US V.

BUSTOS
FACTS
-

1915: 34 citizens of Pampanga submitted a petition to the Executive

Secretary through the law firm of Crossfield and OBrien containing
allegations of malfeasance against Roman Punsalan, justice of peace. They
further ask that he be removed from office in light of his alleged misconduct
The following are the charges contained in said petition:
1. Francisca Polintan: Punsalan told her that he would draw up complaint for P5;
afterwards he said he would take P3 which she paid; also kept her in the
house for four days as a servant and took from her two chickens and twelve
"gandus;"
2. Valentin Sunga: party in a land dispute case; was told by Punsalan that if he
wished to win he must give him P50. Not having this amount, Sunga gave the
justice nothing, and a few days later was informed that he had lost the case.
Returning again to the office of the justice of the peace in order to appeal, the
justice told him that he could still win if he would pay P50
3. Leoncio Quiambao: having filed a complaint for assault against four persons,
on the day of the trial the justice called him over to his house, where he
secretly gave him (Quiambao) P30; and the complaint was thereupon shelved
The Executive Secretary referred the petition to judge Moir who concluded
that the second and third allegations were duly established. He then made a
recommendation addressed to the Governor-General to remove Punsalan
Punsalan asked a motion for retrial. Such was granted. The new trial imposed
a verdict reversing that of the first trial. (contention ni Punsalan: victim siya
ng prosecution, Agustin Jaime started this)
Petitioners herein now became defendants when a complaint was filed
against them on account of them allegedly writing, signing, and publishing an
article which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous
against the justice of the peace Mr. Roman Punsalan
Judge Moir found all the defendants except for few to be guilty of violating the
Libel Law. Counsels for defendants filed for a motion for a new trial. Such
however was denied
Hence, this petition

ISSUE
-

Whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman
Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of
Pampanga?

HOLDING + RATIO
-

NO.
The freedoms of speech, of the press, of assembly and of petition are part
and parcel of the Organic Law of the Constitution of the Philippine
Islands

The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to
criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of
vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is,
therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot
criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other
public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted
terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be
tyranny of the basest sort. The sword of Damocles in the hands of a
judge does not hang suspended over the individual who dares to
assert his prerogative as a citizen and to stand up bravely before
any official. On the contrary, it is a duty which everyone owes to
society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged
misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official
dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any
public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it
is to inquire into and punish them. In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner,
who contributed so largely to the law of libel. "The people are not
obliged to speak of the conduct of their officials in whispers or with
bated breath in a free government, but only in a despotism."
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of
republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech.
Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or
group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch
or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons
assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the
charges made.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
1. The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy, 'which
looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an
incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evildisposed and malignant slanderer.'
2. Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified
QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE: prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof
of malice; communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in
which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which
has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding
interest or duty, although it contained criminal matter which without this
privilege would be slanderous and actionable (e.g. a complaint made in
good faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a
public official when addressed to an officer or a board having some
interest or duty in the matter)
The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong person through
some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions

of various officials such unintentional error will not take the

case out of the privilege
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words.
Privilege destroy that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies
on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the
existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct

THE ULTIMATE TEST THEN IS BONA FIDES

-

The ends and the motives of these citizens to secure the removal from
office of a person thought to be venal were justifiable. In no way did they
abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a
frivolous matter but on instances which not only seemed to them of a grave
character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first
instance to convince him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given
to the petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of
the peace was proper. And finally the charges and the petition were
submitted through reputable attorneys to the proper functionary, the
Executive Secretary. In this connection it is sufficient to note that justices of
the peace are appointed by the Governor-General, that they may be removed
by the Governor-General upon the recommendation of a Judge of First
Instance, or on the Governor-General's own motion, and that at the time this
action took place the Executive Bureau was the office through which the
Governor-General acted in such matter

NOT GUILTY

MUTUC V. COMELEC
FACTS
-

Petitioner, Amelito Mutuc, a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional

Convention assails the validity of a ruling of respondent Commission on
Elections enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign purposes
Mutuc argues that such act is violative of his constitutional right of freedom
of speech
COMELEC contended that prohibition was premised on a provision of the
Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful for candidates "to
purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral
propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature),
flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats,
matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin"

 It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is

the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible
propaganda material, under the above statute subject to confiscation

ISSUE
-

Whether or not COMELEC was justified in prohibiting Mutuc to use a taped

jingle for campaign purposes?

