Between the U.S.

and the deep blue sea: Cold War

policies and political breakdown in Brazil
Guilherme Casares
Published in Frank Jacob (ed.). Peripheries of the Cold
War. Wurzburg: Knigshausen & Neumann, 2015, v. 1,
p. 283-317.
The structural effects caused by the Cold
War on states and their peoples are well known,
having been extensively debated and documented
in the past decades. The bipolar setting that
emerged from the debris of the Second World War
narrowed down the array of international choices
of most countries in the world, forcing them to take
sides with either the United States or the Soviet
Union. Irrespective of the nature of the
relationships that were forged in the years that
followed the wars end ideological or pragmatic,
subservient or autonomous the Cold War made
international politics more stable, on the one hand,
and yet more dangerous, on the other.
This reasoning is best described by what
Raymond Aron has labeled balance of terror in the
thermonuclear age 1 . Nuclear weapons indeed
provided a great degree of stability thanks to
deterrence, but it only actually occurred at the
macro level, or between the global powers. The rest
of the world, for several different reasons, was in
convulsion. While political and social struggles at
the heart of Europe were swiftly settled by Truman
and Stalins need to secure their positions in that
continent, instability and conflicts progressively
moved to the fringes of the planet due to
decolonization. As one of the results of the
downfall of the Eurocentric order, the rise of
independent states in Africa and Asia opened up
opportunities for the enlargement of both
Soviet/communist and American/capitalist spheres
of influence. In those decades, the permanent
struggle for power and influence was progressively
transferred to the periphery, leading to political
turmoil, economic setbacks and even to bloody
wars in the post-colonial world. Paradoxically,
stability of the international system had in those
newly-independent countries its safety valve.
Latin America suffered the mixed effects of
the Cold War. Proximity with the United States
could provide, at least in theory, some degree of
prosperity and stability. Regional giants, such as

Mexico, Brazil or Argentina, were able to bargain

with the superpower by using their size, strategic
assets, or economic capabilities to attract
investments or take loans with an eye on
promoting national development. Smaller states, on
their part, were more vulnerable and often
bandwagoned with the U.S. as their only
alternative. In both cases, the fate of Latin
American nations nonetheless depended on the
willingness of the United States to cooperate or at
least to safeguard their interests in the region.
That was not the case in the years that
immediately followed the end of WWII. Although
Latin America was pushed into the hemispheric
institutional frameworks created by the Truman
administration such as the Inter-American Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance (1947) or the Organization
of American States (1948) relations between the
superpower and its backyard were initially
marked by indifference. Giving up the Good
Neighbor policy of the previous decade, America
took friendship with the hemisphere for granted
and ignored the calls for economic assistance that
came from a continent torn not by war, but by
poverty and backwardness.
Only the imminent threat of communism,
which became evident with the Cuban Revolution
in 1959, would lead the U.S. to reach out to those
countries in a proactive manner. It was John
Kennedys Alliance for Progress that attempted to
reverse the deteriorating relations with the
southern neighbors. Launched in 1961, what the
Kennedy administration had in mind was using
economic assistance to promote democracy, social
modernization and growth therefore fostering
stability south of the border. However, it also
resorted to forceful intervention or support to
regime change in countries where left-wing leaders
seemed to challenge U.S. primacy. This latter trend
became the modus operandi of relations with Latin
America for the decades that followed.
Brazilian politics, economy and foreign
relations during the Cold War years have been
largely shaped by the dynamics of U.S. relations
with Latin America. This chapter looks at the
history of Brazils populist republic (1945-1964)
from a systemic perspective, linking global
processes to domestic outcomes. What kind of
opportunities and challenges did the bipolar setting
offer to Brazil? We argue that, whereas Brazils
political and economic structures have been

adapted according to U.S. postwar interests, those

changes have been met with sheer nationalist
resistance. Brazilian nationalism, on its part, was
not only interpreted through Cold War lenses but
also shaped by the global ideological struggle.
Attempts at turning away from the U.S. were
therefore seen as threats to Americas regional and
global interests. As a result, Brazils bid for political
and economic independence came at the price of
instability and political collapse: having suffered a
military coup dtat in 1964 aimed at preventing
the country from becoming another Cuba, Brazil
was one of the first victims of Cold War policies on
the fringes of Americas sphere of influence.
Promise and Perils of Brazils relationship with the
United States
Most of Brazils early republican history is
told in terms of its relationship with the United
States 2 . When compared to the rest of the
hemisphere, however, those bilateral ties are
relatively recent. As the only Latin American nation
that enjoyed a long monarchical period after
independence, it naturally leaned towards Europe
for most of the nineteenth century, having opened
up its economy to British influence and products as
early as 1810. The republican coup that ousted
Emperor Pedro II in 1889 shifted the gravity center
of Brazils foreign policy, which moved further
from the European kingdoms and towards the
United States, a rising power by then. At the turn of
that century, particularly under Baro do Rio
Branco the most prominent Foreign Minister in
Brazils history, who served from 1902 until his
passing in 1912 Brazilian foreign policy relied so
much on the ties forged with the U.S. that many
analysts labeled our diplomatic orientation
Americanism 3 . It was not about subduing
Brazilian interests to Americas bid for hegemony,
but rather a means to meet Brazils national
aspirations. To use the classical definition of
Bradford Burns, it was an unwritten alliance one
between two territorial giants, yet asymmetrically
related to each other; one driven by pragmatic
calculations, not by ideology4.
Relations with the United States remained
the cornerstone of Brazils diplomatic orientations
for the entire length of the First Republic (18891930). The declaration of war against the German
Empire, in late 1917, was justified on the grounds

that one of the belligerent nations [the United

States] is part of the American continent and that
we are linked to this belligerent nation by a
traditional friendship5. Brazil was not just the only
country to follow the U.S. in declaring war on
Germany, but also the only Latin American country
to send troops to Europe. Due to the prestige
Domcio da Gama, the Brazilian Foreign Minister
(and former ambassador to Washington) enjoyed
among U.S. officials, Brazil was invited to partake
in the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920) with
three delegates, which satisfied the nations desire
for greatness 6 . With the United States Congress
rejecting membership in the League of Nations,
Brazil went on to become the most powerful nation
of the Americas in the newly-founded international
organization.
For the period Brazil was one of the most
active members of the League of Nations, some
analysts argue that Brazilian foreign policy was
divided between America and Europe 7 .
However, the decision to abandon the organization,
after a frustrated bid for a permanent seat in the
Leagues Executive Council in 1926, reaffirmed the
Americanism that guided Brazils diplomacy. The
country chose to reinforce the long-standing
relations with the United States (and the South
American neighbors) in the years that came. It
sided with Washington in the 1928 Havana
Conference against the criticism suffered by the
Coolidge
administration
regarding
U.S.
interventionist policies towards Central America
and the Caribbean. In 1930, Brazils President-elect
Jlio Prestes paid an official visit to the United
States in gratitude for President Hoovers trip to
Brazil the year before.
The rise to power of Getlio Vargas, a
young politician associated with the Tenente
revolts8 of the 1920s, did not at first change Brazils
Americanist orientations. Even though the United
States was initially hesitant to endorse the
revolutionary government, mostly due to the
intense trade relations it had nurtured with the
previous coffee-and-milk regime 9 , the Vargas
administration was finally recognized on
November 8, one month after the so-called
Revolution of 1930 10 . U.S. ambassador to Rio,
Edwin Morgan, declared that his country would
like to continue with the same friendly relations
that it had kept with his [Vargass] predecessors 11.
Indeed, Brazil-U.S. ties became stronger in the

following years, improved by President Roosevelts

Good Neighbor policy launched as he took office
in 1933.
Geopolitical tides, however, began to turn
in the mid-1930s, with Hitler taking over power in
Germany in 1933, and the Rome-Berlin Axis being
established three years later. The Brazilian
government benefitted from this power shift in
Europe by adopting a pendular foreign policy,
bargaining for investments and preferential trade
agreements with both the United States and the
Third Reich. An agricultural and natural resource
powerhouse, Brazil could reap the political and
economic gains from by adopting some sort of
pragmatic equidistance12, paving its way towards
industrialization. As a country formed by large
German, Italian, and Japanese communities, and
having its own tropical version of an authoritarian
leader (whose character was affirmed with the
establishment of the highly centralized regime of
Estado Novo the New State in 1937), Brazil
shared political and cultural similarities with the
European dictatorships of that time. However,
bearing historical bonds with the U.S., it also had
the need to maintain a prosperous relationship
with Washington. Consequently, the Brazilian
pendulum kept swinging until the outbreak of
World War II.
As the war raged in Europe, Brazil lost
economic ground and slowly moved back to the
previous pro-U.S. position. Pressured by the
Roosevelt administration, which had entered the
global conflict in December 1941, a Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the
American republics convened in Rio, in January
1942. The unanimous resolution adopted at that
meeting suggested that countries broke diplomatic
ties with the members of the Axis, which Brazil did
by the end of that month. After several months of
naval offensives in which German submarines
torpedoed Brazilian merchant and transportation
ships, the Vargas government finally declared war
on Nazi Germany and Italy on August 22, 194213.
The state of belligerence consolidated the
renewed proximity between Brazil and the United
States. Getlio Vargas offered Americans strategic
military bases along the Brazilian coast, the most
important of which being the Air Force Base in
Natal, a state capital located in the Northeastern tip
of the country and key to the Allied military
operations in North Africa. He also created the

