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Crbunele ucrainian:O industrie n

criz

Jitariu Ioan-Sebastian
PT11

Crbunele n Ucraina este singura resurs de energie pe care o va oferi ara


n cantiti suficiente. Creterea rentabilitii acestei industrii contribuie la
potenialul economic al Ucrainei.
Industria crbunelui in Ucraina este printre cele mai importante, dac nu
cea mai importanta,aceasta fiind pe locul 7 in topul trilor cu cele mai mari
rezerve de crbuni din lume, cu 34 miliarde de tone i pe locul 3 in lume cu
rezervele de antracit , 5,8 miliarde. Cele mai multe dintre rezervele de crbune ale
arii sunt situate in bazinul Donbas, din estul Ucrainei, ce include regiunile
Donetk i Luhansk.
Ucraina are i o pozitie geografica favorabil ntre Europa i Asia, la
intersecia unor rute internaionale importante , beneficiind i de accesul la unele
proturi fluviale , maritime i feroviare.
n ciuda resurselor de crbune majore, in Ucraina s-a produs un declin al
exploatarii odat cu cderea Uniunii Republicilor Sovietice Socialiste , declinul
accentundu-se la finalul anului 2014, odat cu nceputul unui Razboi rece ntre
Rusia i Ucraina. Multe dintre minele din est au fost nchise sau chiar distruse de
separatitii rui in cteva luni,iar altele fiind privatizate. Acest lucru afectnd
economic Ucraina. Aadar tensiunile politice au fcut industria carbunelui sa
sufere pe tot teritoriul arii. Preul crbunelui a crescut foarte mult, acest factor
inducnd ara ntr-o criz grav.
Un al factor negativ al exploatarii crbunelui in Ucraina este condiia de
minerit. n medie, minele active din Ucraina au o adncime de 700m , acest lucru
ngreundand munca minerului, provocnd foarte multe accidente. Numarul
acestora este printre cele mai ridicate din lume. Un exemplu ar fi in 2014 , cand o
explozie a ucis 7 mineri la peste 700 m adancime.
Prin urmare Ucraina este o tar foarte bogat in resursele de carbune, dar
suferind de o deficien acut n domeniul exploatarii i comercializrii, din
pricina divizrii acestei industrii ntre autoritaile de la Kiev i separatitii prorui.
Pan acum caiva ani, Ucraina a fost al treilea cel mai mare producator de
crbune din Europa. Probabil nu se va mai intoarce niciodat la acel nivel de
producie.

Bibliografie
Ukraine and coal disponibil la:
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Ukraine_and_coal
Ukrainian coal: an industry in crisis disponibil la:
http://www.worldcoal.com/special-reports/10092015/Ukrainian-coal-an-industryin-crisis-2383B/
Euracoal disponibil la:
https://euracoal.eu/info/country-profiles/ukraine/
Ukrainian coal market disponibil la:
http://sadovayagroup.com/operations/ukrainian-coal-market/
Ukraine coal exports by year disponibil la:
http://www.indexmundi.com/energy.aspx?
country=ua&product=coal&graph=exports
Eastern Ukraine coal disponibil la:
http://voxukraine.org/2015/01/09/war-is-not-the-only-grave-problem-for-easternukraine-coal-industry/
Economia Ucrainei pe margina prapastiei disponibil la:
http://europolitics.ro/stiri/economia-ucrainei-pe-marginea-prapastiei-minele-decarbune-din-donbass-sunt-inundate-inflatia-este-de-45-iar-fmi-ul-bate-la-usa/
Institutul national de statistica al Ucrainei disponibil la:
http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/
Pretul carbunelui s-a triplat disponibil la:
http://www.ziarulnational.md/pretul-la-carbune-s-a-triplat-in-ucraina-sunt-patruscheme-de-contrabanda/
Ukraine coal consumtion by year disponibil la:
http://www.indexmundi.com/energy.aspx?
country=ua&product=coal&graph=consumption

Ukraine's coal reserves are located in the Donets Basin (easternmost part
of the country) and in the northwestern area between the cities
of Lviv and Volodymyr-Volynskyi. In the early 21st century, country's
economically extractable coal reserves were estimated at more than 10 billion
tonnes. According to the Ukrainian mining trade union, coal constitutes 95% of
Ukraine's domestic energy resources.
There are also abundant deposits of lignite in central Ukraine, but the
mining of lignite stalled in the 1990s.
In 2012 coal production in Ukraine amounted to 85.946 million tonnes, up
4.8% from 2011. In 2003, Ukraine produced 79.3 million tonnes. Ukraine in 2013
saw a 2.6% decline in coal production from 2012, to 83.698 million tonnes.
Coal mining is one of the biggest industries in Eastern Ukraine. The country's coal
industry employs about 500,000 people. More than 90 percent of Ukraines coal
production comes from the Donets Basin ("Donbass") region.
In July 2014 several mines were closed in Eastern Ukraine because of
fighting during the 2014 pro-Russian conflict in Ukraine.[6] Because of this War in
Donbass (according to the Ukrainian Energy and Coal Industry Ministry) raw coal
production in Ukraine dropped by 22.4% from 2013, to 64.976 million tonnes. As
a result, Ukraine begun importing power-generating coal from South
Africa and Russia. Lack of coal for Ukraine's coal-fired power stations and a shut
down of one of the six reactors of theZaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant lead to
rolling blackouts throughout the country from early till late December 2014.
Ukrainian coal miners have to risk their lives every time they go to work
since their job is extremely dangerous. The coal mines of Donbas are one of the
most hazardous in the world due to enormous working depths (down from 300 to
1200 m) as a result of natural depletion, as well as due to high levels of methane
explosion, coal dust explosion and rock burst dangers. As the Economic
Review points out, "Since 1991, up to 300 [miners] have died at work every
year".
On 17 December 2013 an accident at the Sviato-Pokrovska Mine
(in Donetsk Oblast) killed four miners.

On 17 February 2014 a firedamp explosion in the Pivnichna Saltivka mine


(in Donetsk Oblast), killed seven workers 815 meters underground.
Ukrainian mines are sometimes run by mafia-like organizations. Often, these
organizations derive large incomes from the mines that belong to the government.
As a result, underfinancing causes many employees to have to wait to receive
their monthly salary for weeks or even months. Additionally, a lack of financing
influences the condition of many coal mines. Old mines dont receive the
necessary financial aid, therefore they are not being renovated or remodeled
annually. All these problems together with other challenges have resulted in
"gradually declining production capacity and a loss of global market share".

Figure 1 Russian poster from 1921 - Donets Basin is the heart of Russia.

Figure 2In the Donets Basin there are many extremely dangerous illegal
mines.

