DENIS B.

HABAWEL and ALEXIS

F. MEDINA,
Petitioners,
- versus THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
FIRST DIVISION,
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Found guilty of direct contempt by the First Division of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA
First Division), and sanctioned with imprisonment for a period of ten days and a fine
of P2,000.00, the petitioners have come to the Court for relief through certiorari, claiming that
the CTA First Divisions finding and sentence were made in grave abuse of its discretion because
the language they used in their motion for reconsideration as the attorneys for a party was
contumacious. Specifically, they assail the resolution dated May 16, 2006, [1] whereby the CTA
First Division disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds Attorneys Denis B. Habawel
and Alexis F. Medina of the Ponce Enrile Reyes and ManalastasLaw Offices guilty
of DIRECT CONTEMPT. Each counsel is
hereby ORDERED TO PAY a fine of Two Thousand Pesos and to SUFFER
IMPRISONMENT for a period of ten (10) days.
SO ORDERED.[2]
and the resolution dated July 26, 2006,[3] whereby the CTA First Division denied their motion
for reconsideration and reiterated the penalties.
Antecedents
The petitioners were the counsel of Surfield Development Corporation (Surfield), which sought
from the Office of the City Treasurer of Mandaluyong City the refund of excess realty taxes
paid from 1995 until 2000.[4] After the City Government of Mandaluyong City denied its claim
for refund,[5] Surfield initiated a special civil action for mandamus in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Mandaluyong City, which was docketed as SCA No. MC03-2142 entitled Surfield
Development Corporation v. Hon. City Treasurer of Mandaluyong City, and Hon. City Assessor
of Mandaluyong City, and assigned to Branch 214.[6] Surfield later amended its petition to
include its claim for refund of the excess taxes paid from 2001 until 2003.[7]
On October 15, 2004, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the period to file
the claim had already prescribed and that Surfield had failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
The RTC ruled that the grant of a tax refund was not a ministerial duty compellable by writ
of mandamus.[8]
Surfield, represented by the petitioners, elevated the dismissal to the CTA via petition for
review (CTA AC No. 5 entitled Surfield Development Corporation v. Hon. City Treasurer and

Hon. City Assessor, Mandaluyong City).[9] The appeal was assigned to the First Division,
composed of Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta, Associate Justice Lovell R. Bautista and
Associate Justice Caesar A. Casanova.
In its decision dated January 5, 2006,[10] the CTA First Division denied the petition for
lack of jurisdiction and for failure to exhaust the remedies provided under Section 253 [11] and
Section 226[12] of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).
Undeterred, the petitioners sought reconsideration in behalf of Surfield, [13] insisting that the
CTA had jurisdiction pursuant to Section 7(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 9282; [14] and arguing that
the CTA First Division manifested its lack of understanding or respect for the doctrine
of staredecisis in not applying the ruling in Ty v. Trampe (G.R. No. 117577, December 1,
1995, 250 SCRA 500), to the effect that there was no need to file an appeal before the Local
Board of Assessment Appeals pursuant to Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7160.
On March 15, 2006, the CTA First Division denied Surfields motion for reconsideration. On the
issue of jurisdiction, the CTA First Division explained that the jurisdiction conferred by Section
7(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended by Republic Act No. 9282, referred to appeals
from the decisions, orders, or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases and did not include the
real property tax, an ad valorem tax, the refund of excess payment of which Surfield was
claiming. Accordingly, the CTA First Division ruled that the jurisdiction of the CTA concerning
real property tax cases fell under a different section of Republic Act No. 9282 and under a
separate book of Republic Act No. 7160.
In addition, the CTA First Division, taking notice of the language the petitioners employed in
the motion for reconsideration, required them to explain within five days from receipt why they
should not be liable for indirect contempt or be made subject to disciplinary action, thusly:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. And insofar as the merits of the case are
concerned let this Resolution be considered as the final decision on the matter.
However, this Court finds the statements of petitioners counsel that it is gross
ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction
over this instant petition; the grossness of this Honorable Courts ignorance of the
law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts
jurisdiction over the instant case and this Court lacked the understanding and
respect for the doctrine of stare decisis as derogatory, offensive and disrespectful.
Lawyers are charged with the basic duty to observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts of justice and judicial officers; they vow solemnly to conduct themselves
with all good fidelityto the courts. As a matter of fact, the first canon of legal ethics
enjoins them to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of
the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
superior importance. Therefore, petitioners counsel is hereby ORDERED to
explain within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution why he should not be
held for indirect contempt and/or subject to disciplinary action.
SO ORDERED.[15]

The petitioners submitted a compliance dated March 27, 2006,[16] in which they appeared to
apologize but nonetheless justified their language as, among others, necessary to bluntly call the
Honorable Courts attention to the grievousness of the error by calling a spade by spade.[17]
In its first assailed resolution, the CTA First Division found the petitioners apology
wanting in sincerity and humility, observing that they chose words that were so strong, which
brings disrepute the Courts honor and integrity for brazenly pointing to the Courts alleged
ignorance and grave abuse of discretion, to wit:
In their Compliance, the Court finds no sincerity and humility when counsels
Denis B. Habawel and Alexis F. Medina asked for apology. In fact, the counsels
brazenly pointed the Courts alleged ignorance and grave abuse of discretion. Their
chosen words are so strong, which brings disrepute the Courts honor and integrity.
We quote:
a) Admittedly, the language of the Motion for Reconsideration was not
endearing. However, the undersigned counsel found it necessary to bluntly
call the Honorable Courts attention to the grievousness of the error by
calling a spade a spade. The advocacy needed a strong articulation of the
gravity of the error of the Honorable Court in avoiding the substantial and
transcendental issues by the simple expedient of dismissing the petition for
alleged lack of jurisdiction, in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which requires that the Decision must express clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which the Decision was based (par. 3 of
the Compliance; docket, p. 349);
b) Since the Honorable Court simply quoted Section 7(a)(5) and it
totally ignored Section 7(a)(3), to perfunctorily find that (U)ndoubtedly,
appeals of the decisions or rulings of the Regional Trial Court concerning
real property taxes evidently do not fall within the jurisdiction of the CTA,
the undersigned counsel formed a perception that the Honorable Court was
totally unaware or ignorant of the new provision, Section 7(a)(3). Hence,
the statements that it was gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable
Court to have held that it has not [sic] jurisdiction, as well as, the grossness
of the Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is matched only by the
unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts jurisdiction over the
instant case were an honest and frank articulation of undersigned counsels
perception that was influenced by its failure to understand why the
Honorable Court totally ignored Section 7(a)(3) in ruling on its lack of
jurisdiction (par. 10 of the Compliance; docket, p. 353);[18]
Accordingly, the CTA First Division adjudged both of the petitioners guilty of direct
contempt of court for failing to uphold their duty of preserving the integrity and respect due to
the courts, sentencing each to suffer imprisonment of ten days and to pay P2,000.00 as fine.
Seeking reconsideration,[19] the petitioners submitted that they could not be held guilty of direct
contempt because: (a) the phrase gross ignorance of the law was used in its legal sense to
describe the error of judgment and was not directed to the character or competence of the
decision makers; (b) there was no unfounded accusation or allegation, or scandalous, offensive
or menacing, intemperate, abusive, abrasive or threatening, or vile, rude and repulsive
statements or words contained in their motion for reconsideration; (c) there was no statement in
their motion for reconsideration that brought the authority of the CTA and the administration of
the law into disrepute; and (d) they had repeatedly offered their apology in their compliance.[20]

Their submissions did not convince and move the CTA First Division to reconsider,
which declared through its second assailed resolution that:
The tone of an irate lawyer would almost always reveal the sarcasm in the phrases
used. The scurrilous attacks made in the guise of pointing out errors of judgment
almost always result to the destruction of the high esteem and regard towards the
Court.[21]
and disposed thusly:
WHEREFORE, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. Each counsel is hereby ORDERED TO PAY a fine of Two Thousand
Pesos and to SUFFER IMPRISONMENT for a period of ten (10) days.
SO, ORDERED.[22]
Issues
Arguing that they were merely prompted by their (z)ealous advocacy and an appalling error
committed by the CTA First Division to frankly describe such error as gross ignorance of the
law, the petitioners now attribute grave abuse of discretion to the CTA First Division in finding
that:
I
THE PETITIONERS LANGUAGE IN THE SUBJECT MOTION AND
COMPLIANCE WAS CONTUMACIOUS;
II
THE PETITIONERS WERE NOT SINCERE IN THEIR APOLOGY AND WERE
ARROGANT;
III
THE EXERCISE OF CONTEMPT POWER WAS WITHIN THE LIMITS SET
BY THE SUPREME COURT; AND
IV
THE PETITIONERS WERE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
DIRECT CONTEMPT.

The petitioners continue to posit that the phrase gross ignorance of the law was used in its strict
legal sense to emphasize the gravity of the error of law committed by the CTA First Division;
and that the statements described by the CTA First Division as abrasive, offensive, derogatory,
offensive and disrespectful should be viewed within the context of the general tone and
language of their motion for reconsideration; that their overall language was tempered,
restrained and respectful and should not be construed as a display of contumacious attitude or as
a flouting or arrogant belligerence in defiance of the court to be penalized as direct contempt;
that the CTA First Division did not appreciate the sincerity of their apology; and that they
merely pointed out the error in the decision of the CTA First Division.

For its part, the CTA First Division contends that a reading of the motion for reconsideration
and the character of the words used therein by the petitioners indicated that their statements
reflected no humility, nor were they expressive of a contrite heart; and that their submissions
instead reflected arrogance and sarcasm, that they even took the opportunity to again deride the
public respondent on the manner of how it wrote the decision.[23]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opines that submitting a pleading containing
derogatory, offensive and malicious statements to the same court or judge in which the
proceedings are pending constitutes direct contempt; and that the CTA First Division did not
abuse its discretion in finding the petitioners liable for direct contempt under Section 1, Rule 71
of the Rules of Court.[24]
Ruling
We dismiss the petition for certiorari, and declare that the CTA First Division did not abuse its
discretion, least of all gravely, in finding that the petitioners committed direct contempt of court.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all attorneys to observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on similar
conduct by others. Rule 11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically enjoins all
attorneys thus:
Rule 11.03. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts.
It is conceded that an attorney or any other person may be critical of the courts and their judges
provided the criticism is made in respectful terms and through legitimate channels. In that
regard, we have long adhered to the sentiment aptly given expression to in the leading case ofIn
re: Almacen:[25]
xxx every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the
actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the
criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is articulated by a
lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a
concluded litigation, because then the courts actuation are thrown open to
public consumption.
xxx
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical
evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and the legislative
branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by
the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the
court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.xxx
xxx
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to
exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law
may abridge this right. Nor is he professionally answerable for a scrutiny into

the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen. xxx
xxx
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona
fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm
exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and
the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects
a lawyer to disciplinary action. (emphasis supplied)[26]
The test for criticizing a judges decision is, therefore, whether or not the criticism is bona
fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
Here, the petitioners motion for reconsideration contained the following statements, to wit: (a)
[i]t is gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction
over the instant petition;[27] (b) [t]he grossness of the Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is
matched only by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts jurisdiction; [28] and (c) the
Honorable Courts lack of understanding or respect for the doctrine of stare decisis.[29]
The CTA First Division held the statements to constitute direct contempt of court
meriting prompt penalty.
We agree.
By such statements, the petitioners clearly and definitely overstepped the bounds of
propriety as attorneys, and disregarded their sworn duty to respect the courts. An imputation in
a pleading of gross ignorance against a court or its judge, especially in the absence of any
evidence, is a serious allegation,[30] and constitutes direct contempt of court. It is settled that
derogatory, offensive or malicious statements contained in pleadings or written submissions
presented to the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending are treated as direct
contempt because they are equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near
a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. [31] This is true, even if
the derogatory, offensive or malicious statements are not read in open court.[32] Indeed, inDantes
v. Judge Ramon S. Caguioa,[33] where the petitioners motion for clarification stated that the
respondent judges decision constituted gross negligence and ignorance of the rules, and was
pure chicanery and sophistry, the Court held that a pleading containing derogatory, offensive or
malicious statements when submitted before a court or judge in which the proceedings are
pending is direct contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence
of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice.[34]
In his dissent, Justice Del Castillo, although conceding that the petitioners statements
were strong, tactless and hurtful,[35] regards the statements not contemptuous, or not necessarily
assuming the level of contempt for being explanations of their position in a case under
consideration and because an unfavorable decision usually incites bitter feelings.[36]
Such contempt of court cannot be condoned or be simply ignored and set aside, however,
for the characterization that the statements were strong, tactless and hurtful, although obviously
correct, provides no ground to be lenient towards the petitioners, even assuming that such

strong, tactless and hurtful statements were used to explain their clients position in the case.
[37]
The statements manifested a disrespect towards the CTA and the members of its First
Division approaching disdain. Nor was the offensiveness of their strong, tactless and hurtful
language minimized on the basis that snide remarks or sarcastic innuendos made by counsels
are not considered contemptuous considering that unfavorable decision usually incite bitter
feelings.[38] By branding the CTA and the members of its First Division as totally unaware or
ignorant of Section 7(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 9282, and making the other equally harsh
statements, the petitioners plainly assailed the legal learning of the members of the CTA First
Division. To hold such language as reflective of a very deliberate move on the part of the
petitioners to denigrate the CTA and the members of its First Division is not altogether
unwarranted.
The petitioners disdain towards the members of the CTA First Division for ruling against
their side found firm confirmation in their compliance, in which they unrepentantly emphasized
such disdain in the following telling words:
3. Admittedly, the language of the Motion for Reconsideration was not
endearing. However, the undersigned counsel found it necessary to bluntly call
the Honorable Courts attention to the grievousness of the error by calling a
spade a spade. The advocacy needed a strong articulation of the gravity of the
error of the Honorable Court in avoiding the substantial and transcendental
issues by the simple expedient of dismissing the petition for alleged lack of
jurisdiction, in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which
requires that the Decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which the Decision was based.
xxx
10. Since the Honorable Court simply quoted Section 7(a)(5), and it totally ignored
Section 7(a)(3), to perfunctorily find that (U)ndoubtedly, appeals of the decisions
or rulings of the Regional Trial Court concerning real property taxes evidently do
not fall within the jurisdiction of the CTA, the undersigned counsel formed a
perception that the Honorable Court was totally unaware or ignorant of the
new provision, Section 7(a)(3). Hence the statements that it was gross ignorance
of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction, as well
as, the grossness of the Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is matched only by
the unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts jurisdiction over the instant
case were an honest and frank articulation of undersigned counsels perception that
was influenced by its failure to understand why the Honorable Court totally
ignored Section 7(a)(3) in ruling on its lack of jurisdiction. (emphasis supplied)[39]
We might have been more understanding of the milieu in which the petitioners made the
statements had they convinced us that the CTA First Division truly erred in holding itself bereft
of jurisdiction over the appeal of their client. But our review of the text of the legal provisions
involved reveals that the error was committed by them, not by the CTA First Division. This
result became immediately evident from a reading of Section 7(a)(3) and Section 7(a)(5) of
Republic Act No. 9282, the former being the anchor for their claim that the CTA really had
jurisdiction, to wit:
Section 7. Jurisdiction. The CTA shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
xxx

(3) Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local

tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their
original or appellate jurisdiction; (emphasis supplied)
xxx
(5) Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of
real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment
appeals; (emphasis supplied)
xxx
As can be read and seen, Section 7(a)(3) covers only appeals of the (d)ecisions, orders or
resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by
them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction. The provision is clearly limited to
local tax disputes decided by the Regional Trial Courts. In contrast, Section 7(a)(5) grants the
CTA cognizance of appeals of the (d)ecisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real
property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals. In its
resolution of March 15, 2006, therefore, the CTA First Division forthrightly explained why,
contrary to the petitioners urging, Section 7(a)(3) was not applicable by clarifying that a real
property tax, being an ad valorem tax, could not be treated as a local tax.[40]
It would have been ethically better for the petitioners to have then retreated and simply
admitted their blatant error upon being so informed by the CTA First Division about the
untenability of their legal position on the matter, but they still persisted by going on in their
compliance dated March 27, 2006 to also blame the CTA First Division for their perception
about the CTA First Divisions being totally oblivious of Section 7(a)(3) due to the terseness of
the Decision dated 05 January 2006, viz:
12. Undersigned counsel regrets having bluntly argued that this Honorable
Court was grossly ignorant of Section 7(a)(3) because from the terseness of the
Decision dated 05 January 2006, the undersigned counsel perceived the
Honorable Court as being totally oblivious of Section 7(a)(3). Had the reasons
discussed in the Resolution dated 15 March 2006 been articulated in the 05
January 2006 decision, there would have been no basis for undersigned
counsels to have formed the above-mentioned perception.[41] (emphasis
supplied)
The foregoing circumstances do not give cause for the Court to excuse the petitioners
contemptuous and offensive language. No attorney, no matter his great fame or high prestige,
should ever brand a court or judge as grossly ignorant of the law, especially if there was no
sincere or legitimate reason for doing so. Every attorney must use only fair and temperate
language in arguing a worthy position on the law, and must eschew harsh and intemperate
language that has no place in the educated ranks of the Legal Profession. Truly, the Bar should
strive to win arguments through civility and fairness, not by heated and acrimonious tone, as the
Court aptly instructed in Slade Perkins v. Perkins,[42] to wit:
The court notices with considerable regret the heated and acrimonious
tone of the remarks of the counsel for appellant, in his brief, in speaking of the
action of the trial judge. We desire to express our opinion that excessive
language weakens rather than strengthens the persuasive force of legal

reasoning. We have noticed a growing tendency to use language that

experience has shown not to be conducive to the orderly and proper
administration of justice. We therefore bespeak the attorneys of this court to
desist from such practices, and to treat their opposing attorneys, and the
judges who have decided their cases in the lower court adversely to their
contentions with that courtesy all have a right to expect. (emphasis supplied)
We do not hesitate to punish the petitioners for the direct contempt of court. They threw out
self-restraint and courtesy, traits that in the most trying occasions equate to rare virtues that all
members of the Legal Profession should possess and cherish. They shunted aside the nobility of
their profession. They wittingly banished the ideal that even the highest degree of zealousness
in defending the causes of clients did not permit them to cross the line between liberty and
license.[43] Indeed, the Court has not lacked in frequently reminding the Bar that language,
though forceful, must still be dignified; and though emphatic, must remain respectful as
befitting advocates and in keeping with the dignity of the Legal Profession. [44] It is always
worthwhile to bear in mind, too, that the language vehicle did not run short of expressions that
were emphatic, yet respectful; convincing, yet not derogatory; and illuminating, yet not
offensive.[45] No attorney worthy of the title should forget that his first and foremost status as an
officer of the Court calls upon him to be respectful and restrained in his dealings with a court or
its judge. Clearly, the petitioners criticism of the CTA First Division was not bona fide or done
in good faith, and spilled over the walls of propriety.
The power to punish contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power to punish
contempt of court in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must
falter or fail.[46] We reiterate that the sanction the CTA First Division has visited upon the
petitioners was preservative, for the sanction maintained and promoted the proper respect that
attorneys and their clients should bear towards the courts of justice.
Inasmuch as the circumstances indicate that the petitioners tone of apology was probably
feigned, for they did not relent but continued to justify their contemptuous language, they do
not merit any leniency. Nonetheless, the penalty of imprisonment for ten days and a fine
ofP2,000.00 is excessive punishment of the direct contempt of court for using contemptuous
and offensive language and verges on the vindictive. The Court foregoes the imprisonment.
The Courts treatment of contemptuous and offensive language used by counsel in
pleadings and other written submissions to the courts of law, including this Court, has not been
uniform. The treatment has dealt with contemptuous and offensive language either as contempt
of court or administrative or ethical misconduct, or as both. The sanction has ranged from a
warning (to be more circumspect), a reprimand with stern warning against a repetition of the
misconduct, a fine of P2,000.00, a fine of P5,000.00, and even indefinite suspension from the
practice of law.
The sanction has usually been set depending on whether the offensive language is viewed
as contempt of court or as ethical misconduct. In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty.
Noel S. Sorreda,[47] the errant lawyer who made baseless accusations of manipulation in his
letters and compliance to this Court was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.
Although he was further declared guilty of contempt of court, the Court prescribed no separate

penalty on him, notwithstanding that he evinced no remorse and did not apologize for his
actions that resulted from cases that were decided against his clients for valid reasons. In Re:
Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles,[48] the complaining State Prosecutor, despite his
strong statements to support his position not being considered as direct contempt of court, was
warned to be more circumspect in language. In contrast, Judge Angeles was reprimanded and
handed a stern warning for the disrespectful language she used in her pleadings filed in this
Court, which declared such language to be below the standard expected of a judicial officer.
In Nuez v. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga,[49] Atty. Astorga was meted a P2,000.00 fine for conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer for hurling insulting language against the opposing counsel. Obviously,
the language was dealt with administratively, not as contempt of court. InNg v. Atty. Benjamin
C. Alar,[50] the Court prescribed a higher fine of P5,000.00 coupled with a stern warning against
Atty. Alar who, in his motion for reconsideration and to inhibit, cast insults and diatribes against
the NLRC First Division and its members. Yet again, the fine was a disciplinary sanction.
Despite having earlier directed the petitioners through its resolution of March 15, 2006 that they
should explain within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution why (they) should not be
held for indirect contempt and/or subject to disciplinary action, [51] the CTA First Division was
content with punishing them for direct contempt under Section 1, [52] Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, and did not anymore pursue the disciplinary aspect. The Court concurs with the offended
courts treatment of the offensive language as direct contempt. Thus, we impose on each of them
a fine of P2,000.00, the maximum imposable fine under Section 1 of Rule 71, taking into
consideration the fact that the CTA is a superior court of the same level as the Court of Appeals,
the second highest court of the land. The penalty of imprisonment, as earlier clarified, is
deleted. Yet, they are warned against using offensive or intemperate language towards a court or
its judge in the future, for they may not be as lightly treated as they now are.
ACCORDINGLY, we DISMISS the petition for certiorari; UPHOLD the resolutions dated
May 16, 2006 and July 26, 2006; and MODIFYthe penalty imposed on Attorney Denis B.
Habawel and Attorney Alexis F. Medina by deleting the penalty of imprisonment and
sentencing them only to pay the fine of P2,000.00 each.

SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ], February 04, 2015
JILL M. TORMIS, Complainant, v. JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
For consideration is the Report and Recommendation1 of Justice Maria Elisa Sempio
Diy (Justice Diy), Court of Appeals, Cebu City, submitted to this Court pursuant to its January
14, 2013 Resolution,2referring the complaint filed by Jill M. Tormis (Jill) against respondent
Judge Meinrado P. Paredes(Judge Paredes), Presiding Judge, Branch 13, Regional Trial
Court (RTC),
Cebu
City,
for
investigation,
report
and
recommendation.
The

Facts

In her Affidavit/Complaint,3 dated September 5, 2011, Jill charged Judge Paredes with grave
misconduct. Jill was a student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review during the first
semester of school year 2010-2011 at the Southwestern University, Cebu City. She averred that
sometime in August 2010, in his class discussions, Judge Paredes named her mother, Judge
Rosabella Tormis(Judge Tormis), then Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Cebu City, as one of the judges involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City.
Judge Paredes also mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a
judge,
corrupt,
and
ignorant
of
the
law.
Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only once but several
times. In one session, Judge Paredes was even said to have included in his discussion Francis
Mondragon Tormis (Francis), son of Judge Tormis, stating that he was a court-noted addict. 4
She was absent from class at that time, but one of her classmates who was present, Rhoda L.
Litang(Rhoda), informed her about the inclusion of her brother. To avoid humiliation in school,
Jill decided to drop the class under Judge Paredes and transfer to another law school in
Tacloban
City.
Jill also disclosed that in the case entitled Trinidad O. Lachica v. Judge Tormis5(Lachica v.
Tormis), her mother was suspended from the service for six (6) months for allegedly receiving
payment of a cash bail bond for the temporary release of an accused for the warrant she had
issued in a case then pending before her sala. Judge Paredes was the one who reviewed the
findings conducted therein and he recommended that the penalty be reduced to severe
reprimand.
Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense worse than that committed by
her mother. She averred that on March 13, 2011, Judge Paredes accepted a cash bail bond in the
amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) for the temporary release of one Lita Guioguio in a
case entitled, People of the Philippines v. Lita Guioguio, docketed as Criminal Case No.
148434-R,6 then pending before Branch 8, MTCC, Cebu City (Guioguio case).
Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be administratively sanctioned for his actuations.
Comment

of

Judge

Paredes

In his Comment,7 dated October 28, 2011, Judge Paredes denied the accusations of Jill. He
stated that Judge Tormis had several administrative cases, some of which he had investigated;
that as a result of the investigations, he recommended sanctions against Judge Tormis; that
Judge Tormis used Jill, her daughter, to get back at him; that he discussed in his class the case
of Lachica v. Tormis, but never Judge Tormis involvement in the marriage scams nor her
sanctions as a result of the investigation conducted by the Court; that he never personally
attacked Judge Tormis dignity and credibility; that the marriage scams in Cebu City constituted
a negative experience for all the judges and should be discussed so that other judges, court
employees and aspiring lawyers would not emulate such misdeeds; that the marriage scams
were also discussed during meetings of RTC judges and in schools where remedial law and
legal ethics were taught; that he talked about past and resolved cases, but not the negative
tendencies of Judge Tormis; that there was nothing wrong in discussing the administrative cases
involving Judge Tormis because these cases were known to the legal community and some were
even published in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and other legal publications;
and that when he was the executive judge tasked to investigate Judge Tormis, he told her to
mend
her
ways,
but
she
resented
his
advice.
Judge Paredes further stated that when Jill was still his student, she did not complain about or

dispute his discussions in class regarding the administrative liabilities of her mother; that the
matter was not also brought to the attention of the Dean of Southwestern University or of the
local authorities; that he admitted saying that Judge Tormis had a son named Francis who was a
drug addict and that drug dependents had no place in the judiciary; and that he suggested that
Francis
should
be
removed
from
the
judiciary.
He denied, however, having stated that Francis was appointed as court employee as a result of
the influence of Judge Tormis. She is not an influential person and it is the Supreme Court who
determines the persons to be appointed as court employees. Judge Tormis, however, allowed
her drug dependent son to apply for a position in the judiciary.
Regarding the specific act being complained of, Judge Paredes admitted that he personally
accepted a cash bail bond of P6,000.00 for the temporary release of Lita Guioguio on March 13,
2011. He claimed though that the approval of the bail bond was in accordance with Section 14,
Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-62-SC which allowed executive judges to act on petitions for bail
and other urgent matters on weekends, official holidays and special days. Judge Paredes
explained that he merely followed the procedure. As Executive Judge, he issued a temporary
receipt and on the following business day, a Monday, he instructed the Branch Clerk of Court to
remit the cash bond to the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the
cash bond and issued an official receipt. It was not his fault that the Clerk of Court
acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond only in the afternoon of March 21, 2011.
Lastly, Judge Paredes averred that the discussions relative to the administrative cases of Judge
Tormis could not be the subject of an administrative complaint because it was not done in the
performance
of
his
judicial
duties.
Reply

of

the

Complainant

In her Verified-Reply,8 dated November 23, 2011, Jill countered that her mother had nothing to
do with the filing of the present complaint; that she was forced to leave her family in Cebu City
to continue her law studies elsewhere because she could no longer bear the discriminating and
judgmental eyes of her classmates brought about by Judge Paredes frequent discussions in class
of her mothers administrative cases; that her mother was indeed one of the judges implicated in
the marriage scams, but when Judge Paredes discussed the matter in his classes, the case of her
mother was not yet resolved by the Court and, thus, in 2010, it was still premature; and that
Judge Paredes was aware that administrative cases were confidential in nature.
Jill claimed that the intention to humiliate her family was evident when Judge Paredes branded
her
brother,
Francis,
as
a
drug
addict.
Rejoinder

of

Judge

Paredes

In his Rejoinder,9 dated December 2, 2011, Judge Paredes asserted that it was not premature to
discuss the marriage scams in class because the scandal was already disclosed by Atty. Rullyn
Garcia and was also written in many legal publications, and that the drug addiction of Francis
was
known
in
the
Palace
of
Justice
of
Cebu
City.
In its Report,10 dated September 12, 2012, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) stated
that the conflicting allegations by the parties presented factual issues that could not be resolved
based on the evidence on record then. Considering the gravity and the sensitive nature of the
charges,
a
full-blown
investigation
should
be
conducted
by
the
CA.
On January 14, 2013, pursuant to the recommendation of the OCA, the Court referred the

administrative complaint to the Executive Justice of the CA, Cebu Station, for investigation,
report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the
records.11chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On March 26, 2013, the case was raffled to, and the records were received by, Justice Diy.
Thereafter, the appropriate notices were issued and the confidential hearings were conducted.
Afterwards, Justice Diy received the respective memoranda of the parties.
In her memorandum,12 Jill contended that Judge Paredes act of discussing Judge Tormis cases
in class where she was present was an open display of insensitivity, impropriety and lack
of delicadezabordering on oppressive and abusive conduct, which fell short of the exacting
standards of behavior demanded of magistrates. She asserted that the defense of Judge Paredes
that he could not be made administratively liable as the act was not made in the performance of
his official duties did not hold water because a judge should be the embodiment of what was
just and fair not only in the performance of his official duties but also in his everyday life.
Jill also averred that Judge Paredes violated the subjudice rule when he discussed the marriage
scam involving Judge Tormis in 2010 because at that time, the case was still being investigated;
that the administrative case relative to the marriage scam was decided only on April 2, 2013;
that Judge Paredes was not the Executive Judge of the MTCC when he received the cash bail
bond in the Guiguiocase; that he could not prove that the executive judge of the MTCC was
unavailable before accepting the cash bail bond; and that the assertion of Judge Paredes of his
being an anti-corruption judge and a lone nominee of the IBP Cebu City Chapter to the
Foundation of Judicial Excellence did not exculpate him from committing the acts complained
of.
In his Reply-Memorandum,13 Judge Paredes reiterated the allegations contained in his previous
pleadings. He added that the marriage scams scandalized the Judiciary and became public
knowledge when Atty. Rullyn Garcia of the OCA held a press conference on the matter; that,
hence, every citizen, including him, may comment thereon; that in the hierarchy of rights,
freedom of speech and expression ranked high; that Judge Tormis never intervened in the
present case; that if he indeed made derogatory remarks against Judge Tormis, she should have
filed a criminal action for oral defamation; and that calling for the ouster of drug addicts could
not be considered an abuse, but was meant for the protection of the
Judiciary.14chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In her Report and Recommendation, Justice Diy found Judge Paredes guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge. She opined that his use of intemperate language during class
discussions was inappropriate. His statements in class, tending to project Judge Tormis as
corrupt and ignorant of the laws and procedure, were obviously and clearly insensitive and
inexcusable.
Justice Diy disregarded the defense of Judge Paredes that his discussions of the administrative
case of Judge Tormis in class was an exercise of his right to freedom of expression. She cited
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary 15 which urged members of the
Judiciary to be models of propriety at all times. She quoted with emphasis Section 6 which
stated that Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in
such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence
of
the
judiciary.16chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Justice Diy likewise rejected Judge Paredes position that he could not be held administratively
liable for his comments against Judge Tormis and Francis as these were uttered while he was

not in the exercise of his judicial functions. Jurisprudence,17 as well as the New Code of
Judicial Conduct, required that he conduct himself beyond reproach, not only in the discharge
of his judicial functions, but also in his other professional endeavors and everyday activities.
Justice Diy found merit in Jills allegation that Judge Paredes violated the subjudice rule when
the latter discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010 when the said issue was
still being investigated. She cited, as basis for Judge Paredes liability, Section 4, Canon 3 of
the
New
Code
of
Judicial
Conduct.
As regards Judge Paredes receipt of the cash bail bond in relation to the Guioguio case, Justice
Diy absolved him of any liability as the charge of grave misconduct was not supported by
sufficient evidence. She accepted Judge Paredes explanation that he merely followed the
procedure laid down in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC when he approved the
bail
bond.
Based on these findings, Justice Diy came up with the following recommendations,
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge. Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under
Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, penalized under Section 11 (c) thereof by
any of the following: (1) a Fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2)
Censure;
(3)
Reprimand;
and
(4)
Admonition
with
warning.
Inasmuch as this is Judge Paredes first offense and considering the factual milieu and the
peculiar circumstances attendant thereto, it is respectfully recommended that Judge Paredes be
meted out with the penalty of REPRIMAND with a warning that a repetition of the same or a
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.18
The Courts Ruling
The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of Justice Diy except as to the penalty.
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave
if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to
disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished
from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as
an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who
unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or
for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. 19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be connected with
the performance of his official duties.20 Considering that the acts complained of, the remarks
against Judge Tormis and Francis, were made by Judge Paredes in his class discussions, they
cannot be considered as misconduct. They are simply not related to the discharge of his
official functions as a judge. Thus, Judge Paredes cannot be held liable for misconduct, much
less
for
grave
misconduct.
Discussion

of

a subjudice

matter,

however,

is

another

thing.

On subjudice matters, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct

provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CANON

IMPARTIALITY
SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before them,
make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding
or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public
or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue. (Emphasis supplied)
The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in
order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of
justice.21 The rationale for the rule was spelled out in Nestle Philippines, Inc. v.
Sanchez,22 where it was stated that it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere
that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every
extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the
determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or
sympathies.23chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010, the
investigation relative to the said case had not yet been concluded. In fact, the decision on the
case was promulgated by the Court only on April 2, 2013.24 In 2010, he still could not make
comments on the administrative case to prevent any undue influence in its resolution.
Commenting on the marriage scams, where Judge Tormis was one of the judges involved, was
in contravention of thesubjudice rule. Justice Diy was, therefore, correct in finding that Judge
Paredes violated Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons of Judge Paredes for
discussing the marriage scams in his classes seemed noble, his objectives were carried out
insensitively and in bad taste. The pendency of the administrative case of Judge Tormis and the
publicity of the marriage scams did not give Judge Paredes unrestrained license to criticize
Judge Tormis in his class discussions. The publicity given to the investigation of the said scams
and the fact that it was widely discussed in legal circles let people expressed critical opinions on
the issue. There was no need for Judge Paredes to rub salt to the wound, 25 as Justice Diy put
it.
Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary comments tending to project
Judge Tormis as a corrupt and ignorant judge in his class discussions, was correctly found guilty
of
conduct
unbecoming
of
a
judge
by
Justice
Dy.
Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to
exemplify propriety at all times. Canon 4 instructs:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CANON

PROPRIETY
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
xxx

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In
particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the
judicial office.
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity,
independence and respect for himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit
the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. He should choose his
words and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In other words, a judge
should possess the virtue of gravitas. Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level
of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and
sarcastic comments. He is required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in
conduct
and
in
language.26chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed to observe the propriety required by the
Code and to use temperate and courteous language befitting a magistrate. Indeed, Judge
Paredes
demonstrated
conduct
unbecoming
of
a
judge.
When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and included Francis, whose condition and
personal circumstances, as properly observed by Justice Diy, had no relevance to the topic that
was then being discussed in class, it strongly indicated his intention to taint their reputations.
The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions was never denied by Judge
Paredes who merely justified his action by invoking his right to freedom of expression. Section
6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen,
are entitled to freedom of expression. Such right, however, is not without limitation. Section 6,
Canon 4 of the Code also imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their
freedom of expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the
dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary. In the
exercise of his right to freedom of expression, Judge Paredes should uphold the good image of
the Judiciary of which he is a part. He should have avoided unnecessary and uncalled for
remarks in his discussions and should have been more circumspect in his language. Being a
judge, he is expected to act with greater circumspection and to speak with self-restraint. Verily,
Judge
Paredes
fell
short
of
this
standard.
The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he cannot be held administratively
liable for his negative portrayal of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions. Judge
Paredes should be reminded of the ethical conduct expected of him as a judge not only in the
performance of his judicial duties, but in his professional and private activities as well.
Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the Code mandates:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CANON

INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal
demeanor
of
judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it
is
perceived
to
be
so
in
the
view
of
a
reasonable
observer.
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the

integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
(Emphases supplied)
Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in or out of the court, should
not be tolerated for he is not a judge only occasionally. It should be emphasized that the Code
of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety
not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside
his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality, a public official is also
judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all
times. A judges official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal
existence. Thus, being a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly
accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. He
should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior
of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion.27chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Regarding the act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case, Justice Diy correctly
found that it cannot be regarded as grave misconduct. The Court finds merit in the position of
Judge Paredes that the approval, as well as the receipt, of the cash bail bond, was in accordance
with the rules. Thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Finally, the Investigating Officer disagrees with Jills allegation that Judge Paredes committed
grave misconduct when he personally received cash bail bond in relation to the Guioguio case.
Judge Paredes justified his action by stating that he was merely following the procedure set
forth in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-02-SC, which authorizes executive judges to act
on petitions for bail on Saturdays after 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, Sundays, official holidays,
and special days. Said rule also provides that should the accused deposit cash bail, the
executive judge shall acknowledge receipt of the cash bail bond in writing and issue a
temporary receipt therefor. Considering that Judge Paredes merely followed said procedure, he
cannot be held administratively liable for his act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio
case.
Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash bail bond under Section 17 (a),
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under said provision, the bail bond may
be filed either with the court where the case is pending, or with any Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of the place of arrest, or with any judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court or the Municipal Trial
Court
of
the
place
of
arrest.
Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that executive judges are
authorized to exercise other powers and prerogatives which are necessary or incidental to the
performance of their functions in relation to court administration. In the instant case, Judge
Paredes was merely exercising powers incidental to his functions as an Executive Judge since
he was the only judge available when Lita Guioguio posted bail. Notably, Lita Guioguios
payment for cash bail bond was made on a Sunday. In addition, the judge assigned to the court
where the Guioguio case was then pending and the executive judge of the MTCC, Cebu City
were not available to receive the bail bond. Judge Paredes was the only judge available since
the practice was for one judge to be present on Saturdays. However, there was no judge
assigned
for
duty
during
Sundays.
Relative to the matter above-discussed, the insinuation made by complainant Jill of any
irregularity reflected in the issuance of the two (2) orders of release of different dates is not
backed up by sufficient evidence.28

Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court and penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of
not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4)
Admonition
with
warning.
Considering that this is the first offense of Judge Paredes, the appropriate penalty under the
circumstances
is
admonition.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Meinrado P. Paredes, Presiding Judge of Branch 13 of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, administratively liable for conduct unbecoming of a
judge andADMONISHES him therefor.
YOLANDA A. ANDRES, MINETTE A. MERCADO, AND
ANDRES , Complainants, v. ATTY. SALIMATHAR V. NAMBI, Respondent.

