DE PEDRO, IVY JOYCE L.

ASSIGNMENT #11
1.

REYNANTE TADEJA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 145336
February 20, 2013
FACTS: The RTC found Reynante, Ferdinand, Plaridel, Ricardo and Ricky guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. The CA affirmed
the findings and Decision of the RTC. On the strength of their co-accused Plaridel Tadeja's extrajudicial confession, taken after his
apprehension on 29 November 2006, petitioners pray for the reopening of the homicide case against them. Their prayer is for the
reception of newly discovered evidence, despite the fact that this Court's Decision affirming their conviction already became final and
executory on 26 July 2007.
ISSUE: Whether the case must be reopened.
HELD: NO. The petitioners motions for reconsideration and subsequent pleas for the reopening of the case are denied.
Fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice necessitate that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgment or
orders of courts should attain finality at some definite time fixed by law. Otherwise, there would be no end to litigation.
Section 1 of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court provides that a new trial may only be granted by the court on motion of the accused,
or motu proprio with the consent of the accused "(a)t any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final." In this case,
petitioners judgment of conviction already became final and executory on 26 July 2007 the date on which the Decision of this Court
denying the petition and affirming the ruling of the CA was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments. Thus, pleas for the remand
of this case to the trial court for the conduct of a new trial may no longer be entertained.
Petitioners premise their motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, i.e. Plaridels extrajudicial confession,
executed with the assistance of Atty. Cirilo Tejoso, Jr., and the spot report of the police on Plaridels apprehension.
Newly discovered evidence refers to that which (a) is discovered after trial; (b) could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) is of
such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted.
The most important requisite is that the evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with reasonable
diligence; hence, the term "newly discovered." The confession of Plaridel does not meet this requisite. He participated in the trial
before the RTC and even gave testimony as to his defense. It was only after he and petitioners had been convicted by the trial court
that he absconded. Thus, the contention that his confession could not have been obtained during trial does not hold water.

2.

JOEL B. CAES vs. Hon. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. Nos. 74989-90 November 6, 1989

FACTS: On November 21, 1981, petitioner Joel Caes was charged in two separate informations with illegal possession of firearms and
illegal possession of marijuana before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The cases were consolidated on December 10, 1982. Caes
was arraigned and pleaded not guilty in November 15, 1982. However due to many reasons, trials were always postponed.On January
9, 1984, a motion to revive the cases was filed by Maj. Dacanay. It was granted and the case was set for a new hearing.
ISSUE: Whether the motion to revive the cases was invalid because it was riot filed by the proper party nor was a copy served on
the petitioner.
HELD: It is axiomatic that the prosecution of a criminal case is the responsibility of the government prosecutor and must always be
under his control. This is true even if a private prosecutor is allowed to assist him and actually handles the examination of the
witnesses and the introduction of other evidence. The witnesses, even if they are the complaining witnesses, cannot act for the
prosecutor in the handling of the case. Although they may ask for the filing of the case, they have no personality to move for its
dismissal or revival as they are not even parties thereto nor do they represent the parties to the action. Their only function is to
testify. In a criminal prosecution, the plaintiff is represented by the government prosecutor, or one acting under his authority, and by
no one else.
It follows that the motion for the revival of the cases filed by prosecution witnesses (who never even testified) should have been
summarily dismissed by the trial judge. The mere fact that the government prosecutor was furnished a copy of the motion and he did
not interpose any objection was not enough to justify the action of these witnesses. The prosecutor should have initiated the motion
himself if he thought it proper. The presumption that he approved of the motion is not enough, especially since we are dealing here
with the liberty of a person who had a right at least to be notified of the move to prosecute him again. The fact that he was not so
informed made the irregularity even more serious. It is curious that the motion was granted just the same, and ex parte at that and
without hearing, and the petitioner's subsequent objection was brushed aside.
3.

NELSON VALLENO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 192050
January 9, 2013

FACTS: The trial court found petitioner Nelson Valleno y Lucito guilty of violation of Section 11 of Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00). Upon
arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. In convicting petitioner, the trial court lent credence to the straightforward

testimonies of the police officers over the mere denial of the accused. The trial court ruled that the chain of custody over the illegal
drugs seized was properly established.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in not finding that the prosecution was not able to discharge its burden of proving by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner has committed the crime of violation of section 11, article ii of republic act no. 9165.
HELD: In order for prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug to prosper, there must be proof that (1) the accused was
in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and
(3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. All these elements were duly established by the
prosecution.
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides the procedure to be followed in the seizure and custody of prohibited drugs, to wit:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge
and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the instant case, the chain of custody of the seized illegal
drugs was not broken. There was nothing irregular in the conduct of search of petitioners house.
4.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LINDA ALVIZ

G.R. No. 177158 : February 06, 2013

FACTS: The trial court found accused-appellants Linda Y. Alviz aka "Peking" (Linda) and Elizabeth B. de la Vega aka "Beth" (Elizabeth)
guilty of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
When arraigned on March 21, 2003, both Linda and Elizabeth pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and stipulated that they were
arrested without a warrant of arrest. Linda and Elizabeth appealed to the Court of Appeals which reviewed the parties conflicting
versions of the events of February 4, 2003, when Linda and Elizabeth were arrested. Initially, both Linda and Elizabeth appealed
before the Court. However, Linda executed a Motion for Withdrawal of Appeal on August 14, 2007.
ISSUE: Whether the lower court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
section 5, article ii of republic act 9165.
HELD: Article II, Section 21, paragraph 1 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge
and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.
The above rule is implemented by Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations which expounds on how it is to be
applied, and notably, also provides for a saving mechanism in case the procedure laid down in the law was not strictly complied with:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that
the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said item.

5.

PEOPLE V. LINDA
G.R. NO. 177158 : FEBRUARY 06, 2013

FACTS: Accused-appellants Linda Y. Alviz aka "Peking" (Linda) and Elizabeth B. de la Vega aka "Beth" (Elizabeth) was found guilty of
violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. When
arraigned on March 21, 2003, both Linda and Elizabeth pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and stipulated that they were arrested
without a warrant of arrest.
ISSUE: Whether the lower court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
section 5, article ii of republic act 9165.
HELD: It is a fundamental rule that factual findings of the trial courts involving credibility are accorded respect when no glaring
errors, gross misapprehension of facts, and speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings.
The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses having heard their testimonies
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said
findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals,such as in this case. The Court, therefore, has no reason to deviate from this rule.
Jurisprudence has identified the elements that must be established for the successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
viz: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
for the same. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money consummate the buybust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused. In other words, the commission of the offense of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, like shabu, merely requires the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the moment the exchange
of money and drugs between the buyer and the seller takes place.
The RTC found, and the Court of Appeals eventually affirmed, that all these elements have been amply proven by the prosecution.
6.

