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PROLEGOMENA
T. GIVGN
489
8 (1984) 489-516
TO DISCOURSE-PRAGMATICS
1. Introduction
This paper concerns itself with some informal, but nonetheless explicit, information-theoretic
preliminaries
to discourse-prugmatics.
By discourse-pragmatics
I mean the functional
realm which concerns itself with the communicative
function
of propositions
in their natural discourse context, i.e. in human
communication.
The other two major functional realms coded systematically
in
human language are:
(a) Lexical semantics, and
(b) Propositional
semantics.
Lexical semantics involves clusters of experience which are relatively stable and
generically shared by all members of the culture, i.e. the commonly held world
view. The unit clusters of lexical semantics, words, are coded by sequences of
sounds. Propositional semantics pertains to events, actions or states, identifying
the type of predicate, the transitivity
of the proposition,
and the types of the
major participants
in the state or event, in terms of their case-roles (agent,
dative, patient, locative, instrument,
associative,
benefactive,
manner
etc.).
Propositional
semantics and discourse pragmatics
are coded jointly by syntactic structure. Within syntactic structure, it is possible to identify structural
B.V. (North-Holland)
elements/devices
(word-order,
morphology,
intonation)
more pertinent to the
coding of propositional
semantic information.
Others are more specialized in
coding discourse-pragmatic
function.
Others yet are used primarily
in the
repair that must be done on propositions
in discourse context in order to
harmonize, so to speak, the somewhat competing needs of the two functional
levels coded by the very same clause-level structure.
The proposition
- or sentence/clause
- is the basic unit of information
processing in human language. Smaller units, such as words, may have meanings which are represented in the lexicon. They dont, however, carry information. Although as abbreviations
or elliptic expressions, they can certainly stand
for entire propositions
and thus carry information,
as in (lb) below:
(la) Question:
(1 b) Answer:
Further, information
structure in human language most commonly
involves
units larger than the single proposition.
In this sense, human communication
is
multi-propositional.
Another
name used to refer to it is discourse, which
whenever appropriate we can then break down into smaller hierarchic sub-units
(story, chapter, section, paragraph etc.).
In the discussion throughout we will restrict ourselves to largely one major
discourse type, the narrutiue. In this type, a single speaker controls the floor for
long chunks of speech time, actively producing the discourse. The role of the
interlocutor(s)
(hearer(s)), while important
in terms of feedback, is relatively
passive and non-verbal,
involving primarily gestures, facial expressions,
eye
contact or movement, short exclamations
etc. The fact that such feedback may
be dispensed with altogether in the extreme - written - form of this discourse
genre clearly attests to the more marginal role feedback plays in this discourse
genre, as compared to the other major genre, conuersation [l].
2. Multi-propositional
and informational
coherence
491
of background
[S] This figure is very modest. given that books. stories, lectures etc. often have coherence spans of
thousands of propositions. The figure IO-20 propositions
length of the themuric pnragraph
in connected narrative.
corresponds,
permanently
and community,
extremely
relevant
speaking
to the processing
and commanding
of spec~/ic. information
throughout
his lifetime.
in the same
in discourse.
It forms
is
a higher
to the average
knowledge,
roughly.
(1974)
as well as further
discussion concerning
the communicative
contract
due
to partaking
493
in the same
(2)
[8] Participating
in the same communicative
transaction must then be a sub-specresof partaking in
the same experience, witnessing
the same event, being on stage during the same scene.
Discourse/communication
is thus a means of sharing experiences, events or scenes with others
who were not actually there. so that the experience may be added to their knowledge-base,
and
that they may come to have the ScIme experience, however vicariously.
In many story-telling
traditions.
the bare facts of the story line are all too familiar to the hearer, whose attention is
nonetheless captured by the narrators ability to recreate the scene vividly, and thus make the
hearer undergo the same experience.
[9] See Longacre (1976. 1979) and Hinds (1979) for the hierarchic structure of narrative discourse.
ground of the preceding discourse. From the point of view of the speaker,
however, the dominant
concern at the very same point is how to extend that
coherence, of the preceding discourse, into the subsequent discourse. Now, this
is not to suggest that these two concerns do not overlap. In particular,
the
hearer must often hold his final judgment
concerning
the coherence relations
of a just-produced
proposition until more of the subsequent discourse has been
produced. Hence the relativity of coherence relations.
Once a proposition
has been produced in connected discourse, its coherence
relations vis-a-vis the preceding discourse are largely fixed. At that moment,
and until the discourse is revised or re-interpreted,
the discourse background
is
a matter of record, it has been entered in thefile and its hierarchic structure has
been largely established. These fixed coherence relations are mediated via three
major parameters:
(i) The temporal distance between propositions,
(ii) The hierarchic positions of propositions,
and
(iii) The specific thematic relations of propositions
[lo].
