An analysis of the Italian Foreign Terrorist Fighters phenomenon1.

Alessandro Boncio, Carabinieri OR-9 Counter Terrorism lecturer. MA student in Islamic

Studies at Naples LOrientale University.

Abstract
Since the rise of the self-proclaimed Caliph Abu Bakr al Baghdadi2, the foreign
terrorist fighters phenomenon acquired an exceptional interest in the law
enforcement, intelligence and academic communities of the countries
experiencing such anomaly. This is probably due to the unprecedented dimension
reached (the number of combatants having surpassed that of the Afghanistan
conflict in the 1980s) and the correlated security threat for the countries of origin
of the mujahidiin3.
This paper analyzes the Italian situation, underlining some particular features as
well as shared elements with oher European realities. The Italian condition in this
context is fluid and constantly evolving; the official number of mujahidiin from
Italy is less than a hundred, rather low if compared to elsewhere in Europe, but
the trend is significantly rising. Moreover, as some findings point out, there are
significant similarities between the Italian salafi-jihadist milieu and its
counterparts in other European countries, despite differences e.g. regarding the
ethnic communities of origin or the societal level of integration perceived.
The last part of the paper aims at highlighting several underrated topics related
to the foreign terrorist fighters phenomenon with special reference to the issue of
the returnees. It argues that it is necessary to build up structured deradicalization narratives and programs working in parallel to the intelligence and
security services and aimed at preventing and repressing possible threats in Italy
and beyond.

Disclaimer: all the information originate from open sources and/or personal research and study.
The expressed opinions as well as any mistake or inaccuracy in the text should be referred solely
to the Author.
2 Ibrhm Awwd Ibrhm Al al-Badr al-Smarr, born in Fallujah (Iraq) on 28 June1971, selfproclaimed Caliph with the name Abu Bakr (the first Caliph in the Muslim history after the
death of the Prophet Muhammad) al Baghdadi (he states his heritage links him directly to the
Prophets family).
3 Mujahid (pl. Mujahidiin) generally refers to a fighter engaged in jihad. The author is aware of the
complexity of the relating concepts in the Islamic religion and culture. In the context of this
paper, the author refers to the broader salafi-jihadi interpretation of this terms.
1

Generalities
The Italian foreign terrorist fighters4 phenomenon is relatively small in its size if
compared with the official figures of other Western European countries5.
Nevertheless, the numbers and their significance are somehow different in value
and quality and surely are worth some remarks due to the unique societal
context of Italy.
The Italian society is historically and culturally deep-rooted in Catholicism; as a
consequence, conversions to Islam in Italy are growing at a lower rate if compared
to other European countries6, due to the huge leap of faith that a change of ones
religious affiliation and the considerable social cost of this decision entail within
the Italian context7.
The Muslim community amounts to around 1.8 of the 61 million inhabitants of
Italy8 (the data are net of the illegal migrants flows); there is a steady growth in
conversions, which is estimated at around 4000 per year9. Just a microscopic