ELITO

P.

R E S O LUTIO N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is a Complaint for Disbarment 1 filed against then Labor Arbiter Salimathar V. Nambi
(respondent) on the ground of gross ignorance of the law in issuing an Amended Alias Writ of
Execution against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and its incorporators, the herein complainants, who
are not parties to the case.
Factual Antecedents
On December 10, 2003, respondent rendered a Decision2 in a consolidated labor case3 against
M.A. Mercado Construction and spouses Maximo and Aida Mercado (spouses Mercado),
the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents, M.A.
Mercado Construction and Maximo and Aida Mercado to reinstate the complainants to their
former position[s] without loss of seniority rights and to pay jointly and severally, their full
backwages from October 28, 2000 up to the date of this decision plus ten (10%) percent
attorneys fees of the total monetary award. The Research and Information Unit of this Office is
hereby directed to compute complainants[] monetary award which shall form part of this
decision. The complaint for damages is dismissed. The complaint against Shoemart, Inc., is
likewise DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. 4
The respondents in the labor case, namely the Spouses Mercado, doing business under the name
and style of M.A. Mercado Construction, interposed an appeal which was dismissed for failure
to post an appeal bond. Thus, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued to implement the Decision.
Thereafter, the complainants in the labor case filed an Ex Parte Motion for Amendment of an
Alias Writ of Execution.5 They claimed that they could hardly collect the judgment award from
M.A. Mercado Construction because it allegedly transferred its assets to M.A. Blocks Work,
Inc. They thus prayed that the Alias Writ of Execution be amended to include M.A. Blocks
Work, Inc. and all its incorporators/stockholders6 as additional entity/personalities against which
the writ of execution shall be enforced. In an Order7 dated February 10, 2006, respondent
granted the motion to amend the alias writ of execution. Accordingly, on February 17, 2006 an
Amended Alias Writ of Execution was issued to enforce the monetary judgment amounting to
P19,527,623.55 against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and all its incorporators. By way of special
appearance, M.A. Blocks Work, Inc., together with three of its stockholders who are the

complainants in this administrative case, namely Yolanda A. Andres, Minette A. Mercado and
Elito P. Andres, filed an Urgent Motion to Quash 8 the Amended Alias Writ of Execution,
contending that they are not bound by the judgment as they were not parties to the labor case. In
an Order9 dated March 13, 2006, however, respondent denied the Urgent Motion to Quash.
Aggrieved, herein complainants filed the instant Complaint for Disbarment, which we referred
to the IBP on March 4, 2007 for investigation, report and recommendation.10
IBPs Report and Recommendation
In his Report and Recommendation11 dated September 6, 2010, the Investigating Commissioner
found respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law and recommended that he be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of six months. This was adopted and approved with
modification by the IBP Board of Governors in an April 12, 2011 Resolution, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLUTION NO. XIX-2011-110 Adm. Case No. 7158 Yolanda A. Andres, et al. vs. Atty.
Salimathar V. Nambi
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A;
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, considering respondent[s] contumacious disregard of the lawful Order of
Supreme Court and the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, and for his failure to appear
despite due notices, Atty. Salimathar V. Nambi is herebySUSPENDED from the practice of law
for six (6) months.12(Emphasis in the original).
Issue
Whether respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Our Ruling
At the outset, it must be emphasized that in this administrative proceeding, our discussion
should be limited only on the issue of whether respondent acted in gross ignorance of the law
when he granted the motion to amend the alias writ of execution; when he issued an Amended
Alias Writ of Execution to enforce the monetary judgment against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and
all its incorporators; and when he denied complainants Urgent Motion to Quash. As a rule, for
one to be held administratively accountable for gross ignorance of the law, there must be a
showing that the error was gross and patent as to support a conclusion that the actor was so
moved with malice, bad faith, corruption, fraud, and dishonesty. As such, our discussion should
be focused primarily on whether respondent grossly erred in issuing the above orders as to
amount to malice, bad faith, corruption, fraud and dishonesty. On the other hand, we need not
delve into the issue of whether there is an apparent misapplication of the doctrine of piercing
the veil of corporate fiction when respondent issued the Amended Alias Writ of Execution. For
one, it is outside the ambit of this administrative proceeding. Moreover, the issue of whether the
doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction applies is the subject of an appeal brought by
complainants before the National Labor Relations Commission and eventually to the Court of
Appeals.13 We perused the records of the case particularly respondents Order 14 dated March 13,
2006 denying complainants Urgent Motion to Quash. Therein, we note that respondents ruling

was not arrived at arbitrarily; on the contrary, he cited grounds based on his personal assessment
of the facts at hand, viz:
As culled from the case record, there is substantial evidence that respondents Maximo A.
Mercado and Aida A. Mercado, who are doing business under the name and style of M.A.
Mercado Construction put up a corporation in the name of M.A. Block Works, Inc. where
individual movants are one of the incorporators. We give credence to the argument of the
complainants that the incorporators therein are relatives of Maximo A. Mercado and Aida
Mercado as shown by the Articles of Incorporation adduced by the former. The incorporators
listed have similar family names of the Mercados and the Andreses and common address at
Gen. Hizon, Quezon City and 50 Daisy St., Quezon City, and Maximo A. Mercado is the
biggest stockholder. Aside from the Articles of Incorporation, complainants also submitted a
Letter of Intent/Notice To Proceed where respondents, despite their representation that they
have already ceased their business operation, are still continuing their business operation. The
documents submitted by the complainants were corroborated by certification issued by Maggie
T. Jao, AVP-Assistant Controller of SM Prime Holdings, Inc. that based on their records, an
amount of P3,291,300.00 representing a sum total of all goods, effects, money and credit that
was garnished belong to M.A. Mercado Construction and/or Maximo Mercado and/or Aida
Mercado and/or M.A. Block Works, Inc. and/or Gertrudes Casilda A. Mercado, Yolanda A.
Andres, Minette A. Mercado and/or Elito P. Andres. This Office has therefore, enough reason to
conclude that respondents Maximo A. Mercado and Aida Mercado and the movants herein are
one and the same. Movants are alter egos or business conduits to defraud the complainants and
to consequently evade payment of judgment award. x x x As respondents are duly notified and
aware of the execution proceedings, the argument of denial of due process is untenable.15
It is apparent from the foregoing disquisition that respondents conclusion had some bases and
was not plucked from thin air, so to speak. Clearly, respondent did not act whimsically or
arbitrarily; his ruling could not in any manner be characterized as imbued with malice, fraud or
bad faith. To reiterate what we have already stated above, we are not here to judge in this
present administrative proceeding whether respondents ratiocination on the application of the
piercing of corporate veil is correct; our only concern here is to decide whether respondents
error was so gross as to amount to fraud and dishonesty. Based on the above-quoted
disquisition, it cannot be said, by any stretch of imagination, that respondents error, if any, was
so gross or that he was actuated by malice when he issued the above orders. His conclusion was
reached after an examination of the documents presented and evaluation and assessment of the
arguments raised by the parties. He did not capriciously rule on the issues presented; on the
contrary, he exerted efforts to weigh the positions of the contending parties. In any event, we
hold that respondent should not be held accountable for committing an honest mistake or an
error in the appreciation of the facts of the case before him. Otherwise every labor arbiter or any
judicial or quasi-judicial officer for that matter, would be continually plagued with the
possibility of being administratively sanctioned for every honest mistake or error he
commits. For sure, this would not augur well to the administration of justice as a whole.
Pertinently, the Court ruled in Andrada v. Judge Banzon,16viz:
Well-settled is the rule that unless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption,
malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, respondent judge may not be
held administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of
official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication of
cases. Further, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous rule or decision
he renders would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly
unbearable. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called
upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of the administration of justice can be
infallible in his judgment.17
Based on the foregoing, we have no basis to hold respondent administratively liable for gross
ignorance of the law. However, we note that respondent had consistently and obstinately
disregarded the Courts and IBPs orders. It is on record that respondent totally ignored the

Courts June 7, 2006 Resolution18 directing him to file his Comment. He also failed to attend the
mandatory conference before the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline despite notice. 19 Neither
did he file his Position Paper. As a former Labor Arbiter, respondent should know that orders of
the court are not mere requests but directives which should have been complied with promptly
and completely.20 He disregarded the oath he took when he was accepted to the legal
profession to obey the laws and the legal orders of the duly constituted legal authorities. x x x
His conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon to obey court orders and processes
and is expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives as an officer of the
court.21 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that this appears to be respondents first infraction, we find it proper to impose on
him the penalty of reprimand with warning that commission of the same or similar infraction
will be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the Court REPRIMANDS respondent Atty. Salimathar V. Nambi for
obstinately and unjustifiably refusing to obey lawful orders of the Court and the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act or offense shall be
dealt with more severely. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant and noted in Atty. Nambis record as a member of the Bar.
RE: COMPLAINT DATED JANUARY 28, 2014 OF WENEFREDO PARREO, ET
AL., AGAINST HON. CELIA C. LIBREA-LEAGOGO, HON. ELIHU A. YBAEZ AND
HON. AMY C. LAZARO-JAVIER, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP NO. 108807
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
We hereby resolve the administrative complaint 1 brought against Court of Appeals (CA)
Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybaez and Associate
Justice Amy C. Lazaro Javier for their undue delay in rendering the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 108807 entitledSusan Enriquez and Alma Rodriguez v. Wenefredo Parreno, Ronnie Cuevas
and Joseph Denamarca.
Antecedents
Complainants Wenefredo Parreo and Ronnie Cuevas, with Joseph Denamarca, filed a protest
in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources of the National Capital Region
(DENR-NCR) against the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14391 and TCT
No. 14188 in favor of Susan Enriquez and Alma Rodriguez covering two lots inside the Signal
Village, Taguig.2 The DENR-NCR dismissed the protest, 3 but the dismissal was subsequently
reversed by the DENR.4 Aggrieved, Enriquez and Rodriguez appealed to the Office of the
President (OP), which denied their appeal.5 With their motion for reconsideration having been
similarly denied,6 Enriquez and Rodriguez appealed to the CA by petition for review,7 and it is

such

appeal

from

which

this

administrative

complaint

arose.

It appears that on June 26, 2012, the Special Sixteenth (16 th) Division of the CA issued its
resolution submitting C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 for decision.8 However, the complainants
lament that from the issuance of the resolution until the filing of their complaint on February 8,
2014, the respondents, who comprised the Special 16 th Division of the CA, had not rendered the
decision, which the complainants insist was in patent violation of the mandatory period within
which the respondents should decide under Section 15(1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.9cralawred
The Court required the respondents to submit their comments on the administrative complaint.
In her comment,10 Justice Librea-Leagogo narrated that she became the Chairperson of the CA
16thDivision effective June 4, 2012 conformably with CA Office Order No. 220-12-ABR, and
she served as such until July 5, 2012 in accordance with the successive reorganizations
implemented in the CA under CA Office Order No. 198-12-ABR 11 and CA Office Order No.
220-12-ABR,12 respectively. Citing Section 1, Rule VI of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court
of Appeals (2009 IRCA),13 Justice Librea-Leagogo denied liability for incurring any undue
delay because of her short stint as the Chairperson of the 16 th Division, and considering further
that C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 followed Justice Ybaez as the assigned ponente in his transfer
to the Fourteenth (14th) Division pursuant to CA Office Order No. 220-12-ABR, and eventually
to the Thirteenth (13th) Division, the Division that ultimately promulgated the awaited decision
on
February
28,
2014.14cralawred
Justice Ybaez admitted in his comment 15 that C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 was part of his initial
caseload following his transfer to Manila in December 2009. He stated that he had
conscientiously complied with the Zero Backlog Project (ZBP) initiated by Presiding Justice
Andres B. Reyes, Jr. by giving utmost priority to the older cases assigned to him; that he had
already assigned C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 to a member of his legal staff, but the latter had
meanwhile fallen seriously ill; that due to lack of personnel and a heavy caseload, he had hired
a contractual-lawyer who later resigned upon being offered a permanent position in another
agency of the Government; that after disposing of the older cases assigned to him, he had
rendered the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 on February 28, 2014 before becoming
aware of the administrative complaint; and that he had not been remiss in his duty and
responsibility to promptly administer justice by virtue of his disposing a monthly average of 15
cases.16cralawred
Justice Lazaro-Javier explained her participation in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 as limited to the
adoption and promulgation on June 26, 2012 of the resolution submitting the case for decision
because only filled in the brief vacancy occasioned by the temporary absence of Justice Victoria
Isabel Paredes, then the regular Member of the 16 th Division. She pointed out, however, that she
had nothing more to do with the case upon the return of Justice Paredes; hence, she could not be
administratively liable for any delay in deciding the case.17cralawred
Issue
Are the respondents liable for undue delay in deciding C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807?
Ruling
The

administrative

complaint

is

without

merit.

The Constitution mandates a lower collegiate court like the CA to resolve a case within 12
months from the submission of the last required pleading or as set by the court itself. This is

clear from paragraphs (1) and (2), Section 15 of Article VIII of the Constitution, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be
decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court,
and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and
three
months
for
all
lower
courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court
itself.chanrobleslaw
x x x x cralawlawlibrary
Did

the

respondents

incur

any

administrative

liability

for

the

delay?

Although C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 was submitted for decision by the Special 16th Division on
June 26, 2012 after the parties did not file their memoranda, 18 it was the 13th Division of the CA
(composed of Justice Ybaez as the ponente, Justice Japar B. Dimaampao as the Chairman, and
Justice Melchor Quirino C. Sadang) that promulgated the decision on February 28, 2014, or
nearly 20 months later. Accordingly, the Court answers the query in the negative, for, pursuant
to Section 1, Rule VI of the 2009 IRCA, the adjudication of cases was the responsibility of the
assigned Justice and the Members of the Division to which he or she then belonged.
Determining who should be administratively accountable must consider the specific role each of
the respondents played leading to the resolution of C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807. Under the
applicable rule of the 2009 IRCA, the liability for undue delay in resolving C.A.-G.R. SP No.
108807 might devolve only on the Members of the 13 th Division who actually promulgated the
decision.
Justice Librea-Leagogo and Justice Lazaro-Javier were not accountable for the delay in
rendering the judgment. Justice Librea-Leagogo had a limited participation in respect of C.A.G.R. SP No. 108807 because the reorganization of the CA ensuing after the promulgation of the
resolution by the Special 16th Division on June 26, 2012 caused her transfer to the 15 th Division
through CA Office Order No. 220-12-ABR, 19 terminating her responsibility in C.A.- G.R. SP
No. 108807. Justice Lazaro-Javier should also be exculpated because her participation was
limited to her acting as a special Member of the 16 th Division in lieu of Justice Paredes. Such
substitution prevented a vacuum in the regular 16th Division, and conformed to the procedure
stated in Section 6(d), Rule I of the 2009 IRCA. 20 The constitution of the Special 16th Division
was
by
virtue
of
CA
Office
Order
No.
220-12-ABR. 21cralawred
Justice Ybaez, as the ponente for C.A. G.R. SP No. 108807, carried the case with him when he
was transferred to the 13th Division. But whether or not he was administratively liable for the
delay of eight months should depend on the relevant circumstances. Although often holding that
a heavy caseload is insufficient reason to excuse a Judge from disposing his cases within the
reglementary period,22 the Court has applied this rule by considering the causes of the delay.
In Marquez v. Manigbas,23 the Court relieved the respondent judge from liability because the
delay had been caused by the sudden deluge of cases brought about by the expansion of the
jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts. In Santos v. Lorenzo,24 the Court held that a delay of
seven months in deciding a case could be excused because of the heavy caseload of the trial
courts in the National Capital Judicial Region. In Lubaton v. Lazaro,25 the Court, in sparing the
respondent from the sanctions earlier imposed for undue delay, cited the good faith of the judge,
the motivation of the complainant for bringing the charge, and the excessively heavy caseload
of 3,500 cases, 1,800 of which involved detainees, leaving her only Fridays for the study of her

cases and the resolution of pending incidents and issuance of the proper orders. The Court, in
reversing the sanctions, observed that "it would be unkind and inconsiderate on the part of the
Court to disregard respondent Judge's limitations and exact a rigid and literal compliance with
the
rule."26cralawred
The delay in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 could not be said to have been incurred by Justice
Ybaez with malice or deliberate attempt to impede the dispensation of justice. He assigned
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 to a member of his legal staff, but the latter had fallen seriously ill in
the meantime, forcing him to hire a contractual-lawyer for the purpose. The latter subsequently
joined another agency of the Government on a permanent basis. Thus, Justice Ybaez could
promulgate the decision only on February 28, 2014. His explanation for the delay, being entirely
plausible,
is
accepted.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES for lack of merit the administrative complaint against
Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, Justice Elihu A. Ybanez and Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier.
MARILOU
T.
RIVERA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JAIME C. BLANCAFLOR, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 26, STA.
CRUZ, LAGUNA,Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is the administrative matter that stemmed from the complaint-affidavit 1 filed
on July 16, 2008 by Marilou T. Rivera (Rivera) with the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), charging Judge Jaime C. Blancaflor [Judge Blancaflor, Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 26, Sta. Cruz, Laguna] with Bribery, Gross Misconduct, Immorality and violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act [Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019].
The Antecedents
The facts as set out in the final report and recommendation 2 of Associate Justice Remedios
A. Salazar-Fernando (Justice Fernando) of the Court of Appeals are summarized below.3
Rivera alleged that she had been engaged in assisting litigants to obtain judicial bonds since
year 2000. Sometime in February 2008, she asked her daughter Shiela T. De Mata (De Mata),
who was also a bondsman, to help her secure a bail bond for accused Ricardo Catuday
(Catuday). Catuday was charged of violating Section 11 of R. A. No. 9165 (the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (OPP) of Laguna.
On February 27, 2008, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dan B. Rodrigo (Prosecutor Rodrigo)
recommended a bail of 200,000.00 for Catuday who moved to reduce his bail to120,000.00
before the Office of the Executive Judge, RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna. De Mata brought a copy of
the motion to Prosecutor Rodrigo who did not object to the motion and who signified his
conformity by writing "no objection" and affixing his signature and the date "4/14/08" on the
face of the motion.4
De Mata thereafter brought the document to the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), RTC, Sta.
Cruz, Laguna for the approval of Judge Blancaflor who was then the Executive Judge. De Mata

failed to see Judge Blancaflor; she was told by Dennis Trinidad (Trinidad), a member of the
OCC staff, that Judge Blancaflor was not in the court. Trinidad volunteered to bring the motion
to Judge Blancaflor at Tagpuan Restaurant(in Pila, Laguna that the judge allegedly owned) for
the judges approval. Trinidad, however, returned without securing the requested approval. De
Mata was told to come back the next day.
De Mata went back to the OCC the following morning and was advised this time by Gemma
Gallardo (Gemma), another OCC personnel, to personally approach Judge Blancaflor about
Catudays motion. De Mata acted as advised, but Judge Blancaflor simply told De Mata that it
was not her job to ask for the motions approval and that she should return it to the OCC. De
Mata at that point approached a Kuya Moring, the process server of Branch 27, about her
predicament. Kuya Moring introduced her to Judge Blancaflors driver who tried to help, but
the judge still refused to act on the motion. De Mata next approached Manuel Bugain (Bugain),
a court employee at Branch 26. Bugain offered to bring the motion to Judge Blancaflor who was
then in Barangay Layugan, Pagsanjan, Laguna. When Bugain returned, he told De Mata that
Judge Blancaflor refused to sign the motion because it did not bear the signature of Prosecutor
Rodrigo.
De Mata went back to Branch 26, together with Councilor Cecil Magana (Magana), whose
assistance she sought upon Bugains advice, to secure the requested approval. Whilethe motion
was being handed to Judge Blancaflor, he blurted out: "Hindi granted yan! Magbayad siya
ng P200,000.00. Ayaw ko ng drugs! Hindi granted yan!" Frustrated by the turn of events, De
Mata returned the unapproved motion to Rivera.
On May 27, 2008, Rivera brought the motion to Branch 91, RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna as Judge
Blancaflor was then out on a seminar. The following day, Judge Divinagracia Ongkeko (Judge
Ongkeko), the Presiding Judge of Branch 91 and Vice-Executive Judge of RTC, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, issued an order granting Catudays motion to reduce bond. Rivera immediately secured
a bail bond for Catuday from the Industrial Insurance Company and presented it to Branch 26
for Catudays provisional release.
Still, Judge Blancaflor refused to issue a release order, saying that he never approved Catudays
reduced bailbond of P120,000.00. Rivera then learned from one Teresa Mirasol (Mirasol) that
Judge Blancaflor refused to approve Catudays motion because it was Rivera who was working
for it. According to Mirasol, the information was given to her over the phone by Noralyn
Villamar (Villamar), a.k.a.Macky, allegedly Judge Blancaflors live-in partner.
Rivera further alleged that she experienced the same treatment from Judge Blancaflor when she
worked for the approval of the bail of Roel Namplata (Namplata) who was charged with
violation of Section 15 of R.A. No. 9165, also by the OPP, Laguna. Namplatas recommended
bail was P60,000.00. After securing Prosecutor Rodrigos consent and with the help of Gemma,
she succeeded in securing Judge Blancaflors approval with the handwritten notation:
"Approved P40,000.00 for surety bond. 3-27-08 (SGD.) Judge Blancaflor."
After obtaining a bail bond for Namplata, Rivera tried to secure a release order from Judge
Blancaflor who refused to honor the bond as it had been belatedly filed. He even brought back
the cost of the bond toP60,000.00. In the afternoon of June 12, 2008, Rivera learned that Judge
Blancaflor declared that he would not release Namplata unless a criminal case is filed against
her by Rina Tranilla (Tranilla), a sister of Namplata. True enough, Tranilla filed a complaint for
estafa5 against Rivera at around 4:00 oclock that afternoon. The following day, Judge
Blancaflors order6 was issued, dated June 10, 2008, for Namplatas release.

Explaining her difficulties with Judge Blancaflor in relation with her work as a bondsman,
Rivera claimed that the judge harbored ill will against her because of her involvement in
Special Proceeding No. 4605 entitled Arsenio S. Leron, et al. v. Benjamin S. Leron, et al.,then
pending before Judge Blancaflors sala. Rivera alleged that she was the attorney-in-fact of one
of the defendants in the case, Dr. Emelita R. Leron (Dr. Leron) who filed on March 2, 2007 a
motion for inhibition against Judge Blancaflor.7 The motion allegedly recited in detail Judge
Blancaflors misdeeds and gross misconduct, manifest partiality and indiscretion in fraternizing
with clients and litigants in connection with the case.
Rivera further alleged that Judge Blancaflor inhibited himself from the case after she executed
an affidavit attesting to (1) the judges recommendation to the plaintiff, Normita Leron, to
secure the services of Atty. Ricardo Pilares, Jr. (Atty. Pilares); (2) the rigging of the raffle of the
case to Judge Blancaflor; and (3) the irregular service of summons to the defendants in the case.
Moreover, her son Byron Torres (Byron) and son-inlaw Ricel De Mata (Ricel)) also executed a
joint affidavit8 stating that Judge Blancaflor "bribed" them not to testify in connection with the
motion for inhibition.
Lastly, Rivera maintained that Judge Blancaflor should be charged with immorality for
maintaining an illicit relationship with Villamar, who is not his wife.
In a Supplemental Affidavit,9 dated July 29, 2008, Rivera reiterated her charge that Judge
Blancaflor committed gross misconduct in (1) fraternizing with litigants;(2) maintaining an
illicit affair with a woman not his wife; and (3) exhibiting personal bias and prejudice against
her in her efforts to obtain bail bonds for Catuday and Namplata.
Judge Blancaflors Comment
In his Comment10 dated August 26, 2008, Judge Blancaflor denied Riveras accusations and
dismissed them as "mere concoctions" of her "fertile imagination."
Judge Blancaflor claimed that neither Rivera nor her daughter approached him regarding
Catudays and Namplatas bail bonds. Even assuming that they did, he refused their requests
because they were not authorized bondsmen or agents of any duly accredited surety company.
They were acting as fixers, he explained; thus, he was justified in denying their requests.
Further, Judge Blancaflor claimed that he strictly observes a policy of refusing to reduce the
required bail in drug-related cases even if approval is recommended by the investigating
prosecutor. He could not also order Catudays release because it was Judge Ongkeko who
granted his motion to reduce bail; in his view, Judge Ongkeko should also order Catudays
release.
Judge Blancaflor considered as "fantastic" Riveras account that she and De Mata brought the
motions to reduce bail of Catuday and Namplata to Tagpuan Restaurant in Pila, Laguna for his
approval. He maintained that Riveras account was simply untrue because as a matter of policy,
he does not allow court personnel orany other person for thatmatter, to bring the case records or
any part thereof outsidethe court premises. Moreover, he does not own a restaurant in Pila,
Laguna, nor a house, chapel and resort in Pagsanjan, Laguna.
In the Leron case, Judge Blancaflor recalled that Rivera asked him to extend assistance to her
boss, Dr. Leron, a defendant in the case. He denied her request and since then, she started
harassing and blackmailing him and even filed an administrative case against him.

Shortly thereafter, the Lerons (defendants in Special Proceeding No. 4605), with Riveras active
participation, started circulating stories against him, which culminated in the filing ofa lettercomplaint before Executive Judge Mary Ann E. Corpus-Maalac (Judge Corpus-Maalac)
accusing him of bias, partiality and bribery. The Lerons however eventually withdrew the
complaint after being enlightened aboutthe raffle of cases. Also, he had absolutely no
involvement in the engagement of Atty. Pilares as a lawyer in the case as he does not entertain
fixers.
Judge Blancaflor brushed off the immorality charge against him. He branded it as malicious and
a mere fabrication of Rivera. He alleged that Rivera even hired a Solomon Ondevilla
(Ondevilla) to execute an affidavit against him,[11]] but Ondevilla subsequently denied that he
executed and signed the affidavit.12
Judge Blancaflor questioned Riveras credibility, claiming that she is known for filing fabricated
charges and malicious complaints against lawyers, judges and other public officials, among
them, an Atty. Cayetano Santos.13Further, she has also been charged with numerous criminal
offenses, mostly swindling or estafa cases and violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and is
known to have an illicit relationship withdifferent men.
In his Comment14 to Riveras supplemental affidavit,15 Judge Blancaflor reiterated his denial of
Riveras charges against him. In particular, he took exception to Annex "B" 16 of the
supplemental affidavit, which referred to Namplatas motion to reduce bail bond and which
allegedly carried his marginal note of approval. Judge Blancaflor claimed that the document
was manufactured and was not on file with the court. He added that the marginal note approving
a reduced bail of P40,000.00 was forged; even assuming that it was genuine, it was not a formal
order and he still had the discretion on whether toreduce the P60,000.00 recommended bail. By
way of a reply-affidavit,17 Rivera countered that she is a legitimate bondsman as she is an agent
of Genric Insurance and that she is also a swimming instructor and in business through her
"Rivera Swimming Lessons." With respect to Tagpuan Restaurant, she clarified that the
property is registered in the name of Villamar, Judge Blancaflors live-in partner, and that the
two also purchased and co-owned several parcels of land in Layugan, Pagsanjan, Laguna.
Rivera also claimed that Ondevilla withdrew his affidavit relating Judge Blancaflors illicit
relationship with Villamar because the two of them threatened to file a case against him and
would have him imprisoned. She stressed that Judge Blancaflors attack on her person has
nothing to do with the case she filed against him.
Justice Fernandos Investigation/Findings/Recommendation
In compliance with the Courts resolution of August 17, 2011, 18 Justice Fernando conducted a
thorough investigation of the complaint, in the course of which, she conducted several hearings,
received affidavits and documentary evidence, heard testimonies of witnesses, and even
conducted an ocular inspection.19
Justice Fernando found Judge Blancaflor guilty of (1) bribery, gross misconduct and violation
of R.A. 3019; and (2) immorality. She recommended that the judge be dismissed from the
service, with prejudice to his reinstatement or appointment to any public office, and likewise
recommended the forfeiture of the judges retirement benefits, if any.
The OCA Report and Recommendation

On July 24, 2013, the Court referred Justice Fernandos final report to the OCA for evaluation,
report and recommendation.20 In its memorandum21 of February 25, 2014, the OCA submitted
its report to the Court, adopting the findings and recommendations of Justice Fernando.
The Courts Ruling
After considering Justice Fernandos report and the records of the case, we note that she
conducted a very thorough investigation. We uphold her findings and recommendation as we
find sufficient basis to dismiss respondent Judge Blancaflor from the service.
Re:
charge
and violation of R.A. No. 3019

of

bribery,

gross

misconduct

The first count against Judge Blancaflor regarding this charge involved his alleged: (1) refusal
to approve Catudays motion to reduce bail bond, despite a "no objection" from the prosecutor;
(2) refusal to order Catudays release, despite Judge Ongkekos grant of the motion; (3) refusal
to order Namplatas release, despitehis own approval of the motion to reduce bail bond; and (4)
offer of money to Byron and Ricel to prevent them from testifying in the motion for his
inhibition in the Leron case.
While Judge Blancaflor has the discretion to approve or disapprove a motion to reduce bail, it
appears from the records that he abused this prerogative in the cases of Catuday and Namplata.
Through Judge Blancaflors inaccessibility (he was usually not in the court in the
afternoon)22 and refusal to take action on their pleas for provisional liberty, Catuday and
Namplata and the people working for the approval of their motions (Rivera and De Mata)
suffered inordinate delay and frustrations in securing the motions approval. In more ways than
one, Judge Blancaflor gave De Mata and Riveraa run-around in Catudays and Namplatas cases
for no plausible reason other than the judges strong antipathy towards Rivera.
This is serious misconduct and a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary23 which mandates that "judges shall perform their judicial duties without
favor, bias or prejudice,"24 and that they "shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of
court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in
the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary."25
For instance, when De Mata learned that Judge Blancaflor said that he did not approve
Catudays motion for reduction of his bail because Prosecutor Rodrigo was against the motion,
she went to see the prosecutor about it. Prosecutor Rodrigo told her that there was no problem
with the motion, so he signed it, but he did not know why Judge Blancaflor would not approve
the motion. De Mata then asked the help of Magana, yet even with Maganas intercession,
Judge Blancaflor refused to sign the motion, saying that he did not like drugs. Magana
wondered why Catudays motion was not approved when all the other surety bonds were
approved. The following testimony of De Mata confirmed the difficulties De Mata and her
mother experienced in their work as bondsmen in Judge Blancaflors sala:
xxxx
Q: After Mr. Bugain told you that Judge Blancaflor refuses to sign for the reason that
Fiscal Rodrigo also does not approve of the said motion, what did you do?
A. I went to Fiscal Rodrigo and asked him what was the problem with the motion?

Q: What did Fiscal Rodrigo [tell] you?

A: He said there was really no problem with the motion so he signed it. He did not know
why the motion of Catuday was left pending.
xxxx
Q: During this time, this Mayora was also in branch 26?
A: Yes, mam, and she was also wondering why our application cannot be approved
while all the other surety bonds were approved.
Q: Can you tell us who this Mayora is, what is her occupation?
A: She was a councilor, the wife of the previous mayor. If there are people who cannot
afford to pay bail, they ask her for help and she helps people.26
xxxx
Judge Blancaflor denied the allegations, contending that Catudays motion was not filed with
the OCC and never reached him.27 Justice Fernando found otherwise, citing the Order28 dated
May 28, 2008 of Judge Ongkeko, Vice-Executive Judge of the RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
granting the motion when Judge Blancaflor was attending a seminar in Tagaytay City. Judge
Ongkeko could not have issued the order had it not been filed with the OCC. But what was
more surprising was Judge Blancaflors refusal to acknowledge and to act on the order of
approval. This belies Judge Blancaflors excuses for not acting on Catudays motion and lends
credence to Riveras submission that the judges refusal was to spite her.
The same thing happened when Rivera processed Namplatas bail bond. As the records show,
Judge Blancaflor approved Namplatas motion for reduction of bail. The judge admitted his
approval during the investigation. When he was asked: "Do you clearly remember Judge that
you reduced it as shown by your signature from P60,000,00 to P40,000.00 bail?," he answered:
"That is correct sir, that day," referring to March 27, 2008. 29 Yet, he refused to approve
Namplatas temporary release. In fact, in his Comment to Riveras supplemental complaint, 30 he
disowned the marginal note he made on a copy of Namplatas motion reducing his bail bond
to P40,000.00.
The following exchanges during the investigation further indicate that Judge Blancaflor
overstepped and abused his authority as a judge when he took time to release Namplata, despite
his approval of Namplatas bail bond at its original amount which he earlier reduced
to P40.000.00:
J. Fernando:
But you admit you issued a March 27 Order reducing it to P40,000.00?
Judge Blancaflor:
The marginal note I admit, Your Honor.
J. Fernando:

Yes, thats fine.

