ERNESTO

B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

(One Year Bar in Impeachment Cases; G.R. No. 160261. November
10, 2003)
o It is thus clear that the framers intended initiation to start
with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third
of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not
initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already
initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section
3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution.
o Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act
of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken
thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in
the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the
same official within a one-year period following Article XI,
Section 3(5) of the Constitution


PCGG

BASECO vs PCGG
G.R. No. 75885, May 27, 1987 (Constitutionality and Powers of
PCGG)
o The sequestration, freeze and takeover orders and the
authority of the PCGG to issue them have received
constitutional approbation and sanction.
o The Provisional or "Freedom" Constitution recognizes the
power and duty of the President to enact "measures to
achieve the mandate of the people to * * * (recover ill-

gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of

the previous regime and protect the interest of the people
through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or
accounts."
o What is indispensable is that, there exist a prima facie
factual foundation, at least, for the sequestration, freeze or
takeover order, and adequate and fair opportunity to
contest it and endeavor to cause its negation or
nullification.
o The institution of these provisional remedies is also
premised upon the State's inherent police power,
regarded, as the power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property
o OTHER POWERS OF THE PCGG
1. PCGG may not exercise acts of ownership
2. PCGG has only powers of administration
3. In provisional takeovers, the PCGGs intrusion to
management should be restricted to the minimum
degree necessary to accomplish the legislative will,
which is to prevent the disposal or dissipation of the
business enterprise.
4. The right to vote of sequestered stocks must be done
in the context of the purpose of the sequestration or
provisional takeover, that is to prevent the dispersion
or undue disposal of the corporate assets.

Virata vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 86926, October 15, 1991
(PCGG: Its nature, and the issue of equal protection)

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A reading of the provision of the Constitution on the

Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) does not show that the power
of investigation including preliminary investigation vested
on the Ombudsman is exclusive. Hence, the said provision
of the Constitution did not repeal or remove the power to
conduct an investigation, including the authority to
conduct a preliminary investigation vested on the PCGG.
o The PCGG Charter does not violate the equal protection
clause and is not a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law.
The constitutionality of laws is presumed.
o Equal Protection. There is a reasonable standard or
classification existing wherein similarly situated are charged
and accorded due process.

BIRAOGO v. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010 (Compared to Truth
Commission)
o The creation of EO No 1 is within the authority of the
President, particularly under his Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
o Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. It allows for a valid
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must
pass the test of reasonableness: (SENG)
o (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions;
o (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law;
o (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
o (4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class.
o

The mandate of PTC is to investigate and find out the truth

concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration only. However, the
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that
is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own.

RPC (Art 203, 210,211,211-A,212,215,217,220)
Azarcon v. SB (who is a public officer)
o The Information does not charge petitioner Azarcon of
being a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public
officer committing an offense under the SBs
jurisdiction. Thus, unless petitioner be proven a public
officer, the SB will have no jurisdiction over the crime
charged.
o Article 203 of the RPC determines who are public officers:
Who are public officers. -- For the purpose of applying the
provisions of this and the preceding titles of the book, any
person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election,
or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in
the performance of public functions in the Government of
the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government
or in any of its branches public duties as an employee,
agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be
deemed to be a public officer.
o Thus (to) be a public officer, one must be --
o (1) Taking part in the performance of public
functions in the government, or Performing in said
Government or any of its branches public duties as
an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any
rank or class; and

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(2) That his authority to take part in the

performance of public functions or to perform
public duties must be (LEA)
! by direct provision of the law, or
! by popular election, or
! by appointment by competent authority.

Rodriguez v SB (offense committed in relation to office)
o As long as one (or more) of the accused is an official of the
executive branch occupying position otherwise classified as
Grade 27 and higher of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989, the SB exercises exclusive original
jurisdiction over offenses or felonies committed by public
officials whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees in
relation to their office.
o For an offense to be committed in relation to the office, the
relation between the crime and the office must be direct
and not accidental, in that in the legal sense, the offense
cannot exist without the office (Montilla v. Hilario).
o As an exception to Montilla, this Court, in People v. Montejo
held that although public office is not an element of an
offense charged, as long as the offense charged in the
information is intimately connected with the office and is
alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in
the performance, though improper or irregular, of his
official functions, there being no personal motive to commit
the crime and had the accused would not have committed it
had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to
have been indicted for an offense committed in relation to
his office. (e.g. Police officer shot and killed the victim in the
course of trying to restore local public order brings the case

squarely within the meaning of an offense committed in

relation to the [accuseds] public office)

Marifosque v People (direct bribery) - (PRCF)

o

The crime of direct bribery as defined in Art. 210 of the RPC

consists of the following elements:
o (1) that the accused is a public officer;
o (2) that he received directly or through another
some gift or present, offer or promise;
o (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given
in consideration of his commission of some crime,
or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain
from doing something which it is his official duty to
do; and
o (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of
his functions as a public officer.
Petitioner was a public officer within the contemplation of
Article 203 of the RPC. At the time of the incident,
petitioner was a police sergeant. He directly received the
bribe money from Yu So Pong and his daughter Hian Hian Yu
Sy in exchange for the recovery of the stolen cylinder tanks,
which was an act not constituting a crime within the
meaning of Article 210 of the RPC. The act of receiving
money was connected with his duty as a police officer.

