G.R. No.

L-33281

March 31, 1930

CHIN AH FOO (alias CHAN FOO WOO) and YEE SHEE (alias YEE SUI YENG), widow of Chin
Ah Kim,petitioners,
vs.
PEDRO CONCEPCION, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and LEE VOO, respondents.
Harvey and O'Brien for petitioners.
Lazaro Pormarejo for respondent Lee Voo.
J. A. Wolfson for respondent judge.
MALCOLM, J.:
The question for decision in this certiorari proceeding concerns the power of a Judge of First
Instance, who has in effect acquitted a man charged with murder on the plea of insanity, and who
has ordered the confinement of the insane person in an asylum, subsequently to permit the insane
person to leave the asylum without the acquiescence of the Director of Health. Otherwise stated, the
factor determinative of the question has to do with the effect, if any, of section 1048 of the
Administrative Code on article 8 of the Penal Code.
On November 15, 1927, one Chan Sam (alias Chin Ah Woo), was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Manila with the murder of Chin Ah Kim. Thereafter, the trial judge rendered judgment
declaring the accused not responsible for the crime, and dismissing the case, but requiring the
reclusion of the accused for treatment in San Lazaro Hospital, in accordance with article 8 of the
Penal Code, with the admonition that the accused be not permitted to leave the said institution
without first obtaining the permission of the court. In compliance with this order, Chan Sam was
confined for approximately two years in San Lazaro Hospital. During this period, efforts to obtain his
release were made induced by the desire of his wife and father-in-law to have him proceed to
Hongkong. Opposition to the allowance of the motions came from the wife and children of the
murdered man, who contended that Chan Sam was still insane, and that he had made threats that if
he ever obtained his liberty he would kill the wife and the children of the deceased and probably
other members of his own family who were living in Hongkong. These various legal proceedings
culminated in Doctors Domingo and De los Angeles being delegated to examine and certify the
mental condition of Chan Sam, which they did. After this report had been submitted, counsel for the
oppositors challenged the jurisdiction of the court. However, the respondent judge sustained the
court's right to make an order in the premises and allowed Chan Sam to leave the San Lazaro
Hospital to be turned over to the attorney-in-fact of his wife so that he might be taken to Hongkong to
join his wife in that city.
Article 8 of the Penal Code, pursuant to which the trial judge purported to act in issuing his order of
release, provides that among those exempt from criminal liability are:
1. An imbecile or lunatic, unless the latter has acted during the lucid interval.
When the imbecile or lunatic has committed an act which the law defines as a grave felony,
the court shall order his confinement in one of the asylums established for persons thus
afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the
same court.

Section 1048 of the Administrative Code, which, it is argued, has superseded or supplemented
article 8 of the Penal Code, provides as to the discharge of a patient from custody from a hospital for
the insane the following:
When in the opinion of the Director of Health any patient in any Government hospital or other
place for the insane is temporarily or permanently cured, or may be released without danger,
he may discharge such patient, and shall notify the Judge of the Court of First Instance who
ordered the commitment, in case the patient is confined by order of the court.
An examination of article 8, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code discloses that the permission of the
court who orders the confinement of one accused of a grave felony in an insane asylum is a
prerequisite for obtaining release from the institution. The respondent judge has based his action in
this case on this provision of the law. On the other hand, section 1048 of the Administrative Code
grants to the Director of Health authority to say when a patient may be discharged from an insane
asylum. There is no pretense that the Director of Health has exercised his authority in this case, or
that the head of the Philippine Health Service has been asked to express his opinion.
Contrasting the two provisions of Philippine law which have been mentioned, it is self-evident that for
section 1048 of the Administrative Code to prevail exclusively it would be necessary to find an
implied repeal of a portion of article 8 of the Penal Code. But it is a well-known rule of statutory
construction that when there is no express repeal none is presumed to be intended. The most
reasonable supposition is that when the Legislature placed the provision, from which section 1048 of
the Administrative Code was derived, on the statute books, it did so without any consideration as to
the effect of the new law on article 8 of the Penal Code. It is likewise a canon of statutory
construction that when two portions of the law can be construed so that both can stand together, this
should be done. In this respect, we believe that the authority of the courts can be sustained in cases
where the courts take action, while the authority of the Director of Health can be sustained in other
cases not falling within the jurisdiction of the courts. This latter construction is reinforced by that
portion of section 1048 of the Administrative Code which requires the Director of Health to notify the
Judge of First Instance who ordered the commitment, in case the patients is confined by order of the
court.
In 1916, the Director of Health raised this same question. He then took the view that section 7 of Act
No. 2122, now incorporated in the Administrative Code as section 1048, applied to all cases of
confinement of persons adjudged to be insane in any Government hospital or other places for the
insane, and that the entire discretion as to the sanity of any patient whatever was vested by this
section exclusively in the Director of Health. The Attorney-General, who at that time was Honorable
Ramon Avancea, ruled against the Director of Health, saying that "the Legislature could not have
intended to vest in the Director of Health the power to release, without proper judicial authority, any
person confined by order of the court in an asylum pursuant to the provisions of article 8 of the Penal
Code."
In at least two cases, United States vs. Guendia ([1917], 37 Phil., 337), and People vs. Bascos
([1922], 44 Phil., 204), this court has relied on article 8, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code. The
judgments in the cited cases concluded with this order: "The defendant shall be kept in confinement
in the San Lazaro Hospital, or such other hospital for the insane as the Director of Health may direct,
and shall not be permitted to depart therefrom without the prior approval of the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Iloilo (Pangasinan)."

Due to differences in statutory provisions, the American authorities on the question are not very
helpful. However, one case has been found where the facts were practically identical with the ones
before us, where the law is much the same as Philippine Law, and where the procedure which
should be followed was outlined by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington. We refer to the
case of State vs. Snell ([1908], 49 Wash., 177). In the decision in the cited case, the court, speaking
through Justice Rudkin, said:
On the 7th day of July, 1906, the relator, Chester Thompson, killed George Meade Emory in
the City of Seattle, and by reason thereof was informed against in the superior court of King
county for the crime of murder. A plea of not guilty was interposed, and the place of trial was
changed to the superior court of Pierce county. The relator was tried in the latter court before
the respondent as presiding judge, and the jury be returned a verdict of not guilty by reason
of insanity. On the 3rd day of May, 1907, the respondent entered an order reciting that the
relator was then insane; that he had been acquitted of the crime of murder by reason of
insanity; that his discharge or going at large would be manifestly dangerous to the peace and
safety of the community; and committed him to the county jail of Pierce county. It was further
ordered that, on the 12th day of June, 1907, the relator should be taken from the county jail
of Pierce county and transferred to the state penitentiary at Walla Walla, to be there confined
in the ward set apart for the confinement, custody, and keeping of the criminal insane until
the further order of the court and until discharge therefrom by due process of law. The relator
was committed to the county jail and thereafter transferred to the insane ward of the
penitentiary in obedience to this order, and is now confined in the latter institution. On the
19th day of February, 1908, he applied to the physician in charge of the criminal insane at
the state penitentiary for an examination of his mental condition and fitness to be at large, as
provided in section 6 of the act of February 21, 1907, entitled, "An act relating to the criminal
insane, their trial, commitment, and custody." Laws of 1907, page 33. After such
examination, the physician certified to the warden of the penitentiary that he had reasonable
cause to believe that the relator had become sane since his commitment, and was a safe
person to be at large. The warden thereupon granted the relator permission to present a
petition to the court that committed him, setting up the facts leading to his commitment, and
that he had become sane and mentally responsible, and in such condition that he is a safe
person to be at large, and praying for his discharge from custody. A petition in due form was
thereupon presented to the respondent judge, after service thereof upon the prosecuting
attorney of Pierce county, but the respondent refused to set the matter down for hearing or to
entertain jurisdiction of the proceeding,. . . . Application was there-upon made to this court for
a writ of mandamus, requiring the respondent to set the petition down for hearing, and the
case is now before us on the return to the alternative writ.
xxx

xxx

xxx

We are of opinion, therefore, that the procedure adopted by the relator is in conformity with
the law, and the writ will issues as prayed.
The foregoing is our understanding of the law on the subject. The following represents our
deductions and conclusions. Article 8 of the Penal Code has not been impliedly repealed by section
1048 of the Administrative Code. Article 8 of the Penal Code and section 1048 of the Administrative
Code can be construed so that both can stand together. Considering article 8 of the Penal Code as
in force and construing this article and section 1048 of the Administrative Code, we think that the
Attorney-General was right in expressing the opinion that the Director of Health was without power to

release, without proper judicial authority, any person confined by order of the court in an asylum
pursuant to the provisions of article 8 of the Penal Code. We think also that the converse proposition
is equally tenable, and is that any person confined by order of the court in an asylum in accordance
with article 8 of the Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody in an insane asylum until the
views of the Director of Health have been ascertained as to whether or not the person is temporarily
or permanently cured or may be released without danger. In other words, the powers of the courts
and the Director of Health are complementary each with the other. As a practical observation, it may
further be said that it is well to adopt all reasonable precautions to ascertain if a person confined in
an asylum as insane should be permitted to leave the asylum, and this can best be accomplished
through the joint efforts of the courts and the Director of Health in proper cases.
Various defenses were interposed by the respondents to the petition, but we have not been
impressed with any of them except the ones which go to the merits. After thorough discussion, our
view is that while the respondent Judge acted patiently and cautiously in the matters which came
before him, yet he exceeded his authority when he issued his orders of December 26, 1929, and
March 17, 1930, without first having before him the opinion of the Director of Health.
The writ prayed for will issue and the temporary restraining order will be made permanent, without
costs.
Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-32978 October 30, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANDRES MAGALLANO, defendant-appellant.

