Olson 1

ThePoliticsofthe1970
CleanAirAct
KayleyOlson
PPS301
ProfessorSampson
WinterTerm2016

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Introduction
TheCleanAirAct(CAA)ofthe1970isthebiggestandmostindepthpieceof
environmentallegislationthathasbeenimplemented.Itnotonlyestablishedtheair
qualitycontrolthateachstateneededbutaswellastheexpansionofthefederal
governmentspowerovertheregulationofstatesandtheemissionsoftheirconstituents.
TheCAAisoneoftheonlypiecesoflegislationtobepassedbyalargemajorityof
Congressdespitepartisanshipontheissue.Controversythatcamefromthispieceof
legislationstemmedfromthepowershiftthatwouldoccurbetweenthestatesandthe
federalgovernment.Moreso,therewasaproblemwiththestatesconstituents,mainly
automobileandfuelindustriesagainstelectedofficials.
Alloftheproblemsthatarosefromthepossibilityofhavingastrongercentral
governmentshouldhaveturnedRepublicansawayfromwantingtopassthebill.
However,therewerestillmanythatvotedinfavorofthisbill,includingRepublicanswho
werenotthemajorityineitherChamberatthetime.Thequestionarisesthen,what
promptedthemtopossiblyvotethewaytheydidwhenitwasnotintheirpolitical
ideologytonecessarilydoso.Fromthoroughanalysisoflookingatthepolicyprocess
andthepolicyactorsthatwereinvolvedintheimplementationoftheCAA,itturnsout
thatwhileitcouldhavebeenelectedofficialsgenuineconcernfortheenvironment,there
wasamoreprobablecauseofthemwantingtogetreelected.Inordertodoso,elected

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officialsmusthavebeenincompliancewithwhatthepeoplewantedatthetimedespite
whatthevoterideologywas.Forvoters,theywerelessconcernedaboutelectionssinceit
wasnottheirpoweratstake,butconcernedwiththeirpublichealth.Inturn,the
implementationoftheCAAcamedowntothepoliticsinvolvedinitsimplementation.
LiteratureReview
TheresearchcoveringtheCAA,anditsfirstimpactfulimplementationin1970
afterNixonassumedofficebringsuptwomajorreservations,groupshadwhenitcameto
theimplementationoftheCAA.Theexpansionoffederalgovernmentoverlocal
governmentcausedforconcernwhichgovernmenttrulyknowswhatisbestforthestates.
Thisbroughtuptheissueoflocalconstituentssuchasautomobileindustriesthatare
locatedinspecificstateswoulddowiththenewairqualityregulations,andhowitwould
effecttheirlocalgovernmentsince,insomestates,theyaremainrevenuegenerators.
TheseissueswhileimportantandbroughtupdeliberationwhiletheCAAwasgoing
throughCongress,itstillpassedwithflyingcolorswhenitcamedowntoavote.
FederalGovernmentv.StateGovernment
FederalandStateGovernmentshavedifferentstandpointswhenitcomestothe
importanceofenvironmentalpolicy,especiallywhenitisbeingimplementedonafederal
level.Itispointedoutintheliteraturethattherearespecificregionsthatmaybenefit
fromcertainenvironmentalpolicyasopposedtoothers.Crandall(1983)suggeststhat
thereisaconflictofinterestbetweenstatesandthewellbeingfortheircitizensandthe
benefitsofattractingbigbusinessesfortheirlocaleconomy.Crandall(1983)says,The
usualpoliticalargumentforanationalenvironmentalpolicyisbasedontheneedto