UY VS. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 105965-70, March 20, 2001

FACTS: In Uy vs Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. 105965-70. August 9, 1999], petitioner Uy, who was Deputy Comptroller of the Philippine
navy and designated as Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Comptrollership was charged with estafa through falsification of official
documents and violation of RA 3019. The petitioner filed a motion to quash, arguing that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over
the offense charged and that the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor had no authority to file the offense.
The court ruled that :
1.
It is the court-martial, not the Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction to try petitioner since he was a regular officer of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and fell squarely under Article 2 of the Articles of War mentioned in Section 1(b) of P.D. 1850, Providing for
the trial by courts-martial of members of the Integrated National Police and further defining the jurisdiction of courts-martial over
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
2.
As to the violations of Republic Act No. 3019, the petitioner does not fall within the rank requirement stated in Section 4 of the
Sandiganbayan Law, thus, exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner is vested in the regular courts , as amended by R.A. No. 8249, which
states that In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed
in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested
in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s against
petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
In February 20, 2000, a motion for clarification which in fact appeared to be a partial motion for reconsideration was filed by the
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor filed, which was denied.
The instant case is a Motion for Further Clarification filed by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the Court's ruling in its decision dated
August 9, 1999 and resolution dated February 22, 2000.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and that the
Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts.
HELD: No. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute all criminal cases
involving public officers and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction
of the regular courts as well. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified.
It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper
or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular
courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office.
The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the
discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees. The prosecution of
offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the most important functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770,
the Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in
ensuring accountability in public office.
Even a perusal of the law (PD 1630) originally creating the Office of theOmbudsman then (to be known as the Tanodbayan), and the
amendatory laws issued subsequent thereto will show that, at its inception, the Office of theOmbudsman was already vested with the
power to investigate and prosecute civil and criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan and even the regular courts.

7.

PEOPLE vs. VALDEZ

G.R. No. 175602

February 13, 2013

FACTS: The two accused were tried for three counts of murder by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86, in Quezon City. On
January 20, 2005, after trial, the RTC convicted them as charged, prescribed on each of them the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count, and ordered them to pay to the heirs of each victim P93,000.00 _as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC on July 18, 2006, subject to the modification.The two
accused then came to the Court on final appeal, but on May 9, 2007, Edwin Valdez filed a motion to withdraw appeal, which the Court
granted on October 10, 2007, thereby deeming Edwins appeal closed and terminated.
ISSUE: Whether the withdraw appeal filed by Edwin will affect his co-accused.
HELD: Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. (a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not
affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
As earlier stated, both petitioner and the OSG laterally argue that in the event of Guingguings acquittal, petitioner should likewise be
acquitted, based on Rule 122, Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which states:
SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of
the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
Private respondent however, contends that said provision is not applicable to petitioner inasmuch as he appealed from his conviction,
and the provision states that a favorable judgment shall be applicable only to those who did not appeal.
A literal interpretation of the phrase "did not appeal," as espoused by private respondent, will not give justice to the purpose of the
provision.
Although it is only appellant who persisted with the present appeal, the well-established rule is that an appeal in a criminal
proceeding throws the whole case open for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the parties. The records show that
Rodriguez had withdrawn his appeal due to financial reasons. However, Section 11 (a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that
"an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the
appellant court is favorable and applicable to the latter." As we have elucidated, the evidence against and the conviction of both
appellant and Rodriguez are inextricably linked. Hence, appellants acquittal, which is favorable and applicable to Rodriguez, should
benefit the latter.
8.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. P/SUPT. ARTEMIO E. LAMSEN

FACTS: The foregoing Motions assail the Court's Resolution dated February 20, 2013, which upheld the conviction of accusedappellants of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion.
In their respective Motions, accused-appellants state, inter alia that they obtained affidavits from prosecution witnesses Amel F.
Reyes5 (Reyes) and Domingo Marcelo6 (Marcelo) whose testimonies implicated accused-appellants of the crime of robbery with
homicide. In their affidavits, the aforesaid prosecution witnesses claim that they made their testimonies under duress as they were
forced by elements of the Philippine National Police, the National Bureau of Investigation, and the former mayor of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, Julian Resuello, to point at accused-appellants as perpetrators of the aforesaid crime. They equally claim that they did
not actually see who committed the crime and that they only testified against accused-appellants out of fear of their own lives.
ISSUE: Whether retraction of testimonies previously given in court was valid.
HELD: Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony if credible. The rule is settled
that in cases where previous testimony is retracted and a subsequent different, if not contrary, testimony is made by the same
witness, the test to decide which testimony to believe is one of comparison coupled with the application of the general rules of
evidence. A testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside and disregarded lightly, and before this can be done, both the
previous testimony and the subsequent one should be carefully compared and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was
made, carefully and keenly scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change, discriminatingly analyzed. The unreliable
character of the affidavit of recantation executed by a complaining witness is also shown by the incredulity of the fact that after going
through the burdensome process of reporting to and/or having the accused arrested by the law enforcers, executing a criminal
complaint-affidavit against the accused, attending trial and testifying against the accused, the said complaining witness would later
on declare that all the foregoing is actually a farce and the truth is now what he says it to be in his affidavit of recantation. And in
situations, like the instant case, where testimony is recanted by an affidavit subsequently executed by the recanting witness, we are
properly guided by the well-settled rules that an affidavit is hearsay unless the affiant is presented on the witness stand and that
affidavits taken ex-parte are generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open court.
9.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. EDMUNDO VITERO

G.R. NO. 175327

FACTS: An appeal from a Decision dated July 18, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00070, affirming the Decision
dated October 9, 20032 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, Ligao City, in Criminal Case Nos. 4242-47, -which found accusedappellant Edmundo Vitero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape as defined by Article 266-A, paragraph 1
(a),in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph 5(1 )5 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. In lieu of the death
penalty originally imposed by the RTC, the Court of Appeals sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court gravely erred in convicting accused-appellant of the crime charged despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible,
convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, as in this case. There is a plethora of cases which
tend to disfavor the accused in a rape case by holding that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all
that is necessary to show that rape has been committed and, where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be
convicted on the basis thereof. Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly declared that it takes a certain amount of psychological
depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put her own father to jail for the rest of his remaining life and drag the
rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame. For this reason, courts are inclined to give credit to the straightforward and
consistent testimony of a minor victim in criminal prosecutions for rape.
x x x When the issue focuses on the credibility of the witnesses or the lack of it, the assessment of the trial court is controlling
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witness and the latter's demeanor, conduct, and attitude especially during the crossexamination unless cogent reasons dictate otherwise. Moreover, it is an established rule that findings of fact of the trial court will not
be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted
which would otherwise materially affect the disposition of the case. x x x.
10.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GREGORIO MAGALLANES

G.R. NO. 114265 JULY 8, 1997

FACTS: For the death of one Tapales, the appellant and Salpucial were charged as principal and accessory, respectively, of the crime
of murder. During arraignment, the appellant expressed his willingness to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide with
the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender; Salpucial, on the other hand, pleaded no guilty to the charges
against him. Before us now is the appeal interposed by Gregorio Magallanes where he invokes the justifying circumstance of selfdefense in his favor, and contends, in the alternative, that he should be convicted of the crime of homicide only and not murder.
ISSUE: Whether Magallanes should be convicted of the crime of homicide.
HELD: Anent the claim of self-defense, we reiterate herein the time honored doctrine that although it is a cardinal principle in
criminal law that the prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused, the rule is reversed where the accused admits
committing the crime but only in defense of oneself. In the latter case, the burden is shifted to the accused who must prove clearly
and convincingly the following elements of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Of the seven (7) wounds, five (5) were located in the neck area suggesting that the appellant struck at Tapales with resolve to cause
serious if not mortal damage to Tapales' person. There certainly was no necessity to inflict such wounds upon Tapales especially in
view of the fact that the latter was not even armed. The appellant's theory of self-defense is therefore overthrown by the hard reality
that the alleged aggressor-the deceased in this case-sustained seven (7) stab wounds in the hands of the appellant while failing to
inflict upon the appellant even a minor injury as token of his alleged belligerence and aggression.

