Marriage Full Kris

G.R. No. 83598. March 7, 1997.
LEONCIA BALOGBOG and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG,

petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
RAMONITO BALOGBOG and GENEROSO BALOGBOG,
respondents.
*
Marriages; Presumptions;Civil Code of 1889; Articles 42 to 107

of the Civil Code of 1889 of Spain did not take effect, having been
suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after
the extension of that code in this country.This Court noted long
ago, however, that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 1889 of
Spain did not take effect, having been suspended by the Governor
General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code
of this country. Consequently, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into
force. Since this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the
existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with
the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former
Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules on
evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man
and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are
legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent
proof to the contrary.
Same; Evidence; Although a marriage contract is considered
primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof
that no marriage took placeother evidence may be presented to
prove marriage.In this case, petitioners claim that the
certification presented by private respondents (to the effect that
the record of the marriage had been lost or destroyed during the
war) was belied by the production of the Book of Marriages by the
assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners argue that
this book does not contain any entry pertaining to the alleged
marriage of private respon-dents parents. This contention has no
merit. In Pugeda v. Trias, the defendants, who questioned the
marriage of the plaintiffs, produced a photostatic copy of the record
of marriages of the Municipality of Rosario, Cavite for the month
of January, 1916, to show that there was no record of the alleged
marriage. Nonetheless, evidence consisting of the testimonies of

witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage. Indeed,
although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of
marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage
took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage.
Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence,
that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that they had
three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their marriage
subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children,
private respondents herein, were recognized by Gavinos family
and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.
Same; Same; Presumptions;An exchange of vows can be
presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the witnesses
who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for
having a
261
VOL. 269, MARCH

2
7, 1997
61
Balogbog vs. Court of
Appeals
wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitmentit would
indeed be unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of vows
and quite unnatural for people not to notice its absence.Neither is
there merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage
cannot be presumed because there was no evidence showing in
particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the presence of two
witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as husband
and wife. An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made
from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding
took place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is to
exchange vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be unusual
to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite
unnatural for people not to notice its absence.
Same; Parent and Child;Filiation; In the absence of titles
indicated in Article 265 of the Civil Code, the filiation of children
1
may be proven by continuous possession of the status of a legitimate

child and by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court or
special laws.Petitioners contend that private respondents
reliance solely on testimonial evidence to support their claim that
private respondents had been in the continuous possession of the
status of legitimate children is contrary to Art. 265 of the Civil
Code which provides that such status shall be proven by the record
of birth in the Civil Register, by an authentic document or by final
judgment. But in accordance with Arts. 266 and 267, in the
absence of titles indicated in Art. 265, the filiation of children may
be proven by continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child and by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court or
special laws.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court

of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ramon B. Ceniza for petitioner.
Antonio T. Bacaltos andRaul D. Bacaltos for private
respondents.
262
262
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Balogbog vs. Court of Appeals
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu City (Branch IX), declaring private respondents heirs
of the deceased Basilio and Genoveva Balogbog entitled to
inherit from them.
1
The facts are as follows. Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso

Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva
Arnibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively.
They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935,
predeceasing their parents.
In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso
Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting
against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate
children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they
were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of
their grandparents.
In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private
respondents. They alleged that their brother Gavino died
single and without issue in their parents residence at Tagamakan, Asturias, Cebu. In the beginning they claimed that
the properties of the estate had been sold to them by their
mother when she was still alive, but they later withdrew this
allegation.
Private respondents presented Priscilo Y. Trazo, then 81
years old, mayor of the municipality of Asturias from 1928 to
1934, who testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be
husband and wife and Ramonito to be their first child. On
cross-examination, Trazo explained that he knew Gavino and
Catalina because they performed at his campaign rallies,
Catalina as balitaw dancer and Gavino Balogbog as her
guitarist. Trazo said he attended the wedding of Gavino and
Catalina sometime in 1929, in which Rev. Father Emiliano
2
_______________
1
Per Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo,J., concurred in by Justices Ricardo J.
Francisco and Jose C. Campos, Jr.

