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the Crucified:
A Study in the Liberation
Christology of Jon Sobrino
Sturla J. Stlsett
Peter Lang
Volume 127
PETER LANG
Bern
Berlin
Bruxelles
Frankfurt am Main
New York
Oxford
Wien
Sturla J. Stlsett
PETER LANG
Bern
Berlin
Bruxelles
Frankfurt am Main
Wien
ISSN 0170-9240
ISBN 3-906767-11-6
US-ISBN 0-8204-5341-2
Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Introduction
Theology, Suffering and Praxis
on the Brink of the Millennium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
[1] Naming our Present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
[2] The crucified and the Crucified . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
[3] Liberation Theology in Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
[4] Purpose and Plan of Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
i. Theology in a Crucified Reality
Point of Departure and Fundamental Presuppositions . . . 41
[1] Foundational Experience:
Siding with the Poor in El Salvador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
[2] Theology in a Crucified Reality:
Fundamental Presuppositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
a) To be Honest about Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
b) The Importance of the Theological Location . . . 49
c) The Poor as Theological Location . . . . . . . . . . . 57
d) Liberation of the Poor as
Theological Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
e) The Priority of Praxis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
f) Theology as Interpretation of Reality . . . . . . . . . 99
g) Theology as Intellectus Amoris . . . . . . . . . . . . .103
[3] Main Theological Heritage and Framework:
Jesuit Spirituality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .105
[4] Critical Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
[5] Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .122
vii
viii
219
219
225
237
241
246
258
ix
Preface
12
manuscript at different stages, and gave their constructive and critical comments.
Furthermore, I wish to thank the Norwegian Research Council
and the Faculty of Theology, University of Oslo for making this
work financially and practically possible; Brian McNeil, Peder Nustad and Andy Thomas for proof-reading and linguistic assistance;
Dag Tjemsland and Christian Myhre-Nielsen for computer assistance; and Roger Jensen for the laborious process of making the
manuscript ready for print in the present version.
Last but not least, I wish to thank Anne Veiteberg, my
compaera de vida, and our two children dne and Eivor, for all
their love and support.
There is no gratitude that remains silent forever (Sobrino).
Great gratitude is due to each one of these. And yet they should not
be held responsible for the end result.
As to the translations of the texts quoted in this book, I have
used already existing English translations where available, and only
altered them where I have found it necessary. Where the texts are
available only in Spanish, I have made my own translations, while
providing the original Spanish wording in the notes. I have used
The New English Bible, 1970 (NEB) for Bible quotations. Abbreviations are explained in the text.
This study is dedicated to the memory of Helge Hummelvoll, a
friend and a photographer, who was shot dead on a mission in
Southern Sudan on the 27th of September 1992; and to the memories of Dordi Eika, Kristin Fadum, John Finstad, Geir Nybraaten
and Elbjrg Aadland, who lost their lives in the aeroplane disaster at
the Chichontepec volcanoe, El Salvador on the 9th of August 1995.
Their dedication remains a costly sign of solidarity with crucified peoples.
Oslo, August 2002
Sturla J. Stlsett
13
14
Introduction
Theology, Suffering and Praxis
on the Brink of the Millennium
From a concrete experience of suffering there emerges a new theological perspective. In Aguilares, a small village in El Salvador in the
turbulent days of June 1977, a bishop consoled a terrified population by referring them to, comparing them with, even identifying
them with the crucified Christ. A theologian present, accompany1
Sobrino 1989e, 34-35. See also Sobrino 1992b, 86, Sobrino 1991d, 425 and
Cardenal, Martn-Bar, and Sobrino 1996, 207-212; 208.
15
ing the bishop and the people in their celebration of faith in those
moments of inexplicable terror, reflected on the theological content
of this consolation. It is new, and yet old: to recognise the face of
Jesus the Crucified in the faces of the humiliated and downtrodden
of today, and to signal this recognition by naming their suffering
crucifixion.
This focus coincides with a general mood of profound reorientation in contemporary Christian theology. Johann Baptist Metz,
speaking from the perspective of post-war Germany, has raised the
fundamental issue of how to do theology after Auschwitz.2 From
the perspective of Aguilares and of other war-ridden and poor communities of faith in El Salvador, Latin America, and the South, Jon
Sobrino reformulates the question: How to do theology during
Auschwitz?3 How to do theology, try to speak of, reflect upon, act
upon the reality of God in the midst of a world of innocent suffering? 4
In a similar vein to Metz, another German theologian, Jrgen
Moltmann, indicated a new departure in contemporary theology in
2
3
16
Cf. e.g. Metz 1994, 611, and Metz 1984, reprinted in Metz and Moltmann
1995: 38-48.
Sobrino 1994c, 252. Sobrino 1991d, 422: Y es que en Amrica Latina no
hacemos teologa despus de Auschwitz, sino durante Auschwitz [],
Sobrino writes, with reference to a poem by P. Casaldliga.
This question is central to Latin American liberation theology. Gustavo
Gutirrez has framed the question similarly from the perspective of Peru: It
needs to be realized, however, that for us Latin Americans the question is not
precisely how are we to do theology after Auschwitz? The reason is that in
Latin America we are still experiencing the every day violation of human
rights, murder, and the torture that we find so blameworthy in the Jewish
holocaust of World War II. [] In Peru, therefore but the question is perhaps symbolic of all Latin America we must ask: How are we to do theology while Ayacucho lasts? How are we to speak of the God of life when cruel
murder on a massive scale goes on in the corner of the dead? Gutirrez
1987, 102. Cf. Gutirrez 1990a.
17
No matter how one may wish to assess the precision and the
actual content of this name and this is what we are about to examine it can hardly be regarded as irrelevant. Towards the turn of the
millennium, world history seems to have entered into a remarkably
contradictory and confusing phase. The twentieth century, one of
the worst of human history, has witnessed absurd, radical suffering
of such a character that it seems to be beyond the scope of traditional theodicies.8 Indeed, the unworlds9 of concentration camps,
gulags, killing fields, war zones and nuclear waste dumps were not
restricted to the earlier part of the century, so that we could, with a
certain relief and satisfaction, regard them as nightmares from
which we now finally have woken up; evils of the past, now at
last overcome by progress, maturity, rationality. The silent litanies
from Rwanda, Iraq, Bosnia and Central America barely audible
after the media switched their microphones off and moved their
cameras to other sites, but not less painfully real still echo
throughout the human community. And before, during and after
such spectacular events of repugnant and incomprehensible evil
there is an even more dramatic reality of ordinary, every-day catastrophes: de-humanising poverty, ecological disintegration, and generalised discrimination on the basis of sex, race, belief or conviction.
7
8
9
18
Jon Sobrino was born in Barcelona in 1938. His parents were of Basque origin, and he grew up in Pas Vasco. He joined the Jesuit order in 1956, and one
year later he came to El Salvador for the first time. Since then, he has lived in
El Salvador, with the exception of two lengthy periods of studies abroad. He
studied Literature, Philosophy and the Science of Engineering at St. Louis
University, USA. His theological doctorate studies were carried out in
Frankfurt, between 1968 and 1974, see Sobrino 1975c. Jon Sobrino was a
close advisor to Archbishop Oscar A. Romero. He is now professor of theology and philosophy at the Universidad Centroamericana Jos Simen Caas
(UCA), in San Salvador, El Salvador.
See Deneken 1993, 53-64.
Farley 1996, ibid.
And yet there are those who willingly and even joyfully proclaim ours as a golden age. In 1989, the year of the downfall of the
Berlin wall and hence the end of the Cold War, North American
historian Francis Fukuyama announced that the end of history now
finally has dawned upon us, in the form of liberal democracy as the
end point of mankinds ideological evolution and the final form
of human government.10 Fukuyama is well aware of the reality of
the millions and millions of victims in the twentieth century, and
that they would deny that there is such a thing as historical
progress. And yet, he writes, good news has come,11 because liberal democracy remains the only coherent political aspiration that
spans different regions and cultures around the globe, and furthermore, liberal principles in economics the free market have
spread, and have succeeded in producing unprecedented levels of
material prosperity.12
The perspective of Fukuyama and other self-congratulatory
masters of ceremony of the brave new world order13 is not only
10 Fukuyamas argument first appeared in an article in The National Interest in
the summer of 1989, entitled The End of History? It is expanded and further developed in Fukuyama 1992.
11 Fukuyama 1992, xiii.
12 Fukuyama 1992, ibid.
13 Nelson-Pallmeyer 1992. At the outbreak and as a justification of the Gulf
War in January 1991, there was much talk of a new world order. NelsonPallmeyer quotes the following statement by President George Bush: We
will succeed in the Gulf. And when we do, the world community will have
sent an enduring warning to any dictator or despot, present or future, who
contemplates outlaw aggression. The world can, therefore, seize this opportunity to fulfill the long-held promise of a new world order, where brutality
will go unrewarded and aggression will meet collective resistance [] The
cost of closing our eyes to aggression is beyond mankinds power to imagine.
This we do know: Our cause is just; our cause is moral; our cause is right.
State of Union Address, January 29, 1991, quoted from Nelson-Pallmeyer
1992, x.
19
that which emerges at the end of history. It is certainly also the perspective of historys victors. These victors fail to perceive that the
post-Cold War-world by no means meets the hopeful expectations
that people were justified in having. The termination of the conflict
between the East and the West seems only to have re-opened and
strengthened another front, the North-South.14 In this situation, an
increasing part of the worlds population has become dispensable,
insignificant, excluded. There is a whole (two-thirds) world left
over.15
Christian theology finds itself deeply challenged by this world
situation. Prompted by a marked shift towards a more polycentric,
ecumenical, cross-cultural theology as the centre of gravity of World
Christianity has moved South, the voices of these suffering others
are gradually making themselves heard.16 New theologies are
emerging, embedded in the same Christian tradition, but building
on different experiences and addressing new situations. Latin American liberation theology has been a main impetus and an important
14 The 20th century started late, in 1914, with the great confrontation between
capitalism and socialism, and ended early, in 1989, with the toppling of the
Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. The 21th century has begun with a
confrontation between North and South, between capital and labor. Xabier
Gorostiaga, rector of Jesuit university Universidad Centroamericana in Managua, Nicaragua, and also president of the Regional Coordinator of Economic and Social Research (CRIES), in a speech to the Conference of the
Latin America Sociology Association, in Havana, May 1991. See Gorostiaga
1991, 31-43; 31.
15 I have described and analysed some aspects of this world situation in the
article Stlsett 1995a and in Stlsett 1995c. Gorostiaga, op. cit.: 35, comments:
It is revealing that precisely when the end of history and the triumph of
capitalism are being announced, the World Bank published its Report on
World Development 1990: Poverty, in which it emphasized poverty as the most
pressing question of the decade. The reality of a billion people throughout
the world with less than a $370 annual income is not only shameful, it is
unsustainable.
20
21
22
23
tory? Are they called so merely because they resemble Jesus in his
suffering and death, or because they in a more direct manner represent him or are identified with him? What light is shed on this reality of contemporary suffering by the life, suffering and death of
Jesus? And vice versa: what light can this reality, these suffering
human beings possibly provide in our continuous struggle with the
fundamental christological questions of the ultimate significance of
Jesus Christ and his relevance for humanity today? Does such naming imply a levelling of Jesus and other victims or martyrs in history, so that in the end he becomes little more than the exemplary
martyr? Or does it on the contrary imply that suffering people are
elevated to the status of saviours? If that should be the case, would it
be of any help to those who suffer themselves?
Sobrinos thinking on these matters has received world-wide
attention. The number of studies and dissertations in this field is
now considerable, and rapidly increasing.25 My particular emphasis
in the interpretation of Sobrino on this theme will be to see the crucified people in constitutive relatedness26 to the crucified Jesus in the
first place, and to the mystery of God in the second place. This is, in
my view, an approach that does justice to Sobrinos own intentions.
In his christology this idea of constitutive relatedness plays an
important role.27 According to this view it is not something intrinsic to an object or a person which defines what it, he or she is. Its,
25 I consider the dissertations of Martin Maier: Maier 1992, and Nancy Elizabeth Bedford (under professor Jrgen Moltmann, Tbingen): Bedford 1993
to be the most important. The colloquium in the Karl-Franzens University
in Graz, in 1992, where Jon Sobrino and theologians from Eastern and Western Europe met to discuss Sobrinos approach, is also of particular interest.
The main contributions to this seminar are published in Knig and Larcher
1992.
26 Relacionalidad constitutiva, cf. Sobrino 1976, xiii, xvi, 73; Sobrino 1978a,
50, 60, 70, 73. Compare Moltmann 1974, 11.
24
25
26
27
28
cal situation and course of events change and can be changed. Theology is an act of reflection within this process of historical
transformation.
This is exactly what has happened, then: in Latin America, as in
the world at large, the historical situation has changed, and changed
drastically. The Nicaraguan Jesuit and leading social scientist Xabier
Gorostiaga spoke in 1991 of a crucible of Copernican changes,
greater than those seen in the 1914-1917 period.35 In Latin America,
these changes come in times of cholera,36 he continues, thus referring to the depth of the economic and political crisis facing this
continent.
Economically, there is broad agreement in that the 1980s was a
lost decade for Latin America. In this period Latin America
decreased its participation in the international market from 7% to
4%, at the same time as foreign investment stock dropped from
12,3% in 1980 to 5,8% in 1989. The UN Economic Commission on
Latin America (ECLA) estimates that the number of people living
in poverty in the region increased from 112 to 184 million people in
the same period.37 Gorostiagas conclusion is that Latin Americas
financial and productive debacle in the 1980s could be compared to
the worst years of colonial pillage.38 Another leading analyst, Jorge
35 Gorostiaga 1991, 31.
36 This expression is a play of words in Spanish. Clera refers to the epidemic
disease which, after having been eradicated from the continent, re-ocurred at
the end of the 80s in the slums and poor communities of several countries in
Latin America, in the opinion of many due to the increasing poverty particularly among the urban masses as a result of the austere structural adjustment economic policies that were pursued all over the continent. At the
same time, clera means rage or extreme anger. The expression is, of course,
also a reference to Gabriel Garca Mrquez novel Love in the Times of Cholera.
37 Gorostiaga 1991, 33.
38 Ibid.
29
Castaeda, calls this the worst economic and social crisis since the
Depression.39 If it were not for illegal drug exports, emigration,
and an income-reducing but shock-absorbing informal economy,
Castaeda believes, the outcome would have been far more tragic.40
Increasing poverty is sadly not at all a new phenomenon in
Latin America. What is new, however, is the character of this poverty, and the political and ideological climate within which it
occurs. Analysing the socio-political transformations in Latin
America between 1972 and 1992, Manuel Antonio Garretn, like
many other observers, highlights a positive development too: the
profound process of democratisation that the continent has gone
through.41 Today practically all Latin American countries have
legally constituted and democratically elected governments, a fact
not many would have dared to predict just a decade ago. But this
process has not been accompanied to the same extent by a social
and economic democratisation.42
Two lessons from the last two decades are crucial for appreciating the complexity of the current situation, according to Garretn.43 Firstly, that those visions which held that growth and
development in and by themselves would secure a social change
towards more equity, democracy and social integration have failed.
In order to achieve this, some kind of conscious redistributive
action is indispensable. And secondly, that those political models
which implied redistribution by way of revolution have failed.
Where this was tried, the result was generally that those who origi39 Castaeda 1993, 5. Castaedas figures are even more negative: In 1980, 120
million Latin Americans, or 39% of the areas population, lived in poverty;
by 1985 the number had grown to 160-170 million; toward the end of the
decade it was estimated at the apalling figure of 240 million. Op. cit., 5-6.
40 Op. cit., 6.
41 Garretn 1993.
42 Op. cit., 23.
43 Op. cit., 18.
30
44 Op. cit., 18. See also the interesting passage on pages 24-25: Estamos, as
lejos del ideologismo revolucionario o contrarrevolucionario que supona el
fin de las contradicciones a partir de una lucha por el poder para resolver la
contradiccin principal, la que automticamente resolva las otras. []
(E)stamos tambin lejos del ideologismo reaccionario que afirma el fin de la
historia y de las acciones colectivos por el mejoramiento de las condiciones
de la vida individual y social. No han desaparecido las viejas luchas por la
igualdad, la libertad y la independencia e identidad nacionales. Pero ahora
tales luchas se complejifican, tecnifican, autonomizan, y no se dejan identificar con sistemas ideolgicos monolticos; y adems se une a ellas la lucha
por la expansin de la subjetividad, por la felicidad y la autoafirmacin, que
dejan de ser monoplio de los sectores socio-econmicos priveligiados. La
principal conclusin es que ya no puede pensarse en un sujeto nico de la
historia porque cada uno de estos procesos y dimensiones de la vida social
reconoce sujetos y actores diferentes que a veces pueden incluso encontrarse
en bandos contrarios en algunas de estas dimensiones. Ello implica, adems,
que el repertorio de las formas de accin colectiva heredado de la matriz
clsica es insuficiente y entra en cuestin aunque no puede ni debe ser eliminado en la medida que no se resolvieron las contradicciones del pasado. Las
puras luchas antagnicas deben ser combinadas con bsquedas de consensos
bsicos.
31
32
dominantly takes place among the poor segments of the population,49 it represents a particular challenge to liberation theology.
What is behind this phenomenon? What may its consequences be?
In this matter, liberation theology seems to be moving from a position of neglect and superficial rejection to a more nuanced analysis.
Among the self-critical questions particularly relevant to liberation
theology in this connection is the following: Where is the true
church of the poor to be found?
These developments have put liberation theology to the test: is
it still a liberating theology for the poor of Latin America, and elsewhere? Criticisms and self-criticisms abound.50 However, as Christian theologians know well, times of crisis and trial are
simultaneously times of new possibilities. What future for liberation theology then: will it stand the test? Through our reflection on
Sobrinos expression the crucified people, or the crucified in history, and its constitutive relationship to the crucified Jesus Christ
the crucified and the Crucified as a representative and central
tenet of liberation theology, we shall join in this discussion on the
validity and relevance of this particular strand in contemporary theology at the turn of the millennium.
I hope to show that the focus chosen for this study will be particularly fruitful in view of the present situation of crisis and opportunities. For, in spite of all the changes, one thing is for certain: the
reality of suffering has not disappeared from the Latin American
continent. Neither has the need for real freedom, justice, and life
with dignity for the masses. In view of the new situation in
which everything has changed, but all is the same Jon Sobrino
proposes that liberation theology should move from being merely
a theology of liberation to becoming a theology of liberation and
martyrdom.51 It is obvious to him then, that the crucified people,
the martyr people, have not lost their primary human impor49 See i.a. Escobar 1994, 131, Sjrup 1995.
33
34
35
36
37
52 Cf. Bonino 1993a, and various recent ecumenical documents, such as e.g. the
Message from The Fifth World Conference of Faith and Order in Santiago
de Compostela 1993: Unity today calls for structures of mutual accountability (Paragraph 9), in Best 1994, 227. See also Stlsett 1993.
38
on and with Sobrinos proposals, even if this may lead me to reflecting against them, in part or in toto.
With a clear awareness of the contextuality of all theological
reflection, then, this study does not in any way pretend to present a
universal or neutral assessment of Sobrino, or of liberation theology in general. Rather, this study is undertaken with a determined
and ultimately quite practical purpose: to contribute to an interpretation of Christian faith which is attentive to, responsible vis--vis,
and empowering in the real lives and struggles of the many who are
excluded and victimised in our communities, and on our planet, on
the brink of the millennium. In so doing, it wishes to pay respect to
the memory and legacy of Mgr Oscar Arnulfo Romero and Ignacio
Ellacura, who were pioneers in theologically reflecting the reality of
crucified peoples, committing themselves to their cause to the point
of joining in their martyrdom.
39
40
Vivir en la realidad crucificada de Amrica Latina, aceptada como es y no sofocarla con nada es el primer paso para qualquier conocimiento teolgico.1
41
3
4
42
struggle for a more just and humane society. He and his staff often
took controversial and brave stands during the years of conflict.
Accordingly, UCA its leadership, staff and students alike was the
object of harsh criticisms and attacks from the authorities and sectors loyal to the regime, even to the point of violent persecution.6
Among all the difficult moments Sobrino has lived through
during these years, there are two that have left particularly profound
marks on his theological work. The first one was the assassination of
Archbishop Oscar A. Romero. The Jesuits at the UCA, and especially Ellacura and Sobrino, had become close co-workers with the
Archbishop during his years of ministry. Romeros pastoral commitment, willingness to change, spiritual strength and charismatic personality impressed Sobrino profoundly.7
The second horrifying incident was the killing of his colleagues
six Jesuit priests, amongst them Ignacio Ellacura, together with
their housekeeper and her daughter at the UCAs Pastoral Centre,
the fifteenth of November, 1989. They were all cold-bloodedly massacred by an elite battalion of the Salvadoran Armed Forces.8 Jon
Sobrino was abroad when it happened, while a colleague who had
borrowed his room in his absence, was shot dead.9 Thus Sobrino
lost his brothers and colleagues, and escaped himself by chance. In
particular, the loss of Ellacura, whom he admired and with whom
6
7
43
he had a long-standing and mutually inspiring theological co-operation, has been hard on Sobrino. As will become clear in this study,
Sobrino is avowedly dependent on Ellacuras theological and philosophical works in matters both methodological and substantial.10
44
45
46
47
Once reality is defined as transcendence in history and ultimately christologically founded, it makes possible the qualification of
reality as crucified. Reality is crucified because the truth about
the world is that it is a world of sin and premature death, according
to Sobrino. This is its principal fact (hecho mayor), both quantitatively and qualitatively. It is a world of sin, because sin is that which
brings death to the children of God. But this truth is usually suppressed with injustice (Rom. 1:18); it is not recognised to be the
truth. It is consciously and unconsciously being covered up by all
those who do not belong to the world of the poor, and who are at
least partly responsible for the fact that the world is crucified the
way it is. But discovering this truth about the world helps us to see
19 One important clue to the understanding of Rahners influence on Sobrino
might be found in the following passage: Con su genialidad acostumbrada,
K. Rahner deca que el ser humano es un modo deficiente de ser Cristo. El
que el modo sea deficiente es cosa de esperar, pero el que existan en verdad
seres humanos que son modos de ser Cristo es cosa de agradecer, en la vida
personal ante todo, pero tambin en la tarea terica de intentar escribir una
cristologa. Sobrino 1991d, 30. See also Sobrino 1984b. One critique against
Rahner has been that his proposal of immanent transcendentality by
which Ellacura and Sobrino are clearly influenced comes close to naturalising the supernatural. John Milbank has made this observation a central
piece in his sharp critique of liberation theology in Milbank 1993, 206-255;
207. Compare Hendrikus Berkhof s judgement, Berkhof 1989, 246: In the
end the reader is left with the impression that in Rahner the supernatural (in
contrast with traditional church doctrine) is to such a high degree a self-evident and universal existential that in ordinary usage it can really only be
described as nature. I think there is reason to hold that the strong continuity between Jesus and his followers, the Crucified and the crucified, etc. in
Sobrinos theology to some extent is made possible by this Rahnerian
approach.
20 The influence from Zubiris thought on Sobrino is mostly indirect, mediated
by Ellacura. For presentations and analyses of Zubiris thinking, see e.g.
Ellacura 1983a; Graca 1995; Gonzlez 1993b.
48
it with Gods eyes, see how God looks upon this creation which is
put on a cross.21
Accepting Sobrinos call for honesty about reality, it must be
permitted to ask: Is it adequate to describe reality as crucified?
That there is suffering immense and unjustly inflicted suffering
is a fact that needs to be recalled and restated time and time again.
But is it the truth about reality about the whole of reality? It is a
fact, but is it the principal fact of the world, as Sobrino claims? Is
the experience of suffering more real than other experiences? There
might be a danger here of universalising one particular aspect of
reality an error of which liberation theologians accuse traditional
Western theology.
Sobrinos contention may be affirmed however, to the degree
that its implication is that it is only through an active and persistent
willingness to focus on the negative aspect of reality that it is possible to approach its totality. In other words, reality in its totality is
not just suffering and conflict, not just crucifixion. It is also life and
joy, also resurrection, also the presence of Gods love in history. But
it is only possible to gain a true knowledge of the latter through an
honest confrontation with the former.
b) The Importance of the Theological Location
This is the way it must be understood, then, when Sobrino confesses that for him, this true reality did not exist before 1974,
when he returned to El Salvador from Europe.22 It was in El Salvador that he discovered what he holds to be the true reality: the
21 Sobrino 1992b, 18. En El Salvador hemos redescubierto cmo mira Dios a
esta creacin suya puesta en cruz.
22 Sobrino 1992b, 12.Pues bien, he de comenzar confesando que hasta 1974, en
que regres definitivamente a El Salvador, el mundo de los pobres, es decir, el
mundo real, no exista para m.
49
50
torical situation makes possible and at the same time puts limits to
the realisation of a dynamic theology.28 A consciousness of how
the concrete situation promotes or hinders the theological reflection
is therefore crucial. (T)he location of reception, interpretation and
appeal is fundamental to Christian praxis and theory.29
But because there are both privileged and dangerous locations for theological reflection30, a mere consciousness about the
actual context is not enough. It is furthermore necessary to actively
place oneself in the adequate historical location.31 A privileged
location for theological reflection is what Ellacura calls el lugar
teolgico.32 By that he means, firstly, a location of a special self-revelation of the God of Jesus. This manifestation is both a revealing
illumination and a call to conversion. Secondly, lugar teolgico
means the most adequate place for living out faith through the following of Jesus. And finally, el lugar teolgico is the most appropriate
location for reflection on faith, for the realisation of a Christian theology. These three aspects are intimately related, according to Ellacura: (T)he optimal location for revelation and faith is also the
26 Lat.: Ubicatio. The contextual approach of liberation theology has been
present since the beginning, and is one of its main characteristics. Cf. e.g.:
Gustavo Gutirrez 1980, 23: Theological reflection framed in the perspective of liberation starts off from the perception that this particular context
forces us to rethink completely our way of being Christians and our way of
being a Church. See also Bevans 1992, particularly pp. 63-80.
27 Ellacura 1975b.
28 Ellacura 1975b, 327 (Thesis 2.8).
29 Ellacura 1984a, 169: Hay que reconocer que es fundamental para la praxis y
la teora cristiana el lugar de recepcin, de interpretacin y de interpelacin
[]
30 Ellacura 1984a, 166.
31 Ellacura 1991c, 393: [] es menester situarse en el lugar histrico
adecuado.
32 Ellacura 1984a, 153-178; especially : 165-169.
51
52
53
Every historical situation should be seen from its corresponding key in revelation, but revelation should be focused from the historical situation to
which it is directed, even if no historical moment is equally valid for the correctness of the focus.39
54
community, but rather a quid, a substantial reality in which Christology can be formulated, affected, questioned and illuminated.42
What does Sobrino actually mean by this? It seems to me that
this quid could be explained as perspective or horizon. In a
more recent publication, Sobrino writes that it is possible to do
theology at a desk, but there is no reason to do it from a desk.43 In
other words, the basic perspective which theologians choose in their
work, is decisive. Likewise, Sobrino underscores thereby that this
locus theologicus is not texts like the traditional loci theologici44, but
something real, a determined, historical reality in which it is
believed that God and Christ continue to make themselves
present.45
42 Sobrino 1991d, 59. Por lugar se entiende aqu ante todo un quid, una realidad sustancial en la que la cristologa se deja dar, afectar, cuestionar e iluminar.
43 Sobrino 1995b; 125, n.19: [] a quienes critican a la universidad como lugar
de la teologa por estar alejado fsicamente de la realidad, hay que recordar
que se puede hacer teologa en un escritorio, pero que no hay por qu hacerla
necesariamente desde un escritorio.
44 In traditional Catholic teaching the following are considered loci theologici:
Scripture, tradition, the magisterium, theological sentences. This goes back
to M. Cano. Cf. Sobrino 1991d, 58, note 14. In Sobrino 1994d, Sobrino
develops this priority of reality above texts: [] ni siquiera los ms vigorosos textos sean del pasado o del presente tienen, en cuanto textos, suficiente capacidad para movilizar el espritu humano y creyente de forma
adecuada en la bsqueda de una respuesta. Esa fuerza para preguntar y para
responder slo proviene de la misma realidad. Op. cit. 51, cf. note on p.76:
Los textos pueden llevar la realidad a su plenitud, si se les considera como
smbolo real en el sentido rahneriano. Pero sin realidad, digamos lo obvio,
no hay texto. Y el texto tendr su fuerza en relacin con la realidad, no en
independencia de ella. Por ello, la teologa nunca puede basarse slo en otra
teologa, sino que en algn momento tiene que enfrentarse con y basarse en
la realidad.
45 Sobrino 1991d, 58. Accordingly, lugar teolgico has to do with the choice of
perspective and priorities for the theological work.
55
46 Sobrino 1992b, 16-17. Pues bien, lo primero que descubrimos en El Salvador, si no reprimimos su verdad, es que este mundo es una inmensa cruz y
una injusta cruz para millones de inocentes que mueren a manos de verdugos, pueblos enteros crucificados, como los llam Ignacio Ellacura.
Sobrino continues: Y se es el hecho mayor de nuestro mundo; lo es cuantitativamente, porque abarca dos terceras partes de la humanidad; y lo es cualitativamente, porque es lo ms cruel y clamoroso.
56
47 Cf. below, Chapter v [4]; and Chapter viii [4], theses 1 and 13.
48 This phrase was the title of the Final Document of the Third General Conference of the Latin American Bishops Evangelization in Latin Americas
Present and Future, in Puebla de los Angeles, Mexico, January 23 February 13, 1979 (see Hennelly 1990, 253-258). It was then received as an important confirmation and consolidation of what had been the central intuition
of liberation theology since its origins. Speaking of these origins, Gustavo
Gutirrez tells that this perspective the opcin had been formed by his
own experience with poor people in Lima, Peru, see McAfee Brown 1990,
32-33. Cf. the introduction to Teologa de la Liberacin: In this book we
intend a reflection that is based in the Gospel and in the experiences of men
and women who have comitted themselves to the liberation process in this
subcontinent of oppression and despoilment which is Latin America. It is a
theological reflection that is born out of this shared experience in the effort
to abolish the actual situation of injustice and build a different, more human
society, in which there is more freedom. Gutirrez 1984, 15. Cf. also i.a.,
Gutirrez 1991b, xxv-xxviii; Gutirrez 1982; Gutirrez 1991a, Boff and Pixley
1989.
49 Ellacura treats this question especially in Ellacura 1983b and in Ellacura
1984a, 155-163.
57
(1) Firstly, according to Ellacura, the poor are the materially poor:
The materiality of poverty is its real and irreplaceable element.50
It is not only the mere lack of even indispensable goods, but also
being dialectically deprived of the fruit of ones own work, and of
work in itself, as well as of political and social power.51
By this, Ellacura underscores the socio-economic, dialectical and
political character of poor and poverty. For him, poor is initially and radically a socio-economic concept describing those who
lack material goods. This is the analogatum princeps of poverty.52 It
is a dialectical concept, because it describes the dialectical relation
between the poor and the rich: (T)here are rich because there are
poor and there are poor because there are rich. Being poor is not
just lacking, but being deprived of essential things by people who
themselves take advantage of this deprivation.53 It is a political concept, because the poor [] are in themselves a political force. In
their mere existence they are a potential political force, which
through awareness-raising, organisation and united struggle will
and should become a real political force, according to Ellacura.54
50 Ellacura 1984a, 159: La materialidad de la pobreza es el elemento real insustituible y que consiste no tanto en carecer incluso de lo indispensable, sino
en estar desposedo dialcticamente del fruto de su trabajo y del trabajo
mismo, as como del poder social y poltico, por quienes, con ese despojo, se
han enriquecido y se han tomado el poder.
51 Ibid.
52 Ellacura 1983b, 788.
53 Ibid. Ellacura notes further that it is not necessary to use Marxist categories
to support this understanding. It is more than sufficient with Jesus condemnations of the rich in the Sermon of the Mount according to Luke; the
letter of James exposure of the mechanisms of empoverishment through salaries; and the harsh accusations of the Church fathers in this matter, he
holds.
54 Ellacura 1983b, 788-789. To Ellacura, the poor are not just lugar teolgico,
but also lugar poltico, cf. Ellacura 1984a, 174-178.
58
59
60
There are several questions that emerge from a reading of Ellacuras explication of the poor. Is it at all helpful to operate with a
hierarchy of poor, which it seems that Ellacura does through his
mentioning of perfection and coronation of poverty? And is it
within the power and capacity of the poor themselves to become
poor with spirit i.e. to give their poverty a spiritual dimension
or quality? Or should this rather be seen as the work of God?
Through this last question it can be seen that accusations of some
sort of Pelagianism quickly come to the fore in connection with
Ellacuras positions. But then again, perhaps too quickly?
(2) Jon Sobrino makes the same fundamental option as Ellacura.
Even though he never explicitly criticises Ellacuras definition and
use of the poor, but rather presupposes it, he nevertheless seems
to modify it somewhat in his own explication. However, we shall
see that this does not solve all the difficulties I indicated above.
For Sobrino, the preferred location for a theological-epistemological process is, firstly, the poor of this world (as substantial reality)
and the world of the poor (as socio-theologal location).63 This initial
choice is justified (a priori) from the special relationship between
Jesus and the poor and his presence among them as it is attested in
the New Testament, and (a posteriori) from the experience that everything illuminates Christ better, when seen from the reality of the
poor, Sobrino contends.64
Within the world of the poor, the church of the poor plays a particular role as theological location.65 Sobrino supports I. Ellacuras
63 Sobrino makes a distinction between theological location (lugar teolgico),
as a location apt for theological reflection, and theologal location (lugar
teologal), as a location in which God is present. Cf. Sobrino 1991d, 55 and
64.
64 Sobrino 1991d, 59.
65 Sobrino 1986: 93-136.
61
definition of the term: a church in which the poor are the principal
subjects, and the principle for its internal structure,66 and he gives
three reasons why this should be considered a lugar epistemolgico:67
1) The church of the poor realises itself as a praxis of following Jesus;
it has many martyrs, who are killed in a way similar to Jesus and for
the same reasons as Jesus. 2) Its faith is celebrated in community in
a particular way. Because they are poor, Sobrino believes, they are
able to share faith, carry each other in faith, show solidarity, etc.
Because they as poor are the privileged addressees of the gospel,
their faith is able to challenge and correct the christological faith of
others. 3) Christ makes himself present in the church of the poor
and this church is his body in history, but only to the extent that it
offers Christ the hope and praxis and the suffering, that can make
him present as the Risen and the Crucified.68
Thus, the living faith in Christ in the church of the poor is a
legitimate starting point for gaining christological knowledge,
according to Jon Sobrino. There is a correlation between the fides
quae (that which is believed) and the fides qua (the act of believing),
he holds. But this correlation is not a determination in such a way
that the fides qua would create the fides quae. To avoid any such
misunderstanding it is necessary to return to the biblical witnesses
about the origin and object of christological faith, Jesus of Nazareth.
This distinction between church of the poor and world of
the poor gives Sobrino a framework within which he may tackle
the difficult issues raised in relationship with the hierarchy of
66 Ellacura 1984a, 207-208.
67 Sobrino 1991d, 62-64.
68 Sobrino 1991d, 64: En la iglesia de los pobres [] se hace presente Cristo, y
esa Iglesia es su cuerpo en la historia. Pero no lo es de cualquier forma, sino
en cuanto ofrece a Cristo aquella esperanza y praxis liberadora y aquel sufrimiento que pueden hacerlo presente como resucitado y como crucificado.
62
See below, Chapter ii,[3]; Chapter iv, [10] and Chapter viii, [2].
Sobrino 1991d, 144-145. Cf. i.a.: Sobrino 1982a, 105 and 164-166.
Sobrino 1982b, 62 / Sobrino 1982a, 78.
Sobrino 1982a, 185.
Sobrino 1991d, 59.
63
74
75
76
77
64
65
mentalist efforts that caused such optimism in the fifties and early
79 Though pointing to the radical differences and negative interrelation
between development in the centres and in the peripheries, Prebisch and
ECLA never left the modernisation paradigm. On the contrary, their recommendations for an inward-directed development in Latin-America had
industrialisation, foreign investments and modernisation as central elements. They held the view that development in the periphery is possible
within the framework of a capitalism dominated by the centre. This was
what leading economists and sociologists in the 1960s, like A. Gunder
Frank, Th. Dos Santos, F. Cardoso and O. Sunkel criticised Prebisch for,
when it appeared that also the ECLA strategies for development failed. The
Latin American economic dependency (dependencia) became now the main
focus of interest. The negative connection between the rich and the poor
countries, the structural dependency, needs to be broken, according to the
dependency-school. Oliveros describes the nuclueus of the insight promoted
by the dependency-school in the following formula: Nuestra situacin de
explotacin no era casual, sino causal. Oliveros 1991, 30. Only the peripheries themselves, i.e. the poor groups and countries, can break this dependency. What they need is not primarily development with a little help from the
rich countries, but a process of liberation, that will enable them to become
independent economies. The poor masses of the Latin American continent
are now seen as oppressed, who are in a critical need of liberation. See e.g.
Dussel 1981, 127-136.
80 Despus del concilio la teologa del desarollo capt brevemente el inters de
los sectores modernizantes. A la valoracin del progreso humano se una
aqu una mayor preocupacin social por los pueblos pobres. Su perspectiva
optimista y dinmica no ocultar sin embargo la cortedad de sus enfoques
sobre las causas de la miseria y la injusticia, ni la parquedad de la experiencia
cristiana de donde provena. Gutirrez 1982, 255.
81 McAfee Brown 1990, 35.
82 This speech, which was delivered in the month before the Medelln Conference at a meeting of priests and laity that has been described by Pablo Richard as the explicit break, the qualitative leap, from a worldvision tied to a
developmentalist kind of practice to one tied to the practice of liberation,
has, curiously enough, not been published in English until quite recently,
Gutirrez 1990b.
83 See Gutirrez 1984, 18, n.1.
66
67
68
92 Gutirrez 1984, 69: Cristo salvador libera el hombre del pecado, raz ltima
de toda ruptura de amistad, de toda injusticia y opresin, y lo hace autnticamente libre, es decir, vivir en comunin con l, fundamento de toda fraternidad humana.
93 Gutirrez 1984, 69: [] estamos ante tres niveles de significacin de un
proceso nico y complejo que encuentra su sentido profundo y su plena realizacin en la obra salvadora de Cristo.
94 Gutirrez 1984, 199-226.
69
70
71
one that has not found an answer once and for all. This certainly
does not take away the responsibility to urgently search for such
answer(s).102
Third, and most fundamental to theology, it is liberation from
sin, death and the law. This Pauline expression must be taken not
only in its individual meaning, in Ellacuras view. He interprets and
actualises it as follows: 103
An understanding of what liberation from sin means must
take into account the totality and profundity of the essence of sin.
Sin is not primarily an offence against God, but a real deviation
from and fundamental disobedience to Gods plan and purpose for
humanity, nature and history. It is negation of faith and love. It has
three analogical not identical expressions: original (natural) sin,
personal sin and historical (social) sin. Liberation from sin in
these three different expressions happens progressively and historically, on both the social and personal levels. It is in and through
history that God, in conjunction with the human person104 intervenes to liberate from sin. This is what Ellacura calls salvation in
history, a theme to which he returns time and time again in his
writings.105
Since death is the effect of sin and the law is its cause, Ellacura
argues, an integral liberation must include liberation from these two
102 Ellacura dedicated much of his life and work, both as a Christian, philosopher, theologian and rector of the University, to the task of finding practical
and adequate answers [] which unite short-term and long-term efficacy
with respect for the Christian idiosyncrasy (Ellacura 1987b, 263) to this
question. It is an ever-returning topic in his publications. Cf. e.g. Ellacura
1987b, Ellacura 1991c, Ellacura 1993c, etc.
103 Ellacura 1993b, 216-220.
104 Ellacura 1993b, 217: La liberacin del pecado [] es tambin un proceso
en que intervienen conjuntamente Dios y el hombre []
105 See e.g. Ellacura 1976; Ellacura 1993a; Ellacura 1987a, especially 6-8; Ellacura 1991b and Ellacura 1989c.
72
(death and law) as well as from sin itself. We note again Ellacurias
fundamental structure, the dual unity between the historical and
the transcendental: There is a definitive (transcendent) death, but
this is often anticipated in history. Because of the omnipresence of
sin, human history is full of premature death. Human beings are
deprived of their life, and thus of their possibility of being Gods
glory: gloria Dei, vivens homo.106 The total and definitive liberation
from death is eternal life in which there is no oppression, hunger,
illness, division yet this liberation should accordingly also be
anticipated in history.107
Ellacura finds room for the treatment of the category law
within the same schema. The law leads to sin, and it is therefore
something from which there is a need for liberation. This applies
not just to the Mosaic law as a way to salvation, but to every human
law. This is not to preach anarchy, Ellacura assures, but he sees
the problem as lying in the fact that in history, the law is so often
the institutional justification of a habitual practice of oppression
and repression.108
106 Adv. Haereses IV 20, 7. Archbishop Oscar A. Romero actualised these words
of Irenaeus for the Salvadoran situation thus: gloria Dei, vivens pauper,
Gods glory is the living poor. La dimensn poltica de la fe in Cardenal,
Martn-Bar, and Sobrino 1996, 193. Cf. Sobrino 1989e, 179.
107 Ellacura 1993b, 218: (L)a muerte definitiva, como consecuencia del pecado
natural (original), se adelanta de muchas formas en la historia. La sobreabundancia del pecado en la historia lleva consigo la sobreabundancia de la
muerte en la historia, donde se hace presente la lucha entre la vida y la
muerte, entendidas ambas en toda su plenitud y extensin [] La liberacin
de la muerte slo se dar de forma total y definitiva por el paso a travs de la
muerte en el disfrute precisamente de una vida eterna [], vida en la que no
habr opresin, llanto, enfermedad, divisin, sino plenitud en la comunicacin de Dios que es vida y es amor. Pero esa liberacin definitiva debe ser
anticipada.
108 Ellacura 1993b, 218-219.
73
The two dimensions of sin, death and law, as well as of liberation-salvation, must be held together in mutual openness, Ellacura insists:
Not to see in sin, death and the law more than their theolog(ic)al dimension
is, best case, to present an abstract vision, and worst case, to present an ideologized, manipulating and deforming vision of them. But, at the same time, a
purely secular reading of sin, death and law deprives these fundamental realities of their own reality and their own transcendentality.109
74
75
soteriology in the end only good news for the strong and committed among the poor?
Major themes are involved here. What is the relationship
between salvation and human liberation? What is the relationship
between salvation and history? What is the relationship between salvation and praxis? As can be seen, these fundamental issues are profoundly intertwined in liberation theology.
(3) Against this background, let us now return to Sobrino and see
how he views the liberation of the poor as a theological objective.114
In outlining the main differences between the way theological
knowledge is understood in Latin-American and modern European
theology115, Sobrino takes as his point of departure two basic questions: 1) Presuming that theological knowledge is a Christian theological knowledge, how does the Christian reality influence the
process of gaining knowledge itself? 2) What is the ultimate interest
behind gaining theological knowledge?
Regarding the first question, Sobrino selects three main characteristics that, in his view, need to be present in the process of gaining theological knowledge in order to make that knowledge
specifically Christian: i) The liberative aspect of the history of Jesus
leads to the question whether the theological epistemological process has a liberating function, and if so, what kind of liberation this
is. ii) The dialectical relationship between present and future in Jesus
preaching of the Kingdom of God leads to the question of the relationship between theory and praxis in a given theological epistemology. iii) The difference between religion and Christian faith, or,
christologically stated, the dialectics between cross and resurrection,
114 Lo que es especfico de la teologa de la liberacin pensamos que va ms all
de los contenidos, y consiste en un modo concreto de ejercitar la inteligencia
guiado por el principio liberacin. Sobrino 1995b, 116.
115 Sobrino 1986, 15-47.
76
77
cal aspects. Liberation means the end of oppression and crucifixion, it means life and dignity for the poor and for everyone.
Sobrino adds: But this same term liberation points also to a utopia the integral liberation [] that the kingdom of God
becomes a reality and human beings come to be just that.117
Sobrino underscores the theological signification of liberation as the
coming of the kingdom to the poor in history against the present
reality of the antirreino the anti-Kingdom.118 Thus he too
stresses the conflictual and historical aspects of the term.
As with Ellacura, however, it seems that Sobrino would be well
advised to widen his concept of liberation. Introducing to this concept the struggle against other fundamental forms of oppression
racial, ethnic, sexual would not soften the radical character of it,
but rather bring out the nuances that are absolutely crucial in order
to formulate a theology which may answer to the needs of the
oppressed Latin Americans of today. In his later writings, Sobrino
does in fact seem more attentive to these nuances.119
78
120 Cf. Sobrino 1976, 26, where Sobrino states that Latin American christology,
emphasises [] all the christological elements that point to the paradigm
of liberation (kingdom of God, resurrection as utopia, etc.) and to the praxical disposition to realise them and thereby understand them (Jesus sociopolitical praxis, requirement to follow).
121 For the centrality and development of this self-understanding, see i.a., Segundo 1970; Assmann 1973; Gutirrez 1982, 51-95; Bonino 1975, 86-105; Boff
1991 and Boff 1980, compare discussion in McGovern 1989, 32-40 and Nordstokke 1996, 26-36.
79
The first act has two aspects. The first aspect, that I prefer to
call the passive aspect of the foundational experience, is the mere
being affected by the suffering of the innocent other.123 It is the
realisation that the immense poverty of Latin America is a scandal
which cries to the heavens124; an ethical indignation (Boff )125
that leads to a refusal to accept this situation as normal.126 This is
the moment of discovery, of conscientisation and conversion, it is
a change of perspective that eventually influences the understanding
of both society and Christian faith.127
The other aspect of the discovery or the foundational experience is active. It should not be described as a second moment
122 Lo primero es el compromiso de caridad, de servicio. La teologa viene
despus, es acto segundo. Gutirrez 1984, 35.
123 The prevailing interest for the other in contemporary philosophical and
theological discourse is heavily influenced by the writings of the GermanJewish theologian F. Rosenzweig and, more recently, the Lithuanian-FrenchJewish philosopher E. Levinas. Especially the latter has had a significant indirect influence on the development of liberation theology. Most notable is the
influence on Enrique Dussel once a student of Levinas who explicitly
admits his indeptedness to both these thinkers, e.g. in Dussel 1978, 9, compare Dussel 1981, Dussel 1983. But also Gutirrez sees the thinking of Levinas
as a source of inspiration for liberation theologians.