Definition as per UN Security Council Resolution 2178/2014: namely, individuals who travel to
a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration,
planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of
terrorist training. Among academics, the most cited definition is provided by D. Malet who
defines them as non-citizen of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil conflict D.
Malet, Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identities in Foreign Conflicts, Oxford University Press,
2013, p. 9.
Exhaustive data are difficult to obtain in this field due to the impossibility to ascertain how
many residents left the country and effectively joined the conflict in the Bilad al-Shams (the
historical Grater Syria, not limited by the Sykes-Picot agreement, encompassing territories from
the Eastern Mediterranean to the Western Mesopotamia). Estimates are complex and
governments encounters difficulties to update the figures. Moreover, not all the European
countries are facing the same occurrence, as the official figures show us; P. Neumann, Foreign
fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20.000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s,
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (January 26, 2015)
http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpassesafghanistan-conflict-1980s/
According to unconfirmed reports, there are some 70.000 Italian converts to Islam and the
conversions rate around 4000 people every year. D. Sabaghi & J. Cimino, Gli italiani che si
convertono allIslam The Post Internazionale (September 18, 2014)
According to researcher M. Uhlmann, conversion does not necessarily imply a complete change
of perspective and life. The idea that conversion entails a a radical change in ones universe of
discourse is a widespread assumption (R. Machalek and D. A. Snow, The Convert as a Social
Type, Sociological Theory, 1 [1983]: 259-289, 265). Uhlmann found out that most of the time
we look at a gradual development of the (future) converts identity which usually entails a
widening of the individuals perspective and thus a differentiation of his/her identity, not a
retraction which would entail a rejection of the persons previous identity. This is different for
people who do not convert for spiritual reasons, but because they want to belong to a collective
identity, such as salafism or jihadism. M. Uhlmann, email message to the Author, July 20,
2015.
Data from the IDOS Studies and Research Center 2014 Statistical Dossier on Immigration
www.dossierimmigrazione.it/index_en.php The data are also roughly confirmed by the UCOII
(Union of Islamic Organizations in Italy): R. Bongiorni Cresce il peso delle comunit
Musulmane Il Sole 24 Ore (January 8, 2015) http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2015-0108/cresce-peso-comunita-musulmane-063622.shtml?uuid=ABsVOWaC
Generating reliable figures regarding the number of conversions is impossible, this contributing
to the mentioned lack of knowledge. Since the Muslim community has no formal clergy, there is
no central institution that could take up the task of registering Islams adherents or keeping

percentage of the community embrace an extremist interpretation of Islamic

principles, and an even smaller number join one of the various terrorist
organizations in Iraq and Syria. There are some small strongholds of extremism
in Italy, but on the whole, the Italian Muslim community lives a peaceful life in
accordance with democratic principles.
According to a recent NATO workshop report10 regarding the foreign terrorist
fighters phenomenon, Europe can be grouped into three categories:
1. Countries with high participation: the number of foreign fighters may reach
several hundred. They include the Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Kosovo), Belgium, Britain, Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands
and Sweden. The largest number comes from France (with an estimate of
more than 1550 jihadists), Germany and United Kingdom (around 700
each11).
2. Countries with medium participation: between several dozen and 100
fighters. They include Albania, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Norway,
Spain, and Switzerland.
3. Countries with low participation: ten or fewer mujahidiin. They include
Bulgaria, Hungary, Macedonia and Romania12.
In the same workshop context, an Italian Carabinieri representative stressed the
fact that Italy consider homegrown terrorism as the terrorist activities or plots
perpetrated within a country or abroad by three different categories of
individuals:

Firstly there are Italian citizens (which comprise converts and second
generation migrants); according to the most recent official report twelve
fighters coming from Italy (of them, one is presumed dead and six others
have double citizenship) went to Syria/Iraq.

The second category involves those labeled by Lorenzo Vidino as sociological

citizens13; in this category fit another eleven fighters coming from Italy.
track of the number of conversions to Islam. Furthermore, the process of converting to Islam
consists of a simple ritual which requires no formal registration. In order to become Muslim, the
person wanting to convert simply speaks out the hahda (declaration of belief in the oneness of
God and acceptance of Muhammad as his prophet) in front of two Muslim witnesses. Therefore,
estimates referring to the number of converts have to be regarded as dubious. M. Uhlmann
Home and Belonging in a Semi-Diasporic Setting: Converts to Reflexive Islam in West
European Societies In F. Klger and K. Stierstorfer (ed.), Diasporic Constructions of Home and
Belonging. De Gruyter: Berlin/Boston, 2015; p. 207-226, 214.
10 NATO Centre of Excellence Defence against Terrorism Homegrown Terrorism, causes and
dimensions (June 3-4, 2014) http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/workshop_reports/02Homegrown_Terrorism_Workshop_Report.pdf
11 The data were updated according to C. Lister August 2015 report for Brookings Doha Center
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/08/13-foreign-fighterslister/en-fighters-web.pdf
12 Data related to the above mentioned NATO workshop and updated from ICSR estimate as per
January 2015 http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/
13 According to Vidinos definition, sociological citizens are legally permanent residents raised in a
country, although originally coming from another, who absorbed the local culture, values and
social perception of events. L. Vidino Home-Grown Jihadism in Italy. Birth, development and
radicalization dynamics Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (April 29, 2014)
www.ispionline.it/it/EBook/vidino-eng.pdf

