Investigation of Andersen Consulting Contracts, Ohio

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
FILE ID NUMBERS: 2000047, 2000244
AGENCY: Ohio Department Of Job & Family Services
BASIS FOR INVESTIGATION: Inspector General Initiative
ALLEGATIONS: Improprieties in State Contracts
DATE OPENED: November 3, 2000
INVESTIGATED BY: Thomas P. Charles, Inspector General

Arnie J. Schropp, Deputy Inspector General
Richard A. Whitehouse, Deputy Inspector General
Eric J. McKinniss, Investigator
ASSISTED BY: Lt. Kim Campbell, Ohio State Highway Patrol
DATE OF REPORT: June 29, 2001

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Office of Inspector General (OIG), upon receipt of an anonymous letter, initiated this
investigation. The letter alleged that a former director of the Ohio Department of Human
Services (now the Ohio Department of Job & Family Services (ODJFS) steered a
consulting contract for welfare reform implementation to Andersen Consulting, LLP
(now known as Accenture).
Our investigation revealed that, in 1997, former human services director Arnold R.
Tompkins rejected the recommendation of a contract review committee in favor of
awarding the contract to Andersen. Mr. Tompkins continued to direct the approval of
several additional large unbid contracts to Andersen Consulting, against the advice of his
staff.
Upon leaving state service, Mr. Tompkins formed a partnership with Jacqueline Romer-
Sensky to do consulting work. Within months of leaving state government, their firm,
Tompkins & Sensky, Ltd., entered into consulting contracts with both Andersen and
American Management Systems (AMS). This resulted in questions as to whether
Tompkins’ decisions as director could have been influenced by his desire for employment
with Andersen upon leaving the public sector.
In 2000, the Ohio Departme nt of Human Services merged with the Ohio Bureau of
Employment Services to become the Ohio Department of Job & Family Services. After
four months as a partner with Mr. Tompkins, Jacqueline Romer-Sensky left to become
director of ODJFS. As director, Ms. Romer-Sensky approved additional large unbid
contracts for both Andersen and AMS. We find an unavoidable appearance of
impropriety was created when Ms. Romer-Sensky directly participated in the approval
process of large unbid contracts with both AMS and Andersen, after having been under
contract with both companies just prior to becoming director. However, in our view,
neither this appearance nor any other acts by Romer-Sensky rise to the level of
wrongdoing.
However, we did find reasonable cause to believe wrongdoing occurred on the part of
Mr. Tompkins based upon his actions in awarding large unbid contracts to Andersen. In
examining the totality of circumstances surrounding these contracts, we are unable to
conclude that his acts were intended to be in the best interests of the state. Rather, it
seems clear that he was merely attempting to establish goodwill and guarantee future
business with both Andersen and AMS after he left state service.
The role of Donna Givens, an Andersen employee, was pivotal in the relationship
between Andersen, Arnold R. Tompkins, and ODJFS. Ms. Givens was given a
consulting contract by Arnold R. Tompkins to work at ODJFS. She also established a
contract with Andersen at the same time she was under contract with ODJFS. Ms.
Givens participated in a contract presentation by Andersen before ODJFS. This led to
i
Andersen receiving several other contracts, contrary to the advice of a contract selection
committee. We found reasonable cause to believe wrongdoing occurred based upon the
circumstances surrounding her being under contract with ODJFS while she was doing
business with ODJFS as an Andersen employee.
The above findings led us to conduct a review of the contracting process at ODJFS. We
reviewed contracts for the implementation of an Internet-based system to match welfare
recipients to employers (Ohio Works), a state-wide child support computer system
(SETS), and underlying contracts involving Mr. Tompkins, Ms. Romer-Sensky, and Ms.
Givens. Our investigation revealed many problems largely related to the failure of
ODJFS to adequately oversee these projects.
Our investigation also revealed deficiencies on the part of ODJFS’ process of awarding
contracts. These deficiencies consist primarily of situations where policies and
procedures were disregarded in the course of awarding state contracts. However, we did
find other situations where these policies were simply inadequate. We also believe that
ODJFS failed to enforce contractual provisions of Givens’ contract that resulted in loss to
the state. The result of these problems was the waste of millions of dollars spent on large
projects lacking adequate oversight or accountability by the state. As a result, we found
reasonable cause to believe acts of wrongdoing or omission occurred.
A copy of this report has been forwarded to the Office of the Franklin County
Prosecuting Attorney for possible criminal prosecution. A copy has also been forwarded
to the Auditor of the State of Ohio and the Ohio Attorney General for possible audit and
recovery of state monies, as well as to the Ohio Ethics Commission for possible violation
of Ohio Ethics Laws.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. BASIS OF INVESTIGATION ..................................................................................................1
II. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................1

Welfare Reform Plan..................................................................................................................2
Support Enforcement Tracking System.....................................................................................2
Ohio Works ................................................................................................................................3
III. ACTION TAKEN IN FURTHERANCE OF INVESTIGATION ..........................................4
IV. INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED WRONGDOING ............................................................4

A. DISCUSSION ..............................................................................................................4
B. FINDINGS ...................................................................................................................15
Contract Steering .........................................................................................................15
Arnold R. Tompkins .....................................................................................15
Donna Givens................................................................................................18
Jacqueline Romer-Sensky ............................................................................20
Ethics Violations..........................................................................................................22
Arnold R. Tompkins .....................................................................................22
C. CONCLUSION
(INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED WRONGDOING) ...........................................23
D. REFERRAL .................................................................................................................25
V. REVIEW OF AGENCY MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS.........................................25

A. DISCUSSION ..............................................................................................................27
B. CONTRACT PROBLEMS – GENERALLY............................................................29
Professional Fees .........................................................................................................29
Unbid Contracts...........................................................................................................31
Analysis of the Andersen Contracts ............................................................32
Contracting Process.....................................................................................................34
Accountability Required of Contractor......................................................................36
Detailed Design and Performance Specifications.......................................37
Acceptance Test............................................................................................37
Warranty........................................................................................................38
Project Management .....................................................................................38
Sole Source Contractors...............................................................................40
Requests for Proposal (RFP) .......................................................................40
Costs of Contracts.........................................................................................41
Invoice Errors................................................................................................43
Vagueness of Contract Provisions ...............................................................44
Determination of Deliverables.....................................................................44
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Advice of Counsel ........................................................................................45
Time and Materials .......................................................................................45
C. OHIO WORKS ............................................................................................................46
Background ..................................................................................................................46
JobNet............................................................................................................46
Ohio Works ...................................................................................................47
Issues Associated with Ohio Works ...........................................................................47
Complaints about Ohio Works....................................................................................48
Ohio Works - Systems Operation Service Center .....................................................49
D. CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT / SETS ..........................................................53

Summary of Audits - Support Enforcement Tracking System (SETS) ....................55
The Bank One Contract...............................................................................................56
E. SPECIFIC CONTRACT IRREGULARITIES .........................................................59

Andersen.......................................................................................................................59
Donna Givens...............................................................................................................69
American Management Services ................................................................................81
F. FINDINGS ...................................................................................................................84
G. CONCLUSION
(REVIEW OF AGENCY MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS) .......................85
H. RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................87
I. REFERRALS ...............................................................................................................91
VI. CONCLUSION...........................................................................................................................91
EXHIBITS
1. Chronology of Controlling Board approved Andersen contracts.

2. Chronology of Controlling Board approved AMS contracts.
3. Selection Committee ratings.
4. Chronology of Donna Givens’ contracts with ODJFS.
5. Andersen presentation involving Donna Givens.
6. Strategy memo from Donna Givens to Andersen officials.
7. Contract Review Committee report.
8. Funds received by Tompkins & Sensky, Ltd.. and Tompkins Consulting from AMS and
Andersen.
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9. E-mail message with attached correspondence for Arnold R. Tompkins regarding Ohio
Works.
10. Chronology of events.
11. Andersen invoices for professional fees.
12. Cochran Public Relations / Andersen Consulting invoice comparison.
13. Andersen Contract C-00-01-230 payment schedule and invoices.
14. Andersen invoices.
15. Battelle Strategic Assessment for the ODJFS Merger.
16. Letter from Ms. Sensky to State Auditor Jim Petro.
17. Chronology of significant dates regarding the Bank One contract.
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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION FILE ID NO. 2000047, 2000244
I. BASIS OF INVESTIGATION
The Office of Inspector General (OIG) received an anonymous letter alleging that
the former director of the Ohio Department of Human Services1 steered a
consulting contract to a vendor. Specifically, that former director Arnold R.
Tompkins improperly awarded a contract to Andersen Consulting, LLP 2
(Andersen) for a welfare reform project after a selection committee recommended
another vendor. The issues raised in this matter are set forth in Section IV of this
report. In Section V, we review the management and operations of ODJFS as it
relates to the contracting process in general. We also analyze deficiencies in that
process and examples in specific contracts where those deficiencies resulted in
wrongdoing.
II. BACKGROUND
In 1996, ODJFS was given the task of reforming welfare in the State of Ohio
pursuant to a federal mandate. Subsequently, the 122nd Ohio General Assembly
passed legislation in 1997 mirroring federal welfare reform law. Because the
federal mandates restricted the amount of time state governments had to reform
welfare, ODJFS had to act promptly to avoid financial sanctions. The following
information about various ODJFS programs are pertinent to this investigation and
are discussed as background information.
1
On July 1, 2000, the Ohio Department of Human Services (ODHS) and Ohio Bureau of Employment
Services (OBES) merged and became the Ohio Department of Job & Family Services (ODJFS).
Consequently, for purposes of simplicity and consistency, most references to the agency in this report will
be ODJFS.
2
In January 2001, Andersen Consulting, LLP became Accenture. However, all references to the company
in this report will be Andersen.
1
Welfare Reform Plan

In September 1996, former director Arnold R. Tompkins began to develop a
strategic plan regarding welfare reform legislation to address the federal mandate
requiring every state to have a plan to reform welfare by October 1996. ODJFS
had submitted a plan for the State of Ohio, but sought consulting services from
Andersen to further the plan. On May 31, 1996, after meeting with Andersen
representative Robert Tyre, Mr. Tompkins approved the first unbid Andersen
contract in the amount of $49,500.00. The amount of the contract was just under
the $50,000.00 threshold requiring Controlling Board approval. Subsequently, on
October 7, 1996, at Mr. Tompkins’ request, the State Controlling Board approved
a $1,130,000.00 contract with Andersen to assist ODJFS in the development of
this plan, referred to as a “vision paper.”
Mr. Tompkins’ initial approval of an unbid contract with Andersen Consulting

has cultivated a total of over $60,000,000.00 worth of unbid public contracts with
Andersen. (See Exhibit 1)
Support Enforcement Tracking System

As part of federal welfare reform, the State of Ohio was mandated to centralize
the tracking and payment of child support. Previously, the responsibility for
coordinating child support payments rested with the 88 individual counties.
On June 23, 1997, the State Controlling Board approved a contract renewal for
American Management Systems, Inc. (AMS) to continue working on the Support
Enforcement Tracking System (SETS). However, our investigation revealed that,
due to a clerical error, ODJFS omitted welfare reform language as part of its
Controlling Board request. As a result, ODJFS immediately had AMS
discontinue any welfare reform work until an additional request could be
submitted to cover the cost of such work. On December 15, 1998, Mr. Tompkins
2
requested, and the State Controlling Board approved, the additional request to
fund welfare reform initiatives performed by AMS. This request and the
accompanying contract indicate AMS was to work with ODJFS to provide
“technology enablement” services.
Mr. Tompkins’ approval of the initial contract with AMS for welfare reform and
an integrated case management system has led to over $87 million dollars of
unbid contracts with AMS. (See Exhibit 2)
Ohio Works
As part of the welfare reform plan, the Ohio Works project was intended to
develop a website that would link welfare recipients to available jobs. The former
Ohio Bureau of Employment Services had already developed a similar system
called Ohio JobNet. Mr. Tompkins explained that Ohio JobNet was not utilized
for welfare reform because it did not do enough for businesses and was not a fully
interactive system. In addition, he said that the statistics (unemployment rate,
labor market indexes, etc.) reported to the federal government and posted on the
Ohio JobNet were not current and could not be regionalized. On August 11,
1997, Mr. Tompkins requested, and the State Controlling Board approved, a
contract with Andersen for $1,688,000.00 to assist in the design, creation,
implementation, and operation of a workforce development program (Ohio Works
First) to meet the goals of welfare reform. That request also included language
stating Andersen assisted ODJFS in setting its strategy for the welfare reform
plan, and that no other proposals were sought because of time constraints imposed
by the federal government.
As a result of this approval, subsequent unbid contracts have been awarded to

Andersen for the continued development and ongoing operation of Ohio Works.
3
III. ACTION TAKEN IN FURTHERANCE OF INVESTIGATION
This office reviewed several state-awarded contracts, agency-approved contracts,

Controlling Board requests, and selection committee notes and documents. In
addition, we reviewed contractual agreements, invoices, and correspondence
between Tompkins Consulting, Ltd. or Tompkins & Sensky Consulting, Ltd.,
American Management Systems, Inc. (AMS), and Andersen. We also conducted
numerous interviews.
We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the Ohio State Highway Patrol and
the Ohio Department of Administrative Services throughout the course of this
investigation. The cooperation of the Ohio Department of Job & Family Services
has also helped make this report as thorough and timely as possible.
IV. INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED WRONGDOING
A. DISCUSSION
Arnold R. Tompkins was appointed director of ODJFS on March 1, 1993. During

his tenure, he was responsible for approving contracts for a variety of purposes,
including consulting services for welfare reform implementation. Mr. Tompkins
resigned as director of ODJFS on October 9, 1998. Nearly five months after his
resignation, Jacqueline Romer-Sensky3 replaced Mr. Tompkins as director.
During the five-month period neither was in state service, Mr. Tompkins and Ms.
3
Jacqueline Romer-Sensky was deputy chief of staff for former Governor Voinovich. She served
as a cluster chief over several state agencies including ODHS. In 1993, she was instrumental in
hiring Arnold R. Tompkins as director of ODHS. She resigned as a member of the governor's
staff on September 26, 1998.
4
Romer-Sensky jointly operated a consulting business named Tompkins & Sensky,

Ltd. 4
Mr. Tompkins explained, when interviewed, that he wanted to select the best
vendor for welfare reform implementation. He recalled that the selection
committee recommended that ODJFS contract with AMS to perform welfare
reform implementation. However, since federal mandates restricted the time state
governments had to implement welfare reform, he said he had always felt strongly
about using multiple vendors to perform different portions of the work. He said
Assistant Director Enloe advised him to have a committee make the decision, but
he personally felt strongly about utilizing each vendor’s strengths to receive the
best work possible.
After Andersen developed the “vision paper,” a committee was formed in April
1997 to develop criteria for the selection of a vendor to perform the next phase of
welfare reform. In order to expedite the contracting process, ODJFS utilized a
selection committee to recommend a consulting vendor. This process was utilized
by the agency instead of the standard Request For Proposal (RFP) method
because of the constraints of time placed on the state by the federal government. 5
Before the selection committee was officially formed, a list of potential vendors
capable of performing the implementation phase of the strategic plan were
contacted by ODJFS and asked to submit proposals for the project. The proposals
submitted by these vendors were reviewed and certain vendors (AMS, Andersen,
4
Ohio Secretary of State records indicate Tompkins & Sensky, Ltd. was officially formed on
October 1, 1998.
5
While this is not the standard practice in selecting a vendor to contract with, the Department of
Administrative Services and the State Controlling Board approved it. The State Controlling Board
provides legislative oversight over certain expenditures by state agencies and has approval
authority over various state fiscal activities.
5
Battelle, KPMG Consulting, and Maximus) were asked to give a presentation to

the selection committee.
The selection committee unanimously recommended that AMS assist ODJFS in

the implementation phase. Moreover, Maximus was rated second and Andersen
third. (See Exhibit 3) However, some selection committee members felt AMS
would not be able to perform all aspects of the project. Many committee
members were under the impression the committee’s recommended vendor would
be awarded the entire project. Some questioned whether it was too much for one
vendor to undertake.
Our interviews revealed that some members of the committee did not care for
some individuals associated with Andersen. There was also concern that Robert
Tyre, an Andersen partner, met a number of times with Director Tompkins prior
to, and during, the selection committee process.
In addition, our investigation revealed that Donna Givens, a representative of

Andersen, was also an independent consultant paid on a contract basis by ODJFS.
Ms. Givens previously worked with Mr. Tompkins at the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services. Ms. Givens, while exploring business opportunities
in Ohio for Andersen, introduced Mr. Tompkins to Mr. Robert Tyre, an Andersen
partner. She later entered into four personal services contracts with ODJFS. Ms.
Givens was given contracts totaling $147,735.00, including expenses, between
July 1995 and June 1998 under these contracts. (See Exhibit 4) On October 14,
1996, Ms. Givens obtained an additional contract with Andersen. Subsequently,
she was working under contract with both Andersen and ODJFS when she
participated in an Andersen presentation to an ODJFS selection committee on
May 8, 1997. (See Exhibit 5) As a result of this presentation, Mr. Tompkins
selected Andersen for a $1,688,000.00 unbid contract.
6
On November 6, 1997, Ms. Givens authored a four-page strategy memo for

