STONE HILL

PARK

LIVE WORK PLAY

SHP1-4.1

Planning Statement
Addendum:
Loss of Existing Use
Position Statement

A brighter future for

Thanet and East Kent

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Contents
1.

Introduction................................................................................................................................................... 1

2.

Site History...................................................................................................................................................... 2

3.

UK Aviation Policy ...................................................................................................................................... 10

4.

UK Aviation Trends ..................................................................................................................................... 15

5.

Expert Opinion ............................................................................................................................................ 20

6.

RiverOak Development Consent Order ................................................................................................ 25

7.

Conclusions ................................................................................................................................................. 26

Appendix 1 UK airport baseline information

Appendix 2 Former UK airports case studies

For and on behalf of GVA Grimley Ltd

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1.

Introduction

1.1

This report has been prepared by GVA on behalf of our client, Stone Hill Park Limited, in
support of the Hybrid Planning Application for mixed use redevelopment of the former
Manston Airport in Thanet District Council.

1.2

The purpose of this report is to set out evidence to justify the loss of the existing use in land use
planning terms. It does this by demonstrating that:

Available evidence firmly indicates that there is no reasonable prospect of the former
airport use recommencing and being viable in the long term;

There is no need for an airport in this location (in transport infrastructure terms); and

The economic impact (including hypothetical opportunity loss) of losing the existing use
will not be significant compared to the economic benefits of the proposed development.

1.3

This report is structured as follows:

Section 2 provides a review of the sites history, outlining the multiple attempts that have
been made since the 1990s by numerous different parties to operate a commercially
viable airport here, all of which have failed. It also demonstrates the repeated attempts
by the local authority to identify a CPO indemnity partner to enable them to compulsorily
acquire the site (for the purposes of re-opening the airport), which has also failed;

Section 3 provides an overview of UK aviation policy, including the recommendations of

the Davies Review which confirms that the former Manston Airport site is not suitable to
meet UK aviation needs (and therefore not needed in infrastructure terms);

Section 4 provides background information on UK aviation trends, which is intended to

provide helpful context to the conclusions of Sections 2 and 3. This should be read in
conjunction with Appendices A and B which provide information on existing operational
UK airports and former airports that have been re-purposed;

Section 5 provides an expert opinion from the applicants Aviation Advisor (Alastair Welch)
and a review of the independent Falcon Report;

Section 6 sets out our position regarding the Development Consent Order being sought;
and

Section 7 sets out our conclusions.

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2.

Site History

2.1

This section of the report provides a detailed timeline of activities that have taken place at the
former Manston airport site from its inception in the early 20th Century to the present day. As
we demonstrate below, the site has a complex history, not least due to the numerous owners
who have tried (and failed) to operate Manston airport as a successful, viable business. In fact,
Kent County Council have stated that since the MOD sold RAF Manston in 1998, the airport
has never made a profit and has never delivered on its promise of jobs for the area (KCC
Position Statement, 2015: page 3). The information provided within this section of the report has
been prepared using a culmination of online sources, most notably the KCC Position
Statement (2015) and the RAF Manston History Museum website.

Early History
2.2

The former Manston airport first began being used for aviation purposes in 1915 when it was a
small grass airfield operated by the Admiralty for military operations associated with the First
World War. At first the airfield was primarily used for emergency landings, however, by 1916
there were two units permanently stationed at Manston as well as a Handley Page (RAF
bombers) Training School. Consequently, the airfield experienced fairly substantial growth and
by 1917 it included barracks for c.3,000 troops, its own railway line to Birchington and a power
station. Following the end of World War One the airfield remained open and was
predominantly used for training purposes and the maintenance of military aircraft.

2.3

At the outbreak of World War Two, Manston was still an all-grass airfield. However, during the
Battle of Britain the airfield was heavily bombed and a large amount of the associated
infrastructure and buildings were destroyed. Due to the sites strategic location and
consistently favourable conditions for landing and deploying aircraft, the airfield was re-built
and equipped with a tarmac runway. Use of the airfield for military purposes continued to
intensify following its redevelopment up until the end of World War Two.

2.4

During the 1950s the Site was used by the US Air Force (USAF) as a strategic airbase in
connection with US Cold War operations. The USAF withdrew in 1960 and the airfield became
a joint civilian and RAF airbase. The RAF maintained military presence, alongside the
introduction of occasional passenger and freight flights. This dual function continued, with
intensification of the commercial use over the next three decades leading to a new civilian
terminal opening in 1989 to coincide with the Sites rebranding as Kent International Airport.
At this time a number of seasonal commercial flights to a handful of European destinations
were operating.

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2.5

In the early 1990s, summer charter services were offered to Crete (for one summer) and Cyprus
(for two summers). In 1993 the Department of Trade and Industry identified the site as being
unsuitable for development as a major airport due to its close proximity to neighbouring towns
(which would result in noise disturbance issues).

The Wiggins era: 1998-2005

2.6

In 1998 Wiggins Group acquired Manston Airport for 4.75 million from the Ministry of Defence,
and in 1999 the RAF withdrew all military operations and vacated Manston, resulting in the site
becoming a purely commercial enterprise. The airport was subsequently rebranded as
London Manston Airport.

2.7

According to Wiggins company accounts, between 1999-2000 the airport made an operating
loss of 1.1m, between 2000-2001 made an operating loss of 3.6m and between 2001-2002
made an operating loss of 3.9m (KCC Position Statement, 2015).

2.8

In 2002, the company stated that the airport would double its cargo traffic from 36,000 tonnes
per annum to a profitable rate of 100,000 tonnes per annum within twelve months (Transport
Select Committee, 2015). CAA statistics indicate that the most cargo traffic recorded at the
former airport was in 2003, where 43,000 tonnes were delivered a quantum well below the
benchmark of 100,000 tonnes per annum required to achieve profitability on the basis of the
above. Please see Figure 1 below for a summary of cargo traffic at the former airport.
Figure 1: Amount of freight in tonnes delivered per annum at the airport 2000-2014

Source: CAA, 2016 Data

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2.9

In January 2004, Wiggins renamed itself Planestation and later that year bought 30% of the
airline company EUJet, a budget airline. Subsequently, Planestation made a statement that
the airport would break even if it were to achieve delivery of 70,000 tonnes of cargo per
annum. As Figure 1 illustrates above, this was never achieved.

2.10

In September 2004 EUJet started to operate passenger flights to destinations across Europe
and in its busiest month in early 2005 the airport carried 62,709 passengers, however, by July
2005 all EUJet operations were suspended along with all non-freight operations including MK
Airlines, Manstons main cargo customer, who left the airport for another site in Europe.
Consequently, Planestation went into administration as a result of the significant financial losses
incurred during ownership.

Infratil: 2005-2013
2.11

Infratil Limited acquired Manston Airport from the administrator in August 2005 for 17m (UK
Parliament Transport Committee, Case Study 3: Manston), and began to operate the airport
for passenger and freight transport again.