Brazilian Expeditionary Force (Fora Expedicionria

Brasileira, FEB), which mobilized some 25,000
troops to join the Allies in the Italian Campaign in
1944. At the same time, President Roosevelt
authorized investments, loans, and logistical
support for the construction of a steel mill in Volta
Redonda, in the state of Rio de Janeiro, and for the
creation of a state-controlled mining company, Vale
do Rio Doce. The U.S. government also contributed
to the re-equipping of the Brazilian armed forces
between 1942 and 194514. Having the United States
as the most important ally, the longtime dream of
industrialization was coming true with foreign
policy as the main tool for its achievement.
Dutra: From strategy to paradigm
If the Americanist strategy that guided
Brazils diplomacy for most of the twentieth
century had been proven successful until the
outbreak of the war in Europe, it was eventually
transformed into a foreign policy paradigm in the
postwar era. Having participated in the key
conferences that shaped the new international
political and economic order the Bretton Woods
Conference, in July 1944, and the San Francisco
Conference, from April to June 1945 Brazil
became fully integrated into the free world. It was
even invited by the Roosevelt administration to join
the permanent ranks of the United Nations Security
Council, a project which was still under discussion
among the Allied powers, but the proposal was
ruled out by the British and Soviet delegations 15.
Moreover, siding with the U.S. also led to political
change in Brazil. After fifteen straight years in
office, Vargas was toppled by the military in
October 1945, and succeeded by his former
Minister of War, Eurico Gaspar Dutra. General
Dutra was elected in a context of democratic
renewal16 that followed the defeat of Nazi-Fascism.
The rise of constitutional democracies in Latin
America was one of the earliest signs of U.S.
hegemony across the globe.
Brazils democracy was organized around a
three-party system. Even after stepping down,
Vargas remained so present in the countrys
political reality that it is often said that he created
the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social
Democrtico, PSD) with his right hand and the
Brazilian Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro,
PTB) with his left hand17. While the former relied

on the networks and influence of rural elites who

were heir of the parochial interests of the Old
Republic, the latter was created to embrace the
aspirations of an ascending left-leaning urban
working class which was spiritually connected to
Getlio Vargas. The two parties reflected the
balance of political forces that had sustained him
for fifteen years in power, particularly under the
Estado Novo regime the quasi-fascist experience
that prevailed from 1937 to 1945. Although not
related to the former dictator, the National
Democratic Union (Unio Democrtica Nacional,
UDN), a right-wing conservative party, found in
the anti-Vargas sentiment the cement that held the
opposition together. Underlying the party system
was Varguismo18, the political culture that stemmed
from the long authoritarian period and that
remained for the next three decades as the driving
force of Brazilian politics.
The centrist PSD was the party that
dominated the Constitutional Assembly of 1946
and the Congress that was formed thereafter. As a
result, the years that followed the end of the Estado
Novo were of an apparent stability, in spite of some
economic
setbacks.
The
struggle
against
communism, which had driven many policies
under Vargas, became even harsher in the second
half of the 1940s 19 . Externally, Dutras foreign
policy embraced the United States in a quasiideological sense. From a systemic perspective, it
had become rather difficult for any Latin American
country not to abide by U.S. foreign policy goals.
Even though it is often agreed that the Cold War
would formally begin in 1947 with the enunciation
of the Truman Doctrine20, the bipolar setting that
emerged from the wars end constrained the
likelihood of autonomous foreign policymaking in
the peripheries of the planet. Brazil offered its
wholehearted support for the establishment of a
U.S.-led Inter-American system, structured around
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
(signed at the Rio Conference of 1947) and the
Organization of American States (signed in Bogot,
Colombia in 1948). Relations with the Soviet Union,
which had been established in the course of the war
in April 1945 (Brazil had broken diplomatic ties
with Revolutionary Russia in 1917), were again
halted in October 1947, following the abolition of
the Brazilian Communist Party (Partido Comunista
Brasileiro, PCB)21. The Dutra administration went on
to become one of Washingtons most loyal allies.

Expectations, however, have never been

reciprocal. Brazils friendship with the U.S. was
largely fruitless (a rewardless alignment, in
historian Gerson Mouras terms 22 ), for President
Dutra counted with an economic aid that never
came. Shortly after taking office in 1946, he sent a
personal letter to his counterpart Harry S. Truman
appealing for aid to intensify Brazilian
development, which was immediately followed by
an official request from Itamaraty, the Brazilian
Foreign Ministry, for a five-year $ 1 billion dollar
loan. After all, inflation was on the rise and foreignexchange reserves had reached a low after the war,
with the end of trade surpluses and abrogation of
currency control in 1946. But the long-range
development loan never materialized, and Brazil
received only $ 46 million in 1946 and $ 90 million
the next year, causing perplexity and resentment in
Brazil23.
Without U.S. aid, liberal economic policies,
which were conceived of to attract investments,
quickly took their toll on the government 24 . By
1947, Brazil was on the verge of economic collapse,
which forced the Dutra administration to sign an
agreement with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF)25. While it drove the country to temporary
recession, the ensuing policies favored imports of
industrialized goods and ultimately helped
develop basic industrial sectors. It came, however,
at the expense of Brazilian exports and led to
inflationary pressure. In spite of recurrent requests
from the Brazilian monetary authorities, State
Secretary George Marshall denied the possibility of
launching a Marshall Plan for Latin America,
suggesting instead that the region should seek
private investments and funding 26. In the Brazilian
case, a special bilateral working group was created
in 1948 the Abbink Mission but fell short of
helping the Dutra administration promote growth
and development. Three years later, the Abbink
Mission was replaced by a more institutionalized
group, the Joint Brazil-United States Economic
Development Commission (JBUSEDC), which
created new illusions of American support to
Brazilian industrialization27. On the military front,
the United States inspired the creation of the
Superior School of War (Escola Superior de Guerra,
ESG), based on the premises of the National War
College. It went on to become the cradle of
conservative military thinking, with important
political implications for the next decades.

With time, the automatic alignment of the

immediate postwar years started facing domestic
hurdles. Dutras support to the U.S. in the Korean
War, which was expected to involve the sending of
Brazilian troops to the Korean peninsula, unleashed
popular protests and spurred congressional
resistance. The uneasy political background led the
president to reject the American call to arms, much
to the chagrin of the Truman administration, which
deemed Brazils attitude as undermining the
special alliance of the previous decades. Not even
the wholehearted support to Washington in the
United Nations Security Council in the early stages
of the crisis seemed enough to regain Americas
confidence. Brazilian longtime sentiment of
solidarity toward the United States, on the other
hand, was being undermined by symbolic attitudes
that revealed Trumans lack of interest in reaching
out to Brazil, whose economy was in a critical
condition. Immediately before the multinational
engagement in the war, the U.S. approved a $ 125
million Eximbank loan to Argentina and
announced an even greater one to Mexico, while
delaying the approval of a $ 25 million loan for
expansion of the Volta Redonda steel plant 28 .
Highlighted by the Korean crisis, the theme of
American neglect became a dominant ingredient in
the thinking of the Brazilian political elite29. If the
relationship had visibly deteriorated in the years
that followed the wars end, by 1950 the era of
strained relations was in fact just beginning.
Vargas: between the U.S. and the deep blue sea
Frustration among Brazilians and suspicion
among Americans therefore served as background
for Getlio Vargass return to power in 1951.
Widely supported by nationalist sectors, the
democratically-elected
president
was
now
confronted by a wavering congress. The Brazilian
society was divided over economic and political
issues, and two groups were particularly salient:
the nationalists and the liberals. The former was
concerned with the growing dependence of the
national economy on the U.S. and deemed, by and
large, import-substitution industrialization as the
safest path towards development. They were
largely inspired by the ideas of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Latin America, or
Comisso Econmica para a Amrica Latina (CEPAL)30.
The latter, drawing on the mainstream liberal

economic thinking and standing up for

conservative principles and beliefs, was confident
that economic development could only flow from
foreign direct investments, private enterprise, and
cooperation with the United States. They were anticommunist at heart.
Vargas resorted to populism to appease both
groups, but that was impossible to sustain in the
long run. Populist tactics, which involved reaching
out to the masses and bypassing institutional
commitments, served well for Vargas in a context
of urbanization, economic welfare, and social
transformation, and became the linchpin of the
Estado Novo regime. However, the Cold War
setting of the next decade, insofar as it contributed
to the growing societal polarization, rendered
populism a much less efficient tool. Regardless of
the numerous attempts at asserting himself as the
father of the poor, Getlio Vargas was subjected
to mounting criticism and ruinous attacks.
Nationalists accused the president of selling out the
country to the interests of American imperialism
whenever he decided to come up with policies to
attract foreign investments or to strengthen
bilateral ties with the United States. Liberals
charged the president for making nationalist
decisions that were regarded as much too leftist
and were sometimes identified with communist
ideas31.
To the nationalists, Vargas created the
National Bank for Economic Development (Banco
National de Desenvolvimento Econmico, BNDE),
which went on to become the chief formulator of
policies of development and industrialization. He
also offered his erstwhile supporters a national oil
company, a proposal that was one of the highlights
of his presidential campaign. Contrary to the initial
expectations, however, the draft bill that was sent
to congress in December 1951 proposed to set up a
mixed-economy enterprise owned by the state but
allowing foreign participation. It was the
presidents
solution
to
satisfy
the
developmentalists without closing the door to
those who favored external investments. After
heated debates for the next two years, Law no. 2004
was finally approved in October 1953, establishing
state monopoly on oil and creating the Brazilian
Petroleum Corporation (Petrobrs). From that
moment on, oil became one of the most critical
issues in Brazil-U.S. bilateral agenda, for Americans

would never accept state monopoly in such a

strategic sector.
To the pro-U.S. liberals, the president
attempted to revive the alliance with Washington
by offering the Truman administration political and
military support in the global struggle against
communism. Vargass foreign minister Joo Neves
da Fontoura, who had also served under Dutra in
1946, was the greatest enthusiast for a new
partnership between the two countries. Brazil thus
supplied U.S. troops in the Korean War with
strategic materials, although direct military
participation was vetoed by the congress. To
alleviate
the
ensuing
frustration
among
conservative sectors (and particularly among the
military, most of whom favored Brazilian
engagement in the conflict), Vargas negotiated a
military assistance treaty with the United States.
The Military Agreement, which faced a long and
winding path to congressional approval, entered
into force in late 1952. While the decision to sign a
bilateral accord signaled Brazils willingness to
keep ties with Washington as the cornerstone of its
foreign policy, the lack of economic reciprocity
remained as a major source of domestic discontent
and fierce opposition among nationalist groups.
The dismissal of Vargass minister of war, Estillac
Leal, weeks after the signature of the agreement
revealed not only underlying political instability,
but also deep rifts within the Armed Forces 32 .
Nationalist generals were progressively replaced
by conservative leadership, who were not as
enthusiastic in their backing to the president.
Dwight Eisenhowers inauguration in 1953
contributed to the worsening of relations between
both countries. From the outset, the new republican
administration adopted a negative agenda towards
Latin America, narrowing down their foreign
policy interests to fighting communism in the
hemisphere. The unwillingness to apply funds and
resources from multilateral credit agencies such as
the World Bank or from the Eximbank in
development projects in Brazil was patent.
Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles believed that economic development should
be taken up by private enterprise following the
imperatives of the market. The natural outcome of
such thought was the unilateral dismantlement of
the Joint Commission (set up under Truman) in
December that year, much to the frustration of
Brazilians. Even though long-term commitments

were not terminated, the abrupt policy reversal was

a staggering psychological blow to Brazil. It
spurred the firing of Neves da Fontoura and of
finance minister Horcio Lafer, the two major
proponents of the JBUSEDC, in a cabinet reform in
June 33 . Vargas responded also by turning up the
criticism against the profit remittances of foreign
companies, implying that they were responsible for
Brazils economic morass34.
The year of 1954 was one of distress and
crisis in Brazil. Precarious economic conditions
fueled popular discontent among (and between)
the working class and business elites. The military
command, afraid that the growing nationalism
could give way to undesired communist influence,
forced Vargass labor minister Joo Goulart, a wellknown leftist and one of the presidents
unconditional allies, to resign in February after
allegations of corruption and of stirring up urban
workers against the legal order. That explains why,
in the months that followed, the anti-Vargas
coalition reacted so dramatically to a newspaper
interview given by former chancellor Neves da
Fontoura, in which he denounced diplomatic
attempts to forge anti-American alliance between
Juan Perns Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (the socalled ABC Pact). He pointed out that secret talks
had been carried out between the presidents even
before Vargass return to power, and that the idea
behind the pact was to strengthen labor unionism
in their own regimes and to forge a coalition to
check U.S. influence in the Southern Cone.
The news caused disquietude in the
American diplomatic circles, for the signs of
growing communist infiltration were becoming
more evident. The political crisis in Guatemala,
which led to the controversial U.S.-backed coup
dtat to depose President Jacobo rbenz, seemed
like a bad omen to the Eisenhower administration.
At the height of McCarthyism, the slightest
nationalist and anti-American leanings across Latin
America ended up bolstering the Red Scare
among U.S. officials. Anguish only grew stronger
when they learned from Fontouras declarations 35
that Brazils National Research Council (Conselho
Nacional de Pesquisa, CNPq), running counter to
Eisenhowers Atoms for Peace philosophy, had
secretly negotiated the purchase of three
ultracentrifuges from West Germany to develop a
national nuclear industry.

