Hypatia, Inc.

Fetal Relationality in Feminist Philosophy: An Anthropological Critique

Author(s): Lynn M. Morgan
Source: Hypatia, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Summer, 1996), pp. 47-70
Published by: Wiley on behalf of Hypatia, Inc.
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FetalRelationalityin Feminist
Philosophy:An Anthropological
Critique
LYNNM. MORGAN

relacionalidad entre madre y feto

que replica categoras del
individualismo

This essay critiquesfeminist treatmentsof maternal-fetal"relationality"

that
unwittinglyreplicatefeaturesof Westernindividualism
(for example,theCartesian
divisionbetweentheasocialbodyand thesocial-cognitive
person,or theconflationof
socialand biologicalbirth).I arguefor a morereflexiveperspectiveon relationality
thatwouldacknowledge
how we producepersonsthroughour actionsand rhetoric.
Personhood
can be betteranalyzedas dynamic,negotiatedqualities
andrelationality
realizedthroughsocialpractice.
perspectiva ms reflexiva respecto a relacionalidad ...personas a
travs de acciones y retrican

As fetusesfigureever more prominentlyin the American social imaginary,

feminist theorists are compelled to take notice. The many paths throughthisterreno
polticamente
politically chargedterrainare all lined with contradictions,creatinga seriesofcargado
persistentconundrumsfor feminist analysis.One oft-traveledroadsteersclear
of fetuses as an object of study;its proponentsarguethat to put "the unborn"posiciones:
at the center of analysis is to be co-opted by pro-life strategiesintended to poner al feto
como objeto
divert attention from women in the debate over abortion.Susan Sherwin, for es caer en
estrategia
example, suggests that a focus on the fetus is the defining characteristicof pro vida
nonfeminists (1992, 101), and Janice G. Raymondarguesthat "feministsand
fetalists are not aligned in any way" (1987, 65).1 A more recently blazedtrail
acknowledgesthat fetusesattain social meaning throughevents not necessarily directly related to abortion. One fork of this trail winds through culturaladquieren
studies, where authors analyzefetal texts and social scripts to show that, assignificados
sociales no
metaphors,fetuses wield increasingsocial power (Berlant 1994; Duden 1993;necesariame
nte respecto
Franklin1992; Hartouni 1991, 1993, 1994). Another forkleads into sociolog-a aborto
ical territory,where the identification, commodification,medicalization,and
legalization of fetuses is documented and scrutinized (Boling 1995; Casperdesde
1994; Daniels 1993; Franklin and Ragone n.d.; Ginsburg and Rapp 1995; sociologa,
donde la
Hypatiavol. 11,no. 3 (Summer1996)? byLynnM. Morgan
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medicalizaci
n y
legalizacin
de los fetos

48

Hypatia

Morgann.d.;Rapp 1987,1988,1990,1993; Roth 1993;Rothman 1986;Taylor

1992). These authors, all writing from a feminist perspective, document
society's current obsession with fetuses, but, with a few exceptions, do not
examine the practicalimplicationsof this trend for feminist analysis.
propuesta es
There is another trail, narrowand steep. The explorerswho venture hereexaminar las
have become convinced that feminism'slong-standinginattention to fetusesimplicacione
s prcticas
has become a political liability. It is unwise, they argue, for feminism to de esto para
el anlisis
continue to deny the increasingand undeniablemoral and social importancefeminista
given to fetusesin Europeanand North Americansociety.They point out that
the old maps-the ones that circumventfetal terrain-lead us unwittinglyto
collude with architects of the anti-womanbacklashwho portrayfeminists as
anti-mothersand child killers. As feminists, therefore,they are beginning to
place fetusescloser to the center of analysis.Susan Bordo,for example,asserts
that we "shouldnever have permitted the debate over the status of the fetus
to have achieved center stage in the public imagination,but ought, rather,to
have attempted to preempt that debate with a strong feministperspective
acknowledgingand articulatingthe ethical and emotional value of the fetus"
(1993, 95; emphasisin original). Increasingly,feminist social scientists, historians, and philosophers are beginning to confront directly the disquieting
implications for feminist analysis of the increasing social value accorded
fetuses. They submit-tentatively, and fully cognizant of the political quagmires that lie ahead-that the old paths lead to sites we no longer wish to
inhabit because they leave out significantdimensions of women'sexperience
(see Addelson 1987, 1994;C. Condit 1990;Daniels 1993; Porter1994; Shrage
1994; Tsing 1990). The time has come to move toward Bordo'svision of
feminist perspectiveson fetuses.
There is much to intrigue and excite within this new region of feminist
inquiry. BarbaraKatz Rothman was a pioneer with her 1986 book, The
TentativePregnancy,which directed us to the changing notions of incipient
(fetal and infant) personhood being made possible by the widespreaduse of
reproductive imaging technologies. Rosalind Petchesky, another pioneer,
addressed the dilemmas of fetal personhood in her classic Abortionand
Woman'sChoice(1985). LindaLayne'sworkon pregnancyloss remindsus that
we have at best ignored (and at worst deliberately silenced) an important
dimension of the lived experiences of women who cherish fetal life (Layne
1990, 1992). ElisabethPorter (1994) arguesfor a "moralpraxis"approachto
abortionethics that would make moraljudgmentsabout abortioncontingent
Problema de
on a wide varietyof specific, pragmaticconsiderations.
este
But my explorationsalong this route also uncovered a line of reasoningI reconocimie
nto:
find problematic,if well-intentioned. Acknowledging the fetal realpolitikof visin moral
our times, some feminist philosophersare attempting to construct a vision of de
personhood,
fetal morality and personhood consistent with woman-centered,pro-choice centrada en
mujeres y
politics. I will be taking issuewith one dimension of their work,namely,their pro-choice
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Lynn M. Morgan

49
sus argumentos estn en
superioridad moral de conceptos
relacionales sobre individualisticos

arguments concerning the moral superiority of "relational" over

"individualistic"concepts of personhood. They use this point to argue that
fetuses,devoid of sociality and relationality,cannot and should not be considered personsuntil birth. Anticipating the critiquethat follows, I should state
here that I commend and supporttheir efforts to situate women (including
pregnant women) and fetuses in ethical frameworks, paying attention
always to women's location in a matrix of power. They are fully aware of
"how pregnancy, childbirth, and motherhood enforce women's
powerlessness" (Burgess-Jackson,personal communication). Their voices
are essential, especially now, when androcentric ethics and anti-woman
policymaking are all too pervasive. When I critique their work, then, I do
so in a constructive spirit, in pursuitof our common goal: to develop strong,
defensible, culturally sensitive theoretical foundations for designing better
social policies affecting women.
This essay offersa feminist anthropologist'sreadingof the notion of fetalsocial relationalityas it is unfolding in selected worksby Caroline Whitbeck
(1984), Susan Sherwin (1992), MaryAnne Warren(1989), and others. I will
contrasttheir interpretationswith some of those found in the anthropological
literatureon person and self (Battaglia 1995a; Carrithers,Collins, and Luke
1985; Strather 1992a, 1992b), to argue that the renditions of relationality
and fetal personhood promoted by these philosophers are problematic on
severalcounts. First,and in spite of the authors'attemptsto shed androcentric crticas
Westernbiases, their relationalityremainsfundamentally,paradoxically,and
uncriticallyrooted in the Westernindividualismand Cartesiandualismthey
assail. Second, their discussionsof the "moralsignificanceof birth" (Warren
1989) are being outpacedby social and technological developments,and lack
the universal applicabilityespoused by some. Third, the perspective as currently unfoldingcould be more reflexive,acknowledgingthe social and historical context that gives us the categorieswe use to think aboutsocial-,parental-,
and maternal-fetal relationships, and about the social construction of
relationalitymoregenerally.I will conclude by arguingthat personhoodshould
be seen as a negotiated, dynamic concept currentlybeing contested through
many overlappingpublic discoursesconcerning fetuses. Feminist analysesof
fetal personhood,I will argue,should be sociologically informed,self-critical,
and aggressiveabout recuperatingfeminist renderingsof fetuses. This argument is consistent with Porter's(1994) recent plea for a reflexive, socially
conscientious moralpragmaticsof abortion.