Atty. Aguirre (Riveras, counsel):
Q: The reason Judge Blancaflor why you did not anymore honor your marginal note
reducing the amount from 60 to 40 is that you came to know that it was Waling, the
complainant, and her daughter Shiela who was (sic) following it up with you?
A: That is not correct, sir. What you claim that I did not honor the original marginal note
is because I did not see it in the original file of the case.
Q: But the more important reason Judge is that you came to know that it was the
complainant and her daughter who were following up this bail bond case and when you
came to know that follow up of the complainant and her daughter, you wanted it returned
back to 60 because you said it was too long in coming, the P40,000.00 bond, is that
correct?
A: That is not correct sir:
Q: And another condition of yours before the bail could be approved by you is that the
sister or Namplata must file a case of estafa against the complainant which she did and
one day after, the case against the complainant for estafa was filed before the Office of
the City Prosecutor, you issued the Order of Release, is that correct?
A: That is not correct. That is your own language, sir.
Q: That is the testimony of the witnesses.31
In an effort to justify his errors and omissions in relation to Catudays and Namplatas motions,
Judge Blancaflor argued that he refused to act on the motions because he hates drugs and,in the
case of Namplata, there was a delay in the processing of the bail bond.
We are not at all convinced by Judge Blancaflors explanations. His excuses which were
marked by inconsistencies and typified by his initial denial that he approved Namplatas
motion, only to admit the approval before Justice Fernando cannotjustify his failure to act.
Action by the judge was clearly called for by the urgency of the matter before him the plea for
provisional liberty of Catuday and Namplata who enjoy the right to bail despite the serious
offenses they were charged with. His unexplained refusal in these cases can only support
Riveras claim that his inaction was due to Riveras intervention in the approval of the motions,
a clear sign of his personal bias and prejudice against her. This, in our view, ispatently a gross
misconduct on the part of Judge Blancaflor.
It appears from the records that Judge Blancaflors antipathy towards Rivera arose from her
involvement in the Leron case when she testified against the judge in a motion for his inhibition
from the case. The motion must have caused considerable anxiety and concern for the judge so
that he even exerted efforts to neutralize Rivera, to the extent of offering cash to Byron
(Riveras son) and Ricel (Riveras son-in-law) who executed a joint Affidavit 32 that Judge
Blancaflor and Villamar offered them P10,000.00 each and even warned them not to testify
atthe hearing on the motion. The two showed the cash to Rivera and they had the incident
entered in the police blotter.33 In this regard, Torres and Ricel deposed:
xxxx

1. x x x Kami ay namamasukan kay Armando Q. Torres ("ARMANDO") na tatay ni

BYRON at biyenan na lalaki ni RICEL. Kami ay laging nagkakaroon ng komunikasyon
kay Noralyn M. Villamar a.k.a. Macky ("Macky") dahil may mga transaksiyon silang
pinag-uusapan ng aming tatay na si Armando.
2. Noong ika-02 Marso 2007, araw ng Biyernes, mga 5:00 5:30 ng hapon, tumawag si
Macky kay Byron at sinabi na gusto daw siya makausap nito tungkol sa pagtetestigo nila
laban kay Judge Jaime C. Blancaflor ("Judge Blancaflor"), at sinabihan na pumunta sa
bahay nila.
3. Pagdating ni Byron sa bahay nila Macky at Judge Blancaflor sa Brgy. Layugan ng mga
bandang 6:00 ng gabi, tinanong ni Macky si Byron "Bakit natin kailangang
maglaban?"Nagkunwari akong walang alam at tumahimik na lang ako.
4. Nilapitan ako (Byron) ni Judge Blancflor at sinabi na: "Byron, ayaw ko tayong magkabanggaan. Kung lilitaw kayo sa hearing sa petsa 6 ay ipapakulongko kayo. Ito ang ten
thousand (P10,000.00), ito ay hindi suhol. Wag ka lang tumistigo. Kung tetestigo ka,
mapipilitan kaming lumaban. Kayang-kaya kitang gawan ng kaso tulad ng rape at
anumang kaso na puwedeng isaksak sa iyo.
5. Pinahabol pa ni Macky na: "Kahit patayan pwede kami."
6. Noong 03 ng Marso 2007, araw ng Sabado, bandang 5:10 ng hapon, pumunta si Macky
at si Guillen Almonte sa bahay ng tatay namin na si Armando sa Brgy. Duhat kung saan
kami ay nagtratrabaho.
7. Galit na galit si Macky at sinabi nito kay Armando ngunit nakatingin sa amin: "Pare,
bakit ganito? Ano ang ginawa ng mga bata? Kayong dalawa, tinanggap namin kayo nang
maayos sa Layugan."
8. Hindi na kami umimik at hinayaan naming magsalita na lamang si Macky.
9. Sinabi pa ni Macky na: "Huwag na nating patagalin ito. Ayaw kong tayo ang
magkabanggaan. Kung lalaban kayo, lalaban kami hanggang patayan."
10. Nagtangkang umalis si Byron kaya sumigaw si Macky na: "Byron! Huwag kang
umiwas. Problema natin to. Huwag kang umalis!"
11. Nag-isip si Byron ng dahilan upang maka-alis. Bago siya nakaalis, pahabol na sinabi
ni Macky na: "Mag-aabot ako ng tulong, huwag lang kayong sumali."
12. Nang nakaalis na si Byron mga bandang 6:00 pm, naglabas ng pera si Macky at
inaabot ito kay Ricel, ngunit hindi niya ito kinuha. Kaya ang ginawa ni Macky ay
kinausap si Armando at inilagay ang pera sa mesa at sinabi na: "Pare, kung ayaw
magtiwala ng anak mo sa amin, ito ang P20,000.00 para kay Byron at para kay Ricel.
Ikaw na ang bahala. Meron pang kasunod yan kung pipirma sila ng Affidavit of
Desistance."34
In his comment35 on Riveras complaint, Judge Blancaflor denied the alleged offer, claiming
that the alleged sums did not come from him but from Armando Torres (Torres) and were
"given as support to his son Byron and son-in-law Ricel." When Rivera saw the P20,000.00, she
grabbed it from Byron and proceeded to the police station and made a false story of bribery

against him.36 Judge Blancaflor offered in evidence two affidavits Armando executed 37 dated
March 6, 2007 and August 22, 2008.
Again, the explanation fails to persuade us. Armando is Riveras estranged husband. Their
union produced Byron and De Mata, the wife of Ricel. Rivera and Armando separated in 1983.
It was a case of a marriage turned sour where the spouses filed cases against one another, as
Armando himself stated in his affidavit of August 22, 2008.38 We should not be too quick
therefore to admit Armandos statements as unvarnished truth, especially when he did not even
appear during the investigation to affirm the statements attributed to him, despite several
subpoenas for him to testify, the last one being on December 6, 2012.39
On the other hand, Rivera and Byron reported the bribery incident to the police. The following
exchanges on what transpired in the police station significantly shed light on this incident and
bolstered Riveras claim that Judge Blancaflor committed a serious misconduct in relation with
the Leron case, thus:
Q: Now, do you remember what thisis all about, the incident reported by Byron Torres?
A: It was a threat.
Q. Will you please read it again to refresh your memory?
(Witness reading the blotter)
Q: What you read, the entry in the blotter is in your handwriting?
A. Yes sir.
Q: What do you remember about this P10,000.00?
J. Fernando: 10 or 20?
A: P10,000.00
J. Fernando: 10 lang?
A: Yes, P10,000.00.
Wag siyang aatend sa hearing saa-sais kung hindi sila ang magkakabangga ni Judge
Blancaflor. Q: What is that P10,000.00 there?
A: Ang akin pong pagkakaintindi ito ay suhol dahil nakalagay dito hindi ito suhol. Wag
kang tumestigo dahil kung tetestigo ka ay mapipilitan lumaban gawan ka ng kaso. Pag
tumestigo siya gagawa siya ng kaso.
Translation:
If he testified, he would have a case filed against him.
xxxx
Q: But the signature here of Byron, did he sign it in your presence?

A: Yes sir.
Q: And the witness also signed it in your presence?
A: Yes, sir, in my presence.40
The root cause of the Leron case, as Justice Fernando established and stressed, was the irregular
assignment of the case which was directly brought to Judge Blancaflors sala without going
through a raffle. Atty. Arthur Trinidad, Jr. (Atty. Trinidad), then RTC Clerk of Court, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, testified that the case, Special Proceeding No. 4605, which was filed on November 15,
2006 was not included in the schedule of raffle of cases for the period November 10 to 30, 2006
and was brought to the judges sala even before the case was supposed tobe raffled on
November 30, 2006 because he was made to understand, based on the judges letter to him, that
the case a settlement of estate dispute belonged to the Family Court then handled by
Judge Blancaflor.41 Due to the judges letter, he assumed that the case was within the
jurisdiction of the Family Court so that it was his ministerial duty to forward the case to Judge
Blancaflors sala.42
Not only does it appear that Judge Blancaflor intervened in the assignment of the Leron case, he
also had a hand in ensuring who would represent the disputants, by suggesting, in the presence
of and with the active participation of Villamar, that the lawyers for the parties would be Atty.
Pilares for the plaintiffs43 and Atty. Stephen David (Atty. David) for the defendants. 44 He even
went to the extent of voicing out how the case should turn out.
Thus, Dr. Leron deposed: "Tinanong ko si Judge Blancaflor kung matatalo ako kahit sabihin ko
na wala naman talaga ang lahat ng hinahanap nila. Sagot ni Judge Blancaflor Pwede, depende
sa presentasyon ng abogado mo. Tinanong ko kung sino yong abogado na sinasabi ni Macky.
Sagot ni Judge Blancaflor[,] si [Atty. David] at dinagdag pa niya kumpare ko yan,magaling
yan, at taga-Tektite, madali nating maayos ang kaso. Nabanggit din niya na kumpare ni Atty.
David si
Atty. Pilares. Sinabi niya pa mas lamang kayo kasi mas alam niyo nangyayari kaysa sa
kabila."45
Also, Ricel, Riveras son-in-law, stated under oath that he saw Judge Blancaflor and plaintiff
Gilbert Leron (Gilbert) during the blessing of the chapel inside the compound of the judges
house on January 16, 2007 and he overheard Judge Blancaflor assuring Gilbert not to worry
about the case saying: "Pare wag na kayo mag-alala, ayos na ang kaso nyo nina Dr. Leron,"
while they were drinking beer.46
Judge Blancaflor argued that he had no interest whatsoever in the Leron case as it was
forwarded to Branch 26 in the ordinary course of business since cases falling within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court are directly forwarded to Branch26, his branch. His
letter to Atty. Trinidad should not be considered against him because he was then a new family
court judge. He further argued that he did not refer Atty. Pilares to the plaintiffs; he even
dismissed the case for prematurity and inhibited himself from the case after it was re-raffled.47
We do not find Judge Blancaflors explanations convincing.The circumstances of the Leron
case left Judge Blancaflor no other recourse but to inhibit. As Justice Fernando aptly observed,
it was more prudent for the judge to inhibit than to be placed under a cloud of distrust by the
parties. On the matter of the parties legal representation alone, we find credible the statements

of Rivera, Dr. Leron and Ricel that not only did Judge Blancaflor refer lawyers to the parties
but, more seriously, he gave them hints that they would prevail in the case.
Judge Blancaflors interference in the case in the way just described is not only gross
misconduct; it also constitutes a violation of R.A. No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, particularly Section 3(e) which provides: "In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x Causing any undue injury to
any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence x x x."
To be sure, even if Judge Blancaflor inhibited himself from the Leron case, he cannot extricate
himself from the legal mess he brought upon himself. His interference in the case caused an
undue injury to the party who should have prevailed had the case pushed through; and an
unwarranted benefit to the party who should have lost had the case been decided on the merits.
Worse, he exhibited evident bad faith when he gave both parties expectations of winning the
case. Thus, there is every reason to find probable cause against him for violation of R.A. No.
3019.
It is unfortunate that Judge Blancaflor lost sight of the exacting standards demanded of the
office of a judge in the Leroncase. Time and again, judges have been reminded thatas
magistrates, they must comport themselves in such a manner that their conduct, official or
otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to them as the
epitome of integrity and justice.48 Sad to state, Judge Blancaflor failed to pass this "searching
scrutiny."
Re: charge of immorality
On the charge of immorality for allegedly maintaining an illicit relationship with Villamar
who is nothis wife Justice Fernando aptly observed that Judge Blancaflor offered no evidence,
except general denials to disprove his moral indiscretion, which appeared to be widely known
in the community at the time material to the case. As the records show, statements made here
and there by witnesses and personalities drawn into the case confirm the special relationship
between Judge Blancaflor and Villamar such that Villamar had no hesitation in speaking for the
judge on matters concerning him and his work.
The community, it seemed, had accepted them as man and wife, given that they stayed in
Layugan, Pagsanjan, Laguna and owned Tagpuan Restaurant in Pila, Laguna. This restaurant,
incidentally, even became Judge Blancaflors extension office, usually in the afternoons, as
deposed by Rivera, De Mata, Byron, Ricel and Judge Blancaflors staff whose assistance Rivera
and De Mata sought in their effort to secure the provisional liberty for their clients Catuday and
Namplata. The depositions were backed up by pictures of (1) the places where Tagpuan
Restaurant used to stand and where the two were residing, and (2) the events in the life of the
live-in partners. Notably, Exhs. "N," "N-1," and "N-2"49 were separate camera shots of the place
where Tagpuan Restaurant used to stand; Exh. "A-15-C"50 was a picture of Gilbert, a party in
the Leron case, attending the blessing of the chapel inside the compound of Judge Blancaflors
house; Exh. "E"51 was a picture of Judge Blancaflor and Villamar together in a hut located
inside the compound of their house in Layugan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, apparently relaxing; and
Exhs. "F," "G," and "H" were pictures of Villamar picking up Judge Blancaflor from his office
at the RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, using her Pajero with plate no. XHF 887.52

Judge Blancaflor belittled the immorality charge, dismissing it as merely a fabrication and a
product of Riveras fertile imagination. To substantiate his claim, he cited the withdrawal of
Ondevillas affidavit confirming Riveras charge that he was maintaining an illicit liaison with
Villamar.53
Again, we are not persuaded by the judges response. Given the fact that Judge Blancaflor is a
person of authority and his involvement in the "bribery" incident (as revealed by Byron and
Ricel whom the judge even threatened if they would testify against him), we find more
credibility in Riveras submission that Ondevilla withdrew his affidavit on the immorality
charge because the judge likewise threatened him.
The confluence of the statements of Rivera and the others (Byron, De Mata, Ricel and Mirasol),
the information provided by Judge Blancaflors staff, and the exhibits described above,
constitute more than enough support for the immorality charge against Judge Blancaflor. These
interwoven pieces of evidence pointing to the relationship between the judge and Villamar,
several of which materialized over a period of time, could not conceivably have been the result
of Riveras fabrications. As De Mata testified during the investigation:
ATTY. SHALIM:
Q: Ms. Witness, you mentioned that Noralyn Villamar is the live-in partner of Judge
Blancaflor. How do you know this?
A: Because Tita Macky herself was the one who told me that Judge Blancaflor is her livein partner.
xxxx
J. FERNANDO:
Q: If you know, how long have JudgeBlancaflor and Noralyn been living together as livein partners?
A: 2006, your Honor.
Q: So they started as live-in partners since 2006?
A: June of 2006, Your Honor, because that was when I came back from Manila.
Q: As far as you are concerned, you only learned about it in 2006?
A. Yes , Your Honor.
Q: Have you seen them really living together as live-in partners?
A: No, Your Honor. It was my husband because they were still at Layugan because my
husband was the driver of my father at that time.
xxxx
Q: Are you saying that Judge and Macky are living in Layugan?
A: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx
Q: Are you sure that Macky told you that Judge Blancaflor is her live-in partner?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: How did she tell you?
A: It was just in a casual way that she told me that Judge is her current live-in partner
because previously it was a Colonel.
Q: So despite the fact that you are not close to Macky, Macky intimidated (sic) to you
that Judge Blancaflor is her live-in-partner?
A: Yes, Your Honor.54
Justice Fernando stressed that Judge Blancaflor did not categorically deny the allegations of an
illicit relationship with Villamar. While he stated that his marriage to his wife NoraLopez was
already annulled, the annulment became final only on July 18, 2012 by virtue of an entry of
judgment from the RTC, Br. 199, Las Pias City. Thus, he was still a married man at the time of
his liaison with Villamar.55
For maintaining a relationship with Villamar, Judge Blancaflor crossed the line of a proper and
acceptable conduct as a magistrate and a private person. In Re: Complaint of Mrs. Rotilla A.
Marcos and her children against Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, 56 we said: "x x x The Code of
Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not
only with respect to his performance of his official duties, but also to his behavior outside his
sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also
judged by his private morals. The code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all
times. x x x."
In sum, we find substantial evidence to hold Judge Blancaflor guilty as charged. This
conclusion, as correctly observed by Justice Fernando:
x x x jibes with the affidavits and testimonies of complainant Rivera and her witnesses. His acts
of fraternizing with lawyers and litigants, his partiality in the performance of his duties, his act
of giving bribe money to two (2) witnesses to a case in order for them to withdraw, and
maintaining an illicit affair with a woman not his wife tarnished the image of the judiciary.
Respondent judge demonstrated himself to be wanting of moral integrity x x x He is therefore
unfit to remain in office and discharge his functions and duties as judge.57 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, as observed by the OCA, it has been established that "[t]he findings of investigating
magistrates on the credibility of witnesses are given great weight by reason of their unmatched
opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified."58
Gross misconduct, bribery, violation of R.A. No. 3019 and immorality, all of them constituting
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct,59 are serious charges under Section 8, Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court punishable under Section 11 of the same Rule by any of the following: (1)
dismissal from the service, forfeiture of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including governmentowned or controlled corporations; forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave

credits; (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3)
months but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00.
Considering the gravity of theoffenses committed by Judge Blancaflor, we approve and adopt
the recommendations of Justice Fernando and the OCA for his dismissal from the service, with
the accessory penalties.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Presiding Judge Jaime C. Blancaflor, Branch 26, Regional
Trial Court, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, is found GUILTY of gross misconduct, violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and immorality, constituting serious violations
of the Code of Judicial Conduct under Section 8,Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
Judge Blancaflor is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement and other
monetary benefits, except accrued leave credits. He is DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
This ruling shall be without prejudiceto any disciplinary action that may be brought against
Judge Blancaflor as a lawyer under A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC.60 Accordingly, Judge Blancaflor is
directed to COMMENT within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision and to show cause
why heshould not alsobe suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned as a
member of the Philippine Bar.
A.M.
No.
RTJ-09-2200
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ)

April

2,

2014

ANTONIO
M.
LORENZANA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas
City, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this Decision the administrative complaints 1 filed by Antonio M. Lorenzana
(complainant) against Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria (respondent), Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 2, Batangas City.
The records show that the administrative complaints arose from the case "In the Matter of the
Petition to have Steel Corporation of the Philippines Placed under Corporate Rehabilitation with
Prayer for the Approval of the Proposed Rehabilitation Plan," docketed as SP. Proc. No. 067993, where the respondent was the presiding judge. The complainant was the Executive Vice
President and Chief Operating Officer of Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP), a company
then under rehabilitation proceedings.
i. Complaint
In his verified complaint dated January 21, 2008, the complainant alleged that in the course of
SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, the respondent committed Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of
Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence, Irregularity in the Performance of Duty,
Grave Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to

Observe the Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as
shown by the following instances:
1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation receiver over
SCPs objections and despite serious conflict of interest in being the duly appointed
rehabilitation receiver for SCP and, at the same time, the external legal counsel of most of
SCPs creditors; he is also a partner of the law firm that he engaged as legal adviser.
2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she termed as "consultative
meetings" in her Order2 dated May 11, 2007) in places outside her official jurisdiction
(i.e., a first class golf club, a hotel and sports club facilities in Metro Manila) and where
she arbitrarily dictated the terms, parameters and features of the rehabilitation plan she
wanted to approve for SCP. She also announced in the meetings that she would prepare
the rehabilitation plan for SCP.
3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what the
respondent dictated to him. Thus, the respondent exceeded the limits of her authority and
effectively usurped and pre-empted the rehabilitation receivers exercise of functions.
4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal meetings be off-record so
that there would be no record that she had favored Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB).
5. The respondent had secret meetings and communications with EPCIB to discuss the
case without the knowledge and presence of SCP and its creditors.
6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas (Anonas) as Atty. Gabionzas financial
adviser and, at the same time, as her financial adviser to guide her in the formulation and
development of the rehabilitation plan, for a fee of P3.5M at SCPs expense. Anonas is
also the cousin-in-law of the managing partner of Atty. Gabionzas law firm.
7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations against SCP,
leading to EPCIBs filing of a motion to create a management committee.
8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a subpoena (so that
SCP could confront EPCIBs witnesses to prove the allegation that there was a need for
the creation of a management committee), the respondent denied SCPs requests and
delayed the issuance of the order until the last minute.
9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCPs counsel, Atty.
Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his every attempt to speak; refused to recognize his
appearances in court; and made condescending and snide remarks.
10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Interim
Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved the rehabilitation
plan beyond the 180 days given to her in the Rules, without asking for permission to
extend the period from the Supreme Court (SC).
11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules
(the courts power to approve the rehabilitation plan) to include the power to amend,
modify and alter it.

12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to decide the matter in
EPCIBs favor and made comments and rulings in the proceedings that raised concerns
regarding her impartiality.
13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed special interest and
personal involvement in the case.
ii. Supplemental Complaint
The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint3 dated April 14, 2008 where he
alleged that the respondent committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her
photographs in a social networking website called "Friendster" and posted her personal details
as an RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She also posed with
her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn
underneath except probably a brassiere.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its 1st Indorsement 4 dated March 18, 2008,
referred the complaints to the respondent for comment.
a. Comment to January 21, 2008 Complaint
The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against her. While she admitted that she
crafted a workable, feasible rehabilitation plan best suited for SCP, she maintained that she did
so only to render fairness and equity to all the parties to the rehabilitation proceedings. She also
submitted that if indeed she erred in modifying the rehabilitation plan, hers was a mere error of
judgment that does not call for an administrative disciplinary action. Accordingly, she claimed
that the administrative complaints were premature because judicial remedies were still
available.5
The respondent also argued that the rules do not prohibit informal meetings and conferences.
On the contrary, she argued that informal meetings are even encouraged in view of the summary
and non-adversarial nature of rehabilitation proceedings. Since Section 21, Rule 4 of the
Rules6 gives the rehabilitation receiver the power to meet with the creditors, then there is all the
more reason for the rehabilitation judge, who has the authority to approve the plan, to call and
hold meetings with the parties. She also pointed out that it was SCP which suggested that
informal meetings be called and that she only agreed to hold these meetings on the condition
that all the parties would attend.
As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary period, she contended that she approved
the rehabilitation plan within the period prescribed by law. She argued that the matter of
granting extension of time under Section 11, Rule 4 of the Rules 7 pertains not to the SC, but to
the rehabilitation court.
The respondent likewise refuted the allegations of bias and partiality. First, she claimed that her
denial of the complainants motion for inhibition was not due to any bias or prejudice on her
part but due to lack of basis. Second, she argued that her decision was not orchestrated to favor
EPCIB, as evidenced by the fact that EPCIP itself (as some other creditors did) promptly
appealed her decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Third, she did not remove Atty. Gabionza
as SCPs rehabilitation receiver because she disagreed that the grounds the complainant raised
warranted his removal.

She also found no merit to the allegation of conflict of interest. Lastly, she maintained that the
rest of the complainants allegations were not substantiated and corroborated by evidence.
The respondent further alleged that she did not gravely abuse her authority in not issuing a
subpoena as Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation of the Rules
specifically states that the court may decide matters on the basis of affidavits and other
documentary evidence.
On the allegation of conflict of interest, she maintained that the allegations were not proven and
substantiated by evidence. Finally, the respondent also believed that there was nothing improper
in expressing her ideas during the informal meetings.
b. Comment to April 14, 2008 Supplemental Complaint
In her comment8 on the supplemental complaint, the respondent submitted that the photos she
posted in the social networking website "Friendster" could hardly be considered vulgar or lewd.
She added that an "off-shouldered" attire is an acceptable social outfit under contemporary
standards and is not forbidden. She further stated that there is no prohibition against attractive
ladies being judges; she is proud of her photo for having been aesthetically made. Lastly, she
submitted that the ruling of the Court in the case of Impao v. Judge Makilala 9 should not be
applied to her case since the facts are different.
On July 4, 2008, the complainant filed a reply,10 insisting that the respondents acts of posting
"seductive" pictures and maintaining a "Friendster" account constituted acts of impropriety, in
violation of Rules 2.01,11 2.0212 and 2.03,13 Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
In a Resolution14 dated September 9, 2009, the Court re-docketed the complaints as regular
administrative matters, and referred them to the CA for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The CAs Report and Recommendation
On November 13, 2009, Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, the Investigating Justice, conducted a
hearing, followed by the submission of memoranda by both parties. In her January 4, 2010
Report and Recommendation,15 Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complaints were partly
meritorious. She found that the issues raised were judicial in nature since these involved the
respondents appreciation of evidence.
She also added that while the CA resolved to set aside the respondents decision in the
rehabilitation proceedings, it was not by reason of her ignorance of the law or abuse of
authority, but because the rehabilitation plan could no longer be implemented in view of SCPs
financial predicament.
On the allegation of grave bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings, Justice
Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complainant failed to present any clear and convincing proof that
the respondent intentionally and deliberately acted against SCPs interests; the complaint
merely relied on his opinions and surmises.
On the matter of the respondents inhibition, she noted that in cases not covered by the rule on
mandatory inhibition, the decision to inhibit lies within the discretion of the sitting judge and is
primarily a matter of conscience.

With respect to the respondents informal meetings, Justice Gonzales-Sison found nothing
irregular despite the out-of-court meetings as these were agreed upon by all the parties,
including SCPs creditors. She also found satisfactory the respondents explanation in approving
the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180-day period prescribed by the Rules.
The foregoing notwithstanding, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the respondents unnecessary
bickering with SCPs legal counsel and ruled that her exchanges and utterances were reflective
of arrogance and superiority. In the words of the Justice Gonzales-Sison:
Rather than rule on the manifestations of counsels, she instead brushed off the matter with what
would appear to be a conceited show of a prerogative of her office, a conduct that falls below
the standard of decorum expected of a judge. Her statements appear to be done recklessly and
were uncalled for. xxx. Section 6[,] Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary states that: judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings
before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses,
lawyers and others whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judicial decorum requires
judges to be temperate in their language at all times. Failure on this regard amounts to a conduct
unbecoming of a judge, for which Judge Austria should be held liable.16
On the respondents Friendster account, she believes that her act of maintaining a personal
social networking account (displaying photos of herself and disclosing personal details as a
magistrate in the account) even during these changing times when social networking websites
seem to be the trend constitutes an act of impropriety which cannot be legally justified by the
publics acceptance of this type of conduct. She explained that propriety and the appearance of
propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge and that judges shall
conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Finally, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the CAs May 16, 2006 Decision 17 in CA-G.R. SP No.
100941 finding that the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the creation
of a management committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing in accordance with
the procedures prescribed under the Rules. She ruled that such professional incompetence was
tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and recommended a fine
of P20,000.00. She also recommended that the respondent be admonished for failing to observe
strict propriety and judicial decorum required by her office.
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA
In its Memorandum18 dated September 4, 2013, the OCA recommended the following:
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable
Court that:
1) the Report dated January 4, 2010 of Investigating Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison be
NOTED;
2) respondent Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, Branch 2, Regional Trial Court, Batangas
City, Batangas, be found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a judge and for violation of
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct;
3) respondent Judge Austria be FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(Php20,000.00); and

4) respondent Judge Austria be ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of

impropriety with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or any similar act will be
dealt with more severely.19
In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the respondent was not guilty of gross
ignorance of the law as the complainant failed to prove that her orders were motivated by bad
faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.
The OCA also found that the charges of bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation
proceedings were not supported by evidence. It accepted the respondents explanation in the
charge of failure to observe the reglementary period.
Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority and gross
incompetence are judicial in nature, hence, they should not be the subject of disciplinary action.
On the other hand, on allegations of conduct unbecoming of a judge, violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code), lack of circumspection and impropriety, the OCA shared
Justice Gonzales-Sisons observations that the respondents act of posting seductive photos in
her Friendster account contravened the standard of propriety set forth by the Code.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the recommendation of both Justice Gonzales-Sison and the OCA for the
imposition of a fine on the respondent but modify the amount as indicated below. We sustain
Justice Gonzales-Sisons finding of gross ignorance of the law in so far as the respondent
ordered the creation of a management committee without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
The absence of a hearing was a matter of basic due process that no magistrate should be
forgetful or careless about.
On
the
Charges
of
Grave
Irregularity
in
the
Performance
Bias and Partiality; and Lack of Circumspection

Abuse
of

of
Duty;

Authority;
Grave

It is well settled that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving the
averments of his complaint by substantial evidence.20 In the present case, the allegations of
grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality, and
lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because the complainant failed to establish the
respondents bad faith, malice or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to circumstances
based on mere conjectures and suppositions. These, by themselves, however, are not sufficient
to prove the accusations. "[M]ere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof."21
"[U]nless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad
faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, [the] respondent judge may not be held
administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official
acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication of cases."22
Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these
are, at best, legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial remedies that are
readily available to the complainant. "An administrative complaint is not the appropriate
remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial
remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal." 23Errors committed by

him/her in the exercise of adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative

proceedings but should be assailed instead through judicial remedies.24
On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality
We likewise find the allegations of bias and partiality on the part of the respondent baseless.
The truth about the respondents alleged partiality cannot be determined by simply relying on
the complainants verified complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially
of a judges sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to
the person, and to give equal right to the poor and rich. 25 There should be clear and convincing
evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion of partiality is not enough.26
In the present case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the circumstances
cited by the complainant were grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The complainant, too,
failed to adduce proof indicating the respondents predisposition to decide the case in favor of
one party. This kind of evidence would have helped its cause. The bare allegations of the
complainant cannot overturn the presumption that the respondent acted regularly and
impartially. We thus conclude that due to the complainants failure to establish with clear, solid,
and convincing proof, the allegations of bias and partiality must fail.
On
the
Charges
and Gross Ignorance of the Law

of

Grave

Incompetence

We agree with the findings of the OCA that not every error or mistake of a judge in the
performance of his official duties renders him liable.27 "[A]s a matter of policy, in the absence of
fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous."28
In the present case, what was involved was the respondents application of Section 23, Rule 4 of
the Rules, which provides:
Sec. 23. Approval of the Rehabilitation Plan. - The court may approve a rehabilitation plan even
over the opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor if, in its
judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition of the creditors is
manifestly unreasonable.29
The respondent approved the rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza, subject to the
modifications she found necessary to make the plan viable. The complainant alleged that in
modifying the plan, she exceeded her authority and effectively usurped the functions of a
rehabilitation receiver. We find, however, that in failing to show that the respondent was
motivated by bad faith or ill motives in rendering the assailed decision, the charge of gross
ignorance of the law against her should be dismissed. "To [rule] otherwise would be to render
judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment."30
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision, order or actuation of
the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence.
It must also be proven that he was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption 31 or had
committed an error so egregious that it amounted to bad faith.

In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was motivated by bad
faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering her decision approving the
modified rehabilitation plan. Besides his bare accusations, the complainant failed to substantiate
his allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be presumed 32 and this Court cannot
conclude that bad faith intervened when none was actually proven.
With respect to the action of the respondent in ordering the creation of a management
committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing for the purpose, however, we find the
error to be so egregious as to amount to bad faith, leading to the conclusion of gross ignorance
of the law, as charged.
Due process and fair play are basic requirements that no less than the Constitution demands. In
rehabilitation proceedings, the parties must first be given an opportunity to prove (or disprove)
the existence of an imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of the debtorcompanys assets and properties that are or may be prejudicial to the interest of minority
stockholders, parties-litigants or the general public.33 The rehabilitation court should hear both
sides, allow them to present proof and conscientiously deliberate, based on their submissions,
on whether the appointment of a management receiver is justified. This is a very basic
requirement in every adversarial proceeding that no judge or magistrate can disregard.
In SCPs rehabilitation proceedings, SCP was not given at all the opportunity to present its
evidence, nor to confront the EPCIB witnesses. Significantly, the CA, in its May 16, 2006
decision, found that the respondents act of denying SCP the opportunity to disprove the
grounds for the appointment of a management committee was tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion. As aptly observed by Justice Gonzales-Sison:
[T]he acts of the respondent judge (Judge Austria) in creating a MANCOM without observing
the procedures prescribed under the IRPGICC clearly constitute grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction.34
Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous
order that he renders, this does not mean that a judge need not observe due care in the
performance of his/her official functions.35 When a basic principle of law is involved and when
an error is so gross and patent, error can produce an inference of bad faith, making the judge
liable for gross ignorance of the law.36 On this basis, we conclude that the respondents act of
promptly ordering the creation of a management committee, without the benefit of a hearing
and despite the demand for one, was tantamount to punishable professional incompetence and
gross ignorance of the law.
On
the
Ground
the Reglementary Period

of

Failure

to

Observe

On the respondents failure to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Rules, we find
the respondents explanation to be satisfactory.
Section 11, Rule 4 of the previous Rules provides:
Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. xxx
The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon the lapse
of one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the initial hearing. The court may grant an

extension beyond this period only if it appears by convincing and compelling evidence that the
debtor may successfully be rehabilitated. In no instance, however, shall the period for approving
or disapproving a rehabilitation plan exceed eighteen (18) months from the date of filing of the
petition.37
Under this provision, the matter of who would grant the extension beyond the 180-day period
carried a good measure of ambiguity as it did not indicate with particularity whether the
rehabilitation court could act by itself or whether Supreme Court approval was still required.
Only recently was this uncertainty clarified when A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, the 2008 Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, took effect.
Section 12, Rule 4 of the Rules provides:
Section 12. Period to Decide Petition. - The court shall decide the petition within one (1) year
from the date of filing of the petition, unless the court, for good cause shown, is able to secure
an extension of the period from the Supreme Court.38
Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009 (long after the respondents approval
of the rehabilitation plan on December 3, 2007), we find no basis to hold the respondent liable
for the extension she granted and for the consequent delay.
On
the
Unbecoming of a Judge

Ground

of

Conduct

On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct states that:
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and
be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with
whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.39
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity,
independence and respect for himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must
exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. 40 He should
choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In other words, a
judge should possess the virtue of gravitas.41
As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v. Judge Carretas, 42 a judge should
be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court; he should always keep
his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. Furthermore, a
magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by
uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments.
Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge Rufon, 43 the Court declared that "although
respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble position in
the bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out of court.
Judges are required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in
language."

Accordingly, the respondents unnecessary bickering with SCPs legal counsel, her expressions
of exasperation over trivial procedural and negligible lapses, her snide remarks, as well as her
condescending attitude, are conduct that the Court cannot allow. They are displays of arrogance
and air of superiority that the Code abhors.
Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out that the respondent failed to observe judicial
temperament and to conduct herself irreproachably. She also failed to maintain the decorum
required by the Code and to use temperate language befitting a magistrate. "As a judge, [she]
should ensure that [her] conduct is always above reproach and perceived to be so by a
reasonable observer. [She] must never show conceit or even an appearance thereof, or any kind
of impropriety."44
Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
In these lights, the respondent exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge and thus violated
Section 6, Canon 6 and Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
On the Ground of Impropriety
We are not unaware of the increasing prevalence of social networking sites in the Internet a
new medium through which more and more Filipinos communicate with each other.45 While
judges are not prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in social networking
activities, we remind them that they do not thereby shed off their status as judges. They carry
with them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected
to follow in his/her everyday activities. It is in this light that we judge the respondent in the
charge of impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the public.
Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge
from joining or maintaining an account in a social networking site such as Friendster. Section 6,
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are
entitled to freedom of expression. This right "includes the freedom to hold opinions without
interference and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of
frontiers."46 Joining a social networking site is an exercise of ones freedom of expression. The
respondent judges act of joining Friendster is, therefore, per se not violative of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a correlative
restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct
themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary.
This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their activities,
whether it be in the course of their judicial office or in their personal lives. In particular,
Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit impropriety and
even the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities:
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions
that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and
willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the
dignity of the judicial office.
Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the propriety and appearance
of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an "offshouldered" suggestive dress and made this available for public viewing.
To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must bear
in mind that what they communicate regardless of whether it is a personal matter or part of his
or her judicial duties creates and contributes to the peoples opinion not just of the judge but
of the entire Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This is especially true when the posts the
judge makes are viewable not only by his or her family and close friends, but by acquaintances
and the general public.
Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in the attire she wore
to her family and close friends, but when she made this picture available for public
consumption, she placed herself in a situation where she, and the status she holds as a judge,
may be the object of the publics criticism and ridicule. The nature of cyber communications,
particularly its speedy and wide-scale character, renders this rule necessary.
We are not also unaware that the respondents act of posting her photos would seem harmless
and inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary member of the public. As the visible
personification of law and justice, however, judges are held to higher standards of conduct and
thus must accordingly comport themselves.47
This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and personal
matters.1wphi1 The very nature of their functions requires behavior under exacting standards
of morality, decency and propriety; both in the performance of their duties and their daily
personal lives, they should be beyond reproach.48 Judges necessarily accept this standard of
conduct when they take their oath of office as magistrates.
Imposable Penalty
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross
ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Under Section 11(A) of the
same Rule, a serious charge merits any of the following sanctions:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations; provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3), but
not exceeding six (6), months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00.
On the other hand, conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section
10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. It is penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the

following: (1) A fine of not less thanP1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3)
Reprimand; and ( 4) Admonition with warning.
Judge Austria's record shows that she had never been administratively charged or found liable
for any wrongdoing in the past. Since this is her first offense, the Court finds it fair and proper
to temper the penalty for her offenses.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS IGNORANCE
OF THE LAW for which she is FINED Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (P21,000,00). Judge
Austria is likewise hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of IMPROPRIETY and
to refrain from CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with the STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2426 [Formerly A.M. No. 05-3-83-MTC], June 16, 2015
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. JUDGE ALEXANDER
BALUT,Respondent.
R E S O LUTIO N
PER CURIAM:
On October 9, 2007, the Court partially resolved this case by disposing it as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE the Court finds and declares:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Judge Alexander S. Balut GUILTY of undue delay in deciding 33 cases submitted for
decision and in failing to resolve 101 motions within the 90-day reglementary period. He
is FINED twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same
shall
be
dealt
with
more
severely.
2. Judith En. Salimpade GUILTY of gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct.
She is DISMISSED from the service. She is DIRECTED to RESTITUTE the amount of
P1,817,378.59 representing the amount of shortages in her collections. Her withheld salaries are
to be applied to her accountabilities. The Office of Administrative Services, OCA
is DIRECTED to compute Ms. Salimpade's leave credits and forward the same to the Finance
Division, Fiscal Management Office-OCA which shall compute the money value of the same,
the
amount
to
be
deducted
from
the
shortages
to
be
restituted.
3. Eduardo Esconde GUILTY of gross neglect of duty. He is DISMISSED from the service. He
is also ORDERED to restitute his accountabilities in the amount of P58,100.00
4. Lydia O. Ramos GUILTY of neglect of duty. She is FINED P5,000, which should be
deducted
from
her
retirement
benefits.
The Office of the Court Administrator Legal Office is DIRECTED to file appropriate criminal
charges against Judge Alexander Balut, Judith En. Salimpade and Eduardo Esconde.
SO ORDERED.
As stated in the October 9, 2007 Resolution, the facts of the case are as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On May 3, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a judicial audit and
physical inventory of cases at the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) of Bayombong and Solano,
Nueva Vizcaya. Judge Alexander S. Balut was the acting presiding judge in both courts.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Aside from the judicial audit, a financial audit was also conducted in the MTCs of Bayombong
and
Solano
as
well
as
the
MCTC
of
Aritao-Sta.
Fe.
In the MTC, Bayombong, where Judith En. Salimpade was Clerk of Court II, the audit team
found an unremitted amount of P18,702.00 representing the court's collection from August 3,
2003 to August 18, 2003. Said amount was deposited only on August 18, 2003, upon advise by
the audit team, in the Land Bank of the Philippines account. Furthermore, 31 booklets of
accountable forms issued to Ms. Salimpade by the Property Division, SC and OCA were not
accounted for. Also, the court had a total Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) collection of
P348,993.60 from January 1990 to August 2003. However, only P186,330.98 was remitted by
Ms. Salimpade leaving a balance of P162,662.62; the total Clerk of Court General Fund
(CCGF) collections from January 1996 to August 2003 (audit scope) showed an unremitted
amount of P30,411.70; and as of August 31, 2003 the Fiduciary Fund had a total cash shortage
of P1,864,304.27 which covered the collections from 1995 to August 2003.
In sum, the shortages in the various funds incurred by Salimpade as of August 31, 2003 totalled
P2,057,378.59.
Salimpade, when asked about the shortages, explained that Judge Balut, since 1995 had
been getting money from the JDF collections. She had given in to the requests of Judge Balut
out of fear of him. She also admitted that she lent her co-employees money which she took from
her
collections.
Parenthetically, in September 2003, Judge Balut turned over P240,000.00 to Salimpade and
the latter issued a certification stating that the former had completely settled his monetary
accountability to the MTC, Bayombong. Judge Balut delivered to the Fiscal Monitoring
Division, Court Management Office (CMO) OCA the certification and deposit slip evidencing
the
turnover
of
the
P240,000.00.
The audit team also found that Salimpade failed to regularly submit her monthly report of
collections, as required in Supreme Court Circular No. 32-93. Consequently, Salimpade's
salaries
were
withheld
effective
August
2003
to
the
present.
In the MTC, Solano, the spot cash count on the court's collection disclosed that Eduardo
Esconde, Clerk of Court, had an unremitted/undeposited cash on hand amounting to
P59,545.00. However, the Official Receipts issued to cover said amounts were not accounted
for. The said cash amount was deposited on August 21, 2003 to Land Bank JDF Account No.
0591-0116-34.
A review of the receipts on file from May 2001 to July 2003 also showed a total cash shortage
of P106,527.80. However, on August 29, 2003, Esconde deposited in the CCGF and JDF bank
accounts sums corresponding to the said shortage. Esconde explained to the audit team
that Judge Balut borrowed various amounts from the collections. He stated that Judge Balut
started borrowing funds when the former was still the Clerk of Court of MCTC, Aritao-Sta.
Fe. He transferred to MTC, Solano, to get out of the shadow of Judge Balut. But, much to
his dismay, Judge Balut was designated Acting Presiding Judge of MTC, Solano
and continued the practice of borrowing money from the collections of the court.

