GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M.

VI*LLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE

and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V.
DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by
FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE
PRESIDENT
and
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES
represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his
capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 208566 | November 19, 2013 (EB)

Petitioners then filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari

and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the
annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in
the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for
the 2013 PDAF, and the Executives lump-sum,
discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds
and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion.

x-----------------------x
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE FRANKLIN M.
DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and
HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his
capacity
as
SPEAKER
OF
THE
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 208493
x-----------------------x
PEDRITO
M.
NEPOMUCENO,
Former
Mayor-Boac,
Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of
Marinduque, Petitioner, vs. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON
C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 209251
Facts:

Before the Court are consolidated petitions taken

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which
assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.
In the Philippines, the pork barrel (a term of
American-English origin) has been commonly
referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of
Members of the Legislature (Congressional Pork
Barrel). However, it has also come to refer to certain
funds to the Executive. The Congressional Pork
Barrel can be traced from Act 3044 (Public Works
Act of 1922), the Support for Local Development
Projects during the Marcos period, the Mindanao
Development Fund and Visayas Development Fund
and later the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF)
under the Corazon Aquino presidency, and the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) under
the Joseph Estrada administration, as continued by
the Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the present Benigno
Aquino III administrations.
It was in the year 2000 that the "Priority
Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in
the GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation with
the respective Representative of the District" before
PDAF funds were directly released to the
implementing agency concerned was explicitly stated
in the 2000 PDAF Article.
In the 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles, it is stated that
the "identification of projects and/or designation of
beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list,
standard or design prepared by each implementing
agency (priority list requirement) x x x." However, as
practiced, it would still be the individual legislator
who would choose and identify the project from the
said priority list.
Provisions on legislator allocations as well as fund
realignment were included in the 2012 and 2013
PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the VicePresident, which was pegged at P200 Million in the
2011 GAA, had been deleted.
In addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs
to be identified as implementing agencies if they
have the technical capability to implement the
projects.

Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel:

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b)
non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances;
(d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local
autonomy.
Held:
(A) On Separation of Powers: YES. At its core, legislators have
been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to
identify the projects they desire to be funded through various
Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF
Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify
projects post-GAA may be construed from Special Provisions 1
to 3 and the second paragraph of Special Provision 4.
Legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority
in the areas of fund release (Special Provision 5 under the
2013 PDAF Article) and realignment (Special Provision 4,
paragraphs 1 and 2 under the 2013 PDAF Article).
Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another,
authorized to participate in the various operational aspects
of budgeting, including the evaluation of work and financial
plans for individual activities and the regulation and release
of funds, in violation of the separation of powers principle.
That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory
in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the
prohibition covers any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must
therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa. The Court also
points out that respondents have failed to substantiate their
position that the identification authority of legislators is only
of recommendatory import.
In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all
other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to
wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, the Court also
declared that informal practices, through which legislators
have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget
execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and,
hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment.
(B) On Non-delegability of legislative power: YES. The 2013
PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the
power of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is
lodged in Congress. The power to appropriate must be
exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law. The power of appropriation, as
held by the Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and
Insular Auditor, involves (a) setting apart by law a certain
sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a
personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate

(a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project
or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since
these two acts comprise the exercise of the power of
appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the
2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform
the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred
the power to legislate which the Constitution does not,
however, allow.
(C) On Checks and Balances: YES. Under the 2013 PDAF
Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a
collective allocation limit since the said amount would be
further divided among individual legislators who would then
receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the
GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on
their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are
made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence,
outside of the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto
consideration. This
kind of lump-sum/post-enactment
legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation
of a budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed
procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the
Presidents power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out,
the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the
entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the
specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be
consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the
whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with
legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification
feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally
flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be
treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple
purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical missions,
assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials,
construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup connotes
that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and
purposes of the appropriation for further determination and,
therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which
may be subject to the Presidents power of item veto.
The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA
Chairperson relays, limit[ed] state auditors from obtaining
relevant data and information that would aid in more
stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds. Accordingly,
she recommends the adoption of a line by line budget or
amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per
implementing agency.
(D) On Accountability: YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of
oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested
with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking
on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, this
very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul
of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that: [A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before any
office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he
may be called upon to act on account of his office. Allowing
legislators to intervene in the various phases of project
implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue
advantage of their own office.
However, the Court cannot completely agree that the same
post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislators
control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetrate
himself in office. This is a matter which must be analyzed
based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close
operational proximity between legislators and the Executive
department,
through
the
formers
post-enactment
participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this
matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not