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50

Hypatia

THE ROOTOFALL EVIL?

INDIVIDUALISM:

Abortion challenges feminists to come to termswith the

contradictionsin their own thought, notably the
contradictionbetween the commitment to communityand
nurtureand the commitment to individualright.
(ElizabethFox-Genovese, FeminismWithoutIllusions:A
Critiqueof Individualism)
Feministphilosopherswho addressthe moralstatusof the fetusdo so at least
partlybecause they care about women and are disturbedand angeredby the
erasureof pregnantwomen froman arrayof public discourses(including those
concering abortion, poverty, infant mortality,and substance abuse). They filsofas
watch uneasily as the American public is distracted,enthralled, incited, and feministas
quieren
sometimes literally crazed by proliferating images of fetuses, increasinglytraer a
mujeres al
depicted as free-floating, disembodied little babies at the mercy of their panorama
uncaringor vindictive mothers. Feminist philosophersrightly want to bring
women back, literally "into the picture,"to point out once more that "a fetus
inhabits a woman'sbody and is wholly dependent on her unique contribution
to its maintenance"(Sherwin 1992, 106).
pero
The philosophersI select for attention here, however, are workingwithinterminan
enmarcadas
the constraintsof a continuumestablishedlong ago in the literature.One enden marcos
tradicionales
is markedby those who posit that fetuseshave no value whatsoever,while the1. fetos no
ningn
other end is markedby those who insist that fetuses are full personsfrom thetienen
valor
earliest stages of gestation.2The "fetuseshave no value"end of the spectrum2. personas
completas
is commonly identifiedwith writingsin the early 1970sby Michael Tooley and
MaryAnne Warren,who were accusedof supportinginfanticidefor pointing
out that newbornspossessedfew attributesthat late-gestationfetusesdid not.
The other end of the continuum is exemplified,of course,by some theologians
and others in the pro-lifemovement, whose membersbelieve fetusesto be full
human beings from the moment of conception (Noonan 1979). The feminist
philosophersI refer to seek to position themselves along this continuum, to
devise a view of fetal personhood which would permit elective abortion
throughoutthe gestationalcycle while condemning infanticide.3Warrenand
otherswritingin the samevein force a wedge into this narrowniche by arguing Warren,
that biological birth marks a morally significant division between persons lmite de
nacimiento
and nonpersons. Although Warren concedes that "most contemporary marca una
divisin
philosophers believe that birth cannot make a difference to moral rights," moral entre
she argues that "contrasting biologicaland social relationshipsmake even persona-no
persona
relatively late abortion morally different from infanticide" (Warren 1989,
46; emphasis added).
The philosophical argumentdistinguishinginfanticide from abortion, and
prebirthfrompostbirthstatus, is rooted in discussionsof individualisticversus
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Lynn M. Morgan

51
Distincin filosfica entre aborto e
infanticidio est en la discusin entre
individualismo vs modelo relacional de
persona

relationalmodels of personhood.Moralphilosophyand ethics, feministsnote,

are traditionallyderived from male models in which rational, self-interested
actors arriveat universalmoralprinciplesafter indulgingin abstractthought.
Influenced by Carol Gilligan's (1982) work on the gendered dimensions of
moraldevelopment, severaltheoristsarguethat individualistideologiescreate
a climate in which social relationshipsaredenigratedand devalued.Whitbeck
(1984), for example,arguesthat individualismand patriarchyarecoterminous,
and that in both social relations are inherently oppositional, dyadic, and
antagonistic.Fox-Genovese arguesthat pervasive,historicallyrooted individualistic ideologies have left a pernicious legacy: "Individualismactually perverts the idea of the sociallyobligatedand personallyresponsiblefreedomthat
constitutes the only freedom worthy of the name or indeed historically
possible" (1991, 7). These authors (along with many others) argue that as
feminists we must resist individualisticideologies to construct a viable philoEsta va propone que como
sophical and political alternative.
feministas debemos resistirnos
PRIVILEGING
RELATIONALITY

a ideologas individualisticas
para construir una via
alternativa

antdoto
Relationalityis the preferredfeminist antidote to individualism,as Sherwin sera
asserts:"The general consensus of female theorists is that [moral] theories relacionalid
ad
should involve modelsof human interaction that parallelthe rich complexity
of actual human relationshipsand should recognizethe moral significanceof
the actual ties that bind people in their variousrelationships"(Sherwin 1992,
49). Relationality is presented as an ideologicallyundervaluedbut experientially accuratedimension of social interaction. It is the basis for Whitbeck's
proposed"feministontology,"in which a "self-others"distinction replacesthe
dyadic "self-other"distinction, "becauserelationships,past and present,realized and sought, are constitutive of the self, and so the actions of a person compleja
reflect the more- or less-successfulattempt to respondto the whole configura- configuraci
n de
tion of relationships"(Whitbeck 1984, 76). The approachof these authors,as relaciones
que se
Kroeger-Mappespoints out (1994, 123), is to "valorizerelationality,"to offer formaliza
en el "yo"
it as the superioralternativeto individualism.
Discussionsof individualismversusrelationalismfind expressionin feminist
discussionsof the fetus in the following ways. In the continuum mentioned
above, the pro-lifeposition holds that fetusesarefull personsfromconception
because they possess intrinsic properties.This, Sherwin (1992) argues,is an individualism
o encarnado
example of the unfortunateresults of individualisticthinking. Sherwin saysen visin del
como
that individualismprovides the ideological justification for presumingthat feto
vida
completa
y
"persons"(including fetal persons)must be wholly, corporeallyand ontologi- autocontenid
cally constituted, or else wholly insignificant. The argument proceeds: if a
persons are conceived not as self-maximizingautomatonsbut as relationally
constituted and socially embeddedbeings, then the maternal-fetalnexus need
not be modeled in termsof "either-or"fetal personhoodor inevitable mater-