Andersen. Ms. Givens outlines various strategies in the memo, including how to
gain Andersen contract extensions through Mr. Tompkins, how to position Mr.
Tompkins upon his leaving state government, and how to influence the governor
and legislature through Andersen lobbyists. (See Exhibit 6)
Most committee members we interviewed believe assistant director Jim Enloe, the
committee chairperson, gave the rating results to Director Tompkins to review.
They assumed Director Tompkins would approve their recommendation and
award AMS the contract. However, correspondence from Mr. Enloe, dated June
5, 1997, indicate two vendors were still under consideration for a technological
portion of the project. The correspondence was addressed to AMS and Andersen,
and requested each vendor to present a more comprehensive plan regarding this
aspect of the project. Only two members of the committee recalled anything
regarding this second part of this selection process.
Mr. Enloe told us that a second selection committee would not be unusual given
the complexity and capacity of the project. However, he could not recall who
comprised this final selection committee. He said he remembered Director
Tompkins asking other senior level ODJFS personnel for input.
One member of the committee told us he recalled questions about vendors being
able to handle the technological portion of the project. He said he, Assistant
Director Enloe, and Gregory DePorter reviewed some information and possibly
vendor presentations regarding this issue, but he was not certain what impact their
review had. He did not believe Director Tompkins was involved in this part of
the process.
7
We interviewed representatives from both AMS and Andersen. Neither recalled

receiving correspondence from ODJFS in June 1997 regarding a request for a
more comprehensive presentation. Nor could they produce documents to indicate
they had participated in any additional presentation. However, the representative
from AMS stated she vividly remembers the original presentation to the selection
committee in May 1997. She vaguely recalled discussing technology strategy
with a senior associate of AMS and remembered being disappointed the
technology strategy was never presented.
At the onset of our investigation, we requested and received documents from the
vendor selection committee. Initially, ODJFS was only able to supply summary
scoring sheets that were found attached to some purchase orders and contracts.
However, ODJFS was eventually able to supply us with pertinent notes and
documents from the selection committee. We uncovered no additional documents
or materials from either AMS or Andersen Consulting indicating a second
proposal or presentation was ever requested or presented to a final selection
committee. However, former deputy director Loretta Adams did recall a second
meeting that involved Mr. Tompkins. She indicated that sometime after August
1997 she was appointed to a committee of five that included Mr. Tompkins. She
said the committee heard presentations and interviewed representatives from three
vendors, including Andersen Consulting. She said that after the interviews were
completed, Mr. Tompkins took the committee members into the hall and stated
“Hands down, Andersen is the best, and we are going with them.” She further
said they did not vote or have any other input in the selection.
When interviewed, Mr. Tompkins said that AMS did not have the personnel for
the job and would need a couple of months to bring adequate personnel on board.
However, he felt Andersen was capable of doing the work immediately. Mr.
Tompkins did not recall a second selection committee. He did remember that his
8
assistant director, Mr. Enloe, compiled additional information about each vendor
and forwarded the information submitted by vendors after their presentations.
Mr. Tompkins said that based on the proposals, the presentations, the committee
recommendation, and this additional information, he and Assistant Director Enloe
made the final decision that AMS and Andersen would perform the bulk of
welfare reform implementation.
When asked why he did not choose Maximus instead of Andersen, contrary to the
rankings of the selection committee, Mr. Tompkins said he did not feel Maximus
had the expertise to carry out what ODJFS needed. Additionally, he said
Maximus never responded to a request for a proposal on some training issues that
was part of the welfare reform implementation project.
During Mr. Tompkins’ tenure as director, ODJFS utilized contract review

committees to review contracts and make recommendations to the director before
approval. Committee members were selected from various sections of ODJFS for
their expertise, including the legal services section. We reviewed the committees’
contract review reports on the Andersen contracts. ODJFS was unable to locate
some of the reports, and some of those provided were blank. Some review
committee members said they purposely left them blank because they felt they did
not have enough information about the proposed contracts to make a
recommendation. We found only one contract review committee report that
included a committee recommendation. On August 6, 1998, a contract review
committee comprised of three people reviewed an Andersen contract for
$16,000,000.00. The committee recommended that the contract be denied
because of the cost of the contract and that it could not be justified as a sole
source. (See Exhibit 7) Mr. Tompkins ignored the recommendation of the
committee and approved the contract on August 7, 1998. The Controlling Board
subsequently approved the contract on August 31, 1998.
9
Starting in December 1997, a series of memos were forwarded to Mr. Tompkins

from the ODJFS office of legal services. The memos expressed concerns by the
legal office that the agency was possibly violating federal regulations. The
consensus of the agency legal counsel was that ODJFS would need prior approval
and an exemption from the federal Health and Human Services agency to utilize
federal TANF 6 dollars to fund sole source unbid Andersen and AMS contracts.
The legal office also had concerns about the contract being hourly-based versus
deliverables-based, price escalations, and independent contractor issues. Mr.
Tompkins ignored the concerns of his legal counsel and continued to approve the
unbid contracts. One agency official interviewed said that Mr. Tompkins told her
that he felt the federal rules were too ambiguous to worry about. The ODJFS
legal section continued to express these same concerns to Ms. Romer-Sensky after
she became director.
On October 1, 1998, one week before Arnold R. Tompkins resigned as director,

he and Jacqueline Romer-Sensky entered into a business partnership called
Tompkins & Sensky, Ltd. Our review of the Tompkins & Sensky, Ltd. business
contracts revealed that as early as November 24, 1998, AMS paid Tompkins &
Sensky, Ltd. $20,000.00 in advance to provide future consulting work which
commenced on December 29, 1998, and ended on March 5, 1999.
On January 25, 1999, Tompkins & Sensky, Ltd. contracted with Andersen to
conduct training sessions titled “Relationship Selling Workshops.” This contract
specifically identified Arnold R. Tompkins as the participant representing
Tompkins & Sensky, Ltd. at these workshops. Tompkins & Sensky, Ltd. was
paid $1,000.00 per day, not to exceed $5,000.00, for each workshop.
6
Temporary Aid to Needy Families.
10
On March 1, 1999, Tompkins & Sensky, Ltd. entered into a verbal contract with
AMS for a $10,000.00 monthly retainer fee to provide consulting services on
human service and labor issues. Similar to the contract with Andersen, this
contract specifically said that Arnold R. Tompkins would provide future
consulting work. One week after the effective date of this contract, Jacqueline
Romer-Sensky was appointed director of the former Ohio Department of Human
Services.7
When interviewed, Director Romer-Sensky explained that when she and Mr.
Tompkins formed the partnership, they agreed that they would have individual
clients and projects as well as joint clients and projects. When asked, she said she
was unaware of any contracts between Andersen Consulting and Tompkins &
Sensky, Ltd. during the time she was a partner. She said if there was a contract
with Andersen Consulting, Mr. Tompkins was exclusively doing the work. Ms.
Romer-Sensky said she was aware of their contract with AMS and that she did
work on the AMS project with Mr. Tompkins, subsequently receiving $10,000.00.
She said that payments from many contracts were only starting to come in when
she quit the partnership to become director of ODJFS. Ms. Romer-Sensky said
that most of the payments from the various contracts were deposited in a joint
business account and divided between her and Mr. Tompkins proportional to the
amount of work each performed on the project. On payments received by the
partnership for some projects that were exclusively hers, she retained the total
amount. In one instance, she received a direct payment into her personal account.
On July 7, 1999, four months after the partnership was terminated, Ms. Romer-
Sensky received a final payment of $46,289.00 from Tompkins Consulting for
work she performed and expenses she incurred while in partnership with Mr.
Tompkins.
7
Ms. Romer-Sensky left the partnership on March 5th and was appointed director on March 8th .
After her appointment, Mr. Tompkins changed the name of the consulting business to Tompkins
Consulting, Ltd..
11
Between March and October 1999, Tompkins Consulting, Ltd. (Tompkins

Consulting) entered into two contracts with Andersen totaling almost $11,000.00.
These projects were not associated with ODJFS. At the end of September 1999,
Tompkins Consulting terminated its retainer-type contract with AMS.
On October 10, 1999, exactly one year after leaving state service, Tompkins
Consulting contracted with Andersen for a minimum $10,000.00 monthly retainer
fee to provide consulting services. These services included the promotion of Ohio
Works and related human services work in Ohio. Since October 1999, Tompkins
Consulting has also contracted with Andersen to conduct additional “Relationship
Selling Workshops” at a cost of $3,000.00, plus expenses, for each workshop.
In May 2000, Tompkins Consulting again entered into a verbal contract with
AMS in consideration for a $10,000 monthly retainer fee to provide consulting
services on human services and labor issues. Between April 1999 and December
2000, Tompkins Consulting received a total of $133,000.00 in retainer fees from
AMS. Tompkins Consulting also received $123,344.60, including expenses, from
the Andersen contract during that same time. Andersen ended their contract with
Tompkins Consulting in September 2000. Tompkins Consulting remains under
contract with AMS and continues to earn a $10,000.00 monthly retainer fee. (See
Exhibit 8)
Our investigation revealed that Mr. Tompkins did not officially represent either
Andersen or AMS before ODJFS until exactly one year after he left state service.
However, a review of internal correspondence and communication from Andersen
leads us to believe that Mr. Tompkins was laying the groundwork in the months
before October 1999 to begin representing Andersen before ODJFS.
12
Mr. Tompkins contends that none of his contracts dealt directly with ODJFS
issues until one year after he left state service. However, on August 18, 1999,
within 10 months of leaving state service, an e-mail message from an Andersen
employee referred to draft correspondence from Mr. Tompkins. We obtained a
copy of the e-mail draft that was directed to Mr. Brian Hicks, Chief of Staff to the
Governor, and deals with the Ohio Works project. Among other things, it
addresses the use of technology for Ohio Works, including the development of the
website (www.OhioWorks.com) coordinated by Andersen. (See Exhibit 9) The
Office of the Governor indicated that it could not confirm whether their office
ever received this correspondence.
Additionally, our review of telephone records from ODJFS revealed that officials
from the agency made 60 phone calls and spent a total of 4 hours, 30 minutes
talking to Mr. Tompkins during the first year after he resigned from the agency.
Former interim director Wayne Sholes recalled speaking to Mr. Tompkins on
several occasions. Mr. Sholes recalled one particular phone call he received from
Mr. Tompkins in May 1999. Mr. Tompkins specifically asked Mr. Sholes about
the status of pending unbid Andersen contracts. The Controlling Board
subsequently approved the unbid Andersen contract Mr. Tompkins inquired about
worth $14,298,500.00, on June 21, 1999.
Our investigation also revealed that Mr. Tompkins continued to try and influence
his former agency regarding Andersen beyond his first year after leaving state
service. Ms. Romer-Sensky said she recalled, during the time she was director,
receiving one call from Mr. Tompkins in January or February of 2000 when she
felt “pushed” to act on behalf of Andersen. Ms. Romer-Sensky said she had been
arguing with Andersen over the cost of their pending contracts. Ms. Romer-
Sensky recalled Mr. Tompkins calling late in the afternoon and asking her “why
are you hassling Andersen?”
13
Ms. Romer-Sensky received the call just before the Controlling Board approving
an amendment to the unbid Andersen contracts worth $22,999,287.68 on
February 28, 2000.
See Exhibit 10 for a chronology of events pertinent to this investigation.
The following laws are relevant to the facts uncovered in this case:
Ohio Revised Code Section 102.03, commonly referred to as the “Revolving

Door Prohibition,” states:
(A)(1) No present or former public official or employee shall,
during public employment or service or for twelve months
thereafter, represent a client or act in a representative capacity for
any person on any matter in which the public official or employee
personally participated as a public official or employee through
decision, approval, disapproval, recommendation, the rendering of
advice, investigation, or other substantial exercise of
administrative discretion.
It further states:
(D) No public official or employee shall use or authorize the use of
the authority or influence of his office or employment to secure
anything of value or the promise or offer of anything of value that
is of such character as to manifest a substantial and improper
influence upon him with respect to his duties.
(F) No person shall promise or give to a public official or

employee anything of value that is of such character as to manifest
a substantial and improper influence upon him with respect to his
duties.
Ohio Revised Code Section 2921.02, Ohio’s Bribery statute, states:

(A) No person with purpose to corrupt a public servant or party
official, or improperly to influence him with respect to the
discharge of his duty, whether before or after he is elected,
appointed, qualified, employed, summoned, or sworn, shall
promise, offer, or give any valuable thing or valuable benefit.
14
(B) No person, either before or after he is elected, appointed,

qualified, employed, summoned, or sworn as a public servant or
party official, shall knowingly solicit or accept for himself or
another person any valuable thing or valuable benefit to corrupt or
improperly influence him or another public servant or party official
with respect to the discharge of his or the other public servant’s or
party official’s duty.
Ohio Revised Code Section 2921.42(A)(3) states the following:

During his term of office or within one year thereafter, occupy any
position of profit in the prosecution of a public contract authorized
by him or by a legislative body, commission, or board of which he
was a member at the time of the authorization unless the contract
was let by competitive bidding to the lowest and best bidder.
B. FINDINGS
Contract Steering
Arnold R. Tompkins:
There were no explicit agreements discovered between Andersen, AMS, and
Arnold R. Tompkins establishing a documented link between Mr. Tompkins’
approval of large unbid public contracts and his future consulting contracts with
these same companies. However, facts developed during this investigation lead
us to conclude he had improper interest in unbid public contracts. The following
facts illustrate a pattern of questionable decision making by Mr. Tompkins:
In May 1996, Mr. Tompkins awarded Andersen Consulting their

first unbid contract. The total amount of the contract was
$49,500.00. This amount was under the $50,000.00 threshold
requiring Controlling Board approval.
15
In August 1997, Mr. Tompkins ignored the top two vendors

recommended by a contract selection committee and selected
Andersen Consulting, the third place finisher, for a $1,688,000.00
unbid contract.
In December 1997, Mr. Tompkins requested an additional

$4,600,000.00 amendment to the contract with AMS to expand its
original role of developing the SETS project to add additional
welfare reform projects.
On June 3, 1998, Mr. Tompkins announced to the media that he

planned to resign as director by the end of August 1998. He
delayed resigning until October 9, 1998.
In July of 1998, Mr. Tompkins approved an additional

$13,700,000.00 unbid contract with AMS.
In August of 1998, Mr. Tompkins ignored the recommendations of

a contract review committee and selected Andersen Consulting for
an unbid $16,103,000.00 contract. The committee recommended
the contract not be approved due to the cost of the contract, and
further recommended that the contract should be bid.
Mr. Tompkins repeatedly ignored memos from the agency’s legal

counsel warning him that the unbid contracts may violate federal
regulations prohibiting federal TANF funds from being spent on
unbid contracts. The memos also expressed concerns about the
contract being based on hourly rates, as opposed to deliverables, as
well as escalating prices.
16
As a result of these decisions:
Mr. Tompkins’ initial approval of unbid contracts with Andersen

Consulting has cultivated a total of over $60,000,000.00 worth of
unbid public contracts for Andersen. Because Mr. Tompkins
approved these contracts as hourly-based, rather than deliverables-
based, he left a legacy of contracts that are difficult for ODJFS to
manage and monitor for cost effectiveness.
Mr. Tompkins’ approval of the initial contract with AMS for

welfare reform and an integrated case management system has led
to over $87 million dollars of unbid contracts with AMS.
Subsequent to these events:
On November 24, 1998, 45 days after Mr. Tompkins left state

service, Tompkins & Sensky, Ltd. received $20,000.00 from AMS
for future consulting work.
On January 25, 1999, 15 weeks after Mr. Tompkins left state

service, Andersen Consulting contracted with Tompkins & Sensky,
Ltd. to conduct training seminars at a rate of $1,000.00 per day,
plus expenses, not to exceed $5,000.00 per seminar.
On March 15, 1999, Tompkins Consulting, Ltd. received an

additional contract from Andersen worth $3,750.00.
17
On March 19, 1999, Tompkins Consulting, Ltd. received the first

$10,000.00 monthly retainer fee from AMS for consulting services
based on a verbal agreement.
On October 10, 1999, Andersen awarded Tompkins Consulting,

