on Ryan Cornista in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054.
Accordingly the penalties of reclusion perpetua imposed on him are reduced to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, per each information.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The appellate court held that "it ismanifest that Cornista acted with discernment, being able to
distinguish between right and wrong and knowing fully well the consequences of his acts." The
Court of Appeals enumerated the following acts of Cornista that clearly establish discernment:
10
x x x. His act of grappling for possession of an armalite with Bacolor and hitting the latters head
clearly demonstrated his discernment. He took advantage of the situation where Fieldad was also
grappling with JO1 Bacolor by striking the head of JO1 Bacolor which he obviously knew would
weaken the latters defenses. Moreover, his act of getting the keys from JO2 Gamboa which he
usedin opening the main gate clearly demonstrates the idea of escape and thus established
discernment on his part. Cornista, having acted with discernment may not be excused from criminal
liability.
11
Fieldad, Cornista and Pimentel appealed from the Court of Appeals decision. In the interim,
Cornistafiled a Motion to Withdraw Appeal dated 15 June 2011, which the Court granted in a
Resolution dated 15 August 2011. The case became final and executory as to Cornista on 5
October 2011. The instant appeal thus pertainsto Fieldad and Pimentel only.
12
13
14
Appellants and appellee adopted their respective briefs filed before the Court of Appeals as their
supplemental briefs in this case.
15
16
The Courts Ruling

The appeal is unmeritorious.
Nature of the Killings
Fieldad argues that there can be notreachery since "the jail guards were all issued with firearms to
protect themselves from danger and to maintain peace and order within the compound." This
argument is untenable.
17
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and speciallyto insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might take.
18
In People v. Escote, Jr., where an armed off-duty police officer was killed, we held:
19
x x x. There is treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. The essence
of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission withour risk
of himself. Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim was warned of the danger to his life
where he was defenseless and unable to flee atthe time of the infliction of the coup de grace. In the
case at bar, the victim suffered six wounds, one on the mouth, another on the right ear,one on the
shoulder, another on the right breast, one on the upper right cornea of the sternum and one above
the right iliac crest. Juan and Victor were armed with handguns. They first disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr.
and then shot him even as hepleaded for dear life. When the victim was shot, he was defenseless.
He was shot at close range, thus insuring his death. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
20
In the case of People v. Tabaco, treachery was appreciated in the killing of three peace officers, one
of whom was armed and assigned to maintain the peace and order. They were attending an event
where many armed peace officers were present to maintain peace and order. In that case, the
victims were completely taken by surprise and had no means of defending themselves against the
sudden attack.
21
In the instant case, despite being armed, the jail officers were not afforded any chance of defending
themselves. Without warning, Fieldad and his cohorts disabled the defenses of the jail officers. Chan
held the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa as he shot the latter. Meanwhile, Fieldad teamed-up with Cornista
to divest JO1 Bacolor of his armalite, and to knock him down. Then Fieldad took JO2 Gamboas gun
and shot JO1 Bacolor.
Fieldads Identity was Established

According to Fieldad, since JO2 Niturada did not identify him as a participant in the killings of JO1
Bacolor and JO2 Gamboa, his identity and complicity in the killings were not established. However,
contrary to his contention, Fieldads identity in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054 was
proven by the prosecution. Fieldad disregarded the testimony of Badua, who categorically identified
Fieldad and recounted in detail his participation in the incident:
Q What happened when you bring (sic) water to the kubo?
A At the time when I brought water to the place where (sic) the guards used to take a bath there
were persons grappling possession of the armalite, sir.
Q With whom?
A Charlie and Cornista, sir.
Q You were told to fetch water, then you returned and brought the water to the place where (sic) the
guards used to take a bath and you saw Charlie and Cornista grappling with whom?
A Bacolor, sir.
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
You are referring to Jail Guard Bacolor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is this Charlie inside the courtroom right now?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please point to him, you step down?
A This one, sir. (Witness pointed (sic) and shaked (sic) hand (sic) with accused and who when asked
his name he answered Felmer Fieldad).
Q Is he the same Charlie you are referring to?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Do you know Charlie?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is he in the courtroom?
A Yes, sir.
Q You go to him, where is Charlie there?