The Ukraine government has estimated the country's total coal reserves at
117.5 billion tons, with explored reserves estimated at 56.7 billion tons. The
World Energy Council (WEC) estimates the total coal reserves at 52 billion tons
and explored reserves at 34.2 billion tons. Euracoal states that Ukraines total coal
resources are estimated at 54 billion tonnes, with economically mineable coal
reserves estimated at a further 34 billion tonnes, of which 6.1 billion tonnes are
located in active mines.
While the coal sector is currently dominated by state-owned mining companies,
the USGS reports that "the countrys coal mines were subject to chronic financial
distress and only limited efforts had been made to improve their performance."
Approximately 90% of Ukraine's hard coal comes from the Donets coal basin
where in 2006 there were approximately 225 operating mines which produced
130 million tonnes. The remainder of the hard coal came from the Lviv-Volynskiy
Basin in Western Ukraine where 18 mines produce approximately 6 million
tonnes a year.

Approximately 7 million tonnes of brown coal is mined from the Dnipr Basin in
CentralUkraine.

While government owned operations are declining, plans have been


announced to faciliate a rapid expansion of new mines. The USGS reports that in
2005 Ukraines Coal Industry Ministry "selected seven of the most promising
hard coal deposits with combined reserves in excess of 1 Gt for development. The
seven new mines, if developed, would have a combined capacity to produce 17.7
Mt/yr of coal. Ukraines energy strategy for the period to 2030, which was
approved by the Government in 2006, called for increasing coal output to 130.3
Mt."
The USGS also reports that the Coal Industry Ministry is promoting the rapid
expansion of the brown coal mining sector, calling for private sector bids in 2005
for proposals to develop "two deposits the Aleksandriiskoye deposit, which has
brown coal reserves reported to be 485 Mt, of which 63 Mt were considered
suitable for open pit development, and the Verkhnedniprovskoye deposit, which
has reported reserves of 236 Mt, for which the explored sections were considered
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suitable for open pit development. The Ministry calculated that these deposits
have the potential to produce between 5 and 6 Mt/yr of brown coal by open pit
mining. Mines at the deposits were projected to come onstream in 2 years once
development begins."
President Viktor Yanukovych said Ukraine has about 12 trillion cubic meters
of coalbed methane, which Ukraine is looking for investment to mine. Ukraine's
coal output is expected to rise to around 80 million mt in 2011, from 75.17 million
mt in 2010.
Euracoal lists 149 mines operating in Ukraine, including 120 state-owned and 29
private mines.
The US Energy Information Administration reports that Ukraine's power sector
"is the twelfth-largest in the world in terms of installed capacity, with 54
gigawatts (GW)". However, since gaining independence both generation and
consumption dropped dramatically resulting in approximately 50% over-capacity.
While power exports have increased and new nuclear power stations been
commissioned, substantial investment is required in maintaining and upgrading
the transmission and distribution system.
The Starobeshev power station is a coal-fired power station in eastern
Ukraine. The Environmental Defense Fund reports that financing from a
mulilateral development bank for the "supply and installation of a 210 MW
fluidised bed boiler with ancillary equipment at Unit 4 of the Starobeshevo Power
Station".
In June 2012 the Ukraine announced in a revised energy policy draft that it wishes
to build and upgrade 14GW (out of 20GW) of coal plants.
In 2012 the export of coal and coke through Ukrainian ports was 4 million
tonnes. The largest volumes of coal was exported through the Port of
Mariupol (1.6 million tonnes), Port of Berdyansk (1.15 million tonnes), and Port
of Nikolaev (1.08 million tonnes). Coal imported into Ukraine in 2012 was 1.5
million tonnes: 712,700 through the Port of Ilyichevsk and 786,900 through
the Port of Yuzhny.
The Ukrainian financial and industrial holding company System Capital
Managements energy business, Donbass Fuel-Energy Complex (DTEK)
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(Russian: T- a), generates 25.4% of


all power produced by Ukraines thermal power plants. DTEK is the first private
vertically integrated power generating company of Ukraine. DTEK was formed in
2002, and is an association of 15 various enterprises vertically integrating the
mining and refining of coal to the supplying of electricity. The main companies
are Vostokenergo Power Generation Company, ServiceInvest Energy Company,
and the coal mine Komsomolets Donbassa.
According to its website, the key strategic goal of DTEK is to become the
largest company in the power energy field in Ukraine. DTEK companies account
for one fifth of the countrys output of coal, producing 17.595 million tons of coal
in 2008.
DTEK has three thermal power plants: Zuyevskaya, Kurakhovskaya, and
Luganskaya run by Vostokenergo. In 2008 the electric power transmission volume
constituted 13.51 million MW.[16]
SCM's largest company is Metinvest, an international, vertically integrated
mining and steel group of companies, comprising 23 industrial companies
involved in the mining and steel industry of Ukraine and the Commonwealth of
Independent States. In May 2009, SCM Holdings/Metinvest purchased the West
Virginia-based United Coal Company for an estimated $1 billion.
In 2007 the Divisions mines produced over 5.74 million tons of coal, and
Avdeyevka Coke and Chemical Plant, which operates as a part of the Division,
produced more than 3 million tons of blast furnace coke.

Ukrainian coal: an industry in crisis

The in-depth analysis of the Ukrainian coal mining industry was made in
previous articles: Battle Begins World Coal October 2010 and Visitors from the
East World Coal November 2012. Here is the brief summary of how it was seen
then.
An updated energy strategy to 2030 assumed the nation would produce
115 million tpa of coal in 2030; it would be self-sufficient in metallurgical coal;
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and it would continuously replace Russian natural gas with thermal coal as the
major fuel for Ukraines thermal power plants.
Reaching 115 million tpa of production assumed at least 135 million t of annual
capacity by 2030. In 2013, Ukraines 402 coal mines had a total capacity of
103 million tpa. It was therefore a task to somehow launch new capacity for at
least 32 million t between 2014 and 2030. Such a task required at least US$3.2
3.5 billion of investments potentially from China.
From 2004, Ukraine was a net importer of metallurgical coal with Russian
suppliers filling the annual gap of 6 10 million tpa. The strategy of coal export
growth was available only with metallurgical coal but it required huge
investments in expansion of the capacity at the Ukrainian Black Sea ports.
The rise in domestic coal demand looked, at the time, to be a more reliable
source of the growth in the industry. Due to the political instability in 2000
2010, Ukraine started the transition from gas-fired power plants to coal only in
2011, planning to reduce gas consumption by 30 32 billion m3/y by 2018
2019 (that might boost demand for thermal coal by 18 million tpa). This meant
that it could reduce gas consumption by about 6 billion m3/y by 4Q13 (in other
words, to increase the demand in coal by 3 million tpa).
Generally speaking, the Chinese government and companies were perceived to
become the major future investors in the Ukrainian coal mining industry,
including seaport expansion projects, new launches of coal mines and further
transition of power plants from gas to coal. Thus in July 2012, the Ministry of
Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine signed an agreement with the China
Development Bank for a US$3.6 billion loan for the financing of gas-to-coal
conversions and the construction of coal gasification plants. China is among the
major contenders for the privatisation of the few state-run coal mines and even
thermal power plants in the country.
Looking at the positions held with Donetsk and Lugansk in the Ukrainian coal
industry in 2013, it is not an exaggeration to say these two regions comprimised
the coal heart of the country.
Donbass is the largest coal basin in Ukraine and Europe with total (commercial
and prospective) reserves of 240 billion t of bituminous coal and anthracite.
Metallurgical coal made up more than half of the basins reserves. Almost a
quarter of all reserves are high-quality anthracite, while another quarter are
thermal coal with high calorific value and low ash content.