495
of time.
of place.
of action.
one so obvious
that it remained
of participants.
discourse
may be
the hierarchy
observation:
of discourse
units
may be captured
one observes
in
For example. it has been noted (Givbn, ed., (1983b)) that in topic identification
and the
assignment of coreference relations, the referenfialdisrance of roughly 20 clauses (propositions)
to
the left is probably an upper bound in the grammar of topic processing.
Beyond that gap of
absence from the active file, many languages tend to code the re-entering topic as if it entered the
discourse
for the first time. Some day this figure ought to be correlated
with a putative
psychological
entity of active episodic memory-file.
[12]
correlates
of thematicity.
the heuristics
in communication
KS. manipulution
[13] Some
specific
manipulative.
genres,
such as exams.
interrogations.
or law books,
are overwhelmingly
discourse genres, nor
or phylogeneti-
tally prior.
[14] There
manipulative.
are good
grounds
for
suggesting
that
early
ch. 7).
childhood
speech-acts
are
primarily
T. Giobn / Prolegomena
IO dr.wourse
pragmmatic.~
497
(6)
Parameter
Higher mammals
early childhood
mono-propositional
manipulative
multi-propositional
informative
predominant
impoverished
closed, genetically
homogeneous
low
slow 1161
less predominant
elaborate
open, genetically
divergent
high
fast
(f) cultural
(g) cultural
complexity:
change:
&
Human
adults
tive situation of these two systems may be jointly characterized as follows [15]:
It should be now obvious why communication
in higher mammals and early
childhood is primarily manipulative:
(4 All discourse topics are present within the immediately accessible deictic
range of the speaker and hearer,
(b) All the information pertinent to the communicative situation is shared,
(c) The culture is stable, the body of generic knowledge does not require
frequent updating [17],
(4 The participants belong to a homogeneous and socially-rigid closed circle
within which motivation, status, obligation, action probabilities,
and social
consequences
are largely common knowledge [18], and
(e) The participants share a high degree of empathy, not to mention telepathy.
Under such circumstances,
there is no particular reason to indulge in informational transactions;
the shared background
for interaction
is clear, and all that
remains is to transact the real purpose of the communication:
manipulating
the
other to do something for you.
(7) RATIO
information)
in multi-propositional
discourse, the ratio between the amount
of new information
within that proposition
and the amount of old information in the discourse background/context
required for the successful
interpretation
(thematic integration) of the proposition
into the discourse,
is very large.
499
There is nothing logically necessary about property (7). One could easily
conceive of another discourse type (mono-propositional
discourse) where a
large bulk of specific background
(held) information
is not as crucial for
thematic integration
of a new proposition
into the existing body of knowledge/information
[19]. Further,
one could hypothesize
another
mode of
processing of multi-propositional
discourse, whereby speakers would not rely
upon such a large bulk of background information,
but rather would explicitly
supply it at any point before producing a propositional
chunk of new information. But it is easy to see that if such processing method is used exclusively, the
time required to process a single proposition
bearing new information
would
stretch for all practical purpose ad infinitum. This conundrum
will be illustrated for the two major uses of old information
in discourse:
(a) Participant coherence: The referential identification
of participants-topics,
and
(b) Propositional coherence: The epistemic-modal,
foreground/background,
asserted/presupposed
identification
of propositions.
3.2. I. The use of old information in participant coherence
Let us illustrate the use of old information
in this process,
identification by considering a fairly rudimentary
example:
(8)
(9a)
(9b)
(SC)
(10a)
(lob)
(10~)
is a crook.
1191 As noted in section 3.1, such a processing system relies heavily on the existence of an equally
large body of shared generic information. The difference between the two processing modes, at
some crude level, hinges thus on whether the background is permanenfly shared (generic) or
specificaNy assembled for each particular communicative occasion. Multi-propositional
discourse is
a mode of assembling background
occasion.
information
contingent
communicative
(11)
(12a)
(12b)
(13a)
(13b)
(13~)
left
4. The speaker-hearer
tradition).
tradition).
tradition).
These three modalities are rigidly defined within this tradition as properties
vested in individual propositions.
Such an approach is a natural consequence
of the tradition being pragmatics-free,
involving neither speaker nor hearer nor
speech act nor communicative
intent. Nevertheless, it is possible to show that a
similar tripartite system of modalities also exists in human language when
studied from a discourse-pragmatic
perspective, one which bears some clear
isomorphism
to the Kant/Peirce/Carnap
tradition of propositional
modalities
in logic. This pragmatically-based
system of modalities will be discussed in
section 4.3.
1919).