A This one, sir. (Witness is pointing to the accused, Charlie Fieldad).
COURT
Warden what is the name?
BJMP WARDEN JACABAN
Felmer Fieldad and the nickname is Charlie, Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
How about Cornista is he inside the courtroom?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please point to him?
A (The witness is pointing to one ofthe accused who when asked his name he answered Ryan
Cornista).
Q What happened next when you saw Charlie and Cornista grappling possession of the armalite of
Jail Guard Bacolor?
A They struck the back of the head of Bacolor, sir.
Q Who struck the back head (sic) of Bacolor?
A Cornista, sir.
Q What happened to Bacolor when Cornista struck the back of his head?
A Bacolor fell down, sir.
xxxx
Q What happened when Gamboa was shot by Julius?
A He fell down, sir.
Q What else happened when Gamboa fell down?
A They got his gun, sir.
Q Who got the gun of Gamboa?
A Charlie, sir.
COURT
What kind of firearm?
A 9 MM, sir.
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
What did Charlie do with the gun taken from Gamboa?
A Charlie shot Bacolor, sir.
Q How many times did Charlie shoot Bacolor?
A Two (2) times, sir. (Emphasis supplied)
22
It is a settled rule that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter
best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. Positive
identification of the accused is entitled to greater weight than the bare denial and explanation by the
accused.
23
24
In light of the positive testimony of Badua, Fieldads self-serving defense of denial and alibi must fail.
Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, as it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. True, the
conviction of an accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the
prosecution evidence. Hence, whenthe prosecution evidence has firmly established the guilt of
accused beyondreasonable doubt, conviction is in order.
25
Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence

Moreover, the positive identification of Fieldad by Badua is corroborated by circumstantial evidence.
A careful examination of the record reveals that the following evidence establish Fieldads active
participation in the conspiracy to kill the jail guards:
1. Badua testified that Fieldad, together with Cornista, grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the
possession of the latters armalite gun, and JO1 Bacolor finally fell when Cornista struck him
at back of the head;
26
2. Badua also testified that after Chan shot JO2 Gamboa, Fieldad took JO2 Gamboas gun
and usedit to shoot JO1 Bacolor;
27
3. Dr. Constante F. Parayno, the medical doctor who conducted the autopsy on JO1 Bacolor,
testified that because of the abrasions, the shooting of the victim may have been preceded
by a fight between the victim and the shooter;
28
4. JO2 Niturada testified that he saw Fieldad confederating with Leal and Chan by the nipa
hut before heading out the main gate;
29
5. JO Sidayen testified that he saw Fieldad with Leal, Chan and Cornista at the nipa hut but
moments before the gun shots rang;
30
6. P/Insp. Pamfilo Regis testified that he took the paraffin casts of the hands of
Fieldad; and
31
32
7. Forensic chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong-Cid testified that the paraffin test done on
Fieldads hands was positive for the presence of gun powder nitrates, as contained in her
report. In addition, Fieldad failed to controvert the paraffin evidence. We note that Fieldads
counsel manifested duringtrial that the paraffin casting was performed without the assistance
of counsel, contrary to the right of the accused. However, all the exhibits offered by the
prosecution, including the paraffin casts and test results, wereadmitted in the Order dated 3
March 2000. To be sure, the taking of paraffin casts does not violate the right of the accused
against self incrimination. In People v. Gamboa, we held:
33
34
35
36
37
As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected to he raises the question, under the sixth
assigned error, that it was not conducted in the presence of his lawyer. This right is afforded to any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense whose confession or admission may not
be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and to havecompetent and independent
counsel of his own choice. His right against self incrimination is not violated by the taking of the
paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion and not
when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined as in this case. Indeed, the paraffin test
proved positively thathe just recently fired a gun. Again, this kind of evidence buttresses the case of
the prosecution. (Emphasis supplied)
38
Conspiracy in the Killings

