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TodayisSaturday,May14,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
SECONDDIVISION
G.R.No.163108February23,2005
GLENNCABALLESyCHUA,petitioner,
vs.
COURTOFAPPEALS,HON.EMMANUELD.LAUREA,HON.BENJAMINT.ANTONIO,andPEOPLEOFTHE
PHILIPPINES,respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO,SR.,J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by the petitioner for the
nullification of the Resolution of the Court ofAppeals 1 which dismissed his petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus for his release from detention despite the pendency of People of the Philippines v. Glenn
habeas
Caballes2forrape,anditsresolutiondenyinghismotionforreconsiderationthereof.
Theantecedentsareasfollows:
OnNovember19,2001,petitionerGlennChuaCaballeswaschargedwithrapeofaminorintheRegionalTrial
Court(RTC)ofMalabonCity.ThecasewasdocketedasCriminalCaseNo.25756MNandraffledtoBranch169,
presidedbyJudgeEmmanuelD.Laurea.Becausethepetitionerwaschargedwithanonbailableoffense,hewas
detained.
ThepetitionerwasarraignedonFebruary7,2002andpleadednotguiltytotheoffensecharged.Theprosecution
presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Venice Vera Pio, the private complainant, and her mother.The petitioner,
throughcounsel,commencedhiscrossexaminationofPio,butfailedtocompletethesame.InJanuary2003,the
petitionerengagedtheservicesofanewcounsel,Atty.NoelS.Sorreda,whoenteredhisappearanceasdefense
counsel.3
During the trial of February 26, 2003, the petitioner continued his crossexamination of Pio but still failed to
terminatethesame.ThetrialwassetonMarch6,2003forthepetitionertoterminatehiscrossexaminationof
Pio.However,duetotheillnessoftheprivateprosecutor,thetrialonthesaiddatedidnotproceed.Thetrialwas
further reset to March 17, 2003 during which the petitioner continued with his crossexamination of the private
complainant. Thereafter, the continuation of trial was set on April 3, 21, and 30, 2003. On April 3, 2003, the
petitioner concluded his crossexamination of Pio. The prosecution declared that its next witness would be Dr.
JoseArnelMarquez,theMedicoLegalOfficerofthePhilippineNationalPolice(PNP)CrimeLaboratory,whohad
conducted a medicolegal examination of the private complainant, but stated that he had not been subpoenad.
TheprosecutionprayedforthecancellationofthetrialscheduledonApril21,2003togivetheprosecutiontimeto
secureandcausetheserviceofasubpoenaducestecumonhim.Thepetitionerconformedtothemotionofthe
prosecution.
OnApril28,2003,thepetitionerfiledapetitionforbail.4
The trial of April 30, 2003 did not proceed because the petitioners counsel filed a Manifestation 5 that his
presencewasrequiredinanexecutionsaleinCavite.Thesaidcounselmanifestedthathereservedhisrightto
crossexamineanywitnesstheprosecutionwouldpresentincasetrialwouldproceedonthatdateontheother
hand,intheeventthatthetrialcourtwouldcancelthetrial,hewouldbeavailableinMay2003andduringthefirst
halfofJune2003.
Thetrialcourtresetthehearingofthecaseto8:30a.m.ofJune19,2003andgavetheprosecutionten(10)days
tofileitsopposition6tothepetitionerspetitionforbail.ItlikewiseorderedtheissuanceofasubpoenatoDr.Jose
ArnelMarqueztorequirehimtoattendthetrialonthesaiddate.
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OnMay5,2003,thepetitionerfiledamotion7seekinganearliertrialdate,invokinghisrighttospeedytrialunder
theSpeedyTrialActof1998.Healsofiledamotionfortheurgentresolutionofhispetitionforbail.8
OnMay12,2003,thepetitionerfiledanothermotion9 praying that the hearing scheduled on June 19, 2003 be
moved to an earlier date, preferably on May 26, 28 or 29, 2003. In the meantime, the prosecution filed its
comment/opposition10tothepetitionerspetitionforbail.
OnMay13,2003,thecourtissuedanOrder11declaringthatthepetitionforbailwassubmittedforitsresolution
anddenyingthepetitionersmotionforanearliertrialdate.OnJune16,2003,thetrialcourtissueditsOrder12
denyingthepetitionforbail,onitsfindingthattheevidenceofguiltagainstthepetitionerwasstrong.
DuringthetrialofJune19,2003,Dr.Marquezfailedtoappearbeforethecourtbecause,inthemeantime,hehad
beenassignedtotheEasternPoliceDistrictandfailedtoreceivethesubpoenaissuedtohimbythecourt.The
prosecution prayed for continuance, but the petitioner objected and invoked his right to speedy trial.The court,
nevertheless,grantedthemotionandresetthetrialtoJuly17,2003.