The third category includes visitors (workers or students with a temporary

residence certificate) radicalized largely within the country. According to the
last report to the Parliament, 64 fighters coming from Italy fall into this
group, bringing the total number to 8714. To this group another 102
individuals should be added. They were arrested (45) or expelled (57) from
the country from February 2014, before actively joining terrorist groups in
Iraq and Syria.

Italian features and comparison with other European Realities

The growth of the foreign fighters phenomenon in Italy follows the European
trend, even though is slightly lagged in reacting to external stimuli. In May 2014
(before the establishment of the Islamic State Caliphate) there were some 30
Italian foreign fighters; in January 2015 the total was 53 (+76%); in May 2015 the
number reached 74 (+39,6%) and the last estimate in September 2015 is of 87
individuals (+17,5%).
The percentage of Italians fighting in the Syrian conflict is also following the
European standard; if we consider just the ethnic Italians we have a rough 14%
figure of the total number, but if we include also the sociological citizens, the
percentage increases to 26,4% of the total Italian foreign terrorist fighters
phenomenon.
The Italian mujahidiin begun to follow the path to Syria and Iraq since 2013,
rather late if compared with the rest of the European countries. This feature
reflects the differences in the growth of the phenomenon in Italy. The age of the
Italian foreign terrorist fighters ranges from 18 to 42 years15, with a majority of
youngsters (18-26 years); the 29% of the fighters are converts16 and the
percentage of women makes up around 7% of the total.
The confirmed number of deceased combatants coming from Italy is eighteen, and
there is a rough figure of ten mujahidiin who came back into the country.
The special element that raises some questions in this analysis is the foreign
terrorist fighters ethnic composition, especially if related to the recent Italian
history. There is an overrepresentation of ethnic mujahidiin from the Balkans,
while the number of North Africans among the Italian foreign terrorist fighters is
lower, an interesting fact given that Muslims with North African origin represent
the historically bigger community settled in Italy and the biggest share of the
recent migration wave that interested the country. The explanation for this
situation is probably twofold.
The first reason is demographic; Italys first serious flow of North African
migrants arrived in the 80s. Many young people arrived in Italy from Maghreb
14

15

16

The figures were updated by the Italian Defense Minister during a television interview on Sept.
20, 2015 http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2015-09-20/pinotti-file-dell-isis-87-foreighfighters-passati-dall-italia-170441.shtml?uuid=AC51QL1
A female minor with Italian passport but living with her family in France, was detained in
Adana (Turkey) in October 2015; her identity was not disclosed and two week later she was
expelled from the country. She was suspected of trying to join ISIS forces in Syria and was held
in
a
detention
center
dedicated
to
foreign
fighters.
http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2015/10/15/news/turchia_minorenne_italiana_fermata_al_c
onfine_con_la_siria-125150674/
This is an estimate based on OSINT research and sample created by the author