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the
accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest. Once conspiracy is shown the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
39
40
Contrary to his contentions, the acts of Fieldad before, during and after the attacks on JOs Bacolor,
Jr. and Gamboa disclose his agreement with the joint purpose and design in the commission of the
felonies. The positive testimony of Badua is corroborated by a web of circumstantial evidence that
points to no other conclusion than that Fieldad was complicit in the conspiracy to murder the jail
guards.
Penalty and Damages for Murder
Since treachery qualified the killingsto murder and there being no aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed. However, it must be stated
that Fieldad is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty.
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the trial court correctly ordered appellant to pay to the heirs
of each deceased the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages;
however, the amount of exemplary damages must be increased to P30,000.00. Exemplary
damages are recoverable due to the presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of
treachery in the commission of the crimes.
41
42
The award of actual damages for the expenses incurred in connection with the funerals of JO2
Gamboa and JO1 Bacolor in the amounts of P47,845.00 and P87,349.45, respectively, are
supported by receipts and are in order.
The trial court awarded the amounts of P153,028.00 and P178,500.00 to the heirs of JO2 Gamboa
and JO1 Bacolor, respectively, for loss of earning capacity, applying the formula
Net earning capacity =
{2/3 x [80 age at the time of death] x [gross

annual income reasonable and necessary living
expenses]}
43
However, instead of using the annual income, the trial court computed the net earning capacity using
the monthlyincome. Hence, we multiply the amounts by twelve in order to arrive at the amounts
of P1,836,336.00 for JO2 Gamboa and P2,142,000.00 for JO1 Bacolor.
Elements of Carnapping
Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without consent,
or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. The
elements of the crime of carnapping are that: (1) there is an actual taking of the vehicle; (2) the
offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle; (3) the vehicle belongs to a person other than
the offender himself; and (4) the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof, or it was
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.
44
45
All the elements of carnapping are present in this case. Both appellants admitted that they boarded
the Tamaraw jeep and drove away in it. The owner of the vehicle, BenjaminBauzon, testified that he
did not consent to the taking of his vehicle by appellants.
Appellants argue that the testimony of the vehicle owner, Benjamin Bauzon, cannot be considered
for being hearsay because he was merely informed that his Tamaraw jeep was missing.
Appellants argument is misplaced. Bauzon had personal knowledge that when he arrived home, his
Tamaraw jeep was no longer at the place where he parked it, and that he had to retrieve it from
Bactad:
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
When you arrived in your house where a tamaraw jeep was parked what did you do?
A The tamaraw is no longer there, sir.
xxxx
COURT
What is the description of your tamaraw?
A Old fashioned tamaraw, sir.
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
What is the color of your tamaraw jeep?
A Red, sir.
Q Plate number?
A CDY 255, sir.
Q In whose name was that tamaraw jeep registered?
A In my name, sir.
Q What did you do when you learned that your tamaraw jeep was in Bactad?
A Somebody told me that the tank was emptied so I went to buy gas and then I went to Bactad, sir.
COURT
Did you leave the key?
A Yes, sir, at the ignition.
Q Is it visible?
A Yes, sir.
xxxx
COURT
Did you find your tamaraw jeep at Bactad?
A Yes, sir. (Emphasis supplied)
46
As for intent to gain, we held in People v. Bustinera:
47
Intent to gain or animus lucrandiis an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor
vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain"
is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may
be derived orexpected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was
taken without the owners consent constitutes gain.
48
Defense of Uncontrollable Fear

To escape liability for the crime of carnapping, appellants claim that Leal forced them to take the
Tamaraw jeep to facilitate his flight from jail.
Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts
under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. For such defense to
prosper the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such
a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be
done. A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion was such that it
reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It is
49
50
51
necessary that the compulsion be of such a character asto leave no opportunity to escape or selfdefense in equal combat.
52
In this case, appellants had ample opportunity to escape. In the first place, Leal was already armed
when Fieldad voluntarilyfollowed him to the place where the Tamaraw jeep was parked. The vehicle
stopped three times: to board Delim; to board Chan; and when they stopped to transfer vehicles. In
addition, according to appellants testimonies, only Leal was armed. The following discussion of the
Court ofAppeals is quoted with approval:
x x x. Considering, however, that there were five of them who boarded the Tamaraw jeep, they could
have easily overpowered Leal, who was then alone, had they wanted to. Thus, there could not have
been any appreciable imminent danger to their lives. In fact, they had every opportunity to escape
individually. Bynot availing of this chance to escape, accused-appellants allegation of fear or duress
becomes untenable.
53
To be believed, testimony must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstance. The circumstances under which appellants participated in the
commission of the carnapping would notjustify in any way their claim that they acted under an
uncontrollable fear of being killed by their fellow carnapper. Rather, the circumstances establish the
fact that appellants, in their flight from jail, consciously concurred with the other malefactors to take
the Tamaraw jeep without the consent of its owner.
54
Penalty and Damages for Carnapping