In the MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe, the audit team found that Lydia Ramos, Clerk of Court, succeeded
Eduardo S. Esconde on July 16, 2000, without proper turnover of accountabilities. The team
also found that the amount of P540.00, part of the JDF collections from August 1, 2003 to
August 21, 2003, remained undeposited at the time of audit. Said amount was remitted to the
Chief Accountant, Supreme Court on September 10, 2003. Also, Mrs. Ramos opened an account
at the Rural Bank of Aritao, Inc. for the Fiduciary Fund of the court instead of maintaining an
account with Landbank. Said account was closed on September 11, 2003 and an account was
opened at Landbank, Bambang, on the same date. A comparison of the court's CCGF collections
and remittances for the period of November 1995 to July 2003 revealed a shortage of P510.00.
Mr. Esconde incurred during his incumbency a cash shortage of P430.00 while Mrs. Ramos
incurred a shortage of P80.00 as of July 31, 2003. From August 2003 to June 5, 2004, Mrs.
Ramos incurred a shortage of P430.00. She deposited the amount of P400.00 on August 23,
2004 leaving a shortage of P30.00. Withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund account on various
dates, totalling P243,900.00 for the refund and return of cash bonds to 20 litigants, were not
supported by any official court orders. Of the 20 litigants 15 did not acknowledge receipt of the
amount refunded. The Fiduciary Fund collection of the court from April 1996 to August 31,
2003 amounted to P2,064,978.00. As of August 31, 2003, however, the amount of P846,710.00
was unaccounted for by Mr. Esconde and Mrs. Ramos. Both denied that the shortages incurred
were of their own doing and they instead pointed to Judge Balut as the offender.
Ramos related to the audit team the constant requests/orders of Judge Balut to hand over to
him money from the Fiduciary Fund collections. In these instances, she requested Judge
Balut to affix his signature at the back portion of the withdrawal slips as the cash recipient.
However, not all of the transactions were evidenced by an acknowledgement receipt. Ramos
further stated that Judge Balut also collected the money through Salvador Briones, Court
Interpreter of MCTC-Aritao-Sta. Fe, whose signature also appeared at the back portion of
withdrawal slips as cash recipient. Thetotal withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund Account
given to Judge Balut, as evidenced by withdrawal slips bearing the signatures of Judge
Balut and Briones, for the benefit of the former, as cash recipients, amounted to
P193,500.00.
Aside from these, withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund account totalling P90,500.00 were
also given to Judge Balut. On the face of the slips of this class of withdrawals were notations
such as "Judge," "for Judge," "taken by Judge xxx" and "given to Judge" written by Ramos.
On May 9, 2002, Judge Balut issued a Certification stating that his accountability with the
Fiduciary Fund collection of MCTC Aritao-Sta. Fe as of April 2002 amounted to
P207,774.42.
However, before the final report on the court's shortages was completed, various amounts
totalling P802,299.82 were deposited by Judge Balut, Esconde and Ramos in the court's LBP
Account No. 3251-0544-51, as restitution/payment of part of the shortage of P846,710.00.
As of August, 2004, Ramos had fully settled the balance of her accountability. On the other
hand, Esconde still had a balance of accountability in MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe of P58,100.00
which, as of the time this case was submitted by the OCA for the Court's consideration, has
remained unsettled. (Emphases supplied)
In its Resolution,1 the Court ordered Respondent Judge Alexander Balut (Judge Balut) to pay a
fine for his failure to decide 33 cases and 101 motions without properly requesting for an
extension. The Court, however, did not rule on the administrative liability of Judge Balut with
respect to the result of the financial audit for the reason that he was not given a chance to
present
his
side
on
the
matter.

Consequently, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its Memorandum,2 sought
reconsideration of the Court's decision stating that although Judge Balut was not formally
required to comment on the findings of the audit team regarding the shortage in the court
collections, he was not denied due process of law. The OCA explained that Judge Balut was
able to present his side in his Letter3 to OCA, dated December 9, 2006. The OCA, thus, asked
for the re-opening of the case or in the alternative, that Judge Balut be required to comment on
the
findings
of
the
financial
audit.
In its Resolution,4 dated December 16, 2008, the Court directed Judge Balut to comment on the
audit report and, upon the recommendation 5 of the OCA, referred the matter to the Court of
Appeals
(CA)
for
investigation,
report
and
recommendation.6chanrobleslaw
Thereafter, the CA, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended the dismissal of the
charges against Judge Balut for failure of the OCA to clearly substantiate and prove the
participation of Judge Balut in the financial transactions of the courts. On his admission that he
borrowed money from the judiciary fund, the CA opined that Judge Balut could no longer be
penalized as he was previously fined by the Court in its October 9, 2007 Resolution.
The Court finds itself unable to agree with the recommendation of the CA.
In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary is substantial evidence or such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 7 The standard of
substantial evidence is justified when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is
responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or
even
preponderant.8chanrobleslaw
A review of the records shows that Judge Balut actually messed with the court collections.
The three clerks of court of MTC Bayombong, MTC Solano and MCTC Aritao-Sta Fe
categorically stated thatJudge Balut borrowed money from the court funds and executed
certifications to that effect. They separately reported that Judge Balut had
been borrowing money from the various funds of the court collections. In fact, Lydia Ramos
(Ramos), the Clerk of Court of MCTC-Antao-Sta. Fe, presentedseveral withdrawal
slips9where the back portions were signed either by Judge Balut or his court interpreter,
Salvador Briones, as the recipient of the cash withdrawn from the funds of the court. These
withdrawal slips likewise bore the notations of Ramos such as "Judge," "for Judge," "taken by
Judge," and "given to Judge" to serve as her reminder that the money withdrawn were given to
Judge
Balut.
Significantly, Judge Balut himself issued the Certification 10stating that his cash
accountability as of April 2002 with the Fiduciary Fund was P207,774.42 and there were
certifications issued by the clerks of court attesting that he had settled his accountabilities
with
the
court
funds.
The CA opinion that Judge Balut could no longer be penalized for his admission that he had
borrowed money from the judiciary fund because the Court already fined him in its October 9,
2007 resolution is erroneous. In the said resolution, the Court categorically stated that Judge
Balut was fined for undue delay in deciding 33 cases submitted for decision and for failing to
resolve
101
motions
within
the
90-day
reglementary
period.
Once again, the Court stresses that judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial
conduct.11Because of the sensitivity of his position, a judge is required to exhibit, at all times,
the highest degree of honesty and integrity and to observe exacting standards of morality,

decency and competence.12 He should adhere to the highest standards of public accountability
lest
his
action
erode
the
public
faith
in
the
Judiciary.13chanrobleslaw
Judge Balut fell short of this standard for borrowing money from the collections of the court.
He knowingly and deliberately made the clerks of court violate the circulars on the proper
administration of court funds.14 He miserably failed to become a role model of his staff and
other court personnel in the observance of the standards of morality and decency, both in his
official
and
personal
conduct.
The act of misappropriating court funds constitutes dishonesty and grave misconduct,
punishable by dismissal from the service even on the first offense. 15 For said reason, the
respondent deserves a penalty no lighter than dismissal. This Court has never tolerated and will
never condone any conduct which violates the norms of public accountability, and diminish, or
even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system. 16chanrobleslaw
The Court has considered the recommendation of imposing the penalty of suspension. That,
however, would be unfair to Clerk of Court Judith En. Salimpade, Municipal Trial Courts of
Bayombong and Solano; and Clerk of Court Eduardo Esconde of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Arita-Sta. Fe, who were both dismissed from the service for the same offense. Clerk of
Court Lydia Ramos was fined but only because she had already retired from the service. And it
would send a wrong message to the public that the Court has different standards - one for the
magistrates
and
another
for
the
rank-and-file.
The fact that Judge Balut fully paid his cash liabilities will not shield him from the
consequences of his wrongdoings. His unwarranted interference in the Court collections
deserves administrative sanction and not even the full payment of his accountabilities will
exempt him from liability. "It matters not that these personal borrowings were paid as what
counts is the fact that these funds were used outside of official business."17chanrobleslaw
Similarly, his nearly 22 years in the service would not serve to mitigate his liability. His offense
was not a single or isolated act but it constituted a series of acts committed in a span of several
years. In other words, he was a repeated offender, perpetrating his misdeeds with impunity
not once, not twice, but several times in three (3) different stations. In the case of In Re:
Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit Conducted in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Koronadal City,18 it was written:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
For misappropriating court funds in concert with Ines, Judge Sardido has been charged with
grave misconduct. Admitting that he indeed "borrowed" money from court funds, the latter
recounted that on four occasions in 1994, he had borrowed P130,000 to be able to purchase a
car and thereafter borrowed intermittently through the years, for reasons ranging from the
schooling needs of his children to the illness of his parents.That he intended to repay the
amounts "borrowed" is immaterial. These funds should never be used outside of official
business. Rule 5.04 of Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"A judge or any immediate member of the family shall not accept a gift, bequest, favor or loan
from anyone except as may be allowed by law."
Time and time again, this Court has emphasized that "the judge is the visible representation of
the law, and more importantly, of justice. It is from him that the people draw their will and
awareness to obey the law. For the judge to return that regard, he must be the first to abide by
the
law
and
weave
an
example
for
others
to
follow."
Sadly, the foregoing facts clearly show that Judge Sardido has not only miserably failed to
present himself as an example to his staff and to others, but has also shown no compunction in
violating the law, as well as the rules and regulations. His dishonesty, gross misconduct, and

gross ignorance of the law tarnish the image of the judiciary and would have warranted
the maximum penalty of dismissal, were it not for the fact that he had already been dismissed
from the service in another administrative case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, finding Judge Alexander Balut GUILTY of gross misconduct, the Court
hereby imposes upon him the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations, except the money value of accrued
earned
leave
credits.
Judge Balut is hereby ORDERED to cease and desist immediately from rendering any order or
decision, or from continuing any proceedings, in any case whatsoever, effective upon receipt of
a
copy
of
this
resolution.
This

disposition

is IMMEDIATELY

EXECUTORY.

The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that a copy of this resolution be
immediately
served
on
the
respondent.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
A.M. No. SB-14-21-J [Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB], September 23, 2014
RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON
COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.
- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
This administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc after investigation into certain
allegations that surfaced during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing indicated prima
facieviolations of the Code of Judicial Conduct by an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.
The investigation was conducted motu proprio pursuant to the Courts power of administrative
supervision over members of the Judiciary.1cralawlawlibrary
Factual Antecedents
In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an expos involving billions of government funds
channeled through bogus foundations. Dubbed as the pork barrel scam, as the money was
sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund allotted to members of the House of
Representatives and Senate, the controversy spawned massive protest actions all over the
country. In the course of the investigation conducted by the Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee), the names of
certain government officials and other individuals were mentioned by whistle-blowers who
are former employees of the alleged mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles (Mrs. Napoles), wife of an
ex-military officer. These personalities identified by the whistle-blowers allegedly transacted
with or attended Mrs. Napoles parties and events, among whom is incumbent Sandiganbayan
Associate
Justice
Gregory
S.
Ong,
herein
respondent.

Benhur Luy (Luy), a cousin of Mrs. Napoles who had worked for several years with the
Napoleses, filed illegal detention charges against Mrs. Napoles who accused him of doubledealing. When Luy went public with his story about Mrs. Napoles anomalous transactions and
before the warrant of arrest was issued by the court, she reportedly tried to reach out to the other
whistle-blowers for them not to testify against her but instead point to Luy as the one receiving
and
distributing
the
money.
Marina Sula (Sula) executed a Sworn Statement 2 before the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) on August 29, 2013, part of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
32. In the sixteen (16) years that I worked with Ms. Napoles, I witnessed several personalities
visit our offices and join us as our special guests during our parties and other special occasions.
33. These personalities who would either visit our office or join our events and affairs are:
Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Jinggoy Estrada and family, Senator Bong Revilla, Lani
Mercado-Revilla, Bryan Revilla, Secretary Rene Villa, Congressman Pichay and Wife,
Congressman Plaza, Congressman Ducut, DAR Director Theresita Panlilio, Catherine Mae
Canlas Santos, Pauline Labayen, Jen Corpuz (Staff of Senator Sotto), Mayor Rene Maglanque,
Atty.
Dequina, Justice
Gregory
Ong,
x
x
x.
34. Before the warrant of arrest was issued against Ms. Napoles, she told us that that case could
take four to five years to clear. She said, Antayin niyo munang ma-clear pangalan ko para
makakilos ako at matulungan ko kayo. Sinabi niya na meron na siyang kausap sa
Ombudsman
at
sa
Sandiganbayan.
35. On 28 August 2013 while me and my companions were at the NBI, Janet Lim Napoles
called me. She was crying and ask[i]ng me not to turn my back on her, that we should stay
together. She said kahit maubos lahat ng pera ko, susuportahan ko kayo. Hintay[i]n nyo kasi
lalabas
na
ang
TRO
ko.
x

38. Attorney Tan instructed us to implicate Benhur in case we were asked by the NBI. He said
wala naman ipinakita sa inyong masama si Madam (Janet Lim Napoles). Siguro wala naman
kayong sama ng loob kay madam, kaya nga idiin ninyo si Benhur na siya ang nag-utos at saka
sa kanya ninyo ibinibigay ang pera.3 (Emphasis supplied.)
The following day, the social news network Rappler published an article by Aries Rufo entitled
Exclusive: Napoles Parties with Anti-Graft Court Justice showing a photograph of Senator
Jinggoy Estrada (Senator Estrada), one of the main public figures involved in the pork barrel
scam, together with Mrs. Napoles and respondent. The reporter had interviewed respondent who
quickly denied knowing Mrs. Napoles and recalled that the photograph was probably taken in
one of the parties frequently hosted by Senator Estrada who is his longtime friend. Respondent
also supposedly admitted that given the ongoing pork barrel controversy, the picture gains a
different context; nevertheless, he insisted that he has untainted service in the judiciary, and
further denied he was the one advising Mrs. Napoles on legal strategies in connection with the
Kevlar helmet cases where she was acquitted by a Division of the Sandiganbayan of which
respondent is the Chairman and the then Acting Presiding Justice. 4cralawlawlibrary
On September 12, 2013, Sula executed a Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay5 wherein she
gave details regarding those persons named in her sworn statement, alleged to have visited their
office or attended their events, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

63) T: Ayon sa paragraph Nos. 32 at 33 ng iyong sinumpaang salaysay na may petsang 29

Agosto 2013, nabanggit mo ang mga personalidad na nakikita mong bumibisita sa inyong
opisina o di kaya naman sa tuwing may party o special occacions si JANET NAPOLES ay may
mga special guests kayo na kinabibilangan ng mga malalaking pulitiko at ang iba naman ay
may mga katungkulan sa gobyerno. Maari mo bang ilahad ang mga pangyayari sa mga bawat
pagkakataon
na
nakita
mo
sila
sa
iyong
pagkaka-alala?
S : Opo, iisa-isahin ko po ang mga pangyayari sa mga pagkakataon na nakita ko po ang mga
taong
nabanggit
ko:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x

w) Justice GREGORY ONG - Isang beses ko po siyang nakitang nagpunta sa officesa 2501
Discovery Centre, Ortigas at nakita ko po silang magkausap ni Madam JANET NAPOLES
sa
conference
room.
x x x x6
In her testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on September 26, 2013, Sula was
asked to confirm her statement regarding Justice Ong, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
THE
Isang

CHAIRMAN. Thank
tanong

you,

Senator
kay Ms.

lang

Grace.
Sula.

Sinabi niyo kanina may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya, Malapit na lumabas yung
TRO galing sa korte. May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte sa
Sandiganbayan?
MS.
THE

SULA. Hindi
CHAIRMAN.

Your

ko
attention

po
is

called

alam.
sa

page

MS. SULA. Sandiganbayan po, sorry. Mayroon po siyang binanggit na ano po

THE
MS.

CHAIRMAN. Nandito
SULA. Si

THE

Mr.

Ong,

MS.

po,

CHAIRMAN. Gregory

MS.
THE

sa

page
Justice

20.
Ong

po.
Ong.

SULA. Opo.
CHAIRMAN. Sa

Sandiganbayan?
SULA. Opo.

x x x 7 (Emphasis supplied.)
In a letter dated September 26, 2013 addressed to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno,
respondent meticulously explained the controversial photograph which raised questions on his
integrity as a magistrate, particularly in connection with the decision rendered by the
Sandiganbayans Fourth Division in the Kevlar helmet cases, which convicted some of the
accused
but
acquitted
Mrs.
Napoles.

Respondent surmised that the photograph was taken during the birthday of Senator Estrada in
February, either in the year 2012 or 2013, but definitely not in 2010 or earlier. He explained that
he could vaguely remember the circumstances but it would have been rude for him to prevent
any guest from posing with him and Senator Estrada during the party. On the nature of his
association with Mrs. Napoles, respondent asserted:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(4) I can categorically state, on the other hand, that I have never attended any party or social
event hosted by Mrs. Napoles or her family, either before she had a case with our court, or
while she already had a pending case with our court, or at any time afterwards. I have
never, to use the term of Mr. Rufo in his article, partied with the Napoleses. (Emphasis
supplied.)
As to the Kevlar helmet cases, respondent said it was impossible for him to have been advising
Mrs. Napoles, as claimed by Mr. Rufo, as even the article itself noted that Mrs. Napoles own
brother, Reynald L. Lim, (a.k.a. Reynaldo L. Francisco), a co-accused in the case, was
convicted by the Sandiganbayan. He stressed that these cases were decided on the merits by
the Sandiganbayan, acting as a collegial body and he was not even the ponente of the decision.
Respondent thus submitted himself to the discretion of the Chief Justice such that even without
being required to submit an explanation, he voluntarily did so to defend [his] reputation as a
judge and protect the Sandiganbayan as an institution from unfair and malicious innuendos.
On October 7, 2013, Chief Justice Sereno wrote the Members of this Court, citing the
testimonies of Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee [t]hat the malversation
case involving Mrs. Janet Lim-Napoles, Major Jaime G. Napoles, Jenny Lim Napoles,
Reynaldo L. Francisco and other perpetrators was fixed (inayos) through the intervention of
Justice Gregory S. Ong of the Sandiganbayan, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEN. ANGARA. Sa inyo, hindi niyo alam kung inayos iyong kaso na iyon? Kasi
napakaraming
koneksiyon,
di
ba?
xxxx
Sige,
huwag
kang
matakot,
Benhur.
MR. LUY. Alam ko, inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan
SEN.

ANGARA. Okay.

xxxx
THE CHAIRMAN. xxx Sinabi niyo kanina na may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya
Malapit na lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte. May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa
huwes
sa
korte
sa
Sandiganbayan?
xxxx
MS.
THE

SULA. Si

Mr.

Ong

CHAIRMAN. Gregory

MS.
THE

po,

Justice

Ong

po.
Ong.

SULA. Opo.
CHAIRMAN. Sa

Sandiganbayan?

MS.

SULA. Opo.

xxxx8chanrobleslaw
Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to conduct an investigation motu
proprio under this Courts power of administrative supervision over members of the judiciary
and members of the legal profession (referring to notaries public who were alleged to have
purposely left their specimen signatures, dry seals and notarial books with Mrs. Napoles to
facilitate the incorporation of non-governmental organizations [NGOs] involved in the
scam).9cralawlawlibrary
Under our Resolution dated October 17, 2013, the Court En Banc required respondent to submit
his comment and directed the NBI to furnish the Court with certified copies of the affidavit of
Luy.
On November 21, 2013, the Court received respondents Comment. 10 Respondent categorically
denied any irregularity in the Kevlar helmet cases and explained the visit he had made to Mrs.
Napoles
as
testified
by
Sula.
On Sulas statement, respondent points out that Sula never really had personal knowledge
whether respondent is indeed the alleged contact of Mrs. Napoles at the Sandiganbayan; what
she supposedly knows was what Mrs. Napoles merely told her. Hence, Sulas testimony on
the matter is based purely on hearsay. Assuming that Mrs. Napoles actually made the
statement, respondent believes it was given in the context of massive media coverage of the
pork barrel scam exploding at the time. With the consciousness of a looming criminal
prosecution before the Office of the Ombudsman and later before the Sandiganbayan, it was
only natural for Mrs. Napoles to assure Sula and others involved in their business operation that
she would not leave or abandon them and that she would do all that she can to help them just so
they would not turn their backs on her and become whistle-blowers. Thus, even if Mrs. Napoles
made misrepresentations to Sula regarding respondent as her connection, she only had to do
so in order to convince Sula and her co-employees that the cases to be filed against them would
be
fixed.
As to Sulas statement that she personally witnessed respondent at one time visiting Mrs.
Napoles at her office and having a meeting with her at the conference room, respondent said
that at the birthday party of Senator Estrada where the controversial photograph was taken, Mrs.
Napoles engaged him in a casual conversation during which the miraculous healing power of
the robe or clothing of the Black Nazarene of Quiapo was mentioned. When Mrs. Napoles told
respondent that she is a close friend of the Quiapo Churchs parish priest, he requested her help
to gain access to the Black Nazarene icon. Eventually, respondent, who is himself a Black
Nazarene devotee and was undergoing treatment for his prostate cancer, was given special
permission and was able to drape the Black Nazarenes robe or clothing for a brief moment over
his body and also receive a fragrant ball of cotton taken or exposed to the holy image, which
article he keeps to this day and uses to wipe any ailing part of his body in order to receive
healing. Because of such favor, respondent out of courtesy went to see Mrs. Napoles and
personally thank her. Respondent stressed that that was the single occasion Sula was talking
about in her supplemental affidavit when she said she saw respondent talking with Mrs. Napoles
at
the
conference
room
of
their
office
in
Discovery
Suites.
Respondent maintains that there was nothing improper or irregular for him to have personally
seen Mrs. Napoles at the time in order to thank her, considering that she no longer had any
pending case with his court, and to his knowledge, with any other division of the
Sandiganbayan at the time and even until the date of the preparation of his Comment. He thus

prays that this Court duly note his Comment and accept the same as sufficient compliance with
the
Courts
Resolution
dated
October
17,
2013.
This Court upon evaluation of the factual circumstances found possible transgressions of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct committed by respondent. Accordingly, a Resolution was
issued on January 21, 2014 stating that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to have the instant administrative matter REDOCKETED as A.M. No. SB-14-21-J (Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee Hearing held on September 26, 2013 against Associate Justice Gregory S.
Ong, Sandiganbayan), and ASSIGNS the same to retired Supreme Court Justice Angelina
Sandoval-Gutierrez for investigation, report and recommendation within a period of sixty (60)
days
from
notice
hereof.
The Court further resolves to NOTE the letter dated January 7, 2014 of Atty. Joffre Gil C.
Zapata, Executive Clerk of Court III, Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in compliance with the
resolution of the Court En Banc dated December 3, 2013, transmitting the original records of
Criminal Case Nos. 26768 and 26769. Atty. Zapata is INFORMEDthat there is no more need
to transmit to this Court the post-sentence investigation reports and other reports on the
supervisory history of the accused-probationers in Criminal Case Nos. 26768 and 26769.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice
Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, a retired Member of this Court, submitted her report with
the following findings and conclusions:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
FACTUAL
1. THE KEVLAR CASE

ANTECEDENTS

Two criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan sometime in 2001 Criminal Case No.
26768 for Falsification of Public Documents and Criminal Case No. 26769 for Violation of
Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law. Charged were several members of Philippine Marine Corps
and civilian employees including Ms. Janet L. Napoles (Napoles), her mother Magdalena
Francisco (now deceased), her brother Reynaldo Francisco and wife Anna Marie Dulguime, and
her
(Napoles)
three
employees.
These cases are referred to as the Kevlar case because the issue involved is the same the
questionable purchase of 500 Kevlar helmets by the Philippine Marine Corps in the amount of
P3,865,310.00
from
five
suppliers
or
companies
owned
by
Napoles.
The prosecution alleged inter alia that the accused, acting in conspiracy, released the payment
although there was yet no delivery of the Kevlar helmets; that the suppliers are mere dummies
of Napoles; and that the helmets were made in Taiwan, not in the U.S.A.
Napoles husband, Major Jaime Napoles, was dropped from the two Informations in an Order
issued
by
the
Ombudsman
on
March
18,
2002.
Napoles mother, brother, and sister-in-law were among those convicted for the lesser crime of
Falsification of Public Documents and sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years and 2 months
of prision correccional to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor and each to pay P5,000.00. They
all
underwent
probation.
Napoles and six members of the Philippine Marine Corps were acquitted in both cases.

The court ruled that Napoles was not one of the dealer-payees in the transaction in question.
Even if she owns the bank account where the 14 checks were later deposited, this does not in
itself
translate
to
her
conspiracy
in
the
crimes
charged
x
x
x.
xxxx
THE INVESTIGATION
x

I. During the investigation, Benhur testified that he and Napoles are second cousins. After
passing the Medical Technology Licensure Examination in 2002, he was employed in the JLN
(Janet Lim Napoles) Corporation as Napoles personal assistant. As such, he was in charge of
disbursements of her personal funds and those of her office. He was also in charge of
government transactions of the corporation and kept records of its daily business activities.
In the course of Benhurs employment at the JLN Corporation, Napoles mentioned to him the
Kevlar case, then pending in the Sandiganbayan, saying she has a connect in that court who
would
help
her.
When asked about his testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee concerning the
Kevlar case, Benhur declared that Napoles connect with the Sandiganbayan is respondent,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Q

The question was, Mr. Witness, this is coming from Senator Angara, and I quote,
Kailan ho lumabas yung decision ng Court sa Kevlar? And just to refresh your
memory, Mr. Witness, then Ms. Sula answered, I think 2010. Yun po yung lumabas
po. And then going forward, Senator Angara referred to both of you this question:
Sa inyo, hindi ninyo alam kung inayos yung kaso na iyon kasi napakaraming
koneksyon, di ba? Baka alam ng ibang whistleblowers kung nagka-ayusan sa kaso na
iyon. Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur. Do you remember that question being
asked from you?

xxxx
A
Q

Yes po.
And now Mr. Witness, about this statement of yours at the Blue Ribbon Committee
that Ms. Napoles has a certain connect sa Sandiganbayan, who was this connect you
were talking about, if you remember?
Witness Luy
A
Si Justice Gregory Ong po.
Q
How do you know that Justice Gregory Ong was the connect of Ms. Napoles at the
Sandiganbayan?
A
Ang sinabi po Si Ms. Napoles, pinsan ko po kasi we are second cousins. So
kinuwento talaga sa akin ni Madam kung ano ang mga developments sa mga cases,
kung ano ang mga nangyayari. Tapos po, sinabi niya sa akin mismo na nakakausap
niya si Justice Gregory Ong at ang nagpakilala raw sa kanya po ay si Senator Jinggoy
Estrada.
Benhur further testified that even before the decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated,
Napoles and respondent were already communicating with each other (nag-uusap na po sila).
Therefore, she was sure the decision would be in her favor:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Q
A

Do you remember the date when the decision (in Kevlar case) was promulgated?
Ano po, the year 2010 po maam.

Q
A
Q
A

And you met him (Justice Ong) in 2012?

2012 po, pero prior to that decision, madam, naririnig ko na po kay madam (Ms.
Napoles) kasi kinukwento na po ni madam sa akin na nag-uusap na po sila ni Justice
Gregory Ong.
That was after the decision was promulgated?
Bago po nailabas yung decision, ikinwento po ni Ms. Napoles sa akin na nag-uusap na
po sila ni Justice Gregory Ong. Kaya kampante po si Ms. Napoles. Noong lumabas po
yung decision, alam niya na po. Yung ang sabi sa akin ni Ms. Napoles.

Going back to the hearing before the Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur told Senator Angara that
Napoles fixed the Kevlar case because she has a connect in the
Sandiganbayan:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Baka alam ng ibang whistle blowers kung nagkaka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon (Kevlar case). Sige
huwag
kang
matakot
Benhur.
Benhur Luy: Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa
Sandiganbayan.
On how Napoles inayos or fixed the Kevlar case, Benhur said that he kept a ledger of the
Sandiganbayan case wherein he listed all her expenses in the sum of P100 million pesos. He
was surprised why she would spend such amount considering that what was involved in the
Kevlar case was only P3.8 million. She explained that she gave various amounts to different
people during the pendency of the case which lasted up to ten years. And before the decision in
the Kevlar case was released, she also gave money to respondent but she did not mention the
amount. Thus, she knew she would be acquitted.
Q

You answered Senator Angara this way which we already quoted a while ago, Alam
ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan. You
stated that the connect is Justice Ong. Can you explain before us what you mean,
Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon. What do you mean by that inayos?
Kasi po maam meron kaming ledger ng Sandiganbayan case sa lahat ng nagastos ni
Ms. Janet Napoles, nilista ko po yon lahat. Kasi naririnig ko po kay Janet Napoles,
parang pinsan ko po si Janet Napoles, Paano nagkaroon ng kaso ang ate ko? So
nadiscover ko na lang po na yun pala yung Kevlar. So, mahigit one hundred million na
nagastos po ni Ms. Napoles kasi di lang naman po si sir Justice Gregory Ong

xxx
Q
Did you come to know to whom she gave all the money?
A
Wala po siyangbasta ang sabi niya inayos na niya sibinaggit niya po sikasi si
madam hindi kasi nagki-keep kasi ako pinsan niya po kasi ako, nabanggit niya po si
Justice Gregory Ong. Sinabi niya nagbigay daw po siya ng pera kay Justice Ong pero
she never mentioned kung magkano yung amount.
xxx
Q
Nagbigay ng pera kay Justice Gregory Ong?
A
Opo, yung ang sabi niya (referring to Ms. Napoles).
Q
To you?
A
Yes, madam.
Q
Do you remember when she made that kind of statement?
A
Bago po ano madam, bago po lumabas yung decision kaya kampante na po si Ms.
Napoles bago lumabas yung decision na acquitted siya. Alam na niya. Sa Kevlar case.
xxx
Justice Gutierrez

Continue counsel.
Witness Luy
Kasi naikwento po madam ni Ms. Napoles na almost P100 million na ang nagastos
niya. Tapos ang sabi ko nga po sa kanya: Madam, P100 million na sa halagang P3.8
lang na PO (purchase order) sa Kevlar helmet, tapos P100 million na ang nagastos
mo?
Q
Did she tell you or explain to you to whom this P100 million was paid? How was it
spent?
A
Basta ang natatandaan kodi ko na po matandaan ang mga dates kasi parang
staggered. May P5 million sa ibang tao ang kausap niya. Tapos ito naman tutulong ng
ganito. Iba-iba kasi madam, eh.
Q
But there was no showing the money was given to Justice Ong?
A
Wala po pero nabanggit lang po niya (Ms. Napoles) sa akin na nagbigay po siya kay
Justice Ong, but she never mentioned the amount.
Continuing with his testimony, Benhur declared that in 2012, respondent went twice to Napoles
office at the Discovery Suites Center, 25 ADB Avenue, Ortigas, Pasig City. On the first visit,
Napoles
introduced
Justice
Ong to
Benhur
and
her
other
employees.
Benhur narrated what transpired during that visit. According to him, Napoles has so much
money being placed at the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Police Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) which offered 13% interest annually. Napoles called Benhur
telling him that respondent would like to avail of such interest for his BDO check of P25.5
million. To arrange this, Napoles informed Benhur that she would just deposit respondents
P25.5 million in her personal account with Metrobank. Then she would issue to respondent in
advance eleven (11) checks, each amounting to P282,000.00 as monthly interest, or a total of
P3,102,000.00 equivalent to 13% interest. Upon Justice Ongs suggestion, the checks should be
paid to cash. So, Benhur prepared the corresponding eleven (11) checks,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Q
With respect to the Kevlar case, what participation did you have, if there was any?
Witness Luy
A
Noon 2012 po kasi si Justice Gregory Ong po nasa unit 2501, yung office (of Ms.
Napoles), so kami ni Janet Napoles, nandito sa 2502 kasi yun po talaga ang office
namin. Si Ms. Napoles po sinabi niya sa akin, Ben, kasi si Ms. Napoles, may pera
siyang madami na pine-place niya po sa AFPSLAI at yung AFPSLAI po ay
nagbibigay po sa kanya o nago-offer ng 13% interest annually po. So, ang nangyari po
doon, sabi ni Janet Napoles, si Justice Ong ho raw, gustong magkaroon din ng interest
parang ganoon. So tutulungan niya. So ang ginawa po namin x x x.
Q
Meaning to say, Justice Ong would like to deposit money?
A
Opo.
Q
So he could get 13% interest?
A
Opo, kasi tapos madam ang nangyari po pumunta na po si Ms. Napoles sa kanyang
opisina. Tinawag po niya ako kasi pinasulat na niya sa akin ang checke. So, ang
ginawa po ni Ms. Napoles, yung checke ni..BDO check po kasi yun. Ang sabi sa akin
ni Ms. Napoles, checke daw po yun ni Justice Gregory Ong. Sa, BDO. So, di ko
naman din po nakita Madam yung nakalagay sa
Q
So it is the check of Justice Ong, not the check of Ms. Napoles?
A
Opo, ang amount po ng check madam ay P25.5 million ang amount noong BDO
check na inissue
Q
That belongs to Justice Ong?
A
Opo. Tapos madam, so ang ginawa po namin ni Ms. Napoles, dahil po 13% interest
ang ino-offer ng AFPSLAI, sabi ni Madam ganito na lang, Ben, ipasok na lang muna

natin yung check niya sa personal account ko. Ako na lang muna for the meantime,
mag-iissue ng check sa kanya para ma-avail ni Justice Ong yung interest. So, ang
ginawa namin madam, P25.5 million times 13% interest, tapos divided by 12,
lumalabas P282,000.00 or P283,000.00 or P281,000.00 po madam kasi nag-round off
kami sa P282,000.00. So, ang ginawa ni Madam, baga monthly. So eleven (11) checks
ang prinepare namin. Kung hindi po ako nagkakamali po, JLN Corporation check
angAko pa nga po ang nagsulat at saka bago po namin isinulat yung payee, inalam
pa po namin. x x x So, pumunta na naman si madam sa 2501 kasi nandoon si Justice
Gregory Ong. Noong bumalik siya, pay to cash na lang daw. So, makikita po sa
records namin ni Ms. Napoles na pumasok ang P25.5 million na amount sa kanyang
account at the same time nag-issue siya ng checke na P282,000.00 na eleven checks.
Nag-start kami madam 2012, siguro sometime July or August or mga ganoong buwan
po. Basta 11 checks, hindi nalalayo doon. So, siguro tapos na.
But what actually turned out was that the money of Justice Ong was deposited at the
bank but the interest was paid in advance by Ms. Napoles, and actually the bank will
pay Ms. Napoles the advanced interest she paid to Justice Ong, is that clear? Is that
the arrangement? Do you understand me?
Kasi ang nangyari po maam ganito e: yung P25.5 million ipinasok sa personal
account ni Ms. Napoles dito sa Metrobank. Metrobank kasi po yun e.