Ltd. a $10,000.00 per month retainer contract to provide consulting
services.
Even to the casual observer, the timing of Mr. Tompkins’ consulting contracts
with Andersen and AMS, within weeks of approving large unbid state contracts
with these same companies, establishes a nexus between his decisions as director
and his contracts received after leaving state service. Accordingly, we find
reasonable cause to believe wrongdoing occurred in this instance.
Donna Givens:
Throughout our investigation, Ms. Givens was the common denominator in the
relationship between Andersen, Arnold R. Tompkins, and ODJFS. She
previously worked with Mr. Tompkins at the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services. In early 1995, while under contract with Andersen, Ms. Givens
traveled to Ohio to explore business opportunities for Andersen. She
subsequently met with Mr. Tompkins and introduced him to Mr. Robert Tyre, an
Andersen partner. Subsequently, Mr. Tompkins awarded Ms. Givens her first
consulting contract with ODJFS, and later awarded Andersen their first unbid
ODJFS contract. Ms. Givens later became a sub-contractor for Andersen to work
on the ODJFS project. She was under contract with both ODJFS and Andersen
during this time. Ms. Givens eventually became a full-time employee of
Andersen in February 1999.
18
The following facts uncovered in our investigation give rise to reasonable

suspicion that Ms. Givens had a conflict of interest involving public contracts.
Ms. Givens was awarded her first ODJFS consulting contract by

Mr. Tompkins on July 11, 1995. Subsequently, Ms. Givens was
awarded three additional contracts with ODJFS worth
$147,735.00, including expenses. One of the requirements of her
ODJFS contract was to perform a liaison role for the agency with
Andersen.
On October 14, 1996, Ms. Givens was contracted by Andersen to

work at ODJFS under their contract with the agency.
On May 8, 1997, Ms. Givens participated in an Andersen contract

presentation to ODJFS. Subsequently, Mr. Tompkins requested,
and the Controlling Board approved, an additional $1,688,000.00
unbid Andersen contract. Ms. Givens was under contract with
both Andersen and ODJFS during this time.
On November 6, 1997, Ms. Givens authored a four-page memo to

Robert Tyre, Peggy Strode, and Don Ribar of Andersen. The
memo outlines various strategies to enhance Andersen’s position
with Ohio. Among the various strategies she discussed in the
memo are how to ensure Andersen contract extensions through Mr.
Tompkins, and how to position Mr. Tompkins after he leaves state
government. Ms. Givens was under contract with both Andersen
and ODJFS at the time.
19
Between August 25, 1997, and September 30, 1997, Ms. Givens
billed ODJFS 112 hours and Andersen 207 hours, earning over
$61,000.00 from her dual contracts.
We believe Ms. Givens helped facilitate the approval of a lucrative

unbid contract for Andersen while under contract with both ODJFS
and Andersen. Accordingly, we find reasonable cause to believe
that wrongdoing occurred in this instance.
Jacqueline Romer-Sensky:
Ms. Jacqueline Romer-Sensky began state service as a member of Governor
Voinovich’s staff. She was a cluster chief overseeing several state agencies,
including ODJFS. In 1993, she was instrumental in hiring Arnold R. Tompkins as
director of ODJFS. Ms. Romer-Sensky resigned on September 4, 1998, and
entered into a consulting business partnership with Arnold R. Tompkins, forming
Tompkins & Sensky, Ltd. on October 1, 1998. Ms. Romer-Sensky left the
partnership in March 1999 when Governor Taft appointed her as director of
ODJFS. She resigned as director on March 2, 2001.
The following facts were developed during the course of this investigation:
As a partner in Tompkins & Sensky, Ltd., Ms. Romer-Sensky

received $10,000.00 as her share of the proceeds from a contract
with AMS on November 24, 1998, for future consulting services.
On January 25, 1999, during the time Ms. Romer-Sensky was a

partner, Tompkins & Sensky, Ltd. entered into a seminar-based
proprietary contract with Andersen at a rate of $3,000.00 per
seminar, plus expenses.
20
As director of ODJFS, in June 1999, Ms. Romer-Sensky sought

and received Controlling Board approval for an additional
$60,168,170.00 in unbid contracts for AMS, and $37,297,787.68 in
unbid contracts for Andersen. Ms. Romer-Sensky disregarded
memos from her legal staff warning her that the contracts may be
in violation of federal rules.
On July 7, 1999, Ms. Romer-Sensky was paid a final payment of

$46,289.00 from Tompkins Consulting, Ltd. for previous work she
had performed while in partnership with Mr. Tompkins.
As a partner in Tompkins & Sensky, Ltd., Ms. Romer-Sensky

profited from AMS and Andersen consulting contracts. As director of
ODJFS, it was appropriate for her to distance herself as much as
practicable from the process of approving additional unbid Andersen and
AMS contracts. ODJFS has a contract management section and an
established contract review committee procedure. We find utilizing the
contract review committee and delegating of contract approval authority to
the assistant director was the better method due to Ms. Romer-Sensky
having profited from her involvement with both companies. Accordingly,
while we do not find reasonable cause to believe Ms. Romer-Sensky
committed an act of wrongdoing in this instance, we note that the
appearance of impropriety may have been unavoidable under these
circumstances.
21
Ethics Violations
Arnold R. Tompkins:
Ostensibly, it would appear that Mr. Tompkins complied with the “revolving
door” provision of the ethics law by waiting exactly one full year before signing a
contract with Andersen to represent them before the state agency he formerly
directed. However, the following facts uncovered in our investigation
demonstrate that he continued to influence his former agency well before the end
of his first year after leaving state service.
Between October 1998 and October 1999 there were a total of 62 phone calls
made to Mr. Tompkins’ business and home phone from various ODJFS officials.
The total length of the phone calls was 4 hours and 33 minutes. It is unknown
how many calls Mr. Tompkins may have made to his former agency. However,
several individuals we interviewed said that he called frequently. Some said they
felt Mr. Tompkins was still running the agency, even after he left. Mr. Tompkins
was under contract with both Andersen and AMS during the time these phone
calls were made.
Former interim director Wayne Sholes said he spoke with Mr. Tompkins on
several occasions after Mr. Tompkins left the agency. He recalled Mr. Tompkins
discussing some state projects, and on one occasion Ohio Works.
In May 1999, only seven months after leaving state service, Mr. Tompkins called
the assistant director and inquired about the status of pending Andersen contracts.
The unbid Andersen contract Mr. Tompkins inquired about worth $14,298,500.00
was approved by the Controlling Board on June 21, 1999.
22
On August 18, 1999, an e-mail message authored by an Andersen employee

discusses a draft correspondence from Mr. Tompkins to the Governor’s chief of
staff. The correspondence discusses the Andersen developed and ODJFS funded
Ohio Works project and the further development of the Ohio Works website.
Regardless of whether Mr. Tompkins violated revolving door prohibitions or not,

there remains an appearance of impropriety when he entered into consulting
contracts with both AMS and Andersen. The timing of these contracts
demonstrates he was preparing to “feather his own nest” before leaving state
government. This appearance is made even more compelling because of his
contracts with state vendors he contracted with as director for consulting projects,
within two months of leaving state service. In our view, the spirit of the revolving
door prohibition is to prevent decisions made in the context of public service from
being based on opportunity for future personal gain.
C. CONCLUSION - INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED WRONGDOING
As former director of ODJFS, Arnold R. Tompkins approved large unbid

contracts with both Andersen and AMS. Immediately after leaving state service,
he entered into a limited partnership consulting business with Jacqueline Romer-
Sensky, former chief of staff to Governor Voinovich. Within weeks of Mr.
Tompkins leaving state service, the partnership called Tompkins & Sensky, Ltd.
entered into consulting contracts with AMS and Andersen. The timing of these
contracts within weeks of Mr. Tompkins approving large unbid state contracts
with these same companies gives the appearance of a nexus between his decisions
as director and the awarding of his personal contracts. Additionally, exactly one
year after leaving state service, Mr. Tompkins entered into large retainer-based
consulting contracts with the same companies. Accordingly, we find reasonable
23
cause to believe wrongdoing occurred when Mr. Tompkins entered into personal
contracts with AMS and Andersen shortly after leaving state service.
Throughout our investigation, Ms. Donna Givens was the common thread that
linked Andersen, Arnold R. Tompkins, and ODJFS. She previously worked with
Mr. Tompkins prior to his awarding her a consulting contract with ODJFS. Ms.
Givens was also under contract with Andersen to work on their contract with
ODJFS. She subsequently became a full-time employee of Andersen. As a result
of her connection with both Mr. Tompkins and Andersen, she was instrumental in
facilitating the approval of a lucrative unbid contract for Andersen while
simultaneously under contract with ODJFS. Correspondence between Ms. Givens
and other Andersen officials clearly indicated a strategy to utilize Mr. Tompkins
to facilitate additional Andersen contracts, and to position him to promote
Andersen upon leaving state government. Accordingly, we find reasonable cause
to believe that wrongdoing occurred when Ms. Givens facilitated an Andersen
contract while under contract with both ODJFS and Andersen.
Ms. Jacqueline Romer-Sensky was instrumental in hiring Arnold R. Tompkins as

ODJFS director when she was an agency cluster chief for former Governor
Voinovich. After leaving state service, she entered into a limited partnership
consulting business with former director Arnold R. Tompkins. As a business
partner, she profited from Tompkins & Sensky, Ltd. contracts with both AMS and
Andersen. After being appointed director of ODJFS, she approved additional
unbid contracts with both AMS and Andersen. We find an unavoidable
appearance of impropriety was created under these circumstances. However,
we do not find reasonable cause to believe an act of wrongdoing or omission
occurred in this instance.
24
D. REFERRAL
The facts uncovered during this investigation give rise to possible criminal
violations. Accordingly, a copy of this report was forwarded to the Franklin
County Prosecutor’s Office for their review.
V. REVIEW OF AGENCY MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS
The first part of this report dealt mainly with a state official involved in acts of
alleged wrongdoing. In this section, we more fully examine the circumstances —
in terms of the management and operations of ODJFS 8 — that allowed those
problems to occur. This climate led to tax dollars being paid to certain state
contractors for failed projects and improper expenses.
In addressing certain deficiencies, we found in management and operations

related to the contracting process, we must also deal with allegations of
wrongdoing on the part of certain contractors doing business with the state. This
is pursuant to our authority under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §121.42(A) that gives the
inspector general the duty to:
[i]nvestigate the management and operation of state agencies on

his own initiative in order to determine whether wrongful acts and
omissions have been committed or are being committed by state
officers or state employees. 9
8
As in the last section, because the Ohio Department of Human Services (ODHS) and Ohio
Bureau of Employment Services (OBES) merged and became the Ohio Department of Job &
Family Services (ODJFS) on July 1, 2000, most references to the agency in this report will be
ODJFS for purposes of simplicity and consistency.
9
“State employee” is defined under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §121.41(E) as “any person who is an
employee of a state agency or any person who does business with the state.” [italics added]
25
The information brought to our attention involved the following allegations:
The Ohio Works website was run on a platform not maintained by

ODJFS.
Andersen merely modified another company’s software instead of

building the program from scratch.
Mr. Tompkins lobbied ODJFS staff on behalf of Andersen to add

enhancements.
AMS and Andersen were not working within the MIS standards.
Problems arose between contractors and state employees in terms

of communication and supervision.
AMS did not have to complete work because of a relationship with

a firm owned by Arnold R. Tompkins and Jackie Romer-Sensky.
AMS may not have followed appropriate accounting procedures.
The department is not in compliance with the U.S. Department of

Health and Human Services’ mandates.
The centralized collection system managed by Bank One was not

properly bid out.
Legal advice regarding concerns over major contracts was

disregarded.
Hourly rates charged by contractors were excessive.
A memo from the director was improperly changed.
ODJFS lacked management controls on state projects.
ODJFS lacked expertise in developing and writing contracts.
Andersen effectively wrote and managed the contract.
Invoices were not verified prior to payment.
Contractors’ bills were improper.
26
The Controlling Board did not receive critical documents

necessary to make decisions.
Our purpose is not to conduct an audit of all transactions between all parties to
state contracts. To the extent that such an audit may be necessary, these matters
would be properly referred to the state auditor. Similarly, to the extent that
monies may be deemed recoverable by the state, this matter would properly be
referred to the attorney general. Our review of state contracts was specifically
focused upon whether there exists reasonable cause to believe wrongdoing was
involved in any aspect of the contracting process between ODJFS and certain
state contractors.
A. DISCUSSION
The events that are the subject of this investigation took place in the midst of
sweeping changes in the way the state administers welfare. In August 1996,
Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act. The
Ohio General Assembly, in anticipation of this federal welfare reform, had
already passed House Bill 167. That legislation emphasized self-sufficiency and
gave counties the flexibility to create programs to help welfare participants obtain
and retain paid employment. Governor George Voinovich signed it into law in
1995.
In October 1997, the governor signed into law the state's welfare reform bill.
That bill, HB 408, was intended to fundamentally change Ohio's welfare system.
It replaced the Aid to Dependent Children program with two new programs
27
Ohio Works First10 (OWF) and Prevention, Retention and Contingency. This was
intended to comply with federal mandates and change the system from one of
entitlement to one focused on employment, personal responsibility, and sustained
self-sufficiency.
OWF was designed to be a cash assistance and work readiness program based on
family need. It delegated significant decision making to the counties giving them
flexibility to create programs to fit the needs of particular communities. The state
was to provide counties with technical assistance and monitor performance
objectives set forth in partnership agreements.
Under OWF, the state, through ODJFS, was to enter into partnership agreements
with counties which would define their respective roles and relationship in
delivering social services. Time limits for compliance began to run when HB 408
took effect in October 1997.
In December 1999, Governor Bob Taft signed HB 470. It created ODJFS by

merging the former Department of Human Services and the Bureau of
Employment Services. The merger took place in July 2000.
The management changes within ODJFS were not as dramatic as the changes
above. However, they are critical to an understanding of what happened within
ODJFS. In 1993, Arnold R. Tompkins was appointed director of the Ohio
Department of Human Services before it merged with the Ohio Bureau of
Employment Services to become ODJFS. He served in that capacity until his
resignation on October 9, 1998. In September 1998, Jacqueline Romer-Sensky
resigned her position as Deputy Chief of Staff in the governor’s office where she
had also been an agency cluster chief. The Department of Human Services was
10
This program is not to be confused with “Ohio Works” discussed elsewhere in this report.
28
one of the agencies she coordinated and she had been instrumental in hiring
Arnold R. Tompkins as director.
Mr. Tompkins and Ms. Romer-Sensky formed a limited partnership consulting

firm called Tompkins & Sensky, Ltd. on October 1, 1998. Ms. Romer-Sensky left
the firm to become director of ODJFS in March 1999. On March 2, 2001. Ms.
Romer-Sensky resigned as director.
B. CONTRACT PROBLEMS – GENERALLY
This part of the report addresses issues associated with the process of contracting
between ODJFS and certain contractors. It illustrates deficiencies in this process,
as well as certain perceptions; that led to many of the allegations raised in this
investigation.
Professional Fees
One concern expressed by those interviewed was that ODJFS paid too much
money for professional fees — particularly in the area of information technology
(IT). Our purpose is not to address the merits of outsourcing or privatization.
Those issues are policy matters properly within the discretion of management.
Our role is to determine whether the contracting processes associated with these
efforts functioned improperly or were unduly influenced by considerations other
than what was in the best interest of the state.
We reviewed invoices from many contractors who conducted business with

ODJFS between 1998 and 2000. We found two contractors, Andersen and AMS,
29
with a particularly large amount of contracts for “professional fees.”11 A

summary of our review is set forth below:
SUMMARY OF ANDERSEN INVOICE/EXPENSE REPORTS

FOR PROFESSIONAL FEES
NOVEMBER 1998 - DECEMBER 2000
Invoice No. Billing Period Amount Description

0215342341 8/25/97-9/30/97 $254,550.00 Professional Fees
0215342547 10/1/97-10/31/97 313,020.00 Professional Fees
0215345002 11/1/98-11/30/98 1,075,510.00 Professional Fees
0215345950 3/1/99–3/31/99 2,408,087.00 Professional Fees
0215348128 12/1/99-12/31/99 1,381,880.00 Professional fees
11
We reviewed invoices from other contractors for professional fees. However, we particularly
scrutinized these contracts because each of these contractors later entered into private contracts
with Mr. Tompkins.
30

0215349931 7 /1/00-7/31/00 2,003,949.00 Professional Fees
SUMMARY OF AMS INVOICE/EXPENSE REPORTS

FOR PROFESSIONAL FEES
NOVEMBER 1998 - APRIL 1999
Invoice No. Billing Period Amount Description