124 Cf. the Document on Justice adopted by the Second General Conference
of the Latin American Episcopate (CELAM) in Medelln, Colombia, 1968:
There are in existence many studies of the Latin American people. The misery that besets large masses of human beings in all our countries is described
in all these studies. That misery, as a collective fact, expresses itself as injustice which cries to the heavens (quoted from Hennelly 1990, 97). Sobrino
constantly refers to the actual situation of poverty as an escndalo, see e.g.
Sobrino 1992b, 54.
125 Boff 1981b, 14. See also Boff and Boff 1987, 1-4.
126 Gutirrez very first words in Toward a Theology of Liberation confirms
this: As Christians come in contact with the acute problems that exist in
Latin America, they experience an urgent need to take part in solutions to
them. Gutirrez 1990b.
80
because it is inseparable from the first. It is characterised by commitment. It is the moment for discovering that the poor are not just
suffering, they are also in the process of struggling for liberation.
This is what Gutirrez has described as the irrupcin del pobre
(irruption of the poor), which he interprets as the most important
sign of the times.128 This struggle calls for participation. Neutrality is not possible, according to liberation theology. Either one joins
the cause of the suffering and struggling other, or one supports the
prevailing situation which keeps the poor in their situation of misery. This is the moment of option for the poor, of joining in a liberative praxis, of commitment.
It is important to notice that in the discovery of the other which I
have described, there is also a crucial element of the poor discovering themselves.129 The process of liberation starts with this self-discovery of the poor, and is completely dependent on it to succeed.
The poor must be the main actors or protagonists of the process as
127 It sounds ironic but it is the truth: the churches discovered the poor, says the
Argentinian theologian Jos Mguez Bonino, describing the birth of liberation theology in The Need for a Contextual Theology in Latin America,
lecture given at the seminar Theology and Context at Trollvasshytta, Oslo
March 5-6, 1993: Bonino continues: They (the poor) had always been there
-- hidden away in indian reservations, as semi-slaves in large haciendas or
plantations, invisible as poor peasants. Now they became visible. It would be
futile to try to say whether it was the new awareness that some people in the
churches had developed that triggered the discovery or whether the now
visible poor alerted and led to look for for new answers. Certainly the two
things combined -- they are two sides of a single social and cultural process.
And this is the birth of a new theological quest in Latin America. Bonino
1993b, 4.
128 Spanish: signos de los tiempos. This is an important theme in liberation theology. Juan Luis Segundo calls it a distinguishing mark: Attention to the signs
of the time is the theological criterion which sets off a theology of liberation
from a conservative academic theology. Segundo 1976, 40. See also Gutirrez 1984, 30, and Gutirrez 1990b, 64.
81
These two inseparable aspects of the foundational experience of liberation theology constitute together its methodological startingpoint. It is, in Gutirrez terminology, the first act.
This first act is pre-theological. The being-affected-and-committing-oneself of this experience, resulting in liberative praxis, is
not originally motivated or legitimised in a Christian theory or
reflection, although it often is, de facto, a praxis of faith.132 It is,
rather, a spontaneous response to (experienced) reality.133 P. Frostin
129 Cf. Gutirrez 1982, 52: Los ltimos aos de Amrica latina se caracterizan
por el descubrimiento real y exigente del mundo del otro: el pobre, el oprimido, la clase explotada. En un orden social hecho econmica, poltica e ideolgicamente por unos pocos y para beneficio de ellos mismos, el otro de
esa sociedad las clases populares explotadas, las culturas oprimidas, las
razas discriminadas comienza a hacer or su propia voz. Empieza a hablar
cada vez menos por intermediarios y a decir verdad directamente su palabra,
a redescubrirse a s mismo y a hacer que el sistema perciba su presencia iquietante. Comienza a ser cada vez menos objeto de manipulacin demaggica,
o de asistencia social, ms o menos disfrazada, para convertirse poco a poco
en sujeto de su propia historia y forjar una sociedad radicalmente distinta.
130 This is where the Pedagogy of the oppressed of Paulo Freire has its important
contribution. Freire 1972. Cf. Gutirrez 1984, 132-3.
131 (N)o tendremos una autntica teologa de la liberacin sino cuando los
oprimidos mismos puedan alzar libremente su voz y expresarse directa y creadoramente en la sociedad y en el seno del pueblo de Dios. Cuando ellos
mismos den cuenta de la esperanza de que son portadores. Cuando ellos
sean los gestores de su propia liberacin. Gutirrez 1984,387.
82
132 Faith is understood as liberation praxis, according to Vidales 1979: Liberation theology begins with concrete experience of faith as a liberation
praxis., see also p.45: Insofar as it is liberation praxis, faith entails a discovery of the world of the other in the light of the new scientific line of
reasoning, and also an option for their cause.
133 In this sense, one could perhaps see a parallel to the so-called ethics of proximity, usually related to such thinkers as E. Lvinas and K. E. Lgstrup. Is
liberation theology a theology of proximity? Cf. thesis 12.1 in Chapter viii,
below.
134 Frostin 1992. 192-6. Compare his doctoral thesis, Frostin 1988, 4ff.
135 Gutirrez 1980, 27.
83
(2) To Ellacura, the priority of praxis is closely related to his conception of reality and history. He holds that the historical character
of reality corresponds to the historical character of mind. The
human mind or intelligence (inteligencia) is affected by history, it is
always historical. Its formal structure and differentiative function
is not that of being a comprehension of being nor understanding
(captacin) of meaning, but that of apprehending reality and confronting oneself with it.137 There is a mutual (and constitutive)
interdependence between human intelligence and real things in
the world. Things are real, not just conceptualised in the human
mind. Thus intelligence is receptive to the impression that real
things make on it, it is a sensing intelligence; inteligencia sentiente
(Zubiri).138 But real things can only have this or that meaning
because of their essential respectivity to the human person.139
136 Gutirrez 1980, 15, cf. p.1. See also e.g. Gutirrez 1982, 215-276, especially La
otra historia: la historia del otro. p. 259, cf. 243. Following Levinas, Dussel
gives much weight to the concept of the other who from exteriority, from
beyond, transcendentally breaks the totality (flesh) and domination of
the ontological ego. It is the other as indicated by Schelling, but not in the
way his pupil Hegel incorporates it in his dialectical system, says Dussel.
Because the other in Hegels thinking remains within the totality, it is not
totally other, exteriority, and cannot serve to really challenge the system.
Dussel suggests, then, an analectical overcoming (superacin) of the Hegelian dialectics. It is ana-lectical because it comes from beyond, originating
in a face-to-face encounter with the other (Dussel 1981, 6.) The reality of
the other is anterior to Being (Dussel 1985, 19.) Within this framework, the
origin of liberation theology is described philosophically as a face-to-face
encounter with the poor as other.
137 Ellacura 1975a, 419: La estructura formal de la inteligencia y su funcin diferenciativa [] no es la de ser compresin del ser o captacin de sentido,
sino la de aprehender la realidad y la de enfrentarse con ella.
138 Zubiri 1984.
139 Ellacura 1975a, 419: [] en tanto que slo por su esencial respectividad
con el hombre pueden tener para ste uno u otro sentido.
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When real things appear in the human intellect through the unifying process of intellection, its primary effect is to install the
human person in reality140, i.e. in historical reality, which, in Ellacuras understanding, embraces the totality and yet remains open.
This historical openness towards something more which according to Ellacura makes it possible to speak of transcendence without
accepting the duality that traditionally is implied141 secures
human freedom, and calls for historical transforming action.
Thus, the process of inteleccin, of gaining knowledge, as a
process of installation of the human person in reality, takes on ethical and praxical dimensions. And here perhaps lies the most important contribution of Ellacura to the founding of a new theological
method. His formulation of three dimensions of inteligencia as a
hacerse cargo, cargar con and encargarse de constitutes a Spanish
play on words which is difficult to translate.142
The hacerse cargo de la realidad means gaining knowledge of
reality, the process of cognition. The Spanish expression alludes to
an understanding that goes far beyond a mere objective intellection,
and that links understanding and empathy.143 It is thus a profound
140 Domnguez Miranda 1992, 993.
141 Cf. Ellacura 1991b, 327-329.
142 Ellacura 1975a, 419: Este enfrentarse con las cosas reales en cuanto reales
tiene una triple dimensin: el hacerse cargo de la realidad, lo cual supone un
estar en la realidad de las cosas y no meramente un estar ante la idea de las
cosas o en el sentido de ellas, un estar real en la realidad de las cosas, que
en su carcter activo de estar siendo es todo lo contrario de un estar csico e
inerte e implica un estar entre ellas a travs de sus mediaciones materiales y
activas; el cargar con la realidad, expresin que seala el fundamental carcter
tico de la inteligencia, que no se le ha dado al hombre para evadirse de sus
compromisos reales sino para cargar sobre s con lo que son realmente las
cosas y con lo que realmente exigen; el encargarse de la realidad, expresin
que seala el carcter prxico de la inteligencia, que slo cumple con lo que
es, incluso en su carcter de conocedora de la realidad y comprensora de su
sentido, cuando toma a su cargo un hacer real.
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although basic epistemological process, which implies a standing/being in the reality of things and not just before the idea of
things or their meaning.144 Ellacura holds that this epistemological process of necessity implies the other two moments. The cargar
con la realidad expresses the fundamental ethical character of intelligence, which has not been given to the human person to permit
the evasion of his real responsibilities, but to facilitate the taking
on of what things really are and what they really require.145 Here,
there is also an element of passion, of pathos.146 An authentic cognition of reality implies taking responsibility for it and bearing its
consequences. This comes clearer to the fore in the third expression,
encargarse de la realidad, which signifies taking responsibility for,
taking charge of reality. It is the praxical dimension of intelligence,
which only complies with what it is [] when it takes charge of a
real task (hacer).
The way Ellacura plays with the word cargar could perhaps
be maintained in the following explication: To gain knowledge of
143 Gonzalez Faus 1990, 256: Las mismas expresiones castellanas como !ahora
me hago cargo!, o hazte cargo, aluden a una compresin que va mucho
ms all de la mera inteleccin objetiva, y que vincula conocimiento y
empata. Cf. English translations in Ellacura and Sobrino 1993.
144 Ellacura 1975a, 419.
145 Ibid.
146 Gonzlez Faus, op. cit., 256, sees in Ellacuras definition a linking of logos,
ethos and pathos, which is different from both the modern and the postmodern mentality. The modern instrumental reason wanted to gain
knowledge (hacerse cargo) of reality without bearing with it and taking
responsibility for it. It totalised the first dimension, even to the extent of
putting it up against the two others, i.e. to get to know the reality in order to
escape the burden of it and the responsibility for it. The post-modern reason reacted correctly against this totalisation, but in order to avoid a any
totalisation, it tends to split and separate the three dimensions in a weak
thinking that results also in a weak responsibility and weak love an individualism without subjectivity, says Gonzlez Faus.
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147 Ellacura 1975a, 418ff, cf.: Gonzlez 1990, 986-987. See also Gutirrez 1980,
19: Praxis that transforms history is not the degraded embodiment of some
pure, well conceived theory; instead it is the matrix of all authentic knowledge, and the decisive proof of that knowledges value. It is the point where
people re-create their world and forge their own reality, where they come to
know reality and discover their own selves.
148 Ellacura 1975a, 421: Lo que se necesita, entonces, para no caer en oscuras
ideologizaciones es llevar la hermenutica hasta el anlisis crtico y el desenmascaramiento, cuando sea preciso, de los orgenes sociales y de las destinaciones sociales de todo conocimiento.
149 Gonzlez 1990, 986.
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88
ments, he speaks of a historical theo-praxis and praxis of salvation as the place where the work of God and the activity of human
beings come together in a dual unity of God in human being and
human being in God.155 This is expressed in the Bible in the historical praxises of Moses, of the people of Israel, and ultimately
of Jesus. Participating in such a praxis is then the core of Christian
existence. It is what makes salvation history become salvation in
history: Action in and on history, the salvation of the social
human person in history, is the real pathway whereby God will ultimately deify the human person.156
We have seen then, that according to Ellacura a theological
reflection on the incarnational, historical-revelational and christological aspects of Christian faith, as well as a philosophical reflection
on reality in itself and the very structure and function of intelligence, lead to the necessity of giving priority to praxis.
Before I proceed, it may seem relevant to ask if Ellacuras proposition is not merely an immanent activism, and thereby a reduction of Christian faith to its historical and social functions? Such
accusations of reductionism and functionalism have in fact repeatedly been raised against liberation theology.157 To fully comprehend
Ellacuras position on this point, however, one should note carefully his understanding of transcendence. History and transcend155 Op. cit., 340: [] afirma la unidad dual de Dios en el hombre y el hombre
en Dios. Este en juega una distinta funcin y tiene distinta densidad cuando
la accin es de Dios en el hombre y cuando la accin es del hombre en Dios,
pero siempre es el mismo en.
156 Ellacura 1976, 18. Regarding this deificacin, see Chapter ii [3] (2), below.
157 See, i.a. Gutierrez 1977, 96-98; Kloppenburg 1974, 15-20; Ratzinger 1990
particularly 373-374 (directed explicitly against Sobrino, whom Ellacura in
turn defends in Ellacura 1984b, 170, calling Ratzingers rendering of
Sobrinos points of view a caricature); and, most importantly Congregation 1990a, paragraph 17, pp. 411-412. Again, McGoverns overview is helpful, McGovern 1989, especially 58-59.
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ence are two dimensions, but they are intimately united, according
to Ellacura. Transcendence is not something over and above history, but something which emerges in, through and from history,
and reaches beyond it. It is something more. We can recognise the
same pattern in Ellacuras understanding of human praxis and
Gods saving activity. This structure, in which the influence of Karl
Rahners transcendental method is apparent, is fundamental to Ellacuras thinking.
Nevertheless, reading Ellacura, the impression remains that the
unification of these dimensions seems somewhat strained. One can
understand and follow the reasons why Ellacura deems it necessary
to overcome old distinctions, which furthermore have been so
manipulated as to have a negative ideological effect in society. However, it is difficult to see how Ellacura actually solves the fundamental problems that have given rise to these distinctions in the first
place. What is actually the difference between the over and
above history (which he rejects) and the beyond, the more that
emerges in and through history (which he affirms)?
(3) Moving to christology, Jon Sobrino starts from the fact that Jesus
expressed his faith in the coming of the kingdom through both
words and deeds. Therefore, the relationship between theory and
praxis is fundamental to the understanding of Christian theological
knowledge. Sobrino understands praxis as an intent to operate
on the surrounding historical reality in order to transform it in a
determined direction.158 In a Christian praxis this direction is
towards the kingdom of God. As already pointed out, Sobrino
insists that Latin American liberation theology does not start primarily from a long theoretical theological tradition, but from an
encounter with a concrete, specific reality a crucified reality in
which there is an ongoing attempt to make love and justice believable to oppressed people159; a praxis of liberation.
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91
92
the notional, ethical and praxical which all are unified in the same
process of cognition, corresponds to what Sobrino in more recent
writings formulates as pre-socrtico, socrtico and aristotlico.167 The
pre-Socratic dimension consists in being confronted with (Ellacura: hacerse cargo de) reality as it is without the presumption of
always already having appropriate conceptual categories with which
to interpret it. The socratic dimension consists in the willingness
to bear the consequences of the knowledge gained about reality
(Ellacura: cargar con), i.e. like Socrates working for the transformation of reality (polis) through suffering its negative impact;
without fleeing even fatal confrontations with the powerful of this
world. The Aristotelian dimension is the analytical, instrumental
dimension; being able and willing to practically intervene in order
to transform reality (Ellacura: encargarse de).
Applied to christology, this conception of cognition means the
following, according to Sobrino:
It means hacerse cargo de la realidad de Cristo, which is most effectively
done through a turning to the historical reality of Jesus of Nazareth. It
means cargar con la realidad de Cristo, i.e., the readiness to listen to and
respond to his real ethical demands and to persist in this. It means encargarse de la realidad de Cristo, i.e. [letting Christ generate] a liberative praxis
which makes his cause become reality.168
166 Sobrino cites this definition many times, and in a note in Jesucristo liberador,
he writes: Quisiera decir que en lo personal, esto (sic) modo de concebir el
funcionamiento de la inteligencia es de las cosas que ms me impactaron del
pensamiento de I. Ellacura. Sobrino 1991d, 71, n.40.
167 Sobrino 1993c, 35.
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94
172 Sobrino 1991d, 104-105: Ignacio Loyola, en la segunda semana de sus ejercicios espirituales, slo pide conocimiento interno el Seor para que ms le
ama y le siga.
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96
This means also our particular interest here that he insists that it
is a condition for gaining knowledge about Jesus. It is the epistemological location for christology. Although at times sensible to the
importance of following for christology, European theology has
almost ignored its epistemological relevance, Sobrino holds.181
Latin American theology, however, gives it primary significance,
which makes theological method in this theology become a real
way, where method in the deepest sense becomes content: To
know Jesus is to follow Jesus.
This emphasis on following leads Sobrino to seeing christology
ultimately as a form of mystagogy. Christology can never conceptualize adequately the total truth about its object, Jesus Christ. That is
because Jesus Christ expresses for faith the real, authentic
and insuperable manifestation of the mystery of God and the mystery of human being.182 The object of christology is ultimately a
180 Sobrino 1983b, 943: El seguimiento de Jess no es slo el lugar de la prctica
de la fe, sino lo que posibilita saber qu fe es la que practicamos. Es lo que
unifica en su realizacin lo que ha de transcendente y de histrico en la
vida cristiana.
181 Sobrino 1986, 31: En la teologa europea el seguimiento de Jess se ha relegado normalmente a la teologa espiritual y apenas si ha infludo en la cristologa, y cuando lo ha hecho ha sido para mostrar la peculiar conciencia de
Jess que se muestra en la exigencia de un seguimiento incondicional. Sin
embargo, el seguimiento de Jess como lugar epistemolgico de conocer
a Jess ha sido ignorado casi siempre y est ausente en las cristologas
contemporneas sistemticas. La teologa latinoamericana sin embargo,
comprende el mtodo teolgico en el sentido de camino real. Continuando
con el ejemplo de la cristologa, es el seguimiento real de Jess, aun cuando
sta deba ser tambin esclarecida usando una pluridad de mtodos, anlisis y
hermenuticas. El mtodo en su sentido ms profundo es comprendido
como contenido.
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mystery. Therefore all formulations and conceptualisations are provisional, and fall short.
So it is absolutely necessary that christology be carried out with
great modesty, Sobrino holds.183 It should therefore become a mystagoga184 an introduction to mystery, which means that christology
can show a way, the way of Jesus, in which the human being may be confronted with mystery, may be able to call this mystery Father, as Jesus did,
and may be able to call this Jesus the Christ.185
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For Sobrino, this mystagogy consists in the following of the historical Jesus, because that is the best way to gain access to the Christ of
faith.186 It means travelling the same (logical and chronological)
way that made the first believers reach the full confession of Jesus as
the Son of God: from the mission of Jesus to the kingdom, via the
question for Jesus identity, and on to the confession of his salvific
and unique reality and significance. For Sobrino, then, christology
is the reflexive moment of this travelling. Travelling the way of the
Son and systematic reflection on Jesus Christ are inseparable and
occur simultaneously. It is at the same time reflection on the way
(methodology) and reflection on Jesus Christ (christology).
f ) Theology as Interpretation of Reality
These presuppositions, summed up in the phrases honradez con lo
real, el lugar teolgico, opcin por los pobres, liberacin, and ortopraxis
or seguimiento, lead to a reformulation of the theological task. Formally, theology consists in theologically conceptualising contemporary reality elevar a concepto teolgico la realidad actual 187
Sobrino contends. But if theology is a science, or logos, about God,
how can this be? It is possible because it is believed that this reality,
186 Cf. Rahner, according to Fischer, op. cit., 21: Nachfolge des Gekreuzigten
heisst demnach eben jene glaubend-liebende bergabe seiner selbst an die
Unbegreiflichkeit Gottes. The quotation of Rahner is from Schriften zur
Theologie XIII, Zrich, 1978, 201.
187 [] hacer teologa es formalmente elevar a concepto teolgico la realidad
actual en lo que sta tiene de manifestacin de Dios y de responder y corresponder en la fe a esa manifestacin. Sobrino 1989a, 402. Compare Sobrino
1993c, 28: Con esto queremos decir que la teologa ha actuado teniendo
ante s no slo conceptos sean stos filosficos, polticos, o teolgicos,
bblicos o sistemticos , sino realidades, o, si se quiere, teniendo ante s los
conceptos de liberacin y martirio, pero con el peso especfico que les otorga
la realidad.
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as such, contains something of God. In this concrete, historical reality there is a manifestation of God that theology must heed. The
historical situation becomes thus a source for theology, in addition
to and even prior to the traditional sources. This is a novelty of
liberation theology, in Sobrinos opinion.188
This presence of God in history finds expression in the signs of
the times189: Our theology takes absolutely seriously the present
as a location of Gods manifestation, i.e. it takes seriously the signs
of the times.190 Sobrino supports this view with two central texts
from the Second Vatican Council, in which he finds two different
dimensions of these signs. In Gaudium et Spes no. 4191, the Council
speaks of the historical-pastoral dimension of the signs of the
188 Sobrino does not develop on what is meant by concept. It seems to me
that the elevar a concepto teolgico la realidad actual parallels what is elsewhere described as concept formation: Concept formation refers to a
process by which one learns to sort his specific experiences into general rules
or classes [] Concept formation is a term used to describe how one learns
to form classes. A concept is a rule that may be applied to decide if a particular object falls into a certain class. According to the Analytic school of philosophy, concept is the subject matter of philosophy. Concepts are
according to this understanding logical, and not mental entities. Source:
Encyclopaedia Britannica 1995a and Encyclopaedia Britannica 1995b.
189 This theme has been central to liberation theology since its beginnings. Juan
Luis Segundo calls it a distinguishing mark: Attention to the signs of the
time is the theological criterion which sets off a theology of liberation from a
conservative academic theology. Segundo 1976, 40. Cf. Gutirrez 1984, 30,
and Gutirrez 1990b, 64. See also Gutirrez 1984, 30; and Segundo 1991b.
190 Sobrino 1989a, 398. Cf. Sobrino 1989d.
191 Gaudium et Spes 1966, no. 4: (T)he Church must continually examine the
signs of the times and interpret them in the light of the Gospel. Thus she
will be able to answer the questions men are always asking about the meaning of this life and the next and about the relation of one to the other, in a
way adapted to each generation. So the world in which we live, its expectations, its aspirations, its often dramatic character must be known and understood.
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What is at stake here, Sobrino insists, is not just the relevance of the
Church or of theology vis--vis the modern world, but its very identity. He asks, rhetorically: If God is continuing to be present, to
reveal God-self in history today, how can theology then content
itself only by examining the manifestations of God in the past?
Theology must, if it does not want to end up in some sort of theological deism, take Gods actual presence seriously, and then investigate how this presence is noticable, and what it calls for.
The history of theology shows with perfect clarity that searching for the signs of the times is a risky undertaking. There may be
a short distance between locating Gods presence in history, and
arbitrarily placing God on our side. Sobrino is, of course, aware of
this danger. Yet he claims that his standpoint regarding the importance of the sign of the times does not necessarily introduce theology into the dangerous world of lofty imaginations and
manipulation of Gods revelation.194 There is a need for external
192 Sobrino 1989d, 250: Signos de los tiempos significa aqu aquello que caracteriza una poca y que ofrece una novedad con respecto a otras pocas del
pasado []
193 Gaudium et Spes 1966, no. 11.
194 Sobrino 1989d, 252-253.
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criteria against which the sign of the times may be tested. That is
why Sobrino, in line with liberation theology in general, proposes
the return to the historical Jesus Gods revelation in the past as
the main criterion (norma normans) with which to judge whether it
is God who speaks and what God says through the present
signs of the times.
In Chapter iii I shall discuss what Sobrino means by this criterion of the historical Jesus. But before that, we should note that
even this criterion is not, according to Sobrino, equally accessible
from all locations or standpoints. The (hermeneutical) circularity of
understanding affects this criterion as well.
Liberation theology [] insists on the actual presence of God and believes
that the reality and word of God that are represented in revelation, are better
rediscovered and safeguarded (when read) from the vantage point of the
actual signs of the times.195
What are these signs? As we saw earlier, in the citation from the
introduction to El principio-misericordia, Sobrino also follows Ellacura in holding that among the actual signs of the times when
seen from the true reality, the world of the poor in El Salvador
there is one which overshadows the others: The existence of the crucified people.196
This last point shows why Sobrino wants to give primacy to the
reality of the poor and oppressed: because that reality, as sign of the
times, reveals the presence of God and thereby the truth about real195 Sobrino 1989d, 253-254: La teologa de la liberacin [] insiste en la actual
presencia de Dios y cree que desde los actuales signos de los tiempos mejor se
redescubre y salvaguarda la realidad y la palabra de Dios plasmadas en la revelacin.
196 Sobrino 1992b, 7: [] quiere asentar que el signo de los tiempos por antomasia es la existencia del pueblo crucificado, y la exigencia ms primigenia
es la de bajarlo de la cruz.
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ity. This is the basis for Sobrinos position on the theological significance of contemporary suffering.
g) Theology as Intellectus Amoris
In some more recent articles, Sobrino has reflected further on these
presuppositions, proposing intellectus amoris as the adequate and
ideal definition of the theological endeavour in particular of liberation theology.197 Theology understood in this manner has the following elements, then: 1) It means doing theology in the actual
moment of history. Its content is Gods actual manifestations (signs
of the times) and the active response of faith (fides qua). 2) It means
doing theology as a reaction of mercy to the reality of the crucified
peoples. 3) It means doing theology with a particular subjective preunderstanding (option for the poor) and in a particular objective
location (the world of the poor).198
The qualification of this as intellectus amoris stems particularly
from the second element. Sobrino finds that according to revelation, mercy199 is the kind of love which is the primary and ultimate
reason for Gods salvific intervention, and that this is the love which
is historicized in the practice and message of Jesus,200 that which
shapes his whole life, mission and destiny.201 It designates the
ultimate reality of God and Jesus according to revelation, and therefore also the ultimate reality of the human being.202
197 Cf. Sobrino 1989a, and Sobrino 1988c, also published in Sobrino 1992b, 4780.
198 Sobrino 1989a, 398.
199 Mercy misericordia means to Sobrino [] reaccionar ante el sufrimiento ajeno, una vez que se ha interiorizado en uno mismo, sin ms razones
para ello que su existencia. Sobrino 1992b, 66.
200 Sobrino 1992b, 34.
201 Sobrino 1992b, 37: [] configura toda su vida, su misin y su destino.
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104
105
106
107
108
109
110
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possible to give a just evaluation of the interrelatedness of life, experience, praxis and theological reflection which is so characteristic to
Sobrinos approach to theological method. The Ignatian logic of
existential cognition as Karl Rahner has called it237 finds in
Sobrino a particular, actualised and contextualised expression.238
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of Gods free and gracious identification with the poor and outcasts
of this world. Here liberation theologians also differ clearly from
both classical and modern European theology, who next to God, see
either the Church or the enlightened, modern human person (most
often thought of as man) as the main agents in the process of emancipation-liberation-salvation.
239 Cf. e.g.: Segundo 1990 in which Segundo claims that a notable shift within
liberation theology occurred during the seventies. At the outset, he says, liberation theology was developed in the universities among middle class intellectuals, with the purpose of de-ideologising theology and thereby turning it
into an effective tool for the liberation of the poor and oppressed. The long
term objective was to awake the poor from their passivity and fatalism and
enable them to be agents for liberation. But it was thus theology done on
behalf and in favour of the poor, not by the poor themselves. Then the
change occurred, according to Segundo. The popular movements had neither understood nor appreciated this first line with liberation theology. It
was perceived as something only relevant to Europeanised, middle-class
intellectuals. But then, many among the now frustrated liberation theologians became converted to the poor, in the sense that they now held that
it was the poor themselves that should do theology and not the theologians. The theologians should rather become organic intellectuals in
Gramscis concept. Segundo claims to detect this change in e.g. Gutirrez
theological reflection by comparing the difference between Teologa de la liberacin which he esteems highly and La fuerza de los pobres en la historia
which he thinks is of much lower quality. The problem with the second
line in liberation theology according to Segundo, is that it loses its critical
potential vis--vis the popular culture and the popular faith. This has paralysed liberation theology which has become more repetetive apology than
constructive theology, Segundo sternly states. Segundo himself wishes to
remain faithful to the first line, whereas he thinks that Gutirrez, Dussel,
Sobrino, Boff etc. all have passed from the first to the second line. Interesting as this self-criticism from one of the founders of liberation theology is, it
is hard to agree with this analysis. For a further discussion, see my article
Stlsett 1996b.
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From this, it follows that the poor according to liberation theology also are theological locus, or location, in two senses. Firstly they
are the theological location in a hermeneutical and epistemological
sense; it is necessary to adopt their standpoint in order to gain
knowledge about God, and to be able to interpret the sources of
theology correctly. Secondly, and more fundamentally, the poor
become in this outline the theological location in a more direct,
soteriological sense. The poor bring salvation. Their transformative
action has liberation as its objective, a liberation which will not only
aim at innerworldly goals, but which stretches towards the more,
the beyond, toward salvation in the full Christian sense. And
since the poor are the ones on the margins, on the reverse side of
history, the only way that history may be one history of salvation
for all, is that they break the power of division, conflict and oppression, in a word, sin, from the outside, from exteriority.240
Although there are many variations of the treatment of these
main points among liberation theologians, including those to
whom I have referred to so far, I find the structure and main line of
thought sufficiently consistent to be regarded as a coherent methodological proposal, when judged by its internal standards.241 The
theological implications and consequences of this proposal are, of
course, wider-ranging. Indirectly, this is the subject matter of my
entire study.
(2) What concept regarding the nature of human being, of the
world and of history is presupposed here? I have shown (and I shall
elaborate in greater detail on this below) that Sobrino, following
Ellacura, sees both the nature of human beings and of the world as
constitutively and radically historical. History is where human
beings and the world are intertwined in a mutually interdependent
manner. Even the working of the human mind is ultimately historical. This is why he insists that the Christian concept of salvation too
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is historical, and should be historicised.242 God is the God of history, who acts in and through history for the liberation-salvation of
human beings and the world.
This historical view of human being and world is not the same
as a purely immanent view, however. History is open-ended, Ellacura and Sobrino reiterate, time and time again. Nevertheless, this
repetitious insistence leaves one with the suspicion that they them240 The poor are the other inasmuch as they are excluded from the system, coming from beyond, challenging the totality. Others reveal themselves as others in all their acuteness of their exteriority when they burst in upon us as
something extremely distinct, as nonhabitual, nonroutine, as the extraordinary, the enormous (apart from the norm) the poor, the oppressed
(Dussel 1985, 43). The other as other is a mystery, that reason can never
embrace only faith can penetrate it, continues Enriaue Dussel (Dussel
1985, 46.) The other the poor is thus the Holy One (The Other is the
Holy One. Poor people are holy ones inasmuch as they are outside the system, Dussel 1978, 30) who reveals the totally Other, who is God. God is
the absolute Other, since he is eschatological and therefore does not give
himself entirely to us in history, but only at the end of history (Dussel 1978,
13.; compare Gutirrez 1980, 16) The Other as exteriority is definitively
God. Whenever we respect the Other as other, we live our lives as we should.
Evil enters our lives when we do not respect the Other, but use the Other as
a thing. Furthermore (Dussel 1978, 31): In the totality of the system (contrary to Wittgenstein, who thinks that God does not reveal in the world),
in the world, the self-revelation of the absolute Other takes place through the
oppressed (Dussel 1985, 189). Dussel calls this an epiphany through the
poor (ibid.). Liberating philosophy and liberating theology both stem from
this encounter with the poor and oppressed, understood as a revelation of
the other, according to Dussel.
241 This assessment does not mean that I have accepted the methodological
alternative en bloc, only that it rightly presents itself as a coherent alternative.
Even Ratzinger does not disagree on this: If one seeks to offer a global
judgement, one must say that when we try to understand the fundamental
options of liberation theology, one cannot deny that the whole theology
contains an almost irrefutable logic. Ratzinger 1990, 374.
242 Cf. Chapter ii, [2].
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selves in fact are struggling with this point. The question is whether
Ellacuras and Sobrinos open realism in fact is able to carry the
weight of the theology they formulate. Is it open enough? From
the reading of Ellacura and Sobrino on the issue of history and
transcendence, arises the suspicion that their insistence on reality
as historicity as opposed to any form of idealism and dualism, creates difficulties in the direction of monistic and synergistic tendencies.243 This suspicion and its possible consequences in soteriology
and christology will have to be examined further.
(3) Do we find here a too optimistic view of the nature of human
being, world and history, as has been objected by some?244 Some
elements do point in an optimistic direction: liberation-salvation
in history is thought to be possible. And human beings act in conjunction with God in this process of salvation. Yet at the same time
Sobrinos and liberation theologys foundational experience is an
experience of being victimised by the historical and very concrete
consequences of sin. The power of evil, sin and death is by no
means overlooked or regarded less significant in their theological
concept. For them, theology belongs to the real reality, the reality
of unjust suffering, and can never escape the presence and power of
the negative forces.
This is also why Ellacura and Sobrino point to the necessity of
being poor with spirit. Only through conversion and by the
243 This critical point is exaggerated beyond any reasonable interpretation by
Ratzinger, however. In Ratzinger 1990, 372-373, he faults Sobrino for fundamentally substituting historical fidelity for faith. Ratzinger sees this as a
result of [] a Marxist, materialist philosophy in which history has
assumed the role of God. Ellacura is included in the same criticism. Such
simplistic characteristics leave the impression of being the result of a superficial and indeed averse reading of the texts of Sobrino and Ellacura.
244 See e.g., Congregation 1990d, 349-350, paragraphs 6 and 7c; or from a conservative, evangelical perspective, Almeida 1990, 29-36, 51-52.
117
strength and power of Gods spirit can the poor transform this
world in the direction of the Kingdom of God, and thus lead history towards its fulfilment. The ability of the poor to transform history in the direction of the Kingdom is, according to this view, not
rooted in some inherent quality of theirs as poor, but in their theological status as the priveleged addressees of the gospel.
Is this, nevertheless, not to expect too much from the poor? Are
not the poor also sinners?245 Is this a way of burdening the poor
with a soteriological role which they cannot and should not play?246
Ultimately, is there not too much voluntarism and activism, and
too little mystery and grace in the position of liberation theology on
this point? These questions will follow us as we proceed, in particular when examining the term the crucified people.
245 Christian Duquoc rejects such criticism of the liberation theology position:
A los telogos de la liberacin se les ha acusado de omitir el pecado. Esta
acusacin me parece infundada por un doble motivo: nunca han asimilado a
los pobres con los justos ni han negado que los pobres fueran tambin pecadores; por otra parte han subrayado que el pecado habita nuestra historia,
ya que su forma estructural, la opresin es perceptible en sus destructivos
efectos. Duquoc 1989, 92.
246 Cf. Bedford 1993, who launches this as the most serious criticism of the concept of the crucified peoples in the thinking of Ellacura and Sobrino, see p.
295. Bedford wrote her thesis under professor Jrgen Moltmann in
Tbingen, and her conclusions clearly seems to concur with his views. In a
recent review of the German edition of Mysterium Liberationis in Orientierung, Moltmann puts forward the following criticism of Ellacuras classic
essay on the crucified people: Er [i.e. Ellacura, my comment, SJS] folgert
daraus: Es ist das Opfer der Snde der Welt, und es ist dasjenige, das der
Welt Erlsung bringt []. Zu dieser khnen Aussage kommt mir die kritische Frage in den Sinn: Wenn das gekreuzigte Volk der Welt Erlsung
bringt, wer erlst dann das gekreuzigte Volk? Ist das nicht eine religise
berforderung des Volkes, und macht es seine Lasten nicht noch schwerer,
von denen das Volk doch befreit werden soll? Moltmann 1996, 205. Cf.
Maier 1992, 339.
118
119
120
is only an inner moment of praxis? From where does it get its critical potential if it is totally dependent on praxis? The question is still
open.
(5) Earlier in this chapter i outlined what I called presuppositions for
doing theology meaningfully in a crucified reality, according to
Sobrino. But as was also pointed out, these presuppositions are
based on previous experiences of suffering and oppression experiences that make it meaningful to speak theologically of reality as
crucified. These presuppositions are then theoretically a prioris,
but de facto they emerge a posteriori. The criteria of how to do theology in a crucified reality can only be discovered when experiencing
the reality as crucified. This points to a profound circularity in
Sobrinos fundamental theological method. Theoretically, this circularity may be understood as the circularity which affects any process
of understanding. In other words, it may be (just) another version
of the hermeneutical circle.
Yet it could also be a closed circle, a circular argumentation that
in fact presupposes its own conclusions.254 If this should be the
case, such a theological method would become irrelevant for anybody who does not uncritically accept its presuppositions, or share
the basic experiences that precede it. Worse, it could then become
totally closed to outside criticism and testing or verification, thus in
fact precluding any meaningful dialogue, and in the final analysis
becoming manipulative and ideological, in the pejorative sense of
this word.255
But is this the case in Sobrinos theology, given the centrality
that it accords to the crucified people? In order to be able to give an
answer to this fundamental question, we need to have a clearer
254 Rahner speaks of the circular structure of faith knowledge, see Rahner
1993, 230-232.
255 Cf. Sobrino 1982a, 92.
121
[5] Conclusions
In this chapter I have shown that the reality of contemporary suffering is fundamental to the theology of Jon Sobrino. The principal
reason for this fact is to be sought in Sobrinos own experiences of
suffering in the midst of a concrete praxis for justice and peace.
These experiences make Sobrino describe reality as crucified.
Reflecting upon what it means to do theology in such a crucified reality, Sobrino emphasises seven basic points: (1) First, that it
requires an act of honesty in relation to reality. This act of honesty
implies that the theologian is willing to undergo a profound change
of mind, eyes and heart, i.e. a conversion in order to be able to see
the truth of reality. (2) Second, that there is a close relationship
between the context and content of any given theological thinking.
Theological reflection is always influenced by its situatedness, its
location. It is thus necessary to have a conscious and critical focus
on the way in which theology is being shaped and conditioned by
the concrete location from which it takes place. It is only by being
critically aware of its situatedness that theology can overcome the
limitations which follow from this situatedness, and take advantage
of the opportunities that it represents. Furthermore, Sobrino
believes together with Latin American liberation theologians in
general that there are privileged locations for theology. This privileged location is what he calls the lugar teolgico. This requires from
the side of the theologian a consciousness about the dialectical relation between the sources of theological reflection and its concrete
122
location, and a willingness to move to locations from which the content of the sources can be better grasped.
(3) This privileged location for interpreting the Christian
sources, Sobrino holds to be the poor. Sobrino suggests that theological method should give priority to the conscious and committed
siding with the poor in their struggle for liberation, in order to
avoid the danger of a false neutrality inherent in any reflection and
discourse, and not least in theology. This means that, (4) in a crucified reality where the poor are considered to be a theological locus,
the liberation of the poor becomes a theological objective in its own
right.
This in turn, implies almost by necessity that (5) there be a
major emphasis in theological method on concrete history and historical praxis, in order to overcome the reductionist and escapist
consequences of an erroneous idealism in theology. Rather than
orthodoxy, the stress is laid on orthopraxis. In terms of christology, this emphasis on praxis is expressed in the centrality of the following of Jesus (seguimiento), which Sobrino sees both as a
precondition and as a consequence of gaining knowledge about the
content of faith.
This leads Sobrino to affirm that (6) theology formally consists
in conceptualizing reality theologically. The material for theological
labour is thus not just written texts of the past, but also contemporary events and phenomena, which may be interpreted theologically
as signs of Gods presence, i.e. signs of the times. Finally, Sobrino
proposes that (7) through such a reformulation of the theological
task, theology should be understood as an intellectus amoris.
In all this, we have seen that Sobrino is profoundly indebted to
other liberation theologians, in particular to his late colleague, Ignacio Ellacura. In addition, Sobrino has received important influences from modern European philosophy and theology. But
123
perhaps more significantly, we have seen that this approach to theology has deep roots in the tradition of Jesuit spirituality.
In the course of this consideration of Sobrinos point of departure and fundamental presuppositions, I have raised some questions, doubts and critical objections. These have evolved in
particular around a complex of problems related to the inter-connection and understanding of concepts such as reality, history,
the poor and Christian salvation, which will be of importance in
my further inquiry.
Concluding the present chapter, I would like to highlight one
of the major issues that in my view is at stake here, formulated as a
challenge: How can one combine the absolute, partisan commitment to the poor i.e. the excluded and oppressed other with
a balanced, nuanced view of the fragmentariness and incompleteness of our perception of reality, thus taking seriously the ambiguity
and plurality of history and reality? Applied to the world of the
poor, this challenge can be formulated as follows: How can one
take due account of the diversity of forms of oppression, of the faces
of the poor, of their strategies for survival and liberation, without
losing sight of the common denominator of their situation? How
can one appreciate both the historical potential for strength that lies
in the consciousness of this similarity on the one hand, and the necessary (and promising) theological analysis of this similarity-in-difference on the other?
With these challenges in mind, I shall now concentrate on the
term the crucified people.
124
Sobrino holds that theology, formally speaking, should be a theological conceptualising of historical reality. Accordingly, in this first
approach to an analysis of the crucified people, I shall follow its
journey from historical reality to theological concept. It is this basic
understanding of theological endeavour which makes it possible for
Sobrino to include such a concept in his theological thinking in the
first place, given that it is not a concept that can be derived directly
either from the Scriptures or from the Christian tradition. By saying
this, it is not implied that the idea of crucified people is without
any precedent or parallel, or that it does not have any biblical legitimation.This remains to be shown.2 But its main source is an interpretation of a contemporary historical phenomenon. It is thus a
new theological concept, a theologoumenon.3
We have seen how crucial it is for Sobrino to make true reality
the point of departure for theological reflection. Consequently, he
emphasises that the crucified people is primarily a historical reality,
and only thereafter a theological concept. Because theological concepts are limit-statements, and accordingly not directly accessible
to human understanding, they require prior experience of historical realities, Sobrino holds.4 I have shown which personal experi1
2
3
125
126
Sobrino 1976.
Sobrino 1976, 135-176.
127
Gods suffering and death.9 Then he goes on to determine this suffering of the other as a suffering on the cross: [] the privileged
mediation of God continues to be the real cross of the oppressed.10
There is a profound interrelation between the cross of Jesus and
the historical crosses.11
However, Sobrino does not yet develop this relationship further. One reason may be found in the fact that Sobrino wrote this
book a short time after his return to Central America from Germany, where he had finished his doctoral studies on the christologies of Wolfhart Pannenberg and Jrgen Moltmann.12 Thus, it is
clearly influenced by Jrgen Moltmanns theology, and especially
Der gekreuzigte Gott13 an influence Sobrino openly admits.14
Moltmann also speaks metaphorically of contemporary crosses;
cross of reality15, cross of the present time16, etc. He speaks of
conformitas crucis17, following the cross18, crucified Chris9 Sobrino 1976, 147.
10 Sobrino 1976, 166: [] la mediacin privilegiada de Dios sigue siendo la
cruz real del oprimido.
11 Sobrino 1976, 172: [] la cruz de Jess y las cruces histricas. He also
speaks of [] una historia que sigue siendo de cruz e injusticia, Sobrino
1976, 175.
12 Sobrino 1975c.
13 Moltmann 1973, English translation: Moltmann 1974.
14 De Moltmann he aprendido mucho. Pero, tal vez, la diferencia radica en la
diversa situacin existente en Alemania y Latinoamrica. Moltmann trata de
un modo general cosas que nosotros tratamos de un modo concreto, por
cuanto que en Europa no existen esos conflictos reales que existen entre
nosotros. Yo dira que en Latinoamrica hacemos concretamente lo que
Moltmann presenta idealmente. Sobrino according to Gibellini 1981, 465473; 472. Cf. Gutirrez on Moltmann: Gutirrez 1984, 270-271.
15 Moltmann 1974, 4; 35.
16 Moltmann 1974, 9.
17 Moltmann 1974, 45.
18 Moltmann 1974, 54ff.
128
Moltmann 1974, 17, cf. 24, 25, 55, 124, 149, 152.
Moltmann 1974, 64.
Ibid.
This seems to have changed in Moltmanns later works, however. See e.g.
Moltmann 1990, 198, where he too speaks of the [] martyrdom of whole
groups, people, races, and so forth.
23 Sobrino 1982b, 148 / Sobrino 1982a, 173: [] los crucificados de la historia.
Note the following error in this Spanish edition: the titles of the two final
chapters have been switched. Chapter 7 is in fact El resucitado es el Crucificado [], while Chapter 8 is La Fe en el Hijo de Dios desde un pueblo
crucificado.
129
130
takes his cue from Ignacio Ellacura, seeing the crucified people in
relation to the Songs of the Servant of Yahweh in Isaiah.
More recently this concept of the crucified people has moved
into the very centre of Sobrinos theology, to such an extent that it
can be used to characterise his theology as such. This is shown i.a.
through his inclusion of an entire chapter on this term in the first
volume of his reformulated and expanded christology, Jesucristo liberador26, and in the subtitle of his El Principio Misericordia. Bajar de
la cruz a los pueblos crucificados from 1991. In this book, Sobrino
wishes to set down that the sign of the times par excellence is the
existence of the crucified people, and the most urgent demand is
to take them down from the cross. 27
(2) Sobrino is not the first to introduce the crucified people as
theologoumenon. As in so many other aspects of his theological
thinking, here too he follows Ignacio Ellacura, who in 1979 wrote a
groundbreaking article on the subject. Sobrino also remembers
some of Archbishop Romeros sermons as a direct influence that
made him develop this theme, and in particular he gives significance to the pastoral visit to Aguilares in June 1979, which I referred
to at the beginning of this study.28
There are also other contemporary theologians in Latin America who have been exploring similar approaches, although with dif26 Sobrino 1991d, 423-451.
27 Sobrino 1992b, 7: [] quiere asentar que el signo de los tiempos por antonomasia es la existencia del pueblo crucificado, y la exigencia ms primigenia es la de bajarlo de la cruz. This last formulation gives cause to some
wonder already at this stage. Why is it a task to take the crucified down?
Would not the challenge for Christian faith be rather to see them resurrected? And is there any difference? The formulation to take the crucified
down has Jesuit roots, which may throw some light on this vagueness. See
Chapter viii [4], thesis 10.2.
