Guliyev Personal Rule

Democratization
ISSN: 1351-0347 (Print) 1743-890X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdem20
Personal rule, neopatrimonialism, and regime

typologies: integrating Dahlian and Weberian
approaches to regime studies
Farid Guliyev
To cite this article: Farid Guliyev (2011) Personal rule, neopatrimonialism, and regime
typologies: integrating Dahlian and Weberian approaches to regime studies, Democratization,
18:3, 575-601, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2011.563115
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.563115
Published online: 25 May 2011.
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Date: 06 October 2015, At: 12:20
Democratization
Vol. 18, No. 3, June 2011, 575 601
Personal rule, neopatrimonialism, and regime typologies:

integrating Dahlian and Weberian approaches to regime studies
Farid Guliyev
School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Jacobs University, Bremen, Germany
Downloaded by [Hebrew University] at 12:20 06 October 2015
(Received April 2010; nal version received September 2010)

The concepts of personal rule, neopatrimonialism, sultanism and related
conceptual labels have been widely used in political research, yet remain
inadequately conceptualized. To make it a useful analytical category for
comparative research, this article claries the concept of personal rule,
derives its minimal denition and shows its proper genus, state authority
structure. A new typological framework is advanced as an improved
conceptual scheme that is able to capture variation on two salient dimensions
of contemporary regimes in the developing and postcommunist worlds, the
extent of political competition and the type of state authority structure.
Keywords: personal rule; neopatrimonialism; political regimes; state
authority structure
Introduction
Political personalism, dened as the practice of basing authority primarily on the
person of the ruler [ofce-holder] rather than the formal ofce he or she holds,1 is a
ubiquitous phenomenon despite the almost universal acceptance of formal institutional legality and public administration, which derives its organizational form
and legitimacy from the principles of Webers rational-legal authority.
Whatever form it may take on clientelism, patronage, corruption, cronyism,
rent-seeking or favouritism personalism in politics always involves confusion by
a public ofcial between his public and private roles. In some of the newer states of
the developing and postcommunist worlds political institutions are typically weak,
and the distinction between the public and private domains is not always observed
in practice, which in the extreme case may result in the privatization of the public
sector.2 In sum, personalism manifests itself in different forms and therefore
requires approach from different levels of analysis. It can be analysed at the
level of practices (for example, petty corruption), informal coordination
structures (for example, clientelism) or even segments of society (for example,
Email: fareedaz@gmail.com
ISSN 1351-0347 print/ISSN 1743-890X online

# 2011 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2011.563115
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576
F. Guliyev
anthropological clientelism). In this study I focus specically on personalism at

the level of political regimes, for which personal rule is the most generic term.
The study of personal rule has a long tradition in area studies and comparative
research. However, as with some other political science concepts, the eschewing of
relevant scholarly standards by researchers has resulted in a conceptual disorder.3
The present-day rubric of personal rule includes a broad range of labels including
personal rule regime, neopatrimonial regime, prebendalism, and predatory
rule.4 These terms are used as an adjective to describe a special subtype of nondemocratic regimes, (sultanistic) neopatrimonial dictatorship, and personalist
dictatorship/personalist authoritarian regime.5 They also denote a regime type
on its own: next to neopatrimonial regime and personal rule regime, scholars
use the concepts of (neo)sultanistic regime, kleptocracy as well as such inventive conceptual combinations as patrimonial communism, (neo)patrimonial
democracy, patronal presidentialism, electoral patronal system, and electoral
sultanism.6 The relationships between these concepts, on the one hand, and
between the concept of personal rule and the democracy/nondemocracy distinction, on the other hand, remain rather ambiguous.
To make it clear, these concepts refer to the same general phenomena under
related theoretical labels,7 and the theoretical differences [between them] are
trivial and mostly semantic. 8 The inuential concept of personalist authoritarian
regime is dened by reference to the theoretical material on neopatrimonial and
sultanistic regimes.9 Yet, there is still no consensus about the acceptable
meaning of personal rule, not to mention its operationalization. A wide variety of
terms, denitions and conceptualizations that exist led some scholars to suggest
that the concept ((neo)patrimonialism, in this case) is so vague and elusive that it
has become a catch-all concept.10 Some proposed to abandon it altogether.11
In spite of terminological disarray, the concept of personal rule has been part of
important empirical studies concerning subjects ranging from regime change and
revolution to economic development and governance,12 and, as a conceptual
tool, does not seem to have exhausted its heuristic potential in the comparative
study of contemporary political regimes. Rather than being a dying species,
different forms of personal domination have survived to this day while some
newer ones emerged and matured since the end of the Cold War. Thus said, it is
therefore worthwhile clarifying the concept of personal rule so as to make it a
useful analytical category for comparative research. The clarication of this
concept is also important in light of growing recognition in the comparative politics
literature that the way researchers dene and use the concepts may be responsible
for the results they obtain.13
Methodologically, following the approach to concept analysis advocated by
(neo)Sartorian scholars, this article proposes a minimal denitional standard to
guide use of the concept in future research.14 The analysis is based on a sample
of representative denitions drawn from the English-language literature on personal rule. A two-dimensional framework for studying regimes put forth in this
article is expected to enable comparatively-oriented researchers to explore
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577
regimes simultaneously on both the electoral competition dimension and the state
authority dimension, avoiding thus loss of information about important features of
regimes under study.
The article is organized as follows. The next two sections review the concept of
personal rule in the related literature and discuss denitional approaches to the issue.
The third section elucidates the meaning of personal rule and identies its proper
genus, state authority structure. The fourth section is an elaboration of the concept
of state authority structure. The fth section advances a two-dimensional scheme
and illustrates how it can be usefully applied to explore contemporary regimes.
Finally, the concluding section considers some implications of these ndings for
the study of political regimes in the developing and postcommunist worlds.
Personal rule in history and modern scholarship
Modern concepts of personal rule are adaptations of Webers concept of patrimonialism.15 In Webers tripartite typology of Herrschaft, patrimonialism is a type of
traditionalist domination which develops from patriarchal structure through an
extension of the chiefs family household. From patriarchalism it retains the
source of legitimization derived from sacred tradition. The patrimonial rulers
exercise of authority is constrained by tradition but is at the same time arbitrary.
In contrast to patriarchal authority, patrimonial authority is maintained with the
help of an administrative staff which, however, preserves in many respects the
mechanics of the patriarchal household administration. Notably, the patrimonial
staff is used for the personal interests of the ruler whom it also owes personal
allegiance. An extremely discretionary variant of patrimonialism is called
sultanism. To put it succinctly, the essence of patrimonial domination is in
government as the rulers private domain.16
The revival of interest in Webers concept of patrimonialism is associated with
Guenther Roth whose work has served as the reference point for almost all subsequent conceptual adaptations.17 Webers authority type constructs have two components, beliefs in legitimacy and modes of administration. As a traditionalist type
of domination, patrimonialism rests, at least partly, on the belief in the sanctity of
tradition. However, the logic of conicting imperatives is inherent in Webers
ideal type concepts of authority.18 In the case of traditional authority, tension is
between the sacredness of constraining norms of tradition and the rulers will to
attain absolute domination. Roth argues that beliefs in traditional legitimacy
eroded in most places of the world but certain related actual operating modes
and administrative arrangements survived.19 In view of this change, two types of
patrimonialism can be distinguished: traditionalist and de-traditionalized (personal
rulership). The concept of personal rulership/personalist patrimonialism, therefore, is a diminished subtype construct as it negates the traditional basis, one of
the central attributes of the root concept.20 The original meaning of the concept
of personal rule emphasizes its root (a type of patrimonialism) and its attributes
(based on personal loyalties and the provision of material incentives and rewards).21
578
F. Guliyev
Roth also shows the applicability of the concept at different levels of analysis:
practices, governance, and government form/regime. While in highly industrialized countries personal rulership is an ineradicable component of large public
bureaucracies administrative practices, exemplied by such phenomena as personal apparatus and machine politics, in some of the new states of the developing
world, it lls in an inadequately developed institutional matrix. In fact, in such conditions it becomes a merely private government for those who are powerful
enough to run it.22 Weakly institutionalized states engender personal governance,
and regimes based on a personal governance structure are the outcome.
Finally, Roth clearly demarcates personal rule from the oft-used distinction
between democracy and totalitarianism. The former belongs to the typology of
beliefs and organizational practices that can be found along the continuum
between pluralist democracy and totalitarianism. Since totalitarianism and established democracy are institutionalized regimes, they are immune to the formation
of private governments.23
Related to Roths concept of personal rulership is the concept of personal rule
developed by African researchers, most notably, Robert Jackson and Carl
Rosberg.24 Political systems of personal rule are institutionless polities based
on personal relations, coercion and clientelism.25 The authors note that personal
rule is not incompatible with bureaucratization. Thus, making of organizations at
the lower levels of state (bureaucratization) need not be regarded in terms of creation of effective institutions. For institutions are the rules that effectively bind
the behaviour of political actors. The bureaucratization at the level of administrative apparatus together with the accompanying personalization at the level of
decision-making results in the emergence of personal-bureaucratic systems in
which the strengthened organizational capacity of the bureaucratic apparatus is
used as an instrument of the rulers will to dominate.26
Like personal rule, the concept of neopatrimonialism was advanced primarily
by African specialists.27 Its basic premise is that patrimonialism is not incompatible with modern state. Not that personal rule is noninstitutionalized, as was argued
before by Jackson and Rosberg; it actually is. Neopatrimonialism is a set of
informal institutions which are regularized, accepted and practiced. ODonnell
describes this kind of informal institutionalization as another institutionalization.28 Formal rules, elections and public bureaucracies exist and matter but in
the reality of neopatrimonial regime informal rules and norms take precedence
over formal institutions.
Figure 1 gives an idea of what conceptual modications were used to reconceptualize Webers original patrimonialism. As a conceptual construct, neopatrimonialism is a mixture of the traditional and legal elements of domination.29
Personal arbitrariness and the conformity with customs are the essential characteristics of traditional domination from which neopatrimonial rule retains arbitrariness but not traditionalism. 30 Under neopatrimonialism, government continues
to be treated by the ruler as largely a private domain, just like under traditional
patrimonialism, but customary restrictions now become irrelevant. Moreover,
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579
Figure 1. A schematic representation of some re-conceptualizations of patrimonial