806983 4/16/98-4/30/98 $284,128.75 Professional Services
806984 5/16/98–5/31/98 66,774.00 Professional Services
009A0554 7/1/98-7/15/98 696,468.30 Professional Services
009A0764 1/1/99-1/31/99 1,285,091.00 Professional Services
In addition to the large amount of such fees, we found many examples where
Andersen fees were incorrectly calculated or there was insufficient documentation
for us to ensure an adequate review. These questionable invoices totaled
$279,000.00. This served as another reason for giving greater scrutiny to these
contracts.
Unbid Contracts
An issue raised by many in the course of this investigation relates to the use of
unbid contracts to obtain goods and services from contractors doing business with
31
the state. Our purpose is not to question the use of these contracts generally.
Their propriety is a matter of law based upon the premise that economic as well as
emergency reasons justify waiver of this process. The Controlling Board is
authorized to waive an agency’s obligation to follow competitive selection for the
purchase of supplies or services. Rather, our purpose is to examine specific
circumstances where that process within ODJFS was misused or manipulated and
may not have resulted in a contract that served the best interest of the state.
Analysis of the Andersen Contracts
Many contracts entered into with Andersen illustrate situations in which the state
might have been better served through a competitive selection process.12 The
Andersen contracts referred to throughout this report — including those involving
Donna Givens — identify general areas of concern relating to possible fraud,
waste, or abuse that arose as a result of the decision to not competitively bid these
contracts and to disregard standard policies and procedures in place at ODJFS
which were designed to avoid these problems. The particular contracts
underlying these concerns are analyzed in more detail later in the report. A
summary of those contracts is set forth below:
The first contract between Andersen and ODJFS was for a personal services
contract to provide technical assistance to the Interagency Workforce
Development Reengineering Task Force and consultative services to Mr.
Tompkins and his executive staff. Andersen was to create an interview guide,
12
The competitive selection process is the state's preferred method of purchasing services or
buying technology, that requires a major investment of funds. This process relies on competition
among vendors, which results in lower prices for the state. The competitive process also gives
equal opportunity for all vendors to compete for the contract, thus avoiding the appearance of
improprieties, such as showing favoritism in the contracting business.
32
survey, and a written report. The contract period was from June 15, 1996, to
October 31, 1996. Compensation for these services was $49,500.00.
The second contract was for the period of October 14, 1996, through June 30,
1997. This contract was for consulting services to assist the state in developing a
"Master Plan" to describe how human services would be managed and delivered
in Ohio. Compensation for these services was $1,130,000.00.
The next contract involved two large amendments. It was for Ohio Works.
Initially, Ohio Works was intended to be an Internet application to match welfare
recipients with employers. The initial contract was for the period of August 21,
1997, to June 30, 1998. Compensation for these services was $1,688,000.00. The
contract was amended on March 23, 1998, to expand the scope of the work. The
term of the contract was extended to December31, 1998. This amendment
brought the total compensation for these services to $6,655,000.00.
On August 31, 1998, another contract was approved to run through June 30, 1999,
for $16,103,000. It essentially involved work on Ohio Works and included an
option for extension of the contract from July 1, 1999, through September 30,
1999, in the amount of $4,288,000.00.
Finally, a third Ohio Works contract for the period from July 1, 1999, to June 30,
2001, was awarded totaling $14,298,500.00.
In February 2000, another amendment to the contract totaling $22,999,286.00 was

approved by the Controlling Board, bringing the total amo unt of the Ohio Works
contract to more than $37 million dollars. Again, the amendment was to further
the development and enhancement of Ohio Works, incorporate certain aspects of
33
the Ohio JobNet system into Ohio Works, and also bring the system into
compliance with federal mandates.
Concerns Involving the Andersen Contracts
A review of the contracts in question, and investigation of the circumstances

surrounding them, leads us to make the following observations and conclusions:
Contracting Process
The standard or preferred way for procuring large projects of this nature involving
tens of millions of dollars is by competitive selection through the Department of
Administrative Services (DAS). As it is not always possible or advantageous for
the state to enter into competitive selection, DAS often grants purchasing agencies
a “release and permit.” Subject to a waiver of competitive selection from the
Controlling Board, a release and permit allows an agency to conduct its own
vendor selection process and to enter into a contract. While a purchase made with
a release and permit and a waiver of competitive selection is by definition outside
the standard process, the agency’s contracting procedure should include particular
principles to ensure the integrity of the contracting process.
One principle is to provide full, complete, accurate and reliable information to the
Controlling Board. The request for a waiver of competitive selection should
describe the project in its entirety, including the total scope of work, total dollar
amount and the length of time estimated to complete the project.
34
The manner in which ODJFS presented the Workforce Development Program to

the Controlling Board hindered the Board’s oversight of ODJFS’ contracting
procedure. Instead of seeking approval for the entire program at one time and
returning in the new biennium for any necessary release of funds, ODJFS took
this project to the Board at least five times over four years. The result was the
Controlling Board learned of the scope of the project, including the total cost,
piece by piece over a four-year period.
Another principle is to provide the Controlling Board with adequate assurance as

to how and why a particular contractor is selected for a contract. Usually,
agencies choose a vendor by conducting some type of competitive process that is
less formal than DAS’ competitive selection. Sometimes, however, agencies
select a contractor without any competition. Typically, it is because the vendor is
the only company that can complete the work or it makes the most sense for a
particular company to complete the work. In its first request for a waiver of
competitive selection, ODJFS told the Controlling Board that it selected Andersen
Consulting because Andersen was “uniquely qualified” to develop the program
because it assisted the department in creating a strategy for welfare reform. We
see no basis for such an assertion to have been made.
It is not uncommon for complex information technology projects to increase in

cost and take longer to build than expected. Some factors that may impact a
project’s cost and completion include: the knowledge and sophistication of the
buying agency; the sophistication and age of the technology; the number of
different systems which must interface; the number of different user groups; the
time allowed for development; etc. The following questions should have been
asked to determine why the Workforce Development Program’s scope and cost
increased.
35
Did Andersen’s work on the Welfare Reform Plan include an

analysis of what ODJFS would need to complete the Workforce
Development Program?
If so, did ODJFS include a full and accurate description of the

scope of the Program, including the expected costs and time to
complete the project, in its first request for a waiver of competitive
selection from the Controlling Board?
If Andersen’s work on the Welfare Reform Plan did not include an

Development Program, what about Andersen’s work on the
Welfare Reform Plan uniquely situated Andersen to complete the
Workforce Development program?
If Andersen’s work on the Welfare Reform Plan did not include an

Development Program, what was included in the “Master Plan”
developed by Andersen under Contract No. C-97-01-217?
Was the information that ODJFS provided to the Controlling

Board complete and accurate?
Accountability Required of Contractor
While the state has various “boilerplate” contract provisions that are used by most
agencies, it does not have a model scope of work provision. However, there are
some common sense conventions as to what scope of work for a system as
36
complex as Ohio Works, ServiceLink, or the Decision Support System should

include to ensure that the contractor is accountable for the work it performs. The
scope of work should expressly state in some detail the following requirements:
Detailed Design and Performance Specifications
As Andersen was to design and build a complex web-based information

delivery system, the contract should define what Andersen was to deliver,
including at least minimal design and performance specifications. An
example of a design specification that should have been included in the
contracts is ODJFS’ existing technology with which Andersen must
ensure compatibility or use. The level at which ODJFS expected the
system to operate is an example of a performance specification, which
should be in the contracts.
While the contracts do not expressly define what Andersen was to deliver,
they include a process by which the state and Andersen were to define the
services and deliverables before work began. Such documentation should
be incorporated into the contracts.
Acceptance Test
The contract should include a performance test to define satisfactory

operation of the system. The state’s acceptance of the program and some
portion of payment should be dependent upon successful completion of
the test. The contracts did include a process by which the ODJFS contract
manager had ten days to review each deliverable and reject or accept it.
37
However, this type of acceptance process does not protect the state from
accepting a system that materially conforms to the contract specifications
but fails to operate properly.
Warranty
The contracts included a 30-day warranty which guaranteed that

Andersen’s work would be completed in a “good and workmanlike
manner” and that it would be completed in conformity with the agreed
upon specifications. This warranty was valid only for 30 days following
the date the work was performed. This type of warranty is fine for
consulting services, but it is not adequate for the design, building and
implementation of a complex information technology system. The
contracts should have included a warranty that began after the system was
accepted and followed the successful completion of a performance test.
The warranty period should be for at least 180 days, up to one year.
Project Management
A project of this nature requires an involved project manager from the

state to increase the likelihood that the state’s interests are met. The state
wants a high quality project completed on time, within budget. Through
the first amendment to the first contract ODJFS assigned the project
manager’s responsibilities to Andersen. As a project manager’s primary
responsibility is to hold the contractor accountable to the state for its work,
the assignment of project management to Andersen was self-defeating.
38
Project management ensures that available resources are used in an

efficient manner. A project manager is essential to ensuring that a
contractor’s performance meets the terms and conditions of the contract.
Essentially, until February 2000, the only project manager for Ohio Works
was an Andersen employee. This posed an obvious conflict in terms of
monitoring and oversight of these contracts.
Before February 2000, there were six different ODJFS personnel assigned
this task. However, each lacked experience with state contracts and did
not have the expertise to oversee a major IT project. This resulted in a
failure on the part of ODJFS to hold the contractor accountable. For
example, it was common to receive $1.5 to $2 million dollar monthly
invoices from Andersen for professional fees. Many of these invoices
were submitted and approved on the same day — some within hours of
receiving the invoice. A review of these invoices revealed the following
invoices were approved and paid on the same day:
323 hours for one employee for 1 month’s work at $110.00 = $35,530.00
Clearly, these invoices required greater scrutiny. (See Exhibit 11)
Although ODJFS’ piecemeal presentation of the Workforce Development

Program / IT Project hindered the state’s regulatory system, there are instances in
which circumstances can cause a project to unexpectedly grow. An evaluation of
39
the answers to the above questions would have assisted in the determination of
whether or not the Workforce Development Program was such a project.
The foregoing section focused on the four most important tools for managing the
development of an information technology system: detailed design and
performance specifications; a good acceptance test; an adequate warranty; and an
engaged state project manager. The presence of these four things will go a long
way to negate the effect of most contract provisions that attempt to lessen a
contractor’s responsibility. Other observations we made in the course of our
investigation include:
Sole Source Contractors
If a request involves a sole source contract, the justification should clearly

define why a project could not be competitively bid. In our analysis of
this case, Andersen was not a sole source company and did not provide a
service or product that was unique and only available from them. Instead,
it was merely navigated around that process by Arnold R. Tompkins.
Requests for Proposal (RFP)
ODJFS had the option of following the same competitive selection

requirements as DAS or choosing another method. 13 However, some
competitive selection process should have been followed.
13
This other process would be subject to the review and approval of the Controlling Board.
40
In our view, the decision to not issue an RFP was flawed and resulted in a
more costly project. 14 The Ohio Works project was neither mandated to be
created, nor under deadline to be started, on any particular date. This
makes the decision to not issue an RFP for this project questionable.
Absent some compelling reason to forego the competitive selection
process, it is obvious that the issuance of an RFP in this case was
preferable to the manner in which these contracts were handled and would
have avoided many of the problems that were created in this case.
Costs of Contracts
Andersen was to provide consultative services and discrete deliverables in

three areas under this contract. These three areas were Workforce
Development, Communication and Change Navigation, and Performance
Measures Program. Our review of other contracts revealed that the overall
costs associated with the Andersen contracts were high in comparison to
other similar contracts entered into by ODJFS. This is true also with
current contracts. For example, the last two Andersen contracts for Ohio
Works were not competitively bid and hourly wages ranged from $70.00
to $450.00 per hour. However, Compuware’s contract to continue
developing this system was competitively bid and hourly wages range
from $55.00 to $160.00 per hour.
14
An RFP would have included a description of the product or servi ce to be procured, a list of the
minimum requirements for the product or service sought, and a statement of the contract terms. It
might also include a statement of any desirable but non-mandatory characteristics of a proposed
service, product, or vendor and a list of factors other than price that will be used to evaluate the
responses.
41
Another area we examined relating to the expense of the Andersen

contracts are the costs associated with sub-contractors. Andersen engaged
several sub-contractors, one being Cochran Public Relations (CPR). CPR
provided a variety of professional services to ODJFS through Andersen.
One particular service they provided ODJFS was the development and
presentation of leadership training sessions. There was no specific
subcontract agreement to provide the training sessions. CPR’s services for
the training sessions were billed through Andersen to the state based on a
more general professional services contract they had with Andersen. The
training sessions were held between June and December 2000. There
were very few expenses incurred by Andersen, because ODJFS paid for
room rentals, food, and other supplies directly to the various providers.
There were fourteen CPR employees involved in the project. CPR’s
hourly rates they charged Andersen ranged from $45.00 to $220.00 per
hour. The hourly rates Andersen subsequently billed to the state for these
same employees ranged from $106.00 to $325.00 per hour. The total
difference in the amount of professional fees charged to Andersen by
CPR, and the amount Andersen billed the state for the leadership training
sessions was $42,250.00. When the cost of the professional fees for
leadership training sessions are isolated and analyzed, apart from other
CPR projects, Andersen realized a 63% profit margin. The high profit
margin was gained through the inflated hourly rates Andersen charged the
state. It is a common practice in the industry for companies to include
costs they incur into their hourly professional fees. However, Andersen
incurred minimal costs to provide the ODJFS leadership training sessions.
(See Exhibit 12)
42
Invoice Errors
Our review of Andersen Contract No. C-00-01-230 revealed that Andersen

was submitting invoices for more than $78,500.00 dollars over the amount
due for four consecutive months. It appears ODJFS paid Andersen
$314,000.00 more than they should have been paid during that period.
(See Exhibit 13)
In examining other invoices, a pattern of inaccurate billing became

apparent. We did not find evidence of billing for work not performed.
However, we did find that invoices submitted for particular months did not
accurately reflect services performed in those months. From 1999 through
2000, we found hours billed for one month were actually performed the
month before. This resulted in some consultants billing for 200-400 hours
a month. We found this was particularly the case where Andersen
employed sub-contractors to perform work. 15 Because there was often no
supporting documentation with the invoices, the records would be
difficult, if not impossible, to audit.
Nonetheless, some invoices from Andersen appear to be inaccurate. The

inaccuracies include incorrect hourly totals and employees or
subcontracted employees with hours worked not listed on the pay rate
page, which lead to appearances of incorrect billing amounts. The
incorrect totals and amounts sometimes benefited ODJFS and sometimes
benefited Andersen.
15
A review of invoices from one Andersen subcontractor, Cochran Public Relations, revealed
instances where the invoice Andersen submitted to the state was different from the invoice the
sub-contractor submitted to Andersen. This most commonly occurred when Cochran invoiced
Andersen after Andersen had prepared its invoice for ODJFS. When this occurred, Andersen
included the hours on a subsequent invoice. In one case, Cochran invoiced Andersen for four
months of work on two invoices. In turn, Andersen billed ODJFS on one invoice for all of these
hours billed to them by Cochran.
43
As we have already discovered and discussed elsewhere, many of the

invoices from Andersen were approved by ODJFS the same day they were
received. Most of these invoices were more than $1.5 million dollars.
While it is feasible to financially audit these invoices in one day, it would
seem to be very difficult to ensure deliverable products or services had
been received or completed. Regardless, it appears ODJFS conducted
poor, if any, audits of these invoices. (See Exhibit 14)
Vagueness of Contract Provisions
Beyond the conventional items listed above that were missing from the
Andersen contracts, specific terms related to cost, deliverables,16 time
frames, and the manner in which work was to be performed, etc. were so
vague as to be of little use in measuring performance under the contract.
Determination of Deliverables
One of the most questionable practices associated with the Andersen

contracts is that ODJFS allowed them to write their own deliverables. In
our view, this explained much of the reason these contracts resulted in
higher costs, amendments, and subsequent new contracts for which only
they would be eligible.
16
For example, Contract No. C-98-01-376 contains the following provision, "Deliverables are
expected to be a combination of discrete products and consultative services. The specific
deliverables under this contract will be jointly identified and defined in writing with the ODHS
Contract Manager."
44
Many of the contracts between ODJFS and Andersen contain language

stating, “specific deliverables under this contract will be jointly identified
and defined in writing in the approved work plan by separate
documentation between [ODJFS] Contract Manager and the Contractor.”
ODJFS was asked to provide this documentation to show that, in fact, the
state had defined the deliverables. They were unable to locate this
information.
In our view, this was a crucial step in the management of these contracts.
It would have allowed the state to actually determine the deliverables and
provided both the contractor and the state direction.
Advice of Counsel
On numerous occasions, ODJFS failed to seek or heed the advice of its

own legal counsel.17 As a result, Andersen essentially wrote the contracts
here with little or no influence or apparent negotiation by ODJFS.
Time and Materials
Many of the contracts we reviewed were based upon time and materials as
opposed to deliverables. In the contracts we reviewed, this promoted an
inefficient approach to contract management that encouraged contractors
to focus on receivables rather than results.
17
In a 1997 memo to the assistant director, agency counsel wrote they were concerned that the
contract is broadly enough drafted that there could be difficulty with accountability and pinning
down exactly that for which ODJFS would be paying.
45
C. OHIO WORKS
Background
Past work development, employment and training programs were administered by

many state agencies serving a variety of populations. The creation of ODJFS was
intended to consolidate these programs, improve efficiency, and eliminate
duplication. In doing so, ODJFS needed to determine how to best integrate
approaches from two systems — Ohio Works and Ohio JobNet. A summary of
these two systems is set forth below:
JobNet
Ohio JobNet was developed in-house by OBES. 18 It was accomplished

over a ten-year period with very little outsourcing. It was a state-wide
skills matching system designed to help individuals and businesses link
the unemployed with available jobs. It allowed employers and employees
to create matches based on skill and experience through an electronic job
match system and was accessible through the Internet.
The system collected federally mandated survey statistics for the Federal
Department of Labor (DOL) and has over 10 years of data on long-range
trend analyses. The DOL also places restrictions on how job placements
are executed.
18
OBES is the former Ohio Bureau of Employment Services. It is one of the two agencies which
merged to become ODJFS.
46
Ohio Works
Ohio Works is an Internet-based system that matches welfare recipients to

employers using skill or job search criteria. Ohio Works also contains
information on day care references and directions. This system is
completely outsourced to Andersen and was developed in conjunction
with Eriss.19
The system collects survey data from employers; however, this function as
is all of Ohio Works is not mandated by any Federal or State mandates.
In February 2000, a private study and strategic assessment conducted by