strictly concern the Pork Barrel Systems intrinsic

constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial
assessment.
(E) On Political Dynasties: NO. Section 26, Article II of the
1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing due to
the qualifying phrase as may be defined by law. In this
respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies
a guideline for legislative or executive action. Therefore, since
there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the
policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must
defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on
this score to be largely speculative since it has not been
properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be
able to propagate political dynasties.
(F) On Local Autonomy: YES. The Court, however, finds an
inherent defect in the system which actually belies the
avowed intention of making equal the unequal (Philconsa,
1994). The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based
solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the
specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator
represents. As a result, a district representative of a highlyurbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a
district representative of a far-flung rural province which
would be relatively underdeveloped compared to the
former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even
Senators and Party-List Representatives and in some years,
even the Vice-President who do not represent any locality,
receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control
underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of
the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are
already legally mandated to assist the corresponding
sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social
development, and coordinating development efforts within its
territorial
jurisdiction.
Considering
that
LDCs
are
instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared
towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and
resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by
individual legislators, who are national officers that have no
law-making authority except only when acting as a body.
Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel:
Whether or not the phrases:
(a) and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed
by the President under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the
Malampaya Funds, and
(b) to finance the priority infrastructure development projects
and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized
by the Office of the President of the Philippines under Section
12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the
Presidential Social Fund,
are unconstitutional insofar as
delegations of legislative power

they

constitute

undue

Held: Yes
Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President
under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents
authority with respect to the purpose for which the
Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase
gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds
for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him

to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of

the law.
That the subject phrase may be confined only to energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects
of the government under the principle of ejusdem generis,
meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to
include or be restricted to things akin to, resembling, or of
the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is
belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government states a singular and general class and hence,
cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things
from which the general phrase for such other purposes may
be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it
represents, namely energy development programs of the
government; and, third, the Executive department has used
the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under
the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents own
position that it is limited only to energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government.
However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use
of the Malampaya Funds to finance energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government, remains legally effective and subsisting.
Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869,
as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social
Fund may be used to [first,] finance the priority infrastructure
development projects and [second,] to finance the restoration
of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may
be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of
the Philippines.
The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the
authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social
Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from
calamities. The first indicated purpose, however, gives him
carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any
infrastructure project he may so determine as a priority.
Verily, the law does not supply a definition of priority
infrastructure development projects and hence, leaves the
President without any guideline to construe the same. To note,
the delimitation of a project as one of infrastructure is too
broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to
any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects must be stricken down
as unconstitutional since similar to Section 8 of PD 910 it
lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the
delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains
legally effective and subsisting.
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG
ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN;
JUDY
M.
TAGUIWALO,
PROFESSOR,
UNIVERSITY
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
DILIMAN,
CO-CHAIRPERSON,
PAGBABAGO;
HENRI
KAHN, CONCERNED CITIZENS MOVEMENT; REP. LUZ
ILAGAN, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE;
REP. CARLOS ISAGANI ZARATE, BAY AN MUNA PARTYLIST REPRESENTATIVE; RENATO M. REYES, JR.,
SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAYAN; MANUEL K. DAYRIT,
CHAIRMAN, ANG KAPATIRAN PARTY; VENCER MARI E.
CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON, ANAKBAYAN; VICTOR
VILLANUEVA, CONVENOR, YOUTH ACT NOW, Petitioners,
vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 209287 | July 1, 2014 (EB)
Facts:

For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing

the
constitutionality
of
the
Disbursement
Acceleration Program(DAP), National Budget Circular
(NBC) No. 541, and related issuances of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
implementing the DAP.
At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, a provision of the
fundamental law that firmly ordains that "[n]o money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law." The tenor and
context of the challenges posed by the petitioners
against the DAP indicate that the DAP contravened
this provision by allowing the Executive to allocate
public money pooled from programmed and
unprogrammed funds of its various agencies in the
guise of the President exercising his constitutional
authority under Section 25(5) of the 1987
Constitution to transfer funds out of savings to
augment the appropriations of offices within the
Executive Branch of the Government. But the
challenges
are
further
complicated
by
the
interjection of allegations of transfer of funds to
agencies or offices outside of the Executive
The OSG posits, however, that no law was necessary
for the adoption and implementation of the DAP
because of its being neither a fund nor an
appropriation, but a program or an administrative
system of prioritizing spending; and that the
adoption of the DAP was by virtue of the authority of
the President as the Chief Executive to ensure that
laws were faithfully executed.