TEEHANKEE, Acting, C.J.:

The Court sustains the conviction for parricide of the accused-appellant, Andres Magallano, on his
own admission that he strangled his wife to death. The defense of insanity as an exempting
circumstance was not established and did not overcome the legal presumption that a person's acts
are of his own free will and intelligence. The settled rule is that the onus probandi rests upon him
who invokes insanity as a defense and the defense failed to discharge this burden.
The accused was charged before the Court of First Instance of Davao City with parricide for having
killed his lawful wife, Exequiela Costa, on September 29, 1968.
Upon motion by the counsel de oficio for the accused asserting the accused's insanity, the latter was
referred to the Chief of the Davao General Hospital for examination. The Director was ordered to file
the necessary petition for hospitalization of the accused if in his opinion it served the public welfare
or the welfare of the person concerned.
Pursuant thereto, after psychiatric examination of the accused conducted by Dr. Corazon San Pedro
as attending physician, the officer-in-charge of the Davao Regional Mental Hospital submitted a

report to the effect that the accused was quiet, no bizarre behavior noted. He was in good contact
with his environment, recognized his companions and was aware of the place where he was being
examined. He answered questions coherently and was relevant." She recommended however that
the subject be further examined in the Regional Mental Hospital at least once a week for further
evaluation.
Hence, the office of the City Fiscal moved that the regional hospital be given more time to complete
its examination and to submit a medical report on the accused's state of mind.
Acting on the motion, the trial court on March 29, 1969 ordered that accused be again sent to the
regional mental hospital to be examined by an internist of that institution in collaboration with Dr.
Corazon San Pedro to determine once and for all the mental condition of the accused and to find out
whether he was fit for arraignment .
Subsequently, the officer-in-charge of the Regional Mental Hospital on May 15,1969 furnished the
Court with a resume of the psychiatric examination conducted on the accused, to wit:
In the three interviews done, 1 subject was observed to be in good contact with his
environment. No odd behavior was observed. He answered questions coherently and
relevantly. No hallucinations or delusions elicited. He is well oriented to the date, place
and person. He can give his personal data and other circumstances in his life. He can
relate the event that led to his confinement in jail.
Having been satisfied that the accused was fit and ready for trial on the basis of the two medical
reports, the trial court proceeded to arraign him. With the assistance of his counsel de oficio, the
accused entered a plea of not guilty.
After trial wherein the main issue was the sanity or insanity of the accused during the commission of
the crime, the accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The record shows that on October 1, 1968, the accused companied by his father voluntarily
informed, and surrendered to, the Davao City Police Department that he had killed his wife. The
accused declared upon investigation conducted by policy officers that he strangled his wife 2 to death
in the early morning of September 29, 1968 after an exchange of heated words between them stemming
over his suspicion that she had been unfaithful to him; that the following day, he went to a nearby house
owned by one Peping Orais to whom he confided the killing. The accused described to the police the
scene of the crime and true enough, when the police went there, they found the victim's cadaver. Postmortem findings showed that she died of "asphyxia due to choking" and that she had been dead for more
than 30 hours but less than 50 hours at the time of discovery. 3
Crispin Orais confirmed the accused's declaration in a sworn statement before the Asst. City
Attorney that the accused confided to him that he had killed his wife by choking her with his bare
hands. In his testimony in court 4as first witness for the prosecution, Crispin Orais declared he knew the
accused who went to him on October 1, 1968 at his house in Cabantian, Davao City and inquired about
his father's whereabouts. The witness then sent his son to fetch the father, Diego Magallano. The
accused was then sweating and his face was covered with blood. When asked about his appearance, the
accused replied that he had smashed his head against a tree as if he had lost his mind because he had

killed his wife by choking her to death. The accused pointed to a place about 50 meters away from the
house of Crispin Orais as the place where the killing took place. As to his observation on the accused's
demeanor as the latter related this gruesome story, the witness remarked that the accused was all right
although there were times when he appeared out of his mind for he could not easily answer the
questions.

Patrolman Noe Baita of the Davao City Police Department testified that during the investigation on
October 1, 1968 the accused confessed that he killed his wife in the manner he related it to Crispin
Orais and that all the answers to his question given in the course of the examination were
spontaneous and voluntary. 5
Lt. Exequeil Untalan declared that while he was in charge of the commando unit at Agdao, Davao
City on October 1, 1968, the accused accompanied by his father came to his office to confirm
reports that the accused had strangled his wife; that this surrender was registered in the police
blotter after which the accused was indorsed to the Homicide Section of the City Policy
Department. 6
Lt. Rafael Panal of the Homicide Section who repaired to the scene of the crime found the cadaver
of the victim in the bushes and they brought it to the Davao City morgue where it was examined and
autopsied by Dr. Abear, Medical Officer of the Davao City Health Office. The investigation was
conducted in his precinct by Noe Baita. He observed that although the investigator had to repeat
some questions for the accused to understand, the latter was remorseful and he could talk
coherently. 7
Juan Abear, a medicolegal expert connected with the Davao City Health Department was presented
as witness to confirm that he was the one who conducted the autopsy of the victim on October 2,
1968 and that the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation. 8
Fiscal Josefino Fuentes, Asst. City Fiscal of Davao City testified that he was the one before whom
the accused swore to the truth of the latter's extra-judicial confession; that he himself translated to
the accused all the contents of the confession from English to Visayan, and that the accused
admitted to him that he (the accused) signed it voluntarily. 9
The defense in its attempt to prove mental disorder on the part of the accused presented evidence
consisting of the testimonies of the accused's father, his son and three neighbors.
Arturo Magallano, a son of the accused who attained 6th grade, testified that during the month of
April, 1968 he observed that his father kept saying words that were not pro- per or correct; that his
father even tried to commit suicide by almost typing his neck with a rope; that in Cabacan-Bucana,
Davao after they transferred in 1968, his father worked for a living by going fishing three times a
week and that the witness himself sold the fish at a price dictated by his farther. 10
Luisa Bacala, a 64 year old vegetable vendor and neighbor of the accused, declared that the latter
used to accuse his wife of having a paramour, that one time she saw Exequiela, the wife of the
accused, selling fish in the market when the accused arrived saying that the paramour was already
around; that the accused used to run towards the pier and his family would follow him. 11

Crispin Orais, under the same oath testified that one morning he met the accused telling him that his
(accused's) father was at Cabantian in the company of some policemen and he kept saying this
many times although he had already been assured that his father was not seen around there. 12
Diego Magallano, the father of the accused testified thus: Sometime in 1968 in the first week of April,
this witness received a telegram from the wife of the accused stating that the latter was sickly; he
went to stay with his son in Maasin, Leyte for one month during which time he observed that the
latter was somewhat insane for he kept on saying that his wife had a paramour although this
statement had no basis. He had his son treated by a quack doctor. Upon hearing about the incident
that his son killed his wife, the witness went to Cabantian where he saw his son near the dead body
of his wife. The accused said he killed her for she no longer loved him. The witness corroborated the
declaration of Crispin Orais that the face of the accused was all covered with blood for the reason,
according to the accused, that he bumped his head against a tree for he wanted to kill himself. 13
Ricardo Dayala, a 64 year old vegetable vendor who claimed to be another neighbor of the accused
at Davao City stated that he was acquainted with the accused for a long time; that he used to see
the accused peeping from his house everytime the accused's wife went downstairs to get some
pieces of wood for fuel and he observed that the accused was insane, because at one time when
asked some questions, the accused would talk and laugh at the same time although sometimes the
accused acted sanely. 14
After a review and analysis of the evidence on record, this Court agrees with the State's contention
that the defense has failed to prove that the accused was legally insane at the commission of the
crime.
Indeed, the evidence presented by the defense does not outweigh the certifications submitted by
government psychiatric doctors who had closely observed the accused for a month and a half, 15 and
found that the accused was in good contact with his environment; that he did not manifest any odd
behavior for in fact he could even relate the circumstances that led to his confinement.
Apart from these certifications, statements in court by witnesses for both the prosecution and the
defense have pictured a mental condition on the part of the accused that is not inconsistent with
sanity. The fact that a few days after the killing incident the accused was seen sweating with his face
covered with blood, as testified to by his own father and Crispin Orais, for the reason according to
accused himself that he struck his head against a tree to end his life in atonement for his guilt in
killing his wife 16 is a manifestation of remorse or self-reproach which is but a rational feeling experienced
by normal persons. As correctly observed by the prosecution, it revealed an awareness of a wrongdoing.
Coupled with this manifestation or remorse is the appellant appellant's voluntary surrender to the
police headquarters where he executed a statement confessing his misdeed. The police officer and
the City Fiscal who separately conducted investigation of the accused observed that he was normal
for he could answer their questions coherently and intelligently and that there was no indication of
abnormality on his part. The observation of these public officials is entitled to full credence, for they
have not been shown nor alleged to have any improper or ulterior motive to misrepresent or not tell
the truth about the mental condition and behavior of the accused.
Again from accused's own evidence is the testimony of his son, that before the killing for which he
stands charged, he was working for a living through fishing three times a week and that he himself
prescribed the prices for his catch which his son brought to the market for sale. 17

While there is evidence tending to show that the accused in some instances had displayed some
unusual behavior, at most these could only be eccentricities which do not mean complete deprivation
of intelligence or discernment. The presumption of sanity is not overcome by mere abnormality of
behavior. 18
"In the eyes of the law," as held in the case of People vs. Renegado, 19 "insanity exists when there is a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he
acts without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that
there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will; mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability. The onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance and
he must prove it by clear and positive evidence."
Over and above these is the trial judge's "keen observation of [the accused's] conduct, appearance,
demeanor and behavior in the courtroom everytime he appeared at the trial. He did not find any
symptoms of insanity in his acts or behavior for he behaved better than some of his neighbors who
were around him." 20
The defense attempted to adduce expert testimony to prove the alleged insanity. The expert
however was properly excluded by the Court when he was made to answer by hypothetical
questions in relation to allegations of fact which have not been proven but were in fact disputed by
the prosecution. No contribution could be made by him since he did actually examine the accused
and was being made to testify only on the contents of a book or modern psychiatry without particular
reference to the actual and proven facts regarding the mental condition of the accused.
As to the formal offer of proof by the defense which according to counsel was denied by the trial
Court, we find from the transcript 21 that the trial Court did not in fact deny the verbal motion but made
the suggestion that if defense counsel wanted to state anything else, he could incorporate it in a
memorandum. At any rate, we find that the trial Court did make a thorough consideration of the evidence
submitted by the defense.
As to the question raised by accused of the admissibility of the government doctors' medical reports
as being hearsay since their contents were not testified to in court by the said doctors, suffice it to
state that these formed part of the records, and that at the resting of the case, the defense failed to
register any objection thereon when the prosecution specifically invited the court to take judicial
notice of its records.
Authorities hold that whenever evidence of acts, conduct or declarations are introduced to prove the
defendant insane, the prosecution may offer evidence of other acts, conduct and declarations during
the same period to show that he was sane more so, at the time of the commission of the crime
charged and thereafter and that the irrational acts testified to were mere lapses into which
humans occasionally fall.
Premises considered, this Court finds the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of parricide.
Accordingly, this Court affirms in toto the appealed decision sentencing the accused Andres
Magallano to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua as defined and provided for in Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
sum of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs.

Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

*gi-apil nako ang separate opinion para ibigin

G.R. No. L-14383

November 29, 1919

In re guardianship of the incompetent Jose R. de Inchausti.

CONSUELO RICO VDA. DE INCHAUSTI, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
J. R. DE INCHAUSTI, opponent-appellant.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Felix Socias for appellant.
Claro M. Recto for appellee.

TORRES, J.:
This case was instituted in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila thru a petition filed by
attorneys Crossfield and O'Brien in behalf of the petitioner, Consuelo Rico viuda de Inchausti. On
January 11, 1911, said petition (without date) was verified before the notary public, C. W. O'Brien, by
A. S. Crossfield and was signed by the law firm of Crossfield & O'Brien.
Said petition alleges that Jose R. de Inchausti's mother is Maria de Consolacion Rico, viuda de
Inchausti; that Jose R. de Inchausti has become temporarily insane; that he is now confined in San
Lazaro Hospital; that he has considerable real and personal property; that he is about to receive an
inheritance from the partition of the estate of Rafael de Inchausti; that he is not competent to receive
said inheritance that he requires a guardian for his person and property; that his inheritance,
represented primarily by an interest in the mercantile firm of Inchausti & Co. and secondarily by real
estate, is approximately one hundred seventy five thousand pesos (P175,000). Wherefore the
petitioner prays that, having fulfilled the requirement of law, she be appointed guardian of the person
and property of her said son, Jose R. de Inchausti, after proceedings as required by law.
With the purpose of hearing said petition the trial court issued an order whose dispositive and
pertinent parts are:
It is ordered, in accordance with section 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that in this court
the petition be heard at 10 o'clock in the forenoon of the 18th day of January, 1915.
It is ordered also that on the day and at the hour above named the Director of the San
Lazaro Hospital appear before this court and if possible produce the said Jose R. de
Inchausti.
Let this order be made known immediately.
(Sgd.) JAMES A. OSTRAND,
Judge.
Received copy of the foregoing notice, Manila, P.I., January 12, 1915.

(Sgd.) F. S. BECK.
(Sgd.) CROSSFIELD & O'BRIEN,
Attorneys for Maria de la Consolacion Rico y Medina.
(Sgd.) A. S. CROSSFIELD as next friend of
Jose R. de Inchausti.
By an order of January 18, 1915, the court declared that the petitioner, Da. Maria de la Consolacion
Rico y Medina viuda de Inchausti (accompanied by Mr. Crossfield, her counsel, and Dr. A. P. Goff),
appeared at said hearing; that she duly proved the petition; that she was appointed guardian of the
demented Jose R. de Inchausti; and that she was put under bond for one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000).
The said guardian C. R. de Inchausti and Dr. Goff of San Lazaro Hospital were notified of this
decree, and all the requisites for the filing of a bond as well as for the oath of office and letters of
guardianship were duly complied with.
On November 18, 1915, the Spanish Consul in Manila forwarded to the Court of First Instance of this
city a requisitory letter (exhorto) together with a copy of the judgment from the judge of the Court of
First Instance of the Northern District of Barcelona, (Spain). According to said judgment, in a suit of
Jose R. de Inchausti against Consolacion Medina, involving considerable property, Jose R. de
Inchausti was held mentally sound (being restrained neither by insanity nor mental perturbation) and
therefore possessed of his juridical personality, of his civil capacity and of the free administration of
his property. Wherefore the court declared that Consolacion Rico was no longer guardian; that she
should deliver to him his property; that as guardian she should present her accounts; and that she
should abstain from all administrative acts over said property.
In said requisitory letter the judge of the Court of First Instance of Barcelona requests fulfillment in
this capital of the foregoing judgment, subject to the provisions of article 11 of the Treaty of Peace of
December 10, 1898, between Spain and the United States; of article 6 of the Treaty of July 3, 1902;
and of sections 304 and 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, said court in Manila refused in
an order of April 15, 1916, (fol. 43), and for the reasons therein assigned, the aforementioned
request of the judge of Barcelona.
The aforementioned guardian presented first her accounts (fol. 65) and next her resignation. Both
were duly approved. Afterwards another guardian was appointed but presented his resignation
shortly after assuming the duties of his office. Having also approved this resignation, the court
reinstated the petitioner, who then filed a supplementary petition (fol. 74) as follows: That said
Inchausti & Co's refusal to deliver to her predecessor the part of the funds pertaining to Jose R. de
Inchausti was because the guardianship proceedings were unlawful, the aforementioned Jose R. de
Inchausti never having been notified of the hearing of the petition for the appointment of a guardian;
that this reason is groundless because on January 12, 1915, Dr. Goff, the Director of San Lazaro
Hospital, received notice of the date of the hearing of the aforesaid petition, because on that same
day Dr. Goff informed Jose R. de Inchausti of said notice, and because on the following day, January
13, 1915, Jose R. de Inchausti being visited by A. S. Crossfield, informed and discussed with this
friend said notification; that in the beginning Jose R. de Inchausti had opposed the appointment of a
guardian but, learning the appointment was necessary for the proper administration of his property,
had consented and requested his mother be appointed; that as Jose R. de Inchausti's representative
said A. S. Crossfield is a member of the law firm Crossfield & O'Brien; and that for these reasons the
record should show the notification to Jose R. de Inchausti and the proceedings had were regular
and in accordance with law.

Before the hearing of the supplementary petition counsel for Jose R. de Inchausti prayed the court to
declare all the proceedings null and Maria de la Consolacion's petition of January 11, 1915, void as,
the court having acquired no right or jurisdiction over Jose R. de Inchausti, his property can not be
considered in "custodiae legis".
The court overruled this motion by order of May 9, 1918, (p. 83, bill of exceptions). Jose R. de
Inchausti's counsel excepted thereto, and, on May 14, 1918, appealed to his High Court alleging that
the lower court erred:
1. On March 26, 1918, in overruling the motion of the supposed incompetent praying the
proceedings had be declared null and void, and the original petition dismissed.
2. In not declaring null and void of said proceedings and in not dismissing the original petition
giving rise to this controversy.
3. In not reciting in said order the facts duly proven whereon the decision was based.
Said assignment is based on the fact that appellant was neither notified of the first order issued by
the lower court fixing the hearing of the petition, nor of the others affecting directly his person and
property; that the order of June 16, 1917, was the first that the court had command be forthwith
notified to the appellant; that the appealed order partakes of the nature of a definite judgment; that in
same the court ought to have recited facts considered proven and a base for his conclusions; and
that by not having so done, the court rendered said order defective and revocable.
In his turn the appellee alleges that Dr. Goff, Director of the San Lazaro Hospital, being notified of
the aforesaid order and following the custom in said hospital, transmitted said notification through its
employees to Jose R. de Inchausti. This allegation is corroborated both by Dr. Goff's certificate
(page 130, record) stating that, according to his true belief Jose R. de Inchausti was notified in
accordance with the custom of the hospital in analogous cases, and by an affidavit (page 132,
record) of A. S. Crossfield who testified to having visited Jose R. de Inchausti in San Lazaro Hospital
on January 13, 1915; to being told by Dr. Goff that said Jose R. de Inchausti had been notified of the
order of January 18, 1915, fixing the hearing of the petition for the appointment of a guardian, and to
Jose R. de Inchausti himself having acknowledge the receipt of said notice.
The first and principal question that arises from all these allegations is whether, if the officer of the
court, charged with the notification of all order and decrees, had failed to notify personally Jose R. de
Inchausti, this fact does or does not constitute sufficient ground for declaring null and void all the
proceedings had in this cause, in spite of the fact that the appellant, as an insane patient, was in
accordance with custom, notified by the director of said government institution, San Lazaro Hospital.
Section 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:
When it is represented to a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, by petition verified by
oath of any relative or friend, that any person who is an inhabitant or resident of the province,
is insane or is a spendthrift, incompetent to manage his estate, praying that a guardian may
be appointed for such person, such court or judge must cause a notice to be given to the
supposed insane or incompetent person of the time and place of hearing the petition, not
less than five days before the time so appointed; and such person, if able to attend, must be
produced on the hearing.

According to this statutory provision, the notice of time and place of hearing ought to be given
personally to the supposed demented or spendthrift so, for example, in the case of Yangco vs. Court
of First Instance of Manila and Yangco (29 Phil. Rep., 183), the court declared null and void all the
proceedings had in said case for the reason that said notice was not given personally to the person
alleged to be a spendthrift and incompetent to manage his property.
However, in order to resolve definitely the present suit, it is necessary to examine the provision of
Act No. 2122, which establishes another procedure, whereby a person may be declared insane,
ordered confined in a hospital or an institution for the insane and provided with guardian of his
person.
Section 4 of the foregoing Act No. 2122 provides:
The Director of Health, in all cases where in his opinion it is for the public welfare or for the
welfare of any person who in his judgment is insane, and when such person or the person
having charged of the patient is opposed to his being taken to a hospital or other place for
the insane, shall present, or cause to be presented, a petition to the Court of First Instance of
the district wherein the person alleged to be insane is found, alleging that such person is
insane, that it is for the welfare of the public or of the patient that he be taken to a suitable
place for treatment, and praying the court to commit such person to a hospital or other place
for the insane.
The judge of the Court of First Instance shall cause not less than five days' notice to be given
of the date of the hearing of the petition to such alleged insane person or to the person
having care of such alleged insane person, and to such of his relatives residing in the
province or the city of Manila as the judge may deem proper, and shall order the sheriff to
produce the alleged insane person if able to attend on the hearing. If the judge finds, after
due hearing, that the person in question is insane, and that his relatives are unable for any
reason to take proper custody and care of the patient, he shall order his commitment to such
hospital or other place for the insane as may be recommended by the Director of Health, and
when it appears necessary or convenient he may appoint a guardian for him as provided in
section five hundred and sixty of Act Numbered One hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act
providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine
Islands." . . . .
According to the provisions of the foregoing section an individual may be declared insane and a
guardian for his person and property may be appointed without service of personal notice of the date
of hearing of the petition for a judicial declaration of judicial incapacity and for the appointment of a
guardian of his person and property, as the aforesaid law provides for notice to the person having
care of such alleged insane person, thereby considering same sufficient. Whereas, according to
section 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure, such notice must be served personally upon the alleged
insane person, thereby considering as insufficient null and void all other proceedings outside.
Act No. 2122 was enacted after the Code of Civil Procedure for it was approved on February 1,
1912, and if these laws are incompatible, Act No. 2122 must necessarily be followed.
Said Act No. 2122 does not absolutely and expressly repeal section 559 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, but, regarding the transmittal of notice to a supposed demented, these two Acts are
clearly and manifestly incompatible and contradictory. While section 559 of Act No. 190 requires of
Act No. 2122 requires the service of a personal notice either upon the insane person or upon the
person having charge of such incompetent insane.