On June 27, 2003, the court issued a subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum to Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez
requiringhimtoappearforthetrialsetonJuly17,2003.13
On July 4, 2003, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the courts Order dated June 16, 2003
denying his petition for bail. His motion was set for hearing, also on July 17, 2003. However, the petitioner
preemptedtheresolutionofhismotionforreconsiderationandfiledaMotiontoDismiss14 the case on July 11,
2003onthegroundthathisrighttospeedytrialhadbeenviolated.Hemadethefollowingallegations:
1.Thehearingsintheinstantcasehavemoreoftenthannotbeenscheduledmorethanonemonthapart
2. In the hearing on April 30, 2003, in particular, the day before undersigned counsel had filed a
Manifestation stating inter alia that his available dates for the next hearing may be "any Monday,
WednesdayorThursdayforthewholeofMay2003andthefirsthalfofJune2003,exceptonMay14and
21"yetAtty.ManalaysayaskedforthenexthearingonJune19whichisalreadyoutsideorbeyondthe
dates mentioned in the manifestation, and which was more than 11/2 months away, but which the
HonorableCourtnonethelessgranted
3.Atty.Manalaysayhasneverbeenabletopresentany"goodcause"astohowcomehewasnotableto
presentDr.MarquezonApril30,2003,andthenagainonJune19,2003andasaforesaid,hisabsenceon
March6,2003hasnotbeensupportedbyanymedicalcertificate
4.The first hearing in the instant case was held on June 13, 2002, thus it has now been more than one
year, or close to 400 days ago since trial started neither has there been any authorization from the
SupremeCourtthatthetrialperiodmayexceed180days
5.TherehasbeennostatementbytheHonorableCourtinanyofitsordersgrantingcontinuancethat"the
endsofjusticeservedbytakingsuchactionoutweighthebestinterestofthepublicandtheaccusedina
speedytrial"
6.Asabovestated,itappearsthattheprosecutionmadeafalsestatementbeforetheHonorableCourtin
claimingtheyhadaskedDr.MarqueztotestifyintheJune19,2003hearing,wheninfacttheyhadnot.15
Dr.JoseArnelMarquezhadapparentlystillnotreceivedthesubpoenaissuedbythetrialcourt,becauseofwhich
theprosecutionagainfailedtopresenthimasawitnessduringthetrialofJuly17,2003.Theprosecutionprayed
forcontinuance,towhichthepetitionervigorouslyobjected.Thecourt,however,grantedthemotionandresetthe
trialtoAugust11,2003.16
On July 24, 2003, Judge Laurea issued an Order17 inhibiting himself from hearing the case "to avoid being
misunderstood, to preserve his reputation for probity and objectivity and to live up to the ideal impartial
administration of justice." The case was reraffled to Branch 170, presided by Judge Benjamin T.Antonio, who
calendared the case for trial on September 8, 2003. Nevertheless, on August 11, 2003, the petitioner filed a
MotionforReconsideration18ofJudgeLaureasOrderdatedJuly24,2003,whichthelatterdenied,onthefinding
thatnocogentreasonwaspresentedtoreconsiderthesame.19
DuringthehearingonSeptember8,2003,JudgeAntoniograntedtheprivateprosecutorsmotiontobegivenfive
(5)dayswithinwhichtoopposethepetitionersmotiontodismiss.JudgeAntonioalsosetthetrialonSeptember
18, 2003.20 On the latter date, the trial court issued an Omnibus Order21 denying the petitioners motion to
dismiss.The trial court reasoned that there was no violation of the petitioners right to speedy trial, considering
thattheapparentdelayscouldnotbeattributedtothefaultoftheprosecutionalone.Thetrialcourtnotedthatthe
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petitioneralsosoughtPostponementsofthetrials.
AnentthemotionforreconsiderationofthecourtsOrderdatedJune16,2003whichdeniedthepetitionforbail,
thetrialcourtconsideredthesameashavingbeenabandonedbythepetitioneruponthefilingofhismotionto
dismissthecasewithoutwaitingfortheresolutionofhismotionforreconsiderationonhispetitionforbail.
The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a "Petition for Habeas
Habeas Corpus and/or Certiorari and
Prohibition."22OnOctober2,2003,theCAissuedaResolutionrequiringthepetitionertoinformthecourtofhis
choice of remedy within five (5) days from notice thereof. In compliance therewith, the petitioner filed a
manifestationwiththeappellatecourtthathehadchosenhispetitiontobetreatedasapetitionforhabeascorpus
habeas
without prejudice "to the concomitant application of certiorari if the court considered the same necessary or
appropriatetogiveeffecttothewritofhabeascorpus
habeas
."