countries searching for better life conditions, and their communities were mainly
organized in suburbs of big metropolis like Milan, Naples and Rome17. The
jihadist presence in Italy dates back to the early 90s, with the first structured
terrorist cells (GIA18, SGPC19) active in the country. Due to that reason, the
second generation of this first flow of migrants is nowadays reaching adult age,
thus delaying and influencing the rate of radicalized individuals.
Another cause for the lower rate of North Africans among the Italian fighters
battalion is probably related to the so-called Arab Spring effect and the current
tense situation experienced in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. Ethnic North Africans
are probably more concerned with the ongoing conflicts and tensions in their
countries of origin, and there are reports of older Libyans and Tunisians who
joined the conflicts there. ISIS expansion into those countries (with the
establishment of provinces20 in Libya, Sinai and Tunisia) gave these individuals
a short range trip from Italy and for some of them an opportunity to avenge the
past Islamist defeats at the hand of the Ben Ali, Ghaddafi and Mubarak regimes.
For this group of radicalized men and women, the Maghreb region is easier to
reach as they already have connections and facilitators; they know the
environment and the political situation and they probably consider it more
important to join the fight there.
The Italian jihadist landscape is a fluid and evolving situation composed of
heterogeneous realities with different features.The Italian converts are still a
small percentage in the Muslim community, but the phenomenon is steadily
growing and it is nevertheless significant if related to the countrys role as a
cradle of Christianity. The Italian society and culture is deeply entrenched with
the Christian faith and the leap to reach Islam is even bigger for an ethnic (or
sociologic) Italian.
Among the jihadist first generation networks established in the country21, the
main role of sympathizers and/or associates was to logistically and financially
assist the mujahidiin passing through Italy. The country was always considered
as a kind of safe haven since the time of the al-Qaeda European Network, due
to the porous shores and borders and the possibility to obtain high quality forged
documents that were very useful in the Schengen area.
Maybe the most important feature is the strict ethnic composition of the Italian
radicalized milieu; People coming from Bosnia or Kosovo are not mixing up with
youngsters coming from the Maghreb area; Syrians are not associated with

17
18
19
20
21

M. Groppi, Islamization Processes in Italy International Institute per Counter Terrorism (July 7,
2010) http://www.ict.org.il/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=HOnfBMnZLRU%3d&tabid=379
Groupe Islamique Armee aka Islamic Armed Group, the military wing of the Algerian Islamic
Salvation Front political party.
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, a splinter group from GIA that later became Al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb - AQIM
Wilayat al Barqa, Wilayat al Derna, Wilayat Al Tarabulus and Wilayat al Sina were the first
provinces established outside Shams (the Greater Syria) by the Islamic State.
The so-called al-Qaeda European network was established by the group leaders during the
second phase of the evolution of al-Qaeda. At the end of the Afghan conflict and with the
establishment of an Islamic Emirate in the country by the Taliban, the foreign fighters returned
to their countries of origin to proselytize, recruit and establish terrorist cells in the Western
countries.

Pakistanis and so on. This element reflects the regional variegated composition of
the various Muslim communities and their different paths towards radicalization
and violent behavior22.
With this framework, the Italian jihadist milieu is similar to the German one, with
high number of unemployed and undereducated people among its ranks, often
composed of individuals with previous criminal records; quite the opposite of the
British terrorist battalion, usually better educated, with more qualified jobs and
socially integrated, according to the researcher Daniela Pisoiu23. These differences
are in many cases related to diverging paths of migration and social integration
policies, as well as the ethnic communities of origin.
Present and future issues
Although radicalism cannot be considered terrorism, the process that drives
individuals to embrace radical ideologies is of paramount importance, as it can
constitute the first step towards violent extremism24. Yet, it is undoubtedly true
that there is no single path to radicalization and that every country has its own
particular features in producing radicalized youth25.
However, there are some common denominators in all known case studies, no
matter the origin or residence of the mujahid: the apparent lack of contacts
between wannabe foreign fighters and the traditional qaedist structures; the
massive use of the internet for indoctrination, training, communication etc; the
existing interaction between the lack of socio-economic integration and the
radicalization process.
Moreover, some persistent features, all of them interlinked and consequential,
help to create a rough identikit of a generic foreign terrorist fighter: their young
age and short radicalization process; a rather poor knowledge of Islam (due to
their young age and and often lacking education in Islamic beliefs and
jurisprudence); a fragile motivation (since they didnt have the time or education
to fully comprehend and accept the jihadist ideology)26.
All those factors should be addressed by a structured strategy aimed at the
disengagement from jihadist narratives once we find the right interpretation of
these phenomena. Moreover, opposing this narrative will also impact on the
recruitment tendency: mujahidiin possess an aura of sanctity and righteousness
22

