Sunteți pe pagina 1din 35

A new democratic life for the European Union?

Administrative lawmaking, democratic


legitimacy, and the Lisbon Treaty
O nou 'via democratic' pentru Uniunea European? Reglamentare administrativa,
legitimitate democratic, si Tratatul de la Lisabona
Joshua Louis Miller
Joshua Louis Miller

School of International Service, American University, 4400 Massachusetts Avenue NW,


Washington, DC 20016, USA
Scoala Serviciilor Internationale, Universitatea de Stat al Americii, 4400 Massachusetts
Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20016, USA

A large body of European Union (EU) law EU administrative law is not made by the
EUs democratically elected bodies, the Council of Ministers and the European
Parliament (EP).
O mare parte din legea Uniunii Europene (UE) legea administrative UE nu este
fcut de ctre organele UE alese n mod democratic, Consiliul de Mini tri i
Parlamentul European (PE).
Instead, most administrative laws are made by the unelected European Commission.
That, of itself, does not mean that the EU is insufficiently democratic: most democracies
delegate the power to make administrative laws to unelected regulators.
Ba chiar cele mai multe dintre ele sunt create de persoane nealese de Comisia
European. Acest lucru, insa, nu nseamn c UE nu este suficient de democratic:
majoritatea democraiilor delega puterea de a face legi administrative, autoritatilor de
reglementare nealese.
In those democracies, however, elected legislatures can at least change administrative
laws after they are promulgated.
Si totui, cel puin, in aceste tipologii democratice, legislatiile administrative alese, pot fi
schimbate dup ce acestea au fost promulgate.
This article contends that the EU is different: the Council and EP are effectively unable
to change administrative laws.
Acest articol susine c UE este diferit: Consiliul i PE sunt eficient neimputernicite
pentru modificare legilor administrative.
This article identifies design flaws in the EUs lawmaking processes that are
responsible for this democratic shortcoming.

Articolul identific defecte de proiectare n legislatia UE, care sunt responsabile de


aceasta deficienta democratica.
It then surveys relevant provisions of the new Lisbon Treaty in order to determine
whether Lisbon will remedy that shortcoming: whether it will empower the Council and
EP or citizens directly to change administrative laws.
Ulterior, examineaza normele relevante din noul Tratat de la Lisabona, cu scopul de a
observa dac Lisabona ar reusi sa remedieze aceast deficien : dac aceasta va
permite Consiliului i PE sau chiar direct cet enilor - s schimbe legilatia
administrativa.
For more than two decades, Euroskeptic politicians have denounced the European
Union (EU) as undemocratic.
Pentru mai mult de dou decenii, politicienii eurosceptici au denun at Uniunea
European (UE), ca fiind nedemocratica.
Many academics, albeit with less bombast, have expressed a similar opinion, decrying a
democratic deficit in EU lawmaking (for a summary of academic views, see Wimmel
2009 and Rittberger 2010).
Multe cadre universitare, dei cu mai puina emfaz, i-au exprimat o opinie similar,
care deplnge un 'deficit democratic' n elaborarea legisla iei UE (pentru un rezumat de
opinii academice, vedeti Wimmel 2009 i Rittberger 2010)
Until very recently, however, EU officials had responded to such criticism either
obliquely or else not at all: attacks on the EUs democratic legitimacy were, in Brussels
view, best shrugged off, not to be dignified with a direct reply.
Cu toate acestea, pn nu demult, oficialii UE practic nu au rspuns la astfel de critici:
n opinia Bruxell-ului, atacurile asupra legitimit ii democratice a UE au fost mai mult
ignorate si fara un rspuns direct.
Then in 2004, the defeat of the Constitutional Treaty revealed the dangers of answering
Euroskepticism with reticence.
Apoi, n 2004, esecul Tratatului Constitu ional a dezvluit in totalitate pericolele de a
rspunde euroscepticismului cu reticen.
The French and Dutch no votes persuaded EU officials to adopt a more assertive
communication strategy, and ever since, the EU has been aggressively touting how
democratic it is and responding directly to accusations that it is otherwise (Dinan 2006).
Voturile negative NU al Frantei si Olandei, au convins oficialii UE s adopte o strategie
de comunicare mai ferm, chiar din momentul in care, UE incerca in mod agresiv sa
demonstreze cat este de democratica, rspunzand direct la acuza ii. (Dinan 2006).
Hence the frequent mentions of democracy in the European Commissions White Paper
on a European Communications Policy (Commission of the European Communities

2006, COM (2006) 35; see also Commission of the European Communities 2007, SEC
(2007) 1742; Commission of the European Communities 2008, SEC (2008) 506).
Hence, also, the following comments that were recently spoken to me in Brussels: The
European Union has two sources of legitimacy.
De aici frecventelle menionari despre democraie n Cartea alb a Comisiei Europene
cu privire la Politica European in Comunica ii (Comisia Comunit ilor Europene 2006,
COM (2006) 35; a se vedea, de asemenea, Comisia Comunit ilor Europene 2007,
SEC (2007) 1742; Comisia Comunitilor Europene 2008, SEC (2008) 506).
De aici si succesivele comentarii care mi-au fost spuse de recent la Bruxelles: 'Uniunea
European are dou surse de legitimitate.
One is the member states, with their democratically elected governments who send
their ministers into the Council of Ministers meetings, for instance.
O sursa, de exemplu, sunt statele member, cu guvernele lor alese in mod democratic ce
si-au trimis minsitii la sedinta din Consiliul de Ministri.
And the other source is the fact that European citizens can directly elect the European
Parliament (personal interview, 6 June 2009).
Iar alta sursa este raprezentata de factul ca cetatenii pot sa aleaga in mod direct
Parlamentul Europen (interviu personal, 6 iunie 2009).
These words came from a high-level official at the European Parliament (EP), a civil
servant who works for the EPs Directorate for Citizens Rights and Constitutional
Aceste cuvinte au venit de la un oficial de rang nalt la Parlamentul European (PE), un
funcionar public care lucreaz pentru Direc ia PE pentru drepturile cet enilor i
afacerile constituionale.
His comments put into succinct, quotable form an argument that has become a
cornerstone of EU communications. It is what I call the two sources of legitimacy
argument: the Council and the EP the Unions Legislator, in the terms of the EUs
treaties are democratically elected; therefore, supranational legislative power is
vested in democratically chosen institutions, and thus, the EU, itself, is democratic.
Comentariile sale au pus ntr-o form succint, un argument care a devenit o piatra de
temelie a comunicaiilor UE. Este ceea ce eu numesc argumentul celor 'dou surse de
legitimitate': Consiliul si PE Legislatorii Uniunii, in termenii tratatelor Europene sunt
alesi democratic; prin urmare, puterea lgislativa supranationala este acordata institutiilor
tot asa alese, astfel UE, in sine, este democratica.
So much, apparently, for Euroskeptic rants and academic critiques: the EU is
democratic.
Att de mult, incat se pare c si pentru eurosceptici i criticii academici UE este
democratic.

But how democratic? No state, union, or other political entity is entirely democratic.
Dar cat de democratica? Nici un Stat, Uniune, sau alta entitate politica nu este n
ntregime democratica.
All modern democracies have counter-majoritarian elements to their politics: restricted
franchises, courts that can nullify laws, legislatures with super-majoritarian voting rules,
etc.
Toate democraiile moderne au elemente contra majoritariste in politica lor: francize
restrictionate, instanele care pot anula legile, legislaturile cu regulile de vot super
majoritare etc.
Is, then, the EU democratic enough? This is the actual question that Euroskeptic
politicians and academic critics have been posing.
Este deci, UE suficient de democratic? Aceasta este ntrebarea real pe care
politicienii eurosceptici i criticii academici au ridicato.
After all, even the EUs harshest critics, despite their sometimes bellicose rhetoric,
realize that the Union is not really an authoritarian dictatorship or other type of nondemocracy.
La urma urmei, chiar i cei mai severi critici ai UE, n ciuda elocventei lor, uneori
agresiva, i dau seama c Uniunea nu este ntr-adevr o dictatur autoritar sau orice
alt tip de non-democraie.
Their concern is to what degree the EU is democratic, and the conclusion of the two
sources of legitimacy argument that the EU is a democracy is too obtuse a
response.
Preocuparea lor este de a afla n ce msur UE este democratic, iar concluzia
argumentului celor 'dou surse de legitimitate' - c UE este o democra ie - prea obtuz
ca rspuns.
A more nuanced answer can be found, however, by extending the logic of the two
sources argument.
Cu toate acestea, un raspuns mai expresiv, poate fi gasit prin extinderea logicii din
rationamentul celor doua surse.
The two sources argument implies that democratic legitimacy depends upon
lawmaking power being held by elected officials.
Considerentul celor 'dou surse' implic faptul c legitimitatea democratic depinde de
puterea de legislatie deinuta de funcionarii ale i.
By extension, then, how democratic the EU is should depend upon how much of its
lawmaking power its elected officials hold.

Prin urmare, deci, modul de a fi democratica al UE ar depinde de cantitativul puterii


legislative pe care o detin funcionarii si.
By that measure, the EU seems less democratic than some of its boosters claim. Much
of EU law is not made by its elected bodies.
Prin intermediul acestei msuri, UE pare mai pu in democratic dect unele dintre
componentele sale. O mare parte din legisla ia UE nu este fcut de organele sale
alese.
Those bodies, the Council and the EP, do adopt legislation or basic acts.
Aceste organe, Consiliul i PE, adopt legisla ia si 'actele de baz'.
They do so through the Community method of lawmaking, a legislative process which
is discussed in greater detail below. However, after the Legislator adopts a piece of
legislation, it is implemented by bodies that are not elected: usually by the European
Commission, and occasionally by the various European agencies.
Ei fac acest lucru prin 'metoda comunitar' a procesului de legiferare, un proces
legislativ care este discutat mai n detaliu mai jos. Cu toate acestea, dup ce legislatorul
adopt o lege, ea este pus n aplicare de ctre organele care nu sunt alese: de obicei,
de ctre Comisia European, i, ocazional, de ctre diferitele 'agen ii europene.
These bodies implement the new legislation by drawing up implementing acts, rules
which either declare how legislation should be applied to specific situational contexts or,
more frequently, dictate to member states how they should transpose legislation into
their own national law.
Aceste organe pun n aplicare noua legisla ie, prin elaborarea unor 'acte de
implementare', norme care fie declar modul n care legisla ia ar trebui s fie aplicata
unor contexte situaionale specifice sau, mai frecvent, dicteaza statelor membre modul
n care acestea ar trebui s transpun legea n propria legisla ie na ional.
Acts of these types comprise the EUs administrative law, a voluminous corpus of
guidelines and strictures that are promulgated by regulators, not adopted by legislators.
Acte de acest tip cuprind 'dreptul administrativ' a Uniunii Europene, un corpus
voluminos de orientri i stricturi care sunt promulgate de ctre autorit ile de
reglementare, ce nu au fost adoptate de legislatori.
Thus, lawmaking power in the EU is actually shared between democratically elected
bodies and an unelected executive.
Astfel, puterea de legiferare n Uniunea European este de fapt mpr it ntre organele
alese n mod democratic i un executiv neales.
This alone, however, does not imply that the EU lacks democratic legitimacy. As many
scholars have observed, in most modern democratic states, legislators delegate the
power to make administrative laws to regulatory bodies.