On the second visit of respondent to Napoles office, they just engaged in conversation. She
ordered Chinese food for him which, according to Benhur, is his (respondents) favorite.
On cross-examination, Benhur claimed that in his affidavits executed in the NBI, he did not
mention respondents name. However, in his reply-affidavit filed with the Sandiganbayan, he
alleged that Napoles issued P282,000.00 (the amount stated in each of the 11 checks) but he did
not mention the name of the payee upon instruction of his lawyer, Atty. Baligod. Nonetheless,
he
knew
that
the
checks
were
issued
to
respondent.
II. Sula, also a whistle blower, testified that she was an employee of JLN Corporation. Her
duties included the formation of corporations by making use of the forms, applying for business
licenses,
transfer
of
properties,
purchase
of
cars,
and
others.
Sula corroborated Benhurs testimony that respondent visited the office of Napoles twice
sometime
in
2012.
Sula was asked to explain her testimony before the Blue Ribbon Committee during the hearing
on September 26, 2013, quoted as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The

Chairman

(Senator

Teofisto

Guingona

III)

Sinabi ninyo na may tinawagan si Mrs. Napoles at sinabi niya, Malapit nang lumabas yung
TRO galing sa korte. May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte sa
Sandiganbayan?
x

Ms.
Si

Mr.

Ong

po.

The
Gregory

Justice

Ong

Sula
po.
Chairman
Ong?

Ms.

Sula
Opo.

The

Chairman
Sandiganbayan?

Sa
Ms.

Sula
Opo.

The
Okay. With that, I will just have a closing statement before we leave the hearing.

Chairman

Sula explained that the TRO mentioned by Napoles refers to the TRO to be issued by the
Sandiganbayan in the event the case involving the P10 billion PDAF scam against her is filed
with that court; and that Napoles told Sula and the other employees not to worry because she
has
contact
with
the
Sandiganbayan

respondent
Justice
Ong,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Q
Not the illegal detention case?
Witness Sula
A
Hindi po, pag nakasuhan na po kami sa Sandiganbayan.
Q
Okay, again?
A
Sa pagkakaintindi po namin, ang sabi po ni Madam na it takes 4 to 5 years, so
hihintayin niya na ma-acquit, sabi niyang ganoon, ang pangalan niya para maluwag na
tulungan kami. Ito po ang pagkakaintindi namin na sa Sandiganbayan.
Q
Yung PDAF?
A
Opo, yung PDAF sa Sandiganbayan.
Q
Pagdating ng kaso sa Sandiganbayan?
A
Opo, kasi po ina-ano po niya, siya po tinitira na ni Benhur si Madam tungkol sa P10
billion scam. So, pinag-uusapan namin sa bahay niya sa South Garden Unit na,
Madam, paano po yan, pag lahat ng kaso na iyan dadaan sa lawmakers, dadaan yon sa
Ombudsman at saka sa Sandiganbayan? Sabi niya, Huwag kayong mag-alala. Meron
naman akong mga contact doon. Sabi niyang ganoon sa Ombudsman at sa
Sandiganbayan.
Q
Is that in your affidavit?
A
Wala po. Pero sinabi ko po doon sa part na yon (her testimony before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee) na meron na siyang kilala sa Ombudsman, pero hindi niya
nabanggit ang pangalan. Pero sa Sandiganbayan, ang alam namin kilala niya si Justice
Ong.
Q
Yun ang sagot niya kay Chairman Guingona. Di ba I read it a while ago?
A
Opo, doon sa Sandiganbayan.
Sula also testified that every time Napoles talked to her and the other employees, she would say
that Justice Ong will help her in the Kevlar case. Sulas testimony is as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Q
A

x x x you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?

Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin every time po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na si
Justice Ong an[g] tumulong sa kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.

Sula likewise testified that Napoles told her and the other employees that she will fix (aayusin)
the PDAF case in the Sandiganbayan. Then they replied in jest that her acquaintance in that
court is respondent. Napoles retorted, Ay huag na iyon kasi masyadong mataas ang talent

fee.
x

III. Aries Rufo, a Reporter of Rappler, testified that he cannot reveal who gave him the
photograph [of respondent beside Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada] because he is shielded
by
law
and
he
has
to
protect
his
source.
When
asked
about
his
said:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

comment

upon

seeing

the

picture,

Rufo

Initially, when I saw the picture, since I knew that Justice Ong was one of the members of the
division that handled the Kevlar case, it aroused my curiosity why he was in that picture.
Second, because in journalism, we also get to practice ethical standards, I immediately sensed
though that a Justice or a lawyer, that he should not be seen or be going to a party or be in an
event where respondent (Ms. Napoles) was in a case under his Division. He should not be in a
situation that would compromise the integrity of his office.
Rufo further testified that on August 27, 2013, he faxed a letter to respondent to get his side
about the photo. The next day, he went to respondents office and showed it to him.
Respondent was shocked. He explained that it must have been taken during one of the parties
hosted by his friend Senator Jinggoy Estrada; that he did not know that the woman in the
picture is Napoles because she did not appear during the hearing of the Kevlar case; and that
such picture must have been taken in one of those instances when a guest would like to pose
with
celebrities
or
public
figures.
x

Respondent, in his defense, vehemently denied the imputations hurled against him.
1. He asserted that he could not be the contact or connect of Napoles at the Sandiganbayan
for he never met or came to know her during the pendency of the Kevlar case;
2. Challenging Benhurs testimony that he fixed or inayos the Kevlar case, respondent
claimed that it was decided based on the merits by the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division as a
collegial body. The two other members of the court, Justice Jose R. Hernandez (ponente) and
Justice Maria Cristina J. Cornejo, are independent-minded jurists who could not be pressured or
influenced
by
anybody,
not
even
by
their
peers;
3. On Benhurs allegation that respondent received an amount of money from Napoles prior to
the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, respondent deplored the fact that Benhur
was attempting to tarnish his reputation without any proof. And that it is unthinkable for him to
have received money from Napoles considering that her mother, brother, and sister-in-law were
convicted;
4. Respondent admitted he went to Napoles office twice, sometime in March 2012, after the
decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated in 2010 and narrated what prompted him to do so,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
At the birthday party of Senator Jinggoy Estrada on February 17, 2012, Napoles approached
him and introduced herself. She engaged him in a casual conversation and thanked him for her
acquittal in the Kevlar case. Respondent replied she should thank her evidence instead,
adding that had the court found enough evidence against her, she would have been convicted.

She talked about her charity works like supporting Chinese priests, building churches and
chapels in China, and sponsoring Chinese Catholic priests. He was not interested though in
what she was saying until she mentioned the name of Msgr. Ramirez, former Parish Priest of
Quiapo
Church.
Respondent became interested because he has been a devotee of the Holy Black Nazarene since
he was a little boy. Napoles told him that Msgr. Ramirez has with him the robe of the Holy
Black Nazarene which has a healing power if one wears it. Then respondent asked if he can
have access to the robe so he can be cured of his ailment (prostate cancer) which he keeps only
to himself and to the immediate members of his family. Napoles made arrangement with Msgr.
Ramirez until respondent was able to drape the robe over his body for about one or two minutes
in Quiapo Church. He also received a fragrant ball of cotton which he keeps until now to heal
any ailing part of his body. That was a great deal for him. So out of courtesy, he visited
Napoles in her office and thanked her.
That was his first
visit.
Thereafter, Napoles kept on calling respondent, inviting him to her office, but he kept on
declining. Then finally after two weeks, he acceded for she might think he is walang
kwentang tao. They just engaged in a small talk for about 30 minutes and had coffee.
5. Concerning Benhurs testimony that Napoles paid respondent an advanced interest
consisting of eleven (11) checks in the amount of P282,000.00 each and that he issued to her his
BDO check of P25.5 million which she deposited in her account, he claimed that he never
issued that check as he did not intend to invest in AFPSLAI. In fact, he does not have any
money deposited there. Inasmuch as he did not issue any BDO check, it follows that Napoles
could not have given him those eleven (11) checks representing advanced interest. He further
explained that he found from the internet that in AFPSLAI, an investor can only make an initial
deposit of P30,000.00 every quarter or P120,000.00 per year. The limit or ceiling is P3 million
with
an
interest
of
15%
or
16%
per
annum.
6. The whistle blowers testimony are conflicting and therefore lack credibility. While Sula
testified that Napoles told her that she did not want to approach respondent(should a case
involving the pork barrel scam be filed with the Sandiganbayan)because his talent fee is too
high, however, both whistle blowers claimed that he is Napoles contact in the Sandiganbayan.
With respect to the Rappler Report, according to respondent, Rufo was insinuating four
things:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. That there was irregularity in the manner the Kevlar case was decided;
2. That respondent was close to Napoles even during the pendency of the Kevlar case;
3.

That

respondent

was

attending

parties

of

the

Napoleses;

and

4. That respondent was advising Napoles about legal strategies relative to the Kevlar case.
Respondent dismissed all the above insinuations as false and without factual basis. As to the
last insinuation that he advised Napoles about legal strategies to be pursued in the Kevlar case,
respondent stressed that the case was decided by a collegial body and that he never interceded
on her behalf.
EVALUATION
x

It bears stressing that before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur initially testified that
Napoles fixed or inayos the Kevlar case because she has a contact at the Sandiganbayan,

referring

to

respondent.

Sula

corroborated

Benhurs

testimony.

Testifying before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is certainly an ordeal. The witnesses and
everything they say are open to the public. They are subjected to difficult questions
propounded by the Senators, supposedly intelligent and knowledgeable of the subject and issues
under inquiry. And they can easily detect whether a person under investigation is telling the
truth or not. Considering this challenging and difficult setting, it is indubitably improbable that
the
two
whistle
blowers
would
testify
falsely
against
respondent.
Moreover, during the investigation of this case, Benhur and Sula testified in a candid,
straightforward, and categorical manner. Their testimonies were instantaneous, clear,
unequivocal,
and
carried
with
it
the
ring
of
truth.
In fact, their answers to the undersigneds probing questions were consistent with their
testimonies before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. During cross-examination, they did not
waver or falter. The undersigned found the two whistle blowers as credible witnesses and their
story untainted with bias and contradiction, reflective of honest and trustworthy witnesses.
The undersigned therefore finds unmeritorious respondents claim that Benhur and Sula were
lying.
respondent insisted he could not have intervened in the disposition of the Kevlar case
considering that Napoles mother, brother and sister-in-law were convicted.
Respondent must have forgotten that Napoles natural instinct was self-preservation. Hence, she
would avail of every possible means to be exonerated. Besides, respondents belief that the two
members of his Division are independent-minded Jurists remains to be a mere allegation.
x

With the undersigneds finding that there is credence in the testimonies of Benhur and Sula,
there is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at the inevitable conclusion that in
fixing Kevlar case, money could be the consideration... Benhur testified he kept a ledger
(already shredded) of expenses amounting to P100 million incurred by Napoles for the
Sandiganbayan during the pendency of the Kevlar case which extended up to ten years; and that
Napoles told him she gave respondent an undetermined sum of money.
Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Benhur and Sula are pure hearsay, inadmissible in
evidence:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Justice

Ong

Your honor, since these are all accusations against me by Luy and Sula, and according to Luy
and Sula, these were only told to them by Napoles, always their statements werethey do not
have personal knowledge, it was only told to them by Napoles, is it possible that we subpoena
Napoles
so
that
the
truth
will
come
out?
If
x

Justice
That

x
Gutierrez

is

your

prerogative.

Justice

Ong

I am willing to take the risk although I know I am not an acquaintance of Napoles. Just to clear
my name whether I should be hung or I should not be hung.
x

Atty.
I

Geronilla
dont

think

Justice

it

would

Gutierrez

be

necessary,

(to

your

honor.

Atty.

Geronilla)

Discuss this matter with your client, file a motion, then we will see.
However, respondent and his counsel did not take any action on the undersigneds suggestion.
They did not present Napoles to rebut the testimonies of Benhur and Sula. Significantly,
respondent failed to consider that his testimony is likewise hearsay. He should have presented
Msgr. Ramirez and Napoles as witnesses to support his claim regarding their role which enabled
him
to
wear
the
robe
of
the
Holy
Black
Nazarene.
x

Respondents acts of allowing himself to be Napoles contact in the Sandiganbayan, resulting in

the fixing of the Kevlar case, and of accepting money from her, constitute gross misconduct, a
violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
x

That Benhur personally prepared the eleven (11) checks which Napoles handed to respondent
led the undersigned to conclude without hesitation that this charge is true. It is highly
inconceivable that Benhur could devise or concoct his story. He gave a detailed and lucid
narration of the events, concluding that actually Napoles gave respondent P3,102,000.00 as
advanced
interest.
According to respondent, the purpose of his first visit was to thank Napoles for making it
possible for him to wear the Holy Black Nazarenes robe. Even assuming it is true, nonetheless
it is equally true that during that visit, respondent could have transacted business with Napoles.
Why should Napoles pay respondent an advanced interest of P3,102,000.0 with her own money
if
it
were
not
a
consideration
for
a
favor?
Respondents transgression pertains to his personal life and no direct relation to his judicial
function. It is not misconduct but plain dishonesty. His act is unquestionably disgraceful and
renders him morally unfit as a member of the Judiciary and unworthy of the privileges the law
confers on him. Furthermore, respondents conduct supports Benhurs assertion that he received
money
from
Napoles.
Dishonesty likewise violates Canon 2 (1 and 2) on Integrity of the same Code providing in part
that judges must ensure that their conduct is above reproach and must reaffirm the peoples faith
in
the
integrity
of
the
Judiciary.
Indeed,

respondent

should

not

stay

in

his

position

even

for

moment.

...From respondents end, there was nothing wrong when he visited Napoles twice in her office
considering that the visits took place long after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar
case.
Contrary to respondents submission, such acts also constitute gross misconduct in violation of
Canon 4 on Propriety of the same Code. Section 1 provides that judges shall avoid impropriety
and
the
appearance
of
impropriety
in
all
of
their
activities.
respondents reason for his first visit was to thank Napoles for her help in making it possible
for him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene. Instead of visiting her, respondent could
have extended his gratitude by simply calling her by phone. Worse, he visited her again because
she may think he is an unworthy person. This is an extremely frail reason. He was seen by the
whistle blowers and their co-workers who, without doubt, readily confirmed that he was
Napoles contact at the Sandiganbayan and that he fixed the decision in the Kevlar case.
Respondent cannot be excused for his unconcern for the position he holds. Being aptly
perceived as the visible personification of law and justice, his personal behavior, not only while
in the performance of official duties but also outside the court, must be beyond reproach. A
judicial office circumscribes a personal conduct and imposes a number of inhibitions, whose
faithful observance is the price one has to pay for holding an exalted position.
xxxx
On
the
photograph
with Senator Jinggoy Estrada and Napoles.

showing

respondent

xxxx
This incident manifests respondents disregard of the dictum that propriety and the appearance
of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge. This exacting
standard of decorum is demanded from judges to promote public confidence in the integrity of
the
Judiciary.
In joining Senator Estrada and Napoles in a picture taking, respondent gave a ground for
reproach by reason of impropriety. It bears reiterating Canon 4 (1) on Propriety of the same
Code which provides that judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all
of
their
activities.
Respondent maintained that he did not know Napoles at that time because she was not present
before the Sandiganbayan during the hearing of the Kevlar case for she must have waived her
appearance. Respondents explanation lacks merit. That court could not have acquired
jurisdiction over her if she did not appear personally for arraignment.
Of utmost significance is the fact that this is not the first time that respondent has been charged
administratively. In Assistant Special Prosecutor III Rohermina J. Jamsani-Rodriguez v.
Justices Gregory S. Ong, Jose R. Hernandez and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada, Sandiganbayan, the
Supreme Court found respondent Justice Ong guilty of violation of PD 1606 and The Revised
Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan for non-observance of collegiality in hearing criminal
cases in the Hall of Justice, Davao City. Instead of siting as a collegial body, the members of the
Sandiganbayan Fourth Division adopted a different procedure. The Division was divided into
two. As then Chairperson of the Division, respondent was ordered to pay a fine of P15,000.00
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.

the undersigned cannot hold back her skepticism regarding the acquittal of Napoles. The
Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, of which respondent was the Chairman, held that Napoles did
not conspire with the suppliers in the questionable purchase of the Kevlar helmets as she was
not one of the dealer-payees in the transaction in question and that there was no proof of an
overt act on her part. How could the Fourth Division arrive at such conclusion? The Decision
itself indicates clearly that (1) Napoles was following up the processing of the documents; (2)
that she was in charge of the delivery of the helmets; and (3) the checks amounting to
P3,864,310.00 as payment for the helmets were deposited and cleared in only one bank account,
Security
Bank
Account
No.
512-000-2200,
in
the
name
of
Napoles.
Considering this glaring irregularity, it is safe to conclude that indeed respondent has a hand in
the acquittal of Napoles. All along, the whistle blowers were telling the truth.
xxxx
RECOMMENDATION
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, It is respectfully recommended, for consideration of the
Honorable Court, that respondent Justice Gregory S. Ong be found GUILTY of gross
misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary and be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service WITH
FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, and WITH
PREJUDICE to reemployment to any government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
xxxx
The Courts Ruling
This Court adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Investigating Justice
which
are
well-supported
by
the
evidence
on
record.
Based on the testimonies of Luy, Sula and Rufo, the Investigating Justice formulated the
charges against the respondent, as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the Kevlar case while it
was pending in the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division wherein he is the Chairman;
2. Respondent, being Napoles contact in the Sandiganbayan, fixed the Kevlar case
resulting in her acquittal;
3. Respondent received an undetermined amount of money from Napoles prior to the
promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case thus, she was sure (kampante) of
her acquittal;
4. Respondent visited Napoles in her office where she handed to him eleven (11)
checks, each amounting to P282,000.00 or a total of P3,102,000.00, as advanced
interest for his P25.5 million BDO check she deposited in her personal account;
andChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

5. Respondent attended Napoles parties and was photographed with Senator Estrada
and Napoles.11
Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and corruption or
bribery during the pendency of the Kevlar case, and impropriety on account of his dealing and
socializing with Napoles after her acquittal in the said case. Additionally, respondent failed to
disclose in his September 26, 2013 letter to Chief Justice Sereno that he had actually visited
Napoles at her office in 2012, as he vehemently denied having partied with or attended any
social
event
hosted
by
her.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; while
gross has been defined as out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such
conduct as is not to be excused. 12 We agree with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondents
association with Napoles during the pendency and after the promulgation of the decision in the
Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal, constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding the absence
of direct evidence of corruption or bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.
We cannot overemphasize that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e.,
that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, is required. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is
reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of,
even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. 13cralawlawlibrary
The testimonies of Luy and Sula established that Napoles had been in contact with respondent
(nag-uusap sila) during the pendency of the Kevlar case. As Napoles trusted staff, they
(especially Luy who is a cousin) were privy to her daily business and personal activities.
Napoles constantly updated them of developments regarding the case. She revealed to them
that she has a connect or contact in the Sandiganbayan who will help fix the case
involving her, her mother, brother and some employees. Having closely observed and heard
Napoles being confident that she will be acquitted even prior to the promulgation of the
decision in the Kevlar case, they were convinced she was indeed in contact with respondent,
whose identity was earlier divulged by Napoles to Luy. Luy categorically testified that Napoles
told him she gave money to respondent but did not disclose the amount. There was no reason
for them to doubt Napoles statement as they even keep a ledger detailing her expenses for the
Sandiganbayan, which reached P100 million. Napoles information about her association with
respondent was confirmed when she was eventually acquitted in 2010 and when they saw
respondent visit her office and given the eleven checks issued by Napoles in 2012.
Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Luy and Sula were hearsay as they have no
personal knowledge of the matters they were testifying, which were merely told to them by
Napoles. Specifically, he points to portions of Sulas testimony indicating that Napoles had not
just one but contact persons in Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan; hence, it could have been
other individuals, not him, who could help Napoles fix the Kevlar case, especially since
Napoles never really disclosed to Sula who was her (Napoles) contact at the Sandiganbayan and
at one of their conversations Napoles even supposedly said that respondents talent fee was
too
high.
Bribery is committed when a public officer agrees to perform an act in connection with the
performance of official duties in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received. 14
A judge who extorts money from a party-litigant who has a case before the court commits a
serious misconduct and this Court has condemned such act in the strongest possible terms.

Particularly because it has been committed by one charged with the responsibility of
administering the law and rendering justice, it quickly and surely corrodes respect for law and
the
courts.15cralawlawlibrary
An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. The complainant must
present a panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation. Inasmuch as what is imputed
against the respondent judge connotes a grave misconduct, the quantum of proof required
should be more than substantial.16 Concededly, the evidence in this case is insufficient to
sustain the bribery and corruption charges against the respondent. Both Luy and Sula have not
witnessed respondent actually receiving money from Napoles in exchange for her acquittal in
the Kevlar case. Napoles had confided to Luy her alleged bribe to respondent.
Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the respondent, we find
credible evidence of his association with Napoles after the promulgation of the decision in the
Kevlar case. The totality of the circumstances of such association strongly indicates
respondents corrupt inclinations that only heightened the publics perception of anomaly in the
decision-making process. By his act of going to respondent at her office on two occasions,
respondent exposed himself to the suspicion that he was partial to Napoles. That respondent
was not the ponente of the decision which was rendered by a collegial body did not forestall
such suspicion of partiality, as evident from the public disgust generated by the publication of a
photograph of respondent together with Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada. Indeed, the
context of the declarations under oath by Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, taking place at the height of the Pork Barrel controversy, made all the difference
as respondent himself acknowledged. Thus, even in the present administrative proceeding, their
declarations are taken in the light of the public revelations of what they know of that
government corruption controversy, and how it has tainted the image of the Judiciary.
The hearsay testimonies of Luy and Sula generated intense public interest because of their close
relationship to Napoles and their crucial participation in her transactions with government
officials, dubbed by media as the Pork Barrel Queen. But as aptly observed by Justice
Sandoval-Gutierrez, the challenging and difficult setting of the Senate hearings where they
first testified, made it highly improbable that these whistle blowers would testify against the
respondent. During the investigation of this case, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez described their
manner of testifying as candid, straightforward and categorical. She likewise found their
testimonies as instantaneous, clear, unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth, and
more important, these are consistent with their previous testimonies before the Senate; they
never
wavered
or
faltered
even
during
cross-examination.
It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great weight
by the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as
they testified.17 The rule which concedes due respect, and even finality, to the assessment of
credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases applies a fortiori to
administrative cases.18 In particular, we concur with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrezs assessment
on the credibility of Luy and Sula, and disagree with respondents claim that these witnesses are
simply
telling
lies
about
his
association
with
Napoles.
Contrary to respondents submission, Sula in her testimony said that whenever Napoles talked
about her contacts in the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, they knew that insofar as the
Sandiganbayan was concerned, it was understood that she was referring to respondent even as
she may have initially contacted some persons to get to respondent, and also because they have
seen him meeting with Napoles at her office. It appears that Napoles made statements regarding
the Kevlar case not just to Luy but also to the other employees of JLN Corporation. The

following are excerpts from Sulas testimony on direct examination, where she even hinted at
their expected outcome of the Kevlar case:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Atty. Benipayo
So, Ms. Sula, what were the statements being made by Ms. Janet Lim Napoles
Q
regarding her involvement in the Kevlar case, or how she was trying to address the
problem with the Kevlar case pending before the Sandiganbayan?
Witness Sula
Ang alam ko po kasi marami po siyang kinaka-usap na mga lawyers na binabayaran
niya para tulungan siya kay Gregory Ong sa Kevlar case. Tapos,sa kalaunan po,
nasabi na niya sa amin na meron na po siyang nakilala sa Sandiganbayan na
nagngangalang Justice Gregory Ong. Tapos, sabi niya, siya po ang tutulong sa
A
amin para ma-clear kami. Pero hindi niya sinabi na meron din pong masasagot sa
kaso. Hindi po lahat, kasi po dalawa sa mga empleyado niya, bale apat, dalawang
empleyado niya, isang kapatid niya at sister-in-law ang mag-aano sa kaso pati yung
mother niya na namatay na ay sasagot din sa kaso. Siya lang at saka yung asawa niya
ang bale makli-clear sa kaso.
So, she told you that two (2) employees, one (1) sister-in-law and one brother will
Q
answer for the case and Janet Lim Napoles and her husband will be acquitted, is that
right?
Yun po ang aking pagkaka-alam kasi po, nag-petition po kasi sila eh, yung mga
A
officemates ko. Nagkaroon ng probation. Noong lumabas ang hatol, meron silang
probation period.
xxxx
Q
Which you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?
Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin everytime po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na si
A
Justice Ong ang tutulong sa kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.
19
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
As it turned out, Napoles husband was dropped from the two informations while her mother,
brother and sister-in-law were convicted in the lesser charge of falsification of public
documents. Apparently, after her acquittal, Napoles helped those convicted secure a probation.
But as stated in our earlier resolution, the Court will no longer delve into the merits of the
Kevlar case as the investigation will focus on respondents administrative liability.
Respondents act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions was
grossly improper and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, which took effect on June 1, 2004.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and that fraternizing
with litigants tarnishes this appearance.20 Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by
irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and the
appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and
willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen.21cralawlawlibrary
In Caeda v. Alaan,22 we held that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an
essential manifestation of reality. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to
avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety.

They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach.
[Respondents] acts have been less than circumspect. He should have kept himself free from
any appearance of impropriety and endeavored to distance himself from any act liable to create
an
impression
of
indecorum.
x

Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one
has to pay for occupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not
freely venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid not just
impropriety in the performance of judicial duties but in all his activities whether in his
public or private life. He must conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground for
reproach. (Emphasis supplied.)
On this score, our previous pronouncements have enjoined judges to avoid association or
socializing with persons who have pending cases before their court. Respondent cites the case
of Abundo v. Manio, Jr.23 where this Court did not find fault with a judge who was charged with
fraternizing with his lawyer-friend. In that case, we said:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Respondent admits that he and Atty. Pajarillo became close friends in 1989 when they were
both RTC judges stationed in Naga City. Since they both resided in Camarines Norte, Atty.
Pajarillo hitched rides with respondent to Daet, Camarines Norte in the latters car.
In his Comment, respondent claims that he leaves the door to his chambers open to lawyers or
parties with official court business, whose requests and complaints regarding their cases he
listens to in full view of his staff, who are witnesses to his transparency and honesty in
conducting such dialogues. He also admits that Atty. Pajarillo has been to his house on several
occasions, but only to make emergency long-distance calls to his children in Metro Manila. He,
however, denies that he and Atty. Pajarillo were frequently seen eating and drinking together in
public
places.
We agree with Justice Buzons finding that the evidence against respondent on this point was
insufficient, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On the other hand, the admission of respondent that he attended two public functions where
Atty. Pajarillo was also present; that Atty. Pajarillo had been in his house twice or thrice and
used his telephone; and that he receives lawyers, including Atty. Pajarillo, and litigants inside
his chambers, the door to which is always open so that [the] staff could see that no under the
table transactions are taking place, is not proof that he is fraternizing with Atty. Pajarillo. A
judge need not ignore a former colleague and friend whenever they meet each other or when
the latter makes requests which are not in any manner connected with cases pending in his
court. Thus, Canon 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
30. Social

relations

It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges should live in
retirement or seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the completion
of their work will permit, they continue to mingle in social intercourse, and that they should not
discontinue their interests in or appearance at meetings of members at the bar. A judge should,
however, in pending or prospective litigation before him be scrupulously careful to avoid such

action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or
friendships constitute an element in determining his judicial course.
The factual setting in Abundo v. Manio, Jr. is not similar to the present case because Napoles
was not a colleague or lawyer-friend but an accused in a former case before the
Sandiganbayans Fourth Division chaired by respondent and which acquitted her from
malversation charge. What respondent perhaps want to underscore is the caveat for judges, in
pending or prospective litigation before them, to avoid such action as may raise suspicion on
their partiality in resolving or deciding the case. Thus, he emphasized in his Memorandum that
he never knew Napoles on a personal level while she was still on trial as an accused in Kevlar
helmet case. Respondent even quoted Sulas testimony expressing her opinion that she finds
nothing wrong with respondent going to Napoles office because at that time, the Kevlar case
had
already
been
terminated.
We do not share the view that the rule on propriety was intended to cover only pending and
prospective
litigations.
Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere suggestion of
partiality and impropriety.24 Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that
[p]ropriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities
of a judge. Section 2 further provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In
particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the
judicial office.
As we held in Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana25cralawlawlibrary
Judges, indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel appearing
before them so as to avoid even a mere perception of possible bias or partiality. It is not
expected, of course, that judges should live in retirement or seclusion from any social
intercourse. Indeed, it may be desirable, for instance, that they continue, time and work
commitments permitting, to relate to members of the bar in worthwhile endeavors and in such
fields of interest, in general, as are in keeping with the noble aims and objectives of the legal
profession. In pending or prospective litigations before them, however, judges should be
scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their
personal, social or sundry relations could influence their objectivity, for not only must judges
possess proficiency in law but that also they must act and behave in such manner that would
assure, with great comfort, litigants and their counsel of the judges competence, integrity and
independence.
In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper acts were
committed by the judge. Because magistrates are under constant public scrutiny, the termination
of a case will not deter public criticisms for acts which may cast suspicion on its disposition or
resolution. As what transpired in this case, respondents association with Napoles has
unfortunately dragged the Judiciary into the Pork Barrel controversy which initially involved
only legislative and executive officials. Worse, Napoles much-flaunted contact in the
judiciary is no less than a Justice of the Sandiganbayan, our special court tasked with hearing
graft cases. We cannot, by any stretch of indulgence and compassion, consider respondents
transgression
as
a
simple
misconduct.
During his testimony, respondent acknowledged his violation of judicial ethics and its serious

repercussions, as shown by his answers to the questions from the Investigation

Justice, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Justice Gutierrez
What I am thinking Justice, as a Justice holding a very high position, could it not be
possible for you to just go to the Church of Quiapo and ask the priest there to help you
or assist you, no longer through Ms. Napoles?
Justice Ong
You cannot do that, your honor. Ever since when I was a small boy, I never got near
the image of the Mahal na Poon. Nobody can do that, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
No, no. What I mean is that you can just go to the priest in Quiapo and make the
proper request. Why did you not do that?
Justice Ong
I dont know, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
Because you have been suffering from that ailment, mass or whatever, and that you
are a devotee of the Black Nazarene. You could have gone to the Office of the priest
there and had that request for you to wear that robe of the Black Nazarene?
Justice Ong
Hindi ko po alam na may ganyan, your honor. I was only told by Napoles during that
conversation. Had I known that, siguro po pwede ko pong gawin. Had I known that
there is such a robe, maybe I will do that.
Justice Gutierrez
Okay. It happened already. But just to thank Ms. Napoles, I think Justice you should
have been very, very careful about your actuations. You should not have been seen in
public, you know, with a woman like her who was an accused before. You could have
thanked her simply by calling her. You could have relayed to her your true feelings
that you are so grateful because of her assistance. Were it not for her, you could not
have worn that Holy Robe of the Black Nazarene. You could have simply called her
instead of going to her office; instead of, you know, going to the Church of Santuario
de San Antonio in Forbes Park. And you should have been more careful not to be seen
by the public with her considering that she was a former accused in that case.
Justice Ong
I will heed to that advice, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
Q
And you admitted a while ago, during the interview conducted by Mr. Aries Rufo that
That is a lesson for me; that I should not have associated, you know, with a
former respondent or accused in a case before me. You admitted that? You said
you learned you lesson. Was that the first time you learned that kind of lesson, Mr.
Justice? Or even before you took your oath as a member of the Judiciary, you already
knew that lesson, isnt it or was that the first time? That is why you associated
yourself with Senator Jinggoy Estrada who was accused before of plunder?
Justice Ong
Your honor, talking about.
Justice Gutierrez
Q
Do you admit you committed a lapse along that line?
Justice Ong
A
Yes, your honor. You have to forgive me for that.26 (Emphasis supplied.)
In her report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez noted that respondents purported reason for visiting
Napoles in her office remains uncorroborated, as Napoles and the Quiapo parish priest were not
presented as witnesses despite her suggestion to respondent and his counsel. On the other hand,

Luys testimony on what transpired in one of respondents meeting with Napoles at her office
appears to be the more plausible and truthful version. Expectedly, respondent denied having
issued a BDO check for P25.5 million as claimed by Luy, and asserted he (respondent) did not
deposit any money to AFPSLAI. Unfortunately, Luy is unable to present documentary evidence
saying that, as previously testified by him before the Senate, most of the documents in their
office were shredded upon orders of Napoles when the Pork Barrel Scam controversy came
out.
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez stated that the eleven checks of P282,000.00 supposed advance
interest for respondents check deposit to AFPSLAI were given to respondent as consideration
for the favorable ruling in the Kevlar case. Such finding is consistent with Luys testimony that
Napoles spent a staggering P100 million just to fix the said case. Under the circumstances, it
is difficult to believe that respondent went to Napoles office the second time just to have
coffee. Respondents act of again visiting Napoles at her office, after he had supposedly merely
thanked her during the first visit, tends to support Luys claim that respondent had a financial
deal with Napoles regarding advance interest for AFPSLAI deposit. The question inevitably
arises as to why would Napoles extend such an accommodation to respondent if not as
consideration for her acquittal in the Kevlar case? Respondents controversial photograph
alone had raised adverse public opinion, with the media speculating on pay-offs taking place in
the
courts.
Regrettably, the conduct of respondent gave cause for the public in general to doubt the honesty
and fairness of his participation in the Kevlar case and the integrity of our courts of justice.
Before this Court, even prior to the commencement of administrative investigation, respondent
was less than candid. In his letter to the Chief Justice where he vehemently denied having
attended parties or social events hosted by Napoles, he failed to mention that he had in fact
visited Napoles at her office. Far from being a plain omission, we find that respondent
deliberately did not disclose his social calls to Napoles. It was only when Luy and Sula testified
before the Senate and named him as the contact of Napoles in the Sandiganbayan, that
respondent mentioned of only one instance he visited Napoles (This is the single occasion that
Sula
was
talking
about
in
her
supplemental
affidavit
x
x
x27).
The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even before the
administrative complaint was filed against him motu proprio, is guilty of Dishonesty, a violation
of
Canon
3
(Integrity)
of
the New
Code
of
Judicial
Conduct.
Dishonesty is a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. 28 Dishonesty, being a grave
offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement
benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification from re-employment
in government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the
Judiciary.29cralawlawlibrary
Under Section 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a respondent found guilty of a serious
charge may be penalized as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions
may
be
imposed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or -controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture

of

benefits

shall

in

no

case

include

accrued

leave

credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding
six
(6)
months;
or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Considering that respondent is not a first time offender and the charges of gross misconduct and
dishonesty are both grave offenses showing his unfitness to remain as a magistrate of the special
graft court, we deem it proper to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S.
Ong GUILTYof GROSS MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY, all in
violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, for which he is
hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or
instrumentality of the government including government-owned or -controlled corporations.
This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
EMILIE
SISON-BARIAS, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MARINO E. RUBIA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT [RTC], BRANCH 24,
BIAN, LAGUNA and EILEEN A. PECAA, DATA ENCODER II, RTC, OFFICE OF
THE CLERK OF COURT, BIAN, LAGUNA, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM :
Public trust requires that we exact strict integrity from judges and court employees. This case
emphasizes the need for members of the judiciary and those within its employ to exhibit the
impartiality, prudence, and propriety that the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel require when dealing with parties in pending cases.
Complainant Emilie Sison-Barias is involved in three cases pending before the sala of
respondent Judge Marino Rubia.
The first case is an intestate proceeding. 1 Complainant filed a petition for letters of
administration over the intestate estate of her late husband, Ramon A. Barias. This was opposed
by her mother-in-law, Romelias Almeda-Barias.2
The second case is a guardianship proceeding over Romelias Almeda-Barias. 3 Evelyn Tanael,
the guardian appointed by the court, submitted a property inventory report that included not
only the properties of Romelias Almeda-Barias but also properties forming part of the estate of
complainants late husband.4
The third case is a civil action5 for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of real properties
filed by Romelias Almeda-Barias, represented by Evelyn Tanael, against complainant, among
others.6
In all these cases, a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-510712 and
part of the estate of complainants husband was involved.7