Issues related to the development of nuclear

technology were at the heart of the Cold War,
particularly after the first successful Soviet atomic
test in 1949. Vargass return to power marked the
beginning of a struggle over atomic cooperation
with the United States between nationalists,
represented by the CNPq and the National Security
Council, and the pro-U.S. liberals, spearheaded by
Neves da Fontoura and Itamaraty. While the
former advocated that Brazil should follow an
autonomous path of nuclear scientific research and
toward mastering the full uranium enrichment
cycle, the latter believed that the country had to
take advantage of its position of supplier of
strategic minerals, such as monazite, uranium and
cerium oxide, to the United States. Fontouras
upper hand in negotiating with Washington led to
a number of agreements between 1952 and 1954
(some of them signed even after he had stepped
down), by which Brazil offered nuclear materials
without demanding specific compensations, such
as technology transfers. The most controversial of
these accords was the Wheat Agreement of August
1954, which traded monazite for wheat and was
regarded unfavorable and unequal by nationalist
groups. In such context, the secret plan with the
Germans was yet another chapter of the mounting
ambiguities of the Vargas administration.
All accusations made by Fontoura were
tantamount to treason and enraged opposition
groups, most notably the conservative sectors of the
military, which thereafter began plotting to remove
Vargas from power36. As a matter of fact, signs of a
military-led coup became more intense as Brazils
financial position worsened. On such possibility,
one State Department official wrote: A coup dtat
by the Army would not seriously affect our
interests. The Army is conservative, anticommunist by a large majority, and would respect
existing agreements (). It would be unfortunate
in principle () though our practical security
objectives might even be enhanced37. The United
States was clearly sympathetic to the conspirators,
mostly linked to the ESG and the UDN, and offered
them political backing in the partisan dispute that
followed 38 . Facing insurmountable pressure, the
president decided to resort to his popularity to
regain political leverage. In one of his boldest
moves, Vargas raised the stakes of his populist
gamble by decreeing on the first of May a 100
percent minimum-wage increase that had the

potential to shake the Brazilian economy and that

agitated the middle-class opposition.
But the worst was yet to come. In early
August, Carlos Lacerda39, Vargass most ferocious
critic, was caught in an assassination attempt which
was soon found out to have been plotted by the
presidents chief bodyguard. Although Lacerda
was only wounded, an Air Force officer who was
accompanying him was shot twice in the chest and
killed. A political crisis immediately ensued, with
members of the military and of the opposition
making daily demonstrations to call for the
resignation of a weakened Vargas. On August 24,
fearing that he would be ousted by the Armed
Forces, Getlio Vargas shot himself through the
heart, leaving a suicide letter that was broadcast on
national radio hours after his body was discovered.
In his testament he blamed forces and interests,
domestic and foreign, for his downfall: Once more
the forces and interests which work against the
people have organized themselves anew and have
broken out against me (). The underground
campaign of international groups joined that of
national groups (). They do not want the
Brazilian people to be independent. () If the birds
of prey want someones blood, if they want to go
on draining the Brazilian people, I offer my life as a
holocaust (). Serenely I take my first step towards
eternity and leave life to enter history40.
Vargass death evoked an outburst of antiU.S. riots in some capitals. Government buildings,
such as the U.S. Embassy in Rio and the consulates
in Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre, were attacked.
Protesters also stoned symbolic targets, from the
buildings of Standard Oil and Light & Power to
Coca-Cola trucks and Helena Rubinstein shops 41 .
What once was a largely scattered, unspecific and
anti-imperialist nationalism became a virulently
anti-American sentiment that loomed large over
Brazilian politics for the following decade42.
U.S. ambassador to Rio James Scott Kemper
rejoiced when Vice-president Joo Caf Filho took
office 43 , seeing the new administration as an
opportunity to strengthen Brazil-U.S. relations. One
of Caf Filhos first decisions was to send his
Finance Minister, Eugnio Gudin, to an official
mission to Washington where he negotiated a $ 200
million loan from American banks. The new
Brazilian government seemed to tacitly accept
Einsenhowers understanding that development
should be pursued through agreements with

private companies 44 . Some months later, Brazils

Currency and Credit Superintendency45 eliminated
currency restrictions and tariffs on machinery
imports, which not only endangered some incipient
national industrial sectors, but also weakened the
nationalist policies of the previous years 46 . The
appointment of Raul Fernandes to the Foreign
Ministry was also regarded as a positive sign of
renewed relations. He had been one of the
architects of Dutras special alliance with the U.S.,
having served as Foreign Minister between 1947
and 1951.
Nonetheless, the most important aspect of
Caf Filhos caretaker administration was its
approach towards nuclear policies47. If Vargas was
able to counterbalance albeit oftentimes
unsuccessfully ministers and politicians who
favored agreements that served Washingtons
interests, his successors atomic policies were
framed in strict accordance with U.S. legislation,
such as the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and the
Atoms for Peace program. Two agreements were
signed in August 1955, on the civil uses of atomic
energy and on the recognition of uranium
resources in Brazil. Nationalists, who had lost
political power under Caf Filho, were further
irritated by safeguards that were imposed by the
United States to ensure the peaceful character of
subsequent research and prospects. Irritation
turned into turmoil when secret documents, which
had allegedly been issued by the U.S. Embassy in
Rio with instructions to Brazilian government
officials on how the country should conduct its
nuclear policy, were leaked. As in previous years,
President and Congress were again on a collision
course.
The presidential race of October 1955
therefore took place against a backdrop of
turbulence. The centrist PSD nominated Juscelino
Kubitschek de Oliveira, governor of the wealthy
state of Minas Gerais, to carry on Vargass legacy.
Juarez Tvora of UDN, Caf Filhos former Military
Chief of Staff, and Adhemar de Barros, former
governor of So Paulo, were the contenders. Even
though the anti-Vargas forces which included the
UDN, mainstream sectors of the military command,
and Washington benefitted from the interim
administration, the permanent state of uncertainty
made it an unusually tight race. Although a
moderate compared to his predecessor, Kubitschek
offered little assurance that he would reach out to

the opposition if he won the presidency. After all,

the political platform of the former governor of
Minas Gerais was publicly endorsed by the
communists. Even more troubling to the opposition
was that he decided to run on a PSD-PTB ticket,
picking Joo Goulart, Vargass foremost ally, as his
running mate48.
Kubitscheks electoral victory by a wafer-thin
majority of votes (35.7 percent of valid votes
against 30.3 percent of Tvora and 25.8 of Barros)49
led the opposition to declare the ballot illegitimate
and call for new elections. These men cannot,
should not, will not take office, declared Lacerda,
leader of the UDN, after results were released50. He
joined forces with the military command, which
was particularly interested in preventing the
president-elect from swearing in. Some highranked officers seized the opportunity of Caf
Filhos medical leave to stage a coup dtat on
November 11 and nullify the presidential race. A
legalistic countercoup led by Marshal Henrique
Lott followed the same day, safeguarding the
constitution and appointing Nereu Ramos, the
President of the Senate, as the acting president. To
avoid any new political maneuvers that could lead
to greater instability, the country was put under
martial law for the following months. Under Lotts
aegis, Kubitschek and Goulart finally took office on
January 31, 1956, ushering in an era of renewed
hope and prosperity.
Kubitschek: the triumph of national-developmentalism
Fifty years progress in five, the motto
that drove Kubitscheks campaign, was soon
transformed into an ambitious government plan.
The Plan of Goals (Plano de Metas), as it became
known, was composed of thirty developmentalist
targets that spanned across many economic sectors,
from energy to infra-structure to base industry. The
showpiece of his administration, often regarded as
the thirty-first goal, was the design and
construction of Braslia, a new federal capital deep
in the heartland of the country 51 . A skilled
politician, Kubitschek made use of the
communications revolution of the 1950s to build
the image of a modern country, one guided by
economic optimism which by and large emulated
the American consumerist dream of the postwar
years. Reaching out to the public, while at the same
time avoiding the pitfalls of populism, seemed the

best way to neutralize political opposition at

home52.
By presenting himself as a staunch anticommunist, the president also attempted to
appease the military command and U.S. officials.
He even met with President Eisenhower some
weeks prior to his inauguration to show some
credibility before the eyes of administration
officials and the American business community 53.
Close collaboration with Washington was key to
raising external financing, one of the foundation
stones of the Plan of Goals. Since the new
administration needed to attract foreign capital to
reach the targets without pushing up prices, it
continued Caf Filhos policies of granting
preferential treatment to foreign investors, while
refusing to reinstitute Vargass restrictions on profit
remittances54. On the other hand, contrary to U.S.
expectations, the president decided to leave state
monopoly on petroleum untouched. It represented,
according to Kubitschek himself, not a victory of
communists, but rather a choice of all Brazilian
people55. As his predecessors, he also had to walk
on a tightrope between nationalists and liberals.
Unlike Dutra or Vargas, however, U.S. related to
Kubitschek on the grounds of unmet expectations,
which resulted in a suspicious attitude that
remained for his entire time in office.
In spite of U.S. caution, Kubitschek had
reasons to expect that he would succeed in
obtaining economic assistance from the Eisenhower
administration. That was mostly due to the
emergence of the Cold War in Latin America.
Times were changing, and U.S. officials realized
that neglecting the underdevelopment reality of the
region could expose a geopolitical vulnerability in
the long run for at least three reasons. First of all,
Frances defeat in Vietnam showed that private
capital alone did not suffice to promote rapid
economic development across newly-independent
nations and neither did it appease anti-colonial
sentiments. Moreover, the U.S. found itself under
increasing attack from Latin American countries for
its refusal to help stabilize commodity prices,
which declined steeply after 1954. Americas
continuing hostility toward a coffee agreement, for
instance, was considered selfish and inconsistent
by Brazilian authorities 56 . Finally and most
importantly, as part of a new tactical move, the
Soviet Union was making an economic offensive in
the Third World which targeted, among others,

