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DOMINGO PANIS,
Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zambales & Olongapo
City, Branch III and SERAPIO ABUG,Respondents.
Facts:
The basic issue in this case is the correct interpretation of Article 13(b) of the
Labor Code, Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in
any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons
shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."
Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not
charge an offense because he was accused of illegally recruiting only one person
in each of the four informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed,
there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any
manner promised or offered any employment for a fee."
The trial court granted this argument. Hence, this petition for certiorari by the
prosecution.
Issue: Whether the number of persons dealt with is an essential ingredient of the
act of recruitment and placement of workers
Ruling:
The view of the private respondents is that to constitute recruitment and
placement, all the acts mentioned in this article should involve dealings with two
or more persons as an indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the
petitioner argues that the requirement of two or more persons is imposed only
where the recruitment and placement consists of an offer or promise of
employment to such persons and always in consideration of a fee. The other acts
mentioned in the body of the article may involve even only one person and are
not necessarily for profit.Neither interpretation is acceptable. According to the
Court, the proviso should speak only of an offer or promise of employment if the
purpose was to apply the requirement of two or more persons to all the acts
mentioned in the basic rule.
The Court ruled that the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on
the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a
presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in
recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons
to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in
the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring
or procuring (of) workers."The number of persons dealt with is not an essential
ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts
mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) will constitute recruitment and
placement even if only one prospective worker is involved. The proviso merely
lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a
promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the
individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of
recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create that
presumption.
WHEREFORE, the Orders of the trial court are set aside and the four informations
against the private respondent reinstated.
Case Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ
Facts:
In April 1993, eight informations for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment
and eight informations for estafa were filed against accused-appellants, spouses
Karl and Yolanda Reichl, together with Francisco Hernandez. Only the Reichl
spouses were tried and convicted by the trial court as Francisco Hernandez
remained at large.
The complainants namely, Narcisa Autor de Hernandez, Leonora Perez,
Melanie Bautista Annaliza Perez, Edwin Coling, Estela Abel de Manalo, Anicel
Umahon and Charito Balmes have their own similar stories about the illegal
recruitment conducted by the accused-appellants. They recounted that accused
Hernandez was the one convincing each of them to apply for employment abroad.
Accused Hernandez asked for the payment for the processing of their papers,
travel documents and visas. Complainants then were introduced by Hernandez to
spouse Reichl who in turn promised them for employment abroad. The spouse
issued reciept for the payments made by the complainants. The promises of
employment however did not pushed through and the complainants remained in
the Phillippines. Upon demands, the accused spouse promise them to refund the
payment if their employments never materialized. These agreements were
reduced into a document but the accused spouse never complies with their
leave SM as company nurse because she was having a problem thereat. Bamba
called him several times, seeking advices from him. He started courting Bamba
and went out dating until latter became his girlfriend. He met Lagman and Singh
thru Bamba. As complainants seeking advice on how to apply for jobs abroad, lest
he be charged as a recruiter, he made Bamba, Lagman and Singh sign separate
certifications, all to effect that he never recruited them and no money was
involved. Bamba filed an illegal recruitment case against him because they
quarreled and separated.
RTC rendered judgment finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal recruitment in large scale.
ISSUE:
W/N the trial court erred in convicting accused appellant of the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale
HELD:
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Montehermozo and found Sunace liable
thereof. The National Labor Relations Commission and Court of Appeals affirmed
the labor arbiters decision. Hence, the filing of this appeal.
The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace,
to the principal, employer, not the other way around. The knowledge of the
principal-foreign employer cannot, therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 2-year extension of Montehermozos employment was made
with the knowledge and consent of Sunace
There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound
under the 2-year employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy
thereto. As such, it and its "owner" cannot be held solidarily liable for any of
Montehermozos claims arising from the 2-year employment extension. As the
New Civil Code provides, Contracts take effect only between the parties, their
assigns, and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from
the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision
of law. Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied
revocation of its agency relationship with its foreign principal when, after the
termination of the original employment contract, the foreign principal directly
negotiated with Montehermozo and entered into a new and separate employment
contract in Taiwan. Article 1924 of the New Civil Code states that the agency is
revoked if the principal directly manages the business entrusted to the agent,
dealing directly with third persons.
HELD:
Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding, the alleged continuous communication
was with the Taiwanese broker Wang, not with the foreign employer.
The finding of the Court of Appeals solely on the basis of the telefax message
written by Wang to Sunace, that Sunace continually communicated with the
foreign "principal" (sic) and therefore was aware of and had consented to the
execution of the extension of the contract is misplaced. The message does not
provide evidence that Sunace was privy to the new contract executed after the
expiration on February 1, 1998 of the original contract. That Sunace and the
Taiwanese broker communicated regarding Montehermozos allegedly withheld
savings does not necessarily mean that Sunace ratified the extension of the
contract.
As can be seen from that letter communication, it was just an information given
to Sunace that Montehermozo had taken already her savings from her foreign
employer and that no deduction was made on her salary. It contains nothing
about the extension or Sunaces consent thereto.
Parenthetically, since the telefax message is dated February 21, 2000, it is safe to
assume that it was sent to enlighten Sunace who had been directed, by Summons
issued on February 15, 2000, to appear on February 28, 2000 for a mandatory
conference following Montehermozos filing of the complaint on February 14,
2000.
Respecting the decision of Court of Appeals following as agent of its foreign
principal, [Sunace] cannot profess ignorance of such an extension as obviously,
the act of its principal extending [Montehermozos] employment contract
necessarily bound it, it too is a misapplication, a misapplication of the theory of
imputed knowledge.
NLRC. In their answer, the latter alleged that Rusel deserted his employment by
jumping off the vessel.
within the Philippines and that these need not be strictly observed in cases of
international maritime or overseas employment.
Labor Arbiter held that respondent is liable for the unjust repatriation of the
complainant. NLRC affirmed the finding of the Labor Arbiter.
The Court does not agree. The provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor
Code which afford protection to labor apply to Filipino employees whether working
within the Philippines or abroad. Moreover, the principle of lex loci contractus (the
law of the place where the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. In the
present case, it is not disputed that the Contract of Employment entered into by
and between petitioners and private respondent was executed here in the
Philippines with the approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA). Hence, the Labor Code together with its implementing
rules and regulations and other laws affecting labor apply in this case.
Accordingly, as to the requirement of notice and hearing in the case of a seafarer,
the Court has already ruled in a number of cases that before a seaman can be
dismissed and discharged from the vessel, it is required that he be given a written
notice regarding the charges against him and that he be afforded a formal
investigation where he could defend himself personally or through a
representative. Hence, the employer should strictly comply with the twin
requirements of notice and hearing without regard to the nature and situs of
employment or the nationality of the employer. Petitioners failed to comply with
these twin requirements.
Wherefore, the petition is partly granted. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated
December 18, 2001 and Resolution dated April 10, 2002 are affirmed with
modification to the effect that the award of US$1620.00 representing private
respondent's three months salary is reduced to US$1200.00. The award of
US$550.00 representing private respondent's living allowance, overtime pay,
vacation pay and special allowance for two months is deleted and in lieu thereof,
an award of US$710.00 is granted representing private respondent's living
allowance, special allowance and vacation leave with pay for the same period.