23
24

25

26

See the 2008 report Radicalisation processes leading to acts of terrorism by the European
Commission's
Expert
Group
on
Violent
Radicalisation
(2008,
p.16)
http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20080500_cscp_report_vries.pdf
http://ifsh.de/file-ZEUS/pdf/ZEUS_WP_8.pdf
M. Lombardi, IS 2.0 e molto altro. Il progetto di comunicazione del Califfato in Twitter e Jihad:
la comunicazione dellISIS edited by M. Maggioni and P. Magri for ISPI, 2015 p.93
http://www.ispionline.it/it/EBook/TWITTER_JIHAD_COMUNICAZIONE_ISIS.pdf
In this regard see O. Roy EuroIslam: the jihad within?, The National Interest (n.71, Spring
2003, p.63); L. Vidino and J. Brandon counter radicalization in Europe, International Centre
for the study of Radicalization and Political Violence (2012 p.9) http://icsr.info/wpcontent/uploads/2012/12/ICSR-Report-Countering-Radicalization-in-Europe.pdf
M. Uhlmann (June 10, 2015). Challenges and possible opportunities for developing effective
counter-narrative measures to the Islamic State movement, In Marret, J.-L. & Tol, G. (ed.).
Understanding Deradicalization: Pathways to Enhance Transatlantic Common Perception and
Practices. Middle East Institute: Washington DC www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/Milena
Uhlmann.pdf

among the extremist circles. In the virtual digital world, those faceless fighters
have the authority once retained only by senior jihadist scholars and are now
celebrated as the model to be emulated.
regarding Italy, one of the key elements in need of an enhanced debate is related
to the so called returnees. As of now, there are news of around ten foreign
fighters who have returned to Italy27, (without mentioning Schengen passport
bearers who could possibly travel to other European countries) but there is no
clear policy on how to treat them28.
Apart from a penal discourse29, a returnee is a different person (from his/her prejihad self) with enormous difficulties to reintegrate into the society. Former
combatants often suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder and should/must be
closely monitored and counseled if further violent problems want to be avoided.
Contrary to preventive investigations, where the web is the main tool, direct
contact is needed when wanting to de-radicalize and rehabilitate someone30.
Mentors for such individuals should be preferably Muslims, possibly young and
with in-depth knowledge of youth (sub) cultural codes (it is a known fact that
many jihadists come from the rap/hip-hop scene); this will help returnees to
relate to someone perceived as authentic and trustworthy to open up to.
Of course, there is a relevant difference between ideologically motivated foreign
fighters and people fighting in Bilad al Shams according to a perceived religious
obligation. The narrative and the de-construction of extremist beliefs of such
people should be tailored to their trigger motivation to become a foreign fighter.
Homegrown terrorism and violent extremism are societal phenomena where
issues like belonging, identity, group dynamics and values are important
elements in the collective-identity construction process. Religion, as such, plays
an important role, but for some it probably rather serves as a vehicle for fulfilling
other goals31.