Brazil and its oil industry. That led the United

States to explore alternative methods of economic
assistance for the region, such as soft loans, by
1955.
Soft loans, however, did not change
Eisenhowers
ideological
assumptions
on
development nor represented a new emphasis on
Latin America. They were used tactically to expand
sales of surplus commodities, such as wheat and
flour, but fell short of providing genuine
development assistance. Brazil resorted to them in
a limited fashion, and kept relying on Eximbank
and World Bank loans, which were generally
granted in unfavorable conditions. Despite a
successful mission to Washington conducted by
BNDE president Lucas Lopes in mid-1956, in which
the country negotiated $151 million in Eximbank
loans, U.S. officials never offered concrete aid and
began imposing conditions that were incompatible
with the targets set by the Plan of Goals. Further
loans, which depended on Brazils control of
inflation and balance-of-payments surpluses, failed
to meet the countrys economic needs.
Not even Kubitscheks authorization for the
United States to build a missile-tracking station on
the island of Fernando de Noronha in early 1957,
which
provoked
political
uproar
among
nationalists, seemed to make Americans receptive
to Brazilian aid requests. By the end of that year,
Eximbank loans had slowed down, coffee prices
reached a dramatic low, and Brazils trade deficit
rose to $ 250 million. Ambassador James Dunns
words in a telegram to the State Department in July
1956 never seemed so appropriate: Kubitschek has
made himself vulnerable to criticism by taking such
a strong stand toward friendship for the U.S. I
believe that he feels that we have not given him in
full measure the strong and intimate support he
hoped he would receive from us57. The ideal of a
special relationship with Washington was again
rendered fruitless, and this time Kubitschek was
left with little political support at home.
At the beginning of 1958, Brazil-U.S.
relations had reached its lowest ebb in many years.
Systematic trade deficits, increased consumption of
imported goods and dropping coffee prices due to
overproduction led the government to exhaust its
exchange reserves and teeter on the edge of
bankruptcy. Brazilian authorities were clearly upset
about resorting to the IMF and Eximbank for
emergency assistance, expecting more sympathetic

policies on Eisenhowers part. Coordinated

assistance programs in Africa and Asia had, after
all, become a priority to the United States 58 . The
absence of a specific policy toward Brazil and its
neighbors was nonetheless a source of permanent
concern and disillusionment. Kubitschek even
considered the possibility of selling coffee
surpluses to the Soviet Union so as to force the U.S.
into an agreement, but it failed to touch
administration officials 59 . The president then
decided to change strategies so as to break the
impasse, and found in Vice-president Nixons
goodwill tour a golden opportunity to force a
change in U.S. attitude towards Latin America60.
When Nixon embarked on his eight-nation
trip to South America in April and May 1958, U.S.
officials were apparently unaware of the extent of
anti-Americanism in the hemisphere. It was not the
first time publicity visits by high-ranking officials
were paid to demonstrate U.S. concern for the
region 61 . This time, however, popular reaction
embodied several years of neglect that had helped
deteriorate, in the eyes of Latin Americans, the
already precarious economic situation of their
countries. The goodwill mission degenerated into
tumult and protests in some capitals, such as
Caracas, where Nixons motorcade was attacked by
an angry mob. If the tour proved a fiasco, the riots
at least served as a wake-up call to the Eisenhower
administration, which could not simply blame the
generalized sense of frustration on the
communists62. They also provided an opportunity
for Kubitschek to make a bold move. On May 28,
he wrote a letter to Eisenhower in which he stated
that the hour has come for us to undertake a
thorough revision () for the furtherance of Pan
American ideals in all of their implications 63 .
Under Brazils initiative, the seeds of a hemispheric
proposal had just been sown.
Operation Pan America (OPA), as
Kubitscheks plan was called, was founded upon
the reasoning that Latin American economic and
social underdevelopment could open doors to the
expansion of Soviet influence. More development
leads to more security: that seemed to be the only
justification U.S. officials were willing to consider
at the height of the Cold War 64. OPAs stated aim
was therefore to strengthen all the nations of the
Western hemisphere in their fight against the threat
of international communism. Although the
approach was multilateral, there were expectations

that Washington took the lead of major economic

aid to Latin America65. But even after the failure of
the goodwill trip, underwriting to an ambitious
development program was not exactly what
Eisenhower had in mind. To him, rather than an
opportunity to rebuild U.S. relationship with its
neighbors, the initiative had come to Washingtons
embarrassment 66 . Hence, despite the apparent
public support for the initiative, U.S. diplomacy
was deliberately undermining Kubitscheks efforts.
In the words of Thomas Mann, Assistant Secretary
of State for Economic Affairs, the United States
cannot accept the Brazilian proposals, and the
problem is to resolve the issue constructively, with
as little discord as possible67.
The Eisenhower administration was well
aware, on the other hand, that timing was
inappropriate to turn the proposal down. Between
the months of June and July 1958, Fidel Castros
guerrillas kidnapped some American engineers to
protest against U.S. aid to the Batista regime. In
Panama and Guatemala, students rioted against
Milton Eisenhowers trip to Central America.
Marines were sent to Beirut to help the Lebanese
government suffocate popular demonstrations.
When John Foster Dulles arrived in Rio in early
August, mood in the streets was far from amiable
either. That gave Kubitschek leverage to make a
strong case for OPA, leaving Dulles with no option
other than recognizing the initiatives principles
and reacting accordingly. The idea of a common
Latin American market began taking shape and
would eventually become the Latin American Free
Trade Association (LAFTA). Most importantly,
however, were the talks on the creation of a lending
institution for the hemisphere. The Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB), a fundamental shift in
Eisenhowers foreign economic policy, was finally
established in 195968.
In spite of some advancements on the
regional level, Brazil-U.S. bilateral relations
remained strained. Kubitschek was dismayed at
Washingtons support of the IMF in its reluctance
to approve Brazils request for a loan of $ 300
million69. Some months later, he spoke publicly for
restoring trade ties with the Soviet Union on the
grounds of economic pragmatism. His foreign
policy advisor Augusto Frederico Schmidt stressed
the same point at an OAS meeting in November
1958, arguing that, in spite of all risks involved in
reaching out to communist regimes, that was

preferable to economic stagnation 70 . While such

declarations stirred the Red Scare domestically,
leading
Catholic
cardinals,
mainstream
newspapers, businesspeople, military officers and
even diplomats to speak against Kubitscheks
intentions, they fell short of causing commotion
among U.S. officials. When the twenty-one
members of OPA (the so-called Committee of 21)
gathered in Washington to discuss the massive
economic aid program they expected the
Eisenhower administration to launch, they were
received with nothing less than disdain. As U.S. top
officials kept rebuffing the idea of a long-range
development plan for the region, frustration and
disappointment was all Latin American diplomats
were left with71.
Since Brazilian-American cooperation on
OPA seemed virtually impossible, the ambitious
Kubtischek proposal quickly lost its relevance. At
the turn of 1959, U.S. attention turned to the Cuban
revolutionaries who had successfully seized power
on New Years eve. While it did not provoke an
immediate change in the administration policies,
the revolution in Havana provided an opportunity
for Washington to favor bilateral solutions to Latin
American countries to the detriment of the
multilateral approach suggested by Brazil. By the
time the Committee of 21 reconvened in Buenos
Aires in April, most Central American countries
and Mexico had already withdrawn their support
for OPA. The ultimate irony for Kubitschek,
however, was that Castro emphatically endorsed
the initiative at the Buenos Aires meeting when
the Operations manifest aim was to forestall the
potential Castros of the hemisphere from taking
over72.
OPAs downfall was not the only
disappointment Kubitschek had to face. By early
1959, widespread recession that resulted from an
agreement with the IMF fueled social unrest across
the country. Strikes in urban areas and peasant
revolts in the rural zones were regarded as
potential flanks for communist infiltration.
Standing between a rock and a hard place, the
president could not abandon his Plan of Goals,
although it demanded some inflationary financing,
and more austerity proved politically impossible.
Once again, the best alternative was to try to
persuade the Eisenhower administration to modify
its loan policies. But U.S. and IMF officials, even
knowing that Brazils economic prospects were

bleak and that Kubitscheks political situation was

worsening, intransigently insisted that a more
vigorous stabilization effort was necessary to make
any further loans viable73. On June 9, the Brazilian
president publicly broke off negotiations with the
IMF, and defiantly stated that Brazil has come of
age. We are no longer poor relatives obliged to stay
in the kitchen and forbidden to enter the living
room (). By making greater sacrifices we can
attain political and mainly economic independence
without the help of others74. His words aroused a
wave of nationalism across the country and
boosted his own popularity. A month later, a State
Department report worried that Brazilian
nationalism tended to be directed against the
United States and that it could pose, in its extreme
form, a threat to Brazilian-U.S. relations75.
As bilateral relations with Washington
deteriorated, Kubitschek sought to get his own way
in economic terms by adopting a more independent
stance in foreign affairs. On the bilateral level,
notable advances were made with West Germany,
Italy, and Japan, whose private investments were
essential to the development of the automotive
industry as well as steel and mining sectors 76 .
Commercial arrangements with the Soviet Union,
Eastern European countries and even with the
Peoples Republic of China, while they did not
mean the establishment of diplomatic ties, helped
Brazil alleviate its trade deficits and absorb its
agricultural overproduction. Brazilian efforts were
also directed to force coffee producers into an
International Coffee Accord, signed in September
1959. At the United Nations, Brazil voiced its
support for global disarmament and developmentoriented institutions, such as the Special U.N. Fund
for Economic Development (SUNFED) and the
International Development Association (IDA)77.
Even though the U.S. opposed most of these
decisions, it did nothing to address Brazils
economic needs in more concrete ways. Rather,
Eisenhower resorted to another round of symbolic
acts, embarking on a four-nation trip to South
America in February 1960 to counter the
impression that his administration was neglecting
the region. Due to the belief Brazilian authorities
held that their country will soon become a world
power, a presidential visit to Brazil, with
evidence of special regard for Brazils economic
and political importance in the Americas, would
provide a needed psychological impulse to

improvement
in
United
States-Brazilian
78
relations .
Whereas Eisenhowers visit was generally
considered a success79, having inaugurated an era
of good feeling 80 between both countries, it
probably came too late to avoid Brazils bid for a
more diverse and independent foreign policy. Less
than a month after Eisenhowers tour, UDN-backed
Jnio Quadros, the opposition candidate in the
upcoming presidential elections, visited Cuba and
praised the Castro regime, claiming that its
agrarian reform policies were a model for Brazil. If
Quadross trip was only part of his publicity
strategy, it at least echoed the general mood among
Brazilians. Some months later, the front-runner in
the presidential succession struggle went on to
declare that he would not tolerate that, under the
pretext of Inter-American domestic struggles, the
ruthless phantom of the Cold War sets foot in the
continent 81. Not even the Act of Bogot, adopted
in September 1960 by the Council of the OAS to
recommend measures for economic development
within the framework of OPA, changed Brazilian
perceptions about Washingtons intentions. As
Brazil became a key piece on the Cold War
chessboard, the U.S. was left with few alternatives
to secure its position in Latin America.
Quadros and Goulart: how far could independence go?
When Jnio Quadros took office in January
1961, Brazil enjoyed an international standing that
few could imagine ten years before. The country
was relatively less dependent on the United States,
having taken advantage of the increased
competition between them and the blossoming
economies of West Germany and Japan. Moreover,
despite the lukewarm results of Operation Pan
America, Brazils regional influence was taken to
unprecedented levels due to the initiative 82 . If
nothing else, OPAs demise was the downright
evidence that the priorities of Latin America and of
the Eisenhower administration were ultimately
irreconcilable. That, to a large extent, explains why
John Kennedys inaugural speech was concentrated
on U.S. foreign policy, and specifically of Americas
sister republics south of our border, to whom he
offered a special pledge, a new alliance for
progress, one aimed at assisting free men and free
governments in casting off the chains of
poverty 83 . The new administration believed that