HOLDING + RATIO
-

NO.
First. Utilizing the known principle of statutory construction, ejusdem generis,
the Court opined that it cannot accept COMELECs argument for it is quite
apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of
gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a
favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution
Second. Such act was repugnant to the tenets enshrined in the fundamental
law, particularly, ones constitutional right of freedom of speech
The Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free speech or a free press. It
has been our constant holding that this preferred freedom calls all the
more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the
dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital
right of suffrage. What respondent Commission did, in effect, was to
impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this constitutional
right is directed. Nor could respondent Commission justify its action by
the assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle, would
be free, either by himself or through others, to use his mobile
loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is not to be
emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not
perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other mechanical
contrivances. If this Court were to sustain respondent Commission, then
the effect would hardly be distinguishable from a previous restraint. That
cannot be validly done. It would negate indirectly what the Constitution in
express terms assures.
Third. COMELEC failed to live-up to the mandates of the fundamental law.
Respondent Commission cannot exercise any authority in conflict with or
outside of the law, and there is no higher law than the Constitution. There
could be no justification then for lending approval to any ruling or order
issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to
nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech. Petitioner's case, as
was obvious from the time of its filing, stood on solid footing.

NEAR V. MINNESOTA

FACTS

THE ASSAILED MINNESOTA STATUTE: Chapter 285 of the Session Laws of

Minnesota, 1925, stipulated that: any person who, as an individual, or as
member or employee of a firm, or association or organization, or as an
officer, director, member or employee of a corporation, shall be engaged in
the business of regularly or customarily producing, publishing or circulating,
having in possession, selling or giving away a.) an obscene, lewd, and
lascivious newspaper, magazine, or other periodical; or b.) a malicious,
scandalous, and defamatory newspaper, magazine, or other periodical, is
guilty of a nuisance and all persons guilty of such nuisance may be enjoined
as hereinafter provided.
- Simply put, this statute provided for the abatement, as a public nuisance,
of a malicious, scandalous, and defamatory newspaper, magazine, or
other periodical
- The law gives no definition except that covered by the words scandalous
and defamatory, and publications charging official misconduct are of that
class
- Any citizen may maintain an action to enjoin perpetually the persons
committing such nuisance
- Those charged can avail the defense that the truth was published with
good motives and for justifiable ends
- The Court noted the purpose and effect of the statute; according to them,
the statute in question (I included this part because the Court, I
addressing the issue at hand used the operation and effect test):
1. Is not aimed at the redress of individual or private wrongs, rather, it is
directed towards an existing business, which generally speaking,
involves more than libel; this implies that the law was promulgated not
for the protection of the person attacked, but for the protection of
public welfare
2. Is directed not simply at the circulation of the scandalous and
defamatory statements concerning private citizens, but at the
continued publication by newspapers and periodicals of charges
against public officers of corruption, malfeasance in office, etc.
3. Aims for the suppression of the offending newspaper or periodical
4. Also operates to put the publisher under an effective censorship (in
order for one who has been enjoined from publishing to renew
publication, he must first satisfy the court as to the character of the
new publication; abandoning such step would result to contempt and a
permanent restraint upon the publisher

THE DEFENDANT: Jay Near sole owner and proprietor of The Saturday
Press
- Admitted the publication of the articles in question, but denied that they
were malicious, scandalous, and defamatory
- Invoked the protection of the due process clause

BASIS FOR THE CASE: The records show that the defendant/s, on 24
September 1927, on eight subsequent dates thereafter, published and
circulated editions of the periodical which contained defamatory articles
concerning several public officials (mayor, chief of police, etc.) of
Minneapolis, the Jewish race, and the Grand Jury of Hennepin County
- The information submitted denotes that the articles published contained
imputations of the existence of a Jewish gangster; that such gangster was
in control of gambling, bootlegging, and racketeering in Minneapolis; and
that the public officials mentioned were not energetically performing their
duties, particularly towards the curtailment of the activities of said Jewish
gangster (the articles contained allegations that the public officials,
especially the chief of policy, were in conspiracy with the Jewish gangster)

DISTRICT COURT RULING: ruled that The Saturday Press is a public

nuisance on account of the articles that such periodical published; the
judgment consisted of the enjoinment of defendants as regards to the
production, editing, publication, and circulation of any material deemed to be
scandalous, malicious, and defamatory; Nears appeal was also likewise
denied
Hence, this petition

ISSUE
-

W/N a statute authorizing such proceedings in restraint of publication is

consistent with the conception of the liberty of the press as historically
conceived and guaranteed?

HOLDING + RATIO
NO.
The Court found that the statute imposes an unconstitutional restraint upon
publication. This judgment rested upon the operation and effect of the statute,
without regard to the question of truth of the charges contained in the particular
periodical. To justify this ruling, the court discussed the operation and effect of the
statute, the nature of the liberty of the press, and the reasons why the submitted
justifications for the statute cannot stand.