2.12

However, as illustrated in Figure 1 above, during Infratils ownership of the site (2005-2013) the
airport never achieved more than 31,000 tonnes of freight per annum, falling well short of the
previously stated break-even point of 70,000-100,000 tonnes per annum. At this time, Infratil
regularly declared Manston airport as a specialised freight handler making a substantial
contribution to the UKs air-transport freight capacity. However, we understand that these
statements were

significantly exaggerated,

and

Manston

actually only contributed

approximately 1.3% of national freight tonnage. Furthermore, Infratil published the Kent
International Airport Master Plan in November 2009 which forecast the following annual
passenger movements up to 2033:
Table 1: Infratil Annual Passenger Forecasts 2010-2033
Year

Annual Passengers

2010

< 50,000

2011

50,000-100,000

2012

206,000

2013

295,000

2014

527,000

2015

1,268,000

2018

2,286,000

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2033

2.13

4,752,000

Despite these passenger forecasts, and as Figure 2 illustrates below, actual passenger numbers
experienced at the former airport were significantly lower than forecast year after year. In
fact, passenger numbers failed to exceed 50,000 between 2006 and 2014 when the airport
finally closed. Infratils peak passenger year was 2011 when 48,450 passengers used the airport
which represented 0.02% of the UK total (CAA, Airport Statistics, 2016).
Figure 2: Number of passenger movements 2000 2014

Source: CAA, 2016 data

2.14

In 2013 KLM started passenger flights to Schiphol Amsterdam. However, over the 12 months of
operation KLMs seventy-eight seat Fokker planes were consistently less than half full (42 per
cent of capacity). Furthermore, KLM operations at Manston made no significant financial
contribution to the cost of running the airport. Between 2005 and 2013 the following airlines
also tried (and failed) to sustain regular and profitable services to/from the airport:

Cargolux (for Ghana Airways) to Accra, from April 2007

Kent Escapes (of Seguro Travel Group) flights to Faro and Barcelona every Thursday from
25 May to 26 October 2006, and (we believe) during the 2007 summer season

Flybe daily scheduled routes to Edinburgh (continuing on to Kirkwall, Orkney Islands, and
Sumburg) starting May 2010 (the first daily scheduled routes at Manston since the collapse
of EUjet in 2005) but ceasing by 25 March 2012 due to unsustainable passenger numbers.

Atlantic Holidays - direct chartered flights to Funchal, 13 and 20 June 2011

Air Southwest - seasonal Saturday charter services to Jersey

Newmarket Holidays - irregular chartered flights to Verona, Naples and Portugal during
summer 2013.

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2.15

Following the repetitive failure to even meet break-even levels of passenger and freight
movements, in January 2012 Infratil decided to put Manston Airport up for sale and
commissioned PWC to handle an extensive marketing process. The marketing process carried
out by PWC is set out in further detail in section six of this report, however, in short the process
resulted in an agreement to sell Manston Airport and the associated liabilities to Manston
Skyport Ltd. for 1. The sale of Manston airport was agreed in November 2013.

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Manston Skyport Limited: 2013-2014

2.16

The sale of the former Manston airport was completed in December 2013 when Manston
Skyport Limited took over. However, it is estimated that significant financial losses to the tune of
100,000 per week were incurred over the first 4 months of new ownership (KCC Position
Statement, 2015). Nevertheless, KCC state that following discussions with the owner of Manston
Skyport Limited, and her wider team, they believed that she had every intention to maintain
and grow the aviation business at Manston Airport (KCC Position Statement, 2015: 6).

2.17

As a result of these immediate and substantial financial losses, a 45 day consultation on the
closure of the airport ran from 19th March 2014. This was followed by the withdrawal of KLMs
flights to Schiphol, Amsterdam the airports last remaining commercial passenger services
on 10th April 2014.

2.18

For the duration of Manston Skyport Limiteds ownership the site was internationally marketed
by PwC, the agents selling the airport, to try and secure a new airport operator. As confirmed
by Alastair Welch in July 2014, No passenger airlines with any current activities had any
interest to start operations at the airport (Falcon Consultancy Ltd, 2014: 18).

2.19

We understand that RiverOak did approach Manston Skyport Limited, however, there were
concerns over the proposed arrangements, and they failed to provide any credible business
plan to back up claims of future employment or aviation success to reassure the current
owners that their bid offered commitment to maintain it as an operational airport.

2.20

Kent County Council also met PWC, with a view to helping find a viable new owner/operator.
Over 18 months, discussions were held with thirty interested parties including low cost airline
operators and private investors; many were introduced to PWC by Kent County Council.
However, once again no potential operators came forward with proposals. Despite numerous
attempts by the owner to market the site to secure new business, no new airport or airline
operators considered it a viable option, and consequently the airport was officially closed
shortly after on 15 May 2014.

2014 Present day

2.21

Following closure of the airport in May 2014, Thanet District Council (TDC) explored whether
there were grounds for a Compulsory Purchase Order (CPO) to acquire the site for the
purposes of recommencing an airport use and on 31st July 2014 TDCs Cabinet resolved to
carry out a soft-market testing exercise to identify a possible CPO Indemnity Partner.

2.22

During this period, in September 2014 the former airport was sold by Manston Skyport Limited to
the current owners with a view to delivering a strategic, mixed-use development on the site.

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2.23

On 9 August 2014 the Council issued a Prior Information Notice (PIN) followed by a soft market
testing document on 13 August 2014 in order to identify potential partners to be considered
(a.k.a the Partner Identification Process). We understand that four parties requested the
questionnaire and two submitted returns. The Council then offered meetings with both
responding partners, and only one company, RiverOak Investment Corp (RiverOak),
responded to the request and agreed to progress through to the Due Diligence stage.

2.24

Subsequently, upon receiving RiverOaks response, the Council conducted due diligence on
the company from 18 September 2014 to 18 November 2014. In December 2014 the Council
released their final report outlining their conclusions on the soft market assessment. The Council
concluded that, in their opinion, RiverOak did not have the necessary financial capacity to
support their plan for Manston and that RiverOaks business plan was insufficient.

2.25

In their assessment of RiverOaks business plan, TDC commented how The plan does not
provide for the CPO compensation cost, and this could be substantial. The business
assumptions appear to be optimistic as regards revenues and the known costs of the
operationA 20 year business plan is required for a project of this scale to demonstrate longterm viability, and that the proposed operation is sustainable in the long term. Unless these
requirements can be clearly demonstrated there is no prospect of achieving a CPO
(Extraordinary Full Cabinet Council, 11 December 2014).

2.26

In addition, RiverOaks suggested approach to transfer funds in tranches that allowed the
Council to incur CPO costs to the value of funds in that account was quashed by TDC. In their
statement, the Council concluded that they are not seeking a CPO on a speculative basis
and would not wish to put itself in a position whereby full achievement and vesting of the site
would depend on the partners ability to generate investment in the project (Extraordinary
Full Cabinet Council, 11 December 2014). Therefore, to accept RiverOak as the indemnity
partner was deemed too high-risk, and as a result, concluded that no further action was to be
taken at the present time to pursue a CPO of Manston Airport. This decision was taken on the
basis that the Council were unable to identify any suitable expressions of interest that would
fulfil the requirements of the Council for a CPO indemnity partner and that they (TDC) do not
have the financial resources to pursue a CPO in their own right. Since then, the sites Civil
Aviation Authority (CAA) operating license has been surrendered and much of the key
equipment associated with the operation of the airport has been removed and/or sold.

2.27

In May 2015 the Council agreed to review its position regarding the potential for CPO after
receiving an expression of interest from RiverOak (an American investment company) for use
of the site to recycle end of life aircraft with some cargo and potential future passenger
activity. On the 29 October 2015 the Cabinet decided that RiverOak did not fulfil the

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requirements for an indemnity partner and that no further action would be taken on a
potential CPO of Manston Airport for a second time.
2.28

At the start of 2016 Thanet District Council decided to carry out another soft market testing
exercise to seek interest from external parties in becoming an indemnity partner for the
acquisition of the former airport. On 15 January the Council issued a PIN and interested parties
had until 9 February to register their interest in which five expressions of interest were received
by the deadline. The interested parties then had until 12 February to submit responses to a
follow up questionnaire and a total of three valid submissions were received. We understand
that the Council are currently reviewing the responses received with no further progress
published to date.