Issue: Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the
1987 Constitution, which provides: "No money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law."
Held: No

The DAP was a government policy or strategy

designed to stimulate the economy through
accelerated spending. In the context of the DAPs
adoption and implementation being a function
pertaining to the Executive as the main actor during
the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional
mandate to faithfully execute the laws, including the
GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or
to implement the DAP. Congress could appropriate
but would have nothing more to do during the
Budget Execution Stage. Indeed, appropriation was
the act by which Congress "designates a particular
fund, or sets apart a specified portion of the public
revenue or of the money in the public treasury, to be
applied to some general object of governmental
expenditure, or to some individual purchase or
expense."124 As pointed out in Gonzales v.
Raquiza:125 "In a strict sense, appropriation has
been defined as nothing more than the legislative
authorization prescribed by the Constitution that
money may be paid out of the Treasury, while
appropriation made by law refers to the act of the
legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular
use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt
or dues from the State to its creditors."126

On the other hand, the President, in keeping with his

duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient
discretion during the execution of the budget to
adapt the budget to changes in the countrys
economic situation.127 He could adopt a plan like
the DAP for the purpose. He could pool the savings
and identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP.
The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the
identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP
did not involve appropriation in the strict sense
because the money had been already set apart from
the public treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In

such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power

vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of
the Constitution.

exceptions, none but the enacting authority can

curtail the former. Not even the courts may add to
the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an
express exception excludes all others, although it is
always proper in determining the applicability of the
rule to inquire whether, in a particular case, it
accords with reason and justice.

Issue: Whether or not the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other
executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP violate
Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution insofar as:
(a)They treat the unreleased appropriations and unobligated
allotments withdrawn from government agencies as "savings"
as the term is used in Sec. 25(5), in relation to the provisions
of the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013;
(b)They authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or
programs not provided in the GAAs for the Executive
Department; and
(c)They "augment" discretionary lump sum appropriations in
the GAAs.
Held: Yes

Notwithstanding our appreciation of the DAP as a

plan or strategy validly adopted by the Executive to
ramp up spending to accelerate economic growth,
the challenges posed by the petitioners constrain us
to dissect the mechanics of the actual execution of
the DAP. The management and utilization of the
public wealth inevitably demands a most careful
scrutiny of whether the Executives implementation
of the DAP was consistent with the Constitution, the
relevant GAAs and other existing laws.

B. Requisites for the valid transfer of appropriated funds under

Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

A. Although executive discretion and flexibility are necessary

in the execution of the budget, any transfer of appropriated
funds should conform to Section 25(5), Article VI of the
Constitution

The Constitutional Commission included Section

25(5), supra, to keep a tight rein on the exercise of
the power to transfer funds appropriated by Congress
by the President and the other high officials of the
Government named therein. The Court stated in
Nazareth v. Villar:144
In the funding of current activities, projects, and
programs, the general rule should still be that the
budgetary amount contained in the appropriations
bill is the extent Congress will determine as sufficient
for the budgetary allocation for the proponent
agency. The only exception is found in Section 25 (5),
Article VI of the Constitution, by which the President,
the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions
are
authorized
to
transfer
appropriations to augmentany item in the GAA for
their respective offices from the savings in other
items of their respective appropriations. The plain
language of the constitutional restriction leaves no
room for the petitioners posture, which we should
now dispose of as untenable.
It bears emphasizing that the exception in favor of
the high officials named in Section 25(5), Article VI of
the Constitution limiting the authority to transfer
savings only to augment another item in the GAA is
strictly but reasonably construed as exclusive. As the
Court has expounded in Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections:
When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to
the application of the general rule, the exceptions
are strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions
extend only as far as their language fairly warrants,
and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
general provision rather than the exceptions. Where
the general rule is established by a statute with

The appropriate and natural office of the exception is

to exempt something from the scope of the general
words of a statute, which is otherwise within the
scope and meaning of such general words.
Consequently, the existence of an exception in a
statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall apply
to all cases not excepted. Exceptions are subject to
the rule of strict construction; hence, any doubt will
be resolved in favor of the general provision and
against
the
exception.
Indeed,
the
liberal
construction of a statute will seem to require in many
circumstances that the exception, by which the
operation of the statute is limited or abridged, should
receive a restricted construction.
Accordingly, we should interpret Section 25(5),
supra, in the context of a limitation on the Presidents
discretion over the appropriations during the Budget
Execution Phase.

The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under

Section 25(5), supra, must be made upon a
concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of the Constitutional
Commissions to transfer funds within their respective
offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated
from the appropriations for their respective offices;
and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an
item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices.

