SYNTAX

Bibliography

structural validity

Suppose categorial grammarians are empirically adequate and there is no need for a separate level of logical
form to account for syntactic generalizations. There still
might be the need for logical forms to distinguish
between lexical and structural entailments. Consider, for
example, the contrast between Lou is a bachelor; therefore Lou is unmarried and Martin walked quickly;
therefore Martin walked. Intuitively, the first is valid in
part because of what bachelor means, whereas the validity
of the second is independent of the lexicon. The established account of structural validity rests on logical form:
An entailment is structurally valid if, and only if, it is valid
in virtue of logical form (i.e., if, and only if, the logical
forms of the premise(s) logically entail(s) the logical form
of the conclusion). For example, if the (simplified) logical forms within the second entailment are:
e (walk (Martin, e) quick (e))
e walk (Martin, e),
As Davidson (1967) has argued, the entailment is
indeed structurally valid on the established account.
However, if there is no separate logical form, structural
validity must be understood in a different manner.
The obvious thing to say is that semantic categories
can provide a definition of structural validity without
taking a detour through logical forms. One can say that
an entailment is structurally valid just in case any uniform substitution of expressions of the same semantic
category within it results in a valid entailment (Evans
1976). If, as categorial grammar assumes, syntactic categories are associated with a unique semantic type, which
in turn determines semantic category, one may replace
semantic with syntactic in the above definition. An interesting consequence of this definition is that logical consequence expressed in natural language (setting aside cases
like Hugo walks; therefore Hugo walks) will not be
structural. But this is arguably as it should be: the inference Hugo walks and talks; therefore Hugo walks is
valid in part because of what and meansreplace it with
or and the resulting entailment is no longer valid.
Although logical entailments are said to be valid in virtue
of their form, except for the special case of concluding
something from itself, their validity also rests upon the
lexical meaning of logical constants.
See also Semantics; Syntax.

Ajdukiewicz, K. Die syntaktische konnextitt. In Polish Logic,

19201939. Translated by S. McCall. Oxford: Clarendon,
1967.
Bar-Hillel, Y. A Quasi-Arithmetical Notation for Syntactic
Description. Language, 29 (1953): 4758.
Cresswell, M. Logics and Languages. London: Methuen, 1973.
Davidson, D. The Logical Form of Action Sentences. In The
Logic of Decision and Action, edited by N. Rescher.
Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967.
Dowty, D. Type Raising, Functional Composition, and Nonconstituent Conjunction. In Categorial Grammars and
Natural Language Structures, edited by R. Oherle. Dordrecht,
Netherlands: Reidel, 1987.
Evans, G. Semantic Structure and Logical Form. In Truth and
Meaning: Essays in Semantics, edited by G. Evans and J.
McDowell. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976.
Hendriks, H. Type Change in Semantics: the Scope of
Quantification and Coordination. In Categories,
Polymorphism, and Unification, edited by E. Klein and J. van
Benthem. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam ITLI, 1987.
Jacobson, P. The Syntax-Semantics Interface in Categorial
Grammar. In The Handbook of Contemporary Semantic
Theory, edited by S. Lappin. Oxford U.K.: Blackwell, 1996.
Jacobson, P. Toward A Variable-Free Semantics. Linguistics
and Philosophy 22 (1999): 117185.
Lambek, J. The Mathematics of Sentence Structure. American
Mathematical Monthly 65 (1958): 154169.
Lewis, D. General Semantics. In Philosophical Papers. Vol. 1.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970.
Montague, R. The Proper Treatment of Quantification in
Ordinary English. In Formal Philosophy: Selected Papers of
Richard Montague, edited by R.H. Thomason. New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1973.
Partee, B. Noun Phrase Interpretation and Type-Shifting
Principles. In Studies in Discourse Representation Theory
and the Theory of Generalized Quantifiers, edited by J.
Groenendijk. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Foris, 1987.
Quine, W. V. O. Variables Explained Away. In Selected Logic
Papers. New York: Random House, 1966.
Quine, W. V. O. Ontological Relativity. In Ontological
Relativity. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969.
Steedman, M. Combinatory Grammars and Parasitic Gaps.
Natural Language and Linguistic Theory, 5 (1987): 403440.
Szabolcsi, A. Bound Variables in Syntax: Are There Any? In
Semantics and Contextual Expression, edited by R. Bartsch.
Dordrecht, Netherlands: Foris, 1989.
Zoltn Gendler Szab (2005)

syntax
Syntax is the theory of the construction of sentences
out of words. In linguistics, syntax is distinguished from
morphology, or the theory of the construction of words
out of minimal units of significance, only some of which
are words. According to this division, it is a matter of
morphology that the word solubility decomposes into