Battelle concluded that JobNet could be more easily integrated into Ohio
Works than Ohio Works into JobNet. As a result, ODJFS sought an
amendment to Andersen’s contract with the state (Contract No. C-00-01-
230) to develop Ohio Works incorporating the best features of each
system. (See Exhibit 15)
Issues Associated with Ohio Works
The private study included a number of suggestions of how best to integrate Ohio
Works and JobNet. 20 Three are particularly relevant in light of some of the issues
that have arisen regarding contracts for the system. They are:
Solicit an independent validation and verification (IV & V)

contractor to act as an advocate of ODJFS to help monitor
19
Eriss Corporation (Eriss), a California company that specializes in gathering labor market
information, developed the framework for the website.
20
The integration of Ohio Works and Ohio JobNet was not required by any federal or state
mandates.
47
the system’s development and design process, review

vendor deliverables, participate in system and user
acceptance testing, and assist with the implementation
activities.
Determine when and how should "outsourced” Ohio Works

program become "in sourced" over time.
Develop a comprehensive transition strategy that outlines a

schedule and description of events to execute the
integration of Ohio JobNet into Ohio Works.
In addition, the chief of the ODJFS Bureau of Contract Administration and

Project Management Office advised Ms. Sensky’s senior staff not to enter into the
contract with Andersen — primarily due to the cost questions involved and the
fact that the contract was unbid.
Complaints about Ohio Works
In the early stages of any project of this magnitude, problems may arise and
changes have to be developed and implemented. However, if there is a lack of
support personnel and a slow response to complaints, these problems cannot be
properly addressed. These problems are compounded when the user interface is
complicated or unreliable.
We found that the Ohio Works support desk often receives as many as one
hundred complaints a day. Yet, on many occasions, there was only one person to
respond to e-mails received at the Ohio Works support desk. Users have
experienced problems with accessing and using the system. Others, who have
done so, were often disconnected from the system.
48
Ohio Works - Systems Operation Service Center
We reviewed costs associated with the Systems Operations Service Center. These
were costs associated with creating a production environment for Ohio Works.
The costs of facilities, telecommunications, and Help Desk support are included
in these costs.
Andersen leased space in the Huntington Building to house the operation of Ohio
Works. While it is not improper for Andersen to have secured facilities to
provide such services, it does illustrate another example of the lack of control
ODJFS exercised over the project. As a result, the facility has been used for
purposes other than Ohio Works.
Beyond site costs, other questions have risen regarding professional fees
associated with the center. A cost chart illustrating this is set forth below.
COMPENSATION BREAKDOWN BY CONTRACT INVOLVING

THE SYSTEM OPERATIONS SERVICES CENTER
Contracts Professional Fees Surveys System Operations Services Total
C-99-01-128 $13,538,450.00 $1,123,200.00 $1,441,350.00 $16,103,000.00

(9-1-98-6-30-99)
C-00-01-230 $12,195,700.00 $1,788,800.00 $ 314,000.00 $14,298,500.00

(7-1-99-6-30-01)
Amendment $19,710,487.68 $1,788,800.00 $1,500,000.00 $22,999,287.68

C-00-01-230
Total $45,444,637.68 $4,700,800.00 $3,255,350.00 $53,400,787.68
Professional fees are distinct from System Operations Services. The fees ranging
from $70.00 to $450.00 an hour are for salaries of people actually providing
deliverables (i.e., the designing, building, testing, or implementation of Ohio
Works).
49
The contract states that the $3,255,350.00 for System Operations Services is for
third-party hardware and software to support web/application servers, database
servers, firewalls, and maintenance and disaster recovery. 21 In addition, it
represents the cost of facilities, including telecommunication charges, as well as
the cost of production Help Desk support. We asked ODJFS to provide
documentation for the cost associated with the System Operations Service Center.
We found that ODJFS never asked Andersen for invoices or expenses to justify
the price set in the contracts. This may account for the erroneous payment of
$314,000.00 alluded to earlier.
Andersen was asked to provide us with copies of invoices, contracts, copy of the
lease for the 23rd floor of the Huntington Building for the System Operations
Service Center, and payments for the project site expenses from inception to
current date. We issued a subpoena for that information. We encountered some
reluctance on the part of Andersen to provide us with this information, despite the
fact that a specific provision in the contract provides:
All records relating to costs, work performed and supporting

documentation for invoices submitted to [ODJFS] by Contractor
(Andersen), along with copies of all deliverables submitted to
[ODJFS] pursuant to this contract will be retained and made
available by the Contractor (Andersen) for Audit by the State of
Ohio. (Including but not limited to [ODJFS], Auditor of the State
of Ohio, the Inspector General or duly authorized law enforcement
officials) and agencies of the United States government for a
minimum of three years after payment for work performed under
this contract. If an audit, litigation or other action is initiated
during this time period, Contractor shall retain such records until
the action is concluded and all issues resolved or the three years
end, whichever is later.
21
This includes ERISS's Pathfinder and Skill Match applications licensed by ERISS to ODJFS for
all 88 counties.
50
After much negotiation and discussion, we received a partial list of expenses and
invoices from Andersen. Set forth below are some of the expenses Andersen
provided as being billed against the System Operations Service Center:22
Monthly invoices from Aramark Refreshment Services for items

such as: coffee, tea, napkins, towels, spoons, forks, knives, cups,
stir sticks, water rental, popcorn, facial tissue, sugar, cream, coffee
mate, disinfectant, dish detergent, dishwasher soap, floor cleaning
soap, hot chocolate
Native Grounds Café - for breakfast sandwiches, juice, delivery
E.R. Towers - printer rental
Rental property at 1209 Hunter Avenue, Columbus, OH @
$800.00 per month (8.5 months=$6,934.00)
Hotel rooms at the Doubletree Pidgeon Company, Corporate
Housing in La Jolla, California, for 4 months, $10,126.00
Husband for Rent - repair wheel on luggage dolly, move bulletin
boards, install document holder
Native Grounds Café - lunch sandwiches, potato salad, cookies
juice
Pepper's New York Delicatessen – lunch, soda, delivery $77.90
Native Grounds - Pizza rolls, soda, water, chips
Plank's Café - sub sandwiches
Husband for Rent - repair kitchen faucet $284.87
NSF Bank Charges - $81.00
Tompkins Consulting – Arnold R. Tompkins consulting fee of
$4,800.00
Adam's Mark Hotel, BQT, 35 Deli Buffet - soft drinks, mineral
water $1,219.98
Made from Scratch – cake, punch
Early Bird Captain Hour - Regular Captain hours $955.94
Columbus State Community College - Breakfast, $200.00
Native Grounds Café - 10 bag lunches $62.90
Native Grounds Café - breakfast, juice, $117.20
Campus newspaper ads to advertise OhioWorks, holiday greeting
cards, mouse pad ads, business cards, mailing labels, posters, job
fair rental, correspondence materials, invitations, brochures,
multimedia design and focus groups, $133,455.00
22
On June 15, 2001, legal counsel for Accenture provided us a letter stating that certain items
originally provided to us to justify expenses and described as “for items purchased or rented by
Accenture for the Systems Operations Service Center, (‘SOSC’)” were not correct. He advised
that these expenses were indeed incurred in connection with other ODJFS contracts. However, not
all involved SOSC.
51
Continental Office Furniture - rental for chairs (17@ $547.50 a

piece or $9,307.50), freestanding furniture, furniture lease,
$90,463.08
Continental Office Furniture – furniture lease buyout-$30,629.13
Card system, $3,590.97
AIS employee to work Help Desk, invoices indicate 85% mark up
to state
Daystar-Franchise Temp Service - receptionist and clerk data
entry, $67,120.00
Purchase of computer hardware and software, installation,
maintenance cabling and service agreement, $411,268.00
Internet Service provider - Dial-up, ISDN, and T-1, $37,203.00
Copy machine rental, maintenance, and equipment, $10,932.00
Web hosting and related Internet charges, (UUNET), $53,718.00
Hines - for carpet, painting, and electric $7,496.33
Invoice from Jane Lommel - contracted by Andersen Consulting
on behalf of the Dayton Chamber of Commerce, to do study and
executive report on turnover rates for the Dayton Area $5,000.00
Invoice from Jane Lommel - 1 day training for clients in Columbus
area for OhioWorks $1,500.00; also expenses reimbursed for hotel,
valet parking, mileage, food, and printing, $601.00: Total
$2,101.27
We also noted that contracts we reviewed are unclear as to the issue of ownership
as it relates to equipment purchased for this project.
The current estimate of monthly operations charges is $78,500.00. Beginning in

March 2000, the estimate for monthly operations is $93,750.00. The ODJFS
contract manager was unable to explain why this was the case. Total
compensation for the Operations Center is not to exceed $1,500,000.00 for the
period March 1, 2000, through June 30, 2001. 23
23
Subsequent to this date, CompuWare will perform the contract.
52
D. CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT / SETS
Federal law mandated that states create an operational state-wide child support
enforcement system to meet the requirements of the Family Support Act of 1988.
In August 1997, HB 352 placed into law child support provisions of 1996 federal
welfare reform legislation. State and county agencies implemented federal
mandates and worked to develop a Support Enforcement Tracking System
(SETS). The Child Support Performance and Incentive Act provides graduated
financial penalties to meet guidelines of the Family Support Act. 24
In April 1996, Pickaway County became the first county to test the SETS system
as a pilot project. This was the first step in replacing the 88 county run child
support collection and disbursement systems with one automated state-wide
system. All counties were part of this system by October 1999. Other steps came
more slowly and resulted in deadlines not being met by the state and fines being
assessed under the same federal mandate.
This process has been subject to different interpretations as to certain

responsibilities on the part of the state and whether proper procedures were
followed in bringing this system into compliance. ODJFS officials have admitted
to mistakenly withholding monies from recipients as a result of some of these
interpretations. These issues have resulted in federal fines for failure to meet
deadlines and potential civil actions for recovery relative to the withholding of
24
The federal Family Support Act of 1988 (FSA88) mandated that states implement state-wide
child support computer systems by October 1, 1997. The federal government may levy monetary
sanctions against a state for not meeting FSA88 requirements. Ohio paid $43.2 million in
penalties between 1997 and 1999 for missing deadlines for completion of a state-wide child
support computer system ($4.8 million in 1997; $9.6 million in 1998; and $28.8 million in 1999).
These penalties were deducted from subsequent federal child support funding. Federal officials
visited Ohio in October 2000 and again in June 2001 to determine whether to certify that the
Support Enforcement Tracking System (SETS) meets the FSA88 requirements. Certification
would mean that further penalties associated with FSA88 would be avoided. Failure to receive
certification by October 1, 2001, would result in an additional sanction of $50.4 million. To date,
no determination has been made by the federal government to certify the system in 2001.
53
monies by the state. These matters of policy and law are more properly addressed
by ODJFS based upon advice of legal counsel. These matters are best left to the
courts. For purposes of this report, it would appear there is reasonable cause to
believe that state officials committed wrongdoing in withholding certain monies
from these individuals. However, this wrongdoing was a consequence of poor
judgment and a breakdown in communication25 rather than an attempt at personal
enrichment.
25
One example of the breakdown in communication has to deal with an “altered” memorandum to
the governor’s office from Jacqueline Romer-Sensky. The following summary is based on
interviews with Jacqueline Romer-Sensky, Brian Hicks, and Greg Moody:
On February 6, 2001, Governor Taft requested a written explanation from Director Jacqueline
Romer-Sensky explaining the improper withholding of child support payments to welfare
recipients and recommending solutions to the problem. The deadline for the memo was Monday
February 12th . On Saturday, February 10th , Greg Moody, the governor’s executive assistant on
health and human services issues, met wi th Ms. Romer-Sensky. She gave him the memo and, that
evening, Mr. Moody delivered the memo to the governor’s residence.
On Sunday, February 11, 2001, Mr. Moody went to work at the governor’s office. He gave a
copy of the memo to Mr. Brian Hicks to review for its “accuracy, thoroughness, and clarity.”
They wanted to change the last sentence in the second paragraph that stated, “ODJFS will share
this methodology prior to April 1, 2001.” The reason for this was that they felt it was “unclear,”
“sounded bureaucratic,” and “was not pro-active.” They also wanted to change the second to the
last sentence of the memo that stated, “ODJFS apologizes for any confusion we caused in
explaining this complex set of federal requirements or our implementation work plan to the
governor’s office.” The reason for this change was purportedly that they did not feel it was
accurate.
Mr. Moody called Ms. Romer-Sensky and participated in a conference call with her and Mr.
Hicks. Mr. Hicks explained that he wanted to change her memo. She was in agreement with the
first change, but expressed concern about the second change. She stated that she had adequately
explained the relevant federal regulations to the governor’s office in previous memos. Mr. Hicks
disagreed and insisted on the changes.
Based upon his recollection and notes taken during that conversation, Mr. Moody changed the
memo. The last sentence of the second paragraph was changed to, “This process will be underway
prior to April 1, 2001.” The second to the last sentence of the memo was changed to “ODJFS
apologizes for not explaining this complex set of federal requirements or our implementation work
plan to the governor’s office.”
While she was made aware that her memo was to be changed, she did not assent to any specific
language. In fact, she only saw the new language in her memo the following day when her
director of communications, Jon Allen, gave a copy of the revised memo to her. Mr. Allen
received his copy of the revised memo by fax from the Dayton Daily News. The memo was not
on ODJFS letterhead and had neither been signed nor initialed by Ms. Romer-Sensky. It had
apparently been faxed to the news media by the governor’s press secretary in Washington, D.C.,
Kevin Kellems.
A review of the above information led us to conclude there was not reasonable cause to believe
wrongdoing had occurred relative to the above acts.
54
Summary of Audits - Support Enforcement Tracking System (SETS)
In September 1996, the Ohio Department of Job & Family Services (ODJFS)
Bureau of Internal Audits completed a financial audit of the Support Enforcement
Tracking System (SETS) project.
The bureau also offered an opinion outside the normal scope of a financial audit
dealing with the reasons for delay in the project becoming fully operational. This
opinion was based upon observations and interviews with current and former
ODJFS management and non-management personnel, vendors, and federal
contacts.
The audit cited weak management practices as leading to the delay of the project.
Eight of the fourteen findings dealt with management related issues. These
include:
• [The]…project was too large and complex for ODJFS managers to
effectively manage…
• ODFJS management failed to take responsive corrective action
after being alerted to problem areas…
• The complexity of the project was underestimated by ODJFS
management…
• Decisions vital to the completion of SETS were delayed or made in
haste…
• [Vendors] were allowed to work outside the scope of their
contracts…
• The first vendor contract…was based on deliverables; however,
the vendor did not deliver any significant results. Consequently, a
time and material’s approach was used for the majority of the
SETS contracts, placing increased responsibility on ODJFS
management..
• Progress reports were not utilized by ODJFS for the SETS
project…
• Due to changes in management personnel, a lack of continuity was
created leading to project tasks being unsupervised and without
direction…
55
In May 1999, the Auditor of State’s Fraud, Waste, and Abuse Prevention Division
issued an operational review of SETS. This review provided a background of the
project and offered several recommendations to ODJFS. It found “control
weaknesses,” as well as a “lack of proper methodologies,” were being used to
modify and enhance the program.
The review concluded that ODJFS was continuing to struggle toward federal
certification for SETS and must face the future hurdle of meeting centralized
collection and disbursement by October 2000. Further, that SETS has not
historically been a model for system development. The reasons for this include
changes in federal legislation that resulted in a need for modifications and often
redevelopment of the program, problems with contractors, miscalculation of
hardware needs, and a lack of involvement by end-users in software development.
In addition, the audit found inherent problems with the fact the SETS program
centralizes a system from the county level to the state level, while welfare reform
legislation empowers counties to make business decisions for public assistance
programs at the local level.
Ms. Romer-Sensky requested an audit of the Ohio Child Support System by the
state auditor on February 16, 2001. (See Exhibit 16)
The Bank One Contract
We reviewed the circumstances involving the awarding of a state contract to Bank