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preventstatesfromusingenvironmentalconcessionstoattractindustry.Withoutuniform
federalpolicies,itisargued,stateswouldbeforcedtothelowestcommondenominatorin
environmentalstandards.Thisargumentignorestheopportunityforstatestooffer
prospectivebusinessesotherincentivesifthecitizensvalueenvironmentalquality.In
turn,somestategovernmentswerelessacceptingofgivinguptheircontroloftheirown
geographicalaircontrolstandards,andgiveittothefederalgovernmenttodictateasa
whole.Stategovernmentswerekeepinginmindthebestinterestofthosewhobringin
money,overthehealthandenvironmentalimpactthatsomethingcouldhaveontheir
state.
Statespriortothe1970CAAweredoingrelativelylittletonothingtoaddressair
pollutionproblemsintheirstateundertheAirQualityAct(AQA)of1967.AsBryner
(1995)pointsout,thattheAQAwasinadequateinenforcingstatestoestablishairquality
standardsuntilNixontookofficeandpushedfortheCAAlegislationBryner(1995)
furthersaysthatfromtheimplementationoftheCAA,theEnvironmentalProtection
Agency(EPA)wasestablishedtobetheenforcerofeverythingenvironmentalpolicy
overstategovernments.Whenstatesfailedtocomplywithnationalambientairquality
standards(NAAQS)assetforthbytheEPA,theEPAwouldstepintoformulatea
federalplanthatwouldbeimplementedonthatgivenstate.DaviesandMazurek(1998)
furtheremphasizethepointofthestrengththatthenationalgovernmenthasoverlocal
governmentwhentheysay,Theseactsgavethefederalgovernmentthedominantrolein
settingpollutioncontrolstandardsandgreatlystrengthenedthefederalenforcementrole.
TheCAAplayedamajorroleinexpandingtheroleoffederalgovernmentintheroleof

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localgovernment.Moreimportantlytherewereoversteppinggroundswhereitwas
originallyincontrolofstategovernmentundertheAQA.
AlotoftheresearchwrittenontheCAAemphasizestheideathatthefederal
governmentspowerexpandedoverthecontroloflocalgovernment.Theimportance
beingthattherewasoverlappingcontroloffederalpoliciesconflictingwiththespecific
needsofstatesinregardstomajorautomobilefactoriesandtheiremissions.Whilethe
stateswereallowedtocomeupwithplansontheirowntomeetthestandardsassetby
thegovernment,failuretocomplywiththemwouldbebackedupbythepowerofthe
EPA,asBryner(1995)says.Bailey(1998)describesthatpowerintheCAAexpanded
overalsowhichpollutantsweretobecontrolledspecificallybyfederalpolicies.Bailey
(1998)states,Toimproveenforcementoftheairpollutioncontrollaws,Nixonproposed
thatFederalauthoritytoseekcourtactionbeextendedtoincludebothinterand
intrastateairpollutionsituations,andtoincreasethefinefornoncompliancewithair
pollutionstandardsto$10,000perday.Asstatedbefore,theabilityforstatestocreate
airqualitystandardsundertheAQAwereinadequate,soundertheCAAasBailey(1998)
sumsup,andagreeswiththeotherresearchwrittenontheCAA,TheCleanAir
Amendments1979notonlypreemptedmuchofthisauthorityofthestates,butalso
expandedtherangeofpollutants.
WhenitcametotheimplementationoftheCAA,andthedelegationsoverthe
topicwerediscussedinCongress,mostofCongresswasincompliancewithallowingthe
governmenttoexpandtheirpoweroverstatesandtheirairquality,despitepartisanships
inCongress.TheSubcommitteeonPublicHealthandWelfare(1970)notes,Anumber