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SYNTAX

dissolve + able + ity; but it is a matter of syntax to

analyze the construction of the sentence, That substance
is able to dissolve.
Although syntax is a traditional grammatical topic, it
was only with the rise of formal methods growing out of
the study of mathematical logic that the subject attained
sufficient explicitness to be studied in depth, in works by
Zelig Harris (1957) and Noam Chomsky (1957). Since
then a flourishing field has been created; for it was rapidly
discovered that the syntax of human languages was far
more complex than at first appeared. In this respect, the
development of syntax is comparable to other fields of
cognitive science such as human vision, problem-solving
capacities, and the organization of commonsense knowledge, all of which gave rise to difficult problems once the
goal of fully explicit representation was put in place.
The dawn of syntax is marked by the realization that
the structure of sentences is hierarchical; that is, that
behind the linear order of words and morphemes that is
visible in natural languages there is another organization
in terms of larger or smaller constituents nested one
within another. Description of sentences at this level is
said to give their phrase structure. Moreover, phrases of a
given kind can occur within others of the same kind: It is
this recursive feature of language that enables sentences
of arbitrary complexity to be constructed. The realization
that phrase structure is recursive is very old. Assuming
the categories of a complete noun phrase (NP) and sentence (S), Antoine Arnauld (1662) gives the examples
(rendered here in English):
(1) (SThe divine law commands that [Skings are to be
honored])
(2) (S[NPMen [Swho are pious]] are charitable)
remarking that in (1) the embedded element kings are to
be honored is a sentence occurring within a sentence,
and that in (2) the relative clause has all the structure of a
sentence, except that the relative pronoun who has
replaced the subject.
In linguistic theory the recursive structure of syntax
is expressed by principles of combination modeled after
the clauses of an inductive definition. However, far more
complex devices seem to be required for a compact
description that helps to reveal the basis of the native
speakers ability. Chomskys introduction of grammatical
transformations opened the way to a variety of formalisms and developments (see Atkinson, Kilby, and
Roca 1988 for a useful overview). Chomsky also initiated
the conception of linguistic theory as a study of the
acquisition of a system of linguistic knowledge, or com-

360

petence. Any human language is acquirable under ordinary experiential conditions by any normal child. The
space between empirical evidence and the resulting linguistic competence is sufficiently great that a kind of
readiness for language, universal grammar in Chomskys
terminology, is presupposed. Contemporary theory seeks
to probe the basis for this readiness in terms of innate
rules and principles of grammar. For a more recent statement, see Chomsky and H. Lasnik (in Jacobs et al. 1993).
Within philosophy too the theory of syntax came to
play an important role in the systematization of mathematics, and assumed central importance in Rudolf Carnap (1934). Carnap distinguished between grammatical
syntax, of the sort that a linguist might give in a description of a language, and logical syntax, whose aim was not
only to specify the class of sentences (or well-formed formulas of a calculus) but also to use formal methods in
constructing a theory of logical consequence and logical
truth. Carnap employed the distinction between grammatical form and logical form, which plays a crucial part
in Ludwig Wittgensteins views both in the Tractatus and
in the Philosophical Investigations, and has become part of
the lore of analytic philosophy. The scope of logical syntax in Carnaps terms took on much of the role of semantics in later philosophical discussion. Even with the later
distinction between syntax and model-theoretic semantics, syntactic properties of formalized languages are still
crucial for properties of systems of logic (soundness and
completeness), and proof theory is established as a part of
the syntax of mathematics.
In linguistic theory syntax and semantics have
become increasingly intertwined disciplines, as it was
realized that there are explanatory issues in relating linguistic forms to the specific meanings, or range of meanings, associated with them. S. Lappin (1995) contains a
number of useful expositions on this theme; see also R.
Larson and G. Segal (1995). The current research climate
is in practice very different from conceptions associated
with ordinary language philosophy: The contemporary
view is not that ordinary speech lacks an exact logic, but
rather that a diligent, collaborative effort is required to
find out what the logic is. The concentration on logic
implies that syntactic investigations have a metaphysical
dimension. The patterns of inference of ordinary language call for formalization as part of a general account
of the structure of individual human languages, or
human language in general, and this formalization may
in turn lead to proposals for reification, as in Donald
Davidsons (1967) hypothesis that references to events are
pervasive in ordinary action sentences.

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On the side of linguistics proper, the problems of

morphology have been treated in a progressively more
syntactic manner as, for instance, our example solubility
can be seen as built up by rules of a sort familiar from
syntax. The result is the area now called morphosyntax,
where the question whether morphology is a distinct level
of linguistic organization is under active debate; see R.
Hendrick (1995) for more recent discussion.
See also Arnauld, Antoine; Carnap, Rudolf; Chomsky,
Noam; Davidson, Donald; Language; Logic, History of;
Logical Form; Philosophy; Philosophy of Language;
Proof Theory; Semantics; Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef
Johann.

Contemporary Research, edited by J. Jacobs, A. von Stechow,

W. Sternfeld, and T. Vennemann. Berlin and New York,
1993.
Davidson, D. The Logical Form of Action Sentences. In The
Logic of Decision and Action, edited by N. Rescher.
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967.
Harris, Z. Co-Occurrence and Transformations in Linguistic
Structure. Language 33 3 (1957).
Hendrick, R. Morphosyntax. In Government and Binding
Theory and the Minimalist Program, edited by G. Webelhuth.
Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.
Lappin, S., ed. The Handbook of Contemporary Semantic
Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.
Larson, R., and G. Segal. Knowledge of Meaning. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1995.
James Higginbotham (1996)

Bibliography
Arnauld, A. La logique, ou lart de penser (1662). Translated by
J. Dickoff and P. James as The Art of Thinking. Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1964.
Atkinson, M., D. Kilby, and I. Roca. Foundations of General
Linguistics. 2nd ed. London: Unwin Hyman, 1988.
Carnap, R. The Logical Syntax of Language. London: K. Paul,
Trench, Trubner, 1937.
Chomsky, N. Syntactic Structures. The Hague: Mouton, 1957.
Chomsky, N., and H. Lasnik. The Theory of Principles and
Parameters. In Syntax: An International Handbook of

syntax and syntactics

See Semantics

synthetic statements
See Analytic and Synthetic Statements

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