Quadros, irrespective of his unflattering positions

on issues such as Cuba or reopening diplomatic
relations with Soviet-bloc countries, was some sort
of New Frontiersman 84 who would collaborate
toward prosperous U.S.-Latin American relations.
Domestic politics, however, was still deeply
influenced by forces such as the nationalist-liberal
struggle and anti-communism, and the Vargas
legacy still cast a shadow over the political system.
By and large, the election of Quadros offers
conspicuous examples of how the Cold War setting
exposed ambiguities at the heart of the Brazilian
society. A conservative in politics and morality
who associated himself with private capitalists,
domestic and foreign, he flirted with the
communist bloc to amass the support of the
working class and some nationalist sectors 85 .
Although he was elected in a landslide as the
candidate of a UDN-led coalition, with anti-Vargas
and pro-U.S. leanings, Quadros raised controversy
even among some supporters. Moreover, and
surprisingly enough, the vice-president (elected
under a different ticket) was a well-known political
figure who belonged to the leftist ranks of the PTB.
Joo Goulart (also known as Jango) had served as
vice-president under Kubitschek and also as
Minister of Labor under Getlio Vargas in his
second tenure.
The left-right divide was revealing in three
different respects. First of all, it represented the
erosion of Varguismo. Brazils mainstream political
culture
relied
heavily
on
corporatism,
accommodation of interests, and charisma to
provide social cohesion. Such elements also worked
as centripetal forces in a country torn by discontent.
Therefore, the debacle of Vargass image was, in
many ways, the death of the political center in
Brazil. Secondly, it brought to light the power (and
the vulnerabilities) of populism. Once a political
tactics deeply associated with Getlio Vargas, it
became a useful electoral strategy in the 1960s
presidential race. Jnio Quadros confronted the
spendthrift Kubitschek administration with charges
of
corruption
and
fiscal
irresponsibility,
campaigning around with a broom to tidy up the
economy and sweep out the political heirs of
Varguismo. Joo Goulart made use of the same
strategy but from the other side of the political
spectrum, running for vice-president on what had
been left of Vargass legacy, especially his close ties
to the urban working class. While populism did

suffice for those two politicians to get into office

in the unlikely and somewhat ironic Jan-Jan ticket
it was not enough to overcome the political and
economic challenges they had to confront.
Third, and finally, the left-right cleavage
reaffirmed the role of the military as the bulwark of
stability, even when running counter to democracy.
The deeper the political rift, the more urgent
military interference became. Although the Armed
Forces had performed the historical role of
custodians of politics in Brazil ever since the dawn
of the republican era, they intensified their social
presence after breaking with Getlio Vargas when
the Estado Novo collapsed. As the Cold War
progressed, ideology-driven politics also caused a
division at the core of the military command. The
high-ranked military who returned from the war in
Europe remained faithful to the pro-U.S.
orientation
and
feared
that
Varguista
demagoguery, as they saw it, played into the hands
of leftist or even communist groups. There was, of
course, a considerable number of nationalist
officers sometimes left-wing and anti-American
that were loyal to Vargas and his ideology, but
their power shrunk after his death in 195486. As the
conservative, anti-communist military leadership
grew stronger, it became less tolerant with populist
leanings and was able to gain support from middle
rank officers, who were also afraid of political and
social unrest.
The political foundations of the populist
republic of 1946 were slowly eroding. To cope with
the economic downturn, Quadros resorted to
policies of financial sanity, much to the liking of the
Kennedy administration 87 . He was nonetheless
aware that recession could lead to popular
discontent a dangerous bet in times of crisis and
therefore turned to nationalist and populist
discourse to compensate for macroeconomic
orthodoxy. To do so domestically, reaching out to
workers and labor unions with expansionist
policies, would involve a direct confrontation with
the conservative sectors that had put him in office.
Alternatively, Jnio Quadros decided to use foreign
policy to broaden his political legitimacy at home.
The President acknowledged from the outset that
Brazil was a new force on the world stage 88 and
decided to usher in a new international strategy,
which became known as independent foreign
policy. The same structural constraints that had led
the country to jump on Washingtons bandwagon

some decades before now created conditions for

autonomous action.
Following the tradition of nationaldevelopmentalism, Quadross new foreign policy
placed priority on economic development and
adopted a loose nonaligned position to that end. It
was essential to underscore that the new
orientation would not challenge Brazils traditional
standing in the world: Because of our historical,
cultural and Christian background as well as our
geographical situation, ours is a predominantly
Western nation. Our national effort is directed
toward the achievement of a democratic way of life,
both politically and socially []. Common ideals of
life and organization draw us close to the major
nations of the Western bloc, and on many issues
Brazil can, in a leading position, associate itself
with this bloc89. At the same time, the Brazilian
government felt the urge to strengthen ties with the
newly-independent nations of Africa and Asia that
struggled against imperialist interests which,
under the umbrella of democratic institutions,
mislead if not destroy attempts to organize
popular economies 90 . The President nonetheless
embraced some aspects of the rising Third World
movement without necessarily attaching himself to
clear-cut agendas or political ideologies. Not being
members of any bloc, not even of the Neutralist
bloc, we preserve our absolute freedom to make
our own decisions in specific cases and in the light
of peaceful suggestions at one with our nature and
history91.
Words, however, sounded much more
pleasant to the U.S. taste than the deeds that came
next. Episodes of presidential discourtesy to U.S.
officials became commonplace 92 and led to a rift
between Quadros and ambassador John Moors
Cabot, who left his post in mid-1961 and was
replaced by Harvard professor Lincoln Gordon.
Provocation reached a peak when the Brazilian
president, who favored the reintegration of Cuba in
the Inter-American System, disregarded his
conservative ministers and pinned the Order of the
Southern Cross (Cruzeiro do Sul), Brazils highest
decoration, on Ernesto Che Guevara when he was
passing through Brazil93. Quadros also opened the
way for reestablishing diplomatic ties with the
Soviet Union, having sent commercial missions
there and to several other communist countries.
Those attitudes surely raised eyebrows in the
Kennedy administration; yet, approving his

orthodox policies to shore up the economy, it put

through a favorable debt renegotiation to give
[Quadros] more room to maneuver and closed eyes
to his foreign policy deviations94.
While the international choices of Jnio
Quadros pointed towards a shift in Brazils foreign
policy orientations, a deadlocked congress was still
an obstacle to policies at home. In an unexpected
attempt to gain extraordinary powers, the president
resigned on August 25, 1961, after seven months in
office. Borrowing from Vargass dramatic testament
letter, Quadros claimed in his message to the
congress that terrible forces rose against me and
plotted against me or maligned me, even while
pretending to collaborate95. Apparently he hoped
that a dismayed nation would cry for his return,
granting him carte blanche in true Caesarist
fashion96. It seemed like a fail-safe strategy, for the
congressmen, the Armed Forces, the conservative
sectors (or even the Kennedy administration)
would not like to have a left-wing populist such as
Joo Goulart in charge of the country. Ironically,
Goulart was on a mission to the Peoples Republic
of China the day it happened, which added to the
drama of the situation.
But Quadros seemed to have overestimated
his popularity among conservative forces, and
underestimated the militarys willingness to take
over. As he stepped down, the ministers of the
Armed Forces maneuvered to prevent the vicepresident from assuming the presidency. Social
unrest ensued and raged for the next two weeks.
Richard Nixon, who had become a frequent
columnist for the Los Angeles Times-Mirror after
losing the presidential race, wrote that the U.S. was
getting belly-full of moral neutralism and
declared that time had come for the U.S. to
intervene militarily in Brazil 97 . The Kennedy
administration, on the other hand, addressed the
political turmoil with discretion, since it could put
the entire U.S. plan towards Latin America in
jeopardy. The succession crisis ended up in a
peculiar compromise between Goulart, the military,
and the congress: on September 7 (Brazils
independence day), the new president took office
in a makeshift parliamentary regime hastily
approved some days before. To avoid a coup
against the democratically elected government,
Jango accepted being sworn in with limited
powers, sharing most of his prerogatives with a
Council of Ministers. The new regime, albeit

improvised, was able to hold back the military and

to allay the conservative sectors, which were afraid
of Goulart and the labor unions that supported
him.
On the international front, in which Goulart
was able to keep the upper hand, he and Foreign
Minister San Tiago Dantas strengthened the
foundations of the independent foreign policy
while at the same time making it less sensationalist
and less provocative98. Dantas envisioned a global
strategy that took into account the two faces of
Brazils national interest: development and
economic emancipation, on the one hand; the
historical conciliation between the representative
democratic regime and a social reform which could
eliminate the oppression of the working class by
the ruling class, on the other99.
The Cuban question would naturally come
up as one of the most important manifestations of
the Brazilian strategy. At the OAS Conference of
Foreign Ministers held at Punta del Este in January
1962, Brazil and the United States clashed over
whether to impose economic sanctions on Cuba,
following Castros defiant declaration that he was a
Marxist-Leninist. Dantas led a bloc of six big Latin
American nations (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Ecuador, and Mexico) that abstained in the votes to
impose sanctions and expel Cuba from the
hemispheric organization. Brazils allegedly proCuban position earned the ambassador the
nickname of San Tiago de Cuba by the U.S.
ambassador to the OAS, Delesseps Morrison100.
What Americans did not realize at first was
that the plea for reaching a consensual solution,
rather than an affront to the U.S., represented a
delicate balance between political struggles at
home and Brazils traditional diplomatic canon,
such as non-intervention and peaceful settlement of
conflicts. Those principles were reinforced by the
independent foreign policy. Goularts address to
the U.S. Congress, in April 1962, underlined the
same ideas, while keeping a friendly tone: Brazils
international action responds to no other objective
than that of favoring, by all means in our power,
the preservation and strengthening of peace. It is
our belief that the ideological conflict between East
and West cannot and must not be decided by
military action101. Even if briefly, Kennedy was led
to believe that Goulart was an able reformist who
would help the United States spread the ideas of