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52

Hypatia

en trminos relacionales, los

fetos se mueven a travs de la
mujer embarazada

nal-fetal conflict.4 In relational terms, Sherwin and others argue, fetuses

necessarily "move through"pregnant women. "A fetus is a unique sort of
human entity, then, for it cannot form relationshipsfreely with others, and
others cannot readily form relationshipswith it. A fetus has a primaryand
particularlyintimate sort of 'relationship'with the woman in whose womb it
develops;connections with any other personsarenecessarilyindirectand must
be mediated through the pregnant woman" (Sherwin 1992, 110). Fetuses, fetos
existen
therefore,cannot be grantedfull personhood,becausethey exist as compound, como
dependent ontological entities rather than as capable of relationships. combinaci
n
Relationality thus becomes the philosophicaland moralbasisfor granting(or
not granting)personhoodand social value to fetusesand infants.
It is worth considering in greaterdetail preciselywhat Sherwin means by
relationality.Where does she locate relationality(and where does she situate
herself)?This is by no means an easy question to answer,because the philosophical basis for relationalityis located in a particularlythorny thicket, andel problema
many philosophersare inconsistent and contradictoryon this point. Sherwin,de esta
relacionalida
for example, seems to vacillate between biological and psychologicalbasesford es la
relationality.She puts the biological argumentfirst: "Fetuseshave a uniqueoscilacin
entre lo
physicalstatus-within and dependenton particularwomen. That gives them biolgico y lo
also a uniquesocial status.Howevermuch some mightpreferit to be otherwise,psicolgico
no one other than the pregnantwoman in questioncan do anythingto support
or harm a fetus without doing something to the woman who nurtures it.
Becauseof this inexorablebiologicalreality,the responsibilityand privilege of
determininga fetus'sspecificsocial statusand value must rest with the woman
carryingit" (1992, 110; emphasisadded). Biological explanationsmake sense
becauseNorth Americanculturalideologiescoax us to look for social meaning
(such as explanations for crime or poverty or homosexuality) in biological
phenomena. Yet it would be exceedingly problematicto locate relationality
la cuestin
solelyin biology,as Sherwin is well aware.
de la
a
in
The question of agency becomes critical here. There is tension these agencia se
writingsaboutwhere to locate relationality,abouthow to imagine an abstrac-vuelve crtica
tion that cannot, by definition, residewithin a single individual.Relationality
is an intangiblebond, a glue that links individualsto one another (Strather
1992b, 125). Yet some of these writersseem to link relationalityto individual
cognitive or corporealattributes.Sometimes they locate it in the fetus/infant,
which, it is argued,cannot participatein or formrelationshipsuntil it possesses
some sine qua non of personhood.This is a time-honoredpro-choicefeminist
strategy:"Thosewho defend a woman'smoralright to abortarguethat fetuses
lack one or more morallyrelevant characteristicsand hence fall short of full
moral personhood,rightholderstatus, and membershipin the moralcommunity-as a result of which women are permitted to abort"(Burgess-Jackson
1994, 142). Sherwin uses this strategywhen, citing Petchesky(1985, 341), she
modifies her biological explanation by arguingthat personality("consciousThis content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Mon, 22 Feb 2016 04:17:04 UTC
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Lynn M. Morgan

53

ness and sociability,"in Petchesky'sterms) is also a necessarycomponent of

personhood (Sherwin 1992, 109). Whitbeck notes (albeit parenthetically):
"(Newborns cannot have any responsibilities, and for that reason may be
regardedas immanent [sic]people)" (1984, 80).5Relationality,in other words,
must be reciprocal, but because fetuses are ineffective relational agents, a
Relacionalidad debe ser recproca pero ah se meten en el problema de la
relationshipis impossible.
agencia...ESTO SE RESUELVE CON HARAWAY CON LATOUR
On other occasions, these same theoristsplace the onus for relationalityon
the pregnantwoman. Petchesky,for example,is willing to attributerelationality at leastpartlyto a pregnantwoman'sawarenessof it: " 'Relationship'means,
and second, that there is a consciousnessof
first, that there is interdependence;
this, even if that consciousness is one-sided [i.e., from pregnant woman to
fetus] for a time" (1985, 346). And later, "What is irreducibleand indispensable in this humanizationprocess (the formationof the 'person')is thesubjectivityof thepregnantwoman,her consciousnessof existing in a relationshipwith
the fetus"(1985, 347). Gilligan puts it slightlydifferently,emphasizingmaternal-fetal impartibilityrather than the capacity of one or another party to
develop relationships:"The connection between the fetus and the pregnant
woman becomes the focus of attention and the questionbecomeswhether it is
responsibleor irresponsible,caringor careless,to extend or to end this connection. In this construction,the abortiondilemmaarisesbecausethere is no way
not to act, and no way of acting that does not alter the connection between
self and others"(Gilligan 1987, 25).
agencia
There is a third approach,which would locate relationalityneither in the en red
social
pregnantwoman nor the fetus (that culturallyprivilegeddyad),but in a larger escapand
social network. Warren,for example, while citing fetal/infant "sentience"as o de diada
one plausible prerequisiteto personhood, also argues, "It is doubtful that a
child reared in total isolation from human or other sentient (or apparently
sentient) beings could develop the capacities for self-awarenessand social
interaction that are essential to personhood"(1989, 62). Social relationships
elaborated after birth, in other words, complete the achievement of full
personhood in Warren'sterms. Whitbeck, like Warren,allows agency to be
diffusedthrough a network of alreadyliving personswho constitute, and are
constituted by, others in a historically changing social world. Her feminist
ontology is characterizedby the "corepractice ... of the (mutual) realization
of people" (Whitbeck 1984, 65). This third point, however,revealsan under-es
importante
en
lying contradictionthat Whitbeck and others may be loathe to articulate.Forpensar
la pregunta
understandable practical political reasons, they would prefer to situatede la
agencia
relationalityeither in intrinsic propertiesof the fetus or pregnancy,or in the
woman
herself, or both. They are reluctant to allow relationalityto
pregnant
"leakout" into a pregnantwoman'ssocial world (e.g., father,parents,friends,
government agencies) because sharedrelationalitymight provide a justification for undercuttingher sovereign control over the fate of her pregnancy.
Sherwin, for example, arguesthat "choices"are never made outside a social
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54

Hypatia

segn la autora hay una contradiccin entre

las formas de relacionalidad contextuales y el
determinismo biolgico para asegurar las
decisiones biolgicas

context, yet she also argues that pregnant women should retain exclusive
control over reproductivedecisions (1992, 102). So even though a woman's
life circumstances(and the pregnancyitself) are embeddedwithin and determined by a largersocial context, Sherwin'sanalysisisolates the woman from
that context in order to justify grantingher control over reproductivedecisions. This creates a series of problems,especiallywith respect to underprivileged women. As Daniels points out:
Problemas respecto a
mujeres de bajos privilegios

