What are the

Prospects for a
Pakistan-US Nuclear
Deal?
Urmi Tat
Research Intern, IPCS

The South Asian region has become the focus of global politics, with the proliferation of
unaccountable non-state actors, corruption of civilian institutions and the prevailing atmosphere of
mutual suspicion between India and Pakistan. The possession of nuclear weapons by non-NPT states
like India and Pakistan has been cause for further concern due to apprehensions of nuclear accidents,
potential for misuse of nuclear material and an inexhaustible arms race. Unlike the US-India civilian
nuclear deal, no concrete civilian nuclear agreement has been reached between the US and Pakistan.
However, recent diplomatic visits between the US and Pakistan administrations and commitments
towards increasing nuclear cooperation have given rise to speculation regarding a potential
agreement. The report formulated by Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon of Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace and the Stimson Center respectively, is the latest in a series of suggestions that
could be followed in chalking out a nuclear trajectory between the US and Pakistan. Considering the
influence and stature of the authors in the US strategic community, the report constitutes an insight
into the line of thinking followed by policy-makers.
Following the line of action suggested by Mark Fitzpatrick, in his book Overcoming Pakistans Nuclear
Dangers (2014), the Carnegie-Stimson report seeks to normalise Pakistan into the nuclear
mainstream. However, it recognises that a commercial pathway to being mainstreamed into the
global nuclear order is highly unlikely for Pakistan, which lacks the commercial leverage that resulted
in a nuclear deal for India, and goes on to suggest compromises that it needs to make in order to be
mainstreamed. The question thus remains, whether the recommendations are feasible and
contribute to alleviating the precarious security dilemma in the region.
Recommendations of the Carnegie-Stimson Report
The key motive of the report remains to mainstream Pakistan into a global nuclear regime, which
otherwise remains glaring and inconspicuous with its absence. It remains an affront to the credibility
of the global order if it cannot reign in Pakistan, a defeat it has already suffered with its inability to
bring India within its fold. The premise of the recommendations offered by the report is its projection
that in the next five to ten years Pakistan could have a nuclear arsenal not only twice the size of
Indias but also larger than those of the UK, China, and France, giving it the third-largest arsenal
behind the US and Russia. Since no accurate account of Pakistans nuclear arsenal is available, this
projection that lends urgency to the report, has been labeled as a sensational speculation by the
Center for International and Strategic Studies, Islamabad, and hailed similarly by the Strategic Vision
Institute, Islamabad.
The report recommends five changes to the direction of Pakistans nuclear policy: A shift from full
spectrum to strategic deterrence (i.e. possessing capabilities to deter only the worst cases.
Strategic deterrence is an alternative future envisioned by the report, which requires a limitation of
Pakistans nuclear policy, thus allowing redirection of spending to civilian and military concerns);
commitment to a recessed deterrence posture and limitation of production of short-range delivery

vehicles and tactical nuclear weapons; lifting of Pakistans veto on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
(FMCT) negotiations and reduction of fissile material production; separation of civilian and military
nuclear facilities; signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty without waiting for India.
Feasibility and Implications of the Report
The recommendations of the report leave the impression that Pakistan is indebted to the international
community and that it is ready to make heavy-handed compromises. The proposition to lift the veto
on FMCT negotiations is considered unfair in the light of the fact that India has not been asked to stop
the production of fissile material. The NSG waiver granted to India due to its nuclear deal with the US
has in fact allowed it to obtain uranium from the international market. This proposition is considered
purposefully discriminatory especially when India has been offered advanced nuclear technologies
and systems that could equally undermine the stability of the region. The unilateral concessions that
the report demands reflects a lack of understanding of the geo-strategic scenario that affects
Pakistans deterrence posture. Its need for a nuclear agreement is premised not only on socioeconomic and technological needs but also political needs. Pakistan is wary of Indias potential entry
into the NSG and its subsequent ability to veto Pakistans prospects of an entry into the elite group
but it will not oblige to a deal that makes it psychologically weaker to India in its own perception.
Given the South Asian context, it remains necessary to reign in unaccountable actors but the very
word mainstreaming highlights an assimilationist strategy towards Pakistans entry into the global
nuclear order. The key intention of the Carnegie-Stimson report is to strengthen the global nuclear
regimes such as the NPT by affecting a compromise on the part of Pakistan. As long as policy
proposals continue to ignore the context of indigenous actors, it will continue to be discriminatory and
ineffective. Pakistans need for nuclear sufficiency and sustainability makes cooperation beyond China,
necessary. Whether the Carnegie-Stimson report provides the matrix to achieve this however,
remains disputed.