PROGRAM DOSSIER

B-21
Definition: The B-21 Long Range Strike - Bomber (LRS-B) is a

U.S. bomber under development by Northrop Grumman that is projected to reach initial operational capability (IOC) in the mid-2020s.
Program History: The LRS-B descended from an earlier program called the Next Generation Bomber (NGB), which began after
the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) released its 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review in early 2006. That document canceled an
earlier program, called the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems
(J-UCAS), which would have fielded stealthy strike aircraft for the
U.S. Air Force (USAF) and U.S. Navy (USN). The J-UCAS program
had foundered on tension between the Navys desire to fit the system
on an aircraft carrier and the Air Forces desire for a global strike
enabler with greater range and payload.
The demise of J-UCAS led to the start of three programs:
Image Credit: U.S. Air Force

the Navys X-47B UCAS-D; an unmanned ISR aircraft, largely

sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency, which became the
Northrop Grumman RQ-180; and the Next Generation LongRange Strike (NGLRS) analysis of alternatives, which in 2006
generated the NGB requirement.
By 2008, industry executives were expecting an NGB request for
proposals (RFP) late in 2009 and a program start in FY10, with IOC
in 2018. However, in April 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
canceled NGB due to concern over the programs cost and risk.
Gates decision allowed the Air Force to make a case for a less risky
alternative, while considering other approaches to long-range strike.
In 2010, the Air Force shifted its approach to developing a family
of systems portfolio of ISR, communications, electronic warfare,
and long-range strike platforms. LRS-B would be a penetrating, but
not highly persistent, bomber, used in conjunction with the LongRange Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile, an RQ-180-type ISR asset
and new electronic attack aircraft. The LRS-B program itself would

focus on setting affordable, realistic and achievable requirements up

front and the use of new technology would be rigorously restricted.
The LRS-B program began when Secretary Gates issued a
classified memo in February 2011. USAF funded two competitors
through a preliminary design review (PDR) and manufacturing readiness review: Northrop Grumman and a Boeing/Lockheed Martin
team. In May 2013, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC) approved the requirements for the program. On July 9,
2014, USAF issued the RFP. On Oct. 27, 2015, USAF awarded the
engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) contract, and
with it the whole program, to Northrop.
On Nov. 5, 2015, the Boeing/Lockheed team filed a protest with
the Government Accountability Office (GAO), charging the cost
evaluation performed by the government did not properly reward
the contractors proposals to break the upward-spiraling historical
cost curves of defense acquisitions, or properly evaluate the relative or comparative risk of the competitors
ability to perform, as required by the solicitation. On
Feb. 16, 2016, GAO affirmed the services decision to
award the contract to Northrop, and Lockheed and
Boeing opted not to effectively appeal the decision by
suing USAF in federal court.
On Feb. 26, 2016, at the Air Force Associations
annual air warfare symposium in Orlando, Florida,
USAF Secretary Deborah James announced the
LRS-B would be designated B-21 and revealed a
concept drawing of the aircraft.
Program Details: USAF plans to buy 100 LRS-Bs
to replace its B-52 and B-1 fleets, which are slated to
retire in the mid-2040s. IOC is expected in the mid2020s, with nuclear certification planned two years
after service entry. Some authorities have suggested the service will
require a higher number of bombers. Retired USAF Lt. Gen. David
Deptula has suggested 174 aircraft: enough for a 12-aircraft squadron
for each of USAFs 10 air expeditionary forces, 30 training and testing
aircraft and enough additional aircraft for an attrition reserve. Other
reports have suggested a 200-aircraft force, allowing for 150-160
operational aircraft.
The program to build 100 bombers is estimated to be worth
about $80 billion. In an attempt to restrict the cost growth that has
plagued recent combat aircraft, USAF specified cost as a key performance parameter (KPP) in the competition: an average procurement
unit cost (APUC), or gross cost, of no more $550 million in FY10
dollars ($607 million in FY16) for the first 100 aircraft. However, the
governments ICE predicts the APUC will be lower $564 million
in FY16 dollars.
The $21.4 billion (in FY10 dollars) engineering and
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PROGRAM DOSSIER