28 See Introduction above.
131
29 In Dussel 1969, 127-170, which is actually a reprint of a study from 1963, the
author makes an analysis of the aspects of universalism and mission in the
Servant Songs. The perspective of this early study is not as contextually
rooted and socially committed as that of Dussels later writings. He does not
(yet) relate the suffering poor people of Latin America to the mission of the
Servant. In Gustavo Gutirrez writings, the central theme is Gods particular
solidarity and identification with the poor and suffering, as already pointed
out. See e.g., Gutirrez 1982, 96-130; 112, and Gutirrez 1993a, 148-158; 153:
Desde el sufrimiento cotidiano del pueblo pobre y desde la vida entregada
en la lucha contra las causas de esa situacin se produce una nueva vigencia
del mensaje pascual. In Leonardo Boff s Boff 1987a and Boff 1987b the connection between the suffering of the people and the suffering of Jesus is
made explicit, to the point of being unified in the term crucified. The biblical scholar Carlos Mesters (Mesters 1983), also from Brazil, presents a popular re-reading of the Servant Songs which concludes that El Siervo de Dios
es el pueblo oprimido; pp. 144ff. The economist and lay theologian Franz
Hinkelammert develops a profound and peculiar criticism of capitalism in
terms of crucifixion in Hinkelammert 1981, 223-268.
30 Esta vivencia lo condujo al punto central de su espiritualidad y su teologa:
el reconocimiento de Jess de Nazaret, el Cristo, en los maltratados y
flagelados de la Indias. Gutirrez 1992, 71, cf. 71-100. English version:
Gutirrez 1993b.
132
In the Indies I leave Jesus Christ, our God, being whipped and afflicted, and
buffeted and crucified, not once but thousands of times, as often as the
Spaniards assault and destroy those people. 31
133
35 Ellacura 1978a, see also Ellacura 1989a. An English translation of this essay
is found in Ellacura and Sobrino 1993, 580-603.
36 Jos Maria Mardones sees the emphasis on historicization of the theological
concepts in liberation theology in general and in Ellacuras writings in particular as one of these questions that characterize a whole way of thinking,
correcting a deficiency and omission of predominant theology [] una
de esas questiones que sealan todo un estilo de pensamiento teolgico, corrector de una deficiencia y olvido de la teologa predominante Mardones
1992, 84.
37 See e.g. Ellacura 1973 (English version: Ellacura 1976) which was Ellacuras
first theological book, where he straightaway outlines his position, saying
we must historicize salvation (Ellacura 1976, 5), and (S)alvation history is
a salvation in history: This statement is the theme of this whole book 15. Cf.
e.g. Ellacura 1975a, 425: [] ha de historizarse la salvacin []
38 See Ellacura 1991c, in which he proposes profetismo as method and
utopa as horizon for the historizacin del reino de Dios, 394. Ellacura
wrote this article, which was first published in Revista Latinoamericana de
Teologa (RLT) 17 (1989), pp. 141-184 (with the full title Utopia y profetismo
desde Amrica Latina), just a few months before he was assassinated.
Sobrino considers it a verdadero testamento, cf. Sobrino 1994b and Sobrino
1994a.
134
39 Ellacura 1984a, 181: Para ello [recuperar la plenitud del sentido de trminos
como sacramento y salvacin], nada como historizarlos, lo cual no significa contar su historia, sino ponerlos en relacin con la historia.
40 Mardones 1992, 83. NB: The word utilizar in this articles first sentence is
most probably an error. I believe the correct wording should be: Una de las
insistencias que recorren los escritos de I. Ellacura es la necesidad de historizar los conceptos teolgicos (my emphasis, SJS.) Mardones continues:
Formulado libremente quiere decir que es necesario dar carne histricosocial a conceptos como pecado, gracia, salvacin, cruz, Iglesia, reindo de
Dios, etc.
41 Ibid.
42 Ellacura 1976, 93.
135
We can see then, that the movement between theology and history goes both ways: Theology means both to conceptualise theologically historical reality and to historicise theological concepts.
This dual movement is clearly found in Ellacuras conceptualisation
of the crucified people, which Sobrino subsequently develops further.
Ellacura sets out from historical reality, which he sees as simply the existence of a vast portion of humankind which is literally
and historically crucified.44 What is the meaning of this from the
perspective of salvation history, which to Ellacura means salvation
in history? The question is thus posed in terms of historical soteriology,45 and the dual movement is clear: Faced with this historical
reality he asks what it might mean in theological terms (historical
soteriology). In terms of the crucified people: the people are crucified. And he asks what the main theological theme salvation
might mean when one finds oneself confronted with this historical
reality (historical soteriology). The people are crucified.
It is important at this stage to note carefully two presuppositions that Ellacuria sets forth in his understanding of historical soteriology: (1) It deals with a salvation that has to be realised within
human history, which according to him is the only history there is.
43 Ellacura 1975b, 346: El verum de la Biblia no es un factum dado, una vez
por todas, sino un faciendum. De ah que la reflexin teolgica, ejercitada
desde un logos histrico, no intenta tan slo determinar la realidad y el sentido de lo ya hecho, sino que, desde esa determinacin y en direccin a lo
por hacer, debe veri-ficar, hacer verdadero y real lo que ya en s es principio
de verdad. Por este carcter futuro y prxico no basta con la mera aceptacin
e inteleccin de la Biblia; o, si se prefiere, la intelleccin real de la Biblia
implica desde s misma el ejercicio de una determinada inteligencia, la del
logos histrico(Thesis 10.2.4.).
44 Ellacura 1989a, 305.
45 Although it involves many christological and ecclesiological themes as
Ellacura puts it (ibid.).
136
And (2) humanity participates actively in the realisation of this salvation in history. 46
(1) That there is only one history, is a basic contention of Latin
American liberation theology, which Ellacura had been advocating
since the early 70s, when he launched a fundamental critique of the
traditional Catholic division between natural and supernatural.
Like e.g. Gustavo Gutirrez47 then, Ellacura holds that there is no
separation between a secular history and history of revelation,48
although he is forced to admit that one may experience some differences between what may be a history of salvation and the real
history in which one lives empirically. The point is however that
the believer sees these two as unified or, better, united in what may
be called the great history of God.49 This is possible, in Ellacuras
view, because history is in itself transcendentally open, and because
in this openness, God is present.50
Ellacura makes a great effort to give a solid basis for the unity
of history. This is not the place for a profound analysis of his application of the philosophical-theological positions of Rahner and
Zubiri, and his own development of a philosophy of history. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the very struggle of Ellacura to reach
such an understanding of history, and his somewhat insistent and
repetitive tone when discussing it, points to some profound difficul46 Ellacura 1989a, 306.
47 Gutirrez 1984, 199-226; 200: (L)a afirmacin es clara, en concreto: Hay
una sola historia. Una historia cristofinalizada. Cf. above, Chapter i [2].
48 Ellacura 1984a, 195.
49 Ellacura 1991b, 352. Aceptando que puede darse alguna diferencia entre lo
que puede ser una historia de salvacin y la historia real que le toca vivir
empricamente, puede decirse que en el fondo el creyente ve estas dos historias unificadas o, ms bien, unidas en lo que pudiera llamarse la gran historia
de Dios.
50 Ellacura 1993a, 8 : La historia es de suyo transcendentalmente abierta y en
esa transcendentalidad est ya la presencia, al menos incoada, de Dios.
137
138
sation of unjust structures through a one-sided doctrine of salvation/justification which justifies the oppressor and bids the
oppressed to resign and be content with their lot. These dangers,
and the urgency of overcoming them, are something which the history of the church, not least in Latin America, clearly demonstrates.54
As they concern fundamental and classical theological loci, these
two soteriological presuppositions immediately actualise traditional
dividing lines within theology, such as the one between Catholic
and Protestant soteriology.55 And at the same time they present new
dividing lines: First World/Third World theology, European political theology/liberation theology, etc. It will become clear through
this inquiry that the conclusions regarding the legitimacy and usefulness of speaking theologically of crucified people(s) and the relevance of a theological methodology along the lines proposed by
Sobrino, depend to a considerable degree on how one views these
presuppositions.
Let us now return to Ellacuras essay on the crucified people.
Continuing in this constantly dialectical movement between contemporary history and theological interpretation, Ellacura wishes
to analyse the figure of Jesus and the oppressed humankind from
that point of view which unifies them: their passion and death. 56
Their unity or likeness in suffering makes it, in Ellacuras opinion,
hermeneutically justified to let them shed light on each other: the
crucified people sheds light on the historical significance of the
54 See Chapter iii, below.
55 These issues have been in the forefront in recent Lutheran Roman Catholic dialogue, see e.g. Lutheran-Roman Catholic 1994 and the process towards
a Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification Between the Lutheran World
Federation and the Roman Catholic Church. Although differences and unresolved problems still remain, it is fair to say that there has been considerable
rapprochement between the two churches in this field.
56 Ellacura 1989a, 306.
139
death of Jesus, and the death of Jesus points to the salvific character of the crucified people.
Focusing on the historicity of Jesus death, it is clear, according
to Ellacura, that his death had historical causes just like the death
of the crucified people. The necessity of Jesus suffering of which
the evangelists speak (Gr.: edei pathein), was first and foremost historical, not theological, he believes.57 It was the necessary historical
consequence of a life which corresponded to Gods word. Through
long historical experience culminating with Jesus, the conclusion
emerges: (I)n our (historical) world it is necessary to pass through
persecution and death in order to reach the glory of God. 58
This is only so, however, because of sin. The realm of sin and
the realm of God are opposite realities.59 There is a collective sin
which governs the world and the peoples, destroys history and is
an obstacle to Gods future. We all share in this collective sin,
which is anterior to the individual sins of each.60 This historical,
collective sin puts Jesus to death. That is the true meaning of the
confession that Jesus died for our sins, Ellacura believes.61
This means that Jesus did not have to die primarily for sacrificial or expiatory purposes, according to Ellacura. Although he
admits that interpretations along these lines of such major importance in the Christian tradition do contain some valid elements,
they are insufficient in Ellacuras view, because they underscore the
historical necessity neither of the collective sin nor of the human
action to confront it by destroying injustice and constructing
love.
57
58
59
60
140
Here we reach a main point in Ellacuras soteriological thinking: The power of sin can only be overcome through bearing its consequences: suffering under it. Salvation in history can be achieved only
through confronting sin in an active struggle against it, and bearing
the consequences of the opposition which such a struggle always
by historical necessity will meet. So it was with Jesus in his time,
and so it is with the crucified people today, according to Ellacura.
This point is indeed problematic when applied to suffering people today, as I shall show. There is a striking vagueness in Ellacuras
expressions here, and pressing questions emerge: Why is this so,
that sin is overcome by suffering under it? How is salvation actually
brought about? These questions are not answered by Ellacura. The
vagueness could be explained by the nature of the matter: In the
why and how of salvation, theology reaches its definite limit; it
is facing the unfathomable mystery. Nevertheless, theology must
always be prepared to give convincing reasons for why it holds this
(and not that) to be such a mystery, and why it chooses to express
that mystery in exactly these terms. This becomes increasingly
urgent in an attempt to historicise theological concepts, as we find
in Ellacura. Is this vagueness perhaps rather a symptom of inconsistency an inconsistency that Sobrino would inherit? We shall have
to pay close attention to this as we proceed.62
A historical interpretation of the death of Jesus is thus necessary in order to understand its salvific value, Ellacura insists. It is,
in fact, not possible to separate the historical and the soteriological
in Jesus case.63 It is his historical announcement and service of the
coming Kingdom which meets resistance to the point of persecution and execution. And it is because it was this particular man
(Jesus of Nazareth) who was crucified for these particular reasons
(the service of the Kingdom), and who suffered the consequences
62 See below, Chapter vi.
63 Ellacura 1989a, 317.
141
142
143
tise the salvific role of the crucified people, Ellacura now turns to
an analysis of the Suffering Servant in the book of Isaiah. Faithful to
his hermeneutical principles, Ellacuras interpretation of these texts
is not a mere historical-critical exegesis, but a re-reading from a particular point of view, a particular locus theologicus.70 The choice of
reading the texts of the Suffering Servant from the point of view of
the crucified people is not arbitrary, he holds, because the crucified
people, in his opinion, must be considered the true addressees of
these texts in our historical moment. That this is so, can be confirmed only if it turns out that the texts shed new light on the reality of the crucified people, and if this reality helps clarify and
actualise the texts. This certainly does not exclude a rigorous exegetical examination, but it subordinates this, Ellacura is eager to point
out.71
So, what does the Suffering Servant tell about the crucified people, according to Ellacura? In short, (1) the Servant is chosen by
God (Is. 42,1-7) in order to (2) bring justice to all the peoples of the
world (42,4). In this election, (3) God shows preference for the
lowly, the one(s) despised by the powerful (49,4; 7). (4) The Servants task will lead to persecution and suffering (50,7; 52,14; 53), but
the Suffering Servant shall (5) endure the hardships (50,5-9; 53,7)
and gain victory through them (53,11-12), a victory which (6) means
salvation not just for the Servant but for many(53,4-5; 11-12).
The description of the Suffering Servant in Isaiah reaches its climax in chapters 52,13 -53. From this fourth song, Ellacura draws
the following eight conclusions:
(1) The Servant is someone who is crushed because of the historical intervention by human beings.
144
And finally, (8) Ellacura holds that the global orientation or universal scope of these songs about the Servant makes it impossible to
145
determine once and for all who this Servant is: Suffering Servant of
Yahweh will be anyone who discharges the mission described in the
songs and par excellence the one discharging it in a more comprehensive fashion.73
Since Christian faith first and foremost identifies the Servant
with Jesus, Ellacura thinks that the link between the Servant and
the crucified people should be seen in light of the Servant christology of the New Testament. He notes that direct reference to this
title (Gr.: pais theou) is not frequent in the New Testament texts,
and that it virtually disappeared early on as a direct reference to
Jesus or a christological title, since it did not mean much to the
early-Christian Hellenistic communities.74 Nevertheless the Servant
christology is of primary importance in the New Testament when it
comes to interpreting the salvific value of the death of Jesus, Ellacura holds.
To what extent Jesus himself attributed any salvific value to his
death, is disputed. He probably did not see himself as the Servant.
The main point for Ellacura, however, is that Jesus did not seek
72 Ellacura and Sobrino 1993, 598. Spanish original: Son las frases ms fuertes,
pero que admiten la interpretacin que Dios acepta como querido por El,
como saludable, el sacrificio de quien histricamente es muerto por los pecados de los hombres. Slo en un difcil acto de fe el cantor del siervo es capaz
de descubrir lo que aparece como todo lo contrario a los ojos de la historia.
Precisamente porque ve cargado de los pecados y de las consecuencias del
pecado a quien no los cometi, se atreve, por la misma injusticia de la situacin, a atribuir a Dios lo que est sucediendo; Dios no puede menos de
atribuir un valor permanente salvfico a este acto de absoluta injusticia
histrica. Y se lo puede atribuir porque el propio siervo acepta su destino de
salvar por el sufrimiento a quienes son los causantes de l. Ellacura 1989a,
326.
73 Siervo doliente de Yahv ser todo aquel que desempee la misin descrita
en los cnticos, y lo ser por antonomasia quien la desempae de forma ms
total. Ellacura 1989a, 326.
74 Ellacura 1989a, 327.
146
death for its own (possibly salvific) sake, but accepted death as the
result of his life in struggle against the historical consequences of
sin. The death must be seen as a consequence of his life, a life
expressed in a public announcement of and active and consistent
commitment to the justice which God brings, the Kingdom.75
Thus the salvific value of the death of Jesus is seen as intimately
connected to the concrete character of that life, of which it was a
consequence.
It is this salvific life-death that needs a continuation in history 76,
according to Ellacura. The salvation that Jesus brings is trans-historical.77 But who represents this continuation? Theoretically, several possibilities are open. The crucial point is theologically
interpreted whether God accepts it as such a continuation.78 This
can only be tested against its similarity to what happened to the historical Jesus, Ellacura believes.
In the Servant, as in Jesus, the victim becomes saviour. Ellacura
finds this interpretation fundamentally confirmed and founded in
the scene of the Last Judgement in Matt. 25:31-46. Therefore it is
possible for faith in spite of all the scandal it provokes also to see
the crucified people as saviours, who will eventually bring resurrection, justice, and new life, Ellacura concludes.
This is, in my judgment, a bold new step in theology. Making
the explicit connection between the Suffering Servant, Jesus, and
suffering and oppressed humankind of today, resulting in the attri75 Ellacura 1989a, 329: [] la muerte no fue sino la culminacin de su vida, el
momento definitivo de su entrega total en el anuncio en la realizacin del
reino.
76 This question about continuation actualises again traditional dividing lines
between Catholic and Protestant soteriology. Compare my discussions on
continuity and discontinuity below.
77 Ellacura 1989a, 318.
78 Ellacura 1989a, 330.
147
148
149
Finally, in this essay Ellacura does not explain what the salvation that the crucified people bring actually consists in. But this is a
shortcoming he is well aware of. He points therefore to the necessity
of further reflection. And that is where Sobrino takes over.
150
This chapter is usually not included in christologies. Some analyze what the
cross has to say about Jesus Father and speak of the crucified God, but it is
unusual to analyze what this same cross has to say about Jesus body in history.84
151
152
Thus Sobrino turns from a meditation on the reality of the crucified people to a more analytical exploration of what elements of
the salvific mystery this reality may contain if the crucified people
can be compared to the Servant in this aspect as well. It is particularly in this part that Sobrino goes beyond the essay of Ellacura,
taking up the task which he left, trying to define how and what kind
of salvation is brought about by the crucified people.
(1) How do the crucified people bring salvation? First of all, the crucified people bring salvation by being killed for establishing right and
justice: The suffering Servant equals Jesus in mission and destiny.
Their common mission is to establish justice (Hebr.: mishpat)
among the peoples in the world, and their common destiny is to be
unjustly and cruelly executed for crimes they did not commit. So
also with the crucified people, according to Sobrino: This is also
true for the crucified people, although here the reason for their
death is tragically extended. 90
The crucified people participate in this mission and destiny in
an analogous manner, Sobrino holds. Analogy means that the one
takes part in the reality shares the fundamental characteristics of
the other, although not necessarily in the totality of that reality. In
other words this participation may be a participation in some
aspects of the reality of the other (not all), at the same time as it
may happen in different manners. According to this understanding
the crucified people may participate in the mission and destiny of
the Servant and of Jesus in different aspects and different ways.91
This point is essential in Sobrinos thought concerning the crucified
people, as will become clear. By such analogical method, he justifies
the use of this theologoumenon, at the same time as the method permits a certain flexibility in the application of the terminology on
historical realities.
90 Sobrino 1994c, 258/ Sobrino 1991d, 430-431.
153
Sobrino distinguishes between an active and passive analogous participation. The crucified people consists of many persons
who today actively take up the challenge and mission of establishing
justice in the world, and who for that reason encounter opposition
and persecution. Sobrino calls them prophets of all kinds, who die
formally (formalmente) like the Servant/Jesus. On the other hand,
there is in the crucified people a majority of people who are put to
death, not because of what they actively do or seek to accomplish,
but simply because of what they (passively) are. These are all the
91
154
On analogy, see e.g. Soskice 1985, 65: Analogical relations all refer to the
same thing, they all have the same res significata, but they refer to it in different ways. Elizabeth Johnsons treatment in Johnson 1992, 113-117 is noteworthy. She concludes: The net result of these various recent studies is an
understanding of analogy in the Catholic mind today that once again
stresses its movement through negation towards mystery, and consequently
its nonliteral although still meaningful character of its speech about God.
Nancy Bedford (Bedford 1993) is eager to point out the limits of analogy
within Sobrinos theology, see especially Die Grenzen der Analogie
zwischen dem gekreuzigten Volk und Jesus, p.264ff. Bedford claims for
instance that the analogy between Romero and Jesus which Sobrino
underlines strongly reaches its limit in that Sobrino never says that
Romero is raised from the dead like Jesus. Doch trotz dieser Worte, und
obgleich er betont, dass Romero wie Jesus an Gott geglaubt, prophetisch
gewirkt, den Armen das Evangelium verkndet und die Gtzen angeklagt
hat, und dass er deshalb wie Jesus gettet wurde, behauptet Sobrino nirgendwo, dass Romero wie Jesus auferstanden ist. Die Auferweckung Christi
bleibt in Sobrinos Theologie ein einmaliges Ereignis und der Punkt, an dem
alle Analogien aufhren mssen op. cit., 269. But in fact, Sobrino does
claum that the analogy between Romero and Jesus also includes resurrection. In his book on Romero, Sobrino writes explicitly: Cmo vive hoy
Mons. Romero? Vive, como Jess, resucitado, Sobrino 1989e, 210. The
limit of analogy must hence be found elsewhere in Sobrinos theology. The
issue here is really the question of continuity and/ or discontinuity between
Jesus and his followers the Crucified and the crucified. See below, Chapter
iv, [9], Chapter v, [7] and Chapter viii [3-4].
155
Jesus, and continues to crucify people today. These victims in history are the visible expression of sins invisible offence against
God.94
Like Ellacura, Sobrino holds that sin must be overcome by
bearing it. (A)s to what should be done about sin, [] the answer
is clear, eradicate it, but with one essential condition: by bearing it.
95
Bearing the sins of others does not refer primarily to the guilt of
sin, but to its direct negative consequences. Sobrino continues:
And rather than taking on the guilt of the sin, bearing the sin of others
means bearing the sins historical effects: being ground down, crushed, put
to death.96
93 Sobrino 1991d, 433. En el canto se dice que el siervo carga con pecados
ajenos y que con ello salva a los pecadores de su pecados. De esta forma s
dice tanto lo que es pecado como lo que hay que hacer con l. Pecado es,
ante todo, lo que da muerte, lo que produce vctimas tan reales y visbles
como lo es el siervo.
94 The historical expression of this sin is above all idolatry, according to
Sobrino. See below, particularly Chapter v, [1-3].
95 Sobrino 1994c, 260. / Sobrino 1991d, 433: Por otra parte, qu hacer con el
pecado, pregunta tambin fundamental en el NT, queda claro, erradicarlo,
pero con una condicin esencial: cargndo con l.
96 Sobrino 1994c, 260 / Sobrino 1991d, 433: Y cargar con el pecado de otros es,
antes que asumir lo que el pecado tiene de culpa, cargar con su objetivacin
histrica: ser triturado, machacado, dado muerte.
156
through a scandalous paradox, Sobrino admits bearers of historical soteriology in and through their innocent sufferings.
This is a remarkable theological statement, which might allow
for interpretations that would seem more cynically cruel than
Christian. Such interpretations would clearly miss the point that
Ellacura and Sobrino are making. But what are they actually saying
by this? And could that possibly turn out to be a justifiable Christian theological statement? As can be seen, the possible salvific role
of the crucified in history depends fundamentally on what is meant
by salvation. We must therefore ask what kind of salvation the crucified people bring, according to Sobrino. Again, it is worthwhile to
note that Sobrino explicitly refers to historical salvation: If we do
not make salvation historical in some ways, it is pointless to repeat
that the Servant and the crucified Christ bring real concrete salvation. 97
(2) What kind of salvation is brought about by the crucified people?98 The Servant is destined to be a light to the nations (42,6;
49,6). Do the crucified people bring light? Sobrino thinks so. The
crucified people contribute by their very existence to the unmasking
of the lies about this world. In their capacity to shock, they represent an important force that resists and overcomes the conscious
covering up of the real situation of this world. Such cover up is
always one of the historical consequences of sin. The crucified people offer negative light, to unmask bad solutions to our problems,
but also positive light, in that they show what utopia must be
today, Sobrino believes. They offer a humanising truth.
157
Sobrino is perfectly aware that not all the poor offer all or any of
these values. But he holds it to be a fact that the poor as a whole do
99 In his exposition, Sobrino distinguishes between the Servant bringing light
and salvation, but this distinction is, as far as I can see, more due to the terminological drift of the Servant Songs themselves, than to a substantial distinction in Sobrinos outline. Cf. also Sobrino 1992b, 90-95.
100 This close connection between the epistemological to get to know the
truth about reality and the soteriological in Sobrinos theology is noteworthy. I shall return to this.
101 Like the salvation(s) offered by Jesus during his ministry as portrayed in the
gospels, cf. Chapter iv [2], below.
158
offer them and, structurally speaking, they offer them in a way not
offered by other worlds.103
In the third place, the crucified people offer hope. They offer an
almost absurd hope in their constant struggle for survival, for
change, for liberation, for a better future. Because of the fact that
their struggle is almost always against all odds, their hope turns into
a hope against hope always endangered and under pressure.
Nevertheless, it is there, Sobrino insists: The crucified people
shows that there is a hopeful current in history available to all.
In the fourth place, they offer great love. This is shown through
their countless martyrs, Sobrino maintains. The fact that there are
people willing to lay down their lives for the rights of others, testifies more than anything else that true love is possible in this sinful
history. And this love is something that the crucified people offer to
all who wish to accept, claims Sobrino. For Sobrino, love is the
only word apt to express the ultimate salvific reality. It is love that
effects salvation; salvation consists in love; and love is the result of
salvation.104
In the fifth place and perhaps surprisingly the crucified people offer forgiveness. They do not want revenge on their oppressors.
They open up their homes and communities, and offer a new kind
of fellowship, Sobrino claims, referring particularly to the Salvadoran experience. This welcoming openness towards anybody who
approaches them to help turns out to be a de facto forgiveness,
although it is often not recognised and accepted as thus.105 Again,
102 Sobrino 1994c, 263. / Sobrino 1991d, 437: Dicho esto en lenguaje histrico,
los pobres tienen un potencial humanizador porque ofrece comunidad contra el individualismo, servicialidad contra el egosmo, sencillez contra la opulencia, creatividad contra el mimetismo cultural impuesto, apertura a la
transcendencia contra el romo positivismo y craso pragmatismo.
103 Ibid.
104 See below, Chapter vi [4].
159
Sobrino is perfectly aware that this is not always the case. Nevertheless, he insists that it happens and even that it happens almost ex
opere operato, i.e. on the basis of the structure of reality and not on
the basis of pure intentionality. 106
In the sixth place they generate solidarity.107According to
Sobrino, the reality of the poor the crucified people is the historical origin of solidarity,108 which shows its absolute necessity and
its possibility. Although the solidarity that the crucified people in
fact generate may be small in quantitative terms, it is nevertheless
real and new, Sobrino reiterates.
And finally, Sobrino claims that the crucified people offer a
faith, a way of being church and a holiness that are more authentic,
more Christian and more relevant to the present-day world, and
that capture more of Jesus.109 In this rather pretentious statement,
it becomes particularly obvious that Jon Sobrino speaks out of his
105 Sobrino distinguishes between an absolution-forgiveness (perdn-absolucin) and a welcome-forgiveness (perdn-acogida). Sobrino 1991d, 170ff;
Sobrino 1992b, 142-143. The welcome-forgiveness is the prevalent kind of
forgiveness offered by Jesus in his earthly ministry according to the synoptics, Sobrino holds. It is also the kind of forgiveness offered by the crucified
people. Sobrino 1992b, 152-157.
106 [] quasi ex opere operato, es decir, en basis de la estructura de la realidad
y no a la pura intencionalidad [] Sobrino 1992b, 155.
107 Sobrino 1994c, 263-264 / Sobrino 1991d, 436ff. Cf. Sobrino 1992b, 211-248;
Sobrino and Pico 1985.
108 Sobrino 1992b, 215-221.
109 Sobrino 1994c, 264. Sobrino 1991d, 439. In this statement, in fact, one can
find the whole fundament and material of Sobrinos own theological works:
his christology sets out to present the Christ in whom the crucified believe
(Sobrino 1976, Sobrino 1982a, Sobrino 1991d, etc.), his ecclesiological writings examine the way of being church proposed and put into practice by the
crucified (Sobrino 1986), and his pneumatological writings (especially
Sobrino 1987a), develop a spirituality from the viewpoint of the crucified
and their practice of liberation.
160
161
162
163
goes beyond mere resemblance. It has profound theological meaning. While the Servant is seen as a prophecy and a pre-figuration of
Christ, the crucified people become the continuance of the suffering of Jesus in history.
This interrelationship is of great significance since, as we have
seen, being critical of traditional ontological essentialism, Sobrino
stresses the constitutive character of relations. Such constitutive
relatedness apparently works both ways, according to Sobrino. They
are reciprocal. Therefore, he finds it legitimate to interpret the reality of the crucified people in line with the interpretation of the life
and death of Jesus. In other words; since the death of Jesus according to Christian faith is held to be revelatory, it is legitimate to ask:
what kind of revelation do the crucified people bring? Since the
death of Jesus according to Christian faith is experienced as salvific,
what kind of salvation do the crucified people bring? Since the suffering Jesus calls his disciples to following him, what kind of reaction or response does the suffering of the crucified people call
for?
These three questions uncover what may be seen as an underlying structure in this theological relationship. I shall call this the
three axes between Jesus and the crucified people.
The first axis is epistemological-hermeneutical: In order to gain
knowledge about the suffering Jesus, we must know the suffering
people of today, and in order to interpret the texts of his suffering
adequately, it should be done from the vantage-point of these people. And vice versa: in order to gain theological knowledge and to
interpret the theological meaning of the actual sufferings of the
people, we must look to Jesus.117
The second axis is historical-soteriological: Christian faith
attributes salvific significance to the death of Jesus. This salvation is,
according to Ellacura and Sobrino, always salvation in history.
Today, the salvific effects of the death of Jesus is, in some manner
164
165
166
be in tension in any given christology, since they stem from the central point and mystery of Christian faith in Jesus: that he is both
true God and true human being.121 Nonetheless, the particular
character of this tension is by no means insignificant.
Furthermore, Sobrinos position may be accused of trying to
give a religious explanation of the meaning of the suffering of others. Such explanation runs the risk of coming close to justification
or legitimation, which in its turn, may lead to passivity and resignation on behalf of those suffering. This is exactly what liberation theology claims to be opposing. If the theology of the crucified people
is not to be in direct contradiction with the main drift of liberation
theology, and hence in self-contradiction, Sobrino needs to explain
how victims of today may be accorded a salvific role without
thereby being de facto functionalised, instrumentalised or objectified in a pejorative sense, and without making God in the end
responsible for their suffering.
The emphasis on the historical-soteriological significance of the
crucified people is, in other words, a crucial point. Interestingly, this
is also a point on which Ellacura and Sobrino are more explicit
than other liberation theologians. Gustavo Gutirrez, for instance,
refers to Ellacura-Sobrino when applying their term crucified people in his book on Job.122 However, Gutirrez himself never
addresses the issue of a possible salvific meaning of the suffering of
the innocent. He prefers to speak of the pedagogical value of suffering.123 Of course, the very heart of Gutirrez theology is the
121 Cf. the Confession of Chalkedon 451, which states that Jesus Christ is a
divine person in whom are perfectly conjoined, without either mixture or
separation, a complete divine nature and a complete human nature. See e.g.
Macquarrie 1990, 24 and 147-174.
122 Gutirrez 1987, xvi, n.16. The resemblance of the crucified Jesus and the
Amerindian servant reminds us that the poor of Latin America (and elsewhere in the world) is a crucified people.
123 Gutirrez 1987, 46.
167
168
125 In Jngel 1995, 163-190. German original: Jngel 1982, reprinted in Jngel
1990.
126 Jngel 1995, 163.
169
Paradoxically, this shift from a cultic to an ethical use of sacrifice is due to the central event of Christian faith itself the death of
Jesus. In earliest Christianity the crucifixion of Jesus Christ was
understood and proclaimed not only as a sacrificial death, but
rather as the one sacrifice which has been offered and carried out
once for all (compare Heb 10.12 with 10.10).127 After the perfect
sacrifice of Jesus Christ, no other sacrifices will ever be necessary or
valid, according to this interpretation. Therefore the concept itself
gradually takes on new meaning. It now becomes a metaphor,
according to Jngel.128
This ethical, metaphorical use of the concept of sacrifice is in
itself not necessarily harmful, in Jngels opinion, not even theologically.129 But it is certainly damaging if and when it becomes the
one and only meaning of the concept, so that when applied to the
death of Jesus, this is seen merely in its character of exemplum, and
not in its more fundamental character of sacramentum. This is the
crucial issue. Jngel finds it decisive for the self-understanding of
Christian theology, whether the story of Jesus Christ is conceived
only ethically, as an example of right human behaviour, only as exemplum, or beyond and behind that, as a history which effectively
changes the being of humanity, as sacrament.130
Jngel traces this distinction exemplum sacramentum back to
Augustine, and deems it central to the understanding of Luthers
christology and soteriology. Luther according to Jngel even
holds as false teaching an exclusively ethical exemplum christology
which is oriented to the following of Jesus, because it thus bypasses
the true significance of Jesus Christ. This true significance is
grasped only when the death of Jesus is seen as an unmerited gift
127
128
129
130
170
which effectively changes all humanity, because it changes humanitys relationship to God. By making substitutionary atonement for
the sins of all people by his death, Jesus restores the God-world relationship, and thus the lost wholeness for undivided being, or in
biblical terms, shalom.131 This was only possible because, as Christian faith confesses, the man Jesus is the Son of God, therefore all
of humanity is integrated into his human existence.132
Now, having received with thankfulness and joy the gift of
Jesus death as a sacrament, then it may and should also be seen
as an example, Jngel continues.133 The Protestant emphasis here is
obvious: first we are justified by grace alone, then we are called to
serve our neighbour in the likeness of Jesus. A legitimate following
of Christ can and should take place, a following that sometimes also
takes the character of suffering. This may be described metaphorically as a sacrifice which also the NT does. However one should
exercise singular linguistic restraint in using this category in this
context in particular, Jngel warns.134 And he continues:
In no way can it refer to a soteriologically relevant sacrifice, or to a prolongation of the atoning sacrifice of Jesus Christ. Christianity must narrate or proclaim the death of its Lord, his passion story, not its own passion story. A
soteriologically freighted ethica crucis [ethics of the cross] would be the worst
form of theologiae gloriae [theology of glory].135
By this, Jngel has driven his point home: sacrifice when applied to
Jesus death should primarily be seen as sacramental, being a unique
and effective atonement once and for all, and only secondarily as an
131
132
133
134
135
171
172
[6] Conclusions
In this chapter we have seen how Ellacura and Sobrino, on the
basis of a pastoral intuition of Archbishop Oscar Romero, have
developed theologically the idea of the crucified people. This concept arises out of combining the concrete reality of suffering and
oppression in the world of the poor for them in concreto, El Salvador and the testimonies to the suffering Servant in Isaiah, and the
suffering Jesus in the New Testament. It is thus an application of
what we have found to be a fundamental feature of the theological
139 Original German wording: Auch wenn frappierende hnlichkeiten
zwischen dem Geschick Christi und des gekreuzigten Volkes zu entdecken
sind, ist also eine Art communicatio idiomatum zwischen Jesus Christus als
Gottesknecht und dem gekreuzigten Volk als historischer Fortsetzung des
Gottesknechtes, wonach das Schicksal des Volkes eine shnende Wirkung
im Sinne Christi htte, weder biblisch noch systematisch angemessen. Bedford 1993, 290-291.
173
174
builds on Ellacura to such a large extent. We saw that Sobrino further develops the theological reflection on the crucified people by
seeing it as Jesus (crucified) body in history; that he sees the relationship between the crucified people and the crucified Christ as an
analogical relationship, i.e. the people participate in the reality of
Jesus not totally, but in certain aspects and in certain ways, that he
furthermore attempts a description of how the crucified people
bring salvation (by being killed for establishing right and justice
and by bearing the sin of the world), and what kind of salvation
they bring (light, humanising values, hope, great love, forgiveness, solidarity and faith), while the question of why it is
so, rests with Gods unfathomable plan.
Moving to a preliminary critical evaluation, I noted that the
relationship between the crucified and the Crucified in Sobrinos
framework may be described as having three axes: (i) an epistemological-hermeneutical axis, (ii) an historical-soteriological axis, and
(iii) an ethical-praxical axis; that this relationship is constitutive and
reciprocal, i.e. that both the identity of the crucified people and the
identity of the crucified Jesus are defined through this relation with
the other; and that Sobrino thereby seems to suggest a kind of communicatio idiomatum between Jesus and the suffering people of
today.
Holding this to be a questionable suggestion, especially with
regard to the second axis (the historical-soteriological), I brought in
a dissenting voice, that of Eberhard Jngel, in order to shed light on
some of the issues at stake. Jngel distinguishes between an exemplary and a sacramental understanding of the death of Jesus, holding the latter to be an absolute and irreplaceable foundation and
presupposition for the former, so that Jesus death must be primarily understood as an effective atoning sacrifice for all, which means
that after the sacrament of Jesus sacrifice there is no need for further sacrifices, so that sacrifice from then on acquires a merely
175
141 I shall later propose that Sobrinos theology may be seen as a kind of victimology. See Chapter v [2], below.
176
Attributing to these people a primary role in the history of salvation and in the Christian theological endeavour is the main contention of Sobrino. Can his approach be said to be acceptable, or even
fruitful, and if so, on what terms? While appreciating the originality and relevance of the suggestion, I have raised some doubts. To
see whether these are justified, I shall now turn to a more profound
analysis of the other pole of the relationship between the crucified
and the Crucified: the Crucified Liberator. Following Ellacuras and
Sobrinos advice, however, our interpretation needs to be rooted in
history.
177
178
Tal parece que los espaoles trajeron a Cristo a Amrica para crucificar al indio.1
Defining suffering people as crucified within the context of Christian theology implies establishing a relationship between them and
the crucified Jesus of Nazareth. This is what Jon Sobrino does. For
this reason he finds it justified to give this theme a thorough treatment within the framework of his christology. The crucified people
is for him the (crucified) body of Christ present in the world today.
From this follows that whatever theological status may be given to
the crucified people, it must be derived from an interpretation of
Jesus. In order to know who the crucified in history are, one needs
to provide an answer to the foundational christologial question,
which according to the gospels was posed by Jesus himself: Who
do you say I am? (Mark 8:29, par.)
Answering this question from a Latin American point of view
implies having to deal with the history of christology on that continent.2 It is certainly a dark history, in many aspects. The tight interconnection of christology and conquest has been more than a
chronological coincidence. From Corts to Pinochet, christological
1
2
179
180
Trinidad 1984, 56. The evangelistic motivation behind the Spanish venture
to the West, a motivation which Columbus personally shared, can be seen
from this excerpt from his journal from 1492. The words are directed to King
Ferdinand and Queen Isabella: Your Highnesses, as good Christian and
Catholic princes, devout and propagators of the Christian faith, as well as
enemies of the sect of Mahomet and of all idolatries and heresies, conceived
the plan of sending me, Christopher Columbus, to this country of the
Indies, there to see the princes, the peoples, the territory, their disposition
and all things else, and the way in which one might proceed to convert these
regions to our holy faith. Cited from McKennie Goodpasture 1989, 7. At
the beginning of his second journey, Columbus received the following
instruction from King Fernando and Queen Isabel (los reyes catlicos):
Por ende, sus altezas, deseando que nuestra santa fe catlica sea aumentada
ey acrescentada, mandan y encargan a dicho almirante [] {i.e. Columbus,
my comment, SJS} que por todas las vas y maneras que pudiere, procure e
trabaje atraer a los moradores de dichas islas e tierra firme a que se conviertan a nuestra santa fe catlica. Cited Rivera Pagn 1992a, 73. English
translation: Rivera Pagn 1992b.
Rivera Pagn 1992b, 50.
181
Hernn Corts had a cross in his banner accompanied by the following Latin inscription: Amici, sequamur crucem; si nos fidem
habuerimus, in hoc signo vincemus. 6
The Spanish image of Christ that Columbus and his companions brought with them was complex and ambiguous. According to
an analysis made by Sal Trinidad, at least five main traits may distinguished.7 Firstly, there was the suffering and conquered Christ,
the Christ of the via crucis, the dead Jesus in the tomb. Correspondingly, there was a heavy emphasis on the child Jesus in his
mothers lap. Both these images of Jesus underscore his weakness.
He was the humiliated and defeated victim and the helpless and
harmless child. The image of the helpless child in Marys lap would
also allow the Spanish conquerors to regard themselves as the true
guardians of the child Jesus, who was in need of their protection.
Then there was also the Christ of the mysteries, particularly
present in the Eucharist. The holy communion was regarded almost
as a magic recipe prescribed by the church for eternal life, in order
to live forever.8 This was, of course, seen as an excellent nourishment for conquerors and warriors (although they normally received
the Sacrament only once a year).
A fourth feature in this Spanish image of Christ was the Risen
One as the Almighty Heavenly Monarch. The risen Jesus was thus
made the guarantor of the power of the Spaniards. They were confident that their project of colonisation was legitimate since the Pope
Alexander VI in a papal bull of 1493 had given the Spanish both the
6
7
182
Friends, let us follow the cross, and if we have faith, in this sign we shall
win the victory. Cited from Rivera Pagn 1992b, 48.
Following Sal Trinidad, op. cit. The original Spanish version of this article,
Cristologa Conquista Colonizacin, appeared first in Cristianismo y
Sociedad 43-44/13 (August 1975): 12-25, and is also published in the collection
Equipo 1984, 204-220.
Trinidad 1984, 52.
10
11
12
13
The Pope comissioned the crown to bring to the worship of our Redeemer
and the profession of the Catholic faith their residents and inhabitants,
[]. McKennie Goodpasture 1989, 5.
The encomienda system was designed to force the Indian population to
work for the Spaniards, who were in great need of labour force in the mines
and on the plantations. It was based on an instruction issued by Queen Isabella on December 20, 1503, according to which she commands the Governor of Hispaniola to [] compel and force the said Indians to associate
with the Christians of the island and to work on their buildings, and to
gather and mine the gold and other metals, and to till the fields and produce
food for the Christian inhabitants and dwellers of the said island [].
McKennie Goodpasture 1989, 7-8.
Cf., e.g. Gutirrez 1992 (English translation: Gutirrez 1993b); Hanke 1949;
Mires 1989.
Sobrino 1991d, 31; Sobrino 1992b, 90, et passim.
See above, Chapter ii [1].
183
What happened when this christology from above in a sociological, not theological sense14 was received by and gradually integrated into the culture below, the culture of the conquered and
oppressed indigenous people? Still following Trinidads analysis, we
can detect at least three coinciding and complementary christologies, all with a common ideological effect.
The first one is a christology of resignation. In this, the powerless
and defeated Jesus corresponds to the powerless and defeated people. The main expressions of this christology, which is still prominent in Latin American piety, are church paintings and statues of a
sad and weak Jesus on his way to Golgotha, and above all the
popular Holy Week processions. In Latin America, Sobrino notes,
the most holy religious celebration is Sacred Triduum, the most
holy day is Good Friday, and the most holy moment on Good Friday is the moment of Jesus burial.15 Trinidad is not alone then, in
asking what these Holy Week rites mean today: Are they symbols
of the liberation of Latin America, or are they continuing to play
the role of baptizing and confirming the establishment?16
This ambiguity inherent in a christology which underscores the
interconnection between the suffering of Jesus and the suffering of
14 In other words, I use above and below here in another sense than the
common one in christological debate. See e.g. Pannenberg 1968, 33-35.
15 Hasta el da de hoy, el Cristo de las mayoras pobres de Amrica Latina es el
Cristo sufriente, de modo que la semana santa es el momento religioso ms
importante del ao; de ella, el viernes santo, y de ste, el santo entierro.
Sobrino 1991d, 32.
16 Trinidad 1984. 59. Trinidad continues: What, then, has been the function
of christology in Latin America? The first thing that stands out is its role in
baptizing, sacralizing, the conquista and the resulting oppression, as well as
making a virtue out of suffering. Suffering was supposed to lead to glory and
express communion with the crucified Christ [] Even the beatitudes were
pressed into service: Blessed are the poor [] those who weep [] those
who suffer.
184
185
The confrontation between the Europeans and the natives of the Americas was
perceived by the Europeans as a divine, transcendental, and cosmic battle in
which the victor was God and the loser, Satan. No matter how hard the devil
tried, Jesus Christ vanquished him from the Kingdom that he had here.20
186
187
tology and conquista is less visible and less developed. It has come to
the fore in glimpses, as in the prophetic testimonies of Las Casas
and the Peruvian chronicler Guamn Poma de Ayala. But it might
have been expressed primarily at the level of popular irony.27
It is against the backdrop of these ambiguous christologies, captive and dependent, but with a liberating current underneath, that
the quest for a new Latin American christology emerges. It is a
search for liberating christology in a double sense. Jon Sobrino is
among the first to contribute to such a liberation christology.28
26 This is a main point in Sobrinos treatment of the resurrection, see Postscript, below. Hugo Assmann deems the separation of cross and resurrection
fatal: The dolorous Christs of Latin America, whose central image is ever
the cross, are Christs of impotence an impotence interiorized by the
oppressed. Defeat, sacrifice, pain, cross. Impotence, powerlessness is
accepted undigested, recognised in advance and submitted to. Defeat is not
perceived as a temporary reversal to be overcome in struggle. It appears an
inevitable necessity, as a condition for the privilege of living. [] On the
other hand, the rare glorious Christs of Latin America seated on thrones
and wearing royal crowns like kings of Spain are not other Christs, they are
the same Christs, the same sorrowful Christs, their necessary counterparts.
They are their other face the one the dominator sees. Thus there is no way
to separate cross and resurrection without falling among Christs that alienate, Christs that estrange. Christs of established power (who have no need to
struggle, because they already dominate), and Christs of established impotence (who are too dominated to be able to struggle) are the two faces of
oppressor christologies. Assmann 1984; 135-136.
27 See the suggestive and original article by Pedro Negre Rigol: Negre Rigol
1984.
28 Besides Sobrino, the main proponents of a Latin American liberation christology have been Leonardo Boff, (see his groundbreaking Boff 1972, and the
collection Boff 1981a) and Juan Luis Segundo, who wrote extensively on
these matters; from Segundo 1984-1989 to Segundo 1991a. See also Bonino
1984 and Equipo 1984. For an overview, discussions and appraisals, see e.g.,
Lois 1991; Bussmann 1980; Batstone 1991; Waltermire 1994; Macquarrie
1990, 316-320.
188
29
30
31
32
189
190
to harmonise historical conflicts and immunise against Jesus prophetic denunciations and curses. The traditional kind of soteriology
works in this direction, too, Sobrino believes, in making sin a universal, almost a-historical concept, from which Jesus by his death
has saved all people, once and for all.
Third, Sobrino sees a danger in the tendency to absolutise
Christ, as if he were the ultimate or the divine pure and simple,
not seeing him in his essential relationality with the Kingdom of
God and the God of the Kingdom. This last point concerns a core
tenet in Sobrinos christology which I will deal with in more detail
in Chapter iv, namely that Jesus is the revelation not of God in
directo, but of the Son, i.e. the way to God in history.37
Like Boff, then, Sobrino sets out to explore the image of Jesus as
Liberator. This image of the liberator Christ is new and unexpected38, he claims. It is something that has emerged in the last
decades praxis(/es) for liberation in Latin America.39 The suffering
Christ has now become a symbol for protest and liberation for the
many poor and afflicted throughout the region. Sobrino holds this
new image to be a sign of the times. In it, he sees a historical coincidence of identity and relevance, since it is the image of Christ
which is most relevant to the majority of the Latin American population living in poverty, and at the same time the image which
renders the historical figure of Jesus in the most faithful manner.
