Evgeny Buzyatov

TSTD 401
14 December 2014
The Two Truths in Madhyamaka
In The Introduction to the Middle Way (dbu ma la 'jug pa), Candrakrti says:
6.23. All objects may be seen in truth or in delusion;
They thus possess a twin identity.
The Buddha said the ultimate is what is seen correctly;
The wrongly seen in all-concealing truth.1
In this way Candrakrti defines the two truths. At the first glance, the two truths might look
contradictory and completely separate. Moreover, one might wonder why a Buddha is said to
cognize both truths at the same time: if his or her knowledge is flawless, how a Buddha can
cognize that what is wrongly seen? Different Tibetan masters explain the two truths differently
and have their own way of showing how the two truths comprise the unity. In this paper, I will
analyze some of the controversies, particularly by comparing the presentations of Mipam and
Tsongkhapa, and will try to show how these masters had the same intent.
As Mipam Rinpoche explains in his commentary on the treatise by Candrakrti, the ultimate
truth is concealed by the relative (conventional, all-concealing) truth. 2 Relative truth refers to
what a confused minds of ordinary beings wrongly cognize, and is called truth just because it
appears to be true to them. By the contrast, the noble beings, in their meditative absorption,
cognize only the ultimate truth. In the post-meditation, they perceive mere relative (kun rzob
tsam du, bare relative). The purpose of Madhyamaka, then, is to show that the ordinary
experience of the confused beings is false3 for example, through the varja slivers reasoning that
investigates the four types of production. In that way, one comes to realize the ultimate truth,
1 Chandrakirti, Introduction to the Middle Way, trans. Helena Blankleder and Wulstan Fletcher (New Delhi:
Shechen Publications, 2004), 23.

2 Mipham Rinpoche, The Word of Chandra: The Necklace of the Spotless Crystal, Introduction to the Middle
Way, trans. Helena Blankleder and Fletcher Wulstan (New Delhi: Shechen Publications, 2004), 199. Mipam uses the
terms relative (kun rdzob) and conventional (tha snyad) as synonyms.

3 Ibid., 201.

which is freedom from mental elaborations. Mipam divides ultimate truth into two types. He
defines ultimate truth in itself (rnam grangs min pai don dam) not as a mere emptiness, but as
indivisibility of appearance and emptiness.4 Giving this definition, Mipam avoids the two
extremes of existence and nonexistence: appealing to the appearance side (relative truth)
prevents the extreme of nonexistence, while the approximate ultimate (rnam grangs pai don
dam) refutes true existence of things. In this way, Mipam explains the unity of the two truths:
they are two distinct isolates of a single reality. 5 It is in tune with how Dr. Alexander Berzin
explains one of the special features of Mahyna tradition: unlike the Fundamental Vehicle,
where the two truths are two essentially different sets or types of phenomena, in Mahyna, the
two truths have the same essential nature (ngo bo gcig).6 That is to say, they are the two facts
about any phenomenon, or the two aspects of any phenomenon, which is called twin identity
of objects in the verse from Candrakrti quoted above. As Berzin points out, the emphasis on
understanding relative as concealing is another distinctive feature of the Mahyna tenet
systems. Vaibhs ika mostly uses relative in the meaning dependent on something else, and
Sautrntika emphasizes the meaning that which is worldly convention.7
Je Tsongkhapa agrees that the conventional truth conceals the ultimate, 8 as well as that
ordinary beings perceive conventional truth in a way that does not correspond to how things
actually are.9 However, generally Tsongkhapa defines the two truths in a different way. For him,
conventional truth refers to what an object conventionally is (for instance, a tree is a tree and not
4 Ibid., 192.
5 Ibid.
6 Alexander Bezin, The Two Truths in Vaibhashika and Sautrantika, Berzin Archives (March 2001, revised July
2006),
http://www.berzinarchives.com/web/en/archives/sutra/level5_analysis_mind_reality/truths/2_truths_vaibhashika_sa
utrantika.html.

