Updates on the Law on Property

Immovable Property
By contracts, all uncontested in this case, machineries and equipments are included
in the mortgage in favor of RCBC, in the foreclosure of the mortgage and in the
consequent sale on foreclosure also in favor of petitioner.
The real estate mortgage over the machineries and equipments is even in full
accord with the classification of such properties by the Civil Code of the Philippines
as immovable property. Thus:
Article15.he following are immovable property:
(1)and, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
(5)

Machinery, etc.

x x x x [Star Two (SPV-AMC), Inc. vs. Paper City Corporation of the

Philippines, 692 SCRA 438(2013)]
Movable Property
Article 414 of the Civil Code provides that all things which are or may be the object
of appropriation are considered either real property or personal property.Business is
likewise not enumerated as personal property under the Civil Code.Just like interest
in business, however, it may be appropriated.Following the ruling in Stochecker v.
Ramirez, Business should also be classified as personal property.Since it is not
included in the exclusive enumeration of real properties under Article 415, it is
therefore personal property. (Laurel vs. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076, January
13,2009, 576 SCRA 41)
Property of the public domain
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to State,
that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged
with the conservation of such patrimony, a doctrine consistently adopted under the
1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required for the
registration of lands under the Torrens system. Section 8 of CA 141 limits alienable
or disposable lands ony to those lands which have been officially delimited and
classified.
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources vs.
Yap 568 SCRA 164.
Disposition of lands of the public domain
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public
land or lands of the public domain, namely:

(1)s a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under
private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not
be alienated or disposed;
(2)he following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a)gricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable
through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public
Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to
be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided
the applicants possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945,
or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all
the conditions essential to a government grant arises, and the applicant becomes
the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction,
the land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private
property.
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer
intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from
the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands
or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the
modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is
prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been
already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive
period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code)
that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription. [Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines, 704
SCRA 561(2013)]
Classification of public lands
It cannot be overemphasized that the prerogative of classifying public lands
pertains to administrative agencies which have been specially tasked by statutes to
do so, namely DANR now DENR and its two bureaus, the Bureau of Lands and
Bureau of Forestry. (Republic vs. Mendoza, Sr., 519 SCRA 203)
Alienable and Disposable Land
The certification by DENR Regional Technical Director Celso V. Loriega, Jr. , as
annotated on the subdivision plan, constituted substantial compliance with the legal
requirement. It clearly indicates that Lot 249 had been verified as belonging to the
alienable and disposable area as early as July 18, 1925. (Republic vs. Serrano,
612 SCRA 537)
Property held by public corporations
PRA was created essentially to perform a public service considering that it was
primarily responsible for a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation,

administration and operation of lands belonging to the government with the object
of maximizing their utilization and hastening their development consistent with the
public interest.
x

In contrast, government instrumentalities vested with corporate powers and

performing governmental or public functions need not meet the test of economic
stability. These instrumentalities perform essential public services for the common
good, services that every modern state must provide its citizens. These
instrumentalities need not be economically viable since the government may even
subsidize their entire operation. These instrumentalities are not the governmentowned or controlled corporations referred to in Section 16, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. (Republic vs. City of Paraaque, 677 SCRA 246 [2012])
Ancestral Lands
Respondents being holders of a mere CALC, their right to possess the subject land is
limited to occupation in relation to cultivation. Unlike No. 1,26 Par. 1, Section 1,
Article VII of the same DENR DAO, which expressly allows ancestral domain
claimants to reside peacefully within the domain, nothing in Section 2 grants
ancestral land claimants a similar right, much less the right to build permanent
structures on ancestral landsan act of ownership that pertains to one (1) who has
a recognized right by virtue of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title. [Philippine
Economic Zone Authority vs. Carantes, 621 SCRA 569(2010)]
Ownership of Expropriated property
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by
the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights
in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a
different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any
reversion to the former owner. [Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority
(MCIAA ) vs. Heirs of Marcelina L. Sero, 551 SCRA 633]
Accion Publiciana
Accion publiciana, also known as accion plenaria de posesion, is an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independent of title
it refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual
of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of thy
property. (Madrid vs. Mapoy, 596 SCRA 14)
Acquisition of ownership through delivery
Actual delivery of a thing sold occurs when it is placed under the control and
possession of the vendee. Pante claimed that he had been using the lot as a
passageway, with the Churchs permission, since 1963. After purchasing the lot in
1992, he continued using it as a passageway until he was prevented by the spouses
Rubis concrete fence over the lot in 1994. Pantes use of the lot as a passageway