One for operation of a system to process child support payments on behalf of the
state. A summary of events is set forth below and a more detailed account is
included in the appendix as Exhibit 17.
56
One of the federal mandates brought about by welfare reform required the
creation and operation of an automated Centralized Collection and Disbursement
Unit (CC&D) for child support. ODJFS was designated to operate a CC&D
system for Ohio. States were to be sanctioned for failure to meet this deadline.
When Ohio and other states missed the initial deadline of October 1999, new
federal legislation was passed extending this deadline to April 1, 2000, with
enforcement to begin September 1, 2000.
In February 1997, ODJFS sent Request for Information (RFI) documents to

vendors nationwide regarding the establishment of a CC&D unit, later known as
the State Disbursement Unit (SDU). In May 1997, representatives from Key
Bank, Bank One, The Huntington Bank, Fifth Third Bank, and Lockheed Martin
IMS each made presentations to the state.
In February 1998, ODJFS, through the Department of Administrative Services,

Computer Services Division, released a 259-page Request for Proposal (RFP)
#OA98034 to potential vendors to obtain bids for a CC&D system. Due to the
need for four amendments to this RFP, the date to open bids was delayed to June
4, 1998. However, on that date, no bids had been received.
In June 1998, Lockheed Martin IMS (LMIMS) submitted a bid involving eight
subcontracting firms, including Bank One. Their bid totaled $218,142,232.00,
over five years, which was approximately $70 million more than ODJFS had
projected for the project. An ODJFS review committee found 101 instances in
which the proposal did not comply with the terms of the RFP. In February 1999,
ODJFS cancelled the RFP when LMIMS indicated their bid could not be reduced
without substantial revisions to the contract requirements.
57
In early 1999, representatives of ODJFS contacted State Treasurer Deters’ office

requesting assistance with the CC&D project. 26 ODJFS was told that the
treasurer’s office would only assist if asked by the governor.
In May 1999, ODJFS officials and Deputy State Treasurer James Harper met with
Governor Taft and his chief of staff, Brian Hicks. At the meeting, the Governor
verbally requested that the State Treasurer assist ODJFS with implementation of
the CC&D project.
The Treasurer’s Office and ODJFS decided that Bank One was the bank best
equipped to handle the CC&D project based upon the fact that they were already
familiar with the project. They also felt pressed for time since the state was
facing a federal deadline to have the CC&D project implemented and Bank One
had some familiarity with the project as a sub-contractor under LMIMS.
Additionally, the Treasurer of State already had established a Board of Deposit
Bank Agreement with Bank One as a depository for state funds.27
In June 1999, ODJFS and the State Treasurer’s Office began discussions with
Bank One. The contract in question is not new. Rather, it is an amendment to a
pre-existing contract the Treasurer of State had with Bank One. It was submitted
to the Controlling Board in the amount of $14,695,075.00 for fiscal year 2000 and
$28,679,158.00 for fiscal year 2001. In December 1999, the Controlling Board
approved addendum #11 to the Board of Deposit Bank Agreement, thereby,
26
Prior to the cancellation of the RFP, representatives of ODJFS approached then Treasurer
Kenneth Blackwell for assistance due to their inability to reach an agreement with LMIMS to
lower their cost. ODJFS understood that other states had developed their CC&D programs in
conjunction with their State Treasurer’s Office. Mr. Blackwell deferred the involvement of his
office until after the election, since a new treasurer would be taking office in January 1999.
27
The State Treasurer of Ohio utilizes many different depositories for various public accounts.
The State Board of Deposit, on a biennial basis, designates which banks are state depositories.
The State Board of Deposit is comprised of the Attorney General, the Auditor of State, and
Treasurer of State. The Treasurer of State functions as chair of the board. There are 256
designated depositories. Bank One is one o f those designated as a state repository.
58
establishing Child Support Payment Central (CSPC) as Ohio’s State

Disbursement Unit.
Our investigation into these events revealed there was no reasonable cause to
believe an an act of wrongdoing or omission occurred in this instance.
E. SPECIFIC CONTRACT IRREGULARITIES
We next address instances of irregularities in specific contracts between ODJFS

and certain contractors. Information pertinent to these contracts is set forth
below, along with observations made in the course of our review.
Andersen
In May 1996, Arnold R. Tompkins requested the first unbid Andersen contract in
the amount of $49,500.00. The contract was for consulting services in workforce
development. In October 1996, upon the request of Mr. Tompkins, the
Controlling Board approved an additional Andersen contract in the amount of
$1,130,000.00 to assist ODHS in developing a master plan on how human
services would be managed and delivered in Ohio. In August 1997, upon the
request of Mr. Tompkins, 28 the Controlling Board approved another unbid
$1,688,000.00 contract with Andersen Consulting to develop Ohio Works. This
contract was amended to bring the total amount to $6,650,000.00 In August
1998, upon the request of Mr. Tompkins, 29 the Controlling Board approved an
unbid contract in the amount of $16,103,000.00 with Andersen.
28
Mr. Tompkins rejected the vendor selection committee’s recommendation.
29
Mr. Tompkins requested the contract over the objections of a contract review committee and
ODJFS legal staff.
59
In June 1999, upon the request of Jacqueline Romer-Sensky, the Controlling

Board approved an additional unbid contract with Andersen Consulting in the
amount of $14,298,500.00. In February 2000, upon the request of Ms. Romer-
Sensky, the Controlling Board approved an amendment to the contract with
Andersen in the amount of $22,999,287.68. These contracts were, in part, for the
continued development of Ohio Works.
A detailed review of the above-mentioned contracts between Andersen

Consulting and ODJFS is set forth below.
Contract C-96-01-680
Time of performance: June 15, 1996 - October 31, 1996

Hourly Rate: $150.00
Max hours: 330
Reimbursements allowed: None
Agency Director: Arnold R. Tompkins
Contract Manager: James Enloe, Assistant Director
Total amount of contract: $49,500.00
Encumbered in FY: 1996 - $4,500.00; 1997 - $45,000.00
Funding Program: Director's Office, State funds only.
Services to be provided: Consultation services with ODHS staff, (The
Director, Assistant Director, and Executive Staff
members); consultation services with the
Interagency Workforce Development
Reengineering Task Force: development of a work
plan and a time line for analyzing and, as
appropriate recommending options for
reengineering the state's workforce development
system including job development, training and
placement activities. Other services include:
development of an interview guide and survey;
facilitation of focus groups; preparation and
presentation of a written summary report.
Contract completion: Six weeks.
Final invoice submitted: August 22, 1996.
60
Based upon Andersen correspondence dated May 30, 1996, we found that this
contract was entered into nine days after Andersen executive, Robert Tyre, met
with Arnold R. Tompkins.
This contract did not go to the Controlling Board because it was just below the
$50,000.00 threshold. However, we noted that no Justification Form was
prepared for this contract. This form is required to be submitted with every
contract. Further, the contract was not presented to the review committee and the
contractor did not undergo evaluation when the contract was completed. Both
these are required pursuant to ODJFS standard policies and procedures. We
found no explanation for this deviation from the norm.
Time of performance: October 14,1996- June 30, 1997

Hourly Rate: N/A - Deliverables-based.
Phase 1 - $165,000.00
Phase 2 - $430,000.00
Phase 3 - $535,000.00
Max hours: N/A
Total amount of contract: $1,130,000.00
Contract Manager: Project Manager ODHS Welfare Reform Manager,
Stan Sells
Encumbered in fiscal year: 1997
Funding Program: N/A
Services to be provided: Phase 1 - Work with state officials to develop plan
and time line to establish a structure and process
which will result in recommendation of a master
plan.
Phase 2 - Conduct analytical assignments specified
in the plan to enable the programmatic baseline
assessment and formulate a strategy to serve as the
underpinning of the Master Plan, including
clarification and confirmation of the ODHS future
61
vision for welfare reform in Ohio. The delineation

of Ohio's current organizational structure and
system of services; completion of client population
trends analysis; a review of the states’ technological
infrastructure and process; cross agency operational
vision development of process/technology
strategies. By conclusion of Phase 2, contractor
will have developed a conceptual design for the
Master Plan. Contractor shall provide change
management by developing and managing
communications with stakeholders, by developing
sponsorship and leadership for change, and by
managing stakeholder relations.
Phase 3 - Construction of the recommended Master
Plan built upon conceptual design developed in
Phase 2 and based upon identified and selected
options, resource requirements associated with
those options, cost\benefit analysis of options,
overall funding strategies, recommendations for
revenue enhancement alternatives, including key
tasks and a prioritized list of projects for plan
implementation. Through Phase 3 contractor will
provide Change Management as listed above.
The contract provides funds, $250,000.00, to enable
the department to execute project orders that may be
identified during the Phase 3 planning and design
phases. The department will provide Controlling
Board with a report prior to the use of the
$250,000.00 for implementing any project orders.
Contract completion: Phase 1 of Welfare Reform Planning Project was
completed in and accepted, on December, 4, 1996.
The invoice from Andersen Consulting was dated
January 31, 1997, was received stamped into the
ODHS on February, 5 1997, at 3:26 pm and
approved that same day by Stan Sells. Phase 2,
Deliverable #1, invoice was submitted by Andersen
on March 10, 1997, and approved on March 12,
1997, by Stan Sells. The amount invoiced was
$220,000.00. Phase 2, Deliverable #2, was received
on March 31, 1997, and approved by Stan Sells on
April 1, 1997, for $210,000.00.
62
This was not a competitively bid contract in that costs were only requested from
Andersen. However, four contractors were invited to make a presentation for
selection. The firms were Andersen, Macro International, Inc., Maximus, and
Deloitte & Touche. Andersen, the eventual selection, was the only one contractor
with cost figures included on the Controlling Board request. However, no cost
analysis was performed as required by ODJFS standard policies and procedures.
Nonetheless, ODJFS cited one reason for contracting with Andersen Consulting
was the fact that "Andersen had direct and recent experience in helping another
state develop a strategic master plan to position its human services department for
welfare reform and a block grant environment." In fact, this was not the case.
Upon further inquiry by the Legislative Budget Office, the ODJFS representative
responded that the “state” was actually New Brunswick, Canada. The Legislative
Budget Office responded,
If part of the reason for using a consultant to lead the welfare
reform restructuring is to benefit from that firm’s expertise, that
firm’s expertise on the issue becomes an issue in and of itself. It is
necessary to question whether the firm's knowledge of the
Canadian system places them at an advantage relative to Ohio in
terms of restructuring Ohio's system — or will the firm be learning
about welfare reform options (and gaining experience which they
can then apply to other states) at the same time the department
could be learning about welfare reform options and gaining
experience which could be applied to future restructuring effort in
Ohio.
Based upon our investigation, it is clear that the latter was true in this case.
In response to a question on the Justification Form that asked whether the contract
was a one-time project that will end with termination of the contract, ODJFS
responded that there was a possibility that they will contract with Andersen in
FY98 to assist in the implementation of welfare reform.
63
A truly competitive process was not followed in this instance. No cost analysis
was performed. Further, the contract was not presented to the review committee
and the contractor did not undergo evaluation when the contract was completed.
Both these are required pursuant to ODJFS standard policies and procedures. We
found no explanation for this deviation from the norm.
Time of performance: August 11, 1997 - June 30, 1998

Hourly Rate: Level Hourly Rate
Partner $390.00
Associate Partner $310.00 to $340.00
Manager $220.00 to $325.00
Consultant $160.00 to $235.00
Analyst $ 70.00 to $175.00
Compensation not to exceed: $1,688,000.00 plus amendment ($6,655,000.00)
Contract Manager: Isaac Palmer / Fran Frazier
Funding Program: 400-410
Services to be provided: Work with ODHS to assist in the design, creation,
implementation, and operation of a work force
Development Program to meet the goals described
in the ODHS Welfare Reform Plan and HB 408.
Utilize a business integration approach on the
project involving four components. These
components — business process, organization,
technology, and strategy — each will support the
alignment of ODHS with the Vision Plan, which
was created as part of the Welfare Reform Planning
Project. (Note: Andersen had already completed
this part for $1,130,000.00.) (Andersen, through
ODHS personnel, wrote HB 408 for Tompkins)
Deliverables are expected to be a combination of
discrete products and consultative services. The
specific deliverables under this contract will be
jointly identified and defined in writing with the
ODHS Contract Manager.
64
Contract completion: Contract was amended to allow additional monies.

FY98: $3,873,000.00
FY99: $1,094,000.00
Total Contract amount is $6,655,000.00
This contract was unbid. No cost analysis was performed. A Justification Form
was not prepared for this contract. The form submitted for the amendment states
that this is an amendment to a sole-source contract. However, according to their
October 1996 Controlling Board request, several companies were able to perform
this work. The contractor did not undergo evaluation when the contract was
completed. Both of these are required pursuant to ODJFS standard policies and
procedures. We found no explanation for this deviation from the norm.
This contract came after a presentation by Andersen in May 1997. Mr. Tompkins
entered into a personal services contract with Donna Givens to act as liaison
between Andersen Consulting and ODJFS. During this time, Ms. Givens also
represented Andersen and actively participated in this presentation. Despite the
fact that two other firms scored higher with the selection committee, Mr.
Tompkins gave Andersen a portion of the work in the contract.
The deputy director of MIS for ODJFS and two of his top assistants scheduled a
meeting with Mr. Tompkins before this contract was executed. They expressed
their concern about the lack of MIS participation in the Decision Support System.
The main concern was that this was essentially the same system that the
department had already contracted IBM to develop. They advised that it would
adversely affect available resources, money, time, etc. Reportedly, Mr. Tompkins
told them they did not have to worry because Andersen was going to manage and
maintain the project. After the contract was executed, Andersen requested and
received all the source codes and general systems designs for the data warehouse
being designed by IBM. Ultimately, the Decision Support System was never
used. The costs associated with the system were in excess of $2.4 million.
65
Time of performance: September 1, 1998 - June 30, 1999

(Extension time per contract July 1–December, 31,
1999)
Partner $420.00
Manager $260.00 to $360.00
Analyst $ 70.00 to $190.00
Compensation not to exceed: $16,103,000.00 (extension adds $4,288,000.00)
Contract Manager: Diana Redman
Funding Program: 400-411
Services to be provided: Conduct an overview of the work force
Development Project, rollout a localized employer
information data base and job skill matching
Internet-based application (Ohio Works) to be used
by case workers and welfare recipients.
The competitive process was not followed in this instance. No cost analysis was
performed. The contractor did not undergo evaluation when the contract was
completed. Both are required pursuant to ODJFS standard policies and
procedures. We found no explanation for this deviation from the norm.
The Contract Review Committee did not recommend Andersen for this particular
contract. The reason was that they could not justify the cost of the project and the
use of a sole-source provider. Nonetheless, Mr. Tompkins disregarded this
recommendation based upon what he stated was Andersen’s experience in this
type of work.
Further, contract language speaks of an eventual “transition of operations to the

ODJFS.” Instead, new contracts were issued to Andersen — as they were the
66
only contractor with expertise on the system. This process did not begin until
June 2001 — well after the initiation of this investigation.
Certain language in this contract apparently paved the way for future contracts.
That language states the following in apparent anticipation that work may not be
complete at the end of the contract:
The specific deliverables under this contract will be jointly

identified and defined in writing in the approved work plan or by
separate documentation between ODHS Contract Manager and the
Contractor.
Quarterly deliverable attachments are expected to be a combination

of discrete projects, tasks, or reports, activities that will be billed
based on time, and materials as agreed to by ODHS and the
Contractor.
If future work was foreseeable, then this contract clearly should have been
competitively bid. If future work was not foreseeable, which appears unlikely, we
see no reason why this language has been included.
This contract also furthered the development of the Decision Support System
referenced above.
It is in this contract that the System Operations Service Center was created.
Issues associated with that center are addressed elsewhere in this report.
There has been no reconciliation of Andersen invoices by ODJFS. This is

required in time and material contracts to track the rate in which hours are
expended in relation to work.
67
This contract represents the third contract, excluding amendments, with Andersen.
Nonetheless, we found no indication that ODJFS officials questioned the lack of
any project manager, project plan, or cost analysis.
Contract C-00-01-230 (and amendment)
Time of performance: July 1, 1999 - June 30, 2001