The operation and effect of the statute is that public authorities may
bring the owner or publisher of a newspaper or periodical before a judge
upon a charge of conducting a business of publishing scandalous and
defamatory matter in particular, that the matter consists of charges against
public officers of official dereliction and, unless the owner or publisher is
able and disposed to bring competent evidence to satisfy the judge that the
charges are true and are published with good motives and for justifiable
ends, his newspaper or periodical is suppressed and further publication is
made punishable as a contempt. This is of the essence of censorship.

The Court then proceeded with its exposition of the definition and nature of
the liberty of the press
According to Blackstone: the liberty of the press is indeed essential to the
nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints
upon the publications, and not in freedom from censure from criminal
matter when published; every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what
sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this is to destroy the
freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or
illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity.
Madison, on the other hand said that, the security of the freedom of the
press requires that it should be exempt not only from previous restraint
by the Executive, as in Great Britain, but from legislative restraint also.
Patterson v. Colorado: the main purpose of the constitutional provision is
to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been
practiced by other governments, and they do not prevent the subsequent
punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare; the
preliminary freedom extends as well to the false as to the true; the
subsequent punishment may extend as well to the true as to the false.
This was the law of criminal libel apart from statute in most cases, if not in
all.
***note: observe that all the foregoing definitions state that previous
restraint is prohibited; the term previous restraint refers to
censorship in advance; this means that no statute requiring
publishers of newspapers or periodicals deemed to be a public
nuisance to seek official approval before resuming publication
should be passed (too bad, because this was the exact essence of the
Minnesota statute in question); exception: previous restraint may be
constitutional during wartime (not applicable to the case at bar)
Jurisprudence has also recognized that punishment for the abuse of the
liberty of the press is essential to the protection of the public
However, in the past 150 years, there has been almost an entire
absence of attempts to impose previous restraints upon
publications relating to the malfeasance of public officers is
significant of the deep-seated conviction that such restraints
would violate constitutional right. Public officers, whose character
and conduct remain open to debate and free discussion in the
press, find their remedies for false accusations in actions under
libel laws providing for redress and punishment, and not in
proceedings to restrain the publication of newspapers and
periodicals. The general principle that the constitutional guaranty of the
liberty of the press gives immunity from previous restraints has been
approved in many decisions under the provisions of state constitutions.

In the case at bar, it is useless to inquire as to the permissible scope of

subsequent for the statute in question does not deal with punishments, it
provides for no punishment except in case of contempt for violation of the
courts order, but for suppression and injunction, that is, for restraint upon
publication
Attempted justifications of the statute:
The statute deals not with publication per se, but with the "business" of
publishing defamation
THE COURTS REPLY: If, however, the publisher has a
constitutional right to publish, without previous restraint, an
edition of his newspaper charging official derelictions, it cannot
be denied that he may publish subsequent editions for the same
purpose. He does not lose his right by exercising it.
Characterizing the publication as a business, and the
business as a nuisance, does not permit an invasion of
the constitutional immunity against restraint
The constitutional freedom from previous restraint is lost because charges
are made of derelictions which constitute crimes
THE COURTS REPLY: With the multiplying provisions of penal
codes, and of municipal charters and ordinances carrying penal
sanctions, the conduct of public officers is very largely within the
purview of criminal statutes. The freedom of the press from
previous restraint has never been regarded as limited to such
animadversions as lay outside the range of penal enactments.
The publisher is permitted to show, before injunction issues, that the
matter published is true and is published with good motives and for
justifiable ends
THE COURTS REPLY: If such a statute, authorizing suppression
and injunction on such a basis, is constitutionally valid, it would
be equally permissible for the legislature to provide that at any
time the publisher of any newspaper could be brought before a
court, or even an administrative officer (as the constitutional
protection may not be regarded as resting on mere procedural
details) and required to produce proof of the truth of his
publication, or of what he intended to publish, and of his
motives, or stand enjoined. If this can be done, the legislature
may provide machinery for determining in the complete exercise
of its discretion what justifiable ends are, and restrain publication
accordingly. And it would be but a step to a complete system of
censorship.
The statute is designed to prevent the circulation of scandal which tends
to disturb the public peace and to provoke assaults and the commission of
crime

THE COURTS REPLY: Charges of reprehensible conduct, and in

particular of official malfeasance, unquestionably create a public
scandal, but the theory of the constitutional guaranty is that
even a more serious public evil would be caused by authority to
prevent publication.
If the township may prevent the circulation of a newspaper for no reason
other than that some of its inhabitants may violently disagree with it, and
resent its circulation by resorting to physical violence, there is no limit to
what may be prohibited. The danger of violent reactions becomes greater
with effective organization of defiant groups resenting exposure, and if
this consideration warranted legislative interference with the initial
freedom of publication, the constitutional protection would be reduced to
a mere form of words.
-MINNESOTA STATUTE DECLARED TO BE UNCNSTITUTIONAL

GROSJEAN V. AMERICAN PRESS CO., INC.