The Director of Health's intervention in the case of the demented who requires an urgent and quick
administrative action may be preliminary but is entirely independent and forms no part of the judicial
proceedings in Chapter XXVII of said Act No. 190 modified, as far as guardians of insane persons
are concerned, by the aforementioned Act No. 2122. (See sections 1043 to 1050 of the
Administrative Code of 1917.)
On account of the urgency of the case Jose R. de Inchausti having been attacked so suddenly by
insanity his mother had no time to call upon the Director of Health and she had even difficulty in
securing the assistance of the Director of San Lazaro Hospital for the care of her son who was in
need of immediate vigilance for his own welfare and for the benefit of her family and of the public.
However, in the Court of First Instance her counsel filed a petition setting forth that which had taken
place and praying the appointment of a guardian for the incompetent. The court, after hearing said
petition, issued the order of January 18, 1915, which was served upon Dr. A. P. Goff, director of the
aforesaid hospital, and the mother-guardian.
If, according to section 4 of Act No. 2122 (supra), service of notice upon the person in charge of the
insane is sufficient and if the aforementioned order of January 18 was duly served upon the Director
of the San Lazaro Hospital where Inchausti was confined, then clearly the motion to declare null and
void all proceedings had, upon the ground of the trial judge having acted without his jurisdiction, had
no legal foundation. Act No. 2122, amending (by implication) section 559 of Act No. 190, does not
require absolutely the personal service of notice to the insane, but either to the insane or to the
person in charge of him.
The case of Yangco vs. Court of First Instance of Manila and Yangco (29 Phil. Rep., 183) above
mentioned deals with the appointment of a guardian for an alleged spendthrift, a proposition quite
different from the appointment of a guardian for an alleged insane person who in the ordinary course
of human events cannot possibly be given a notice. True, the mere fact that a person is alleged
insane is not conclusive of insanity. However, if this principle be observed in theory for effecting
judicial intervention, in many instances, to follow same in practice would be impossible, useless,
prejudicial and even dangerous. On the other hand, the right of the insane is not prejudiced by
service of notice upon either the person or relative having in charge. When section 559 of Act No.
190 was amended by Act No. 2122, establishing a different practice for service upon an
incompetent, the legislator had this in mind. Therefore, the service upon the Director of the San
Lazaro Hospital of the notice of the order appointing a guardian for Jose R. de Inchausti is beyond a
doubt sufficient, and the provisions of the law now in force was thereby complied with, and the trial
judge acquired jurisdiction in the premises.
In fact it appears in the record, admitted by the appellant, that the order, fixing the date of the
hearing of the petition giving rise to this suit, was served upon the Director of the San Lazaro
Hospital wherein Jose R. de Inchausti was then confined suffering from insanity. It also appears from
said Director's certificate and Attorney Crossfield's affidavit, at no time impugned by the appellant
that the aforementioned notice immediately delivered to said appellant who made no effort to deny
or contradict it. The Director of San Lazaro Hospital being the person having charge of the appellant,
then it is obvious that the law was duly complied with.
Nevertheless, the appellant alleges that the petition, being verified by Attorney A. S. Crossfield and
not by a relative or a friend, was not verified by oath as required by law. But in same oath of A. S.
Crossfield it appears that he is a friend of the appellant alleged to be incompetent just what is
required by the provision of section 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the lower court
acquired jurisdiction over the appellant's person and committed no error both in dismissing the
motion to declare null and void all proceedings had and in declaring of no effect said petition, the
origin of this suit.

True, the facts and conclusion upon which the court's decision was based do not appear in the order
of May 9, 1918. But we have considered just the recital in this opinion of what said court failed to do,
in order to show the legality of the decree appealed from, because said order, a resolution of a
motion, has in effect judicially decided all the proceedings had in this case, the previous decrees and
orders of January 18 and July 6, 1915, of April 15, 1916, and on February 16, 1918. Further, if a
return to the court of origin for the amendment of said judicial decree so as to recite the facts and
conclusions upon which same was based, were made, this case, begun in January, 1915, would be
unduly and unnecessarily prolonged; the amended decree would be written upon the same
consideration and; and a decree, whose dispositive parts are in harmony with the merits of the case
and of the law similar to the one now appealed, would result.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of May 9, 1918, is hereby affirmed with costs.
Street, Malcolm, Avancea and Moir, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ARAULLO, J., dissenting:

We do not agree to the foregoing decision, affirming the order of May 9, 1918, of the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila, whereby the motion of the attorney of the opponent, Jose R. de
Inchausti, that all the proceedings had in this case be annulled, was dismissed.
The basis of said motion was that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the person of
Jose R. de Inchausti, and that the property of the latter could not fully be considered in custodiae
legis. Appellant's principal assignment of error in his brief, with reference to this order, is to the effect
that the first order of the court issued in these proceedings, by virtue of the petition of Consolacion
Rico Viuda de Inchausti, praying that she be appointed as guardian over the person and over the
property of her son, Jose R. de Inchausti, on the ground that he was insane, and setting a day for
the hearing therefore, was never served upon the said Jose R. de Inchausti, nor was he served with
the later orders that had direct bearing upon his person and property, excepting that of June 16,
1917, of which we shall speak later, all of which constitute a manifest violation of the provision of
section 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
This section reads:
APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS OF PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND. When it is
represented to a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, by petition verified by oath of any
relative or friend, that any person who is an inhabitant or resident of the province, is insane
or is a spendthrift, incompetent to manage his estate, praying that a guardian may be
appointed for such person, such court or judge must cause a notice to be given to the
supposed insane or incompetent person of the time and place of hearing the petition, not

less than five days before the time so appointed; and such person, if able to attend, must be
produced on the hearing.
In the foregoing decision the majority of the court acknowledges that, according to this section, the
notice of the time and place of hearing of the petition, in cases where this section is applicable, must
be given personally to the supposed insane or spendthrift, and because of non-compliance with this
requisite in the case of Yangco vs. Court of First Instance of Manila and Yangco (29 Phil. Rep., 183)
all the proceedings had in said case were declared null and void; however, invoking section 4 of Act
No. 2122, the majority hold, in the instant case, that the requisite of the service of the notice to the
supposed insane person, Jose R. de Inchausti, was complied with, and that, therefore, there is no
reason for sustaining the petition of counsel for J. R. de Inchausti that the proceedings had in this
case be declared null and void.
Section 4 of Act No. 2122 reads:
The Director of Health, in all cases where in his opinion it is for the public welfare or for the
welfare of any person who in his judgment is insane, and when such person or the person
having charge of the patient is opposed to his being taken to hospital or other place for the
insane, shall present, or cause to be presented, a petition to the Court of First Instance of the
district wherein the person alleged to be insane is found, alleging that such person is insane,
that it is for the welfare of the public or of the patient that he be taken to a suitable place for
treatment, and praying the court to commit such person to a hospital or other place for the
insane. The judge of the Court of First Instance shall cause not less than five days notice to
be given of the date of the hearing of the petition to such alleged insane person or to the
person having care of such alleged insane person, and so such of his relatives residing in
the province or the city of Manila as the judge may deem proper, and shall order the sheriff to
produce the alleged insane person if able to attend on the hearing. If the judge finds, after
due hearing, that the person in question is insane, and that his relatives are unable for any
reason to take proper custody and care of the patient, he shall order his commitment to such
hospital or other place for the insane as may be recommended by the Director of Health, and
when it appears necessary or convenient he may appoint a guardian for him as provided in
section five hundred and sixty of Act Numbered One hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act
providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine
Islands." . . .
It is true, as the majority say that the above provision of law was enacted subsequent to Act No. 190,
that is, the Code of Civil Procedure, but in our opinion said provision cannot in any manner be
considered as modifying or amending in part the aforesaid section 559 of the said Code of
Procedure, as the majority hold.
Each of these two statutory provisions refers to cases distinct from each other. The first, that is,
section 4 of Act No. 2122, fixes the duty of the Director of Health in all cases where in his opinion it is
for the public welfare or for the welfare of any person who, in his judgment, is insane, and when such
person or the person having charge of the patient is opposed to his being taken to a hospital or other
place for the insane, to cause to be presented to the court of first instance of the district a petition
praying said person be committed to a hospital or other place for the insane. The said section also
prescribes, in view of this petition, the procedure to be followed in the court of first instance, in order
that the supposed insane may be committed to a hospital or asylum recommended by the Director of
Health, as well as for the appointment by the court of a guardian for the insane person, should it
appear necessary or convenient. The second, that is, section 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
refers to the case where a relative or friend of the supposed insane prays for the appointment of a
guardian for him, in other words, where a private person interested in the welfare of the supposed