Formilleza v. SB G.R. No. 75160, March 18, 1988
G.R. No. 75160, March 18, 1988 (indirect bribery)

An essential ingredient of indirect bribery (Art. 211 RPC) is

that public officer concerned must have ACCEPTED the gift
or material consideration.

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There must be a clear intention on the part of the public

officer to take the gift so offered and consider the same as
his own property from then on, such as putting away the
gift for safekeeping or pocketing the same. Mere physical
receipt unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstance or
act to show such acceptance is not sufficient to lead the
court to conclude that the crime of indirect bribery has
been committed. To hold otherwise will encourage
unscrupulous individuals to frame up public officers by
simply putting within their physical custody some gift,
money or other property.

Sarigumba vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 154239-41; 16 February 2005 (malversation)
The elements are the following: (PCF-ATC)
(a) The offender is a public officer;
(b) He has the custody or control of funds or
property by reason of the duties of his office; (c)
The funds or property involved are public funds or
property for which he is accountable; and
(d) He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated,
or has consented to, or through abandonment or
negligence, permitted the taking by another person
of, such funds or property.
The felony consists not only in misappropriation or
converting public funds or property to ones personal use
but also by knowingly allowing others to make use of or
misappropriate the same. The felony may thus be
committed by dolo or by culpa. The crime is consummated
and the appropriate penalty is imposed regardless of

whether the mode of commission is with intent or due to

negligence. An accountable officer may thus be convicted
of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of
misappropriation and the only evidence is that there is a
shortage in the officers account which he has not been
able to explain satisfactorily. All that is essential is proof
that the accountable officer has received public funds but
that when demand therefor is made, he is unable to
satisfactorily account for the same.
The law declares that the failure of the public officer to
account for such public funds or property upon demand by
any duly-authorized officer shall be prima facie evidence
that he has appropriated the same for his personal use.
In malversation of public funds, payment, indemnification,
or reimbursement of funds misappropriated, after the
commission of the crime, does not extinguish the criminal
liability of the offender which, at most, can merely affect
the accuseds civil liability thereunder and be considered a
mitigating circumstance being analogous to voluntary
surrender.

Parungao vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 96025 ; May 15, 1991 (technical malversation)
Since technical malversation (RPC Art. 220) does not
include, or is not included in the crime of malversation of
public funds (RPC Art. 217), an accused charged of the latter
cannot resultantly be convicted of the former.
In malversation, the offender misappropriates public funds
for his own personal use or allows any other person to take
such public funds for the latter's personal use.
On the other hand, in technical malversation, the public
officer applies public funds under his administration not for

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his or another's personal use, but to a public use other than

that for which the fund was appropriated by law or
ordinance.
In the absence of a law or ordinance appropriating the
public fund allegedly technically malversed, the use thereof
for another public purpose will not make the accused guilty
of violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.

RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)

People v SB [GR No. 147706-07] (jurisdiction)
o The legislature, in mandating the inclusion of presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of GOCCs within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, has consistently
refrained from making any distinction with respect to the
manner of their creation.
o The deliberate omission clearly reveals the intention of the
legislature to include the presidents, directors or trustees,
or managers of both types of corporations (with original
charter or created under Corporation Code) within the
jurisdiction of the SB whenever they are involved in graft
and corruption. Had it been otherwise, it could have simply
made the necessary distinction. But it did not.
o The concerned officers of GOCCs, whether created by
special law or formed under the Corporation Code, come
under the jurisdiction of the SB for purposes of the
provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Otherwise, a major policy of Government, which is to
eradicate, or at the very least minimize, the graft and

corruption that has permeated the fabric of the public

service like a malignant social cancer, would be seriously
undermined.

Meneses v People (jurisdiction)
o The point sought to be made by appellants that private
persons cannot be convicted of a violation of Section 3[3]of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, its application
being limited only to public officers, cannot be conceded.
Section 1 of the law makes clear the legislative intention to
make application of the statute extend both to public
officers and private persons.
o Section 4 [b] of R.A. 3019 punishes any private individual
who knowingly induces a public officer to commit any
offense defined in Section 3 of the said statute. Appellant
insists that he cannot be punished for merely applying for a
free patent from the accused. This would be true, were this
the full extent of his participation, but as circumstances
show, he voluntarily participated in the fraud committed
against the Quisumbings. Indeed, it would be unlikely that
the public officers concerned would go to such lengths to
grant such titles were they not persuaded to do so by the
appellants.
o Having conspired and confederated with the accused
public officers, in the perpetration of acts designed
towards the obtention of pecuniary benefits or advantage,
in violation of law, they must be deemed to have
consented to and adopted as their own, the offense of said
public officers; in a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of
all.