Key Messages
2.29

The following key messages have emerged from a review of the sites history:

Multiple airport operators have tried to run a commercially viable airport (both freight and
passenger services) at Manston since the 1990s. All have failed;

The Airport (whilst operational) was not a significant employer. Our research indicates that
between 2005 and 2014 the number of on-site jobs peaked at 144;

The scale of operations at the airport in the period since 2000 peaked at 206,875
passengers and/or 43,000 tonnes of cargo. This is a fraction of what would be considered
as nationally significant (Please also refer to Table 2 which compares the scale of
operations at Manston to other UK airports); and

The local authority has repeatedly tried to identify a CPO indemnity partner. It has failed on
each occasion.

2.30

To conclude, this section has demonstrated how over the past 15-20 years, very significant
effort from multiple parties has gone into trying to make an airport at Manston viable
including a willingness from TDC to use compulsory purchase power. All efforts have failed,
and we are unaware of any material change in circumstances that would suggest that this
position would be any different in the future.

2.31

The economic harm of the allowing the change of use of the site is purely hypothetical in our
view (on the basis that the evidence indicates that an airport would not be a viable
proposition in the first case). Nonetheless, we note that at its peak, the site employed 144
people between 2000 and 2014.

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3.

UK Aviation Policy

3.1

This section of the report reviews the relevant national aviation policy in the context of the
former Manston Airport. We set out an analysis of the Aviation White Paper (2003), UK Aviation
Policy Framework (2013) and Airports Commission (Davies Review).

UK Aviation White Paper (2003)

3.2

The Labour Governments aviation White Paper published in December 2003 set out an
approach to provide a strategic framework for the development of air travel in the UK over
the next 30 years.

3.3

The White Paper forecast that the demand for air transport would increase over the following
25-30 years. The report encouraged growth of regional airports outside of London and the
South East to grow those economies and divert flights away from the congested London area
(DfT, The Future of Air Transport, 2003).

3.4

To clarify, the term regional airport used in throughout this report refers to all airports in the UK
other than the five major London and South East locations: Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted,
Luton and City. In addition, all future references to London and the South East airports only
comprises the five London airports listed above, and does not include other regional airports
in the wider South East region.

UK Aviation Policy Framework (2013)

3.5

Published in March 2013, the aviation policy framework sets out the Governments policy to
allow the aviation sector to continue to make a significant contribution to economic growth
across the country. The framework also provides a baseline level of statistics for the Airports
Commission to take into account important issues such as aircraft noise and climate change. It
sets out the governments objectives on these issues which are intended to challenge and
support the development of aviation across the UK.

3.6

The framework highlights how the Governments primary objective is to achieve long-term
economic growth, and recognises that the aviation sector is a major contributor to the
nations economy so supports its growth within a framework which maintains a balance
between the benefits and costs (most notably climate change and noise).

3.7

Statistics gathered in 2011 during the preparation of the framework reveal that the aviation
sectors turnover in the UK was around 53 billion, and the sector employed around 220,000
workers directly and supports many more indirectly.

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3.8

A key priority flagged within the framework is to work with the aviation industry and other
stakeholders to make better use of existing runway capacity at all UK airports. (Aviation Policy
Framework, 2013: 10). Furthermore, it is recognised that in the medium-long term beyond 2020
there will be a requirement to increase capacity, and the Airports Commission has been
instructed to advise on the location, timing and scale of this additional capacity.

3.9

Although the government has stated their intention to make best use of existing airport
capacity outside of London and the South East, the framework recognises that the
development of airports can have negative as well as positive local impacts, including noise
levels. and that proposals for expansion at these airports should be judged on their individual
merits, taking careful account of all relevant considerations, particularly economic and
environmental impacts (Aviation Policy Framework, 2013: 22).

Emerging Demand Forecasts

3.10

In January 2013 the Department for Transport (DfT) published revised aviation forecasts to
inform the development of the Aviation Policy Framework and the Airports Commission.

3.11

In summary, demand for air travel is forecast to increase at a slower rate than has occurred
over the last 40 years, reflecting the anticipation of market maturity and saturation across
different passenger markets. The major London and South East airports are forecast to be at
maximum capacity by 2030, and a number of non-London airports including Birmingham,
Bristol, East Midlands and Manchester Airport are also estimated to reach full capacity over a
similar time scale.

The Airports Commission (Davies Review) (2013-2015)

3.12

The Airports Commission is an independent commission chaired by Sir Howard Davies that was
established in September 2013 by the UK Government. The commission was formed to
examine the need for additional UK airport capacity and make recommendations to
government on how this can be met in the short, medium and long term. The Airports
Commission were instructed with two core responsibilities which comprised:

Submitting a report to the government by the end of 2013, identifying and recommending
options for maintaining the UKs status as an international hub for aviation and immediate
actions to improve the use of existing runway capacity in the next 5 years; and

Submitting a final report to the government by summer 2015 assessing the environmental,
economic and social costs and benefits of various solutions to increase airport capacity considering operational, commercial and technical viability.

3.13

The Airports Commission Interim Report, published in December 2013, sets out initial
recommendations for making better use of the UKs existing runway capacity over the next

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five years following extensive research and analysis. Reflecting the forecasts made in the UK
Aviation Policy Framework, the Commissions interim report states that by 2040, the London
and South East airports (i.e. Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Luton and City) are projected to be
at full capacity.
3.14

Notwithstanding the above, the interim report concludes that intervening to redistribute the
excess demand away from airports in London and the South East does not appear to be a
credible option (Airports Commission: Interim Report, 2013: 11).

3.15

Various options to foster greater use of airports outside of London and the South East were
investigated, including the potential to impose a congestion charge on the UKs busiest
airports to incentivise airlines and their passengers to use other airports, including regional
airports that are not yet fully utilised. However, the report concludes that most of the new
services developed at less-congested airports under this policy would simply duplicate services
already available at Heathrow, such as flights between London and New York. In addition,
there is little scope for Government intervention to force airlines and passengers to use less
busy airports, and past measures of this kind have rarely (if ever), achieved their objectives. As
a result, the Commissions interim report concludes that there is a clear case for one net
additional runway in London and the South East to come into operation by 2030 (Airports
Commission: Interim Report, 2013).

3.16

As was also argued by Mr Welch in his expert opinion (see section 5), the interim report
reinforces their conclusions to meet the increasing demand for extra capacity by providing an
additional runway in London and the South East by stating that the optimal approach is to
continue to invest in an airport system that caters for a range of airline business models
(Airports Commission: Interim Report, 2013: 12).

3.17

However, although the emerging capacity problems for UK airports cannot be addressed
without new infrastructure, the Airports Commission does recognise that there are
opportunities to make better use of existing capacity in the short-term.

3.18

Many comments submitted during the interim reports consultation period on making best use
of existing capacity pointed to the level of unused capacity at many UK airports. Making more
use of this capacity has been put forward as an alternative to the provision of new runway
capacity. One suggestion to improve this was to allow the Government to mandate or
provide strong financial incentives for the redistribution of traffic around the UKs airport
network. However, the interim report concludes that mandatory measures are impractical and
strong financial incentives would have significant adverse consequences (see Airports
Commission: Interim Report, 2013, Chapter 4: 120).

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3.19

The Commission also considered other alternative measures that would potentially provide
incentives for the use of under-utilised capacity (or remove obstacles to its use) which
included enhanced surface transport links to airports and offering financial incentives to open
new routes.