In short, the Latin American population is longing for a liberator, and Jesus of Nazareth is a liberator, a Messiah, Sobrino believes.
The image of Christ the liberator restores the essence of the title
Messiah, which though maintained down the centuries, has by now
lost any sense of historical or popular messianism.40 Thus, the title
37 Sobrino 1978a, 105. I shall return to this in Chapter iv [8-10].
38 Sobrino 1991d, 33.
39 Cf. the shift from development to liberation, described in Chapter
i[2]d), above.
191
Christ the liberator picks up a story that was more or less broken
off after the first generations of Christians.41 Inspired by this image
of a Liberator-Messiah, Sobrino sets out to show its validity. 42
192
Liberation theology [] insists on the actual presence of God and believes that
the reality and word of God that are represented in the revelation, are better
rediscovered and safeguarded (when read) from the actual signs of the times.44
The actual sign of the times from which Sobrino starts his christology is the new image of Christ as liberator having emerged among
poor and oppressed Christians struggling for liberation in Latin
America. This image is informed from, and should be tested
against, the historical Jesus, Sobrino believes. The historical Jesus is
what he calls his methodological point of departure. One could
say, then, that Sobrino sets out from the Latin American historical
Jesus.
Before explaining what this apparently contradictory expression
might mean, I must once more45 add a note on the significance of
the resurrection in Sobrinos christological enterprise. Why does
Sobrino not begin with the resurrection of Christ?46 After all, this
may be said to be the starting point of the New Testament. Admitting that all christology and Christian faith actually emerge after
and as a result of the resurrection of Christ, Sobrino nevertheless
deems the resurrection inadequate as starting point, because, in
order to interpret the resurrection correctly, we must know who it
was that was raised from the dead, why he was raised, and how we
gain access to the risen One.47 Therefore, it is better to begin with
the historical Jesus of Nazareth, Sobrino contends.
This should not be understood as preferring jesuology to
christology, however. As should have become clear, the perspective of the resurrection is present already from the beginning in
44 Sobrino 1989d, 253-254: La teologa de la liberacin [] insiste en la actual
presencia de Dios y cree que desde los actuales signos de los tiempos mejor se
redescubre y salvaguarda la realidad y la palabra de Dios plasmadas en la revelacin.
45 See Introduction above, and Postscript below.
46 Cf. e.g., Pannenberg 1968, 53ff.
193
194
195
What does Jon Sobrino actually mean by the term the historical Jesus? It has become common terminology within New Testament studies to speak of three quests of the historical Jesus,
referring to Albert Schweitzers (1875-1965) influential study The
Quest of the Historical Jesus from 1906. The first quest actually
started long before Schweitzer though, with Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768), whose writings were posthumously published
by Gottfried Ephraim Lessing in 1774. The presupposition of this
original quest was that there was a radical abyss between the historical figure of Jesus, and the way the Christian church interpreted and
presented him. This criticism paved the way for the liberal life of
Jesus movement, which highlighted the religious personality of
the historical Jesus in a manner that made him look suspiciously
like an ideal figure by the progressive standards of the nineteenth
century.
It was this development that Schweitzer together with Johannes Weiss (1863-1914), William Wrede (1859-1096) and Martin Khler (1835-1912), although on different grounds firmly rejected.
Schweitzer set out to find the historical Jesus, but encountered a
complete stranger, belonging to a totally apocalyptic world view
which seemed to Schweitzer to have no contact with that of modern
human beings of the twentieth century. The quest had failed, in
other words. This failure made Rudolf Bultmann take the position
that the historicity of Jesus was of close to no importance to christology; the only necessary affirmation was that Jesus had lived.
Questioning whether this really is all there is to say, one of Bultmanns students Ernst Ksemann, and the Norwegian scholar Nils
Alstrup Dahl (independently of each other, around 1953) re-open
the issue, thus initiating a new or second quest. In the foreground of this quest was the aspiration to explore the continuity
between the preaching of Jesus and the preaching about Jesus. The
new quest built on the presupposition that it was possible to gain
196
This programmatic statement does not mean that Sobrino is unaware of the profound difficulties revealed in the various quests for
51 See i.a., McGrath 1994, 316-327; Dahl 1991; Borg 1994b; Borg 1994a; Meier
1991; Crossan 1991; etc.
52 Sobrino 1978a, 3. Sobrino 1976, 2-3.
197
the historical Jesus within New Testament studies since H. S. Reimarus.53 The historical Jesus who comes to the fore in Latin American Christology not only in that of Sobrino54 is not the same as
the European, liberal Jesus. The historical Jesus implies here the
whole history of Jesus, his development and destiny, which ends
in crucifixion and is culminated and confirmed in the faith in his
resurrection.55 It is not a term used in opposition to the Christ of
faith; its intention is not liberation from dogma.56 Sobrino clearly
does not belong to the first quest, in other words.
On the contrary, the historical Jesus is used in his approach to
give the correct direction to the understanding of the christological
dogma.57 The historical Jesus is both the way to the Christ of faith,
and its safeguard.58 The historical Jesus becomes then, for
Sobrino, a criterion to discern and correctly interpret on the one
hand the historical situation and praxis, the signs of the times, and
on the other hand the fides qua, the actual explication and application of the christological dogma. A historical praxis without the historical Jesus as norm is in danger of becoming reductionist. A
Christian transcendental faith without the historical Jesus as norm,
is in danger of becoming alienating and ideologised. In the historical Jesus the two come together, are corrected and complemented,
Sobrino is convinced.
198
199
presupposed that some of this is possible, and when accepted by historical criticism, it is certainly welcome. By historical is meant here formally the praxis of
Jesus as the place where the maximum metaphysical density of his person is
expressed. This praxis is every activity, in words and deeds, with which he transforms the surrounding reality in the direction of the Kingdom of God and
through which his own person is gradually formed and expressed. But moreover,
it [i.e. Jesus praxis, my comment, SJS] has unleashed a history which has come to
us in order to be continued. Thus, the actual praxis is a demand made by Jesus,
but also the hermeneutical location for the comprehension of Jesus.61
200
tice stories that have been collected and edited in order that this
practice may be followed.65 Historical is [] that which unleashes
history.66
One main difference in emphasis here from the protagonists of
the second quest might perhaps be formulated thus: while the principal point in the second quest was the fundamental continuity
between the preaching of Jesus and the preaching about him,
Sobrino stresses the continuity between the praxis of Jesus and the
praxis of his followers today.67 For Sobrino, historicity is the past as
continued in the present, heading for the future: Jesus past can be
recovered in the present only if it pushes us toward the future.68
What about the third quest? Is Sobrinos historical Jesus compatible with the main insights of these recent developments within
New Testament scholarship? First of all, Sobrino does not demonstrate familiarity with this contemporary current. He does not
explicitely refer to any of its main proponents (Crossan, Meier,
Borg, et al.).69 Besides this, it should be noted that Sobrinos point
of departure and main interest in the historical Jesus is different
64 This latter, is an addition which Sobrino calls una relativa novedad que ha
sido exigida por la experiencia latinoamericana. Relating practice and
spirit in this manner reduces the danger of falling into pure activism, on
the on hand, and pure spiritualism, on the other, Sobrino believes. Sobrino
1991d, 98-99
65 Sobrino 1982a, 82.
66 Sobrino 1991d, 97.: Histrico es [] lo que desencadena historia. This
definition is borrowed from Moltmann, see his Moltmann 1967.
67 This does not imply that the second quest was not preoccupied with praxis.
Nonetheless, at least it seems that the issue of praxis takes a more central
position and has other characteristics in Sobrino.
68 Sobrino 1978a, xxiii. / Sobrino 1976, xvi: Dicho de otra forma, el pasado de
Jess slo se recobra en el presente si impulsa hacia un futuro.
69 See i.e. Borg 1994b; Meier 1991; Crossan 1994; and Theology Today Vol. 52,
no 1, April 1994 (the whole issue is dedicated to the third quest for the historical Jesus).
201
202
203
The christological program that Sobrino proposes selects those aspects of Jesus life
that will help in formulating a strategy for liberation. These aspects include the
resurrection and the Kingdom of God, the socio-political activity of Jesus and the
obligation of the Christian to follow his example. This is a paradigm which is
more directed at a struggle for the truth than at an academic search for the
truth.76
Chow portrays the christology of Sobrino almost as a baptised revolutionary polemic or ideology, and he even introduces a direct
comparison with the Communist Manifesto. And, if liberation theology needs the figure of a revolutionary Christ in order to attract
revolutionary disciples, it is obvious that Sobrino has done a good
73 Cf. the discussion in Bedford 1993, 134-138; with reference to, i. a., Ogden
1978; and Segovia 1980, as well as Bussmann 1980,.9f, 56f and 158. Nancy
Bedford holds that Sobrino lacks clear methodological criteria for how to
recover the historical Jesus. What he is really concerned with, in her opinion,
is the synoptic image of Jesus, rather than the later, dogmatic portrait of
Jesus. Bedford supports her argument with a reference to Myre 1980, 109f:
La christologie de lauteur est donc moins fonde sur le Jsus de lhistoire,
comme il le prtend, que sur la christologie des vangiles synoptiques.
Why does Sobrino insist on the designation historical, according to Bedford? Der tiefere Grund ist wohl, dass ohne dieses Wort ein Aspekt vielleicht verlorenginge, auf den er um jeden Preis aufmerksam machen will,
nmlich, dass Jesus Christus historisch ist, weil er whrend seines irdischen
Lebens Geschichte entfesselt hat (desencaden) und sie kraft seines Geistes
immer noch entfesselt. Op. cit [], 138
74 Chow 1992.
75 [] el expositor ms destacado de la cristologa entre los telogos de la Liberacin. Chow 1992, 57-79; 60.
76 El programa cristolgico que propone Sobrino, escoge aquellos aspectos de
la vida de Jess que ayudarn a disear una estrategia de liberacin, y ellos
incluyen la Resurreccin y el Reino de Dios, la actividad sociopoltica de
Jess y la obligacin del cristiano de seguir su ejemplo. Ese es un paradigma
creado ms para luchar por la verdad que para una bsqueda de la verdad acadmica. Op. cit., 65
204
205
clearly predetermined by ones faith, one does not write good history, nor good theology. 81
Sobrinos historical Jesus is thus predetermined by his faith, or
rather, by his socio-political programme the liberation of the poor
in Latin America, according to Chow. Wanting to demonstrate
what he holds to be a more correct historical interpretation of Jesus,
Chow moves on to a rendering of the main tenets of E.P. Sanders
Jesus and Judaism from 1985.
It should be noted that, even though his book is from 1992,
Chow bases his harsh criticism solely on Cristologa desde Amrica
Latina. After all, Sobrinos approach to this issue is further developed in Jess en Amrica Latina and Jesucristo liberador, as a consequence of the questions and criticisms he had received. But
moreover, Chow oversimplifies the distinctions between faith and
science, and between theological and historical. His position with
regard to historical science draws close to a positivistic historicism.
Chow does not discuss Sobrinos explicit statements on the interrelationship between these aspects, nor does he himself discuss the
meaning of historical. Finally, the stark ideological (anti-Marxist)
framework of Chows analysis makes him unable to meet his own
standards of neutrality: his discourse seems to be at least as much
struggle (on a rhetorical level, that is) as an academic search for
truth.
Although Chows critique for these reasons is generally inadequate, I do think that there is a core in it that should be taken seri80 My translation. Sobrino quiere tener el mejor de los mundos, afirma que
busca el Cristo histrico al mismo tiempo que plantea declaraciones de fe
que, precisamente debido a su carcter intrnsico, son inatacables desde
cualquir perspectiva histrica. Op. cit., 71.
81 My translation. Si intenta llegar a conclusiones que estn claramente predeterminadas por su fe, no escribe buena historia ni buena teologa. Op. cit.,
72.
206
82
83
84
85
207
When it comes to the issue of the Pharisees, however, McGovern agrees with Meier:
[] Meiers point about oversimplifying the role of the Pharisees in Jesus death
appear quite valid in the light of recent scholarship. But even on this point, the
particular work he cites (Sanders: Jesus and Judaism) was published after
Sobrino and Segundo had completed their works.86
208
Ibid.
Williamson 1983.
Op. cit., 153.
Sobrino 1976, 31ff; Sobrino 1991d, 127ff.
the critique goes even further, alleging i.a. that Sobrino consciously
leaves out the Lords prayer in his treatment of the prayer of Jesus,
because [] it doesnt fit Sobrinos anti-Jewish model.90 AntiJewishness has been a fundamental structure in Christian theology
all the way at least since Tertullian, in Williamsons view. In main
themes of his christology, such as God, Jesus, law, church, Jewish
exegesis, prayer, late Judaism, legalistic piety, the Pharisees, and
not least Jewish responsibility for the death of Jesus, Williamson
finds Sobrino guilty of accepting and applying uncritically this antiJewish schema.
In the same manner, Williamson faults Sobrino for failing to see
that Judaism was and is a behavioural system, having no creed. It
was and is orthopraxy the very thing Jesus is said to have
demanded. 91
His most fundamental criticism with regard to Sobrinos historical Jesus is that it is
[] historically uncritical or uncritically historical, simply taking a parable as
an actual instance of a generalized attitude or simply taking a parable as an
event or, in any case, taking the parable out of context of its situation in the
Redaktionsgeschichte of the gospels. The latter comment, however, is applicable to
Sobrinos entire approach to the historical Jesus and is a basic structural flaw,
methodologically, in everything he says about Jesus.92
How should one assess these critics? One main observation is that,
Williamson, like some of the other critics, fails to recognise the distinctiveness of the Latin American quest, whose main intention is
not to secure the christological interpretation against criticisms of
modern (secular) historical science. As I have shown, historical
90 Op. cit.,152. Sobrino, of course, has no reason to leave out the Lords
prayer; see Sobrino 1991d, 253, et passim.
91 Op. cit., 150
92 Op. cit., 151.
209
210
211
But how can you engage in a praxis of following if you cannot know
beforehand at least something of what this praxis consists in? The
point is that you cannot, without having heard the story of Jesus.
What Sobrino wants to give priority to is not the historical Jesus,
the factual, real Jesus in directo99 but the direction, impetus, main
tendencies in what is told and remembered about him, about his
real life especially his practice and relationships. This story, or narration, of Jesus life is what links the historical Jesus and his followers of our day. And this is the link that Sobrino more than anything
is concerned to secure. For this, he needs the story of Jesus as correction as guiding principle, as criterion. In fact Sobrino does use
97 Sobrino uses pro-seguir (continue, carry on) to underscore that the following (seguimiento) of Jesus is not a mere imitation of him, but a continuation of his practice. Thus mediations are absolutely necessary. Cf. Sobrino
1991d, 100.
98 La cristologa latinoamericana entiende por Jess histrico la totalidad de la
historia de Jess, y la finalidad de comenzar con el Jess histrico es la de que
se prosiga su historia en la actualidad. Sobrino 1982a, 81.
99 Cf. [] lo histrico-factual de Jess. Sobrino 1991d, 113.
212
213
to the supposition that Jesus, like any other human being, in fact
passed through important changes during his life.
The telling of a (hi-)story is almost always done with a particular objective: one wants to convince someone, to make something
happen. Every story-telling is rhetoric.104 What critics like Chow
fail to recognise, is that this applies equally to all academic work.
Even the scientific historian tells his story with a purpose open or
concealed. This purpose, or the wider intentional project within
which the telling of the story occurs, may be called a governing
master-narrative.105
104 In the classical sense rhetoric is the art and/or technique of persuasive discourse. It is, says Paul Ricoeur, without doubt as old as philosophy; it is said
that Empedocles invented it. But it was Aristotle who first conceptualised
the field of rhetoric, and the question that set his project in motion was:
what does it mean to persuade? Ricoeur 1978, 9-12. The centrality of rhetoric in theology is underlined in Jones 1995, where the following definition is
found: Rhetoric in theology functions as the dangerous science of the possible, for the sake of the inexpressible, in the hands of the hopeful (p. 109).
See also: Tracy 1987, particularly 47-65; and Booth 1991.
105 When I speak of master-narrative (which might also have been called
meta-narrative) I am not thereby defending what post-modernists criticise
as the (authoritarian) meta-narratives of modernity; rather, I wish to point
out that every interpretation of history takes on a narrative structure, and
that the particular interpretation of a historical event is dependent on this
narrative structure and the greater narrative framework into which it is
imbedded, without thereby implying that the issue of the relationship
between the narrative and historical reality is beyond reach or irrelevant.
Along these lines then, I would recommend a search for an understanding of
the historical which on the one hand takes into account the conditioned
and engaged position of any interpreter of history, without on the other
hand necessarily giving way to complete historical relativism and subjectivism. See, e.g. White 1973, Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob 1994; cf. Moxnes 1995. I
shall deal with this in greater detail in Chapter v below, where the work of
Paul Ricoeur in this field will play an important role.
214
Sobrinos christology clearly has such a guiding, governing master-narrative; namely the liberation of the poor.106 Jesus is Liberator, and Sobrinos portrait of the historical Jesus is intended to
support this image of Jesus as liberator. Only by placing his interpretation within the confines of this master-narrative can Sobrino
actually achieve his goal in returning to the historical Jesus, namely
to hinder manipulative, oppressive images of Christ. Any attempt at
verifying the historicity of Sobrinos interpretation (or any other
interpretation that claims to build on history), must include an
evaluation of the adequacy of this wider pattern and purpose, what
I choose to call its master-narrative. The validity of this master-narrative must be checked against both identity (i.e. against what we
may, however fragmentarily, know about Jesus) and relevance (i.e.
against the contemporary situation and needs of the communities).
Only by taking this wider context of our historical quest into
account, may the return to the history of Jesus function as a remedy against oppressive christologies. In this sense, Assmanns
observation applies here too: neither a more biblical nor a more
historical christology can by itself safeguard christology against
sabotage.
[4] Conclusions
In order to be better able to appreciate the characteristics of
Sobrinos theological reflection, we have in this chapter recalled the
history of christology in Abya-Yala, or Latin America as it came to
be called. The disastrous interconnection of evangelisation and vio106 This master-narrative concurs with what I shall propose to term the victimological orientation of Sobrinos christology. See below, Chapter v [2].
215
lent conquest was legitimated by and resulted in profoundly distorted images of Christ implicit and explicit christologies on
that continent for centuries. It is against this backdrop of oppressive
christologies that the contemporary christology of liberation of
which Sobrino is among the leading protagonists develops. This
christology aims to be critical and liberating, by overcoming the
old, alienating interpretations of Christ, and replacing these with an
interpretation which corresponds to the poor populations aspiration towards liberation and justice. Believing that such an image
actually is a truthful rendering of the historical figure of Jesus of
Nazareth, Sobrino recommends a return to the historical Jesus as
the methodological starting point for a liberating christology.
This return to the historical Jesus has evoked criticisms and
questions, however. Comparing Sobrinos approach with the socalled three quests for the historical Jesus, I concluded that
although he is more directly influenced by the second quest, the
bulk of Sobrinos tenets does not seem to be seriously questioned by
the third quest. However, Sobrino belongs more properly to a specifically Latin-American quest. Evaluating the historicity of the
Latin American historical Jesus, I am led to the following conclusions:
1) The conscious interconnection of both historical poles the
present and the past, Jesus and his followers, the Crucified and the
crucified in the search for the historical Jesus is a trait which
makes the Latin American quest in which Sobrino clearly shares,
compare favourably with the three quests.
2) Nonetheless, Sobrino is not consistent enough in making
explicit this aspect when he applies the term the historical Jesus. In
this, the critics cited above have in fact laid bare a weakness in
Sobrinos work. At times, as I shall show, he seems to use historical as an argument for the objectivity of his portrait of Jesus. It
should be noted, however, that this is a point with which Sobrino
216
deals in a more refined manner in his later writings than in his earlier. But the main difficulty which Sobrino still needs to clarify is
what it actually means to use the historical Jesus as norm.
3) Sobrino cannot do anything more than draw a portrait of
Jesus. The validity of Sobrinos portrait of the historical Jesus cannot
be evaluated without taking into account the master-narrative
encompassing it, which is that of the liberation of the poor. The
validity of this master-narrative must be checked against both identity (against what we may, however fragmentarily, know about
Jesus) and relevance (against the contemporary situation and needs
of the communities).
4) The narrative and rhetorical character of Sobrinos christology should be stronger underlined, and further developed.
I shall return to these points for further treatment below. But now I
am ready to leave the methodological considerations and proceed to
an analysis of the content of Sobrinos historical-theological reading of Jesus of Nazareth.107 In the previous chapter, I concluded
that in order to interpret the theological significance of the crucified
people, it is necessary to interpret the story of Jesus, especially his
suffering and death. The potential salvific meaning of the existence
of a crucified people would have to reflect the salvific meaning of
Jesus death on the cross. A central feature in Sobrinos interpretation of Jesus death is to see it as the historical consequence of his
life. I shall now examine those incidents and permanent traits in
Jesus life which Sobrino finds leading to his death on the cross.
217
218
In the following three chapters I shall examine Sobrinos interpretation of Jesus life and death. On the basis of his historical soteriology on the one hand (which requires salvation to be realised within
the one and only history) and the concrete situation of suffering
and oppression in Latin America on the other (which makes the
soteriological interest take shape as a longing for a Liberator of the
poor), the question arises whether it can be assured that Jesus, being
immersed in this history, can be rightfully seen as such a liberator.
And if so, it will be crucial to find out in what way Jesus is liberator.
Hence, I begin with investigating in what sense Jesus life is salvific,
according to Jon Sobrino.
219
his life.3 This criteria is not original; it was suggested by New Testament scholar Nils Alstrup Dahl already in 1953, at the beginning
of the second quest.4 But Sobrino gives a particularly Latin American reason for highlighting this criterion. It acquires special evidence in the concrete situation of Latin America.
There the deaths of hundreds and thousands of persons is analogous to Jesus
death, and the causes of their death are historically similar to the causes of
Jesus death. That Jesus must have lived and acted in the way he is reported
to have lived and acted is not only plausible, it goes without saying.5
220
221
individuals and entities always exist within structures of relationship; process, change, transformation, and openness replace stasis,
changelessness, and completeness as basic descriptive concepts.
Accordingly, preference is given to an organic model: the qualities
of life openness, relationship, interdependence, change, novelty
and even mystery become the basic ones for interpreting all reality.12
All of these qualities of life mentioned by McFague play a significant role in Sobrinos reading of the life of Jesus. But he gives a
particular and major importance to Jesus relationships to the Kingdom of God and the God of the Kingdom, whom Jesus calls abba,
(intimate) Father. In both, Sobrino is confident that he is on secure
historical ground13, at the same time as he deems these relations to
be the most significant for spelling out adequately the theological
meaning of the life-and-death of Jesus. Accordingly, Sobrino structures his rendering of the life of Jesus around these two relations.14
Because he deems the former relation (Jesus-Kingdom) external
and the latter (Jesus-Father) internal, he suggests that an examination should begin with the former. 15
As we already know, these are not the only important relationships of Jesus, according to Sobrino. The relationships between
Jesus and his followers, Jesus and the poor and outcasts, the popular
masses, etc. that is, from our perspective, the relation between the
Crucified and the crucified play a fundamental role in his christology. But it is necessary to see the importance of these other relationships as a consequence of Jesus constitutive relations to the
Kingdom of God and the God of the Kingdom, and not vice versa.
In other words, the importance of the relationship between the
12
13
14
15
222
Ibid.
Sobrino 1982a, 89.
Compare Moltmann 1974, 127.
Cf. Sobrino 1991b, 578ff.
Crucified and the crucified gains strength from Jesus the Crucifieds
particular and unique relations to the Kingdom and to the
Father. First, then, I shall consider these relations, before proceeding to a study of Jesus relationship with his followers.
But first, one more word on praxis. Sobrino claims that the
maximum metaphysical density of a person is expressed in his or
her praxis.16 Behind this somewhat awkward expression with its
Zubirian-Ellacuran fingerprints, lies an anthropology/ontology
which is ultimately rooted in the Old Testament conception of
God. Just as God in the Old Testament is never presented as a God
quoad se, but always in relations as a God-of-a-people:17 thus, God
is insofar as God acts, or reigns.18 According to this conception, then, a human person expresses her or his own being through
action. This is why Sobrino gives priority to Jesus praxis in giving
answers to the christological question about who he is.19 Sobrino
makes it clear even from the very beginning of Cristologa desde
Amrica latina that he intends to give preference to the praxis of
Jesus over his own teaching and over the teaching that the New Testament theologians elaborated concerning his praxis.20 This is at
the same time a way of safeguarding the historicity of the interpretation of Jesus, Sobrino believes, holding that
16
17
18
19
223
[] (t)he most historical element in the historical Jesus is his practice, that
is, his activity brought to bear upon the reality around him in order to transform it in a determinate, selected direction, the direction of the Kingdom of
God.21
224
225
226
tal kernel and basic thrust, then the renewal presented by liberation
theology is related to the importance it gives to the Kingdom. Ellacura held that the Kingdom of God is the main object of theology, and that which all authentic followers of Jesus should strive to
realize.31 Sobrino argues that the Kingdom should be taken as
structuring principle because it corresponds to the requirements of
both identity and of relevance: identity, since it is the central content of the gospel, and relevance, since it is what the Latin American
people and particularly the poor need, long and strive for.32
According to Sobrino, it is certain that the Kingdom of God
was central to the historical Jesus. Applying the three criteria mentioned earlier33, he finds that the notion of the Kingdom (1) appears
in all levels of the synoptic tradition; (2) reappears in the gospels
even though it is not central to other New Testament writings and
(3) is congruent with Jesus historical destiny.34
There seems to be no major opposition to such a stance within
New Testament scholarship of today.35 We may then accept the historical basis, but what does it mean? Jesus, though he makes the
Kingdom the centre of his activity, never explains directly what this
Kingdom is. He only proclaims that it has come near. Sobrino
therefore suggests three complementary methods in order to find
out what Jesus understood by this term.
31
32
33
34
Ellacura 1987a.
Compare Moltmann 1974, 7-31.
Sobrino 1982b, 74.
Sobrino 1991d, 113-114: Por ejemplificarlo en el anlisis del reino de Dios,
es criterio de historicidad (a) que aparece en todos los estratos de las tradiciones sinpticas, (b) que reaparece en los evangelios aun cuando no aparezca centralmente en los otros escritos neotestementarios y (c) la
congruencia al destino histrica de Jess.
35 According to Stephen J. Patterson, basileia is [] a concept most scholars
still agree in placing at the center of Jesus preaching. Patterson 1995, 43.
227
228
229
(2) The message of the Kingdom has some particular addressees: the
poor. The Kingdom of God is for the poor (Luke 4:18; 6:20; 7:22;
Matt 11:5). But who are the poor?40 As we saw earlier, Sobrino finds
two dimensions of poverty, two types of poor appearing in the
gospels:41 the economically poor and the sociologically poor.
The economically poor are people who suffer some sort of basic
need, while the sociologically poor are those who are despised by
society, the ones held to be sinners, the publicans, the prostitutes,
the meek, the lowly, etc. The poor are, to repeat, those for whom
life is a heavy burden on the basic level of survival and living with a
minimum of dignity.42 Furthermore, Sobrino underscores the collective (the poor as a people)43 and dialectical (the poor as empobrecidos impoverished in opposition to and oppressed by the rich)
aspects of the poor, as they appear in the gospels.
Jesus shows an obvious partiality t owards these poor, and grants
them the Kingdom. The Kingdom is only for the poor, Sobrino
contains, once again giving exegetical support to his argument with
a reference to Jeremias.44 The Kingdom is essentially partisan, and
this partisanship is scandalous and accordingly difficult to
accept. It is true that the Kingdom, as an eschatological reality, is
universal, but this universality is reached only through its scandalous
partiality with the poor.
40 In Chapter i I presented Sobrinos understanding and definition of the
poor. In this, he is exegetically dependent on Jeremias and Soares-Prabhu,
and systematically on Gutirrez and Ellacura.
41 Sobrino 1991d, 143-148. Cf. i. a.: Sobrino 1982b, 105 and 164-166.
42 Sobrino 1994c, 84. / Sobrino 1991d, 151: Hemos dicho que pobres son aquellos para quienes la vida es una pesada carga en sus niveles primarios de sobrevivir y de vivir con un mnimo de dignidad..
43 Cf. the crucified people, below, Chapter viii [2].
44 Cf. Jeremias 1987, 116: [] the reign of God belongs to the poor alone []
the first beatitude means that salvation is destined only for beggars and sinners.
230
Given that the Kingdom is for the poor, and the greatest threat to
the poor is premature death, the Kingdom is a Kingdom of basic
life. Poverty means being close to death. The basic distinction
between poor and non-poor relates to the grantedness of life:
Those who can take life and survival for granted, and those who
45 Sobrino 1991d, 160-161. / Sobrino 1994c, 89-90.
46 See below, Chapter v.
47 Sobrino 1994c, 128. / Sobrino 1991d, 221-222: Para los pobres es el reino,
porque son materialmente pobres, y el reino es para los no-pobres, en la
medida en que se abajan a los pobres, los defienden y se dejan imbuir del
espritu de los pobres.
231
232
(4) This stress upon the Kingdom as a Kingdom of basic life allows
its concrete materiality to come into focus. The coming of the Kingdom will take shape in history as the granting of life to the poor. It
has to do with the living conditions of those marginalised economically and socially in society. But will an improvement of their living
conditions be all that the Kingdom promises? No, Sobrino admits
that such an interpretation would put limits to Gods transcendent
reality, and thus reduce not only the mystery of God, but the mystery of life in itself. There is something more to it.
Bearing in mind Sobrinos fundamental option for what he
(with Ellacura) calls historical transcendence, we arrive at Sobrinos
conclusive definition of the systematic concept of the Kingdom of
God: The Kingdom of God is the just life of the poor, always open
to a more.52 That the Kingdom is life of the poor is as we have
seen understood as life as a basic, material reality. That it is the
just life points to the fact that the poor are denied this life, which
is their right, by the forces of the anti-Kingdom. Waiting and working for the coming of the Kingdom means struggling for justice in
history.
The historical transcendence is expressed in the addition
always open to a more. Sobrino explains: Life is a reality that is
by its very nature always open to a more; it is something dynamic
that points to a development of itself to fulfil itself on various levels,
with new possibilities and new demands.53 Illustrating this point,
Sobrino presents the phenomenology of bread, in which he tries
to show how bread is always more than bread: It has a praxic
dimension (how to obtain bread), an ethical dimension (how to
share it), a community dimension (the bread as shared) and a primary celebratory dimension (eating together at table). It also has a
social and political dimension (the question of bread for others, for
52 Sobrino 1994c, 131ff / Sobrino 1991d, 226ff.
53 Sobrino 1994c, 132. / Sobrino 1991d, 227.
233
communities, for a whole people) and thus relates to the need for
liberation, and the questions of political strategies and ideologies,
and pastoral strategies and ecclesiologies, etc. Furthermore, the reality of bread evokes the need for spirit:
[] mercy to stir our hearts at the sight of those without bread, courage to
struggle for bread, fortitude to stand firm in the face of conflicts and persecutions, truth to analyse the reasons why there is no bread and find ways of
overcoming these.54
54 Sobrino 1994c, 132. / Sobrino 1991d, 228: [] misericordia para que se remuevan las entraas ante los sin-pan, valenta para luchar por l, fortaleza para
mantenerse en los conflictos y persecuciones, verdad para analizar las causas
de que no haya pan y para analizar los mejores caminos para superarlas.
55 Sobrino 1994c, 132. / Sobrino 1991d, 228-229: La buena noticia del pan
mueve a agradecer al Dios que lo ha hecho o puede llevar a la pregunta por
qu permite que no haya pan y que no sea compartido. Mueve a seguir al
Jess que multiplic panes para saciar el hambre o puede llevar a la pregunta
de por qu la historia da muerte a hombres como l. Puede llevar a la pregunta de si hay algo ms que pan, si hay un pan de la palabra, necesario y
buena noticia, incluso cuando no hay pan material, si es verdad que al final
de la historia habr pan para todos y si merece la pena trabajar por ello,
aunque muchas veces la oscuridad lo permee todo, si la esperanza de que
haya pan es ms sabia que la resignacin []
234
By this fine example, Sobrino aims to show how life always develops into a more, and this, in his view, demonstrates how transcendence begins with and develops from within history.
This means that Sobrino also reframes the issue of the Kingdoms status as present or future reality, the already but not-yet.56
In and through the proclamation and activity of Jesus and, subsequently, of his followers the Kingdom has already come. It has
appeared in signs; although these are concrete salvific events, they do
not equal the totality of the reality of the Kingdom. As total reality,
the Kingdom is still not yet present, it is eschatological. In this
sense, the eschatological reservation is valid.
This concept, der eschatologische Vorbehalt, originally coined by
E. Ksemann, has played a central part in the debate regarding
European political theology. Sobrino agrees that the concept does
have its rationale, although not as a total levelling of all historical
reality in comparison with the utopia of the Kingdom, but as a criterion which makes it possible to judge to what extent the Kingdom
may be said to be historically present at a given moment. The historical reality is not just not the Kingdom, but it is certainly not
the Kingdom, and thereby the critical and utopian character of the
Kingdom comes to the fore, without it losing its historical relevance.57 A different way of expressing this, is to say that the Kingdom has come on the level of its definite Mediator (Jesus), but not
on the level of mediation: the Kingdom as a total reality.
What kind of salvation is brought about by the coming of the
Kingdom, then? Sobrinos answer to this question is of particular
importance to this study:
235
The salvation brought by the Kingdom though this is not all the Kingdom
brings will, then be being saved in history from the evils of history. What
the benefits of the Kingdom might be is determined above all by the actual
situation of oppressed human beings and not by an a priori decision about
what salvation might mean. Salvation is always salvation of someone, and in
that someone, from something. The salvation brought by the Kingdom
comes, therefore, in history. So with Jesus, the content of salvation was dictated by the reality of his listeners, and his actions (miracles, casting out of
devils, welcoming sinners) were beneficial because they brought good where
there had been specific ills.58
236
237
appeared: Jesus. We need not wait for another even though before and
after Jesus other mediators exist, related to him and authorized by him
which is no more than repeating, in Kingdom terminology, the basic christological confession: Christ is the mediator.63
Jesus, as mediator of the Kingdom, is both its proclaimer and initiator. The relationship between Jesus and the Kingdom the mediator and the mediation is essential and constitutive, Sobrino says,
once again showing his predilection for relationality as fundamental
category in theology. Given the main characteristics of the Kingdom as portrayed by Sobrino, then, we get a clearer picture of who
this Jesus is.
First, as mediator of the Kingdom Jesus stands in a particular
relation to a particular people. Since the Kingdom of God is popular, i.e. belonging to a people, Jesus is profoundly related to the
same people, the same collectivity of excluded and downtrodden
human beings. Jesus appears as a popular leader in the same tradition as Moses, Joshua, etc. In this sense, he appears as and is conceived to be an anointed, a messiah. At the same time, his role vis-vis the people when seen from the standpoint of his suffering and
crucifixion, is similar to that of the Suffering Servant. His messianism is not as expected; he becomes a crucified Messiah.64 Jesus relationship with the multitude, with his own people, and with his
flock of followers are given due consideration in Sobrino. Particular
weight is given to Jesus misereor super turbas, his compassion with
the multitudes (Mark 8:2; 6:34).65 And the issue of the peoples role
63 Sobrino 1994c, 108. Note particularly the important insertion [] before
and after Jesus other mediators exist, related to him and authorized by him
[], to which I shall return below.
64 Cf. Dahl 1974.
65 Cf. Sobrino 1992b, 34: El misereor super turbas no es slo una actitud
regional de Jess, sino lo que configura su vida y su misin y le acarrea su
destino. Y es tambin lo que configura su visin de Dios y del ser humano.
238
239
240
241
242
God is transcendence. But this transcendence is brought out in different ways, according to the different traditions, for instance, as
creator, as absolute sovereignty, incomprehensibility, and so on. The
novelty and particular character of Jesus interpretation of this transcendence is, however, that he sees it essentially as grace. Gods
transcendence, his infinite distance, ultimacy and otherness, has
come radically close in an unexpected and unmerited way, without thereby ceasing to be transcendence. The very notion of what
Gods transcendence is, is thus transformed. So is the understanding
of transcendent power, which from now on not only will be a power
from above a power to judge the unjust as Sobrino sees it, but
furthermore a power from below a power to raise up both victims
and victors, and restore justice.77
This analysis of the traditions of the content and formality of
the reality of God present in the testimonies of Jesus, may then be
further scrutinised and complemented by a closer examination of
the prayers and words of Jesus. Since he was a pious Jew, it is obvious
that Jesus was a praying man, Sobrino notes. But more than this,
the gospels portray him as someone who seeks fulfilment and guidance through prayer in all important moments of his life. According
to Luke (3:21), his public life begins with a prayer; in all of the gospels it ends with a prayer. Accordingly, Sobrino accords great significance to the prayers of Jesus.78 Through them, he sees a possibility
of grasping something of the interiority of Jesus own person.
Jesus prayer is not ingenuous, nor mere routine. On the contrary, he shows himself critical of the possible misuse of prayer, in
77 Compare my discussions in Chapters VI and VII below.
78 In addition to the detailed treatment in Sobrino 1976, 109-134; and Sobrino
1991d, 239-243, Sobrino has written a book solely dedicated to the theme:
Sobrino 1981a. See also his numerous writings on spirituality and Christian
life: Sobrino 1978b; Sobrino 1983c; Sobrino 1984a; Sobrino 1987a; Sobrino
1988a; Sobrino 1988b; Sobrino 1991c; Sobrino 1992e; etc.
243
several forms. He condemns clearly what Sobrino labels mechanical prayers (Matt 6:7f ), hypocritical prayers (Matt 6:5f ), cynical prayers (Luke 18:11), alienating ( Matt 7:21) and oppressive
prayers (Mark 12:38,40).
All these passages show Jesus or, more accurately, the first communities
reflecting on prayer on the basis of their memories of Jesus as conscious of
the numberless ways in which prayer can be spoiled: spiritual narcissism,
vanity and hypocrisy, verbosity, alienating and oppressive manipulation
[]79
244
81 Sobrino 1994c, 141. / Sobrino 1991d 242: Y a la inversa, de ese gozo se puede
colegir lo que Dios es para Jess, aquello que produce gozo porque es bueno,
alguien en quien se puede verdaderamente confiar y llamar Padre.
82 Sobrino 1994c, 141. / Sobrino 1991d, 243: Dios permanece como el misterio
insondable para Jess y Jess lo deja ser Dios.
245
246
Sobrino 1994c, 146. / Sobrino 1991d, 251: [] Jess usa el trmino arameo
palestinense abba, de cuya historicidad no se puede dudar. Cf., Sobrino
1994c, 67: In the Gospels this something central in Jesus life is expressed by
two terms: Kingdom of God and Father. Of both, the first thing to say is
that they are authentic word of Jesus. Sobrino 1991d, 121: En los evangelios
eso que es central en la vida de Jess aparece expresado con dos trminos:
reino de Dios y Padre. De ambas cosas hay que decir, en primer lugar, que
son palabras autnticas de Jess.
It was Jeremias who first focused on this word, and built it into a
cornerstone in his theological position84, as it is in Sobrinos. Abba
is a form of the Aramaic word for father. In the New Testament it
is found in Gal 4:6, Rom 8:15 and Mark 14:36 alongside the Greek
ho pater as an address to God.85 According to Jeremias, this way of
addressing God had a very familiar and intimate tone. He saw it as
an absolute novelty and something unique to Jesus, and argued that
it could not be found elsewhere in contemporary Judaism.86 It
reflected, according to Jeremias, the address of a child to its father.
Applying such an intimate address to God, was something unheard
of and even shocking to Jesus contemporaries.87 To them, it would
most probably sound disrespectful of Gods majesty. Trusting in the
criterion on dissimilarity (widely accepted as adequate during the
second quest) Jeremias concluded that the term originated with
Jesus, and furthermore (now depending on linguistic analyses) that
it was used by Jesus every time he addressed God as Father.88
This theological point rapidly won a widespread hearing, also
beyond the confines of theological scholarship. The idea of the particular intimacy of childrens address made it a short step to translate abba with daddy, although Jeremias was hesitant to make that
step explicitly himself.89
84 Barr 1988, 28. The argument is fundamental in Jeremias writings. See references in Barrs article, and Jeremias 1987, 36-37.
85 Cf. Ashton 1992.
86 Jeremias 1987, 66: All this confronts us with a fact of fundamental importance. We do not have a single example of God being addressed as Abba in
Judaism, but Jesus always addressed God in this way in his prayers.
87 Op. cit., 67: abba was a childrens word, used in everyday talk, an expression of courtesy. It would have been disrespectful, indeed unthinkable, to
the sensibilities of Jesus contemporaries to address God with this familiar
word.
88 Ibid: Jesus dared to use Abba as a form of address to God. This Abba is the
ipsissima vox Jesu.
247
248
95 Ibid.
96 After all, the word appears only three times in the New Testament, and the
one occurrence in the Gospels refers to a prayer of Jesus to which there
reportedly were no human witnesses.
97 Placher 1994, 59.
249
children, even if this is not related to the specific term abba in the way that
has been suggested. It may also be quite true that the use of abba was original with Jesus and historically genuine []98
250
251
252
253
107 Sobrino 1976, 276 . To the question of whether God is absent or not, see
below, Chapter vii [4].
254
organized in his life story. Thus the historical Jesus is nothing else but the
history of Jesus.108
255
256
257
258
idols of death. It is worth noting here, though, that this transformation or liberating process in Sobrino consists in both divinisation
and humanisation. Jesus becomes son of God through the relationship with the God Father. This is a process of filiation, according to Sobrino, which is theologically ultimately confirmed by God
in the act of the resurrection. At the same time, this walking
towards God which makes Jesus son of God, and thereby participating in the very reality of God (divinisation), is equally a process
through which Jesus becomes a human being (hacerse l mismo un
ser humano [] ).120 It is a process of authentic humanisation.
This critical point in Sobrinos christology is somewhat diffuse.
I shall therefore give it a more detailed treatment below. 121 At this
stage, it may suffice to suggest the following interpretation of this
relationship in Sobrino: being a true human being means living
before the true God in faith and trust, letting God be God. At the
same time the true God as attested by the Bible is a God who precisely being divine lets human being be human being. Divinity
and humanity thus enters into a mutually constitutive relationship.
Such a conclusion does not come from an abstract analysis of the
concepts divinity and humanity, but from a concrete re-reading
of that human life in which according to the Christian faith true
humanity and true divinity coincide: the life of Jesus of Nazareth.
As we shall see, this simultaneous movement in the supposedly
opposite directions of humanity and divinity closely relates to the
concept of salvation in Sobrino as well.122
259
260
261
262
263
264
139 Ibid.
140 Grovijahn 1991, 20. Grovijahn calls for a redefinition of the traditional
understanding of martyrdom, which she finds not only deceptive, but idolatrous. (21). Sobrino has launched proposals in the same direction, cf.
Sobrino 1991d, 440-451.
141 Grovijahn 1991, 27.
142 Johnson 1992, 74. The quotation is from Sobrino 1988b, 153-156. Original
Spanish wording in Sobrino 1987a, 185-188. The emphasis is Sobrinos.
265
266
267
268
salvation, that the Kingdom is coming as grace and joy, not repudiation and exclusion. But, to the rich, those who are well off
within the social and religious society of that day, the call to conversion is a call to turn away from the security they believe they have in
their wealth and position, and to follow Jesus actively in his unselfish and humble service to the poor.
In the second period, after the Galilean crisis, the call to follow
Jesus takes on a new character. The Kingdom has not come in its
fullness as Jesus and his disciples had expected and resistance is
increasing. Jesus starts to speak of his suffering and death.
The following is now concretised in the following of the concrete person
Jesus, in a situation in which it is no longer obvious that Jesus himself would
have anything to do with the coming of the Kingdom, as was earlier
believed.148
269
that Jesus has changed, and this change has not been simply peaceful and gradually developing.152
(2) If we now turn from a historical to a more systematic approach,
we must ask what this relationship between Jesus and his followers
actually means when seen as a constitutive relationship. A full treatment of the significance in and for theology of the centrality of this
relation in Sobrino must await our concluding chapter (VIII).
However, seeing it in the perspective of Jesus life and mission, it
may be helpful to address already at this stage some main elements
of the meaning and content of following Jesus today according to
Sobrino.
Because of historical as well as theological differences, following Jesus today cannot and ought not be pure imitation153,
Sobrino points out. The historical differences are obvious. Among
the most important theological differences are the (negative) fact
that the Kingdom has not come, and the (positive) presence and
action of the Spirit. This latter makes following today spirit, not
law. It is not supposed to be realised by everybody in the same
manner, but according to the personal carismas. One should for this
reason speak of an analogy of following.154 However, following
151 Sobrino 1991d, 259-262; 259: La historicidad de esta crisis es hoy discutida
o, al menos, matizada []
152 Sobrino 1991d, 262. Jess ha cambiado y ese cambio no ha sido simplemente evolutivo y pacfico. Se le llame o no crisis, se la pueda datar y localizar como crisis galilea o no, es secundario para el propsito de este
apartado. Lo importante es que Jess aparece en fidelidad a Dios hasta el
final, y esa fidelidad queda expresada como ir a Jerusaln, donde se va a
encontrar con Dios, otra vez de forma nueva, en la pasin y la cruz.
153 Sobrino 1983b, 940. El seguimiento de Jess en la actualidad no puede ni
debe ser pura imitacin, por la diversidad de circundancias histricas y
teolgicas. Cf. Sobrino 1976, xvi.
154 Sobrino 1976, xvi.
270
271
272
273
274
Christian faith, viz. the divinity of Jesus. In answering that question, some basic observations will follow.
275
reading which is conscious that it starts from a position in a particular moment of history in a particular community. In this community there is already present a confession, a faith in this Jesus of
whom the texts speak. At the same time this methodology stresses
that that which is read and confessed is something which appeared
in the same history as the one the readers experience and take part
in. There is a clear continuity between the communities in which
Jesus appeared and made a profound impact, and the communities
in which the christological reflection of today is carried out.