First RequisiteGAAs of 2011 and 2012 lacked valid

provisions to authorize transfers of funds under the
DAP; hence, transfers under the DAP were
unconstitutional
o
Section 25(5), supra, not being a selfexecuting provision of the Constitution,
must have an implementing law for it to be
operative. That law, generally, is the GAA of
a given fiscal year. To comply with the first
requisite, the GAAs should expressly
authorize the transfer of funds.
o
Section 25(5), supra, not being a selfexecuting provision of the Constitution,
must have an implementing law for it to be
operative. That law, generally, is the GAA of
a given fiscal year. To comply with the first
requisite, the GAAs should expressly
authorize the transfer of funds.
o
Did the GAAs expressly authorize the
transfer of funds? Yes
o
A reading shows, however, that the
provisions of the GAAs of 2011 and 2012
were textually unfaithful to the Constitution
for not carrying the phrase "for their
respective offices" contained in Section
25(5), supra. The impact of the phrase "for
their respective offices" was to authorize
only transfers of funds within their offices
(i.e., in the case of the President, the

transfer was to an item of appropriation

within the Executive). The provisions carried
a different phrase ("to augment any item in
this Act"), and the effect was that the 2011
and 2012 GAAs thereby literally allowed the
transfer of funds from savings to augment
any item in the GAAs even if the item
belonged to an office outside the Executive.
To that extent did the 2011 and 2012 GAAs
contravene the Constitution. At the very
least, the aforequoted provisions cannot be
used to claim authority to transfer
appropriations from the Executive to
another branch, or to a constitutional
commission.
Second Requisite There were no savings from which
funds could be sourced for the DAP
Third Requisite No funds from savings could be
transferred under the DAP to augment deficient
items not provided in the GAA
o
The third requisite for a valid transfer of
funds is that the purpose of the transfer
should be "to augment an item in the
general
appropriations
law
for
the
respective offices." The term "augment"
means to enlarge or increase in size,
amount, or degree.
Fourth Requisite Cross-border augmentations from
savings were prohibited by the Constitution
o
By providing that the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, and the Heads of the
Constitutional
Commissions
may
be
authorized to augment any item in the GAA
"for their respective offices," Section 25(5),
supra, has delineated borders between their
offices, such that funds appropriated for one
office are prohibited from crossing over to
another office even in the guise of
augmentation of a deficient item or items.
Thus, we call such transfers of funds crossborder
transfers
or
cross-border
augmentations.
o
Regardless of the variant characterizations
of the cross-border transfers of funds, the
plain text of Section 25(5), supra,
disallowing cross border transfers was
disobeyed. Cross-border transfers, whether
as augmentation, or as aid, were prohibited
under Section 25(5), supra.

Issue: Whether or not the DAP violates: (1) the Equal

Protection Clause, (2) the system of checks and balances, and
(3) the principle of public accountability enshrined in the 1987
Constitution considering that it authorizes the release of funds
upon the request of legislators.
Held: No

With respect to the challenge against the DAP under

the Equal Protection Clause,203 Luna argues that the
implementation of the DAP was "unfair as it [was]
selective" because the funds released under the DAP
was not made available to all the legislators, with
some of them refusing to avail themselves of the DAP
funds, and others being unaware of the availability of
such funds. Thus, the DAP practised "undue
favoritism" in favor of select legislators in
contravention of the Equal Protection Clause.

Similarly, COURAGE contends that the DAP violated

the Equal Protection Clause because no reasonable
classification was used in distributing the funds
under the DAP; and that the Senators who
supposedly availed themselves of said funds were
differently treated as to the amounts they
respectively received.

