Hermana R. Cerezo vs.

David Tuazon
G.R. No. 141538
March 23, 2004
CARPIO, J.
Facts: A County Bus Lines passenger bus, owned
by Mrs. Cerezo and driven by Foronda, collided
with a tricycle driven by Tuazon. Because of this,
Tuazon filed a complaint for damages on the basis
of quasi-delict against Mrs. Cerezo and Foronda.
Summons were served to Mrs. Cerezo but not to
Foronda.
The trial court then rendered a decision finding
Mrs. Cerezo liable for damages. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence,
the current petition.
It is the contention of Mrs. Cerezo that the trial
court cannot validly render judgment as against
her because Foronda, an indispensable party, was
not served with summons. In addition, Tuazon has
failed to reserve his right to file a separate civil
action.
Issue: Whether or not the judgment of the trial
court is binding upon Mrs. Cerezo despite the
failure of Tuazon to reserve his right to file a
separate civil action.
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the
judgment as against Mrs. Cerezo is valid and
binding because the civil case that was filed is
based on quasi-delict (Article 2176 of the Civil
Code) and therefore there is no more need to
reserve the right to file a separate civil action.
To clarify, the Court stated that the same
negligent act may give rise to a civil liability
arising from a delict under Article 103 of the RPC
or a quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. The choice falls upon the petitioner which
of the two he would utilize to prosecute his claim.
If he chooses to file his claim under Article 2176,
then such case shall proceed independently of
the civil action.
It is also important to note that there is a
distinction between the civil liability ex delicto

and quasi-delict. In case of a quasi-delict, the

employers liability under Article 2180 is not only
solidary but is also primary and direct. This
means that in order to hold the employer liable
for damages, it is not necessary that the actual
tortfeasor be impleaded as an indispensable
party. Moreover, the liability of two or more
persons for quasi-delict, being solidary, the
petitioner may go after each of them for the
whole obligation. Hence, the actual tortfeasor is
neither an indispensable nor a necessary party in
a complaint for damages against an employer
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
With this, it is the Courts conclusion that there is
no need to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda (the
actual tortfeasor) before Mrs. Cerezo (the
employer of Foronda) may be held liable under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. This is because the
liability of the employer under such article is
primary, direct and solidary.
Note: The Supreme Court, in justifying this
ruling, cited it ruling in the case of Barredo vs.
Garcia, which states that, To hold that there is
only one way to make defendants liability
effective, and that is, to sue the driver and
exhaust his (the latters) property first, would be
tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a
devious and cumbersome method of obtaining
relief. True, there is such a remedy under our
laws, but there is also a more expeditious way,
which is based on the primary and direct
responsibility of the defendant under article
[2180] of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is
more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs,
because the procedure indicated by the
defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it
being a matter of common knowledge that
professional drivers of taxis and other similar
public conveyances do not have sufficient means
with which to pay damages. Why, then, should
the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through
this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably
useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts
have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the
pathways of right and justice.