The right to self-sovereigntyalso means the right to be a free

decision-makerin one's private life, to have a realm in which
one can be self-determining.Yet a retreat into privacy,especially forpoorwomen, can never securethe powerof self-determination. The power to be a free decision-makerarisesnot in
isolation,but in socialconnectionto a whole web of relationships
that can empowerwomen in the context of povertyand domination. Self-sovereigntythus is indivisiblefromsocial empowerment. (Daniels 1993, 134; see also Porter1994, 78)

poder de
autodeterminacin en
condiciones de
pobreza no son
seguras,
autodeterminacin no
es una cosa aislada,
conexin social

problema

If our analyses isolate women from society, even for the sole purpose of de aislar a
de
allowing her to control reproductivedecisions, we will have to accept any mujeres
sociedad
unsavoryconsequences.Such analysesprivatizedecision making,and could be
interpreted as absolving society of responsibility to foster social climates privatizaci
n de las
conducive to bearing(or not) and raisingchildren.This is but one example of decisiones
the paradoxesand contradictionsthat invariablyemergewhen we argue-as
we must-for both sociality and individualism.
el asunto se
An alternative approachto the problemof locating agency (i.e., the locuspuede pensar
bien al
of action and responsibility)questionsthe premisethat it can be "located"atms
cuestionarse
all through a process of philosophical inquiry. Monica Casper (1994), asi agencia
puede ser
sociologist analyzingideas about the volition attributedto fetuses,arguesthatlocalizada a
travs de la
agency is not an alreadyexisting fact (ontological or otherwise) to be discov-filosofa
ered or revealed but is rathera social project.There are many sites, she says,
where agency is discursivelyand concretely configuredand enacted. Casper Casper:
feto no es
notes that in the case of fetal surgery,agency slips around,slidingfromfetuses, ontolgico,
un
for example, to pregnantwomen, to medicalpractitionersand others,depend- es
proyecto
social,
A
where
fit
into
the
matrix.
feminist
that
on
the
actors
power
program
ing
agencia se
explicitly rejects the possibility of fetal agency has to be understood as a acta, se
concreta
response to competing discoursesthat grant active agency to fetuses.6This discursiva
political context undoubtedly affects feminist philosophizing (and mente
anthropologizing).Acknowledging the power relations inherent in assigning
agency might enable us to be more explicit aboutwhy we might be compelled,
rightnow, to emphasizerelationalityand maternalagency over individualism
and fetal agency.
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LynnM. Morgan

55

FEMINIST
RELATIONALITY
CULTURE-BOUND
Their effortsat culturaldestabilizationnotwithstanding,Sherwin,Warren,
and Whitbeck are steeped in the same Western individualismthey seek to
undercut;so steeped, in fact, that they may not recognizethe culture-bound
tenor of their arguments.The Western ethnobiological view of personhood
holds that relationality is superimposedupon a developing, naturallygiven
mind-body. The Western view also holds that persons, once formed (or
"embodied"), are corporeally immutable and fixed, rather than susceptible
to continuing social influences (Conklin and Morgan n.d.; Strathern
1992a; Turner 1994). Persons, once established, retain this fundamentally
unchangeable essence. The critical analytic problem, therefore, is not to
account for the "coming into being" of bodies,which are "natural,"but the
"coming into being" of persons,which are, presumably,uniquely social and
historical. Relationality is considered by these authorsas integral to personhood, but not to the body itself. I will untangle the problematicsof each of
these issuesin turn.
rekacionalidad es sobre personas y no sobre cuerpos que seran fijos
First,Westernindividualismrequiresas a precursorto humanpersonhoodan
alreadyexisting material corporeality;biological existence must alwaysprecede sociality.In Warren'swords,"The infant at birth enters the human social
world,where, if it lives, it becomesinvolved in social relationshipswith others,
of kinds that can only be dimly foreshadowedbefore birth" (1989, 56).
Corporeal integrity and skin-encapsulationthus prefigure the person; the cuerpo
individual
individualbody is viewed as a biopsychologicalblank slate upon which people es base
later write. In Mackenzie'swords, "The more physicallycomplex and devel- para
relaciones
oped the being is, the more value we attributeto its potential for personhood" posteriore
s
(1992, 145). This biological-social developmental dualism extends to the
mind, too, which comes to possess its morally meaningful qualities (e.g.,
sentience, consciousness,responsibility)throughphysioneurologicalprocesses
consideredlargelyasocial and unstoppable.
Sherwin argues in this vein that fetal relationality is impossible during
pregnancy,becausethe fetus'sabilityto formits own relationshipsis forestalledimplcitame
que
by the presenceof the pregnantwoman'sbody.She impliesthat relationships,nte
relaciones,
in order to be morally valid, should be held by individuals (what we might para ser
think of as "in-dividu-ables").LikewiseWhitbeck assertsthat the "relationsof moralmente
vlidas
the self to othersarerelationsamonganalogousbeings"(1984, 76). By this she deben ser
entre
means that persons are created through mutually constitutive, reciprocal,individuos.
se
communicative processes rather than through domination or annihilation No
problematiz
but
I
(1984, 76),
interpretedthe phrase"analogousbeings"also to mean that a la persona
these beings should be biologically independent of each other. Whitbeck's occidental
autnoma
"self-others"scheme does not problematizethe autonomousWesternpersonor
self. A wholly realized relationality hinges, in the views of Sherwin and
Whitbeck, on the notion of corporealautonomy.
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56

Hypatia
persona
como
instancia
de
relaciones
sociales
visiones
ms
radiacalesButlerdonde el
cuerpo es
ms que
un
substrato
material.

An alternativeview ofpersonhoodmight interpretbodiesnot asblankslates

but as the literalinstantiationof social relations.These moreradicalvisions of
the relational body-personcan best be illustratedby examples from societies
where the body is thought to be more than a materialsubstrateupon which
meaningis encoded (see Butler1990, 129), specifically(and predictably),with
examplesfromnon-Westernsocieties.7In the BrazilianAmazon, for example,
indigenouspeoples commonly emphasizethe father'scontributionto forming
a child. The Shavante say that the father literallyformsthe fetus fromsemen.
Frequentintercourse,especiallyduringthe fifth month, is requiredto effect a
pregnancy."As one Shavante explained the process . . . while ticking the
months off with his fingers:'Copulate.Copulate, copulate, copulate, copulate
a lot. Pregnant.Copulate, copulate, copulate. Born'" (Maybury-Lewis1967,
63, quoted in Scheper-Hughesand Lock 1987, 19). Beth Ann Conklin points
out that among the Wari'of the westernAmazon, the father'scommitment to
creating a child's body/personthroughrepeatedcoitus means that pregnancy
can never be a "mistake";every pregnancyis instead the result of deliberate,
el embarazo
concerted social initiative (Conklin and Morgann.d.; Conklin 1995). Manyno puede ser
error,
non-Westernvariantsof relationalpersonhoodstressthe permeabilityof bod-un
procedimient
ies in nature-culturetransformations;for example, "The Suya cosmologydoes os del padre
continuos, es
not mark two distinct poles of nature and culture standing in permanentel resultado
una
opposition. Rather there are degreesof naturalnessand degreesof socialness.de
inciativa
Social life is thus a constant socializationor naturalizationof human beings,deliberada y
concertada
bodies, animals, and space" (Seeger 1981, 119). The "person"--even before
birth and afterdeath-is never perceived as a "natural"or asocial entity. The
sociedad
physical substanceof the body-flesh, blood, and bones, as well as personal-donde no
cuerpoity-is literally constructed-and continually reconstructed-by and underexiste
natural pues
the watchfulcare of others in a social world.The body and the personare thusse construye
y re construye
coterminous,and the body/personis valued socially preciselybecauseit is the
productof specific social interactions.
One other differencebetween non-Wester relationalityand Westernfeminist relationality concerns the role of physiological nurturancein creating
de
persons.By physiologicalnurturanceI am referringto more than the ethic of rol
crianza
in
in
the
often
stressed
and
others
for
children
West);people many psicolgica
(so
caring
non-Wester societies insist that the exchange of food and body substanceses
demasiado
actuallycreate kinshipand personhood(Meigs 1984). They often tie gradientsoccidental
of personhood to the exchange of body substances(such as blood, sweat, or
breast milk), rather than to the ability of newboms to interact, respond, or crianza
como
form social bonds as in Westernsocieties. Yet Whitbeck (1984, 65), for one, altruismobecauseit connotes feminine selflessness. feminidad
shies awayfromthe term"nurturing"
The Reagan-erasocial context of her remarksneeds to be kept in mind, yet
one wondersaboutdenying the importanceof nurturancein creatingchildren
just becausethe concept has historicallybeen used to oppresswomen. A child
advocacy slogan currentlyin vogue says, "It takes a whole village to raise a
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LynnM. Morgan