The petitioner averred that (a) he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial and his constitutional right to a
speedy disposition of the case (b) Judge Laurea erred in inhibiting himself from the case (c) the trial court
committedgraveabuseofitsdiscretionindenyinghispetitionforbailand(d)JudgeAntoniohadprejudgedthe
caseagainsthim.
OnDecember9,2003,theCAissueditsassailedResolutiondismissingthepetition,viz:
WHEREFORE,forbeingthewrongorimproperremedy,thePETITIONFORHABEASCORPUS
HABEAS
isDISMISSED.
SOORDERED.23
According to the appellate court, while the petitioner manifested his preference that his petition be treated as a
petitionforhabeascorpus
habeas
,thesamewasnottheproperremedytoreviewandexaminetheproceedingsbefore
thetrialcourtandasarelieffromthepetitionersperceivedoppressivesituationinthetrialcourt.TheCAfurther
emphasizedthatawritofhabeascorpus
habeas
isnotawritoferrorthatitcouldnotexerciseitscertiorarijurisdiction
over the acts or omission of the respondent judge as a concomitant remedy and that the remedy for habeas
corpusandcertiorariaredifferentinnature,scopeandpurpose.Theappellatecourtdeclaredthatthepetitioner
failedtopresentanyevidencetoprovethattherewasanyintentionalordeliberatedelaycausedtoprejudicehim
nor was there any malice in the failure of the prosecution to promptly serve the subpoena duces tecum/ad
testificandumtoitswitnesses.Thecourtalsonotedthattheresettingofpetitionerscasemayalsobeattributedto
thevoluminousworkoftheRTCinvolved.
Thepetitionerfiledamotionforreconsiderationofthesaiddecisioncontendingthat(a)thecongestionofthetrial
courtscalendarisnotavalidgroundforcontinuanceofthetrial(b)thetrialcourtfailedtosecureanextensionof
timeofthetrialperiodfromtheSupremeCourt(c)thetrialcourtshouldhavegivenaprecedencetothecase,the
charge therein being a heinous crime (d) his petition for a writ of habeas
habeas corpus was proper because his
continued detention had become illegal, following the prosecutor and the trial courts violation of his right to a
speedytrial,andthetrialcourtsdenialofhismotiontodismissthecaseandhispetitionforbailwhichwastainted
with grave abuse of discretion and (e) a writ of habeascorpus
habeas
may be issued with the writ of certiorari for the
purposeofreview.However,theCAdeniedthepetitionersmotionforlackofmerit.
ThepetitionerfiledapetitionforcertiorariinthisCourtunderRule65oftheRulesofCourtreiteratingthegrounds
contained in his motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. The petitioner averred that the appellate court
committedgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtoexcessorlackofjurisdictioninrenderingitsresolution,aswell
astheresolutiondenyinghismotionforreconsiderationthereof.
In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that a petition for a writ of habeas
corpusisnottheproperremedytoassailthetrialcourtsorderdenyinghispetitionforbail,motiontodismissthe
case, and Judge Laureas order of inhibition. The OSG posits that the petitioner was not deprived of his
constitutionalrighttoaspeedydispositionofhiscaseaswellasundertheSpeedyTrialAct.
The issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether or not the decision of the CA is already final and
executory (b) whether the proper remedy from the appellate courts denial of a petitioner for a writ if habeas
corpusisapetitionforcertiorariunderRule65oftheRulesofCourtand(c)ifintheaffirmative,whetherornot
thepetitionerisentitledtotheissuanceofthewrit.
Onthefirstissue,wefindandsorulethatthepetitionersrecoursetothisCourtviaapetitionforcertiorarifrom
the decision of the CA dismissing his petition for a writ of habeascorpus
habeas
is inappropriate. Section 39 of Batas
PambansaBlg.129providesthattheperiodforappealfromthejudgmentofanycourtinhabeascorpus
habeas
cases
shall be fortyeight (48) hours from notice of the judgment appealed from. While the said provision was not
incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court approved Administrative Matter No. 01103SC
amendingSection3,Rule41ofthesaidRules,whichtookeffectonJuly15,2001,thus:
SEC.3.Periodofordinaryappealappealinhabeascorpuscases.
habeas
Theappealshallbetakenwithinfifteen(15)
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days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellantshallfileanoticeofappealandarecordonappealwithinthirty(30)daysfromnoticeofthejudgmentor
finalorder.However,anappealinhabeascorpus
habeas
casesshallbetakenwithinfortyeight(48)hoursfromnoticeof
thejudgmentorfinalorderappealedfrom.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for
extensionoftimetofileamotionfornewtrialorreconsiderationshallbeallowed.