FACTS
-

Appellees are (nine) publishers of newspapers in Louisiana

They pray that the Court enjoin the enforcement of Act No. 23 of Louisiana
against them, particularly such that reads:
That every person, firm, association, or corporation, domestic or foreign,
engaged in the business of selling, or making any charge for, advertising or
for advertisements, whether printed or published, or to be printed or
published, in any newspaper, magazine, periodical or publication whatever
having a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week, or displayed and
exhibited, or to be displayed and exhibited by means of moving pictures, in
the State of Louisiana, shall, in addition to all other taxes and licenses
levied and assessed in this State, pay a license tax for the privilege of
engaging in such business in this State of two percent. (2%) of the gross
receipts of such business.
The act requires everyone subject to the tax to file a sworn report every
three months showing the amount and the gross receipts from the business
The resulting tax must be paid when the report is filed
Failure to file the report or pay the tax as thus provided constitutes a
misdemeanor and subjects the offender to a fine not exceeding $500, or
imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both, for each violation
Any corporation violating the act subjects itself to the payment of $50 to be
recovered by suit
All of the appellees are corporations
- The lower court entered a decree for appellees and granted a permanent
injunction.

ISSUES + HOLDING + RATIO

1. W/N THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO TRY THE
CASE AT BAR? NO
- The requisite amount ($3,000) is involved in respect of each of six of the
nine appellees. This is enough to sustain the jurisdiction of the district
court.
2. W/N THE BILL DOES NOT MAKE A CASE FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF? NO
- The laws of Louisiana afford no remedy whereby restitution of taxes and
property exacted may be enforced, even where payment has been made
under both protest and compulsion. It is true that the present act contains a
provision ( 5) to the effect that, where it is established to the satisfaction of
the Supervisor of Public Accounts of the state that any payment has been
made under the act which was "not due and collectible," the Supervisor is
authorized to refund the amount out of any funds on hand collected by virtue
of the act and not remitted to the state treasurer according to law. It seems
clear that this refers only to a payment not due and collectible within the
terms of the act, and does not authorize a refund on the ground that the act is
invalid.
3. W/N THE ACT:
a. abridges the freedom of the press in contravention of the due process
clause contained in 1 of the 14TH Amendment?
YES. The First Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press. . . ." While this provision is not a restraint upon the powers of
the states, the states are precluded from abridging the freedom of speech
or of the press by force of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The freedoms of speech and of the press are rights of
fundamental character safeguarded by the due process of law clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by state legislation.
a.1 W/N THE 14TH AMENDMENT DOES NOT APPLY TO
CORPORATIONS? YES AND NO
A corporation is not a "citizen" within the meaning of the privileges and
immunities clause. But a corporation is a "person" within the meaning of
the equal protection and due process of law clauses, which are the clauses
involved here.
a.2 THE TAX IN THE INSTANT CASE
- Operates as a restraint in a double sense
- First, its effect is to curtail the amount of revenue realized from
advertising - Second, its direct tendency is to restrict circulation
a.3 W/N THE TAX IS VALID?
NO. The form in which the tax is imposed is, in itself, suspicious. It is not
measured or limited by the volume of advertisements. It is measured
alone by the extent of the circulation of the publication in which the
advertisements are carried, with the plain purpose of penalizing the

publishers and curtailing the circulation of a selected group of

newspapers.
b. denies appellees the equal protection of the laws in contravention of the
same Amendment?
YES. Having reached the conclusion that the act imposing the tax in
question is unconstitutional under the due process of law clause because
it abridges the freedom of the press, we deem it unnecessary to consider
the further ground assigned that it also constitutes a denial of the equal
protection of the laws.
OBITER: The newspapers, magazines and other journals of the country, it is safe to
say, have shed and continue to shed, more light on the public and business affairs
of the nation than any other instrumentality of publicity, and, since informed public
opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or
abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise
than with grave concern. The tax here involved is bad not because it takes money
from the pockets of the appellees. If that were all, a wholly different question would
be presented. It is bad because, in the light of its history and of its present setting,
it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the
circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the
constitutional guaranties. A free press stands as one of the great interpreters
between the government and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter
ourselves.