domination.
Notes: 1Weber, Economy and Society, 212 41; 2Roth, Personal Rulership; Remmer, Neopatrimonialism; Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa; 3Chehabi
and Linz, A Theory of Sultanism, 348; 4Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics,
63 8; Lewis, From Predendalism to Predation, 80.
the rulers personal powers are now enhanced by his maintaining of modern
administrative and military apparatuses.31
Another prominent concept of personal rule is sultanistic regimes.32 In the most
recent Linzian typology of nondemocratic regimes, sultanism appears as an extremely arbitrary type of semi-traditional regimes.33 A typical neosultanistic regime
is characterized by the fusion of the private and the public, familial power and dynasticism. No distinction is made between a state career and personal service to the
strongman who rules using rewards and fear to enact compliance and loyalty.
The concept of personal rule is also used in classical typologies of dictatorial
regimes. Most prominently, personal dictatorship appears in Huntingtons typology alongside one-party systems and military regimes.34 Personal dictatorship is
dened by the author as a regime in which the individual leader is the source of
authority and that power depends on access to, closeness to, dependence on, and
support from the leader.35 A subset of personal dictatorships, named sultanistic,
are characterized by patronage, nepotism, cronyism, and corruption.36 (Table 1
presents a selection of paradigmatic examples of personal rule in modern history.)
Following Huntingtons typology, Geddes creates an elaborate coding of
authoritarian regimes which includes single-party, military, personalist regimes
and their amalgams.37 Synthesizing contributions from the early work on personal
rule, Geddes denes personalist regime as a type of authoritarian regime in which
power emanates from the individual ruler who employs an informal patronage
network to distribute material benets and provides access to ofce to his
580
F. Guliyev
Table 1. Some paradigmatic cases of personal rule.
Country
Central African Rep
Chile
Cuba
Dem Rep of Congo
Dominican Rep
Equatorial Guinea
Haiti
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Liberia
Malawi
Mexico
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Panama
Paraguay
Philippines
Romania
Uganda
Ruler
Years in power
Bokassa
Pinochet
Batista
Mobutu Sese Seko
Trujillo
Macias Nguema
Duvalier family
Sukarno
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi
Saddam Hussein
Taylor
Banda
Daz
Somoza family
Babangida/Abacha/Abubakar
Noriega
Stroessner
Marcos
Ceausescu
Idi Amin
1966 1979
1973 1989
19331944, 1952 1959
1965 1997
1930 1961
1968 1979
1957 1986
1949 1966
1941 1979
1979 2003
1997 2003
1966 1994
18761880, 1884 1911
1936 1979
1985 1999
1983 1989
1954 1989
1965 1986
1965 1989
1971 1979
Source: Authors compilation.
collaborators and supporters in exchange for loyalty. The ruler also controls the
bureaucratic apparatus and military and prevents their development into strong
power bases that might challenge his rule. In the other two types of authoritarianism,
either the military or the party retains autonomy and has inuence on policy-making
and personnel decisions.
Personal rule: thin and thick denitions