The penalty for carnapping is provided in Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539:
SECTION 14.Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is
defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished
by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen
years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of
persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four
months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed
or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Emphasis
supplied)
In this case, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight
months and not more than seventeen years and four months. Under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, as applied to an offense punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence expressed at a range whose maximum term shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by the special law, and the minimum term not be less than the minimum
prescribed. Hence, the penalty imposed by the trial court of imprisonment from fourteen years and
eight months to sixteen years and two months is in order.
55
The trial court awarded nominal damages in the amount of P15,000.00 and moral damages in the
amount ofP25,000.00 to the owner of the vehicle.
No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that nominal or moral damages may be
adjudicated. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
56
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Moral damages include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury.
57
58
The trial court's award of nominal damages is in order. However, we delete the award of moral
damages since there was no showing that Benjamin Bauzon experienced any physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, or any similar injury.
1wphi1
Finally, in addition to the damages awarded in the murder cases and in the carnapping case, we also
impose on all the amounts of damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date
of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
59
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal. The Decision dated 22 October 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03943, affirming with modification the 3 November 2008 Joint
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
1. Fieldad is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole
in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054;
2. The award of exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. U-10053 is increased
to P30,000.00; 3. The award of exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. U-10054 is
increased to P30,000.00; 4. The amount of Pl 53,028.00 for loss of earning capacity awarded
to the heirs of JO2 Gamboa in Criminal Case No. U-10053 is increased to P1,836,336.00;
5. The amount of Pl 78,500.00 for loss of earning capacity awarded to the heirs of JO1
Bacolor in Criminal Case No. U-10054 is increased to P2,142,000.00;
6. The award of moral damages in Criminal Case No. U-10055 is deleted; and
7. Interest is imposed on all the damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from
the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO

G.R. No. 203984 June 18, 2014 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA, Accused-Appellant

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G.R. No. 203984 June 18, 2014 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA, Accused-Appellant

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FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 203984

June 18, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

Ruling of the RTC

THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9165 provide as follows:

June 18, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION

Exh. "C-2" Picture of Second brick of marijuana fruiting tops

Ruling of the RTC

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Ruling of this Court

The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9165 provide as follows:

The Ruling of the RTC

November 19, 2014

MA. MIMIE CRESCENCIO, Petitioner,

we exercised exclusive appellate jurisdiction. 3 With the

The four accused entered Identical "not guilty" pleas.

xxx xxx xxx

No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel

This was the lesson learned from the

G.R. No. 188133

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

July 23, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appeliee,

Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of

September 17, 2014

MA. GRACIA HAO and DANNY HAO, Petitioners,

November 19, 2014

RIZALDY SANCHEZ y CAJILI, Petitioner,

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered convicting accused Rizaldy Sanchez y

Version of the Prosecution

Version of the Defense

The Ruling of the RTC

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered convicting accused Rizaldy Sanchez y

The Courts Ruling

Q: Was the operation upon the instruction of your Superior?

September 29, 2014

b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10055 reads:

Upon arraignment, appellants pled not guilty.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Courts Ruling

Fieldads Identity was Established

Q You go to him, where is Charlie there?

Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence

Conspiracy in the Killings

{2/3 x [80 age at the time of death] x [gross

As for intent to gain, we held in People v. Bustinera:

Defense of Uncontrollable Fear

Penalty and Damages for Carnapping

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