B-21 (Continued)
manufacturing development (EMD) contract is cost-reimbursable
with incentive fees built in for reaching certain milestones. With a
cost-reimbursable contract, allowable cost overages will be paid for
by the government. These allowable overages would be spelled out
in the contract. The EMD phase will include construction of around
four developmental aircraft.
The Air Force plans to issue fixed-price-incentive-fee contracts
for the first five lots of low-rate, initial production (LRIP) aircraft,
between 19-21 bombers total. The first four lots will be fixed price.
Lot 5 will be a not-to-exceed price and the service will renegotiate
terms in Lot 6 and beyond, they said. The price for those aircraft has
not been disclosed, but will be higher than the APUC.
The LRS-B could fly as early as 2018. The first LRIP batch could
be completed in 2021. If IOC is declared in the year that the final
LRIP batch is delivered, that would lead to a 2025 IOC. Full-rate production will proceed after the five LRIP lots, at a rate of seven or eight
per year. That would see the 100th aircraft completed in the late 2030s.
Technical Details: Few details are known about the technical
requirements for the LRS-B. The program is needed, officials say, to
prosecute the most highly defended targets around the globe, particularly highly mobile systems, such as air defenses, and hard and deeply
buried targets, such as command and control and nuclear facilities.
These targets require tracking through the moment of strike or
precisely targeted penetrator weapons, thus making them unsuitable
for standoff weapons such as cruise missiles. Given the short development schedule, it is likely that LRS-B will use existing hardware and
technology, at least in its initial version, with multiple block increments in future plans.
One requirement considered obvious is broadband stealth to
enable the aircraft to evade detection even by search radars operating
in the VHF band. The concept image revealed on Feb. 26 showed
the bomber would have a flying wing planform, like its B-2 predecessor. The aircraft will likely incorporate a new generation of stealth
technology beyond the F-35 in terms of capability, survivability,
producability and maintainability.
Range will also be a key factor. The B-2 had a range of over
6,000 nm. It was designed to achieve a 10,000 nm round trip with
one outbound refueling from Whiteman AFB to Soviet missile
fields and back. Such range may not be required for the LRS-B. It
is thought the LRS-B will incorporate advances to propulsion and
aerodynamics that will make it a more efficient flyer than the B-2,
but it may turn out to be a smaller aircraft.
Think tank reports have assessed that a 2,500 nm combat radius
would be adequate for the system. That would allow the bomber to
strike targets 2,000 nm.inland while refueling over 500 nm away from
an adversarys coast, safe from increasingly potent anti-access/areadenial systems against which air-refueling tankers are very vulnerable.
However, the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty might

provide a reason for a slightly shorter radius. Bombers with a range

less than 8,000 km (4,319 nm) are not considered heavy bombers
by the Treaty, and thus are not subject to its limits on nuclear delivery
vehicles. So a modest reduction from the 2,500-nm number would
leave the U.S. free to build any number of LRS-Bs, and even to build
heavy bombers within New Start limits to carry cruise missiles or
future hypersonic weapons.
Maximum takeoff weight (MTOW) and payload are predicted to
be somewhere between the B-2 and half of it. The B-2s MTOW is
336,500 lb. and it can carry 60,000 of weapons in two bomb bays
either two 30,000-lb. GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrators
(MOP) or larger numbers of smaller weapons such as 16 B61-12
GPS-guided nuclear bombs on two rotary launchers. A capacity
based on one B-2 style bomb bay for one MOP or eight B61s is
considered the low end of payload possibilities. However, it is not
certain the LRS-B will be required to carry the MOP.
Some observers have hypothesized that the bomber will be
powered by two off-the-shelf Pratt & Whitney F135 engines, which
would be the right size for a half-scale B-2. However, the F135 is
heavy and expensive, and a higher-bypass-ratio engine would be
more efficient and have a cooler exhaust, which would be beneficial
because thermal, mechanical and acoustic stress on the aft deck
structure behind the exhausts has been a perennial B-2 problem.
Pratt & Whitney has discussed an engine named PW9000, with a
medium bypass ratio (about 4:1) and the core of the PW1000G commercial engine, and such a development would be low-risk. It is also
possible that the LRS-B will have four smaller engines, although the
Feb. 26 concept image appears to indicate two.
USAF spokespeople have stated the bomber will be optionally
manned. The relatively large size of a heavy bomber means the
size/weight/power penalty for a cockpit is relatively low. Unmanning the bomber with proper command and control and software
would be a relatively simple addition. In the near term, however, the
bomber will be manned.
Status: In October 2015, USAF disclosed it had spent $1.9 billion in
secret risk-reduction work for the two competing teams. In its FY17 budget
request, USAF projected it would spend $12.1 billion on development
of the LRS-B from FY17 to FY21, based on a new independent cost
estimate. IOC is projected for the mid-2020s. Nuclear certification will follow two years later. The aircraft is likely to be operational at least 30 years.

All Program data is excerpted from the Aviation

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