57

no se puede universalizar crianza

occidental

child." The cross-culturalcomparisonremindsus that nurturingis not everywhere or automatically linked to the self-sacrificingmother (see ScheperHughes 1992), but can ratherbe conceived as a qualitydistributedthroughout
communities of men and women, which hold a collective responsibilityfor
bringingother people into being.
MarilynStrather notes that in Melanesiaincipient personscontain other
persons, have "other persons implied in [their] constitution" (1992b, 152).
Reproductionin Melanesia, then, as in many non-Westernsocieties, is not a
processof linkingfetuses and/or infants with other persons-of superimposing
the new personfrom
sociality over a biological substrate-but of differentiating
the others (including supernaturalbeings and animal "persons,"as well as
parentsand other kin) who contributedto the creation of this nascent being.
Whereas Sherwin might locate the essence of personhood in a fetus/infant's
corporealityor in its ability to communicate and respond (1992, 111), an
alternative perspective might view the fetus/infant as a motley amalgamof
many social influences which enable its constitution. These might include
social events (such as the failing contraceptionor acquisitionof a better-paying job), personality traits inherited from important persons (such as the
whistling grandmotheror gardeningdad), and substances (such as prenatal una visin
alternativa
vitamins, or peanut butter on seven-grainbread). In other words,an alterna- entonces
ser
tive view of personhood could perceive body substance(and not just the puede
el cuerpo
substancia
as
constituted.
could
then
be
and
cognitive self) socially
Relationships
implied
como
highlighted at every stage of potential, incipient, and emergent personhood, socialment
from the social context of courtship and sexuality through conception and econstituido
early gestation throughbirth, socialization,education, and initiation through
to the end of the life cycle.
cuerpo/
a
The claim that body/personsare created throughphysiologicalnurturance persona
travs de
has implicationsfor how we might reframepregnancytermination and fetal crianza
tiene
death. A woman (or her partner[s],or relevant others in her social world) muchas
might elect not to sustain or nurturethe fetal or infant body.This would not implicacio
nes sobre
constitute active killing (the terms in which induced abortion is so often marco del
embarazo
described), but the failure to complete the social process of producing
body/persons.The ethnographicliteraturecontains numerousdescriptionsof
sickly or stillborn infants whose dis-ease is attributed to failures of social
nurturance in utero (Conklin and Morgan n.d.; Scheper-Hughes 1992). I
should emphasize, however, that the decision to discontinue an emergent
personin non-Westernsocieties is rarelya "freechoice" undertakenby women
acting in their own individualisticbest interests,as Westernfeminists might
imagine it. Such a decision is more likely to be the cumulative result of a resultado
numberof unstableor unpredictablesocial contingencies (such as the illness, de
contingenc
absence, or death of relevant parties, or the inability of the social group to ias
sociales
generate the kin commitmentsneeded to nurturea futurechild). As such, the
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58

Hypatia

descontinuacin de feto
cuerpo/persona es un
proceso social
variaciones culturales!!

discontinuationor terminationof a prospectivefetal or infant body/personis

an eminently social and dynamicprocess.
Cross-culturalvariationsin ideologies of personhoodare importantto this
argument not (just) because I write as an anthropologist,but because my
anthropological sensibilities are unsettled by the claims of some feminist
philosopherswho plant flagson panculturalterritory.Whitbeck, for example,
arguesthat her "responsibilitiesapproachto ethics has a greaterpotential for
cross-culturalapplicabilitythan does the rights approach"(1984, 80). This nocin de
responsabili
may be true in the limited sense, but Whitbeck does not acknowledge the dad viene
una
extent to which the "responsibilitiesapproach"derivesfroma historicallyand de
nocin
universal
culturallyspecific ratherthan a universalnotion of personhood.One wonders de persona
whether Whitbeck privatizesmoralagency (quapersonhood)by locating it in
individuals(i.e., in discrete persons/bodies)ratherthan in social groups,thus
overlookingthe connections among(ratherthan between) people that underlie social organizationin many societies. Can a philosophy that normalizesa
particularculturalformever account fornegotiatedenactmentsof personhood
in relation to changing configurationsof power acrossthe globe?How could
such a philosophy account for relationshipsamong groups(such as Arabsand
Jews), whose identities are continually reconfiguredby politics?How can we
think about societies where moral agency extends beyond the human realm,
for example, when animals or ancestors are considered moral agents? We
shouldbe skepticalof any approachthat essentializesindividualbodies/persons
in uniquelyWesternways.
THE MORALAMBIGUITYOFBIRTH

Being awareof the historical [andcultural]particularityof

moralconcepts allows us to adopt a healthy caution about
absolutistpositions and to question ongoing moraldebate.
(ElisabethPorter,"AbortionEthics:Rights and
Responsibilities")
One avenue of feminist response to abortion politics has been to reassert
what Virginia Held (1987, 122) and Mary Anne Warren (1989) call the
"moralsignificanceof birth."
Birth is morally significant because it marks the end of one
relationship and the beginnings of others .... Although the
infant is not instantlytransformedinto a personat the moment
of birth, it does become a biologicallyseparatehumanbeing. As
such, it can be known and caredfor as a particularindividual.
(Warren1989, 62; my emphasis)
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LynnM. Morgan

59

segn varias, la lnea divisoria entre personas

completas y no-personas debera ser trazada en el
nacimiento biolgico. PERO ESTO ES
PROBLEMTICO