11.

AGUINALDO VS DOMAGAS
SEPTEMBER 26, 1991

FACTS: A letter-complaint charging petitioners with sedition was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Cagayan. After
investigation by the DOJ panel of prosecutors, the corresponding Information was filed in court.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecutors can file the said Information without previous authority from the Ombudsman.
HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative and reiterated its ruling regarding the shared authority of the DOJ to investigate the case.
Again, it should be noted that the complaint in that case was addressed solely to the provincial prosecutor.
12.

PEOPLE vs. ALBERTO DELIGERO

G.R. No. 189280
April 17, 2013

FACTS: Deligero y Bacasmot was charged with qualified rape in an Information dated December 16, 2002. Accused-appellant
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, trial ensued. Later on, the Court finds the accused Alberto Deligero y Bacasmot
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as defined and penalized under Article 266-A, par. 1(a) in relation to Article 266B, par. 5 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. He is sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of RECLUSION
PERPETUA instead of death by lethal injection, which penalty has been abolished.
ISSUE: Whether the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: Accused-appellants being unarmed is inconsequential considering the circumstances of the instant case. We have
previously held that "in rape committed by close kin, such as the victims father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her
mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed. Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence
and intimidation." Accused-appellant, AAAs granduncle, is certainly a person having moral influence and ascendancy over AAA. AAA
would surely observe the deference accorded by her own parents to accused-appellant, her fathers uncle. Indeed, AAA herself fondly
called accused-appellant as "Papa," showing that she more or less treated him like her own father.

Neither is it required that specific evidence be presented to prove the disparity in physical strength between AAA and accusedappellant. As argued by the prosecution, accused-appellant is a grown man who is used to hard work and manual labor as a farmer
and a chainsaw operator, while AAA is a very young girl when she was allegedly raped and when she testified. It was the trial court
which had the opportunity to observe the physical disproportion between them and considered the same in finding accused-appellant
guilty. Accordingly, it is not for this Court to reverse the findings of fact of the trial court on this matter.

13.

PEOPLE v. SOMOZA
G.R. No. 197250, July 17, 2013

FACTS: Reynaldo Andy Somoza was found guilty of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Accused-appellant however pleaded not guilty to both charges when
arraigned. Accused-appellant appealed his case to the Court of Appeals. He presented a lone assignment of error: the trial court
erred in convicting him of the crimes charged because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in convicting Somoza of the crime charged because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
HELD: The Court of Appeals held that the buy-bust was not affected by the absence of a pre-operation report. Under the obtaining
facts, no pre-operation report was prepared as the buy-bust operation was urgently conceived. Notwithstanding the swiftness of the
execution of the strategy, the law enforcers described their operation in detail during trial.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements
of both the illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, it upheld the conviction of accused-appellant for both crimes.
A successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs requires that the following elements be established:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration of the sale; and
(2) the delivery to the buyer of the thing sold and receipt by the seller of the payment therefor.
In the prosecution for the sale of dangerous drugs, the absence of marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the
prosecution, as long as the sale of dangerous drugs is adequately proved and the drug subject of the transaction is presented before
the court. The lack of pre-operation report had no effect on the legality and validity of the buy-bust operation. In the first place, a
pre-operation report is not indispensable in a buy-bust operation. In the second place, the facts of the case show that the buy-bust
operation was not part of the original plan -- to serve the search warrant on accused-appellant -- but was resorted to address the
contingencies of the circumstances. The urgency of the situation reasonably excused the preparation of a pre-operation report. More
importantly, a pre-operation report is ordinarily submitted by the local PNP or the NBI to comply with Section 86 of Republic Act No.
9165 which requires close coordination with the PDEA on all drug related matters. Here, to require a pre-operation report for
purposes of the buy-bust would constitute unnecessary bureaucratic red tape as there was already coordination by the NBI and the
PNP Dumaguete City with the PDEA in the planning of the service of the warrant and in the decision to resort to a buy-bust operation.
14.

PEOPLE vs. PEPINO-CONSULTA

G.R. No. 191071
August 28, 2013

FACTS: The RTC of the City of San Fernando, Pampanga in Criminal Case No. 14206, found accused-appellant Rogelia Jardinel PepinoConsulta guilty of the crime of illegal sale of shabu, under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. When accused-appellant was arraigned on April 25, 2005, she pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged. On the other hand, the accused denied that there was a buy-bust operation conducted against her and that she was
only framed up.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: Well-settled is the rule that, between the positive assertions of the prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of
accused, the former indisputably deserve more credence and entitled to greater evidentiary weight .
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 reads:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge
and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
On the other hand, Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, which implements
said provision, stipulates:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were

confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that
the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items.
In the present case, the above-mentioned procedures were not observed at all by the police officers. Both PO2 Dizon and PO3 Tiongco
clearly and categorically admitted during their respective cross-examinations that the five sachets of suspected shabu allegedly
obtained from the buy-bust operation were not physically inventoried nor photographed in the presence of accused-appellant or her
counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and an elective official. In fact, they stated that the buy-bust operation was
actually conducted without the presence of the said representatives.
15.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. GANI

G.R. NO. 195523, June 05, 2013

FACTS: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental find herein appellant Ernesto Gani y Tupas guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death. On August 25, 1998,
appellant, duly assisted by his counsel, entered a plea of "not guilty" to the offense charged. In his appellants brief his defense was
that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused- appellant of the crimes charged despite the fact that his guilt was
not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: At any rate, settled is the rule that alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and
identification of an accused by the complainant. Positive identification where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill
motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over a denial which, if not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. They cannot be given greater evidentiary
value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
In the case under consideration, appellant failed to present any clear and convincing proof that AAA was moved by hatred or revenge,
or that she was influenced by her aunt to implicate appellant. Thus, appellant's bare allegation of frame-up must fail.
16.

Lacson v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999

FACTS: Petitioner Lacson was involved in a criminal case that started when eleven persons, believed to be members of the Kuratong
Baleleng Gang (KBG) were killed by the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG)where the petitioner was one of the
heads. Then, in a media expose, it was said that what happened was a rub-out and not a shoot-out. Among other issues, petitioner
argues that Republic Act (R.A.) 8249, that was enacted during his case was pending,has a retroactive effect and is plan from the facts
and was made to suit the petitioners case, thus, making it an ex-post facto law that would affect the right of the accused to
procedural due process. Hence, the issue.
ISSUE: Whether the statute R.A. 8249 may be considered as an ex post facto law that may affect the petitioners right to due
process.
HELD: No. There is nothing ex-post facto in R.A. 8249 an ex post facto law generally provides for a retroactive effect on penal
laws. However, the Court explains, R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. As the Court defines, Penal laws are those acts of the legislature
which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties thereof; or those that defines crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their
punishment. Republic Act 8249 is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character, thus, may not be considered an ex
post facto law. Therefore, the argument of the petitioner that the law in question has retroactive effect and may affect his right to due
process is wrong.
17.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICARDO PIOSANG