insane, should appear in court praying for the appointment of a guardian for the administration of his
property. This same section prescribes the procedure in court upon presentation of said petition. It is
not possible to confuse one case with the other; neither is it possible to confuse the procedure of
one with the other, in order that the proper declaration and judicial order issue on the petition.
Wherefore, the majority could not help but acknowledge that "both of these legal provisions, dealing
concretely with insane or demented persons, are clearly and manifestly incompatible and
contradictory. Section 559 of Act No. 190 requires service of a personal notice upon the insane
person; section 4 of Act No. 2122 requires service of a personal notice either upon the insane
person or upon the person having care of same." The majority ought to have begun by declaring that
there is a clear and manifest difference in the first parts of both statutory provisions; i.e., with
reference to the petition, the object of the corresponding law, which, in either case, may be filed
subject to the procedure outlined in the court of first instance, according to their nature. This being
so, it is evident that, if the object of the legislator was to fix a specified procedure that should be
followed according as to whether the petition was filed in court by the Director of Health in
compliance with his duty to cause the commitment of the alleged insane in a hospital or in an
asylum, or by a person interested in the welfare of the supposed insane, praying for the appointment
of a guardian to administer his property, the procedure prescribed by the law in each of these two
different cases must be followed in the manner provided and no portion of one of said statutory
provisions can be substituted with a portion of another different from the former, thereby forming a
heterogeneous whole, without cohesion and relation. In a word, there is no similarity between the
petition of the Director of Health to commit an alleged insane person to an asylum and to secure for
him a guardian to administer his property, should it appear necessary, and the petition of a mere
private individual for the appointment of a guardian for a friend or a relative alleged to be insane and
incompetent to manage his estate. The procedures prescribed by law in each case must necessarily
be very distinct. Upon this matter no extended discussion is necessary. The text of section 4 of Act
No. 2122 clearly gives this interpretation because after dealing with the procedure to be followed in
the case of the petition of the Director of Health for the commitment of an alleged insane to an
asylum or hospital, said section then provides that the judge shall order the commitment of the
supposed insane person to such hospital or place recommended by the Director of Health, and,
when it should appear necessary and convenient, may appoint a guardian as provided for in section
560 of Act No. 190, or the Code of Civil Procedure; i.e., that the procedure laid down in section 559
will be observed, namely, the procedure that when the petition is filed by a relative or a friend of the
alleged insane to obtain the appointment of a guardian, which is not for the purpose of committing
the alleged insane to a hospital or an insane asylum to which section 4 of Act No. 2122 refers and
for which it provides a procedure distinct from that established in said section 559. There is,
therefore, no way or manner whatsoever by which to harmonize the first part of section 4 of Act No.
2122, relative to the petition of the Director of Health for the commitment of an alleged insane to a
hospital or asylum with section 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which refers only to the petition
of a relative or friend of the alleged insane or incompetent to manage his property for the
appointment of his guardian. If there be any connection at all between the provision of the
aforementioned section 4 of Act No. 2122 and the provision of the said Code of Civil Procedure
concerning guardianship of persons of unsound mind, it is only in regard to the appointment of a
guardian for the supposed insane person after the latter had already been committed to the hospital
or asylum at the Director of Health's petition and recommendation, in which case that same section
of the law expressly provides that the appointment of a guardian must be in accordance with the
provision of section 560 of the Code of Civil Procedure a proviso which, taken in connection with
the absence in said section 4 of said Act No. 2122 of any reference with section 559, clearly shows
that the aforementioned Act did not take into account this section of the Code when it imposed upon
the Director of Health the duty of petitioning the court, for the public welfare or for the good of a
person, whom he regards as insane, the commitment or placing of such person in a hospital or
asylum when such insane person or the persons in charge of him is opposed to such commitment.
And this silence is understood simply because it is not the same that a public officer, like the Director

of Health, should in the discharge of his duties, petition the commitment or the placing of an alleged
insane person in a hospital or asylum, as when any other person should ask the appointment of a
guardian for one of his relatives or friends who may be in such sad status as to be incompetent to
manage his own person and property. As we have said, and it is imperative and necessary to say it
again, these are two different and distinct cases to which it is not possible, nor did the statute
attempt, to apply one and the same procedure.
The fact that, as stated in the majority opinion of the court, the intervention of the Director of Health
in the case of any insane person who by his status and condition urgently requires quick
administrative action, is completely independent of and is not included in the judicial proceedings
embraced in the chapter relative to the guardianship of insane persons of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Act No. 190), constitutes the most convincing proof that the judicial proceedings
comprised in the said chapter, which treats of the guardianship of insane persons, cannot be
understood as having been modified by said Act No. 2122 in so far as the latter law requires the
intervention of the Director of Health in the form of a petition that he must file with the court for the
commitment to a hospital or an asylum of the person of an alleged insane. The logical and
inescapable consequence of the foregoing is that the aforesaid section 559 of the Code of Civil
Procedure has no bearing whatever with such intervention of the Director of Health and cannot
either be considered, as having been modified in any manner by said section 4 of Act No. 2122.
What is more, said section 4, or better said Act No. 2122 itself is administrative in character.
According to its title, its objects is "for the confinement of insane persons in Government hospitals or
other institutions for the insane, and for the appointment of a board of physicians to inquire into the
mental condition of persons alleged to be insane, when the evidence presented is not satisfactory to
the court, or when there exists a reasonable doubt as to the condition of any patient confined in a
hospital for the insane." The provisions of this Act relative to the confinement of insane persons are
found in sections 1043 to 1050 of the Administrative Code of 1917, cited in the majority opinion with
reference to the modification by the aforesaid Act No. 2122, according to the majority, of the judicial
proceedings regarding guardians comprehended in the Code of Civil Procedure. These sections
1043 to 1050 of the Administrative Code form part of article XIII "Government hospitals for
insane" one of the several articles in Chapter 37, "Philippine Health Service," of the said
Administrative Code, and the matter of said chapter comprehended within articles one to sixteen,
which includes said article 13, constitutes the Public Health Law, according to section 396 of the
same chapter. The said section 1043 is entitled "Judicial proceedings for commitment of insane
persons," and is a reproduction of that part of section 4 of Act No. 2122 relative to the commitment
petition which the Director of Health must file with the court of first instance for the confinement of an
alleged insane person. But section 1043, supra, does not speak what in section 4 of Act No. 2122
appears in the following term:
The judge of the Court of First Instance shall cause not less than five days' notice to be given
of the hearing of the petition to such alleged insane person or to the person having care of
such alleged insane person and to such of his relatives residing in the province or the city of
Manila as the judge may deem proper, and shall order the sheriff to produce the alleged
insane person if able to attend on the hearing . . . .
Said section (1043, Adm. Code) limits itself to saying:
If the judge shall find, after due hearing, that the person in question is insane, and that his
relatives are unable for any reason to take proper custody and care of the patient, he shall
order his commitment to such hospital or other place for the insane as may be
recommended by the Director of Health . . . .

The omission in said section 1043 of the provision that not less than five days' notice of the hearing
of the Director of Health's petition shall be given either to such insane or the person in charge of him
shows that said judicial proceedings apply only to the case mentioned in said section 1043, which is
administrative in character as is section 4 of Act No. 2122. Otherwise, said section 1043 would have
stated in detail the court's procedure to be followed upon presentation of the Director of Health's
petition. At all events, there being no special provision in the Code of Civil Procedure and special
proceedings to be followed when the Director of Health files a petition in the Court of First Instance
for the commitment of an alleged insane person (in accordance with section 4 of Act No. 2122 as
well as section 1043 of the Administrative Code) it follows, in our opinion, that it is useless and
justifiable to invoke said first section and in connection therewith the second sections in order to
maintain that section 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been modified relative to the
guardianship of persons of unsound mind. And this is untenable inasmuch as in the second part of
section 4 of Act No. 2122 as well as in section 1044 of the Administrative Code mention is made of
the appointment of a guardian for the insane that the court must make when it should appear
convenient or necessary or when his confinement involves the care of his estate or property,
because, as already said in the first of said sections, it is clearly stated that said appointment of a
guardian, after the commitment of the alleged insane to a hospital or asylum at the recommendation
of the Director of Health, must be made by the court, as provided in section 560 of the same Code of
Civil Procedure and accordingly it goes without saying that the petition filed for the appointment of a
guardian must follow the procedure established in the foregoing section 559; i.e., that the petition for
the appointment of a guardian must be filed in accordance with the provision of the preceding
section 559. In the second case, that is to say under section 1044 of the Administrative Code, it is
also expressly ordered that the municipal president at the request of the provincial fiscal, or in the
city of Manila the chief of police at the request of the fiscal of the city of Manila, shall take charge of
the property of the alleged insane in confinement pending the court's appointment of a guardian,
following as it should, although the section does not so state, the procedure laid down by the present
Code of Civil Procedure.
Furthermore, it can be explained perfectly why there is and ought to be a difference between the
procedure which, according to section 4 of Act No. 2122, must be followed in the given case where,
in compliance with his duty, the Director of Health asks the court of first instance to commit an
alleged insane and that which, according to section 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure, must be
followed where a relative or a friend asks the court's appointment of a guardian for the administration
of said person's estate. In the first case the Director of Health's petition must be presented or caused
to be presented in the court for the sake of the public welfare or of the person whom he considers
insane; and when such person or the person having charge of the patient is opposed to his being
taken to a hospital or an insane asylum, that is to say before said petition may be filed, it is
necessary that the patient or the person having him in charge be opposed to said commitment
wherefore it is necessary that a previous notice of the hearing be given at least to the person having
charge of the patient, if it cannot be given to the patient himself, and to such of his relatives as reside
in the province or in the city of Manila, once their opposition is known. In the second case, however,
when the petition is filed by a relative or a friend of the alleged insane in order that a guardian be
appointed for the administration of his property, though this petition be presumed beneficial for the
patient, it may happen to be prejudicial to him as it might deprive him of the administration of his
property upon the false and unjustifiable ground of his incompetency to manage it and, for this
reason, the law requires that the supposed insane be notified thereof personally so as to give him an
opportunity to oppose said petition. And in both cases it is expressly required that, if possible, the
alleged insane person shall be produced in person to the end that the judge himself may ascertain
whether or not the facts upon which the petition is founded are true.
Coming now to an examination of the proceedings, as appear in the printed record on appeal filed
with this court for the determination of this appeal, we find that the provision of section 4 of Act No.