Likewise,Sherwin argues that fetuses "differfrom newborns, who immediately begin to develop into persons by virtue of their place as subjects in
human relationships" (1992, 111). The dividing line between full persons
and non-persons should be drawn, say Held, Warren, and Sherwin, at
i.
biological birth.
This argumentis problematicon at least three counts. First, as discussed reduccionis
mo
above, it relies on a biological reductionismby using physical autonomy (i.e., biolgico,
autonoma
separateness)as the most importantqualificationfor personhood.Second, it como lo
romanticizesa disappearingepoch in which biologicalbirthdidmarkthe social ms
importante
ser
beginning of personhood, and ignores an emerging discontinuity between para
persona
social and biological birth in North American society. And third, it does not ii.
biolgico
allow forgradationsin value which makelate gestationfetusesmoresignificant locomo
marca que
than earlygestation fetuses.
ignora
There was a time not long ago in the United States when biological birth nuevas
did markthe social (as well as legal) beginnings of personhood. Parents-to- tecnologas
iii.
be typically had to wait until biological birth to "know" the baby and no hay
grados
bestow its selected gender-specific name. Biological birth was ritualized- entre fetos
ms
phone calls in the wee hours, cigars, gifts, announcements, photographs- grandes y
in recognition that the occasion marked the beginnings of social identity ms
pequeos
and personhood. Whereas many non-Western societies have traditionally
distinguished between biological and social birth (see Morgan 1989), in the
United States the two were historically conflated.8 The social reality has
en eeuu el
since changed.
nacimiento
Social and biological birth have become uncoupled in the United States social y el
biolgico se
over the last two decades.As a resultof reproductiveimagingtechnologies,the separaron...t
commodificationof babies,and other social changes,the attributionof person-ecnologas...
hood (what I call "socialbirth")can now precedebiological birth. The result
"fetal
is a new, unprecedentedcategoryof fetal persons(see Duden 1993; Petchesky persons"
1987; Rothman 1986). These late-gestationfetuses are genderedand named;
their pictorialrepresentationsappealfrombillboardsand hang (in the formof
ultrasoundscans) on walls and refrigerators.In the media they are increasingly
depicted as active, technologically sophisticatedagents, shown on television
(in an AT&T ad) "talking"on the telephone (Taylorn.d.), or convincing
adultsto buy a particularkind of car (Taylor1992).
It is my contention that those who set off to prove the "natural"importance momento
en el que se
of birth forgot to keep an eye on the weather.Their rhetoric of birth as the le est
dando gran
moral dividing line between personsand nonpersonsis simply unconvincing valor social
los fetos
in an era when ever greatersocial value is being attachedto fetuses (especially aTECNOLO
wanted, viable, third-trimester fetuses). Furthermore (and here I para- GAS
phrase Sawicki 1991, 86), argumentsfor the "moralsignificanceof birth"are
doomed to be politically ineffective because they do not resonate with the
experiences of women who desire and create fetal personhood through their
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60

Hypatia

avid consumption of infertility treatments, amniocentesis, ultrasound,and

in-uterovideo services.
Fetal personhoodpresentsundeniablydifficultchallenges for feminist analysis, but ignoring or denying the phenomenon will not make it disappear.
Rather than stating categoricallythat "fetuses,after all, are not yet persons"
tenemos
(Purdy 1990, 278), we need now to direct attention to the morallyrelevant que poner
atencin a
gradationsthat occur within the gestational period (Noddings 1989; Porter los grados
1994). Distinctions between early- and late-gestation fetuses are critical to que se
estn
abortionpolitics. Yet Sherwin dismissesthe semantic (and thus the practical dando en el
and moral)distinction between "embryo"and "fetus,"explainingthat she will perodo
gestacional
use the term "fetus"to "coverthe entire period of developmentfrom conception to the end of pregnancy" (1992, 251). This is unfortunate, because
Sherwin's metonymic reduction forces even the sympathetic reader to
invoke a mental image that lumps together viable late-gestation fetuses
(which can be read as social persons) with unformed early-gestation
embryos (see C. Condit 1990, 83).
Whereas Sherwin talks about "the fetus"as an undifferentiatedor monolithic entity, other feminist social scientists are analyzing the social practices that work to establish (or to resist) different kinds, qualities, and "el feto"
degrees of fetal personhood (Casper 1994; Morton 1994). "The fetus" can est
nombrand
symbolize and encapsulate a number of timely social issues (Oaks n.d.). o una
cantidad
Although the abortion debate is the most contentious public context de
influencing our society's views of fetuses today, it should be noted that cuestiones
sociales
multiple new meanings, emerging from developments in law, medicine,
religion, and popular culture, are being generated and affect the way we
think about fetuses. These overlapping discoursesneed to be identified and
disentangled, lest they all be erroneously construed as variations on the
abortion debate. The so-called infertility epidemic, for example, has generated its own narrativesof pregnancy loss and attendant meanings of fetuses en cirugas
fetales, se
(Inhorn 1994; Layne 1990, 1992; Sandelowski 1993). There is intense convierten
objetos
negotiation over meanings in fetal surgeryunits as fetuses become "objects en
de trabajo y
of work" (Casper 1994), and in courtrooms as lawyers debate the legal objeto de
en
status of the unborn (D. Condit 1995; Gallagher 1987). As the contexts for debate
las
fetal discourse proliferate, it will be increasingly clear that we cannot talk CORTES
about "the" fetus but rather need to talk about a diversity of situations and
perspectives which carrywith them many different meanings.9

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Lynn M. Morgan

61

THEUSESOF"FETUS
TALK"
An approachto selfhood as an embodiedand historically
situatedpracticalknowledge ... promptsa largerquestion of
rhetoric,namely,what use a particularnotion of self has for
someone or for some collectivity. (DebboraBattaglia,
"Problematizingthe Self: A Thematic Introduction")
If we apply Battaglia'sinsight to the motivations of feminist theorists
thinking about incipient personhood,we can better understandwhy we could
be reluctant to engage in "fetustalk."We know that our discursivepractices
(including our silences) have social consequences. If we talk about fetuses,
then, or write about them in the pages of our journals,we come dangerously
close to ceding territory to pro-life activists who benefit from the reification of fetal persons (see Pollitt 1992). The threats to reproductive rights
are real and must not be underestimated, but the pro-choice philosophical
discourse I have described here carriesanother set of disquieting social and
implicaciones de hablar o no
political implications.
hablar de fetos
Consider the problematicconsequences of positing biological birth as the
normative,natural,and most sensiblemoraldividingline between personsand
parto
nonpersons. First, this assertion collapses a potentially useful distinction biolgico
between biological and social birth which might help make sense of contem- como lo ms
natural y lo
poraryshifts in the social (and moral) significanceof biological birth and the ms positvo
social construction of early personhood in Europe and the United States. es doble
filo---termina
Second, emphasizingbiologicalbirth ipsofacto divideswomen into categories,esencializan
el instinto
"natural"mothers being those who respect the moral significance of birth, do
maternal
"unnatural"mothers implicitly those who do not (for example, those who tambin
deposit their newborns in trashcansor abandon them in hospital nurseries).
Warrenallies herself with women possessedof something akin to a maternal
instinct when she says, "Most women readily accept the responsibilityfor
doing whateverthey can to ensurethat their (voluntarilycontinued) pregnancies are successful,and that no avoidableharmcomes to the fetus"(1989, 58).
While it maybe unfairto takeWarren'scomment out of context-she wasnot,
after all, writing about fetal abuse or the punitive actions taken against
pregnantsubstanceabusers-her statement is unfortunately(and unintentionally, I hope) consistent with a dichotomy emergingin the popularpressthat
distinguishes"goodmothers"fromthe "badmothers"who victimize their own
children. But we live in treacheroustimes, when we can expect our own words
to be used against us. Rather than interrogatingthe nefarious dichotomy
between good and bad mothers,or noting the backlashor the privatizedmoral
Warren
economy embedded within it, Warren uncritically accepts a stereotype of termina
criminalmonstermotherswho neglect, abuse,abandon,or kill their newborns aceptando
acriticame
or children (Tsing 1990; see also Boling 1995).1?The monster mothers'per- nte el
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estereotip
o de la
madremonstruo

62

Hypatia

sonal stories,no matterhow grim,can never be made to justifytheir actions.