after the 1992 sale in his favor was a clear assertion of his right of ownership that
preceded the spouses Rubis claim of ownership.
Delivery of a thing sold may also be made constructively. Article 1498 of the Civil
Code states that:
Article498.hen the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution
thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the
contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be
inferred.
Under this provision, the sale in favor of Pante would have to be upheld since the
contract executed between the Church and Pante was duly notarized, converting
the deed into a public instrument. [The Roman Catholic Chruch vs. Pante, 669
SCRA 234(2012)]
Ownership and Certificate of Title
Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of
ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such
ownership although both are interchangeably used.
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not
mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from
a certificate of title, the latter only serving as the best proof of ownership
[Lacbayan vs. Samoy, Jr., 645 SCRA 677(2011)]
Accession (Alluvium)
But it must be stressed that accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article
457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that
the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the
result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where accretion
takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.Thus, it is not enough to be a riparian
owner in order to enjoy the benefits of accretion.One who claims the right of
accretion must show by preponderant evidence that he has met all the conditions
provided by law. Petitioner has notably failed in this regard as it did not offer any
evidence to prove that it has satisfied the foregoing requisites. (New Regent
Sources, Inc. v. Tanjuatco, Jr., G.R.No. 168800, April 16, 2009, 585 SCA
1329)
Builder in good faith
Introduction of valuable improvements on the leased premises does not give the
lessee the right of retention and reimbursement which rightfully belongs to a builder
in good faith the doctrine is that a lessee a neither a builder in good faith nor in
bad faith that would call for the application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code
since his rights are governed by Article 1678. (Sulo sa Nayon, Inc. vs. Nayong
Filipino Foundation, 576 SCRA 655)

The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of
accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way
around. However, even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him,
nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. (Briones vs. Macabagdal, G.R.
No. 150666, August 3, 2010)
Respondents argument does not hold water. Since respondents occupation of the
subject property was by mere tolerance, she has no right to retain its possession
under Article 448 of the Civil Code. She is aware that her tolerated possession may
be terminated any time and she cannot be considered as builder in good faith. It is
well settled that both Article 448 and Article 546 of the New Civil Code, which allow
full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds
on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. Verily, persons whose
occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good
faith. At the time respondent built the improvements on the premises in 1945, she
knew that her possession was by mere permission and tolerance of the petitioners;
hence, she cannot be said to be a person who builds on land with the belief that she
is the owner thereof. [Esmaquel vs. Coprada, 638 SCRA 428(2010)]
The good faith referred to by Alida Mores was about the building of the
improvements on the leased subject property. However, tenants like the spouses
Mores cannot be said to be builders in good faith as they have no pretension to be
owners of the property. Indeed, full reimbursement of useful improvements and
retention of the premises until reimbursement is made applies only to a possessor
in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner
thereof. It does not apply where ones only interest is that of a lessee under a rental
contract; otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to improve his
landlord out of his property. [Mores vs. Yu-Go, 625 SCRA 291(2010)]
In fine, the Court applied Article 448 by construing good faith beyond its limited
definition. We find no reason not to apply the Courts ruling in Spouses Macasaet
vs. Spouses Macasaet In the instant case. First, good faith is presumed on the part
of the respondent-spouses. Second, petitioner failed rebut this presumption. Third,
no evidence was presented to show that petitioner opposed or objected to the
improvements introduced by the respondent-spouses. Consequently, we can validly
presume that petitioner consented to the improvements being constructed.
(Communities Cagayan, Inc. vs. Nanol, 685 SCRA 453 [2012])
With the unassailable finding that Angeles house straddled the lot of Pascual, and
that Angeles had built his house in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code, which
spells out the rights and obligations of the owner of the land as well as of the
builder, is unquestionably applicable. Consequently, the land being the principal
and the building the accessory, preference is given to Pascual as the owner of the
land to make the choice as between appropriating the building or obliging Angeles
as the builder to pay the value of the land. Contrary to the insistence of Angeles,
therefore, no inconsistency exists between the finding of good faith in his favor and

