JUDICIAL HEIRARCHY

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Petitioner,versus - HEIRS OF FERNANDO F. CABALLERO, represented by
his daughter, JOCELYN G. CABALLERO, Respondents. G.R. Nos.
158090
Respondent Fernando C. Caballero (Fernando) was the registered
owner of a residential lot. On the said lot, respondent built a
residential/commercial building consisting of two (2) stories.
On March 7, 1968, Fernando and his wife, Sylvia Caballero, secured a
loan from petitioner GSIS in the amount of P20,000.00, as evidenced
by a promissory note. Fernando and his wife likewise executed a real
estate mortgage on the same date, mortgaging the afore-stated
property as security. Fernando defaulted on the payment of his loan
with the GSIS. Hence, the mortgage was foreclosed and the same was
sold at a public auction where the petitioner was the only bidder.
For failure of Fernando to redeem the said property within the
designated period, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership on September 5, 1975. Petitioner wrote a letter to
Fernando, informing him of the consolidation of title in its favor, and
requesting payment of monthly rental in view of Fernando's continued
occupancy of the subject property. In reply, Fernando requested that
he be allowed to repurchase the same through partial payments.
Negotiation as to the repurchase by Fernando of the subject property
went on for several years, but no agreement was reached between the
parties.
On January 16, 1989, petitioner scheduled the subject property for
public bidding. On the scheduled date of bidding, Fernando's daughter,
Jocelyn Caballero, submitted a bid in the amount of P350,000.00,
while Carmelita Mercantile Trading Corporation (CMTC) submitted a
bid in the amount of P450,000.00. Since CMTC was the highest bidder,
it was awarded the subject property. On May 16, 1989, the Board of
Trustees of the GSIS issued Resolution No. 199 confirming the award
of the subject property to CMTC.
Due to the foregoing, Fernando, represented by his daughter and
attorney-in-fact, Jocelyn Caballero, filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint against CMTC, the GSIS
and its responsible officers, and the Register of Deeds of Kidapawan,
Cotabato.

Fernando against petitioner for annulment of bid award, deed of

absolute sale and TCT No. 76183. Respondents, on the other hand,
alleged that petitioner's counterclaim is permissive and its failure to pay
the prescribed docket fees results into the dismissal of its claim.
To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court
has devised the following tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law
raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? (b)
Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claims, absent
the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same
evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendants
counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim
and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would
indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.[12]
Tested against the above-mentioned criteria, this Court agrees with the
CA's view that petitioner's counterclaim for the recovery of the amount
representing rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is
permissive. The evidence needed by Fernando to cause the
annulment of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT is different
from that required to establish petitioner's claim for the recovery of
rentals.
The issue in the main action, i.e., the nullity or validity of the bid award,
deed of absolute sale and TCT in favor of CMTC, is entirely different
from the issue in the counterclaim,i.e., whether petitioner is entitled to
receive the CMTC's rent payments over the subject property when
petitioner became the owner of the subject property by virtue of the
consolidation of ownership of the property in its favor.
The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket
fees. This, petitioner did not do, because it asserted that its claim for
the collection of rental payments was a compulsory counterclaim.
Since petitioner failed to pay the docket fees, the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over its permissive counterclaim. The judgment rendered
by the RTC, insofar as it ordered Fernando to pay petitioner the rentals
which he collected from CMTC, is considered null and void. Any
decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be
struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court.
Petitioner further argues that assuming that its counterclaim is
permissive, the trial court has jurisdiction to try and decide the same,
considering petitioner's exemption from all kinds of fees.

In his complaint, Fernando alleged that there were irregularities in the

conduct of the bidding. CMTC misrepresented itself to be wholly
owned by Filipino citizens. It misrepresented its working capital. Its
representative Carmelita Ang Hao had no prior authority from its board
of directors in an appropriate board resolution to participate in the
bidding. The corporation is not authorized to acquire real estate or
invest its funds for purposes other than its primary purpose. Fernando
further alleged that the GSIS allowed CMTC to bid despite knowledge
that said corporation has no authority to do so. The GSIS also
disregarded Fernando's prior right to buy back his family home and lot
in violation of the laws. The Register of Deeds of Cotabato acted with
abuse of power and authority when it issued the TCT in favor of CMTC
without requiring the CMTC to submit its supporting papers as required
by the law.

In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government

Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees, the Court
ruled that the provision in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of
Republic Act No. 8291, which exempts it from all taxes, assessments,
fees, charges or duties of all kinds, cannot operate to exempt it from
the payment of legal fees. This was because, unlike the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions, which empowered Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules of the Supreme Court concerning pleading,
practice and procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed this power
from Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court now has the sole authority
to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts.

After trial, the RTC, in its Decision dated September 27, 1994, ruled in
favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint. In the same decision,
the trial court granted petitioner's counterclaim and directed Fernando
to pay petitioner the rentals paid by CMTC in the amount of
P249,800.00. The foregoing amount was collected by Fernando from
the CMTC and represents payment which was not turned over to
petitioner, which was entitled to receive the rent from the date of the
consolidation of its ownership over the subject property.

The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our

government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole
province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this
prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal,
alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by this Court.
Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of
exemption from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291
necessarily fails.

Fernando filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the

RTC in an Order dated March 27, 1995. Aggrieved by the Decision,
respondent filed a Notice of Appeal. The CA, in its Decision dated
December 17, 2002, affirmed the decision of the RTC with the
modification that the portion of the judgment ordering Fernando to pay
rentals in the amount of P249,800.00, in favor of petitioner, be deleted.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a
Resolution dated April 29, 2003. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner enumerated the following grounds in support of its petition:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR
OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT GSIS' COUNTERCLAIM, AMONG
OTHERS, OF P249,800.00 REPRESENTING RENTALS COLLECTED
BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT FROM CARMELITA MERCANTILE
TRADING CORPORATION IS IN THE NATURE OF A PERMISSIVE
COUNTERCLAIM WHICH REQUIRED THE PAYMENT BY GSIS OF
DOCKET FEES BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT CAN ACQUIRE
JURISDICTION OVER SAID COUNTERCLAIM.
Going now to the first assigned error, petitioner submits that its
counterclaim for the rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is in
the nature of a compulsory counterclaim in the original action of

In said case, the Court ruled that:

Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from
the payment of legal fees without transgressing another equally
important institutional safeguard of the Court's independence fiscal
autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the
Court to levy, assess and collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover,
legal fees under Rule 141 have two basic components, the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the Judiciary
Fund (SAJF). The laws which established the JDF and the SAJF
expressly declare the identical purpose of these funds to "guarantee
the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution
and public policy." Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a vital
source of the Court's financial resources but also comprise an
essential element of the Court's fiscal independence. Any exemption
from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to governmentowned or controlled corporations and local government units will
necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation
is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court's guaranteed fiscal
autonomy and erodes its independence.
Petitioner also invoked our ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Judge
Asuncion where the Court held that: Where the trial court acquires
jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment

awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same

has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
In Ayala Corporation v. Madayag, the Court, in interpreting the third
rule laid down in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Judge Asuncion
regarding awards of claims not specified in the pleading, held that the
same refers only to damages arising after the filing of the complaint or
similar pleading as to which the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment.
The amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before
the filing of the complaint or any pleading should be specified. While it
is true that the determination of certain damages as exemplary or
corrective damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the
duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the amount
sought on the basis of which the court may make a proper
determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate
docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or
to claims although specified are left for determination of the court is
limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the
claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.
Petitioner's claim for payment of rentals collected by Fernando from
the CMTC did not arise after the filing of the complaint; hence, the rule
laid down in Sun Insurance finds no application in the present case.
Due to the non-payment of docket fees on petitioner's counterclaim,
the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over it and, thus, there is no
need to discuss the second issue raised by petitioner.

should be done at the expense of the party adjudged by the court to

pay the same.
The RTC issued its questioned December 13, 2010 Order granting the
motion for execution but denying petitioners prayer for the return of
M/V Pilar-I in the same state in which it was taken by respondent. In so
resolving, the RTC ratiocinated:
First, the judgment of the Supreme Court does not require the delivery
of M/V Pilar in the state the defendants wanted it to be. Secondly, said
judgment has now become final and it is axiomatic that after judgment
has become executory, the court cannot amend the same, except: x x
x None of the three circumstances where a final and executory
judgment may be amended is present in this case. And third, the
present deplorable state of M/V Pilar certainly did not happen
overnight, thus, defendants should have brought it to the attention of
this Court, the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court after it became
apparent. Their inaction until after the judgment has become final,
executory and immutable rendered whatever right they may have to
remedy the situation to be nugatory.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by the
RTC in its March 7, 2011 Order.
Hence, this petition.
To be succinct, only two central issues need to be resolved: (1)
whether petitioner was justified in resorting directly to this Court via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65; and (2) whether petitioner is
entitled to the return of M/V Pilar-I in the same condition when it was
seized by respondent.
The Courts Ruling: The Court finds the petition to be partly
meritorious.
Hierarchy of Courts; Direct Resort To The Supreme Court Justified

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and the

Resolution, dated December 17, 2002 and April 29, 2003, respectively,
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 49300, are AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196200
September 11, 2013
ERNESTO DY, Petitioner, vs. HON. GINA M. BIBAT- PALAMOS, in
her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 64, Makati City, and ORIX METRO LEASING AND FINANCE
CORPORATION, Respondents.
Petitioner Ernesto Dy and his wife, Lourdes Dy, were the proprietors of
Limchia Enterprises which was engaged in the shipping business. In
1990, Limchia Enterprises, with Lourdes as co-maker, obtained a loan
from Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation to fund its
acquisition of M/V Pilar-I, a cargo vessel. As additional security for the
loan, Limchia Enterprises executed the Deed of Chattel Mortgage over
M/V Pilar-I.
Due to financial losses suffered when M/V Pilar-I was attacked by
pirates, Spouses Dy failed to make the scheduled payments as
required in their promissory note. After receiving several demand
letters from respondent, Spouses Dy applied for the restructuring of
their loan.
On August 18, 1992, respondent filed the Complaint and Petition for
Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Preferred Ship Mortgage under
Presidential Decree No. 1521 with Urgent Prayer for Attachment with
the RTC. Following the filing of an affidavit of merit and the posting of
bond by respondent, the RTC ordered the seizure of M/V Pilar-I and
turned over its possession to respondent. On September 28, 1994,
respondent transferred all of its rights, title to and interests, as
mortgagee, in M/V Pilar-I to Colorado Shipyard Corporation
(Colorado).
On July 31, 1997, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Spouses Dy,
ruling that they had not yet defaulted on their loan because respondent
agreed to a restructured schedule of payment. There being no default,
the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage on M/V Pilar-I was premature.
The RTC ordered that the vessel be returned to Spouses Dy. This was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA).

Petitioner argues that his situation calls for the direct invocation of this
Courts jurisdiction in the interest of justice. Moreover, as pointed out
by the RTC, what is involved is a judgment of the Court which the
lower courts cannot modify. Hence, petitioner deemed it proper to bring
this case immediately to the attention of this Court. Lastly, petitioner
claims that the present case involves a novel issue of law that is,
whether in an action to recover, a defendant in wrongful possession of
the subject matter in litigation may be allowed to return the same in a
deteriorated condition without any liability.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the petition should have
been filed with the CA, following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. It
pointed out that petitioner failed to state any special or important
reason or any exceptional and compelling circumstance which would
warrant a direct recourse to this Court.
Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to this Court
is improper because the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and
must remain to be so in order for it to satisfactorily perform its
constitutional functions, thereby allowing it to devote its time and
attention to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and preventing the
overcrowding of its docket.
Nonetheless, the invocation of this Courts original jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari has been allowed in certain instances on the ground
of special and important reasons clearly stated in the petition, such as,
(1) when dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of public
policy; (2) when demanded by the broader interest of justice; (3) when
the challenged orders were patent nullities; or (4) when analogous
exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified the
immediate and direct handling of the case.
This case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of hierarchy
of courts. Justice demands that this Court take cognizance of this case
to put an end to the controversy and resolve the matter which has
been dragging on for more than twenty (20) years. Moreover, in light of
the fact that what is involved is a final judgment promulgated by this
Court, it is but proper for petitioner to call upon its original jurisdiction
and seek final clarification.
Wrong Mode of Appeal; Exception

Consequently, on August 17, 2010, petitioner filed a motion for

execution of judgment with the RTC. In the intervening period,
Colorado filed its Manifestation/Motion, dated July 29, 2010, informing
the RTC that M/V Pilar-I, which was in its possession, had sustained
severe damage and deterioration and had sunk in its shipyard because
of its exposure to the elements. For this reason, it sought permission
from the court to cut the sunken vessel into pieces, sell its parts and
deposit the proceeds in escrow. In his Comment/Objection, petitioner
insisted that he had the right to require that the vessel be returned to
him in the same condition that it had been at the time it was wrongfully
seized by respondent or, should it no longer be possible, that another
vessel of the same tonnage, length and beam similar to that of M/V
Pilar-I be delivered. Colorado, however, responded that the vessel had
suffered severe damage and deterioration that refloating or restoring it
to its former condition would be futile, impossible and very costly; and
should petitioner persist in his demand that the ship be refloated, it