7 For that reason, Berzin often uses the terms superficial truth and deepest truth instead of conventional
(relative) and ultimate.
8 Tsong-kha-pa, The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment, trans. The Lamrim Chenmo
Translation Committee (Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 2002), 175.

a waterfall), and ultimate truth refers to how this object exists (it is devoid of impossible ways of
existence, i.e. two or four extremes).10 The unity of the two truths, in this case, refers to the fact
that they are the two non-contradictory facts about the same object. As Helena Blankleder and
Wulstan Fletcher explain, Tsongkhapa makes emphasis on distinguishing between conventional
existence of things, which is not to be refuted, and inherent existence of things (bden par grub
pa, truly established existence), which is negated with Madhyamaka reasoning. 11 In his Great
Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment (byang chub lam rim che ba, abbr. lam rim
chen mo), Tsongkhapa criticizes those scholars who claim that Madhyamaka completely refutes
existence and production of phenomena.12 Particularly, he investigates the debates between
Ngrjuna and the followers of the lower Buddhist tenet systems who accuse Mdhyamikas in
nihilism. Ngrjuna responds that samsara, liberation, the four noble truths, arising and
disintegration are untenable if one asserts inherent existence, but they are perfectly tenable if one
asserts emptiness.13 Thus, the problem is not conventional truth as such, but ignorance that
superimposes inherent existence onto it.14 In order to show that Candrakrtis intent is not to
refute production, but to refute inherent production, Tsongkhapa quotes the following verse:
6.114. Because things are not produced
9 Tsong-kha-pa, The Great Treatise, 181. An example he gives is that there is no inherent impermanence
in the same way as there is no inherent permanence.
10 Alexander Berzin, The Validity and Accuracy of Cognition of the Two Truths in Gelug-Prasangika, Berzin
Archives, (February 2002, revised June 2006),
http://www.berzinarchives.com/web/en/archives/sutra/level5_analysis_mind_reality/truths/validity_prasanghika_ma
dhyamaka.html. Also see The Fourteenth Dalai Lamas presentation of Madhyamaka, which seems to follow the
same logic: The tree is the conventional truth and its real way of existing is the ultimate truth. (Dalai Lama XIV
Tenzin Gyatso, A Key to the Madhyamika, in Four Essential Buddhist Texts (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan
Works and Archives, 1982), 106).

11 Helena Blankleder and Wulstan Fletcher, trans. Translators Introduction, in Introduction to the Middle Way
(New Delhi: Shechen Publications, 2004), 49. Also, see Tsongkhapa himself: he [Candrakrti] does not refute
conventionalities. (Tsong-kha-pa, The Great Treatise, 161).

12 Tsong-kha-pa, The Great Treatise, 127.

13 Ibid., 131.
14 Ibid., 182.

Causelessly, or from causes such as a divine creator,

Or from self, other, or both self and other,
They are produced dependently.15
Tsongkhapa asserts that there is a conventional production, which is not to be refuted: it is
nothing else than dependent origination.16 He was aware that the opponents might argue that his
approach is closer to Svtantrika-Madhyamaka, where each truth is validated through its own
valid cognition and there is a separation of the two truths.17 Indeed, Tsongkhapa was criticized
for that, particularly by Mipam and Gendun Chopel.18 Mipam criticizes his approach especially
because it might be easily misunderstood in a way that things have inherent existence that the
way ordinary beings perceive things is correct, 19 and because it may lead astray from the
realization of the ultimate truth beyond assertions and conceptual elaborations. 20 In fact,
Tsongkhapa criticizes those Madhyamaka scholars who say that it is inappropriate for their own
system to identify or to assert21 of any phenomenon and who hold that stabilizing your mind
without apprehending anything at all is cultivation of the genuine Madhyamaka view.22
Therefore, the two masters have very different approach to the explaining Madhyamaka view,
and they suggest different way of meditation on it.
Nevertheless, both masters are explaining how to avoid the two extremes of existence
(eternalism) and nonexistence (nihilism), and thus how to come to the correct view of the Middle
15 Ibid., 186.
16 Ibid., 185-194.
17 Ibid., 129.
18 Helena Blankleder and Wulstan Fletcher, Translators Introduction, 50.
19 Mipham Rinpoche, The Word of Chandra, 165-183.
20 Helena Blankleder and Wulstan Fletcher, Translators Introduction, 50.
21 It is important to notice, as Berzin explains, that here the word assert does not imply asserting
inherent existence, it is Tibetan dod rather than sgrub (Alexander Berzin, private communication, 11
December 2014).
22 Tsong-kha-pa, The Great Treatise, 177-178.