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Donbass provided 100% of metallurgical coal production and around 97%


of thermal coal production in Ukraine in 2013, while two other coal basins
(Lvovsko-Volynsky basin in western Ukraine and the Dneprovsky lignite basin
west of Donbass) provided 100% of lignite and only 3% of thermal coal outputs.
Donbass coal mines are located mainly in so-called Old Donbass (the central and
northern parts of the Donetsk region and the southern part of the Lugansk region).
Metallurgical coal was extracted mainly in the central part of Donetsk near
Makeevka, Gorlovka, Donetsk, Krasnoarmeysk, Konstantinovka and a few other
cities, as well as in the Krasnodar and Kadeevo districts of Lugansk. Thermal coal
was mainly extracted in Antratsit, Lutugino, Lisichansk and Alchevsk districts of
Lugansk.
Most of the countrys largest coal mining assets both private (such as
Pokrovskoye, formerly Krasnoarmeyskaya-Zapadnaya-1, Krasnodonugol,
Zasyadko, Dobropolyeugol) and state-run (such as Makeevugol,
Sverdlovanthracite, Rovenki-Anthracite, Luganskugol etc.) are located within the
Old Donbass area. Out of Ukraines twelve coke-chemical plants (consumers of
the metallurgical coal), seven plants are located in Donetsk and Lugansk,
providing 66% of the total metallurgical coal production in the country in 2013.
Thermal power plants in Donetsk and Lugansk provided around 40% of the total
thermal coal consumption in Ukraine in 2013.
Since 2013 and the start of hostilities between the Ukranian goverment
and the opposition, the Ukrainian government and private investors remain in
control of certain coal mining assets in Donbass, with Pavlogradugol (in the
Dnepropetrovsk region and owned by SCM Group) being the largest of them.
They also control two of seven regional coke-chemical plants with 32% share in
Ukraines metallurgical manufacture. In July 2015, all state-run coal mines
controlled by the Ukrainian government stopped their work for an indefinite
period.
The opposition controls 88 coal mines in Donetsk and Lugansk, including
Pokrovskoye, Krasnodonugol, Zasyadko, Makeevugol, Dobropolyeugol,
Sverdlovanthracite, Rovenki-Anthracite and Luganskugol accounting for around
70% of coal manufacture in Donbass. They also control five of seven regional
coke-chemical plants with a 33% share in metallurgical coal production.
In 3Q13, the sharp decline of coal production in Donbass resulted in
Ukraine boosting the import of Russian coal (including thermal coal) in the first
two quarters of last year. In 2Q14 and 3Q14, Ukraine said it would refuse to buy
Russian coal and attempted to import coal from the US and South Africa.
However the challenge Ukraine met before when trying to increase coal export
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namely the low capacity and depth of the Ukrainian Black Sea ports now started
to play against the active import of coal. The ports simply could not process the
required volume of import (while all Russian imports still went by rail).
Meeting the threat of the energy crisis, Ukraine renewed the import of Russian
thermal coal in the final two quarters of last year to supply thermal power plants
across the country. By 1Q15, Russian coal made up about 40% in Ukrainian
thermal coal supply.
Disregarding a discussion on the political aspects of the situation, the
following looks at what can be done with the Ukrainian government and private
investors towards improving the hard situation in the countrys coal market.
Obviously, the major way out is the implementation of Minsk-2 agreement, which
may re-open the door to Ukrainian and foreign investors to all coal mines in
Donbass.
Meanwhile, the supply of the national energy system with thermal coal has
become the priority task for the government. Obviously, it cannot instantly boost
thermal coal production at the mines controlled by the government or private
investors; time and investments are required and both are in deficit. Due to
political reasons, the Ukrainian government does not want to increase the import
of coal from Russia, which is an understandable position from the business point
of view (Ukraine already is dependent on Russia for gas and oil).
The single alternative is to boost coal import from the US, South Africa and other
countries. This however requires a fast resolution of the issues of low capacity
and depth of the Ukrainian seaports. As a temporary measure, they may use
smaller vessels (as do Ukrainian miners for EU export) but it may be inefficient
for total replacement of the Russian import. In any case, Ukraine urgently needs
to modernise at least one large seaport, making it capable of taking the large
vessels used in transatlantic operations. It seems Odessa seaport was selected for
such a role should the new Governor of Odessa suceed in privatisating this asset
and attracting reliable foreign investment to fund the expansion project.
Another possible though not the best solution is to transition the power
sector back to gas. The gas supply to Ukraine from Russia is a process that has
strong political and financial support from the EU and the US. It seems that
Ukraine will continue to receive the gas from Russia at a more or less acceptable
price without any sharp declines in supply volumes. This therefore may guarantee
the gas-fired power plants the potential to continue their work. In contrast, the
coal supply is a game played by Ukraine alone, as even its close ally Poland
refused to fund the supply of coal from Silesia to Ukraine. Thus if it is a choice to
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select between two options Russian gas or Russian coal Ukraine has much
better negotiation positions for gas.
The situation with metallurgical coal is less dramatic as steel mills and cokechemical plants have significantly reduced their production (thus lowering the
total demand in metallurgical coal). However, it is not good for the competitive
positions of the Ukrainian steelmakers, especially in the export markets, where
their place is being re-occupied with suppliers from APAC and Russia.
The political tensions in eastern Ukraine have the visible economic
measures to make coal mining industry suffer greatly.