the grant of the reliefs set forth in Article 448 of the Civil Code. [Angeles vs.
Pascual, 658 SCRA 23(2011)]
Accretion
It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits
that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case,
the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect in relation to Article 457 of
the Civil Code.
Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 specifically covers ownership over
alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek. It reads:
ART.4.ccretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams,
rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the
owners of such lands.
Interestingly, Article 457 of the Civil Code states:
Art.57.o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the
banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property
automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added.
The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property
must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property
may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No
matter how long the possession of the properties has been, there can be no
prescription against the State regarding property of public domain. Even a city or
municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against the State. [Offices of
the City Mayor of Paraaque City vs. Ebio, 621 SCRA 555(2010)]
However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show
that the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the
current of the river had formed Lot 3998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed that
the property was the dried-up riverbed of the Paraaque River, leading both the RTC
and the CA to themselves hold that Lot 4998-B was the land which was previously
part of the Paraaque River xxx (and) became an orchard after it dried up.
(Republic vs. Santos III, 685 SCRA 41 [2012]).
Dried-up Creek
Assuming that Sapang Bayan was a dried-up creek, under Art. 420 and Art. 502 of
the Civil Code, rivers and their natural beds are property of public dominion
(Fernando vs. Acuna, 657 SCRZ 499)
Co-ownership

We have ruled that the words married to preceding the name of a spouse are
merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. Such words do not
prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both
spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code. [GoBangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr., 700 SCRA 702(2013)]
Co-ownership: rights of a co-owner
A co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to build a house on the co-owned
property, which is an act tantamount to devoting the property to his or her exclusive
use. Cruz vs. Catapang, 544 SCRA 512.
Co-ownership; Partition
The right to seek partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches; The
only exception to the imprescriptibility of an action for partition against a co-owner
is when a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership. Monteroso vs. Court of
Appeals, 553 SCRA 66.
In order that a co-owners possession may be deemed adverse to that of the cestui
que trust or the other co-owners, the following elements must concur:
1. The co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation of the co-ownership
amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or the other co-owners;
2. Such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust
or the other co-owners;
3. The evidence on the repudiation is clear and conclusive; and
4. His possession is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious. [Heirs of Jose
Reyes, Jr. vs. Reyes, 626 SCRA 758(2010)]
Co-ownership and Partnership
There is a co-ownership when an undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons.It is a partnership when two or more persons bind themselves to contribute
money, property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the
profits among themselves.
From the above it appears that the fact that those who agree to form a coownership share or do not share any profits made by the use of the property held in
common does not convert their venture into a partnership. Or the sharing of the
gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership whether or not the persons
sharing therein have a joint or common right or interest in the property.
Co-ownership and Partnership
This only means that, aside from the circumstance of profit, the presence of other
elements constituting partnership is necessary, such as the clear intent to form a
partnership, the existence of a juridical personality different from that of the
individual partners, and the freedom to transfer or assign any interest in the