2
TSN, December 3, 1969, pp. 2-6.
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VOL. 269, MARCH 7,
263
2
1997
Jomao-as officiated and Egmidio Manuel, then a municipal
councilor, acted as one of the witnesses.
The second witness presented was Matias Pogoy, a family
friend of private respondents, who testified that private
respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina.
According to him, the wedding of Gavino and Catalina was
solemnized in the Catholic Church of Asturias, Cebu and
that he knew this because he attended their wedding and
was in fact asked by Gavino to accompany Catalina and carry
her wedding dress from her residence in Camanaol to the
poblacion of Asturias before the wedding day. He testified
that Gavino died in 1935 in his residence at Obogon,
Balamban, Cebu, in the presence of his wife. (This
contradicts petitioners claim made in their answer that
Gavino died in the ancestral house at Tagamakan, Asturias.)
Pogoy said he was a carpenter and he was the one who had
made the coffin of Gavino. He also made the coffin of the
couples son, Petronilo, who died when he was six.
Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to
Gavino. She testified that after the wedding, she was handed
a re-ceipt, presumably the marriage certificate, by Fr.
Jomao-as, but it was burned during the war. She said that
she and Gavino lived together in Obogon and begot three
children, namely, Ramonito, Petronilo, and Generoso.
Petronilo died after an illness at the age of six. On
crossexamination, she stated that after the death of Gavino,
she lived in common law relation with a man for a year and
then they separated.
Private respondents produced a certificate from the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar (Exh. P) that the Register of
Marriages did not have a record of the marriage of Gavino
and Catalina, another certificate from the Office of the
Treasurer (Exh. L) that there was no record of the birth of
Ramonito in that office and, for this reason, the record must
be presumed to have been lost or destroyed during the war,
and a certificate by the Parish Priest of Asturias that there
was likewise
_______________
3
TSN, July 9, 1970, pp. 3-28.
TSN, July 25, 1980, pp. 3-28.
264
264
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
no record of birth of Ramonito in the church, the records of

which were either lost or destroyed during the war. (Exh. M)
On the other hand, as defendant below, petitioner Leoncia
Balogbog testified that Gavino died single at the family
residence in Asturias. She denied that her brother had any
legitimate children and stated that she did not know private
respondents before this case was filed. She obtained a
certificate (Exh. 10) from the Local Civil Registrar of
Asturias to the effect that the office did not have a record of
the names of Gavino and Catalina. The certificate was
prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga,
who testified that there was no record of the marriage of
Gavino and Catalina in the Book of Marriages between 1925
to 1935.
Witness Jose Narvasa testified that Gavino died single in
1935 and that Catalina lived with a certain Eleuterio
Keriado after the war, although he did not know whether
they were legally married. He added, however, that Catalina
had children by a man she had married before the war,
although he did not know the names of the children. On
cross-examination, Narvasa stated that Leoncia Balogbog,
5
who requested him to testify, was also his bondsman in a

criminal case filed by a certain Mr. Cuyos.
Ramonito Balogbog was presented to rebut Leoncia Balogbogs testimony.
On June 15, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Cebu City
rendered judgment for private respondents (plaintiffs below),
ordering petitioners to render an accounting from 1960 until
the finality of its judgment, to partition the estate and
deliver to private respondents one-third of the estate of
Basilio and Genoveva, and to pay attorneys fees and costs.
Petitioners filed a motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration, contending that the trial court erred in not
giving weight to the certification of the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer of
8
_______________
5
TSN, Aug. 12, 1972, pp. 5-18.
TSN, Aug. 28, 1972, p 13.
TSN, Sept. 16, 1972, pp. 4-20.
TSN, July 7, 1983, pp. 3-5.
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VOL. 269, MARCH 7,