Complainant alleged that there was delay in the publication of the notice in the petition for
issuance of letters of administration filed. She was then informed by her brother, Enrique "Ike"
Sison, that respondent Eileen Pecaa, the daughter of his good friend, was a data encoder in the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna.8
Complainant, together with her two brothers, Enrique and Perlito "Jun" Sison, Jr., 9 met with
respondent Pecaa on February 20, 2010.10 During this meeting, complainant informed
respondent Pecaa of the delay in the publication of the notice in the petition for issuance of
letters of administration. She then asked respondent Pecaa to check the status of the
publication of the notice.11 Respondent Pecaa asked for complainants number so that she
could inform her as soon as any development takes place in the case. 12 Enrique13 and
Perlito14executed affidavits to corroborate these allegations.
Respondent Pecaa asked complainant to meet her again at her house in Bian,
Laguna.15 Complainant went there with Enrique.16 Respondent Pecaa then informed
complainant that she could no longer assist her since respondent Judge Rubia had already given
administration of the properties to Evelyn Tanael.17
Complainant stated that she was not interested in the grant of administration to Tanael because
these concerned the properties of her mother-in-law, Romelias Almeda-Barias.18 She was only
concerned with the administration of the properties of her late husband, to which respondent
Pecaa replied, "Ah ganun ba? Iba pala ung kaso mo."19
Complainant alleged that respondent Pecaa sent her a text message on March 2, 2010 20 asking
complainant to call her. Complainant called respondent Pecaa who informed her that
respondent Judge Rubia wanted to talk to her.21 Complainant agreed to meet with respondent
Judge Rubia over dinner, on the condition that respondent Pecaa would be present as well.22
On March 3, 201023 at around 7:00 p.m, complainant picked up respondent Pecaa at 6750
Ayala Avenuein Makati City. They proceeded to Caf Juanita in The Fort, Bonifacio Global
City. Respondent Pecaa said that respondent Judge Rubia would arrive late as he would be
coming from a Rotary Club meeting held at the Mandarin Hotel.24
Respondent Judge Rubia arrived at Caf Juanita around 8:30 p.m. During the dinner meeting,
respondents allegedly asked complainant inappropriate questions. Respondent Judge Rubia
allegedly asked whether she was still connected with Philippine Airlines, which she still was at
that time.25 Complainant was then informed that respondent Judge Rubia knew of this fact
through Atty. Noe Zarate, counsel of Romelias Almeda-Barias. 26 This disclosure surprised
complainant,as she was under the impression that opposing counsel and respondent JudgeRubia
had no business discussing matters that were not relevant to their pending cases.27
Respondent Judge Rubia also allegedly asked her questions about her supposed involvement
with another man and other accusations made by Romelias Almeda-Barias. 28 She was asked
about the hospital where she brought her husband at the time of his cardiac arrest.29
These details, according to complainant, were never discussed in the pleadings or in the course
of the trial.30Thus, she inferred that respondent Judge Rubia had been talking to the opposing
counsel regarding these matters outside of the court proceedings. 31 The impression of
complainant was that respondent Judge Rubia was actively taking a position in favor of Atty.
Zarate.32
To confirm her suspicion, respondents then allegedly "told complainant to just talk to Atty.
Zarate, counsel for the oppositor, claiming that he is a nice person. Complainant was appalled
by such suggestion and replied[,] Why will I talk to him? Judge di ko yata kaya gawin un."33

After dinner, complainant stayed behind to settle the bill. Even before he left, she alleged that
respondent Judge Rubia had made insinuations that she was awaiting the company of another
man.34
From then on, complainant and respondents did not communicate and/or meet outside the
courtroom until August 8, 2010.
In the meantime, complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia acted in a manner that
showed manifest partiality in favor of the opposing parties, namely, Romelias Almeda-Barias
and Evelyn Tanael, as represented by their counsel, Atty. Noe Zarate.35
On June 15, 2010, counsel for complainant was personally handed a copy of a motion for
consolidation filed by the oppositor, Romelias Almeda-Barias, despite the date of the hearing on
such motion being set on June 18, 2010. 36 Complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia did
not even consider the comment/opposition to the motion for consolidation filed by her counsel,
which stated that since two of these cases were special proceedings, they could not be
consolidated with an ordinary civil action. Respondent Judge Rubia insisted on discussing the
totality of the different issues involved in the three distinct cases under one court
proceeding.37 As such, complainant alleged that the main issues of the special proceedings were
consolidated with matters that were properly the subject of a separate civil
action.38 Complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia refused to issue Orders39 that would
have allowed her to comply with her duties as the special administrator of her late husbands
estate.40 This included the order to conduct an inventory of the properties, rights, and credits of
the deceased, subject to the authority of the administrator.
In addition, complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia refused to grant her request for
subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum that she had prayed for to compel Evelyn Tanael to
produce the documents showing the accrued rentals of the parcel of land belonging toher late
husband.41 As such, complainant raised that respondent Judge Rubias refusal emboldened
Evelyn Tanael and oppositor Romelias Almeda-Barias to interfere in the management of the
estate of complainants late husband.42 Because of this refusal, she asserted that respondent
Judge Rubia failed to adhere to the duty of the court to ensure a proper inventory of the estate.43
Complainant enumerated occasions that alleged manifest partiality on the part of respondent
Judge Rubia. She alleged that respondent Judge Rubia failed to require a timely filing of the
pre-trial brief on the part of Evelyn Tanael and Romelias Almeda-Barias, and despite their
noncompliance on four (4) separate pre-trials that were postponed, Tanael and Almeda-Barias
were not declared in default.44 She also alleged that respondent Judge Rubia stated that the
burden to prove ownership of the property was on complainant, when in fact it was the
oppositor, or Tanael and Almeda-Barias, who had the burden of proof to show that the land was
fraudulently transferred to her late husband.45
Complainant admitted that she did not inform her counsel of the dinner meeting she had with
respondents.46 It was Enrique who allegedly told complainants lawyers about it when he went
to the lawyers office to pay some bills. 47 Complainant said that her lawyer immediately
admonished her for agreeing to meet with respondent Judge Rubia. Complainant then texted
respondent Pecaa on August 8, 2010 on her lawyers reaction concerning the March 3, 2010
meeting. The following exchanges took place via text message:
COMPLAINANT:
Hi Aileen! Sorry jz feeling bad. . my lawyer jz called me at galit n galit. My brother went to hm
today to pay som bills. Sa kakadaldal na mention s lawyr my meeting wid u n judge rubia. My
lawyr ws mad dat m nt suppose to do dat w/out hs knowledge. I cnt understand anymore wat he

ws sayng kanina kse nga galit. He wil file yata somtng abt dat n I dnt knwwat? Pls. Help me.
(August 8, 2010, 2:31 p.m.)
AILEEN PECAA [sic]:
Ha? Anong ififile? Bkt xa galit? Bka lalo tayo mapahamak? (August 8, 2010, 3:48 p.m.)
COMPLAINANT
M nt very sure bt he mentioned abt administrative or administratn something. I hav to talk to
hm n person para mas claro. Hirap kse by fon tlaga. He ws mad bcoz f our meetng nga, dats wat
struck hm. Sorry, daldal kse ni kuya. M going to col kuya tomorrow na. Its 1am na hr, I have to
buy foncard pa. (August 8, 2010, 4:18 p.m.)
AILEEN PECAA [sic]
Admin? Nku d mapapahamak nga kaming 2 ni juj. Pati ikaw mapapahamak pa dn. (August 8,
2010, 4:28 p.m.)
AILEEN PECAA [sic]
Bkt xa galit kng mkpg kta ka sminwidout his knowledge. I cnt fathom y wil it end up filing an
admin case. (August 8, 2010, 4:29 p.m.)
AILEEN PECAA [sic]
Pls Emily do something 2 pacify ur lawyer, juj rubia will definitely get mad wid us. (August 8,
2010, 4:30 p.m.)48(Emphasis supplied)
On September 15, 2010, complainant moved for respondent Judge Rubias inhibition. This was
denied on October 6, 2010. Complainant then filed a motion for reconsideration denied in an
order49 dated November 15, 2010.50
On November 11, 2010, complainant filed a complaint affidavit 51 before the Office of the Court
Administrator charging respondent Pecaa for gross misconduct and respondent Judge Rubia
for conduct unbecoming of a judge, partiality, gross ignorance of the law or procedure,
incompetence, and gross misconduct.52
The Office of the Court Administrator referred the complaint to respondents for comment.53
In her comment,54 respondent Pecaa did not deny meeting complainant on February 20, 2010
through the introduction of Enrique Sison.55 However, she claimed that the alleged meeting
between complainant and respondent Judge Rubia was merely a chance encounter.
Respondent Pecaa alleged that "sometime [in the] second week of March 2010," 56 when she
was on her way to Makati City to meet her sisters for coffee, complainant invited her for dinner.
Respondent Pecaa hesitantly agreed after complainant had insisted. 57 Complainant picked her
up at Starbucks 6750 in Makati City, and they proceeded to Caf Juanita in Burgos Circle for
dinner. Upon passing by Burgos Circle, respondent Pecaa saw respondent Judge Rubias car
parked near Caf Juanita.58
At about past 10:00 p.m., respondent Pecaa said that she saw respondent Judge Rubia together
with some companions walking toward his car.59 She stepped out of the restaurant and greeted
him. Complainant allegedly followed respondent Pecaa and so the latter was constrained to
introduce complainant as an employee of Philippine Airlines to respondent Judge Rubia. 60 After

the introduction, respondent Judge Rubia went to his car and left. Complainant and respondent
Pecaa returned to the restaurant to finish their food and pay the bill.61
Complainant drove respondent Pecaa back to Makati City. During the drive, complainant
allegedly asked her help regarding the cases filed in court and inquired as to what she could
give to respondent Judge Rubia because her lawyers instructed her to bribe him. Respondent
Pecaa only said that respondent Judge Rubia does not accept money and that he is financially
stable.62
After the dinner, complainant allegedly kept on sending text messages to respondent Pecaa
concerning her case filed in court.63 Respondent Pecaa admitted to the exchanges through text
messages she had with complainant on August 8, 2010 regarding the filing of administrative
case against her and respondent Judge Rubia.64
Respondent Pecaa denied being an advocate of Atty. Zarate. 65 She maintained the position that
she should not be held administratively liable for what she construed to be primarily judicial
matters, such as the bases for respondent Judge Rubias decisions and orders in court.66
Respondent Judge Rubia filed his comment67 on January 17, 2011.
Respondent Judge Rubia claimed that the alleged meeting between him and his co-respondent
Pecaa together with complainant was a mere chance encounter.68 He denied any pre-arranged
dinner meeting, stating that after the brief encounter with complainant, he had to rush home to
attend to his ailing wife.69 He stated that he was only introduced to complainant because she
was an employee of Philippine Airlines where he was a former executive. 70 Respondent Judge
Rubia argued that if the alleged meeting with complainant did take place, it should have been
mentioned in the first motion for inhibition.71 Further, he emphasized that it took complainant
eight (8) months since the alleged dinner meeting to file a motion for inhibition and an
administrative case.72
Respondent Judge Rubia surmised that complainant and her counsel, hoping for a favorable
outcome of the cases filed, initiated contact with respondent Pecaa. The filing of the
administrative case against him was only to compel him to inhibit from the cases to seek a
friendlier forum.73
Moreover, respondent Judge Rubia denied knowledge of any text messages exchanged between
complainant and respondent Pecaa as well as any active advocacy in favor of opposing
counsel, Atty. Zarate.74
As to the allegations of partiality concerning the orders he issued for the cases filed, respondent
Judge Rubia argued that the best forum to ventilate complainants allegations was not through
an administrative proceeding but through judicial recourse.75
Due to the gravity of the charges and the conflicting facts presented by the parties, the Office of
the Court Administrator recommended the referral of the administrative complaint to a Court of
Appeals Justice for investigation, report, and recommendation.76
On September 12, 2011, this court issued a resolution referring the administrative complaint to a
Justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and recommendation. 77 The complaint
was assigned to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan.
On December 5, 2011, Atty. Noe Zarate filed a motion for Intervention 78 allegedly due to the
implication of his name in the administrative complaint.79

Atty. Zarate argued that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping
because the orders issued by respondent Judge Rubia and mentioned in the complaint were
assailed in a petition for certiorari.80
Further, Atty. Zarate alleged that he did not know respondents personally, and he was not
closely associated with them.81 He asserted that the records were replete with incidents where he
and respondent Judge Rubia engaged in heated discussions on legal matters.82 He maintained
that he did not foster any closeness or personal affinity with respondent Judge Rubia that would
substantiate complainants allegations.83
In addition, Atty. Zarate expressed his agreement with respondents narration of the events on
the alleged dinner meeting.84 He argued that if the dinner meeting did take place, this incident
should have been the ground for the motion for inhibition filed.85
Atty. Zarate stated that, granting arguendo that the dinner meeting happened, there was nothing
"wrong, improper or illegal"86 about it. It could have been reasonably interpreted as an
extrajudicial means initiated by respondent Judge Rubia to assuage the parties in the
contentious litigation.87
The motion for intervention was noted without action by Justice Gaerlan.88
On December 15, 2011, the parties, together with their counsels, appeared before Justice
Gaerlan. It was agreed that respondents would file their respective supplemental comments and
complainant her reply to the comment. Complainant manifested that she would present three (3)
witnesses: herself and her two brothers. Respondent Pecaa would testify for herself and
present Semenidad Pecaa, her aunt, as witness. Respondent Judge Rubia manifested that he
would testify on his behalf and present respondent Pecaa as witness.89
Respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaa filed their respective supplemental comments dated
December 15, 201190and December 16, 2011,91 respectively. Complainant filed her consolidated
reply on January 17, 2012.92
A second hearing on the administrative complaint ensued on January 10, 2012 where
complainant testified on the dinner meeting on March 3, 2010.
During the hearing, complainant identified a document containing a list of phone calls showing
that she called respondent Pecaa on March 2 and 3, 2010. 93 Counsel for respondent Pecaa
stipulated that these calls were made to her.94
The hearing of the administrative complaint continued on January 12, 17, and 24, 2012.
In the January 17, 2012 hearing, respondent Pecaa testified to the allegations in her comment
and judicial affidavit. She alleged for the first time that the dinner meeting with complainant
happened on March 10, not March 3, 2010.
On January 24, 2012, Mr. Rodel Cortez, secretariat of the Rotary Club of Makati Southwest
Chapter, was presented as witness for respondent Judge Rubia. Rodel testified that the Rotary
Club of Makati Southwest Chapter had a meeting on March 10, 2010 at Numa Restaurant in
Bonifacio Global City. Respondent Judge Rubia attended the meeting as shown in the
attendance sheet identified by Rodel.
Rodel testified that after the meeting, he, Billy Francisco, and respondent Judge Rubia walked
together toward the parking area. When they were nearing Burgos Circle where their cars were
parked, Rodel allegedly saw complainant and respondent Pecaa approaching them. 95 He then

saw respondent Pecaa introduce complainant to respondent Judge Rubia. 96 After the
introduction, he saw respondent Judge Rubia go to his car and drive away.97
Respondent Judge Rubia testified for himself. He identified the comment and judicial affidavit
filed.98 He alleged that the encounter with complainant at Burgos Circle was on March 10, not
March 3, 2010.99
Complying with the order dated January 31, 2012, 100 the parties filed their respective
memoranda.
Justice Gaerlan submitted his investigation report dated March 13, 2012. 101 In his report, Justice
Gaerlan recommended that no penalty be imposed against respondents. 102 He was "convinced
that the meeting at Burgos Circle was just a chance encounter" 103 and found that complainant
failed to prove her claim with substantial evidence that would justify the imposition of a penalty
on respondents.104
Justice Gaerlan relied on the testimony of Rodel Cortez as against the uncorroborated testimony
of complainant.105
Justice Gaerlan emphasized the fact that it had taken complainant eight (8) months before she
filed the administrative complaint.106 He stated that the deliberate concealment of the meeting
was inconsistent with her resolve to prove respondent Judge Rubias alleged partiality toward
the counsel of the opposing party.107
As to the other charges against respondent Judge Rubia, Justice Gaerlan stated that the
administrative case was not the proper recourse for complainant.108 The proper action for her
was to pursue remedial action through the courts "to rectify the purported error" 109 in the court
proceedings.
The Office of the Court Administrator referred the report to this court.
The issue in this case is whether respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaa should be held
administratively liable.
This court must set aside the findings of fact and reject the report of Justice Samuel Gaerlan.
Respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaa should be held administratively liable for their actions.
The findings of fact of an investigating justice must be accorded great weight and finality
similar with the weight given to a trial court judges since an investigating justice personally
assessed the witnesses credibility.110 However, this rule admits of exceptions.
In J. King & Sons Company, Inc. v. Judge Hontanosas, Jr.,111 this court held:
Such findings may be reviewed if there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of
weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and
which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. Among the circumstances
which had been held to be justifiable reasons for the Court to re-examine the trial court or
appellate courts findings of facts are, when the interference made is manifestly mistaken; when
the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and when the finding of fact of the trial
court or appellate court is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by
evidence on record.112 (Citations omitted)
These exceptions are applicable in this case. In disregarding the complainants testimony and
relying on the testimony of Cortez, respondent Judge Rubias witness, Justice Gaerlan said:

While respondents were able to present a witness to corroborate their version of the incident on
all material points, complainant miserably failed on this regard. The Investigating Justice who
had the untrammeled opportunity to observe the deportment and demeanor of the respondents
witness, Rodel Cortez (Cortez) during the hearing finds his forthright narration of facts credible
and rang with truth. The clear, candid and unmistakable declaration of Cortez that the incident
that transpired along the sidewalk of Burgos Circle was just a chance encounter, absent any
ulterior motive for him to perjure, swayed this Investigating Justice to believe that the dinner
meeting between Judge Rubia and Barias did not [take] place. A testimony is credible if it bears
the earmarks of truth and sincerity and has been delivered in a spontaneous, natural, and
straightforward manner.
Not only that. Cortez[s] testimony was likewise corroborated by other pieces of evidence, such
as the Program of Meeting and the Attendance Sheet of the Rotary Club of Makati Southwest
which tend to prove that at that particular date and time Judge Rubia was in a rotary meeting
and was not dining with Rubia and Pecaa. These evidence, when taken together, debase the
uncorroborated version of incident as narrated by Barias. Barias[] self-serving declarations
have no evidentiary value when ranged against the testimony of a credible witness on
affirmative matters.113 (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot agree with Justice Gaerlans assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight given to their testimonies.
Justice Gaerlan placed too much importance on the testimony of Rodel Cortez, the Secretariat
of the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter, and qualified him as a "disinterested"
witness.
A disinterested witness testimony is afforded evidentiary weight by his or her lack of interest in
the outcome of the case.1wphi1 This lack of stake makes the disinterested witness testimony
more believable. To actively take part in litigation as a party or a witness entails willingness to
commit to the arduous and exacting nature of most judicial proceedings. The disinterested
witness candor and submission to the proceedings before the court add credibility and
believability to the content of his or her testimony.
To qualify a witness as truly disinterested, courts should analyze the circumstances that
surround his or her testimony.
The record shows that the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter, employed Rodel in
1989.114 He was appointed Secretariat in 1994 where respondent Judge Rubia was a former
President and remains an active member.115
The finding that respondent Judge Rubia is administratively liable could taint the reputation of
the organization that the witness has been serving for more than 20 years. It would be a definite
blow to the reputation of the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter, if its former President
were to be found guilty of the offenses that complainant imputed upon respondent Judge Rubia.
The possibility of Rodel testifying in favor of respondent Judge Rubia as a result of his loyalty
to the latter and the Rotary Club puts into question the characterization that he is disinterested.
The substance of Rodels narration of events should also be scrutinized.
Complainant alleged that the dinner meeting set among her, respondent Pecaa, and respondent
Judge Rubia took place on March 3, 2010, as indicated in the investigation report of Justice
Gaerlan. The record shows that the Investigating Justice accepted the formal offer of Exhibit A,
which was complainants judicial affidavit establishing the date of the dinner as March 3, 2010
in Caf Juanita.116 Complainant also alleged in her complaint that respondent Judge Rubia came
from Mandarin Hotel in Makati from the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter meeting.117

The testimony of Rodel and the evidence submitted by respondents alleged that the chance
meeting of respondent Judge Rubia with complainant and respondent Pecaa took place on
March 10, 2010 on the side street of Burgos Circle in Bonifacio Global City, after the Rotary
Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter meeting and dinner at Numa Restaurant, on their way to the
parking lot. This means that the testimony of and the evidence presented by Rodel do not
disprove the occurrence of the dinner meeting as alleged by complainant, since the meeting of
the Rotary Club and the dinner meeting alleged by complainant took place on different dates.
Assuming that the alleged chance meeting between complainant and respondent Judge Rubia
took place on March 10, 2010 as alleged by respondents, this does not discount the veracity of
complainants allegations. Both the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter dinner and the
dinner meeting alleged by complainant took place in the vicinity of Bonifacio Global City. This
could have allowed respondent Judge Rubia ample time to travel to the dinner meeting after the
meeting of the Rotary Club of Makati.
The investigation report stated that the attendance sheet 118 and the program of meeting that
Rodel submitted corroborated his testimony. The date indicated on the attendance sheet and on
the program of meeting was March 10, 2010, not March 3, 2010. However, there was nothing to
indicate the time of arrival or departure of the attendees. Neither was there an indication of the
time when the meeting began or ended. The attendance sheet and the program of meeting, by
themselves or taken as corroborative evidence of Rodels testimony, do not discount the distinct
and tangible possibility that the dinner meeting as narrated by complainant took place. On the
other hand, we find the allegation that the dinner meeting took place on March 3, 2010 more
credible.
Complainant presented a document containing a list of calls she made from January to March
2010.119 She identified her cellular phone number 120 as well as respondent
Pecaas.121 Respondent Pecaa admitted that the number identified by complainant was her
number.122 On March 2 and 3, 2010, calls were made to respondent Pecaas
number.123 Respondent Pecaa admitted that she had received a call from complainant before
the latter picked her up at 6750 Makati City.124 However, no calls to respondent Pecaa were
recorded on March 10, 2010 in the document presented. 125 On the other hand, the calls made to
respondent Pecaa as shown in the document coincided with complainants allegations.
Finally, during the December 15, 2011 hearing, respondent Judge only manifested that he would
testify for himself and present respondent Pecaa as witness. 126 He did not manifest that he
would be presenting Rodel or any participant in the Rotary Club meeting as his witness.
The totality of these circumstances places doubt on the alibi of respondent Judge Rubia and
Rodels narration of events.
The differing accounts on the dates and the venues were not addressed in the investigation
report of Justice Gaerlan. The report failed to mention that complainant alleged that respondent
Judge Rubia arrived late precisely because he came from a meeting of the Rotary Club of
Makati. These glaring inconsistencies did not add evidentiary weight to respondents claims.
They only put into question the veracity of the exculpatory evidence.
This court has held:
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish a respondents
malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is
required. Faced with conflicting versions of complainant and respondent, the Court gives more
weight to the allegations and testimony of the complainant and her witnesses who testified
clearly and consistently before the Investigating Judge.127 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

After scrutinizing the testimony of complainant and the evidence she presented to support her
allegations, we find her account of the event to be genuine and believable.
Complainants narration of the dinner meeting held on March 3, 2010 and her account of events
leading up to the dinner meeting were detailed and comprehensive. The conversation alleged by
complainant that took place with respondents during the meeting was replete with details.
The strongest corroborative evidence to support complainants allegations was the exchange of
text messages between complainant and respondent Pecaa regarding the dinner meeting. These
text messages were admitted by respondent Pecaa. 128 However, Justice Gaerlan failed to give
any weight to the exchange of text messages. This fact was not included in his investigation
report.129
The content of the text messages of respondent Pecaa belied respondents claim that the
alleged dinner meeting in Burgos Circle was only a chance encounter.
AILEEN PECAA [sic]
Bkt xa galit kngmkpg kta ka smin widout his knowledge. I cnt fathom y wil it end up filing an
admin case. (August 8, 2010, 4:29 p.m.)
AILEEN PECAA [sic]
Pls Emily do something 2 pacify ur lawyer, juj rubia will definitely get mad wid us. (August 8,
2010, 4:30 p.m.)130(Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Pecaa used the phrase, "mkpg kta," which may be translated to "have a meeting."
"Mkpg kta" can in no way mean a chance encounter.
Further, respondent Pecaas text messages sent to complainant belied her claim of an innocent
chance encounter. She said that respondent Judge Rubia would get angry after complainant had
informed her that her lawyer might file an administrative case against them. Respondent Judge
Rubia would not have had a reason to get upset because of the possibility of administrative
liability if an innocent and coincidental encounter happened and not a dinner meeting. However,
if the meeting took place as alleged by complainant, this would have logically led to a hostile
reaction from respondents, particularly respondent Judge Rubia.
In her testimony before Justice Gaerlan, respondent Pecaa gave the following testimony:
ATTY FERNANDEZ:
In August 2010, you admitted in your comment and your supplemental comment that you
received a text coming from Emilie Barias saying her lawyer is mad with her because of that
meeting, isnt it?
EILEEN PECAA:
Yes, sir.
ATTY FERNANDEZ:
In fact you admitted that there were text messages coming from you and Judge Rubia in March
2010, isnt it?
EILEEN PECAA:

Yes, sir.
ATTY FERNANDEZ:
And in fact, you admitted that there were [sic] indeed a text message coming from you and this
is: ["]ha anong ipafile baka lalo tayong mapapahamk?["] And another message says "bakit
siya...another...did you do something to pacify her lawyer...so you affirm these message [sic]?
EILEEN PECAA:
Yes, sir.
ATTY FERNANDEZ:
Based on those messages of yours, is it correct that you fear....?
EILEEN PECAA:
I am not afraid in a way na pinalalabas nila.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
And in fact in your comment and in your supplemental comment you were explaining the
context of these messages?
EILEEN PECAA:
Alin po doon?
ATTY. FERNANDEZ
The first one? "bakit sya galit baka lalo tayong mapahamak"
EILEEN PECAA:
Ang ipinapaliwanag ko chance meeting outside the street.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ
How about the part where "administrative[. . . .]"
EILEEN PECAA:
The reason why I said that is because as employees of the court, whenever an administrative
case is filed against us[,] we will be investigated like this, and our benefits and promotion
chances we will be disqualified.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ
In your text messages you never mentioned to Emilie that it would end up in an administrative
case because you simply thought that it was a chance meeting?
EILEEN PECAA:
Ano po sir?
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:

You cannot fathom why it will end up as an administrative case because it was only a chance
meeting?
EILEEN PECAA:
Immediately on the text messages she knows already what happened why should I have to
explain?
....
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
Did you tell her while exchanging text messages that it was just a chance meeting?
EILEEN PECAA:
No more, sir.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
So you no longer took it upon you to tell Emilie to advise her lawyer not to get mad becauseit
was only a chance meeting? (No answer from the witness.)131
Respondents also alleged that the chance encounter happened because respondent Pecaa, while
having dinner with complainant, stepped out of the restaurant to greet respondent Judge Rubia
on the side street of Burgos Circle. Since complainant allegedly followed respondent Pecaa out
of the restaurant, the latter introduced complainant to respondent Judge Rubia.
This allegation is quite implausible after taking into account the following admissions:
1. Respondent Pecaa described her relationship with Judge Rubia as "[w]ala naman po
masyado. My dealing with the Judge is only in relation with my work because during flag
ceremonies he always reminds us not to act as go between or not to be involved in the
cases filed in the court."132
2. Respondent Judge Rubia is not the immediate superior of respondent Pecaa as the
latter is in the Office of the Clerk of Court.
3. Respondent Pecaa was having dinner with complainant whom she knew had a
pending case before respondent Judge Rubia.
4. Respondent Judge Rubia always reminded court employees not to have dealings with
litigants.
There was clearly no reason for respondent Pecaa to go out of her way to greet respondent
Judge Rubia. In fact, after allegedly being repeatedly reminded that court employees should not
have any dealings with litigants, respondent Pecaa should not have gone out to greet
respondent Judge Rubia since she was dining with a litigant.
The odds that complainant and respondent Pecaa would meet respondent Judge Rubia by pure
coincidence are highly improbable. Granted, chance meetings between persons may take place,
but a chance meeting between a litigant in the company of a court employee who acceded to
assisting the litigant in a case and the judge deciding that case is outside the realm of common
experience. The odds of such an occurrence are, indeed, one in a million. The sheer

improbability of such an occurrence already puts into question the truth of respondents
allegations.
Based on these considerations, the narrative of complainant is more believable and must be
afforded greater evidentiary weight.
Delay in filing of administrative complaint is not a defense
The investigation report placed particular emphasis on the eight-month period between the
alleged dinner meeting and the filing of the administrative complaint. The eight-month delay in
the filing of the administrative complaint is of no consequence.
Delay in filing an administrative complaint should not be construed as basis to question its
veracity or credibility. There are considerations that a litigant must think about before filing an
administrative case against judges and court personnel. This is more so for lawyers where the
possibility of appearing before the judge where an administrative complaint has been filed is
high.
Here, respondent Judge Rubia presided over three cases that involved complainant and her late
husbands estate. He wielded an unmistakable amount of control over the proceedings.
Filing an administrative case against respondents is a time-consuming ordeal, and it would
require additional time and resources that litigants would rather not expend in the interest of
preserving their rights in the suit. Complainant might have decided to tread with caution so as
not to incur the ire of respondent Judge Rubia for fear of the reprisal that could take place after
the filing of an administrative complaint.
Judges and court personnel wield extraordinary control over court proceedings of cases filed.
Thus, litigants are always cautious in filing administrative cases against judges and court
personnel.
In any case, administrative offenses, including those committed by members of the bench and
bar, are not subject to a fixed period within which they must be reported. In Heck v. Judge
Santos,133 this court held that:
Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that an administrative
complaint against an erring lawyer who was thereafter appointed as a judge, albeit filed only
after twenty-four years after the offending act was committed, is not barred by prescription. If
the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath
they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would
immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever
administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the
integrity of the practice of law as well as the administration of justice. No matter how much
time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the
institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining
arm of the Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the
bench and bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyers Oath.134 (Emphasis supplied)
If this court saw fit to penalize a member of the bench for an offense committed more than
twenty years prior to the filing of the complaint, then the eight-month period cannot prejudice
the complainant.
The interval between the time when the offense was committed and the time when the offense
was officially reported cannot serve as a basis to doubt the veracity of complainants

allegations. This courts mandate to discipline members of the judiciary and its personnel is
implemented by pertinent rules and statutes. Judges are disciplined based on whether their
actions violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct. 135 Court personnel are also governed by the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel 136 and are appointed in accordance with the Civil Service
Law, as provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. None of these rules for
administrative discipline mandates a period within which a complaint must be filed after the
commission or discovery of the offense. This court determines with finality the liability of
erring members of the judiciary and its employees. The gravity of an administrative offense
cannot be diminished by a delay in the filing of a complaint.
To dismiss the commission of the offense based on this eight-month period is to ignore the
distinct and tangible possibility that the offense was actually committed. The commission of the
offense is not contingent on the period of revelation or disclosure. To dismiss the complaint on
this ground is tantamount to attaching a period of prescription to the offense, which does not
apply in administrative charges.
Respondent Pecaas actions amount to violations of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
"Court personnel, regardless of position or rank, are expected to conduct themselves in
accordance with the strict standards of integrity and morality."137
The complaint states that respondents were allegedly acting in favor of Atty. Noe Zarate,
counsel for the opposing parties in the three cases pending in the sala of respondent Judge
Rubia. Because of respondents actions, complainant and all who will be made aware of the
events of this case will harbor distrust toward the judiciary and its processes. For this alone,
respondents should be held administratively liable.
For respondent Pecaa, the fact that she allowed herself to be placed in a position that could
cause suspicion toward her work as a court personnel is disconcerting.
As a court employee, respondent Pecaa should have known better than to interact with litigants
in a way that could compromise the confidence that the general public places in the judiciary.
Respondent Pecaa should have refused to meet with complainant in her home. She should
have refused any other form of extended communication with complainant, save for those in her
official capacity as a Data Encoder of the court. This continued communication between
complainant and respondent Pecaa makes her culpable for failure to adhere to the strict
standard of propriety mandated of court personnel.
Respondent Pecaa admitted to meeting with complainant several times, despite the formers
knowledge of the pendency of cases in the court where she is employed and in addition to the
text messages exchanged between them. She had a duty to sever all forms of communication
with complainant or to inform her superiors or the proper authority of complainants attempts to
communicate with her. Respondent Pecaa failed to do so. Instead, she continued to
communicate with complainant, even to the extent of advising complainant against filing an
administrative case against her and respondent Judge Rubia.
Respondent Pecaa violated Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel:
CANON
FIDELITY TO DUTY
....

SECTION 3. Court personnel shall not discriminate by dispensing special favors to anyone.
They shall not allow kinship, rank, position or favors from any party to influence their official
acts or duties.
....
SECTION 5. Court personnel shall use the resources, property and funds under their official
custody in a judicious manner and solely in accordance with the prescribed statutory and
regulatory guidelines or procedures.
Respondent Pecaas actions constitute a clear violation of the requirement that all court
personnel uphold integrity and prudence in all their actions. As stated in Villaros v. Orpiano:138
Time and time again, we have stressed that the behavior of all employees and officials involved
in the administration of justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed with a
heavy responsibility. Their conduct must be guided by strict propriety and decorum at all times
in order to merit and maintain the publics respect for and trust in the judiciary. Needless to say,
all court personnel must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying integrity, honesty and
uprightness.139
Respondent Pecaa should, thus, be held administratively liable for her actions.
Respondent Judge Rubia committed gross violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
By meeting a litigant and advising her to talk to opposing counsel, respondent Judge Rubia
violated several canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Respondent Judge Rubia failed to act in a manner that upholds the dignity mandated by his
office. He was already made aware of the impropriety of respondent Pecaas actions by virtue
of her admissions in her comment. At the time of the referral of the complaint to the Office of
the Court Administrator, respondent Judge Rubia was already the Executive Judge of Branch 24
of the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna.140 As a judge, he had the authority to ensure that
all court employees, whether or not they were under his direct supervision, act in accordance
with the esteem of their office.
Respondent Pecaa even alleged that respondent Judge Rubia made several warnings to all
court employees not to intercede in any case pending before any court under his jurisdiction as
Executive Judge.141 However, nothing in the record shows that respondent Judge Rubia took
action after being informed of respondent Pecaas interactions with a litigant, such as
ascertaining her actions, conducting an inquiry to admonish or discipline her, or at least
reporting her actions to the Office of the Court Administrator.
For this failure alone, respondent Judge Rubia should be held administratively liable.
Furthermore, the evidence on record supports the allegations that a meeting with complainant, a
litigant with several cases pending before his sala, took place. Respondent Judge Rubias mere
presence in the dinner meeting provides a ground for administrative liability.
In Gandeza Jr. v. Tabin,142 this court reminded judges:
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but also
the mere appearance of impropriety in all activities.
To stress how the law frowns upon even any appearance of impropriety in a magistrates
activities, it has often been held that a judge must be like Caesars wife - above suspicion and
beyond reproach. Respondents act discloses a deficiency in prudence and discretion that a

member of the Judiciary must exercise in the performance of his official functions and of his
activities as a private individual. It is never trite to caution respondent to be prudent and
circumspect in both speech and action, keeping in mind that her conduct in and outside the
courtroom is always under constant observation. 143 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Respondent Judge Rubia clearly failed to live up to the standards of his office. By participating
in the dinner meeting and by failing to admonish respondent Pecaa for her admitted
impropriety, respondent Judge Rubia violated Canons 1 and 2 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Canon 1 INDEPENDECE
Judicial Independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair
trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual
and institutional aspects.
Section 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their
assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of
any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from
any quarter or for any reason.
Section 6. Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the
particular parties to a dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.
Section 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to
reinforce public confidence in the judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial
independence.
Canon 2 INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.
Section 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in view of a reasonable observer.
Section 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity
of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
Section 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or
court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.
In De la Cruz v. Judge Bersamira,144 this court explained the necessity of a judges integrity:
By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are required to observe an
exacting standard of morality and decency. The character of a judge is perceived by the people
not only through his official acts but also through his private morals as reflected in his external
behavior. It is therefore paramount that a judges personal behavior both in the performance of
his duties and his daily life, be free from the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond
reproach. Only recently, in Magarang v. Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr., the Court pointedly stated
that:
While every public office in the government is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary.
Hence, judges are strictly mandated to abide by the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and with

existing administrative policies in order to maintain the faith of the people in the administration
of justice.145
In Castillo v. Judge Calanog, Jr.,146 this court held:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his
behavior outside his sala as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public
official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety
at all times. As we have recently explained, a judges official life can not simply be detached or
separated from his personal existence. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept
restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal
behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be
above suspicion.147 (Citations omitted)
In De la Cruz, this court emphasized the need for impartiality of judges:
. . . [A] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. A
judge is not only required to be impartial; he must also appear to be impartial. x x x Public
confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges.
. . . In this connection, the Court pointed out in Joselito Rallos, et al. v. Judge Ireneo Lee Gako
Jr., RTC Branch 5, Cebu City, that:
Well-known is the judicial norm that "judges should not only be impartial but should also
appear impartial." Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less
than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements of due process, like notice and
hearing, would become meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased
judge. Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a
manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court
judges like herein respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact
with the litigating parties.
They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of the peoples
sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct should be beyond reproach. 148 (Citations omitted,
emphasis supplied)
In the motion for intervention filed by Atty. Zarate before Justice Gaerlan, Atty. Zarate stated
that even if respondent Judge Rubia was present at the dinner meeting, it was merely an attempt
to reconcile the parties and reach an extrajudicial solution.149
This is telling of a culture of tolerance that has led to the decay of the exacting nature of judicial
propriety. Instead of being outraged by respondent Judge Rubias meeting an opposing party,
Atty. Zarate defended respondent Judge Rubias actions.
Had it been true that a settlement was being brokered by respondent Judge Rubia, it should have
been done in open court with the record reflecting such an initiative.