2122 as well as that of section 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with and
that both provisions have been disregarded.
In fact, these proceedings were commenced upon a petition filed with the Court of First Insane of
this city by Attorneys Crossfield and O'Brien in behalf of Seora Maria de la Consolacion Rico viuda
de Inchausti, in which, after alleging that her son Jose R. de Inchausti of unsound mind and confined
temporarily in San Lazaro Hospital was incompetent to take charge of considerable property valued
approximately at P175,000 about to be delivered to him, which was his share of an inheritance from
Rafael Inchausti, prayed that, after fulfilling the proceedings required by law, she be appointed
guardian of the person and property of said insane. Said petition, which bears no date, was not
verified by petitioner's oath but by that of A. S. Crossfield, (a member of the law firm of Crossfield &
O'Brien) on January 11, 1915. On presentation of said petition, the court issued an order on the
following day, (January 12) by which in consideration of said petition, it ordered, that, in accordance
with section 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the petition be heard at 10 o'clock a.m. of the 18th
of January, 1915; and also that the Director of the San Lazaro Hospital for the insane appear in court
on the day and hour aforesaid and produce the body of the said Jose R. de Inchausti, if possible,
and finally that said order be forthwith notified to interested parties. Appearing at the bottom of said
order, are found the signatures of F. S. Beck, Crossfield and O'Brien as attorneys for the petitioner,
and A. S. Crossfield as next friend of Jose R. de Inchausti acknowledging receipt of copies thereof. It
does not appear in the record who was he that received a copy of the order and signed F. S. Beck,
although it is very probable that he was an employee of the San Lazaro Hospital, an assistant or
representative of Dr. A. P. Goff, the hospital director. But it should be noted that the alleged insane
does not appear to have been notified either of the order or of the hearing of said petition as
expressly required by the aforementioned section 559, although on the other hand it appears that a
copy was received by A. S. Crossfield, (who called himself next friend of the alleged insane Jose R.
de Inchausti), doubtless because he was the one who swore to the petition stating that he was one
of the counsel for the petitioner and the next friend of Jose R. de Inchausti. But, as will be readily
understood, this can in no way justify the failure of personal service upon the supposed insane Jose
R. de Inchausti, for whose person and property the appointment of a guardian was asked upon
allegation that he was insane, because the provision of section 559 is definite: it gives for granted
that the petition for the appointment of a guardian should be filed by a relative or a friend of the
alleged insane and provides that the judge shall order same to be notified to the supposed insane
. . . for the same reason, as already said, that such a petition, although presented presumably for his
benefit by a relative or friend, may be prejudicial by attempting to dispossess him of his property and
of its free use and management. Moreover, in proceedings of this nature, as can be plainly deduce
from the provisions of the aforementioned section 559, the supposed insane can and ought to be
considered as the party against whom said petition is filed and, for this reasons, ought to be notified
of same and its hearing, in order that he may be heard and given an opportunity to defend himself
duly before an adjudication, affecting in such an essential and important manner his rights and
interests, is made against him. Wherefore the express provision of section 559 has been infringed.
The hearing of the aforementioned petition having been had on the said 18th day of January, 1915,
at 10 a.m., the court issued a decree on the same date, wherein he set forth (1) that Seora
Consolacion Rico viuda de Inchausti had petitioned that she be appointed guardian of Jose R. de
Inchausti on the ground that he was suffering a mental derangement and was incompetent to
administer his property; that accompanied by Dr. A. P. Goff and her counsel Mr. Crossfield the
petitioner appeared in the day and hour set for said hearing; (2) that from Dr. A. P. Goff's testimony
at the hearing and from the two medical certificates presented as evidence and attached to the
record as Exhibits A and B, (the former from Drs. A. P. Goff himself and J. W. Smith, chief of the
prison sanitation division and a member of the committee for the insane, the latter from Drs. W. E.
Musgrave and C. Fitzpatrick) it appears that Jose R. de Inchausti was then confined in the
department for the insane in San Lazaro Hospital suffering from a mental derangement of such a
state that his release would prove dangerous; that it had been proven to the court's satisfaction that

the said Jose R. de Inchausti could not in any way manage his property, wherefore that the said
petitioner was appointed guardian of the said Jose R. de Inchausti with bond in the sum of P100,000
satisfactory to the court. According to the certificate of the assistant clerk of court this decree was
served on the following day (January 19) upon the aforementioned guardian, Consolacion Rico
viuda de Inchausti and upon Dr. A. P. Goff of the San Lazaro Hospital, and, according to another
certificate of this same assistant clerk, dated January 18, 1915, the guardian herein had furnished
the said personal bond and having taken oath in order to qualify herself for the office, the clerk of the
Court of First Instance issued to her the letters of administration on the same day. The decree in
question, however, was not served upon the alleged insane Jose R. de Inchausti nor upon any
person representing him in these proceedings, nor does it appear that same was served upon him
through the Director of the San Lazaro Hospital wherein he was then confined. But, beside this
omission which is very material, it should be observed also, as far as the appearance of Jose R. de
Inchausti at the hearing of the petition is concerned, that it has not been shown, either before said
hearing, or in the order of the court appointing his guardian, or by any effort made afterwards, that
Jose R. de Inchausti's non-appearance at said hearing was due to an impossibility. In his testimony
at the hearing, in answer to the several questions propounded to him concerning Jose R. de
Inchausti's condition then on that date (January 18) at the hospital, Dr. Goff said he was still in the
ward for the insane, suffering from a mental derangement, and that it was dangerous to let him
loose. At this hearing the two medical certificates, mentioned above, were also presented in
evidence. But Dr. Goff was not asked nor did he say anything to the effect that Jose R. de Inchausti
could not be produced on that occasion because his presence in court would be dangerous or
because his removal from the hospital, in order to be present during the hearing, would be injurious
to him. Thus, the presence of the alleged insane Jose R. de Inchausti at the hearing was absolutely
disregarded. No effort whatever was made to justify his non-appearance or absence at the hearing.
Not one of the those ten present his mother, the petitioner Consolacion Rico viuda de Inchausti,
her counsel Mr. Crossfield, and Dr. Goff the only persons present according to the court's own order
made the slightest mention that Jose R. de Inchausti's absence was due either to insanity or to
danger to public order and security. Furthermore, in Dr. Goff's testimony at the hearing the last
question put to him by attorney Crossfield was whether he had answered in writing the order of the
court, and Dr. Goff replied, "No, Sir." Therefore, Dr. Goff not only failed to answer in writing the order
of the court requiring if possible the production in person of Jose R. de Inchausti at the hearing an
answer which he ought to have given in writing as implied by the petitioner's own counsel and the
alleged insane's friend. Mr. Crossfield, in asking that question but he even failed to answer said
order verbally; i.e., he did not obey the court's order to produce in person Jose R. de Inchausti at the
hearing, nor give any reason for not obeying it, the result being that trial was had in the absence of
Jose R. de Inchausti, an evident violation not only of section 559 of the present Code of Civil
Procedure but also of section 4 of Act No. 2122, cited by the majority as basis for affirming the order
appealed from and in holding that all the proceedings had in this cause are not null and void. So
evident is this violation, so notorious this silence, this carelessness and this neglect regarding the
unfortunate Jose R. de Inchausti, committed with or without reason to San Lazaro Hospital as
insane, and still so great the heedlessness of the provisions of the statute that in the same order of
the court of January 18, 1915, there is not a word to show that the court was then informed by Dr.
Goff or by any one else that, for some justifiable cause, Jose R. de Inchausti could not be produced
in person on that occasion nor that the court had taken this into consideration in appointing the
petitioner guardian of the alleged incompetent. To be convinced of this, it is enough to read the
aforesaid decree reciting that, according to the evidence adduced, it appears that Jose R. de
Inchausti was then confined in the ward for the insane in San Lazaro Hospital on account of a
mental derangement of such a state that his release would be dangerous and that it had been
proven to the court's satisfaction that he could not, in any way, administer his property; but it was not
further stated, as it ought and could have been if, in compliance with the order served upon him, Dr.
Goff had stated that Jose R. de Inchausti could not be produced that the latter in spite of said order,
had not appeared at the hearing for the reason already given. There was no difficulty whatever in
having this inserted in said order if Dr. Goff had made any statement to that effect at the hearing.

But, unfortunately, none of those in this case said to be interested in the welfare of Jose R. de
Inchausti, not even Dr. Goff, has made an effort to comply with the law. Everything appears to have
been done to please the petitioner and her counsel and managers, in open violation of the law,
disregarding the lawful rights granted to Jose R. de Inchausti and depriving him of his right to
discuss and to impugn the certificates of Dr. Goff and the two other physicians declaring him
mentally deranged, to cross-examine the said Dr. Goff and to oppose, by means of evidence which
he might have been able to adduce, to his deprivation of liberty, and not be confined as insane in the
San Lazaro Hospital, thus dispossessing him of the free disposition and administration of his
property.
The proceedings in this case followed their course, there having been issued, since the order of
January 18, 1915, several other orders and decrees concerning the fixing of a monthly pension for
the alleged incompetent, the approval of the accounts presented by the guardian, the appointment of
a new guardian, Don Antonio Ma. Barretto, the approval of the final accounts presented by the old
guardian, and the reduction of the pension previously approved. But none of these orders and
decrees have been served upon the aforementioned Jose R. de Inchausti, nor was there any
attempt to notify or acquaint him with them, in spite of the fact that the court, in fixing the date of the
hearing of the guardian's petition which gave rise to these proceedings, said in each: "Let the
interested parties be notified forthwith of this order" notification which was served in every case
only upon Crossfield & O'Brien, counsel for the guardian.
Things went on in this manner until October 1916 when Messrs. Inchausti & Co., who had
possession of the inheritance of the alleged incompetent from his father, refused to deliver to the
guardian Antonio Ma. Barretto the monthly pension fixed by the court, upon the ground that the
proceedings in guardianship were unlawful as Jose R. de Inchausti did not appear to have ever been
notified of the hearing for the appointment of a guardian, as required by law. Said Antonio Barretto,
upon his own motion, was relieved as guardian and the mother of the alleged insane was reinstated
as such guardian and on May 23, 1917, she presented to the court a petition signed by her, wherein,
after reciting Messrs. Inchausti & Co.'s refusal to deliver the monthly pensions for the reasons
already mentioned and alleging several facts connected with the proceedings had for her
appointment as guardian, she prayed that the record be corrected so as to show now, as before, that
the aforementioned insane had been duly notified of the date of the hearing of the petition and that
the proceedings had were regular and in accordance with law. In view of this petition the court
issued an order fixing the 10th of November of the same year, 1917, as the date of the hearing, and
ordering sent by registered mail to Jose R. de Inchausti a copy of the petition and of all the papers
presented therewith and also expressly ordered that, if possible, another copy of said petition and
papers be handed personally to said demented, notifying him likewise of said order for hearing. This
was the only order of the court which was served upon the alleged insane Jose R. de Inchausti who
was then in Barcelona, Spain; the hearing having been continued until February 16, 1918, when it
was again postponed to April 8, 1918. The court ordered the guardian on the date first mentioned to
notify Jose R. de Inchausti by cablegram of the postponement and of the date on which the hearing
would take place. But, Jose R. de Inchausti sent a cablegram to the Court of First Instance through
the American Consul General at Barcelona, stating that in the following month of March his attorney
in fact with full powers to represent him would arrive in this city, and on the 26th of the same month
of March, attorneys Gutierrez Repide y Socias appeared in this case in behalf of Jose R. de
Inchausti and filed a motion (mentioned in the beginning hereof) to declare null and void all the
proceedings had in this case and to dismiss the petition filed by Maria Consolacion Rico Viuda de
Inchausti, mother of Jose R. de Inchausti, praying appointment as guardian of their son. The court
after hearing said motion, without stating any ground other than that after due consideration he
found that it ought to be denied, did deny by the aforementioned order of May 9, 1918, an appeal
from which by counsel for Jose R. de Inchausti has been decided in the majority opinion to which we
have been referring and from which we dissent.