Petitioner asserts that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion

when it failed to rule in his favor despite the fact that he had been
deprived by respondent of his property rights over M/V Pilar-I for the
past eighteen(18) years. Moreover, the change in the situation of the
parties calls for a relaxation of the rules which would make the
execution of the earlier decision of this Court inequitable or unjust.
According to petitioner, for the RTC to allow respondent to return the
ship to him in its severely damaged and deteriorated condition without
any liability would be to reward bad faith.18
Conversely, respondent submits that there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC as the latter merely observed due
process and followed the principle that an execution order may not
vary or go beyond the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce.19
Respondent adds that the proper remedy should have been an
ordinary appeal, where a factual review of the records can be made to

determine the condition of the ship at the time it was taken from
petitioner, and not a special civil action for certiorari.
There are considerable differences between an ordinary appeal and a
petition for certiorari which have been exhaustively discussed by this
Court in countless cases. The remedy for errors of judgment, whether
based on the law or the facts of the case or on the wisdom or legal
soundness of a decision, is an ordinary appeal. In contrast, a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original action designed to correct
errors of jurisdiction, defined to be those "in which the act complained
of was issued by the court, officer, or quasi-judicial body without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is
tantamount to lack of in excess of jurisdiction."22 A court or tribunal
can only be considered to have acted with grave abuse of discretion if
its exercise of judgment was so whimsical and capricious as to be
equivalent to a lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be extremely patent
and gross that it would amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility."
Therefore, a misappreciation of evidence on the part of the lower court,
as asserted by petitioner, may only be reviewed by appeal and not by
certiorari because the issue raised by the petitioner does not involve
any jurisdictional ground. It is a general rule of procedural law that
when a party adopts an inappropriate mode of appeal, his petition may
be dismissed outright to prevent the erring party from benefiting from
his neglect and mistakes. There are exceptions to this otherwise
ironclad rule, however. One is when the strict application of procedural
technicalities would hinder the expeditious disposition of this case on
the merits, such as in this case.
Petitioner Not Barred from Demanding Return of the Vessel in its
Former Condition
Petitioner insists that it is respondent who should bear the
responsibility for the deterioration of the vessel because the latter,
despite having in its possession the vessel M/V Pilar-I during the
pendency of the foreclosure proceedings, failed to inform the court and
petitioner himself about the actual condition of the ship. For estoppel to
take effect, there must be knowledge of the real facts by the party
sought to be estopped and reliance by the party claiming estoppel on
the representation made by the former. In this case, petitioner cannot
be estopped from asking for the return of the vessel in the condition
that it had been at the time it was seized by respondent because he
had not known of the deteriorated condition of the ship.
This Court is not unaware of the doctrine of immutability of judgments.
When a judgment becomes final and executory, it is made immutable
and unalterable, meaning it can no longer be modified in any respect
either by the court which rendered it or even by this Court. Its purpose
is to avoid delay in the orderly administration of justice and to put an
end to judicial controversies. Even at the risk of occasional errors,
public policy and sound practice dictate that judgments must become
final at some point.
As with every rule, however, this admits of certain exceptions. When a
supervening event renders the execution of a judgment impossible or
unjust, the interested party can petition the court to modify the
judgment to harmonize it with justice and the facts. A supervening
event is a fact which transpires or a new circumstance which develops
after a judgment has become final and executory. This includes
matters which the parties were unaware of prior to or during trial
because they were not yet in existence at that time.
In this case, the sinking of M/V Pilar-I can be considered a supervening
event. Petitioner, who did not have possession of the ship, was only
informed of its destruction when Colorado filed its Manifestation, dated
July 29, 2010, long after the September 11, 2009 Decision of this Court
in Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation v. M/V "Pilar-I" and
Spouses Ernesto Dy and Lourdes Dy attained finality on January 19,
2010.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLYGRANTED. Respondent is
ordered to pay petitioner the value of M/V Pilar- I at the time it was
wrongfully seized by it.
JANE DUARTE vs. MIGUEL SAMUEL A.E. DURAN,
September 14, 2011
This petition arose from a suit[5] for collection of sum of money filed by
respondent Miguel Samuel A.E. Duran[6] against petitioner Elena Jane
Duarte with Branch 5 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Cebu.
According to respondent, on February 14, 2002, he offered to sell a
laptop computer for the sum of P15,000.00 to petitioner thru the help of
a common friend, Josephine Dy (Dy). Since petitioner was undecided,
respondent left the laptop with petitioner for two days. On February 16,
2002, petitioner told respondent that she was willing to buy the laptop
on installment. Respondent agreed; thus, petitioner gave P5,000.00 as
initial. On February 18, 2002, petitioner gave her second installment of
P3,000.00 to Dy, who signed the handwritten receipt allegedly made by

petitioner as proof of payment. But when Dy returned to get the

remaining balance on March 15, 2002, petitioner offered to pay only
P2,000.00 claiming that the laptop was only worth P10,000.00. Due to
the refusal of petitioner to pay the remaining balance, respondent thru
counsel sent petitioner a demand letter dated July 29, 2002.
Petitioner, however, denied writing the receipt dated February 18, 2002
and receiving the demand letter dated July 29, 2002. Petitioner
claimed that there was no contract of sale. Petitioner said that Dy
offered to sell respondents laptop but because petitioner was not
interested in buying it, Dy asked if petitioner could instead lend
respondent the amount of P5,000.00. Petitioner agreed and in turn, Dy
left the laptop with petitioner. On February 18, 2002, Dy came to get
the laptop but petitioner refused to give it back because the loan was
not yet paid. Dy then asked petitioner to lend an additional amount of
P3,000.00 to respondent who allegedly was in dire need of money.
On June 2, 2003, the MTCC rendered a Decision in favor of
respondent. It found the receipt dated February 18, 2002 and the
testimonies of respondent and his witness, Dy, sufficient to prove that
there was a contract of sale between the parties. On appeal, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu, Branch 12, reversed the MTCC
Decision: this Court finds the alleged receipt issued by the witness
Josephine Dy [in] her own handwriting a mere product of machination,
trickery and self-serving. It shows no proof of conformity or
acknowledgment on the part of the defendant that indeed she agreed
on the stipulations. Thus, it cannot be given any credence and
ultimately, did not bind her.
On June 1, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Review with the CA.
Finding the petition meritorious, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and
reinstated the Decision of the MTCC. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which the CA denied in a Resolution dated May 22,
2006.
Summed up, the issues boil down to: (1) the timeliness of the filing of
the Petition for Review with the CA; (2) the existence of a contract of
sale.
Petitioners Arguments:
Petitioner contends that the filing of the Petition for Review with the CA
on June 1, 2004 was beyond the reglementary period.[41] Records
show that respondent received a copy of the RTC Decision on March
25, 2004, filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 12, 2004 since
April 9 and 10 were holidays and April 11, 2004 was a Sunday, and
received a copy of the RTC Order denying his Motion for
Reconsideration on May 27, 2004.[42] Thus, he only had one day left
from May 27, 2004 within which to file a Petition for Review with the
CA.[43]
Petitioner likewise denies the existence of a contract of sale, insisting
that the laptop was not sold to her but was given as a security for
respondents debt. To prove that there was no contract of sale,
petitioner calls attention to respondents failure to present a written
contract of sale.
Respondents Arguments:
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that his Petition for Review
was timely filed with the CA because he has 15 days from receipt of
the RTC Order dated May 13, 2004 within which to file a Petition for
Review with the CA under Section 1[50] of Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court. Respondent defends the ruling of the CA by arguing that the
receipt dated February 18, 2002 is an actionable document, and thus,
petitioners failure to deny under oath its genuineness and due
execution constitutes an admission thereof. In addition, petitioners
denial of the receipt of the demand letter dated July 29, 2002 cannot
overcome the presumption that the said letter was received in the
regular course of mail. Respondent likewise points out that the Statute
of Frauds does not apply in the instant case. Finally, respondent claims
that the award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses are not
excessive and that the factual and legal bases of the award were
stated in the body of MTCC Decision.
Our Ruling: The Petition Lacks Merit
The Petition For Review Was Timely Filed With The CA
To standardize the appeal periods and afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, we ruled in Neypes v. Court of Appeals that litigants
must be given a fresh period of 15 days within which to appeal,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration under Rules 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45 of the
Rules of Court. This ruling, as we have said in Fil-Estate Properties,
Inc. v. Homena-Valencia, retroactively applies even to cases pending
prior to the promulgation of Neypes on September 14, 2005, there
being no vested rights in the rules of procedure.
Since the instant case was pending in the CA at the time Neypes was
promulgated, respondent is entitled to a fresh period of 15 days,
counted from May 27, 2004, the date respondent received the RTC
Order dated May 13, 2004 denying his motion for reconsideration of
the RTC Decision dated March 19, 2004 or until June 11, 2004, within
which to file his Petition for Review with the CA. Thus, we find that

when he filed the Petition for Review with the CA on June 1, 2004, his
period to appeal had not yet lapsed.
There Was A Contract Of Sale Between The Parties
As to whether there was a contract of sale between the parties, we
hold that there was, and the absence of a written contract of sale does
not mean otherwise. A contract of sale is perfected the moment the
parties agree upon the object of the sale, the price, and the terms of
payment. Once perfected, the parties are bound by it whether the
contract is verbal or in writing because no form is required. Contrary to
the view of petitioner, the Statute of Frauds does not apply in the
present case as this provision applies only to executory, and not to
completed, executed or partially executed contracts. In this case, the
contract of sale had been partially executed because the possession of
the laptop was already transferred to petitioner and the partial
payments had been made by her. Thus, the absence of a written
contract is not fatal to respondents case. Respondent only needed to
show by a preponderance of evidence that there was an oral contract
of sale, which he did by submitting in evidence his own affidavit, the
affidavit of his witness Dy, the receipt dated February 18, 2002 and the
demand letter dated July 29, 2002.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.

DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY

ATTY. TOMAS ONG CABILI vs. JUDGE RASAD G. BALINDONG,
Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, A.M. No.
RTJ-10-2225 (formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3182-RTJ)
On November 29, 1997, the Iligan City RTC rendered a Decision,
holding the MSU liable for damages amounting to P2,726,189.90. The
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the Iligan City RTC decision and the CA
decision subsequently lapsed to finality. On January 19, 2009, Entry of
Judgment was made.
On March 10, 2009, the Iligan City RTC issued a writ of execution. The
MSU, however, failed to comply with the writ; thus, on March 24, 2009,
Sheriff Gerard Peter Gaje served a Notice of Garnishment on the
MSUs depository bank, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP),
Marawi City Branch.
The Office of the Solicitor General opposed the motion for execution,
albeit belatedly, in behalf of MSU. The Iligan City RTC denied the
opposition in its March 31, 2009 Order. The MSU responded to the
denial by filing on April 1, 2009 a petition with the Marawi City RTC, for
prohibition and mandamus with an application for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction against
the LBP and Sheriff Gaje. The petition of MSU was raffled to the RTC,
Marawi City, Branch 8, presided by respondent Judge.
The respondent Judge set the hearing for the application for the
issuance of a TRO on April 8, 2009. After this hearing, the respondent
Judge issued a TRO restraining Sheriff Gaje from garnishing
P2,726,189.90 from MSUs LBP-Marawi City Branch account. On April
17, 2009, the respondent Judge conducted a hearing on the
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Thereafter, he required MSU to file a memorandum in support of its
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. On April
21, 2009, Sheriff Gaje moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. The respondent Judge thereafter granted the motion
and dismissed the case.
On May 8, 2009, complainant Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili, counsel of the
private plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 06-2954, filed the complaint charging
the respondent Judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse
of Authority, Abuse of Discretion, and/or Grave Misconduct Prejudicial
to the Interest of the Judicial Service for interfering with the order of a
co-equal court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, by issuing the TRO to
enjoin Sheriff Gaje from garnishing P2,726,189.90 from MSUs LBPMarawi City Branch account.
In its December 3, 2009 Report, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) found the respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law
for violating the elementary rule of non-interference with the
proceedings of a court of co-equal jurisdiction. It recommended a fine
of P40,000.00, noting that this is the respondent Judges second
offense.

Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order

has been issued is considered as still pending, so that all the
proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit. A court
which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the
advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and
to control its own processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide the
jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents
arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to
the orderly administration of justice.
To be sure, the law and the rules are not unaware that an issuing court
may violate the law in issuing a writ of execution and have recognized
that there should be a remedy against this violation. The remedy,
however, is not the resort to another co-equal body but to a higher
court with authority to nullify the action of the issuing court. This is
precisely the judicial power that the 1987 Constitution, under Article
VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2, speaks of and which this Court has
operationalized through a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
In the present case, the respondent Judge clearly ignored the principle
of judicial stability by issuing a TRO to temporarily restrain Sheriff Gaje
from enforcing the writ of execution issued by a co-equal court, Branch
6 of the Iligan City RTC, and from pursuing the garnishment of the
amount of P2,726,189.90 from MSUs account with the LBP, Marawi
City Branch. The respondent Judge was aware that he was acting on
matters pertaining to the execution phase of a final decision of a coequal and coordinate court since he even quoted MSUs allegations in
his April 8, 2009 Order.
The respondent Judge should have refrained from acting on the
petition because Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC retains jurisdiction to
rule on any question on the enforcement of the writ of execution.
Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (terceria), cited in the course
of the Courts deliberations, finds no application to this case since this
provision applies to claims made by a third person, other than the
judgment obligor or his agent; a third-party claimant of a property
under execution may file a claim with another court which, in the
exercise of its own jurisdiction, may issue a temporary restraining
order. In this case, the petition for injunction before the respondent
Judge was filed by MSU itself, the judgment obligor. If Sheriff Gaje
committed any irregularity or exceeded his authority in the enforcement
of the writ, the proper recourse for MSU was to file a motion with, or an
application for relief from, the same court which issued the decision,
not from any other court, or to elevate the matter to the CA on a
petition for certiorari. In this case, MSU filed the proper motion with the
Iligan City RTC (the issuing court), but, upon denial, proceeded to seek
recourse through another co-equal court presided over by the
respondent Judge.
It is not a viable legal position to claim that a TRO against a writ of
execution is issued against an erring sheriff, not against the issuing
Judge. A TRO enjoining the enforceability of a writ addresses the writ
itself, not merely the executing sheriff. The duty of a sheriff in enforcing
writs is ministerial and not discretionary. As already mentioned above,
the appropriate action is to assail the implementation of the writ before
the issuing court in whose behalf the sheriff acts, and, upon failure, to
seek redress through a higher judicial body. Significantly, MSU did file
its opposition before the issuing court Iligan City RTC which denied this
opposition.
That the respondent Judge subsequently rectified his error by
eventually dismissing the petition before him for lack of jurisdiction is
not a defense that the respondent Judge can use. His lack of familiarity
with the rules in interfering with the acts of a co-equal court
undermines public confidence in the judiciary through his
demonstrated incompetence. In this case, he impressed upon the
Iligan public that the kind of interference he exhibited can be done,
even if only temporarily, i.e., that an official act of the Iligan City RTC
can be thwarted by going to the Marawi City RTC although they are coequal courts. That the complaining lawyer, Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili,
subsequently reversed course and manifested that the respondent
Judge is basically a good Judge, and should only be reprimanded,
cannot affect the respondent Judges liability. This liability and the
commensurate penalty do not depend on the complainants personal
opinion but on the facts he alleged and proved, and on the applicable
law and jurisprudence.

The Courts Ruling: The Court Finds The OCA Recommendation WellTaken

When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know
and to simply apply it. Anything less would be constitutive of gross
ignorance of the law.

The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular

orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in
the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with
the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction
having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The
rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court
that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein
has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other
coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to
control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers
acting in connection with this judgment.

Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC or the Amendment to Rule 140 of the

Rules of Court Re: Discipline of Justices and Judges, gross ignorance
of the law is a serious charge, punishable by a fine of more than
P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00, suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months, or dismissal from the service. Considering
the attendant circumstances of this case, the Court after prolonged
deliberations holds that a fine of P30,000.00 is the appropriate penalty.
This imposition is an act of leniency as we can, if we so hold, rule for

the maximum fine of P40,000.00 or for suspension since this is the

respondent Judges second offense.

argues that the principle on "non-intervention of co-equal courts" does

not apply where, as here, a third party claimant is involved.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Rasad G. Balindong, Acting

Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Marawi City, is hereby
FOUND GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and FINED in the
amount of P30,000.00, with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the
same will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

We are not persuaded.

[G.R. NO. 154623 : March 13, 2009]

JIMMY T. GO v. THE CLERK OF COURT AND EX-OFFICIO
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
The present controversy stemmed from the execution of the Decision
of RTC, Bacolod City, Branch 45 in a complaint for collection of a sum
of money docketed as Civil Case No. 98-10404.
On August 10, 1998, respondent Multi-Luck Corporation (Multi-Luck)
filed a collection suit against Alberto T. Looyuko (Looyuko) as sole
proprietor of Noah's Ark Merchandising Inc. (NAMI). The complaint
pertained to three (3) dishonored United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB) checks with an aggregate amount of P8,985,440.00 issued by
Looyuko/NAMI to Mamertha General Merchandising. These checks
were indorsed to Multi-Luck, who claimed to be a holder in due course
of such checks.
On January 27, 2000, upon Multi-Luck's motion for judgment on the
pleadings, the Bacolod RTC rendered a Decision ordering
Looyuko/NAMI to pay Multi-Luck the value of the three (3) UCPB
checks. Looyuko/NAMI did not file an appeal. Hence, the Decision
became final and executory.
Upon Multi-Luck's motion, the Bacolod RTC issued a writ of execution
over a house and lot covered by TCT No. T-126519 registered in the
name of Looyuko and one share in the Negros Occidental Golf and
Country Club, Inc. in the name of NAMI. The auction sales were
scheduled on November 10, 20006 (for the house and lot) and
November 6, 2000 (for the stock certificate),7 respectively.
On October 25, 2000, petitioner filed a complaint for injunction with a
prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction against respondents before the RTC, Pasig City, Branch
266, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 68125.8 The
complaint alleged that petitioner is a "business partner" of Looyuko and
that the former co-owned the properties of Looyuko/NAMI including the
properties subject of the aforementioned auction sales. It was further
alleged that the intended public auction of the subject properties would
unduly deprive him of his share of the property without due process of
law considering that he was not impleaded as a party in Civil Case No.
98-10404.
Multi-Luck filed a motion to dismiss on the ground, among others, that
the Pasig RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of petitioner's
claim and over the public respondent sheriffs as well as over MultiLuck.
In the Order dated October 30, 2000, the Pasig RTC granted
petitioner's prayer for issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO). Thereafter, in the Order dated November 23, 2000, the Pasig
RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining public respondent
sheriffs Caponpon, Jr. and Villanueva, Jr. from holding the public
auction.
In the Order dated December 7, 2000, the Pasig RTC denied
respondents' motion to dismiss.
Multi-Luck moved for the reconsideration of the November 23, 2000
and December 7, 2000 Orders but both motions were also denied by
the Pasig RTC in separate Orders both dated February 2, 2001.
Multi-Luck elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for the issuance of restraining order and/or
injunction.
As previously stated herein, in the Decision dated April 30, 2002, the
CA granted Multi-Luck's petition and reversed the ruling of the Pasig
RTC. The CA ruled that the November 23, 2000 Order issued by the
Pasig RTC interfered with the order of the Bacolod RTC, which is a coequal and coordinate court. The CA held that the Pasig RTC gravely
abused its discretion when it granted the injunctive relief prayed for by
petitioner despite the glaring lack of a clear legal right on the part of the
latter to support his cause of action. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its equally challenged
Resolution dated July 31, 2002.
Hence, this present Petition for Review on Certiorari .
Petitioner theorizes that since he was a "stranger" to Civil Case No.
98-10404, he should be considered a "third party claimant" pursuant to
Rule 39, Section 16 of the Rules of Court. Corollarily, whatever
judgment or decision rendered in the Civil Case No. 98-10404 did not
bind him or his properties. Petitioner adds that as a co-owner of all
properties and monies belonging to Looyuko/NAMI, he was unduly
prejudiced by the Decision in Civil Case No. 98-10404. Petitioner
insists that he should have been impleaded in Civil Case No. 98-10404
so that there could be a final determination of the action as to him. He

We have time and again reiterated the doctrine that no court has the
power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another
court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief
sought by injunction.16 This doctrine of non-interference is premised
on the principle that a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction
may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent
jurisdiction.17 As correctly ratiocinated by the CA, cases wherein an
execution order has been issued, are still pending, so that all the
proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit.18Since
the Bacolod RTC had already acquired jurisdiction over the collection
suit (Civil Case No. 98-10404) and rendered judgment in relation
thereto, it retained jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other coordinate
courts over its judgment, including all incidents relative to the control
and conduct of its ministerial officers, namely public respondent
sheriffs. Thus, the issuance by the Pasig RTC of the writ of preliminary
injunction in Civil Case No. 68125 was a clear act of interference with
the judgment of Bacolod RTC in Civil Case No. 98-10404.
The jurisprudential "exception" adverted to by petitioner, i.e. Santos v.
Bayhon, 199 SCRA 525 (1991), finds no application in this case. In
Santos, we allowed the implementation of a writ of execution issued by
the Labor Arbiter to be enjoined by order of the RTC where a third
party claimant had filed his action to recover property involved in the
execution sale, since the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction to decide
matters of ownership of property and the civil courts are the proper
venue therefor. In the case at bar, the Bacolod RTC had jurisdiction
and competence to resolve the question of ownership of the property
involved had petitioner filed his claim with the said court.
As to petitioner's argument that he was unduly prejudiced by the
Decision in Civil Case No. 98-10404 as a co-owner of all properties
and monies belonging to Looyuko/NAMI, the Court finds the same to
be without basis.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary
injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole
or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance, or non-performance of the act
or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice
to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or
acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.
Pursuant to the above provision, a clear and positive right especially
calling for judicial protection must be shown. Injunction is not a remedy
to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not
issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to
restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. There
must exist an actual right. There must be a patent showing by the
complaint that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts
against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right.
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their
claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Thus, to be entitled
to an injunctive writ, the petitioner has the burden to establish the
following requisites:
(1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;
(2) a violation of that right;
(3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage.
To bolster his claim of interest on the attached properties, petitioner
presented the Agreement dated February 9, 1982. However, the Court
notes that the authenticity and the due execution of these documents
are presently under litigation in other proceedings which are not
pending before the Pasig RTC.
The attached real properties are registered solely in the name of
Looyuko and NAMI. Corollarily, petitioner had no standing to question
the Bacolod RTC's judgment as he is a stranger to Civil Case No. 9810404 and he has no clear right or interest in the attached property.
Likewise, the stock certificate is registered in the name of NAMI.
Moreover, the checks subject of Civil Case No. 98-10404 were made in
payment for obligations incurred by Looyuko in the course of the
business operation of NAMI. Even assuming for the sake of argument
that indeed, petitioner co-owns NAMI, whatever obligation the business
incurred in the course of its operation is an obligation of petitioner as a
part owner. In effect, petitioner was merely forestalling the

implementation of a final judgment against the corporation which he

purportedly co-owns.
To recapitulate, once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the
ministerial duty of the presiding judge to issue a writ of execution
except in certain cases, as when subsequent events would render
execution of the judgment unjust. The present case does not fall within
the recognized exceptions. In Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we declared that a court
has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution proceedings in another
court with concurrent jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated April 30, 2002, and Resolution dated July 31, 2002 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64473 are AFFIRMED. Cost against
petitioner. SO ORDERED.

ESTOPPEL
G.R. No. L-21450
April 15, 1968
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. MAGDALENO
SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA
BAGUIO, defendants, MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC.
(CEBU BRANCH) bonding company and defendant-appellant.
On July 19, 1948 barely one month after the effectivity of Republic
Act No. 296 known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 the spouses Serafin
Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case No. R-660 in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno
Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the sum of
P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the
complaint until the whole obligation is paid, plus costs. As prayed for in
the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court against
defendants' properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon the
filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and
Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on the 31st of
the same month.
After being duly served with summons the defendants filed their
answer in which, after making some admissions and denials of the
material averments of the complaint, they interposed a counterclaim.
This counterclaim was answered by the plaintiffs.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs and, after the same had become final and
executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court issued a writ of
execution against the defendants. The writ having been returned
unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution
against the Surety's bond, against which the Surety filed a written
opposition upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to prosecute and (2)
Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the payment of the amount
due under the judgment. Upon these grounds the Surety prayed the
Court not only to deny the motion for execution against its counterbond but also the following affirmative relief : "to relieve the herein
bonding company of its liability, if any, under the bond in question."
The Court denied this motion on the ground solely that no previous
demand had been made on the Surety for the satisfaction of the
judgment. Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon
failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second
motion for execution against the counterbond. On the date set for the
hearing thereon, the Court, upon motion of the Surety's counsel,
granted the latter a period of five days within which to answer the
motion. Upon its failure to file such answer, the Court granted the
motion for execution and the corresponding writ was issued.
Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that
the same was issued without the required summary hearing provided
for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As the Court denied
the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals from such
order of denial and from the one denying its motion for reconsideration.
Its record on appeal was then printed as required by the Rules, and in
due time it filed its brief raising therein assignment of errors.

Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Upon
these premises the Surety's motion prayed the Court of Appeals to set
aside its decision and to dismiss the case. By resolution of January 16,
1963 the Court of Appeals required the appellees to answer the motion
to dismiss, but they failed to do so. Whereupon, on May 20 of the
same year, the Court resolved to set aside its decision and to certify
the case to Us. The pertinent portions of its resolution read as follows:
It would indeed appear from the record that the action at bar, which is a
suit for collection of money in the sum of exactly P1,908.00 exclusive
of interest, was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu on July 19, 1948. But about a month prior to the filing of the
complaint, more specifically on June 17, 1948, the Judiciary Act of
1948 took effect, depriving the Court of First Instance of original
jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is
not more than P2,000.00. (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. No. 296.)
We believe, therefore, that the point raised in appellant's motion is an
important one which merits serious consideration. As stated, the
complaint was filed on July 19, 1948. This case therefore has been
pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding
appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until after receipt of
this Court's adverse decision.
There are three cases decided by the Honorable Supreme Court which
may be worthy of consideration in connection with this case, wherein
the Honorable Supreme Court frowned upon the 'undesirable practice'
of appellants submitting their case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when
adverse.
Considering, however, that the Supreme Court has the "exclusive"
appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any
inferior court is in issue" (See. 1, Par. 3[3], Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended), we have no choice but to certify, as we hereby do certify,
this case to the Supreme Court.
It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu against the Sibonghanoy spouses was
for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only an amount within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the
provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about a
month prior to the date when the action was commenced. True also is
the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the
courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority
of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts
and circumstances of the present case which shall forthwith be set
forth We are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches
from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annuling
everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different
ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or
estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of
public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is
not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity
or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of Appeals, on
December 11, 1962, decided the case affirming the orders appealed
from.

It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction
(Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by
way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether
the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of
the parties was not important in such cases because the party is
barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the
court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that
such a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public
policy.

On January 8, 1963 five days after the Surety received notice of the
decision, it filed a motion asking for extension of time within which to
file a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals granted the
motion in its resolution of January 10 of the same year. Two days later
the Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging
substantially that appellees action was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of
P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become
effective, Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the
subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed
P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a
quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the
lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take
cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money
involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so.
Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well
as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to
obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication
on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by
the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of
jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in
effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present

Nevertheless, not one of the assignment of errors it is obvious

raises the question of lack of jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly.

case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the
judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and
unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity
Company, Inc.
G.R. No. 147406
July 14, 2008
VENANCIO FIGUEROA y CERVANTES, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
On July 8, 1994, an information for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide was filed against the petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 18. The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.5 Trial on the merits ensued and on
August 19, 1998, the trial court convicted the petitioner as charged. In
his appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned, among others, for
the first time, the trial courts jurisdiction.
The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision, considered
the petitioner to have actively participated in the trial and to have
belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was already
estopped by laches from asserting the trial courts lack of jurisdiction.
Finding no other ground to reverse the trial courts decision, the CA
affirmed the petitioners conviction but modified the penalty imposed
and the damages awarded.
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari raising the following issues for our resolution:
a. Does the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue of
jurisdiction during the trial of this case, which was initiated and filed by
the public prosecutor before the wrong court, constitute laches in
relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,
notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately raised in
petitioners appeal to the Honorable Court of Appeals? Conversely,
does the active participation of the petitioner in the trial of his case,
which is initiated and filed not by him but by the public prosecutor,
amount to estoppel?
Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to
hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of
the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a
retroactive application thereof.10 In this case, at the time the criminal
information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide with violation
of the Automobile Law (now Land Transportation and Traffic Code) was
filed, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 12911 had already
been amended by Republic Act No. 7691.12 The said provision thus
reads:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.Except in cases
falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts
and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of
fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated
thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof:
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof.
As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods or imprisonment for 2
years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years, jurisdiction to hear and try the
same is conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs). Clearly,
therefore, the RTC of Bulacan does not have jurisdiction over Criminal
Case No. 2235-M-94.
While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General acknowledge
this fact, they nevertheless are of the position that the principle of
estoppel by laches has already precluded the petitioner from
questioning the jurisdiction of the RTCthe trial went on for 4 years
with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever
raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters
that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be
raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is
further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable.
To settle once and for all this problem of jurisdiction vis--vis estoppel
by laches, which continuously confounds the bench and the bar, we
shall analyze the various Court decisions on the matter.
As early as 1901, this Court has declared that unless jurisdiction has
been conferred by some legislative act, no court or tribunal can act on
a matter submitted to it. Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial
proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the
court; it is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law and
an objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction cannot be waived by
the parties. x x x

Later, in People v. Casiano,17 the Court explained:

4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of
jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually
had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried
and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not
barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same "must
exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the
parties or by estoppel". However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and
the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for
instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it
to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an
inconsistent positionthat the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the
principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by
law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing
thereon.
Thus, Corpus Juris Secundum says:
Where accused has secured a decision that the indictment is void, or
has been granted an instruction based on its defective character
directing the jury to acquit, he is estopped, when subsequently
indicted, to assert that the former indictment was valid. In such case,
there may be a new prosecution whether the indictment in the former
prosecution was good or bad. Similarly, where, after the jury was
impaneled and sworn, the court on accused's motion quashed the
information on the erroneous assumption that the court had no
jurisdiction, accused cannot successfully plead former jeopardy to a
new information.
Where accused procured a prior conviction to be set aside on the
ground that the court was without jurisdiction, he is estopped
subsequently to assert, in support of a defense of previous jeopardy,
that such court had jurisdiction."
But in Pindagan Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Dans,19 the Court, in not
sustaining the plea of lack of jurisdiction by the plaintiff-appellee
therein, made the following observations:
It is surprising why it is only now, after the decision has been rendered,
that the plaintiff-appellee presents the question of this Courts
jurisdiction over the case. Republic Act No. 2613 was enacted on
August 1, 1959. This case was argued on January 29, 1960.
Notwithstanding this fact, the jurisdiction of this Court was never
impugned until the adverse decision of this Court was handed down.
The conduct of counsel leads us to believe that they must have always
been of the belief that notwithstanding said enactment of Republic Act
2613 this Court has jurisdiction of the case, such conduct being born
out of a conviction that the actual real value of the properties in
question actually exceeds the jurisdictional amount of this Court (over
P200,000). Our minute resolution in G.R. No. L-10096, Hyson Tan, et
al. vs. Filipinas Compaa de Seguros, et al., of March 23, 1956, a
parallel case, is applicable to the conduct of plaintiff-appellee in this
case, thus:
x x x that an appellant who files his brief and submits his case to the
Court of Appeals for decision, without questioning the latters
jurisdiction until decision is rendered therein, should be considered as
having voluntarily waived so much of his claim as would exceed the
jurisdiction of said Appellate Court; for the reason that a contrary rule
would encourage the undesirable practice of appellants submitting
their cases for decision to the Court of Appeals in expectation of
favorable judgment, but with intent of attacking its jurisdiction should
the decision be unfavorable: x x x
Then came our ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy that a party may be
barred by laches from invoking lack of jurisdiction at a late hour for the
purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the active
participation of said party invoking the plea. We expounded, thus:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different
ways and for different reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of
estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a
general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of
public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is
not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity
or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction
(Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by
way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether
the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of
the parties was not important in such cases because the party is
barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the
court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that
such a practice cannot be toleratedobviously for reasons of public
policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a

cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too
late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court
(Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S.Ct.
283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in
Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a
party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a
particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that
same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned
in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra)to
the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only
if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
For quite a time since we made this pronouncement in Sibonghanoy,
courts and tribunals, in resolving issues that involve the belated
invocation of lack of jurisdiction, have applied the principle of estoppel
by laches. Thus, in Calimlim v. Ramirez, we pointed out that
Sibonghanoy was developing into a general rule rather than the
exception.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that
rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by
laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for
the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after
the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer
be raised for being barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is
"failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
In Calimlim, despite the fact that the one who benefited from the plea
of lack of jurisdiction was the one who invoked the courts jurisdiction,
and who later obtained an adverse judgment therein, we refused to
apply the ruling in Sibonghanoy. The Court accorded supremacy to the
time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver
or by estoppel.
Yet, in subsequent cases decided after Calimlim, which by sheer
volume are too plentiful to mention, the Sibonghanoy doctrine, as
foretold in Calimlim, became the rule rather than the exception.
The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the
exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to
bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual
milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies,
laches should be clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have
been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. That
Sibonghanoy applies only to exceptional circumstances is clarified in
Calimlim v. Ramirez, which we quote:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in
decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the
subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be
conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,
even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent
pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited
case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in
said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not
contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in
Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept
of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and,
instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered
the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather
the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored
principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.
Indeed, the general rule remains: a courts lack of jurisdiction may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is
that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very
authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on
the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the
complaint, not by the defenses contained in the answer.
Also, in Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral, even if the pleader of lack of
jurisdiction actively took part in the trial proceedings by presenting a
witness to seek exoneration, the Court, reiterating the doctrine in
Calimlim, said: Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of
jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel through active participation in
the trial. Such, however, is not the general rule but an exception, best
characterized by the peculiar circumstances in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy.
In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after
fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had already been
elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoyis an exceptional case because of the
presence of laches, which was defined therein as failure or neglect for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is

the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,

warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
Clearly, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present
in the case at bar. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the
Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of contempt, promptly
filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said courts jurisdiction
based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance
with the appellate courts directive to show cause why she should not
be cited for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect
could not be considered as an active participation in the judicial
proceedings so as to take the case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy.
Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that
could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to comply.
The Court, thus, wavered on when to apply the exceptional
circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule
enunciated as early as in De La Santa and expounded at length in
Calimlim. The general rule should, however, be, as it has always been,
that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the courts absence
or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to
the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a
person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not
estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject
matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere
consent of the parties. This is especially true where the person seeking
to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure
any advantage or the adverse party does not suffer any harm.
Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no
way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC,
considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the
appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed
for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not
sustain the defense of "estoppel by laches" unless it further appears
that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until
the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so
changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be
then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of
equities, and other causes.36 In applying the principle of estoppel by
laches in the exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein
considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having
the judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or
less 15 years. The same, however, does not obtain in the instant case.
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the
defenses or theories set up by the defendant or respondent in his
answer or motion to dismiss. Jurisdiction should be determined by
considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties but
also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the
controversy. x x x x The proceedings before a court or tribunal without
jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void, hence, susceptible
to direct and collateral attacks.
With the above considerations, we find it unnecessary to resolve the
other issues raised in the petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on
certiorari is GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94 is hereby
DISMISSED without prejudice. SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 162322 March 14, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, - versus - BANTIGUE POINT
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
This Rule 45 Petition requires this Court to address the issue of the
proper scope of the delegated jurisdiction of municipal trial courts in
land registration cases.
On 17 July 1997, respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosario, Batangas an
application for original registration of title over a parcel of land with an
assessed value of 4,330, 1,920 and 8,670, or a total assessed
value of 14,920 for the entire property, more particularly described as
Lot 8060 of Cad 453-D, San Juan Cadastre, with an area of more or
less 10,732 square meters, located at Barangay Barualte, San Juan,
Batangas.
Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration
on 8 January 1998 while the records were still with the RTC.
On 31 March 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio
the records of the case to the MTC of San Juan, because the
assessed value of the property was allegedly less than 100,000.
Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General Default and
commenced with the reception of evidence. Thereafter, it awarded the
land to respondent Corporation.
Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic, the CA ruled that since the
former had actively participated in the proceedings before the lower
court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner is