Ukrainian coal mining enterprises in 2014 saw a 22.4% decline in


production of raw coal from 2013, to 64.976 million tonnes, according to rough
estimates, the Ukrainian Energy and Coal Industry Ministry said.
Coking coal output last year fell by 32.1%, to 16.109 million tonnes, while
production of power-generating coal declined by 18.5%, to 48.867 million tonnes.
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The coalmines subordinated to the ministry reduced coal production by 26.6% in


2014, to 17.726 million tonnes. In particular, coking coal production decreased by
31.9%, to 4.602 million tonnes, while power-generating coal output fell by
24.5%, to 13.124 million tonnes.
In December 2014, coal production plummeted by 54.5% from December 2013,
to 3.429 million tonnes. In particular, coking coal output plunged by 72.8%, to
563,200 tonnes, while power-generating coal production decreased by 47.6%, to
2.866 million tonnes.
The ministry's coalmines in December 2014 cut production by 74.3%, to 581,800
tonnes. In particular, coking coal production plunged by 85%, to 100,100 tonnes,
power-generating coal fell by 69.8%, to 481,700 tonnes.
Coalmines in Donetsk region in 2014 produced 26.073 million tonnes of coal
(30.4% down from 2013), those in Luhansk region mined 17.879 million tonnes
(31.3% down), Dnipropetrovsk region 18.917 million tonnes (4% up on 2013),
Lviv region 1.816 million tonnes (20.3% up), and Volyn region 291,300 tonnes
(22.6% down).
Coal production in Donetsk region in December 2014 amounted to 1.084
million tonnes (66.8% down from December 2013), Luhansk region produced
485,400 tonnes of coal (78.7% down), Dnipropetrovsk region 1.674 million
tonnes (0.6% down), Lviv region 163,500 tonnes (12.7% up), and Volyn region
22,700 tonnes (35.9% down).
As reported, Ukraine has begun importing power-generating coal from South
Africa and Russia due to a decline in coal production in Donetsk and Luhansk
regions amid hostilities, which caused a decrease in coal stocks at thermal power
plants' warehouses.
Ukraine in 2013 saw a 2.6% decline in coal production from 2012, to 83.698
million tonnes. In particular, state-owned mines reduced coal production by 2.9%
in 2013, to 24.147 million tonnes.

Ukrainian coal : An industry divided


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The armed conflict in eastern Ukraine has broken the countrys coal
industry into two parts: one is under control of the authorities in Kiev, and another
one is under the control of pro-Russian rebels. By the end of November 2014, a
large number of mines in the country had been closed. Many of them have been
completely destroyed: they lie in the region ravaged by the war between Ukraines
troops and separatist rebels.
After the cease-fire at the beginning of 2015, the authorities in Kiev and the
leaders of the self-proclaimed republics announced the implementation of the
strategies for the development of their respective parts of the countrys coal chain.
The power plants and steel mills that consume coal are located mostly in distant
metropolitan areas controlled by Kiev or Russia. Export facilities in the Crimea
are now controlled by Russia. The prospects for the mines and the transportation
infrastructure remain unclear. A large investment will be required to restore the
mines. Before that can become a consideration, the geopolitical situation must be
resolved.
Until recently, Ukraine was the third largest coal producer in Europe. It will
probably never return to that level of production 85 million metric tons (mt) in
2013. In general, the prospects of overcoming this crisis for coal producers remain
as obscure as the prospects of ending the Ukraine conflict, as even the most
ambitious plans for both sides can quickly unravel as hostilities resume.
Ukraine Will Cut Coal Industry by Half
In early March 2015, the problems of the Ukraine coal industry, in addition to the
economics, gained social attention as 20,000 miners from the five coal-producing
regions of the country walked off the job. The chairman of the Independent Trade
Union of Miners of Ukraine Mikhail Volynets warned the authorities that if the
industrys problems were not resolved, another 10,000 miners would march on
Kiev to protest, which would tarnish the image of the new Ukrainian government.
And, they did.
About 20,000 coal miners in Ukraine launched strikes, protesting against
the plans of the government and demanding the payment of salary. (Photo credit:
Union of Miners of Ukraine)
Protest actions with several thousand miners took place April 21-24, 2015
at Independence Square, in front of the Presidents residence. Unrest among
miners has not stopped; regional protests are occurring weekly. As this edition
of Coal Age was going to press, Lvyv Coal Company had blocked the Lviv-RavaRusskay highway, demanding the payment of salary.
Most of the people employed by the Ukrainian coal industry have not
received compensation since October 2014. The miners, however, are asking for
17

more than salaries; they want Vladimir Demchishin, the Minister of Energy and
Coal Industry of Ukraine, to resign. He announced plans to close half of mines
and dismiss 27,000 miners by 2018; moreover, Demchishin has been criticized
recently by political opponents and coal operators, who see him as incompetent.
Demchishins stark vision for the future of Ukraines coal industry consists
of three steps. The first and probably the most important is the abandoning
of any state support for coal producers. Last year, state support for the coal
industry amounted to UAH 11 billion ($600 million). Its estimated that 70%-80%
of mines in the country are producing coal at a loss. The conditions of the
agreement for monetary support in the form of loans from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) stipulate that the government should no longer subsidize
loss-making industries.
The second step is the privatization of the mines, which are currently
owned by the Ministry. Today it owns 35 mines. The government hopes to sell as
many as 23 mines, while the remaining 12 would be closed. The government also
hopes the new owners will invest the capital to modernize these mines.
Demchishin stated that there are several preliminary investment agreements with
some Chinese companies for as much as $3.6 billion.
The third and last step is coal chain optimization, which provides that the
government would purchase coal for the lowest cost producer, or have the option
to import coal if its available at a lower price. This would bankrupt almost half of
the coal mines in the country, but it would improve the governments balance
sheet and it might lower electricity rates. The Energy Ministry estimates that, by
2018, this plan will reduce employment in the countrys coal industry from the
current level of 52,000 to less than 25,000.
No matter; Ukraines coal production will fall in the near term. In JanuaryFebruary 2015 (the latest statistics available), steam coal production dropped by
48.7%, or 4.8 million mt, to 5.87 million mt year-on-year. The production of
coking coal in the same period fell by 68.7%, or 2.8 million mt to 1.3 million mt.
Hardest hit in the current crisis are state-owned coal mines, which have the lowest
level of profitability. In January-February 2015 they decreased production by
71.5%, or 3.1 million mt, to 1.24 million mt, including coking coal production,
which dropped by 73.9%, or 1 million mt, to 0.3 million; also, energy coal
dropped by 70.4%, or 2.1 million mt, to 0.9 million mt.
In 2014, Ukraine reduced coal production by 22% to 65 million mt compared to
2013, including the coal production at the territories controlled by pro-Russian
rebels. Almost all forecasts say that this years drop would be more significant
and coal production can decrease by more than one-third. Ukraine might produce
40 million mt in 2015.