As appears from the foregoing, two years and four months had passed after the hearing of the
petition of Maria Consolacion Rico viuda de Inchausti's appointment as guardian of the person and
property of her son, Jose R. de Inchausti, alleged to be insane, and after the Court of First Instance
of this city had issued the order of January 18, 1915, granting same by appointing her as guardian,
and because Messrs. Inchausti & Co., believing the guardianship proceedings illegal refused to
deliver the pension and necessary funds for the maintenance of her ward, the supposed insane, said
guardian tried to show the legality of said proceedings and asked for the amendment thereof so as
to make it appear of record. In order to accomplish this object said guardian filed, with her petition of
May 23, 1917, a certificate from Dr. A. P. Goff, Director of the San Lazaro Hospital, dated April 26,
1917, and A. S. Crossfield's affidavit of April 27, of the same year 1917.
In his certificate, after stating that Jose R. de Inchausti was confined in the San Lazaro Hospital in
January 1915, because of mental derangement; that as Director of said Hospital, on the 12th of the
same month of January he received an order signed by J. A. Ostrand, judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, which stated that a petition had been filed with the court alleging that the
aforementioned Jose R. de Inchausti was of unsound mind, that, therefore, in accordance with
section 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure, said petition would be heard at 10 a.m. January 18,
1915, and that he was ordered to appear before said court at said day and hour and to produce if
possible the person of said Jose R. de Inchausti, Dr. Goff went on saying that following the practice
in the hospital in such cases according to his firm belief, the aforesaid Jose R. de Inchausti was
informed immediately, of said order; that as aforesaid, on the day set for the hearing he appeared as
ordered but he did not produce the person of said Jose R. de Inchausti, not deeming it wise on
account of his mental condition; and that he believed that he had so informed the court at the
hearing.
In his affidavit, after alleging that he is an attorney at law practising in this city and has been Jose R.
de Inchausti's legal adviser from the end of 1904 to the beginning of 1915; that Jose R. de Inchausti
being so mentally deranged as to be incompetent to handle his inheritance from his father, Rafael de
Inchausti, a guardian was necessary and as a friend and counselor, he filed the said petition with the
Court of First Instance; which issued an order fixing January 18, 1915, for the hearing, A. S.
Crossfield added that on the 13th of the same month, he, the affiant, visited, as a friend, Jose R. de
Inchausti confined as insane, in the San Lazaro Hospital; that Dr. Goff, then the Director of said
hospital, had mentioned the receipt of an order to appear personally at the hearing for guardianship
and the notification to the said Jose R. de Inchausti of this order; that in the course of conversation
later with the affiant, Jose mentioned of his having been notified of said petition and hearing, saying
they were not necessary as he could attend to his own business; but that, some time afterwards,
having proved to him the necessity of his mother being his guardian, Jose said that accompanied by
a friend who was then in the hospital he would go with his mother to Spain and requested the affiant
to represent him as his next friend and brother mason in all that concerned the partition of the estate
and the guardianship proceedings; that on this and other occasion before the hearing Jose R. de
Inchausti talked rationally about some things, and incoherently about others; that he (the affiant)
appeared at said hearing as Jose's friend; and that as the fact of the notification to the said
incompetent had been confirmed both by Dr. Goff and the incapacitated himself he, the affiant,
acknowledged receipt thereof as it appeared in the record.
If the object of Jose R. de Inchausti's guardian as can be gathered from her motion of May 23, 1917,
presented, as we have said, two years and several months after the hearing of her petition for
appointment as such guardian and after the court's order granting said petition, was to prove that the
provision of section 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been complied with in said hearing and
said appointment, such an object she has not obtained.

In the first place, everything set forth by A. S. Crossfield in his affidavit, relating to the order and to
the personal appearance of the insane Jose R. de Inchausti at the hearing, is hearsay from the
Director of the San Lazaro Hospital, Dr. A. P. Goff, who, in his certificate, did not affirm positively and
certainly Jose R. de Inchausti's personal notification, merely stating that according to his best
knowledge Jose R. de Inchausti was immediately notified of said order in accordance with the
custom observed in the hospital in such cases. This certainly is not affirming that said notification
was carried out for the simple reason that founded as Dr. Goff's belief was on the custom observed
at the hospital in such cases, it cannot infer from this that in this case such custom necessarily was
followed. Undoubtedly Dr. Goff wished to tell and told the whole truth and, that he might not falsify,
neither affirmed nor certified that he, as Director of the Hospital, had notified Jose R. de Inchausti of
the order in question, having merely taken for granted that same had been done; but without even
expressing who had served said notice upon his word. This, in connection with the fact that the copy
of the order fixing the date of the hearing of the petition (as already said) appears to have been
received by F. S. Beck it not appearing who this person may be nor if he belong to the San Lazaro
Hospital, there being no mention of this, nor of the position said F. S. Beck held in said hospital
makes more vague and uncertain Dr. Goff's certification regarding this point in question and,
consequently it is of no use to the petitioner in establishing her object in the aforementioned motion.
In the second place, regarding the said order of the court of January 12, 1915, requiring the Director
of the San Lazaro Hospital for the insane to produce the person of Jose R. de Inchausti at the
hearing, if possible, the said Dr. Goff, in his certificate, confined himself to saying he did not produce
the person of said Jose R. de Inchausti because, taking into consideration his mental condition, he
did not believe it convenient and added that he believed this was what he had testified in curt at the
hearing; i.e., Dr. Goff did not assure, because he wanted to tell the whole truth, that he made such
testimony before the court at the hearing upon his failure to produce in person said Jose R. de
Inchausti in compliance with said order. He only said that he believed he so testified, a statement
which does not make certain that he so did. That which Dr. Goff has so stated noticeably contradicts
that which the guardian said in her aforesaid motion of May 23, 1917, wherein she stated that Dr.
Goff testified at said hearing that the aforesaid Jose R. de Inchausti must not be brought in court at
the trial on account of his mental condition. Thus said guardian has affirmed what Dr. Goff himself
did not attempt to affirm, because he only believed he stated before the court the impossibility to
produce on that occasion the person of Jose R. de Inchausti, as had been ordered. It should be
noted too that Dr. Goff himself in his certificate states that the order of the court, signed by Judge
Ostrand, mentioned that the petition for the appointment of a guardian would be heard in accordance
with section 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that in fact is what said order states. Wherefore
appears more clear Dr. Goff's intention to say no more than the pure truth and not to affirm, as a
certain and positive fact, that which he did not personally know to have been done and that which he
was not sure he had stated before the court at the hearing.
In the third place, in addition to the fact, as we have already said, that everything stated by A. S.
Crossfield in his affidavit relative to the notification of said order is hearsay from Dr. Goff, said A. S.
Crossfield declares in the same affidavit that, in conversation, said Jose R. de Inchausti said he had
been notified of the petition for the appointment of a guardian and of the hearing thereof; that
afterwards he said such an appointment was unnecessary for he (Inchausti) could manage his own
business, but that when he (Crossfield) explained the necessity for appointing his mother as
guardian, he said he (Inchausti) would go to Spain with his mother; and requested the affiant to
represent him as his friend and brother mason in all the guardianship proceedings as well as in the
partition of his state. This conversation must have taken place after the 13th but before the 18th of
the same month of January, 1915, the date of the hearing; and it is evident from what Jose R. de
Inchausti himself has said, according to the affiant A. S. Crossfield, that he was not in such a
condition as to be unable to make similar statement in court, and that his mental condition was not of
such a character as to have rendered him incompetent to talk about, and look after, his own affairs
and, certainly, this is not what would have been said by a mad man whose presence in court would

have been a danger to public order and security. Furthermore, it is rather queer that what the alleged
insane Jose R. de Inchausti said to Crossfield concerning the appointment of his mother as guardian
and his request that Crossfield appear for him in the guardianship proceedings had not been
expressed by Jose R. de Inchausti to Dr. Goff with whom he was constantly in contact. This would
have been one of the reasons which Dr. Goff could have alleged before the court for his failure to
produce the person of Jose R. de Inchausti as he had been ordered. Furthermore, it does not
appear elsewhere, except in A. S. Crossfield's own testimony, that he as friend was authorized to
appear for the aforesaid Jose R. de Inchausti in this guardianship proceedings, and although as
friend, it appears that on January 12, 1915, A. S. Crossfield received a copy of the aforementioned
order fixing the date of hearing of the petition for the appointment of a guardian it should be
observed, on the one hand, that the same A. S. Crossfield was a member of the law firm Crossfield
& O'Brien, counsel for the petitioner Maria Consolacion Rico viuda de Inchausti who signed said
petition and that he was also the person who verified the petition, as a member of the said law firm,
and as the best friend of Jose R. de Inchausti. These facts ought to be considered as legal
impediments against Crossfield's appearing in the guardianship proceedings for the person against
whom said petition was filed, though apparently for the welfare and best interest of such person. On
the other, the text of section 559 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings,
many times cited in this opinion, is very definite; it orders that the supposed insane be notified five
days before the date fixed of the time and place of hearing of the petition for the appointment of a
guardian when said petition is filed by any relative or friend and it also orders that, if possible, said
person must be produced. Therefore, the supposed insane person, for whom a guardian is to be
appointed, is placed and considered not as on the side of the relative or friend who filed the petition,
but (graphically speaking) as opposed to said relative or friend, which simply means that the same
relative or friend who has petitioned for the appointment of a guardian cannot represent nor appear
at the hearing of said petition or in the guardianship proceeding in behalf of said insane and
incompetent person. In a word, A. S. Crossfield, being one of the counsel for the petitioner and
calling himself friend of Jose R. de Inchausti as he has so stated in verifying the petition made a part
of these proceedings, could not and should have represented Jose R. de Inchausti as friend in the
proceedings for the appointment of guardian, because this is equivalent to simultaneously
representing two opposing parties, defending different and antagonistic interests. Therefore, the fact
that A. S. Crossfield, who called himself Jose R. de Inchausti's friend, had received, as such friend a
copy of said order and had been present at the hearing is of no consequence whatever; nor should it
be taken into consideration at all in determining whether the supposed insane person was previously
notified of the order fixing the date of the hearing and of the petition for the appointment of his
guardian and whether he was duly represented at the hearing and is in these proceedings, since
said Crossfield was also counsel for the petitioner and since, as he stated in his affidavit, he
pretended to be the representative of said Jose R. de Inchausti in these proceedings. And this is
perfectly understood because if A. S. Crossfield is one of the counsel who signed the guardian's
petition, verified it and appeared at the hearing as petitioner's counsel, according to His Honor Judge
Ostrand himself, in the aforementioned order of January 18, 1915, he (Crossfield) would not have
opposed or impugned said petition nor would he have tried that Jose R. de Inchausti was not
suffering from insanity and indeed was competent to take care of his person and property, but, on
the contrary, as counsel for the petitioner, he would have maintained at the hearing what was
claimed by his said client, as in fact he did by examining Dr. Goff, who was present as a witness for
said petitioner, regarding Jose R. de Inchausti`s mental condition and at the same time presenting
the two certificates Exhibits A and B aforementioned, the first of Dr. Goff's and the second of Drs.
Musgrave and Fitzpartrick.
Finally, in so far as concerned his relations with Jose R. de Inchausti for whom, as a demented
incapable of administering his property, a guardian was asked, A. S. Crossfield was in the same
state and situation as Maria Consolacion herself, viuda de Inchausti and mother of said Jose R. de
Inchausti, for as such friend of his and petitioner's counsel, he verified said petition, wherefore he
could not legally have represented him either at the hearing or in the guardianship proceedings for