FACTS: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City finds accused-appellant Ricardo Piosang, alias Ricric, guilty of raping AAA, 3 a
minor. Then Accused-appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals. However the appealed judgment was only affirmed with
modifications.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged despite the prosecutions
failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says
that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended
party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her
relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA could not have invented a horrible story.
Positive identification where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying
on the matter prevails over a denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence is negative and self-serving
evidence undeserving of weight in law. They cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters.
18.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANCISCO DIAZ and GERARDO DIAZ

G.R. No. L-24002

FACTS: This is an appeal of defendants Francisco Diaz and Gerardo Diaz from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Samar
convicting them of murder. Gerardo was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, while Francisco was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal. Both appellants were ordered to pay
solidarily to the heirs of Quintin Tadia an indemnity in the sum of six thousand pesos (P6,000) and to pay the costs proportionately.
In this case, Appellant Francisco Diaz admits that he killed Tadia. He justifies the killing on the ground of self-defense. His younger
brother Gerardo denies any participation in the killing. He has set up the easily contrivable defense of alibi.
ISSUE: Whether credence can be accorded to Francisco Diaz's plea of self-defense and Gerardo's alibi.
HELD: The prosecution eyewitnesses, Remegia Carasos and Anita Pacaira, positively identified Gerardo Diaz as the gun wielder who
with his brother, Francisco, ambushed Tadia on the cliff. Such an unmistakable identification can be negated by the alibi interposed by
Gerardo Diaz. He claimed that on September 5, 1963 he was in his house "having a headache and his bones were aching. The
attack was also attended with abuse of superiority. Two armed young men unexpectedly assaulted an unarmed sexagenarian.
However, abuse of superior strength is merged with treachery.

19.

LUCILLE DOMINGO vs. MERLINDA COLINA

G.R. No. 173330
June 17, 2013

FACTS: In an Information dated March 8, 1999, herein petitioner was charged before the MTC in Davao City, with violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22. That on or about February 28, 1998 in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, knowing fully well that he/she have (sic) no funds and/or credit with the drawee
bank, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously issued UCPB Check No. 0014924 dated February 28, 1998 in the amount of P175,000.00 in
payment of an obligation in favor of Merlinda Dy Colina; but when the said check was presented to the drawee bank for encashment,
the same was dishonored for the reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED" and despite notice of dishonor and repeated demands upon him/her to
make good the check, he/she failed and refused to make payment or to deposit the face amount of the check, to the damage and
prejudice of herein complainant in the aforesaid amount.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred and gravely abused its discretion in upholding that the RTC-branch 16 of davao city has jurisdiction to
entertain an appeal interposed which was violative of section 2, rule 111 of the rules on criminal procedure when the trial court had
already ruled that the act from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
HELD: The last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: The extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist. Moreover, the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 120 of the same Rules states that: In case the judgment is of acquittal, it
shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist.
In the instant case, the Orders of the MTCC, dated October 25, 2001 and November 23, 2001, did not contain any such finding or
determination. The Court agrees with the CA that in acquitting petitioner in its Order dated October 25, 2001, the MTCC did not rule
on the civil aspect of the case. While it subsequently held in its November 23, 2001 Order that "the act from which the civil liability of
the accused in favor of the private complainant may arise does not exist in this case," the MTCC, nonetheless, failed to cite evidence,
factual circumstances or any discussion in its October 25, 2001 Decision which would warrant such ruling. Instead, it simply
concluded that since the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the offense charged, then the act from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist. The MTCC held that its observations and ratiocinations in its October 25, 2001 Order justified its conclusion.
However, after a careful review of the above-mentioned Orders, the Court finds nothing therein which the MTCC could have used as a
reasonable ground to arrive at its conclusion that the act or omission from which petitioner's civil liability might arise did not exist.
20.

JANDUSAY V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 185129 JUNE 17, 2013

FACTS: The petitioner was formally charged with estafa or violation of paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
before the RTC. During trial, the prosecution presented a copy of the minutes of the April 3, 2001 meeting which contained an
undertaking signed by the petitioner that he will return the P661,015.00 by the end of September 2001. The RTC accorded merit to
the minutes presented by the prosecution, and together with the other evidence proffered, found the petitioner guilty of
misappropriating the associations funds. The CA affirmed the petitioners conviction. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the judgment of the RTC finding him guilty of estafa beyond
reasonable doubt.
HELD: No. The courts a quo were correct in convicting the petitioner of estafa. Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, the
elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (1) that the money, goods or other personal property is received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return, the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of
such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is demand by the
offended party to the offender. As correctly found by the CA:
In the case at bar, the aforementioned elements have been sufficiently established by the prosecution. It cannot be denied that
accused-appellant, as Treasurer of CALAPUPATODA, received and held money for administration and in trust for the association. He
was thus under an obligation to turnover the same upon conclusion of his term as Treasurer. Instead, however, he misappropriated

the same to the prejudice of the association and, despite demand, failed to account for or return them. Such failure to account, upon
demand, of funds or property held in trust is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.
In addition, misappropriation or conversion may be proved by the prosecution by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. The
"failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation." 13 As mentioned,
the petitioner failed to account for, upon demand, the funds of the association of the year 2000 which were received by him in trust.
This already constitutes circumstantial evidence of misappropriation or conversion of said properties to petitioners own personal use.
21.

LEGADOS V. DE GUZMAN
(1989)

FACTS: Long before the passage of B.P. Big. 129, 5 a complaint for simple seduction 6 was filed with the then City Court of Dipolog
(Branch 11) against Vilmor Icao. The complaint was presented by the offended girl, Cora Legados, represented by her mother, Rosa,
and was subsequently made the basis of an information filed by the First Assistant City Fiscal. 8 After entering a plea of not guilty on
arraignment, Icao moved to quash the information on the ground that the City Court had no jurisdiction to try the offense, and the
fiscal who filed the information bad no authority to do so.
The Court denied the motion and scheduled the case for trial on the merits. Icao thereupon instituted an action of prohibition 9 with
the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City which, in due course, granted the petition and permanently enjoined the
proceedings in the City Court. It is this Order which is now assailed in this Court as having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether the court had jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: No. The writ of prohibition was, of course, correctly issued by the respondent Judge, being consistent with the doctrine
obtaining at the time, i.e., that an inferior court had no jurisdiction over the crime of simple seduction. But, as already pointed out,
the doctrine has since been changed. Now, the offense is explicitly declared by law to be within the exclusive original jurisdiction, no
longer of Courts of First Instance (since abolished and replaced by Regional Trial Courts), but of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
22.