3.20

Enhanced surface transport links: The Commission recognises that passengers do not think of
their journey only in terms of its airborne component. The length of time it takes to reach the
airport, the cost, quality, comfort and convenience of the journey are all important
considerations. Therefore, meeting passengers needs in terms of surface transport often
means offering a range of options with a range of prices. The interim report states:

3.21

Airlines respond to the needs of their customers; if passengers do not want to travel to an
airport because of the quality of its surface transport, airlines will be less likely to schedule flights
to or from it. Poor surface transport can send the message that an airport is second best or
not the citys main airport. For long-haul passengers, particularly those with a choice of
airlines, these are significant issues. (Aiports Commission: Interim Report, 2013: 158).

3.22

In the case of Manston, although transport connectivity is slowly improving, the sites location
and proximity (or lack of) to local transport hubs does not foster an attractive and high-speed,
well-connected service to the origin/destination of a significant critical mass of passengers.
There is a strong case for attaching greater strategic priority to transport investments which
improve surface access to our airports, however, schemes of this nature will take significant
time and costs to plan and deliver.

3.23

Financial incentives to open new routes: The Commission considered option to use APD
holidays (i.e. tax free routes) to encourage the development of routes to new destinations.
Under this proposal, new routes would benefit from an initial period (probably two years)
during which they would be exempted from APD. This would enable new routes to develop
their market and help to offset some of the commercial risks associated with opening them.
However, the Commission highlight two potential pitfalls with this option:

If the proposal were non-discriminatory (in other words, if it applied to every new route
equally) then there would be substantial potential to game the system, for example via
airlines switching between airports in the same regions of their origin and destination
countries to ensure that they would always benefit from the holiday. This behaviour would
reduce the UKs tax income from APD without generating connectivity benefits.

If the proposal introduced measures to counter these perverse incentives, then it would run
a substantial risk of being challenged on the basis that it was distorting competition by
favouring particular routes in favour of others.

3.24

Therefore, the Commission concluded that they cannot recommend the use of APD
holidays. In summary, despite a number of options being investigated as outlined above, the

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Commissions interim report concludes that intervening to redistribute the excess demand
away from airports in London and the South East does not appear to be a credible option. As
a result, the Commission made the decision to focus the second phase of their work, and final
report, on determining the most suitable location and design for new airport capacity for the
airports in London and South East (as specified above).

Key Messages
3.25

The following key messages have emerged from a review of UK aviation policy:

In summary, Government policy supports the UK aviation sector; and

There is a critical need to increase capacity in and around London. The Airports
Commission, appointed by Government to investigate potential solutions to this issue
concluded that this need can only be satisfied by expanding the capacity of airports in
and around London (i.e. Heathrow, Gatwick, City, Stansted, Luton). The potential role of
Manston in meeting this need was tested and it was concluded that the site was
unsuitable (in locational grounds). On this basis, we conclude that in transport
infrastructure terms there is no need for the airport to be retained.

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4.

UK Aviation Trends
UK Regional Airports

4.1

As previously stated, the Airports Commissions interim report published in December 2013
stated that demand would increase in/around London and that no regional airport option
could replace the need for extra capacity in that area. The Aviation note prepared by the
House of Commons further supports the Airports Commissions position by arguing that
demand for air travel is not spread evenly across the UK and alleviating capacity demands
should be focussed on London and the South East (i.e. Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Luton
and City) (House of Commons, Aviation: Regional Airports, 2014).

4.2

A subsequent report by the House of Commons Transport Committee notes that although
smaller airports can be important assets to communities due to a range of enablers such as
employment and the import and export of goods and people, they are fragile commercial
entities (House of Commons, Smaller Airports, March 2015). Part of this is due to the fact that
whilst the airport operates from a fixed location and catchment area, airlines and other
aviation businesses are highly mobile and can swiftly adjust or relocate their services in line with
demand.

4.3

Since the recession in 2008, numerous airports including Bristol Filton, Blackpool, Coventry,
Plymouth, Penzance and Manston have all closed either completely or to commercial traffic.
Although the precise circumstances varied between those cases, the closures were ultimately
a result of airport owners and/or airlines concluding that commercial services were no longer
viable in that location.

4.4

The UK contains a relatively large number of airports in a small geographical area. In fact, it
contains more airports per person than comparable European countries. The Charted
Institute of Logistics and Transport (CILT) outlines the practical consequences of the UKs
aviation situation:
Smaller airports vary in terms of financial viability, but there are a
number which are not, and probably never will be, profitable. There are
some regions where there are more airports than are really needed,
and where the case for public financial support is not strong. An airport
cannot survive if airlines and other aircraft operators do not want to use
it (Source: CILT, UK Smaller Airports, 2014).

4.5

As such, the House of Commons consider that there is no case for a general policy of state
intervention to keep all smaller airports open. Rather, the range of consumer and operator

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choice provided by the number of airports in the UK is welcomed. Obviously however, this puts
airports that are not deemed attractive or viable at risk of closure.
4.6

This brief analysis of current policy and recommendations surrounding regional airports in the
UK demonstrates how their future is far from secure and subject to numerous external factors.
In fact, judging by the recommendations made in the latest reports, it seems unlikely that any
smaller airports outside of London and the South East will benefit from substantial investment or
growth going forward unless perceived as attractive by airline operators and associated
aviation service providers (as discussed further below).

Hub Airports
4.7

It is argued that the UK is suffering from a shortage of hub airport capacity rather than a
shortage of general airport capacity at present (House of Commons Transport Committee,
Smaller Airports, 2015). As aforementioned, the UK contains a high proportion of airports
relative to its geographical size, but few hub airports. Hub airports serve both their own
catchment areas and incoming traffic from other airports. The volume of traffic handled by
hub airports enables them to serve additional destinations and to maintain high service
volumes. The UK currently has one hub airport, Heathrow. Heathrows significantly constrained
capacity issue has damaged domestic air connectivity from smaller airports to Heathrow, and
the number of UK destinations served from Heathrow has steadily declined over the past
decade. In 2015, the only smaller airports with an air route to Heathrow were Aberdeen, Belfast
City, Leeds-Bradford and Newcastle. We understand that services between Inverness and
Heathrow have also just been re-instated as of 3rd May 2016.

4.8

For enhanced hub capacity to benefit smaller regional airports such as Manston, they would
need security and comfort that a certain number of the new slots created at the hub airport
would be secured for their services. The benefit and value of regional links to hub airports is
demonstrated by the fall in passenger numbers at smaller airports where such services have
been withdrawn. For example, Durham Tees Valley airport experienced a 75% reduction in
passenger numbers following the withdrawal of its Heathrow service in 2009 (DfT, Enquiry into
smaller airports, SMA0039, 2014).

Airline Operators Perceptions of Regional Airports

4.9

As the size of aircrafts has grown, resulting in a need to fill more seats, airline operators
commercial strategies have changed accordingly. Operators such as British Airways and
Lufthansa have adopted the US model of developing hub and spoke networks (Falcon
Report, Stage 1, 2014). This model has ultimately led to regional airports becoming relegated

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into hub feeders, with the opportunity for them to attract lucrative long haul flights almost
entirely removed.
4.10

In response to this trend, regional airports found new revenue opportunities by attracting
seasonal traffic and freight services, as was the case for the former Manston airport. For a short
period of time, regional airports profited from a relatively niche concept of airline operation
low cost carriers (LCCs). LCCs provide a short-medium distance air travel product at a low cost
by eliminating all unnecessary costs whilst maximising the capacity of the aircraft. When LCCs
first arrived on the market they chose to base the bulk of their operations from regional airports
where they could negotiate virtually free operating costs with a willing airport operator
arguing the case that the airport could generate compensating revenues from car parking,
retailing and other associated services. For a short period of time this model was successful
and satisfied both airline and airport operators, however, many regional airports struggled to
generate sufficient profit to suitably maintain and modernise their facilities.