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ofwitnessesarguesthatanexpansionoffederalauthoritywasrequired.Rep.AbnerJ.
Mikva(D.Ill)declaredthat:ThepresentapproachofFederalcoordinationofair
pollutionrequiresaninterstatesolution:FederalStandards,Federalenforcement,and
privateremediesinFederalcourtswhenenforcementfails.Theissueoffederal
governmentv.stategovernmentwasnotanissueofsenatorsandcongresspeoplenot
wantingtopassthelegislation,butratheranissueofprivatesectorsinspecificstatesthat
wouldnowhavetoabidebytherulessetforthbythisfederalpolicy.
ThePublicSectorv.ThePrivateSector
Politiciansandprivatebusinessesinlocalgovernmentshaveissueswiththe
implementationoftheCAAandhowitaffectedthemindividually.Theargumentof
statesnotwantingtohavetheimplementationoftheCAA,camedowntomainlythe
localbusinessesandthemoneythatcouldbeobtainedbyhavinglargercorporationsthat
havesignificantairpollutionbeallowedtoemitharmfulemissions.Forthebenefitsof
businesses,especiallyindustrialbasedindustries,theydidnotwantfederalregulationon
whattheycouldandcouldnotdo,sincethepowerofregulationhadultimatelybeenlifted
fromthestatesandputintothehandsofthegovernment.
Assaidbefore,politicianswereinfavorofimplementingthispolicy,becauseone,
itwaswhattheywantedfortheirstate,andtwo,forotherpoliticians,itwouldgainthem
reelectioneveniftheydidnotagreeonwantingtoexpandtheroleofthefederal
government.DuringtheimplementationprocessoftheCAAandtheresponsethatpeople
hadtoRep.AbnerJ.MikvasaidaccordingtotheSubcommitteeinPublicHealthand
Welfare(1970),Thissolutionwasopposedbyindustrialgroupswhoarguedthatthebest

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waytoimprovethecontrolofairpollutionwouldbetolimittheauthorityofthefederal
government.HerbetS.Richey,amemberoftheboardofdirectorsoftheUnitedStates
ChamberofCommerce,toldtheSubcommitteethat:Toavoiddelaysinairpollution
controlprogramsincreasedresponsibilityshouldbegiventolocalandstateairpollution
agencies.Itisarguedthat,inthebestinterestofprivatebusinessestokeepthrivingat
theratetheywereinagivenstate,thelocalgovernmentwouldkeeptheirbestinterestat
heartandlistenmoretotheindustrializedbusinessesthatwerebrininginrevenuetothat
localgovernment,assaidbyBecker(1983).
Asfearedbeforebytheprivatesector,withtheexpansionofthefederal
governmenttocontrolmoreandmorepollutantsastimewenton,camestricterpolicies
forthelocalgovernmentsthatdirectlyeffectedbusinesses,particularlyfueland
automobileindustries.Bailey(1998)says,Rep.Rogersensuredthattheprovisionson
airqualitystandardsandstateimplementationplanswerestricterthandesiredbythe
Administration.Newprovisionswerealsoaddedtomakeeachstateanairqualityregion,
establishstandardsforaircraftemissions,andobligefederalfacilitiestocomplywiththe
airpollutioncontrolrequirementsoffederal,stateandlocalgovernments.Accordingto
Muskie(1990),whilelocalgovernmentswantedtobeonthesideofbusinesseswhowere
generatingrevenuefortheirlocalgovernment,thelocalgovernmentshadtocomplywith
federalregulation.Thisleftindustrializedbusinessestosufferduetoallthestrings
attachedandthefinesthatcouldcometothestateswithnoncomplianceoffederal
regulations.Thebusinesseswerehithardtocomplywithfederalregulation,which
explainstheirreservationsofwantingtheimplementationoftheCAAtogothrough.No

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onewouldlookoutforthem,andtheywouldhavenothingbutbeforcedtocomplywith
thenewregulations.
Specificallyspeakingwiththeautomobileandfuelindustry,localgovernments
stillsawtheimportanceofhavingthesebusinessesproducingattheratetheywerebefore
theimplementationoftheCAA.Delegationsoccurredtoaccommodateforthehardhits
thatwouldhappenfortheautomobileindustrytomakeamendmentsbeforeitwas
implemented.Bailey(1998)writes,Althoughthebillreceivedbroadbipartisansupport,
theprovisionsonautomobileemissionsandfuelstandardsprovedcontentious,anda
numberofamendmentswereofferedthatsoughttomakethebilllesspalatabletothe
automobileandfuelindustries.Infairnesstotheautomobileandfuelindustry,itwas
recognizedbymembersofCongressthattheautomobileindustrywouldbehitthehardest
andthatthiswouldcausealargeneedforadaptiontooccursincemostAmericansrelyon
automobilesastheirmainwayoftransportation,eveniftheyownanautomobile
privatelyornot.
Manycompanies,notjustautomobilecompaniesspecifically,butcompaniesthat
werelargelyindustrialmadeargumentsthattherestrictiononairpollutionwastosoonto
do,andthattheserestrictionscouldnotbeeffectivelyregulatedtohelpthequalityofthe
air.Bailey(1998)writes,Thestandardbearersofmostindustrialgroupsdisagreed.
HerbertS.RicheyrepeatedtheoppositionoftheUSChamberofCommercetonational
emissionstandards.Hedeclaredtheindustryopposednationalemissionstandards
becausetheyarenotresponsivetotheneedsanddemandsoflocalconditions.Inother
words,peopleinfavorfortheindustrializedbusinessesandwhattheybringtothe