Presupposition
and assertion
The logic-bound
tradition described in section 4.1, did not directly take into
account the contrast between presupposition
and assertion. The closest precursor of presupposition
in that tradition
was the Kantian
analytic truth
(Carnaps necessary truth). This mode of truth requires no justification
via
factual evidence. Rather it is taken for granted as part of the logical structure of
reasoning, part of the definition of terms/rules,
etc. Within a later tradition
[22], the notion of presupposition
was developed as an extension
of logic,
roughly meaning precondition
for meaningfulness
of atomic propositions
~
as contrasted with preconditions
for truth. This was best illustrated by taking
two propositions,
A and B, and showing how regardless of whether B is true or
false, A must be equally true as a necessary precondition
to B having its
meaning. As an example consider the following:
(16a) Mary regretted that Joe left.
(16b) Mary didnt regret that Joe left.
(16~) Joe left.
In order to use the verb regret felicitously in either (16a) or (16b), (16~) must
be true. So, (16~) is presupposed
by both (16a) and (16b). While this tradition
represents a clear advance over traditional logic in accounting for the linguistic
facts, it remains in essence anti-pragmatic.
Neither the hearers nor the speakers
are mentioned in this account of shared background,
and the objectivization
of communication
as propositions
disembodied
of the speech act and communicative intent persists in this tradition.
4.3. Discourse-pragmatics:
The communicative
contract
Uncontested
knowledge (including
necessary truth, analytic truth
presupposed truth).
(17b) Realis-asserted
knowledge (includingfuctual/synthetic
truth).
(17~) Irrealis-asserted
knowledge (including possible/conditional
truth).
(1971).
Keenan
(1969.
1972). Horn
and
T. Giubn / Prolegomenu
IO discourse -
pragmuiics
503
at a particular
504
T Glob
(19) PROPOSITIONAL
MODALITIES
contract
caluse
(a) speakers
assumption
about hearers
knowledge of P
(b) strength of
speakers
belief in P
(c) need for
speaker to
support P
with evidence
(d) strength of
speakers
evidence
supporting P
(e) speakers
willingness
to tolerate
challenge to P
(f) probability of
hearer
challenging P
/ Prolegomenu
lo disc0ur.w
prapurrc.~
CONTRACT
presupposed
knowledge
realis
assertion
familar with P
or
believes in P
unfamiliar
strongest
strong
weak
not necessary
necessary
not possible
not an issue
stronger
least willing
more willing
most willing
low
intermediate
high
irrealia
assertion
with P
unfamiliar
with P
Giubn
Prolegomrna
to discourse - prupnatrcs
505
is bald.
is not bald.
The most common negation pattern in language pertains only to the asserted
parts, leaving presupposed
portions outside its scope (see Given (1979a: ch.
3)). While the subject is the most common presupposed,
non-asserted
part of
sentences in connected
discourse, it is by no means the only one. Other
nominal participants
may be excluded from the scope of assertion, such as the
object in (21b) below:
(21a) Context: What did she do with the cheese?
(21b) Reply: She ate it.,
Neither she (subject) nor it (object) are totally new information
in (21b), but
only the verb ate.
When both a direct and an indirect object are present in the sentence, the
more common tendency is for the direct object to be old/presupposed
(topical) information,
and for the indirect object to be the new, asserted information. Thus, in (22b) below, both subject and DO are topics, while both verb
and IO are asserted new information:
(22a) Context:
(22b) Reply:
While such
mechanisms
[26] Philosophers
tendencies
are indeed more common,
all languages
have the
for reversing them and topicalizing
less-likely portions of the
traditionally
assume
(among
others
Russell (1905);
Strawson
(1950))
that the
negative (20b) is ambiguous, one reading being internal which indeed spares the presupposition
(Theres a king of France, but hes nor bald); the other being external and taking both
presupposition
and assertion under NEG scope (It is not true that theres a king of France, nor
therefore that he is bald). For extensive arguments against this interpretation
of the common
pattern of syntactic negation, see Givhn (1979a: ch. 3).
proposition
such as the verb, while making various nominals the focus of new
information.
Thus, in (23aac) below, a cleft-focus pattern, in each case only a
single nominal participant
is under the focus of asserted new information:
(23a) It was Jbe who invited Mary over to his house (subject cleft).
(23b) It wus Mhy that Joe invited over to his house (DO cleft).
(23~) It was to his h&se that Joe invited Mary (IO cleft).
Sentences
relatively
of new information
are
As an example consider:
rate
principle
6. The
of incrementing
new
information:
The
one
chunk
per clause
T. Giobn / Prolegomena
to discourse - pragmatm
501
clauses in connected
discourse contain only one item (henceforth
chunk) of
new information.
In other words, in the processing of human discourse, the
following principle seems to hold [27]:
(23) THE ONE-CHUNK-PER-CLAUSE
PROCESSING
PRINCIPLE:
The majority of sentence/clauses
in connected discourse will have only
one chunk (be it a nominal,
predicate
(verb, adjective)
or adverbial
word/phrase)
under the scope of asserted new information.