Insa cest singur lucru, nu sugera faptul c UE nu are o legitimitate democratic. Aa


cum muli savanti au observat ca n cele mai multe state democratice moderne,
legislatorii delega puterea de a face legi administrative organelor de reglementare.
Therefore, if what diminishes democratic legitimacy were merely the delegation of
rulemaking to unelected agents, the EU would still be as democratic as rest of the
worlds democracies (Majone 1998, Moravcsik 2002, 2004, Zweifel 2004).
De aceea, n cazul n care s-ar diminua legitimitatea democratic, delegarea de
'elaborare a reglementrilor' se v-ar face doar de agen i neale i, iar UE ar fi n
continuare la fel de democratica ca i restul democra iilor lumii (Majone 1998,
Moravcsik 2002, 2004, Zweifel 2004).
In those other democracies, however, elected legislators retain a key element of
lawmaking power, the power to amend or repeal the laws their regulators have made.
That is, the actors who make their states democratically legitimate can overrule the
actors who make their states functional.
n aceste alte democraii, oricum, legislatorii isi pastreaza un element cheie al puterii de
legiferare, si adica puterea de a modifica sau abroga legile facute de catre autorit ile
lor de reglementare. Astfel, actorii care fac ca statul lor sa aiba o legislatie democratica
pot conduce actorii ce fac ca statele lor sa fie functionale.
In some states, a legislative veto streamlines this process. For example, from 1939 to
1983, the United States Congress could invalidate an administrative law with a simple
majority vote in either of its two houses, and the legislatures of certain US states still
wield versions of the legislative veto and so do the national legislatures of several other
countries (Tompkins 2000, Turk 2000).
n unele state, un 'veto legislativ' simplifica acest proces. De exemplu, 1939-1983,
Congresul Statelor Unite invalidase o lege administrativ la un vot cu majoritate simpl,
n ambele sale case, i legislatiile anumitor state americane nc mnuie versiuni ale
veto-uluiu legislativ, acelasi lucru facandul si legislaturile na ionale ale altor ri
(Tompkins 2000, Turk 2000).
However, even in countries without legislative vetoes, national legislators, following their
states normal, if sometimes cumbersome, legislative due process can always make a
new basic law that changes a present administrative one and it is not so in the EU. In
the EU, as this article will show, administrative law is effectively insulated from review by
the Legislator.
Cu toate acestea, chiar i n rile fr vetourile legislative, legislatorii na ionali, dup
starea lor normal, pot face ntotdeauna o nou lege de baz, care o schimb pe una
actual administrative ceea ce nu se intampla n UE. n Uniunea European, asa cum
acest articol va demonstra, dreptul administrativ este izolat n mod eficient de revizuirilie
legislatorilor.

This means that supranational legislators possess a lesser share of lawmaking power
than their national-level counterparts and that supranational regulators hold a greater
share than the regulators of most democratic states.
Acest lucru nseamn c legislatorii suprana ionali de in o pondere mai mic a puterii de
legiferare dect omologii lor la nivel na ional i c autorit ile de reglementare
supranaionale dein o pondere mai mare dect autorit ile de reglementare a majorit ii
statelor democratice.
This, then, is why administrative lawmaking diminishes the EUs democratic legitimacy:
not because the Council and EP do not make administrative laws, but because they
cannot change the administrative laws made by others.
Acesta, deci, este motivul din care diminueaz legitimitatea procesului de legiferare
administrativ democratic a UE: si nu din cauza faptului ca Consiliul i PE nu fac legi
administrative, ci pentru c nu se pot schimba legile administrative fcute de al ii.
The first part of this article discusses all of this in greater detail. This article begins by
reviewing the three main processes through which the Legislator can exercise its
lawmaking power.
Prima parte a articolului discut mai n detaliu despre toate acestea. Articolul ncepe
prin revizuirea celor trei procese principale prin care legislatorul poate exercita puterea
de legiferare.
It observes certain design flaws in those processes which preclude their use as
mechanisms for changing administrative laws. Thus, the first part of this article identifies
the democratic shortcoming previewed above that the EUs elected bodies cannot
effectively amend or repeal administrative laws and thereby concludes that the EU
falls short on the two sources measure of democratic legitimacy.
El observ anumite 'defecte de proiectare' n acele procese care exclud utilizarea lor ca
mecanisme de schimbare a legilor administrative. Astfel, prima parte identific
neajunsurile democratice previzualizate mai sus - faptul c organele alese ale UE nu
pot modifica sau s abroge n mod eficient legile administrative - i, prin urmare, ajunge
la concluzia c UE nu atinge asteptarile, pe msura celor 'dou surse' de legitimitate
democratic.
That said, the article is agnostic as ton whether other aspects of EU governance might,
in effect, compensate for its Legislators deficiency of lawmaking power. For example,
soft lawmaking processes such as the open method of coordination have expanded
the role of national governments in supranational lawmaking has, then, soft
lawmaking made the EU more democratic, balancing out the legitimacy-diminishing
effects of the Legislators impotence?
Acestea fiind spuse, articolul este agnostic fata de alte aspecte ale guvernan ei UE care
ar putea compensa deficienta puterii de reglamentare a Legislatorilor. De exemplu,
procesele de legiferare 'soft', cum ar fi metoda deschis de coordonare au extins rolul
guvernelor naionale n reglamentarea suprana ionala - are, deci, legiferarea soft

capacitatea de a face UE mai democratic, balansnd efectele de diminuare a


legitimitii incapabilitatii legislatorului?
I leave this question for future research: the contribution of soft lawmaking to the EUs
democratic legitimacy is beyond the scope of this article, which focuses on hard law
exclusively and on administrative law particularly (on soft law and the Lisbon Treaty, see
Telo 2009).
V las aceast ntrebare pentru viitoarea cercetare: contribu ia legiferarii soft la
legitimitatea democratic a UE este dincolo de domeniul de aplicare al acestui articol,
care se concentreaz exclusiv pe legea 'hard' i pe dreptul administrativ deosebit (on
soft law and the Lisbon Treaty, see Telo 2009).
Similarly, this article does not explore whether the EU makes up for what is,
fundamentally, a failing in who governs, by governing itself well. It might well do so if, as
certain scholars have argued, democratic legitimacy actually has two parts: inputoriented legitimacy, or important decisions being made by elected officials, and outputoriented legitimacy, the production of useful goods and policies such as free markets,
uniform health and safety standards, and a common currency.
n mod analog, acest articol nu examineaza dac UE face ceva pentru ceea ce este, n
mod fundamental, o lips prin care guvernarea este n sine buna.
S-ar putea face insa si acest lucru. Aa cum anumi i oameni de tiin sustin,
legitimitatea democratic are de fapt dou pr i: 'Legitimitatea orientat spre intrare',
sau decizii importante fcute de oficiali ale i, i 'legitimitatea orientat spre ie ire',
producia de bunuri i politici, cum ar fi pie ele libere, standarde uniforme de sntate i
siguran, precum i o moned comun. (Scharpf 1999, vedeti deasemenea Lord and
Magnette 2004).
Does the Legislators inability to change administrative laws undermine the EUs
democratic legitimacy if that failing yields, say, a more stable regulatory regime, which,
in turn, encourages long-term economic investment and thus greater prosperity?
Oare incapacitatea legislatorului de a schimba legile administrative, sa submineze
legitimitatea democratic a UE n cazul randamentelor scazute, afirmand, un regim de
reglementare mai stabil, care, la rndul su, sa ncurajeza investi iile economice pe
termen lung i, prin urmare sa duca la o mai mare prosperitate?
That is, is damage done to the EUs input-oriented legitimacy compensated for by gains
to its output-oriented legitimacy? I must also leave questions such as these for future
consideration. In order to engage the two sources of legitimacy argument on its own
terms, this article employs that arguments own notion of democratic legitimacy, which is
solely input oriented.
Sunt oare daunele facute legitimitatii orientate spre intrare al UE compensate prin
ctigurile legitimitii sale orientate spre ieire? Trebuie s las, asemenea ntrebri,
pentru o viitoare examinare al acestora. Pentru a angaja argumentul celor 'dou surse

de legitimitate', in baza propriilor termeni, acest articol foloseste notiunea de legitimitate


democratic, care este orientata exclusiv spre intrare.
In short, then, the first part of this article identifies a democratic shortcoming in EU
governance and some of that shortcomings causes. The second part of this article
explores whether the shortcoming is likely to be remedied by the new Lisbon Treaty,
which will be discussed below in much greater detail.
Pe scurt, deci, prima parte a acestui articol identific o lacun democratic n
guvernana UE i unele dintre cauzele ale neajunsurilor ei. Cea de a doua parte a
acestui articol exploreaz dac neajunsurile pot s fie remediate de noul Tratat de la
Lisabona, care va fi discutat mai jos n detaliu mult mai mare.
Thus, this article joins an emerging literature, a hybrid of political science, public law,
and democratic theory, which is debating whether or not Lisbon will make the EU more
democratic (e.g. Devuyst 2008, Sieberson 2008, Cuesta 2010, see also Smismans
2004 on the Constitutional Treaty), but which is yet to address the particular problem of
the Legislators inability to review administrative laws.
Astfel, acest articol se altur unei literature n curs de dezvoltare, un hibrid de tiin e
politice, drepturi publice i teoria democratic, care se dezbate dac Lisabona va face
sau nu UE mai democratic (e.g. Devuyst 2008, Sieberson 2008, Cuesta 2010, see
also Smismans 2004 on the Constitutional Treaty), dar care abordeazea nc si
particulara problema a incapacitii legislatorului de a revizui legile administrative.
Lisbon promises, in its own words, a revitalized democratic life for the EU. This article
contends that the treaty will not fully deliver on that promise, at least if democratic life
means, in part, that the power to change administrative laws is vested in the EUs
democratic bodies or directly in EU citizens, themselves, through referenda,
deliberative fora, legislative petitions, and the various other tools of direct democracy.
Lisabona promite, n propriile sale cuvinte, o 'via democratic' revitalizat pentru UE.
Acest articol susine insa c tratatul nu va mentine pe deplin pe aceast promisiune, cel
puin n cazul n care 'viaa democratic' nseamn, n parte, c puterea de a schimba
legile administrative este imputernicita organelor democratice ale UE - sau direct
cetenilor ai UE nsusi, prin referendumuri, forumuri deliberative, peti ii legislative,
precum i diverse alte instrumente ale democra iei directe.
This article reaches this conclusion by surveying selected provisions of the Lisbon
Treaty, provisions that various proponents of the treaty have said, in both public
comments and private conversations with me, are those most likely to make the EU
more democratic.
Articolul ajunge la aceast concluzie prin studiul preveziunilor selectate de Tratatul de la
Lisabona, preveziuni spuse c diferiti susintori ai tratatului, atat in comentarii publice
cat i conversaii private cu mine, acestea fiind cele mai apropiate de a face UE mai
democratic.