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economy,couldsimplynotmeetthefederallevelsofwhatneededtobeaccomplished
basedonthefactthattheycannotmeetthemonlocallevels.Thisdebateonhowthese
industriessimplycannotmeetthelevelsofregulationassetforthbythefederal
governmentcontinuedwithpeoplefromtheNationalSteelCorporation,theChevron
ResearchCompany,andtheManufacturingChemistsAssociation.
Summary
EventhrougheverythingthattheCAAsetforthsayingthattherewouldbea
balancebetweenstatesandthefederalgovernmentwherestateswouldbeimportantto
theprocessofmeetingregulationsinstates,thiswasnotdone.Bythishappening,it
effectedmorethanjustthelossofpowerinstatesbutthehardhitsthatcametothe
businessesinstates.DaviesandMazurek(1998)say,EPAsregionalofficesfedthe
stateappetiteforindependence.DespitenumerousEPAdeclarationsthatthestateswere
partnersandshouldbetreatedassuch,regionalofficesoftentreatedstateofficialsas
incompetentsubordinates.Eventhoughtherewereeffortsfromthestatesidetopossibly
helptheautomobileandfuelindustry,itwasnotenoughtogetanyamendmentspassedin
theSubcommitteestogetpassedduringthedelegationofthelegislationoftheCAA.
TheresearchthatcoversthepoliticsoftheCAAbreaksitdownintoissuesthat
arosebetweenfederalandstategovernment,andtheissuesbetweenthepoliticiansand
corporations.Ultimatelythejourneytofindmiddlegroundontheissuespresentedbythe
federalgovernmentandtheurgencytocontrolairpollution,andlocalgovernmentsand
theirlossofpowerintheirownstatesthataffectedtheircorporateconstituentswasnever
foundandthefederalgovernmentwonwiththeirpowerandabilitytocontrolstatesand

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theairpollution.Therepresentativesofstatesfortheirownconstituencieswere
ultimatelybackedintoacornerbythefederalgovernmenttoadheretothepoliciesofthe
CAAdespiteconcernsfromtheirconstituents.
Discussion
Fromwhatwassaidintheresearchespeciallyinbringinguptheissuesthat
occurredintheimplementationoftheCAAsuchastheissuesbetweenfederalandlocal
governments,andpoliticiansandcorporatebusinessowners,thereisthequestionasto
howthislegislationstillpassedevenwiththereservationsthatcamefromSenatorsand
CongressPeopleabouthowitwouldeffectthepowerstateswouldhaveandhowit
wouldeffecttheirlocalconstituencies?Whywouldpeoplewanttopassalegislationthat
wouldaffecttheirpower?Ononesideoftheargument,onecouldassertthatitisdueto
thegenuineconcernpoliticianshaveforthehealthoftheirconstituents.Butinreality,
anythingdealingwithpolicycomespoliticsandtheneedtofeedintothepoliticalpower
ofthepoliticians.Thisisthetrueassertionforthequestion,thatpoliticianspassedthe
CAAnotforthehealthbenefitsthatitwouldbringtheirconstituents,butthepolitical
backingtheywouldgetfromtheirvoterstomaintainincumbency.
ThebenefitsofpoliticiansbackingtheCAAwerefartoogreattopassup,evenif
itdidmeangoingagainstsomeoftheirownpartisanshipideologies,andtheideologiesof
theirconstituents.Thiscanallbeproventhroughlookingattheanalysisofthepolicy
processandthepolicyactorsinregardstotheCAA.Thesetwoveryimportantstepsin
makingpolicybringsforththepoliticsthatgointoacongressionalvoteonagivenpolicy.