PEOPLE V. ABDUL
G.R. NO. 186137, JUNE 26, 2013

FACTS: The abovenamed accused, did sell, and /or distribute to PO1 Daniel E. Akia, Jr., a member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency, based at Melvin Jones, Harrison Road, Baguio City, who passed as buyer, one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu," a dangerous drug, weighing 1.85 grams for an agreed
amount of P6,500.00, without any lawful authority in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Appellant entered a
plea of "not guilty" during his arraignment, after which trial on the merits ensued.During the pretrial conference, both parties
admitted that a forensic chemist had examined the substance allegedly confiscated from respondent, that it was found positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, and that the forensic chemist prepared a report thereon. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 61 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 24621-R finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution sufficiently established compliance with the chain-of-custody rule.
HELD: Yes. The chain-of-custody rule is a method of authenticating evidence, by which the corpus delicti presented in court is
shown to be one and the same as that which was retrieved from the accused or from the crime scene. 39 This rule, when applied to
drug cases, requires a more stringent application, because the corpus delicti the narcotic substance is not readily identifiable and
must be subjected to scientific analysis to determine its composition and nature.
The records are replete with instances of noncompliance with the foregoing. The time and place of the marking was never
established. All the foregoing facts show that there were substantial evidentiary gaps in the chain of custody of the plastic sachet.
Hence, these facts put into question the reliability and evidentiary value of the contents of the alleged confiscated plastic sachet from
appellant if indeed it was the same as the one brought to the laboratory for examination, found positive for shabu, and then
presented before the RTC.
23.
PEOPLE V. CREDO
G.R. NO. 197360, JULY 3, 2013
FACTS: On June 22, 2005 at around 10:30 in the evening at Zone 4 Barangay San JOSE, Municipality of Pili, Province of Camarines
Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, Credo, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there, with intent to take the life of JOSEPH NICOLAS Y Arroyo, attack and hack the latter with a bolo, wounding
him in the different parts of the body, thereby causing the direct and immediate death of said JOSEPH NICOLAS y ARROYO.
Abuse of superior strength being attendant in the commission of the crime, the same will qualify the offense committed to murder.
The Regional Trial Court, found the accused-appellants Ronald Credo a.k.a. "Ontog," Randy Credo and Rolando Credo y San
Buenaventura guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder for the death of Joseph Nicolas. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court gravely erred in finding that the accused are guilty of the crime charge.
HELD: No. It bears repeating that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally binding
and conclusive upon the Supreme Court. Except for compelling or exceptional reasons, such as when they were sufficiently shown to
be contrary to the evidence on record, the findings of fact of the Regional Trial Court will not be disturbed by this Court. Thus, once a
guilty verdict has been rendered, the appellant has the burden of clearly proving on appeal that the lower court committed errors in

the appreciation of the evidence presented. Here, there is no showing that the trial court or the Court of Appeals overlooked some
material facts or committed any reversible error in their factual findings.
Conspiracy is said to exist where two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy for it may be deduced from the acts of the accused before, during and
after the commission of the crime charged, from which it may be indicated that there is a common purpose to commit the crime.
In the present case, the prosecution witnesses were one in saying that prior to the hacking incident, they saw all three appellants
walking together towards the direction of the "bingohan" and that all three were each carrying a bolo. Appellants, therefore,
deliberately sought Joseph out to confront him about the altercation incident between him and Randy. Likewise, the two eyewitnesses
confirm each others respective statements that all three appellants were armed with a bolo with which they repeatedly hacked the
victim, who fell to the ground; after which, appellants left the scene of the crime.
24.

PEOPLE V. REYES
G.R. NO. 173307, JULY 17, 2013

FACTS: Victorino Reyes was charged of rape for raping his 13-year-old neighbor AAA. Upon his arraignment on February 23, 1998,
Reyes pleaded not guilty to the information. Although admitting that AAA and BBB had watched television in his house at the time of
the rape, Reyes insisted that he had been sleeping on the sofa in front of the television set in the sala of his house from 7:30 p.m. of
December 26, 1996 until 2:30 a.m. of the next day. He denied the accusation, and called attention to the medical findings showing
that AAAs hymen was intact; hence, she was still a virgin.
The Court finds the accused Victorino Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the court erred in its decision.
HELD: No. As the text of the law itself shows, the breaking of the hymen of the victim is not among the means of consummating
rape. All that the law required is that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman under the circumstances described in the law. By
definition, carnal knowledge was "the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman." This understanding of rape
explains why the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates the crime.
In objective terms, carnal knowledge, the other essential element in consummated statutory rape, does not require full penile
penetration of the female. The Court has clarified in People v. Campuhan that the mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis
capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. All that is necessary to reach the consummated
stage of rape is for the penis of the accused capable of consummating the sexual act to come into contact with the lips of the
pudendum of the victim. This means that the rape is consummated once the penis of the accused capable of consummating the
sexual act touches either labia of the pudendum.
25.

PEOPLE V. RAMOS
702 SCRA 204, G.R. NO. 190340

FACTS: Appellants Rogelio and Marissa Ramos were charged with the crime of murder. Upon arraignment, both appellants pleaded
not guilty. On trial, Rogelio admitted to killing the victim but only due to self-defense. Marissa corroborated his story of defense.
However, the RTC rejected the appellants claim of self-defense as the elements of self-defense, specifically unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim and reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression, were not established. The penalty of
reclusion perpetua was imposed upon them and payment of damages.
ISSUE: Whether the conviction was proper.
HELD: Yes. The rule consistently adhered to in this jurisdiction is that when the accused admits that he is the author of the death of
the victim and his defense is anchored on self defense, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove the justifying circumstance to the
satisfaction of the court. With this admission, the burden of evidence is shifted to the appellant to prove that all the essential
elements of self-defense are present. He must show and prove by clear and convincing evidence that his act was justified. Otherwise
his conviction must be upheld and he cannot be exonerated from criminal liability. On this score, the accused must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecutions evidence.
The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the RTC, as affirmed
by the CA, properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 235 of the RPC. Anent the award of
damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim;

actual or compensatory damages;
moral damages;
exemplary damages;
attorneys fees and expenses for litigation; and,
interest, in proper cases.

26.

CRESPO V. MOGUL
151 SCRA 462 (1987)

FACTS: An information for Estafa was filed by the Fiscal against Crespo in the Criminal Circuit Court of Lucena. When the case was
set for arraignment, Crespo filed a Motion To Defer Arraignment on the ground that there was a pending Petition for Review with the
Department of Justice. Said Motion was denied by Judge Mogul. Crespos Motion For Reconsideration also having been denied, he filed
a TRO with the CA, which granted the same. Thereafter, the CA granted Crespos Writ of Injunction and perpetually restrained Judge
Mogul from having Crespo arraigned until the Sec. of Justice finally made his decision and ordered the Fiscal to move for dismissal of

the case. The Fiscal then filed a Motion attaching the Secretarys Resolution calling for the dismissal of the case. Judge Mogul denied
the Motion and set Crespos arraignment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court may refuse to grant a Motion to Dismiss filed by the Fiscal under orders from the Secretary of
Justice and instead insist on arraignment
HELD: Yes. It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the fiscal. However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control.
The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe
elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal.
Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information
be filed in Court. The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction
over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the
trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion
was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
27.

ROBERTS V. CA
254 SCRA 307 (1996)

FACTS: Petitioners were prosecuted in connection with the Pepsi Number Fever. Of the four cases filed against the petitioners,
probable cause was found by the investigating prosecutor only for the crime of estafa. Thereafter, an information was filed with the
trial court.
Petitioners filed a petition for review to the Department of Justice seeking the reversal of the finding of probable cause by the
investigating prosecutor. They also moved for the suspension of the proceedings and the holding in abeyance of the issuance of
warrants of arrest against them. Meanwhile, the public prosecutor also moved to defer the arraignment of the accused-appellants
pending the final disposition of the appeal to the DOJ. Respondent Judge Asuncion denied the said motions based on the case of
Crespo, which provides that:
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may
be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review
or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left
entirely for the determination of the Court.
ISSUE: Whether the denial of the motions was proper
HELD: No. There is nothing in Crespo v. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an appeal, by way of a petition for
review, by an accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, as
far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in Court. Whether the DOJ would affirm or reverse the challenged Joint Resolution is still a matter
of guesswork. Accordingly, it was premature for respondent Judge Asuncion to deny the motions to suspend proceedings and to defer
arraignment on the following grounds:
This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow whatever opinion the Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would
undermine the independence and integrity of this Court. This Court is still capable of administering justice.
The real and ultimate test of the independence and integrity of this court is not the filing of the aforementioned motions to suspend
proceedings and issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment at that stage but the filing of a motion to dismiss or to
withdraw the information on the basis of a resolution of the petition for review reversing the Joint Resolution of the investigating
prosecutor. However, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the information is filed the trial judge may grant or deny it, not out of
subservience to the Secretary of Justice, but in faithful exercise of judicial prerogative.
28.