This article finds that those provisions are unlikely to provide many new opportunities for
the Council, EP, or EU citizens to amend or repeal administrative laws. Even under
Lisbon, they will not hold that key element of lawmaking power.
Articol constat c aceste dispoziii puin probabil vor oferi mai multe oportunit i noi
pentru Consiliu, PE sau ceteni UE pentru a modifica sau abroga legile administrative.
Chiar i n Lisabona, acestea nu vor avea acel element cheie al puterii de legiferare.
Obstacles to changing administrative laws
Obstacole in modificarea legelor administrative
Over the past 50 years, a succession of treaty reforms, legislative acts, informal
agreements, and administrative decisions have repeatedly created, scrapped, and
amended the processes through which the EUs elected bodies exercise their
lawmaking power.
De-a lungul ultimilor 50 de ani, o succesiune de reforme ale tratatului, acte legislative,
acorduri informale, precum i decizii administrative au creat n mod repetat, scoas din
uz, i modificat procesele prin care organele alese ale UE i exercit puterea de
legiferare.
Today, those bodies enjoy three main processes. One among them is the Community
method, which I have briefly mentioned above.
Astzi, aceste organe se bucur de trei procese principale. Una dintre ele este metoda
comunitar, pe care am menionato pe scurt mai sus.
Under the Community method, the Commission proposes legislation only it enjoys this
right of initiative which then becomes law if each of the Council and the EP adopt the
Commissions proposal through a majority, or sometimes supermajority, vote; each body
may also reject the proposed legislation or amend it and then vote to adopt or reject it.
n conformitate cu metoda comunitar, Comisia propune legisla ia si doar ea se
bucur de acest 'drept de iniiativ' - care, atunci cand devine lege, dac fiecare dintre
Consiliu i PE adopta propunerea Comisiei printr-un vot de majoranta, sau, uneori,
supermajoranta; fiecare organ poate respinge, de asemenea, legisla ia propus sau s
o modifice i apoi s voteze cu scopul de a o adopta sau respinge.
Of course, this description is a simplification; below, when discussing Lisbons changes
to the Community method, I will briefly explain some of its more complex facets.
Simplification, though, helps illuminate how closely the Community method resembles
the legislative processes of most democratic nation-states.
Desigur, aceast descriere este o simplificare; mai jos, atunci cnd se vor discuta
schimbrile la metoda comunitar de la Lisabona, voi explica pe scurt cteva dintre
aspectele sale mai complexe. Simplificare, de i, ajut la iluminarea a ct de strns
metoda comunitar seamn cu procesele legislative ale majorit ii democratice
statelor-naiune.

Both are processes through which elected officials make new laws. The Community
method, however, is a far less useful tool for changing administrative laws than is a
parliamentary or Congressional vote for changing national regulations.
Ambele sunt procese prin care funcionarii ale i fac noi legi. Metoda comunitar, cu
toate acestea, este un instrument cu mult mai pu in util pentru schimbarea legilor
administrative dect este votul parlamentar sau al Congresului, pentru modificarea
reglementrilor naionale.
Its failing is a design flaw that is alien to most democratic states: the Commissions
monopoly over the right of initiative. Even if huge supermajorities of the Council and the
EP were to favor changing an administrative law, they cannot change it via a new basic
act unless the Commission proposes such legislation, and the Commission is unlikely to
do that.
In caz contrar acesta este un defect de proiectare de cele mai multe ori strin statelor
democratice: monopolul Comisiei asupra dreptului de ini iativ. Chiar dac
supermajoritatile uriase ale Consiliului i PE au vrut sa favorizeze schimbarea unei legi
administrative, ele nu o pot schimba printr-un nou act de baz, cu excep ia cazului n
care Comisia propune o astfel de legisla ie, iar Comisia este pu in probabil s fac
acest lucru.
If the Commission believes that the law should be changed, it will simply change the law
on its own, issuing a new administrative law that supersedes the current one. Then, the
Legislator would get what it wants, but only fortuitously, and without exercising its
lawmaking power.
n cazul n care Comisia consider c legea ar trebui schimbat, o va faceo de la sine,
emitand o nou lege administrativ care o va nlocuie te pe cea curent. Atunci,
legislatorul ar obine ceea ce doreste, dar numai n mod fortuit, i fr exercitarea puterii
sale de legiferare.
If, however, the Commission believes that the law should not be changed, then,
obviously, it will not initiate a basic act that rewrites it. Note that this scenario does not
assume that the Commission is cynically ignoring the public good in order to defend
some perverse self-interest.
Cu toate acestea, in cazul n care, Comisia consider c legea nu ar trebui s fie
modificata, atunci, n mod evident, nu se va ini ia un act de baz pe care sa-l rescrie.
De notat c acest scenariu nu presupune ca Comisia sa ignore cu cinism binele public,
n scopul de a-i auto-apra unele interese proprii.
Rather, the Commission and the Legislator genuinely disagree on what the public good
is: the former believes that the public good is retaining the administrative law as is and
the latter believes that the public good is amendment or repeal.
Dimpotriv, Comisia i legislatorul nu sunt cu adevrat de acord asupra a ceea ce este
binele public: primul consider c bunul public este re inerea dreptului administrativ a a

cum este iar ultimul consider c bunul public este reprezentat de modificare sau
abrogare.
In such disputes, the Commission will win the day, as the Legislator is paralyzed so long
as the Commission refuses to act.
n astfel de dispute, Comisia va ctiga, deoarece legislatorul este paralizat, att timp
ct Comisia refuz s acioneze.
The same reason also precludes the Council and EP from using comitology to change
administrative laws. Comitology, the second major process through which the Legislator
exercises its power, is, so to speak, the due process of rulemaking.
Acelai motiv, de asemenea, exclude, Consiliul i PE de la utilizarea 'comitologiei'
pentru a schimba legile administrative. Comitologie, al doilea proces major prin care
legislatorul i exercit puterea, este, ca s spunem a a, procesul datora de
reglementarii.
After the Council and EP have adopted legislation, committees of civil servants draft
what they see as appropriate implementing acts. Commission officials chair these
committees, but representatives from the Council and the EP sit on them and offer
oversight.
Dup ce Consiliul i Parlamentul European au adoptat legi, comitetele de func ionari
publici proiecteaza ceea ce ei vd ca acte de punere n aplicare, dup caz. Comisia
prezideaz aceste comitete, dar reprezentan ii Consiliului i PE examineaza si oferta de
supraveghere.
The acts these committees draft are then promulgated as administrative laws. Of
course, this description greatly simplifies what is a very complex, and still rather
opaque, body of procedures and one that has been repeatedly changed by a
succession of legislative acts and decisions.
Actele proiectate de aceste comitete sunt apoi promulgate legi administrative. Desigur,
aceast descriere simplific foarte mult ceea ce este un foarte complex, i nc destul
de opac, corp de proceduri care a fost modificat n mod repetat printr-o succesiune de
acte legislative i decizii.
However, a more detailed description is unnecessary here because
this article is that the Commission, not the Council or the EP,
committees. Therefore, a Commission representative is the one
committees agenda and thereby determines, in effect, which laws
write or rewrite.

what is relevant to
chairs comitology
who sets a given
the committee will

Cu toate acestea, o descriere mai detaliat este inutil aici, pentru c ceea ce este
relevant pentru acest articol este faptul c Comisia, si nu Consiliul sau PE, prezideaz
comitetele de comitologie. Prin urmare, un reprezentant al Comisiei este cel care
stabilete ordinea de zi a anumitor comitete i determin, ce legi n vigoare comisia va
scrie sau rescrie.

That is, agenda-setting power belongs to the Commission (Larsson and Trondal 2006,
Blom-Hansen 2008), and if the Commission-appointed chair does not want to alter a
law, then the Legislators representatives can do no more than beg, pressure, persuade,
and bargain for a new agenda to be set.
Aceasta, 'putere' aparine Comisiei (Larsson i Trondal 2006, Blom-Hansen 2008), iar n
cazul n care preedintele Comisiei-numit nu vrea s modifice o lege, atunci
reprezentanii legislatorului nu pot face mai mult dect s ceara, sa puna presiune,
convinga, i negocieze pentru o nou agend care urmeaz s fie stabilit.
Such pleading, however, is rarely effective: though some scholars might disagree, a
growing body of empirical studies have found that committee chairs use their agendasetting power very effectively to ensure that comitology outcomes are very close to what
the Commission would decide without comitology (Weiler 2000, p. 277, Ballman et al.
2002, and, again, Blom-Hansen 2008).
Cu toate acestea, o astfel de pledoarie, este rareori eficient: de i unii cercettori nu
sunt de acord, un organ in crestera a studiilor empirice a constatat c oficialii comisiei
folosesc puterea de stabilire a agendei foarte eficient pentru a se asigura c rezultatele
sunt foarte aproape de ceea ce Comisia ar decide fr comitologie (Weiler 2000, p.
277, Ballman i colab., 2002, i din nou, Blom-Hansen, 2008).
Thus, the beginning of this article was not being disingenuous in describing the
promulgation of new administrative laws as a responsibility of the Commission: the
Council and EP actually exercise very little power through the comitology process.
Astfel, nceputul acestui articol nu a fost a fost lipsit de sinceritate in descrierea
promulgarii unor noi legi administrative ca o responsabilitate a Comisiei: Consiliul i PE
de fapt, exercita foarte puin putere prin procesul de comitologie.
Treaty reform is the third main process through which elected officials can make law.
Changes to the EUs treaties are proposed and adopted by the Council or, more
accurately, the European Council, the member state governments whose ministers
comprise the Council of Ministers at an intergovernmental conference (IGC).
Reforma tratatului este al treilea proces principal prin care au fost alesi func ionarii care
pot face legea. Modificrile aduse tratatelor UE sunt propuse i adoptate de Consiliu sau, mai precis, Consiliul European, guvernele statelor membre ale cror mini tri
cuprind Consiliul de Minitri - la conferina interguvernamental (CIG).
Neither the EP nor the Commission has a formal role in an IGC. They may, as some
scholars have argued, have some informal influence, which they exercise through
behind-the-scenes negotiations with the Council (Christiansen and Jorgensen 1998,
Sverdrup 2001, Falkner 2002).
Nici PE, nici Comisia nu are un rol formal ntr-o CIG. Ele, a a cum unii oameni de tiin
au susinut, au o oarecare influen informal, pe care o exercit prin intermediul
negocierilor din spatele scenei cu Consiliul (Christiansen i Jorgensen 1998, Sverdrup
2001, Falkner 2002).

Even so, their roles are basically consultative. Thus, the Council, not the Commission, is
the IGC agenda-setter, which means that the Commission cannot prevent the Council
from proposing an amendment that would change an administrative law unlike how,
under the Community method and comitology, it can prevent the initiation of a basic act
or the promulgation of an implementing one.
Chiar i aa, rolurile lor sunt, n principiu consultative. Astfel, Consiliul, nu Comisia, este
programatorul ordinii de zi la CIG, ceea ce nseamn c Comisia nu poate s mpiedice
Consiliul s propun un amendament care ar schimba o lege administrativ - spre
deosebire de modul n care, n conformitate cu metoda i comitologie comunitar,
aceasta poate preveni iniierea unui act de baz si promulgarea sau punerea n aplicare
a unei legi.
The Commission could, however, effectively hinder such an amendments adoption.
Adopting treaty amendments requires member states unanimous consent in two forms:
a consensus vote at the IGC and ratification of the IGCs decision by every member
state, through whatever ratification processes their national laws prescribe.
Comisia ar putea, totui, s mpiedice n mod eficient o astfel de adoptare a unui
amendament. Adoptarea de modificri ale tratatului necesit acordul unanim al statelor
membre n dou forme: un vot consensual n cadrul CIG i ratificarea deciziei CIG de
ctre fiecare stat membru, prin orice proces de ratificare prescrisa de legisla iile lor
naionale.
That means 27 diverse veto players must reach agreement twice (on veto player
theory and the EU, see Tsebelis 2002, especially pp. 248282). This is a uniquely high
threshold in most nation-states, constitutional change does not require unanimous
concurrence and meeting it would be even more difficult were the Commission to
oppose the amendment.
Asta nseamn c 27 diversi 'juctori veto' trebuie s ajung la un acord de dou ori (pe
teoria juctorului veto i UE, a se vedea Tsebelis 2002, n special pp. 248-282). Acesta
este un prag unic de mare - n cele mai multe state-na iune, schimbarea constitu ional
nu necesit acordul unanim - i ntrunirea Comisiei de a se opune modificrii.ar fi i mai
dificil.
In such a case, the Commission could offer a buffet of incentives to one member state
in order to strip its vote away from the other 26 member states. That is, the Commission
could determine whichever states payoff for cooperation with the others is lowest and
then create a payoff for defection that is greater.
ntr-un astfel de caz, Comisia ar putea oferi un pumn de motivatii unui stat membru, n
scopul de a jupui votul su, departe de celelalte 26 de state membre. Astfel, Comisia ar
putea s determine care este 'plata pentru cooperare' a statului cu ceilal i care este mai
mica i apoi sa creeze o 'plata pentru dezertarea', care este mai mare.