There is variation in the extent of inclusiveness of the commonly-used denitions
of personal rule. For the purpose of creating a minimal denitional standard, it is
necessary rst to identify an approach which would include neither too much nor
too little in its conception of personal rule. It will be helpful, therefore, to group
existing denitions according to the inclusiveness or thickness of their concepts.
Thick concepts are multi-faceted; thin concepts have one or a few characteristics.38
Based on this distinction, three broad lines of thinking about personal rule can be
identied, from thinnest to thickest: ruler-level, statist, and institutionless polity.
The ruler-level approach

The ruler-level approach focuses on the type of ruler/ruling coalition and its
relationship with regime institutions. According to this view, personal rule
Democratization
581
connotes institutionally unbounded leadership in a nondemocratic regime. This

perspective is best exemplied by Huntingtons concept of personal dictatorship.
Peceny and collaborators argue that the most crucial factor differentiating [authoritarian] regimes from one another is whether the government is dominated by the
military as an institution, a hegemonic political party, or a single individual.39
Another example is Brookers typology.40 In his framework, Brooker divides
authoritarian regimes into personal versus organizational forms. As the next step,
he subdivides personalized forms into ruling monarchies, leaders of military or
party who are also personal dictators, and populist presidential monarchies.41 In
Brookers account, personal rule is the outcome of the reversal of the principalagent relationship between the leader and the organization that put him in power.
Similarly, focusing on the internal dynamics of the ruling coalitions in institutionally weak polities, Acemoglu and his collaborators discuss how a coalition of
military or civilian leaders can be transformed into a personal dictatorship if one
of the junta members manages to dominate all aspects of decision-making by
eliminating and excluding other members of the former junta.42
Pushed to the extreme, this approach detects personal dictators in every type of
authoritarian regimes. This logic excludes personal rule from regime typologies.43
Gandhi and Przeworski classify dictatorships based on the identity of the effective
heads of state, and the resulting typology of monarchical, military and civilian
regimes excludes personal rule.44 The three types, the authors argue, are at least
supported by the rst institutional trench which surrounds dictators including
consultative councils (monarchies), juntas (military), and political bureaus (single
party).45 Nevertheless, the thesis that dictatorial rulers are necessarily institutionally
constrained is not borne out by either empirical research or theory.
The statist approach
Second is the statist approach which focuses on the properties of the power infrastructure, especially the relationship between a ruler and the state apparatus.46 The
statists concept of personal rule takes into account the characteristics of the ruler
and the state apparatus as well as the way the personal ruler actually rules. As its
proponents incorporate the power infrastructure (both state apparatus and patronclient network) into their denition, they explicitly draw on Webers sociology of
domination. Some scholars working in this tradition have focused on the distinction between pre-bureaucratic patrimonialist and professional-autonomous forms
of administration, the latter also known as Weberian bureaucracy.47
The statist approach seeks to account for how the institutionally unchecked
ruler actually exercises power in a state. As Roth made it clear, Webers sociology
of Herrschaft was concerned not only with the question of beliefs in legitimate
authority but also with the actual operating modes and administrative arrangements by which rulers govern, not just rule.48 Trying to nd how systems
really work, Weber, always dealt with Herrschaft in terms of both legitimacy
and the typical staff arrangements of the various kinds of rulers.49
582
F. Guliyev
The institutionless polity approach
Finally, the third approach incorporates many more aspects of politics in what its
adherents call systems of personal rule. Personal rule is dened as a distinctive
type of institutionless polity in which all political relations are based on personal
interactions, and in which formal political institutions, such as the constitution, the
legislature, the courts, and the laws play very little role as constraints on politicians
behavior.50 In this view, formal institutions are regarded as largely irrelevant.51
To describe the similar set of conditions, other scholars used the concept weak
state in which personal rule is a feature pertaining to informal politics in weak
states more generally.52
Discussion
The differences between these denitions are signicant. Personal rule dened
through the type of ruler is reductionist allowing some to consider personal rule
a non-type for presumably lacking its own institution and drop it out from typologies.53 The denition of personal rule as institutionless politics is too thick. It
writes features of weak stateness into its framework of personal rule and thus conates personal rule with weak state, which in turn is an even thicker concept. The
statist approach is a corrective. It embraces the idea of unbounded ruler but also
shows how a single person can actually enact his domination. As the middle
ground denition, it points to three dimensions that will be sufcient for deriving
a set of minimal attributes in the following section. These are leadership/
decision-making, public administration and the institutional structure of power.
Deriving minimal attributes
Following Gerrings minimal strategy of denition which allows to identify the
bare essentials of a concept an analysis of about 40 different denitions of
personal rule helps determine three minimal (and therefore necessary) attributes of
personal rule.54 As Table 2 shows, these attributes are decision-making by a single
person/small clique, neopatrimonial administration and patron-client network.
Power monism
Power monism is, in the words of Weber, a domination over the masses by the Single
One.55 In systems of personal rule, political power is concentrated in the hands of one
person rather than some collectively-run institution. Oftentimes the leader organizes a
clique to support his rule: [d]uring and after a seizure of power, personalist cliques are
often formed from the network of friends, relatives, and allies that surrounds every
political leader.56 But since any cliques survival depends on access to the ruler,
cliques do not usually act as a check on the rulers powers.
Furthermore, power monism entails but is not limited to the high concentration
of power in the executive. Since the executive can be a collective body, power
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Table 2. Attributes of personal rule.

Dimensions
Ruler/decision-making
Public administration
Institutional structure
Core attributes
Specifying characteristics
Single person/small
clique
(power monism)
Neopatrimonial
(hybrid form)
Non-institutional decision-making
Weak horizontal constraints
Discretionary
Personal loyalty
Material rewards
Radial decision-making
Formally bureaucratic organization
Legal procedures
Political clientelism
Informal Patronage
Use of public resources for private
ends Particularistic
Patron-client
network
monism means specically that all the decision-making authority resides within an
individual, not a collective executive (such as a political party or military as an
institution). Personalized decision-making is, however, not sufcient for a
macro-concept of personal rule. Strictly speaking, it stands for a personal ruler
in the narrow sense.
Neopatrimonial administration
Neopatrimonial administration refers to the condition of subordination of the state
coercive and administrative apparatuses to the individual executive on the basis of
the loyalty and rewards principle. It is a distinct type of administration as it
combines certain characteristics of both types of Webers original scheme. The
ideal-type bureaucracy is a professional organization characterized by formal
employment, salary, pension, promotion, specialized training and functional
division of labor, well-dened areas of jurisdiction, documentary procedures, hierarchical sub- and super-ordination.57 Weberian bureaucracy also preserves a
degree of autonomy and acts as a corporately coherent entity.58
Purely patrimonial administration, by contrast, serves as a merely personal
instrument of the ruler.59 A patrimonial administrators loyalty to his ofce is
based not on his impersonal commitment. . .to impersonal tasks which dene its
extent and its content, it is rather a servants loyalty based on a strictly personal
relationship to the ruler.60 A patrimonial administration is maintained by the
rulers granting of beneces (for example, allowances in kind or fees) and efs
to his staff. The ruler recruits his staff according to particularistic, rather than
merit-based, criteria (for example, family membership, inheritance rules, personal
loyalty) to serve mainly the private ends of his leadership.61
The existence of patrimonial administration in modern times would be an anachronism, for most contemporary states are governed with a public administration
which is, at least formally, built on the principles of Weberian legal-rational
584
F. Guliyev
bureaucracy.62 While patrimonial administrations differ in their professionalism