PEOPLE V. MABUYO
G.R. NO. L-29129, MAY 8, 1975

FACTS: Appellant Mabuyo was convicted by CFI of Batangas of the crime of murder. In his appeal, the appellant alleges that the trial
court erred in convicting him of a crime not properly charged in the information since he was charged with murder allegedly
committed in Bo. Bagumbayan, Tanauan, Batangas, but was found guilty of said crime committed in Bo. Ambulong, some 12
kilometers away in the same municipality and province.
ISSUE: Whether the conviction was proper
HELD: Yes. The alleged irregularity does not constitute a reversible error. It is a settled rule that unless the particular place of
commission is an essential element of the offense charged, conviction may be had even if it appears that the crime was committed
not at the place alleged in the information, provided the place of actual commission was within the jurisdiction of the court. In the
instant case the place of commission does not constitute an essential element of the offense charged and the evidence discloses that
said offense was in fact committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the
appellant was misled or surprised by the variance between the proof and the allegation in the information as to the place where the
offense was committed.

29.

PEOPLE V. POSING
G.R. NO. 196973, JULY 31, 2013

FACTS: SPO1 Angeles who testified that while on duty on 13 August 2003, at the Station Anti Illegal Drugs (SAID), an asset based at
Makabayan St., Brgy. Obrero informed the duty officer about the illegal activities of certain Ruper Posing (Posing), a known drug
pusher in their barangay. As a result a team was formed to conduct a buy bust operation. The buy-bust operation was rendered
successfully. The team arrested Posing and recovered from him two plastic sachet of shabu. Prior to the turnover of the evidence to
the desk officer, SPO1 Angeles placed his marking on the two (2) small heat sealed transparent plastic sachets. The same were then
turned over to PO2 Sales, who prepared a request for laboratory examination. On the same day, the specimens were delivered by
PO1 Nicart to the PNP Crime Laboratory for quantitative and qualitative examination, wherein each sachet was found to contain 0.03
gram and tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. An information was thereafter filed for
violation of RA 9165. On arraignment, Posing pleaded not guilty. Trial court found him guilty. On appeal, CA affirmed the ruling of the
Trial Court. Hence, this appeal. Posing argued that the chain of custody was not followed.
ISSUE: Whether the conviction was proper
HELD: Yes. In this case, the prosecution was able to prove, through the testimonies of its witnesses that the integrity of the seized
item was preserved every step of the process. After the sale of shabu and another sachet was discovered in the person of accusedappellant, SPO1 Angeles, who was the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation, marked the drug specimens, and then turned over the
same to the desk officer, who in turn handed it to PO1 Sales. The latter then prepared a Request for Laboratory Examination, and on
the same day, the specimens were delivered by PO1 Nicart to the PNP Crime Laboratory for quantitative and qualitative examination,
conducted by Engr. Jabonillo.
The same was corroborated by PO1 Sales and Engr. Jabonillo, whose testimonies were dispensed with, and formed part of the
stipulations of facts agreed upon by both the prosecution and defense. Therefore, the conviction was proper.
30.

PEOPLE V. ZULIETA
G.R. NO. 192183, NOVEMBER 11, 2013

FACTS: On July 21, 2006, an Information was filed charging appellant with the crime of Murder. The accused, with treachery and with
intent to kill, stab one Armand Labando, with the use of a Batangas knife, hitting on the chest. The latter thereby inflicting mortal
wounds which caused his immediate death.
When arraigned on November 3, 2006, appellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial, no stipulation of facts was made hence trial
on the merits ensued. The RTC rendered its Judgment finding appellant guilty of killing the victim Armand Labando, Jr. (Labando) with
the attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Aggrieved, appellant filed his Notice of Appeal which was approved by the RTC. The CA affirmed RTCs decison. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the court gravely erred in convicting the accused despite the failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: No. The SC found both the RTC and the CA that treachery attended the killing. "There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." "The essence
of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless,
unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape." Otherwise stated, an unexpected and sudden attack which renders
the victim unable and unprepared to put up a defense is the essence of treachery. In this case, the victim Labando was totally
unaware of the threat. He was merely sitting on the bench in front of a sari-sari store eating bananas when appellant, without any
provocation or prior argument, suddenly stabbed him on his chest, piercing the right ventricle of his heart thus causing his
instantaneous death. The stabbing was deliberate, unexpected, swift and sudden which foreclosed any escape, resistance or defense
coming from the victim. This is a classic example of treachery.
Settled is the rule that factual findings of the trial court and its assessment on the credibility of witnesses deserve utmost respect by
this Court. In this case, we find no reason to deviate from the findings or assessment of the trial court there being no showing that it
has overlooked or mis-appreciated some facts which if considered would materially impact on or change the outcome of the case. On
the contrary, we find that the trial court meticulously studied the case and properly weighed the evidence presented by the parties.
31.

SANCHEZ V. DEMETRIOU
227 SCRA 627

FACTS: Mayor Antonio Sanchez was charged before the RTC of Calamba, Laguna of seven informations of homicide, in connection
with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez.
The petitioner argues that the seven informations filed against him should be quashed because, among others:
1. He is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons; and
2. As a public officer, he can be tried for the offense only by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether the information should be quashed
HELD: NO. 1. The court ruled that where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the homicide committed on the
occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a constituent of the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Therefore,
there will be as many crimes of rape with homicide as there are rapes committed. In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the
crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty to the highest degree. Thus, homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of rape, loses

its character as an independent offense, but assumes a new character, and functions like a qualifying circumstance. However, by
fiction of law, it merged with rape to constitute an constituent element of a special complex crime of rape with homicide with a
specific penalty which is in the highest degree. The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape committed
by him in conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of
simply helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. In other words, the allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was raped seven
times, with each of the seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the assistance of the other six.
Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus silence Sarmenta. Every one of the seven accused is being
charged separately for actually raping Sarmenta and later killing her instead of merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then
slaying her. The separate informations filed against each of them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is complexed by the
subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were
committed in succession by the seven accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.
2. Section 4,paragraph (a) of P.D. No, 1606, as amended by P.D. No.1861, provides: The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code
2. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law
is higher than prisioncorreccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00xxx
The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner stands charged obviously does not fall under paragraph (1), which deals
with graft and corruption cases. Neither is it covered by paragraph (2) because it is not an offense committed in relation to the office
of the petitioner. There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the petitioner's office as
municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element of the crime charged. The offense can stand independently of the
office. Moreover, it is not even alleged in the information that the commission of the crime charged was intimately connected with the
performance of the petitioner's official functions
32.