property by one with the consent of the others. [Jarantilla, Jr. vs. Jarantilla, 636
SCRA 299(2010 )]
Co-ownership; Partition
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is
proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary
agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a
declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a coownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other
hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is
proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the
defendant from the real estate in question is in order. x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that the parties are unable to
agree upon the partition directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be
done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the
accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have been
accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the
party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real
estate in question. x x x (Emphasis supplied.) [Lacbayan vs. Samoy, Jr., 645
SCRA 677(2011)]
Fraudulent Partition
A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who
had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Such
action for the annulment of such partition, however, must be brought within four
(4) years from discovery of the fraud. (Feliciano vs. Canoza, 629 SCRA 550)
Oral partition
The validity of an oral partition is already well-settled. It is not required, contrary to
the MTCs stated reason for denying some documentary exhibits to prove partition,
such as the individual TCTs obtained by Manuel Urbano II and Cornelio Gamboa over
portions they have acquired, that the partition agreement be registered or
annotated in OCT No. 48098 to be valid. In another case, we have held that after
exercising acts of ownership over their respective portions of the contested estate,
petitioners are estopped from denying the existence of an oral partition. [Notarte
vs. Notarte, 679 SCRA 378(2012)]
Condominium
In order to have a notice of assessment to be considered a lien on a condominium
unit, the same must be registered in the Registry of Deeds. Cardinal Building
Owners Association, Inc, vs. Asset recovery and Management Corporation,
495 SCRA 103.

Not having been specifically conferred with power to hear and decide cases which
are criminal in nature, as well as to impose penalties therefor, we find that the
HLURB has no jurisdiction over criminal actions arising from violations of PD 957.
[Dazon vs. Yap, 610 SCRA 79(2010)]
As earlier stated, both the law and the Master Deed refer to utility installations as
forming part of the common areas, which reference is justified by practical
considerations. Repairs to correct any defects in the electrical wiring should be
under the control and supervision of respondent to ensure safety and compliance
with the Philippine Electrical Code, not to mention security and peace of mind of the
unit owners. (Limson vs. Wack-Wack Condominium Corp., G.R. No. 188802,
February 14, 2011)
The case before the RTC involved an intra-corporate disputethe Moreno spouses
were asking for an accounting of the association dues and were questioning the
manner the petitioner calculated the dues assessed against them. These issues are
alien to the first case that was initiated by Salvaciona third party to the petitionerMoreno relationshipto stop the extrajudicial sale on the basis of the lack of the
requirements for a valid foreclosure sale. [Chateau de Banie Condominium
Corporation vs. Moreno, 644 SCRA 288(2011)]
Among the obligations of FDC and FSCC to the unit owners or purchasers of FSBs
units was the duty to provide a centralized air-conditioning unit, lighting, electricity,
and water; and to maintain adequate fire exit, elevators, and cleanliness in each
floor of the common areas of FSB. But FDC and FSCC failed to repair the centralized
air-conditioning unit of the fourth floor of FSB despite repeated demands from
Agcaoili. To alleviate the physical discomfort and adverse effects on his work as a
practicing attorney brought about by the breakdown of the air-conditioning unit, he
installed two window-type air-conditioners at his own expense.Also, FDC and FSCC
failed to provide water supply to the comfort room and to clean the corridors. The
fire exit and elevator were also defective.
These defects, among other circumstances, rightly compelled Agcaoili to suspend
the payment of his monthly amortizations and condominium dues. Instead of
addressing his valid complaints, FDC disconnected the electric supply of his Unit
411 and unilaterally increased the interest rate without justification.
Clearly, FDC was liable for damages. Article 1171 of the Civil Code provides that
those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for
damages. [Fedman Development Corporation vs. Agcaoili, (2011)]
Action to Quiet Title
If the person claiming to be the owner of the property is in actual possession
thereof, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the
property, does not prescribe, the reason being that one who is in actual possession
of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is

disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. Alio vs.
Heirs of Angelica A. Lorenzo, 556 SCRA 139.
In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites must concur:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. [PhilVille Development and Housing Corporation vs. Bonifacio, 651 SCRA
327(2011)]
Possession
Two elements are paramount in possession there must be occupancy or taking and
there must be intent to possess. (So vs. Food Fest Land, Inc., 617 SCRA 5410)
Acquisition of Possession
Execution of a public instrument gives rise only to a prima facie presumption of
delivery. It is negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the
land sold. (Beatingco vs. Gasis, 642 SCRA 539)
Actual and constructive possession
A person who does not have actual possession of the thing sold cannot transfer
constructive possession by the execution and delivery of a public instrument.
[Villamar vs. Mangaoil, 669 SCRA 426(2012)]
Possession and Occupation
Possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the
publicdomain because the law requires possession and occupation.Ong vs.
Republic, 548 SCRA 160.
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Possession is broader than
occupation be cause it includes constructive possession. Unless, therefore, the law
adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Republic vs. Enriquez, 501 SCRA 436.
Possession alone is not sufficientto acquire title to alienable lands of the public
domain because the law requires possession and occupation-since these words are
separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make
one synonymous with the other; Possession is broader than occupation because it
includes constructive possession-when the law adds the word occupation, it seeks
to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Mistica vs.
Republic, 599 SCRA 401.
Possession by Tolerance
The rule is that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes
unlawful upon demand to vacate made by the owner and the possessor by
tolerance refuses to comply with such demand; The absence of demand to vacate

precludes the Court from treating this case, originally instituted as one for forcible
entry, as one of the unlawful detainer, since demand to vacate is jurisdictional in an
action for unlawful detainer. Acaylar, Jr. vs. Harayo, 560 SCRA 624.
Right of Possessor
The purchasers right of possession is recognized only as against the judgment
debtor and his successor-in-interest but not against persons whose right of
possession is adverse to the latter
Where a party in possession was not a party to the foreclosure, and did not acquire
his possession from a person who was bound by the decree, but who is a mere
stranger and who entered into possession before the suit was begun, the court has
no power to deprive him of possession by enforcing the decree. Development
Bank of the Philippines vs. Prime Neighborhood Association, 587 SCRA
582.
Usufruct
While the share was bought by Sime Darby and placed under the name of Mendoza,
his title is only limited to the usufruct, or the use and enjoyment of the clubs
facilities and privileges while employed with the company. In Thomson v. Court of
Appeals,20 we held that a trust arises in favor of one who pays the purchase price
of a property in the name of another, because of the presumption that he who pays
for a thing intends a beneficial interest for himself. [Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc.
vs. Mendoza, 699 SCRA 290(2013)]
The complicating factor in the case is the nature and basis of Wilfredos possession;
he was holding the property as usufructuary, although this right to de jure
possession was also disputed before his death, hand in hand with the de facto
possession that is subject of the present case. Without need, however, of any
further dispute or litigation, the right to the usufruct is now rendered moot by the
death of Wilfredo since death extinguishes a usufruct under Article 603(1) of the
Civil Code. This development deprives the heirs of the usufructuary the right to
retain or to reacquire possession of the property even if the ejectment judgment
directs its restitution. [Rivera-Calingasan vs. Rivera, 696 SCRA 613(2013)]
Easement on riparian bank
Thus, the above proves that petitioners right of ownership and possession has been
limited by law with respect to the 3-meter strip/zone along the banks of Mahabang
Ilog Creek. Despite this, the Court cannot agree with the trial courts opinion, as to
which the CA did not pass upon, that respondents have a better right to possess the
subject portion of the land because they are occupying an area reserved for public
easement purposes. Similar to petitioner, respondents have no right or title over it
precisely because it is public land.
Likewise, we repeatedly held that squatters have no possessory rights over the land
intruded upon. The length of time that they may have physically occupied the land
is immaterial; they are deemed to have entered the same in bad faith, such that the

