Duty, Breach, Causation, Remoteness, Damage

Is there a precedent to the particular liability which the situation falls within? If cant remember
authority, relate it to Donoghue v Stevenson. If not, go through Caparo test:
1. reasonable foreseeability would the reasonable man foresee C suffering damage as result of D;
2. sufficient proximity;
3. fair, just and reasonable;
(4. public policy).
Courts generally reluctant to impose liability for omissions Smith v Littlewoods. But:
Undertaking a task, even gratuitously, you assume a duty to act carefully Barret v MOD;
C under care or control of D eg school to safeguard pupils Barnes v Hampshire CC;
Rel between D and 3P which causes harm to C Carmarthenshire CC v Lewis.
Standard of care
The reasonable man Blyth. Personal attributes cannot be taken into account Nettleship v Weston.
The greater the risk of harm, the more precautions must be taken: likelihood that injury will occur
(Bolton v Stone) + seriousness of the injury risked (Paris v Stepney). Consider also:
Whether D under legal/moral compulsion to act; cost/practicalities of taking precautionary steps; usual
practice in trade/profession in question; state of technical or scientific knowledge (Roe v Minister of
Health).
The ordinary skilled or professional man Bolam (or who holds himself out to be that Green v
Fiber Glass Co)
Sport: participant must show reckless disregard for safety Woolridge v Sumner. Although ordinary
standard of reasonable care used in Condon v Basi.
Breach
Res ipsa loquitur raises inference of negligence which D. If he does, C must prove negligence.
1) D had right to control thing that caused damage Gee with Easson (trains/door/in or out of station)
2) Accident could not, in normal course of events, have happened without negligence;
3) The cause must be unknown not as in Barkway.
Causation
But for test Barnett.
Multiple causes
Concurrent causes Fitzgerald v Lane: liability apportioned according to blame
Successive/consecutive causes: tort followed by later tort D1 continued to be liable for loss of
earnings after leg amputated Baker v Willoughby
Tort followed by non-tort D liable up to non-tort Jobling v Associated Dairies.
Pre-existing conditions D2 only liable for additional damages Performance Cars v Abraham
(spray)
Omissions D not liable as C wouldnt have worn harness had it been provided McWilliams.
Proof did D on the balance of probabilities:
Cause
Substantially/materially contribute to (Bonnington Castings)
Materially increase risk of (McGhee v NCB)
Damage to C?
If extent of Ds contribution known, then only liable for % of damages caused (Holtby). Throws
Wilsher in doubt (More than 1 causative agent no claim).
If extent unknown, may be liable for whole (Fairchild) (1 causative agent, several tortfeasors)
Can seemingly recover for loss of substantial chance Allied Maples Group.
Intervening causes
To break chain of causation, must be something unreasonable or extraneous or extrinsic Lord
Wright in The Orepesa.
Novus actus interveniens (act of stranger) does break:
1. Intervening act of C. Must act unreasonably (McKew), otherwise wont break chain (Wieland).
2. Intervening act of 3P. If true cause of damage, D not liable (Harnett v Bond).
If act of 3P is reckless (Wright), but can be negligent and not break if natural and probable consequence
of Ds act Rouse v Squires.

3. Intervening act of nature Carslogie Steamship Co.

Where intervening act does not break:
1. Intervening act of 3P if not truly independent Scott v Shepherd.
2. Instinctive act in emergency created by Ds tort Jones v Boyce (jumped from coach)
3. Foreseeable act that D ought to have guarded against Stansbie.
For medical treatment to break chain, must be completely inappropriate response to patients condition
Webb.
Remoteness
The Wagon Mound was the type of damage reasonably foreseeable. Take broad approach as in
Bradford.
Intended consequences are never too remote Lord Lindley in Quinn v Leatham.
Eggshell-skull principle take you victim as you find him. Applied in Smith v Leech Brain.