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ThepolicyprocessfortheCAAbeganwiththechangingofadministrationsand
furthermorethechangingofthepoliticalagendain1970.
PolicyProcess
AccordingtoDaviesandMazurek(1998)itwasduringthe1970swhenNixon
assumedofficethattheagendahadshiftedtoprioritizeenvironmentalpolicyasthemost
important.DaviesandMazurek(1998)say,Despiteearlierinitiativesandprecedents,
muchoftheofenvironmentalproblemstobeaddressedwasestablishedintheearly
1970s.Theverybasisofthepolicyprocess,accordingtoSampson(2016)comesfrom
settingtheagenda,creatingsolutions,makingachoice,andthenimplementingthatsaid
decisions.AccordingtoParker(1992),inthe1970sthesettingofthepoliticalagenda
camefromtheswitchofpoliticaladministrationsafterthe1968electionswhenthe
JohnsonadministrationwasreplacedbythenewlyelectedNixonadministration.
IntoNixonstermaspresidenttherewasanemergenceoftheimportantthe
peoplehadfortheenvironment,asdiscussedbyParker(1992).Thispushthatgotthe
attentionofthemanythatshowcasedtheimportanceoftheenvironmentandkeepingit
sustainableskyrocketedenvironmentalpolicytothetopofthepoliticalagenda.As
discussedbyHarriganandVogel(2007),thisisaveryimportantkeyfactorinpolicy,
whenitgainsrecognitionfromthepublicbecauseitputspressureontheelectedofficials
whoactonbehalfofthepublictoultimatelymakethedecisionforthemtosolvethe
problemofinadequateairstandards.Moreso,thisisanimportantpressurethathitthe
electedofficialsbecausetheycouldnotignorethepublicproblemthathadbeendeemed
asanurgentissue.

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Whenthepolicyprocessworksinfavorofcertaintypesofpolicies,itisdoneso
wherepoliticianscannotbeimpartial,especiallywhenthereispressurefromconstituents
toactonanissue.InregardstotheCAA,electedofficialsweregettingpressuredtoactin
favorofthispolicydespitetheirpartisanships,assaidbyBryner(1983).Republicans
understoodthatbypassinginfavoroftheCAAtheywouldgiveuppowerfortheirstate
becauseitwouldbegoingtotheEPA,andinturngivingfederalgovernmentmore
power.AsknownofmostRepublicans,theyarenotinfavorofgivinggovernment
power,theyareinfavorofsmallergovernments.Butevenso,RichardNixon,whowas
Republicanatthetimeofhispresidencywhenthisbillwasbeingpassedthrough,sawthe
needtosupportthisbillbecauseinCongressatthetime,boththeHouseandtheSenate
hadDemocratsasthemajorityleader,asnotedbyMuskie(1990).
Inturn,whenlookingattheentiretyofallthepartsofthepolicyprocess,
especiallytheimplementationofthepolicy,itcanbeseenthateventhePresidentwho
wasRepublicanatthetime,neededtoworkwithhisgovernmentpeersintheHouseand
theSenatewhichbothwereranbytheDemocraticparty.AsParker(1992)notes,thatin
termsofnumbers,andwhowasagainstwho,Democratshadthenumberstopassthebill
whentheygainedthesupportfromPresidentNixon,howeverthereisstillthequestionas
towhytheRepublicansstillvotedinawaythatmadetheCAApassinalmostacomplete
landslide.Thisisseenintheactorsofthepolicyprocess,becauseeventhoughelected
officialsaretheonesmakingthedecisions,assaidbeforetherewaspressuretomakeair
qualityanimportantissueofthe1970s.Thisallcamefrompressureledbyinterest
groups,socialmovements,themedia,andultimatelythepeople.