Held argues, similarly, that the capacity for mothering emerges from the
"naturalfacts."Using that logic, she denies on biological groundsthe male
potential for adequateparenting:"Since men, then, do not give birth, and do
not experience the responsibility,the pain, and momentousnessof childbirth,
they lack the particularmotives to value the child that may springfrom this
capacity and this fact" (Held 1987, 125). This kind of rhetoric implicitly
reinforcesthe assumptionthat all women who have babies are "good"mothers.1 It also severelylimits the creative possibilitiesfor co-parenting,communal parenting,adoptive parenting,or other formsof raisingchildren by those
esencializar quita la posibilidad de pensar posibilidades
who are not the birth mothers.
creativas de maternidad-paternidad
The emphasison biological birth creates a third problem.It denies legitimacy to a growingnumberof people (including pro-choice women and men)
who may occasionally attribute personhood to late-gestation fetuses. Their
experiencesand logic are sometimessensitivelyportrayedin the ethnographic
ltimo
literature(Rapp 1987, 1990; Rothman 1986; Sandelowski 1993), but would elproblema
es
not fit comfortablyinto the philosophicalliteraturediscussedhere. If biologi- entonces si
esta barrera
cal birth marksthe beginningsof personhood,is there room within feminism existe
pq
for those who deeply mourn early miscarriage,or those who bestow person- entonces
la gente se
encarnia
hood on late-gestationfetuses?
con los
KathrynAddelson, citing C. Wright Mills, notes that "the explanations fetos?
people offer are themselves in need of explanation" (Addelson 1987, 91). If
we assume that our analytic assumptionsderive from particularsocial and
intellectual traditions, then we have a responsibilityto formulateresponses
with a heightened awarenessto the historical and cultural idiosyncraciesof
those traditions,and to make our reflexivityexplicit. I wish, for example, thates
Warrenor Sherwinhad acknowledgedhow difficultit is to discussabortionasfundamental!!
! tener en
a problemlinked to qualities of the fetus ratherthan to the social context ofcuenta
contextos en
parenting (see Burgess-Jackson1994, 15). I wish they were more attentive tolos que
the changing social significance of biological birth and the proliferationofformulamos
respuestas
meanings attaching to fetuses. I wish they could imagine a relationalitythat
overridesrather than replicatesCartesiandualisms,or a form of relationality
that might be patternedcompletely differentlyin another social, national, or
historical context. I wish they would be as candid about their political motivations as Monica Casper,who states,
As a pro-choice feminist from a nation where abortion is one
of the most contentious and divisive issuesin the public arena,
where the fetus has emergedas a majorculturalicon ... at the
hands of antiabortionforcesgrantingit personhood,and where
abortion doctors are now being murderedby "pro-life"terrorists, I am quite resistantto engaging in any practice that grants
agency to the fetus. (Casper 1994, 851)
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LynnM. Morgan

63

We need to acknowledgethat we are not revealing"truths"about the personhood of fetuses (or others), but rather engaging in the process (historically
and culturally situated) of producing persons ourselves, through our
actions, reactions, and rhetoric (including our academic rhetoric). Our
actions and writings create a vocabulary,a rhetoric, a set of meanings with
which to make sense of fetal personhood and relationality. Precisely
because the political stakes are so high, those of us who write about fetal
relationality have a responsibility to be reflexive and self-critical, to think
about the kind of world we want to create.
AND MORALPRAGMATICS
OF INSTRUMENTAL
PERSONHOOD

Formalizednotions of personhoodare not to be construedas

descriptiveof a static, preordained,social world;they are
instrumentalitieswhich people actively use in constructing
and reconstructinga worldwhich adjustsvalues and goals
inheritedfrom the past to the problemsand exigencies which
comprisetheir social existence in the here and now.
andAgency:
(Michael Jacksonand Ivan Karp,Personhood
The Experienceof SelfandOtherin AfricanSocieties)
Early anthropological investigations of personhood tended to overdraw
discrepancies between cultures. Non-Western cultures were "sociocentric"
comparedto "egocentric"Westerncultures(Shwederand Bourne 1984). The
ideal types-approachhas begun to fall out of favor,however,as anthropologists
focus more on the variability within cultures between individualistic and
relational poles, as well as on social practices through which personhood is la
dynamicallyconstructedand contested (Battaglia1995a;Conklin and Morgan personidad
no es una
n.d.; Spiro 1993;Strathem 1992b). Personhoodisnot a static analyticcategory categora
but a fluid and volitional social practice;it is repeatedlyre-createdby people esttica,
debe ser
entwined in multiple social (and often global) contexts. Personhoodmust be entendida
como
understoodas an outcome of powerrelations,as an unstableprojectsubjectto producto de
relaciones
constant negotiation and debate.12
de poder,
At least some of the implicationsfor a feminist philosophyof fetusesshould negociacion
be fairlyclear by now. Rather than focusingon the elaborationof ideal types es etc
(such as patriarchalindividualismversus feminist relationality, or prebirth
asocialityversuspostbirthrelationality),it might be possibleto pursuea more
pragmaticsituational ethics of fetal relationality.Such an approachwould
have to take account of multiplevariablesincludingnot just the familiarlitany
of race, class, and gender, but also particularitiesconcerning a pregnant
woman's religious affiliation, romantic and familial entanglements, health
insurance, legislative constraints, nationalist politics, and so on. As Rayna
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64