Followingtherule,thepetitionershouldhaveappealedtothisCourtfromtheCAdecisiondenyinghispetitionfor
awritofhabeascorpus
habeas
,aswellasthedenialofhismotionforreconsiderationthereofinstead,thepetitionerfiled
apetitionforcertiorariunderRule65oftheRulesofCourt,asamended.Thewellsettledruleisthatcertiorariis
notavailablewheretheaggrievedpartysremedyofappealisplain,speedyandadequateintheordinarycourse,
thereasonbeingthatcertioraricannotcoexistwithanappealoranyotheradequateremedy.Theexistenceand
availabilityoftherighttoappealareantitheticaltotheavailmentofthespecialcivilactionforcertiorari.Thesetwo
remediesaremutuallyexclusive.24Anappealinthiscasewouldstillhavebeenaspeedyandadequateremedy.
Consequently, when the petitioner filed his petition in this Court, the decision of the CA was already final and
executory.
It bears stressing that a decision in a habeascorpus
habeas
action stands in no different position than with any other
proceeding and if the appealed decision is to be reviewed by an appellate court, the remedy is by writ of error
becausetheerrorcommittedbythecourtisanerrorofjudgmentandnotanerrorofjurisdiction.25
Besides,ascorrectlyheldbytheCA,awritofhabeascorpus
habeas
isnottheproperremedytoassailthetrialcourts
denial of the petitioners motion to dismiss the case, the denial of the petition for bail, as well as the voluntary
inhibitionofJudgeLaurea.
Apetitionfortheissuanceofawritof habeascorpus
habeas
isaspecialproceedinggovernedbyRule102oftheRules
26
of Court, as amended. In Ex Parte Billings, it was held that habeas
habeas corpus is that of a civil proceeding in
character. It seeks the enforcement of civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of
whichthecomplaintismade,butintotherightofliberty,notwithstandingtheactandtheimmediatepurposetobe
served is relief from illegal restraint. The rule applies even when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and
secure freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas
habeas corpus, he thereby commences a suit and
prosecutesacaseinthatcourt.27
Habeascorpusisnotinthenatureofawritoferrornorintendedassubstituteforthetrialcourtsfunction.28It
Habeas
cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error.The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider
questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas
habeas corpus
proceedingisaddressedtothequestionofwhethertheproceedingsandtheassailedorderare,foranyreason,
nullandvoid.29Thewritisnotordinarilygrantedwherethelawprovidesforotherremediesintheregularcourse,
andintheabsenceofexceptionalcircumstances.Moreover,habeascorpus
habeas
shouldnotbegrantedinadvanceof
30
trial. Theorderlycourseoftrialmustbepursuedandtheusualremediesexhaustedbeforeresortingtothewrit
whereexceptionalcircumstancesareextant.Inanothercase,itwasheldthathabeascorpus
habeas
cannotbeissuedas
awritoferrororasameansofreviewingerrorsoflawandirregularitiesnotinvolvingthequestionsofjurisdiction
occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of human life and
libertymustbepreserved,andnotdestroyed.31Ithasalsobeenheldthatwhererestraintisunderlegalprocess,
mere errors and irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by habeas
corpusbecauseinsuchcases,therestraintisnotillegal.32
Habeascorpusisasummaryremedy.Itisanalogoustoaproceedinginremwheninstitutedforthesolepurpose
Habeas
of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause of his detention may be
inquired into and his statements final.33 The writ of habeascorpus
habeas
does not act upon the prisoner who seeks
relief,butuponthepersonwhoholdshiminwhatisallegedtobetheunlawfulauthority.34Hence,theonlyparties
before the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only
questiontoberesolvediswhetherthecustodianhasauthoritytodeprivethepetitionerofhisliberty.35The writ
maybedeniedifthepetitionerfailstoshowfactsthatheisentitledtheretoexmeritojusticias.36
Awritofhabeascorpus,
habeas
whichisregardedasa"palladiumofliberty"isaprerogativewritwhichdoesnotissueas
a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It, is, however, a writ of right on proper
formalities being made by proof.37 Resort to the writ is to inquire into the criminal act of which a complaint is
madebutuntotherightofliberty,notwithstandingtheact,andtheimmediatepurposetobeservedisrelieffrom
illegalrestraint.38Theprimary,ifnottheonlyobjectofthewritofhabeascorpusadsubjuciendum
habeas
istodetermine
thelegalityoftherestraintunderwhichapersonisheld.39
Our review of the petitioners material averments in his petition before the CA reveals that it was a "petition for
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habeascorpusor,inthealternative,apetitionforawritofcertiorari"Thepetitionerassailedthereintheordersof
habeas
thetrialcourtdenyinghispetitionforbailandhismotiontodismissonthegroundthathewasdeprivedofhisright
toaspeedydispositionofthecaseagainsthim,andquestionedJudgeLaureasorderofinhibition.Weagreewith
the CA that a petition for a writ of habeas
habeas corpus cannot be joined with the special civil action for certiorari
because the two remedies are governed by a different set of rules. Rule 2, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court
mandates that the joinder of causes of action shall not include special actions or actions governed by special
rules,thusproscribingthejoinderofaspecialproceedingwithaspecialcivilaction.