All other
elements in the clause will tend to be topical, background
or presupposed
old information.
If principle (23) indeed holds, it would mean that intransitive
clauses, with
only subject and verb, would tend to vest new information
in the verb, since
the subject is most commonly
the connecting
topical leitmotif and thus old
information.
And that in transitive (or two-argument)
clauses, either the verb
or the object would tend to be old information
(topical) as well. This would
predict that the majority of discourse contexts for transitive clauses would
resemble (24a) and (24b) below, rather than, say, (24~):
(24a)
Context:
Reply:
(24b) Context:
Reply
(24~) Context:
Reply:
What did
He saw a
What did
He fed it.
What did
He fed a
tion)
that the subject is normally excluded from asserted scope, variant (25a),
turns out to be the more marked, less frequent one in discourse, is used
when the clause is intransitive
(one argument).
While variant (25b),
turns out to be the unmarked,
more frequent one in discourse, is used
(almost obligatorily)
when the clause is transitive (two or more arguThis means that when a direct or indirect object (or an adverb) is
of this principle
evidence,
WH-questions
(1976)):
509
(28i):
portion
ch. 9).
[30]
It
is assumed
state/event
here
familiar
ticipants
in that
[31]
The
equation
load
of
to
semantic
have
include
evidence,
modifier
the
to
of
entire
then
is nor
words
with
he
made
in
rather
in
and
this
particular
that
within
than
suggested
new
the
must
is
information
of
known
he the
case
to the
information
clause.
way
NPs
such
may
of
NPs
noun
turn
out
carries
if
to he trivial.
they
in
contrast.
It is possible
the
that
of
since
morphemes,
to
adjectival
especially
that
hearer,
identity
is.
the
it
codes
topics/par-
hearer.
chunks.
nominal,
the
the
is reasonable,
Grammatical
reckonning
with
to
that
discourse-pragmatic/unction.
the head
above
proposition
it
chunks
in
roles
however,
correction
the
her.
information
modifiers.
word
if
or
proposition
propositional-semantic
will
that
him
the
focus
take
or
into
verbal
modifiers
of new
that
carry
a slight
account
are
to
There
restrictive
In
major
code
correction
phrases
modifiers.
information.
the
tend
which
is some
it
which
is
the
case
pragmatics
511
processing
[32]. The possibility
that principle
(23) may be motivated
by
consideration
(iii) above, i.e. by some less mechanical properties of the sofrware, or manner by which new episodic information
is integrated within the
already existing coherence structure of the storage, is obviously more attractive.
We will discuss it directly below.
8. Generalizing
In section 3.1, we contrasted higher mamma1 (and early childhood) communication with adult human language, suggesting, among other things, that the
role of the immediately
available
situational context is paramount
in the
(phylogenetically
and ontogenetically)
earlier communicative
modes. We further suggested that those early modes also rely much more heavily on the
stable pool of shared generic information. Between the use of shared immediate
context and shared generic information,
it was argued, the early communicative modes can get away with little incrementation
of specific knowledge via
propositional,
informative
discourse. The discussion from that point onward
I am indebted
to Doug Moran
(personal communication).
he goes.
indulge
at the
Louis XIV.
(in France)
Plato.
(in Western civilization)
World War II. (in most of the human
The Sun.
(for all humans)
specific persons,
events
world)
specific information.
But at that level already the process involves the contract
between speaker and hearer. Two steps of abductive generalization
must then
take place within the individual absorbing new information:
(a) Generalization
about the similarity of events/states pertaining
to the same
referential token, thus creating the notion of type of erlent/stute.
and
(b) Generalization
about the similurity of indioiduul tokens which participate in
similar events/states,
thus creating the notion of type of indwiduul [34].
In addition, for generic information
to be the generically shared background
within the culture, another potentially
gradual process of spreading it to more
and more individual speakers must take place.
Within the storage pool of a single speaker, there must be open access from
episodic storage to generic/lexical
storage. This is so because the two generalization processes suggested above both require cross-comparisons
within the
pool of episodic memory in order to consolidate
generic information
- and
then presumably
move it on to the more stable pool of lexical storage.
Therefore. while one would want to posit the existence of both cognitive/neurological capacities, one must also provide for connections
between the two.
Within the culture (species), one may view science as the systematization
of
this process of generalization.
via which specific information
gets generalized,
to the point where it affects changes in the cultures generic view of its
universe. The probabilistic,
inductive/abductive
nature of such a process in
science must surely resemble the process of moving from specific to generic
information
within the individual [35].
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T. G~obn / Prolegomena
to drscourse _ pragmat~s