Now, this is the same continuity that we find in the testimonies
to Jesus relationship with other human beings, according to
Sobrino. Jesus actively seeks such continuity and horizontality:
[] the messiah seeks followers and the son wants all to call God
Father.172 This is a first step, so to speak, in the reflection on the
christological confession. Although it is consciously starting from a
position of confession, it applies a method (historical reading)
which makes it possible to stress this continuity of Jesus with other
human beings, and explain why this person could be called messiah, son etc.
Moving from a description of Jesus as a son or a messiah to an
outright confession of him as the Messiah and Son of God, is something which never ceases to be a leap of faith, Sobrino is convinced.
But he argues that from this position, through this methodological
approach, it is a leap of faith which seems more historically and
171 Sobrino 1994c, 159. / Sobrino 1991d, 272: Pues bien, a partir de lo que
hemos dicho, Jess, por su anuncio e inicio del reino de Dios, va apareciendo en la lnea del ungido, el mesas que responde a la esperanza de salvacin del pueblo pobre y oprimido. Y por su relacin con Dios-Padre va
apareciendo en la lnea del hijo, del ser humano que responde y corresponde a Dios. Lo dicho no fuerza a confesarlo como el mesas y el hijo, pero
hace verosmil que se lo pudiese confesar de esta forma.
172 Sobrino 1994c, 159. / Sobrino 1991d, 273: [] el mesas busca seguidores y
el hijo quiere que todos llamen Padre a Dios.
276
The continuity between Jesus and other human beings does not represent a hindrance to the full confession of his divinity in Sobrinos
view. To the contrary, Sobrino holds that this continuity actually
founds that confession, both epistemologically and theologically.
This is a crucial point for the understanding of Sobrinos theology, and thus for his treatment of the theological significance of suffering by way of the relationship between the crucified and the
Crucified. It will continuously engage our attention. At this stage, I
shall make four basic observations emerging from my investigation
so far.
(1) The first observation deals with the rhetorical character of
Sobrinos christology. That Sobrinos christology is rhetorical is of
173 This is the point that Chow fails to understand, see Chapter iii [3] (1).
174 Sobrino 1994c, 159. / Sobrino 1991d, 273. De esta forma, se prepara la posibilidad de formulacin y, sobre todo, la correcta comprensin del dogma
cristolgico. A partir de la concreta relacin de Jess con Dios y su reino, y
partir de su concreta relacin con los hermanos se podr confesar en qu
consiste su verdadera humanidad y su verdadera divinidad.
277
278
atic, it does so, in my view, when Sobrino puts forward his case with
key-terms like reality, history, and theological concept, that
remain vague and finally undefined. Accordingly, I think that
Sobrinos theology would benefit from a more explicit reflection on
the rhetorical character of the theological enterprise, and on the
nature of religious and theological language indeed, of language at
all.178
(2) My second observation regards the translation of Sobrinos
books into other languages, which sometimes is in danger of
obscuring this theological two-step method, e.g. from son to Son.
It can be seen most clearly in the translation of the Spanish title
Jesucristo liberador into the English Jesus the Liberator. What the
Spanish title indicates is that Jesus Christ i.e. the Jesus who is confessed as the Anointed one, Messiah is in fact one who can be perceived as a liberator. This is what Sobrino wishes to demonstrate
through his historical-theological re-reading. In the English title,
because of two changes, the most natural interpretation seems to be
a somewhat different one. Jesus stands here without its confessional predicative Christ, while the capital L in Liberator could
indicate that it should be understood as a confession; Jesus is the
(ultimate) Liberator. These are nuances, which do not amount to
contradictions, but the capitalisation of words in English titles and
headings seems to alter the original meaning in Sobrinos texts
here.179
178 The British theologian Gareth Jones faults Sobrino for his (lack of reflection
on) rhetoric. Jones 1995, 85-112, especially 110-111. For a further discussion
and development, see Chapter v, below.
179 There is also a considerable difference between the orginal Spanish title Cristologa desde Amrica latina and its English version: Christology at the Crossroads, which Macquarrie has correctly pointed out, Macquarrie 1990, 316:
The Spanish original edition bore the very sober and descriptive title Cristologa desde Amrica latina, but the English version has the more dramatic
title []
279
280
[10] Conclusions
What is the good news of Jesus? How does Jesus bring salvation
through his life, according to Sobrino?
Firstly, Jesus brings salvation by being mediator of the Kingdom
of God. Jesus initiates and proclaims the coming of the Kingdom in
the midst of a human history of sin and suffering. The Kingdom
brings multiple salvations, according to the different needs of
human beings. Jesus saves people around him through his merciful
183 Sobrino 1976, xviii-xix, my translation. [] Jess es el Hijo eterno del
Padre porque a travs de su Espiritu es capaz de seguir engendrando seguidores suyos, configurando a otros hombres a su imagen. The English translation in Sobrino 1978a, xxv-xxvi seems to me somewhat more moderate
than the Spanish original: We also provide the most radical and thorough
verification of the truth of Christology: i.e., that Jesus is the eternal Son of
the Father. For we thereby show that through his Spirit he is continually
capable of raising up followers and shaping other human beings in his
image.
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282
283
tice, and in concrete acts of love. They are mediators of the Kingdom when they provide a critical light that unmasks the injustices
of this world. They are mediators of the Kingdom when they do not
take revenge, but rather offer forgiveness and possibilities of conversion and reconciliation. They bring salvation to history as they celebrate the gift of life always open to a more, in the very presence of
circumstances and forces that threaten this life.
Secondly, the crucified people bring salvation to history in their
status as sons and daughters of God. As Jesus, in his responding and
corresponding to the nearness of the Kingdom, becomes the Son of
God true human being and true God in his relation to Godthe-Father, the crucified people through him enter into the same
relation. God calls all persons to this relationship as a child of God,
this filiation, which is simultaneously a process of humanisation
and deification. This process is salvific; and since salvation is a quality to be shared, it brings salvation to human history at large. In
their similarity with the destiny of the One whom Christians confess to be the ultimate revelation of that filiation, the crucified people can be recognised as offering this salvation in history.
This corresponds to a third perspective, namely that the crucified people bring salvation to history by being way. As Jesus is the
way to correspond to the Kingdom of God and the God of the
Kingdom in history, the crucified people in their likeness with
Jesus reveal a way through history. It is, in Sobrinos view, a way of
liberation, a way of authentic humanisation, a way of participating
in the love and life of God; hence, a way of salvation.
As the pattern and specific content of Sobrinos thought get
clearer, the critical questions return with new force: What is actually
implied in this interpretation? Is it not a somewhat idealised vision
of the destiny of suffering people today? Does it not make salvation
too much of a human effort? And, is it really admissible on Chris-
284
tian terms to draw such a close comparison between Jesus and his
followers and even victims in general?
In other words, these views regarding the salvific function of the
crucified people seen in the light of Jesus life pose questions regarding the clarity and validity of the concept. One such question is
related to the observation that these characteristics (mediators,
sons and daughters, way) still seem to suppose the active and
conscious commitment of the crucified people. The theology of the
crucified people is closely related to ecclesiology, we note again, particularly with reference to the church of the poor, the Church Base
Communities (CEBs). But at the same time, Sobrino also wishes to
speak of crucified people in a wider sense, including innocent victims of history with or without awareness of an analogous relationship to Jesus. Perhaps the influence of Rahner here comes to the
fore through an implicit idea of anonymous mediators, sons and
daughters, followers. Is there an anonymous crucified people?184
Another question that arises regards the relationship between
the crucified people as receivers and mediators of salvation. Are they
themselves saved by bringing salvation to the world? How can they
be understood as saved recalling that salvation according to
Sobrino must show itself in history if salvation is life in fullness,
and this life is precisely what they as crucified are being
deprived of?
184 Sobrino 1991d, 448, n. 29: Este sera el lugar para mensionar a los mrtires
annimos. Segn la lgica de los cristianos annimos, y pensamos que su
tratamiento es necesario en la actualidad. Por decirlo grficamente, en vida
los seres humanos tenemos nombres y apellidos. Con la muerte, perdemos
los apellidos (cristianos, budistas, musulmanes, hindes, agnsticos, ateos
[]), pero con la muerte por amor recobramos para siempre el nombre de
humano que Dios nos ha puesto a todos.
285
286
287
288
Sobrino 1994c, 161./ Sobrino 1991d, 276. Cf. Sobrino 1982a, 115-149.
transformation. It is sufficient to underscore its relationship to society as a whole and to the goal of transformation of this society as a
whole.
Jesus does have such a praxis, according to Sobrino. He does
relate to society as a totality with the goal of transforming it. However, Jesus only weapon in this praxis is the word. Therefore it is a
prophetic praxis, which basically consists in controversies,
unmaskings and denunciations.
(1) In the controversies as recounted in the gospels, Jesus engages in
discussions and bitter quarrels with particular persons and groups of
people, who are gradually depicted as Jesus opponents and adversaries. Jesus is questioned and criticised, and has to defend himself.
But it seems also that he deliberately provokes and engages in these
controversies with a particular purpose. In order to uncover this
basic cause and purpose Sobrino examines several of the controversies, especially as they are described in Mark: 1) the healing and forgiving of the paralytic in 2:1,12; 2) eating with sinners in 2: 15-17; 3)
the question of fasting in 2:18-22, 4) plucking grain on the sabbath
in 2:23-28 and 5) curing the man with a withered hand in 3:1-6. Furthermore, he undertakes an analysis of the controversy over the
greatest commandment (Mark 12:28-31; Luke 10:25ff; Matthew
22:34-40).
The main reason for the controversies, Sobrino concludes, is
God. God is the reality which is in question. But the basic question
is not whether God exists or not primarily a Western post-Enlightenment dilemma, it seems but who this God is, who the true God
really is and how this reality of God is adequately corresponded to.
Jesus purpose in engaging in these controversies seems to be primarily a defence. Jesus defends his vision of God as the true God of
life. This is necessary because God and Gods Kingdom are challenged.
289
290
Jesus does not draw this picture for purely theoretical reasons, but for its
practical consequences: according to the particular God they accept, so
human beings behave, and so they structure society into the form of the
Kingdom or anti-Kingdom. 5
Sobrino 1994c, 167. / Sobrino 1991d, 287: Y esta ilustracin no la hace Jess
por razones puramente tericas, sino por sus consecuencias prcticas: segn
se acepte a un determinado Dios, as se comportan los seres humanos, y as
configuran la sociedad en forma de reino o de antirreino.
Cf., however, Sobrino 1991d, 167, where Sobrino defines Satan as [] la
fuerza negativa de la creacin, que la destruye y la hace capaz de destruir, la
cual se expresar histrica y socialmente como antirreino.
291
292
The choice of beginning with these is somewhat arbitrary, Sobrino comments, underlining that he does not want to attribute to Jesus a view that
would see the economic sphere as determining everything else. The not
here is important, since it is by mistake omitted in the English translation
(Sobrino 1994c, 170; cf. Sobrino 1991d, 292). However, the strong denunciations of the rich and their wealth, which furthermore is seen concretely in its
relational character vis--vis poverty, fits well with Sobrinos basic interpretation of Gods salvific gift in the Kingdom as just life for the poor. Furthermore, by following Ellacura in his definition of poor and poverty,
making material poverty the irreplaceable condition for all poverty, Sobrino
himself does seem to hold such a view of social reality, giving primacy to the
sphere of economy in configuring society. Even if it might be said to be
arbitrary, it suits Sobrinos purpose very well to begin with Jesus denunciations of the rich.
Sobrino 1994c, 173. / Sobrino 1991d, 297. [] no pueden ustedes servir a
Dios y al dinero.
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
The term victimology was coined in 1949 by an American psychiatrist, Frederick Wertham26. It gradually became a common designation for a specific area of study within criminology, namely the
study of criminal-victim relationships.27
When I submit that Sobrinos theology as liberation theology
in general opts for a victimological perspective or has a victimological orientation, I refer to his claim that the fundamental
theological questions questions of God, of Jesus, of salvation and
liberation can existentially best and most appropriately be posed
from the perspective of the victims. Furthermore, as should be clear
by now, their posture is not just one of perspective, but also one of
commitment: they hold that these questions therefore must be
posed here; face to face with victims, sharing in their sufferings and
hopes, already in active service for them and together with them in
order to remove the causes of suffering and bondage, or in the
words of liberation theologians: in the struggle for historical liberation. This praxis-orientation, which rather than a merely detached
study of victims presupposes and fosters commitment and active
intervention, seems to concur with the understanding of victimology which i.a. Emilio C. Viano advocates: [] the common
denominator of victimological work is crisis intervention and the
short- and long-term remedies that should be made available to victims.28
26 Wertham used it for the first time in his book The Show of Violence : The
murder victim is the forgotten man (sic). With sensational discussions on the
abnormal psychology of the murderer, we have failed to emphasize the
unprotectedness of the victim and the complaceny (sic) of the authorities.
One cannot understand the psychology of the murderer if one does not
understand the sociology of the victim. What we need is the science of victimology. Quoted from Fattah, Ezzat A.: Victims and Victimology. The
Facts and the Rhetoric in Fattah 1992, 31.
27 See Schafer 1977, 1.
301
302
dates general stereotypes of sympathetic, blameless victims vs. monstrous, evil offenders that are both untrue and damaging, to both
groups. Media portrayals, turning victims into saints33, contribute
strongly to the maintenance of these stereotypes, while as a matter
of fact, research shows that these groups tend to have a lot in common. 34
This is not the place to discuss whether a committed, praxisoriented victimology really is incompatible with a truly critical victimology. But Fattahs arguments are important reminders also for a
theology which seeks to adopt the perspective of victims and promote their cause. Might a theology of the crucified people
become negligent of or even antagonistic towards the reality and
after all humanity of crucifiers, and thus miss what many hold to
be one of the major treasures of the gospel the forgiveness of sins?
Does such a theology portray the victims as saints and the offenders
as demons, and thus contribute to false stereotypes? Does it make
use of a manipulative rhetoric? Any theology with a victimological
orientation should be critically aware of these dangers. Even theology may end up re-victimising the victim.35
Victim and victimological are not unproblematic terms
then. Some of those who earlier defined themselves as victims prefer
now to present themselves as survivors, also in the Central American context.36 In Chapter iv, we were also reminded of a certain
uneasiness with this terminology among feminist theologians.37
Yet, it would be an even greater problem if the ambiguities of
the terminology victim and its possible manipulation were to
allow covering up the reality to which it refers. There is reason to be
33 Fattah refers to Ellis Coses article Turning Victims into Saints in Time
Magazine, Jan. 22, 1990.
34 Fattah speaks of striking similarities between the victim and offender populations. See Victims and Victimology: Facts and Rhetoric in op. cit., 33-41.
35 See: Viano 1990, xiii.
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304
305
306
307
guage which is close to or outright myth[olog]ical, it is not sufficient in my view to justify this by a reference to the similarity of
historical circumstances, nor to the common use of biblical language in Latin-America today. A thorough hermeneutical method is
also needed.48
The problem can be illustrated by the term anti-Kingdom.
What does it in fact refer to in historical terms? Avoiding the direct
expression Satans Kingdom does not in fact take away the difficult task of historicising the concept, giving it concrete meaning in
contemporary terms, without falling into the pitfall of a direct,
quasi-referential understanding of myth[olog]ical language. There is
here the risk of a dangerous shortcut, which may lead to a direct
demonizing of concrete, historical, political, or theological opponents.49 A famous example of such manipulative use of mythological language for political purposes is President Reagans labelling of
the Soviet Union as the evil Empire.
It would be exaggerated to claim that Sobrino commits this
error. There is a great distance between his careful theological analysis and Reagans rhetoric (in the pejorative sense). I do, however,
question whether Sobrino secures his approach sufficiently against
such unintended negative implications, or whether, in fact, he
remains rather vulnerable at this point.
(3) That these questions are not just speculative exercises growing
out of a secularized European context, can be demonstrated by
making reference to one of the most urgent Latin American challenges to liberation theology today, viz. the rapid growth of popular
48 The translator makes a mistake when he translates Sobrinos title Jess y la
cuestin de Dios: desidolatrizacin de la divinidad (Sobrino 1991d, 346)
with Jesus and the Question of God: Demythifying Divinity (Sobrino
1994c, 186). It is tempting to interpret this error as an unconscious indication of this lack of reflection on the mythological language in Sobrino.
308
Protestantism. This phenomenon is complex, and often too superficially and stereotypically analysed by liberation theologians. It
would therefore merit closer consideration.50 The point which I
49 Raymund Schwager, in an interesting commentary on this aspect in
Sobrinos theology delivered as a response in the disputation in Graz referred
to above, recalls the inherent dangers in seeing the devil at work in ones enemies and opponents: Mindestens der Teufelsglaube war in der Geschichte
des Abendlandes eine sehr reale historische Macht, denn in seinem Namen
wurden Hunderttausende, ja vielleicht sogar Millionen von Menschen
schuldlos hingerichtet. Der Teufel war allerdings in erster Linie nicht dort
wirksam, wo man ihn glaubte zu erkennen, nmlich in den Hexen, sondern
im System, das ihn bekmpfte und das mittels der Folter selber jene Beweise
schuf, auf die sich die Verurteilungen sttzen. Schwager 1992, 45. He also
finds the above-mentioned relationship between the historical powers of
oppression and the biblical statements about the devil, Satan, etc. unclear in
Sobrino. This unclarity may be overcome however, Schwager is convinced,
and he presents his own proposal of how this may be done (51, n.7). In brief,
Schwagers proposal sees [] das Satanische als die letze Eigengesetzlichkeit
einer ffentlichkeit [], die sich selber verschliesst, das Bse in ihr auf
andere projiziert und diese zu Opfern macht [] (52). By way of this definition, emerging from an analysis of the biblical material which Schwager
has presented in various writings, it is possible to give an answer to what the
biblical statements may mean in todays context: Dazu muss die Eigengesetzlichkeit jenes Systems nher betrachtet werden, das unsere Welt vorherrschend bestimmt. Sobrinos prime criterion for recognising the
presence of idols, is that they produce many victims. While deeming this an
important criterion, Schwager thinks it should be strengthened by two other
criteria: 1) Eine Eigengesetzlichkeit ist dann satanisch, wenn sie sich in sich
selber einschliesst, dies heisst, wenn sie keine Zukunft erffnet. 2) [] ein
System [kann] erst dann im eigentlichen Sinn als teuflisch bezeichnet werden, wenn es nicht bloss physische Opfer zur Folge hat, sondern auch die
Wrde und die Seelen der Menschen angreift (53). Finally, Schwager thinks
that such an understanding of the demonic also gives important clues to
how Satan must be fought: [] kollektive Projektionen werden nicht
durch Gegenprojektionen, sondern nur durch das langsame Erarbeiten einer
wahreren Sicht der Wirklichkeit berwunden (54).
309
wish to make here is related to the often fundamentalistic and apocalyptic character of these movements. Their preaching is frequently
highly speculative, using a mythological language that is not translated, i.e. without hermeneutical awareness. While Church Base
Communities combat social problems with the help of biblical concepts through secularising these concepts, many Pentecostal movements do the opposite; they sacralise social problems.51 It therefore
becomes crucial to pay particular attention to the hermeneutical
problems related to the use of an apocalyptic/mythological language, especially when addressing a situation in which this language
may not cause estrangement in the first place, but rather feel familiar. Under such circumstances, it may become an even more dangerous instrument for manipulation.
Jon Sobrinos hermeneutical method is a hermeneutics of
praxis. This method has many advantages and is an important corrective to the often theoretical-abstract explicative rather than
transformative hermeneutical methods that have been favoured in
mainstream Western theology since the Enlightenment. Nevertheless, as I have pointed out at several stages now, there still seems to
be a shortcoming in Sobrinos hermeneutics, which relates to an
insufficient account of the interpretative steps taken in any theological enterprise, however rooted in praxis it may be. In a short comment, Sobrino says at one point that we should not look to Jesus
for an answer to our modern systematic questions.52 I take this to
mean that we should not approach the figure of Jesus as norm and
foundation for Christian theology without a careful hermeneutical
awareness. The question arises, however, if it is not so that Sobrino
at times comes close to doing exactly that.
50 Cf. my article: Stlsett 1995d.
51 See Cecilia Mariz interesting comparison: Mariz 1994, 78.
52 Sobrino 1994c, 177. / Sobrino 1991d,302: [] ni hay que esperar de Jess
una respuesta a nuestras preguntas sistemticas de hoy.
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311
312
oppressive structures and realities of contemporary society. However, scrutinising Sobrinos further argument regarding the historical Jesus, and the de facto use he makes of this term in his own
writings, I found that it has a distinct meaning in his work. Both
poles of the historical existence are taken into consideration from
the very beginning. What Sobrino looks for is not the Jesus of
Nazareth in himself (who of course, is out of reach) nor primarily
as he is seen by scientific historians, but rather the Jesus of Nazareth as seen from the vantage-point of believing and struggling
Christian communities in Latin America. The connection between
these two poles is seen primarily as a chain of remembrance realised
in practice following.
Although recognising this distinctness of the Latin American
historical Jesus and its comparative advantages to (although at the
same time dependence on) the so-called three quests for the historical Jesus, I joined other critics bound in asking whether (1) it really
is helpful to make use of the term the historical Jesus while
acknowledging important differences from what has commonly
been understood by it, and whether (2) this term really is consistently applied in Sobrino. It seemed that he tends to slide between
this openly contextualised and interested quest for the Jesus of history or history of Jesus -, and a more traditional historistic argument where historical is used to lend scientific legitimacy and
objectivity to the results obtained or rather, the interpretation
presented.
Now, in this chapter, midway in my analysis of Sobrinos rereading of the life and death of Jesus, I have come to a point where
all of these hitherto unanswered crucial questions return, with
renewed strength. I have found that the ultimate explanation in
Sobrinos christology, the root cause of the experience of suffering
and main motivation for a praxis of theological cognition and liberating practice, is that reality has a theologal-idolatrous structure.
313
The gods are at war with God. This is why there is a yearning for
and an objective need for salvation in and through history. This is
why the Son of God meets resistance and rejection, and finally execution. This is why sons and daughters of God in the world today
become victims of oppression, injustice and seemingly endless suffering.
Thus, at the very foundations of Sobrinos christology and soteriology, and subsequently, his whole theological project, lies an
explanation of the structure of reality which is expressed in theological-myth[olog]ical language, but which at the same time Sobrino
claims to be historical. How can it be? Should this be seen as an
inconsistency? Or should it rather be considered a necessity, because
what we deal with are attempts at putting the unspeakable into
words, the inexpressible into logical reasoning?
These basic questions still need further elaboration in Sobrinos
works. In a sum, there seems to be something of a short-cut in
Sobrinos general outline; a short-cut from reality to theology, from
history to theology, and from praxis to theory, which may in the
end result in a too tight interconnection of the crucified and the
Crucified. While appreciating the need for and attempt at a unified
perspective, I hold that this must not and need not be achieved at
the expense of a conscious and critical awareness of the distinction
between and relative independence of each pole.
Therefore I shall now draw on some perspectives and contributions that throw fresh light on these issues, and which in my opinon
could serve to complement and advance Sobrinos outline. I shall
turn to the hermeneutical methodology prepared by the philosophical contributions of Paul Ricoeur, and then applied in theology
with a particular regard to the Latin American situation by Jos Severino Croatto.
314
315
316
The problem with myths for modern man is however that they
cannot be connected with the time of history as this is understood
when applying a critical method, and likewise, that they cannot be
connected with geographical space. That is why myths cannot any
longer function directly as an explanation. Therefore, the call for
demythologisation is legitimate and necessary, according to
Ricoeur.
Does not this expel myths from the domain of modern
thought? No, because in losing its explanatory pretention, the myth
reveals another important function in the process of understanding,
namely its exploratory significance, which Ricoeur calls its sym58
59
60
61
Ibid.
Ricoeur 1969b, 6.
Ricoeur 1969b, 5.
Ricoeur 1969b, 5.
317
318
65
66
67
68
69
70
319
320
321
This dialectic unification of the two formerly competing interpretative moves in a hermeneutical method of understanding explanation understanding (comprehending) turns out to have vast
potential.77 Ricoeur demonstrates its usefulness not only in the
interpretation of texts, but also in the fields of a theory of action
and a theory of history. This is where we can follow the thrust of
Ricoeurs philosophy from the interpretation of texts and back
again to action, i.e. into the field of anthropological philosophy.
74
75
76
77
322
323
324
325
326
Sketching out some basic ingredients of such an ethics of reading,88 Jeanrond submits 1) that a readers claim to the appropriateness of his/her interpretation should correspond to the actual task
fulfilled,89 2) that a total adequacy of reading is impossible, but one
should indeed strive for a relative adequacy90 3) that such relative
adequacy can be achieved when a text is read through perspectives
which seem appropriate to its generic and stylistic identity, and
when the reader aims at responding critically to the text as far as
possible without claiming to have exhausted the text91, and finally
4) that distortion of interpretation may emerge both from the text
and from the reader, but such distortion may be unmasked when a
given interpretation is validated in a community of readers.
Jeanronds critique and proposal for a further development of
Ricoeurs thinking in terms of an ethics of reading is helpful. At the
same time, it confirms the importance and applicability of Ricoeurs
work. But can Ricoeur be of guidance also in Latin America, among
poor communities struggling for liberation? Jos Severino Croattos
answer to this is definitely in the affirmative.
327
328
96
97
98
99
Croatto 1987, 1.
This distinction has become a commonplace in linguistics since de Saussure.
Croatto 1981, 2; Croatto 1987, 13-15.
Croatto 1987, 37.
329
Croatto 1981, 3.
Croatto 1987, 21.
Croatto 1987, 67.
Without confusing things we shall see that the interpretation of texts supposes the existence of another process, that of the interpretation of particular
practices or events, and that the very constitution of those texts originates in
an experience that is interpreted. And so I go beyond the limitation imposed
by Paul Ricoeur, for example, when he defines hermeneutics as the theory of
the functions of understanding in their relationship to the interpretation of
texts. Croatto 1987, 1-2.
104 Croatto 1987, 36ff.
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
verses 5 and 6, where the Servant is sent to Israel. Croattos comment here is enlightening:
For literary criticism, this is an inconsistent gloss. Hermeneutically, this
gloss is rich, as a transfer of meaning to an updated referent in virtue of the
needs of the community that is handing down the text.118
A second stage is found in the Septuagint, where we still find a collective interpretation of Israel as the Servant, now seen in the light
of the experiences of persecution and exile in the diaspora. Israels
salvific mission is here highlighted. Moving to the New Testament,
the individual interpretation takes over totally. Because of the symbolic reference to one person in the songs, the christological reading
is facilitated. This reading was so powerful, in light of the Christian experience, that it permeates many pages of the New Testament.119 However, the collective exegesis is kept alive and can be
refound in the Targum of Jonathan (second century A.D.), which
in fact differentiates the references of the Songs, holding Is. 42:1-9
to refer to the Messiah and 50:4-11 to the prophet Isaiah.
In Croattos view, these manifold and different re-readings are
fully legitimate and prove the openness of the texts. And again, this
process of re-readings is bound to continue, even after the Christ
event:
By the same token, we too can reread [the Servant Songs] without being limited by the christological reading of the New Testament. Paul himself had
already extended the figure of the Servant as the light of the gentiles to himself (Gal. 1:15; in one of the Lukan accounts of Pauls vocation, Acts 26:18
and in the episode of Antioch, Acts 13:47.) Today, too, situations exist in
which persons, groups of persons, or whole peoples call for a new interpretation of these songs these mighty compendia of the presence of God and of
the trust of those working in Gods service.120
118 Croatto 1987, 28.
119 Croatto 1987, 28.
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Here Croatto takes us back to our main theme, the theological significance of contemporary suffering as this is conceptualised
through the crucified people in the theology of Jon Sobrino.
What Sobrino has done is in fact to present such a new interpretation of the songs from a particular historical perspective. After studying the contributions of Ricoeur and Croatto, we are better
equipped to continue our analysis of this new interpretation, its
meaning and implications. We have gathered some partly convergent and partly alternative perspectives on the crucial questions
regarding reality, history and language that have been raised so far.
By the help of these perspectives, I shall now continue the investigation. But first, I shall sum up the findings of this chapter.
[7] Conclusions
The root of the soteriological problem according to Sobrinos theology is that reality is subject to a continuous struggle between the
God of life and the idols of death. Reality has a theologal-idolatrous structure. This was the first main finding of the present chapter. Through an analysis of Sobrinos reading of the conflicts that
develop around the activity of Jesus particularly his prophetic,
anti-idolatrous praxis consisting in controversies, unmaskings and
denunciations we saw how this theme of the confrontation of
divinities is given the function of the ultimate explanation, not
just within the framework of the biblical worldview, but analogously in world history at large. This is indeed a crucifying conflict.
Idolatry, not atheism, is accordingly the main opponent of faith,
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does not make due account of the interpretative steps taken, and
in particular does not leave sufficient room for a critical evaluation of this ultimate explanation of the structure of reality and the
root causes of suffering and evil.
Whether this is a fair evaluation of Sobrinos writings, and if so,
how it might be made constructive through proposals for overcoming these difficulties, are questions that remain to be answered. This
is the task of the rest of this study. I have looked for some alternative viewpoints and theoretical frameworks that shed light on these
issues, with the goal of clarifying, and if possible, modifying and
advancing Sobrinos conception. I suggest that Paul Ricoeurs profound work in the field of philosophical hermeneutics, and the
reception and creative further development of this by Jos Severino
Croatto in a Latin American theological context, are particularly
promising in this aspect.
In the account I have given of some main characteristics and
tenets in this Ricoeurian line of thought I have particularly highlighted the questions of (1) how symbolic and mythological language relates to historical reality and human experience of suffering
and evil (Ricoeur), (2) how there can be a critical, explanatory
moment in a hermeneutical process without thereby yielding to a
reductive and in fact, outdated sense of historicism and rationalism (Ricoeur and Croatto), and (3) how the interpretation of texts,
and particularly the biblical texts, may be open to ever new meanings without thereby becoming random and relativistic, and likewise without becoming separated from a committed historical
praxis for the liberation of the poor (Croatto).
This has furnished us with critical elements for our continuing
inquiry into the meaning and implications of the crucified people
for a contemporary theology.
Before moving on, I shall come back for a moment to Sobrinos
reading of the history of Jesus. Who is Jesus, according to Sobrino,
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Hitherto, as I emphasised and discussed in the previous chapter, Sobrino has presented Jesus primarily in continuity with other
human beings. This is valid here, as well, as I have signalled: []
like so many prophets before and after him. It is a continuity
which works in both directions. Just as Jesus follows Hosea and
Amos, so he himself has prophetical followers such as Mgr Romero
and Mgr Proao [], Sobrino repeatedly points out.121 Jesus is a
prophet. Not necessarily the Prophet, yet.122 The ultimate leap of
faith from son to the Son, from messiah to the Messiah, is
also a leap from seeing Jesus as one of the prophets to see him as the
one, unique and ultimate Prophet. This problematic concerning the
dialectic tension continuity-discontinuity is, as we shall see, crucial
for the assessment of our theme: the crucified and the Crucified. I
have warned about a possible short-cut between the two. In this
connection, it means that there is a need for an appreciation also of
the discontinuity in this relationship. Will perhaps Sobrinos analysis of Jesus death on the cross give a better foundation for making
the leap of faith required to see the discontinuity between Jesus and
other human beings?
342
The heart of the matter in our inquiry into the relationship between
the crucified and the Crucified in Jon Sobrinos christology has to
do with the death of Jesus. What does this death mean, when seen
against the background of suffering and death of millions in our
time and history? Can it possibly be attributed a salvific significance? And what light can be thrown on this contemporary suffering around the globe and in our midst through an
interpretation of Jesus death?
In the present chapter I shall consider Sobrinos interpretation
of Jesus death.2 My analysis will basically follow Sobrinos own taxonomy in dealing with this topic in Jesucristo liberador. While his
treatment in Cristologa desde Amrica latina was governed to a considerable degree by Moltmanns approach, in Jesucristo liberador the
composition is basically inherited from Ellacuras article Por qu
1
2
343
Ellacuras principal argument here is that there is an intimate relation between the historical reasons for Jesus death and its soteriological significance. He is contesting a theological thinking which
operates on two levels whether these are called religious and
secular, natural and supernatural, or otherwise. There is only
one historical reality, which is without separation and without confusion, in which God and human beings intervene respectively.5
This christological (Chalcedonian) approach to reality6, which in
modern Catholic theology has profound roots in Vatican II and
particularly Rahners theology, makes the intersection of the historical and soteriological/theological interpretations of the death of
3
4
5
6
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Ellacura 1978b. The article was first published in the Spanish theological
review Misin Abierta, 70, 1977, 176-186.
My translation, SJS. El intento de poner en relacin a Jess con la historia,
y consiguientemente, a la Iglesia con la historia, es esencial para la comprensin y realizacin del cristianismo, as como para la realizacin y la comprensin de la historia. Si no se llega a tener clara esta relacin, se cae en
posturas religiosistas o en posturas secularistas, con menoscabo de lo que es
realmente la salvacin histrica. Op. cit., 65
Cf. Ellacura 1991b, 327.
Sobrino holds that [] el dogma cristolgico ofrece una categora estructuradora de la realidad, en palabras de J. I. Gonzlez Faus. Sobrino 1991d,
27. Cf. Maier 1992, 344-348.
345
346
347
ity of the cross did not begin either with Bultmann nor with the
conquest christologies. The tendency is present already in the
New Testament.
There is a tendency to smoothen or even gloss over the scandal
of the cross. As early as in Pauls insistence on the preaching of the
cross to the Corinthians, one can deduce that it must have been a
great temptation for the first Christians to let the enthusiastic celebration of the triumph in Jesus resurrection take such a position
that the cross was regarded only as a brief moment of transition, or
even overlooked totally. It is therefore of utmost importance to Paul
and to the evangelists to show that the resurrected is none other than
the crucified. The tendency to bypass the concrete historicity and
scandal of the cross present already in the New Testament, is
accordingly a tendency which the New Testament itself corrects.
One interesting example of this development, as Sobrino sees it,
is the rapid disappearance of christological titles that link Jesus primarily with his suffering and death, such as the title comparing him
with the Suffering Servant of Is. 53. Instances of comparison
between Jesus and the Servant can be found, especially in traditions
apparently stemming from Peter (Acts 3:13, 26; 4:27, 30; 8:26; 1 Pet
2:22-24.). But they soon became replaced by other titles that stress
Jesus victory and exaltation in heaven, rather than his suffering.12
This tendency took other forms as well. One of them was the
increasing inclination to give priority to cosmological and soteriological aspects. After the resurrection, the questions about the reasons for and possible meaning of the death of Jesus were posed from
the viewpoint of eternity, so to speak: Why did the Son of God have
to die on a cross? When the drama of Easter was seen as Gods
design for the salvation of humankind, the more historical questions naturally lost interest. The cross was thus reduced from a real
historical scandal and tragedy to a noetic mystery. Furthermore,
12 Sobrino 1976, 140.
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349
holds, but remains an unfathomable mystery which finds its contemporary parallel in the crosses of history.
This is the ultimate reason for recovering the historicity of the
cross, then: it corresponds to the daily experience of millions of
Christians in Latin America. Again, Sobrino argues on the basis of
the similarity (isomorfismo) of Latin America today and Palestine in
Jesus time. Latin Americans are inclined to ask about the historical
reasons of Jesus death, because they know so many who die like
him today.
(2) Among the first and most difficult questions relevant to a
quest for the historical meaning of Jesus death are those related to
Jesus own consciousness. Did Jesus expect to die a violent death?
And if so, did he accord his forthcoming death a particular meaning?
Sobrino maintains that Jesus must have understood what was in
store for him. The whole climate of his mission was one of confrontation and persecution, and increasingly so. Jesus was a man in
conflict. That this conflict could eventually take serious proportions and have a dramatic outcome, must have become gradually
clear to Jesus. Ever since the violent death of John the Baptist, Jesus
must have lived with this risk. Furthermore, since he saw himself
and his own mission in line with those of the prophets, persecution
to the point of death would also be seen as indeed a possible consequence of his activity.15
It is important to emphasise this, according to Sobrino, because
it shows Jesus fidelity and loyalty to his mission. Jesus continues to
correspond to the reality of the coming Kingdom and the goodness
of the God-Father, in spite of all the opposition that this brings
14 In underlining this aspect, Sobrino can be seen in the tradition of inter alia
Martin Luther and Sren Kierkegaard, see McCracken 1994.
15 Sobrino 1991d, 317ff.
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351
18 Sobrino 1994c, 202-203. / Sobrino 1991d, 321: Dicho en forma muy general,
su muerte va a ser algo bueno para otros, para todos.
352
By this, we are immediately brought back to Jngels argument outlined in Chapter ii. Does this confirm that Sobrino advocates a
(merely) exemplary soteriology/christology? We must remain attentive to this critical question.20
It may seem that an important shift has taken place in Sobrinos
thought on this point. We have just seen how Sobrino stresses the
continuity between Jesus life and his death, not only on an external
level (that the opposition that he met persisted and finally grew as
strong as to take his life) but also on an internal level: that the kind
of service that followed from his faithfulness to the heavenly Father
was a service that would remain unquestioned even in the face of
death. Now, if we go back to Sobrinos tenth thesis on the death of
Jesus in Cristologa desde Amrica Latina,21 we find quite another
version, in fact, one that seems to be in stark opposition to what has
just been cited:
19 Sobrino 1994c, 203-204. / Sobrino 1991d, 323: Jess va a su muerte con lucidez y con confianza, con fidelidad a Dios hasta el final y como expresin de
servicio hacia los suyos [] Ve que eso es bueno y exigido para l, y que eso
es lo bueno, y por ello, exigido a los dems. En este sentido, puede decirse
que Jess va a la muerte con confianza y la ve como ltimo acto de servicio,
ms bien a la manera de ejemplo eficaz y motivante para otros que a la manera de mecanismo de salvacin para otros. Ser fiel hasta el final, eso es ser
humano.
20 Once again, we also note here the close connection between Jesus soteriological role and his true humanity in Sobrino. Salvation and true humanisation seem close to synonyms. Cf. Sobrino 1993j, 887: La opcin por los
pobres es un modo de ver la historia, de reaccionar hacia ella y de encarnarse
en ella; pero es tambin la manera de llegar a vivir como ser humano. Es salvacin.
21 This chapter, La muerte de Jess y la liberacin en la historia, was published as early as in 1975: Sobrino 1975b.
353
What typifies the death of Jesus, and what differentiates it from the death of
other religious and political martyrs, is that Jesus dies in complete rupture
with his cause. Jesus feels abandoned by the very God whose approach in
grace he had been preaching.22
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356
this short cut implies a failure to make explicit every move in the
process of interpretation. Ricoeurs and Croattos contributions
show a way to avoid this, without thereby losing the substantial
point that Sobrino wishes to make in terms of theological content.
But let us first briefly review Sobrinos position on the trials of Jesus.
(a) With regard to the religious trial, Sobrino considers that the
underlying objective reason why Jesus was convicted was his
attacks in words and deeds on the Temple (Matt.26:61; Mark
14:58; cf. John 2:15).28 His attacks were not just critiques on certain
aspects of the Temple cult, but rather expressed a distinct and contrary alternative to the Temple.29 Harsh as their attitude may seem
in a post-paschal perspective, it is therefore nevertheless not difficult
to understand that the religious leaders felt offended and threatened
by Jesus. His provocative stance with regard to the law, expressed
clearly in his deliberate transgression of the law regarding the Sabbath, made him in the eyes of scribes, Pharisees, and priests guilty
of blasphemy. This would in itself be reason enough for the religious leaders to have him condemned to death. But the issue gets
even more antagonistic with the controversy regarding the Temple.
That the culmination of this conflict evolves around the significance and role of the Temple, is for Sobrino consistent with the
underlying struggle of gods and of their mediators and mediations:
[] the reason for Jesus condemnation is absolutely consistent with his
rejection right through his life. The anti-Kingdom (a society structured
around the Temple in this case) actively rejected the Kingdom and its mediators. What the religious trial makes clear even at an editorial level is that
the gods too are at war [] Jesus is condemned in the name of a god.30
357
(b) That Jesus preaching and practice ultimately represented a radical threat to the religious authorities is beyond discussion, according to Sobrino. Indirectly, it was a threat to any oppressive power.
But the penalty for serious religious transgressions such as severe
blasphemy or assault on the temple was stoning, not crucifixion.
This is where the trial turns explicitly political. Here it should be
remembered, however, that the sharp distinction between the
spheres of religion and politics is a modern development. In the
days of Jesus the two were intimately connected, as the story of
Jesus condemnation clearly shows.
Politically, Jesus was convicted as a rebel, a dangerous subversive, a threat to Roman rule in Palestine. Sobrino finds the most
reliable sources from a historical point of view in Luke 23:2 and
John 19:12.-15: We found this man perverting our nation, forbidding us to pay taxes to the emperor, and saying that he himself is
the Messiah, a king.31 All of these three complaints about the
activity of Jesus can be traced back to particular episodes related in
the gospels. But at the end of the day, neither of these plausible
causes for seeing Jesus as politically dangerous to the Roman
authorities is the main reason for Pilates final conviction. On the
contrary, Sobrino notes, none of the accusations made against Jesus
really convinces Pilate. The turning point for Pilate is the general
reasoning that is most clearly expressed in John 19:12: If you release
this man, you are no friend of the emperor. Everyone who claims to
be a king sets himself against the emperor.
30 Sobrino 1994c, 206. / Sobrino 1991d, 326-327: Si todo esto es as, la causa de
la condena de Jess es absolutamente coherente con el rechazo a Jess a lo
largo de su vida. El antirreino (una sociedad configurado alrededor del templo en este caso) rechaza activamente al reino y sus mediadores rechazan activamente al mediador. Lo que juicio religioso esclarece, aunque sea al nivel
redaccional, es que tambin los dioses estn en lucha [] Jess es condenado en nombre de un dios.
31 Sobrino 1991d, 327.
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360
361
(such as the mob scene in Jerusalem at pilgrimage feasts), and historical evidence (such as that concerning the holding of trials, and who had rights to
execute criminals for certain charges.38
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363
all that Sobrino could count on in making in general the historical Jesus norma normans for his christology, and in particular
for recovering the historicity of Jesus death on a cross, then he
would seem to be building on a rather weak foundation. But our
recourse to Ricoeur and Croatto has shown a more solid, and thoroughly hermeneutical foundation for historicity. If we follow
Ricoeur, historical analyses of this kind belong to the explanatory
move, which, as we remember, is a completely legitimate and necessary although not sufficient step on the way to understanding or
comprehension. It is, as we recall, a step leading from a first
naivet to a second naivet.
Sobrino may draw support from such historical analyses, but
should not rely completely on them as fully accomplished interpretations. If he does not wish to take into account such analyses, he
will easily fall into what Croatto calls the pitfall of concordism
an uncritical search for correspondences between real-life situations
and occurrences related in the scriptures. If his interpretation is in
conflict with these historical analyses, then we have difficulty in
arguing that his position has come past the level of first naivet, of
spontaneous fideism. This would hardly be a way of making historicity normative. On the other hand, if he remains content with a
recourse to a historical analysis and cuts short his argument there,
then it will not be a fully completed process of interpretation. He
should not, in other words, give these historical analyses normative
status alone.
Furthermore, we learned from Ricoeur that what links understanding and explanation together when it comes to interpreting
historical events, is the category of narration. The narrative precedes
explanation; one has to enter into its dynamics, follow its thrust and
development, and be open to its surprising turns. But at the same
time the narrated story calls for explanation. There is a certain logical continuity in it. The end has to be acceptable in some sense, in
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certain inconsistency, or lack of balance between Sobrinos rhetorical emphasis on recovering and giving normative status to the historical basis, and the highly relative role played by more traditional
historical analyses in the strict sense in Sobrinos overall theology.
The weaknesses inherent to a methodology which tends to make
hermeneutical short cuts, may thus be overcome.
This means, in other words, that I hold that historicity as normative in Sobrinos approach should be understood in this wider,
Ricoeurian sense, and that, when so understood, it is a possible and
sound methodological criterion.
Coming back to my critical question regarding a possible preconceived systematic interest governing Sobrinos historical quest,
then, it must be said that 1) this interest is not illegitimate, but necessary in order to fulfil the task of interpretation, and 2) when
checked against contemporary historical findings Sobrinos tenets
are not invalidated; these findings (or at least the major thrust of
them) do in fact support Sobrinos interpretation, and may play the
role of an explanatory move in the process of reaching a fuller comprehension of the past; in casu the chain of events leading to Jesus
death on a cross.
Hence, Sobrino may well proceed from this historical interpretation to a more systematic theological one, which is what he does
when he interprets Jesus trial in terms of the scheme of the struggle
of divinities and their mediations.50 But what is actually implied in
this move from historical to theological? It is time to turn to our
second critical question.
(2) In Chapter v we were troubled by Sobrinos insistence in the historicity of the anti-Kingdom and its mediators, the idols or gods
or more plainly, although Sobrino avoids using these more common
terms devils, demons, or the Devil.51 Here it seems that he is
advocating a mythological and strongly dualistic world-view. Real-
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368
369
370
371
372
in Sobrinos wording since the one who dies is the one believed
to be Son of God.
At this point I should like to make three points of a more general character: First, this almost automatic move from a historical
to a soteriological mode of questioning is Sobrinos way of coming
to terms with one of the main problems in christological reflection
since the Enlightenment: the question of how a contingent, particular event in history can be thought of as having universal significance. Here, Sobrino procures to build his bridge over the ugly
great ditch of G. E. Lessing, the gulf between accidental truths of
history and necessary truths of reason.58 He does so not by harmonising the two, but by rooting them in contemporary, historical
experience. It is from within a concrete experience of suffering and
struggle for survival and for a better future that the question about
the universal through time and space salvific significance of
that which happened to Jesus becomes existential. Thus, the tension
between the two is not solved, but it can be dealt with in a coherent
manner. Sobrinos methodology (as that of liberation theology in
general), complemented with and corrected by the RicoerianCroattan approach, may thus show a way towards bridging the
ugly great ditch.
The second point has to do with the apparent shift in accentuation in Sobrinos christology noted above. Sobrino answers the
question of Jesus identity by reference to his relations. When analysed from the antagonistic relationships then, there is a continuity
between Jesus life and his death. But when we see his death in the
light of the constitutive relationships with the Kingdom and GodFather, there is a complete discontinuity, a rupture. In this sense, the
tension and apparent contradiction revealed above seem less prob58 This dilemma formulated by Lessing (d. 1781), can be found in his Theological Writings, A&C Black 1956, p. 83. Cf. Macquarrie 1990, 177-178, and
McGrath 1994, 314f.
373
59 Cf. also Philipp Melanchthons (1497-1560) famous dictum: Christum cognoscere est beneficia eius cognoscere. For a criticism, see Lnning 1984, 693.