WealsoagreewiththerulingoftheCAthatapetitionforawritof habeascorpus
habeas
isaremedydifferentfromthe
specialcivilactionofcertiorariunderRule65oftheRulesofCourt,asamended.Thewritofhabeascorpus
habeas
isa
collateralattackontheprocesses,orders,orjudgmentofthetrialcourt,whilecertiorariisadirectattackofsaid
processes, orders, or judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excessorlackofjurisdiction.Awritofcertiorarireachesonlyjurisdictionalerrors.Ithasnootheruse,exceptto
bringbeforethecourtarecordmaterialtobeconsideredinexercisingjurisdiction.Awritofcertiorarireachesthe
record. On the other hand, a writ of habeas
habeas corpus reaches the body but not the record it also reaches
jurisdictionalmattersbutdoesnotreachtherecord.However,whenjurisdictionisobtainedbytheissuanceofa
writofhabeascorpus
habeas
,tobringthebodyofthepersonwhoselibertyisinvolvedintocourt,andifitisnecessary,to
providetherecorduponwhichthedetentionisbased,thatmaybeaccomplishedbyusingawritofcertiorariasan
ancillary proceeding, i.e., it is subordinate to or in aid of the primary action for the purpose of impeaching the
record.Whenawritofcertiorariisissuedasthefoundationofjurisdictiontobringitanddirectuponthevalidityof
a judicial determination by any body or officer, jurisdictional questions only are reached, and such questions
pertainingtothedetentionmadebytheofficerorbodyparticularlycomplainedof.40
Thepetitionermanifestedtotheappellatecourtthathispetitionshouldbetreatedasapetitionforhabeascorpus
habeas
.
Eventhen,theCArightlydismissedthepetitionbecausethepetitionerfailedtoestablishhisrighttothewrit.The
recordsshowthatthepetitionerwaschargedwithrapepunishablebyreclusionperpetuaandwasdetainedbased
onthesaidchargehence,iftheevidenceofhisguiltisstrong,heshallnotbeadmittedtobailregardlessofthe
stage of the criminal prosecution.41 There is no question that the trial court had jurisdiction over the offense
charged and over the person of the petitioner. The jail warden has the authority and, in fact, is mandated to
detainthepetitioneruntilgrantedbailbythecourt,orthecaseagainsthimdismissed,oruntilheisacquittedafter
trial. The petitioner failed to establish that his incarceration pendente lite was illegal, and likewise failed to
establishexceptionalcircumstanceswarrantingtheissuanceofawritofhabeascorpus
habeas
bytheappellatecourt.
1 a \^/p h i1 .n e t

InGalvez v. Court ofAppeals, 42 the Court ruled that a petition for habeascorpus
habeas
is not the proper remedy to
assailthedenialthereof:
Theoriginaljurisdictiontograntordenybailrestedwithsaidrespondent.Thecorrectcoursewasforpetitioner
toinvokethatjurisdictionbyfilingapetitiontobeadmittedtobail,claimingarighttobailpersebyreasonofthe
weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review
jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court ofAppeals if
appropriatereliefwasalsoavailablethere.43
TheremedyofthepetitionerfromtheOrderofthetrialcourtdenyinghispetitionforbailwastofileapetitionfor
certiorari in the CA if the trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the said order.44 If the petitioner had done so, his petition would have been granted
becauseasgleanedfromtheassailedorderofthetrialcourt,itfailedtosummarizethetestimoniesoftheprivate
complainant and that of her mother. Hence, such order is invalid.45 The trial court would have had to issue
anotherordercontainingthesummaryofthetestimoniesoftheprivatecomplainantandhermother,includingits
findingsandconclusions.However,thepetitionerwouldstillnotbeentitledtobereleasedfromdetentioninthe
meantime.
ItbearsstressingthatunderthesecondparagraphofSection1,Rule13746oftheRulesofCourt,thevoluntary
inhibitionofaJudgeisaddressedtohissounddiscretionforjustorvalidreasons,theprimaryconsiderationbeing
thatthepeoplesfaithinthecourtsofjusticeisnotimpaired.47Thepetitionershouldhavethusfiledapetitionfor
certiorariand/orprohibitionintheCA,insteadofapetitionforhabeascorpus
habeas
.