thereby estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on

appeal. The CA further found that respondent Corporation had
sufficiently established the latters registrable title over the subject
property after having proven open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land by itself and its
predecessors-in-interest even before the outbreak of World War II.
Dissatisfied with the CAs ruling, petitioner Republic filed this instant
Rule 45 Petition and raised the following arguments in support of its
appeal:
I.THE REPUBLIC CANNOT BE ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING
THE JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OVER THE
APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE
EVEN FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
II. THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACQUIRE
JURISDICTION OVER THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL
REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE.[17]
The Courts Ruling
We uphold the jurisdiction of the MTC, but remand the case to the
court a quo for further proceedings in order to determine if the property
in question forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
I. The Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction in
this case.
At the outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is not estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court, even if the former raised
the jurisdictional question only on appeal. The rule is settled that lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by
the Constitution or the law. It cannot be acquired through a waiver or
enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the
acquiescence of the court. Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may
be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal.
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that a party may be estopped from
raising such [jurisdictional] question if he has actively taken part in the
very proceeding which he questions, belatedly objecting to the courts
jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order subsequently
rendered is adverse to him is based on the doctrine of estoppel by
laches. We are aware of that doctrine first enunciated by this Court in
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.
The facts are starkly different in this case, making the exceptional rule
in Tijam inapplicable. Here, petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to
the application for registration when the records were still with the
RTC.[25] At that point, petitioner could not have questioned the
delegated jurisdiction of the MTC, simply because the case was not yet
with that court. When the records were transferred to the MTC,
petitioner neither filed pleadings nor requested affirmative relief from
that court. On appeal, petitioner immediately raised the jurisdictional
question in its Brief.[26] Clearly, the exceptional doctrine of estoppel by
laches is inapplicable to the instant appeal.
II. The Municipal Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the
case.
In assailing the jurisdiction of the lower courts, petitioner Republic
raised two points of contention: (a) the period for setting the date and
hour of the initial hearing; and (b) the value of the land to be registered.
First, petitioner argued that the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction
over the application, because the RTC set the date and hour of the
initial hearing beyond the 90-day period provided under the Property
Registration Decree.
We disagree.
The Property Registration Decree provides:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - The court shall,
within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the
date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than fortyfive days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order. x x x.
The RTCs failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour of the
initial hearing within five days from the filing of the application for
registration, as provided in the Property Registration Decree, did not
affect the courts its jurisdiction. Observance of the five-day period was
merely directory, and failure to issue the Order within that period did
not deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case. To rule that
compliance with the five-day period is mandatory would make
jurisdiction over the subject matter dependent upon the trial court.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the
Constitution or the law.[35] It cannot be contingent upon the action or
inaction of the court. This does not mean that courts may disregard the
statutory periods with impunity. We cannot assume that the law
deliberately meant the provision to become meaningless and to be
treated as a dead letter. However, the records of this case do not show
such blatant disregard for the law. In fact, the RTC immediately set the
case for initial hearing a day after the filing of the application for
registration, except that it had to issue a second Order because the
initial hearing had been set beyond the 90-day period provided by law.

The delegated jurisdiction of the MTC over cadastral and land

registration cases is indeed set forth in the Judiciary Reorganization
Act, which provides:
Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration
Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court
to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots
where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots where
the value of which does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos
(100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the
claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more
than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real
property. Their decision in these cases shall be appealable in the same
manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. (As amended by
R.A. No. 7691) (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land
registration cases in two instances: first, where there is no controversy
or opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the value of which does
not exceed 100,000.
The case at bar does not fall under the first instance, because
petitioner opposed respondent Corporations application for registration
on 8 January 1998. However, the MTC had jurisdiction under the
second instance, because the value of the lot in this case does not
exceed 100,000.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the value of the land should not be
determined with reference to its selling price. Rather, Section 34 of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act provides that the value of the property
sought to be registered may be ascertained in three ways: first, by the
affidavit of the claimant; second, by agreement of the respective
claimants, if there are more than one; or, third, from the corresponding
tax declaration of the real property.
In this case, the value of the property cannot be determined using the
first method, because the records are bereft of any affidavit executed
by respondent as to the value of the property. Likewise, valuation
cannot be done through the second method, because this method
finds application only where there are multiple claimants who agree on
and make a joint submission as to the value of the property. Here, only
respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation claims the
property.
The value of the property must therefore be ascertained with reference
to the corresponding Tax Declarations submitted by respondent
Corporation together with its application for registration. From the
records, we find that the assessed value of the property is 4,330,
1,920 and 8,670, or a total assessed value of 14,920 for the entire
property.[43]Based on these Tax Declarations, it is evident that the total
value of the land in question does not exceed 100,000. Clearly, the
MTC may exercise its delegated jurisdiction under the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, as amended.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is
DENIED. Let this case be REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of
San Juan, Batangas, for reception of evidence to prove that the
property sought to be registered is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
SO ORDERED.

EXCLUSION OF DAMAGES
IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDO SANTE, Petitioners,- versus HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 60, Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, and VITA
N. KALASHIAN,
Respondents. G.R. No. 173915
On April 5, 2004, respondent filed before the RTC of Baguio City a
complaint for damages against petitioners. In her complaint, docketed
as Civil Case No. 5794-R, respondent alleged that while she was
inside the Police Station of Natividad, Pangasinan, and in the presence
of other persons and police officers, petitioner Irene Sante uttered
words, which when translated in English are as follows, How many
rounds of sex did you have last night with your boss, Bert? You fuckin
bitch!
Thus, respondent prayed that petitioners be held liable to pay moral
damages in the amount of P300,000.00; P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages; P50,000.00 attorneys fees; P20,000.00 litigation expenses;
and costs of suit.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that it was the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and not the RTC of Baguio, that
had jurisdiction over the case. They argued that the amount of the
claim for moral damages was not more than the jurisdictional amount
of P300,000.00, because the claim for exemplary damages should be
excluded in computing the total claim.
On June 24, 2004,[6] the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed on August 2, 2004, a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85465, before the Court

of Appeals. Meanwhile, on July 14, 2004, respondent and her husband

filed an Amended Complaint increasing the claim for moral damages
from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00. Petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss with Answer Ad Cautelam and Counterclaim, but the trial court
denied their motion in an Order dated September 17, 2004.
Hence, petitioners again filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87563,
claiming that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the amendment of the complaint to increase the amount of
moral damages from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00.
The case was raffled to the Seventeenth Division of the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that the case clearly falls under the
jurisdiction of the MTCC as the allegations show that plaintiff was
seeking to recover moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00,
which amount was well within the jurisdictional amount of the MTCC.
The Court of Appeals added that the totality of claim rule used for
determining which court had jurisdiction could not be applied to the
instant case because plaintiffs claim for exemplary damages was not a
separate and distinct cause of action from her claim of moral damages,
but merely incidental to it. Thus, the prayer for exemplary damages
should be excluded in computing the total amount of the claim.

alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement

of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs causes of action.[20] It is
clear, based on the allegations of the complaint, that respondents main
action is for damages. Hence, the other forms of damages being
claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorneys fees and
litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the
main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the complaint.
Considering that the total amount of damages claimed was
P420,000.00, the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the RTC
had jurisdiction over the case.
Lastly, we find no error, much less grave abuse of discretion, on the
part of the Court of Appeals in affirming the RTCs order allowing the
amendment of the original complaint from P300,000.00 to
P1,000,000.00 despite the pendency of a petition for certiorari filed
before the Court of Appeals. While it is a basic jurisprudential principle
that an amendment cannot be allowed when the court has no
jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the
amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court,[23] here, the RTC
clearly had jurisdiction over the original complaint and amendment of
the complaint was then still a matter of right.

In essence, the basic issues for our resolution are:

1) Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the case? and
2) Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in allowing the
amendment of the complaint?

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, for lack of merit. The Decision

and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated January 31, 2006 and
June 23, 2006, respectively, are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court
of Baguio City, Branch 60 is DIRECTED to continue with the trial
proceedings in Civil Case No. 5794-R with deliberate dispatch. No
costs. SO ORDERED.

We deny the petition, which although denominated as a petition for

certiorari, we treat as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 in
view of the issues raised.

NON PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES

Section 19(8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,[17] as amended by

Republic Act No. 7691,[18] states:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and
costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila,
where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds
Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7691 further provides:
SEC. 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the
jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec.
33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be
adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). Five (5)
years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted further
to Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00):Provided, however,
That in the case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional
amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this
Act to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).
Relatedly, Supreme Court Circular No. 21-99 was issued declaring that
the first adjustment in jurisdictional amount of first level courts outside
of Metro Manila fromP100,000.00 to P200,000.00 took effect on March
20, 1999. Meanwhile, the second adjustment from P200,000.00 to
P300,000.00 became effective on February 22, 2004 in accordance
with OCA Circular No. 65-2004 issued by the Office of the Court
Administrator on May 13, 2004.
Based on the foregoing, there is no question that at the time of the
filing of the complaint on April 5, 2004, the MTCCs jurisdictional
amount has been adjusted to P300,000.00.
But where damages is the main cause of action, should the amount of
moral damages prayed for in the complaint be the sole basis for
determining which court has jurisdiction or should the total amount of
all the damages claimed regardless of kind and nature, such as
exemplary damages, nominal damages, and attorneys fees, etc., be
used?
In this regard, Administrative Circular No. 09-94[19] is instructive:
xxxx
2. The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining
the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where
the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main
cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the
main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of
such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the
court. (Emphasis ours.)
In the instant case, the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 5794-R is for
the recovery of damages for the alleged malicious acts of petitioners.
The complaint principally sought an award of moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorneys fees and litigation expenses, for the
alleged shame and injury suffered by respondent by reason of
petitioners utterance while they were at a police station in Pangasinan.
It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, vs. HEIRS OF MARGARITA VDA.

DE VENTURA G.R. No. 151800
On November 17, 1996, respondents filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a Complaint for Falsification of Public Documents and
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act) against Zenaida H. Palacio and spouses
Edilberto and Celerina Darang. Respondents alleged therein that
Palacio, then officer-in-charge of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) Office in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, designated Celerina
Darang, Senior Agrarian Reform Program Technologist stationed at
Sto. Tomas, San Jose City, to investigate the claims of respondents
against the formers husband Edilberto Darang; that Celerina Darang
accepted such designation, conducted an investigation and rendered a
report favorable to her husband, Edilberto Darang; that Celerina
Darang supported such report with public documents which she
falsified; and that Palacios then issued a recommendation, based on
Celerina Darangs report, to award the landholding in dispute to
Edilberto Darang.
Acting on respondents complaint against the aforementioned DAR
officers and Edilberto Darang, petitioner issued a Resolution
dismissing the charge for insufficiency of evidence. Respondents filed
several motions seeking reconsideration of the above Resolution, all of
which were denied.
Herein respondents then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
with this Court, but per Resolution dated July 14, 1999, the petition
was referred to the CA. On February 27, 2001, the CA promulgated the
assailed Decision denying the petition for certiorari for falsification of
public documents but granting the provisional dismissal of complaint
for violation of RA 3019.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied in
its Resolution dated December 11, 2001. Hence, this petition.
The crux of the matter is whether the CA has jurisdiction over decisions
and orders of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. This issue has been
directly addressed in Kuizon v. Desierto and reiterated in the more
recent Golangco v. Fung, wherein the Court declared, thus:
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives and
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases only. It cannot, therefore, review the orders, directives or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or nonadministrative cases.
In Kuizon v. Desierto, this Court clarified:
The appellate court correctly ruled that its jurisdiction extends only to
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In
the Fabian case, we ruled that appeals from decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to
the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. It bears stressing that when we declared Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 as unconstitutional, we categorically stated that
said provision is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative disciplinary
action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action for
certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review,
such as from an incident in a criminal action.

The question that arises next is what remedy should an aggrieved

party avail of to assail the Ombudsmans finding of the existence or
lack of probable cause in criminal cases or non-administrative cases.
In Estrada v. Desierto, the Court emphasized that parties seeking to
question the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal
cases or non-administrative cases, may file an original action for
certiorari with this Court, not with the CA, when it is believed that the
Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion.

the benefits or advantages given to him by the public officials charged

under the complaint, are truly unwarranted.

Respondents originally filed a petition for certiorari before this Court

but the same was referred to the CA. It, thus, behooves this Court to
now look into whether the Ombudsman indeed acted with grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing the charge of Falsification of Public
Documents and provisionally dismissing the charge of Violation of
Section 3, par. (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, against Zenaida H.
Palacio and spouses Edilberto and Celerina Darang.