As to complainants questioning of respondent Judge Rubias actions in the issuance of the

orders in her pending cases and the exercise of his judgment, this court agrees that complainant
should resort to the appropriate judicial remedies. This, however, does not negate the
administrative liability of respondent Judge Rubia. His actions failed to assure complainant and
other litigants before his court of the required "cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 150 Because
of this, respondent Judge Rubia also violated Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct on
Impartiality:
CANON 3. IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the
decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.
Section 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias, or prejudice.
Section 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the
judge and of the judiciary.
Section 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the
occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding
cases.
Section 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come before them,
make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding
or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or
otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.
Complainant correctly cited Pascual v. Judge Bonifacio151 where this court held:
Upon assumption of office, a judge becomes the visible representation of the law and of justice.
Membership in the judiciary circumscribes one's personal conduct and imposes upon him a
number of inhibitions, whose faithful observance is the price one has to pay for holding such an
exalted position. Thus, a magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a
manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand the most searching public scrutiny,
for the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the
people's faith in the judicial system. This Court does not require of judges that they measure up
to the standards of conduct of the saints and martyrs, but we do expect them to be like Caesar's
wife in all their activities. Hence, we require them to abide strictly by the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
It appears now that respondent has failed to live up to those rigorous standards. Whether or not
he purposely went to the Manila Hotel on November 25, 1998 to meet complainant or only had
a chance meeting with him, his act of trying to convince complainant to agree to his proposal is
an act of impropriety. It is improper and highly unethical for a judge to suggest to a litigant what
to do to resolve his case for such would generate the suspicion that the judge is in collusion with
one party. A litigant in a case is entitled to no less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
Judges are not only required to be impartial, but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an
essential manifestation of reality. Hence, not only must a judge render a just decision, he is also
duty bound to render it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and its
integrity. Respondent's conduct in the instant case inevitably invites doubts about respondent's
probity and integrity. It gives ground for a valid reproach. In the judiciary, moral integrity is
more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. Moreover, a judge's lack of impartiality or the mere
appearance of bias would cause resentment if the party who refused the judge's proposal

subsequently lost his case. It would give rise to suspicion that the judgment was "fixed"
beforehand. Such circumstance tarnishes the image of the judiciary and brings to it public
contempt, disrepute, and ridicule. Thus, we are constrained to rule that respondent violated Rule
2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. His misconduct is not excused but rather made more
glaring by the fact that the controversy involving complainant was pending in his own
sala.152 (Citations omitted)
The totality of the actions of respondent Judge Rubia is a clear manifestation of a lack of
integrity and impartiality essential to a judge.
By meeting with complainant, respondent Judge Rubia also violated Canon 4 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct:
CANON 4. PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of
a judge.
Section 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
Section 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In
particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the
judicial office.
Section 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of the legal
profession who practice regularly in their court, avoid situations which might reasonably give
rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality.
On propriety, this court held in Atty. Raul L. Correa v. Judge Medel Arnaldo Belen 153 that:
Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary exhorts members of the
judiciary, in the discharge of their duties, to be models of propriety at all times.
....
A judge is the visible representation of the law. Thus, he must behave, at all times, in such a
manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand the most searching public scrutiny.
The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the
people's faith in the judicial system.154
Because of the meeting, and the subsequent orders issued after the meeting, respondent Judge
Rubia violated the notions of propriety required of his office. Respondents have relentlessly
stood by their position that the meeting was a chance encounter, and, thus, no impropriety could
be attributed to the meeting itself.
Respondent Judge Rubias actions belittled the integrity required of judges in all their dealings
inside and outside the courts. For these actions, respondent Judge Rubia now lost the requisite
integrity, impartiality, and propriety fundamental to his office. He cannot be allowed to remain a
member of the judiciary.
Respondents in this case failed to subscribe to the highest moral fiber mandated of the judiciary
and its personnel. Their actions tainted their office and besmirched its integrity. In effect, both
respondents are guilty of gross misconduct. This court defined misconduct as "a transgression
of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross

negligence by a public officer."155 In Camus v. The Civil Service Board of Appeals, 156 this court
held that "[m]isconduct has been defined as wrong or improper conduct and gross has been
held to mean flagrant; shameful. . . . This Court once held that the word misconduct implies a
wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment."157
Both respondents are indeed guilty of gross misconduct. However, respondent Judge Rubia is
also guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge for violating Canons 2, 3, and 4 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct.
This is not to say that complainant comes to these proceedings with clean hands either. As a
litigant, she is enjoined to act in such a way that will not place the integrity of the proceedings
in jeopardy. Her liability, however, is not the subject of these proceedings. To ensure that these
actions will no longer be committed by any party, respondents must be sanctioned accordingly,
in keeping with the courts mandate to uphold a character of trust and integrity in society.
WHEREFORE, the court resolved tore docket the case as a regular administrative matter.
Respondent Judge Marino Rubia is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with corresponding
forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and disqualified from
reinstatement or appointment in any public office, including government owned or -controlled
corporations. Respondent Eileen Pecaa is SUSPENDED for one (1) year for gross misconduct.
This decision is immediately executory. Respondent Judge Rubia is further ordered to cease and
desist from discharging the functions of his office upon receipt of this decision. Let a copy
hereof be entered in the personal records of respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179914

June 16, 2014

SPOUSES
REYNALDO
AND
HILLY
G.
SOMBILON, Petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. REY FERDINAND GARAY AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
ATTY.
REY
FERDINAND
vs.
JUDGE ROLANDO S. VENADAS, SR., Respondent.

T.

GARAY, Petitioner,

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A judge owes the public and the court the duty to know the law by heart and to have the basic
rules of procedure at the palm of his hands.1
Before us are two consolidated cases: (1) a Petition for Review on Certiorari 2 under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assailing the June 13, 2007 Decision 3 and the August 8, 2007 Resolution4 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00477-MIN; and (2) an Administrative
Complaint5 against Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. (Judge Venadas, Sr.) of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch 8, for Grave Abuse of Authority and Grave
Misconduct.
Factual Antecedents

Spouses Reynaldo and Hilly G. Sombilon (spouses Sombilon) were the previous owners of a
601-square meter property, with two buildings constructed on it, in South Poblacion, Maramag,
Bukidnon.6 The said property, which they mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as
security for their loan, was foreclosed and sold at public auction on July 15, 1998, where PNB
emerged as the winning bidder in the amount of P2,355,000.00.7Consequently, on August 20,
1998, a Certificate of Sale was issued in PNBs name, which was duly registered with the
Registry of Deeds for Bukidnon on August 25, 1999. 8 The one-year redemption period lapsed
but spouses Sombilon failed to redeem the property.9
In 2005, spouses Sombilon sought the help of Atty. Rey Ferdinand T. Garay (Atty. Garay), a
Public Attorneys Office (PAO) lawyer, who was once appointed by the court as counsel de
officio for Hilly Sombilon in a criminal case and who happens to be the owner of a lot adjacent
to the property.10 Spouses Sombilon told Atty. Garay that they wanted to reacquire 11 the property
from PNB, but had no money to repurchase it. 12 Thus, they were hoping that he would agree to
advance the money and, in exchange, they promised to sell him the 331-square meter portion of
the property, where one of the buildings is located, for P5 million.13
On February 9, 2005, Atty. Garay together with spouses Sombilon went to PNB to inquire about
the status of the property.14 They were informed by the bank that the property could be
purchased at the fair market value ofP2,938,000.00.15 The following day, Atty. Garay went to
the bank alone and offered to buy the property by making a down payment of P587,600.0016 or
20% of the purchase price.17
On February 14, 2005, upon learning that Atty. Garay intended to purchase the entire property
for himself, spouses Sombilon offered to buy back the property from PNB. 18 The bank advised
them to make a 10% down payment of the banks total claim19 to formalize their offer.20
On February 15, 2005, a Final Deed of Conveyance was issued in favor of PNB.21
On April 14, 2005, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 94384 was issued in the name of
PNB.22
On the same date, PNB decided to approve the purchase offer of Atty. Garay 23 since spouses
Sombilon failed to make the required down payment.24
G.R. No. 179914
On May 9, 2005, PNB filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession 25 before
the RTC of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. The case was docketed as Special Civil Case No. 37505 and raffled to Branch 8, presided over by Judge Venadas, Sr.
On June 10, 2005, Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order 26 granting the Petition and, on June27,
2005, he issued a Writ of Possession27 in favor of PNB.28
On June 22, 2005, PNB informed spouses Sombilon that Atty. Garays offer to purchase the
property had been approved due to their failure to pay the full down payment.29
On July 10, 2005, spouses Sombilon moved for a reconsideration 30 of the issuance of the Writ
of Possession arguing that Atty. Garay,31 who was the former counsel of Hilly, was barred from
purchasing the property pursuant to paragraph 5,32 Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 14, 2005, Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order 33 holding in abeyance the implementation
of the Writ of Possession, a portion of which reads:

Although, ordinarily a writ of possession is issued by the court because it is a mandatory and
ministerial duty under Act 3135, x x x there is x x x an exception to this rule that if the
implementation and enforcement of the writ of possession would work [great] injustice to the
registered owner because the petitioner PNB or in this case Atty. Garay counsel for the
Sombilon[s] is not entitled thereto. There is much to be said about the conduct of Atty. Garay in
manipulating that the property in question was finally bought by him from the PNB not to
mention the possible violation of the [canon] of legal and judicial ethics. However, the court
cannot ignore the version of Mrs. Sombilon. The court will give Atty. Garay [the opportunity] to
rebut the evidence presented by spouses Sombilon and he is directed to appear on August 2,
2005, at 8:30 in the morning. And if this case cannot be accommodated in the morning[,] it will
proceed in the afternoon.
Send proper notice to Atty. Rey Ferdinand Garay for him to appear on said date.
In the meantime, the full implementation x x x of the Writ of Possession is hereby held in
abeyance. Sheriff Claudio C. Bugahod is hereby directed to return all items to the house of
Spouses Sombilon and to restore them in full possession of the property, if already implemented
and enforced.
SO ORDERED.34
Aggrieved, Atty. Garay and PNB elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari with
prayer for issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Injunction 35 under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.
Initially, on August 2, 2005, the CA dismissed36 the Petition for Certiorari for several procedural
defects.37However, on reconsideration,38 the CA reinstated the Petition.39
On July 25, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution 40 granting the PNB and Atty. Garays application
for a TRO. Thus:
Accordingly, let a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued upon the posting of a Five
Thousand Peso (P5,000.00) bond within five (5) days from receipt hereof ordering, [petitioners]
to:
1. Cease and desist from doing any act which is destructive of, or involves danger to, or alters
the nature and condition of the property;
2. Cease and desist from collecting rent or income [for the use of] the said property;
3. To deposit any rent or income arising from the said property which they may have already
received to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of the Tenth Judicial Region,
Malaybalay City; and
Furthermore, all tenants are hereby ordered to deposit any rentals arising from the disputed
property to the said Clerk of Court.
SO ORDERED.41
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 13, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision 42 granting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA
found grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Venadas, Sr. in holding in abeyance the
implementation of the Writ of Possession.43 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the assailed July 14,
2005 Order of the court a quo is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.44
Spouses Sombilon moved for reconsideration45 but the CA denied the same in its August 8,
2007 Resolution.46
Hence, spouses Sombilon filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari contending that:
THE [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVELY ERRED IN
GRANTING THE PETITIONFOR CERTIORARI OF [ATTY. GARAY AND PNB] AND IN
DECLARING THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNT[ING] TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION COMMITTED BYTHE [RTC], BRANCH [8],
MALAYBALAY CITY, WHICH IS CONTRARY [TO] LAW AND APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.47
Spouses Sombilons Arguments
Spouses Sombilon insist that the CA should have dismissed the Petition for Certioraridue to the
failure of PNB and Atty. Garay to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Order.48
They also allege that PNB and Atty. Garay engaged in forum-shopping when they filed a
Motion to Recall Order with the RTC, in addition to the Petition for Certiorari they earlier filed
with the CA.49
As to the assailed Order, they contend that Judge Venadas, Sr. did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession because PNB no
longer has the legal personality to apply for a Writ of Possession considering that the subject
property had already been sold to Atty. Garay,50 who they claim is also not entitled to the Writ of
Possession as he is disqualified from purchasing the subject property pursuant to paragraph 5,
Article 1491 of the Civil Code.51
Atty. Garays and PNBs Arguments
Atty. Garay, on the other hand, argues that the CA did not err in granting the Petition for
Certiorari as Judge Venadas, Sr. acted with grave abuse of discretion when he recalled the Writ
of Possession without notice to him and PNB. 52 He also emphasizes that it is a ministerial duty
of the court to issue a writ of possession after the redemption period has lapsed.53
PNB, for its part, asserts that as the registered owner of the subject property, it is entitled to the
Writ of Possession.54 Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Venadas, Sr. in
holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession, which he had earlier issued.55
PNB further avers that it is not privy to the arrangement or relationship between Atty. Garay and
spouses Sombilon.56 In any case, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code
does not apply to the instant case as Atty. Garay purchased the subject property from PNB and
not from spouses Sombilon.57
Anent its failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration prior to filing a Petition for Certiorari,
PNB explains that in this case the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration may be dispensed with
as the issue involved is purely one of law, which is an exception under prevailing
jurisprudence.58

Besides, there was no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available at the time considering that
Judge Venadas, Sr. issued the assailed Order, holding in abeyance the implementation of the
Writ of Possession, without affording PNB the opportunity to be heard.59
Lastly, PNB denies that it committed forum-shopping claiming that it did not institute another
action simultaneously with the Petition for Certiorari it filed with the CA.60
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
Meanwhile, on November15, 2005, Atty. Garay filed a Verified Complaint 61 against Judge
Venadas, Sr., charging him with Grave Abuse of Authority and Grave Misconduct when he
proceeded with the hearing of spouses Sombilons motion for reconsideration of the Order
granting the issuance of the Writ of Possession despite lack of notice to PNB and for holding in
abeyance the Writ of Possession he issued in Special Civil Case No. 375-05.
Atty. Garays Arguments
Atty. Garay claims that Judge Venadas, Sr. should be administratively sanctioned for holding in
abeyance the Writ of Possession he earlier issued 62 and for ignoring Sections 4,63 5,64 and 665 of
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court as he proceeded to hear the motion despite lack of notice to
PNB.66
Judge Venadas, Sr.s Arguments
In his defense, Judge Venadas, Sr. denies the charges against him arguing that he did not annul
the Writ of Possession but merely stayed its execution and implementation to prevent any
injustice.67 He insists there was no violation of due process because he immediately scheduled a
hearing for PNB to present its evidence.68
Report and Recommendation of the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
The OCA, in its Report,69 found Judge Venadas, Sr. administratively liable for grave abuse of
authority bordering on gross ignorance of procedure.70 Although the OCA did not touch on the
issue of whether Judge Venadas, Sr. should be administratively sanctioned for holding in
abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession as it was still pending with the CA at
that time, it nevertheless found Judge Venadas, Sr. guilty of blatantly disregarding Sections 4, 5,
and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court when he acted on the defective motion filed by spouses
Sombilon.71 It also pointed out that PNB and Atty. Garay were deprived of their rights to due
process as no proper notice was sent to them.72 Thus, the OCA recommended that:
a) the instant administrative complaint be DOCKETED as a regular administrative complaint;
b) respondent Judge Rolando S. Venadas,Sr. be found guilty of gross ignorance of procedure;
and
c) respondent Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. be ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) with a WARNING that a similar transgression x x x will be
dealt with more severely.73
On November 26, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000 with G.R.
No. 179914.74
Issues

Stripped of the non-essentials, the issues boil down to: (1) whether Judge Venadas, Sr.
committed grave abuse of discretion in holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of
Possession; and (2) whether he should be administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance
the implementation of the Writ of Possession and for disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15
of the Rules of Court.
Our Ruling
G.R. No. 179914
The issuance of a writ of possession is
ministerial upon the court.
A debtor has one year from the date the Certificate of Sale is registered with the Register of
Deeds within which to redeem his property.75 During the one-year redemption period, the
purchaser may possess the property by filing a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
before the court, upon the posting of a bond. 76 But after the one-year period, the purchaser has a
right to consolidate the title and to possess the property, without need of a bond. 77 And once title
is consolidated under the name of the purchaser, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes
ministerial on the part of the court; thus, no discretion is left to the court. 78 Questions regarding
the regularity and validity of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale may not be raised as a ground
to oppose or hold in abeyance the issuance of the writ of possession as these must be raised in a
separate action for the annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale. 79 The pendency of
such action is also not a ground to stay the issuance of a writ of possession.80
In this case, the redemption period had long lapsed when PNB applied for the issuance of the
Writ of Possession.1wphi1 In fact, the title over the subject property had already been
consolidated in PNBs name. Thus, it was ministerial upon Judge Venadas, Sr. to issue the Writ
of Possession in favor of PNB, the registered owner of the subject property.
Though there are instances when the issuance of the Writ of Possession may be deferred, 81 we
find none of these recognized exceptions present in the instant case. Spouses Sombilon claim
that the sale between PNB and Atty. Garay was invalid as it was done in violation of paragraph
5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code. However, the alleged invalidity of the sale is not a ground to
oppose or defer the issuance of the Writ of Possession as this does not affect PNBs right to
possess the subject property. Thus, there was no reason for Judge Venadas, Sr. to hold in
abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession. Clearly, he committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed Order holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of
Possession because PNB, as the registered owner, is entitled to the possession of the subject
property as a matter of right.
Regarding the failure of PNB and Atty. Garay to move for a reconsideration of the assailed
Order prior to the availment of a special civil action for certiorari, we agree with PNB that the
filing of a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with where the decision is a patent
nullity or where there is violation of due process,82 such as in the instant case.
All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in granting the Petition for Certiorari.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
As to the Administrative Complaint filed against Judge Venadas, Sr., we agree with the findings
and recommendations of the OCA.

Records show that spouses Sombilon failed to comply with the three-day notice rule and the
required proof of service embodied in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court,
thereby rendering the motion fatally defective. Despite this, Judge Venadas, Sr. still took
cognizance of the motion filed by spouses Sombilon, depriving PNB and Atty. Garay of their
right to due process.
To exculpate himself from the charges against him, Judge Venadas, Sr. claims that the motion
was personally served on PNB and its counsel on July 12, 2005 but they refused to receive the
same. However, as aptly pointed out by the OCA, no affidavit was submitted to substantiate
such allegation. Thus, we agree with the Court Administrator that Judge Venadas, Sr. is guilty of
grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of procedure for blatantly disregarding
Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Blatant disregard of basic, elementary, and well-known rules of procedure and law is gross
ignorance of the law,83which is classified as a serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, punishable by either dismissal from
service, suspension for more than three months but not exceeding six months, or a fine of more
than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.84
Thus, in view of his blatant disregard of the rules and his grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the assailed Order, and considering that this is his first offense, we find Judge Venadas, Sr.
guilty of grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of the law and is hereby fined
the amount of P20,000.00. Incidentally, in the April 18, 2007 Resolution in A.M. No. 12600Ret.,85 the Court approved the application of Judge Venadas, Sr. for disability retirement but
withheld the amount of P100,000.00 pending the final resolution of this case. In view thereof,
the fine of P20,000.00 herein imposed on Judge Venadas, Sr. is to be deducted from the
withheld amount of P100,000.00.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 179914, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The June 13, 2007
Decision and the August 8, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00477MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
In Administrative Matter No. RTJ-06-2000, Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. of the Regional Trial
Court of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, Branch 8, is hereby found guilty of grave abuse of
authority bordering on gross ignorance of the law and is ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) to be deducted from the withheld amount of P100,000.00
from his retirement benefits pursuant to the April 18, 2007 Resolution in A.M. No. 12600-Ret.
SO ORDERED.
A.M.
No.
MTJ-11-1778
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 08-1966-MTJ)
MARICOR
L.
vs.
JUDGE LIZABETH GUTIERREZ-TORRES, Respondent.

June

5,

2013

GARADO, Complainant,

RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a Verified Complaint-Affidavit, 1 filed by complainant Maricor L. Garado charging
respondent Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
60, Mandaluyong City, with violation of the Rule 3.05, 2 Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial

Conduct in connection with Civil Case No. 20129 entitled "Maricor Garado v. Rose Virgie
Estor."
Complainant alleges that she is the plaintiff in the aforesaid civil case for sum of money and
damages. She complaints that the case is covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure and only involves a claim for the payment of a loan amounting to P50,000 plus
interest and a claim for damages amounting to P30,000, but the case has remained unresolved
for more than 20 months from the time it was filed.
Complainant narrates that her complaint against defendant Rose Virgie Estor was filed on
August 22, 2005. After respondent judge denied defendant Estors motion to dismiss on July 3,
2006, Estor thereafter filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Extension of Time (To File
Responsive Pleading) followed by a second motion to dismiss on November 16, 2006.
Complainant, meanwhile, filed a motion to render judgment with an opposition to the second
motion to dismiss on November 27, 2006. The two motions were submitted for resolution on
November 27, 2006 and January 15, 2007, respectively, but both motions remained unresolved
as of the date of the filing of the complaint on May 9, 2007.
In a 1st Indorsement3 dated May 17, 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
directed Judge Torres to file her Comment on the complaint within ten days. Respondent judge
received the 1st Tracer4 against respondent judge on July 24, 2007 requiring her to file the May
25, 2007, but failed to comply with the directive. Thus, the OCA issued required Comment
within five days from notice. Respondent judge also received the 1st Indorsement on Tracer on
August 3, 2007, but still failed to comply.
On March 10, 2008, this Courts Third Division issued a Resolution 5 directing respondent judge
to: (1) show cause why she should not be administratively sanctioned in view of her refusal to
submit her Comment despite the two directives, and (2) file her Comment within five days from
receipt of notice, otherwise, an administrative case will be filed against her. Respondent judge
received a copy of the Resolution on April 16, 2008, but again ignored the same. Consequently,
the Court issued another Resolution6 on July 14, 2008 imposing upon Judge Torres a fine
of P1,000, to be paid within ten days from receipt, or imprisonment of five days if the fine is not
paid within the period of ten days. The July 14, 2008 Resolution also directed respondent judge
to comply with the Courts Show Cause Resolution dated March 10, 2008. Despite receipt of
the Resolution, however, Judge Torres neither complied with the Resolution nor paid the fine.
Thus, on April 21, 2010, the Court issued a Resolution 7 and resolved to await the payment of
the fine by respondent judge; to consider the filing of her Comment as waived; and to refer this
administrative matter to the OCA for final evaluation, report and recommendation.
On November 11, 2010, the OCA submitted its Memorandum 8 to the Court finding respondent
judge administratively liable and recommending that the Court:
1. RE-DOCKET the case as a regular administrative matter against respondent Judge Lizabeth
G. Torres;
2. DISMISS respondent Judge Lizabeth G. Torres from the service and impose upon her all the
attendant penalties; and
3. IMPOSE upon respondent Judge Lizabeth G. Torres the penalty of FIVE (5) days
imprisonment for her failure to pay the FINE of P1,000.00 within the required period, pursuant
to the Courts Resolution dated 14 July 2008.9

In recommending the penalty of dismissal, the OCA noted that in five previous administrative
cases,10 respondent was found liable for undue delay in rendering a decision, resolution or order,
and sternly warned that the commission of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more
severely. The OCA also noted eight other pending administrative cases 11 filed by different
litigants against respondent judge involving offenses of similar nature. As well, the OCA noted
the four instances under the present administrative case where respondent judge failed to
comply with directives/orders issued by this Court.
We agree with the OCA that respondent judge should be held administratively liable.
At the outset, the Court notes that respondent had been given ample opportunity to address the
complaint against her. The OCA sent and respondent judge received the 1st Indorsement dated
May 17, 2007 and 1st Tracer dated July 24, 2007, both of which explicitly required her to file
her Comment on the complaint. However, up until her dismissal from the service by the Court
on November 23, 2010,12 respondent had not complied with the OCA directives. Moreover,
respondent also failed to comply, despite due notice, with the Resolutions dated March 10, 2008
and July 14, 2008 of the Court itself.
Respondents failure to submit her Comment and compliance as required by the OCA and this
Court is tantamount to insubordination, inefficiency, and neglect of duty.14 It was respondents
duty then not only to obey the lawful orders of her superiors, but also to defend herself against
complainants charges and prove her fitness to remain a member of the bench. By her failure to
comply with the OCA and this Courts directives, respondent judge has completely lost her
chance to defend herself.
As to the merits of the administrative complaint, the pleadings and evidence on record clearly
establish respondents liability for undue delay in resolving Civil Case No. 20129.
Section 15(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, mandates that cases or matters filed with
the lower courts must be decided or resolved within three months from the date they are
submitted for decision or resolution. With respect to cases falling under the 1991 Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure, first level courts are only allowed 30 days following the receipt of the
last affidavit and position paper, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, within which
to render judgment. Section 6 of the said Rule also requires first level courts to render judgment
motu proprio or upon motion of the plaintiff if the defendant fails to file an answer to the
complaint within the allowable period.
Judges are oft-reminded of their duty to act promptly upon cases and matters pending before
their courts. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct directs judges to "dispose of
the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods." Canons 6 and 7 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics further exhort judges to be prompt and punctual in the disposition
and resolution of cases and matters pending before their courts:
6. PROMPTNESS
He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice
delayed is often justice denied.
7. PUNCTUALITY
He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing that the time of
litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is of value and that if the judge is unpunctual in his habits, he
sets a bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction with the administration of
justice.1wphi1

Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988 likewise reminds all judges to observe
scrupulously the periods prescribed in Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and to
act promptly on all motions and interlocutory matters pending before their courts.
Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of
judges. If judges do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the
prejudice of litigants. Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to administer justice promptly.15 In this case,
respondent judge failed to live up to the exacting standards of duty and responsibility that her
position required. Upon the failure of the defendant Estor to file her Answer in Civil Case No.
20129, respondent was then required under Section 6 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure to render judgment in Civil Case No. 20129 within 30 days. She failed to do so
contrary to the rationale behind the said Rule, which was precisely adopted to promote a more
expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of
litigants to the speedy disposition of cases.16
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, classifies undue delay in rendering a
decision and violation of Supreme Court directives as less serious charges which are punishable
with the penalty of suspension from office without salary and other benefits for one month to
three months, or a fine of P10,000 to P20,000. Given that respondent had been previously
dismissed from the service in Lugares v. Gutierrez-Torres, 17 however, the penalty of suspension
is already inapplicable. Thus, the Court imposes upon respondent for her undue delay in
resolving Civil Case No. 20129 a fine in the maximum amount of P20,000, and another fine
of P10,000 for her repeated failure to obey this Courts directives, both amounts to be deducted
from her accrued leave credits.
WHEREFORE, respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres is found LIABLE of the less serious
charges of undue delay in resolving Civil Case No. No. 20129 and violation or Supreme Court
directives. She is FINED the amount orP20,000 for the first offense and another P10,000 for the
second offense, both amounts to be deducted from her accrued leave credits. To effect the
penalties imposed, the Employee's Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services-OCA, is
DIRECTED to ascertain respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres's total earned leave credits.
Thereafter, the Finance Division, Fiscal Management Office-OCA, is DIRECTED to compute
the monetary value or respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres's total accrued leave credits and
deduct therefrom the amount of the fines imposed, without prejudice to whatever penalty the
Court may impose on other remaining and/or pending administrative cases against her, if any.
HON. JULIETA A. DECENA, HON. VIRGILIO D. PONTANAL, HON. AMELITA A.
IBASCO, HON. GERRY D. RAA, HON. PEDRO N. MORA. JR., and HON.
FERDINAND T. AGUILAR, complainants, vs. JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, Pili, Camarines
Sur, respondent.
R E S O LUTIO N
TINGA, J.:
The regular session of a municipal council was interrupted by a heckler in the audience
hurling various accusatory remarks and insults at the council members. The heckler is a judge,
the incident, the subject of this case.

On 26 May 2000, the Office of the Court Administrator received a Joint AffidavitComplaint executed by various municipal officials of Bula, Camarines Sur. The affiantscomplainants, Mayor Julieta A. Decena (Decena), Vice-mayor Virgilio D. Pontanal (Pontanal),
and Councilors Amelita A. Ibasco (Ibasco), Gerry D. Raa (Raa), Pedro N. Mora, Jr. (Mora), and
Ferdinand T. Aguila (Aguilar) sought the dismissal from the service and the disbarment of
respondent Judge Nilo A. Malanyaon (Judge Malanyaon), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 32, of Pili, Camarines Sur, on account of his conduct during the 21
February 2000 session of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula.
In a Resolution dated 19 June 2002, the Court referred the matter for investigation, report
and recommendation to Court of Appeals Justice Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr.[1] After Justice Rosario
sought to be excused owing to his forthcoming retirement then, [2] the Court referred the matter
to the Court of Appeals for assignment to a Justice by court-wide raffle. [3] The case was raffled
to Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. After conducting several hearings on the case, Justice Reyes, Jr.
rendered a Report and Recommendation (Report), which was received by this Court on 22 July
2003. From the Report, we draw the following antecedent facts:
On 21 February 2000, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur convened its regular
session, with Vice-mayor Pontanal presiding. Among the matters on the agenda was the
revocation of two previous council resolutions[4] authorizing Rolando N. Canet (Canet) to
operate a cockpit in the municipality. A former vice-mayor of Bula, Canet is also the nephewin-law of Judge Malanyaon. Both Judge Malanyaon and Canet attended the 21 February 2000
session of the Sangguniang Bayan. Canet, however, came along with many supporters.
[5]
Noticing his presence, the Sanggunian offered to recognize Judge Malanyaon; but he
declined, saying that he merely wanted to be an observer.[6]
From that point on, the episode during the Sanggunian session as culled in the Report on the
basis of the submitted affidavits transpired in this wise:
Subsequently, during the deliberations, the vice mayor attested that respondent interrupted the
session by shouting comments in their vernacular such as: Ambog, Ambog iyan (lies, they are
lies); Butig! Caya mo yan? Maski Butig! Maski Piglalado Camo! (Lies! Can you do that?
Even if they are lies? Even if you are being deceived?) and Dale Sana Camong Dale! (You
do things recklessly). During the deliberations relative to the authority of Mr. Rolando N.
Canet to operate a cockpit, the respondent judge, with blazing eyes and a red face further
interrupted the session by lambasting the municipal councilors with disparaging and insulting
remarks, which left the whole proceedings in confusion.
In the heat of respondents outbursts, he uttered the following remarks to the vice mayor:
Ika Bondying (the vice mayors nickname),. So kag-igin MO BUKO ADTONG MADAYA, Di
adto nag gagamit kana kuwa kan municipyo, o camo ginagamit mo si Revo mo! Mag adal
kamo, a biente uno mil, susmareosep kamo. Sabi co ka ninyo mig-lecture aco pero abo man
kamo, o taono, basta camo matugaan ni alkalde?Mga uda ugali! (You Bodying, your father
was not deceitful. He was not using the property of the municipality, now you are using
your Revo. You all study!You are receiving twenty one thousand pesos, my god, I told you
I will lecture you, but you did not want me to. Why? As long as you were promised by the
mayor? You have no etiquette!)
O Bondying ika, maski ambugan camo kana alkalde, tutubudon ninyo? Urgent na ono? Din a
kamo pwendeng butigan. Pigbubutigan camo. Amo yan sabihon ko ka ninyo! (You Bondying,

even if the mayor is telling you lies, will you follow her? What urgent? You could not be
lied upon again! You are being deceived, thats what I will tell you!)
Pedro N. Mora, former municipal councilor of Bula, Camarines Sur, in his affidavit also
conformed that he heard the respondent judge utter: Ambog, Ambog iyan(lies, they are lies);
Butig! Caya mo yan? Maski Butig! Maski Piglalado Camo! (Lies! Can you do that? Even if
they are lies? Even if you are being deceived?)and Dale Sana Camong Dale! (You do things
recklessly) during the session of Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, held on 21 February 2000.
xxx
Ferdinand T. Aguilar, another former councilor of Bula, Camarines Sur, likewise attested to the
intemperate language used by the respondent during the regular session of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Bula on 21 February 2000. Aguilar however adds that he too became the object of
respondents ire when the latter publicly told him the following:
O, Aguilar, ono pigsusunod mo? Ilinga, ilinga tolos ninyo, ono regal, o ono regal ninyo? You
cannot suspend the rule without 2/3 votes! Ono, magbasa kamo! Saying kito sweldo
ninyo! (You Aguilar, What are you following? Look, look at this, what is the regulation,
what are your regulations? You cannot suspend the rule without the 2/3 votes! You
read! Your salary is just a waste!);
O, ika (pointing at Aguilar) O ono pigsusunod mo? O, kua raw, basaha ninyo! Onong klaseng
Sanggunian adi? Di nagsusunod sa regal a, Ferdinand? Di ninyo piggagamit to mga payo
ninyo! O, ilinga! Basaha Ferdinand. (You, [pointing at Aguilar] what are you following? You
get [the rules] and read them! What kind of Sanggunian is this? You not following the
rules a, Ferdinand? You are not using your head! You look and read it, Ferdinand.);
Ika sana Ferdinand saying kito alintak mo! Uray ni ina nya, onong urgent na nakakaptan
ninyo? Kon pig-gagamit ya mga gamit kot munisipyo, di ninyo pigaactibaran! (You Ferdinand
you what is in your head is such a waste. Ass of your mother! To what urgent matter that
you are holding on? If it is the property of this municipality is the one being used, you are
not acting on it.);
Ika Ferdinand nag-aadal ka kin abugasiya, nagpapabuta man ika, ining, pigbubutigan na
kamo? (You Ferdinand, you are studying law and yet you were blinded even though you
are cheated);
Ika, Ferdinand basahon ko, kon gusto mo bikolon ko, di san sinasabing bago magtaong permit
agko Ordinansa. Si isay ya nagsasabi? Ya tinatawam kin poder ngowan uya Sangguniang Bayan
ya mig-taong lisensya! Tinawan na kin lisensa o ono pa? (You Ferdinand, I will read to you, if
you want I will read it to you in our dialect. That it is never stated there that before issuing
permit, there should be an ordinance first. Who said that? The one that is given the power
is the Sangguniang Bayan the one that will issue the license! He [Rolando Canet] was
already given a license, what else?);
Ika Aguilar, basahon mo iton a! da siton nagsasabing bago tawan kin lisensya, kumasta ngona
kin ordinansa! O sa cockfighting o kon sa demonyo! Ining sa bulangan na ini 1964 pa ako,
a! ngani ninyong maintindihan. Ngowan, si Rolando Canet agko lisensiya, huli ta abo ni
Decena, natugon man kamo gusto ninyong anularan! Ngowan, gusting bumayad abong
pabayadon. Magbasa kamo, 21 mil, buray ni ina niya! Ako, nag-absent akong kabangang

aldow para magatender kading session, sangribo ana nauda kanako! Gusto ko sanang
porbaran kamo adding osipon na kon talagang nakastahan na kamo! Magbasa kamo, 21 mil,
buray ni ina niya, 21 mil. (You Aguilar, read that [referring to the rules], it is never stated
here that before you issue a license, you have to pass first an ordinance, in the cockfighting
or whatever devil is that! This law about the cockfighting this has been the law since 1964
so that you will understand. Now, Rolando Canet has a license, just because Decena does
not want to give permit you want the same annulled. Now, he wants to pay but does not
want to accept the same. You read, 21 thousand [referring to our salary] ass of your
mother! I did not report for half a day just to attend this session and I lost P1,000.00 in the
process in the form of salary just so I will be able to prove for myself about the rumors
that you have been bought [or to that effect]! You read! Twenty one thousand! Ass of your
mother, twenty one thousand!)
Sayang Ferdinand, kun arog ya naturan mo, di ida makakapasar, amo yan sasabihon ko
kanimo! Kon arog kito ya studio mo, babaliktaron mo to demonyong iton, a, maski ton butig,
amo tutuboron mo a, tibaad di ika maka-abogado, kon maka-abogado man, makakarsel
ka! (What a waste Ferdinand, if thats what you learned, you will not pass [the Bar exams]
thats what I will tell you. What are you going to tell them, if that is how you understand,
that you will reverse this kind of devil even if it is a lie and yet you will follow the
same. You might not become a lawyer, and if you become one you will go to jail.)
Ernesto B. Ballaber, who is the incumbent Barangay Captain of Salvacion, Bula, Camarines
Sur, testified through his affidavit that he was present and seated beside the respondent judge on
the date in question. He noticed that the respondent judge was drunk as the latter gave off a
strong alcoholic scent. Moreover, Ballebar observed that the respondents eyes were watery and
red.
Ballebars deduction that Judge Malanyaon was drunk was reinforced when the respondent stood
up, banged the table and shouted in the vernacular: Butig!, Butig! Butig! (Lies! Lies!
Lies!) and Ambog! Ambog iyan! (Lie! Its a lie!) during the session. Ballebar further testified
that the respondent also verbally abused the members of the Sangguniang.
xxx
Gerry D. Raa asseverated that when the issue on the resolutions affecting the operation of the
cockpit arena by Rolando N. Canet was being taken up by the council, Judge Malanyaon
suddenly pushed the table in front of him, bolted from his chair and fiercely castigated the
members of the Sangguniang Bayan with every personal attacks. In fact, Raa attested that the
respondent publicly discredited and humiliated him during the session by imputing that he was
operating an illegal cockpit in the municipality.[7] (Emphasis not ours.)
Mora and Raa, as well as two other witnesses [8] for the complainants confirmed that Judge
Malanyaon reeked of liquor as he proceeded with his tirade.
According to Bartolome D. Parro, the Sangguniang Bayan OIC Secretary, because of the
outbursts of Judge Malanyaon the session was suspended. Meanwhile, the Sanggunian members
were involuntarily detained at the session hall. They were unable to leave as the entrance and
exits were blocked by supporters of Canet. Meanwhile, Judge Malanyaon continued his
outbursts against the councilors.[9]