In cases where the right of the accused to a speedy trial is violated by the prosecution, the remedy lies in the
procedureprovidedforunderRepublicActNo.8493,asimplementedbyRule119ofthe2000RulesofCriminal
Procedure.Section8ofthesaidRuleprovides:
SEC.8.Sanctions.Inanycaseinwhichprivatecounselfortheaccused,thepublicattorney,ortheprosecutor:
(a) Knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing that a necessary witness would be
unavailablefortrial
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(b)Filesamotionsolelyfordelaywhichheknowsistotallyfrivolousandwithoutmerit
(c)Makesastatementforthepurposeofobtainingcontinuancewhichheknowstobefalseandwhichis
materialtothegrantingofacontinuanceor
(d)Willfullyfailstoproceedtotrialwithoutjustificationconsistentwiththeprovisionshereof,thecourtmay
punishsuchcounsel,attorney,orprosecutor,asfollows:
(1)Byimposingonacounselprivatelyretainedinconnectionwiththedefenseofanaccused,afine
notexceedingtwentythousandpesos(P20,000.00)
(2) By imposing on any appointed counsel de oficio, public attorney, or prosecutor a fine not
exceedingfivethousandpesos(P5,000.00)and
(3) By denying any defense counsel or prosecutor the right to practice before the court trying the
caseforaperiodnotexceedingthirty(30)days.Thepunishmentprovidedforbythissectionshallbe
withoutprejudicetoanyappropriatecriminalactionorothersanctionauthorizedundertheseRules.
Ifthetrialcourtactedwithgraveabuseofitsdiscretionamountingtoexcessoflackofjurisdictioningrantingthe
prosecutions motion for the resetting of the trial over the petitioners objections, the more appropriate remedy
wouldhavebeentofileapetitionforcertiorariand/orapetitionformandamustocompelthetrialcourttocomply
withthetimelineprovidedforbythesaidRulefortrialandterminationofthecase.
Itwasinappropriateforthepetitionertofileapetitionforhabeascorpus
habeas
assailingthetrialcourtsorderdenying
hismotiontodismissthecaseforfailuretocomplywiththetimelineprovidedforbythesaidRules.Readingand
evaluating the assailed Order of the trial court dated September 18, 2000, it cannot be gainsaid that the court
violatedtherightofthepetitionertospeedytrial.Thus:
The instant motion is anchored on the alleged violation of and/or to enforce the right of the accused to speedy
trial.Ininvokingsuchright,theaccusedcontendsthatthefailureoftheprosecutiontopresentthemedicolegal
officerwhoexaminedthevictimontwo(2)occasions,andthenonappearanceoftheprivateprosecutoronone
occasioncausedunduedelayintheproceedingsofthiscase.
The prosecution vigorously opposed the Motion to Dismiss and claimed that since the prosecution has not yet
rested its case, the Court may not be able to appreciate the merits of the instant motion in the light of the
unfinishedpresentationofevidencefortheprosecutionandthatthegroundsreliedbythedefensedonottouch
onthesufficiencyoftheprosecutionsevidencetoprovetheguiltoftheaccusedbeyondreasonabledoubt,but
ratherontheallegeddelayandfailuretopresentDr.JoseArnelMarquezofthePNPCrimeLaboratory.
Afterdueconsideration,theCourtfindstheinstantmotionuntenable. The alleged delay and failure to present
themedicolegalofficercannotbeattributedtothefaultoftheprosecutionand/ortheCourt.Theprosecutionand
theCourtcannotencroachontherightofthemedicolegalofficertoappearinasmuchashisscheduleconflicted
with the hearings set for his appearance. Moreover, delays assailed by defense counsel that violated accused
right to speedy trial are not all at the instance of the prosecution. In fact, the defense, contributed to the delay
sincetheformerdefensecounselandeventhepresentdefensecounselsoughtpostponementsofthehearings.
l^v v p h i1 .n e t

Bethatasitmay,despitethenonpresentationofthemedicolegalofficer,theCourt(Branch169)proceededin
resolvingthePetitionforBailoftheaccused(albeitunfavorabletothecauseoftheaccused)onthebasisofthe
soletestimonyofthecomplainant,whichisbackedupbyseveraljurisprudencetothiseffect.Thedefense,fileda
MotionforReconsiderationofsaiddenialafterhehasfiledaMotiontoDismiss.Thefilingofthesepleadingsadds
tothedelayuntilthePresidingJudgewhodeniedthePetitionforBailvoluntarilyinhibitedhimselffromthiscase.