the Alliance for Progress throughout Latin

America.
Brazils dire economic straits and political
radicalization nevertheless fettered any possibility
of fruitful relations in the months that followed.
U.S. officials resented that Jango supposedly turned
a blind eye to nationalization of American
companies, such as the American & Foreign Power
(AMFORP) and the International Telephone and
Telegraph (ITT), as well as to the cancellation of
some concessions granted to Hanna Mining Co.,
without due compensation. But Goulart was met
domestically with opposition even from his own
allies, such as his brother-in-law and governor of
Rio Grande do Sul, Leonel Brizola, who repudiated
interference from the federal government in states
rights to regulate local companies102. Congress was
deadlocked. Rising inflation, recession and general
strikes led to the collapse of Tancredo Nevess
cabinet in early June 1962. The gubernatorial and
legislative elections that took place in October that
year led to even greater polarization between left
and right, with the PSD holding only a slight
majority in congress, and thus having difficulties to
sustain the Prime Minister. If the parliamentary
system was conceived of to avoid Goularts
purported radicalism, it eventually led Brazil to a
major political impasse.
How the Cold War led to Brazils democratic breakdown
The opposition was determined to push the
president into the abyss, and counted with
Washingtons wholehearted support. Aside from
the partisan struggle, anti-Goulart groups
progressively organized themselves in think tanks
so as to take the fight to the ideological
battleground. Among the most prominent
organizations were the Institute of Social Studies
and Research (Instituto de Pesquisas Econmicas e
Sociais, IPES) and the Brazilian Institute of
Democratic Action (Instituto Brasileiro de Ao
Democrtica, IBAD). Together with the Escola
Superior de Guerra they constituted a formidable
coalition of anti-communist elites that were actively
engaged
in
undermining
the
Goulart
administration from within.
At the same time, fearing that Soviet and
Cuban influence grew stronger in government
circles and penetrated in the backward rural areas
of Brazil, the Kennedy administration decided to

exert more direct influence over Brazilian politics.

Kennedys policies towards the Brazilian Northeast
had been influenced by two articles published by
Tad Szulc in the New York Times in late 1960,
which severely exaggerated the subversive
potential of the Peasant Leagues and labeled Recife,
the capital of Pernambuco, a red stronghold 103 .
USAID programs to the Brazilian Northeast within
the framework of the Alliance for Progress, which
had already been agreed upon during Goularts
visit to Wahsington in April 1962, progressively
acquired a strong political dimension. Moreover,
immigration figures of that year alone were
suspiciously high: no less than 4,968 U.S. citizens
arrived in Brazil, a number greater than the three
previous years combined, and in similar
proportions of the World War years, when the U.S.
had a military base in Natal. Some local journalists
denounced an American infiltration of the
Northeast, which would allow the Kennedy
administration to intervene militarily in Brazil in
case a civil war occurred be it under the
justification of protecting U.S. citizens or,
depending on how events unfolded, of a
communist takeover104.
Furthermore, U.S. think tanks and agencies
such as the Council on Foreign Relations, the
Agency for International Development or the
Central Intelligence Agency began working in close
collaboration with the IPES/IBAD/ESG complex105.
Ambassador Gordon also admitted that the U.S.
government spent at least $ 5 million to finance
candidates that favored U.S. policies and opposed
Goulart 106. Finally, there was a strong connection
between the Brazilian military and U.S. officials,
first conducted by Gordon, then taken up by
Colonel Vernon Walters, who was appointed
military attach in October 1962. Walters had
developed close friendships with several Brazilian
officers when he served as combat liaison officer
with the FEB in Italy during World War II. One of
the things Gordon expected from his attach was
to be able to influence what was going on in the
Brazilian armed forces. With the progressive
deterioration of the political setting, they both
reckoned that the military would move sooner or
later to topple Goulart 107 . The Kennedy
administration, fearing that they could lose control
of the situation, had to be kept informed about
further developments.

Amidst the economic and political crisis, the

president saw himself in a permanent struggle with
the congress to regain his power, making use of his
popularity among workers as a bargaining chip to
hasten the realization of a referendum to restore the
presidential regime. Initially scheduled for 1965,
the fate of the political system was put to popular
vote in early 1963, and the return of Jango as the
countrys full-fledged president was approved in a
landslide. While the New York Times described the
result as Goularts personal triumph108, it may also
be understood as a deep sense of frustration with
the makeshift regime. The restoration of the
presidential system was nonetheless faced with
growing social tension. National strikes and bursts
of urban and rural violence became commonplace
as burgeoning inflation (which grew by 80 percent
in 1963 alone) and slowdown in economic activity
brought the corporatist apparatus, one of the pillars
of Varguismo, to the ground. Social movements
became more radical and violent in both ends of the
political spectrum, leaving Jango with little popular
support even among those groups that traditionally
stood by his side.
Having a much weaker personality than
Vargas, Goulart had to make an abrupt left turn.
Without partisan backing, he reached out to the
Workers General Command (Comando Geral dos
Trabalhadores, CGT), Brazils strongest labor union
movement, and to the (still illegal) Communist
Party, which remained loyal to him. At the same
time he attempted to reach out to the industrial
sectors by appointing business-oriented ministers
and undertaking key economic reforms (embodied
in the Three-Year Plan or Plano Trienal) to tackle the
inflationary boom 109 . San Tiago Dantas, who had
been appointed Finance Minister with the return of
presidentialism, negotiated with USAID director
David E. Bell a generous aid package (which
became known as the Bell-Dantas Agreement) in
March 1963. Political instability, however,
prevented the agreement to be put into practice. To
the consternation of U.S. officials, Goularts entire
cabinet was dismissed in July. As Jangos rhetoric
became more radical, the Kennedy administration
waged an economic warfare against him through
Alliance for Progress selective funding. By mid1963 U.S. officials launched a program called
islands of administrative sanity, following a
suggestion made by Gordon, to undermine Goulart
by strengthening pro-U.S. and anti-Goulart state

governors. Aid to the central government was

suspended, but more than $ 100 million were
committed to states that opposed the president110.
The slow economic strangulation dragged
Brazil into economic and political chaos. While
anti-Goulart governors such as Guanabaras Carlos
Lacerda or Minas Geraiss Magalhes Pinto
inaugurated projects that were funded by USAID
and World Bank loans, Goulart was left with
radical but largely ineffective measures, such as
approving new restrictions on profit remittances,
determining state monopoly on oil imports, or
emitting money to keep up with the balance-ofpayment deficit. Many among the right-wing and
conservative groups believed that Brazil was on the
verge of becoming a second Cuba. Ambassador
Gordon wrote that there was compelling evidence
that Goulart had decided to overthrow the
constitutional order in favor of a personal populist
dictatorship, copying the course of his mentor
Vargas in the 1930s and aiming at ultimate
ratification by plebiscite 111 . U.S. policymakers
were terrified that the Brazilian president, who was
once thought to be a moderate reformist, would
lead Brazil to a communist dictatorship. At a
meeting with Gordon in October, Kennedy asks
him whether he saw a situation coming where we
might be, find desirable to intervene militarily
ourselves?. The ambassador hesitantly replied:
Well, this is the other category, which I call
Dangerous Contingency Possibly Requiring a
Rapid Action. This is the very problem112.
The assassination of John Kennedy in
November 1963 marked the end of Americas
indecisiveness with Jango. The new U.S. president
Lyndon Johnson thought the Brazilian president
had become a liability to the free world and
decided to harden U.S. policy toward Goulart. By
January 1964, Brazilian democracy was on the
verge of total collapse. With almost no political
support, Goulart ruled out the possibility of
resignation. He would rather be ousted as the
president who attempted to undertake popular
reforms but was stopped by the conservative
conspiracy 113 . The president was well aware that
dominant military segments were already
organizing themselves to forcefully prevent him
from mobilizing popular forces. With Johnson in
charge, the green light for a military coup that
would receive U.S. support was just a matter of
time.

Goularts decision to raise the populist bid

by proposing radical reforms was therefore an allor-nothing strategy that could either cost his
mandate or grant him incredible powers. On March
13, in a rally that gathered 200,000 people in
downtown Rio, Goulart proposed a major
constitutional change that would encompass basic
reforms, such as agrarian and military reforms, to
please the aroused working class. With private
property rights at stake, the opposition groups
decided once and for all that Goulart had to leave
by force. At the end of the day, Gordon concludes
that Brazil no longer faced a choice between coup
dtat and maintenance of constitutional legitimacy.
It had become a choice between populist coup from
the top down and preventive counter-coup from
the mainstream military114.
Three days after Goularts infamous rally,
President Johnson and his top officials met with
U.S. ambassadors and USAID directors from Latin
America to establish new priorities for the Alliance.
At the conference Lincoln Gordon regretted that
Brazil was undergoing a terrible economic situation
and pictured Goulart as an incompetent, juvenile
delinquent who seems intent merely on
survival115. The time was appropriate for him to
suggest the contingency plan for Brazil should be
set in motion. Pressed by the circumstances, the
Johnson administration determined the U.S. would
no longer oppose military coups, recognizing any
government in effective control. While the Mann
Doctrine, as it became known, did not represent
any departure from previous policies, its
announcement was seen as the green light for the
Brazilian conspirators to depose Goulart116.
Political events were moving fast under an
atmosphere of uncertainty. On March 20, Army
Chief of Staff General Castello Branco sent a secret
letter to senior officers informing them that the
nation was at imminent risk of being placed under
the communism of Moscow 117 . A week later,
Gordon cabled the State Department to inform
Rusk that Goulart was definitely engaged on
campaign to seize dictatorial power, accepting the
active collaboration of the Brazilian Communist
Party, and of other radical left revolutionaries to
this end. Direct involvement in supporting the
organized opposition led by Castello Branco was
fundamental to help avert a major disaster here
which might make Brazil the China of the 1960s118.
Gordon thus requested the Johnson administration

