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John Locke personal identity summary:

8. Man is the animal (organized body of life over time) of a particular form, Homo Sapien.
Even a Homo Sapien of limited reason and intelligence is still a man
9. A person is defined as a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and
can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places
consciousness is inseparable from thinking. Have a real time understanding and
comprehension of our senses. Distinguishes the self from all other selves
10. The continuity of consciousness and hence personal identity is defined by memory.
There are breaks in consciousness, not all memories are accessible at all times.
Substance as it changes does not define identity
11. An example is given as to how we already identify with our consciousness: if our arm is
chopped off (a part of our substance) we no longer identify with the piece of meat we
called our arm, we identify with the remaining body as it caries with it our
consciousnesses
12. dont fully understand
13. What links consciousness through variations in substance is memory
If the same consciousness can be transferred from one thinking substance to another, it
will be possible that two thinking substances may make but one person. For the same
consciousness being preserved, whether in the same or different substances, the personal
identity is preserved
14. Locke criticizes the neo-platonists who argue for a re-incarnation of an immaterial
substance that retains memory. He argues that not retaining any conscious experience of
those they profess to have the same soul would not, even if true, would not make them
the same person, this difference Locke's stresses is his main criticism of those who think
that substance defines identity. He then gives a scenario in where some of the particles
(substance) are retained in two different animals and says that this is absurd that this
makes them the same person.
15. Our idea of man is both made up of body and soul, if the consciousness which locke
identifies with soul is transferred, which he gives and example between a prince and a
cobbler, we would, as 3rd persons, identify them with their bodies, although the the
thoughts of the prince will be in the body of the cobbler. Locke labels them as being the
same man, as identifiable by their bodies, but the person is different
16. Despite our changing substance we are still responsible for our actions, even if I share
no material or immaterial substance in common when I performed the action. This is
true because I share the same consciousness with myself over those periods of time.
17. If the consciousness of the body was located in a specific part (little finger) and that part
removed, we would identify that person with the little finger
18. In the course of justice we punish the conscious person. Not the substance of the person.
If a man lost an arm in the procedure of a court case we wouldn't lock the man up with
his arm
19. Breaks in consciousness are also breaks in the self. And it would be incorrect to punish
someone for what they did in this break of consciousness or visa versa
20. in a body in which there is a break in consciousness and hence memory it can be said

that there are two people within the same man


21. don't fully understand
22. it is unlikely that God will punish men for what they had no conscious understanding of
doing
23. A consciousness could be imagined to by united in two bodies, would they not be the
same person? Two consciousness in a single body could be likewise considered two
people
24. non
25.

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