COSCA V. PALYPAYON JR.

237 SCRA 249

FACTS: Complainants are employees of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon Jr., is the Presiding Judge of the Court while Nelia
Esmeralda-Baroy is the Clerk of Court. An administrative complaint was filed charging
respondents, for illegal solemnization of marriage. Complainants alleged that Judge
solemnized 6 marriages even without the requisite marriage license, so marriage did
not reflect any marriage license number. The Judge did not sign their marriage contracts
and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he had to wait for
the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after
the ceremony.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action of respondent Judge was proper.
HELD: The Family Code proves that the formal requisites of marriage are a valid
marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. The absence of any of the
requisites shall render the marriage void and that, while an irregularity in the formal
requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible
for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
* The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the
illegal marriage, and what we are providing for pertains to the administrative liability of
respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal
Code provides that priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil
authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be
punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law.
REPUBLIC vs CRASUS IYOY, 470 SCRA 508
FACTS: Crasus and Iyoy married on was married and had five children. Later, Fely went
to the US and at the same year sent divorce papers to Crasus asking the latter to sign
them. Crasus found that Fely married an US Citizen named Micklus and had a child. Fely
went back to the PH, and she attended the marriage of one of her children while using
the surname of her 2nd husband. Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity in
their marriage in the ground of psychological incapacity since Fely brought danger and
dishonor to the family. Fely filed a counter claim and avouched that Crasus was a
drunkard, womanizer, and jobless, the reason forced the former to left for the US. Fely
argued her marriage to Micklus is valid since shes already an American Citizen and
therefore not covered by our laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not the abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute
psychological incapacity?
RULED: No, since the evidences of the respondent failed to prove psychological
incapacity as the Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable
differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical
abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by
themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said
Article.

Article 36 of the Family code refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting apart
even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume

REPUBLIC vs CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, G. R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

FACTS: Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Ozamis City with a son
and a daughter. Lady Myros left for the US bringing their son and after a few years she
was naturalized as an US citizen. Respondent Orbecido learned from his son who was
living with his wife in the States that his wife had remarried after obtaining her divorce
decree. He filed a petition for authority to remarry with the trial court invoking par. 2 of
Art. 26 of the Family Code. Having no opposition, the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur granted
the petition of the respondent and allowed him to remarry. The Solicitor Generals
motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner filed for review on certiorari of the
Decision of the RTC. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par.
2 to the instant case.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER THE ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
HELD: Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit
competent evidence showing his allegations that his naturalized American
wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried. Art. 26 (2) a divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under the Philippine laws. Article 26 par.
2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where
at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later
on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a
divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen
while residing in the US. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does not apply to the instant
case. However, the legislative intent must be taken into consideration and rule of
reason must be applied. The Supreme Court ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26 should be
construed and interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of then becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be sanction absurdity and
injustice. Were the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import
would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary
the letter of the law. A stature may therefore be extended to case not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirits or intent.

CORPUZ vs. STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL G.R. No. 186571 August
11, 2010
FACTS: Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpus is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married
respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but left for Canada due to work and commitments.
When he returned, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already involved with another
man. He filed for divorce in Canada which was granted. A month later, the divorce
decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina and
wished to marry her. He went to Civil Registry to register his Canadian divorce decree.
However, an official of NSO informed him that the former marriage still subsists under
the Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition from a competent judicial
court. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of dissolution of marriage but the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that
Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree
because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas
was the proper party who can institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the
Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse
obtains a foreign divorce decree.
ISSUE: Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants
aliens like Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign
divorce decree.
HELD: Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED. The foreign divorce decree is
presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to
petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction. The second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens but conclusion is not sufficient
basis to dismiss Gerberts petition. In other words, the unavailability of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of
legal interest to petition for the recognition of foreign divorce decree. The foreign
divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law
have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive

evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
FUJIKI vs. MARINAY
FACTS: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki is a Japanese who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay. The marriage did not sit well with Fujiki parents and he could not bring his wife
to Japan. Eventually, they lost contact with each other. Marinay met another Japanese,
Shinichi Maekara. Without the first marriage being dissolved, they got married. Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact
Fujiki. Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On
14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC for the Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage. Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2)
that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio
under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse
such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the
NSO. Upon petition, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the petition, that the petition
was in "gross violation" of the provisions of the rule. Apparently, the RTC took the view
that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the
petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki. The trial court reiterated its two
grounds for dismissal, one, for lack of right to sue and improper venue under Sections
2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.The Court required respondents to file their
comment on the petition for review. The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar
and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the
Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation and Motion. The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. Marinay and
Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to
comment on the petition. Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that
she was previously married to Fujiki. Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of
violence on Marinay. On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to
oppose the petition.She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say
might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.
HELD: Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend
the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino

citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido, this Court
recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" under the laws of
his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely
because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on
the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly
that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a
foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse
being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of
his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of
the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was
rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Courts
decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino
and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the
ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage
void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying
the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the
foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will
be discriminated the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot
remarry.