to provide the plotters with petroleum, small arms

and ammunition, and a U.S. carrier task force in
case of a civil war. The United States should be
ready to intervene in Brazil if necessary. On March
29, the U.S. ambassador sent another message do
Secretary Rusk urging the United States to act
promptly: I well understand how grave a decision
is implied in this contingency commitment to overt
military intervention here. But we must also weigh
seriously the possible alternative () of defeat of
democratic resistance and communization of Brazil
(). [The] earliest possible action would achieve
optimum results119.
Operation Brother Sam was launched on
March 31, just to be cancelled soon afterwards due
to the coups quick success. In the meantime,
however, a powerful naval task force, consisting of
the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Forrestal, six support
warships, and four oil tankers, was ordered to set
sail for the South Atlantic. Even though
Washington was ready to render assistance to antiGoulart forces if necessary, U.S. officials were
delighted to learn that no military action had been
necessary120. On April 1, the Johnson administration
authorized emergency and long-term assistance for
the new government, and declared that the coup
represented a constitutional transition, so that
recognition of the new regime was unnecessary.
The U.S. president wired his warmest wishes to
interim president Ranieri Mazzilli for making it
through within a framework of constitutional
democracy and without civil strife121. Two weeks
later, after being elected by the congress, General
Castello Branco took over as Brazils new president.
The Armed Forces would remain in charge of the
country for the next twenty-one years.
Final remarks
There is still an open historiographical
debate regarding Goularts role in the breakdown
of democracy. Although few authors deny that
fragmentation and polarization were tearing the
political system asunder, they are usually reluctant
in affirming that the president himself was
threatening the constitutional order. To the
contrary, the mainstream literature on the collapse
of Brazils populist republic locates the causal
nexus of the political crisis elsewhere. Some works
rely on economic causes, offering a deterministic
approach that linked the downfall of the national-

developmentalist model (ushered in by Vargas in

the 1930s) to the military intervention in 1964 122 .
Others sustain that the growing polarization of the
party system, be it due to structural causes 123 or to
the choices made by the president throughout his
three years in office that led to radicalization124, was
responsible for the demise of the Brazilian political
system. Finally, the changing role of the military in
Brazilian politics from some sort of moderating
role that prevailed until the early 1960s to the
desire to take over that led to the coup is also
regarded as an important variable to explain the
failure of Brazils political system 125.
Regardless of the theoretical approach to the
events of March/April 1964, the structural forces of
the Cold War that acted on many levels, from the
geopolitical interests of the United States toward
Latin America to the ideological struggle between
capitalism and communism or liberalism and
nationalism constrained Brazilian politics and
economy ever since the wars end in 1945. Attempts
at acting independently were met with systematic
U.S. opposition, which counted with the help of
Brazils opposition groups from the UDN to
businesspeople to the military and led to the
breakdown of democracy. If it is not possible to
affirm that the United States directly participated in
the 1964 coup, one cannot deny that U.S. policies to
undermine Goulart were decisive in sealing the fate
of Brazilian politics.
The three years that followed the coup dtat
were ones of generous U.S. economic policies
towards the Brazilian military regime. Between
1964 and 1966 almost half of all AID monies were
directed to Brazil. In the same period, only South
Vietnam and India received more assistance
dollars.
Multilateral
loans
and
corporate
investment also ballooned126. If repression against
communist subversion was growing harsher in an
authoritarian context, Brazils relative economic
success offered the legitimacy the Armed Forces
needed to remain in power. With time, as the
hardliners became more influential and eventually
took over, expectations of a special alliance with the
U.S. were again frustrated. By 1974, Brazil was not
just more powerful (economically and politically)
than ever before but also willing to challenge U.S.
positions, reviving the independent foreign policy
project of Quadros and Goulart, but now under the
militarys iron fist. While Brazils bid for great
power status came as a blow for U.S. interests, it

was Americas influence over Brazilian politics that

created conditions for this renewed attempt at
independence in the first place.
1

Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International

Relations (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1966)
2

For detailed accounts on Brazils relationship with the United

States, see Moniz Bandeira, Presena dos Estados Unidos no
Brasil (dois sculos de histria) (Rio de Janeiro: Civilizao
Brasileira, 1973); Amado Cervo and Clodoaldo Bueno,
Histria da Poltica Exterior do Brasil (Braslia: UnB, 2002);
Monica Hirst, Understanding Brazil-United States Relations:
contemporary history, current complexities and prospects for
the 21st century (Braslia: FUNAG, 2013); Robert Wesson,
The United States and Brazil: limits of influence (New York:
Praeger, 1981); Joseph Smith, Brazil and the United States:
convergence and divergence (Athens: the University of
Georgia Press, 2010). For specific works on the early Cold War
decades, see Jan Knippers Black, United States Penetration of
Brazil (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977);
Phyllis R. Parker, Brazil and the Quiet Intervention, 1964
(Austin: Unversity of Texas Press, 1979); Ruth Leacock,
Requiem for Revolution: the United States and Brazil, 19611969 (Kent: the Kent State University Press, 1990); W.
Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups dtat: BrazilianAmerican relations, 1945-1964 (Albuquerque: the University
of New Mexico Press, 1993).
3

On Brazils foreign policy paradigms and the role of ideas in

shaping Brazilian foreign policy, see Letcia Pinheiro, Trados
pelo Desejo: um ensaio sobre a teoria e a prtica da poltica
externa brasileira contempornea, Contexto Internacional,
22:2 (2000); Alexandra de Mello e Silva, O Brasil no
Continente e no Mundo: atores e imagens na poltica externa
brasileira contempornea, Estudos Histricos, 8:15 (1995).
4

Bradford Burns, The Unwritten Alliance; Rio Branco and

Brazilian-American Relations (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1966); Rubens Ricupero, Rio Branco: o
Brasil no Mundo (Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2000).
5

Nilo Peanha quoted in Lus Cludio Villafae G. Santos, A

Amrica do Sul no Discurso Diplomtico Brasileiro, Revista
Brasileira de Poltica Internacional, 48:2 (2005), 5.
6

Celso Lafer, A Identidade Internacional do Brasil e a Poltica

Externa Brasileira (So Paulo: Perspectiva, 2001).
7

Eugnio Vargas Garcia, Entre Amrica e Europa: a poltica

externa brasileira na dcada de 1920 (Braslia: UnB, 2006).
8

Hentschke offers a neat description of the context and

purpose of the Tenente revolts: After World War I, urban
industrial centers in the dynamic southeast experienced an
unprecedented social mobilization. Labor and a new, wagedependent middle class articulated their demands for more
political participation. Yet, initially the oligarchic regime,
dominated by the states of So Paulo and Minas Gerais, proved
unable to absorb and institutionally channel these new
tendencies. Instead, it responded with force and deinstitutionalization (). An insurrection of lower-rank
military (tenentes) from Rio de Janeiros Fort Copacabana
revitalized the tradition of the young officers who, during the
last years of the Empire, had defended their rights, as citizensoldiers, to criticize the government. Jens R. Hentschke, The
Vargas Era Institutional and Development Model Revisited:
themes, debates, and lacunas in Vargas and Brazil: new

perspectives, ed. Jens R. Hentschke (New York: Palgrave,

2006), 4.
9

The coffee-and-milk or coffee with milk (Portuguese: cafcom-leite) regime is the term used to describe the informal
agreement between the agricultural elites, most notably the
coffee and dairy producers, that ruled the country during the
early Republican era after the military stepped down, from
1894 to 1930. During this period, representatives of the two
most populous and hegemonic states of the First Republic, So
Paulo and Minas Gerais, alternated the presidency between
them. See Hentschke, Vargas and Brazil, 284.

22

Gerson Moura, Sucessos e iluses: relaes internacionais

do Brasil durante e aps a Segunda Guerra Mundial (Rio de
Janeiro: FGV, 1991).
23

Stanley E. Hilton, The United States, Brazil, and the Cold

War, 1945-1960: End of the Special Relationship, The
Journal of American History 68:3 (1981): 602.
24

10

Cervo and Bueno, Histria da Poltica Exterior do Brasil,

233.
11

Quoted in Fernando de Mello Barreto Filho, Os Sucessores

do Baro: relaes exteriores do Brasil de 1912 a 1964 (So
Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2006): 91.
12

Gerson Moura, Autonomia na Dependncia: a poltica

externa brasileira de 1935 a 1942 (Rio de Janeiro: Nova
Fronteira, 1980).
13

Brazil was the only South American country to send troops

to the war in Europe. For more details on Brazils decision to
go to war, see Vgner Camilo Alves, O Brasil e a Segunda
Guerra Mundial: histria de um envolvimento forado (So
Paulo: Loyola, 2002); Gerson Moura, Relaes Exteriores do
Brasil 1939-1950: mudanas na natureza das relaes BrasilEstados Unidos durante e aps a Segunda Guerra Mundial
(Braslia: FUNAG, 2012); Jacob Gorender, A Participao do
Brasil na Segunda Guerra Mundial e suas Consequncias in
Getlio Vargas e a Economia Contempornea, org. Tams
Szmrecsnyi and Rui G. Granziera (So Paulo: Hucitec, 2004).
14

archenemy, the United States. Cliff Welch, Keeping

Communism Down the Farm: the Brazilian rural labor
movement during the Cold War, Latin American Perspectives
33:3 (2006): 30.

Alves, Brasil e a Segunda Guerra Mundial.

15

Eugnio Vargas Garcia, O Sexto Membro Permanente: o

Brasil e a criao da ONU (Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto,
2011).
16

Samuel Huntington called such context of democratic

renewal the second wave of democratization on the global
level. See Samuel Huntington, Democracys Third Wave,
Journal of Democracy 2:2 (1991): 12.

Srgio Besserman Vianna, Poltica Econmica Externa e

Industrailizao: 1946-1951, in A Ordem do Progresso: cem
anos de poltica econmica republicana 1889-1989, ed.
Marcelo de Paiva Abreu (Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 1990).
25

Paulo Roberto de Almeida, Relaes internacionais e

Poltica externa to Brasil: histria e sociologia da diplomacia
brasileira (Porto Alegre: UFRGS, 2002).
26

Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups dtat, 23.

27

Hirst, Understanding Brazil-United States Relations, 43.

28

Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups dtat, 30-31.

29

Hilton, United States, Brazil, and the Cold War, 624.

30

Jacqueline A. Hernndez Haffner, A CEPAL e a

Industrializao Brasileira (1950-1961) (Porto Alegre:
EDIPUCRS, 2002): 31.
31

Cervo and Bueno, Histria da Poltica Exterior do Brasil,

273.
32

Cervo and Bueno, Histria da Poltica Exterior do Brasil,

281.
33

Donald E. Worcester, Brazil: from Colony to World Power

(New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1973), 201.
35

Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups dtat, 78.

36

Wesson, United States and Brazil, 18.

37

Quoted in Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups dtat, 77.