PUNZALAN V. PLATA
704 SCRA 426

FACTS: At the height of intoxication, a group led by Punzalan feuded with the Platas. In the end, Punzalan filed multiple charges
against Plata and his friends; while Plata countered with even more charges against Punzalan and his cohorts. The City Prosecutor
dismissed the charges against Punzalan for lack of sufficient bases. The dismissal reached the DOJ, which promptly ordered the filing
of charges against Punzalan. Upon review, however, the DOJ changed its mind and ordered the dropping of charges. The Platas
moved to reconsider, but they were denied. They went to the CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Secretary.
The CA ruled in their favor, and ordered the DOJ to reinstate the filing of charges. Hence, this appeal.
In essence, the petitioners argue that the determination of the existence of probable cause is lodged with the prosecutor, who
assumes full discretion and control over the complaint. They insist that the DOJ committed no grave abuse of discretion when it
issued Resolutions ordering the withdrawal of the informations. In the absence of grave abuse of discretion, they contend that the
courts should not interfere with the discretion of the prosecutor.
ISSUE: Whether the information should be withdrawn
HELD: Yes, the DOJ should withdraw the informations. The well-established rule is that the conduct of preliminary investigation for
the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. The prosecution of
crimes lies with the executive department of the government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that the laws of the
land are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute the laws is the right to prosecute their violators.
Succinctly, the public prosecutor is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom
he believes to have committed the crime and should be held for trial. In the present case, there was no clear evidence of grave abuse
of discretion committed by the DOJ.
33.

ABELA V. GOLEZ
131 SCRA 12 (1984)

FACTS: Private respondent Almalbis filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Roxas City a complaint for estafa against Anisco. After
conducting a preliminary investigation, herein petitioner Abela dismissed the complaint "for lack of merit." Thereafter, private
respondent Almalbis commenced the action for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Roxas City against Abela.
ISSUE: Whether the public prosecutor can be compelled by action for mandamus
HELD: No. The public prosecutor is entitled to use his judgment and discretion in the appreciation of evidence presented to him
and, in the exercise thereof, he may not be controlled by mandamus. Whether an information should be filed in court is a matter
address to the sound discretion of the fiscal according to whether the evidence is in his opinion sufficient to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Otherwise stated, the fiscal can not be compelled to act in a distinct manner whether to
prosecute or not to prosecute and, instead, is allowed to stand on his opinion and conviction, "reserving only to the Secretary, in any
appropriate case when the latter believes public interest impels that a different course of action should be taken, to temporarily
relieve the fiscal of the duty to act by designating somebody else to take his place solely and only for the purpose of such particular
case.
34.

BROCKA V. ENRILE

192 SCRA 183 (1990)

FACTS: Petitioners were charged with 3 counts of Illegal Assembly before RTC. All the petitioners were released on bail P3,000
each except for LinoBrocka, Ben Cervantes, Cosme Garcia and RodolfoSantos (Brocka, et al.), who were charged as leaders of the
offense of Illegal Assembly for whom no bail was recommended. Due to this, an urgent petition for bail was filed before the RTC. On
Feb. 7 or 9, RTC QC Judge Defensor-Santiago ordered Brocka, et als provisional release and recommended bail at P6,0000 each.
Brocka, et al filed respective bail bonds but despite service of release order, Brocka et al remained in detention. The respondentspolice officers invoked Preventive Detention Action (PDA) allegedly issued against Brocka, et al on Jan. 28, 1985.
On Feb 11, 1985, Brocka, et al was charged with Inciting to Sedition in 3 criminal cases; hasty and spurious filing of this second
offense.
Brocka, et al. contend that respondents' manifest bad faith and/or harassment are sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal
prosecution, aside from the fact that the second offense of inciting to sedition is illegal, since it is premised on one and the same act
of attending and participating in the ACTO jeepney strike. They maintain that while there may be a complex crime from a single act
(Art. 48, RTC), the law does not allow the splitting of a single act into two offenses and filing two informations therefor, further, that
they will be placed in double jeopardy.
The primary issue here is the legality of enjoining the criminal prosecution of a case, since the two other issues raised by Brocka, et
al. are matters of defense against the sedition charge.
ISSUE: Whether the criminal case prosecution may be enjoined
HELD: Yes. The general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final. There
are however exceptions, among which are:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of;
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice;
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.
In the petition, Brocka, et al. have cited the circumstances to show that the criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution,
having been undertaken by state officials in bad faith. Respondents, on the other hand, had invoked a PDA in refusing Brocka, et al.'s
release from detention. This PDA was, however, issued on January 28, 1985, but was invoked only on February 9, 1985 (upon receipt
of the trial court's order of release). Under the guidelines issued, PDAs shall be invoked within 24 hours (in Metro Manila) or 48 hours
(outside Metro Manila). Noteworthy also is Brocka, et al.'s claim that, despite subpoenas for its production, the prosecution merely
presented a purported xerox copy of the invoked PDA. The hasty filing of the second offense, premised on a spurious and
inoperational PDA, certainly betrays respondent's bad faith and malicious intent to pursue criminal charges against Brocka, et al.
35.

PEOPLE V. FRIAS
G.R. NO. 203068, SEPTEMBER 18, 2013

FACTS: The accused-appellant was charged in an Information for the crime of rape before the RTC allegedly committed, by means of
force and intimidation, have carnal knowledge upon the person of [AAA] , by poking a fan knife at her, ordering her to undress and
inserting his penis into her vagina, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged. During the pre-trial conference, the parties
stipulated on the following: first , the identity of AAA; and second ,that the accused-appellant is the one charged in the Information
cited above. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. The RTC rendered a Decision finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. Unperturbed, the accused-appellant appealed the RTCs Decision dated September 30, 2008 to
the CA.
The CA rendered the herein assailed decision which affirmed the RTCs Decision. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs Decision dated September 30, 2008 which found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape.
HELD: No. The crime of rape is defined under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, which states that: Art. 266-A. Rape: When
and How Committed. Rape is committed:
1
By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a
Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b
When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c
By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d
When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.
2
By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault
by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice
of another person.

It is well-settled that, in a criminal case, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal,
especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence on record. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when
the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters, that this Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the court
below.
36.

RINGOR V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 198904, DECEMBER 11, 2013

FACTS: The petitioner was charged in an Information for estafa under paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the RPC, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 2278K before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur. Upon arraignment, the petitioner entered a plea of not
guilty to the offense charged. The pretrial conference was deemed terminated.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. The RTC rendered a Decision finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of estafa under paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the RPC. On appeal, the CA rendered the Decision dated August 12, 2011, which
affirmed with modification the RTC Decision.
The petitioner sought a reconsideration of the CA Decision but it was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in convicting the petitioner for the felony of qualified theft under Article 310 in relation to Article 308
of the RPC.
HELD: No. The Court yields to the factual findings of the RTC which were affirmed by the CA, there being no compelling reason to
disregard the same. In a criminal case, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal,
especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence on record. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when
the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters, that this Court will recalibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the court
below.
37.