Morfe v. Mutuc

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G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968 (purpose)

Section 7 of RA 3019 requiring periodical submission of
SALN is valid exercise of police power. The same does not
violate due process, liberty, privacy, and the rights against
self-incrimination and unreasonable search and seizure.
Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the Anti-Graft
Act of 1960 was precisely aimed at (1) curtailing and
minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and (2)
maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It
is intended to (3) further promote morality in public
administration. A public office must indeed be a public
trust.

Villa v SB [GR 87186] (punishable acts)
It is asserted that the omission to ascertain the reputability
of the supplier would result only in administrative and not
criminal liability, as held by the Court of Appeals. We do not
think so. Not only administrative but also criminal liability
under the aforementioned paragraphs (a) and (e) Section 3,
of R.A. 3019 was incurred. The failure to ascertain the
reputability of Rocen Enterprises constituted a violation of
the rules and regulations promulgated by competent
authority and comes under paragraph (a). The manifest
partiality that resulted in unwarranted benefits to Rocen
was in contravention of paragraph (e).
o The failure to show that the petitioners profited from the
transaction would not necessarily result in acquittal. In
Luciano v Estrella, in interpreting paragraph (g), Section 3 of
R.A. 3019, it was said:
o . . . the act treated thereunder partakes of the
nature of malum prohibitum; it is the commission
of that act as defined by the law, not the character

or effect thereof, that determines whether or not

the provision has been violated. And this
construction would be in consonance with the
announced purpose for which Republic Act 3019
was enacted, which is the repression of
certain acts of public officers and private persons
constituting graft or corrupt practices or which may
lead thereto. Note that the law does not merely
contemplates repression of acts that are unlawful
or corrupt per se, but even of those that may lead
to or result in graft and corruption . . .

Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. Nos. 146368-69 (October 2003) (punishable acts)
The elements of the offense under Section 3(c) of RA 3019
are as follows: (PPGC)
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) he has secured or obtained, or would secure or
obtain, for a person any government permit or license;
(3) he directly or indirectly requested or received
from said person any gift, present or other pecuniary or
material benefit for himself or for another; and
(4) he requested or received the gift, present or
other pecuniary or material benefit in consideration for help
given or to be given.
Section 3 (c) applies regardless of whether the gifts value is
manifestly excessive or not, and regardless of the occasion.
What is important here is whether the gift is received in
consideration for help given or to be given by the public
officer. The value of the gift is not mentioned at all as an
essential element of the offense charged under Section 3
(c), and there is no need to require the prosecution to

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specify such value in order to comply with the requirements

of showing a prima facie case

Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan
[G.R. Nos. 162314-17, October 25, 2004] (punishable acts)
Essential elements of the crime under Section 3(e):
o 1. The accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions;
o 2. He must have acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and
o 3. That his action caused any undue injury to any
party, including the government, OR giving any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions.
Violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 can be
committed in two ways, namely:
(1) Causing undue injury to any party, including the
government, OR;
(2) By giving any private party any unwarranted
benefit, advantage, or preference.
*Advantage and undue injury/advantage/benefit are not
elements of a single crime. Rather, they are two distinct
ways of committing the crime. Hence, undue injury and
advantage need not concur/need not be both alleged in the
information to constitute a crime under 3(e) of R.A. 3019.

CONRADO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 94955 ; Aug 18, 1993 (punishable acts)
The elements of the offense under Sec. 3(f) of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act are that: (PNTF)
o The offender is a public officer;

The officer has neglected or has refused to act

without sufficient justification after due demand or
request;
A reasonable time has elapsed from such demand
or request without the public officer having acted
on the matter;
Such failure to act is for the purpose of (1)
obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person
interested in the matter, some pecuniary or
material benefit or advantage in favor of an
interested party, OR (2) discriminating against
another.

Valencia v SB [GR 141336] (punishable acts)

o

The elements of the crime of violation of Section 3 (e) are

the following:
o 1. The accused is a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions;
o 2. He must have acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and
o 3. His action has caused undue injury to any party,
including the Government, OR has given any party
any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his functions.
On the other hand, the elements of the crime of violation of
Section 3 (g) are:
o 1. The offender is a public officer;
o 2. He enters into a contract or transaction on
behalf of the government; and
o 3. The contract or transaction is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government

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A careful scrutiny of the Information shows that all the

above elements are averred therein. It sufficiently alleges
that petitioners are public officials discharging official or
administrative functions who, in evident bad faith and with
manifest partiality, entered into a grossly disadvantageous
contract on behalf of the government with a private person
which gives the latter unwarranted benefit and advantage.