Then when the Motion to Dismiss was set for hearing, the Court, in an attempt to expedite the proceedings,
suggestedforthepartiestostipulateonthemedicalfindingsofthemedicolegalofficersoastodispensewithhis
presentation.Defensecounsel,however,wouldnotwanttoenterintosuchastipulation.Hence,anotherdelay.48
We agree with the petitioner that a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
habeas corpus may be filed if one is
deprivedofhisrighttoaspeedydispositionofthecaseunderArticleIV,Section16ofthe1987Constitutionand
ofhisrighttodueprocess.49However,thepetitionerneverinvokedinthetrialcourthisconstitutionalrighttoa
speedydispositionofthecaseagainsthim.WhatheinvokedwashisrighttoaspeedytrialunderRule119ofthe
2000RulesofCriminalProcedure.Heinvokedhisconstitutionalrighttoaspeedydispositionofthecaseagainst
him,forthefirsttime,onlyintheCourtofAppealswhenhefiledhispetitionforhabeascorpus
habeas
.
Eventhen,thepetitionerfailedtoestablishhisclaimthathewasdeprivedofhisrighttoaspeedydispositionof
thecase.InMarilynCorpuz,etal.,v.Sandiganbayan,50theCourthadtheoccasiontostate
Therightoftheaccusedtoaspeedytrialandtoaspeedydispositionofthecaseagainsthimwasdesignedto
preventtheoppressionofthecitizenbyholdingcriminalprosecutionsuspendedoverhimforanindefinitetime,
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andtopreventdelaysintheadministrationofjusticebymandatingthecourtstoproceedwithreasonabledispatch
inthetrialofcriminalcases.Suchrighttoaspeedytrialandaspeedydispositionofacaseisviolatedonlywhen
theproceedingisattendedbyvexatious,capriciousandoppressivedelays.Theinquiryastowhetherornotan
accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy
dispositionisarelativetermandmustnecessarilybeaflexibleconcept.
Whilejusticeisadministeredwithdispatch,theessentialingredientisorderly,expeditiousandnotmerespeed.It
cannotbedefinitelysaidhowlongistoolonginasystemwherejusticeissupposedtobeswift,butdeliberate.Itis
consistentwithdelaysanddependsuponcircumstances.Itsecuresrightstotheaccused,butitdoesnotpreclude
therightsofpublicjustice.Also,itmustbeborneinmindthattherightsgiventotheaccusedbytheConstitution
andtheRulesofCourtareshields,notweaponshence,courtsaretogivemeaningtothatintent.
TheCourtemphasizedinthesamecasethat:
A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to
approachspeedytrialcasesonanadhocbasis.
Indeterminingwhethertheaccusedhasbeendeprivedofhisrighttoaspeedydispositionofthecaseandtoa
speedytrial,fourfactorsmustbeconsidered:(a)lengthofdelay(b)thereasonforthedelay(c)thedefendants
assertionofhisrightand(d)prejudicetothedefendant.Prejudiceshouldbeassessedinthelightoftheinterest
of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pretrial
incarcerationtominimizeanxietyandconcernsoftheaccusedtotrialandtolimitthePossibilitythathisdefense
willbeimpaired.Ofthese,themostseriousisthelast,becausetheinabilityofadefendantadequatelytoprepare
hiscaseskewsthefairnessoftheentiresystem.Thereisalsoprejudiceifthedefensewitnessesareunableto
recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still
disadvantagedbyrestraintsonhislibertyandbylivingunderacloudofanxiety,suspicionandoften,hostility.His
financialresourcesmaybedrained,hisassociationiscurtailed,andheissubjectedtopublicobloquy.
Delay is a twoedged sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case beyond reasonable
doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the government to carry its burden. The
ConstitutionandtheRulesdonotrequireimpossibilitiesorextraordinaryefforts,diligenceorexertionfromcourts
or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly
prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for the government to sustain its right to try the
accuseddespiteadelay,itmustshowtwothings:(a)thattheaccusedsufferednoseriousprejudicebeyondthat
which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay and (b) that there was no more delay than is reasonably
attributabletotheordinaryprocessesofjustice.
Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay. Different weights
shouldbeassignedtodifferentreasonsorjustificationsinvokedbytheState.Forinstance,adeliberateattemptto
delaythetrialinordertohamperorprejudicethedefenseshouldbeweightedheavilyagainsttheState.Also,itis
improperfortheprosecutortointentionallydelaytogainsometacticaladvantageoverthedefendantortoharass
or prejudice him. On the other hand, the heavy case load of the prosecution or a missing witness should be
weightedlessheavilyagainsttheState.
Inthiscase,thepetitionerwasarraignedonFebruary7,2002.Inthemeantime,hewasabletopresentonlytwo
witnesses.Thepetitionerfailedtoterminatethecrossexaminationoftheprivatecomplainantbytheyear2002.