4.11

As competition between airline operators has continued to increase, the trends indicate that
LCCs are moving back towards the larger airports, including hub airports. When the previous
owners of Manston airport, Manston Skyport were asked to comment on the discussions had
with airline operators, they confirmed that conversations were had with a number of airlines.
No passenger airlines with any current activities had any interest to start operations at the
airport (Falcon Report, 2014). Furthermore, KLM, which was the company operating
commercial flights at Manston, confirmed that they would not return to the airport even if it reopened. It would appear, therefore, that there is little confidence or willing from airline
operators to run services from Manston should it be re-opened. It is highly probable that the
airports history of consistently failed passenger operations and low-quantum of airline activity
will undoubtedly dissuade most carriers.

The UK Airport System and Statistics

4.12

The UK aviation market is served by a diverse system of airports, from a global aviation hub at
Heathrow through large scale point-to-point airports, such as Manchester, Birmingham and
Gatwick, down to small airports primarily focusing on maintaining lifeline routes, for example in
the Highlands and Islands. There are also important freight operations at Stansted and East
Midlands, and bellyhold freight services are provided from other locations, of which Heathrow
is by some distance the most significant.

4.13

Passenger demand and connectivity are highly concentrated on the four largest airports:
Heathrow, Gatwick, Manchester and Stansted, which accounted for over 60% of passengers
served last year and each served more than 140 destinations weekly, compared to fewer than
100 at any other airport.

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4.14

The fact that three of these four airports are close to the capital indicates the central role
played by the London system in supporting UK aviation connectivity. As shown in Appendix 1,
London benefits from a very large and strong aviation market in global air transport, reaching
close to 150 million passengers in 2015 (Source: CAA Statistics, 2016). A summary of airport
statistics is provided in Table 1 below, as well as statistics for the former Manston Airport in its
final full operational year (2013) for comparison purposes. Please see Appendix 1 for a
complete set of statistics for UK airports.
Table 2: UK Airport Statistics, 2015
Airport

Air Transport
Movements

Passenger
Movements

Freight (Tonnes)

Employees (Direct)

Heathrow

469,658

74,814,273

1,460,531

66,000

Gatwick

242,213

36,155,343

67,501

21,000

London City

79,250

4,319,281

24

2,000

Luton

80,808

11,806,102

4,101

9,400

Southend

8,913

894,287

N/A

Stansted

142,833

21,909,281

52,255

10,200

1,023,675

149,898,567

1,584,414

Edinburgh

101,163

10,863,412

1,363

600

Manchester

145,544

19,174,159

89,148

19,000

Newquay

5,971

249,794

185

Cardiff

10,755

633,143

N/A

Bristol

49,234

5,958,476

200

Exeter

10,904

576,281

1,450

East Midlands

31,310

3,650,045

26,254

N/A

Manston (2013)

1,086

36,474

29,306

144

Total London
Area Airports

Source: CAA, Airports Data, 2016

Re-Purposed Airports
4.15

As aforementioned, numerous regional airports in the UK have closed since 2008, including
Bristol Filton, Blackpool, Coventry, Plymouth, Penzance and Manston. Almost all of these have
undergone successful re-developments (or these are being planned) to use the vacant and
redundant airport sites for alternative uses.

4.16

For example, the former Blackpool Airport site has been granted enterprise zone status by the
Government which is forecast to create c.3,000 new jobs by 2030. The new enterprise zone
came into effect in January 2016.

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4.17

Similarly, an outline application at the former Coventry Airport was granted permission in
December 2015 which secured planning for the creation of a modern manufacturing and
distribution hub called Imperial Park. Recent press has indicated that there has been a strong
level of interest in the development and it is expected that Reserved Matters applications
which are currently pending for the site will be granted in July 2016 (CoStar, March 24 2016).

4.18

Bristol Filton Airfield, a c.140ha site, received outline planning permission in June 2015 for
redevelopment plans comprising approximately 2,600 new homes, employment space, a
hotel, schools and a supermarket. The owners, BAE Systems, have forecast that the
development will generate up to 7,700 new jobs.

4.19

For full details of the various former UK airports that are undergoing re-development, please
refer to Appendix 2.

Key Messages
4.20

A review of UK aviation trends has demonstrated the following:

There is a comparative over-supply of airports in the UK commensurate with the

population size. Accordingly, the Government considers there to be no case for state
intervention to keep regional airports open;

The industry is increasingly focussed on hub airports (both passenger and airline operator
preference) as a means of better meting needs; and

There are numerous examples of smaller, non-viable regional airports closing across the UK,
and being re-purposed as mixed-use developments which have made a significant
contribution to their local economies and other needs (leading to a net benefit over the
former airport use).

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5.

Expert Opinion
Mr Alastair Welch

5.1

The opinion expressed below has been prepared by Mr Alastair Welch who has worked in the
operations of airports and aerodromes for 20 years up until 2015. His experience in the aviation
industry includes, but is not limited to, the following:

Airport operations, finance and strategy at Heathrow;

General Manager at Stansted Airport with responsibility for engineering and the operation
of the passenger terminal (at the time, the UKs largest);

Managing Director of Southend Airport from 2007-2013, leading the redevelopment of the
airfield into Londons defacto 6th Airport with the delivery of a runway extension in a
highly complex environment, a new control tower, passenger terminal, railway station and
hotel. With the introduction of regular passenger flights from Aer Lingus and EasyJet, the
airport moved from carrying fewer than 30,000 passengers per annum to around one
million during the period between 2008 and 2013.

Business advisory role to firms on matters of airport resilience (for the CAA) and airfield
operations (for the UK MOD). This advisory practice has grown and includes aviation
service development activity for airports around the world in addition to transaction
support and strategic advice; and

In addition, he has been the Interim Chairman of Manston airport since 29 November 2013.
At Manston airport he was part of the team which led the consultation process over the
possible closure of the airfield. This process commenced in March and the closure of the
site subsequently took place on 15 May 2014.

5.2

As is evident from Mr Welchs extensive experience of aviation matters, including at Manston

airport specifically, he is particularly well placed to provide an expert opinion on the prospects
of the site resuming its previous use as a viable airport. A summary of his opinion on this matter
is set out below.

Mr Welchs Opinion
5.3

Following the decision by the MOD and RAF to cease their operations, there have been a
number of owners of the site. All of which have tried to create a fully-functioning, successful
and viable airport business but all have failed. The airport has been operating at a loss since
the RAFs vacation of the site in 1998.

5.4

Regional airports that are successful have generally become so because they operate as
balanced businesses. This typically comprises a diverse series of income streams from a range

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of activities including passengers, freight, general aviation, flying clubs/flight training, and
airport tenants generating rental income.
5.5

Many comparable airports have developed balanced and very resilient businesses over a
substantial period of time. Airports such as Norwich, Southend and Bournemouth have very
diverse income streams, particularly from a significant number of successful airport tenants,
which makes them resilient to any specific market changes.

5.6

Airports which have become available following RAF disposal more recently have found this
diversification and resilience much harder to achieve. There is no strong foundation of tenants
and other activities on which to base a business, whilst other airports have developed very
strong positions around diversified and reliable income streams.

5.7

There are a number of reasons for this, but fundamentally, any successful, balanced airport
needs strong connections and a 360 degree catchment area. At the former Manston airport
site, whilst connectivity is improving (including the introduction of a highspeed rail station at
Thanet Parkway expected imminently), the site is simply too far east of the key catchment
areas, with journey times from London approximately taking just over an hour at best. In
addition, the local catchment area is simply not sufficiently populated for a passenger airport
to succeed. Furthermore, in physical terms, the former airports location means that it is
effectively cut off on two sides (North and East) by the English Channel which automatically
limits its catchment.