RAMIREZ V. PEOPLE
706 SCRA 667

FACTS: On January 5, 2009, the RTC convicted the petitioner and one Josephine Barangan (Barangan) of the crime of Estafa. After
several re-settings, the judgment was finally promulgated on March 25, 2009 and warrants of arrests were accordingly issued. Three
(3) months after, the petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Lift Warrant of Arrest and to Reinstate Bail Bond, which was denied
by the RTC . Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the motion to admit notice of appeal and to post bond with the CA, asking for the reversal
of the RTC Order. She subsequently filed her notice of appeal on November 17, 2010. The CA denied it. The CA ruled that the
petitioner failed to file the notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period prescribed by the Rules, reckoned from the date of
notice of the RTCs judgment of conviction, as she filed her notice of appeal with the CA only on November 17, 2010.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in denying the motion
HELD: Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the period when an appeal from a judgment or
final order in a criminal case should be taken:
Sec. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from
notice of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial
or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motions has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which
time the balance of the period begins to run.
In this case, the judgment convicting the petitioner of the crime of Estafa was promulgated on March 25, 2009. Instead of filing a
notice of appeal within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of judgment, the petitioner filed with the RTC a motion to lift
warrant of arrest and to reinstate bail bond three (3) months later. It was only in November 2010 or more than a year later since the
RTC denied her motion that the petitioner filed with the CA her motion to admit notice of appeal. At that point, her judgment of
conviction has already attained finality and cannot be modified or set aside anymore in accordance with Section 7, Rule 120 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus, the CA did not commit any reversible error in denying the petitioners motion inasmuch as
by the time the petitioner filed the same, the appellate court was already bereft of any jurisdiction to entertain the motion. The Court
has already stressed that the right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege,
and may be exercised only in accordance with the law. The pdhsarty who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the
requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.
38.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO BERIALES

G.R. No. L-39962 March 3, 1977

FACTS: In this case, which involved a prosecution in the Court of First Instance, the Court ruled, inter alia, that the fiscal's duty to
direct and control the prosecution of criminal cases requires that he must be present during the proceedings; and that evidence
presented by the private prosecutor at a hearing, at which neither the fiscal nor his assistant or duly authorized special counsel was
officially present, cannot be considered as evidence for the People of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether said ruling can be applied to MTCs.
HELD: NO. This pronouncement, as can be clearly deduced therefrom, applies to the trial and prosecution of criminal cases before
the Courts of First Instance, Criminal Circuit Courts, and City Courts (which are provided by law with their own City Fiscals) only, and
not to the municipal courts.

The procedure in the trial of criminal cases before the municipal courts and City Courts which do not have their own City Fiscals has
not in any way been altered or modified by the pronouncement in this case. Under Sec. 2, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court,
and in the light of the ruling in the cases of P.P.I. vs. Alvarez and P.P.I. vs. Perez, et al., police, constabulary, and other peace or law
enforcement officers and private prosecutors may prosecute criminal cases in the said courts, but this authority ceases upon actual
intervention of the provincial or City Fiscal or their assistants, or upon the elevation of the case to the Court of First Instance.
39.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN FIRST DIVISION & THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 188165
December 11, 2013

FACTS: The Court resolves the petitions for certiorari the State instituted to assail and nullify, in G.R. No. 188165, the
Sandiganbayans dismissal of Criminal Case SB-08-CRM-0265 entitled People of the Philippines v. Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario S.
Perez, Ernest Escaler, and Ramon A. Arceo, for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended; and, in G.R. No.
189063, the Sandiganbayans dismissal of SB-08-CRM- 0266 entitled People of the Philippine v. Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario
S.Perez, Ernest Escaler, and Ramon A. Arceo, for robbery under Article 293, in relation to Article 294, of the Revised Penal Code. The
relevant case for this topic is G.R. No. 189063. Where upon Sandiganbayans finding that theOffice of the Ombudsman had incurred
inordinate delay in resolving the complaint Cong. Jimenez had brought against the respondents, it dismissed Criminal Case No. SB-08CRM-0266 (involves robbery)mainly to uphold their constitutional right to the speedy disposition of their case. The State contended
that the delay in the resolution of the case against the respondents was neither inordinate nor solely attributable to the Office of the
Ombudsman. Citing Mendoza-Ong v.Sandiganbayan, wherein the Court held that the speedy disposition of cases was also consistent
with reasonable delays, the State supported its contention by listing the various incidents that had caused the delay inthe
investigation, and then laying part of the blame on the respondents themselves.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed the case due to the violation of the
respondents constitutional right to speedy disposition of their cases.
HELD: NO.Sandiganbayan was right in dismissing the case upon finding that there had been aninordinate delay in the resolution
against respondents of the charge in Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266.The right to the speedy disposition of cases is enshrined in
Article III of the Constitution. It is notlimited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including
civiland administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.The fact-finding investigation and
preliminary investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman lastednearly five years and five months. The Office of the Ombudsman had
taken an unusually long periodof time just to investigate the criminal complaint and to determine whether to criminally charge
therespondents in the Sandiganbayan. Such long delay was inordinate and oppressive, and constitutedunder the peculiar
circumstances of the case an outright violation of the respondents right under theConstitution to the speedy disposition of their
cases.The guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution would bedefeatedis the States argument
thatthe fact-finding investigation should not be considered a part ofthe preliminary investigation (because the former was only
preparatory in relation to the latter; andthat the period spent in the former should not be factored in the computation of the period
devotedto the preliminary investigation) is accepted.It is incumbent for the State to prove that the delay was reasonable, or that the
delay was notattributable to it. In both regards, the State failed. There was really no sufficient justificationtendered by the State for
the long delay of more than five years in bringing the charges against therespondents before the proper court.
40.

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER vs. BR. 48, RTC MANILA

G.R. No. 81385 February 21, 1989

FACTS: Philippine Journalists Inc (PJI) executed a mortgage in favor of Development Bank of Philippines(DBP) for certain financing
accommodations.PJI assigned 67% of stocks to DBP. DBP appointed certain PJI stockholders as proxies.PJI failed to comply with its
obligation to DBP leading to the cancellation of appointment of petitioners and designated Olaguer, Velez, and De Leon
(Petitioners).Olaguer also asked some of respondent to assign shares not only to the three proxies by DBPbut also to two others to be
chosen by him so they can sit in the PJI board of directors.Though Olaguer was voted chairman of the board and CEO of PJI, he failed
to comply with hiscommitment which gave respondents to cancel the assignment. He also did some illegal actswhich gave rise to
several complaints in court against herein Petitioners.Before the cases were resolved, then president Cory Aquino terminated his
appointment asmember of the board of directors of DBP.Despite the termination, Olaguer still continued with the performance of his
functions.There was an agreement entered into by DBP and herein respondents calling for a specialstockholders meeting to elect a
new board of directors.Olaguer contends that the agreement cannot be implemented because Olaguer claims that hehas just been
designated the fiscal and team leader of the PCGG assigned to PJI and that all hisactions are sanctioned and reported to PCGG, and
that it is PCGG which exercises the votingrights of all PJI common stocks sequestered since 1986. .Olaguer then filed a motion to
dismiss the cases against him on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the persons of herein petitioners. The motion to
dismiss was denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: No. The trial court has no jurisdiction over the case. It is the Sandiganbayan who has jurisdictionover PCGG cases. There is
no dispute that PJI is now under sequestration by the PCGG and that civil case no. 0035was filed in Sandiganbayan wherein the PJI is
listed as among the corporations involved in theunexplained wealth case against Marcos. Records also show that Olaguer was acting
inbehalf of the PCGG. The Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases regarding the unexplained wealth of
Marcos. The decision of theSandiganbayan is subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court.In the exercise of its
functions, the PCGG is a co-equal body with the RTC and co-equal bodieshave no power to control the other.