Teves v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 154182, December 17, 2004 (punishable acts)

The elements of the offense charged in this case, which is

unlawful intervention in the issuance of a cockpit license in
violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, are
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary
Interest in any business, contract, or transaction,
whether or not prohibited by law; and
3. He intervenes or takes part in his official
capacity in connection with such interest.

On the other hand, the essential ingredients of the offense

proved, which is possession of prohibited interest in
violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, are as
follows:
o

The accused is a public officer;

He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary

interest in any business, contract or transaction;
and
He is prohibited from having such interest by the
Constitution or any law.

Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the

cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he would have a
direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by SB,
they remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992,
and as such their property relation can be presumed to be
that of conjugal partnership of gains in the absence of
evidence to the contrary. His interest in the Valencia Cockpit
is direct and is, therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of
the LGC of 1991
o

The offense proved is necessarily included in the

offense charged. The variance doctrine thus finds
application to this case, thereby warranting the
conviction of petitioner Edgar Teves for the offense
proved.

Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary

Interest. (a) It shall be unlawful for any local
government official or employee, directly or
indirectly, to:
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other
games licensed by a local government unit.

Petitioner Teresita Teves must, however, be acquitted. The

charge against her is conspiracy in causing the issuance of
the appropriate business permit/license to operate the
Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center. Conspiracy must be
established separately from the crime itself and must meet
the same degree of proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable
doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct
evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during, and after the commission of the
crime, all taken together, the evidence must reasonably be
strong enough to show community of criminal design.

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Certainly, there is no conspiracy in just being married to an

erring spouse. For a spouse or any person to be a party to a
conspiracy as to be liable for the acts of the others, it is
essential that there be intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common
design. Except when he is the mastermind in a conspiracy, it
is necessary that a conspirator should have performed
some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution in the
execution of the crime planned to be committed.

RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees)
Ombudsman v. Bernardo
G.R. No. 181598; March 6, 2013 (Section 8)
o Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired
during his incumbency an amount of property which is
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property, said property
shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully
acquired.
o Dishonesty is incurred when an individual intentionally
makes a false statement of any material fact, practicing or
attempting to practice any deception or fraud in order to
secure his examination, registration, appointment, or
promotion. It is understood to imply the disposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle;
lack of fairness and straightforwardness; the disposition to

defraud, deceive or betray. Like the offense of Unexplained

Wealth, Section 52(A)(1), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service treats
Dishonesty as a grave offense, the penalty of which is
dismissal from the service at the first infraction. (Office of
the Ombudsman v. Valencia).
Negligence, on the other hand, as the omission of the
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation
and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of
the time, and of the place. In the case of public officials,
there is negligence when there is a breach of duty or failure
to perform the obligation, and there is gross negligence
when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.
In the case at bar, given the fact that Bernardo was able to
successfully overcome the onus of demonstrating that he
does not possess any unexplained wealth and that the
omissions in his SALNs did not betray any sense of bad
faith or the intent to mislead or deceive on his part
considering that his SALNs actually disclose the extent of
his and his wifes assets and business interests, we are
inclined to adjudge that respondent is merely culpable of
Simple Negligence instead of the more serious charge of
Dishonesty.
Notably, the Ombudsman appeared to have heavily relied
solely on the respondents SALNs for the years 1993 to
2001. We do not understand why no evidence was
presented to show Bernardos beginning net worth from the
first day of his employment with the government as
declared in the SALNs filed by him. His beginning net worth
must be considered for purposes of determining whether
his disposable income was more than sufficient to justify
his property acquisitions and foreign travels for the

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covered period, and whether he possesses the financial

capability to acquire or purchase properties as reported in
his SALNs. Such net worth of the respondent as declared in
the statement filed by him from the first day of his
employment with the government shall be considered as his
true new worth as of such date, for purposes of determining
his capacity for future property acquisitions during his
tenure as a public officer. Any unexplained increase in his
net worth thereafter may then fall within the ambit of the
presumption provided by Republic Act No. 1379.

Segovia v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 124067. March 27, 1998 (Section 13)
o Under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Law, the suspension of a public officer is mandatory after a
determination has been made of the validity of the
information in a pre-suspension hearing conducted for
that purpose.
o Once a proper determination of the validity of the
Information has been made, it becomes the ministerial
duty of the court to issue the preventive suspension order.
However, preventive suspension may not exceed the
maximum period of ninety (90) days in consonance with
the Civil Service Decree, now Section 52 of the
Administrative Code of 1987.

Tecson v. Sandiganbayan (1999) (three-fold responsibility)
o A public official or employee is under a three-fold
responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or
omission. This simply means that a public officer may be
held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a
wrongful doing.

Thus, if such violation or wrongful act results in damages to

an individual, the public officer may be held civilly liable to
reimburse the injured party. If the law violated attaches a
penal sanction, the erring officer may be punished
criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to
suspension, removal from office, or other administrative
sanctions. This administrative liability is separate and
distinct from the penal and civil liabilities.
The dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily
bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or
similar acts, which were the subject of the administrative
complaint
Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law. It thus has no bearing
in the criminal proceedings before the SB.

RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees)
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs CORTES (2004) Unauthorized sale
of stamps

Respondent should be reminded that a public servant must

exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and
integrity for no less than the Constitution mandates that a
public office is a public trust and public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives. This constitutionally-enshrined principles, oftrepeated in our case law, are not mere rhetorical flourishes

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or idealistic sentiments. They should be taken as working

standards by all in the public service. In addition, the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (R.A. No. 6713) enunciates the State Policy of
promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service.
Muyco vs Saratan
A.M. no. P-03-1761, April 2, 2004 (Section 5)
o Section 5 (a) and (d) of Rep. Act No. 6713 or the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees provides:
o Sec. 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. In
the performance of their duties, all public officials
and employees are under obligation to:
! (a) Act promptly on letters and requests. All
public officials and employees shall, within
fifteen (15) working days from receipt
thereof, respond to letters, telegrams or
other means of communications sent by the
public. The reply must contain the action
taken on the request.
! (d) Act immediately on the public's personal
transactions. All public officials and
employees must attend to anyone who
wants to avail himself of the services of
their offices and must, at all times, act
promptly and expeditiously
o A public employee has the duty to act on the letters and
requests of the public within 15 working days from the time

she receives them and to attend promptly and expeditiously

to anyone who wants to avail of the services of her office.
Even if she were truly at a loss on what action to take on
complainants request, as she claims, respondent should
have communicated to complainant her alleged dilemma
instead of sitting on the letter, thus giving the impression
that she ignored the same. Repeatedly, we have
emphasized the heavy burden and responsibility which the
court officials and employees are mandated to observe, in
view of their exalted positions as keepers of the public
faith. They are constantly reminded that any impression of
impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of
official functions must be avoided. We will never
countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all
those involved in the administration of justice that would
violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the
faith of the people in the judiciary.

Trieste v SB [GR 70332-43] (Section 7)

o

Inasmuch as Treasurer Vega signed and paid the vouchers

after the materials were delivered, petitioner's signature on
the vouchers after payment is not the kind of intervention
contemplated under Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.
What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law
is the actual intervention in the transaction in which one
has financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability
may attach. The official need not dispose his shares in the

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Interdisciplinary Course on Corruption, Impunity, and Governance | Atty. Patricia Cervantes-Poco

corporation as long as he does not do anything for the firm

in its contract with the office. For the law aims to prevent
the don-tenant use of influence, authority and power.
o There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had, in his
capacity as Mayor, used his influence, power, and authority
in having the transactions given to Trigen. He didn't ask
anyone-neither Treasurer Vega nor Secretary Maravilla for
that matter, to get the construction materials from Trigen.
o Petitioner should not be faulted for Trigen's transaction
with the municipality, which has been dealing with it even
before petitioner had assumed the mayorship. Personal
canvasses conducted found that Trigen's offer was the
lowest, most reasonable, and advantageous to the
municipality.

In Re Julian Ocampo and Renato San Juan, A.M. No. 00-10-230MTCC, June 20, 2001 (Section 7)
o

Violation of Circular No. 7, dated September 23, 1974, re

Raffling of Cases
o The circular provides that: xxx No case may be
assigned to any branch without being raffled. xxx
The raffle must be conducted in such manner that
all the branches of the Court in that station or
grouping, including vacant salas, shall receive more
or less the same number of civil, criminal, and other
kinds of cases.
o Respondent judge justifies the assignment of the
jueteng cases to him without any raffle on the
ground that the accused, if first-time offenders, can
be immediately arraigned and sentenced to pay a
fine.

No matter how urgent a case may be, this

fact cannot justify the procedural shortcuts
employed by respondent judge of
dispensing with the raffle of the same in
violation of Circular No. 7 when there are
provisions for such situations.
! In a case which also involved an MTC
Executive
Judge
who
did
not
raffle jueteng cases and instead assigned
them to his own branch, we found said
judge guilty of a "clear breach of his duty as
a judge."
Improper Disposition of Confiscated Bet Money in a
Gambling Case
o P.D. No. 1602, Sec. 2 provides that cash money or
articles of value in cases of illegal gambling shall be
confiscated or forfeited in favor of the government.
o Respondent judge cannot be excused on the ground
that the bet money was not always turned over to
his court by the Office of the City Prosecutor. It was
his duty to see to it that the money was turned over
to his court and then ordered by him to be paid to
the government.
o To sign a receipt for the money without counting
the same is negligence on the part of respondent
clerk of court. No matter how tedious and timeconsuming the counting of the money might be,
respondent clerk of court should have had no
reason for not immediately doing so. Nor can
respondent judge escape liability for the money
since he exercises control and supervision over his
court and its personnel. In fact, he admits that he
!