and infrastructural capacity some are simply dysfunctional conceptually,
however, it is not correct to equate inefciency and dysfunctionality with
patrimonial administration which, in Webers account, is simply a certain kind of
administration.
Some scholars pointed out that Weber allowed for a bureaucratic rationalization of patrimonial rulership that did not undermine its essentially patrimonial
character.63 Indeed, Weber referred to certain historical mixes of rational and traditional forms of domination as to patrimonial-bureaucratic states. But to avoid
any confusion with those historical forms, the term neopatrimonial administration
can be used to refer to an organizationally hybrid arrangement whereby patrimonial
features are built into the formally structured bureaucratic organization.64 Bratton
and van de Walle describe such constellation in terms of the incorporation of
patrimonial logic into bureaucratic institutions.65 In fact, patrimonial principles
and bureaucratic procedures can reinforce each other.
At a more disaggregate level, a useful distinction can be made between bureaucracys high-level managers and low-level implementers. The ruler of a neopatrimonial staff maintains personal control of the state apparatus through the
appointment of loyal retainees, which stands for the patronage system.66 This is
typically accomplished by providing allies with jobs at the top and high (managerial) levels of public administration. They, in turn, become clients of the ruler and
are personally loyal to him. Whereas the traditional patrimonial apparatus in
Webers scheme is a personal administrative staff, a modern neopatrimonial
administration is based on personal (non-ideological) loyalty/dependence and
some form of merit-based personnel recruitment at lower levels of bureaucracy.
The typical patrimonial characteristics that can be found in any contemporary
neopatrimonial administration are personal obedience to the ruler by loyalist
ofce-retainees, material rewards and radial decision-making by direct orders.
Describing Pinochets rule in Chile as a neopatrimonial, rather than bureaucraticauthoritarian, regime Remmer especially highlighted radial decision-making and
personal control.67 Most important, neopatrimonial administration retains
patrimonialisms private-regardingness: Organizational ends [of patrimonial
organizations] are predominantly the private, subjective ones of their respective
heads, not public, objective ones.68
Patron-client network
Related to neopatrimonial management is the patron-client network. As neopatrimonial administration presupposes a loyalist network in place, the informal institutional channel of patron-client ties is embedded in it. By appointing retainees to
the top administrative-bureaucratic positions, the ruler creates an informal
network whereby he stands as the chief patron. The retainees of high level constitute
the rulers immediate circle of lieutenants and clients.69 By the same functional
logic, the top-level clients use their status and access to state resources to benet
Democratization
585
themselves and distribute the spoils of the ofce to their cronies, relatives and
friends. This stands for political clientelism, namely a system based on an exchange
of political support for material benets between patrons and clients. . .[involving] a
hierarchical structure where multiple clients are connected to each patron.70
The patron-client network thus created provides the institutional infrastructure
of power which penetrates the state and society.71 The reach of the patronage
network varies and can be highly consequential for the fate of the regime.72
Surprisingly, however, this attribute of personal rule is neglected in a recent
debate on authoritarian regime types. For instance, Slater criticizes Geddes typology of authoritarian regimes for being based solely on the procedures for decisionmaking and the composition of ruling coalitions.73 Drawing on Manns framework,
Slater proposes a two-dimensional typology with variation along both despotic
power (personalized vs. collective) and infrastructural power (party or military).74
The personal type is excluded for allegedly lacking its own institution to enact
decisions. However, by concentrating narrowly on regime institutions, the author
overlooks the possibility of the patronage network acting as a functional equivalent.
To summarize, the three features describe what we may call state authority
structure, that is the patterns of how state authority is organized and how state
power is used.75 Therefore, personal rule can be dened as a type of state authority
structure in which the ruler is an individual leader whose decision-making power
is institutionally unconstrained, who presides over a neopatrimonial public administration and who uses the patron-client network as the principal institutional
mechanism for wielding political power. Personal rule, however, is not the only
type of authority structure, and the next section elaborates on other types that
are possible.
On state authority structure
The concept of state authority structure, as it is understood here, encompasses the
extent of institutionalization of government decision-making and the strategies of
administration that the ruler can choose to rely on in his relation with the civil
society. The extent of institutionalization of government decision-making, the
rst component of state authority structure, includes all formal institutional
factors that can operate as constraints on the ruler in his power to make policies.
This includes such things as, for example, a strong political party, government
by military-as-institution, an autonomous legislature, and constitutionalism. The
extent of institutionalization can also be conceived of in terms of the distinction
between personal and legal/institutional rule.76 Based on the discussion in the previous section, a public administration, the second component, can be patrimonial,
neopatrimonial and bureaucratic.
These two components produce the 2X3 matrix. As Table 3 shows, the cells
combining an institutionalized ruler and a patrimonial administration, and a
non-institutional ruler and a legal-rational bureaucracy are incompatible and can
be logically compressed.77 Consequently, we are left with four types of authority
586
F. Guliyev
Table 3. Types of state authority structure.

Type of ruler
Institutional
Public administration
Patrimonial
Neopatrimonial
Bureaucratic
Institutional patronage
Legal bureaucratic
Non-institutional
Patrimonial
Personal rule
Note: The cells shaded gray can be logically compressed.
structure, institutional patronage, legal bureaucratic, patrimonial, and personal