Way. From this perspective, they have the same intent, and, in fact, there are a lot of similarities
in their presentations. Tsongkhapa criticizes his opponents for falling into the extreme of
nihilism, or at least for providing the explanation that might be easily misunderstood in a
nihilistic way. Particularly, he says that if there would be no difference between existence and
inherent existence, there would be no difference between things, no necessity to have any correct
(i.e. Buddhist) view, to perform wholesome actions and avoid unwholesome, to follow the path,
and so on.23 However, it does not mean that Mipam actually makes this fault. His presentation
also elaborately explains that there is a necessity to discriminate what is correct and what is
incorrect on the conventional level, and perhaps to practice in accordance with that:
Conventional phenomena are established by valid cognition; therefore, how could phenomena
like pots be regarded as nonexistent? To say that they are nonexistent would be to discount the
entire range of conventional existence and to affirm that there is nothing. This would amount to a
nihilist view.24 Also, Mipam explains that, from a certain perspective, empirical existence can
invalidate25 the Madhyamaka position. He gives an example with a person whose vase was
stolen: if he or she would be told that the vase is not different from a vase he or she saw in a
dream, the person might get angry. Moreover, Mipam mentions that other-production implies a
complete divorce between inherently existent cause and inherently existent effect, 26 and that
refuting the four types of production implies dependent origination of things. 27 These passages
resemble very much what Tsongkhapa says, though Tsongkhapa emphasizes these points and
dedicates several sections of his Lamrim Chenmo merely to them. Tsongkhapa, in turn, was
criticized for being too close to the extreme of eternalism, but he had never asserted inherent
23 Ibid.
24 Mipham Rinpoche, The Word of Chandra, 197-198.
25 Ibid., 202.
26 Ibid. That is to say, Mipam also states that it is inherent existence should be refuted.
27 Ibid., 203.

existence. In fact, in the chapter of the Lamrim Chenmo on wisdom, he repeats again and again
that inherent existence is the actual object of refutation; he asserts lack of inherent nature of
things to be the main point of the system of Ngrjuna.28
Both masters agree that a Buddha cognizes the two truths simultaneously. However, for
Tsongkhapa it means that a Buddha correctly perceives the ultimate and the conventional
truths,29 while Mipam asserts that a Buddha would perceive the ultimate truth and mere relative,
but not the conventional truth, which is a delusion.30 The term mere relative is discussed in the
Furthest Everlasting Continuum (rgyud bla ma, Skt. Uttaratantra),31 and, as Khenpo Tsultrim
Gyatso explains, this term refers to the pure appearances (bdag snang) that a Buddha sees when
all the impurity generated by ignorance are exhausted through the Dharma practice. 32 Even
though the two ways of explaining are different, they again come down to the same point: a
Buddha is omniscient and knows everything without being deluded by the projections of inherent
existence.
According to Blankleder and Fletcher, Tsongkhapa himself acknowledged that the distinction
between conventional existence and inherent existence is very subtle, and one can directly
cognize this difference only on the path of seeing.33 However, other masters agree that the direct
realization of the ultimate truth is achieved only with the attainment of the path of seeing. 34 Thus,
28 Tsong-kha-pa, The Great Treatise, 139.
29 Ibid., 129-130.
30 Mipham Rinpoche, The Word of Chandra, 199.
31 Arya Maitreya, The Mahayana Uttaratantra Shastra, in Buddha Nature: The Mahayana Uttaratantra
Shastra with Commentary, trans. Rosmarie Fuchs (Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 2000),
191.
32 Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche, The Unassailable Lions Roar, in Buddha Nature: The Mahayana
Uttaratantra Shastra with Commentary, trans. Rosmarie Fuchs (Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 2000),
375.

33 Helena Blankleder and Wulstan Fletcher, Translators Introduction, 49.

34 Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche, The Unassailable Lions Roar, 312; Mipham Rinpoche, The
Word of Chandra, 149.

there is no contradiction and no reasons to say that Tsongkhapas approach is more difficult to
apply.
To conclude, Tsongkhapa and Mipam present different explanations of the two truths.
Particularly, they give different definitions of them and in a different way interpret why
conventional truth is confusing. They have different views on whether Mdhyamikas make
statements or not. However, their intent is the same: each of the masters in his own unique way
explains how the two truths comprise the unity and how one should avoid the extremes of
nihilism and eternalism. Neither Mipam nor Tsongkhapa asserts inherent existence of
phenomena, as well as neither of them asserts complete nonexistence of things. According to
both of them, a practitioner of the Madhyamaka system should refute and finally stop the
projections of inherent existence that his or her mind creates. At the same time, he or she should
acknowledge the principle of cause and effect, and discriminate between what is correct and
what is incorrect in terms of the conduct or the view.

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