nature of their possession is presumed to have retained the same character

throughout their occupancy.
As to the issue of who is the proper party entitled to institute a case with respect to
the 3-meter strip/zone, We find and so hold that both the Republic of the Philippines,
through the OSG and the local government of Las Pias City, may file an action
depending on the purpose sought to be achieved. The former shall be responsible in
case of action for reversion under C.A. 141, while the latter may also bring an action
to enforce the relevant provisions of Republic Act No. 7279 (otherwise known as the
Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992).
Under R.A. 7279, which was enacted to uplift the living conditions in the poorer
sections of the communities in urban areas and was envisioned to be the antidote
to the pernicious problem of squatting in the metropolis, all local government units
(LGUs) are mandated to evict and demolish persons or entities occupying danger
areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines,
waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and
playgrounds. [Pilar Development Corporation vs. Dumadag, 693 SCRA
96(2013)]
Easement of right of way, (NPC cases)
If the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his
proprietary rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use,
free enjoyment and disposal of the property or through restrictions and limitations
that are inconsistent with the exercise of the attributes of ownership or when the
introduction of structures or objects which, by their nature, create or increase the
probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life and property found on the
land is necessary, then the owner should be compensated for the monetary
equivalent of the land. National Power Corporation vs. Tiangco, 514 SCRA
674.
Because of the nature of the easement of right-of-way of National Power
Corporations (NAPOCORs) transmission lines, which will deprive the normal use of
the land for an indefinite period, just compensation must be based on the full
market value of the affected properties. National Power Corporation vs.
Purefoods Corporation, 565 SCRA 17.
Considering the nature and the effect of the installations power lines, the limitations
on the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal
use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of just
compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent
of the land. National Power Corporation vs. Bongbong, 520 SCRA 290.
As earlier mentioned, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, substantially
provides that properties which will be traversed by transmission lines will only be
considered as easements and just compensation for such right of way easement
shall not exceed 10 percent of the market value. However, this Court has repeatedly

ruled that when petitioner takes private property to construct transmission lines, it
is liable to pay the full market value upon proper determination by the courts.
(Citations omitted.) (National Power Corporation vs, Tuazon, G.R. No.
193023, June 22, 2011)
We agree with both the RTC and the CA that there was a full taking on the part of
NPC, notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and actually
dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be
compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation. Indeed, the
expropriators action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or
occupancy but may still amount to a taking.] Compensable taking includes
destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of
the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner,
lessening or its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of
the use of his property, nor material whether the property is removed from the
possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands. (National Power
Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, G.R No. 165828, August
24, 2011)
It has been ruled that the owner should be compensated for the monetary
equivalent of the land if, as here, the easement is intended to perpetually or
indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietary rights through the imposition of
conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment and disposal of the property
or through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent with the exercise of the
attributes of ownership, or when the introduction of structures or objects which, by
their nature, create or increase the probability of injury, death upon or destruction
of life and property found on the land is necessary. Measured not by the takers
gain but the owners loss, just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. [Cabahug vs.
National Power Corporation, 689 SCRA 666(2013)]
Continuous and apparent easement
A water facility constructed on a lot in a subdivision, through which the residents of
the subdivision obtain water for 30 years, constitutes a continuous and apparent
easement, and a compliance with the requisite for an open space in the
subdivision. Hence, the said lot cannot be sold. (Liwag vs. Happy Glen Hope
Homeowners Association, Inc., 675 SCRA 744 [2012])
Easement of lateral and subjacent support
We sustain the CA in declaring that a permanent injunction on the part of petitioner
from making injurious excavations is necessary in order to protect the interest of
respondent. However, an annotation of the existence of the subjacent and lateral
support is no longer necessary. It exists whether or not it is annotated or registered
in the registry of property. A judicial recognition of the same already binds the
property and the owner of the same, including her successors-in-interest.
Otherwise, every adjoining landowner would come to court or have the easement of