60 See Sobrino 1976, 7: Por ltimo creemos que el Jess histrico es el principio hermeneutico para acercarnos tanto noticamente como en la praxis
real a la totalidad de Cristo, donde se realiza realmente la unidad de cristologa y soteriologa.
374
Auln contended that this dualistic-dramatic view was the dominant soteriological idea of the New Testament, and that it continued to have such a fundamental importance during the first
millennium of Christian history. Although these contentions were
overstated,62 there was no doubt that Auln had correctly uncovered a major trend of Christian soteriological thought that had
largely been forgotten in the centuries of struggle between an
objective approach dating back to Anselm of Canterbury (1033
1109)63 and a subjective approach, usually attributed to one of
Anselms earliest critics, Peter Abelard (1079 1142).
Strangely enough, Sobrino does not pay any attention to this
classic soteriological model,64 nor does he elaborate on the basic
New Testament themes of this model, such as salvation as victory,
struggle, ransom, redemption, etc. He mentions it only in a
footnote and in a quick rejection in passing.65 Given the fundamental importance of the theologal-idolatrous structure of reality in
61 Auln 1931, 17-22.
62 John McIntyre deems it inaccurate to give the classic theory such preeminence as Auln does. It is the case of a brilliant idea being over-stated.
McIntyre 1992, 43. Cf. McGrath 1994, 347-348; and a more elaborated critique in Gunton 1988, 54-59.
63 His classic work is Cur Deus Homo (1098).
64 His silence about Aulns seminal work is however understandable when one
takes into account that that work hardly enjoys the same status as classic
within Catholic theology as it does in the Protestant field. Furthermore, one
should remember that Sobrino does not discuss the historical development
of the soteriological dogma through the ages, but chooses to concentrate on
its beginnings.
65 Sobrino 1991d, 368. n.4 and Sobrino 1991d, 371 / Sobrino 1994c, 228.
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376
377
68
69
70
71
378
Here one may recognise a significant current in Sobrinos christology: the influence of the theology of the cross from Paul and
Luther, mediated through Moltmann, and of the great tradition of
the mystics, especially in the way it has found expression in Jesuit
spirituality. Here there is a theologia negativa, with a profound insistence on discontinuity, on mystery, on revelation sub specie contrarii,
on the cross that criticises all human explanation and all natural and
human religion (in the sense of the early Barth), and on the ruptura epistemolgica.72 As I have repeatedly noted also the strong
emphasis on the continuity between Jesus and his followers, Jesus
life and his death, etc. in Sobrino, the vital question is how Sobrino
actually balances this tension. Will it stretch or break?
(2) The second question raised with regard to the meaning of the
death of Jesus is the soteriological question in the proper sense.
How could something good, even the ultimate good, emerge from
such a horrifying event? Here we move from the level of faith that
there is salvation in the cross of Christ to a more explicitly theological level how there can be salvation in the cross.73 In order to
come to terms with this, different theoretical models were introduced by the early Christians, models that subsequently would
grow more sophisticated and speculative. These models have gained
a major significance in Christian soteriological thinking, even to
such an extent that their provisional, tentative character of being
tools to help explain something which in the end is believed to
72 This current is at least in some important aspects less dominant in Jesucristo liberador than it was in Sobrinos earlier works, particularly Cristologa
desde Amrica Latina, as I have pointed out earlier. But here we may appreciate that it is still significant. Sobrinos understanding of the epistemological
breach (see Sobrino 1986, 34ff; and Sobrino 1976, 149) is criticised by Moltmann in Moltmann 1990, 244, see n. 43, p. 372.
73 Sobrino 1991d, 362, a salvation which furthermore now gradually is concentrated in the theme of salvation from sin, Sobrino adds.
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be beyond explanation, often has been forgotten. Again, the imminent danger of this is that the inexplicable scandal and offence
which have been part and parcel of the preaching of the cross since
its very beginnings may disappear.
So it is with due precaution that Sobrino moves to a brief presentation of what he regards as the principal soteriological models
which emerged from the reflection of the first Christians. He concentrates on four such models or frameworks. First there is the
model of sacrifice. The intrinsic logic of sacrifice according to the
Bible is that human beings present what is dearest to them as an
offering to God, in order to show their respect for the sovereignty of
God and so try to bridge the infinite distance between God and
human beings, a distance stemming from human bondage to sin.74
What they present to God they even destroy in order to separate it
from the world of human creatures, making it sacred, i.e. separated from the sinful world of the profane. But having done this,
human beings then symbolically take this offering back again, e.g.
by eating it, now receiving it from the hand of God in the hope that
God has accepted the sacrifice, so that their participation in it now
symbolises and/or effectuates a new community between human
beings and God. The gap has been bridged. The crucial point here
is, in Sobrinos interpretation, whether God accepts the sacrifice or
not.
According to this model then, Jesus death is seen as the perfect
and ultimate sacrifice for the sins of human beings. Sobrino follows
its trajectory from the Old Testament to its culmination and ultimate transformation by radical criticism when applied to the death
of Jesus in the Letter to the Hebrews (7:25; 9:12 and 24 et passim).
Jesus sacrifice is superior to all other sacrifices, the New Testament
affirms. It is without defect or blemish (1 Pet 1:19) and has been
accepted by God. Therefore, it is able to bring salvation. Great stress
74 Sobrino 1991d, 223.
380
is put on Gods acceptance, in other words. This is the main criticism the Letter to the Hebrews makes of the earlier institution of
sacrifices. Only Jesus is an offering acceptable to God, it insists.
Then there is the model of the new covenant a model which
also draws its rationale from the Old Testament. The term of a covenant between God and Israel, seen as representative of humanity, is
one of the principal ways to describe the reality of salvation in the
Old Testament. A covenant was sealed by the shedding of blood (cf.
Heb. 9:18). Hence it was natural for the first Christians to see in
Jesus death the sealing of a new salvific covenant, one already
promised in the Old Testament (cf. Jer. 31:31-24). Again, this model
is explicitly taken up by the Letter to the Hebrews, which quotes
the text from Jeremiah twice, in 8:6-13 and 10:16ff. Furthermore, the
new covenant plays a primary role in the accounts of the Last Supper, in the Gospels as well as in 1 Corinthians 11: In the same way,
after the supper he took the cup and said, This cup is the new covenant sealed by my blood. Whenever you drink it, do this as a
memorial of me. (1 Cor. 11:25).
As a third model Sobrino presents the soteriological reflection
related to the figure of the Suffering Servant. Although there are
many indirect references to the Servant Songs in the New Testament75, it seems that the first Christians only gradually, through an
arduous and daring theological effort, came to apply the theological
insights of these songs directly to the death of Jesus, in order to
explain its salvific significance. It is important to remember the
strong and, at the time, well founded obstacles to such an application:
75 Sobrino mentions the following: Parts of Isaiah 42:1-9 are explicitly quoted
in Matthew 12:18-21; 11:10, and implicitly in John 1:32-4 (election), Matthew
3:17 and John 8:12 (to be a light for the Gentiles), and Luke 4:18, 7:23 (to
open the eyes of the blind). Sobrino 1994c, 225.
381
These passages are unique in the Old Testament, and were not easily applied
to Jesus, because they assert that a human being sheds blood, innocently, in
the place of and for the benefit of those who deserved to do so, interceding
for them, for their justification and healing. In Israel, before, during and
after Jesus time, such an idea was unthinkable, because human sacrifices
were forbidden.76
76 Sobrino 1994c, 225. / Sobrino 1991d, 366-367: Estos pasajes son nicos en al
AT y no fueron aplicados a Jess con facilidad, pues en ellos se afirma que un
ser humano derrama sangre, inocentemente, en lugar y en favor de quienes
realmente lo merecan, intercediendo por ellos y en favor de ellos: para su
justificacin, su sanacin. En Israel, tanto antes como durante y despus del
tiempo de Jess, esta idea era impensable, pues se prohiban los sacrificios
humanos.
77 [] expiacin vicaria del siervo [] Sobrino 1991d, 370. Sobrino follows Boff in suggesting 4 Maccabees 5:1-17 as a text which shows a parallel
interpretative development. In this text the tragic martyrdom of innocent
children is interpreted in the context of Gods salvific work. Boff explains:
God always wins in the end. Despite the sinfulness of persecutors, God
does not permit the senselessness of their victims death to abide. God transforms it into a vehicle of forgiveness not of persecutors, surely, but of the
sinful people (2 Macc. 6:28, 17:20-22, 18:4, 1:11). Boff 1987b, 76. Cf. Sobrino
1991d, 367.
78 Sobrino 1994c, 227.
382
79 Sobrino 1991d, 363. Once more, Sobrino shows that he is not hesitant to
borrow from the works of other theologians. See Sobrino 1991d, 358, note 1.
Sobrino also refers to material from E. Schillebeeckx, X. Lon-Dufour and J.
I. Gonzlez Faus.
80 Boff 1987b, 95-96.
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386
bly, says Sobrino what has been present all his lifetime: steadfast
love.
Now in the New Testament what was pleasing to God was the whole of
Jesus life in words of the Letter to the Hebrews, a life in faithfulness and
mercy and what Jesus cross highlights, beyond any doubt, is that this is
how Jesus life was.87
Seeing the salvific significance of Jesus death in line with the sacrificial model, it is important for Sobrino to underline that it is not an
isolated understanding that he is advocating, but a process-oriented and integral understanding: it is the life-and-death of Jesus
as a whole which is pleasing to God. Furthermore, one should note
carefully that it is not suffering per se which brings about salvation,
but love. It is enduring love in spite of opposition opposition that
causes suffering and even death that reveals that there is a salvific
presence.
I stress these two points because they are of the utmost importance when assessing the theological significance of suffering in
light of Sobrinos reflections on the crucified people. Note the significance accorded to suffering here: it is not instrumental. Suffering does not bring about salvation, but reveals a salvific presence in
history in spite of the obvious and overwhelming opposition and
signs of the contrary: It is a conviction derived from accumulated
historical experience that love has to go through suffering.88 The
blood of Christ shows how costly salvation is, and salvation is costly
because to save is to recompose what has been torn asunder.89
87 Sobrino 1994c, 228. / Sobrino 1991d, 371: Pues bien, en el NT lo que ha sido
grato a Dios ha sido la totalidad de la vida de Jess, en palabras de la Carta a
los Hebreos, una vida en fidelidad y en misericordia, y lo que la cruz de Jess
pone de relieve, sin ninguna duda, es que as ha sido la vida de Jess.
88 Sobrino 1994c, 228. Que el amor tenga que pasar por el sufrimiento es conviccin histrica acumulada. Sobrino 1991d, 371.
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may now know what they are and what they may become. This is
the essence which is expressed in the sentence: [] human beings
have been able to see love on earth, to know what they are, and
what they can and should be. The manifestation is closely followed
by an invitation, then. Having been shown what is truly human
according to the heart of God, all human beings are invited to realise this true humanity in history, by being shaped in the image of
God through the following of Jesus. The salvific significance of
Jesus life-until-death is, that of a causa ejemplar, according to
Sobrino:
Jesus leaves us with the legacy of being Servants like him. On this principle,
Jesus cross as the culmination of his whole life can be understood as bringing salvation. This saving efficacy is shown more in the form of an exemplary
cause than that of an efficient cause. But this does not mean that it is not
effective: there stands Jesus, faithful and merciful to the end, inviting and
inspiring human beings to reproduce in their turn the homo verus, true
humanity.94
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in harmony with the message of Jesus that God is good and that it is
good for human beings that there is a God. But that the death of
Jesus the cross on Golgotha is ultimately the result of Gods initiative, is scandalous. However, this scandalous fact must not be
interpreted in contrast to the love and goodness of God, Sobrino
insists, but in line with it. If the cross of Christ ultimately stems
from God, it must be because God [] could not find any clearer
way of telling us human beings that he really wills our salvation.97
But is this really such a clear way, such a forma inequvoca?
Can the cross of Jesus really be seen as an unmistakable expression
of love?
It is the love of God that brings salvation. Jesus salvific presence
in history is due to Gods own initiative. Here there is continuity: an
unbroken movement from God, in and through Jesus self-giving
life, and back to God. But the cross of Jesus is Gods initiative, too.
Here there is discontinuity, rupture, scandal. What it shows, however, according to Sobrino, is that there is no limit to the love of
God; no limit to Gods salvific will for human beings. Not even the
unbearable ending to the life of Jesus a life which is the ultimate
and definitive expression of that which is pleasing to God could
come between the love of God and sinful human beings:
The New Testaments language is powerful: not even what was dearest to
God, his own Son, placed a limit on Gods showing his love for human
beings. Not sparing the Son is the way of saying that there is no restraint on
Gods love for human beings.98
97 Sobrino 1994c, 231. / Sobrino 1991d, 375: [] no ha tenido otra forma ms
inequvoca de decirnos a los seres humanos que en verdad quiere nuestra salvacin.
98 Sobrino 1994c, 231. / Sobrino 1991d, 375: El lenguaje de del NT es
poderoso: ni lo ms querido por Dios, su propio Hijo, ha puesto lmite a que
Dios muestre su amor a los hombres. No perdonar al Hijo es el modo de
expresar que nada impide el amor de Dios a los hombres (sic).
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in the end a mystery, which remains mystery even after the logical
reasoning. Nevertheless, it is not insignificant which paradoxes a
given christology contains, and how they function. In Sobrinos
attempt (whether one calls these vague points paradoxical or not)
difficult questions still remain unanswered. In my view, the most
pressing among them are these two: why should Gods love for Jesus
put limits to Gods love for humanity? And does not this make Jesus
death merely a demonstrative drama?
These questions are related to the centrality of the term credibility in Sobrinos approach. Why should the love of God need
credibility? The answer to this is not so difficult when one remembers the historical point of departure for Sobrinos soteriological
question. His inquiry into the salvific meaning of the death of Jesus
is not guided by purely intellectual nor pious interests. It emerges
from the perspective of the depth of contemporary suffering, on
contemporary Golgothas: what does Jesus death mean, when
seen from the suffering and death of millions in our time and history? The love of God that comes to expression through the salvific
life-and-death of Jesus needs credibility because of, and vis--vis,
the victims of this world. Seen from their place, their perspective,
the world still seems unredeemed. How can one know that this
(Jesus life-and-death) is what is pleasing to God, and how can one
believe in the love of God when Jesus still dies, and Jesus followers,
Gods children, continue to suffer and die? Sobrinos answer is that
Gods love can be credible to the victims of this world only if not
even the Godforsakenness of Golgotha where the gods of the antiKingdom triumph is unknown or actually forsaken by God or
Gods beloved son. If the love of God had actually drawn back from
the darkness of Golgotha, then it would not be trustworthy for
those who dwell on the Golgothas of today. Sobrino agrees with
Bonhoeffer: only a suffering God can save us. This is why not only
the life, but also the death of Jesus is Gods own initiative. If God
394
Yet the crucified Jesus dies and the crucified people continue to
suffer and die. The soteriological enigma is not solved. If the love of
God endures even the darkness of Golgotha, it is credible. Yet even
if or especially when the love of God is credible: why does it
seem to have no power? Thus the soteriological question is made
even more acute. Gods answer is not ultimately unequivocal. Or, at
least, not until the resurrection. Only faith in the resurrection sees
that Gods salvific love present in Jesus death on Golgotha is not
only credible, but also powerful, that is, able to deliver what was
promised: viz., salvation.103
At this point, regarding the sense in which it can be held that
the cross actually is the result of Gods initiative, I find Sobrinos
texts somewhat indeterminate. Is God actually present or absent on
the cross of Jesus? If the cross is a result of Gods initiative, does that
make God responsible for Jesus death? And what would Gods relation to the crosses of history mean in that case? I shall discuss this in
more detail in Chapter vii.
Sobrinos interpretation of Jesus salvific death ends with this paradox then: in Jesus death Gods salvific action towards humanity
102 Sobrino 1994c, 231-232. / Sobrino 1991d, 376: Qu dice, en definitiva la cruz
de Jess? Dice que Dios se ha acercado irrevocablemente a este mundo, que
es un Dios con nosotros y un Dios para nosotros. Y para decir eso con la
mxima claridad se deja ser un Dios a merced de nosotros.
103 See Postscript below.
395
What is the link between the historical reasons for Jesus death and
its soteriological and theological significance, according to Sobrino?
What is it that unites the question of why Jesus is killed with the
question of why he dies? As I have already noted, Sobrino prefers to
answer the two questions with reference to different explicative
models a dualistic battlefield-model and a monistic sacrificial
model. This is surprising, given that Sobrino underscores the intimate link between the two questions so strongly. It will therefore
occupy us in the subsections to come.
Yet Sobrino maintains that intimate connection. He does so by
reference to another key concept in christology, namely incarna104 Sobrino 1994c, 232. / Sobrino 1991d, 377: Algo hay en el amor puro y creble, aunque impotente, que, paradjicamente, genera esperanza en el poder
del amor en quanto tal [] De esa manera, Dios quiere mostrarnos su amor
en la cruz y, as, salvarnos.
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397
human life can be like, lived in and from the constitutive relationships with God and Gods Kingdom, expressed in consistent and
creative service of the poor of this world, the lost and destitute of
Gods world-wide people. In this event, faith sees that Gods love
does not draw back, even in the darkest hour of opposition and suffering. And faith heeds in this event Gods invitation to enter into
relationship with Jesus, and into the same relationships as Jesus: to
the God of the Kingdom and the Kingdom of God. So, faith finds
salvation in this event, even when it cannot know if the salvific love
of God come close on Golgotha actually is powerful enough to
claim victory over the anti-Kingdom, the gods of evil who crucify
the Son of God and continue to crucify children of God.
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399
400
may not) occur when human beings see the manifestation and
accept the invitation. Such an understanding seems to imply a too
limited explication of the bold and unexpected New Testament
confessions of what has actually happened on Golgotha. And it is,
in my view, a too low key, too cautious, interpretation compared
with the expectations and hopes expressed by suffering and struggling Christian communities today when they turn to the cross in
faith, and claim to find in it a source of liberation and hope for the
future.
In another sense, a unilateral exemplarist approach tends to be
too moralistic. When too much weight is laid on the human
responsibility and possibility of actually accomplishing salvation
for oneself, for each other, for humanity the imminent danger is
that the gravity and strength of that which hinders salvation from
becoming a present reality in full force is reduced or underestimated, at the same time as the power and ability and even the
good will of human beings are overstated.
This objection actualises traditional differences between Catholic and Protestant soteriologies. The idea of a cooperatio in some
sense present in the process of salvation is central in Catholic teaching in general, and in liberation theology in particular. Nevertheless, I deem it relevant to raise this critique with regards to Sobrinos
outline, because it is not insignificant even within Catholic thinking, actually how this cooperatio is conceived of, and because exactly
when one takes into account the main thrust of Sobrinos christology his point of departure and liberating interest it becomes
crucial not to advocate a too harmonious world view, expressed in a
overly optimistic anthropology and a too weak, and perhaps
abstract, hamartiology.
The issue at stake here may be formulated in the following critical question: Is Jesus the Liberator in the end depicted as an exemplary martyr by Sobrino? Interpreted as a variant of the exemplarist
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402
403
404
405
406
407
408
is a basic pre-understanding and requirement that salvation is something which happens in history and to history then why is his
answer to the soteriological question framed in an exclusively monistic framework? How do the dualistic/antagonistic and the monistic/constitutive relationships relate to each other here?
It should be remembered that this difficult integration of dualism/monism is at the heart of practically all Christian theology.
Some form of dualism whether moderate or more extreme will
always be present. The whole need for such a concept and reality as
salvation itself depends upon it. Something is wrong; there is
something opposing or obstructing the good will of God from
being realised in history. There must be, in one form or another,
some forces contrary to God. They may be found inside or outside
of human beings; they may be under the control or outside the control of God. At the same time it is pivotal for Christian theology to
maintain that the last word remains with God alone. Christians do
not believe in an Anti-God; they are not di-theists. How can one
integrate the dualistic perspective in a monistic one? In the end, it is
really the theodicy-problem we are facing, once again: how can we
reconcile the existence of God with the existence of evil?
There is thus no cause for surprise that Sobrino too is struggling
in order to come to terms with this aporia of dualism-monism in his
thinking. Theologians through the ages have sought a variety of different solutions to this problem. Much painstaking effort has been
dedicated to avoiding the idea of God being directly responsible for
the evil forces, and on the opposite end, of taking evil as seriously as
it merits: facing the reality of seemingly meaningless and absurd
human suffering, without thereby postulating forces that actually
threaten God, the Creator of Heaven and Earth. And it is noteworthy that there is not one canonically or dogmatically sanctioned
answer to this dilemma.126
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410
411
412
terms like the hidden God and Gods opus alienum, might seem
a consequence of the classic model which Sobrino wishes to evade.
All in all, I suspect that Sobrinos main reason for not following
this dualistic model all the way through, is due to his reluctance to
advocate an excessively combative, aggressive christology. It is vital
for him to speak with utter honesty and seriousness of the tangible
and terrible consequences of evil forces in history; he must speak of,
from and faced with the constant suffering of the poor. Therefore, a
conflictual dualistic framework of interpretation suits him well in
addressing this historical situation. At the same time, however, he is
reluctant to state the salvation brought forward by God in Jesus,
manifested in the cross, in similar terms. It is obviously important
to Sobrino that Jesus the Liberator should not be visualised as a
Jesus warrior; and that the God of the Kingdom not be seen as
some kind of Supreme Warlord. Although such consequences are
by no means necessary consequences of using the classic model, as I
shall try to show, they may lie close at hand.
So these precautions are intelligible and justifiable to a certain
extent. Nevertheless, I hold that it would be possible for Sobrino to
132 Auln 1930, 10-11: Frsoningsdramat avtecknar sig mot en dualistisk bakgrund. Det gller ett vervinnande av de frdrvsmakter, som p samma gng
ro gentemot gudsviljan fientliga makter. Gud tnkas vara i eminent mening
engagerad i den kamp- och segersgrning, som Kristus utfr. Den er strngt
taget den gudomliga viljans eget verk. Om en frsoning r det frga redan
drigenom att, i och genom segern ver de fientliga makterna, en frvandlad
och av frsoning prglad situation kommer til stnd mellan Gud och
vrlden. Men frsoningsmotivet framtrder i nnu skarpare belysning, om
man ger tillbrligt akt derp, att de fientliga makterna eller tminstone
vissa av dem p samma gng, frn viss synspunkt sett, tnkas ssom
stende i den gudomliga domsviljans tjnst och utfra dess uppdrag. Frn
denne utgngspunkt kommer segergrningen, makternas vervinnande, tillika att te sig ssom ett Guds frsonande: Han frsonas i och med det att
han sjlv frsonar vrlden med sig.
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133 Once again, there is nothing wrong in using two or several different models
as Sobrino does. They do not even need to be integrated or coherent. Different approaches are necessary in order to grasp the complexity of the theme
which is under consideration. Nevertheless, the more the relation between
the models can be explained, the clearer the whole picture will be.
134 As will have become clear to the reader, Sobrinos rendering of the story of
Jesus builds to a large extent athough not exclusively on the version
found in the Gospel of Mark. This gospel gives particular reasons to be critical of all triumphalist frameworks. Sobrino agrees with X. Alegre in that
Mark is anti-triumphalist. Sobrino 1991d, 397.
414
The question is whether Jesus death on the cross can be conceived as a victory. Sobrino prefers to postpone the perspective of
victory to the resurrection. It is the evil forces who triumph at
Golgotha.135 Yet, Sobrino speaks of an overcoming of the evil
forces from within, which takes place on the cross.
[] on the cross we see God submerged within the negative. The possibility
of overcoming the negative is realised by submersion within the mechanisms
and processes of the negative. 136
Thus one can see the cross as victory, even within the confines of
Sobrinos christology, when it is seen as a victory won by a victim.
We have seen that Sobrino attaches the utmost importance in
his christology to Jesus relationality to the Kingdom of God and to
the God of the Kingdom. Jesus, as mediator and inaugurator of the
Kingdom, proclaims the good news about its coming in words and
deeds, directed particularly to those considered less dignified and
fortunate in social, economic and religious terms. Jesus makes a
preferential option for the poor, since the Kingdom is in the end
just life for the poor, always open to a more. This is all a reflection of and a response to the reality and nearness of God the loving
father, in whom Jesus trusts and rests, and with whom he experiences an intimate communion, yet also by whom he sees himself
questioned, called, and sent to a consistent service for those whom
God especially loves: the weak, the forgotten, the victims in history.
Jesus has to proclaim the good news to the poor against the bad
news of their exclusion, marginalisation, and finally their condemnation. The salvific service of Jesus life is realised within a dualistic
135 Sobrino 1994c, 248.
136 Sobrino 1978a, 221. Sobrino 1976,165: Dios no aparece como quien tiene
poder sobre lo negativo desde fuera; en la cruz se le ve sumergiendo dentro
de lo negativo. La posble superacin de lo negativo, se efecta sumergindose en los mecanismos de lo negativo.
415
perspective; there are forces that hold people down, and there is the
saving force of God, which restores, liberates, redeems. We recognise clearly the traits of the classic soteriological model. Because of
his many acts of restitution, of forgiveness, of healing, Jesus is confessed as messiah: liberator. But does the liberator triumph in the
final struggle against these deadly forces? Does the liberator become
victor?
Because of this surprising and even scandalously partisan service, Jesus faces opposition and persecution. In the midst of these
conflicts, the biblical witnesses report that Jesus experiences profound temptations. The temptations deal primarily with questions
of power. Jesus is engaged in a struggle against the powers of evil,
actively present in human history. This struggle is real and serious
so serious that it in the end leads to Golgotha. Now the question is:
with which power, with what means is Jesus struggle to be fought?
With the power of effective, retributive justice or with the power of
suffering love? What is really at stake here is whether the option for
the poor, the scandalous partisanship of the Kingdom, will be consequently maintained. A Jesus warrior, a messiah according to
traditional theocratic expectations: would he actually be a true liberator of the poor, of the victims of history? Are they not the ones
who always fall outside or in between; the ones who never can
expect to gain anything from the directly confrontational and violent competition for power in history?137 If Jesus responded to the
attack from the anti-Kingdom forces by following their own deadly
logic, by using their own means, would he not then be caught in
their perverted logic of power?
137 See to this the criticism that liberation theology has failed to appreciate poor
peoples actual strategies for survival and resistance, raised i.a. by David Stoll
(Stoll 1990, 313ff et passim) and David Martin (Martin 1990, 290f.) I have
commented on this criticism in Stlsett 1995d, 231-234.
416
138 This perspective of a victory, an overthrow of the ruler of this world, i.e.
the Devil, etc. is clearly more Johannine than Synoptic. See John 6:70; 13:2
and 27; 12:31; 16:11. See Ladd 1974, 192, however.
139 As Sobrinos christology rightly underlines, Jesus is an active victim. Jesus
is the one who gives his life, faithful to the end. Jesus is not a passive victim; he does not resign.
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419
only a stage, and in which human beings are only helpless spectators, incapable of affecting the outcome of the struggle, and thus
bearing no responsibility for it. But if this language is used in order
to express the seriousness and mystery of the presence of evil in the
midst of human history, without ontologising it, then it may prove
to be de facto revelational and thus appropriate in theological reasoning. Perhaps this could be described as a way of using mythical
language in a non-mythological way.142
Sobrino could well have used the soteriological model that highlights struggle, victory and redemption in interpreting the salvific
meaning of Jesus death on the cross. That would bring his argument to a more consistent conclusion. Instead, as I have shown,
Sobrino chooses the sacrificial model as his primary tool for such
interpretation. This is certainly not wrong. The sacrificial model has
solid support, both in the Bible and in the tradition. In doing so,
Sobrino succeeds in avoiding some of the common misinterpretations and misuses of this model which have had such unfortunate
consequences for the perception of God in much theological reasoning. One may ask, however, if Sobrinos rather one-sided emphasis on acceptance as the inner meaning of sacrifice actually does
justice to the New Testament use of sacrifice in understanding the
142 Gunton (op. cit., 65) claims that this is what Paul does when speaking of
principalities and powers. To undergird this view, Gunton quotes the following interesting passage from Caird, G.B.: The Language and Imagery of
the Bible Duckworth, London 1980, 242: They [i.e. the principalities and
powers] stand, as their names imply, for the political, social, economic and
religious structures of power [] of the old world order which Paul believed
to be obsolescent. When therefore he claims that on the cross Christ has disarmed the powers and triumphed over them, he is talking about earthly realities, about the impact of the crucifixion on the corporate life of men and
nations. He is using mythical language of great antiquity and continuing
vitality to interpret the historic event of the cross.
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421
422
Yet Yahweh took pleasure in him [who was crushed] and [healed] the one
who made his life an offering for sin. He will see his seed, he shall prolong
his days and the purpose of Yahweh shall prosper in his hand.148
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[8] Conclusions
The following findings will sum up this lengthy chapter. In line
with basic presuppositions in liberation theology soteriology and
the corresponding view of history, Jon Sobrino sees the theological
significance of Jesus death as closely related to the historical reasons
for the crucifixion. On the historical surface, so to speak, Jesus is
killed because of his critical attitude and symbolic actions against
the Jewish Temple, and because the Roman authorities fear that he
might become dangerous, having gained a considerable following
amongst the impoverished and subjugated populace of Palestine.
The deeper logic of the killing of Jesus, however, is found in the
struggle of the gods. Jesus passion and death mark the culmination
of a confrontation between the mediators of the god of the institutionalised and self-protective religious establishment of Israel and
the mediators of the political gods of the Romans in particular the
Emperor Caesar on the one hand, and Jesus as mediator of the
God of the Kingdom, who has drawn graciously near in and
through his life and mission, on the other.
Evaluating this interpretation, I have argued that although there
does not seem to be any strong evidence against Sobrinos interpretation on a strictly historical basis, it comes clear that Sobrinos
application of historicity should be understood in a RicoeurianCroattan sense, according to which explanatory and exploratory
150 See particularly Sobrino 1992b, 97-158.
151 See below, Chapter viii [4], thesis 9.
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moves come together in one, comprehensive process of interpretation. When it is so understood (and only then), it is defensible and
legitimate to speak of historicity as normative in the way Sobrino
does. Sobrino, however, does not make it explicitly clear that we are
to understand it in this way: we see this from the ambiguity that
follows his reference to the struggle of the gods as a historical explanation for Jesus death. Ricoeurs distinction between explanatory
and exploratory moves would allow Sobrino to overcome this ambiguity.
Moving to the strictly soteriological question, I discovered a
shift in Sobrinos perspective, from a dualistic to a monistic framework. This is clearly reflected in the soteriological model to which
he gives preference. Having made the battlefield-model central in
his outline so far, he suddenly leaves this model aside, and proceeds
to a sacrificial model, with strong emphasis on Gods manifestation,
Gods acceptance and the credibility of Gods love. On the cross,
seen in continuity with and as the culmination of Jesus life and
misson, faith discovers Gods manifestation of what a true human
being (homo verus) is, at the same time as Gods love for fallen
humanity is made unequivocally clear and credible in the eyes of
those experiencing Golgothas in their own lives, according to
Sobrino. This manifestation is in itself salvific.
Noting this strong illustrative emphasis I discussed whether this
approach should be criticised for being reductively exemplarist.
Pointing out the difficulties and risks with Sobrinos interpretation
that it might be too modest and too moralistic I sought elements in Sobrino that might balance these exemplarist features with
what I see as legitimate traits of a more constitutive or objective
soteriological approach. I found this in the centrality that Sobrino
gives to constitutive relationality in his theology. Salvation is
brought about through these relationships, and it consists in new
and healed relationships. These relationships are constitutive, as
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427
the full gravity of the conflict between sinful humanity and the holy
God which has been fundamental to this model throughout the history of Jewish and Christian faith. Holding that this is partly so, I
suggested that Sobrino should develop further the interpretation of
Jesus sacrifice in the light of the fourth Song of the Servant, where
he can, in fact, find useful elements for building the bridge between
the battlefield- and sacrificial models, and for widening his use of
the sacrificial model. Jesus the Victorious Victim is Jesus the Suffering Servant. This would also allow for a consideration of a perspective which is almost absent in Sobrinos treatment, so far, namely
the perspective of the crucifiers.
These issues are of great importance in considering the viability of
Sobrinos introducing the crucified people(s) into his christology
as an expression of the theological significance of contemporary suffering. But still there is one important step to be taken, before I can
undertake that final assessment. It deals with the issue of what the
cross says of God. Is God crucified?
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1
2
429
430
This was perhaps the most important leitmotif in Adolf von Harnacks
groundbreaking Dogmengeschichte [History of Dogma (1886-1889)]. See also
Boman 1981 (an English version is found in Hebrew Thought Compared with
Greek, New York: Norton, 1970.)
431
The strength of this seemingly irrefutable logic made it a persuasive argument even as late as in the eighteenth century, when Benedict Spinoza drew
the conclusion that God is without passions (deus expers est passionum)
from it: Again, God cannot pass to a higher or a lower perfection: and
therefore he is affected with no emotion or sadness. Q.E.D. Ethics V, 17; in
Opera: Lateinisch und Deutsch, vol. 2, ed. Konrad Blumenstock, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1980: 526.31-528.6. Quoted from
McGrath 1995, 115.
10 Cf. Philo of Alexandrias (c. 30 BC c. 45. AD) influential treatise Quod Deus
immutabilis sit (That God is unchangeable).
11 Sarot 1992, 26.
12 One indicator of how uncontroversial the doctrine of impassibility was is the
absence of any serious treatment of the matter as such between Gregory the
Wonderworkers Ad Theopompum and Marshall Randles The Blessed God
from 1900. Sarot 1992, 1.
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Rwanda, and the ecological crisis towards the end of the millennium, this cumulative experience has created a cultural and intellectual climate in which the idea of an impassible God seems
unacceptable, on moral and intellectual, as well as on strictly theological grounds.
Furthermore, this development has been forged by a deepened
understanding of the nature of love. It is a central New Testament
affirmation that God is love (1 John 4,8; 16.). But can God really be
conceived as love and simultaneously as devoid of passion, totally
unrelated and self-sufficient? Human experience, showing that the
inner core of love means vulnerability, relatedness and affection
makes many theologians respond with a clear refusal. This has
become particularly obvious as traditionally marginalised voices
have been making themselves increasingly heard in theological
issues, through feminist and liberation theologies of distinct kinds.
A loving God cannot be devoid of passion, they say that would
contradict fundamental human experiences of the essence of love.
Furthermore, these theologians support their case with an abundance of both Old and New Testament references describing Gods
passion, and thus severely questioning the early Christian conception of Gods perfection stated in Greek terms.22
This new tendency to see God as in some way participating
in the suffering of the world, is also motivated by the emergence of
a new awareness with regards to the world as a living organism. On
the basis of this awareness, process theology sees God as being in
22 See i. a. Gen.6:5-7; Exod.32:12-14; Dt.32:36; Jg.2:18; 10:16; 1 Sam 15:11;
Ps.78:40, 90:13, 95:10, 106:45, 135:14; Isa.42:14, 63:9-10.15; Jer.4:19, 31:20,
42:10, 48:35-36; Hos.11:1-11; Jon.3:9-10, 4:2-3.10; Lk.6:36, 10:21; Jn.3:16, 5:19,
10:30.38, 14:7-10, 15:13, 17:4; Acts 20:28; Rom.5:8; 8:32; 2 Cor.4:4; Eph.4:30;
Phil.2:6-8; Heb.11:5, 13:16. On the other hand, there are biblical references
used to support the impassibilist stance, such as Num.23:19; 1 Sam.15:29;
Ps.102:25-28; Isa.40:18.25, 41:4, 43:10; Ezek.5:11; Hos.13:14; Mal.3:6; Acts
14:15; 1 Tim.6:15-16; Heb.1:10-11, 6:17 and James 1:17. Sarot 1992, 13, n.34.
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God, that is what Christians are called to do! For Bonhoeffer then,
the human autonomy of the Modern Age is no accident, but rather
the world finally come of age. His call for a religionless interpretation of the Gospel is a theological recognition of the legitimacy
of the process of secularisation. How can such an interpretation be
possible? It is possible by way of a theologia crucis, according to
which God is revealed not as the one ruling the world in power and
glory, but rather as the one letting Godself be pushed out of the
world in the event of the cross on Golgotha. Only in this way can
God be a God for human beings, Bonhoeffer says, echoing Luther.
And so, from the Nazi prison cell in 1944, awaiting a forthcoming
execution, the profound and pointed maxim takes form: Only the
suffering God can help. The radical and yet preliminary and fragmentary character of Bonhoeffers statements has made them particularly open to a variety of interpretations. Different aspects of
Bonhoeffers thinking have been weighted. Those who have continued on the project of a theology of secularisation, such as William
Hamilton (Death of God: The Culture of Our Post-Christian Era,
1961), Paul van Buren (Secular Meaning of the Gospel, 1963), and
Thomas J. J. Altizer (Gospel of Christian Atheism, 1966), developed
something which came to be called a God-Is-Dead-theology. This
theology, which attained world-wide attention after the magazine
Time had made it the main story of an edition in 1965, took its lead
from the general perception of the cultural mode just referred to.
They concentrated on the task of reformulating the gospel in secular terms, and thus giving the freedom and autonomy of modern
man full theological legitimacy.27
To others, like Moltmann and Jngel, it has been Bonhoeffers
christological solution to the deadlock of theism and atheism by
way of a theologia crucis that has been the main impetus. Gods unification with Christ signifies that suffering, vulnerability, perishability and death do affect God. This being so, the theistic concept of
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God has come to its end. The Modern Ages atheistic critique of
religion may in fact be affirmed from a Christian point of view, to
the extent that it rejects this conception of God and its metaphysical
premises. Yet this affirmation does not lead to a complete doing
away with either metaphysics or Christian faith in God, but rather
to a different, specifically Christian i.e. rooted in faith in Gods
identification with the crucified Christ conception of God,
which, although not simply free of metaphysics, still is free in relationship to metaphysics.28 It leads beyond theism and atheism(Moltmann29), to a theology after the death of God
(Jngel30).
Liberation theology and Third World theologians in general
have taken up the heritage from Bonhoeffer in a distinct manner.
From the perspective of the poor peoples and nations, it has become
increasingly clear what an ambiguous project modernity is.31 It is
ambiguous because, in spite of having the liberation of humankind
as its aspiration, it creates victims. From the perspective of these victims then, the autonomy of modern (European) man is not just
27 Inge Lnning has rightly observed a critical weakness inherent to theological
attempts of this sort, namely that they easily lend themselves to making the
death of God bluntly into a [] Legitimation der restlosen bertragung
traditioneller Gottesattribute auf den Menschen [] Interessant ist die Feststellung [des Todes Gottes] dann hchstens als Symptom des gesellschaftlichen Herrschaftsanspruches einer eindimensionalen, skularistischen
Daseinsdeutung. Eine Theologie, die sich auf solche Prmissen als eine Theologie des Todes Gottes etablieren wollte, wre ein verfngliches, im bestem
Falle ein berflssiges Unternehmen kulturpolitischer Art. Lnning 1984,
701.
28 Jngel 1983, 48.
29 Moltmann 1974, 249-252.
30 Jngel 1983, 43-105; 43.
31 Nor has the process of secularisation advanced as much in the poorer areas of
the world. Its irreversibility even in the First World as a social phenomenon at least is now widely called into question.
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the trinitarian character of Christian faith in God. God is a trinitarian process at the centre of which stands the cross.33 On the cross
God is dead, and yet not dead. This can only be maintained by the
help of trinitarian thinking.34 On the cross, both the Father and the
Son suffer, but in distinct manners. The Son suffers the death of the
cross. The Father does not suffer death (which would be to adhere
to the patripassianist heresy, he holds), but suffers his own abandonment, his own giving up (Gr.: paradidonai)35 of the Son on
the cross. The abandonment of Jesus (derelictio Jesu) becomes a central point in Moltmanns argument. The Father actually abandons
the Son on the cross.36 That is ultimately why Jesus dies, and
that is also what distinguishes Jesus death from all other deaths in
history. Jesus dies forsaken by God; his death cry should be taken in
its utterly radical meaning, as recorded in Mark.
Thus the event of the cross actually becomes not primarily an
event between humanity and God, according to Moltmann, but an
event in God. On the cross there is a confrontation between God
and God; nemo contra Deum nisi Deus ipse. Through this event all
suffering, sin and godforsakenness is taken into Gods very being,
Moltmann boldly goes on.
In that case, what is salvation? Only if all disaster, forsakenness by God,
absolute death, the infinite curse of damnation and sinking into nothingness
is in God himself, is community with this God eternal salvation, infinite joy,
indestructible election and divine life.37
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unwarranted shift of soteriological models (from dualistic to monistic, cf. above), it is interesting to see the following similar objection
made to Moltmann by Boff :
In Moltmanns vision the passion is reduced to a single basic causality; that
of God the Father. The causality of Jesus adversaries, who produced the historical death of Jesus Christ with their moral introversion and self-centeredness goes by the board.49
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something new, even to God. It opens up the possibility of a suffering for the sake of others, a suffering which does not nullify human
dignity, a suffering which may still uphold hope. This is a suffering
born of the struggle against suffering, Boff explains, a definition
which he subsequently develops with regard to the Latin American
experience.51
In her book SHE WHO IS,52 the Catholic feminist theologian
Elizabeth A. Johnson takes up the issue of the suffering God from
the vantage point of womens experience. In a much less polemical
style than that of Slle and Boff even when speaking of anger
and wrath as female metaphors for suffering53 she too cautions
against predicating suffering of God in such a way that suffering
becomes a value in itself, or that God becomes essentially weak or
powerless []54 With a critical reference to some of Moltmanns
most radical and paradoxical statements55, Johnson holds that the
depiction of a helpless God, powerless in suffering, is particularly
dangerous when directed to women and oppressed people, since in
her view, one of the key ingredients in the maintenance of systems
of oppression is inculcating a feeling of helplessness in those
oppressed.56
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as with all the other victims in history, that opens up the future
through even the most negative of experiences. The victory is won
through a living communion of love, which overcomes evil from
within.63
Johnson seems to take a via media between Moltmann and
Boff, when she states that suffering can be conceived of ontologically as an expression of divine being insofar as it is an act freely
engaged as a consequence of care for others.64 As in Sobrinos outline, Johnsons ontology here seems to be founded on the category
of constitutive relationality. God is love. Gods essence as love is
relational; faced with a suffering world, Gods love relates to this
suffering. In this way, through the loving relation to those who suffer, suffering affects Gods own being, and Johnson may speak of a
suffering in God: In the light of the feminist prizing of mutuality
as moral excellence, love does entail suffering in God.65
From the perspective of womens interpreted experience then,
Bonhoeffers powerful statement may be affirmed, according to
Johnson: Only a suffering God can help. And from that particular
experience, new elements are brought forward to the reflection on
the question of how the suffering God helps. In developing these
elements, it is interesting to see the degree to which Johnsons reflection resembles that of Sobrino in many aspects. Key words for both
of them are, as we have seen, relationality, community, and the
power of love expressed in solidarity and praxis. They share the
belief that speaking of Gods suffering may help in strengthening
human responsibility in the face of (other peoples) suffering. Johnson too, takes up Archbishop Romeros profound pastoral intuition
when he spoke of the corpses piled up, here in our land and
throughout the world as the presence of the body and blood of
63 Op. cit., 268-269.
64 Op. cit., 265. My emphasis, SJS.
65 Op. cit., 266.
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Christ. In an impressive manner, Johnson applies this to the holocaust of women, particularly all those women who have been marginalised and mistreated in and by the Christian tradition and
history itself from the violated and tortured Bethlehem woman
told of in that text of terror (Phyllis Trible) in Jgs. 19:25, to the
perhaps more than a million women annihilated in the name of
God by the Inquisition. Johnson holds these women to be images
of the crucified in an unspeakable way. 66
It is important for Johnson to stress that her choice to maintain
the symbol of the suffering God, in spite of being well aware of its
possible dangers, is far from a conceptual solution to the problem of
suffering. Like Boff, she insists that it is crucial not to forget the
analogical character of our language on the mystery of God, and the
mystery of suffering. But perhaps more strongly than Boff, she
keeps in mind that one must speak of, and is confronted with, a suffering that is and remains totally absurd; a suffering which is not
freely taken on in the struggle against suffering; a suffering which
totally destroys faith, hope and human dignity. That is what Wendy
Farley calls radical suffering.67 When speaking of such suffering, and
of Gods suffering in connection with it, Elizabeth Johnson insists,
we may only do so under the rule of darkness and broken
words.68 The most astute theodicies pale before the torment in
the history of the world.69
66 Op. cit., 263.
67 Johnson quotes Wendy Farleys definition of radical suffering: Radical
suffering is present when the negativity of a situation is experienced as an
assault on ones personhood as such [] This assault reduces the capacity of
the sufferer to exercise freedom, to feel affection, to hope, to love God []
In radical suffering the soul itself has been so crippled that it can no longer
defy evil. The destruction of the human being is so complete that even the
shred of dignity that might demand vindication is extinguished. Johnson
1992, 249, quotation taken from Farley 1990, 53-55.
68 Johnson 1992, 272.
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a constructive, affirmative side, which is the possibility.75 In the process of perishing new possibilities emerge. By involving Gods self in
perishability through the self-identification with the dead man
Jesus, God participates in the struggle within perishability between
its destructive aspect the tendency to absolute nothingness76
and its constructive aspect the possibility. This struggle pertains to
Gods own being. God is in this struggle,77 which ultimately means
that Gods being is in becoming, as Jngel audaciously formulates
it, reversing thus Aristotles priorities of actuality and potentiality.78
Contrary to what Aristotle held, Jngel gives ontological priority to
potentiality, that which is in the process of becoming, the possibility.
In bearing annihilation in himself, God proves himself to be the victor over
nothingness, and he ends the negative attraction of hell, death and the
devil. By proving himself to be this victor, God reveals what he truly and
ultimately is. God is the one who can bear and does bear, can suffer and does
suffer, in his being the annihilating power of nothingness, even the negation
of death, without being annihilated by it.79
74 What is revealed to be the actual premise of the ultimate thought of that
metaphysics which understands itself as theo-onto-logic is the negative metaphysical evaluation of perishability. Its basic ontological structure is fixed as
that of annihilation. That which perishes is destroyed. The word of the cross
speaks in opposition to that. Its objection does not imply that perishing is a
harmless affair. Rather, in the word of the cross, the seriousness of death is
expressed in an unsurpassable way. The objection is directed toward the
ontological discrediting of that which is perishable. Op. cit., 203-204.
75 That which is ontologically positive about perishability is the possibility. Op.
cit., 213.
76 A tendency towards nothingness certainly appears to be an aspect of that
which is actually negative in perishability. For the tendency not to be is a
threat to everything perishable! Op. cit., 211 .