rule.
The combination of an institutional ruler and a neopatrimonial administration
produces the type of authority structure that can be called institutional patronage,
typically in the form of party patronage though military patronage is also a
possibility.78
A non-institutionalized ruler does not match with a genuine (Weberian)
bureaucracy as it does not tolerate rules capable of binding the ruler, and
because legal-rational bureaucracy, by denition, contradicts a single-person
dictate. Truly personal rulers create formal institutions but such institutions typically turn out to be non-binding.79
The personal authority structure may be further classied into common, decentralized, and highly centralized. The common type includes all the features of
personal rule but may develop in two possible directions: toward a more dispersed
clientelism or toward greater centralization. These trends are known in the literature as prebendalism and neosultanism, respectively.
Lewis denes prebendalism as a decentralized [neo]patrimonial rule.80 On
the opposite side, neosultanistic subtype of personalist authority structure is a
highly centralized variant of personal governance under which the ruler has
maximum discretion.81 Chehabi and Linz mention that the difference between
neopatrimonialism and neosultanism lies not only in the degree of arbitrariness
but also in the size of the regimes clientele.82 As this feature is difcult to
measure directly, the narrowness of the patronage network (or the circle of
clients) can serve as an additional qualitative indicator to distinguish between
subtypes of personal authority structures.
An integrative framework
Dening regime
Political regime is a multi-dimensional concept, and one useful approach is to see
regime as a bounded whole or a system which shares sets of properties distinguishing it from other systems.83 Conventionally, the concept of political
regime has been dened by analogy with the formal and informal rules of a political
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game determining who has access to political power, and how those who are in
power deal with those who are not.84 Another scholar denes political regime
as that set of institutions coordinating and controlling the civil administration,
the police, and the military within a state. . ..A regime claims to control a
state.85 Therefore, if regime refers to a set of rules that regulate access to the
political game and how the game is played, the play itself involves state power.
A regime then is the pattern of rules which regulate access to, distribution and
exercise of state power.
Some scholars have suggested that the concepts of regime and state, and regime
and administration can be analytically distinguished.86 Regimes are more permanent than governments but normally less permanent than states.87 The state is a
more permanent centralized structure of domination and coordination encompassing an infrastructural apparatus of administrative and coercive organizations
created to extract, manage and distribute resources within the borders of a
country.88
Regimes and states, however, can be closely intertwined in developing
countries.89 It is acknowledged that the distinction between state and regime
can become quite blurred in the real world,90 and under personal rule, in particular,
regime and state are fused or thoroughly entangled with one another, both closely
identied with the ruler.91
The framework: Dahlian and Weberian dimensions of political regime
The framework laid out in this article builds on the conceptual distinctions between
state apparatus/public administration and regime, and between state authority
structure and the conventional democracy/authoritarianism distinction. Regime
and state/bureaucracy are distinct concepts. Yet, a meshing of these in the
developing world context makes their separation analytically counterproductive.
Instead, these dimensions can be seen as complementary and examined together
within the integrative regime framework. Using the partial regime strategy, the
proposed framework dimensionalizes the regime concept into a composite of
two partial regimes.92
Treating political regime as a composite of partial regimes (rather than as a
regime) helps to distinguish and highlight the link between two most salient
aspects of political regime. The rst partial regime of access to power (the
Dahlian dimension) stands for what is commonly understood by political regime
(type) procedures that regulate access to state power. The second partial
regime of state authority structure is that part of regime which describes who
rules how and determines how and under what conditions and limitations the
power of the state is exercised (one can call it the Weberian dimension).93
In the proposed framework, access to power or the electoral dimension is put
forth as foundational. 94 Before turning to the question of authority structure, it
seems to be more appropriate (and necessary) to establish the identity of
regime by asking to what extent a given regime tolerates political competition
588
F. Guliyev
for the key governmental ofces and whether the elected ofcials are accountable
to the population. This information can be used to classify regimes according to
Dahls criteria of political competition.95
Because many contemporary regimes in the developing and postcommunist
worlds are hybrid (that is, exhibit stable patterns of both democracy and authoritarianism), a simple dichotomous approach to measuring regimes has become almost
obsolete.96 Building on a recently advanced typology, it is possible to identify ve
regime categories according to Dahls criteria: closed authoritarianism, hegemonic
and competitive authoritarianism (these two are subtypes of electoral authoritarian
regimes), electoral democracy and liberal democracy.97 By matching state authority types (excluding patrimonial), a useful typology is obtained. The property
space for this 3X5 typology is shown in Table 4.
The relations between the two dimensions of political regime are continually
interactive.98 Organization and exercise of state power along the personal lines
restrict competition and distort institutional checks and balances, whereas competitive elections, where allowed or held, help break up the vicious circle of political
power concentration and provide for greater political accountability.
Cells (14) and (15) in Table 4, standing for combinations of democracy and
personal rule, are shaded for the following considerations. There is little doubt
that personal domination is impossible in an established democracy for it rests
on constitutionalism and the rule of law. Therefore, cell (15) can be eliminated.
As competitive regimes progress in consolidating democracy, they are
expected to move away from personal rule.99 But, unfortunately, the adoption of
electoral competition does not ensure that the consolidation of democratic institutions will ensue. In the table, cell (14) combining a personal authority structure
with a minimalist democracy is shaded to indicate that this combination is possible
depending on how one denes democracy.
Table 4. The property space for the typology of political regimes formed from the partial
regimes of access to power and state authority structure.
State authority structure
Legal-rational
Bureaucratic
Institutional
patronage
Personal
rule
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
Access to Power
Closed authoritarian
Hegemonic authoritarian
Competitive authoritarian
Electoral democracy
Liberal democracy
Notes: This cell is a combination that is theoretically possible but empirically unlikely (but see
Hartlyn, Crisis-ridden Elections; Webber, Consolidated Patrimonial Democracy?); This cell can
be logically compressed.
Democratization
589
The standard procedural denition of democracy focused on contested elections

and popular participation may not be good at detecting the personalist structuring
and use (and abuse) of state power.100 An elected executive, especially in presidential systems, can gradually transform a poorly institutionalized democracy into a
sultanistic dictatorship.101 In a minimalist democracy, voters have a means to
punish incumbents. After all, they can vote the incumbent ruler out if he attempts
to personalize the system. However, in this view, voters can oust such ruler only
the next time they vote. Moreover, even a reasonably competitive election may
not guarantee that the personal ruler does not get re-elected. At the more fundamental level, under conditions of weak institutional restraints, the personal authority
structure can entrench itself in the competitive mechanism by ensuring rotation
of members of the same clique in government.102
An illustrative application
As a way of illustrating its heuristic potential, I present an application of the proposed conceptual scheme. Since this studys primary interest is in personal rule, I
exclude other types of state authority structure from this illustrative analysis
assuming variation along this dimension will not be called into question. There
is so far no good measure of hybrid regimes; nor is there a systematic measurement of authority structures. Perhaps, like any cross-national coding, the measures
used here are not perfect. Nevertheless, relying on existing data, I was able to
identify about 19 unambiguous cases of regimes with personal authority structure
which existed in 2004, the latest date for which data were available (see Table 5).
Consulting additional literature evinced patterns characteristic of personal rule
continuing to this day in almost all of these regimes.103
Table 5 is interesting in several ways. First, it is noteworthy that most of the
regimes with personal rule structure are concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa and
post-Soviet Eurasia.104 Secondly, there is a difference in the levels of competition
in these regimes. The third column presents categorizations of these regimes
based on Roessler and Howards coding. Together with the Polity score (in the
next column) it aptly illustrates the point: there are two salient dimensions of
political regime and personal rule can co-exist with different levels of competition,
from a positive Polity score of 5 in Putins Russia to a -2 in Yemen and Chad to a -9
in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. With the universal acceptance of the institutions
and values of democracy, personal rule is not a closed autocracy phenomenon as
has been commonly assumed.
Conclusion
In a 1999 review of Sultanistic Regimes Crawford Young noted, In a world where
regimes must at least maintain the trappings of democracy to be accepted by the
international community, the kind of extravagantly personal rule characterized as
sultanism is perhaps less likely to emerge.105 True, but why see personal rule in
590
F. Guliyev
Table 5. Contemporary cases of personal rule.