ACCION PUBLICIANA

A close examination of the records will reveal that the Ombudsman

acted properly in dismissing the charge for falsification of public
documents because herein respondents utterly failed to identify the
supposedly falsified documents and submit certified true copies
thereof.
As to the provisional dismissal of the charge for Violation of Section 3
par. (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, the Court likewise finds no
reason to overturn the ruling of the Ombudsman. The hornbook
doctrine emphasized in Presidential Commission on Good Government
v. Desierto must be borne in mind, to wit:
x x x the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the
Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers
without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. Said
exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate and the
courts will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon
respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as
well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will
grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much
the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the
exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they
decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.
Nevertheless, the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the
existence of probable cause is not absolute. However, it is incumbent
upon petitioner to prove that such discretion was gravely abused in
order to warrant the reversal of the Ombudsmans findings by this
Court.
In Velasco v. Commission on Elections,[18] the Court defined grave
abuse of discretion as follows: grave abuse of discretion is such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction, or [an] exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or an exercise of
judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act in a
manner not at all in contemplation of law.
Here, the Ombudsman based its provisional dismissal on the ground
that the case between the same parties before the DAR Adjudication
Board (DARAB), DARAB Case No. 0040, had not yet reached finality,
as there was a pending Motion for Relief from Judgment that was yet
to be resolved. The Ombudsman reasoned out that since what Section
3, par. (e), R.A. No. 3019 penalized was the giving of unwarranted
advantage or preference to a private party, it was only prudent to await
the final resolution in DARAB Case No. 0040, which would show if the
favorable recommendation given by Celerina Darang benefiting her
husband Edilberto was, indeed, unjustified, unwarranted or unfounded.
Since the main issue in DARAB Case No. 0040 is whether the
disputed parcel of land should be awarded to Edilberto Darang, then it
is true that a final resolution of the aforementioned DARAB case would
establish whether the benefit or advantage given to him was indeed
unwarranted.
The reason behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction may also be
applied here by analogy. The objective of said doctrine is to guide a
court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its
jurisdiction until after an administrative agency, which has special
knowledge, experience and tools to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact, has determined some question or a particular aspect of
some question arising in the proceeding before the court. This is not to
say that the Ombudsman cannot acquire jurisdiction or take
cognizance of a criminal complaint until after the administrative agency
has decided on a particular issue that is also involved in the complaint
before it. Rather, using the same reasoning behind the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, it is only prudent and practical for the Ombudsman
to refrain from proceeding with the criminal action until after the
DARAB, which is the administrative agency with special knowledge
and experience over agrarian matters, has arrived at a final resolution
on the issue of whether Edilberto Darang is indeed entitled under the
law to be awarded the land in dispute. This would establish whether

Thus, aside from the fact that the CA has no jurisdiction over decisions
and orders of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, it was also incorrect
to hold that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.

BF CITILAND CORPORATION, G.R. No. 173351- versus- MARILYN

B. OTAKE July 29, 2010
Petitioner BF Citiland Corporation is the registered owner of Lot 2,
Block 101 situated in Brisbane Street, Phase III, BF Homes
Subdivision, Paraaque City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 52940. Based on the tax declaration filed in the Office of the
Assessor, the lot has an assessed value of P48,000.00.
On 24 February 1987, respondent Merlinda B. Bodullo bought the
adjoining Lot 1, Block 101 covered by TCT No. 77549. However,
records show respondent occupied not just the lot she purchased. She
also encroached upon petitioners lot.
On 13 October 2000, petitioner filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court
(Branch 77) of Paranaque City a complaint for accion publiciana
praying that judgment be rendered ordering respondent to vacate the
subject lot.
In its 25 April 2003 Decision, the MeTC ruled in favor of petitioner.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration claiming she was a
lawful possessor and buyer in good faith of the disputed lot. In its
Order dated 20 June 2003, the MeTC denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit and for lack of the requisite notice of
hearing. The MeTC then issued a writ of execution.
Respondent filed a motion to quash the writ of execution on the ground
that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over accion publiciana cases. In its
30 January 2004 Order, the MeTC denied the motion to quash the writ
of execution. It held that under Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended by Republic Act 7691, the MeTC had exclusive
original jurisdiction in all civil actions involving title to or possession of
real property with assessed value not exceeding P50,000.00.
Respondent argued that even if the MeTC had jurisdiction over accion
publiciana cases, the total value of the lot together with the residential
house she built on it exceeded P50,000.00.
Respondent filed in the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque City a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking
dismissal of the accion publiciana case for lack of jurisdiction of the
MeTC.
In its 29 December 2004 Decision, the RTC held that accion publiciana
was within the exclusive original jurisdiction of regional trial courts. The
RTC further explained that BP 129, as amended, did not modify the
jurisprudential doctrine that a suit for accion publiciana fell under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.
Upon the RTCs denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration,
petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule
42 of the Rules of Court contending that the RTC erred in ruling that
the MeTC had no jurisdiction over accion publiciana cases.
In its 28 July 2005 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for review holding that appeal from a decision of the RTC
rendered in the exercise of its original jurisdiction should be by way of
a notice of appeal.
The Court of Appeals ruled that appeal by way of petition for review
under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court could be resorted to only when
what was appealed from was a decision of the RTC rendered in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. In its 5 July 2006 Resolution, the
Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition for review.
The issues for resolution are (1) whether a petition for review under
Rule 42 is the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65; and (2) whether the RTC correctly
ruled that the MeTC has no jurisdiction over accion publiciana cases.
The petition is meritorious.
Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court states:
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving
a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
(b) Petition for review. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.

The Rule is clear. In cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, appeal to the Court of Appeals is taken by filing a
notice of appeal. On the other hand, in cases decided by the RTC in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, appeal to the Court of Appeals
is by a petition for review under Rule 42.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 does not interrupt the course of
the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction from further proceeding has been issued against
the public respondent. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is, without
a doubt, an original action.
Since the decision of the RTC in the petition for certiorari under Rule
65 was rendered in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, appeal from
the said RTC decision to the Court of Appeals should have been made
by filing a notice of appeal, not a petition for review under Rule 42.
However, in numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal
construction of the rules when to do so would serve the demands of
substantial justice. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon. It is better to excuse a technical lapse rather than
dispose of a case on technicality, giving a false impression of speedy
disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a
miscarriage of justice. In the present case, a dismissal on a technicality
would only mean a new round of litigation between the same parties
for the same cause of action, over the same subject matter. Thus,
notwithstanding petitioners wrong mode of appeal, the Court of
Appeals should not have so easily dismissed the petition.
Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, the plenary action of accion publiciana
must be brought before regional trial courts. With the modifications
introduced by Republic Act No. 7691, the jurisdiction of regional trial
courts has been limited to real actions where the assessed value
exceedsP20,000.00 or P50,000.00 if the action is filed in Metro Manila.
If the assessed value is below the said amounts, the action must be
brought before first level courts. As so amended, BP 129 now provides:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title
to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs: Provided, That in cases
of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property
shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
Under BP 129, as amended, jurisdiction even in accion publiciana
cases is determined by the assessed value of the property. The Court
recently explained in Spouses Alcantara v. Nido that assessed value is
the worth or value of the property as fixed by the taxing authorities for
the purpose of determining the applicable tax rate. The assessed value
does not necessarily represent the true or market value of the property.
In the present case, the complaint, which was filed after the enactment
of R.A. 7691, contained a statement that, based on the tax declaration
filed in the Office of the Assessor, the lot subject of the accion
publiciana has an assessed value of P48,000.00. The subject lot, with
an assessed value below the jurisdictional limit of P50,000.00 for Metro
Manila, comes within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MeTC
under BP 129, as amended. Thus, the RTC erred in holding that the
MeTC had no jurisdiction in this case.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the
Resolutions dated 28 July 2005 and 5 July 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88995. WeREINSTATE the 25 April 2003
Decision and the 20 June 2003 Order of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(Branch 77) of Paraaque City in Civil Case No. 11868.

JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON

ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style ACG
Express Liner, - versus - MORTIMER F. CORDERO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 164703
Between June and August 1997, Tony Robinson (Australian national
based in Brisbane, Australia, who is the Managing Director of
Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA)) signed documents appointing
Mortimer Cordero as the exclusive distributor of AFFA catamaran and
other fast ferry vessels in the Philippines.
After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson, lawyers of
Allan C. Go who is the owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu
City, a single proprietorship, Cordero was able to close a deal for the
purchase of two (2) SEACAT 25 as evidenced by the Memorandum of
Agreement dated August 7, 1997. Accordingly, the parties executed
Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 for one (1) high-speed catamaran
(SEACAT 25) for the price of US$1,465,512.00. Per agreement

between Robinson and Cordero, the latter shall receive commissions

totalling US$328,742.00, or 22.43% of the purchase price, from the
sale of each vessel.
Cordero made two (2) trips to the AFFA Shipyard in Brisbane,
Australia, and on one (1) occasion even accompanied Go and his
family and Landicho, to monitor the progress of the building of the
vessel. However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly
with Robinson for a second catamaran engine from their company
which provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT 25.
On August 21, 1998, Cordero instituted Civil Case No. 98-35332
seeking to hold Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho liable jointly and
solidarily for conniving and conspiring together in violating his
exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights,
thus depriving him of his due commissions and causing him actual,
moral and exemplary damages, including P800,000.00 representing
expenses for airplane travel to Australia, telecommunications bills and
entertainment, on account of AFFAs untimely cancellation of the
exclusive distributorship agreement. Cordero also prayed for the award
of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees and
litigation expenses.
Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of jurisdiction over
his person and failure to state a cause of action, asserting that there
was no act committed in violation of the distributorship agreement.
Said motion was denied by the trial court on December 20, 1999.
Robinson was likewise declared in default for failure to file his answer
within the period granted by the trial court. As for Go and Tecson, their
motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action was
likewise denied by the trial court on February 26, 1999.
The controversy boils down to two (2) main issues: (1) whether
petitioner Cordero has the legal personality to sue the respondents for
breach of contract; and (2) whether the respondents may be held liable
for damages to Cordero for his unpaid commissions and termination of
his exclusive distributorship appointment by the principal, AFFA.
I. Real Party-in-Interest
First, on the issue of whether the case had been filed by the real partyin-interest as required by Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which
defines such party as the one (1) to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
The purposes of this provision are: 1) to prevent the prosecution of
actions by persons without any right, title or interest in the case; 2) to
require that the actual party entitled to legal relief be the one to
prosecute the action; 3) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and 4) to
discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to
sound public policy.[31] A case is dismissible for lack of personality to
sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence
grounded on failure to state a cause of action.
On this issue, we agree with the CA in ruling that it was Cordero and
not Pamana who is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines
as shown by the Certification dated June 1, 1997 issued by Tony
Robinson.
For all intents and purposes, Robinson and AFFA dealt only with
Cordero who alone made decisions in the performance of the exclusive
distributorship, as with other clients to whom he had similarly offered
AFFAs fast ferry vessels. Moreover, the stipulated commissions from
each progress payments made by Go were directly paid by Robinson
to Cordero.
Moreover, petitioner Go, Landicho and Tecson never raised petitioner
Corderos lack of personality to sue on behalf of Pamana, and did so
only before the CA when they contended that it is Pamana and not
Cordero, who was appointed and acted as exclusive distributor for
AFFA. It was Robinson who argued in support of his motion to dismiss
that as far as said defendant is concerned, the real party plaintiff
appears to be Pamana, against the real party defendant which is
AFFA. As already mentioned, the trial court denied the motion to
dismiss filed by Robinson.
We find no error committed by the trial court in overruling Robinsons
objection over the improper resort to summons by publication upon a
foreign national like him and in an action in personam, notwithstanding
that he raised it in a special appearance specifically raising the issue of
lack of jurisdiction over his person. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, while jurisdiction over the
defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of
summons upon them in the manner required by law or through their
voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority. A
party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the
jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalid service of
summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court.
In this case, however, although the Motion to Dismiss filed by
Robinson specifically stated as one (1) of the grounds the lack of