Partner $450.00
Manager $280.00 to $385.00
Analyst $ 70.00 to $200.00
Compensation not to exceed: $14,298,500.00
Contract Amendment added: $22,999,286.00
Agency Director: Jacqueline Romer-Sensky
Contract Manager: Stan Sells, Rivo Nurnieks
Encumbered in FY: 2000-01
Funding Program: 400-410 TANF
Services to be provided: Enhancements to Ohio Works application,
continued operation of Ohio Works, operate toll
free support line, continued system roll-out, support
activities state-wide, publication of results of state-
wide employer survey to the Ohio Works website,
continue to provide project management for Ohio
Works, development of workforce development
training curriculum.
The competitive process was not followed in this instance. No cost analysis was
performed. A Justification Form was prepared for this contract and states that this
is an amendment to a sole-source contract. The contractor did not undergo
evaluation when the contract was completed. Both these are required pursuant to
ODJFS standard policies and procedures. We found no explanation for this
deviation from the norm.
68
On the operating request to the Controlling Board, ODJFS stated:
This is a sole-source contract with Andersen Consulting because of

their knowledge of our agency and its programs particularly
workforce development, which was gained through previous
personal services contracts. Without this contract, the state will not
have the capability to operate the Ohio Works system. [This is a
problem because transfer and training were required of Andersen
in prior contracts.]
This contract was also for time and materials. It was not based on deliverables.
Further, there has been no reconciliation of Andersen invoices. This is necessary
in time and material contracts to track the rate in which hours are expended in
relation to work involved.
The amendment added the integration of Ohio Works and Ohio JobNet. Given
the increase over the original contract amount, one must question the use of these
amendments that simply raise the cost of foreseeable expenses.
This contract represents the fourth contract, excluding ame ndments, with
Andersen. Again, we found no indication that ODJFS officials initially
questioned the lack of any project manager, project plan, or cost analysis.
Donna Givens
The following information is submitted by way of background to better

understand the circumstances surrounding ODJFS contracts involving Donna
Givens.
69
Arnold R. Tompkins worked with Ms. Givens in the 1980’s at the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services. In February 1995, while under
contract with Andersen, Ms. Givens traveled to Ohio to explore business
opportunities. About that time, she introduced Robert Tyre, an Andersen partner,
to Arnold R. Tompkins. In July 1995, she entered into the first of her four
consulting contracts with ODJFS at an hourly rate of $125.00. In October 1996,
she became a sub-contractor for Andersen and began working at ODJFS under the
Andersen contract executed by Mr. Tompkins. In May 1997, she participated as a
representative of Andersen in a contract presentation to ODJFS. Ms. Givens was
under contract with both ODJFS and Andersen at the time.
In November 1997, Ms. Givens authored a strategy memo for Andersen. The
memo outlined strategy on how to obtain contract extensions with ODJFS through
Mr. Tompkins and how to “position” Mr. Tompkins upon his departure from state
government.
A summary of the contracts in question between ODJFS and Ms. Givens is set
forth below:
Contract Number: C-96-01-368
Contract Dates: July, 11, 1995, to September 30, 1995

Compensation: $125.00 per hour (60 hours maximum)
Reimbursement: $2,000.00 for travel and other related expenses
Total: $9,500.00
Deliverables: Provide consultant services upon request to support the
development of a Conceptual Integrated Program
Document (CIPD). The document will reflect the
integration of the three major program reform initiatives:
Health Care Reform, Welfare Reform, Family and Children
services Reform. Consult with Director and Assistant
Director for approximately 6 hours on 7-11-95 to determine
scope of the project. Attend a 6-hour working retreat with
the Executive staff of ODHS on 7-12-95 to discuss the
70
development of the integrated plan for administration of

human services programs. Contractor will record
conclusions of the retreat. Facilitate 3 separate project
management teams in the development of major program
description documents for health care, welfare reform and
family and children services programs, which will be
incorporated into the CIPD.
The above contract was later amended as set forth below:
Contract Amendment #1: C-96-01-368
Contract Dates: July 11, 1995, to September 30, 1995

Compensation: 150 hours added to the contract
Reimbursement: $3,800.00 added for transportation, lodging and
meals
Total: $32,050.00
Deliverables: The following were added to the amended contract:
1. Meet with Deputy Directors including those
who lead the three ODHS project management
teams.
2. Meet with the QSTP facilitators assigned to
each of the three ODHS project management teams.
3. Attend and facilitate ODHS program
management team meetings.
4. Provide technical assistance regarding
deliberations at the Federal level and programs in
other states and localities.
5. Edit the program description documents and
draft a final integrated document that ODHS will
use to administer human services programs.
6. Meet two or three local directors of county
human services programs who are representative of
the variety of approaches and issues facing ODHS.
7. Meet with staff of Governor's Office to
determine overlap between Families and Children’s
First Initiative and the Family and Children
Services Reform.
71
8. Meet with the ODHS Block Grant

Committee to determine overlap/integration of
activities in that area.
The original contract provided for a $2,000.00 allowance for travel, food, and
lodging in this contract. This subsequent amendment to the contract increased the
amount by $3,800.00. Reimbursement under the contract was limited to actual
and necessary expenses subject to the limits as established pursuant to Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. §126.31 and §126.32 and Ohio Admin. Code §126-1-02.
Givens billed the state for time and expenses involved in traveling to and from her
place of residence, Washington, D.C., to attend meetings in Columbus required
under the contract.
Chapter 6000 of the ODJFS Standard Operating Procedures outlines the policy
and procedure to be followed in contracting for goods and services. These
procedures make it clear that contractors may not be compensated for time spent
in travel status. (See SOP 6105.5 Travel Expenses) Therefore, in our view, it
was improper for Givens to bill the state for time spent traveling to and from
Washington, D.C. and improper for ODJFS to pay the bill.
Further, the contract stated that the contractor's headquarters 30 shall be Franklin
County, Ohio. Therefore, Ms. Givens should not have even billed for travel
expenses involved traveling to and from Washington, D.C. and it was improper
for ODJFS to pay the bill.
30
Ohio Admin. Code §126-1-02 defines "Headquarters" as the office address at which a state
agent has his/her primary assignments or if a state agent's primary work assignment involves
scheduled travel, the place from which he/she can most effectively carry out his/her assigned
duties.
72
Contract Number: C-96-01-368, Amendment #2
Contract Dates: Extends contract to December 31, 1995

Compensation: Additional 56 hours at $125 - $7,000.00
Reimbursement: None
Total: $39,050.00
Deliverables: The additional time and hours were necessary to complete
any remaining tasks itemized in the original contract and
Amendment #1 and to add the following tasks:
1. Monitor the progress of the passage of the Federal
Welfare Reform Legislation and its effect on state welfare
reform efforts.
2. Provide consultant services upon request
concerning Federal Welfare Reform legislation.
3. Incorporate the Conceptual Integrated Program
Document (CIPD) (policy document) any changes which
may be required by the federal level program.
4. Incorporate into the ODHS Operational Plan (a plan
to be developed by in-house staff subsequent to the
completion of the CIPD) any changes that may be required
by the federal level program.
Givens continued to bill the state for travel time and expenses, contrary to the
terms of these contracts. In addition, she submitted invoices for hours more than
those allowable under the contract.
This second amendment was dated August 18, 1995. Nonetheless, on August 4,
1995, Ms. Givens submitted an invoice for the month of July 1995. A summary
of that invoice and subsequent billings pursuant to C-96-01-368 are set forth
below:
July Invoice
63 hours @ $125.00 per hour = $7,875.00
Expenses 1,485.11
Total $9,360.11
73
Improper amount paid on this invoice = $3,485.11 (16 hours @ $125.00 per hour)
August Invoice
118 hours @ $125.00 per hour = $14,750.00
Expenses 2,199.71
Total $16,949.71
Improper amount paid on this invoice = $4,387.21 (17.5 hours @ 125.00 per hour)
September Invoice
34.5 hours @ $125.00 per hour = $4,312.50
Expenses 644.76
Total $4,957.26
Improper amount paid on this invoice = $1,082.26 (3.5 hours @ $125.00 per hour)
October Invoice
6.5 hours @ $125.00 per hour = $812.50
Total $812.50
No overpayment - all work completed in D.C.
November Invoice
15 hours @ $125.00 per hour = $1,875.50
Expenses 398.76
Total $2,274.26
Improper amount paid this invoice = $ 398.76 (for expenses)
December Invoice
28.5 hours @ $125.00 per hour = $3,562.50
Total $3,562.50
No improper payment was made on this invoice.
Ms. Givens billed $33,188.00 for time and $4,728.34 for travel, food, and
lodging expenses. The amount that appears to have been improperly paid
under this contract is $9,353.34.
We find the same issues regarding excessive travel, food, and lodging expenses
with all the following other contracts entered into with ODJFS by Donna Givens:
74
Contract Dates: March 1, 1996, through June 30, 1996

Compensation: $ 125.00 per hour (75 hours maximum)
Reimbursement: $ 1,500.00 for travel and other related expenses
Total: $10,875.00
Deliverables: 1. Provide consultant services upon request to support
the finalization and implementation of the Vision
Document for the department, The Vision Document, and
subsequent implementation, integrate the three major
reform initiatives: Health Care, Welfare Reform and
Family and Children Services.
2. Incorporate the comments of ODHS staff into the
Vision Document and produce a final report.
3. Draft an implementation plan to be used to
administer human services programs.
4. Meet with department staff, governor's office,
agency staff and human service association's staff regarding
the draft impleme ntation plan to receive input and
comments.
5. Produce a final implementation plan on which the
department will base its delivery of services.
In the course of our review, we learned that this contract was originally for 80
hours. However, because that figure would have placed her compensation for
fiscal year 1996 over $50,000.00, it was changed to avoid the requirement that
this go before the Controlling Board.
A summary of the amounts invoiced pursuant to C-96-01-620 are set forth below:
April Invoice
10 hours @ $125.00per hour = $1,250.00
Expenses -0-
Total $1,250.00
May Invoice
40 hours @ $125.00 per hour = $5000.00
Expenses 350.00
75
Total $5,350.00
Improper amount paid on this invoice = $787.50
(3.5 hours for flight time and travel expenses to D.C. on May 9, 1996)
June Invoice
25 hours @ $125.00 per hour = $3,561.45
Expenses 436.45
Total $3,997.90
The amount that appears to have been improperly paid under this contract is
$1,224.12.
Contract Number: C- 97-01-071
Contract Dates: July 01, 1996, to June 30, 1997

Total: $49,500.00
Deliverables: 1. Assist ODHS leadership with developing the
implementation plan and a communications plan for
Welfare reform. Specific tasks will include: interviewing
key staff; reviewing and developing document drafts;
conducting staff retreats; providing management advice and
consultation services; and conducting focus groups.
2. Perform liaison role with the contractor hired,
Andersen Consulting, to develop the plan for the
Workforce Development project (Interagency Workforce
Development Re-Engineering Task Force).
3. Develop a strategy for the implementation of the
integrated program plan (the Vision Document) for the
administration of the major health care, welfare, family
and children's program reform initiatives.
A summary of that amounts invoiced pursuant to C-97-01-071 are set forth below:
July Invoice
129 hours@ $125.00 per hour = $16,125.00
76
Expenses 1,526.52
Total $17,651.52
Improperly paid on this invoice = $4,151.52
(21 hours for flight time and travel expenses to D.C.)
August Invoice
123 hours @ $125.00 per hour = $15,315.00
Expenses 966.00
Total $16,281.28
Improperly paid on this invoice = $ 3,653.78
(21.5 hours for flight time and travel expenses to D.C.)
September Invoice:
78.5 hours @ $125.00 per hour = $ 9,812.50
Expenses -0-
Total $9,812.50
Improperly paid on this invoice = $1,312.50
(10.5 hours for flight time and travel expenses to D.C.)
October Invoice:
35 hours @ $125.00 per hour = $4,375.00
Expenses -0-
Total $4,375.00
Over paid this invoice = -0-
June Invoice:
10 hours @ $125.00 per hour = $1,250.00
Expenses -0-
Total $1,250.00
Our review revealed that 163 hours billed were for work in Columbus. Another
159.5 hours were billed for work performed in Washington, D.C. It is worth
noting that there is no documentation to demonstrate what consulting work might
have been done there. The remaining 53 hours were billed for travel, food, and
lodging expenses.
$7,805.30.
77
Contract Dates: July 1, 1997, to June 30, 1998

Total: $48,310.00
Deliverables: 1. Assist the department develop a communication
strategy and a communications work plan for
implementation of Ohio's Welfare Reform Plan.
2. Provide consultation services to Project W.R.I.S.T.
(Welfare Reform Implementation System Transformation.)
Team and work specifically with the Comprehensive
Communication Plan Committee.
3. Provide support to the communications effort by
providing knowledge of key components necessary to
develop a communications strategy, as well as knowledge
of the change management approach needed to implement
the strategy.
4. Assist development of a detailed work plan that is
vital to assure the communications strategy is implemented
in a timely, coordinated, and effective manner.
5. Specifically, the contractor will perform the
following duties: identify messages to be communicated
and key audiences; identify key staff to assist with the
implementation of the communications plan; identify
individuals in all audience groups to assist with
communicating the message; provide on going training and
support; develop a public education campaign to include
media strategy and posters, brochures, videos,
presentations, etc. to reach all key audiences; identify
events that are forums for communicating the message;
identify communication vehicles and audiences for which
they are most appropriate; provide support to plan, conduct
and report the minutes of the Comprehensive
Communication Plan Committee meetings, as requested by
the WRIST Project Director.
The Contract Review Committee unanimously voted to not recommend this

contract for lack of documentation and because it was not competitively bid. Mr.
78
Tompkins ignored the committee's recommendation and approved the contract to

Ms. Givens.
A summary of the amounts invoiced pursuant to C-97-01-071, are set forth below:
July Invoice
96 hours @ $125.00 per hour = $12,000.00
Expenses $ 1,530.81
Total $13,530.81
August Invoice
186.50hours @ $125.00 per hour = $23,312.50
Expenses $ 2,336.28
Total $25,648.78
September Invoice
67.5 hours @ $125.00 = $8,437.50
Expenses 448.61
Total 8,886.11
Improperly paid on this invoice = $448.61
$4,315.70. This figure is based upon flight time and travel expenses as estimated,
based upon our interview with Ms. Givens. This brings the total amount that
appears to have been improperly paid under the four contracts with ODJFS to
$22,698.46.00. That figure is based upon DAS policies and the relevant contract
language.
In the fall of 1997, Ms. Givens wrote two letters to the legal department of
ODJFS to explain her approach to billing for travel time and expenses in light of
her work on behalf of both ODJFS and Andersen. She indicated that she divided
expenses between the ODJFS and Andersen contracts. She stated she started
work on the other Andersen contract on August 25, 1997, and worked 20 hours
79
between that date and August 29th. During the same period of time, she claims
she worked 45 hours for ODJFS.
During this period, she billed ODJFS as follows:
August 25-28 Actual Allowed

Airfare $546.00 $546.00
Hotel 323.42 175.50
Meals
8/25 32.78 25.00
8/26
8/27 43.19 25.00
8/28 15.77 15.77
8/29 (at home)
Cab fare 32.00 32.00
Parking ___2.00 2.00
Total $995.16 $821.27
In addition, she also billed ODJFS for travel time during this period. As a result,
out of the 45 hours she billed, 7 hours were billed for travel time.
Ms. Givens returned to Columbus on September 2, 1997, and billed for work
through September 4th. For this period, she claims to have divided expenses
between ODJFS and Andersen, billing for such things as meals, hotel, and cab
fare. These expenses totaled $238.73. Similar expenses from September 9th
through 11th totaled $209.61. ODHS was billed for travel time during this period.
For the period from August 25, 1997, through September 30, 1997, Andersen
billed ODJFS for 207 hours @ $230.00 per hour totaling $47,610.00 for Ms.
Givens time. During that same period, Ms. Givens billed ODJFS for 96 hours @
$125.00 per hour totaling $12,000.00.
80
In June 1998, Ms. Donna Givens’ last consulting contract with ODJFS expired.
In February 1999, she became a full-time employee of Andersen.
American Management Services
In December 1997, the Controlling Board approved a contract subject to a limited

competitive bid process in the amount of $1,600,000.00 to AMS to assist ODJFS
in welfare reform. 31 In August 1998, upon the request of Arnold R. Tompkins, the
Controlling Board approved an unbid contract in the amount of $13,700,000.00
with AMS to continue development of the Integrated Case Management System
(ICMS).
In June 1999, upon the request of Ms. Romer-Sensky, the Controlling Board
approved two additional unbid contracts with AMS. The first was in the amount
of $67,292,500.00 and was for the continued development and implementation of
an integrated system for the Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF) program.
The second was in the amount of $27,176,250.00 and was the contract renewal for
the SETS program.
After reviewing these contracts, there appear to be no obvious improprieties in

the manner in which they were obtained and managed. The state’s MIS
department was managing these IT projects and there was ongoing state
participation. We also found that, due to the fact that these contracts were
awarded through a competitive selection process, there was a defined scope of
work, design specifications, and performance specifications. Another firm has
been selected to perform an Independent Verification and Validation of the SETS
31
AMS was already under contract with ODJFS to implement the SETS program.
81
contracts as required by federal mandate. This will determine if the contractors

under the SETS contracts, including AMS have met all of their obligations, etc.
Most contracts with AMS dating back to 1995 have been competitively selected.
The only exception was Contract No. 98-261 for work related to welfare reform.
But, although this contract was not awarded through an RFP, it did go through a
competitive selection process where five vendors made presentations to a
selection committee. AMS was rated the highest out of the five vendors.
The AMS contracts have been managed by ODJFS. Although most are for time
and materials, ODJFS has taken the following steps to ensure that deliverables
were met:
• Purchase Orders are verified.
• Contractors’ names are verified to match the name assigned to PO.
• Wage rates are verified for each person listed on invoice.
• Invoices are checked to include contractor’s job description.
• Contractors’ signatures are matched with timesheets.
• State supervisor’s signature is checked on timesheet.
• Rates at which expenses are incurred are checked.
Travel and expenses are detailed and approved.
A chronology of AMS contracts is set forth below:
Issuer: Purpose of Contract SFY Cost Type /Competitive BID