Regime category
by competition2
Polity
score3
Eurasia
Eurasia
Eurasia
Eurasia
Eurasia
Eurasia
Eurasia
Hegemonic (1993)
Hegemonic (2002)
Hegemonic (1999)
Hegemonic (1995)
Electoral (2000)
Hegemonic (1999)
Closed (1991)
27
27
26
23
5
23
29
Uzbekistan
Yemen
Eurasia
Middle
East
Hegemonic (1991)
Hegemonic (1999)
29
22
Libya
Middle
East
Africa
Africa
Africa
Africa
Closed (1987)
27
Hegemonic (1991)
Hegemonic (1997)
Competitive (1996)
Hegemonic (2002)
0
24
22
24
Africa
Competitive (2006)
Africa
Hegemonic (1996)
25
Obiang (1979 )
Africa
Africa
Africa
Hegemonic (2003)
Competitive (1998)
Competitive (2001)
21
24
22
Conte (1984-2008)
Eyadema family (1967 )
Museveni (1986)
Country
Region1
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Russia
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
Chad
Rep of Congo
Dem Rep of
Congo
Equatorial
Guinea5
Guinea
Togo
Uganda
Personal authority structure4

Aliyev family (1993 )
Lukashenko (1994)
Nazarbayev (1990)
Akayev (1990 2005)
Putin (20002008)
Rahmon (1992 )
Niyazov/ Berdimuhammedov
(1990)
Karimov (1990 )
Saleh (1978-1990, North
Yemen; 1990-, Rep of
Yemen)
Gadda (1969)
Compaore (1987)
Biya (1982)
Deby (1990 )
Sassou Nguesso (1979-1992,
1997)
Kabila family (1997 )
Notes: 1 Middle East Mid East, North Africa N Africa, Post-Soviet Eurasia PS Eurasia, Sub
Saharan Africa SS Africa; 2 Categories represent the most recent values available from
Brownlees dataset, Portents of Pluralism. Closed Authoritarian Closed; Hegemonic
Authoritarian Hegemonic; Competitive Authoritarian Competitive; 3 The scores are ve-year
averages, 2004 2008, (except Kyrgyzstan, 2000 2004) calculated from the combined Polity score.
The Polity scale ranges from -10 (complete autocracy) to +10 (complete democracy); the standard
thresholds are the following: regimes scoring from -10 to -7 are coherent autocracies, those from
-6 to +6 are incoherent polities (or anocracies), and those from +7 to +10 are coherent
democracies (Sources: Polity IV, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm; Marshall and
Jaggers, Polity IV Project; Jaggers and Gurr, Tracking Democracys Third Wave, 4734); 4 The
primary sources for these assessments are Geddes coding of authoritarian regimes, What Do We
Know; Brownlee, Portents of Pluralism; and BBC Country Proles (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
country_proles/default.stm). Regimes were considered as having personal authority structure if
they were coded as personal in Geddes and Brownlees data. Personal (with single party or
military) and triple hybrids were excluded. For newer cases of personal rule in post-Soviet Eurasia,
additional sources consulted include: on post-Soviet regimes in general, Hale, Regime Cycles;
Fisun, Postsovietskie Neopatrimonialnie Rezhimi. On Central Asia and Azerbaijan: Bohr,
Independent Turkmenistan; Guliyev, Post-Soviet Azerbaijan; Ilkhamov, Neopatrimonialism,
Interest Groups and Patronage Networks; Isaacs, Informal Politics; Ishiyama, Neopatrimonialism
and the Prospects for Democratization. On Russia and Belarus: Lynch, How Russia is Not Ruled
(Ch.4); Hale, Eurasian Polities; Eke and Kuzio, Sultanism in Eastern Europe; 5 Because of its
small population size, Equatorial Guinea is not included in Geddes dataset; yet it is a clear-cut case
of personal rule, see, for example, McSherry, The Political Economy of Oil.
Democratization
591
such an exaggerated way and not recognize it as a viable institutional arrangement

of authority and as a strategy of maintaining power? Before it was toppled by US
troops in 2003, Saddam Husseins regime in Iraq for more than 20 years had
been governed as a system of personal rule and, according to an Iraq specialist,
[t]he best way to picture the power structure in Saddam Husseins Iraq is to
imagine a series of widening circles [webs of patronage], with the gure of the president at their centre.106 Furthermore, as the present analysis has shown personal
domination can coexist with the formal institutions of electoral competition.
Personal rule can also be facilitated by the instrumental use of the formal law, as
Akech has recently argued.107
With a claried and less demanding denition at hand, personal rule can be a
useful analytical concept as it captures well how politics is conducted in some developing nations. Although constructing better measures of personal rule remains a
challenge, if we are to understand the working of politics in the developing and
postcommunist worlds, this need not dissuade us from studying this important
aspect of political life there.
As the analysis in this article has shown, the concept of personal rule
describes properly the state authority structure. This understanding helps to
distinguish and integrate two separate but closely inter-linked partial regimes of
access to power and state authority structure. The new framework takes into
account the analytical division between the two but strives for their integration
in a complementary and interactive manner. The conceptual scheme will enable
scholars to map regimes along the full spectrum of liberal democracy and
closed autocracy, on the one hand, and along the range of state authority structures, on the other.
The new framework opens avenues for wider application of some of the
concepts which have traditionally been the prerogative of area studies and
within-region comparisons (for example, Sub-Saharan Africa). As comparative
research has moved toward designing better tools to measure political competition,
the next challenge is to develop better measures of state authority structures,
particularly its personal type and its variants. This article has pointed to three
core and some specifying attributes of personal rule which can serve as the
basis for constructing appropriate measures.
In light of the current scholarly interest in the issues of regime stability in less
than democratic regimes, the proposed conceptual scheme can be especially fruitful.
While recent studies have focused on authoritarian institutions and the role and
consequences of nominally democratic institutions (such as elections, parties and
legislatures),108 extra-electoral factors as well as state authority structure integral
to the concept of political regime have received less attention, especially in crossregional research.109 As scholarly interest shifted toward the study of why some
rulers care to dress their windows if institutions in nondemocratic contexts are
nothing but the window-dressing,110 the strength of formal institutions has been
taken for granted and the role of actual modes and structures of governance, including that of informal institutions, has been unduly neglected.111 In this regard, it is
592
F. Guliyev
worthwhile revisiting some of the older theoretical concepts which, with some
exceptions, have been largely underutilized in recent generalist comparative
research.
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Matthijs Bogaards, Guenther Roth, Nozima Akhrarkhodjaeva,
and the anonymous reviewers and editors of this Journal for valuable suggestions and
encouragement. He also thanks Barbara Geddes, Jason Brownlee and Marc Howard for providing their data on political regimes, and the OSI Global Supplementary Grant Program for
additional nancial support for his PhD study.
Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Zagorski, Comparative Politics, 58.