18

Republics Adopting Separate Development Program


The optimization plans that the Kiev government is considering does not include
any mines located in the territory controlled by pro-Russian rebels. The heads of
the so-called Donetsk Peoples Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk Peoples
Republic (LPR) previously stated that they want to sell coal to Ukraine Thermal
Power Plants (TPP). Some Kiev politicians favor purchasing coal from the selfproclaimed republics, but the official Kiev government is afraid that the money
will be diverted from the mines to support the rebels.
The future of almost all coal mines in the territories controlled by the proRussian rebels is clearly connected to geopolitical factors, especially decisions
made in Kiev. Acting on their own, the leaders of the rebels in March 2015
published a coal development program for 2015.
The program in the DPR provided that unrecognized republics this year will
produce 10.3 million mt of coal, according to the Ministry of Fuel and Energy
Complex of the rebel republic Eduard Polyakov. He said that this is 3 million mt
(or 41%) more than in 2014, and 5.4% greater than 2013, when the industry had
not yet felt the impact of the fighting.
Similar to the coal mines in the territories controlled by Kiev troops, the coal
mines in the self-proclaimed republics also have a very low level of profitability
and the rebel leaders promise to improve this situation by increasing efficiency.
In 2015, Polyakov said coal mines in the Donbass (a region under DPR control)
expect a 33% increase in development work, and they also expect to reduce
dilution (ash content) of coal by 1.9%. It is expected that this measure will
increase the value of the coal produced by about 4%, so mines this year will
receive additional UAH 250 million ($10.5 million) if they can sell this coal to
somebody.
The biggest problem for the coal industry in the self-proclaimed republic
is that it cannot legally export coal. The mines cannot even sell coal to Russia,
which is supporting the rebels, as Russian customs simply cannot legally accept
cargo not passed through Ukrainian customs. Ironically, all of the customs offices
in the region are controlled by the rebels. There are already large stocks of coal at
the warehouses throughout the region, and it is unclear where it finally will go.
The strategy for coal industry development in rebel republics has another
option. A special scheme has been developed which involves transporting coal to
the Russian port Taganrog and its further supply via the Azov and Black Seas to
the Middle East, in particular to Iran, Turkey and North Africa. The idea is not as
outrageous as it seems, as these countries have previously purchased coal from
the Donbass mines and lost the ability to do it just several months ago.
According to the head of the Industry Development Agency in the
government of DPR Yevgeny Lavrenov, there are dozens of enterprises in these
19

countries, which have been constructed by the Soviet Union, where the steel or
power production processes require the use of coal with similar characteristics as
those produced in the Donbass.
Russian analysts believe that there is a possibility that such coal-supply
agreements could really be concluded in the near term. Some companies,
depending on what happens between the U.S. and Iran, may not even hide it. The
first vice-president of the Russian Union of Engineers Ivan Andrievsky said that
the rebels republics today have enough political power to negotiate with Iran,
Turkey and North Africa for the sale of at least 2 million mt of coal annually.
According to Andrievsky, this issue will be crucial in the actions of the leaders of
self-proclaimed republics as coal production over the recent decades was the
economic mainstay of Donbass region. Without a coal industry, these regions now
have no chance to survive the current crisis and continue with their struggle for
sovereignty.
Moreover, experts coal mines at the rebel republics will likely conclude
non-official agreements this year and sell coal to Russian companies, which will
further supply it for export under the guise of Russian-origin coal. Obviously, this
scheme would be completely illegal and may result in the introduction of further
sanctions against some Russian companies, but the option still remains possible,
given the fact that in general, Russian politics became slightly adventurous last
year.

Figure 3 The gate of one of the coal mines in Donetsk Oblast. The sign translates to Coal is the gold of
Donbass.

Ukraine is well-endowed with energy resources, especially its 31 800


million tonnes of proven coal reserves as at the end of 2012, ranking the country
20

No. 7 in the world. Major coal deposits are located in the Donetsk, Lviv Volyn
and Dnipro coal basins, as well as in the Dnipro-Donets and Zakarpattya coal
depressions. The deposits are located in thin seams (0.8 1.0 metres) at an
average depth of around 700 metres. Some mines are deeper than 1 000 metres.
Although coal production declined significantly from 1990 to 1996, it has
stabilised since 2000. While Ukraine is totally self sufficient in coal, it remains
heavily reliant on natural gas and oil imports. Coal-fired power plants produced
38.2 % of Ukraines total electricity supply in 2011. Ukraines Energy Strategy to
2030, updated in 2013, envisages increasing the installed capacity of coal-fired
power plants by upgrading existing units and constructing new ones.
As of December 2012, more than 350 legal entities operated in the coal, lignite
and peat production, processing and agglomeration sectors in Ukraine, of which
approximately 250 produced and processed hard coal. There are more than 143
mines in Ukraine. The Ministry of Energy supervises 22 coal production
enterprises which operate 94 mines, including 43 private mines. The eight largest
companies account for approximately 63 % of domestic coal production.
Coal is sold either under bilateral contract on the free market or, in the case of
some sales from state-owned mines, via the wholesale market operator, Ugol
Ukrainy. Coal trading will become even more market based in 2013 as it moves
on to the Ukrainian Energy Exchange. By 2016, the government plans to further
liberalise the coal market, accelerate restructuring of the coal sector, close
unviable mines and privatise the remaining, more attractive coal mining
companies. From 2015 to 2030, the coal industry is expected to invest, steadily
grow and reach an output of 115 million tonnes.
In 2012, an agreement was signed for a $ 3.7 billion loan from the State Bank of
China for projects in Ukraine to substitute natural gas with domestic coal and for
the construction of coal gasification plants.

Hard coal

21

In 2012, total coal production increased by 4.0 % to 65.6 million tonnes.


Steam coal production accounted for 71.1 % of total production. Coal
consumption also increased to 74.3 million tonnes, of which 55.5 % was used in
power plants.
The increase in coal production in 2012 was achieved after several years of
capital investments in order to modernise the sector. State financing for the
technical modernisation of mines amounted to UAH 13.2 billion, with state mines
spending UAH 9.9 billion on capital expenditures in 2012, 72 % more than in
2011.
State enterprises produced 24.8 million tonnes in 2012, including 17.7 million
tonnes of steam coal and 7.2 million tonnes of coking coal. The share of state
enterprises in total domestic coal production has been decreasing due to structural
changes in the industry resulting from the Ukrainian energy privatisation
programme and increased investments by the private sector.
DTEK, the largest private energy company in Ukraine, produced 39.7 million
tonnes of run of mine coal, which accounted for approximately 46.1 % of
Ukraines total coal production. DTEK owns, leases or has concession rights to
operate 31 coal mines and 13 coal enrichment plants, including three mines and
one coal enrichment plant in Russia.
Based on Ukrainian government estimates of coal reserves, DTEK has production
licenses, after reserve reclassifications, new coal discoveries and acquisitions,
covering an estimated 1 699.7 million tonnes of reserves.
DTEKs operating subsidiary DTEK Pavlogradugol is the largest coal producing
company with an annual output of approximately 17.0 million tonnes. DTEK
Pavlogradugol operates ten mines and an integrated mining complex, including
transportation and production infrastructure, located in the Dnipropetrovsk region
of Ukraine, with estimated coal reserves of 652.9 million tonnes and a production
life of 52 years, assuming current production rates.
DTEKs subsidiary DTEK Mine Komsomolets Donbassa operates one mine and
coal enrichment plant located in the Donetsk region with estimated coal reserves
of 110.9 million tonnes and a production life of 43 years.
22