Anent the petitioners theory that the DAP violated

the system of checks and balances, Luna submits
that the grant of the funds under the DAP to some
legislators forced their silence about the issues and
anomalies surrounding the DAP. Meanwhile, Belgica
stresses that the DAP, by allowing the legislators to
identify PAPs, authorized them to take part in the
implementation and execution of the GAAs, a
function that exclusively belonged to the Executive;
that such situation constituted undue and unjustified
legislative encroachment in the functions of the
Executive; and that the President arrogated unto
himself the power of appropriation vested in
Congress because NBC No. 541 authorized the use of
the funds under the DAP for PAPs not considered in
the 2012 budget.
Finally, the petitioners insist that the DAP was
repugnant to the principle of public accountability
enshrined in the Constitution,204 because the
legislators relinquished the power of appropriation to
the Executive, and exhibited a reluctance to inquire
into the legality of the DAP.
The OSG counters the challenges, stating that the
supposed discrimination in the release of funds under
the DAP could be raised only by the affected
Members of Congress themselves, and if the
challenge based on the violation of the Equal
Protection
Clause
was
really
against
the
constitutionality of the DAP, the arguments of the
petitioners should be directed to the entitlement of
the legislators to the funds, not to the proposition
that all of the legislators should have been given
such entitlement.
The challenge based on the contravention of the
Equal Protection Clause, which focuses on the release
of funds under the DAP to legislators, lacks factual
and legal basis. The allegations about Senators and
Congressmen being unaware of the existence and
implementation of the DAP, and about some of them
having refused to accept such funds were
unsupported with relevant data. Also, the claim that
the Executive discriminated against some legislators
on the ground alone of their receiving less than the
others could not of itself warrant a finding of
contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. The
denial of equal protection of any law should be an
issue to be raised only by parties who supposedly
suffer it, and, in these cases, such parties would be
the few legislators claimed to have been
discriminated against in the releases of funds under
the DAP. The reason for the requirement is that only
such affected legislators could properly and fully
bring to the fore when and how the denial of equal
protection occurred, and explain why there was a
denial in their situation. The requirement was not
met here. Consequently, the Court was not put in the
position to determine if there was a denial of equal
protection. To have the Court do so despite the
inadequacy of the showing of factual and legal
support would be to compel it to speculate, and the
outcome would not do justice to those for whose
supposed benefit the claim of denial of equal
protection has been made.
The argument that the release of funds under the
DAP effectively stayed the hands of the legislators
from conducting congressional inquiries into the
legality and propriety of the DAP is speculative. That
deficiency eliminated any need to consider and
resolve the argument, for it is fundamental that
speculation would not support any proper judicial
determination of an issue simply because nothing
concrete can thereby be gained. In order to sustain
their constitutional challenges against official acts of

the Government, the petitioners must discharge the

basic burden of proving that the constitutional
infirmities
actually
existed.205
Simply
put,
guesswork and speculation cannot overcome the
presumption of the constitutionality of the assailed
executive act.
We do not need to discuss whether or not the DAP
and its implementation through the various circulars
and memoranda of the DBM transgressed the system
of checks and balances in place in our constitutional
system. Our earlier expositions on the DAP and its
implementing issuances infringing the doctrine of
separation of powers effectively addressed this
particular concern.
Anent the principle of public accountability being
transgressed
because
the
adoption
and
implementation
of
the
DAP constituted
an
assumption by the Executive of Congress power of
appropriation, we have already held that the DAP and
its implementing issuances were policies and acts
that the Executive could properly adopt and do in the
execution of the GAAs to the extent that they sought
to implement strategies to ramp up or accelerate the
economy of the country.

Araullo vs. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, February 3,

2015
POLITICAL LAW; POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT; JUDICIAL
REVIEW. We have already said that the Legislature under our
form of government is assigned the task and the power to
make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more
true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the
Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative
department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means,
or what a specific portion of the Constitution means,
especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its
meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this
would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial
processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final
court determination of a case based on a judicial
interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be
undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different
interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the

Legislative department. That would be neither wise nor

desirable, besides being clearly violative of the fundamental,
principles of our constitutional system of government,
particularly those governing the separation of powers.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; STRICT CONSTRUCTION ON THE
ACCUMULATION AND UTILIZATION OF SAVINGS. The decision
of the Court has underscored that the exercise of the power to
augment shall be strictly construed by virtue of its being an
exception to the general rule that the funding of PAPs shall be
limited to the amount fixed by Congress for the purpose.
Necessarily, savings, their utilization and their management
will also be strictly construed against expanding the scope of
the power to augment. Such a strict interpretation is essential
in order to keep the Executive and other budget implementors
within the limits of their prerogatives during budget execution,
and to prevent them from unduly transgressing Congress
power of the purse. Hence, regardless of the perceived
beneficial purposes of the DAP, and regardless of whether the
DAP is viewed as an effective tool of stimulating the national
economy, the acts and practices under the DAP and the
relevant provisions of NBC No. 541 cited in the Decision
should remain illegal and unconstitutional as long as the funds
used to finance the projects mentioned therein are sourced
from savings that deviated from the relevant provisions of the
GAA, as well as the limitation on the power to augment under
Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. In a society
governed by laws, even the best intentions must come within
the parameters defined and set by the Constitution and the
law. Laudable purposes must be carried out through legal
methods.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; POWER TO AUGMENT; CANNOT BE
USED TO FUND NON-EXISTENT PROVISION IN THE GAA.
Further, in Nazareth v. Villar, we clarified that there must be
an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of
expenditure with an appropriation to which savings may be
transferred for the purpose of augmentation. Accordingly, so
long as there is an item in the GAA for which Congress had set
aside a specified amount of public fund, savings may be
transferred thereto for augmentation purposes. This
interpretation is consistent not only with the Constitution and
the GAAs, but also with the degree of flexibility allowed to the
Executive during budget execution in responding to
unforeseeable contingencies.