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ThePolicyActors
ForapolicytomakeitinthepoliticalworldaccordingtoHarriganandVogel
(2007),itneedstohavepoliticalbacking,inthesensethatthereneedstobeenough
momentumbehindtheideatoforceittobeatthetopofthepoliticalagenda.According
toBecker(1983),themomentumbehindtheCAAwastheconservationmovementthat
resweptthenationinthe1970sleadbyinterestgroupsinsupportoftheenvironment.
Fromthismovementstemmedthemediascoverageofit,andfromthis,itfurther
perpetuatedthemomentumbyfeedingthisinformationtothepeople.
Thedangerwithinformationflowingsoquicklytothepublicisthatitgetsinto
thehandsofthepublic.Whenthepublicpaysattentiontowhatthepublicwants,it
shapeswhatitimportant.Throughthepublicandthroughmediacoverage,thepubliccan
conveywhattheybelieveisimportanttothepolicymakers.Electedofficialscannot
ignorewhatisbeingcoveredinthemediabecausetheyarewatchingthenewstooand
theycanseewhatthepublicwants.Electedofficialsneedtocareaboutwhatthepublic
wants,especiallywhenitisonsuchalargescalesuchastheconservationmovement
becausethepeopleholdthepowerofvoting,asdiscussedbyBecker(1983).Forelected
officials,votingholdstheirfatefortheirjob.Theyneedtohavethevoters,whogoout
andvote,tobeontheirside.
Forthepublic,unliketheelectedofficials,theydonothavetoworryaboutgetting
reelected,orhowapolicywillreflectorgoagainsttheirideology.Withapieceof
legislationliketheCAA,thepublicwasnotconcernedabouthowthiswouldeffectthe
powershiftforthefederalgovernmentonthisissue,theyweremoreconcernedabout

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theirhealth.Thepublichadlesstolosebysayingtheysupportedthebillbecausetothem
itwasaconcernonpublichealth.Theconcernofpowerbeingshiftedinthegovernment
fromstatetofederalregulationwasnotoneforthepeoplebecauseithadnotbeenframed
thatwayforthepublic.AsCrandall(1983)notes,theCAAforthepublichadbeen
shapedinsuchawaywhereitwasaconcernofpublichealth,notthepowershiftandthe
wayitwouldeffecttheirstateandcompaniesintheirstate.
Itisnottosaythatthepublicwasnaveinwhattheywanted,becausetheywere
overallconcernedwiththepublichealth,theyjustdidnotdeemtheissuesthatcongress
peoplesawwereasimportantduetotheframingofhowtheissueathandwasbeing
portrayed.Inregardstotheelectedofficialstheyneededtolistentothepeoplebecauseif
theyweretosimplyignoreeverythingthepublicwantedwhenitcamedowntoanissue
ofpublichealthforthem,theycouldeasilyvotethatpersonoutofofficedespitehow
theirpartisanshipalignswiththevoterspartisanship.

Conclusion
Overallwhenlookingatthebigquestionastowhyelectedofficialswouldallowa
pieceoflegislationthatultimatelywentagainstsomeoftheirpoliticalideologiestobe
passedinsuchalandslidevote,camedowntothefactorsofthepolicyprocessandthe
policyactors.ThesetwovitalpartsoflegislationinAmericahelpmakeorbreakabill,
andfortheCAAduringthe1970s,ithelpedpushthebillallthewaythroughtobe
passed.Thisisallinthankstohowtheprocessissetupwhenimplementinglegislation

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sincethemajorityofCongresswasDemocraticandpolicyactorssuchasinterestgroups
thatbroughttheattentionoftheproblem,thathelpedputpressureonthemediatocover
it.Inturnthismadethepublicawareofwhatwasgoingon,andframedtheissueinsuch
awaythatpartisanshipwasnolongeraconcerntothepublicandputpressureonthe
electedofficialstovoteinfavorofprotectingpublichealth.Overall,thereasonwhy
CongresspassedtheCAAwithflyingcolorswasnotjustbecauseoftheirgenuine
concernfortheenvironment,butmorethepoliticsthatwentintoandtheconcernofnot
gettingreelectedunlesstheywereincompliancewithwhatthepublicultimatelywanted.

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