5.8

Further to the above, the site is too close to Gatwick to capture critical mass and the
propensity to fly from the immediate catchment area around the airport is low. Whilst niche
services to/from the former airport operated recently (a KLM service to Schiphol, Amsterdam
and a handful of occasional summer charter services), the income from these services alone
could not cover the marginal costs of the operations, and certainly could not contribute to the
wider costs of the site.

5.9

Cargo activity is even more price sensitive than passenger related activity and whilst it would
not be good business acumen, in a highly competitive environment, to predicate a business
on cargo alone, volumes would have to be many times greater than the former airport
previously experienced in order to generate a profit.

5.10

The former airports relative advantage to turning cargo aircraft around rapidly was directly a
function of how quiet the airport was. If the cargo volumes were to grow, so would the direct
cost of operations, making profit no more likely than was the case before. All this in an
environment where an ever increasing amount of air cargo is transported in the belly hold of
passenger aircraft, rather than in specific freight aircraft that were previously used at the site.

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5.11

Other income streams from tenants, general aviation and flying clubs/flight training remain
limited and simply not enough to make a difference at a site as large and expensive to
operate as the former Manston Airport site.

5.12

Following the failure of the site around 2005, it was purchased by infrastructure specialists
Infratil. Whilst they invested heavily in the site, by the time their ownership came to an end the
business had consumed c.50m and they simply saw losses increase exponentially.

5.13

In 2013, following a global search by Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) which lasted almost
two years, not a single credible organisation was prepared to pay more than 1 for the site as
there was simply no value in the site functioning as an airport.

5.14

When the site was sold to Manston Skyport Limited in November 2013, a business plan was put
together to assess the degree to which the site could progress as a balanced airfield with work
in hand to secure both passenger and cargo business.

5.15

This business plan was well documented, but the potential for these new income streams
quickly dried up and the hope that the Davies commission would recommend making best
use of current runways in the South East (instead of building new runways) was dashed in
December 2013. With more long term capacity scheduled for the London airports system,
passengers were simply not going to migrate to the former Manston Airport. Its long term fate
was sealed with its closure in May 2014.

5.16

Following the airports closure, the site was sold in September 2014. Much of the key
equipment which had been used when the site operational has been removed and/or sold.
The aerodrome and air traffic licences have been revoked.

5.17

Whilst it is technically possible to open a new airport on the site, this would involve very
considerable amounts of time, money and expertise. In addition, the previous process of CAA
licencing has become EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) certification, which adds to
both complexity and cost.

5.18

Therefore, even if an organisation which owned the site today chose to recommence
operations, it would take at least a year and tens of millions of pounds to secure that
outcome. Even then, there is no evidence (both from our own and national authorities
research) that a profitable business would result, but quite the contrary, as all of the evidence
available suggests it would, again, fail.

The Falcon Report

5.19

In July 2014, Falcon Consultancy Limited was commissioned by Thanet District Council to
provide their expert opinion on the viability of the airport at Manston.

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5.20

Within the report, comments are made on Manstons historic performance as an airport:
The airport has never sustained growth. Now, the doubts surrounding
Manstons survival have become a self-fulfilling prophesy (Falcon
Consultancy Ltd, 2014: 7)
Manston Airport was up for sale for some time. That there was no
interest reflects its poor business reputation, (it has never made a profit in
all the years since the RAF moved out) and the general industry
perception that it is not in an ideal location. It has failed to fulfil its
perceived role as a regional airport (Falcon Consultancy Ltd, 2014: 9)

5.21

The report also provides commentary on the likelihood of the former airport re-developing into
a successful cargo and/or low-budget business operation:
fierce competition between all the airlines is redrawing the map
once again and forcing the low cost airlines back towards the larger
airports. Ever larger aircraft delivered to the major airlines offer many
more seats to be filled from the major airports and the capacity and
performance of these aircraft is so great that, for the moment at least,
the growth in air cargo can be absorbed in the belly holds of passenger
aircraft (Falcon Consultancy Ltd, 2014: 3)
Capacity is growing at a far faster pace than demand for airfreight
and as sea freight yields are falling there is also a shift from airfreight to
sea freight. The climate for cargo-only aircraft operations could not be
much worse. (Falcon Consultancy Ltd, 2014: 21)

5.22

In addition to the above, the report states that Falcon consider Manston has no natural
sustainable passenger marketits catchment area and its propensity to travel is insufficient to
generate for the airlines enough traffic on one route to sustain a twice daily operation the
minimum required to risk launching a service (Page 8).

5.23

Falcons overall assessment of Manstons viability concludes:

No business plan with a credible investment plan of less than 20 years is
likely to define the commitment necessary to rebuild confidence. Phase
1 investment required could be in the order of 100m with no
guarantees of success. (Falcon Consultancy Ltd, 2014: 7).

5.24

In conclusion, the Falcon report states that there is no commercial justification for re-opneing
and marketing the airport in the same configuration as it was upon closure and should

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therefore remain closed (Falcon Consultancy Ltd, 2014: 14). They recommend that if there is
to be any discussion around the former airport re-opening, one of the fundamental issues that
needs to be addressed is reducing the journey time to/from the London area because there
are so many alternative airport options which can be accessed more easily. Even the
proposed Thanet Parkway station (which is yet to be confirmed anyway) would require some
additional mode of transport to connect passengers from the terminal to the station.
5.25

As such, although much of the Falcon report identifies that the chances of Manston airport reemerging as a successful and profitable operation are slim, it does conclude that commercial
aviation operations at Manston would be a viable option, provided that a suitable long-term
operating model for the airport was developed. We note that the Falcon report makes no
suggestion or attempt to provide any such long-term operating model for former airport.
However, in light of this conclusion set out in the report, the Council made a decision to assess
the option of acquiring Manston from its current owners under the Compulsory Purchase
Powers.

5.26

As part of this assessment, it was decided that the compulsory purchase of the former airport
by the Council could only be possible if a suitable operating partner for the airport could be
identified and such a partner could indemnify the Council from the costs of issuing a
Compulsory Purchase Order (CPO) as TDC do not have the finances to pursue a CPO in their
own right.

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6.

RiverOak Development Consent Order

6.1

We understand that following an unsuccessful attempt to be appointed as TDCs indemnity

partner to compulsorily acquire the former Manston Airport, RiverOak have since decided to
pursue obtaining a Development Consent Order (DCO). A DCO is the means of obtaining
permission for developments categorised as Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects (NSIP),
including transport projects.

6.2

We also understand that RiverOaks objective is to reinstate the site as a specialised aviation
agglomeration centre which would provdie a range of facilities and services including; a
major international centre for air freight; a reliever for the major airports of London; a base for
at least one passenger carrier and a fixed base operation for executive travel (RiverOak
Investment Corp., LLC Website).

6.3

We note that for an airport proposal to achieve NSIP status it would need to handle at least 10
million passengers per year or 10,000 air cargo movements per year. We note that from a
passenger number perspective, this would require an increase of 4,800% over the previous
peak number of passengers achieved at Manston, and a 600-3,200% increase in freight
aircraft movements*.

6.4

To put this in further perspective this scale of traffic would be commensurate with some of the
UKs biggest airports (Source: CAA Airport Data, 2015):

6.5

Luton: 12,263,505

Birmingham: 10,187,122

Edinburgh: 11,114,587

Glasgow: 8,714,307

Clearly this is very ambitious and we question whether this is genuinely achievable (noting that
there is no business plan in the public domain).