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gave the police P2,000.00 of the confiscated bet

money and spent an equal amount for office
supplies This amounts to a misappropriation of
funds constituting serious misconduct.
Improper Solicitation of Airconditioner (IMPT!)
o Respondent clerk of court admits that he solicited
an airconditioner from the Robertson Department
Store owned by Mr. Robert Obiedo who had
pending cases before the MTCC. This is highly
improper conduct. That the unit was slightly used
and that a similar donation has been previously
made do not justify the request of respondent clerk
of court. As noted by the investigating judge,
respondent clerk of court may even be held liable
under R.A. No. 6713, Sec. 7(d) which provides in
pertinent part:
! "Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. Public
officials and employees shall not solicit or
accept directly or indirectly, any gift,
gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or
anything of monetary value from any
person in the course of their official duties
or in connection with any operation being
regulated by or any transaction which may
be affected by the functions of their office."
Like judges, a court employee should be careful to avoid
any action which may reasonably give rise to suspicion
that his relations with others influence the decision of
cases in his court.
Respondent judge apparently sees nothing wrong with
respondent clerk of court's solicitation of an air conditioner.
In his comment, respondent judge stated that the suspected

writer of the expose had no cause to complain as "the

Branch to which she belongs was also given a unit which she
enjoys whenever she reports for office." This is a reflection
of moral obtuseness which renders respondent unfit for the
judicial office It is noteworthy that the Branch referred to is
respondent judge's court.

ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN (plunder)
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001
o On how the law uses the terms combination and series
does not constitute vagueness.
o The petitioners contention that it would not give a
fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law
seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Voidfor-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced
under the petitioners reliance since ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked
against that specie of legislation that is utterly
vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving
clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said
doctrine may not invoked in this case since the
statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness
doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude.
o On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees
that governmental purpose may not be achieved
by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.

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Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial

challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute
and to one which is overbroad because of possible
chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore,
in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take
chances as in the area of free speech. A facial
challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully since the
challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists.
Petitioner's stand that the statute(specifically Sec.4)
evades the mandatory element of the prosecution in
criminal law to prove beyond reasonable doubt the acts
constituting plunder is turned down by the court.
o SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of
establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act
done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire illgotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy.
o The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each
and every component of the crime suffers from a
dismal misconception of the import of that
provision. What the prosecution needs to prove
beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts
sufficient to form a combination or series which
would constitute a pattern and involving an
amount of at least P50M. There is no need to prove
each and every other act alleged in the Information
o

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to have been committed by the accused in

furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire illgotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the
accused is charged in an Information for plunder
with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public
treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these f
ifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by
pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond
reasonable doubt provided only that they
amounted to at least P50M.
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings
us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt
or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of
accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden
wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where
the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par.
(d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of
the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent
with reason and common sense. There would be no
other explanation for a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash P50M or more, than
"a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is
therefore not required to make a deliberate and
conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily
follows with the establishment of a series or
combination of the predicate acts.
Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not
define or establish any substantive right in favor of

the accused but only operates in furtherance of a

remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to
substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking
Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for
what is crucial for the prosecution is to present
sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude
exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal
intent.
o Where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder,
the prosecution need not prove each and every
criminal act done to further the scheme or
conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the
pattern are concerned, however, the elements of
the crime must be proved and the requisite mens
rea must be shown.
o Indeed, 2 provides that -
! Any person who participated with the said
public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder
shall likewise be punished for such
offense. In the imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance
of
mitigating
and
extenuating
circumstances, as provided by the Revised
Penal Code, shall be considered by the
court.

The application of mitigating and extenuating

circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to
prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates
quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder
since the degree of responsibility of the offender is
determined by his criminal intent. It is true that 2
refers to "any person who participates with the said
public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no
reason to believe, however, that it does not apply
as well to the public officer as principal in the
crime.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that
plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is
a malum in se. For when the acts punished are
inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they
are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts
are punished in a special law, especially since in
the case of plunder the predicate crimes are
mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to
treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are
mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing
Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against
jaywalking, without regard to the inherent
wrongness of the acts.

SERAPIO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR 148468; January 28, 2003
o On the issue of sufficiency of information:

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We do not agree with petitioner. Section 6, Rule