personal jurisdiction, it must be noted that he had earlier filed a Motion

for Time to file an appropriate responsive pleading even beyond the
time provided in the summons by publication. Such motion did not
state that it was a conditional appearance entered to question the
regularity of the service of summons, but an appearance submitting to
the jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the summons by
publication issued by the court and praying for additional time to file a
responsive pleading. Consequently, Robinson having acknowledged
the summons by publication and also having invoked the jurisdiction of
the trial court to secure affirmative relief in his motion for additional
time, he effectively submitted voluntarily to the trial courts jurisdiction.
He is now estopped from asserting otherwise, even before this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. With costs against the
petitioner in G.R. No. 164703.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171092
March 15, 2010
EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER, Petitioner, vs. BRITISH AIRWAYS,
Respondent.
On April 28, 2005, petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier filed a Complaint for
damages against respondent British Airways before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City. She alleged that on February 28, 2005, she
took respondents flight 548 from London, United Kingdom to Rome,
Italy. Once on board, she allegedly requested Julian Halliday
(Halliday), one of the respondents flight attendants, to assist her in
placing her hand-carried luggage in the overhead bin. However,
Halliday allegedly refused to help and assist her, and even
sarcastically remarked that "If I were to help all 300 passengers in this
flight, I would have a broken back!"
Petitioner further alleged that when the plane was about to land in
Rome, Italy, another flight attendant, Nickolas Kerrigan (Kerrigan),
singled her out from among all the passengers in the business class
section to lecture on plane safety. Allegedly, Kerrigan made her appear
to the other passengers to be ignorant, uneducated, stupid, and in
need of lecturing on the safety rules and regulations of the plane.
Affronted, petitioner assured Kerrigan that she knew the planes safety
regulations being a frequent traveler. Thereupon, Kerrigan allegedly
thrust his face a mere few centimeters away from that of the petitioner
and menacingly told her that "We dont like your attitude."
Upon arrival in Rome, petitioner complained to respondents ground
manager and demanded an apology. However, the latter declared that
the flight stewards were "only doing their job."
Thus, petitioner filed the complaint for damages, praying that
respondent be ordered to pay P5 million as moral damages, P2 million
as nominal damages, P1 million as exemplary damages, P300,000.00
as attorneys fees,P200,000.00 as litigation expenses, and cost of the
suit.
On May 16, 2005, summons, together with a copy of the complaint,
was served on the respondent through Violeta Echevarria, General
Manager of Euro-Philippine Airline Services, Inc.
On May 30, 2005, respondent, by way of special appearance through
counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction
over the case and over the person of the respondent.
Respondent alleged that only the courts of London, United Kingdom or
Rome, Italy, have jurisdiction over the complaint for damages pursuant
to the Warsaw Convention,5 Article 28(1) of which provides:
An action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff,
either before the court of domicile of the carrier or his principal place of
business, or where he has a place of business through which the
contract has been made, or before the court of the place of destination.
Thus, since a) respondent is domiciled in London; b) respondents
principal place of business is in London; c) petitioner bought her ticket
in Italy (through Jeepney Travel S.A.S, in Rome); and d) Rome, Italy is
petitioners place of destination, then it follows that the complaint
should only be filed in the proper courts of London, United Kingdom or
Rome, Italy.
Likewise, it was alleged that the case must be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent because the summons
was erroneously served on Euro-Philippine Airline Services, Inc. which
is not its resident agent in the Philippines.
On October 14, 2005, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 132, issued an
Order granting respondents Motion to Dismiss. (RTC reason: Warsaw
Convention)
Petitioner now comes directly before us on a Petition for Review on
Certiorari on pure questions of law, raising the following issues:
I. WHETHER X X X PHILIPPINE COURTs HAVE JURISDICTION
OVER A TORTIOUS CONDUCT COMMITTED AGAINST A FILIPINO
CITIZEN AND RESIDENT BY AIRLINE PERSONNEL OF A FOREIGN
CARRIER TRAVELLING BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL LIMIT OF ANY

FOREIGN COUNTRY; AND THUS IS OUTSIDE THE AMBIT OF THE

WARSAW CONVENTION.
II. WHETHER x x x RESPONDENT AIR CARRIER OF PASSENGERS,
IN FILING ITS MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON LACK OF
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE AND
OVER ITS PERSON MAY BE DEEMED AS HAVING IN FACT AND IN
LAW SUBMITTED ITSELF TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER
COURT, ESPECIALLY SO, WHEN THE VERY LAWYER ARGUING
FOR IT IS HIMSELF THE RESIDENT AGENT OF THE CARRIER.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner argues that her cause of action arose not from the contract
of carriage, but from the tortious conduct committed by airline
personnel of respondent in violation of the provisions of the Civil Code
on Human Relations. Since her cause of action was not predicated on
the contract of carriage, petitioner asserts that she has the option to
pursue this case in this jurisdiction pursuant to Philippine laws.
Respondents Arguments
In contrast, respondent maintains that petitioners claim for damages
fell within the ambit of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. As
such, the same can only be filed before the courts of London, United
Kingdom or Rome, Italy.
Our Ruling: The petition is without merit.
The Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country.
It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law
in this country. In Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines,12 we held
that:
The Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw Convention. It took effect on
February 13, 1933. The Convention was concurred in by the Senate,
through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The Philippine
instrument of accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on
October 13, 1950, and was deposited with the Polish government on
November 9, 1950. The Convention became applicable to the
Philippines on February 9, 1951. On September 23, 1955, President
Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring our formal
adherence thereto, "to the end that the same and every article and
clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled in good faith by the
Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof."
The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by
the Philippine government and, as such, has the force and effect of law
in this country. The Warsaw Convention applies because the air travel,
where the alleged tortious conduct occurred, was between the United
Kingdom and Italy, which are both signatories to the Warsaw
Convention.
Thus, when the place of departure and the place of destination in a
contract of carriage are situated within the territories of two High
Contracting Parties, said carriage is deemed an "international
carriage". The High Contracting Parties referred to herein were the
signatories to the Warsaw Convention and those which subsequently
adhered to it.
In the case at bench, petitioners place of departure was London,
United Kingdom while her place of destination was Rome, Italy. Both
the United Kingdom and Italy signed and ratified the Warsaw
Convention. As such, the transport of the petitioner is deemed to be an
"international carriage" within the contemplation of the Warsaw
Convention.
Since the Warsaw Convention applies in the instant case, then the
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is governed by the
provisions of the Warsaw Convention.
Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring
the action for damages before
1. the court where the carrier is domiciled;
2. the court where the carrier has its principal place of business;
3. the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the
contract has been made; or
4. the court of the place of destination.
In this case, it is not disputed that respondent is a British corporation
domiciled in London, United Kingdom with London as its principal
place of business. Hence, under the first and second jurisdictional
rules, the petitioner may bring her case before the courts of London in
the United Kingdom. In the passenger ticket and baggage check
presented by both the petitioner and respondent, it appears that the
ticket was issued in Rome, Italy. Consequently, under the third
jurisdictional rule, the petitioner has the option to bring her case before
the courts of Rome in Italy. Finally, both the petitioner and respondent
aver that the place of destination is Rome, Italy, which is properly
designated given the routing presented in the said passenger ticket
and baggage check. Accordingly, petitioner may bring her action before
the courts of Rome, Italy. We thus find that the RTC of Makati correctly
ruled that it does not have jurisdiction over the case filed by the
petitioner.

Petitioner contends that in Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, the

cause of action was based on a breach of contract while her cause of
action arose from the tortious conduct of the airline personnel and
violation of the Civil Code provisions on Human Relations. In addition,
she claims that our pronouncement in Santos III v. Northwest Orient
Airlines that "the allegation of willful misconduct resulting in a tort is
insufficient to exclude the case from the comprehension of the Warsaw
Convention," is more of an obiter dictum rather than the ratio
decidendi. She maintains that the fact that said acts occurred aboard a
plane is merely incidental, if not irrelevant.

and such is not constitutive of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction

of the court.

We disagree with the position taken by the petitioner. Black defines

obiter dictum as "an opinion entirely unnecessary for the decision of
the case" and thus "are not binding as precedent." In Santos III v.
Northwest Orient Airlines, Augusto Santos III categorically put in issue
the applicability of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention if the action
is based on tort.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 14, 2005 Order of

the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 132, dismissing the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction, is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

In the said case, we held that the allegation of willful misconduct

resulting in a tort is insufficient to exclude the case from the realm of
the Warsaw Convention. In fact, our ruling that a cause of action based
on tort did not bring the case outside the sphere of the Warsaw
Convention was our ratio decidendi in disposing of the specific issue
presented by Augusto Santos III. Clearly, the contention of the herein
petitioner that the said ruling is an obiter dictum is without basis.
It is thus settled that allegations of tortious conduct committed against
an airline passenger during the course of the international carriage do
not bring the case outside the ambit of the Warsaw Convention.
Respondent, in seeking remedies from the trial court through special
appearance of counsel, is not deemed to have voluntarily submitted
itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Special Appearance to Question a Courts Jurisdiction Is Not Voluntary
Appearance
Petitioner argues that respondent has effectively submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court when the latter stated in its
Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration that
"Defendant [is at a loss] x x x how the plaintiff arrived at her erroneous
impression that it is/was Euro-Philippines Airlines Services, Inc. that
has been making a special appearance since x x x British Airways x x x
has been clearly specifying in all the pleadings that it has filed with this
Honorable Court that it is the one making a special appearance."
In refuting the contention of petitioner, respondent cited La Naval Drug
Corporation v. Court of Appeals where we held that even if a party
"challenges the jurisdiction of the court over his person, as by reason
of absence or defective service of summons, and he also invokes other
grounds for the dismissal of the action under Rule 16, he is not
deemed to be in estoppel or to have waived his objection to the
jurisdiction over his person."
The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure clearly provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendants voluntary
appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons.
The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a
voluntary appearance.
Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, together with other grounds
raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the
court. What the rule on voluntary appearance the first sentence of
the above-quoted rule means is that the voluntary appearance of the
defendant in court is without qualification, in which case he is deemed
to have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due
to improper service of summons.
The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were filed
by petitioner solely for special appearance with the purpose of
challenging the jurisdiction of the SB over her person and that of her
three children. Petitioner asserts therein that SB did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person and of her three children for lack of valid
service of summons through improvident substituted service of
summons in both Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II. This stance the
petitioner never abandoned when she filed her motions for
reconsideration, even with a prayer to admit their attached Answer Ex
Abundante Ad Cautelam dated January 22, 2005 setting forth
affirmative defenses with a claim for damages. And the other
subsequent pleadings, likewise, did not abandon her stance and
defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper substituted services of
summons in the forfeiture cases. Evidently, from the foregoing Sec. 20,
Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner and
her sons did not voluntarily appear before the SB constitutive of or
equivalent to service of summons.
Moreover, the leading La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals applies
to the instant case. Said case elucidates the current view in our
jurisdiction that a special appearance before the courtchallenging its
jurisdiction over the person through a motion to dismiss even if the
movant invokes other groundsis not tantamount to estoppel or a
waiver by the movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his person;

In this case, the special appearance of the counsel of respondent in

filing the Motion to Dismiss and other pleadings before the trial court
cannot be deemed to be voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
said trial court. We hence disagree with the contention of the petitioner
and rule that there was no voluntary appearance before the trial court
that could constitute estoppel or a waiver of respondents objection to
jurisdiction over its person.

G.R. No. 183035 : January 9, 2013

OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HERTZ PHIL.
EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC., Respondent.
On 12 December 2002, Optima entered into a Contract of Lease with
respondent over a 131-square-meter office unit and a parking lot in the
Optima Building. Renovations in the Optima Building commenced in
January and ended in November 2005. As a result, Hertz alleged that it
experienced a 50% drop in monthly sales and a significant decrease in
its personnels productivity. It then requested a 50% discount on its rent
for the months of May, June, July and August 2005.
On 8 December 2005, Optima granted the request of Hertz. However,
the latter still failed to pay its rentals. On 8 December 2005, Optima
wrote another letter to Hertz, reminding the latter that the Contract of
Lease could be renewed only by a new negotiation between the parties
and upon written notice by the lessee to the lessor at least 90 days
prior to the termination of the lease period. As no letter was received
from Hertz regarding its intention to seek negotiation and extension of
the lease contract within the 90-day period, Optima informed it that the
lease would expire on 28 February 2006 and would not be renewed.
On 1 March 2006, Optima, through counsel, wrote Hertz a letter
requiring the latter to surrender and vacate the leased premises in view
of the expiration of the Contract of Lease on 28 February 2006. It
likewise demanded payment of the sum of 420,967.28 in rental
arrearages, unpaid utility bills and other charges. Hertz, however,
refused to vacate the leased premises. As a result, Optima was
constrained to file before the MeTC a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer
and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction (Unlawful Detainer Complaint)
against Hertz.
On 28 March 2006, or 14 days after service of the Summons, Hertz
filed a Motion for Leave of Court to file Answer with Counterclaim and
to Admit Answer with Counterclaim (Motion for Leave to File Answer).
In that Motion, Hertz stated that, "in spite of the defective service of
summons, it opted to file the instant Answer with Counterclaim with
Leave of Court." In the same Motion, it likewise prayed that, in the
interest of substantial justice, the Answer with Counterclaim attached
to the Motion for Leave to File Answer should be admitted regardless
of its belated filing, since the service of summons was defective.
On 22 May 2006, the MeTC rendered a Decision,25 ruling that
petitioner Optima had established its right to evict Hertz from the
subject premises due to nonpayment of rentals and the expiration of
the period of lease.
Hertz appealed the MeTCs Decision to the RTC. Finding no compelling
reason to warrant the reversal of the MeTCs Decision, the RTC
affirmed it by dismissing the appeal in a Decision dated 16 March
2007.
On appeal, the CA ruled that, due to the improper service of summons,
the MeTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent
Hertz. The appellate court thereafter reversed the RTC and remanded
the case to the MeTC to ensure the proper service of summons.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the CAs Decision was denied
in a Resolution dated 20 May 2008. Aggrieved by the ruling of the
appellate court, petitioner then filed the instant Rule 45 Petition for
Review on Certiorari with this Court.
THE ISSUE
1. Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent Hertz;
THE COURTS RULING
The MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz.
In civil cases, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be
acquired either by service of summons or by the defendants voluntary
appearance in court and submission to its authority. In this case, the
MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz by
reason of the latters voluntary appearance in court.
In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy,36 we had
occasion to state:

Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired

either by the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his
person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition,
one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had
occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment,
and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered
voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. This, however, is
tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party
who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the
court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have
submitted to its authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule
on voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an
unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction
of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion
seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for
resolution.
In this case, the records show that the following statement appeared in
respondents Motion for Leave to File Answer: In spite of the defective
service of summons, the defendant opted to file the instant Answer
with Counterclaim with Leave of Court, upon inquiring from the office of
the clerk of court of this Honorable Court and due to its notice of
hearing on March 29, 2005 application for TRO/Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction was received on March 26, 2006.
Furthermore, the Answer with Counterclaim filed by Hertz never raised
the defense of improper service of summons. The defenses that it
pleaded were limited to litis pendentia, pari delicto, performance of its
obligations and lack of cause of action. Finally, it even asserted its own
counterclaim against Optima.
Measured against the standards in Philippine Commercial International
Bank, these actions lead to no other conclusion than that Hertz
voluntarily appeared before the court a quo. We therefore rule that, by
virtue of the voluntary appearance of respondent Hertz before the
MeTC, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondents.

