449 U.S.

1
101 S.Ct. 42
66 L.Ed.2d 1

State of COLORADO
v.
Peter Rodney BANNISTER.
No. 79-1901.
Oct. 20, 1980.

PER CURIAM.

In the early morning of October 15, 1979, an officer of the Colorado Springs
Police Department observed a blue 1967 Pontiac GTO automobile moving
along a road at a speed above the legal limit. Before the officer could pursue
the vehicle, it disappeared from his sight. Shortly thereafter, the officer heard a
police radio dispatch reporting that a theft of motor vehicle parts had occurred
in the area he was patrolling in his car. The radio dispatch announced that a
number of chrome lug nuts were among the items stolen, and provided a
description of two suspects. A few minutes after hearing the report, the officer
spotted the same automobile he had seen earlier, still speeding. He saw the car
enter a service station, and followed it there for the purpose of issuing a traffic
citation to its driver.

As the officer approached the car, both of its occupants, including the
respondent, stepped out of it. A conversation between the officer and the
respondent ensued, just outside the closed front door of the automobile. At this
time, the officer observed chrome lug nuts in an open glove compartment
located between the vehicle's front bucket seats, as well as two lug wrenches on
the floorboard of the back seat. These items were in plain view, illuminated by
the lights of the service station. Recognizing that the respondent and his
companion met the description of those suspected of stealing motor vehicle
parts, the officer immediately arrested both of them. He then seized the lug nuts
and wrenches.

Before the date scheduled for his trial on charges of stealing motor vehicle

parts, the respondent moved to suppress the items that the arresting officer had
seized. The trial court granted the motion, and its decision was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Colorado.1 The State subsequently filed a petition for
certiorari in this Court.
4

The provisions of the Fourth Amendment are enforceable against the States
through the Fourteenth, and it is axiomatic that "searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically
established and well delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). One of these exceptions,
recognized at least since Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280,
69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), exists when an automobile or other vehicle is stopped and
the police have probable cause to believe it contains evidence of a crime. See
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 760, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2591, 61 L.Ed.2d 235
(1979). Carroll upheld the legality of a search that was conducted immediately
after a vehicle was stopped. Since Carroll, warrantless searches have been
found permissible even when a car was searched after being seized and moved
to a police station. Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 304, 46 L.Ed.2d 209
(1975); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419
(1970). In each of these latter cases, the search was constitutionally permissible
because an immediate, on-the-scene search would have been permissible. Texas
v. White, supra, 423 U.S., at 67, 96 S.Ct., at 305; Chambers v. Maroney, supra,
399 U.S., at 52, 90 S.Ct., at 1981.

At issue in the present case is a seizure that occurred on the scene shortly after
a speeding car was stopped. Thus, if there was probable cause "that the
contents of the automobile offend against the law," Carroll, supra, 267 U.S., at
159, 45 S.Ct., at 287 the warrantless seizure was permissible.2

Probable cause in this case is self-evident. Indeed, the Supreme Court of

Colorado acknowledged that there was probable cause, but mistakenly
concluded that a warrant was required to open the car door and seize the items
within.

The officer could not stop the vehicle the first time he detected it speeding, but
he accosted it at his next opportunity, when it entered the service station. His
subsequent approach to the side of the automobile in order to issue a traffic
citation to its driver was entirely legitimate.3 Standing by the front door of the
car, the officer happened to see items matching the description of some of those
recently stolen in the vicinity, and observed that the occupants of the car met
the description of those suspected of the crime. These circumstances provided

not only probable cause to arrest, but also under Carroll and Chambers,
probable cause to seize the incriminating items without a warrant.4
8

The petition for certiorari and the respondent's motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis are granted, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado is
set aside, and the case is remanded to that court for proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

(Colo.) 607 P.2d 987.

Another factor that contributes to the justification for the absence of a warrant
in such a situation is that "the circumstances that furnish probable cause to
search a particular auto for particular articles are most often unforeseeable."
Chambers, supra, 399 U.S., at 50-51, 90 S.Ct., at 1981. See also Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974). This
factor applies with particular force in this case. As the reason for the stop was
wholly unconnected with the reason for the subsequent seizure, it would be
especially unreasonable to require a detour to a magistrate before the
unanticipated evidence could be lawfully seized.

There can be no question that the stopping of a vehicle and the detention of its
occupants constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-558, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3082-3083, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116
(1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574,
2578, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975).

The respondent does not dispute that the items seized were illuminated by the
lights of the service station, nor that they were in the plain view of the officer
as he spoke to him beside the front door of the car. There was no evidence
whatsoever that the officer's presence to issue a traffic citation was a pretext to
confirm any other previous suspicion about the occupants.