the same reason that the mother herself, the nearest relative of the alleged insane, could not
represent him, she being the person who, on the ground of the incompetency of her son to
administer his property, asked to be appointed as his guardian.
In conclusion, after a careful study of the proceedings, the irregularities, the anomalies and the
violations of the law committed in this case stand out in bold relief, and the petitioner's effort, two
years and four months afterwards, to show compliance with the law had been unfruitful. The very
claim of the guardian-petitioner, that the record be corrected so as to show Jose R. de Inchausti as
having been duly notified of the hearing of her petition, is an implied admission that same did not
appear in the proceedings and, consequently, that said notice had not been fulfilled. Regarding the
presentation of the person of Jose R. de Inchausti (then in San Lazaro Hospital) by the director of
said hospital, expressly ordered by the court on January 12, 1915, in accordance with section 559 of
the Code of Civil Procedure a production also required by section 4 of Act No. 2122 invoked in the
majority opinion it is evident that the correction of the record, asked by the guardian, regarding
this particular point, far from being carried out or being considered as corrected through Dr. Goff's
certificate and A. S. Crossfield's affidavit already mentioned, has once more proven and confirmed
the fact that in these proceedings the precepts of the aforementioned statutory provisions have been
openly infringed.
In view of this result, we do not believe it necessarily to go further into the legal consideration of the
consequences of said infraction. Enough for our purpose to recall and reproduce herein what was
said and decreed by this High Court in the case of Yangco vs. Court of First Instance of Manila and
Yangco (29 Phil. Rep., 183), wherein petitioner Luis R. Yangco, adjudge a spendthrift by an order of
said judge, prayed that the proceedings had be declared null and void upon the ground that the court
had acted without jurisdiction in the premises, as the proceedings were had and the decree entered
without notice to the petitioner.
lawphil.net

In one of the paragraphs of the said decision of this High Court, it was said, citing cases and
doctrines pertinent to the case:
To declare a person of full age to be incompetent to manage his affairs and thereby deprive
him of the possession of and right to hold and manage his property is a serious thing. It
takes from him one of the greatest privileges of life in contravention of those fundamental
rights which all men naturally have to possess, control, manage, and enjoy their own
property. It is for this reason that the courts generally hold that the statute permitting a
declaration of incompetency and the appointment of guardians for the property of
incompetents must be strictly followed, and any material departure therefrom, especially with
respect to notice, results in a loss of jurisdiction. So careful was the Legislature to see to it
that no one should be declared an incompetent and deprived of his property without full
opportunity to be heard that, in framing section 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it not only
required personal notice to the alleged incompetent but also provided that he shall be
present in court during the proceedings, if he be able to attend; and ability to attend does not
in our judgment, relate to absence but to physical condition. . . .
And in the syllabus of that decision it was declared:
Where, in a proceeding to have the court declare that the person against whom the
proceeding is directed is a spendthrift and incompetent to manage his property, the statute
provides that on presentation, of a petition, duly verified, alleging that a given person is a
spendthrift and incompetent to manage his estate, the court or judge must cause notice to be
given to the alleged incompetent of the time and place of the hearing on the petition, not less
than 5 days before the time set for the hearing and further requiring that such person must

be produced on the hearing if he is able to attend, such notice is jurisdictional and the failure
to give such notice deprives the court or judge of power to make a valid decrees affecting the
interest of the alleged incompetent.
Where the statute in such a proceeding requires personal notice and there is no provision for
other notice, notice to a person other than the alleged incompetent, although it may be a
near relative or friend, does not comply with the statute and confers no jurisdiction on the
court or judge.
Persons cannot be deprived without due process of law of the right to hold and manage their
own property.
It is very clear that everything said about a spendthrift in the aforementioned decision of this court is
also applicable to the case of an alleged insane for whom the appointment of a guardian is asked by
a relative or a friend, because section 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes, as is well
known, the same procedure to be followed where the petition is filed for one case or the other.
Therefore, all the proceedings had in this case, since the decree of January 18, 1915, whereby
Maria Consolacion Rico viuda de Inchausti was appointed guardian of her son, the supposed insane
Jose R. de Inchausti, are null and void, and it should have been so held, and the decree of May 9,
1919, appealed from, should have been reserved. Such is our opinion.

G.R. No. L-11739, Mercader v.

Wislizenus
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
August 25, 1916
G.R. No. L-11739
CESAR MERCADER, petitioner,
vs.
ADOLPH WISLIZENUS, judge of the Twentieth Judicial
District, respondent.

Tomas Alonso for petitioner. Williams, Ferrier and SyCip for

respondent.
MORELAND, J.:
This is a proceeding in this court to obtain a writ
of certiorari directed to the Court of First Instance of the Twentieth
Judicial District requiring it to send up the record in a proceeding
taken to declare Vicente Escio a lunatic and incompetent to manage
her affairs and for the appointment of a guardian of her person and
property, and, in case such proceeding or any portion thereof is
found by this court to have been taken outside or in excess of the
jurisdiction of the court, to vacate and annul the same.
It is alleged in the complaint that proceedings were duly
commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Twentieth Judicial
District to declare Vicenta Escio a lunatic and incompetent to
manage her affairs and to appoint a guardian of her property. After
the hearing and investigation required by the Code of Civil
Procedure the court found the respondent to be a lunatic and
incompetent to manage her business and affairs and appointed
Pantaleon E. del Rosario guardian of her property. An appeal from
the order of incompetency and appointment of a guardian was duly
taken to this court by those opposing the proceedings. While the
appeal was in progress and still pending the guardian named made
an application to the Court of First Instance under section 573 of
the Code of Civil Procedure in which he alleged that Cesar Mercader,
the plaintiff in this proceeding, had taken possession of and was
engaged in secreting certain property of the incompetent and was
collecting and reducing to possession certain moneys belonging to
her; and that, although called upon by the guardian to deliver such
property and funds to him as such guardian, Mercader had refused
to do so and still retains possession thereof claiming that he is
entitled thereto. Due notice having been given and a hearing had,
the court made an order directed to Mercader requiring him to
appear before the court of 9 o'clock on the 24th day of March, 1916,

and then and there to show cause why he should not deliver the
property in question to the guardian of the incompetent.
The contention of the plaintiff here is that the order in question,
requiring the plaintiff in this proceeding to show cause as aforesaid,
was made without and in excess of the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance for the reason that, the order declaring Vicenta Escio
an incompetent and appointing Del Rosario guardian of her property
having been appealed to the Supreme Court, the Court of First
Instance was deprived of all jurisdiction over that proceeding and
was accordingly wholly unauthorized to take any further steps
therein and particularly the one which resulted in the order to show
cause referred to.
The case having been duly submitted to this court on the merits we
proceed to the determination thereof. We do not agree with counsel
for the plaintiff. The order declaring the incompetency and
appointing a guardian was good, until reversed or set aside, and
authorized the guardian, in spite of the appeal, to do whatever was
necessary, under the direction of the court, to protect the property
of the incompetent. It was not only a right which the court may
exercise but it was one which it ought to exercise, it having been
shown that Vicenta Escio was incompetent, to see to it that her
property was protected during the pendency of the appeal and to
prevent its being wasted or converted by designing persons.
Proceedings to declare persons incompetent to manage their affairs
and to appoint guardians for them and their property are within the
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance by express provision of law
and they are consequently authorized and required to decide all
questions which may arise therein during their progress through the
courts. So far as the jurisdiction of the court is concerned it is of no
consequence which way a particular question may be decided. The
fact remains that the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and
that it had authority to decide any question connected herewith. We

have held in many cases that certiorari will lie only in cases where
the court has acted outside or in excess of its jurisdiction and its
action for that reason is void (Government of the Philippine Islands
vs. Judge of First Instance of Iloilo and Bantillo, ante, p. 157; Arzadon
vs. Chanco, 14 Phil. Rep., 710; In re Prautch, 1 Phil. Rep., 132;
Springer vs. Odlin, 3 Phil. Rep., 344; Napa vs. Weissenhagen, 29 Phil.
Rep., 180; De fiesta vs. Llorente and Manila Railroad Co., 25 Phil.
Rep., 554; Herrera vs. Barretto and Joaquin, 25 Phil. Rep., 245; Gala
vs. Cui and Rodriguez, 25 Phil. Rep., 522; Province of Tarlac vs.
Gale, 26 Phil. Rep., 338.)
While the power of the Court of First Instance with regard to a
judgment or an order is very much restricted by reason of the fact
that an appeal has been perfected, this fact does not mean that the
proceeding in which the appeal was taken, and all of the incidents
thereof, are withdrawn from the consideration of the court. The
proceeding as such is still within the jurisdiction of the court,
although certain parts thereof have been withdrawn from the
operation of its powers by the appeal. (Velasco & Co. vs. Gochuico &
Co., 28 Phil. Rep., 39.) In the case before us the court had
jurisdiction to require the plaintiff herein to show cause in the
manner ordered and in doing so he did not subject himself to review
by certiorari.
The complaint is dismissed on the merits, with costs. So ordered.
Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur. Johnson and Trent, JJ., concur in the
result.