Municipal Liability

8. Mendoza v De Leon
Facts: An action for damages against the individual members of the municipal council
of the municipality of Villasis, Pangasinan was filed, for the revocation of the lease of an
exclusive ferry privilege duly awarded to the plaintiff under the provisions of Act No.
1643 of the Philippine Commission. After use of a little more than one year, the plaintiff
was forcibly ejected under and pursuance of a resolution adopted by the herein
defendants, awarding a franchise for the same ferry to another person.
Issue: WON the members of the municipal council are personally liable
Held: Yes. In administering the patrimonial property of municipalities, the municipal
council occupies, for most purposes, the position of a board of directors of a private
corporation. In disposing of the local public utilities, if the term may be used, such as the
fishing and ferry rights, etc., they must exercise considerable judgment. It required
some considerable amount of business acumen to compel performance on the part of
lessees of these privileges in accordance with the terms of their leases and in a manner
which will not cause the property to deteriorate. Questions must continually arise which
are not expressly provided for in contracts and which must be settled, if possible, in a
manner that will preserve the just claims of the municipality. Indeed, it is not at all
improbable that on occasion the councilors may have reason to believe that a particular
contract has been rescinded by the other party or has never been legally entered into, in
both of which cases, decisive steps must be taken to safeguard the interest of the
municipality. Thus, in Municipality of Moncada vs. Cajuigan, the lessee of a municipal
fishery was evicted for failing to pay his quarterly rents. The municipal authorities rightly
held that the contract was rescinded but forcibly evicted the lessee instead of resorting
to the courts. Hence, in an action by the municipality against the lessee and his
bondsmen to recover rent arrears, damages were allowed the lessee on his
counterclaim for the loss caused by the forcible eviction. Nevertheless, we do not think
the councilors could have been held personally liable for their error in resorting to
forcible eviction of the lessee. Theirs was an error of judgment, and honest mistake on
their part as to the rights of the municipality in the premises. We think the rule of
personal liability should be with municipal councilors in such matters as it is with the
directors or managers of an ordinary private corporation.
Local Offices
13. Adormeo v COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner and private respondent were the only candidates who filed their
certificates of candidacy for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections. Private
respondent Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992. He served the full term. Again,
he was re-elected in 1995-1998. In the election of 1998, he lost to Bernard G. Tagarao.
In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again won and served the unexpired term of
Tagarao until June 30, 2001. On March 2, 2001, petitioner filed with the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., on the ground

that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for three (3) consecutive terms
as follows: (1) in the election of May 1992, where he served the full term; (2) in the
election of May 1995, where he again served the full term; and, (3) in the recall election
of May 12, 2000, where he served only the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost
to Tagarao in the 1998 election. Petitioner contended that Talagas candidacy as Mayor
constituted a violation of Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
Issue: WON there was a violation of the three term limit rule
Held: No. Respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms because he did
not win in the May 11, 1998 elections. He was installed only as mayor by reason of his
victory in the recall elections and his victory in the recall elections was not considered a
term of office and is not included in the 3-term disqualification rule. He did not fully serve
the three (3) consecutive terms, and his loss in the May 11, 1998 elections is
considered an interruption in the continuity of his service as Mayor of Lucena City.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual hasserved three consecutive terms in
an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification can apply. For nearly two years he
was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the
1998 elections.
39. Garcia v Pajaro
Facts: Petitioner Sebastian Garcia was an employee at the City Treasurers Office,
Dagupan and has been employee thereat as Revenue Collector appointed to that
position by then City Mayor. He was ordered suspended by City Treasurer Juanito
Pajaro from June 1, 1990 to March 15, 1992 and directed the withholding of his salary
because of the Formal Charge filed against him. From June 1, 1990 up to March 15,
1992, he had been reporting for work because he did not honor the suspension order as
the City Treasurer acted as the complainant, investigator and judge and there was no
complaint against him from the Office of the City Mayor. He did not believe in the Order;
he did not submit himself for investigation.
Issue: WON the City Treasurer has the power to remove, suspend or discipline
petitioner
Held: Yes. The Administrative Code of 1987is the primary law governing appointive
officials and employees in the government. This Code enumerates the grounds for
disciplining them. They may be removed or dismissed summarily (1) when the charge is
serious and the evidence of guilt is strong; (2) when the respondent is a recidivist x x x;
and (3) when the respondent is notoriously undesirable. Technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied; due process in the administrative context cannot
be fully equated with that in the strict judicial sense. The power to discipline is
specifically granted by Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987 to heads of
departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces and cities. In the case at bar,
the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority referred to in Section 47 of the
Administrative Code of 1987. The term agency refers to any of the various units of the
government including a department, a bureau, an office, an instrumentality, a
government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit

therein. Respondent Pajaro, as the city treasurer, was the head of the Office of the
Treasurer; while petitioner, a senior revenue collector, was an officer under him. Thus,
the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority who could investigate petitioner and
issue a preventive suspension order against him.