TheCourtcannotdeterminethereasonforthedelaybecausetherecordsoftheRTCarenotbeforeit.Neitherof
the parties made any explanation for the delay nor is there any showing that the counsel of the petitioner
complainedaboutthedelay.Asidefromthepetitionersclaimthattheprivateprosecutorfailedtogivegoodcause
forhisfailuretopresentDr.JoseArnelMarquezduringthetrialdatesApril30,2003andJune19,2003,aswell
astosubstantiatehisabsenceduringthetrialofMarch6,2003withamedicalcertificate,thepetitionerfailedto
supporthisclaiminhispleadingsbeforetheCAandinthisCourt.Ontheotherhand,thecounselofthepetitioner
was absent during the trial on April 30, 2003 because he had to attend an execution sale in Cavite. The
petitionerscounselgaveprioritytotheexecutionsaleandaskedforaresettingdespitethefactthathisclient,the
petitioner, was detained for a quasiheinous crime. While it is true that the trial was reset to June 19, 2003, or
more than one month fromApril 30, 2003, the petitioners counsel himself manifested that he was available for
trialduringthefirsthalfofJune2003.Therewasadifferenceofonlyfour(4)daysfromthetrialdatesetbythe
courtandtheavailabledatessuggestedbythepetitionerscounsel.Itbearsstressingthattrialdatescannotbe
setsolelyattheconvenienceofthepetitionerscounsel.Thetrialdatesavailableinthecalendarofthecourtand
oftheprosecutormustalsobetakenintoaccount.
1 v v p h i1 .n t

Hence, it cannot be said that the petitioner was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case simply
becausetheprivateprosecutorfailedtosubmitamedicalcertificateforhisabsenceduringthetrialofMarch6,
2003.Thepetitionercouldhaveaskedthecourttocitetheprivateprosecutorincontemptofcourtforhisfailureto
submitthesaidcertificatehefailedtodoso.Moreover,thepetitionerfailedtoestablishanyseriousprejudiceby
thedelayofthetrial,andthattheStatedeliberatelydelayedthetrialtoprejudicehim.
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INLIGHTOFALLTHEFOREGOING,thepetitionisDENIEDforlackofmerit.Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
Puno,(Chairman),AustriaMartinez,Tinga,andChicoNazario,JJ.,concur.

Footnotes
1 Penned byAssociate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, withAssociate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Elvi

JohnS.Asuncion,concurring.
2CriminalCaseNo.25756MN.
3Rollo,pp.6970.
4Id.at18.
5Id.at11.
6Id.at12.
7Id.at13.
8Id.at27.
9Id.at15.
10Id.at17.
11Id.at95.
12Id.at3031.
13Id.at49.
14Id.at32.
15Id.at3334.
16Id.at35.
17Id.at36.
18Id.at38.
19Id.at41.
20Id.at42.
21Id.at43.
22Id.at45.
23Id.at76.
24PeopleofthePhilippinesv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.144332,June10,2004.
25Gasterv.Stateexrel.Whitcher,94N.W.787(1903).
2646F.Supp.663(1942).
27Clickv.Click,127S.E.194,citingExParteTomTong,108U.S.556.
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28Burtonv.Smithers,31F.2d966(1929).
29U.S.v.Pridgeon,38L.Ed.627ExParteKearsey38L.Ed.391.
30Jonesv.Perkins,62L.Ed.1(1918).
31Johnsonv.Zerbst,82L.Ed.1461(1938).
3239CJS,HabeasCorpus,15,p.448.
Habeas
33Sismonv.GeorgiaIronandCoalCompany,43SE,78(1903).
34Bradov.30thJudicialCircuitCourtofKentucky,35L.Ed.443(1973).
3539Am.Jur.,HabeasCorpus,86,p.208.
Habeas
36Clickv.Click,supra.
37Bailey,HabeasCorpus,par.2,p.6.
Habeas
38ExparteBillings,supra.
39Caisonv.Landon,96L.Ed.547(1952).
40Gasterv.Whitcher,supra.
41 Sec. 7, Rule 114 reads: Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardlessofthestageofthecriminalprosecution.
42237SCRA685(1994).
43Id.at713714,citingEnrilev.Salazar,etc.,etal.,186SCRA217(1990).
44Peoplev.Gomez,325SCRA61(2000).
45SeeGoodmanv.DelaVictoria,325SCRA658(2000).
46Ajudgemay,intheexerciseofhissounddiscretion,disqualifyhimselffromsittinginacase,forjustor

validreasonsotherthanthosementionedabove.
47Peoplev.Kho,357SCRA290(2001).
48Rollo,pp.4344.
49Bernartev. Court ofAppeals, 263 SCRA 323 (1996) Olaguer v. Military Commission, 250 SCRA 144

(1987).
50G.R.No.162214,November11,2004.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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