27

28

29

30

31

G. Masini lItalia nel mirino della jihad; 10 jihadisti rimpatriati, Il Giornale (January 15,
2015)
http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/cronache/litalia-nel-mirino-jihad-dieci-foreign-fightersrimpatriati-1083098.html
The only Italian organization known to the author which is included in the European Network
of Deradicalisation is EXIT S.C.S. Onlus, led by Cristina Caparesi http://www.europeannetwork-of-deradicalisation.eu/profiles/75-exit-italy
The recent bill introduced in February 2015, regulates (among other norms) the crime of
travelers (or who recruit, facilitate and finance those trips) who reach the theaters of jihad to
join terrorist organizations. (see D.L. n.7, February 18, 2015)
Dr. Kiran Sarma, leader of the Risky and Extreme Behavior Research Group at the National
University of Ireland in Galway and partner of the European Commissions Radicalization
Awareness Network (RAN HEALTH) has splendidly addressed the usefulness of the instrument
of de-radicalization and rehabilitation. Those, provide access to a huge amount of information,
which are very useful to build resilience at community level and for the prevention of the
radicalization process. K. Sarma and others, 8th Annual International Conference of the
Society for Terrorism Research (September 17-19, 2014)
On the individual motivational factors leading to radicalization, see T. Precht, Home grown
terrorism and Islamist radicalization in Europe, Danish Ministry of Justice (December 2007)
http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/sites/default/files/media/Arbejdsomraader/Forskning/Fors
kningspuljen/2011/2007/Home_grown_terrorism_and_Islamist_radicalisation_in_Europe__an_assessment_of_influencing_factors__2_.pdf

Countering radicalization is perceived differently across the spectrum of pertinent

actors (law enforcement agencies, governments, academics etc.), but it must be
understood that radicalization inexorably intertwines social and ideological
factors and thus should be fought in a multidisciplinary way. A recent study on
countering violent extremism (CVE) showed that logic and rationality are not
winning elements; when you are trying to convince people, facts do not matter32.
Appealing to an individuals value system seems to be the most effective way to
change opinions and spur people to action33.
The longstanding debate on radicalization between security services and
academics could finally find a common ground exactly on this topic. Different
priorities can be harmonized in the analysis and forecast of future trend. The law
enforcement agencies are too engaged in the investigation and prevention of
attacks in the short term; a strategic approach coming from the academic world,
pointing to future threats is surely a valuable tool. On the other hand, scholars
and researchers are always struggling for up to date information to analyze; if
they would be provided with desensitized data, they could produce a theoretical
model pointing in the direction of future menaces.
Italy, as other European countries, should enhance its capacity to analyze and
prevent further radicalization, acknowledging the simple fact that Europe,
willingly or not, will be the recipient for migrants in the near future and will have
to absorb and integrate at least part of them into their society in the future.
A closing remark is related to transnational terrorist activities; the current
jihadists strategy (highlighted also by past and current investigations in Italy) is
to nurture an extremist religious ideology through self-created internet networks
that often cross national borders34. The foreign fighters trend is not a national
problem but a worldwide issue that should be addressed as such. This is another
important reason why an international, multiagency approach is needed.
Investigations alone can be useful in the short term period in order to prevent
attacks or the escape of more radicalized youth35, but we need to find new
encompassing ways to deal with the root causes that transform troubled
youngsters into violent actors in this hybrid conflict36.

The motivated reasoning hypothesis derives from L. Festingers cognitive dissonance theory (L.
Festinger a theory of cognitive dissonance Stanford University Press (1957). Motivated
reasoning builds on a key insight of modern neuroscience; reasoning is actually suffused with
emotions; we push threatening information away and pull friendly ones close. We apply fight or
flight reflexes not only to predators, but to data itself.
33 C. Nemr, Countering Islamic State recruitment: you are doing it totally wrong, War On the
Rocks
(July
14,
2015)
http://warontherocks.com/2015/07/countering-islamic-staterecruitment-youre-doing-it-totally-wrong/
34 The most influential ideologue of the current global jihadist architecture is surely Mustafa
Setmarian Nasar, best known as Abu Musab al Suri. He is the author of Da'wa al muqawamah
al islamiyyah al alamiyyah (global Islamic resistance call), a 1600 pages jihadist strategic book
http://www.lawandsecurity.org/portals/0/documents/abumusabalsuriarchitectofthenewalqae
da.pdf
35 In this context, during the Italian European Union Presidency an official Network of Point of
Contacts for Foreign Fighters information exchange was established. Italian EU Presidency:
Newly established network of contact points on foreign fighters Polizia di Stato (December 16,
2014) http://www.poliziadistato.it/articolo/36930/
36 J. J. McCuen, Hybrid Wars, Military Review (March-April 2008) p. 107-113
32