17

Maria Victoria Benevides, O Suicdio de Getlio e suas

consequncias a curto e longo prazo in Getlio Vargas e a
Economia Contempornea, org. Szmrecsnyi and Granziera,
152.
18

One of the most complete works on the role of Getlio

Vargas (and the political culture named after him) is Robert M.
Levine, Father of the Poor? Getlio Vargas and his era
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). See also
Hentschkes compilation, Vargas and Brazil.
19

Rodrigo Patto S Motta, Em Guarda Contra o Perigo

Vermelho (So Paulo: Perspectiva, 2006).
20

See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: a critical

appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
21

Following the party's suppression in 1947, communist

leaders adopted a revolutionary line that was shaped, as was
the anticommunism of Brazilian officials, by cold-war
pressures. Embracing the Comintern analysis of colonialism,
PCB theorists considered Brazil in a semicolonial relationship
with so-called imperialist powers, especially the USSRs

Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups dtat, 68.

34

38

Cervo and Bueno point out that, contrary to U.S.

involvement in the events immediately prior to the 1964 coup,
there is no concrete evidence of direct American participation
in the partisan struggle during the Vargas years. See Histria
da Poltica Exterior do Brasil.
39

For a biographical article on Carlos Lacerda, see Bryan

McCann, Carlos Lacerda: the rise and fall of a middle-class
populist in the 1950s Brazil, Hispanic American Historical
Review 83:4 (2003).
40

Translation into English made by Thayer Watkins, available

at http://www.applet-magic.com/vargas.htm . Last access on
March 23, 2014. For a thorough analysis of the testament letter,
see Thomas D. Rogers, I Chose This Means to Be With You
Always: Getlio Vargass Carta Testamento in Henshcke,
ed. Vargas and Brazil.
41

Jordan M. Young, Brasil 1954/1964: o fim de um ciclo civil

(Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1974); Luiz Alberto Moniz
Bandeira, Presena dos Estados Unidos no Brasil (Rio de
Janeiro: Civilizao Brasileira, 1973).

42

Wesson, United States and Brazil, 21.

43

Moniz Bandeira, Presena dos Estados Unidos no Brasil,

365.
44

Cervo and Bueno, Histria da Poltica Exterior do Brasil,

284.
45

The Currency and Credit Superintendency, established in

1945, was Brazils monetary authority prior to the creation of
the Brazilian Central Bank, in 1965.
46

Moniz Bandeira, Presena dos Estados Unidos no Brasil,

366.
47

Cervo and Bueno, Histria da Poltica Exterior do Brasil,

285.
48

Smith, Brazil and the United States, 141.

70

Moniz Bandeira, Presena dos Estados Unidos no Brasil,

388.
71

Moniz Bandeira, Presena dos Estados Unidos no Brasil,

390.
72

Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups dtat, 127.

73

Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups dtat, 128.

74

Smith, Brazil and the United States, 146.

75

McCann, Brazilian Foreign Relations, 16.

76

Paulo Fagundes Vizentini, A Poltica Externa do Governo

JK, in Sessenta Anos de Poltica Externa Brasileira, ed. Jos
Augusto Guilhon Albuquerque (So Paulo: NUPRI, 1996),
305; Smith, Brazil and the United States, 146.
77

Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups dtat, 134.

49

Data available at http://seculoxx.ibge.gov.br. Last access on

March 12, 2014.
50

Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups dtat, 86.

51

Smith, Brazil and the United States, 142.

52

Frank D. McCann, Brazilian Foreign Relations in the

Twentieth Century in Brazil in the International System: the
rise of a Middle Power, ed. Wayne A. Selcher (Boulder:
Westview, 1981): 15.
53

Smith, Brazil and the United States, 142.

54

Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups dtat, 91.

55

Kubitschek quoted from personal interview to Moniz

Bandeira, Presena dos Estados Unidos no Brasil, 375.
56

Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups dtat, 93.

57

Ambassador James Dunn to Department of State, July 3,

1956. Quoted in Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups dtat, 89.
58

Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups dtat, 110.

59

78

Instruction From the Department of State to All Diplomatic

Posts in Latin America (CA-6306). Washington, February 4,
1960.
Available
at
http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs/195860v05/reference/frus.frus195860v05.i0012.pdf
79

There are contradicting accounts of Eisenhowers speech to

the Brazilian Congress. According to U.S. official documents,
the presidents address to the Congress provoked the applause
of even many ultra-nationalists, some of whom have active
flirtations with the communists (Despatch From the Embassy
in Brazil to the Department of State (No. 1019), April 20,
1960.
Available
at
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus195860v05/d289 ). Smith reports, on the other hand, that the speech
was met with strong silence (Smith, Brazil and the United
States, 146).
80

Moniz Bandeira, Presena dos Estados Unidos no Brasil,

402-3.

Moniz Bandeira, Presena dos Estados Unidos no Brasil,

380.

82

60

Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups dtat, 112.

83

61

Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups dtat, 113.

62

In the words of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director

Allen Dulles, the treatment given to Nixon was a shock that
brought South American problems to our attention as nothing
else could have done. Quoted in Smith, Brazil and the United
States, 144.
63

Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups dtat, 114.

64

Alexandra de Mello e Silva, Desenvolvimento e

Multilateralismo: um estudo sobre a Operao Pan-Americana
no contexto da poltica externa de JK, Contexto Internacional
Jul/Dec (1992): 220.
65

Smith, Brazil and the United States, 145.

66

Wesson, The United States and Brazil, 22.

67

Quoted in Smith, Brazil and the United States, 145.

Henrique Altemani de Oliveira, Poltica Externa Brasileira

(So Paulo: Saraiva, 2005), 87.
Leacock, Requiem for Revolution; Kennedys Inaugural
Address, delivered on January 20, 1961, is available at
http://www.jfklibrary.org/AssetViewer/BqXIEM9F4024ntFl7SVAjA.aspx . Last access April
12, 2014.
84

In reference to the group of young and bright people

Kennedy brought to his government to face the challenges of
the 1960s, or the New Frontier, as in his acceptance speech.
85

Moniz Bandeira, Presena dos Estados Unidos no Brasil,

404.
86

Wesson, The United States and Brazil, 20.

87

Wesson, The United States and Brazil, 23.

88

Jnio Quadros, Brazils New Foreign Policy, Foreign

Affairs October (1961), 19.
89

68

Moniz Bandeira, Presena dos Estados Unidos no Brasil,

382-383.
69

Despatch No. 1019, April 20, 1960.

81

Smith, Brazil and the United States, 146.

Quadros, Brazils New Foreign Policy, 21 (emphasis

added).
90

Quadros, Brazils New Foreign Policy, 23.

91

Quadros, Brazils New Foreign Policy, 26.

92

Moniz Bandeira, Presena dos Estados Unidos no Brasil,

410-411.
93

In his book of memoirs, Saulo Ramos, a top Brazilian officer

in the Quadros administration, recalls that Finance Minister
Clemente Mariani, head of the Brazilian delegation at the Punta
del Este Conference in August 1961, received orders from
President Quadros to invite Che Guevara to Brazil. Quadros
wanted to award the revolutionary leader with the Cruzeiro do
Sul (Southern Cross), Brazils highest commendation for
foreigners. This is going to be a bombshell. The United States
will devour us, reasoned Mariani. Ambassador Sergio Frazo
promptly solved the puzzle behind Quadross apparently
baffling decision: Minister, you should not worry. President
Kennedy is going to love this. He is struggling in the U.S.
Congress to approve funds for () the Alliance for Progress.
The Brazilian gesture will scare the Republican congressmen
that oppose Kennedy, and the funds will be approved. Things
work there on the basis of fear. Saulo Ramos, Cdigo da Vida
(So Paulo: Planeta, 2007).
94
95
96

The original audio recording was released by the John F.

Kennedy Presidential Library and is available at
http://arquivosdaditadura.com.br/documento/galeria/transcricao
-audio-editado. Last access March 18, 2014.
113

Moniz Bandeira, Presena dos Estados Unidos no Brasil,

469.
114

Gordon, Brazils Second Chance, 60.

115

Smith, Brazil and the United States, 160.

116

Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups dtat,

117

Smith, Brazil and the United States, 160.

118

Smith, Brazil and the United States, 161.

119

Cable from Ambassador Gordon to Secretary of State Rusk,

March
29,
1964.
Avaliable
at
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/bz03.
pdf . Last access April 2, 2014.
120

Smith, Brazil and the United States, 162.

121

Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups dtat, 167.

Wesson, The United States and Brazil, 23.

Leacock, Requiem for Revolution, 45.
122

Wesson, The United States and Brazil, 23.

97

Moniz Bandeira, Presena dos Estados Unidos no Brasil,

418.
98

112

Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups dtat, 149.

99

San Tiago Dantas, Poltica Externa Independente (Braslia:

Fundao Alexandre de Gusmo, 2011), 9.
100

Smith, Brazil and the United States, 155.

101

Joo Goulart, Brazil and the United States: similarity of

political organization in Vital Speeches of the Day (1962).

See, for example, Dreyfus, 1964: a conquista do Estado;

Jacob Gorender, Combate nas trevas. A esquerda brasileira:
das iluses perdidas luta armada (So Paulo: tica, 1987).
123

Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza, Estado e Partidos

Polticos no Brasil (1930 a 1964) (So Paulo: Alfa-mega,
1976); Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos, Sessenta e Quatro:
anatomia da crise (So Paulo: Vrtice, 1986);
124

Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo, Democracia ou Reformas?

Alternativas democrticas crise poltica (1961-1964) (So
Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1993).
125

103

John DeWitt, The Alliance for Progress: economic warfare

in Brazil (1962-1964), Journal of Third World Studies, vol.
XXVI, no.1 (2009), 62.

Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: changing patterns

in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971);
Glucio Ary Dillon Soares, O Golpe de 1964 in 21 anos de
regime militar: balanos e perspectivas eds. Glucio Soares
and Maria Celina DArajo (Rio de Janeiro: Fundao Getlio
Vargas, 1994).

104

126

102

Smith, Brazil and the United States, 156.

Moniz Bandeira, Presena dos Estados Unidos no Brasil,

447-448.
105

Ren Armand Dreifuss, State, class and the organic elite:

the formation of an entrepreneurial order in Brazil 1961-1965
(PhD thesis, University of Glasgow, 1980). It was later
published in Portuguese as 1964: a conquista do Estado (Rio
de Janeiro, Vozes, 1981).
106

Carlos Fico, O Grande Irmo: da Operao Brother Sam

aos anos de chumbo (Rio de Janeiro: Civilizao Brasileira,
2008), 77. See also Maria Helena Moreira Alves, State and
Opposition in Military Brazil (Austin: the University of Texas
Press, 1985).
107

Leacock, Requiem for Revolution, 127-8.

108

Moniz Bandeira, Presena dos Estados Unidos no Brasil,

444.
109

Marcelo de Paiva Abreu, Inflao, Estagnao e Ruptura:

1961-1964 in Abreu, A Ordem do Progresso.
110
111

Black, United States Penetration of Brazil, 65.

Lincoln Gordon, Brazils Second Chance: en route toward

the First World (Washington, D.C.: The Century Foundation,
2000), 56.

Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups dtat, 168.