110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or
information. A complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the
accused, the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense
was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than
one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information.
In this case, the amended Information specifically
alleges that all the accused, including petitioner,
connived and conspired with former President
Joseph E. Estrada to commit plunder through any or
a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts or
similar schemes or means. And in paragraph (a) of
the amended Information, petitioner and his coaccused are charged with receiving or collecting,
directly or indirectly, on several instances money in
the aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00.
! In Jose Jinggoy Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
(Third Division), et al., we held that the
word SERIES is synonymous with the clause
on several instances; it refers to a repetition
of the same predicate act in any of the
items in Section 1(d) of the law. We further

held that the word COMBINATION

contemplates the commission of at least
any two different predicate acts in any of
the said items.
o It is not necessary to allege in the amended
Information a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy because as Section 3 of R.A. 7080
specifically provides, the same is evidentiary and
the general rule is that matters of evidence need
not be alleged in the Information.
On the liability of individuals:
o Under the amended Information, all the accused,
including petitioner, are charged of having
conspired and confabulated together in committing
plunder. When two or more persons conspire to
commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts
of others. In contemplation of law, the act of the
conspirator is the act of each of them. Conspirators
are one man, they breathe one breath, they speak
one voice, they wield one arm and the law says that
the acts, words and declarations of each, while in
the pursuit of the common design, are the acts,
words and declarations of all.
On the issue of w/not Info charges more than one offense:
o The acts alleged in the information are not charged
as separate offenses but as predicate acts of the
crime of plunder.
o It is clear on the face of the amended Information
that petitioner and his co-accused are charged only
with one crime of plunder and not with the
predicate acts or crimes of plunder. It bears

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stressing that the predicate acts merely constitute

acts of plunder and are not crimes separate and
independent of the crime of plunder. Resultantly
then, the petition is dismissed.

ORGANO v. SB
G.R. No. 133535; September 9, 1999
o In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in
the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof
shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal
circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended.
o Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crime of
plunder unless committed by public officials and
employees occupying the positions with Salary Grade "27"
or higher, under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation
to their office.
G.R. No. 136916. December 14, 1999
o One is given the impression that only lowly government
workers or the so-called small fry are expediently tried and
convicted by the Sandiganbayan. The reason for this is that
at present, the Sandiganbayan has the exclusive and
original jurisdiction over graft cases committed by all
officials and employees of the government, irrespective of
rank and position, from the lowest-paid janitor to the
highly-placed government official. This jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan must be modified in such a way that only

those occupying high positions in the government and the

military (the big fishes) may fall under its exclusive and
original jurisdiction. In this way, the Sandiganbayan can
devote its time to big time cases involving the big fishes in
the government. The regular courts will be vested with the
jurisdiction of cases involving less-ranking officials (those
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade twentyseven (27) and below and PNP members with a rank lower
than Senior Superintendent. This set-up will prove more
convenient to people in the provinces. They will no longer
have to travel to Manila to file their complaint or to defend
themselves. They can already file their complaint or their
defense before the Regional Trial Court or the Municipal
Trial Court in their respective localities, as the case may be.

RP v. SB & MARCOS
G.R. No. 152154; November 18, 2003
o On the nature of forfeiture proceedings:
o These proceedings are civil in nature, contrary to the
claim of the Marcoses that it is penal in character.
o In Almeda Sr., et al. vs. Perez, et al., SC suggested a test
to determine whether the proceeding for forfeiture is
civil or criminal:
. . . Forfeiture proceedings may be either
civil or criminal in nature, and may be in
rem or in personam. If they are under a
statute such that if an indictment is
presented the forfeiture can be included in
the criminal case they are criminal in
nature, although they may be civil in form;
and where it must be gathered from the
statute that the action is meant to be

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criminal in its nature it cannot be considered

as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not
involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for
the offense charged the proceeding is of a
civil nature; and under statutes which
specifically so provide, where the act or
omission for which the forfeiture is imposed
is not also a misdemeanor, such forfeiture
may be sued for and recovered in a civil
action.
In the case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan and Macario
Asistio, Jr., SC categorically declared that:
! The rule is settled that forfeiture
proceedings are actions in rem and
therefore civil in nature.
The proceedings under RA 1379 do not terminate in the
imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of
the properties illegally acquired in favor of the
State. Section 6 of said law provides:
x x x If the respondent is unable to show to
the satisfaction of the court that he has
lawfully acquired the property in question,
then the court shall declare such property
forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue
of such judgment the property aforesaid
shall become property of the State x x x
The procedure outlined in the law leading to forfeiture
is that provided for in a civil action.

REPUBLIC v. SB
G.R. 84895; May 4, 1989

Independent Civil Action

o A cursory reading of Executive Order No. 14 shows that
the PCGG is authorized to file both criminal and civil
cases against persons suspected of having acquired illgotten wealth. Section 3 thereof provides:
SECTION 3. Civil suits for restitution,
reparation of damages, or indemnification
for consequential damages, forfeiture
proceedings provided for under Republic Act
No. 1379, or any other civil actions under
the Civil Code or other existing laws, in
connection with Executive Order No. 1 dated
February 28, 1986 and Executive Order No.
2 dated March 12, 1986, may be filed
separately from and proceed independently
of any criminal proceedings and may be
proved by a preponderance of evidence.
o It is crystal clear from the law that the PCGG may file
an independent civil action separate from the criminal
action. Hence, section 5 thereof which empowers the
PCGG to grant criminal immunity must be interpreted to
relate only to a criminal action and not to a civil action.
In case of a civil action, the power to grant immunity
or the making of the decision not to file a civil case or
to drop one already in progress must be related to
section 3 of the law which specifically provides for the
procedures and the applicable laws in the prosecution
of civil suits.
o The well-settled doctrine is that amicable settlements
and/or compromises are not only allowed but actually
encouraged in civil cases. Article 2028 of the Civil Code
categorically states: "A compromise is a contract