Medard, Underdeveloped State in Africa, 177. As Medard notes, particularistic
practices can transform the whole functioning of the political system such that a
difference in quantity generates a difference in quality, ibid., 185.
For this reason, multiple conceptual problems emerged in the study of Third Wave
regimes; see Collier and Levitsky, Democracy with Adjectives.
These ve labels are taken from, respectively, (1) Jackson and Rosberg, Personal
Rule in Black Africa; Jackson and Rosberg, Personal Rule: Theory and Practice;
and Sandbrook, Politics of Africas Economic Stagnation; (2) Albrecht, Political
Opposition, Ch. 1; (3) Medard, Underdeveloped State in Africa; Remmer, Military
Rule; Remmer, Neopatrimonialism: Politics of Military Rule in Chile; Snyder,
Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships; Bratton and van de
Walle, Neopatrimonial Regimes; and Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic
Experiments in Africa; (4) Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics; (5) Lewis,
From Predendalism to Predation.
See, respectively, (1) Goodwin and Skocpol, Explaining Revolutions; and
Goodwin, No Other Way Out; (2) Huntington, Third Wave; Huntington, How
Countries Democratize; and Geddes, What Do We Know About Democratization.
In the order given, these seven terms are from (1) Linz and Stepan, Problems of
Democratic Transition; Thompson, Anti-Marcos Struggle; Chehabi and Linz, A
Theory of Sultanism; Snyder, Paths out of Sultanistic Regimes; Kamrava, NonDemocratic States; Linz, Authoritarian and Totalitarian Regimes; and Zagorski,
Comparative Politics, Ch. 11; (2) Andreski, African Predicament; and Acemoglu,
Robinson, and Verdier, Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule; (3) Kitschelt et al.,
Post-Communist Party Systems; (4) Hartlyn, Crisis-ridden Elections; and Webber,
Consolidated Patrimonial Democracy?; (5) Hale, Regime Cycles; (6) Hale,
Eurasian Polities as Hybrid Regimes; (7) Thompson and Kuntz, After Defeat.
Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, 63.
This is the conclusion from Jean-Francois Medards analysis, as cited in Bratton and
van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, 90; see also van de Walle, The
Path from Neopatrimonialism, 1.
Geddes, What Do We Know, 132 4; Ulfelder, Contentious Collective Action,
315.
Theobald, Research Note: Patrimonialism, 555; see also Erdmann and Engel,
Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered.
Democratization
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
593
Hadenius and Teorell, Pathways from Authoritarianism; Pitcher, Moran, and