The Commission is not unskilled in this type of politicking. It has already employed the
tactic on several occasions, preventing member state agreement by promising to
increase a would-be defectors cohesion funding (EU funds intended to reduce regional
income disparities) (Marks 1996). Similarly, the Commission could threaten to lower a
states payoff for cooperation.
Comisia nu este necalificat n acest tip de politicianism. Ea deja a angajat tactica n
mai multe ocazii, mpiedicnd acordul statului membru promitand sa suplimenteze
fondurile de coeziune al dezertorului (fondurile UE destinate s reduc disparit ile
regionale de venit) (Marks 1996). n mod similar, Comisia ar putea amenin a s reduc
'plata de cooperare' a unui stat.
The Commission could, for example, hint at future funding cuts or at mobilizing
domestic interest groups against the states government should it vote for the
amendment. Such carrots and sticks would likely preclude any IGC decision that the
Commission opposes, unless every member state is so strongly in favor of the decision
that even the least supportive state is unmoved by Commission inducements (Schmidt
2000, Boyle 2006).
Comisia ar putea, de exemplu, sa sugereze viitoarele reduceri de finan are sau la
mobilizarea grupurilor de interese interne mpotriva guvernului statului care ar trebui s
voteze pentru modificare. Astfel de metoda al biciului si biscuitului probabil ar
mpiedica ca orice decizie din CIG la care se opune Comisia, cu excep ia cazului n
care fiecare stat membru este puternic favoareizant al deciziei pe care chiar i statul cel
mai puin susinator este neimpresionat de convingerile Comisiei (Schmidt 2000, Boyle
2006).
Thus, treaty reform is an ineffective vehicle for changing administrative laws. Even
without formal agenda-setting power, the Commission could defend the laws it has
promulgated.
Astfel, reforma tratatului este un vehicul ineficient pentru schimbarea legilor
administrative. Chiar i fr putere formal de stabilire a agendei, Comisia ar putea
apra legile care le-a promulgat.
Dead ends
Fundaturile
In summary, the EUs democratic bodies are able to exercise their lawmaking power
through three main processes: the Community method, comitology, and treaty reform.
None of these processes, however, enables the Legislator to change administrative
laws, at least not without the endorsement of the Commission.
Pe scurt, organismele democratice ale UE sunt capabile s- i exercite puterea de
legiferare prin intermediul a trei procese principale: metoda comunitar, comitologie i
reforma tratatului. Cu toate acestea, nici una dintre aceste procese, nu permite
legislatorul s schimbe legile administrative, cel pu in nu fr aprobarea Comisiei.

Therefore, the EUs elected bodies lack a key element of lawmaking power: they, the
actors who make the Union legitimate, cannot overrule the EUs regulators, the actors
who make it functional.
Prin urmare, organele alese ale UE nu au un element-cheie al puterii de legiferare: ei,
actorii care fac legitimitatea Uniunii, nu pot trece peste autorit ile de reglementare ale
UE, actorii care fac ca aceasta sa funcioneze.
This design flaw distinguishes the EU from most modern democracies and means that
the EU, according to the two sources of legitimacy argument, is less democratic than
what some of its most enthusiastic acolytes have claimed. That said, the strident claims
made by some of the EUs critics are also exaggerated.
Acest defect de proiectare distinge UE de cele mai multe democra ii moderne i
nseamn c UE, n conformitate cu argumentul celor 'dou surse de legitimitate', este
mai puin democratic dect unii dintre acoli ii si cei mai entuzia ti. Acestea fiind
spuse, preteniile stridente fcute de unii dintre criticii UE sunt de asemenea exagerate.
Dutch MP Harry van Bommel (2008) greatly overstated what this article has observed
when he claimed that there is no European democracy; if anything there is only
European bureaucracy. The elected Legislator wields much of the Unions lawmaking
power; unquestionably, the EU is largely democratic. It is just imperfectly so and
perhaps not as democratic as it should be.
PM olandez Harry van Bommel (2008), ceea ce a observat acest articol n mare msur
exagerat, este, atunci cnd el a afirmat c 'nu exist nici o democra ie european;
dac ceva exist aceaste este dect birocraia european'.
This, in fact, is what the European Council said, albeit more eloquently, in 2001s
Laeken declaration. That communique proclaimed that the need for more democracy
in the EU and called for a Convention on the Future of Europe which would be tasked
with delivering it.
Acest lucru, de fapt, este ceea ce a spus Consiliul European, de i mai elocvent, n
declaraia de la Laeken din 2001. Aceasta a declarat nevoia de' mai mult democra ie
'n UE i a solicitat o Convenie privind viitorul Europei, care va avea sarcina de a
realiza acest lucru.
Convention met one year later and responded to its mandate by writing the EUs
Constitutional Treaty. As mentioned at the beginning of this article, the Constitution was
voted down in 2004 by French and Dutch voters.
Convenie ntlnita un an mai trziu care a i rspuns la mandatul su scriind Tratatul
Constituional al UE. Dup cum am menionat la nceputul acestui articol, Constitu ia a
fost votat n 2004 de ctre alegtorii francezi i olandezi.
Three years later, though, an ad hoc group of high-level EU officials (the Action
Committee for European Democracy or Amato Group) repackaged much of the
Constitutions content into a slimmer, less grandiloquent text. This new treaty, which is

actually a bundle of amendments to the EUs previous treaties, was considered,


amended, and adopted by the European Council as the Lisbon Treaty (also called the
Reform Treaty).
Trei ani mai trziu, ns, un grup ad-hoc de func ionari la nivel nalt in UE (Comitetul de
aciune pentru Democraie european sau 'Grupul Amato') a reasambalat o mare parte
din coninutul Constituiei ntr-un text mai suplu si mai pu in grandilocvent. Acest nou
tratat, care este de fapt un pachet de amendamente la tratatele anterioare ale UE, a
fost considerat, modificat, i adoptat de Consiliul European ca Tratatul de la Lisabona
(denumit, de asemenea, Tratatul de reform).
Then, all 27 member states ratified it although Ireland first voted down Lisbon, but
then voted for it in a second referendum. The Lisbon Treaty, which finally came into
force in December 2009, promises to revitalize the democratic life of the Union.
Apoi, toate cele 27 de state membre l-au ratificat - cu toate c Irlanda a votat prima data
contra Lisabonei, dar apoi pentru, ntr-un al doilea referendum. Tratatul de la Lisabona,
care a intrat n cele din urm n vigoare n decembrie 2009, promite s revitalizeze
'viaa democratic a Uniunii'.
That is, the treaty recognizes that the EU has not been as democratic as it should be,
and it offers itself as a remedy. How effective a remedy the treaty will be is the subject of
the remainder of this article. Below, I review seven treaty provisions that, proponents of
Lisbon have argued, are especially likely to make the EU more democratic.
Aceasta este, care tratatul recunoate c UE nu este destul de democratic cum ar
trebui s fie, i ea se ofer ca un remediu. Ct de eficient este un remediu din tratat va
fi obiectul de discutie a continuarii prezentului articol. Mai jos, am revizui apte
prevederi ale tratatului care, susintorii Lisabonei au sprijinit, si care sunt n special
susceptibile de a face UE mai democratic.
The results of my survey are discouraging, at least if a revitalized democratic life
means an EU without the democratic shortcoming observed above: in those provisions,
I find few new opportunities for the Council and the EP or for EU citizens, directly to
change administrative laws (though the provisions I examine might well increase the
EUs democratic legitimacy in other ways, which, again, are beyond the scope of this
article).
Rezultatele sondajului meu descurajeaz, cel pu in n cazul n care o 'via democratic'
revitalizat nseamn o Uniune European fr neajunsul democratic observat mai sus:
n aceste dispoziii, am gsit cteva noi oportunit i pentru Consiliu i PE - sau pentru
cetenii UE, n mod direct - s schimbe legile administrative (De i dispozi iile
examinate de mine ar putea crete i legitimitatea democratic a UE n alte moduri,
care, din nou, sunt dincolo de domeniul de aplicare al acestui articol).

European citizens initiative


Iniiativa cetenilor europeni
Lisbon has created a new lawmaking process, the European citizens initiative (ECI).
Under this process, one million EU citizens from more than one member state may
petition the Commission, asking it to propose new legislation. Then, following the due
process of the Community method, that legislation can be adopted, amended, or
rejected by the Council and the EP (Article 11, treaty on the EU (TEU); Article 24, treaty
on the functioning of the EU (TFEU).
Lisabona a creat un nou proces de legiferare, ini iativa numit cet enilor europeni (ICE).
n cadrul acestui proces, un milion de cet eni ai UE din mai multe state membre pot
cere o petitie Comisiei, solicitndo s propun o nou legisla ie. Apoi, datorit
procesului al metodei comunitare, aceast legisla ie poate fi, adoptata, modificat, sau
respins de ctre Consiliu i PE (articolul 11, Tratatul privind Uniunea European
(TUE), articolul 24, Tratatul privind funcionarea Uniunii Europene ( TFUE).
The new legislation could be a basic law that changes a present administrative one.
Could, therefore, the ECI facilitate changes to administrative laws which the Legislator
favors, but which the Commission might otherwise block by declining to exercise its
right of initiative? This is not likely, because the ECI does not actually break the
Commissions monopoly over that right.
Noua legislaie ar putea fi o lege de baz care schimb una administrativ deja
prezent. Ar putea, prin urmare, ICE faca modificri la legile administrative pe care
legislatorul le favorizeaz, dar pe care Comisia lear putea de altfel bloca prin refuzul de
a-i exercita dreptul de iniiativ? Acest lucru nu este probabil, deoarece ICE nu rupe
efectiv monopolul Comisiei asupra acestui drept.
The ECI grants less power to citizens than do most other initiative processes, such as
those found in Switzerland, in several EU member countries, and in many US states.
These initiatives allow citizens to circumvent their political bodies entirely by proposing
new laws by themselves (and also, by themselves, adopting the proposed laws through
referenda). Lisbon, however, empowers citizens merely to take the initiative of inviting
the Commission to act.
ICE acord mai puin putere cetenilor dect fac majoritatea celorlalte procese de
iniiativ, cum ar fi cele gsite n Elveia, n diferite ri membre ale UE, i n multe state
din SUA. Aceste iniiative permit cetenilor s ocoleasc organele lor politice n
ntregime prin propunerea de a sine de noi legi ( i, de asemenea, de la sine, adoptarea
legilor propuse prin referendumuri). Lisabona, cu toate acestea, ofer cet enilor doar
s 'ia iniiativa de a invita' Comisia s acioneze.