Admitting his presence during the Sanggunian session, Judge Malanyaon explained,
however, that he was there not as a judge but in his private capacity as a taxpayer. He denied he
was drunk, even as he admitted he was enraged and furious over the proceedings at the
Sanggunian. He did not deny delivering a diatribe, but he claimed his actions were appropriate
since the proposed revocation of his nephew-in-laws cockpit license was illegal in his
estimation.[10]
All told, Judge Malanyaon did not dispute the facts as laid down by the complainants and
the latters witnesses. He justified his behavior though as the fulminations of a righteously
outraged citizen which according to him should be segregated from his function as a judge.
Judge Malanyaon deserves to be taken to task for his outrageous behavior as it clearly
violates the Code of Judicial Conduct.
First. The remarks uttered are patently defamatory and even vulgar. Indeed, such utterances
should not be expected of a public official worthy of his office. At fault is not the sentiment
harbored, but the impolitic choice of words employed to express such sentiment. [11] It is not
even particularly relevant if Judge Malanyaon was inebriated at that time, for the reckless
character of his remarks are in themselves palpable, whether they were delivered in a drunken
or sober state.
Second. Judge Malanyaons harangue was directed at the members of the Sangguniang
Bayan in the course of a regular session of the body. The members of the Sanggunian are, by
reason of their public office, entitled to the respect of other people, especially their fellow
public officers. Judge Malanyaons diatribe indicates his inability to accord his fellow public
officials their due.
Third. Judge Malanyaon made his remarks in a public forum. Obviously, however, he forgot
or even failed to realize that he is a representative of the judicial branch of government, the
judge being the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. [12] The
judiciary is loathe to interfere with the due exercise by co-equal branches of government of
their official functions, absent any justiciable action brought in due course.
Fourth. It must be understood that Judge Malanyaons remarks were aimed at preventing the
Sanggunian from revoking the cockpit license of Canet. In doing so, he was attempting to
interfere with the will of the Sanggunian as an independent legislative body. As observed by
Investigating Justice Reyes, Jr., the awkward situation was aggravated when Judge Malanyaon
publicly humiliated the councilors in front of their constituents, making them look witless and
obtuse, and thereby creating a mockery of the proceedings. [13] The disruptive presence of several
supporters of Canet, a local town politician, porated the protest against the plan to revoke the
cockpit license with political color. Judge Malanyaons active participation in apparent concert
with Canets supporters exposed him as nothing but a common lobbyist, as he forgot to act as a
judge with the standard judicial temperament and prudence.
Fifth. Judge Malanyaon obstructed the Sangguniang members from performing their official
duties. As Investigating Justice Reyes, Jr. pointed out, the acts complained of Judge Malanyaon
is no less a crime under Article 144 of the Revised Penal Code. [14] As a judge, respondent should
very well know how deleterious it would be to the discharge of his functions if the court
hearings he presides over would be rudely interrupted by fulsome tirades delivered by a
spectator in the audience. If such a situation arise in his courtroom, Judge Manlayaon would
have every right to take offense to the disruption in the proceedings. A legislative session is no

less an official proceeding as a court session and any one who disrupts either proceedings
deserves to be sanctioned.
Sixth. The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge shall neither allow family
relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment, nor allow the prestige of judicial office
to be used or lent to advance the private interests of others. [15] It does not escape our attention
that Judge Malanyaon was agitated during the Sanggunian session because the interests of his
nephew-in-law were under attack. Perhaps, Judge Malanyaon honestly believed that the
revocation of Canets cockpit license was illegal. Yet, it would not justify his undisguised
attempt to prevent the threatened detrimental action against his relative with his influence. We
agree with the conclusion of Investigating Justice Reyes, Jr. that Judge Malanyaon allowed
himself to be used by his nephew-in-law to promote the latters private interests, in
contravention of the Code of Judicial Conduct.[16]
Judge Malanyaon needs to be reminded that his judicial identity does not terminate at the
end of the day when he takes off his judicial robes.Even when garbed in casual wear outside of
the halls of justice, a judge retains the air of authority and moral ascendancy that he or she
wields inside the sala. As the Court once held:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept
restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal
behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be
above suspicion.[17]
It may strike perhaps as a poetically tragic notion, but for very good reasons, a judge's
official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. [18] Indeed, the
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2 in particular, mandates that a judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities, as well as behave at all times as
to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.[19] Thus, the Court
has to dismiss outright Judge Malanyaons suggestion that his actions be evaluated as one of a
taxpayer or ordinary citizen and not as that of a judge. In fact, his utterances were not made
under a cloak of anonymity, for the members of the council, as well as some of the people in the
gallery knew very well that he was a judge. It is highly probable that his invectives took on a
greater imperative on the listeners precisely because he was a judge, with all the authority
attendant to the office.
The conduct of Judge Malanyaon relative to the 21 February 2000 legislative session of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Bula is inexcusable and simply cannot be condoned. His actuations
constitute palpable violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
CANON 2 A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF
IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01. A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary
xxx

Rule 2.03. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the
private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in
a special position to influence the judge.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends that respondent be fined Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00). In his seventeen (17) years in the judiciary, Judge Malanyaon has not been
sanctioned, except once by reprimand. With the comparative seriousness of the offense, a fine
of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) would serve as an appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Nilo A. Malanyaon is hereby found GUILTY of conduct
unbecoming of a judge, in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01 and Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. He is ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) with a
STERN WARNING that the commission of the same or a similar act or omission in the future
will be dealt with more severely.

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC

OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C.
DEL CASTILLO
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya, et al., all members of the Malaya Lolas Organization,
seek reconsideration of the decision of the Court dated October 12, 2010 that dismissed their
charges of plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and gross neglect against Justice Mariano Del
Castillo in connection with the decision he wrote for the Court in G.R. No. 162230,
entitled Vinuya v. Romulo.[1]
Mainly, petitioners claim that the Court has by its decision legalized or approved of the
commission of plagiarism in the Philippines.This claim is absurd. The Court, like everyone else,
condemns plagiarism as the world in general understands and uses the term.
Plagiarism, a term not defined by statute, has a popular or common definition. To
plagiarize, says Webster, is to steal and pass off as ones own the ideas or words of
another. Stealing implies malicious taking. Blacks Law Dictionary, the worlds leading English
law dictionary quoted by the Court in its decision, defines plagiarism as the deliberate and
knowing presentation of another person's original ideas or creative expressions as ones own.
[2]
The presentation of another persons ideas as ones own must be deliberate or premeditateda
taking with ill intent.
There is no commonly-used dictionary in the world that embraces in the meaning of
plagiarism errors in attribution by mere accident or in good faith.

Certain educational institutions of course assume different norms in its application. For
instance, the Loyola Schools Code of Academic Integrity ordains that plagiarism is identified
not through intent but through the act itself. The objective act of falsely attributing to ones self
what is not ones work, whether intentional or out of neglect, is sufficient to conclude that
plagiarism has occurred. Students who plead ignorance or appeal to lack of malice are not
excused.[3]
But the Courts decision in the present case does not set aside such norm. The decision
makes this clear, thus:
To paraphrase Bast and Samuels, while the academic publishing model
is based on the originality of the writers thesis, the judicial system is based on
the doctrine of stare decisis, which encourages courts to cite historical legal
data, precedents, and related studies in their decisions. The judge is not
expected to produce original scholarship in every respect. The strength of a
decision lies in the soundness and general acceptance of the precedents and
long held legal opinions it draws from.[4]
Original scholarship is highly valued in the academe and rightly so. A college thesis, for
instance, should contain dissertations embodying results of original research, substantiating a
specific view.[5] This must be so since the writing is intended to earn for the student an academic
degree, honor, or distinction. He earns no credit nor deserves it who takes the research of others,
copies their dissertations, and proclaims these as his own. There should be no question that a
cheat deserves neither reward nor sympathy.
But the policy adopted by schools of disregarding the element of malicious intent found
in dictionaries is evidently more in the nature of establishing what evidence is sufficient to
prove the commission of such dishonest conduct than in rewriting the meaning of
plagiarism.Since it would be easy enough for a student to plead ignorance or lack of malice
even as he has copied the work of others, certain schools have adopted the policy of treating the
mere presence of such copied work in his paper sufficient objective evidence of
plagiarism. Surely, however, if on its face the students work shows as a whole that he has but
committed an obvious mistake or a clerical error in one of hundreds of citations in his thesis, the
school will not be so unreasonable as to cancel his diploma.
In contrast, decisions of courts are not written to earn merit, accolade, or prize as an
original piece of work or art. Deciding disputes is a service rendered by the government for the
public good. Judges issue decisions to resolve everyday conflicts involving people of flesh and
blood who ache for speedy justice or juridical beings which have rights and obligations in law
that need to be protected. The interest of society in written decisions is not that they are
originally crafted but that they are fair and correct in the context of the particular disputes
involved. Justice, not originality, form, and style, is the object of every decision of a court of
law.
There is a basic reason for individual judges of whatever level of courts, including the
Supreme Court, not to use original or unique language when reinstating the laws involved in the
cases they decide. Their duty is to apply the laws as these are written. But laws include, under
the doctrine of stare decisis, judicial interpretations of such laws as are applied to specific
situations. Under this doctrine, Courts are to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point.

Once the Court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same;
regardless of whether the parties or property are the same.[6]
And because judicial precedents are not always clearly delineated, they are quite often
entangled in apparent inconsistencies or even in contradictions, prompting experts in the law to
build up regarding such matters a large body of commentaries or annotations that, in
themselves, often become part of legal writings upon which lawyers and judges draw materials
for their theories or solutions in particular cases. And, because of the need to be precise and
correct, judges and practitioners alike, by practice and tradition, usually lift passages from such
precedents and writings, at times omitting, without malicious intent, attributions to the
originators.
Is this dishonest? No. Duncan Webb, writing for the International Bar Association puts it
succinctly. When practicing lawyers (which include judges) write about the law, they effectively
place their ideas, their language, and their work in the public domain, to be affirmed, adopted,
criticized, or rejected. Being in the public domain, other lawyers can thus freely use these
without fear of committing some wrong or incurring some liability. Thus:
The tendency to copy in law is readily explicable. In law accuracy of
words is everything. Legal disputes often centre round the way in which
obligations have been expressed in legal documents and how the facts of the
real world fit the meaning of the words in which the obligation is
contained. This, in conjunction with the risk-aversion of lawyers means that
refuge will often be sought in articulations that have been tried and tested. In
a sense therefore the community of lawyers have together contributed to this
body of knowledge, language, and expression which is common property and
may be utilized, developed and bettered by anyone.[7]
The implicit right of judges to use legal materials regarded as belonging to the public
domain is not unique to the Philippines. As Joyce C. George, whom Justice Maria Lourdes
Sereno cites in her dissenting opinion, observed in her Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook:
A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is
exempted from a charge of plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from a
law review article, novel thoughts published in a legal periodical or language
from a partys brief are used without giving attribution. Thus judges are free
to use whatever sources they deem appropriate to resolve the matter before
them, without fear of reprisal.This exemption applies to judicial writings
intended to decide cases for two reasons: the judge is not writing a literary
work and, more importantly, the purpose of the writing is to resolve a
dispute. As a result, judges adjudicating cases are not subject to a claim of
legal plagiarism.[8]
If the Court were to inquire into the issue of plagiarism respecting its past decisions from
the time of Chief Justice Cayetano S. Arellano to the present, it is likely to discover that it has
not on occasion acknowledged the originators of passages and views found in its
decisions. These omissions are true for many of the decisions that have been penned and are
being penned daily by magistrates from the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of
Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts nationwide and with them, the municipal trial courts and

other first level courts. Never in the judiciarys more than 100 years of history has the lack of
attribution been regarded and demeaned as plagiarism.
This is not to say that the magistrates of our courts are mere copycats. They are not. Their
decisions analyze the often conflicting facts of each case and sort out the relevant from the
irrelevant. They identify and formulate the issue or issues that need to be resolved and evaluate
each of the laws, rulings, principles, or authorities that the parties to the case invoke. The
decisions then draw their apt conclusions regarding whether or not such laws, rulings,
principles, or authorities apply to the particular cases before the Court. These efforts, reduced in
writing, are the product of the judges creativity. It is hereactually the substance of their
decisionsthat their genius, originality, and honest labor can be found, of which they should be
proud.
In Vinuya, Justice Del Castillo examined and summarized the facts as seen by the
opposing sides in a way that no one has ever done.He identified and formulated the core of the
issues that the parties raised. And when he had done this, he discussed the state of the law
relevant to their resolution. It was here that he drew materials from various sources, including
the three foreign authors cited in the charges against him. He compared the divergent views
these present as they developed in history. He then explained why the Court must reject some
views in light of the peculiar facts of the case and applied those that suit such facts. Finally, he
drew from his discussions of the facts and the law the right solution to the dispute in the
case. On the whole, his work was original. He had but done an honest work.
The Court will not, therefore, consistent with established practice in the Philippines and
elsewhere, dare permit the filing of actions to annul the decisions promulgated by its judges or
expose them to charges of plagiarism for honest work done.
This rule should apply to practicing lawyers as well. Counsels for the petitioners, like all
lawyers handling cases before courts and administrative tribunals, cannot object to
this. Although as a rule they receive compensation for every pleading or paper they file in court
or for every opinion they render to clients, lawyers also need to strive for technical accuracy in
their writings. They should not be exposed to charges of plagiarism in what they write so long
as they do not depart, as officers of the court, from the objective of assisting the Court in the
administration of justice.
As Duncan Webb said:
In presenting legal argument most lawyers will have recourse to either
previous decisions of the courts, frequently lifting whole sections of a judges
words to lend weight to a particular point either with or without
attribution. The words of scholars are also sometimes given weight, depending
on reputation. Some encyclopaedic works are given particular authority. In
England this place is given to Halsburys Laws of England which is widely
considered authoritative. A lawyer can do little better than to frame an
argument or claim to fit with the articulation of the law in Halsburys. While
in many cases the very purpose of the citation is to claim the authority of the
author, this is not always the case. Frequently commentary or dicta of lesser
standing will be adopted by legal authors, largely without attribution.
xxxx

The converse point is that originality in the law is viewed with

skepticism. It is only the arrogant fool or the truly gifted who will depart
entirely from the established template and reformulate an existing idea in the
belief that in doing so they will improve it. While over time incremental
changes occur, the wholesale abandonment of established expression is
generally considered foolhardy.[9]
The Court probably should not have entertained at all the charges of plagiarism against
Justice Del Castillo, coming from the losing party. But it is a case of first impression and
petitioners, joined by some faculty members of the University of the Philippines school of law,
have unfairly maligned him with the charges of plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and
gross neglect for failing to attribute lifted passages from three foreign authors. These charges as
already stated are false, applying the meaning of plagiarism as the world in general knows it.
True, Justice Del Castillo failed to attribute to the foreign authors materials that he lifted
from their works and used in writing the decision for the Court in the Vinuya case. But, as the
Court said, the evidence as found by its Ethics Committee shows that the attribution to these
authors appeared in the beginning drafts of the decision. Unfortunately, as testified to by a
highly qualified and experienced court-employed researcher, she accidentally deleted the same
at the time she was cleaning up the final draft. The Court believed her since, among other
reasons, she had no motive for omitting the attribution. The foreign authors concerned, like the
dozens of other sources she cited in her research, had high reputations in international law.
Notably, those foreign authors expressly attributed the controversial passages found in
their works to earlier writings by others. The authors concerned were not themselves the
originators. As it happened, although the ponencia of Justice Del Castillo accidentally deleted
the attribution to them, there remained in the final draft of the decision attributions of the same
passages to the earlier writings from which those authors borrowed their ideas in the first
place. In short, with the remaining attributions after the erroneous clean-up, the passages as it
finally appeared in the Vinuya decision still showed on their face that the lifted ideas did not
belong to Justice Del Castillo but to others. He did not pass them off as his own.
With our ruling, the Court need not dwell long on petitioners allegations that Justice Del
Castillo had also committed plagiarism in writing for the Court his decision in another
case, Ang Ladlad v. Commission on Elections.[10] Petitioners are nit-picking. Upon close
examination and as Justice Del Castillo amply demonstrated in his comment to the motion for
reconsideration, he in fact made attributions to passages in such decision that he borrowed from
his sources although they at times suffered in formatting lapses.
Considering its above ruling, the Court sees no point in further passing upon the motion
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for leave to file and admit motion for reconsiderationin-intervention dated January 5, 2011 and Dr. Peter Payoyos claim of other instances of alleged
plagiarism in the Vinuya decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC

March 8, 2011

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A

STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent law professors 1 in
response to the Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause Resolution), directing them
to show cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of
specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerated therein.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly dockets this as an
administrative matter, not a special civil action for indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court, contrary to the dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno
(Justice Sereno) to the said October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution. Neither is this a
disciplinary proceeding grounded on an allegedly irregularly concluded finding of indirect
contempt as intimated by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (Justice Morales) in her
dissenting opinions to both the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution and the present
decision.
With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly in mind, the Court
finds that with the exception of one respondent whose compliance was adequate and another
who manifested he was not a member of the Philippine Bar, the submitted explanations, being
mere denials and/or tangential to the issues at hand, are decidedly unsatisfactory. The proffered
defenses even more urgently behoove this Court to call the attention of respondent law
professors, who are members of the Bar, to the relationship of their duties as such under the
Code of Professional Responsibility to their civil rights as citizens and academics in our free
and democratic republic.
The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case are as follows:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.
RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents
of paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a
decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been
proved.

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice.
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.
CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when lawyers speak their
minds, they must ever be mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical standards of their
profession, and in particular, avoid foul and abusive language to condemn the Supreme Court,
or any court for that matter, for a decision it has rendered, especially during the pendency of a
motion for such decisions reconsideration. The accusation of plagiarism against a member of
this Court is not the real issue here but rather this plagiarism issue has been used to deflect
everyones attention from the actual concern of this Court to determine by respondents
explanations whether or not respondent members of the Bar have crossed the line of decency
and acceptable professional conduct and speech and violated the Rules of Court through
improper intervention or interference as third parties to a pending case. Preliminarily, it should
be stressed that it was respondents themselves who called upon the Supreme Court to act on
their Statement,2 which they formally submitted, through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean
Leonen), for the Courts proper disposition. Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and
academic freedom invoked by the respondents, it is worth discussing here that the legal
reasoning used in the past by this Court to rule that freedom of expression is not a defense in
administrative cases against lawyers for using intemperate speech in open court or in court
submissions can similarly be applied to respondents invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it
is precisely because respondents are not merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould
the minds of young aspiring attorneys that respondents own non-observance of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, even if purportedly motivated by the purest of intentions, cannot be
ignored nor glossed over by this Court.
To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents actuations, it is apropos to revisit the
factual antecedents of this case.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Antecedent Facts and Proceedings
On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo)
in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated. On May 31, 2010,
the counsel3 for Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Vinuya decision, raising solely the following grounds:
I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject this Honorable Courts (sic)
assertion that the Executives foreign policy prerogatives are virtually unlimited;
precisely, under the relevant jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such
prerogatives are proscribed by international human rights and humanitarian standards,
including those provided for in the relevant international conventions of which the
Philippines is a party.4

II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic protection with the broader, if
fundamental, responsibility of states to protect the human rights of its citizens
especially where the rights asserted are subject of erga omnes obligations and pertain to
jus cogens norms.5
On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque)
and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
in G.R. No. 162230, where they posited for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of
the grounds for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. Among other arguments, Attys. Roque
and Bagares asserted that:
I.
IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE COURTS
JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST THREE SOURCES AN
ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND
AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THESE SOURCES SUPPORT
THE JUDGMENTS ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSING THE INSTANT PETITION WHEN
IN TRUTH, THE PLAGIARIZED SOURCES EVEN MAKE A STRONG CASE FOR THE
PETITIONS CLAIMS.7
They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only of
extensive plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources by
the ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying the Petition."8
According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya decision
were namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decents article "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus
Cogens;"9 (2) Christian J. Tams book Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International
Law;10 and (3) Mark Ellis article "Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime."11
On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on July 19, 2010,
journalists Aries C. Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted an article, entitled "SC justice
plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort women," on the Newsbreak website. 12 The same article
appeared on the GMA News TV website also on July 19, 2010.13
On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roques column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted," appeared in the
Manila Standard Today.14 In the said column, Atty. Roque claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle, one
of the authors purportedly not properly acknowledged in the Vinuya decision, confirmed that
his work, co-authored with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent, had been plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted
Prof. Criddles response to the post by Julian Ku regarding the news report 15 on the alleged
plagiarism in the international law blog, Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle responded to Kus blog
entry in this wise:
The newspapers16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for reconsideration filed yesterday
with the Philippine Supreme Court yesterday. The motion is available here:
http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-in-the-supremecourt/
The motion suggests that the Courts decision contains thirty-four sentences and citations that
are identical to sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL article (co-authored with Evan Fox-

Decent). Professor Fox-Decent and I were unaware of the petitioners [plagiarism] allegations
until after the motion was filed today.
Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the courts jus cogens discussion is that it
implies that the prohibitions against crimes against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture are not
jus cogens norms. Our article emphatically asserts the opposite. The Supreme Courts decision
is available here:http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm17
On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the Court in reply to
the charge of plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.18
In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly plagiarized author in the Vinuya decision,
Dr. Mark Ellis, wrote the Court, to wit:
Your Honours:
I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my attention in the last few days.
Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed Court, I am compelled, as a question
of the integrity of my work as an academic and as an advocate of human rights and
humanitarian law, to take exception to the possible unauthorized use of my law review article
on rape as an international crime in your esteemed Courts Judgment in the case of Vinuya et al.
v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230, Judgment of 28 April 2010).
My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible plagiarism by the Philippine
chapter of the Southeast Asia Media Legal Defence Initiative (SEAMLDI), 19 an affiliate of the
London-based Media Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI), where I sit as trustee.
In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive discussion in footnote 65, pp.
27-28, of the said Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also concerned that your esteemed
Court may have misread the arguments I made in the article and employed them for cross
purposes. This would be ironic since the article was written precisely to argue for the
appropriate legal remedy for victims of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.
I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law in 2006 has been made available to your esteemed Court. I trust that your
esteemed Court will take the time to carefully study the arguments I made in the article.
I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court as to the issues raised by this
letter.
With respect,
(Sgd.)
Dr. Mark Ellis20
In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court formed the Committee
on Ethics and Ethical Standards (the Ethics Committee) pursuant to Section 13, Rule 2 of the
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the
Court referred the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics Committee. The
matter was subsequently docketed as A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and Bagares to comment on
the letter of Justice Del Castillo.21

On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement
by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the Statement), was posted in
Newsbreaks website22 and on Atty. Roques blog.23 A report regarding the statement also
appeared on various on-line news sites, such as the GMA News TV 24 and the Sun Star25 sites, on
the same date. The statement was likewise posted at the University of the Philippines College of
Laws bulletin board allegedly on August 10, 201026 and at said colleges website.27
On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the University of the
Philippines College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the Court, through Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice Corona). The cover letter dated August 10, 2010 of Dean
Leonen read:
The
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines

Honorable

Through:

Hon.
Chief Justice

Renato

Subject:

Statement
from
the
UP
on
the
Plagiarism
Vinuya v Executive Secretary

C.
of
College
in
the

Corona
faculty
of
Law
case
of

Your Honors:
We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement signed by thirty[-]eight
(38)28members of the faculty of the UP College of Law. We hope that its points could be
considered by the Supreme Court en banc.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.)
Marvic
Dean and Professor of Law

M.V.F.

Leonen

(Emphases supplied.)
The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted letter did not contain the actual
signatures of the alleged signatories but only stated the names of 37 UP Law professors with the
notation (SGD.) appearing beside each name. For convenient reference, the text of the UP Law
faculty Statement is reproduced here:
RESTORING INTEGRITY
A
STATEMENT
THE
UNIVERSITY
OF
ON THE ALLEGATIONS
IN THE SUPREME COURT

BY
THE
FACULTY
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
COLLEGE
OF
LAW
OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had
suffered abuse during a time of war. After they courageously came out with their very personal
stories of abuse and suffering as "comfort women", waited for almost two decades for any
meaningful relief from their own government as well as from the government of Japan, got their
hopes up for a semblance of judicial recourse in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R.

No. 162230 (28 April 2010), they only had these hopes crushed by a singularly reprehensible
act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land.
It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law views
the charge that an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court committed plagiarism and
misrepresentation in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. The plagiarism and misrepresentation are
not only affronts to the individual scholars whose work have been appropriated without correct
attribution, but also a serious threat to the integrity and credibility of the Philippine Judicial
System.
In common parlance, plagiarism is the appropriation and misrepresentation of another persons
work as ones own. In the field of writing, it is cheating at best, and stealing at worst. It
constitutes a taking of someone elses ideas and expressions, including all the effort and
creativity that went into committing such ideas and expressions into writing, and then making it
appear that such ideas and expressions were originally created by the taker. It is dishonesty, pure
and simple. A judicial system that allows plagiarism in any form is one that allows dishonesty.
Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, to allow plagiarism in the Supreme
Court is to allow the production of laws by dishonest means. Evidently, this is a complete
perversion and falsification of the ends of justice.
A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows that the ponente
merely copied select portions of other legal writers works and interspersed them into the
decision as if they were his own, original work. Under the circumstances, however, because the
Decision has been promulgated by the Court, the Decision now becomes the Courts and no
longer just the ponentes. Thus the Court also bears the responsibility for the Decision. In the
absence of any mention of the original writers names and the publications from which they
came, the thing speaks for itself.
So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this case and the
spokesman of the Court.
It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original articles is a
reference to the primary sources relied upon. This cursory explanation is not acceptable,
because the original authors writings and the effort they put into finding and summarizing those
primary sources are precisely the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of the footnotes together
with portions of their writings in fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the plagiarism since it
provides additional evidence of a deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors work
of organizing and analyzing those primary sources.
It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be familiar with all legal
and scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable, because personal unfamiliarity with sources
all the more demands correct and careful attribution and citation of the material relied upon. It
is a matter of diligence and competence expected of all Magistrates of the Highest Court of the
Land.
But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers, Professors Evan Criddle
and Evan Fox-Descent, that the High Court actually misrepresents the conclusions of their
work entitled "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens," the main source of the plagiarized text. In
this article they argue that the classification of the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual slavery as
crimes against humanity have attained the status of jus cogens, making it obligatory upon the
State to seek remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts of
the same article to arrive at the contrary conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual dishonesty
of copying works without attribution by transforming it into an act of intellectual fraud by
copying works in order to mislead and deceive.

The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it deals with State
liability and responsibility for personal injury and damage suffered in a time of war, and the role
of the injured parties home States in the pursuit of remedies against such injury or damage.
National courts rarely have such opportunities to make an international impact. That the
petitioners were Filipino "comfort women" who suffered from horrific abuse during the Second
World War made it incumbent on the Court of last resort to afford them every solicitude. But
instead of acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed its resolution for almost seven
years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners seeking justice from the Court. When it
dismissed the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the Court
decided this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the Supreme Court added insult to
injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to
take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false sympathy
and nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for even the most basic values of
decency and respect. The reputation of the Philippine Supreme Court and the standing of the
Philippine legal profession before other Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake.
The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its decisions and cannot
accept excuses for failure to attain the highest standards of conduct imposed upon all members
of the Bench and Bar because these undermine the very foundation of its authority and power in
a democratic society. Given the Courts recent history and the controversy that surrounded it, it
cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction as this
would only further erode faith and confidence in the judicial system. And in light of the
significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but of women
elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times
of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered
and misinterpreted texts.
The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without ensuring that its
own conduct, whether collectively or through its Members, is beyond reproach. This necessarily
includes ensuring that not only the content, but also the processes of preparing and writing its
own decisions, are credible and beyond question. The Vinuya Decision must be conscientiously
reviewed and not casually cast aside, if not for the purpose of sanction, then at least for the
purpose of reflection and guidance. It is an absolutely essential step toward the establishment of
a higher standard of professional care and practical scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which are
critical to improving the system of administration of justice in the Philippines. It is also a very
crucial step in ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the Final Arbiter of all
controversies: a position that requires competence and integrity completely above any and all
reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of judicial and professional ethics.
With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust reposed upon them
as teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the University of the
Philippine College of Law that:
(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is
unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral conduct and
judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court;
(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the entire
Supreme Court and undermines the foundations of the Philippine judicial system
by allowing implicitly the decision of cases and the establishment of legal
precedents through dubious means;
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence
to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice

to all those who have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as the
petitioners therein;
(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty and
to save the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as an institution, it is necessary
for the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign his position, without
prejudice to any other sanctions that the Court may consider appropriate;
(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by which
it conducts research, prepares drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions in order to
prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and concise guidance to
the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and writing
in pleadings, practice, and adjudication.
Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27 July 2010.
PI No. 12-205-CA-J

December 10, 2013

RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF THOMAS S. MERDEGIA AGAINST HON.

VICENTE S.E. VELOSO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS,
RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP No. 119461.
x---------------x
A.C. No.: 10300
RE: RESOLUTION DATED OCTOBER 8, 2013 IN OCA IPI No. 12-205-CA-J AGAINST
ATTY. HOMOBONO ADAZA II.
R E S O LUTIO N
BRION, J.:
On October 8, 2013, we issued a Resolution 1 dismissing the administrative complaint of Tomas
S. Merdegia against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso. In this same
Resolution, we also directed Atty. Homobono Adaza II, Merdegias counsel, to show cause why
he should not be cited for contempt.
After considering Atty. Adazas explanation,2 we find his account insufficient, and find him
guilty of indirect contempt.
According to Atty. Adaza, he should not bepunished for indirect contemptas he was merely
performing his duty as Merdegias counsel when he assisted him in preparing the administrative
complaint against Justice Veloso. Atty. Adaza asserted that both he and his client observed
Justice Velosos partiality during the oral arguments, but instead of immediately filing an
administrative complaint against him, he counseled Merdegia to first file a Motion to Inhibit
Justice Veloso from the case. However, upon finding that Justice Veloso refused to inhibit
himself, Merdegia repeated his request to file an administrative complaint against Justice
Veloso, to which Atty. Adaza acceded. Thus, Atty. Adaza pleaded that he should not be faulted
for assisting his client, especially when heal so believes in the merits of his clients case.
Atty. Adazas explanation, read together with the totality of the facts of the case, fails to
convince us of his innocence from the contempt charge.

As Atty. Adaza himself admitted, he prepared the administrative complaint after Justice Veloso
refused to inhibit himself from a case he was handling. The complaint and the motion for
inhibition were both based on the same main cause: the alleged partiality of Justice Veloso
during the oral arguments of Merdegias case. The resolution dismissing the motion for
inhibition should have disposed of the issue of Justice Velosos bias. While we do not discount
the fact that it was Justice Veloso who penned the resolution denying the motion for inhibition,
we note that he was allowed to do this under the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals.3 Had Merdegia and Atty. Adaza doubted the legality of this resolution, the proper
remedy would have been to file a petition for certiorari assailing the order denying the motion
for inhibition. The settled rule is that administrative complaints against justices cannot and
should not substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies against an assailed decision or
ruling.4While a lawyer has a duty to represent his client with zeal, he must do so within the
bounds provided by law.5 He is also duty-bound to impress upon his client the propriety of the
legal action the latter wants to undertake, and to encourage compliance with the law and legal
processes.6
A reading of Merdegias administrative complaint7 shows an apparent failure to understand that
cases are not always decided in ones favor, and that an allegation of bias must stem from an
extrajudicial source other than those attendant to the merits and the developments in the
case.8 In this light, we cannot but attribute to Atty. Adaza the failure to impress upon his client
the features of our adversarial system, the substance of the law on ethics and respect for the
judicial system, and his own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an officer of
the Court demand of him in acting for his client before our courts.
To be sure, deciding administrative cases against erring judges is not an easy task. We have to
strike a balance between the need for accountability and integrity in the Judiciary, on the one
hand, with the need to protect the independence and efficiency of the Judiciary from vindictive
and enterprising litigants, on the other. Courts should not be made to bow down to the wiles of
litigants who bully judges into inhibiting from cases or deciding cases in their favor, but neither
should we shut our doors from litigants brave enough to call out the corrupt practices of people
who decide the outcome of their cases. Indeed, litigants who feel unjustly injured by malicious
and corrupt acts of erring judges and officials should not be punished for filing administrative
cases against them; neither should these litigants be unjustly deterred from doing sobya wrong
signal from this Court that they would be made to explain why they should not be cited for
contempt when the complaints they filed prove to be without sufficient cause.
What tipped the balance against Atty. Adaza, in this case, is the totality of the facts of
thecasethat,when read together with the administrative complaint heprepared,shows that his
complaint is merelyan attempt to malign the administration of justice. We note Atty. Adazas
penchantfor filingmotions for inhibition throughout the case:first, against Judge Ma. Theresa
Dolores C. Gomez Estoesta of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, who issued an order
unfavorable to his client; and second, against all the justices of the Court of Appeals division
hearing his appeal, for alleged bias during the oral arguments onhiscase. Theseindicators, taken
together with the baseless administrative complaint against Justice Veloso after he penned an
order adverseto Atty. Adazas client, disclosethat there was more to the administrative complaint
than the report of legitimate grievances against members of the Judiciary.
In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, etc.,9 we cited a litigant in indirect
contempt of court for his predisposition to indiscriminately file administrative complaints
against members of the Judiciary. We held that this conduct degrades the judicial office,
interferes with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary, and thus constitutes indirect
contempt of court. Applying this principle to the present case, we hold that Atty. Adazas acts
constitute an improper conduct that tends to degrade the administration of justice, and is thus
punishable for indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

As a final note, Atty. Adazas contemptuous conduct may also be subject to disciplinary
sanction as a member of the bar.10 If we do not now proceed at all against Atty. Adaza to
discipline him, we are prevented from doing so by our concern for his due process rights. Our
Resolution of October 8, 2013 only asked him to show cause why he should not be cited in
contempt, and not why he should not be administratively penalized. To our mind, imposing a
disciplinary sanction against Atty. Adaza through a contempt proceeding violates the basic
tenets of due process as a disciplinary action is independent and separate from a proceeding for
contempt. A person charged of an offense, whether in an administrative or criminal proceeding,
must be informed of the nature of the charge against him, and given ample opportunity to
explain his side.11
While the two proceedings can proceed simultaneously with each other,12 a contempt
proceeding cannot substitute for a disciplinary proceeding for erring lawyers, 13 and vice versa.
There can be no substitution between the two proceedings, as contempt proceedings against
lawyers, as officers of the Court, are different in nature and purpose from the discipline of
lawyers as legal professionals. The two proceedings spring from two different powers of the
Court. The Court, in exercising its power of contempt, exercises an implied and inherent power
granted to courts in general.14 Its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings; to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts; and,
consequently, in the administration of justice;15 thus, it may be instituted against any person
guilty of acts that constitute contempt of court.16 Further, jurisprudence describes a contempt
proceeding as penal and summary in nature; hence, legal principles applicable to criminal
proceedings also apply to contempt proceedings. A judgment dismissing the charge of
contempt, for instance, may no longer be appealed in the same manner that the prohibition
against double jeopardy bars the appeal of an accuseds acquittal.17
In contrast, a disciplinary proceeding against an erring lawyer is sui generis in nature; it is
neither purely civil nor purely criminal. Unlike a criminal prosecution, a disciplinary
proceeding is not intended to inflict punishment, but to determine whether a lawyer is still fit to
be allowed the privilege of practicing law. It involves an investigation by the Court of the
conduct of its officers, and has, for its primary objective, public interest. 18 Thus, unlike a
contempt proceeding, the acquittal of the lawyer from a disciplinary proceeding cannot bar an
interested party from seeking reconsideration of the ruling. Neither does the imposition of a
penalty for contempt operate as res judicata to a subsequent charge for unprofessional
conduct.19
Contempt proceedings and disciplinary actions are also governed by different procedures.
Contempt of court is governed by the procedures under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas
disciplinary actions in the practice of law are governed by Rules138 and 139 thereof.20
IN THESE LIGHTS, the Court finds Atty. Homobomo Adaza II GUILTY OF INDIRECT
CONTEMPT for filing a frivolous suit against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E.
Veloso, and hereby sentences him to pay, within the period of fifteen days from the
promulgation of this judgment, a fine of P5,000.00. The respondent is also WARNED that
further similar misbehavior on his part may be a ground for the institution of disciplinary
proceedings against him.