6.6

Accordingly, it is our view that at this point in time, there is limited/no evidence to suggest that
the DCO proposals have any prospect of being realised.

*Footnote: Calculations made using typical Boeing airplane cargo capacities which range from 138 tonnes at their largest to
26,300 kg at their smallest (Source: http://www.boeing.com/commercial/freighters/)

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7.

Conclusions

7.1

This report has been prepared by GVA on behalf of our client, Stone Hill Park Limited, in
support of the Hybrid Planning Application for mixed use redevelopment of the former
Manston Airport in Thanet District Council. The information set out within this report has been
collated to justify our argument that:

Available evidence firmly indicates that there is no reasonable prospect of the former
airport use recommencing and being viable in the long term;

There is no need for an airport in this location (in transport infrastructure terms); and

The economic impact (including hypothetical opportunity loss) of losing the existing use
will not be significant compared to the economic benefits of the proposed development.

May 2016 gva.co.uk

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Stone Hill Park

Bibliography

Airports Commission, Final Report, July 2015

Airports Commission, Interim Report, 2013

Civil

Aviation

Authority,

Data

and

analysis,

UK

Airports,

Online

source:

Online

source:

https://www.caa.co.uk/Data-and-analysis/UK-aviation-market/Airports/

CoStar,

Funding

Deal

at

Coventry

Airport,

March

24

2016,

http://www.costar.co.uk/en/assets/news/2016/March/MG-takes-off-with-505m-fundingdeal-at-Coventry-Airport/

Department for Transport, Enquiry into smaller airports, SMA0039, 2014

Department for Transport, The Future of Air Transport, December 2003

Falcon Consultancy Limited, Viability Study of Manston Airport: Stage 1, 16 July 2014

House of Commons, Aviation: Regional Airports, 6 March 2014

House of Commons Transport Committee, Smaller Airports, 13 March 2015

Kent County Council, Manston Airport under private ownership, Position Statement, March
2015

RAF Manston History Museum, History in Brief, Online source: http://www.rafmanston.co.uk/

The Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport, UK Smaller Airports, 2014

UK Government, Aviation Policy Framework, 2013

May 2016 gva.co.uk

27

Appendices

gva.co.uk

Appendix I
UK airport
baseline
information

gva.co.uk

Airport Name

Location

Distance from closest major

destination

London Heathrow

M25 West

12 miles W of London

London Gatwick

Crawley

25 miles S of London

London Luton

Luton

30 miles N of London

London Stansted

Bishops Stortford

c.30 miles NE of London

London City
Southend

LB Newham
Southend/Rochford

c.8 miles from the West End

c.37 miles E of London

Barra
Birmingham
Manchester
Prestwick
Doncaster Sheffield

Outer Hebrides
Birmingham
Ringway
Glasgow, Scotland
Finningley

c.140 miles W of Glasgow

5 miles E of Birmingham
6.5 miles SW of Manchester
1 mile NE of Prestwick
3 miles SE of Doncaster

East Midlands Intl

Castle Donington

7 miles SE of Derby

Belfast International
Manston
Newquay
Glasgow
Edinburgh
Cardiff Wales
Newcastle
Stornoway
Durham Tees Valley
Liverpool
Bournemouth
Leeds Bradford
Humberside
Exeter
Bristol
Coventry
Cambridge
Aberdeen
Inverness
Blackpool
Norwich
Benbecula
Belfast City
Carlisle
Biggin Hill
Campbeltown
Southampton
Oxford
Islay
Lydd
Sumburgh
Tiree
Gloucestershire
Kirkwall
Dundee
Scatsta
Swansea
Shoreham
Lands End

Belfast
Ramsgate
Watergate Bay
Glasgow, Scotland
Kirkliston
Rhoose
Prestwick
Isle of Lewis, Hebrides
Darlington
Speke, Liverpool
Bournemouth
Yeadon, Leeds
Kirmington, Lincolnshire
Exeter, Devon
Lulsgate Bottom
Coventry
Cambridge
Aberdeen
Dalcross
Blackpool
Hellesdon, Norwich
Benbecula
Belfast
Lake District, Cumbria
South London
Argyll and Bute
Eastleigh, Hampshire
Kidlington, Cherwell
Islay, Argyll and Bute
Shepway, Kent
Shetland, Scotland
Tiree, Inner Hebrides
Staverton, Tewkesbury
Orkney Islands
Dundee
Shetland
Fairwood Common
Lancing, W of Brighton
St Just, Cornwall

11 miles W of Belfast
14 miles E of Canterbury
3.5 miles NE of Newquay
6 miles W of Glasgow
6 miles W of Edinburgh
9 miles SW of Cardiff
6 miles NW of Newcastle
2 miles E of Stornoway
5 miles SE of Darlington
6.5 miles SE of Liverpool
3.5 miles NE of Bournemouth
6 miles NW of Leeds
11 miles S of Hull
4 miles E of Exeter
7 miles SW of Bristol
3 miles SSE of Coventry
1.5 miles E of Cambridge
5 miles NW of Aberdeen
7 miles NE of Inverness
2.5 miles SSE of Blackpool
2.5 miles N of Norwich
136 miles NW of Glasgow
3 miles NE of Belfast
5 miles ENE of Carlisle
12 miles SSE of London
3 miles W of Campbeltown
3.5 miles N of Southampton
6 miles NW of Oxford
4.5 miles NW of Port Ellen
12 miles S of Ashford
17 miles S of Lerwick
2.5 miles NNE of Balemartine
3.5 miles W of Cheltenham
2.5 miles SE of Kirkwall
0.5 miles S of Dundee
17 miles N of Lerwick
5 miles WSW of Swansea
1 mile W of Shoreham-by-Sea
5 miles W of Penzance

Available Transport
Underground and Express Trains to Central London, buses,
coaches, taxis and car hire
Trains, coaches, buses, taxis and hire cars
Buses, taxis and car hire. Nearest railway station Luton Parkway
1.5 miles away
Trains (including express service), buses, taxis and hire cars.
Airport has dedicated train station
Dedicated DLR train station, buses, taxis
Trains, buses, coaches, taxis
Buses, taxis, trians (Birmingham Intl Station), hire cars
Buses, trains, taxis
Trains, buses, taxis and car hire
Buses, taxis.
Coach services, local bus service. Closest train station East
Midlands Parkway (miles)
Bus, coach
N/A
Buses
Coaches, taxis. Nearest train station Paisley (1mile away)
Trams, bus, coach,
Buses. Closest train station Rhoose (2 miles away)
Terminal train station, buses
Buses and taxis
Trains, buses and taxis.
Buses, taxis and car hire
Buses, taxis. Nearest station Christchuch (3 miles)
Buses, coaches and taxis
Taxis, buses, car hire
Buses, taxis
Buses. Closest train station Bristol T Meads (8 miles away)
Buses, taxis. Nearest station Coventry (2.7miles away)
Bus, taxis
Dyce Train Station (2 miles from Airport), buses
Taxis
Taxis, buses. Nearest railway station Squires Gate (0.2 miles)
Taxis, car hire, limited bus services
Trains (access via shuttle bus), buses
Taxis. Nearest station is Carlisle City (10km away)
Buses, taxis, car hire
Bus, trains (Southampton Airport station 100m from terminal)
Buses, taxi, car hire
Buses, taxis, car hire
Buses, taxis, car hire
Buses and taxis
Taxis, Car hire, buses
Buses, taxi, car hire
Taxis
Buses, taxis
Taxis
Taxis. Closest train station is Shoreham-by-Sea, 2 miles away)
Bus, taxis

Number of runways

Length of longest runway (m

Width of runway(s) (m)