77 Op. cit., 217.
78 Op. cit., 214.
79 Op. cit., 219.
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Metz finds too much of Hegel, i.e. too much sublation of the negative in this language of suffering in God; a language which he also
deems to violate the classical doctrine of analogy concerning the
maior dissimilitudo that holds between God and the world. He fears
that a secret aestheticization, a quasi-mythical universalization
and, in the end, an eternalisation of suffering are the results of such
theology. Not even christology necessitates nor legitimates theology
speaking of a suffering God or of suffering in God, in Metz opinion.
These powerful and noteworthy objections do not lead Metz to
defend the classical impassibilist stance, however. Instead, he advocates a mysticism of suffering unto God.85
Suffering, which makes us cry out or finally fall wretchedly silent, knows no
majesty. It is nothing great, nothing sublime; at root it is something entirely
different from a powerful, solidaristic suffering-with [Mitleiden]. It is not
simply a sign of love; rather it is much more a horrifying sign of no longer
being able to love. It is that suffering which leads into nothingness if it is not
a suffering unto God.86
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459
460
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factor to this development, as shown above. A representative example from the theological scene is Sallie McFagues book The Body of
God and the interest it has aroused.96
Jon Sobrinos christology has been criticised for being too disembodied.97 This criticism is not fair, particularly when one considers the emphasis on the concrete materiality of the Kingdom of
God in his understanding. The phenomenology of bread98 has
much to do with corporeality. It is true however, that these aspects
could be further developed by Sobrino, particularly with respect to
what the corporeality of the Kingdom as mediation might mean
for the reality of God. If one takes the cue from Sarot and asks what
kind of embodiment could be thought of as Gods from the viewpoint of Sobrinos christology, then the suggestion that the crucified
people represent in some form Gods suffering body in history is
close at hand.
96 McFague 1993.
97 Referring to Sobrinos discussion in Sobrino 1994c, 189-191, Anne Primavesi
raises the following critique against Sobrino in Primavesi 1995, 108-109:
Christian descriptions of God tend to reinforce this image of God as disembodied male voice. One of the clearest advocates for it is the liberation theologian Jon Sobrino, who invokes it, in Jesus name, on behalf of the poor and
oppressed of Latin America [] An antagonistic, conflict-laden FatherGod without appearance, without body, but with a voice that challenges, is
offered as the image on which to build a liberating praxis. Yet this image of
the God who spoke as disembodied, all-conquering voice in conflict with
other gods contributed in no small measure to the kind of colonizing, militarist Christianity which, against all that Sobrino would wish for, brought
devastation to so many indigenous peoples and to their lands.
98 See Chapter iv [2] (4), above.
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underlined. Contemplating the connection between God and suffering is necessary since history goes on producing crosses even
after the resurrection of Jesus.102 It is a horror that history is like
this and that not even God changes things. This horror can never be
removed by theological reflection. However, the scandal that sin
does appear to have power in history even power to kill Gods
own Son, as well as Gods children is an aporia that prompts theological reflection, now in the shape of historical and practical theodicy.
Sternly rejecting the idea that his concentration on suffering
and cross should have anything to do with proposing a cult of suffering or masochism, with providing a basis for some conceptual
Platonic or Hegelian dialectic, or with wanting to diminish the
resurrection, Sobrino once again recurs to his fundamental theological programme of honesty to reality.103 It is reality itself that
forces theology to place itself at the foot of the cross. Jon Sobrinos
personal, experiential basis for his dwelling on the theme of the
cross could hardly be more forcefully stated than this:
Allow me to say this with a very personal experience. On 16 November 1989,
when the Jesuits of the Central American University were murdered outside
their house, the body of Jun Ramn Moreno was dragged inside the residence into one of the rooms, mine. In the movement one book from the
bookcase in the room fell on to the floor and became soaked in Juan
Ramns blood. That book was The crucified God. It is a symbol of course,
but it expresses [what I intend to develop in] this chapter, Gods real participation in the passion of the world.104
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this ultimate solidarity with humanity he reveals himself as the God of love,
who opens up a hope and a future through the most negative side of history.
Thus Christian existence is nothing else but a process of participating in this
same process whereby God loves the world and hence in the very life of
God.108
In this dense thesis, which in fact entails much of Sobrinos christology in nuce, we see first of all that Sobrino clearly joins the current
change to passibilism. Suffering and death do affect God on the
cross; God himself is crucified. This is explained in trinitarian
terms: The Father suffers the death of the Son. But what does this
suffering the death of the Son mean? Does Sobrino say that Jesus
is actually forsaken by God on the cross? Sobrinos language is
ambiguous; it is as if he is hesitating. In the sub-chapter The Presence of God on Jesus Cross note the title! he speaks of Jesus
feeling that he had been abandoned by God109, and of Gods
seeming absence on the cross.110 Yet he argues following Moltmann that Jesus died in theological abandonment111, and that
this is actually the ultimate reason for his death, making it a complete scandal even after the resurrection. In order to hold this
108 Sobrino 1978a, 224. / Sobrino 1976, 168: En la cruz de Jess el mismo Dios
est crucificado. El Padre sufre la muerte del Hijo y asume en s todo el dolor
de la historia. En esa ltima solidaridad con el hombre se revela como el
Dios de amor, que desde lo ms negativo de la historia abre un futuro y una
esperanza. La existencia cristiana no es entonces otra cosa que participar en
ese mismo proceso de amor de Dios al mundo y de esa forma participar de la
misma vida de Dios.
109 Sobrino 1978a, 218 (quotation from Moltmann), my emphasis, SJS. /
Sobrino 1976, [] el abandono experimentado de Dios.
110 Ibid.: my emphasis, SJS. / Sobrino 1976,163: Esta discontinuidad entre la
expectacin de Dios y su (aparente) ausencia en la cruz es lo tpico de la
muerte de Jess; note the parenthesis.
111 Sobrino 1978a, 219. / Sobrino 1976, 163.
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opens up a hope and a future through the most negative side of history.117
The mystery of God, thus spelled out in terms of trinitarian
process, into which the history of suffering has been given room by
Gods assuming the suffering of Jesus on the cross, makes theology
profoundly historical. God is present in history; history is present in
God. But this is not seen merely as a passive being in history, but
rather an active transformation of history towards its ultimate goal:
God all-in-all. Every human being is invited to take part in this process, Sobrino points out: Thus Christian existence is nothing else
but a process of participating in this same process whereby God
loves the world and hence in the very life of God.118
This active transformation of history the process whereby
God loves the world is revealed to us through the Son. The life
and mission of Jesus is the ultimate revelation of how Gods transforming love is concretised in human history. It is a life and a mission to be continued. Jesus, the Son of God, sets in motion a chain
of following; he is the revelation of the Way to the Father. It is a
Way to be travelled, not merely worshipped. Hence the profoundly practical character of this theological interpretation. It gives
no impetus to passive resignation, but summons all Gods children,
all human beings, to an active participation in the transforming of
history from within. Thus, salvation history may become salvation
in history.
(b) Does Sobrino present a merely conceptual solution, behind
the backs of the victims, as Metz warns? I cannot see that. Sobrinos
insistence on seeing God in unity with the dead Jesus on the cross,
117 Sobrino 1978a, 224. / Sobrino 1976, 168.
118 Sobrino 1978a, 224. My emphasis, SJS. / Sobrino 1976, 168: La existencia
cristiana no es entonces otra cosa que participar en ese mismo proceso de
amor de Dios al mundo y de esa forma participar de la misma vida de Dios.
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and on seeing the cross not as Gods arbitrary design but rather as
the ultimate consequence of a life in correspondence to Gods love
a praxis in concrete solidarity with victims within the constraints
of human history, prevents it from becoming such a conceptual
solution. The death of Jesus shows that the way to be travelled may
lead to suffering. Through this event of the cross, it is revealed that
God is so immersed in history that not even the depths of human
tragedy remain untouched by Gods love. Christian life consists in
the following of Jesus in merciful service to the victims of this
world, at the risk and cost of becoming a victim oneself.119 Christian reflection on the mystery of God and how it relates to the presence of suffering theodicy must therefore become partisan,
committed and practical.120 In this, Sobrinos mysticism of following actually seems to parallel to a large extent Metz mysticism of
suffering unto God with open eyes.
(c) What about the powerful objection voiced by Slle and Boff
and after them by several other feminist and liberation theologians?121 Is the difference between victim and executioner implicitly
made irrelevant in Sobrinos approach? Sobrino himself would of
course vehemently defend himself against such charges. Nonetheless this is where some difficulties related to his argument begin to
show.
Sobrino rightly affirms that God identifies on the cross with the
victim Jesus. Jesus as Way shows how this identification is expressed
119 Cf Sobrino 1976, 150 6a tesis: La teologa de la cruz debe ser histrica, es
decir, ha de ver la cruz no como un arbitrario designio de Dios, sino como la
consecuencia de la opcin primigenia de Dios: la encarnacin. La cruz es
consecuencia de una encarnacin situada en un mundo de pecado que se
revela como poder contra el Dios de Jess.
120 Cf. Sobrino 1986, 15-47 and Sobrino 1988c, reprinted in Sobrino 1992b, 4780.
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It is decisive not to domesticate this scandal, Sobrino continues: Jesus is abandoned on the cross. God is silent. God does not
intervene to save Jesus from the powers of death. There is a radical
discontinuity between what Jesus experienced in his life and what
he experiences on the cross. God the intimate Father is no longer
near, no longer accessible.
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Whereas for Jesus, the infinite distance of God as mystery was always
accompanied by the absolute closeness of God as Father, this vanishes on
the cross: there is no closeness of God, there is no experience of God as a
kind Father.133
What does this radical discontinuity say about God then? In trinitarian terms, God the Son suffers and dies, abandoned by God the
Father. But this, in Sobrinos outline, is not taken as far as saying
that God actually is directly causing the death of Jesus. God is not
an executioner, not a crucifier, according to Sobrino.134 On the
contrary, what we have here is the silence, the non-intervention, the
non-action of God. It is the forces of evil, the idols of death that
actually kill Gods Son. The scandal is that God does not prevent it
from happening. (T)he fundamental objective fact is death
inflicted unjustly on the just man Jesus and the countless unjust
deaths throughout history which God did nothing to prevent.135
This distinction, I think, is vital. But is it sufficient?136
If this non-intervention is not to be taken as cruelty on Gods
behalf, it must be interpreted paradoxically as Gods real participation in the passion of the world, Sobrino continues. God suffers
[] on Jesus cross and on those of this worlds victims by being
their non-active and silent witness.137
133 Sobrino 1994c, 239. / Sobrino 1991d, 401: Si para Jess, la distancia infinita
de Dios como misterio iba acompaada de la absoluta cercana de Dios
como Padre, eso desaparece en la cruz: no hay cercana de Dios, no hay experiancia de Dios como Padre bondadoso.
134 Sobrinos strongest formulation in Jesucristo liberador is [] Dios deja
morir a Jess [] Sobrino 1991d, 409.
135 Sobrino 1994c, 240. / Sobrino 1991d, 403: [] el hecho fundamental es la
muerte infligida injustamente al justo Jess, y las innumerables muertes
injustas a lo largo de la historia, ante las cuales Dios no interviene.
136 This raises again the question of how to relate God and the idols to each
other; how to relate a dualistic to a monistic framework.
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477
Gods suffering is, then, very likely, if it is true that God wanted to reveal
his solidarity with this worlds victims. If from the beginning of the gospel
God appears in Jesus as a God with us, if throughout the gospel God shows
himself as a God for us, on the cross he appears as a God at our mercy and,
above all, as a God like us.140
Yes, but not a God absent from us, nor from Jesus. This is where I
have difficulties with Sobrinos argument. It is the point where he
tries to explain more precisely why God must remain inactive vis-vis Jesus death, why Jesus must suffer. He argues both with
credibility and efficacy here, as these quotations show: God is
inactive on the cross so that we human beings can rely on his
love.141And further: What this crucified God reminds us of constantly is that there can be no liberation from sin without bearing of
sin, that injustice cannot be eradicated unless it is borne.142
But these formulations may easily lend themselves also to
clearly untenable interpretations, in stark opposition to Sobrinos
explicit intentions, because, faced with the innocent suffering of an
Other, non-intervention can and must be seen as cruelty that is,
139 Sobrino 1994c, 246. / Sobrino 1991d, 412: El Dios crucificado no es una
realidad que pueda abordarse con un concepto terico, sino con un concepto
prxico; no se trata pues de teo-loga, sino de teo-praxis; qu es lo que desencadena el Dios crucificado.
140 Sobrino 1994c, 245. / Sobrino 1991d, 410: El sufrimiento de Dios es, pues,
bien verosmil, si es que Dios ha querido revelar su solidaridad con las
vctimas de este mundo. Si desde el principio del evangelio, Dios aparece en
Jess como un Dios con nosotros, si a lo largo de l se va mostrando como un
Dios para nosotros, en la cruz aparece como un Dios a merced de nosotros y,
sobre todo, como un Dios como nosotros.
141 Sobrino 1994c, 244 / Sobrino 1991d, 409: Dios est inactivo en la cruz para
que los hombres (sic) podamos fiarnos de su amor []
142 Sobrino 1994c, 246 / Sobrino 1991d, 412: Lo que ese Dios crucificado
recuerda siempre es que no hay liberacin del pecado sin cargar con el pecado, que no hay erradicacin de la injusticia sin cargar con ella.
478
given that intervention is a possible option. The question is therefore, whether suffering on the cross of Golgotha and on the crosses
on our planet is due to Gods deliberate abstention from salvific
intervention. Put in another way, the question may be formulated
thus: Which God is absent from Jesus cross the God of Jesus or
the (Greek) almighty and impassible God?
In line with my deliberations and proposals in the previous
chapter which I hold to be consonant with the explicit intentions
of a liberation christology I submit that deliberate non-intervention in the face of suffering is not an option for the God who is
revealed in and through the life, ministry and death of Jesus. The
principal point, which is truly scandalous in the eyes of the world, is
not that God is absent, but rather that Gods salvific presence on the
cross is not as expected. God saves through a love so strong that it
even endures the radical suffering of the cross. God saves through
(co-)suffering love. This love is as Sobrino himself rightly argues
both credible and efficacious. It shows that there is no pain so great,
no burden so heavy, no evil so vicious as to actually separate human
beings from Gods salvific love.143
In order to overcome the ambiguity of God being portrayed as
both crucified and crucifier, it is therefore preferable in my view to
refrain from speaking of Gods absence from Jesus on the cross, or
of the Fathers abandonment of the Son as the cause for the death of
the Son. It seems that the patterns of thought that Sobrino inherited from Moltmann is an obstacle rather than a help for Sobrinos
liberation christology at this particular point.144
But if this conclusion is justified, what then about Jesus cry
recorded by Mark? And what about all those who experience Gods
abandonment in their lives? The crucial point here is to distinguish
between the experience of Gods abandonment, and its possible
actuality. The Crucifieds (as well as the crucifieds) experience of
143 Cf. Rom. 8:17-19.
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144 In a careful analysis of this debate, with references to Moltmanns, Boff s and
Sobrinos positions, Sobrinos younger colleague Antonio Gonzlez reaches a
conclusion which comes close to my own: Es el pecado del mundo y no el
Padre quien crucifica al Hijo. Si solamente Dios puede estar contra Dios,
ste no se ha hecho verdaderamente hombre (sic) y estamos ante una forma
de docetismo o de monofisismo. Gonzlez 1994, 105.
145 This point should be elaborated pneumatologically as well; God is present
with the sufferers the C/crucified in the Holy Spirit. Cf. Gonzlez 1994,
124: Para que el Padre de Jess sea verdaderamente el Dios de los pobres es
menester que en la ruptura radical que se da en la cruz con toda imagen
tradicional de Dios, el Padre siga misteriosamente presente y unido al Hijo.
La garanta de esta unidad es el Espritu (Heb 9, 14), el cual ser quien
resucite al hijo (Rm 1, 4; Tim 3, 16); compare pp. 125ff.
146 Por el Espritu sigue el Padre unido al Hijo y as se nos muestra como verdadero Padre bueno y se nos descubre lo inaudito: Dios estaba al lado de todos
los aparentemente abandonados de Dios y no al lado de todos los aparentemente por El benditos con el poder y la gloria. Gonzlez 1994, 125.
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148 Op. cit., 54: Ayer tuvimos un bombardeo y nos salvamos por Dios []
Dios acta, Padre [] Dios est con nosotros, Padre, porque si no hubiera
estado Dios, hubiera sido an peor.
149 Op. cit., 55: Cuntas veces no decimos que Dios acta en nuestra historia
[] Pero, Padre, y si acta, cundo acaba esto? Y tantos aos de guerra y
tantos miles de muertos? Qu pasa con Dios? Quotation from Vigil 1987b,
119.
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Which God do the victims prefer then? The God of Life, a liberator God of the Exodus or the suffering God, the God of the
cross? We may recall here the lone sufferer in the deep, dark pit
mentioned by Elizabeth Johnson. A liberator God would be the
God with the bright light and long ladder. This God saves out of
Gods difference with the poor. God has power to redeem, they do
not. A crucified God is the God who simply shares the situation of
suffering; a God who comes near, is in communion with those who
suffers; a God who is bearing the consequences of evil, just like
them. This God saves also, but now out of Gods similarity with the
poor. Only such a complete sharing can actually understand, heal
and thus save.
In his discussion of these two opposites, Sobrino now makes use
of the categories affinity and alterity. The poor know and expect
that alterity can be liberating. When people enter into their world
who have what they dont economic resources, political power,
education they hope that this difference will be used in a way that
will benefit them. (And besides the poor are numerous enough;
they dont need or wish more people to become poor like them!)
Again, Sobrino takes Archbishop Romero as the prime example.
His alterity was received by the poor as something positive. Nevertheless, when Romero refused to receive particular protection from
the Government, and subsequently was killed for his brave stance
for justice and the rights of the poor, then Romero became like
them. He shared the destiny of many among the poor, who suffer
unprotected at the hands of oppressors. In spite of the immense
tragedy that this was for the poor who lost their most prominent
defender it was simultaneously to them an expression of love and
solidarity which awoke new hope and inspired new struggle to overcome evil and suffering. In this sense, the tragic event became
salvific, in Sobrinos interpretation.150
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Moltmann.154 The other side of this intuition is recall that salvation is tantamount to humanisation in Sobrinos understanding
that pure alterity does not humanise.155
In what, exactly, does this salvific character of affinity consist?
In other words: how does the crucified God save a crucified people?
The key word to Sobrino is as it was to Elizabeth Johnson communion. The experience of communion with God in the midst of
darkness and radical evil is, in spite of everything, an experience of
salvation. Any communion, and particularly this communion, is
something which produces identity, dignity and joy. Whereas the
alterity of God as liberator expresses the efficacy of the salvation
that the victims long for, the affinity of the crucified God expresses
the graciousness and tenderness of this salvation.
(T)hat which is salvific and liberating in a crucified God lies in the overcoming of the orphanhood, the radical destituteness and the total degradation
which the poor of this world experience.156
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est to us. From the outset, he held that the traditional theodicy
from the vantage-point of Latin America turns into anthropodicy.
Historical suffering, radical suffering, cruelty and oppression originate from human beings. At the same time, the framework of a
struggle of divinities, i.e. the actual reality and destructive effectiveness of the idols of death in history has come to play an increasing role in Sobrinos christology. In Chapter v, The Crucifying
Conflict, I have discussed this at length and laid bare what I see as
limitations in Sobrinos thinking at this point. Here, however, these
two perspectives are explicitly linked together:
In the processes of liberation [] the problem of the human being and of
anthropodicy which also has its equivalent in religious language: the idols
makes itself present with great impact. Thus the problem is not just to find
light, but to find strength, firmness and love to be able to defend the victims
and combat the idols.159
159 Op. cit., 71, my emphasis, SJS. En los procesos de liberacin [] se hace
muy presente tambin y con gran fuerza el problema del ser humano y de la
antropodicea, lo cual tiene tambin su equivalente en lenguaje religioso: los
dolos. Y entonces el problema no es slo de encontrar luz, sino sacar fuerza,
firmeza y amor para defender a las vctimas y combatir a los dolos.
160 Ibid.: Y se podr o no aceptar a un Dios crucificado, pero hay que estar muy
claros en la existencia de dolos crucificadores.
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But how then, can one confess God to be the ultimate source of
life, and Jesus to be the ultimate liberator, the victorious victim? Do
the idols actually threaten God? Do we not already know the outcome of the struggle? How can one integrate the dualistic framework in a monistic one? Again the answer is that evil and
therefore also the idols, cf. Chapter v above belong to history. At
the end of history there will be no crucifixion, no struggle, no suffering. (I)n history we believe simultaneously in the God of liberation and the God of the cross, but at the end there can be no
crucifixion.161 God will then be all in all; not as a result of a quasiautomatic law, but as a result of Gods salvific presence and activity
in and through history.
In this sense because without affinity, without communion
there is no salvation it may be seen as a necessity that God suffers. But importantly it cannot be said in the same sense that it
is a necessity that the people suffer. God suffers in order to save
the people from their sufferings. The people suffer because of historical sin. Following the drift of this logic, the suffering of the people is no necessity; it is rather a tragic fact. This clarification is
important.
However, the case is not closed. Because, if salvific love in history must pass through suffering; if we see the call to salvation as an
invitation to participating in Gods life in history (which involves
suffering); if we see the crucified people as the body of the crucified
God; then the question is whether it is possible to avoid the conclusion that there is a sense in which the suffering of the people too is a
necessity. Obviously, such a conclusion does not seem to be in
accordance with the intention and interest that moves Sobrinos
theology. For one thing, it would be likely to encourage resignation
rather than a compassionate and courageous faith-praxis. Further161 Op. cit., 72. (E)n la historia creemos, a la vez, en el Dios de la liberacin y
en el Dios de la cruz, pero al final no puede haber crucifixin.
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[6] Conclusions
At the centre of any truly Christian theology stands the cross. What
faith in God emerges from Jesus cross on Golgotha? What light is
shed or shadow cast on the mystery of God from the many
crosses of our time? Is God too crucified? These questions which
are ultimate limit-questions and thus can be asked only with a clear
consciousness of the short-sightedness of our vision and the brokenness of our words have been the object of my considerations in
this chapter.
I began by describing and analysing a remarkable shift in the
Christian conception of God, which has occurred mainly during
the last century. That was the shift away from a firm belief, built on
Greek presuppositions, that God-self could not be affected by suffering. Since God was held to be immutable, almighty and incorporeal, God could not suffer. This perception of God was supported
by the doctrine of Christs two natures, according to which Jesus
suffers and dies only in his human nature, leaving his divine nature
unaffected. Although this view was generally held up until modern
times, we have traced a theological undertow which confesses Gods
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Y ese pueblo, que en los setenta fue crucificado por las dictaduras militares, que
en los ochenta fue crucificado por la democracia formal sin vida real, y que en los
noventa est siendo crucificado por el neoliberalismo que se desentiende de los
pobres, ese pueblo sigue siendo para nosotros la mxima presentizacin de Cristo
crucificado y de Dios en l.1
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I also found that, according to Sobrino himself, it is the intention of an absolute honesty to reality that leads him to identify
this reality as crucified, and to see the true reality, the true world,
as the world of the poor. Hence, Sobrino makes this world of the
poor, more particularly, the church of the poor, the primary theological location. In this connection I raised the critical question
whether this really is an appropriate description of reality. Is suffering really such an hecho mayor, such an indispensable fact for
gaining a true view of our time?
In Chapter iii, I found that Sobrinos recourse to the historical
Jesus actually depends on the master-narrative within which he
sees the quest as being pursued. This master-narrative is for
Sobrino the liberation of the poor, which he sees as a theological
objective in its own right. As I have pointed out on several occasions, Sobrino postulates a structural similarity, an isomorfismo
estructural, between his contemporary situation and outlook and
the sources of the past. At this point, I missed in Sobrinos writings
a more explicit description of the hermeneutical move from history or reality to theology. In Chapter v I showed that this move
could be more thoroughly analysed and founded by paying attention to Croattos appropriation and further development of
Ricoeurs hermeneutics. Now, on this background, should we
accept Sobrinos claim that the reality of suffering is so relevant that
it must be made central in and to the theological endeavour?
(a) We need to define more precisely the term suffering. What
kind of suffering does Sobrino address? There are two principal
aspects of suffering that are central. They often come together, but
not always, and not necessarily. Firstly, there is a suffering stemming
from poverty. This poverty may be either economical, i.e. material,
or sociological, referring to all sorts of social exclusion and deprivation. Secondly, it is a violent suffering. It is the suffering of perse-
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4
5
The poor are impoverished, and there is a dialectical opposition between poor
and rich.
Sobrino 1991d, 440-451 / Sobrino 1994c, 264-271.
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region will have increased by 60 million since the end of the 70s.7
Yet there are at the same time many analysts who speak of something close to an economic miracle in the region in the last years.
Latins ride high was the heading for the cover story of The Economist of July 18, 1992.8
This paradox clearly shows that in spite of the much desired
and welcomed process towards democracy and peace, the issue of
justice and equity is by no means solved in the region. It also shows
that democratisation has not yet reached the sphere of economy in
7
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At the same time, there has within the social sciences been an
increasing awareness of and focus on the varieties and internal differences within that all-encompassing term poor. The poor have
many faces. They are urban slum-dwellers or landless peasants.
They are unemployed, factory workers in free trade zones, or belong
to the informal economy. They are indigenous, blacks, women,
children. They suffer from malnutrition, drug abuse, street violence, lack of proper health care and education. Their strategies for
survival both legal and illegal are countless and still largely
undiscovered by analysts. In sum, the poor have different, sometimes even conflicting interests. And furthermore, the disenchantment with politics, the deep distrust of traditional parties and
politicians, the death of ideologies, together with explosive
growth and diffusion of senseless media propaganda the rule of
the telenovelas make it reasonable to expect that the general awareness of these (self-) interests among the poor is on the decrease.
This changing reality of the poor has also affected their cultural
and religious characteristics. The contemporary suffering which is
the starting point for Sobrino and the other liberation theologians,
finds particular expression in what Gutirrez called the irruption of
the poor. This irruption was seen as the awakening and mobilisation of the poor themselves, in a struggle for liberation and justice.
Their liberation praxis was interpreted in the light of Christian faith
as the principal force for salvation in history, in the one and only
history there is, according to liberation theologians. Its primary
ecclesial expression was the Ecclesial Base Communities (CEBs). It
is doubtful whether one can speak of an irruption of the poor in
this sense in Latin America or elsewhere in the world today.
Hugo Assmann is among those who now believe that the expectation that the poor would be the principal protagonists in the transformation and humanisation of society that was implied in the
emphasis on the irruption of the poor (an expectation held by the
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poor themselves and by others), was far too optimistic, and did not
take realistically into account the strength of the counter-forces.12
The paradoxically optimistic climate and widespread conscientisation and mass mobilisation of the late sixties are long gone. The
world of the 1990s seems to present itself as a world without credible alternatives. From now on, it appears, it will only be more of
the same celebrated by Francis Fukuyama and those who agree
with him, but mourned by many groups and agents in solidarity
with the poor and the excluded.
As for the CEBs, these reached their culmination in the period
from 1975 to 1982. Today, they probably gather no more than 1 or
2% of the population; and this population is not even among the
poorest. Instead, the CEBs form a small elite, which because of
their social condition become somewhat separated from the poorest.13 Instead put broadly the poor are becoming Pentecostals.
To put it polemically, but not altogether incorrectly, we may say
that the church of the poor is no longer Catholic base communities, but independent, charismatic and often fundamentalist Pentecostal congregations and churches.14 The spread of popular
Protestantism, particularly among the poor segments of the population, implies what many see as a revolutionary change in the religious configuration of the continent. Its social, economic and
political consequences are already notable, and may be expected to
be even more considerable, although the fundamental character of
these consequences are not as clear as many hold.15
12 Assmann 1994b, 7.
13 (L)as comunidades eclesiales de base renen hoy slo el 1% o el 2% de la
poblacin, y no precisamente entre los ms pobres. Forman una pequea
lite que por su condicin social se separa un poco de los ms pobres.
Comblin 1993, 39. My translation, SJS.
14 See the Introduction [3], above.
15 Cf. particularly Mariz 1994; Sjrup 1995, in addition to the other relevant literature that is suggested in the Introduction [3], above.
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35
36
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this mobilisation, (d) belonging to the people, is no longer a disgrace or shame, but rather a source of pride.
These two understandings depend on different political
options, defining different political agents or subjects. The populist
version holds the State, controlled by the middle class, to be the
principal political agent and thus embodiment of the people,
whereas in the other version this role is attributed to the civil society, the different groups be they neighbourhood associations,
labour unions, human rights groups, indigenous movements, religious communities or others that together make up the popular
movement. Ribeiro de Oliveira concludes:
When we use the term in one or the other sense, we are placing ourselves
within one or the other framework or reference. Therefore, by taking up the
definition of the people given by the popular movement, we are taking up a
stance that implies seeing the reality of the Church in Latin America from
the standpoint of the oppressed classes.37
514
these to the level implied in Sobrinos use of the crucified people.39 Likewise, the popular movement as a unified political subject is deeply questioned in our day. Its diversity and internal
tensions now attract considerable attention. In his analysis of the
socio-political transformations in Latin America between 1972 and
1992, Manuel Antonio Garretn claims that one should no
[longer] identify the transforming action with one historical subject
only, not even if this be seen as the victims of domination.40 This is
particularly a lesson valid for liberation theology in the 1990s, he
thinks.41 Thus it seems that Ribeiro de Oliveiras analysis today at
least would have to be further refined, perhaps even considerably
altered. In fact, if one follows his line of thought, one may have to
end up by stating that the people in Latin America today those
united, organised and committed civil forces belonging to the popular movement even in sum is only a small minority.42
This said, there is a danger of overstating the level of precision
intended in the term the crucified people. In Sobrinos use as in
Romeros, it seems the function of such a designation is more suggestive and generative, than definitory. As we have seen, Ignacio
39 Sobrino is aware of this lack of representativity: No hay que exagerar, pues,
la cuantitativa de la nueva imagen [de Cristo como liberador, my addition,
SJS] y de la nueva fe en actualidad, sometidas ambas al bombardeo de religiosidades contrarias y no suficientemente apoyadas por la Iglesia institucional
[] Sobrino 1991d, 35. Nevertheless it remains unclear what this lack of
representativity means for his concept of crucified people.
40 Finalmente, supone no identificar la accin transformadora con un solo
sujeto de la historia, aunque sea las vctimas de la dominacin, al que todos
deben supeditarse. Garretn 1993, 27.
41 Among the tenets that liberation theology should review in light of these
socio-political tranformations, Garretn underscores this: [] la visin de
la unidad de un sujeto de la historia, identificado con las vctimas de la
opresin, sin considerar a veces la diversidad de actores y sus intereses reales
muchas veces contradictorios entre s. Op. cit., 28.
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42 On the other hand, there has been much talk of a grassroots explosion in
Latin America and elsewhere in the South during the last decade. While
old popular movements have stagnated, new ones, with different characteristics and agendas, have emerged: urban movements consisting of squatters and slum-dwellers, indigenous groups, women groups, etc. An
interesting discussion of this development is found in Castaeda 1993, 175236. Although highlighting the difficulties encountered by the CEBs, and
stating that (t)he importance of the grass roots religious movements in
Latin America has been both exaggerated and idealized (p. 217), Castaeda
deems it indisputable [] that as the economic and social situation in the
region continues to stagnate or regress, while forms of political expression
open up, the role of the Church in grass roots social movements will continue (p. 218). And as the Salvadoran example clearly shows, according to
Castaeda: If and when the Church ceases to be a defender of status quo
and becomes a force for social change, the consequences are momentous (p.
216).
43 See above, Chapter ii [2].
44 In a sociological sense, that is. With regard to the theological meaning of the
term people this is of course more directly applicable to the CEBs,
although it raises the question of the relationship between these and the
whole people of God.
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more vague, and the term is in danger of losing its concrete relation
to reality, to concrete persons and communities.
Sobrino attempts to solve this dilemma by suggesting a distinction between an active meaning and a passive meaning, unified by
the category analogy. On the one hand, the crucified people are
those who actively take up the challenge and mission of establishing
justice in the world, and who for that reason encounter opposition
and persecution. On the other hand, the crucified people includes a
majority of human beings who are put to death, not because of
what they actively do or seek to accomplish, but simply because of
what they (passively) are. These are all the innocent victims of history. Analogy unites these distinct groups of people because they
both though in different ways experience a kind of suffering
which resembles that of Jesus. Thus Sobrino also seems to apply
people both in a more precise meaning i.e. as understood in the
popular movement, and in a more general, wide meaning.45
(2) In what way does the linguistic expression the crucified people
refer to reality? What is the linguistic status of this expression? I
have repeatedly signalled the need for a further reflection on these
questions within the confines of a theology of the crucified people(s). It appears that it is Sobrinos loyalty to the principle of
being honest to reality that has prevented him from such explicit
reflections on the nature and role of theological language. It is as if
he fears that reality will disappear in language, and result in what
he sees as post-modernist irrealism, cynicism, and (ironically) indifference.46 Therefore it seems that he is unable to make up his mind
with regard to the linguistic status of the crucified people. It is
certainly metaphorical,47 but then again not metaphorical at
45 See above, Chapter ii [6].
46 Sobrino has a few, rather polemical references to post-modernism, see e.g.,
Sobrino 1993g, 359.
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Ricoeurs more well-known functional definition of symbol, however, is the one from Symbolism of Evil: A symbol gives rise to
thought.55 The symbol of the crucified people in Sobrinos christology is geared towards exactly this: to give rise to (new) thought
on the reality of the suffering of millions and millions in our
present as well as in the past56 contemplating its radical seriousness and its close connection to the central core of Christian faith,
the cross of Christ. But furthermore, given the practical orientation
of Sobrinos christology, I am tempted to alter Ricoeurs definition
sligthly: The symbol of the crucified people in Sobrinos christology
gives rise to compassionate action.57
Hence the rhetorical character in a good sense of Sobrinos
theology. By redescribing suffering persons and groups around the
globe today as crucified people, he seeks to mobilise a Christian
worldview and praxis in favour of these victims of history. This is in
fact how the centrality of the mercy principle works in his own theological endeavour: by way of rhetoric. His theological reflection is
meant to give rise to compassionate action, to undergird a Christian
praxis that ultimately will serve the liberation of the poor and
excluded. The mediation through discourse is crucial in that undertaking.
Unlike other liberation theologians, Sobrino has not been very
explicit about which other mediations should be given priority in
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57
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through what we may know of the historical relations that they are
meant to qualify.60 In this manner, the revelational primacy of Jesus
historical life is maintained.
The relational category with its dynamic character also enables
Sobrino to see a development, growth and even change in Jesus
with respect to these confessional titles. Jesus becomes Son, Messiah,
Lord and Liberator through his life, mission, death and resurrection. This is what the centrality of the rather controversial concept filiation in Sobrinos thinking clearly shows.
There are moreover two advantages with this approach for the
christological endeavour as such. First, by this way of proceeding
from concrete, historical relations to the limit-questions of faith in
Christ, it gives the latter a historical rooting which can rescue christology from the lofty abstractness which so often has been attached
to it. Second, by seeing these relations not only as historical in a
past sense, but also as relations which the community and hence the
theologian him-/herself participate in today, the christological
endeavour gains actuality and takes on a concrete contextual as well
as existential character.
Moving now to soteriology, I have noted several strengths in the
use of a relational approach. In Chapter iv, I argued that this makes
Jesus maleness lose its salvific significance. Hence a major obstacle
for a liberating soteriology as seen from a feminist perspective is
removed. In Chapter vi, I demonstrated how this relational emphasis though not fully developed in this direction by Sobrino himself saves Sobrinos christology from the pitfalls of a mainly
exemplarist or subjectivist soteriology.61 Christ saves by way of
relations. Through these salvific relations the believer is trans60 Although it should be noted that these approaches (deductive inductive,
from above or from below) tend to be more complementary than alternative.
61 See Chapter vi [5], above.
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This is clarifying, in my opinion, not only for this particular christological topos, but for the role of relationality in Sobrinos theology
at large. It may be seen as Sobrinos way of integrating continuity
and discontinuity, historical and theological, immanent experience
and transcendent mystery in his thinking. This is an integration
that I have repeatedly asked for in this inquiry. In what way does
this respond to my concerns?
First and foremost, this is clarifying because it shows in what
way the necessary discontinuity may be preserved even within a
profoundly relational approach. The ultimacy and mystery of Jesus
as One with God from eternity is firmly maintained. But simultaneously, a way is shown towards the recognition and verification of
the significance of this doxological confession in human history.
This way is the historical life of Jesus from Nazareth. This human
life in the midst of the conflicts, struggles and sufferings of
human history is Gods ultimate apparition, Gods salvific presence in history. And that it is a real presence, is shown through the
cross: God is present in history even at the point where it is most
profoundly anti-God in cruelty, evil, and radical, systematically
inflicted suffering.
Hence, the early Christian confession of Jesus as Way is clearly
emphasised. Thus secondly there is also a possibility of speaking
of any human beings filiation: in the likeness and following of
Jesus amidst the conflicts of history, faith embraces the promise of
Gods presence as a loving Father. Filiation understood as historical filiation becomes thereby a soteriological concept too.
In other words, the history of Jesus/the Jesus of history represents the access to God for all human beings. This is the third way in
which this clarification answers to a concern that I have raised: the
question of Jesus as example and/or sacrament. Jesus becomes thus
example, since he is the way to follow. But he is also clearly sacrament, since he is the true and salvific presence of the eternal God in
531
history. And although it is the latter which is the foundation for the
former as Jngel rightly insisted it is the former which is the historical path to the recognition and appreciation of the latter, as
Sobrino maintains.
I affirm this clarification since it in my judgement should make
it possible for Sobrino to maintain both continuity and discontinuity, arguing that a method based on continuity is the best manner to
reach the ultimate leap of faith (discontinuity) on which any full
confession of Jesus as the Christ, Jesus as the Liberator, ultimately
relies.
It should also enable him to hold together the opposite perspectives of salvation as a process filiation, deification, etc. and salvation as a breakthrough, an irruption, a liberation. The first
perspective relies on the relations historical, dynamical, transformative by which we become in history what we are in the
image of God, being transformed into the likeness of the Son
through the faith in and following of him. This is what it means to
hacerse hijos en el Hijo (Rom. 8:29). Here there is room for praxis,
for human labour and effort, in a kind of cooperatio which does not
found or condition salvation, but concretises it, actualises it in history.
The second perspective strongly maintains that the initiative as
well as the completion of this is all the work of God, who is mysteriously and graciously present in history through Jesus the Son.
God is the one constituting the salvific relationships, opening them
up and inviting everyone into them through the history of Jesus/the
Jesus of history. Here there is room for grace alone, faith alone, and
God as the mystery to whom only doxological statements are ultimately appropriate.67
Yet this clarification is not in every aspect consistent with other
tenets of Sobrino. Firstly, it raises anew questions as to the basic presupposition of the unity of history. If there is a distinction between
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(i.) First, with regard to the epistemological-hermeneutical significance of the crucified people, I shall submit two theses.
(1) The crucified people make possible and promote the process of gaining true knowledge (i.e. knowledge as comprehensive and appropriate
as possible) of the world, of God, and of Jesus as the Christ.
[1.1] Epistemology is the reflection on the possibility of gaining
knowledge. Any process of cognition is set in motion and directed
by a determined interest. Any process of cognition takes place: it
happens in a historical, geographical, social, etc. location which
informs and shapes it. And any process of cognition is intimately
united with human praxis, to the extent that it is an integral part of
that praxis. Yet, while being conditioned and moulded by its driving interest, its location, and the praxis of which it is an integral
part, the process of gaining knowledge is not fully determined by
these. What is known through this process is reality, which is ultimately external to the same process of cognition itself. Reality can
never be grasped in its totality through any process of human cognition. However, the process of cognition aims at a knowledge as
comprehensive and appropriate as possible, true knowledge. The
possibility of gaining true knowledge is dependent on this process
interest, location and praxis.
In order to gain true knowledge it is necessary to pay particular
attention to those aspects of reality that are normally consciously
or unconsciously, with or without the use of power kept beyond
the horizon of the knowing subject. These aspects are disharmonious and unpleasant, and there is a strong tendency to cover them
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and mission of Jesus as gracious and merciful love, Creator and Sustainer of the entire universe, is compatible with a world in which
there is destruction and senseless evil; correspondingly, how it can
be the case that Jesus, who is believed to be the ultimate revelation
and presence of God in history, ends his life in desolation, shame
and apparent failure on the cross outside the city walls of Jerusalem.
The reality and symbol of the crucified people helps to overcome these fundamental aporias: By making present and exposing
the underside of history and the reality of the other who is normally expelled and suppressed, the crucified ones make possible a
more appropriate approach to reality, and to the totality of reality.
By thus laying bare its negative aspects, the crucified people
through their mere presence testify to the evil and sinfulness of
human history and the present world. A truthful approach to gaining knowledge of reality leads to admitting its present state of
incompatibility with the will of God as this is revealed in the history
of Jesus of Nazareth.
Yet seeing oppressed and excluded human beings today as crucified, implies seeing them as related to the cross of Jesus, in which
Christian faith sub specie contrarii finds the ultimate revelation of
God in history. Holding God to be ultimate reality, Creator and
Sustainer of the whole universe, and holding the totality of reality
to be accessible only by way of a consistent confrontation with its
negative aspects, requires thus that God be known also in and
through these negative aspects (in order to confess God as God of
the totality of reality). The crucified people as reality and symbol thus points to Gods identification with the victims of evil and
sinful forces of human history, an identification which is paradigmatically and constitutively revealed in Gods self-disclosure in
unity with the human person Jesus who dies as a victim on the
cross. Thus the crucified people makes it possible to know God as
the true God, the God of the totality of reality, since they testify to
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Gods ultimate historical solidarity with the victims. The true God
in a history of suffering is the God of the victims.
[1.3] Reflection on the possibility of gaining true knowledge of Jesus
as the Christ, i.e. the ultimate Saviour of the world, may be called
christological epistemology. Gaining knowledge of Jesus as the
Christ means knowing him as Saviour, i.e., as one who responds to
the utmost concerns of human existence both on a personal and on
a communal level. But knowing Jesus as Saviour also means being
able to see him as Saviour even while acknowledging the fact that he
was condemned and crucified, and moreover, being able to see him
as the one who saves through this apparent failure.
By exposing the negativity of reality, the consequences of sinfulness and evil of human history, the crucified people as reality
and symbol helps in gaining adequate knowledge of this utmost
concern which makes salvation necessary, this fundamental anxiety
and problem of humanity: the tremendum, the interruption, the
radical suffering, El Mozote, Srebrenica it is a reality with many
names, but which in the end remains an unexplicable and unnameable mysterium iniquitatis.
A credible Saviour must respond to this mystery of evil. Since it
is obviously not yet resolved nor removed, a Saviour must be seen as
sharing the burden of this ultimate mystery, being affected by it,
but simultaneously as having the capacity to overcome it definitively. By seeing Jesus as the One who in his life vehemently resisted
this sinfulness inherent in human history, and willingly confronted
it even to the point of suffering its ultimate consequences; by seeing
him as the One who did not resign when confronted with the
deadly logic of power, but who remained faithful to the new reality
of the Kingdom of God which had appeared in and through him in
history, Christian faith sees Jesus as Saviour. The victim who did
not give in to the powers that made him a victim, has become victor
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since these are the ones who are made central persons in these texts,
and (again) to whom they are primarily addressed.
(ii.) The second axis the historical-soteriological is the one that
has given most rise to critical questions. The following seven theses
are dedicated to clarifying the salvific aspects of the relationship
between the crucified and the Crusified.
(3) Since God is present on the cross of Jesus, Gods presence on the historical crosses today can be analogically affirmed in faith.
[3.1] Christian faith holds that God is present on the cross of Jesus.
In spite of the experienced absence of the God of the Kingdom, the
loving God of life and justice, (an experience most radically
expressed in Mark 15:34), it is maintained that God has chosen to be
present on Golgotha. God did not ultimately abandon Jesus, but
remained in communion with him, even to the point of being made
a victim by the powers of the anti-Kingdom, the powers of death.
This means that God is affected by suffering and human history.
The conception of God as impassible and unaffected is criticised
and ultimately overcome on the cross. God has freely and out of
love chosen to be different. God is a crucified God, a suffering God,
a Dios mayor y menor.
[3.2] Christian faith holds Jesus Christ to be the ultimate and
unique revelation of the true God and of true humanity. The execution of Jesus thus testifies to the scandalous and incomprehensible
presence and power of evil forces in history. By killing Gods Son,
and continuing to kill Gods children, these forces show themselves
as forces contrary to God. Since these forces are directed against
God, they are labelled as sin.
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is the work of the Holy Spirit; and that the Holy Spirit works ubi et
quando visum est Deo;74 gives good reason to expect that this ubi et
quando (whenever and wherever else God out of love may choose
to be present) points to Gods salvific presence with the crucified
people.
(5) Since salvation is a reality always flowing over, a reality always to
be shared, the crucified people may be seen as sharing salvation with the
world by testifying to Gods salvific presence, and by transmitting and
communicating signs and fruits of this salvation to others.
[5.1] Salvation is a dynamic reality, not a static condition. Salvation
is a reality to be shared, to be communicated, not be kept or
guarded for oneself. To bring salvation means going out of oneself
in love, entering into healing, mutual relationships with the
other.
If we hold that God is present on Jesus cross, and therefore,
analogically, on the crosses in human history, and that this presence
is salvific, one may see the crucified people as sharing salvation with
the world. The crucified people share salvation with the world by
testifying to Gods salvation, transmitting signs of this salvation,
and thereby even mediating, in a derived sense, Gods salvation in
history.
[5.2] The testimony of the crucified people is a testimony to the saving presence of God, contrary to all expectation and appearance.
The testimony of the crucified people is, therefore, a testimony to
the qualities and values of the Kingdom of God: life in its fullness,
justice, community and sharing. The testimony of the crucified
people becomes at the same time a testimony against all crucifying
forces, that is, against everything that de-humanises persons and
74 Cf. Confessio Augustana, art V.
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odds, making therefore their hope a hope against hope. It happens when the crucified people promote life in its fullness, with justice and well-being for all a community in which there is room for
everyone (una sociedad donde todos quepan) and resist and confront all crucifying forces which prevent the fullness of life. It happens occasionally, and contrary to all expectation and beyond
everything that might be required from them, in the midst of this
struggle for life when they accept the cost of this struggle, even to
the extent of laying down their own lives for the sake of others.