subjacent and lateral support registered in order for it to be recognized and

respected. (Castro vs. Monsod, G.R. No. 183719, February 2, 2011)
Voluntary Easement
As we have said, the opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish
only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at
bar.The fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of
necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property right, which survives
the termination of the necessity.A voluntary easement of right of way, like any other
contract, could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the
owner of the dominant estate.Unicourse Development and Marketing Corp.
Vs. Joseph Chung, et al., G.R. No. 173252, July 17, 2009, 593 SCRA 382.
Easement; restrictions on rights of owner of dominant estate.
The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the following prescribed
restrictions on its rights on the servient estate, to wit: (1) it can only exercise rights
necessary for the use of the easement; (2) it cannot use the easement except for
the benefit of the immovable originally contemplated; (3) it cannot exercise the
easement in any other manner than that previously established; (4) it cannot
construct anything on it which is not necessary for the use and preservation of the
easement; (5) it cannot alter or make the easement more burdensome; (6) it must
notify the servient estate owner of its intention to make necessary works on the
servient estate; and (7) it should choose the most convenient time and manner to
build said works so as to cause the least convenience to the owner of the servient
estate.Goldcrest Realty Corporation vs.Cypress Gardens Condominium
Corporation, 584 SCRA 435.
Easement of right of way
However, petitioners claim that the outlet is longer and circuitous, and they have to
pass through other lots owned by different owners before they could get to the
highway. We find petitioners concept of what is adequate outlet a complete
disregard of the well-entrenched doctrine that in order to justify the imposition of an
easement of right of way, there must be real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for
it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the
basis of setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can
be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed.20
[Dichoso, Jr. vs. Marcos, 647 SCRA 495(2011)]
Nuisance
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the
health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or
disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of
any public highway or street, or any body of water; or, (5) hinders or impairs the use
of property. A nuisance may be per se or per accidens. A nuisance per se is that

which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be
abated under the undefined law of necessity.
Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the
city council or the city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished
portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and property. This fact alone should
have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the structure.
Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of
law have the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance. [Gancayo vs.
City Government of Quezon City, et al., (2011)]
Donation
It must be stressed that the donation is onerous because the DECS, as donee, was
burdened with the obligation to utilize the land donated for school purposes. Under
Article 733 of the New Civil Code, a donation with an onerous cause is essentially a
contract and is thus governed by the rules on contract.
It has been 16 years since the execution of the deed of donation. Petitioner DECS
failed to use the property for the purpose specified in the deed of donation. In fine,
petitioner DECS has no use for the property, hence, the same shall be reverted to
the respondents. Secretary of Education, The vs. Heirs of Rufino Dulay, Sr.,
480 SCRA 452.
Post-mortem dispositions typically:
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor,
or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain ownership (full
or naked) and control of the property while alive.
(2) That before the [donors] death, the transfer should be revocable by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by
means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed.
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
Further
(4) [T]he specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be revoked by
the donor indicates that the donation is inter vivos, rather than a disposition mortis
causa.
(5) That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed
to the effect that the donation is to take effect at the death of the donor are not
controlling criteria; such statements are to be construed together with the rest of
the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor, (and)
(6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation inter vivos
rather that mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the
property subject of the deed.

It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a

perfected donation inter vivos. First. Rodrigo stipulated that if the herein Donee
predeceases me, the [Property] will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be
inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez, signalling the irrevocability of the passage
of title to Rodriguezs estate, waiving Rodrigos right to reclaim title. This transfer of
title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguezs acceptance of the
disposition which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its execution
on 3 May 1965. Rodrigos acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a
gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the
recipient. Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the Property, she could
have easily stipulated, as the testator did in another case, that the donor, may
transfer, sell, or encumber to any person or entity x x x or words to that effect.
It will not do, therefore, for petitioner to cherry-pick stipulations from the Deed
tending to serve his cause (e.g. the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon
my demise and devise). Dispositions bearing contradictory stipulations are
interpreted holistically, to give effect to the donors intent. In no less than seven
cases featuring deeds of donations styled as mortis causa dispositions, the Court,
after going over the deeds, eventually considered the transfers inter vivos,
consistent with the principle that the designation of the donation as mortis causa,
or a provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is to take effect at the
death of the donor are not controlling criteria [but] x x x are to be construed
together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of
the transferor. Indeed, doubts on the nature of dispositions are resolved to favor
inter vivos transfers to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property
subject of the deed. (Villanueva vs. Branoco, G.R. No. 172804, January 24,
2011, 640 SCRA 308)