In 2011, DTEK entered into two 49 year concession agreements with the
Ministry of Energy and one 49 year lease agreement with the State Property
Fund, pursuant to which the companys subsidiaries, DTEK Rovenkyanthracite,
DTEK Sverdlovanthracite and DTEK Dobropolyeugol, operate six mines and an
integrated mining complex, including three coal enrichment plants, located in the
Donetsk and Lugansk regions, five mines and an integrated mining complex,
including three coal enrichment plants, located in the Dolzhano Rovenetskyi
region and five mines and an integrated mining complex located in the Donbass
region. As at 31 December 2012, DTEK Rovenkyanthracite, DTEK
Sverdlovanthracite and Coal industry across Europe 2013 57 DTEK
Dobropolyeugol have coal reserves of 162.9 million tonnes, 208.0 million tonnes
and 367.8 million tonnes with average production lives of 33 years, 40 years and
94 years respectively, assuming current production rates.
In February 2012, DTEK acquired a 95.4 % stake in its subsidiary
Bilozerska Mine, which operates one mine in the Dobropolsky region with
estimated coal reserves of 71.6 million tonnes and a production life of 90 years.
Also in 2012, the company acquired three mines located in the Rostov region of
Russia with aggregate reserves of 125.6 million tonnes and an average production
life of 73 years. The three Russian mines are operating through DTEKs
subsidiaries, Obukhovskaya, Don Anthracite and Sulinanthracite.
In 2012, DTEK exported 2.8 million tonnes of coal through its subsidiary,
DTEK Trading LLC, primarily to Turkey, India, Egypt, Russia, the USA and EU
member states. The country as a whole exported 6.1 million tonnes.

23

Lignite
Ukraine produces only small volumes of lignite less than 200 thousand
tonnes each year from the Olexandria and Mokra Kalyhirka deposits in the
Kirovohrad and Cherkasy regions, near the Dnipro River. However, with
estimated reserves of 2 336 million tonnes, there is great potential and in 2012
Ukraine and China began a joint project to exploit lignite for electricity generation
in the Kirovohrad region.

24

25

Majority of produced steam coal in Ukraine is consumed domestically for


electricity production. Coal comprised 43.7% of fuel for energy generating
companies in 2011, which makes it second most important fuel after nuclear.

Increased demand for steam coal is supported by underutilized capacity of


coal-burning TPPs, implementation of pulverized coal injection (PCI) technology
at metallurgical plants and increasing export volumes. However, currently
Ukraine has a surplus of anthracitic coal, which is mainly exported to Turkey,
Bulgaria and Western Europe countries.
Coal production in Ukraine halved over the last 20 years on the back of
low demand in the mid-1990s and on a lack of investments into sectors
development. Ukraine has a chance to restore former potential implementing
successful reforms.
26

Over the last 2 years, coal production increased by 14% from 72 mmt in 2009 to
82 mmt in 2011 mainly on increased production from private mines. Further
increase in mining output is expected after the privatization and modernization of
nearly 100 state mines.

27

Ukraine Coal Exports by Year


year

exports

change

1980

NA

1981

NA

1982

NA

1983

NA

1984

NA

1985

NA

1986

NA

1987

NA

1988

NA

1989

NA

1990

NA

1991

NA

1992

8,708.26

NA

1993

4,548.14

-47.77 %

1994

4,526.09

-0.48 %

1995

2,645.55

-41.55 %

1996

2,947.58

11.42 %

1997

3,012.62

2.21 %

1998

2,430.60

-19.32 %

1999

2,881.44

18.55 %

2000

3,742.35

29.88 %

2001

5,632.81

50.52 %

2002

4,623.09

-17.93 %

2003

6,053.89

30.95 %

2004

7,802.16

28.88 %

2005

4,041.07

-48.21 %

28

2006

4,279.17

5.89 %

2007

4,631.91

8.24 %

2008

6,395.61

38.08 %

2009

6,847.56

7.07 %

2010

8,443.71

23.31 %

2011

9,896.55

17.21 %

2012

8,204.50

-17.10 %

Ukraine Consumtion by Year


year

consumption

change

1980

NA

1981

NA

1982

NA

1983

NA

1984

NA

1985

NA

1986

NA

1987

NA

1988

NA

1989

NA

1990

NA

1991

NA

1992

132,331.40

NA

1993

114,773.80

-13.27 %

1994

92,090.40

-19.76 %

1995

94,668.70

2.80 %

1996

74,109.49

-21.72 %

1997

71,511.34

-3.51 %

1998

72,537.60

1.44 %

1999

71,912.59

-0.86 %

2000

72,349.10

0.61 %

29

2001

70,000.08

-3.25 %

2002

70,665.88

0.95 %

2003

77,432.96

9.58 %

2004

69,248.30

-10.57 %

2005

70,633.91

2.00 %

2006

76,103.58

7.74 %

2007

76,964.48

1.13 %

2008

72,307.22

-6.05 %

2009

61,879.35

-14.42 %

2010

68,571.48

10.81 %

2011

70,641.63

3.02 %

2012

77,327.14

9.46 %

How crucial is Eastern Ukraine coal?