Initial Contract /
SETS for Independent Verification & $285,000.00 Competitively Bid through
DAS Validation (IV&V) 95 RFP
Same contract as above
DAS SETS -IV&V (continued) 96 $285,000.00
Same contract as above
DAS SETS -IV&V (continued) 96 $130,000.00
Initial Contract/
SETS Implementation Assistance Team 97 $3,442,530.00 Competitively bid through
DAS RFP
82
SETS Implementation Assistance Team Amendment to above

DAS (Amendment) 98 $10,971,248.00
DAS SETS -Implementation Assistance Amendment to above

Team (Amendment) 99 $10,971,248.00
RFP\ Competitively Bid
ODHS SETS- Programming/Project MGT 00 $15,243,265.00
Renewal
ODHS SETS Programming/Project MGT 01 $13,927,500.00
Competitively Bid
ODHS Welfare Reform Project Management 98 $1,600,000.00
Amendment to above
ODHS Integrated Case Management System 98 $4,600,000.00
Extension\ of above contract
ODHS Integrated Case Management System 00 $32,872,500.00 Extension

Extension
DAS Help with Y2K issues 99 $650,000.00
ODHS SETS Implementation 98 $3,000,000.00
ODHS SETS Implementation 99 $3,000,000.00
We would agree that there are benefits to retaining a contractor throughout the
course of a project. However, as with Andersen, we are concerned where this
relationship is initiated with a small contract that begets another and another.
Problems associated with these contracts have to do with actual implementation

of the projects by ODJFS. These problems were elaborated upon earlier in this
report in the section involving the Support Enforcement Tracking System (SETS).
However, from a contracting standpoint, there appear to be no improprieties.
Accordingly, we find no reasonable cause to believe an act of wrongdoing or
omission occurred in this matter.
83
F. FINDINGS
In this report, we have examined numerous instances where proper policies and
procedures have been disregarded in the course of awarding state contracts.
Many other incidents illustrate situations where mechanisms established to
provide oversight or guidance in this process were subverted or non-existent.
We find reasonable cause to believe wrongdoing has occurred in the contracting

process at ODJFS in many instances. We also find the same in specific projects
and contracts. These instances have been cited in the foregoing part of this
section of the report.
Specific circumstances relating to our findings of wrongdoing in the contracting

process are set forth below:
Contracts were improperly run directly out of the director’s office.

Advice from agency legal and other staff regarding proper procedures was
disregarded by the director.
Arnold R. Tompkins improperly disregarded the selection committee
recommendations as director.
Contracts were unnecessarily awarded without going through the RFP
process.
No advanced planning documents were prepared by ODJFS.
No competitive selection process was used for unbid contracts by ODJFS.
No project manager was assigned to state contracts to ensure the
contractors’ efficiency and the fact that deliverables were made.
Contract managers lacked expertise to handle certain projects.
No project plan was created for large contracts.
No cost analysis was established for large contracts.
84
Contracts were improperly based upon “time and materials” rather than
specific “deliverables.”
ODJFS failed to follow their own standard operating procedures relating
to the contracting process.
Invoices were not reconciled to ensure proper billing.
Contractor hours were not properly verified.
No contractor evaluations were performed as required after completion of
contracts.
No participation by MIS personnel in outsourced IT projects.
G. CONCLUSION
REVIEW OF AGENCY MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS
Our investigation reveals reasonable cause to believe wrongdoing occurred on the

part of Mr. Tompkins based upon his actions in awarding large unbid contracts to
Andersen. In examining the totality of circumstances surrounding these contracts,
we are unable to conclude that his acts were intended to be in the best interests of
the state. Rather, it seems clear that he was merely attempting to curry favor and
guarantee future business with both Andersen and AMS.
The above findings led us to conduct a review of the contracting process. We

reviewed contracts for the implementation of an Internet-based system to match
welfare recipients to employers (Ohio Works), a state-wide child support
computer system (SETS), and underlying contracts involving Mr. Tompkins, Ms.
Romer-Sensky, and Ms. Givens.
It is clear that Arnold R. Tompkins single-handedly made Andersen a key player

in Ohio’s transition from welfare to work. He ignored the advice of counsel and
the recommendation of a contract review committee in awarding large state
85
contracts. He allowed these contracts to be awarded outside of the customary

competitive review process. He also failed to ensure that these contracts were
negotiated and administered to ensure timely and efficient completion of the work
promised. This resulted in contracts based more on what the state would agree to
pay rather than what it could expect to derive from what it paid for. In the case of
Ohio Works, it is no surprise that, in the end, we were left with an overpriced
system fraught with problems.
The role of Donna Givens, an Andersen employee, was pivotal in the relationship
between Andersen, Arnold R. Tompkins, and ODJFS. We found reasonable
cause to believe wrongdoing occurred based upon the circumstances surrounding
her being under contract with ODJFS while she was doing business with ODJFS
as an Andersen employee.
Our investigation revealed deficiencies on the part of ODJFS’ process of

awarding contracts. These deficiencies consist primarily of situations where
polices and procedures were disregarded in the course of awarding state contracts.
However, we did find other situations where these policies were non-existent or
simply inadequate. We also believe that ODJFS failed to enforce contractual
provisions of Givens’ contract that resulted in loss to the state. The result of these
problems was the waste of tax dollars spent on large projects lacking adequate
oversight or accountability by the state. As a result, we found reasonable cause to
believe acts of wrongdoing or omission occurred in the administration of this
process.
It is worth noting the efforts of Ms. Romer-Sensky with regard to awarding state
contracts during her tenure as director. While we may question her judgment in
some instances, she did implement positive changes in the administration and
oversight of state contracts. Most notable was the creation of the Bureau of
86
Contracts Office in August 1999. This bureau was created to bring more
experience to the process and allow for independent review by the ODJFS legal
department. The decision to rebid all major contracts was made. To ensure better
use of resources, provide management leadership, and to ensure projects are
completed on time and within budget, Ms. Romer-Sensky created the Project
Management Office in December 2000.
As for the contractors involved — particularly, Andersen — we are concerned

that they reaped the benefits of Mr. Tompkins’ wrongful acts. We have
concluded that certain invoices submitted to the state were inaccurate. We have
also opined that certain expenses submitted to the state were improper. However,
this is not to say that these bills were fraudulent or in violation of law. Only a
professional audit can conclusively demonstrate whether monies may be due the
state. However, we can conclude that the state got less than it should have
bargained for in many of these contracts. And it paid more than we think it
should have. As a result, we have referred this matter for review of those issues
by the appropriate agencies.
Ultimately, there is ample blame to be assumed by the state in this matter.

Notwithstanding how these contracts were started, it is difficult to believe that
bills submitted routinely received such little scrutiny to determine whether work
was actually performed and that project management could be left to a contractor.
These incidents underscore the reason large contracts should be based upon
results or “deliverables” as opposed to contractors’ costs in time and materials.
H. RECOMMENDATIONS
In the next few weeks, ODJFS will have a new director who will be charged with
restoring faith in this agency. However, it is important to note that since the
87
resignation of Ms. Romer-Sensky, the department has been under the direction of
two interim directors and a management review team that has begun this work.
Specifically, they have:
dealt with budget cuts
avoided employee layoffs thru attrition and retirement incentives
dealt with public concerns over the closing of 56 employment offices in
favor of one-stop centers
persuaded Bank One to stop charging a $3 fee to non-customer parents
cashing child support checks
set up an external review of SETS
strengthened ties with county child support enforcement directors
repaid $1.5 million dollars of child support mistakenly withheld
strengthened the office of chief inspector
We recognize the efforts of all those involved in addressing many of the problem
areas discussed in this report and providing the new director with a firm
foundation upon which to build. In continuing the positive changes within
ODJFS, we offer the following administrative recommendations:
Agency Oversight Over Contracting Process
All state agencies should have the capacity to conduct internal audits of state
contracts. Larger state agencies should have a more formalized structure for
doing so. Such audits might be conducted periodically, randomly, or as may be
required under the circumstances. However, some system of review is required to
avoid problems revealed in this investigation. We recommend the agency take
steps to ensure they have the capacity to do this.
88
We recommend that the agency perform its own audit of contracts with Andersen
and provide the results of their findings within ninety days of the date of this
report.
This investigation demonstrates the need for project management as an integral

component in ensuring the state receives value from contracts with contractors.
We recommend that the agency ensure that common principles of project
management are used in future contracts.
Role of the Chief Inspector
The investigative arm of the chief inspector must fully investigate complaints of
contract irregularities and have the ability to order audits of questionable
contracts. The chief inspector may also do background checks of private
contractors involved in state contracts to uncover improper relationships in the
selection process.
The chief inspector should be required to immediately report any allegations of

wrongdoing by the senior staff to the state inspector general and work with that
office in investigating complaints.
Adherence to Established Policies and Procedures in State Contracts
Many problems uncovered in the course of this investigation relate to failure on

the part of agency officials to follow established policies and procedures in
awarding state contracts. We recommend that the agency undertake steps to
ensure that these are followed in the course of awarding future state contracts and
89
that better documentation is available to justify any necessary deviations from that
process.
Implementation of Recommendations for Independent Oversight
The report of the Management Improvement Committee (MIC) in May of 2000

recommended the creation of a formal, organized Office of Internal Oversight
within the Office of Budget and Management. The certification of key employees
as program managers and contract specialists was also suggested. These
recommendations should be seriously considered in light of these circumstances
and are not supplanted by oversight within state agencies. We agree with the
findings of the committee that problems like those discussed in the MIC report
may be avoided if this recommendation is followed. We recommend that the
governor’s office consider implementation of these recommendations.
Controlling Board Issues
Minutes of the meetings of the Controlling Board should be recorded. Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. §121.66(C) states “the minutes of a regular or special meeting of any
public body shall be promptly prepared, filed and maintained and shall be open to
public inspection.” Additionally, an understanding of the business discussed
during these meetings would assist this office in investigations, as well as those
offices charged with oversight of state contracts. We recommend that the
Controlling Board begin creating and maintaining these minutes.
90
I. REFERRALS
In the course of this investigation, this office has met with representatives from
both the auditor of state and attorney general offices. Based upon the fact we
have found reasonable cause to believe acts of wrongdoing or omission were
committed in the contracting process, we make these referrals for possible audit
and recovery of monies that may be due the state.
A copy of our report will also be forwarded to the Ohio Ethics Commission for
review and such action as they see fit.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no way to overstate the immensity of the task involved in merging the two social
services agencies that were to become ODJFS. Moreover, it is not the purpose of this
report to opine as to the judgment involved in undertaking such a task. It was clearly
well intentioned and designed to better serve the citizens of Ohio. To be sure, one of the
tasks was to deal with the clash of cultures between the former agencies brought together
in this regard. These differences posed unique management challenges that needed to be
addressed by decision makers from the management level to the director’s office.
Similarly, our role is not to second-guess each of these determinations in hindsight.
However, regardless of the particular challenges faced by an agency, a certain level of
administrative acumen is required and is subject to our review and public scrutiny. It is
that type of decision making that we have reviewed in this report.
In examining the quality of management that existed at ODJFS during our period of
review, we are dealing with two administrations and two directors — Arnold R.
Tompkins and Jacqueline Romer-Sensky. In our view, Mr. Tompkins’ actions created a
91
chain of events whose consequences were only exacerbated by the changes caused by the
merger. It seems apparent that many of the decisions he made — particularly toward the
end of his tenure as director — were based upon personal enrichment rather than sound
judgment exercised in the best interest of the agency.
Ms. Romer-Sensky, conversely, inherited a situation that appears to have been destined
for trouble. Issues relating to the merger of two agencies to form ODJFS, the evolution
of how it was to provide social services, and myriad political considerations further
complicated issues associated with doing business with contractors. However, while
probably inevitable, the degree to which these events adversely affected the agency could
have been minimized had they been recognized sooner.
In the final analysis, this report should serve as a caution to those who would misuse their
position for personal gain. As importantly, it should serve as a guide to possible
problems that can arise in awarding state contracts. Beyond honesty and fair dealing, the
citizens of the State of Ohio have the right to expect to receive fair value. This is best
achieved through adherence to established procedures in awarding state contracts and
establishing adequate oversight throughout the entire process.
92

Investigation of Andersen Consulting Contracts, Ohio

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Investigation of Andersen Consulting Contracts, Ohio

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

FILE ID NUMBERS: 2000047, 2000244

AGENCY: Ohio Department Of Job & Family Services

BASIS FOR INVESTIGATION: Inspector General Initiative

ALLEGATIONS: Improprieties in State Contracts

DATE OPENED: November 3, 2000

INVESTIGATED BY: Thomas P. Charles, Inspector General

ASSISTED BY: Lt. Kim Campbell, Ohio State Highway Patrol

DATE OF REPORT: June 29, 2001

I. BASIS OF INVESTIGATION ..................................................................................................1

II. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................1

III. ACTION TAKEN IN FURTHERANCE OF INVESTIGATION ..........................................4

IV. INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED WRONGDOING ............................................................4

V. REVIEW OF AGENCY MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS.........................................25

D. CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT / SETS ..........................................................53

E. SPECIFIC CONTRACT IRREGULARITIES .........................................................59

1. Chronology of Controlling Board approved Andersen contracts.

Welfare Reform Plan

Mr. Tompkins’ initial approval of an unbid contract with Andersen Consulting

Support Enforcement Tracking System

As a result of this approval, subsequent unbid contracts have been awarded to

III. ACTION TAKEN IN FURTHERANCE OF INVESTIGATION

This office reviewed several state-awarded contracts, agency-approved contracts,

IV. INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED WRONGDOING

Arnold R. Tompkins was appointed director of ODJFS on March 1, 1993. During

Romer-Sensky jointly operated a consulting business named Tompkins & Sensky,

Battelle, KPMG Consulting, and Maximus) were asked to give a presentation to

The selection committee unanimously recommended that AMS assist ODJFS in

In addition, our investigation revealed that Donna Givens, a representative of

On November 6, 1997, Ms. Givens authored a four-page strategy memo for

We interviewed representatives from both AMS and Andersen. Neither recalled

During Mr. Tompkins’ tenure as director, ODJFS utilized contract review

Starting in December 1997, a series of memos were forwarded to Mr. Tompkins

On October 1, 1998, one week before Arnold R. Tompkins resigned as director,

Between March and October 1999, Tompkins Consulting, Ltd. (Tompkins

See Exhibit 10 for a chronology of events pertinent to this investigation.

Ohio Revised Code Section 102.03, commonly referred to as the “Revolving

(F) No person shall promise or give to a public official or

Ohio Revised Code Section 2921.02, Ohio’s Bribery statute, states:

(B) No person, either before or after he is elected, appointed,

Ohio Revised Code Section 2921.42(A)(3) states the following:

In May 1996, Mr. Tompkins awarded Andersen Consulting their

In August 1997, Mr. Tompkins ignored the top two vendors

In December 1997, Mr. Tompkins requested an additional

On June 3, 1998, Mr. Tompkins announced to the media that he

In July of 1998, Mr. Tompkins approved an additional

In August of 1998, Mr. Tompkins ignored the recommendations of

Mr. Tompkins repeatedly ignored memos from the agency’s legal

As a result of these decisions:

Mr. Tompkins’ initial approval of unbid contracts with Andersen

Mr. Tompkins’ approval of the initial contract with AMS for

Subsequent to these events:

On November 24, 1998, 45 days after Mr. Tompkins left state

On January 25, 1999, 15 weeks after Mr. Tompkins left state

On March 15, 1999, Tompkins Consulting, Ltd. received an

On March 19, 1999, Tompkins Consulting, Ltd. received the first

On October 10, 1999, Andersen awarded Tompkins Consulting,

The following facts uncovered in our investigation give rise to reasonable

Ms. Givens was awarded her first ODJFS consulting contract by

On October 14, 1996, Ms. Givens was contracted by Andersen to

On May 8, 1997, Ms. Givens participated in an Andersen contract

On November 6, 1997, Ms. Givens authored a four-page memo to

We believe Ms. Givens helped facilitate the approval of a lucrative