That invitation might be declined outright, with the Commission giving due consideration
to the petitioners request, but deciding against it. It might also be responded to
obliquely, with a legislative proposal that addresses the petitioners concerns in ways
the petitioners see as cursory or insufficient (Auer 2005, pp. 8384). Thus, the ECI
cannot be used to change administrative laws that the Commission wants to retain as
is. Only a version of the ECI that allows citizens to bypass the Commission altogether,
and to propose legislation directly, could facilitate as much (e.g. Papadopoulos 2005).
Aceast invitaie poate fi refuzat direct, in ca daca Comisia acordnd aten ia cuvenit
solicitarii petiiei decide mpotriva ei. S-ar putea intampla, de asemenea, aparitia
rspuns oblic, cu o propunere legislativ care s abordeze preocuprile peti ionarilor pe
care acestea o vd ca fiind insuficienta sau fugar (Auer 2005, pp. 83-84). Astfel, ICE
nu poate fi utilizat pentru a schimba legile administrative pe care Comisia dore te s le
pstreze ca atare. Numai o versiune a ICE care permite cet enilor s ocoleasc
Comisia cu totul, i s propun n mod direct legisla ie, ar putea intadevar facilita acest
lucru (e.g. Papadopoulus 2005).
Subsidiarity
Subsidiaritate
Ever since the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), EU lawmaking has been
constrained by the principle of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity prohibits the making of EU laws
in order to achieve objectives which local, regional, or national laws could achieve more
effectively (Article 5, TEU). The Lisbon Treaty retains this principle and also institutes a
new procedure for its enforcement. After the Commission initiates a basic act, a third
(or, in some cases, a quarter) of national parliaments may formally register complaints
that the proposed legislation will violate subsidiarity. This objection is nicknamed a
yellow card.
nc de la adoptarea Tratatului de la Maastricht (1992), elaborarea legisla iei UE a fost
constrns de principiul subsidiaritii. Subsidiaritatea interzice realizarea legisla iei UE,
n vederea atingerii obiectivelor pe care legile locale, regionale sau na ionale lear putea
realiza mai eficient (articolul 5 din Tratatul UE). Tratatul de la Lisabona pstreaz acest
principiu i, de asemenea, instituie o nou procedur pentru aplicarea lui. Dup ce
Comisia iniiaz un act de baz, o treime (sau, n unele cazuri, un sfert) din
parlamentele naionale pot s nregistreze n mod oficial plngeri daca legisla ia
propus va nclca subsidiaritatea. Aceast obiec ie este numita 'cartona ul galben'.
The Commission must respond to a yellow card by reviewing the proposal, and then
withdrawing, amending, or sticking with the proposal, as is. Should, however, the
Commission choose the third option, then a full majority of national parliaments may
register a second objection. The second objection, nicknamed the orange card, refers
the proposal to the Council and the EP. Each body then votes on whether the proposed
legislation violates subsidiarity, and a majority affirmative vote from either immediately
terminates the proposal (Article 7, Protocol on the Application of the Principles of
Subsidiarity and Proportionality).

Comisia trebuie s rspund la un cartona ul galben, prin revizuirea propunerii, i apoi


retragerea, modificarea sau adaugarea propunerei, a a cum este. Cu toate acestea, in
cazul n care, Comisia alege a treia op iune, apoi majoritatea complet a parlamentelor
naionale pot propune o a doua obiec ie. A doua obiec ie, supranumita 'cartona ul
portocaliu', se refer la propunerea Consiliului i PE. Apoi fiecare organ voteaz dac
legislaia propus ncalc subsidiaritatea, iar un vot cu majoritate afirmativ imediat va
anula propunerea (articolul 7, Protocolul privind aplicarea principiilor subsidiarit ii i
proporionalitatii).
Many proponents of Lisbon have hailed the yellow and orange cards as a strong new
check on the Commissions lawmaking powers. Yet, the Commission can ignore a
yellow card: it can simply choose not to amend its legislative proposal. And orange
cards, though less impotent, are largely superfluous: the Council, being a representative
of national interests, is likely to vote down subsidiarity-violating proposals during the
normal Community method process, even without a formal objection by national
parliaments.
Multi dintre sustinatorii tratatului de la Lisabona au apreciat cr ile galben i portocaliu
ca un control puternic nou asupra competen elor de legiferare ale Comisiei. Cu toate
acestea, Comisia poate ignora un cartona galben: ea poate alege pur i simplu s nu
modifice propunerea legislativ. Iar cartonasele portocalii, de i mai greu, sunt n mare
msur de prisos: Consiliul, fiind un reprezentant al intereselor na ionale, este capabil
s voteze contra propunerilor care ncalca subsidiaritatea n timpul procesului normal
din metoda comunitar, chiar i fr o obiec ie formal din partea parlamentelor
naionale.
Furthermore, even if the cards do have some effect on the Commissions design of new
legislation, they cannot compel the Commission to change laws that are already in
effect. Their impact is ex ante, not ex post. Also, their impact is on legislation, not on
administrative laws. The cards impede the adoption of basic acts, not the promulgation
of implementing ones. In summary, then, Lisbons new provisions on subsidiarity are
largely toothless and very limited in scope: yellow cards can be ignored; orange ones
are redundant, and the impact of both is entirely ex ante and on legislation only, not ex
post and on administrative laws.
Mai mult dect att, chiar i n cazul n care cr ile nu au un anumit efect asupra
proiectului Comisiei de creare a unei noi legisla ii, acestea nu pot obliga Comisia s
schimbe legi care sunt deja n vigoare. Impactul lor este ex ante, nu ex post. De
asemenea, impactul lor este asupra legisla iei, si nu asupra legilor administrative.
Cartonasele mpiedic adoptarea actelor de baz, si nu promulgarea celor de punere n
aplicare. Pe scurt, apoi, noile dispozi ii din Tratatul de la Lisabona privind subsidiaritatea
sunt n mare msur stirbe i foarte limitate n domeniu: cartona ele galbene pot fi
ignorate; portocaliile suntinutile, iar impactul ambelor este n ntregime ex ante, i doar
asupra legislaiei.

Civil society
Societate civila
Lisbon requires EU officials to carry out broad consultations with representatives of civil
society (Article 11, TEU). These include labor unions, business federations, religious
institutions, and NGOs, as well as the European Economic and Social Committee. The
latter organ, which was established by the Treaty of Rome (1958), is an advisory body
to other EU institutions and comprises civil society leaders from every member state.
Both in Europe and elsewhere, by relaying their concerns through groups such as
these, citizens have been able to lobby their national lawmakers with remarkable
effectiveness.
Lisabona cere oficialilor UE s 'efectueze consultri ample' cu reprezentan ii societ ii
civile (articolul 11 din Tratatul UE). Printre acestea se numr sindicate, federa ii de
afaceri, instituii religioase i ONG-uri, precum i Comitetul Economic i Social
European. Acest ultim organ, care a fost stabilit prin Tratatul de la Roma (1958), este un
organ consultativ pe lng alte institu ii ale UE i cuprinde lideri ai societ ii civile din
fiecare stat membru. Att n Europa i n alte pri, transmiterea de preocuprilor lor se
face prin intermediul unor grupuri, cum ar fi acestea, prin care cet enii au fost capabili
sa influenteze parlamentarii lor naionali cu o eficacitate remarcabil.
The reason for this is that civil society groups can threaten otherwise unresponsive
lawmakers with consequences that are especially severe: a labor union, for example,
can threaten to withhold the votes of its entire membership from a lawmaker who is
seeking reelection, whereas an individual citizen can threaten only his or her own vote.
Motivul pentru aceasta este faptul c grupurile societ ii civile pot amenin a
parlamentarii care nu corespund cu consecine deosebit de grave, care sunt: o uniune
de munc, de exemplu, poate amenina s re in voturile tuturor membrilor sai pentru
un parlamentar care cauta un nou mandat, n timp ce un cet ean poate s amenin e
dect propriul sau vot.
This is what recent studies of governmental accountability have found: that by acting
collectively through civil society groups, citizens of various countries have successfully
pressured indolent national lawmakers into doing what citizens want (e.g. Smulovitz and
Peruzotti 2000). So, might the Lisbon Treatys provisions on civil society empower EU
citizens to do the same, to compel supranational lawmakers to do what European Union
citizens want which might include changing certain administrative laws?
Aceasta este ceea la ce au gasit unele studii recente de responsabilitate
guvernamental: care, acionnd n mod colectiv prin intermediul unor grupuri ale
societii civile, cetenii din diferite ri au fcut presiuni cu success asupra
parlamentarilor naionali indolenti n a face ceea ce doresc cet enii (e. d. de Smulovitz
and Peruzotti 2000). Aa c, ar putea oare dispoziiile Tratatului de la Lisabona asupra
societii civile sa permita cetenilor UE s fac acela i lucru, pentru a obliga
parlamentarii supranaionali s urmeze ceea ce doresc insusi cet enii Uniunii
Europene - ce ar putea include atat si modificarea anumitor legi administrative?

This happens only if two conditions are satisfied. First, the EUs lawmakers must fear
the threat that civil society can make: the withholding of votes or other types of political
support which the lawmakers will need in order to be reelected. Second, lawmakers
must actually be capable of yielding in response to that threat: EU lawmakers must
actually be able to do what civil society is asking of them. Even under Lisbon, neither of
these conditions is satisfied.
Acest lucru se ntmpl numai n cazul n care dou condi ii sunt ndeplinite. n primul
rnd, parlamentarii UE trebuie s se team de amenin area pe care societatea civil o
poate face: reinerea de voturi sau de alte tipuri de sprijin politic de care parlamentarii
vor avea nevoie pentru a fi realei. In al doilea rnd, parlamentarii trebuie s fie de fapt
capabili s dea rspuns la aceast amenin are: Parlamentarii UE trebuie s fie de fapt
n msur s fac ceea ce societatea civil cere de la ei. Chiar i n Lisabona, nici una
dintre aceste condiii nu este ndeplinit.
The Council and the EP, being elected bodies, might fear civil societys threats, but the
Commissions actions could render these bodies incapable of yielding. In order to
secure their reelection, Council ministers and members of the European Parliament
(MEPs) may be prepared to change a law. For reasons discussed in the first part of this
article, though, the Legislator will be powerless to make the change, if the Commission
opposes it.
Consiliul i PE, fiind organele alese, ar putea s se team de amenin rile societ ii
civile, dar aciunile Comisiei ar putea face ca aceste organisme sa incapabile de a ceda.
n scopul de a asigura un nou mandat, mini trii Consiliului i membri ai Parlamentului
European (MPE) pot fi pregtii s schimbe o lege. Din motive discutate n prima parte a
acestui articol, ns, legislatorul va fi lipsit de putere pentru a face schimbarea, n cazul
n care Comisia se opune.
Conversely, the Commission is capable of yielding, but is unlikely to fear civil societys
threats. The Commission is able to promulgate any changes to administrative laws that
civil society groups might demand. As an unelected body, though, the Commission
would not fear the threat of withheld political support that accompanies such demands.
Thus, even under Lisbon, civil society enjoys far less leverage over EU lawmakers than
it enjoys over national ones, leverage that seems inadequate to force changes to
administrative laws.
Pe de alt parte, Comisia este capabil s produc, dar este pu in probabil s se team
de ameninrile societii civile. Comisia este n grad de a promulga orice modificare a
legilor administrative care ar putea s fie ceruta de grupurile societ ii civile. De i este
un organ neales, Comisia nu ar teme amenin area sprijinului politic care nso e te
aceste cereri. Astfel, chiar i n Lisabona, societatea civil se bucur de mult mai pu ina
influen asupra parlamentarilor din UE dect se bucur celelalte na iuni, efectul
mecanismului cu parghii care pare inadecvat pentru a for a modificrile la legile
administrative.