Johnston, Rethinking Patrimonialism; Magaloni, Credible Power-Sharing.
Personalist regimes were shown to be the second, after single-party, most stable
type of authoritarianism: Geddes, What Do We Know. Some historical cases
were remarkably durable: Snyder, Paths out of Sultanistic Regimes, 62 7;
Remmer, Military Rule; Remmer, Neopatrimonialism. This invalidated earlier
beliefs in the inherent instability of personal rule: for example, Huntington, Political
Order, 124. In regimes of personal rule, democratic transition and immediate
democratization are typically difcult to achieve: Snyder, Explaining Transitions;
Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments; Linz and Stepan, Problems of
Democratic Transition. In contrast to more corporate and bureaucratized forms of
authoritarianism, neopatrimonial dictatorships have been found to be more susceptible to revolutionary overthrow: Goodwin and Skocpol, Explaining Revolutions;
Goodwin, No Other Way Out. Political opening here is normally driven by
popular protest: Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments. But even
after they collapse, neopatrimonial regimes are most likely to be replaced by other
types of nondemocratic rule: Huntington, How Countries Democratize; Linz and
Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition. Alongside the effects on regime
change, personal rule is associated with a set of negative economic outcomes,
high levels of corruption, and poor governance: Jackson and Rosberg, Personal
Rule; Sandbrook, Politics of Africas Economic Stagnation; Chehabi and Linz, A
Theory of Sultanism, 21 3; van de Walle, African Economies; Chang and
Golden, Sources of Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes.
Munck and Snyder, Mapping Political Regimes.
Collier and Gerring, Concepts and Method in Social Science.
Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. I, Ch. III: 22641; Vol. II, Ch. XXII, 100610;
see also Bendix, Max Weber, Ch. XI, 32984; Murvar, Some Reections on
Webers Typology.
Bendix, Max Weber, 334.
Roth, Personal Rulership.
Gould, Conicting Imperatives.
Roth, Personal Rulership, 195.
Collier and Levitsky, Democracy with Adjectives.
Ibid.
Ibid., 197.
Jackson and Rosberg, Personal Rule; Jackson and Rosberg, Personal Rule: Theory
and Practice.
Jackson and Rosberg, Personal Rule, 8.
Ibid., 5.
For example, Medard, Underdeveloped State; Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments.
ODonnell, Another Institutionalization.
Erdmann and Engel, Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered.
Bendix, Max Weber, 295, 340.
Remmer, Neopatrimonialism, 165.
Chehabi and Linz, A Theory of Sultanism.
Linz, Authoritarian and Totalitarian Regimes, 14357.
Huntington, Third Wave; Huntington, How Countries Democratize.
Huntington, How Countries Democratize, 581.
Ibid.
Geddes, What Do We Know.
594
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
F. Guliyev
Coppedge, Dening and Measuring Democracy.
Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry, Dictatorial Peace?, 17.
Huntington, How Countries Democratize; Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes;
Brooker, Authoritarian Regimes.
Brooker, Authoritarian Regimes, 142.
Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin, Do Juntas Lead to Personal Rule?.
Hadenius and Teorell, Pathways from Authoritarianism; Magaloni, Credible
Power-Sharing.
Gandhi and Przeworski, Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion; Gandhi and
Przeworski, Authoritarian Institutions.
Gandhi and Przeworski, Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion, 16 17.
Munck and Snyder, Mapping Political Regimes, 22.
See, for example, Evans and Rauch, Bureaucracy and Growth.
Ibid.
Posner and Young, Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa, 126.
For example, Forrest, Asynchronic Comparisons.
For example, Slater, Iron Cage in an Iron Fist; Lai and Slater, Institutions of the
Offensive; Gandhi and Przeworski, Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion.
Gerring and Barresi, Putting Ordinary Language to Work; Gerring, Social Science
Methodology; the full sampling of denitions on which this analysis is based is
available from the author.
Weber cited in Murvar, Some Reections on Webers Typology, 379.
Geddes, What Do We Know, 130.
Weber, Economy and Society, 1393.
Evans, Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses, 567.
Weber, Economy and Society, 231 2.
Ibid., 10301.
Ibid., 10318; Delany, Development and Decline.
Erdmann and Engel, Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered.
Hutchcroft, Oligarchs and Cronies, 416, 438; Callaghy, State-Society Struggle,
73 5.
Clapham, Third World Politics, 48 9.
Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments, 62.
Riggs, Fragility of the Third Worlds Regimes, 229.
Remmer, Neopatrimonialism, 165.
Delany, Development and Decline, 466.
Kurer, Political Foundations of Economic Development Policies, 653.
Snyder and Mahoney, Missing Variable; Munck and Snyder, Mapping Political
Regimes.
Snyder, Explaining Transitions.
Slater, Iron Cage in an Iron Fist; Lai and Slater, Institutions of the Offensive;
Geddes, What Do We Know.
Slater, Iron Cage in an Iron Fist; Mann, Autonomous Power of the State.
Kohli, State-Directed Development, 9.
Lange, Rule of Law, 52 4.
On logical compression and other typological techniques, see Elman, Explanatory
Typologies.
The literature on patronage parties and the state is abundant; on Western countries,
see Shefter, Political Parties and the State; Piattoni, Clientelism, Interests, and
Democratization
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
595
Democratic Representation; for the developing world, see for example, Smith, Life
of the Party.
This useful distinction between binding and non-binding institutions is from Wright,
Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain?.
Lewis, From Predendalism to Predation, 80; also see Joseph, Democracy and
Prebendal Politics in Nigeria, 63 8.
Chehabi and Linz, A Theory of Sultanism, 910.
Collier and Adcock, Democracy and Dichotomies.
Remmer, Exclusionary Democracy, 65; Fishman, Rethinking State and Regime,
428.
Rose, Dynamic Tendencies, 602 3.
Fishman, Rethinking State and Regime; Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan; Goodwin,
No Other Way Out; Mazzuca, Reconceptualizing Democratization.
Fishman, Rethinking State and Regime, 428; Goodwin, No Other Way Out, 11 13.
Fishman, Rethinking State and Regime, 428; Mann, Autonomous Power.
Lawson, Conceptual Issues, 187.
Goodwin, No Other Way Out, 13.
Chehabi and Linz, A Theory of Sultanism, 10; quote is from Fishman, Rethinking
State and Regime, 428.
Schmitter, Consolidation of Democracy, 426 30.
Snyder, Beyond Electoral Authoritarianism; Schedler, Logic of Electoral
Authoritarianism, 6; quote is from Lawson, Conceptual Issues, 187.
Bratton and van de Walles approach reverses the logic suggested in this study. The
authors differentiate between neopatrimonial regimes based on Dahls criteria of
Polyarchy although their denition of neopatrimonialism places a strong emphasis
on informal institutions. In a similar criticism, Snyder and Mahoney (The
Missing Variable, 112) point out, The dimensions of participation and competition
that anchor Bratton and van de Walles regime typology. . .do not discriminate among
cases of neopatrimonialism in terms of their varied patronage institutions.
Dahl, Polyarchy.
For discussion, see Bogaards, How to Classify Hybrid Regimes?.
Howard and Roessler, Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes.
Schedler makes a similar point in Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism, 6.
van de Walle, Path from Neopatrimonialism.
For example, Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development.
See Thompsons study of the Philippines in Anti-Marcos Struggle.
On how an unconsolidated democracy can degenerate into a neopatrimonial or
delegative democracy, see Hartlyn, Crisis-ridden Elections; ODonnell, Delegative
Democracy. On how electorally competitive regimes coexist with neopatrimonialism
in some African countries, see Lindberg, Its Our Time to Chop. Bratton and van de
Walle also observe that in Africa big-man democracy is emerging, in which the formal
trappings of democracy coexist with neopatrimonial political practice, Democratic
Experiments, 233.
All sources appear in the notes section under the table.
In both regions states suffer from a set of similar syndromes of the crisis of stateness;
see an excellent collection of essays comparing postcolonial Africa and post-Soviet
Eurasia in Beissinger and Young, Beyond State Crisis?
Young, Resurrecting Sultanism.
Tripp, How Saddam Rules Iraq.
Akech, Constraining Government Power in Africa; see also Diamond, Progress
and Retreat in Africa.
596
108.
109.
110.
111.
F. Guliyev
On the former see, for example, Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization; Magaloni and Kricheli, Political Order and One-Party Rule; on the latter,
see, for example, Schedler, Electoral Authoritarianism; Gandhi and Przeworski,
Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion; Gandhi and Przeworski, Authoritarian
Institutions; Gandhi, Political Institutions under Dictatorship.
Snyder makes a similar point in Beyond Electoral Authoritarianism.
Gandhi and Przeworski, Authoritarian Institutions, 1292.
As Helmke and Levitsky (Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics, 72526)
pointed out, Such a narrow focus [on formal institutions] can be problematic, for it
risks missing much of what drives political behavior and can hinder efforts to explain
important political phenomena.
Notes on contributor
Farid Guliyev is a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science and a research associate at the
TEAMS Research Center, both at Jacobs University Bremen, Germany. He is currently
working on his PhD thesis on the relationship between oil wealth and personal rule in the
developing and postcommunist worlds.
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ISSN: 1351-0347 (Print) 1743-890X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdem20

Personal rule, neopatrimonialism, and regime

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Date: 06 October 2015, At: 12:20

Personal rule, neopatrimonialism, and regime typologies:

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(Received April 2010; nal version received September 2010)

ISSN 1351-0347 print/ISSN 1743-890X online

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anthropological clientelism). In this study I focus specically on personalism at

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Figure 1. A schematic representation of some re-conceptualizations of patrimonial

Table 1. Some paradigmatic cases of personal rule.

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Source: Authors compilation.

Personal rule: thin and thick denitions

The ruler-level approach

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connotes institutionally unbounded leadership in a nondemocratic regime. This

The institutionless polity approach

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Table 2. Attributes of personal rule.

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bureaucracy.62 While patrimonial administrations differ in their professionalism

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Table 3. Types of state authority structure.

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Note: The cells shaded gray can be logically compressed.

structure, institutional patronage, legal bureaucratic, patrimonial, and personal

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The standard procedural denition of democracy focused on contested elections

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Table 5. Contemporary cases of personal rule.

Personal authority structure4

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such an exaggerated way and not recognize it as a viable institutional arrangement

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Zagorski, Comparative Politics, 58.

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Hadenius and Teorell, Pathways from Authoritarianism; Pitcher, Moran, and

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Brownlee, Jason. Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization. Cambridge: Cambridge

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Gandhi, Jennifer. Political Institutions under Dictatorship. New York, Cambridge

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Medard, Jean-Francois. The Underdeveloped State in Africa: Political Clientelism or

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