The collapse of coal production in the territories controlled by the selfproclaimed DNR and LNR is an outcome of conflict in eastern Ukraine. As of
December 1, 2014, the coal reserves at Ukrainian coal-fueled power plants
decreased by 2.5 times relative to the same period last year. Given this sharp
deficit of coal, Ukraines Cabinet of Ministers was forced to look for coal abroad
to cover the shortage. Ukrinterenergo, a state-owned foreign trade company,
signed a contract with British Steel Mont Trading Ltd to purchase 1 million tons
of coal from South Africa in August. The first South African coal was delivered at
the end of October, but due to some political factors South African coal was
declared unfit for the usage. Because Ukraine cannot take out about three million
tons of coal from the Donbas (extracted by Ukrainian state-owned mines), the
nations leadership has no choice but to continue looking for the alternative
energy suppliers. Kazakhstan could export coal to Ukraine from Ekibastuz coal
field and cover some of Ukraines needs.
30

Given reduced import of Russian gas, having a stable supply of coal is


critically important for the energy security of Ukraine. Today, the major obstacles
to its security are ongoing armed conflicts in the war-torn region of Donbas,
which halted the work of 68 coal mines. However, even if the peace is established
in the region, the industry will still have many problems.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraines coal industry was in a
severe crisis, which was a continuation of the trend that started in the Soviet
period: coal production fell from 216 million tons in 1975 to 189 million tons in
1985 and even more sharply later from 165 million tons in 1990 to 71 million tons
in 1996. The Donbas has been experiencing the difficulties typical for the coalmining regions of Germany (Ruhr), the UK (North East England), Poland (Upper
Silesia) and Russia (Kuzbass) in the last third of the 20th century. A large number
of unprofitable mines and quarries, alive exclusively due to the financial support
from the state budget, was a clear signal that the industry needs a thorough reform
that would help to make the industry more profitable.

Figure 4oal production in Ukraine, mln tons,1975-1996 and Average annual


production of one miner in Ukraine, Russia and Poland, tons of coal

31

Strong trade unions in the mining industry were a serious obstacle to these
steps. Although in the 1990s the number of miners did not exceed 5% of total
employment in Ukrainian economy, miners triggered more than a half of all
organized strikes at that times. Their demands had not only economic (e.g.
provide each miners family with a separate apartment), but also political, be it the
constitutional nature provision to the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine
(1991) and holding of early presidential elections (1993). Moreover, their actions
had a serious impact on the political spectrum within the higher echelons of
power. So in 1993 after the miners march on Kiev, Yefim Zviagilskiy, who was
the director of the Zasyadko mine and the chairman of the Donetsk executive
committee and Donetsk City Council, was appointed to the First Deputy Prime
Minister. Largely because of his influence, the Cabinet allocated the huge
subsidies for the coal industry, the total amount of which at the end of 1993 was a
record-breaking: 3.8% of GDP. The situation significantly changed after Leonid
Kuchma was elected as the President of Ukraine in 1994. Coming from
Dnepropetrovsk, he tried to limit the influence of the Donetsk clan, which could
have been done via restricting of the Donbass coal industry. Given a high inflation
and a severe contraction of GDP, the government could reduce the amount of
subsidies for the coal mines to 0.7% of GDP in 1995. At the same time the
Cabinet began intensive negotiations with the World Bank which lead to a
program of radical reforms aimed to create a competitive coal market in Ukraine.
In December 1996, the World Bank and Ukraines Cabinet of Ministers
signed an agreement on the allocation of 300 million dollars intended for coal
reform implementation. Over the next four years about seventy unprofitable
mines were closed, which led to the dismissal of more than 150 thousand
employees. However, the industry continued to depend on the subsidies: at the
end of 2000 the subsidy was close to 1.1% of GDP. Yulia Tymoshenko Deputy
Prime Minister for Energy in a pro-reform government of Viktor Yushchenko,
who headed the Cabinet of Ministers in 1999-2001apparently had to resign

32

when the government after an attempt to eliminate the subsidies. Vitaliy Hayduk,
her successor, previously worked as Deputy Head of the Donetsk Regional
Administration and was also involved in the creation of the Industrial Union of
Donbass Corporation that traded gas. In December 2002 Viktor Yanukovych, the
former governor of the Donetsk region, became the Prime Minister and ensured
the preservation of coal industry subsidies. The situation did not change after the
Orange Revolution, too: during the period from 2005 to 2010 the amount of
subsidies increased from UAH 3.3 billion (0.74% GDP) to UAH 7.7 billion
(0.71% GDP).

A number of problems of the coal industry remains unresolved to this day.


First of all, the productivity is low. While the average annual production of one
miner in Poland in 2007 stands at 761 tons of coal, the Ukrainian counterpart got
only 189 tons. Difficult mining conditions (the average depth of current existing
mines is 700 m) result in an extremely high death and injury rate: the number of
deaths in mining accidents per 1 million ton of coal extracted is 2.2 as of 2008.
For comparison, in Russia, even during the unfavorable for the coal industry year
of 2007, when the release of methane in the Ulyanovsk Mine took the lives of 110
people, this rate was 0.77. The other Achilles heel of the Ukrainian coal industry
is maintenance of the non-market pricing, a key role in which is played by The
Coal of Ukraine State Enterprise that buys the coal from state mines and resells it
to the power plants.
n teritoriile controlate de gruparile separatiste pro-ruse si
trupele ruse regulate, se afla 60% din minele ucrainene (88
de companii), crbunele fiind extras in 24 dintr-un total de 93 de mine din
Donbass. Acest lucru a fost anunat n cadrul unei ntlniri ce a avut loc n
orasul Lysychanskintre reprezentantii industriei mineritului, transmiteserviciu de
presa al Administraiei Regionale din Lugansk.
n legtur cu luptele n partea de est a Ucrainei, care au nceput la sfritul lunii
aprilie, din 93 de mine de carbunedin Donbas, se extrage carbune doar in 24, la
care se adauga 12 mine aflate n alte regiuni din Ucraina. n total sunt 36 de mine,
a declarat ministrul adjunct al energiei din Ucraina, Yuriy Zyukov.
El a precizat c 60 de mine sunt in conservare, iar alte 7 sunt distruse complet.
33