Hypatia

mined by its concrete historical and local embeddedness"(1993, 66). This

approachwouldminimizethe need to elaboratenormative,universalistdiscussions of fetal personhood.Rather,feminist philosopherscould work to show
how relationshipsare createdand resistednot just within and between selves,
but within and by the largersocial order.They could look more closely at the
social practicesthat work to realize (or deny) differentkinds of relationality
and visions of individualism.The kind of analysisI proposewill necessarilybe
untidy; it will not, for example, help identify any clear-cutbasis on which to
construct (as opposedto deconstruct)fetal identities. But I arguethat ambiguity, messiness, instability, and dynamism are precisely the qualities missing
from many contemporaryanalysesof fetal personhood (Morgann.d.; Porter
1994), which err in adoptingthe absolutistimperativecharacteristicof earlier
works.The position I outline is sharedby manyfeminist ethnographers(and a
handfulof philosophers,includingAddelson 1994; Poovey 1992; Porter1994;
Shrage 1994) currentlyanalyzingthe social arenaswhere people struggleto
make sense of the changing significance of pregnancy, motherhood, fetal
identity,and personhood.
Acknowledging the possibility and, indeed, the emergingsocial reality of
fetal personhoodrequiresnew perspectiveson the tensions between individualism and relationality.The argumentthat relationalmodes of interactionare
superiorto individualisticmodes can be shelved, along with the assertionthat
any biological markerhas moralsignificanceoutside of a specific culturaland
historical context. Fetal relationality is not "naturally"or "universally"
restricted to the period after biological birth, despite Warren'sor Held's
arguments.Rather,relationalityand individualismcoexist as interdependent
aspectsof Euro-Americansocieties (Porter1994, 81).13In Porter'swords,"The
commitment to pluralismthat is central to modem politics entails the acceptance of conflicting collective normsand practices,but it also entails exciting
modelsof individualitythat providescope forreplacingnotions of the isolated,
individualist self with notions of selfhood that consider others in situated,
concrete, historical,social, and familialsettings"(Porter1994, 83). The fetus's
capacity for relationality is not determinedby its intrinsic characteristics,its
personalityor biological functions, but by the meanings people give it in a
social world. Relationality (like individualism)is a socially dynamic process; relacionalid
ad e
its parametersare set within historical and political contexts. The focus must individualid
ad son
turn, then, to social practices and contexts. There is plenty to be concerned procesos
about at this level: teen pregnanciescause widespreadconsternation, while dinmicos
y sociales
older white women'spregnanciesoften provide occasion to rejoice (Solinger
1992; Hartouni 1994); fetuses are revered and exalted while children suffer
malnutrition and homelessness and abuse; fetuses can be seen and photographedand named while countless children suffersocially invisible poverty;
Haitian women'sbabies drownat sea while Swedish women'spre-termbabies
are rescuedby expensive, high-tech, neonatal intensive care (Hart 1994).
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Lynn M. Morgan

65

To returnto my mountaineeringmetaphor,the twisting pathwaygradually

opens onto an expansivepanorama.The distant view shows the historicaland
social contingencies that create and deny different kinds and qualities of
persons (in spite of a dominant ideology professing universal equality). It
rendersfuzzyand problematicthe distinctions between "natural"bodies and
"social" persons. It shows the power mechanisms that place categories of
people (and their offspring)into differentiallyvalued social strata.And most
important,perhaps,it remindsus that we have the responsibilityand authority
to produce persons ourselves, not the old-fashioned way, but through our
rhetoricand political engagement.

NOTES

Thanksto MikeWeiler,whokindlyofferedchildcareat a crucialstagein thewriting.

I am indebtedto KathrynAddelson,CaroleBrowner,
KeithBurgess-Jackson,
Monica
Casper,MeredithMichaels,RachelRoth,SusanShaw,Karen-Sue
JimTrostle,
Taussig,
TomWartenberg,
andthe reviewers
andeditors,allof whomofferedhelpfulcomments
on earlierdraftsof thisessay.
1. In a laterwork,Raymondseemsmorewillingto considerfetuseswithin a
feministcontext.She says,"Itis imperative
thatfeministsespeciallybeginto articulate
the statusof the fetusand situatethe fetusin relationto thepregnantwoman"( 1993,182).

2. Thisdichotomization
SherwinbrieflymentionsSumner
is,of course,debatable.
to fetalpersonhood,
butshedoesnot
(1981),whoshenotestakesa gradualist
approach
furtherconsidergradualism
in herownanalysis.
3. Warrennow takespainsto distanceherselffroma pro-infanticide
position,
saying,"todenythatinfantshavebasicmoralrightsis to riskbeingthoughtto condone
infanticideandthe neglectandabuseof infants"(1989,56).
4. Casper(1994), D. Condit(1995), Daniels(1993), Smith(1983), andothers
conflict"is the discursive
framethatcharacterizes
most
pointout that"maternal-fetal
U.S. thinkingaboutpregnantwomenandfetuses.
contemporary
5. As a conscientious
I pointout thatthesetheoristswouldlikethe
cartographer,
in orderfor personhoodto be
fetus/infantto possessintrinsic"privateproperties"
conferred.
6. CaspercitesWilliamLiley,an earlyproponentof fetalsurgery,
assomeonewho
createsfetalagencythroughlanguage:
"Hisaccountcontainsa streamof actionverbs
the successof the pregnancy,
'induces'
implyingfetal agency:The fetus'guarantees'
'determines'
thedurationofpregnancy,
'decides'which
changesin maternalphysiology,
to stimuli,andsoon"(Casper
wayhe orshewillpresentin labor,'learns'and'responds'
1994,844).
7. Battaglia(1995b,8) rightlycautionsthat"theequationof an individuated
'self'
with the 'Westernworld'and the relational'self'with the 'non-Western
world'is
I haveintentionallyoverdrawn
the contrastbetweenWestern
strikingly
problematic."
andnon-Western
societieshere.Spiro(1993) pointsout that non-Western
societies
manifestelementsof individualism
andegocentrism,
justas Westernsocietiesdisplay
elementsof relationalityand sociocentrism.
But if anthropologists
commonlyerrin
the cross-cultural
tend to overdrawthe
contrasts,feministphilosophers
overdrawing
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66

Hypatia

gender contrasts (i.e., in saying that men are individualists while women are
relationalists).The critical question for the purposesof this analysis is how feminist
philosopherscan better describerelationality,with the eventual goal of incorporating
this concept into public policies affectingwomen.
8. This division between biological and social birth underlies Virginia Held's
misunderstandingof the significanceof the ethnographicrecord.When Held statesthat
"ritualscelebratingthe act of giving birtharerare"(1993, 122), she failsto acknowledge
that biologicalbirthis often a subsocialprocessin non-Westerncultures,while socialbirth
is often heavily ritualized.
9. I am indebted to Monica Casper (personal communication) for helping to
clarifythis issue.
10. Representationsof infanticide are worthy of separatetreatment.Warrenseeks
desperatelyto distance herself from chargesthat she advocates infanticide, which is
uniformlyrepresentedas a heinous, barbariccrime againstnature. It should be noted
that U.S. media accounts of infanticide reservethe term almost exclusively for nonhuman animals,or for female infanticidein China and India. The assumptionthat the
killing of offspringdoes not occur in the United States, or, if it does, it should in no way
evoke a sympatheticresponse,does not allow us to analyze the social circumstances
which might drive a person to commit such a horribleact.
11. I am indebted to Susan Shaw for pointing this out.
12. See the bioethics literature,or disabilityrightsjournals,for multipleexamples;
also Poovey (1992), and essaysin Ginsburgand Rapp (1995).
13. In fact, it is the uniquely North American configurationof relationalityand
individualism that explains Sherwin's curious assertion (described earlier) that
"relationships"are superimposedupon the biological body/person.

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