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whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions,

avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced." On the other hand, there is no similar
general rule in criminal prosecutions. Immunity must be
specifically granted.
In the instant case, the PCGG issued a resolution dated
May 28, 1986, granting immunity from both civil and
criminal prosecutions to Jose Y. Campos and his family.
In exchange for the voluntary surrender of the ill-gotten
properties acquired by the then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos and his family which were in Jose Campos'
control, the latter and his family were given full
immunity in both civil and criminal prosecutions. In the
absence of an express prohibition, the rule on amicable
settlements and/or compromises on civil cases under
the Civil Code is applicable to PCGG cases.

REPUBLIC v. SB & Bugarin
G. R. No. 102508; January 30, 2002
o Basis to Determine Value of Assets: Acquisition Cost
o In ascertaining the value of respondents properties and
shareholdings, it is not the fair market value, as claimed
by the petitioner, that should be made as basis thereof.
Rather, as correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, it is
the acquisition cost thereof, since it was the actual
amount of money shelled out by respondent in
acquiring them. It is the acquisition cost that must be
charged against respondents lawful income and funds.

RP v. SB & MARCOS
G.R. No. 152154; July 15, 2003
o Presumption that Property is Ill-gotten:
o The law raises the prima facie presumption that a
property is unlawfully acquired, hence subject to
forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly
disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful
income of the public officer who owns it. (Sec 2 of RA
1379)
o Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations states:
Prima Facie Evidence. Any accumulation of assets,
properties, and other material possessions of those
persons covered by Executive Orders No. 1 and No.
2, whose value is out of proportion to their known
lawful income is prima facie deemed ill-gotten
wealth.
o Indeed, the burden of proof was on the respondents to
dispute this presumption and show by clear and
convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits were
lawfully acquired and that they had other legitimate
sources of income. A presumption is prima facie proof
of the fact presumed and, unless the fact thus prima
facie established by legal presumption is disproved, it
must stand as proved.

ESTRADA v. DESIERTO
G.R. No. 156160; December 9, 2004
o On who are covered by the Foreign Currency Deposits Act:
o At this point, it is worth stressing, that the Office of the
Ombudsman in its previous Order dated 20 February
2001, ruled that the absolute confidentiality of foreign
currency deposit account provided for under R.A. 6426

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does not apply to the foreign currency deposit

accounts of herein complainant, since the protection
under the said law is intended only for depositors who
are non residents and are not engaged in trade and
business in the Philippines. In coming out with such
ruling, this office has as its basis one of the Whereas
clauses of P.D. 1246 which amended Sec. 8 of R.A. 6426.
For emphasis, the pertinent provision of the said law is
hereby quoted:
WHEREAS, in order to assure the
development and speedy growth of the
Foreign Currency Deposit System and
offshore Banking System in the Philippines,
certain incentives were provided for under
the two systems such as confidentiality of
deposits subject to certain exceptions and
tax exemptions on the interest of the
income of depositors who are nonresidents
and are not engaged in trade or business in
the Philippines.
In Salvacion v. Central Bank and China Bank, 278 SCRA
27 (1997), the Highest Tribunal adopted the opinion of
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that only
foreign currency deposits of foreign lenders and
investors are given protection and incentives by the
law, and further ruled that the Foreign Currency
Deposits Act cannot be utilized to perpetuate injustice.
o Following such pronouncements, it is respectfully
submitted that foreign currency deposits of Filipino
depositors, including herein complainant, are not
covered by the Foreign Currency Deposits Act, and

are thus not exempt from the processes dulyissued by the BIR.
o SC upheld such contention. SC stated that We do
not perceive any grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the public respondents when they issued the
aforecited rulings. We, thus, defer to the policy of
non-interference in the conduct of preliminary
investigations.
HEIRS OF LICAROS v. SB
G.R. No. 157438; October 18, 2004
o On the issue of Prescription:
o An action to recover ill-gotten wealth is outside the
purview of the ordinary rules on prescription, as
contained in Article 1146 of the Civil Code.
o Section 15 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 15. The right of the State to recover
properties unlawfully acquired by public officials
or employees, from them or from their nominees
or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription,
laches or estoppel.
o The intendment of the foregoing constitutional
provisionexempting actions to recover ill-gotten
wealth from the operation of the general rules of
prescriptionpresumably lies in the special attendant
circumstances and the primordial state interests
involved in cases of such nature.
o From the preceding discussion, it is clear that any action
involving the recovery of unlawfully acquired
properties against Licaros or his transferees, may not
be deemed to have prescribed. The language of the
Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court is clear and
unequivocal.

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