Oficialul a adugat c pe teritoriul controlat de grupurile teroriste se afla 88


de mine. Acest lucru inseamna 60% din numrul total de mine din Ucraina, a
conchis Zyukov.
Din cauza lipsei de crbune termic, exploatat in mare parte n zona de
rzboi, Ucraina a redus cu 50% exportul de energie electric.
Mai mult dect att, teroritii au blocat lilvrarile de crbune spre Ucraina. n
acelai timp, dup cum anunta managementulminelor din zona ocupata,
carbunele din Donbas este n mod constant incarcat si trimis cu grantituri de
tren spre Federaia Rus.
Nicaieri in Ucraina colapsul economic al tarii nu este atat de socant
precum in orasul Vuhlehirsk. Aici locuiesc 8.000 de oameni si nicio cladire nu a
ramas nedoborata de bombardamentele rebelilor pro-rusi, in campania lor de a
cuceri orasul Debatseve. In Vuhlehirsk functiona, inainte de inceperea razboiului,
o mina de carbune importanta. A ajuns sa fie inundata atunci cand i s-a taiat
electricitatea acum cateva luni iar statiile de pompare au fost oprite. Vulhehirsk se
afla la 80 de kilometri de Donetk.
Economia Ucrainei este cenusa. FMI-ul si-a reevaluat in scadere
previziunile economice pe 2015, estimand o contractie de economica de 9% desi
o serie de analisti spun ca scaderea va fi de 10%! La sfarsitul anului, inflatia va
ajunge la 46% din cauza ritmului accelerat in care creste pretul la gaz. Insa FMI
apreciaza ca Ucraina este la timp cu toate reformele cerute de fond. Desi numai
4% din teritoriul Ucrainei este sub controlul rebelilor, premierul Iateniuk a notat
ca Ucraina a pierdut 20% din economie. Donbas era hubul industrial al Ucrainei.
Chiar daca conflictul din Ucraina nu se va stinge, modul in care aceasta tara
disperata va reusi sa isi revina va depinde foarte mult de ritmul in care industria si
infrastructura vor fi reparate. Va depinde si de cat de repede Ucraina va reusi sa se
interconecteze cu drumuri si cai ferate, in ciuda determinarii liderilor rebeli prorusi de a obtine autonomia in regiunile Donetsk si Lugansk.
Ministrul Energiei ucrainene a spus ca tara sa controleaza doar 35% din
cele 95 de mine de carbune, vitale pentru sustinerea retelelor de energie electrica.
Restul minelor se afla pe teritoriile controlate de rebeli si sunt inundate.
Situatia Ucrainei este de-a dreptul dramatica. Vanzarile din retail au scazut cu
30% in ultimele doua luni iar vanzarile de automobile s-au prabusit cu 76% in
perioada ianuarie aprilie. Populatia ucraineana este presata atat de cotele mari
de inflatie cat si de faptul ca guvernul de la Kiev a dispus inghetarea salariilor si a
pensiilor. In plus, Kievul are probleme si cu rezervele monetare si isi achita cu
greutate datoriile externe. Media salariilor lunare in Ucraina este de 186 de dolari
iar puterea de cumparare a monedei ucrainene este decimata de nivelul ridicat al
inflatiei. Kievul respecta si reteta austera impusa de FMI care a redus cu 30 de
miliarde de dolari programele sale sociale. Rata somajului in Ucraina este doar de
10% insa oricand aceasta cifra se poate dubla. Singura veste buna pe care
ucrainenii au primit-o in ultima perioada este ca, in sectorul bancar, a existat o
crestere in luna aprilie a depozitelor private, acest lucru intamplandu-se pentru
prima oara din ianuarie 2014.
34

Unii analisti sustin ca singura sansa a Ucrainei de a o lua de la capat este


sa intre in incapacitate de plata si sa nu mai isi poata achita datoriile internationale
in fata creditorilor sai. Detinatorii straini de titluri de stat ucrainene sunt
investitori sofisticati. Aici vorbim si despre una dintre cele mai mari firme de
investitii americane. Atunci cand s-au apucat de investit in Ucraina, stiau foarte
bine la ce riscuri se expun. In mod normal, banii de la FMI ar trebui sa fie
injectati in economia ucraineana, nu catre achitarea datoriilor catre creditorii
straini. Pana acum, Ucraina a primit 10 miliarde de dolari de la FMI in ultimele
12 luni iar aceasta suma a fost redirectionata imediat catre plata investitorilor
straini care au bagat bani in titlurile de stat ucrainene.
Pentru a ajuta Ucraina, FMI si donatorii din Vest au cazut de-acord sa acorde
Kievului 40 de miliarde de dolari pentru a stabiliza economia. Suma este
infiorator de mica in comparatie cu ce probleme are Ucraina. Mai important este
ca FMI-ul cere ca 15 miliarde de dolari din aceasta asistenta financiara sa vina din
restructurarea titlurilor de stat ale Ucrainei. In esenta, FMI cere ca cei care au
investit in Ucraina sa accepte o parte din investitia facuta. Evident, o asemenea
solutie este de neacceptat pentru creditori.
Separatitii din Donbas au acaparat minele de extragere a crbunelui din estul Ucrainei, iar
analitii vorbesc despre patru scheme de contraband care i-ar mbogi de pe urma aurului
negru, n timp ce preul acestuia pe piaa neagr s-a majorat de trei ori.
Potrivit unei investigaii realizate de postul TV ucrainean TSN, mii de familii de mineri
ucraineni mor de foame dup ce separatitii care au acaparat minele le ofer de patru ori mai
puini bani pentru lucrrile de extragere. Teroritii au vzut n extragerea crbunelui o
posibilitate s-i aureasc buzunarele, de aceea au lansat ntre ei un adevrat rzboi al
crbunelui.
Dup ce ucrainenii plteau anul trecut pn la o mie de hrivne pentru o ton de crbune,
anul acesta au ajuns s plteasc i dou mii de hrivne la nceputul toamnei, iar acum pe piaa
neagr o ton de crbune cost 3,2 mii de hrivne. Evoluia preurilor este demonstrat i de
anunurile de pe Internet.
Ucraina a investit, n ultimii cinci ani, 167 de milioane de hrivne sau circa 190 de milioane de
euro n extragerea crbunelui n Harkov i Donek, iar acum separatitii au distrus minele n
cteva luni.
Circa 60 de mine din 95 nu funcioneaz, iar 15 sunt complet distruse. Chiar dac
minerii din Donbas sunt cei care au fost adepii lumii ruse i chiar au luat armele n mn,
acum lumea rus nu a venit cu acelai rspuns. Sunt nevoii ca pentru bnui s munceasc mai
departe n aceste guri, fiind impui de ocupani, susine ministrul Energiei i Industriei
Crbunelui, Iuri Ziukov.
Jurnalitii ucraineni au depistat patru scheme prin care separatitii vnd crbunele. Prima se
refer la comercializarea prin posturile vamale ale administraiei ilegale din regiunile
separatiste, iar a doua prevede livrarea n Rusia pentru ca ulterior crbunele s ajung pe piaa
ucrainean.
Rusia nu are nevoie de crbunele nostru, deoarece l au pe al lor la un pre de 30 de
dolari, a respins aceast variant ministrul Ziukov. Totui, observatorii OSCE au fixat recent
35

cazuri n care crbunele ucrainean era transportat n Rusia.


A treia schem vorbete despre vnzarea crbunelui la ntreprinderile de asigurare cu
agent termic de pe teritoriul ocupat de insurgenii rui, iar a patra - despre un schimb dintre Rusia
i Ucraina prin intermediul mainilor cu ncrctur umanitar trimise de Moscova teroritilor.
Investigaia dezvluie drama pensionarilor ucraineni care trebuie s dea dou pensii pentru o
ton de crbune i lupta acerb ntre cei care protejeaz separatitii rui pentru aurul negru.

36