Council transparency
Transparenta Consiliului
Lisbon requires the Council to deliberate in public (Article 16, TEU). This means that EU
citizens will now know the positions their ministers have previously taken in secret.
Armed with that knowledge, they can threaten to vote out governments whose ministers
fail to make the supranational laws they want. These could include basic acts that would
change unpopular administrative ones. Thus, transparency delivers political
accountability, and with Council ministers now accountable for the positions they take,
EU citizens will be able to compel the Council to change administrative laws.
Lisabona cere Consiliului s delibereze n public (articolul 16, TUE). Acest lucru
nseamn c cetenii UE vor ti acum pozi iile pe mini trii leau luat anterior n mod
secret. narmai cu aceaste cunostinta, ei pot amenin a s voteze impotriva guvernelor
ale cror minitri nu reuesc s fac legile suprana ionale pe care cetatenii le doresc.
Acestea ar putea include acte de baz, care pot sa schimbe cele administrative
nepopulare. Astfel, transparena ofer o responsabilitate politic, iar cu mini trii
Consiliului acum responsabili fata de pozi iile pe care le ocupa, cet enii UE vor fi n
msur s oblige Consiliul s schimbe legile administrative.
Two flaws, however, undermine this optimistic reasoning: the first is its assumption that
Council politicking has been opaque prior to Lisbon. In fact, the Council has always
been very transparent. Generally, the positions member states take have been very well
known: most governments have routinely explained their policy positions through press
releases, reports to their parliaments, campaign propaganda, and other public
pronouncements and when those pronouncements have been disingenuous, their real
positions have often been exposed by disgusted, gossipy, off-the-record sources
(Moravcsik 2002, pp. 612613).
Cu toate acestea, dou defecte, submineaz acest ra ionament optimist: prima este
presupunerea c politicianismul Consiliului a fost opac nainte de Lisabona. De fapt,
Consiliul a fost ntotdeauna foarte transparent. n general, statele membre care au
poziii au fost foarte bine cunoscute: majoritatea guvernelor au declarat n timp curent
poziiile lor politice prin intermediul comunicatelor de pres, rapoarte ctre parlamentele
lor, propagand de campanie i alte declara ii publice - iar atunci cnd aceste declara ii
au fost lipsite de sinceritate, poziiile lor reale au fost adesea expuse ca dezgustate,
brfitoare, provenite din surse neoficiale (Moravcsik 2002, pp. 612-613).
Therefore, Lisbons requirement of public deliberation merely allows citizens to observe
firsthand what they have already been told is happening. Yet, even if the Council has
somehow been insufficiently transparent, additional transparency will not bring about
changes to administrative laws. As discussed at length, the Council lacks a lawmaking
process that enables it to change administrative laws even when it might want to such
as when better informed, and consequently irate, citizens might pressure their national
governments for supranational reforms.

Prin urmare, cerina de deliberare public din Lisabona se limiteaz in apermite


cetenilor sa observe mai intai ceea ce le sa spus deja ca se ntmpl. Cu toate
acestea, chiar i n cazul n care Consiliul a fost oarecum insuficient de transparent,
transparena suplimentara nu va aduce modificri la legile administrative. Aa cum sa
discutat pe larg, Consiliul nu dispune de un proces de legiferare, care i permite s
schimbe legile administrative chiar i atunci cnd se doreste acest lucru - cum atunci
cnd cetenii mai bine informai, i n consecin iritati, ar putea s fac presiuni
asupra guvernelor lor naionale pentru reforme supranationale.
Again, the Council is unable to yield to citizens threats. This is the second flaw to the
transparencyaccountabilitycitizen empowerment logic. The rules of EU lawmaking,
not a lack of accountability, preclude the Council from changing administrative laws an
institutional impediment, not insufficient oversight, is to be blamed. Increased
transparency might help illuminate this shortcoming, but it will do nothing to remedy it.
Din nou, Consiliul nu este n msur s cedeze n fa a amenin rilor cet enilor. Acesta
este al doilea defect in logica mputernicirii transparen -responsabilitate-cet ean.
Regulile de legiferare ale UE, si nu o lipsa de responsabilitate, mpiedic Consiliului s
schimbe legile administrative - un impediment institu ional, si nu o supraveghere
insuficient, este de vin. Creterea gradului de transparen ar putea ajuta la
iluminarea acestui neajuns, dar nu va face nimic pentru a remedia la el.
The European Court of Justice
Curtea European de Justiie
Lisbon permits the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to rule on many new issues which,
in the past, were beyond the scope of its authority (Articles 251281, TFEU; see also
Court of Justice of the European Communities 2009). This means that the court will now
have opportunities to review and, should it choose, strike down certain laws which it
was not able to review prior to Lisbon. These include not only basic acts, but also
administrative laws, which both the Council and EP may petition the court to annul.
Lisabona permite Curii Europene de Justi ie (CEJ) s se pronun e asupra multor
probleme noi, care, n trecut, erau dincolo de domeniul de aplicare al autorit ii sale
(articolele 251-281 TFUE, a se vedea, de asemenea, Curtea de Justi ie a Comunit ilor
Europene 2009). Acest lucru nseamn c instan a va avea acum oportunit i de a
revizui i, ar trebui s aleag de a dobori anumite legi pe care nu a fost n grad s
revizuiasc nainte de Lisabona. Acestea includ nu numai acte de baz, ci i legile
administrative, pe care att Consiliul, ct i PE le poate cere instan ei s fie anulate.
Thus, by expanding the scope of the ECJs authority, Lisbon has, by extension, given
the Legislator new opportunities to change (or at least nullify) certain administrative
laws. Judicial review, typically considered a counter-majoritarian procedure, now might
make the EU more democratic: a ruling which sides with the Legislator and strikes down
an administrative law that will have the effect of overruling unelected regulators on
behalf of elected officials.

Astfel, prin extinderea domeniului de aplicare al autorit ii CEJ, Lisabona, da


Legislatorului noi oportuniti de a schimba (sau cel pu in a anula) anumite legi
administrative. Controlul jurisdicional, n mod tipic este considerat o procedur contra
majoritarist, care ar putea face UE mai democratic: o hotrre in care pr ile cu
legislator doboara o lege administrativ, care n folosul oficialilor ale i va avea ca efect
anularea autoritilor de reglementare nealese.
Yet, such rulings are likely to be very rare, for the same reason that, prior to Lisbon,
petitioning the court has been an unlikely method of changing administrative laws. The
court may annul only those laws that violate the EUs treaties, either because their
content conflicts with treaty provisions or because the procedures by which those laws
were promulgated offended due process (e.g. their accompanying statements of
reasons might be inadequate; an arcane rule of comitology may not have been properly
followed; etc.).
Cu toate acestea, astfel de hotrri sunt foarte rare, pentru acela i motiv pentru care,
nainte de Lisabona, petitionarea instan ei a fost o metod pu in probabil in
schimbarea legilor administrative. Instana de judecat poate anula numai acele legi
care ncalc tratatele UE, fie din cauza conflictelor cauzate de dispozitiile tratatului sau
pentru c procedurile prin care au fost promulgate aceste legi au ofensat un proces
echitabil (d.e. nsoitoarea inadecvata a declara iilor de motive sau nu s-a urmat
corespunzator vreo regul arcana al comitologiei etc.).
The court offers no help to petitioners who simply dislike a law that is not in conflict with
the treaties. Yet, only rarely will the court view an administrative law as in conflict. The
court tends to scrutinize basic acts much more closely than implementing ones; it
typically allows the Commission and other regulators wide discretion in rulemaking
(Bignami 1999a, pp. 479483; also Bignami 1999b for several case law examples of the
courts deference to regulators, as well as a rare example of its striking down an
implementing act).
Instana de judecat nu ofer nici un ajutor pentru peti ionarii carora pur i simplu nu le
place o lege ce nu se afl n conflict cu tratatele. Oricum rareori instanta va vedea o
lege administrativ ca fiind n conflict cu tratatul. Instan a tinde s controleze actele de
baz mult mai strns dect punerea lor n aplicare; ea n mod obi nuit permite, Comisiei
i altor organe de reglementare o putere larg de apreciere n elaborarea
reglementrilor (Bignami 1999a, pp 479-483;. De asemenea, Bignami 1999b pentru mai
multe exemple legale de cazuri a deferen ei instan ei fata de autorit ile de
reglementare, precum i un exemplu rar de doborare a sa din cauza punerei n aplicare
a unui act).
Thus, petitioning the ECJ has always been a doubtful means of annulling administrative
laws, and this has not changed with Lisbons adoption: the treaty increases the number
of laws that the ECJ may review, but not the small likelihood of the courts annulling any
given one.
Astfel, petitiile CEJ au fost ntotdeauna un mijloc de anulare a legilor administrative
ndoielnice, iar acest lucru nu sa schimbat odat cu adoptarea Tratatului de la Lisabona:

tratatul mrete numrul de legi care CEJ poate revizui, dar nu i mica probabilitatea a
curtii de a anula orice modificare.
Delegated acts
Acte delegate
Lisbon has created a new category of administrative laws, the delegated act (Article
290, TFEU). The treatys definition of this instrument is somewhat ambiguous, but most
legal scholars see delegated acts as amendments to technical or non-essential parts of
already adopted legislation. That is, they change the actual content of legislation, unlike
implementing acts, which apply legislation to situational contexts (see Ponzano 2008 for
a more detailed discussion). Like implementing acts, though, delegated ones are
promulgated by the Commission, not voted into law by the Council and EP through the
Community method.
Lisabona a creat o nou categorie de legi administrative, 'actul delegat' (articolul 290
din TFUE). Definiia tratatului pentru acest instrument este oarecum ambigua, dar cei
mai muli oameni de tiine juridice vad actele delegate ca modificri la partile tehnice
sau neeseniale ale legislaiei deja adoptate. Cu alte cuvinte, ele modific con inutul real
al legislaiei, spre deosebire de actele de punere n aplicare, care aplic o legisla ie
pentru contexte situaionale (a se vedea Ponzano 2008 pentru o discu ie mai detaliat).
La fel ca si actele de punere n aplicare, ns, cele delegate sunt promulgate de ctre
Comisie, si nu votate de ctre Consiliu i PE prin metoda comunitar.
However, the latter bodies do enjoy two controls over the making of delegated acts
which they do not enjoy over the making of implementing ones. First, a new delegated
act, after being drafted by the Commission, does not come into force if either the
Council or EP objects: each part of the Legislator wields a veto. Second, for a given
basic act, the Legislator can revoke the Commissions power to promulgate any new
delegated acts at all. Either the Council or EP may revoke the Commissions power,
and, importantly, the Commission does not have to initiate such votes of revocation.
Therefore, the EUs elected bodies do wield fairly strong controls over the promulgation
of new delegated acts.
In orice caz, acestea din urm se bucur de dou controale asupra crearii de acte
delegate insa nu au capacitatea de le pune in aplicare. n primul rnd, un nou act
delegat, dup ce a fost elaborat de ctre Comisie, nu intr n vigoare n cazul n care,
Consiliul sau EP obiecteaza: fiecare parte a legislatorului manuieste un drept de veto. n
al doilea rnd, pentru un act de baz, legislatorul poate revoca cu totul puterea Comisiei
de a promulga orice noi acte delegate. Fie Consiliul sau PE poate revoca competen a
Comisiei, i, mai important, Comisia nu trebuie s ini ieze astfel de voturi de revocare.
Prin urmare, organele alese ale UE nu exercita controale asa de puternice asupra
promulgarii noilor acte delegate.