SUMMARY PROCEDURE
[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1226. January 31, 2000]
GLORIA LUCAS, complainant, vs. JUDGE AMELIA A. FABROS,
MeTC, Branch 9, Manila, respondent.
In a verified complaint dated May 20, 1997, complainant Gloria Lucas
charged respondent, Judge Amelia A. Fabros of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 9, Manila, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave
Abuse of Discretion relative to Civil Case No. 151248 entitled "Editha
F. Gacad, represented by Elenita F. Castelo vs. Gloria Lucas, for
Ejectment".
Complainant, who was the defendant in the aforecited case, alleged
that Judge Amelia A. Fabros issued an Order dated February 26, 1997
granting the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of the Order dated
January 13, 1997, which dismissed the case for failure of plaintiff and
her counsel to appear at the Preliminary Conference.
Complainant averred that it is elementary, under Section 19 (c) of the
Rules of Summary Procedure, that a motion for reconsideration is
prohibited, but respondent judge, in violation of the rule, granted the
motion for reconsideration.
On June 18, 1997, respondent judge was required to comment on the
administrative complaint. In her Comment dated September 16, 1997,
she admitted that she granted the motion for reconsideration even if
the same is a prohibited motion in an ejectment case. She explained,
however, that it was granted in the interest of justice.
In her Comment, respondent stated:
"The Order subject of this complaint is the Order dated January 13,
1997 dismissing the complaint for ejectment for failure of the plaintiff to
appear for preliminary conference and more importantly her lawyer,
Atty. Jose Suing, who was duly empowered to appear for preliminary
conference by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney.
Immediately upon learning the said order of dismissal and awarding of
attorneys fees, Atty. Suing filed a Motion for Reconsideration on
January 17, 1997 (Annex "A") stating that he failed to appear due to a
sudden excruciating stomach pain. He further stated that his Secretary
called the Court but to no avail until finally the call came through and
she was informed that the case was dismissed.
Over the objection of the defendant that the Motion for Reconsideration
was a prohibited pleading which this Presiding Judge is fully aware of
under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the Motion for
Reconsideration was nonetheless granted in the interest of justice.

The complaint and the Comment were referred to the Office of the
Court Administrator for evaluation. On August 25, 1997, OCA
submitted that we find that respondent Judge Fabros abused her
discretion in granting the Motion for Reconsideration.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that respondent
judge be fined in the amount of P2,000.00 for grave abuse of
discretion. The Court, however, finds this recommendation without
factual and legal basis.
As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under
Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus,
"SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings,
motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this
Rule.
xxx
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for
reopening of trial;
xxx"
This rule, however, applies only where the judgment sought to be
reconsidered is one rendered on the merits. As held by the Court in an
earlier case involving Sec. 15 (c) of the Rules on Summary Procedure,
later Sec. 19 (c) of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure effective
November 15, 1991: "The motion prohibited by this Section is that
which seeks reconsideration of the judgment rendered by the
courtafter trial on the merits of the case."[7] Here, the order of
dismissal issued by respondent judge due to failure of a party to
appear during the preliminary conference is obviously not a judgment
on the merits after trial of the case. Hence, a motion for the
reconsideration of such order is not the prohibited pleading
contemplated under Section 19 (c) of the present Rule on Summary
Procedure. Thus, respondent judge committed no grave abuse of
discretion, nor is she guilty of ignorance of the law, in giving due
course to the motion for reconsideration subject of the present
complaint.
ACCORDINGLY, the complaint filed against respondent Judge Amelia
A. Fabros is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MATEO
G.R. No. 147678-87, July 7, 2004
Facts: Appellant Efren Mateo was charged with ten counts of rape by
his step-daughter Imelda Mateo. During the trial, Imeldas testimonies
regarding the rape incident were inconsistent. She said in one
occasion that incident of rape happened inside her bedroom, but other
times, she told the court that it happened in their sala. She also told the
court that the appellant would cover her mouth but when asked again,
she said that he did not. Despite the irreconcilable testimony of the
victim, the trial court found the accused guilty of the crime of rape and
sentenced him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Solicitor General
assails the factual findings of the trial and recommends an acquittal of
the appellant.
Issue: Whether or not this case is directly appeallable to the Supreme
Court.
Held: While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the
Supreme Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it
proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost
circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling
to provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the
case is elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at
stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be
accorded an accused, and no case in the evaluation of the facts can
ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on,
particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an
error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render
judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so
warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records
of the case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition.
Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules of procedure is
constitutionally vested in the Supreme Court
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts.
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the
rule-making prerogative of the Supreme Court than the law-making
power of Congress. The rule here announced additionally allowing an
intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate
court, before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic
review is such a procedural matter.
Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more
particularly Section 3 and Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule

124, Section of Rule 125, and any other rule insofar as they provide for
direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in
cases where the penalty imposed is death reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the Supreme Court en banc,
dated 19 September 1995, in Internal Rules of the Supreme Court in
cases similarly involving the death penalty, are to be deemed modified
accordingly.
[A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA. June 29, 1992.]
LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO of the Court
of Appeals dated 14 November 1990.
The petitioner, Reynato S. Puno, was first appointed as Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals on 1980. On 1983, the Court of Appeals
was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court
pursuant to BP Blg. 129. On 1984, petitioner was appointed to be
Deputy Minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice. Thus, he ceased to
be a member of the Judiciary.
After February 1986 EDSA Revolution, there was a reorganization of
the entire government, including the Judiciary. A Screening Committee
for the reorganization of the Intermediate Appelate Court and lower
courts recommended the return of petitioner as Associate Justice of
the new court of Appeals and assigned him the rank of number 11 in
the roster of appellate court justices.
When the appointments were signed by Pres. Aquino, petitioner's
seniority ranking changes from number 11 to 26. Then, petitioner
alleged that the change in seniority ranking was due to "inadvertence"
of the President, otherwise, it would run counter to the provisions of
Section 2 of E.O. No. 33.
"SECTION 2. Section 3, Chapter 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 2. Organization. There is hereby created a Court of Appeals
which shall consist of a Presiding Justice and fifty Associate Justices
who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The
Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his appointment and the
Associate Justice shall have precedence according to the dates of their
respective appointments, or when the appointments of two or more
shall bear the same date, according to the order in which their
appointments were issued by the President. Any Member who is
reappointed to the Court after rendering service in any other position in
the government shall retain the precedence to which he was entitled
under his original appointment, and his service in the Court shall, for all
intents and purpose be considered as continuous and uninterrupted."
Petitioner Justice Reynato S. Puno wrote a letter to the Court seeking
the correction of his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals. The
Court en banc granted Justice Puno's request.
A motion for reconsideration was later filed by Associate Justices
Campos Jr. and Javellana who are affected by the ordered correction.
They alleged that petitioner could not claim reappointment because the
courts where he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the
date of his last appointment.
In his Comment, petitioner argues that, by virtue of Executive Order
No. 33 read in relation to B.P. Blg. 129, his seniority ranking in the
Court of Appeals is now number five (5) for, though President Aquino
rose to power by virtue of a revolution, she had pledged at the
issuance of Proclamation No. 3 (otherwise known as the Freedom
Constitution) that "no right provided under the unratified 1973
Constitution (shall) be absent in the Freedom Constitution."
Moreover, since the last sentence of Section 2 of Executive Order No.
33 virtually re-enacted the last sentence of Sec. 3, Chapter 1 of B.P.
Blg. 129, statutory construction rules on simultaneous repeal and reenactment mandate, according to petitioner, the preservation and
enforcement of all rights and liabilities which had accrued under the
original statute. 13 Furthermore, petitioner avers that, although the
power of appointment is executive in character and cannot be usurped
by any other branch of the Government, such power can still be
regulated by the Constitution and by the appropriate law, in this case,
by the limits set by Executive Order NO. 33 14 for the power of
appointment cannot be wielded in violation of law.
In their Reply and Supplemental Reply, Associate Justices Javellana
and Campos submit that the appeal or request for correction filed by
the petitioner was addressed to the wrong party. They aver that as
petitioner himself had alleged the mistake to be an "inadvertent error"
of the Office of the President, ergo, he should have filed his request for
correction also with said Office of the President and not directly with
the Supreme Court. Furthermore, they point out that petitioner had
indeed filed with the Office of the President a request or petition for
correction of his ranking, (seniority) but the same was not approved
such that his recourse should have been an appropriate action before
the proper court and impleading all parties concerned. The aforesaid
non-approval by the Office of the President they argue, should be
respected by the Supreme Court "not only on the basis of the doctrine
of separation of powers but also their presumed knowledge ability and
even expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce" 17 for it (the

non-approval) is a confirmation that petitioners seniority ranking at the

time of his appointment by President Aquino was, in fact, deliberate
and not an "inadvertent error" as petitioner would have the Court
believe.
The resolution of this controversy is not a pleasant task for the Court
since it involves not only members of the next highest court of the land
but persons who are close to members of this Court. But the
controversy has to be resolved.
The core issue in this case is whether the present Court of Appeals is a
new court such that it would negate any claim to precedence or
seniority admittedly enjoyed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals and
Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33
or whether the present Court of Appeals is merely a continuation of the
Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to said
Executive Order No. 33.
It is the holding of the Court that the present Court of Appeals is a new
entity, different and distinct from the Court of Appeals or the
Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33,
for it was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched
by the revolutionary government of Corazon C. Aquino in the aftermath
of the people power (EDSA) revolution in 1986.
A revolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the
established government in any country or state by those who were
previously subject to it" 19 or as "a sudden, radical and fundamental
change in the government or political system, usually effected with
violence or at least some acts of violence." 20 In Kelsens book,
General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which "occurs
whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a
new order . . . a way not prescribed by the first order itself." 21
It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one,
and more popularly known as the "people power revolution" that the
Filipino people tore themselves away from an existing regime. This
revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino
government.
The Court holds that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate
Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33 phased out as part of
the legal system abolished by the revolution and that the Court of
Appeals established under Executive Order No. 33 was an entirely
new court with appointments thereto having no relation to earlier
appointments to the abolished courts, and that the reference to
precedence in rank contained in the last sentence of Sec. 2, BP Blg.
No. 129 as amended by Executive Order No. 33 refers to prospective
situations as distinguished from retroactive ones.
But even assuming, arguendo, that Executive Order No. 33 did not
abolish the precedence or seniority ranking resulting from previous
appointment to the Court of Appeals or Intermediate Appellate Court
existing prior to the 1986 revolution, it is believed that President Aquino
as head of then revolutionary government, could disregard or set aside
such precedence or seniority in ranking when she made her
appointments to the reorganized Court of Appeals in 1986.
It is to be noted that, at the time of the issuance of Executive Order No.
33, President Aquino was still exercising the powers of a revolutionary
government, encompassing both executive and legislative powers,
such that she could, if she so desired, amend, modify or repeal any
part of B.P. Blg. 129 or her own Executive Order No. 33. It should also
be remembered that the same situation was still in force when she
issued the 1986 appointments to the Court of Appeals. In other words,
President Aquino, at the time of the issuance of the 1986
appointments, modified or disregarded the rule embodied in B.P. Blg.
129 as amended by Executive Order No. 33, on precedence or
seniority in the case of the petitioner, for reasons known only to her.
Since the appointment extended by the President to the petitioner in
1986 for membership in the new Court of Appeals with its implicit
ranking in the roster of justices, was a valid appointment anchored on
the Presidents exercise of her then revolutionary powers, it is not for
the Court at this time to question or correct that exercise.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration
and the seniority rankings of members of the Court of Appeals,
including that of the petitioner, at the time the appointments were made
by the President in 1986, are recognized and upheld. SO ORDERED.