They thus testify that true love existence for others is possible in
sinful history. It also happens when, contrary to all expectation and
beyond everything that might be required of them, they embrace
and forgive those who have done wrong against them: their oppressors, perpetrators, crucifiers. The crucified people bring forth signs
of salvation when, as a result of their mere existence or their active
commitment, they generate solidarity and mercy values that are
indispensable for the healing and survival of humankind and all of
creation. And finally, they transmit salvation to others when they
confess and celebrate faith in the God of life, the true God, the God
of Jesus, thereby negating and denying all the idols that are offered
them obedience and adoration.
[5.4] Salvation as a fundamental reality is constituted and offered by
God in Christ, in its fullness and once and for all. It is therefore
helpful to distinguish between these signs or fruits of salvation,
and the salvific reality in se. Salvation and the fruits of salvation
should not be identified with one another.75 The salvation which
comes from God does not come in portions, to varying degrees. But
explicit signs of this reality may show themselves in history to a varying degree, and in different manners. Where there are signs of salvation, faith may confidently celebrate Gods presence. However,
75 Sobrino 1991d, 160f / Sobrino 1994c, 89-90.
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more often than not, radical suffering gives a clearer sign of dehumanisation, of no longer being able to love, than of salvation.
Yet, faith also knows Gods presence where there seem to be no
salvific signs. Although faith believes that God is present on Jesus
cross, it recalls the scandalous silence and darkness of Golgotha.
[5.5] In a derived sense, then, it can be said that the crucified people
mediate salvation. Jesus is the Mediator of the salvific reality of the
Kingdom of God in history. The reality of salvation is that the
Kingdom has come. Jesus mediates this firstly, by causing and representing its presence in directo, and secondly, by making its presence visible. In this second capacity, Jesus calls others to follow him,
in order to continue this mediating function of making salvation
visible and tangible in history. Entering into relationship with Jesus
implies being introduced into the same relationships as Jesus: relationship to the God of the Kingdom and to the Kingdom of God.
The crucified people are taken in a particular though not
exclusive manner into this relationship by God. Therefore they
also may in a particular manner mediate the reality of salvation, by
following Jesus in being (a) mediators of the Kingdom, (b) sons and
daughters of God, (c) way to God. The degree of this mediation,
of making salvation a visible and tangible reality in history, varies.
The crucified peoples awareness of and self-understanding with
regard to this mediating mission vary too. However, in the final
analysis, whether this mediating mission is carried out by the crucified people or not, depends on God alone.
(6) Although the crucified people is indispensable for salvation in history, they do not constitute salvation. They are not saviours; they do not
play a salvific role, in the ultimate sense. God alone constitutes salvation. Jesus alone is Saviour.
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So far, I have stressed the continuity between the Crucified and the
crucified. Now it is time to address the matter of discontinuity, in
other words, to clarify wherein the difference between them lies.
[6.1] Although the crucified people testify to, transmit and mediate
Gods salvation in history, they do not constitute salvation.76
Salvation is Gods nearness and communion, expressed in and
through profound relationships. These relationships are reciprocal.
Yet only God properly constitutes these constitutive, salvific relationships. This is where there is an asymmetry in the relationships.
Asymmetry in this case does not mean that the relationships are not
reciprocal, but that one of the poles in the relationship is ultimately
the constitutive, founding pole upon which the relationship relies.
The crucified ones share salvation with the world as a result of
the particular relationship God has established with them through
Jesus, the Crucified One. The crucified people is light only
because they reflect Jesus, the Light of the world.77 The crucified
people bring signs and fruits of salvation to the world only insofar
as they reflect the salvific reality of Gods predilection for and presence among them.
[6.2] The crucified people are not saviours, nor do they play a
salvific role in the ultimate sense. This clarification is important in
order (i) to maintain that to the crucified people too, salvation is
grounded in Gods grace alone; it is not something that builds on
their capacities, efforts or circumstances (i.e., it is euaggelion, in the
76 Contrary to Ellacura and Sobrino, who both speak of the poor as saviours.
See Sobrino 1991d, 437: Pobres con espritu puntualizaba I. Ellacura, para
recalcar la totalidad salvfica de los pobres; pero aada que en la materialidad de la pobreza y no en otras materialidades se da la connaturalidad para
ese espritu que les hace vivir como salvados y como salvadores; and Sobrino
1993g.
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ments or sacraments of salvation. Rather, they are the most visible expression of the need for salvation. They lay bare the wounds
of human existence.
In this sense, however, they are indispensable for salvation in
human history: there can be no salvation without them. Therefore,
God has chosen to be near them in a particular manner. And this
presence produces unexpected and life-bringing fruits of salvation
which are beneficiary to all human beings.
The Kingdom is primarily for the poor. The resurrection is primarily a sign of hope for the crucified ones. But through them, these
realities become signs of hope for salvation and eternal life for all,
for humanity as a whole, and for all creation.
[6.4] This means that I cannot agree with Ellacuras and Sobrinos
boldest statements: that the crucified people are a principle of salvation, by carrying the sins of others (away). The typology/analogy Servant-Jesus-victims today is theologically admissible and
fruitful. However, as in any analogy, there is also an element of dissimilarity. One basic dissimilarity between the suffering of Jesus and
the suffering of victims today regards those aspects of Jesus salvific
life-and-death which in the history of theology have been expressed
through the terms of substitution and expiation. Regardless of
what precise meaning these terms should be given in a contemporary interpretation, there is an element of uniqueness, of something
accomplished once-and-for-all, which should be preserved. Any
continuance of these in history through the crucified people
would in fact threaten the validity of what Jesus accomplished on
behalf of many (Rom 5:19 ).
[6.5] What furthermore makes the cross of Jesus different from
other crosses, is that faith sees in it the completion of a human life
lived in full and unambiguous devotion to God and to other
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is salvific, but love. Nor is it suffering which makes love salvific, but
the fact that true love endures also in spite of senseless evil and pain.
This is valid not only for the crosses of history, but for the cross
of Jesus too. The cross can be seen as expressing the will of God, not
in the sense that God wills the suffering of Jesus, but in that it
shows that true, salvific love in a reciprocal relationship, a communion, between human being and God survives and conquers
even the historical reality of sin and evil.
[7.3] There should be no necessity of suffering, then. Christian
faith holds that God does not endorse suffering and evil, but firmly
opposes them. These tragic historical realities do not stem from
God. Through Christ, God summons all human beings to counter
these realities, to work for their abolition. The only sense in which
it is theologically legitimate to speak of a necessity of suffering, is
that it is an accumulated historical experience that in this work for
its abolition, in this struggle to remove suffering, suffering is often
the cost. There is a suffering for the sake of freedom, communion,
salvation; a suffering out of love for the sake of love. The cross of
Jesus, Gods own suffering, shows that this fact does not imply that
the love of God has lost, nor that those who suffer this situation are
abandoned from the God of life. On the contrary, it shows that this
God remains mysteriously present with all the crucified ones, so
that this reality in which crucifixions occur will not ultimately triumph.
[7.4] As to the soteriological premise that, in Ellacuras words, the
power of sin can only be overcome through bearing its consequences: suffering under it, or in Sobrinos words, (A)s to what
should be done about sin, [] the answer is clear, eradicate it, but
with one essential condition: by bearing it, this can be accepted
only in the following sense: Given the historical reality of sin and
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evil, on the one hand, and the fact that the salvific love of God is
not to be understood in idealistic, a-historical terms, but rather is
incarnated, concrete and historical, on the other hand, the salvific
love of God shows its strength and ultimacy by letting itself be
affected truly and wholly even by this negative historical reality.
The love of God is present, even where evil apparently reigns. If it
were not, none of those who fall victims under these forces would
be within reach of Gods salvific love. This is where the necessity
of Gods suffering under sin lies.
And yet, this necessity of suffering cannot and should not be
transferred analogically or otherwise to the crucified people.
Their suffering is not a salvific necessity; it is a tragic fact.80
(8) Since God constitutes salvation in solidarity with the victims of history, there can ultimately be no salvation which does not imply the full
restoration of the rights and dignity of the victims.
[8.1] The true God in a world of suffering is a God of victims.
Christian faith affirms that this true God is revealed in history in
unity with the victim Jesus of Nazareth. Thus, it can be said that
Christian theology and soteriology has a victimological orientation.
[8.2] The victimological orientation of Christian theology does not
imply that victims are called to accept their destiny and quietly reconcile themselves with it. Much to the contrary, Christian theology
summons all those who suffer to endurance (Gr.: hypomone)81 and
active resistance, not resignation. And it offers a hope in the ultimate overcoming of the reality in which human beings are victimised.
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nium. The experience of being co-responsible for other peoples suffering and at the same time being tied up in systems and networks
which paralyse both the ability and the willingness to break out of
this situation of guilt, leads many into an apathy and resignation
which may come to expression as despair, restless pursuit of satisfaction, ennui, or emptiness.
The concern for the inclusion of the crucifiers also emerges
from a wish to take due account of and come to terms with the
insight expressed in the Pauline statement they had all sinned,
and in the Lutheran formula simul iustus et peccator.
However, this concern becomes crucial from a consistent perspective from the South, or from the crucified peoples, too. History shows the complexity and ambiguity of all human interaction.
Even though it is pivotal that one never blur the distinction
between perpetrator and victim, crucifier and crucified, it is also
true that there are seldom clear-cut borders between the two in
actual history. This only shows the radical nature of evil: the victims
in one relation may become offenders in another. The spiral of
oppression is an illuminating example of this complexity of human
relationships.83
In El Salvador, as in other war-ridden countries, the post-warsituation shows how the armed conflict itself often de-humanised
both parties, even those who in principle defended a just cause, or
were innocently and against their will drawn into the hostilities. It
also clearly points to the necessity of reconciliation, forgiveness, restoration, and inclusion of even war-criminals and murderers crucifiers in the new community. This is not contrary to a theology
of crucified people. What such a theology should always make clear,
however, is that this reconciliation, forgiveness, and new beginning
can never be established at the expense of the victims.
83 Compare the striking similarities between the victim and offender population indicated by Fattah, Chapter v [2], above.
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One final reason for including an explicit concern for the crucifiers is the observation that crucifiers also crucify themselves in their
act of crucifying others. The very misdeed threatens the identity
and integrity of the human person committing it. The crucifiers are
always in the danger of being identified with their wrongdoings.
This parallels the danger of the crucified persons of becoming one
with what has been done against them.84 But according to Christian anthropology, a human person is always more than what he or
she does, and more than that which has happened to him or her.
This is said, again, without blurring the real distinction
between offender and offended. Crucifiers primarily offend other
persons victims. But in the same act, they also victimise themselves. Therefore they must be included in a theological reflection
on crucified people.
[9.2] The crucifiers active and passive collaborators in the
destruction of others cannot be saved qua crucifiers without their
victims, those whom they have crucified. Since it is the perverted
relation to the other (oppression) which defines who these human
persons are in these relations (oppressors), it is only by the cessation
of these perverted relations that they can be freed from that status.
But once such a destructive relation has been established, it is only
the victimised part who has the possibility of breaking it, and of reestablishing new, positive relations.85 This is due to the historical
dimension of human existence. There is no way to undo what has
been done. And there are no others than those against whom evil
has been done, those who have been sinned against, who have the
84 Cf. the ambiguities of the terms victim and victimisation discussed
above.
85 As the oppressed, fighting to be human, take away the oppressors power to
dominate and suppress, they restore to the oppressors the humanity they had
lost in the exercise of oppression. Freire 1972, 32.
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authority and right to forgive and forget that wrong which has been
committed against them.86
[9.3] However, it cannot be demanded of victims that they forgive. It
does happen that the crucified people in fact welcome and forgive
their crucifiers. When this occurs, it represents signs of salvation,
miracles of the Kingdom occurring in history. But this can never be
expected, still less required from the crucified people.
Furthermore, the tragic fact is that most victims are dead.
Given that they are the only ones with the authority and capacity to
undo the oppressive relations, this fact may seem to eternalise the
perverted relationships. There can be no ultimate forgiveness nor
liberation for the perpetrators without the victims.
However, Gods identification with all victims through the victim Jesus makes possible the healing of these perverted relations
even when the victim in person is not able to do so. Therefore, the
message of the cross is good news even to the crucifiers. Since God
is in solidarity with victims, sharing their lot to the ultimate consequences, God can do what they may no longer be capable of doing.
God can forgive on behalf of others, living or dead. The God of victims is therefore the true God also for crucifiers, with the ability
through Jesus the Victorious Victim to save even them. And by
being God also for crucifiers by being primarily the God of victims,
God is shown as the true God, the God of all people, of all of reality.
This means however, that Gods authority to forgive on behalf
of living and dead victims is founded on Gods credible solidarity
with these, in other words, on the historical revelation of Jesus, and
86 I am grateful to Paul Leer-Salvesen for his contributions, comments and
responses regarding this particular aspect. See particularly his original and
groundbreaking doctoral thesis, Leer-Salvesen 1991, and furthermore LeerSalvesen 1996 and Leer-Salvesen 1995.
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on the promise that God shall restore the lives and rights of all victims.
[9.4] In this way, a theology of the crucified people inclusive of the
crucifiers presents also an important lesson for theologies of
Pauline, Lutheran, or other origins and inclinations, whenever these
de facto promote a salvation which neglects the reality and rights of
the victims of history, through (i) giving an excessive priority to the
relationship between God and the individual human being at the
cost of the relationships between human beings, and/or (ii) a misguided equalising of all persons and groups in their complicity with
evil and guilt, to such an extent that concrete trespasses and the very
real distinction between the offender and the victim are made less
important.
(iii.) Finally, I move to the ethical-praxical axis between the crucified
and the Crucified. My deliberations here can be summarised in the
following four theses:
(10) A responsible theological application of the theologoumenon the
crucified people depends on a credible affirmation and promotion of a
praxis for taking the crucified down.
[10.1] The acceptance of the crucified people as theological symbol is only recommendable as long as it is made explicitly clear that
their crucifixion, their situation of suffering, is something which is
caused by the inexplicable presence of sinfulness and evil in human
history, and not by God. The best way of making this clear is by
affirming, promoting and committing oneself in a credible praxis
for reducing, removing and ultimately overcoming this situation of
suffering.
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[10.2] The formula taking the crucified people down, a formulation with roots in Jesuit spirituality, 87 expresses the urgency, ultimacy and content of this praxis. In this sense, it can be affirmed. It
is an open question, however, how well this formula may function
within the framework of other Christian traditions and confessions,
in which the idea of taking Jesus down from the cross does not play
any significant role in spirituality or theology. It also leaves a certain
unclarity with regard to how the difference between taking down
from the cross and rising from the dead should ultimately be
understood.
[10.3] However one wishes to designate this praxis, it is a praxis of
mercy, with no reason other than the suffering of the other, and
with no other aim than the removal of the suffering of the other.
This praxis is rooted in a pre-reflexive, pre-theological heeding and
accepting the call of the suffering other, and therefore needs no theological or religious foundation. It is in this sense a purely human,
even secular praxis. Yet, since this mercy-principle is ultimately
founded in God according to the biblical revelation, God is primarily known through Gods merciful acts in history it becomes a
praxis rooted in God. As such, it may be called a theo-praxis. Since
this praxis de facto takes the shape of Jesus praxis in history the
history of Jesus shows a unique pro-existence on Jesus part, dedicating his life not only to the other, but particularly to that other
who is a victim it may also be called a praxis of following, or a
christo-praxis.88
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(11) The praxis of the crucified people or, analogically, of all followers of
Christ in solidarity with the crucified people, may be called salvific only
in the sense that it actualises in history that salvific reality which is
already and once and for all initiated by God through the coming of the
Kingdom.
[11.1] In correspondence with the distinction between salvation and
fruits and signs of salvation maintained above, the praxis of the crucified people or, analogically, of all followers of Christ in solidarity
with the crucified people, is salvific only in a derived sense. It does
not effectuate or constitute salvation, but, responding to the reality
of the Kingdom which has appeared in human history in Jesus, it
actualises in history that salvific reality.
This is a necessary clarification, in order to preclude a possible
conception of a cooperatio which effectively leaves it up to human
beings, and in particular to victims, to bring about salvation in the
ultimate sense. If this were the case, the implication would be that
salvation would be only for the strong, active, committed, etc., or
more precisely for the strong, committed, etc. among victims. To
avoid the moralisation of salvation implied in any thought of God
helping (only) the ones who help themselves, the urgency and
indispensable character of Christian praxis should be seen as reflecting that movement of praxis which is already initiated and empowered by God in Christ, and which one day will be completed by
God.
[11.2] This emphasis need not in any way render human praxis void
of theological significance. On the contrary, such praxis may be
seen as reflecting and making visible and tangible Gods salvific love
in history. It may also be seen as an actualisation of what it means to
be fully human: being able and willing to intervene actively on
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behalf of and for the sake of the suffering other, and to enter into
community with him/her (face to face).
(12) The reality and symbol of the crucified people demands and founds
an ethics which is at the same time an ethics of proximity and an
ethics of following.
[12.1] The ethical orientation and foundation of this praxis of taking the crucified down from the cross has accordingly common
traits with that which has been called an ethics of proximity (Levinas, Dussel, and also K. E. Lgstrup). Its basis is the demand that
occurs in the face-to-face encounter with the other, particularly
with the suffering other.
[12.2] Simultaneously it is an explicitly Christian ethics in that it
finds this demand expressed and communicated in the gospel of
Gods identification with the crucified Jesus, and in that it sees in
the life of Jesus the ultimate, illuminative example of how to
respond to this demand of the suffering other. It becomes thus an
ethics of following. However, this following cannot rely on written norms, nor on a pure imitation of Jesus, but is ultimately based
only in the reality of the suffering other, in which God in Christ is
believed to be present.
(13) The reality and symbol of the crucified people makes theology as
such take on a profoundly practical and committed character; it
becomes an intellectus amoris. Theology does not necessarily become
thereby a closed discourse, however, but participates in a common quest
for truth and justice.
[13.1] Since the reality of the crucified people calls for transforming
action, i.e. praxis, theology, as reflection on this reality in the light
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of faith in God, emerges from such praxis. When the reality and
symbol of the crucified people is reflected theologically upon in the
light of the history of Jesus, it leads to a new praxis: a merciful
praxis of following. Theology, then, becomes a markedly practical
endeavour: emerging from, reflecting on, and resulting in a liberating, healing praxis.
[13.2] Since the reality of the crucified people calls for a partisan
praxis for and with them, against everything which oppresses and
excludes them, a theological reflection on this praxis must necessarily become a committed endeavour too. Thus it gives priority to a
process of cognition which is empathic and built on the cognisant
subjects personal engagement in what is known: the object of the
process of cognition. In this sense, theology becomes an intellectus
amoris, with a clearly mystagogical orientation.
[13.3] This practical and committed character does not make theology tantamount to fideism, however. There is no need for theology
to become a closed discourse. On the contrary, because it is engaged
in historical reality, and seeks to interpret the situation of victims
and the signs of the presence of God in that reality, it may join in a
common quest for truth and justice together with all persons
regardless of their theological, philosophical or ideological presuppositions.
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Postscript
Hope Against Hope:
The Resurrection of the C/crucified
571
Accepting this point of view, I have not dealt explicitly with the
resurrection. Although I trust that the results of this study as presented in Chapter viii have proved the appropriateness of my
approach, it is obvious that an analysis of faith in the resurrection as
thorough as that which we have carried out with regard to the crucifixion would have been helpful, and would have added important
insights to what has been said. Yet such an analysis falls outside the
framework of the present study. It does so for obvious reasons of
space. But furthermore, my procedure has been justified by the fact
that I chose to approach my theme from the perspective of the concrete and historical reality of suffering and oppression crucifixion(s). That starting point inevitably drove me to the cross of
Jesus. The reality of the world as seen from the perspective of the
victims directed my quest to Jesus as the Crucified One.
However, Christian faith holds that this Crucified One was
raised by God. And it insists that the one who has risen, is none
other than the one who was crucified, Jesus from Nazareth. Without intending a complete analysis, then, I shall briefly sketch out
some basic features of what this faith in the resurrection means for
what has been said about the relationship between the crucified and
the Crucified. I shall ask what particular light faith in the resurrection sheds on the reality and symbol of the crucified peoples, and
vice versa, what this contemporary suffering implies for Christian
faith in the resurrection. This will be done first by presenting some
main traits of Sobrinos position in this matter, and then by suggesting some further developments on the basis of my own reflections
and proposals in this study.
572
573
as the triumph of justice over injustice.7 This is the good news of the
resurrection then: that at least once justice has completely triumphed over injustice, and the victim definitively triumphed over
the executioner.8
The resurrection thus becomes an expression of hope in justice
against the prevalent experience of injustice. It is not a general hope
equivalent to optimism, nor equivalent to a dialectical approach
which reckons that any progress has to pass through a negation.
Rather, it is hoping against hope (Rom. 4:18). This Sobrino sees as
a third approach, between despair and optimism.9 It is a hope
which emerges paradoxically exactly at that point were all hope
seems to be lost: at the foot of the cross(es). For this reason, the
crosses of the crucified in history represent the location from which
to proclaim Jesus resurrection today.10
The resurrection of Jesus means hope for the crucified ones of
history. Is it only their symbol of hope, in Sobrinos view? It is not
exclusively theirs, but primarily. This is another result of the scandalous partisanship of the Gospel11: just as the Kingdom belongs to
the poor, the Christian hope of resurrection is primarily a hope for
the crucified.12 And just as it is only by accepting this partisan
7
574
12 Sobrino 1982a, 176. (L)a resurreccin es esperanza en primer lugar para los
crucificados. Dios resucit a un crucificado, y desde entonces hay esperanza
para los crucificados de la historia.
13 Sobrino 1982a, 177. Hay que participar, pues, de la crucifixin, aunque sea
analgicamente, para que exista una esperanza cristiana.
14 Sobrino 1982a, 176-177. La correlacin entre resurreccin y crucificados,
anloga a la correlacin entre reino de Dios y pobres, que predic Jess, no
significa desuniversalizar la esperanza de todos los hombres, sino encontrar el
lugar correcto de su universalizacin.
15 Sobrino 1982a, 175 La pregunta que lanza la resurreccin es si participamos
nosotros tambin en el escndalo de dar muerte al justo, si estamos del lado
de los que asesinan o del lado de Dios que le da vida.
575
576
577
21 Although la lucha clearly may have belligerent connotations (like the struggle in English) the term is wider, implying all sorts of hard, day-to-day work
for bread and survival. It is in this wider sense I use it here. The dimension
of fiesta and celebration such a central feature of Latin culture has come
more to the fore in Latin American theology during the last years. Cf.
Taborda 1987, and Assmann 1996, (see particular his conclusion: [] hay
toda una vasta gama de vivencias del placer de la vida cotidiana que tampoco
han tenido mucho espacio en las elucubraciones teolgicas.). Sobrino frequently reflects on the experience of joy in the midst of hardships: No es lo
mismo adorar, rezar, obedecer a Cristo y rendirle culto y nada digamos de
organizar cruzadas para seguir su santa voluntad que sentir el gozo en el
Dios que se ha manifestado en l [] Dicho en lenguaje ms conceptual, a
la doble perspectiva de ortodoxia en nuestra relacin con Jesucristo, queremos aadir una tercera que, a falta de mejor expresin, pudiramos llamar
ortopathos, es decir, el modo correcto de afectarnos por la realidad de Cristo.
Y en ese afectarse debe estar centralmente presente el gozo que causa el que el
Cristo es Jess de Nazaret y no otro [] As como el creyente ha de aceptar
su verdad y proseguir su praxis para corresponder a su realidad, as al Cristo
que es buena noticia se le corresponde con gozo. Sobrino 1993e; cf. Sobrino
1993g, 368-369.
578
579
either idealising victims and thereby de facto playing into the hands
of their offenders by helping to make the victims content with their
lot, and passively resigned, or excusing all victims and thereby
adopting a naive and simplistic approach to the analysis of the patterns of human interaction, thus in fact becoming blind to the radical nature of evil.
Proclaiming faith in the resurrection as a way of claiming the
victims victory can help to prevent these dangers. By pointing to
the resurrection as a future promise, it can promote a hope and a joy
which can free the victims from the bondage that their present situation represents, and from the despair and fear that this situation
causes in them. By pointing to the resurrection as present reality,
through the empowering presence in their midst of the Crucified
and Risen One, the Victorious Victim, it can restore their dignity
and affirm their hope even now, and not only in view of a (possibly)
distant future. By pointing to the fact that the One who was raised
from the dead is none other than Jesus, it can summon all victims
and all others who join them in solidarity and service to follow
the example of him who did not give in to the powers that create
victims, but remained faithful to the life-restoring reality of the
Kingdom of God and the salvific presence of the God of the Kingdom.
Thereby, at best, the victims self-esteem may be restored and
their passivity broken. Thus they may also be set free to testify to
Gods salvation and make it visible and tangible in history. The victims, the crucified people, may share salvation with the world, contrary to everything that would and could be expected of them.
580
581
former good messages (euangelia), surpassing not only the benefactors who
came before him, but also leaving no hope that anyone in the future would surpass him, and since for the world the birthday of the god was the beginning
of his good messages (euangelion), [may it therefore be decided that] []26
582
And since this Jesus had become victorious, it implied that there
was a future surpassing the present age good news to its victims!
even a future that was radically different. For if it was the victim
Jesus who had been proved victorious, then the values and the system that had made him a victim were proved wrong and invalid.
This perspective certainly brings out the anti-authoritarian, revolutionary character of the early Christian preaching. Likewise, it
lays bare its profound victimological orientation. It is tempting to
draw a parallel to our own times here. We hear the joyful proclamations of the End of History and a New World Order, while the
number of people expelled and exploited by this Order continues to
grow. Instead of pax romana, the world community gives clearer
and clearer signs of being subject to a pax americana.29 However far
one might wish to go in exploiting this parallelism (and perhaps it
should not be pressed too far), at least this much is clear: that
choosing the perspective of victims, making the reality and symbol
of the crucified people central in Christian theology particularly at
the turn of the millennium, is in accordance with the core and origin of the Christian gospel.
583
584
Afterword
The Reality of Continuing Crucifixion
in a Globalised Age
585
586
Virilio, 1997.
Baumann, 1998, 9.
Baumann, 1998, 2.
587
For those who are not free to leave, those who do not possess the
means to buy themselves out of local dependency, the situation is
increasingly difficult. Through privatization, flexibilisation of
labour and technocratisation of politics, these people lose ever more
of the influence they may have had on the living conditions in their
local place a place at which they are now condemned to remain.
Or rather, they are condemned to remain in their place, forbidden
to cross borders and yet they must move, out of desperate need.
Ours is also a time of migration. When the locally tied move, they
are obligated to take great risks. Many do not reach their destination alive. And those who do are often arrested and returned by
force upon arrival.
It is faced with this new challenge the free, unrestricted
mobility of the few, and the local captivity or forced migration of
the many that I think it is fruitful to reconsider one important
aspect of liberation theologys claim of one history. What this
claim implies, is not merely that salvation takes place now, and not
primarely in Gods future; but furthermore that salvation takes
place here, not in another place, in the beyond, in heaven nor in
the virtual wonderworld of cyberspace. Jon Sobrinos strong emphasis on the locus theologicus, the theological place or location, thus
gains a particular relevance in relation to the forces of globalisation.
The theological place is both the apt place for theological perception and interpretation, and the place in which Gods saving power
is at work. God liberates concrete places, spaces, and human communities the very places that to the globalised elite have become
insignificant, but to the excluded majorities signify social deprivation and humiliation.
This approach calls for a much more critical awareness of the
deep interdependence between humanity and nature, an aspect that
liberation theology has been rather slow to address. The theological
7
588
589
Since the writing of the manuscript for this book, Jon Sobrino
has published another important work in Christology, La Fe en Jesucristo. Ensayo desde las victimas (1999). The main focus of my book
the crucified in history, the crucified people is given the most
thorough treatment by Sobrino in Jesucristo liberador. In La Fe en
Jesucristo Sobrino does not present significant changes or modifications to this theme. Yet the theme is further developed. Whereas in
Jesucristo liberador Sobrino develops the theme of the crucified people, in Fe en Jesucristo he asks the question of what realistic hope
these people may have of becoming a resurrected people.8 This
close interconnection between the crucified people and a (possibly)
resurrected people is explored in several aspects. Most notably,
Sobrino boldly puts forward the possibility of being resucitadores.
This is not a question of actually repeating in history what God did
to Jesus in the unique event of the resurrection. It is rather the possibility, within the analogical consciousness of similarity-in-difference, to give signs (Gr.: semeia) of the reality of the resurrection
through a committed service to and with the victims, a service that
is imbued with a certain power (Gr.: dynamis)9. Such resurrectionpraxis will always have a sense of impossibility attached to it; it is
working against all odds for the restoration of the justice and dignity of the victims in history.10
I believe that it is this possible impossibility that continues to
make the cross of Jesus a sign and source of hope in our time. In the
midst of the struggle, in the graceful following of Jesus, we may
Sobrino, 1999, 32: [] qu esperanza y con qu realismo tiene un pueblo crucificado de ser tambin un pueblo resucitado; []
9 Sobrino, 1999, 93: Se trata de analoga, obviamente, pues no podemos pretender llevar a cabo una praxis que reproduzca el acontecimiento escatolgico de la resurreccin de Jess, aunque s podemos como lo haca Jess en
su anuncio del reino poner semeia (signos), a travs de una determinada
dynamis (fuerza).
10 Ibid.
8
590
591
592
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623
624
625
626
A
Abelard 375
Altizer 440
Anselm 104, 375, 378, 421, 422,
526
Aquinas 256, 460
Aristotle 214, 319, 323, 454
Aron 325
Assmann 34, 75, 79, 188, 189,
190, 194, 215, 300, 421, 461,
501, 502, 557, 578, 593, 594
Augustine 104, 170, 273, 399
Auln 295, 374, 375, 410, 411,
413, 414, 418, 427, 594
B
Balthasar 474
Barth 379, 456, 555, 607
Batstone 188, 255, 269, 469, 594
Baumann 587, 588
Bedford 24, 118, 154, 166, 172,
173, 204, 211, 402, 555, 594
Berkhof 21, 48, 594
Boff 27, 34, 57, 79, 80, 114, 119,
125, 132, 188, 189, 191, 220,
297, 335, 382, 383, 388, 421,
429, 446, 447, 448, 449,
451, 452, 460, 469, 471,
628
464
Hempel 325, 326
Higgins and Letson 112
Hinkelammert 75, 132, 503,
608
Horsley 197
I
Iparraguirre 105, 106, 608
J
Jeanrond 320, 321, 322, 326,
327, 365, 545, 596, 608
Jeremias 197, 199, 208, 210,
230, 246, 247, 248, 249,
251, 608
John Chrysostom 98
Johnson 154, 265, 361, 362, 437,
449, 450, 451, 452, 455, 483,
485, 490, 519, 608
Jones 214, 279, 608
Jngel 169, 170, 171, 172, 173,
175, 176, 275, 353, 389, 399,
400, 402, 433, 439, 440,
441, 453, 454, 455, 456, 467,
490, 522, 532, 609
K
Khler 196
Kant 77, 438
Ksemann 196, 199, 210, 235
Kazel 265
629
Kierkegaard 350
King Ferdinand 181
Kliksberg 499
L
Las Casas 132, 133, 186, 190,
607
Leer-Salvesen 564, 610
Lon-Dufour 383
Lessing 196, 373
Lvinas 83, 526
Libnio 34, 112
Lgstrup 83, 568
Lnning 374, 389, 441, 611
Lwy 306, 611
Loyola 95, 96, 98, 106, 110, 112,
608, 615
Luther 170, 223, 350, 379, 399,
411, 414, 433, 434, 435, 437,
438, 440, 442, 443, 445,
473, 490, 533, 542, 562, 565,
610
Luther King 274
M
Mack 197
MacIntyre 213, 611
Macquarrie 47, 161, 167, 188,
224, 279, 373, 399, 444, 611
Maier 24, 44, 118, 344, 611
Marcel 315, 618
Marcuse 68
630
631
632
V
Vaage 199, 625
Verms 241, 248, 625
Viano 301, 302, 303, 625
Virilio 587
W
Weber 306
Weiss 196
Wertham 301
Whitehead 430, 437
Widmann 235, 623, 626
Williamson 208, 209, 210, 626
Wrede 196, 255
Z
Zubiri 47, 48, 84, 88, 105, 108,
137, 200, 223, 311, 522, 601,
605, 606, 626
Theo Sundermeier
Universitt Heidelberg
Klaus Koschorke
Universitt Mnchen
Werner Ustorf
University of Birmingham
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Band
2 Ingo Lembke: Christentum unter den Bedingungen Lateinamerikas. Die katholische Kirche
vor den Problemen der Abhngigkeit und Unterentwicklung.
Band
3 Gerd U. Kliewer: Das neue Volk der Pfingstler. Religion, Unterentwicklung und sozialer Wandel
in Lateinamerika.
Band
Band
5 Werner Ustorf: Afrikanische Initiative. Das aktive Leiden des Propheten Simon Kimbangu.
Band
Band
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8 Pamela M. Binyon: The Concepts of Spirit and Demon. A Study in the use of different
languages describing the same phenomena.
Band
9 Neville Richardson: The World Council of Churches and Race Relations. 1960 to 1969.
Band 10 Jrg Mller: Uppsala II. Erneuerung in der Mission. Eine redaktionsgeschichtliche Studie
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Band 11 Hans Schpfer: Theologie und Gesellschaft. Interdisziplinre Grundlagenbibliographie
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Band 12 Werner Hoerschelmann: Christliche Gurus. Darstellung von Selbstverstndnis und Funktion indigenen Christseins durch unabhngige charismatisch gefhrte Gruppen in Sdindien.
Band 13 Claude Schaller: LEglise en qute de dialogue. Vergriffen.
Band 14 Theo Tschuy: Hundert Jahre kubanischer Protestantismus (18681961). Versuch einer
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Band 15 Werner Korte: Wir sind die Kirchen der unteren Klassen. Entstehung, Organisation und
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Band 16 Amold Bittlinger: Papst und Pfingstler. Der rmisch katholisch-pfingstlerische Dialog und
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Band 17 Ingemar Lindn: The Last Trump. An historico-genetical study of some important chapters
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Band 18 Zwinglio Dias: Krisen und Aufgaben im brasilianischen Protestantismus. Eine Studie zu den
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Band 19 Mary Hall: A quest for the liberated Christian. Examined on the basis of a mission, a man
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Band 20 Arturo Blatezky: Sprache des Glaubens in Lateinamerika. Eine Studie zu Selbstverstndnis
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Band 21 Anthony Mookenthottam: Indian Theological Tendencies. Approaches and problems for
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Band 22 George Thomas: Christian Indians and Indian Nationalism 18851950. An Interpretation in
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Band 23 Essiben Madiba: Evanglisation et Colonisation en Afrique: LHritage scolaire du Cameroun
(18851965).
Band 24 Katsumi Takizawa: Reflexionen ber die universale Grundlage von Buddhismus und Christentum.
Band 25 S.W. Sykes (ed.): England and Germany. Studies in theological diplomacy.
Band 26 James Haire:The Character andTheological Struggle of the Church in Halmahera, Indonesia,
19411979.
Band 27 David Ford: Barth and Gods Story. Biblical Narrative and theTheological Method of Karl Barth
in the Church Dogmatics.
Band 28 Kortright Davis: Mission for Carribean Change. Carribean Development As Theological
Enterprise.
Band 29 Origen V. Jathanna:The Decisiveness of the Christ-Event and the Universality of Christianity
in a world of Religious Plurality. With Special Reference to Hendrik Kraemer and Alfred George
Hogg as well as to William Ernest Hocking and Pandipeddi Chenchiah.
Band 30 Joyce V. Thurman: New Wineskins. A Study of the House Church Movement.
Band 31 John May: Meaning, Consensus and Dialogue in Buddhist-Christian-Communication.
A study in the Construction of Meaning.
Band 32 Friedhelm Voges: Das Denken von Thomas Chalmers im kirchen- und sozialgeschichtlichen
Kontext.
Band 33 George MacDonald Mulrain: Theology in Folk Culture. The Theological Significance of
Haitian Folk Religion.
Band 34 Alan Ford: The Protestant Reformation in Ireland, 15901641. 2. unvernderte Auflage.
Band 35 Harold Tonks: Faith, Hope and Decision-Making. The Kingdom of God and Social PolicyMaking. The Work of Arthur Rich of Zrich.
Band 36 Bingham Tembe: Integrationismus und Afrikanismus. Zur Rolle der kirchlichen Unabhn-gigkeitsbewegung in der Auseinandersetzung um die Landfrage und die Bildung der
Afrikaner in Sdafrika, 18801960.
Band 37 Kingsley Lewis: The Moravian Mission in Barbados 18161886. A Study of the Historical
Context and Theological Significance of a Minority Church Among an Oppressed People.
Band 38 Ulrich M. Dehn: Indische Christen in der gesellschaftlichen Verantwortung. Eine theologische und religionssoziologische Untersuchung politischer Theologie im gegenwrtigen
Indien.
Band 39 Walter J. Hollenweger (ed.): Pentecostal Research in Europe: Problems, Promises and
People. Proceedings from the Pentecostal Research Conference at the University of
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Band 40 P. Solomon Raj: A Christian Folk-Religion in India. A Study of the Small Church Movement
in Andhra Pradesh, with a Special Reference to the Bible Mission of Devadas.
Band 41 Karl-Wilhelm Westmeier: Reconciling Heaven and Earth: The Transcendental Enthusiasm
and Growth of an Urban Protestant Community, Bogota, Colombia.
Band 42 George A. Hood: Mission Accomplished? The English Presbyterian Mission in Lingtung,
South China. A Study of the Interplay between Mission Methods and their Historical Context.
Band 43 Emmanuel Yartekwei Lartey: Pastoral Counselling in Inter-Cultural Perspective: A Study of
some African (Ghanaian) and Anglo-American views on human existence and counselling.
Band 44 Jerry L. Sandidge: Roman Catholic/Pentecostal Dialogue (19771982): A Study in
Developing Ecumenism.
Band 45 Friedeborg L. Mller:The History of German Lutheran Congregations in England, 19001950.
Band 46 Roger B. Edrington: Everyday Men: Living in a Climate of Unbelief.
Band 47 Bongani Mazibuko: Education in Mission/Mission in Education. A Critical Comparative
Study of Selected Approaches.
Band 48 Jochanan Hesse (ed.): Mitten im Tod vom Leben umfangen. Gedenkschrift fr Werner
Kohler.
Band 49 Elisabeth A. Kasper: Afrobrasilianische Religion. Der Mensch in der Beziehung zu Natur,
Kosmos und Gemeinschaft im Candombl eine tiefenpsychologische Studie.
Band 50 Charles Chikezie Agu: Secularization in lgboland. Socio-religious Change and its Challenges
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Band 51 Abraham Adu Berinyuu: Pastoral Care to the Sick in Africa. An Approach to Transcultural Pastoral Theology.
Band 52 Boo-Woong Yoo: Korean Pentecostalism. Its History and Theology.
Band 53 Roger H. Hooker: Themes in Hinduism and Christianity. A Comparative Study.
Band 54 Jean-Daniel Plss: Therapeutic and Prophetic Narratives in Worship. A Hermeneutic Study
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Secular Society.
Band 55 John Mansford Prior: Church and Marriage in an Indonesian Village. A Study of Customary
and Church Marriage among the Ata Lio of Central Flores, Indonesia, as a Paradigm of
the Ecclesial Interrelationship between village and Institutional Catholicism.
Band 56 Werner Kohler: Umkehr und Umdenken. Grundzge einer Theologie der Mission
(herausgegeben von Jrg Salaquarda).
Band 57 Martin Maw: Visions of India. Fulfilment Theology, the Aryan Race Theory, and the Work
of British Protestant Missionaries in Victorian India.
Band 58 Aasulv Lande: Meiji Protestantism in History and Historiography. A Comparative Study
of Japanese and Western Interpretation of Early Protestantism in Japan.
Band 59 Enyi B. Udoh: Guest Christology. An interpretative view of the christological problem in
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Band 84 Heinrich Schfer: Protestantismus in Zentralamerika. Christliches Zeugnis im Spannungsfeld von US-amerikanischem Fundamentalismus, Unterdrckung und Wiederbelebung
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Band 85 Joseph Kufulu Mandunu: Das Kindoki im Licht der Sndenbocktheologie. Versuch einer
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Band 86 Peter Fulljames: God and Creation in intercultural perspective. Dialogue between the
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Band 87 Stephanie Lehr: Wir leiden fr den Taufschein! Mission und Kolonialisierung am Beispiel
des Landkatechumenates in Nordostzaire.
Band 88 Dhirendra Kumar Sahu: The Church of North India. A Historical and Systematic Theological
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Band 89 William W. Emilsen: Violence and Atonement. The Missionary Experiences of Mohandas
Gandhi, Samuel Stokes and Verrier Elwin in India before 1935.
Band 90 Kenneth D. Gill: Toward a Contextualized Theology for the Third World. The Emergence
and Development of Jesus Name Pentecostalism in Mexico.
Band 91 Karl O. Sandnes: A New Family. Conversation and Ecclesiology in the Early Church with
Cross-Cultural Comparisons.
Band 92 Jan A.B. Jongeneel: Philosophy, Science and Theology of Mission in the 19th and 20th
Centuries. A Missiological Encyclopedia. Part I: The Philosophy and Science of Mission.
Band 93 Raymond Pfister: Soixante ans de pentectisme en Alsace (19301990). Une approche
socio-historique.
Band 94 Charles R.A. Hoole: Modern Sannyasins. Protestant Missionary Contribution to Ceylon
Tamil Culture.
Band 95 Amuluche Gregory Nnamani: The Paradox of a Suffering God. On the Classical, ModernWestern and Third World Struggles to harmonise the incompatible Attributes of the
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Band 96 Geraldine S. Smyth: A Way of Transformation. A Theological Evaluation of the Conciliar
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of Churches, 19831991.
Band 97 Aasulv Lande / Werner Ustorf (eds.): Mission in a Pluralist World.
Band 98 Alan Suggate: Japanese Christians and Society. With the assistance of YAMANO Shigeko.
Band 99 Isolde Andrews: Deconstructing Barth. A Study of the Complementary Methods in Karl
Barth and Jacques Derrida.
Band 100 Lynne Price: Faithful Uncertainty. Leslie D. Weatherheads Methodology of Creative
Evangelism.
Band 101 Jean de Dieu Mvuanda: Inculturer pour vangliser en profondeur. Des initiations
traditionnelles africaines une initiation chrtienne engageante.
Band 102 Allison M. Howell:The Religious Itinerary of a Ghanaian People.The Kasena and the Christian
Gospel.
Band 103 Lynne Price, Juan Seplveda & Graeme Smith (eds.): Mission Matters.
Band 104 Tharwat Kades: Die arabischen Bibelbersetzungen im 19. Jahrhundert.
Band 105 Thomas G. Dalzell SM:The Dramatic Encounter of Divine and Human Freedom in theTheology
of Hans Urs von Balthasar.
Band 106 Jan A. B. Jongeneel: Philosophy, Science, and Theology of Mission in the 19th and 20th
Centuries. A Missiological Encyclopedia. Part II: Missionary Theology.
Band 107 Werner Kohler: Unterwegs zum Verstehen der Religionen. Gesammelte Aufstze. Herausgegeben im Auftrag der Deutschen Ostasien-Mission und der Schweizerischen
Ostasien-Mission von Andreas Feldtkeller.
Band 108 Mariasusai Dhavamony: Christian Theology of Religions. A Systematic Reflection on the
Christian Understanding of World Religions.
Band 109 Chinonyelu Moses Ugwu: Healing in the Nigerian Church. A Pastoral-Psychological
Exploration.
Band 110 Getatchew Haile, Aasulv Lande & Samuel Rubenson (eds.): The Missionary Factor
in Ethiopia: Papers from a Symposium on the Impact of European Missions on Ethiopian
Society, Lund University, August 1996.
Band 111 Anthony Savari Raj: A New Hermeneutic of Reality. Raimon Panikkars Cosmotheandric
Vision.
Band 112 Jean Pierre Bwalwel: Famille et habitat. Implications thiques de Iclatement urbain. Cas
de la ville de Kinshasa.
Band 113 Michael Bergunder: Die sdindische Pfingstbewegung im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine historische
und systematische Untersuchung.
Band 114 Alar Laats: Doctrines of the Trinity in Eastern and Western Theologies. A Study with Special
Reference to K. Barth and V. Lossky.
Band 115 Afeosemime U. Adogame: Celestial Church of Christ. The Politics of Cultural Identity in a
West African Prophetic-Charismatic Movement.
Band 116 Laurent W. Ramambason: Missiology: Its Subject-Matter and Method. A Study of MissionDoers in Madagascar.
Band 117 Veli-Matti Krkkinen: Ad UltimumTerrae. Evangelization, Proselytism and Common Witness
in the Roman Catholic Pentecostal Dialogue (19901997).
Band 118 Julie C. Ma: When the Spirit meets the Spirits. Pentecostal Ministry among the Kankanaey
Tribe in the Philippines. 2., revised edition.
Band 119 Patrick Chukwudezie Chibuko: Igbo Christian Rite of Marriage. A Proposed Rite for Study
and Celebration.
Band 120 Patrick Chukwudezie Chibuko: Paschal Mystery of Christ. Foundation for Liturgical
Inculturation in Africa.
Band 121 Werner Ustorf / Toshiko Murayama (eds.): Identity and Marginality. Rethinking Christianity
in North East Asia.
Band 122 Ogbu U. Kalu: Power, Poverty and Prayer. The Challenges of Poverty and Pluralism in African
Christianity, 19601996.
Band 123 Peter Cruchley-Jones: Singing the Lords Song in a Strange Land? A Missiological Interpretation of the Ely Pastorate Churches, Cardiff.
Band 124 Paul Hedges: Preparation and Fulfilment. A History and Study of Fulfilment Theology in
Modern British Thought in the Indian Context.
Band 125 Werner Ustorf: Sailing on the Next Tide. Missions, Missiology, and the Third Reich.
Band 126 Seong-Won Park: Worship in the Presbyterian Church in Korea. Its History and Implications.
Band 127 Sturla J. Stlsett: The crucified and the Crucified. A Study in the Liberation Christology of
Jon Sobrino.
Band 128 Dong-Kun Kim: Jesus: From Bultmann to the Third World.
Band 129 Forthcoming.
Band 130 Uchenna A. Ezeh: Jesus Christ the Ancestor. An African Contextual Christology in the Light
of the Major Dogmatic Christological Definitions of the Church from the Council of Nicea
(325) to Chalcedon (451).
Band 131 Chun-Hoi Heo: Multicultural Christology. A Korean Immigrant Perspective.