However, the Council or EP can object to a delegated act only while it is a draft, before
it becomes law. And a vote to revoke the Commissions power to make new delegated
acts will likely leave in force any that have already been promulgated: legal scholars
anticipate a vote of revocation as having an ex nunc, not ex tunc, effect (Hofmann
2009). Like yellow and orange cards, then, the controls that are unique to delegated
acts are ex ante, not ex post: they do not empower the Council and EP to change
delegated acts that have already come into effect. Therefore, delegated acts will be as
insulated from the Legislators review as are implementing ones which, themselves,
are not made any easier for the Council and EP to change by Lisbons creation of a
second category of administrative laws.
In orice caz, Consiliul sau PE poate formula obiec ii la un act delegat numai atta timp
ct acesta este in proiectare, nainte de a deveni lege. Iar un vot pentru a revoca
puterea Comisiei de a face noi acte delegate va lsa probabil n vigoare, orice legi care
au fost deja promulgate: savani juridici anticipeaz un vot de revocare ca avnd un
efect ex nunc (din latina acum) si nu ex tunc (din latina atunci), (Hofmann 2009). La
fel ca si cartonaele galbene i portocalii, apoi, controalele care sunt unice pentru actele
delegate sunt ex ante si nu ex post: ele nu abiliteaz Consiliul i PE s schimbe actele
delegate care au intrat deja n vigoare. Prin urmare, actele delegate vor fi la fel izolate
de la controlul legislatorului ca si cele care se pun n aplicare - ele nsele, nu sunt fcute
pentru usura Consiliului i PE schimbarile prin crearea unei a doua categorii de legi
administrative de la Lisabona.
Qualified majority voting
Votul cu majoritate calificat
Lisbon has changed the Councils use of qualified majority voting (QMV) during the
Community method process. Prior to Lisbon, the Council adopted most legislation with a
super-majoritarian vote a qualified majority, in EU terms. Adoption of legislation on
certain salient issues, though (e.g. immigration, social security, etc.), required Council
unanimity. Now, however, for most of those issues, Lisbon has replaced the unanimity
requirement with QMV (see European Parliament Committee on Constitutional Affairs
2008, A6-0013/2008). Additionally, Lisbon has re-defined what exactly constitutes a
qualified majority. The treaty replaces a complicated system of triple-majority voting
with a lesser double-majority requirement: 55% of member states representing 65% of
EU citizens must vote to adopt legislation, and fewer than four states are not allowed to
block the formation of the second, population-based majority (Article 16, TEU).
Lisabona a schimbat utilizarea de ctre Consiliu a 'votului cu majoritate calificat' (VMC)
n timpul procesului de metoda comunitar. nainte de Lisabona, Consiliul adopta
majoritatea legislaiilor printr-un vot super-majoritarist - o 'majoritate calificat', n ceea
ce privete UE. Adoptarea legislaiei cu privire la anumite aspecte importante, precum
(de exemplu, imigraia, securitatea social etc.), necesita unanimitatea Consiliului.
Acum, cu toate acestea, pentru cele mai multe dintre aceste probleme, Lisabona a
nlocuit cerina de unanimitate cu VMC (a se vedea Comisia European a Parlamentului
pentru afaceri constituionale 2008, A6-0013 / 2008). In plus, Lisabona a re-definit exact

ceea ce constituie o majoritate calificat. Tratatul nlocuiete un sistem complicat de


'triplu majoritar', cu un vot care are o cerin mai mic, 'dublu majoritar': 55% din statele
membre, reprezentnd 65% din cetenii UE trebuie s voteze pentru a adopta o
legislaie, iar la mai puin de patru state nu li se permite s blocheze formarea a unei a
doua majoritii bazat pe populaie (articolul 16 din Tratatul UE).
Thus, Lisbon not only increases the use of QMV, but it also makes a qualified majority
much easier for the Council to reach. The effect of these changes is that basic acts
should now be easier to adopt: past expansions of QMV, by diminishing the veto power
of any given member state, have reduced Council gridlock (Schulz and Konig 2000).
Could, then, the Council more easily adopt basic legislation which changes
administrative laws?
Astfel, Lisabona nu doar ca mrete utilizarea QMV, dar face, de asemenea, o
majoritate calificat mult mai uor atinsa de catre Consiliu. Efectul acestor modificri
este faptul c actele de baz ar trebui s fie acum mai u or de adoptat: extinderi
anterioare ale VMC, prin diminuarea puterii de veto a oricrui stat membruin parte,
reducand ambuteiajul din Consiliul (Schulz i Konig 2000). Ar putea, atunci, Consiliul s
adopte mai uor legislaiile de baz, pentru a schimba legile administrative?
Probably not, for a reason this article has already discussed at length: the Commission
monopolizes the right of legislative initiative. Lisbons changes to QMV empower the
Legislator to adopt with greater alacrity only those acts that the Commission will initiate,
and, as discussed, the Commission will not initiate basic acts for the purpose of
changing administrative ones. Thus, Lisbons provisions on QMV will not empower the
Legislator to change administrative laws. In fact, they may lead to the promulgation of a
far greater quantity of administrative laws which the Council and EP will remain unable
to change. With legislation being easier to adopt, the Legislator can be expected to
adopt more of it than it would have without Lisbons new QMV rules.
Probabil c nu, din cauza motivului despre care acest articol a discutat deja pe larg:
Comisia monopolizeaz dreptul de iniiativ legislativ. Modificrile VMC-ului de la
Lisabona mputernicesc adoptarile legislatorului cu o mai mare vioiciune numai acele
acte pe care Comisia le va iniia, i, dup cum sa discutat, Comisia nu va ini ia acte de
baz n scopul de a le schimba pe cele administrative. Astfel, dispozi iile de la Lisabona
privind VMC-ul nu va permite legislatorului s schimbe legile administrative. De fapt,
acestea pot duce la promulgarea unei cantit i mult mai mari de legi administrative pe
care Consiliul i PE vor reusi s se schimbe. Legisla ia, fiind mai u or de adoptat, se
poate atepta ca legislatorul s adopte mai mult dect ar reusi sa o faca in absen a
unor noi reguli QMV de la Lisabona.

This additional legislation will need to be implemented. Therefore, the Commission will
need to promulgate even more administrative laws than it would have promulgated

without Lisbon. Not only will the Legislator remain unable to change administrative laws,
but over time, the post-Lisbon EU may come to be regulated by many more
unchangeable laws than would an EU without the treaty.
Aceast legislaie suplimentar va trebui s fie pusa n aplicare. Prin urmare, Comisia
va trebui s promulge mai multe legi administrative dect ar fi promulgate fr
Lisabona. Nu numai c va rmne n imposibilitatea legislatorului de a schimba legile
administrative, dar n timp, UE post-Lisabona ar putea ajunge s fie reglementat prin
mai multe legi neschimbtoare dect ar face-o Uniune European fr tratat.
Dubious opportunities
Oportuniti dubioase
The new administrative laws would need to be enforced, which is also the
Commissions responsibility: for every new law it promulgates, the Commission also has
to monitor compliance with that law and bring appropriate enforcement actions if it
discovers a violation. Thus, should Lisbon birth a plethora of new administrative laws,
the Commissions various enforcement arms might be overwhelmed: with no additional
resources, they would now have to enforce many more strictures than before. Under
such constraints, the Commission, like other underresourced agencies, would likely
tackle only particularly egregious or headline-making violations.
Noile legi administrative ar trebui s fie puse n aplicare, ceea ce este, de asemenea,
responsabilitatea Comisiei: Pentru fiecare lege nou promulgata, Comisia trebuie, de
asemenea, s monitorizeze respectarea acestei legi i sa introduca ac iuni adecvate de
aplicare n cazul n care se descoper o nclcare. Astfel, Lisabona ar trebui s dea
natere la o serie de noi legi administrative, ar putea cople i diferitele arme de aplicare
ale Comisiei: fr resurse suplimentare, acestia ar trebui acum s aplice mult mai multe
stricturi dect nainte. n conformitate cu aceste constrngeri, Comisia, ca i alte agen ii
ezaurite de resurse, ar aborda probabil numai nclcri n special flagrante sau de luare
de titlu.
That would leave infractions that are less severe and less attention-grabbing to be
committed with impunity, which is a typical outcome of managerial overload: the
managed or at least those among them who are more discreet than their colleagues
are able to disregard the rules the manager has established because the overloaded
manager lacks resources to enforce them. This dynamic has often been observed in
manager-managed relationships between elected office-holders and regulators: in many
polities, as office-holders workloads have grown, regulators have gradually been able to
accrue more lawmaking power, because the office-holders have had to allocate
resources away from restricting regulatory overreach and toward their own expanding
responsibilities.

Asta ar lsa infraciuni care sunt mai pu in severe i mai pu in hapsane s fie comise cu
impunitate, ceea ce este un rezultat tipic de 'supraincarcare de conducere': acelea
gestionate - sau cel puin acelea care sunt mai discrete - sunt n msur s ignore

regulile stabilite de manager, deoarece managerul suprancrcat nu dispune de resurse


pentru a le aplica. Aceast dinamic a fost observata de multe ori n rela iile gestionate
de un manager care sunt deintorii de birouri i autorit ile de reglementare alese: n
multe societati, din cauza faptului ca volumul de lucru al de intorilor de birou a crescut,
autoritile de reglementare au fost treptat n msur s acumuleze mai mult putere de
legiferare, pentru c titularii de birouri au trebuit s aloce resurse departe de
restrictionarea de reglamentare si sa se ntinda ctre propriile lor responsabilit i de
expansiune.
Lawmaking power is thus transferred from elected to unelected officials, and for that
reason, many scholars of public administration have assumed that managerial overload
necessarily decreases democratic legitimacy (Peters 1981). However, in a managermanaged relationship between unelected regulators and the citizens whom they
regulate, managerial overload can have a very different effect. Citizens who can ignore
an administrative law because their regulators are unable to enforce it can in practical
effect, if not legal fact annul the law, because unpunished non-compliance with a law
effectively renders that law void. That is, managerial overload effectively empowers
citizens to annul the administrative laws they dislike.
Puterea legiferri este astfel transferat de la func ionarii lesi la cei neale i, i din acest
motiv, muli oameni de tiin ai administraiei publice au presupus c suprasarcina
managerial scade inevitabil legitimitatea democratic (Peters 1981). Cu toate acestea,
ntr-o relaie gestionata managerial, ntre autorit ile de reglementare nealese si
cetenii pe care ii reglementeaz, suprancrcarea managerial poate avea un efect cu
totul diferit. Cetenii care pot ignora o lege administrativ pentru c autorit ile de
reglementare nu sunt n msur s o aplice, poate, ca efect practic, nelegal poate sa
anuleze legea, deoarece nepedepsirea in cazul incalcarii unei legi, face din acea lege
un vid. Astfel, suprasarcina de conducere confer n mod eficient cet enilor
posibilitatea de a anula legile administrative care nu sunt pe placul lor.
Thus, if citizens lack more formal mechanisms for changing administrative laws,
managerial overload can actually increase democratic legitimacy. EU citizens should
hope, then, that Lisbon overwhelms the Commissions enforcement arms. They should
also be wary of any reforms aimed at reducing Commission overload. Such reforms
for example, the Prodi Commissions Kinnock reforms have had mixed success in the
past (Metcalfe 2000, Levy 2006). Greater success now would rob EU citizens of
opportunities to change (or at least annul) administrative laws, which Lisbon might give
them.
Astfel, n cazul n care cetenii nu dispun de mecanisme mai formale pentru
schimbarea legilor administrative, suprasarcina managerial poate cre te de fapt
legitimitate democratic. Cetenii UE ar trebui s spere, atunci, c Lisabona va coplesi
armele de aplicare ale Comisiei. Acestea ar trebui, de asemenea, sa se abtina de la
orice reforma care vizeaz reducerea la suprasarcin a Comisiei. Astfel de reforme - de
exemplu, Comisia lui Prodi in reforma Kinnock - au avut un succes mixt n trecut
(Metcalfe 2000, Levy 2006). Un succes mai mare acum ar jefui cet enii UE de