Number of terminals

Annual Air transport movements

Number of destinations served

Year Airport Opened

3902, 3660

469,658

185

1946 (Civil)

50, 50

3316

45

242,213

c.200

1958 (South), 1988 (North)

2162

46

80,808

103

1938

3049

46

142,833

Over 150

1991

1
1

1508
1856

30
37

1
1

79,250
8,913

Over 40
Over 20

1987
1935

1
1
2
2
1

Open Beach
3052
3048
2986
2895

Open Beach
45
45, 45
46, 45
60

1
1
3
1
1

947
81,125
145,544
4,126
3,190

Unknown
Over 140
Over 200
Over 10
Over 30

1936
1939
1938
1934
1936

2893

46

31,310

Over 80

1965

2
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
2
4

2780
2748
2744
2665
2556
2392
2329
2315
2291
2285
2271
2250
2196
2076
2011
2008
1965
1953
1887
1869
1841
1836
1829
1828
1820
1750
1723
1552
1545
1505
1500
1472
1431
1428
1400
1360
1350
1036
785

45, 45
220
45
46
46, 46
46
46
46, 23
45
46
46
46
45
46
45
46
46
46
46
46, 23
45
46, 46
45
30, 23
45
46
37
30
46
32
45
30
34, 30
46
30
31
46, 18
18, 50
37, 37, 19, 18

1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

30,516
5,971
74,746
101,163
10,755
35,302
6,275
3,868
32,686
5,602
30,354
3,975
10,904
49,234
245
51,113
10,499
1,046
8,416
1,692
40,476
976
34,083
1,611
121
6,985
1,248
1,207
10,566
1,114
8,101

Over 70
Over 10
110
Over 120
Over 20
74
Over 5
Over 200
Over 70
Over 35
Over 50
Over 5
Over 40
Over 100
Over 15
Over 10
67
Over 15
Over 5
Over 20
Unknown
Over 20
Unknown
Private Charters only
1
Over 30
Unknown
2
2
10
1
3
Over 10
Under 5
1
Unknown
Private Charters only
1

1963
***
1934
1966
1977
1952 (Civil)
1935
1937
1966
1933
1944
1931
1974
1937
1957
1936
1937
1934
1947
1930 (Civil)
1933 (1967)
1942
1983
1960 (Civil)
1917
N/A
1910
1935
1940
1954
1936
1942
1931
1948 (Civil)
1963
1940
1941
1911
1937

Data Source
CAA, Airport Statistics, 2015
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"

Appendix II
Former UK
airports case
studies

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Appendix 2
Former UK Airports Baseline Information
Introduction:
This note provides case studt examples of former UK airports which have undergone (or are
undergoing) re-development to use the vacant and redundant former airport sites for
alternative uses.
Bristol Filton Airport, South Gloucestershire
Site Area: 143 ha
Site History: The airport was first used to manufacture aeroplanes in 1910. Also used as the
UK base for the construction and testing of Concorde. The site played an important role in
Bristol's aviation history, from the establishment of a Royal Flying Corps aerodrome to the
final Concorde landing in 2003. After its official closure in December 2012 the airfield has
continued to be a home for police and ambulance helicopters.
Prior to closure, BAE systems, the owner of the airport, undertook a review of the
commercial viability of the site and then began extensive discussions with South
Gloucestershire Council to look at alternative uses for the site. BAE submitted an outline
application for a mixed use development on the site in October 2014 and permission was
granted in June 2015 (ref: 14/05445/K).
Summary of proposed mixed-use redevelopment: As currently planned and when
complete, the site will provide a total of 2,675 homes, 24.95 ha (61.65 acres) of
employment land comprising B1a, B1b, B1c, B2 and B8 uses Extra Care, Secondary and
Primary Schools, Community Facilities together with significant improvements in
infrastructure and the provision of open space. It is estimated that the development will
generate nearly 8,000 new jobs during its lifetime.
Full outline application details: Mixed use development on 143.13 hectares of land
comprising: residential development for up to 2,675 dwellings and apartments (comprising
2,635 x Use Class C3 and 40 x Live Work Units Sui Generis); up to 24ha of stand-alone
employment land (comprising up to 17ha Use Class B1a and up to 7ha Use Class B1b/c, B2
and B8); Retail/Food and Drink facilities in Employment Hub up to 900sqm (Use Class
A1/A3/A4); 120 Bed Hotel up to 3,800 sqm (Use Class C1); Rail Halt (0.45ha Use Class Sui
Generis); Education provision to include a Secondary School (8.28ha) (to incorporate Built
Sports Centre up to 1,550sqm Use Class D2), 2 no. Primary Schools (total 5ha) and 2 no.
Children's Nurseries (total 0.8ha) (all Use Class D1); Mixed-Use Centre to comprise
Community Facilities up to 3,000sqm; Dental Surgery up to 800sqm; Health Centre up to
2,100sqm (All Use Class D1); 70 Bed Extra Care Facility up to 12,500sqm (Use Class C2);
Public House up to 800sqm (Use Class A4); Opticians up to 600sqm (Use Class A1/A2);
Retail/Services/Food and Drink facilities up to 500sqm (Use Classes A1, A2, A3 and A5);
Business Offices up to 500sqm (Use Class B1) and Retail Supermarket up to 2,787sqm gross
(Use Class A1); together with; supporting infrastructure and facilities including demolition,
ground works and remediation, highways, utilities, landscaping, sustainable urban
drainage system, wildlife water basins and public open space. Outline application
including access, with all other matters reserved.

Bristol Filton Airport Outline Masterplan:

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gva.co.uk

Coventry Airport, Warwickshire

Site History: Coventry Airport opened in 1936, and began its use as an aircraft
manufacturer. During WWII the airport was utilised as a fighter station, and post-war was
returned to civil use as a passenger and freight terminal. Airline operators lost confidence
in the airport in the early 21st century and by 2008 all commercial passenger operations
had ceased, and in 2009 the airport closed.
Outline planning permission has since been secured for the creation of a modern
manufacturing and distribution hub - Imperial Park - granted in December 2015 (ref:
W/12/1143). In early 2016, a planning application for reserved matters was submitted with
the intention to transform the airports former passenger facilities into a new manufacturing
and distribution hub on 30 acres of land on the south side of the airport. .
It is estimated that the development could bring up to 600 new jobs to the local
community. The work will also transform an area of land that has lain unused for almost
eight years following the closure of Coventry Airports passenger terminal and associated
buildings.
Plymouth Airport
Site History: The airport officially opened in 1931.

As well as transporting mail and

passengers, the airport was used as a bad weather training base for the Royal Air Force as
RAF Roborough as well as other services of the armed forces. By 2007 Air Southwest was
operating routes to Gatwick, Newcastle, Dublin, Cork, Chambery and Glasgow. The airport
officially closed in December 2011.
We understand that no redevelopment applications have been submitted, however,
discussions underway for its redevelopment. For example, Arup were commissioned by
Plymouth City Council in 2014 to prepare an options assessment to inform the Plymouth
Plan, having specific regards to the long term future of Plymouth City Airport. The report
concludes that re-commencing aviation uses on site is theoretically possible but, in a similar
light to the former Manston Airport, would require a credible and robust long-term business
and investment plan to work (which we understand is yet to emerge).
In 2015, Regeneris published a report stating that the closed airport could meet 10% of
Plymouths housing need and play a vital role in the citys economic and social future if it
were to be redevelopment. We understand the current proposals comprise a new
community which would include approximately 1,600 homes, a hotel, gym, restaurants,
shops, a park, a school and a cycling hub velodrome, creating around 360 new jobs and
adding c.60m to the ctys economy.

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