oportuniti de a schimba (sau cel puin de a anula) legile administrative, pe care le-ar
putea propune Lisabona.
Managerial overload and its consequences would be a secondary effect of Lisbon, but
the treaty explicitly permits one other type of unpunished non-compliance: withdrawal
from the Union. Any member state may quit the EU by notifying its fellow members of its
intention to leave. The other member states and the EP can then delay the secession
by up to two years, but after a maximum delay of 24 months, the member may
renounce the EUs legal authority (Article 50, TEU). Quitting the Union would, in effect,
render unwanted laws void, as the Commission could no longer punish violations of EU
laws within the ex-member state. Thus, withdrawal is a mechanism that citizens can use
to annul an administrative law.
Supraincarcarea managerial i consecinele sale ar fi un efect secundar de la
Lisabona, ns tratatul permite n mod explicit un alt tip de nepedepsiri in cazul
nerespectarii legilor: retragerea din Uniune. Orice stat membru poate prsi UE prin
notificarea colegilor membri ai si cu privire la inten ia sa de a prsi Uniunea. Celelalte
state membre i PE pot apoi ntrzia secesiunea cu pn la doi ani, dar dup o
ntrziere maxim de 24 de luni, membrul poate renun a la autoritatea legal a UE
(articolul 50, TUE). Renuntarea la Uniune de fapt ar anula legi nedorite, deoarece
Comisia nu mai poate pedepsi nclcrile legisla iei UE n cadrul statului ex-membru.
Astfel, retragerea este un mecanism pe care cet enii o pot utiliza pentru a anula o lege
administrativ.
Of course, withdrawal is also a very blunt instrument. Members who choose to leave the
EU necessarily repeal all of EU laws, popular and unpopular, administrative and
otherwise, not merely one choice, offensive implementing act. That means withdrawal
would likely be accompanied by high economic and political costs, many of which would
be entirely unrelated to the specific act that the withdrawing member abhors (Weiler
1985, Berglund 2006). A Eurozone member that withdraws would suffer especially high
costs, as it struggles to create a new currency without panicking financial markets,
defaulting on its debt obligations, or otherwise devastating its economy (Eichengreen
2010). Therefore, member states are very unlikely to exercise the withdrawal option:
because it necessarily packages the repeal of one particular stricture with a plethora of
unfavorable consequences, quitting the Union is likely to be prohibitively painful.
Desigur, retragerea este, de asemenea, un instrument foarte obtuz. Membrii care aleg
s prseasc UE pentru abrogarea n mod necesar a tuturor legilor UE, populare i
nepopulare, administrative i neadministrative, nu fac doar o alegere, ci un act
ofensator de punere in aplicatie. Asta nseamn c retragerea probabil va fi nso it de
costuri ridicate economice i politice, dintre care multe vor fi complet fr legtur cu
actul specific pe care membrul care se retrage il aplica (detest Weiler 1985, Berglund
2006). Un membru al zonei euro, care se retrage va avea de suferit costuri deosebit de
ridicate, deoarece se lupt pentru a crea o nou moned, fr a panica pie ele
financiare, incapacitat de obligaiile datoriilor sale, devastatand economia proprie
(Eichengreen 2010). Prin urmare, statele membre sunt foarte pu in probabil s- i
exercite opiunea de retragere: deoarece, inevitabil, abrogarea unui anumit stat va

aduce nu doar pachete de stricturi dar si o serie de alte consecin e nefavorabile,


renuntarea la Uniunea va fi prohibitiv de dureroasa.
The EU needs a more subtle mechanism, one through which elected officials, or
citizens themselves, can change particular administrative laws without also annulling
those laws they want to retain and without harming their unrelated economic and
political interests.
UE are nevoie de un mecanism mai subtil, unul prin care func ionarii alesi, sau cet eni
nii, pot modifica anumite legi administrative, fr a anula, de asemenea, acele legi pe
care doresc s-i le pstreze i fr a afecta interesele lor economice i politice care nu
au legtur cu asta.
Such a mechanism is needed, though, only if citizens or their elected officials actually
want to change their laws. Do they? Administrative laws are typically lengthy, detailed
guidelines on issues which, candidly, are arcane, technical, and tedious to non-experts.
Do EU citizens, Council ministers, and MEPs ever understand and care enough about
such laws to want to change them? Until now, this article has bracketed that question,
but it is too vital to be ignored entirely. An affirmative answer would establish the
practical relevance of the theoretical and law-based arguments made in this article and
in the literature it builds upon; a negative answer would expose those arguments as
academic constructs devoid of real-life implications.
Este nevoie de un astfel de mecanism, ns, numai n cazul n care cet enii sau
funcionarii lor alei intradevar doresc s schimbe legile. Nu-i a a? Legile administrative
sunt, de obicei, linii directoare mai lungi si detaliate cu privire la aspecte care, sincer,
sunt arcane, tehnice, i obositoare pentru non-exper i. Vor reusi oare cet eni UE,
minitrii Consiliului, i deputaii europeni s n eleag vreodat i sa aiba grij suficient
de mult de aceste legi pe care vor s le schimbe? Pn n prezent, acest articol a pus in
baranteze aceast ntrebare, dar este prea importanta pentru a fi ignorata n totalitate.
Un rspuns afirmativ ar stabili relevan a practic a argumentelor teoretice i bazate pe
legi fcute n acest articol i n literatura de specialitate pe care acesta se construie te;
un rspuns negativ ar expune acele argumente ca constructe academice lipsite de o
implicatie reala.
Thus, this question actually warrants lengthier consideration and more thorough
empirical study than this article can provide. Nonetheless, I will speculate here that the
outcome of such an effort would, most likely, be an affirmative answer. Admittedly, as
many scholars of EU politics have observed, the Council and EP rarely try to change
administrative laws through the Community method, comitology, or treaty reform.
However, interpreting that inaction as satisfaction with the regulatory status quo would
be a dangerous leap in reasoning: the very impotence of these three lawmaking
processes, as identified in the first part of this article, has likely dissuaded the Legislator
from trying to use the many more frequently.
Astfel, aceast intrebare justific de fapt considerarile de lunga durata si studiile
empirice mai aprofundate dect acelea pe care acest articol le poate oferi. Cu toate
acestea, voi specula aici c rezultatul unui astfel de efort ar trebui, cel mai probabil, s

fie un rspuns afirmativ. Este adevrat c, dup cum au observat mul i savan i de
politica UE, Consiliul i PE rareori ncearca s schimbe legile administrative prin metoda
comunitar, comitologie sau reforma tratatului. Cu toate acestea, interpretarea aceste
lipse de aciune ca i o satisfacie n legtur cu statusul de reglementare quo ar fi un
salt periculos n raionament: insi neputina acestor trei procese de crea ie legislativ,
astfel identificate n prima parte a acestui articol, probabil a descurajat legislatorul de a
ncerca utilizarea frecventa.
The Legislator has, however, tried to annul administrative laws through another means:
judicial review. As discussed above, the Legislator has asked the ECJ to annul various
administrative laws and aggrieved citizens have done the same (though locus standi
rules have often compelled individual citizens to approach the court indirectly, by asking
their national courts to ask the ECJ to review the validity of a law). Of course, such court
actions have been limited in number, especially in comparison with the large number of
administrative laws that the courts are never asked to review: of themselves, they are
too few to establish citizens and their Legislator as routinely wanting to change many
administrative laws. That claim would be too expansive.
Legiuitorul in orice caz, a ncercat s anuleze legile administrative printr-un alt mijloc:
controlul judiciar. Aa cum sa discutat mai sus, legislatorul a solicitat CEJ s anuleze
diverse legi administrative si ceteni nedrept i i au fcut acela i lucru (De i normele
calitii procesuale active au constrns adesea cet enii s se apropie de instanta
indirect, prin solicitarea instanelor naionale s solicite CEJ pentru revizuirea validitatii
unei legi). Desigur, astfel de aciuni n instan au fost limitate n numr, mai ales n
comparaie cu numrul mare de legi administrative pe care instan ele nu sunt rugate s
le verifice: ele nsele sunt prea puine pentru a stabili cet enilor i Legislatorilor lor ca in
care mod obisnuit doresc sa schimbe multe legi administrative. Aceast afirma ie ar fi
prea scump.
These actions do, however, undermine a commonly believed fiction: that EU citizens
and their elected officials will be placidly content with, or blissfully oblivious to, whatever
laws their regulators make. In reality, citizens and the Legislator have wanted so
strongly to change administrative laws that they have willingly incurred the costs of
seeking assistance from their courts: the Commissions goodwill, in the case of the
Council and EP, and personal time and legal expenses for individual citizens.
Aceste aciuni, oricum, submineaz o ficiune in mod obisnuit crezuta: in care cet enii
UE i funcionarii lor alei vor accepta usor, sau din fericire vor uita pur si simplu, de
legile facute de catre autoritile legislative. n realitate, cet enii i-au dorit att de
puternic ca Legiuitorul s schimbe legile administrative incat si-au asumat de bunvoie
costurile de a solicita sprijinul instanelor lor: fondul comercial al Comisiei, n cazul
Consiliului i PE, precum i timpul personal i cheltuielile juridice individual pentru
ceteni.
In summary, EU citizens and their Legislator do, at least sometimes, want to change
administrative laws. Does the new Lisbon Treaty empower them to do so and thereby
increase the Unions democratic legitimacy? The findings of this article are

discouraging. Lisbons provisions might well increase the EUs legitimacy in other ways:
for example, its ex ante controls on delegated acts are a small step toward greater
democratic participation in the promulgation of new administrative laws (on participation
rights in rulemaking, see Bignami 2004, Smismans 2005, Mendes 2011). However,
already-promulgated laws continue to elude democratic control.
Pe scurt, cetenii UE i Legislator, cel pu in uneori, doresc s schimbe legile
administrative. Oare noul Tratat de la Lisabona o s le permit s fac acest lucru crescand astfel legitimitatea democratic a Uniunii? Constatrile acestui articol sunt
descurajante. Dispoziiile de la Lisabona ar putea cre te i legitimitatea UE n alte
moduri: de exemplu, controalele ex ante cu privire la actele delegate sunt un mic pas
spre o participare democratic mai mare la promulgarea noii legi administrative (privind
drepturile de participare 'n elaborarea reglementrilor, vezi Bignami 2004, Smismans
2005, Mendes 2011). Cu toate acestea, legile deja promulgate continu s se sustrag
controlului democratic.
Under Lisbon, the Legislator will remain unable to change administrative laws, and
citizens will be able to annul them only in effect, and only by becoming lawbreakers (via
managerial overload) or secessionists (through the withdrawal procedure). These are
two options that, if routinely exercised, would leave the EU a union in name only. Is that
the poisonous trade-off Lisbon begets: increased democratic legitimacy at the expense
of obedience to the law and enduring confederation? If so, then what Lisbon offers the
EU is not new democratic life, but a disappointing choice: the status quo or a
democratic death.
n cadrul Tratatului de la Lisabona, legislatorul va rmne n imposibilitatea de a
schimba legile administrative, iar cetenii vor putea s le anuleze numai cand vor fi n
vigoare, i numai daca ncalc legea (prin suprasarcin de conducere) sau separatism
(prin procedura de retragere). Acestea sunt dou op iuni care, dac sunt exercitate n
mod obinuit, ar lasa UE doar numele de uniune. Este oare acesta compromisul
otrvitor caruia Lisabona ii d natere: cu un grad sporit de legitimitate democratic
platind pretul de supunere fa de lege i a confederatiei rezistente? Dac este a a,
atunci ceea ce Lisabona ofer UE nu este nou 'via democratic', ci o alegere
dezamgitoare: status quo sau o 'moarte a democratiei'.
Acknowledgements
Mulumiri
The author is grateful to the American Consortium on EU Studies for helping to fund the
research that contributed to this article. The author also thanks Paul Simon Adams, Katy
Collin, Kate Goodwin, Tazreena Sajjad, Emmanuel Teitelbaum, Krista Tuomi, and Lori
Wagner for their insightful comments and feedback.
Autorul este recunosctor consoriului american de Studii ale UE pentru a ajuta la
finanarea cercetrii, care a contribuit la acest articol. Autorul, de asemenea, ii
mulumeste: Paul Simon Adams, Katy Collin, Kate Goodwin, Tazreena Sajjad,

Emmanuel Teitelbaum, Krista Tuomi, i Lori Wagner pentru comentariile si parerile lor
profunde.

BIBLIOGRAFIA NU O MAI TRADUC XD ahahahah SPOR LA INVATAT MINUNE!!!!!!!