265
1997
Asturias (Exh. 10) to the effect that no marriage of Gavino
and Catalina was recorded in the Book of Marriages for the
years 1925-1935. Their motion was denied by the trial court,
as was their second motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration based on the church records of the parish of
Asturias which did not contain the record of the alleged
marriage in that church.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that
private respondents failed to overcome the legal presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife are in fact married, that a child is presumed to be

legitimate, and that things happen according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. Hence, this
petition.
We find no reversible error committed by the Court of
Appeals.
First. Petitioners contend that the marriage of Gavino and
Catalina should have been proven in accordance with Arts.
53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law
in force at the time the alleged marriage was celebrated. Art.
53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code
of 1889 should be proven only by a certified copy of the
memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof
have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they are
questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such
as that of the continuous possession by parents of the status
of husband and wife, may be considered, provided that the
registration of the birth of their children as their legitimate
children is also submitted in evidence.
This Court noted long ago, however, that Arts. 42 to 107 of
the Civil Code of 1889 of Spain did not take effect, having
been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines
shortly after the extension of that code of this
country. Consequently, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into
force. Since this case was brought in the lower court in 1968,
the existence of
9
10
_______________
9
10
1964 Rules of Court, Rule 131, 5 (z), (bb), and (cc).

Benedicto v. De la Rama, 3 Phil. 34 (1903).
266
266
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
4
13
the marriage must be determined in accordance with the

present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the
former Civil Code, except as they related to vested
rights, and the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of Court,
the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting
themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This
presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the
contrary. In this case, petitioners claim that the certification
presented by private respondents (to the effect that the
record of the marriage had been lost or destroyed during the
war) was belied by the production of the Book of Marriages
by the assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners
argue that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to
the alleged marriage of private respondents parents.
This contention has no merit. In Pugeda v. Trias, the
defendants, who questioned the marriage of the plaintiffs,
produced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages of the
Municipality of Rosario, Cavite for the month of January,
1916, to show that there was no record of the alleged
marriage. Nonetheless, evidence consisting of the testimonies
of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage.
Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary
evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof
that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be
presented to prove marriage. Here, private respondents
proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and
Catalina were married in 1929; that they had three children,
one of whom died in
11
12
13
14
15
16
Alavado v. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230, 235
(1985);Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97, 102-103 (1975).

14
4 SCRA 849 (1962). SeeMadridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1(1930); Jones v.
Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179 (1937); People v. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 (1984).
15
Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425 (1975).
16
Tolentino
v.
Paras, 122
SCRA
525 (1983); United
States
v.
Memoracion, 34 Phil. 633 (1916);People v. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106(1984).

267
VOL. 269, MARCH 7,

267
1997
infancy; that their marriage subsisted until 1935 when
Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents
herein, were recognized by Gavinos family and by the public
as the legitimate children of Gavino.
Neither is there merit in the argument that the existence
of the marriage cannot be presumed because there was no
evidence showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in
the presence of two witnesses, declared that they were taking
each other as husband and wife. An exchange of vows can be
presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the
witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the very
purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital
commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding
without an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people
not to notice its absence.
The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State
is interested in the preservation of the family and the
sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern.
As stated in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee:
17
18
_______________
11
Civil Code, Art. 2270.
12
1964 Rules of Court, Rule 131, 5(bb).
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that

of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil
contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance
of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every
intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons
5
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the

absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order
to society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our
Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonioAlways presume marriage. (U.S. vs. Villafuerte and
Rabano [1905], 4 Phil.
_______________
17
Civil Code, Art. 55.
18
43 Phil. 43, 56 (1922). Accord, Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).
268
268
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
476; Son Cui vs. Guepangco,supra; U.S. vs. Memorancion and

Uri [1916], 34 Phil. 633; Teter vs. Teter [1884], 101 Ind., 129.)
Second. Petitioners contend that private respondents

reliance solely on testimonial evidence to support their claim
that private respondents had been in the continuous
possession of the status of legitimate children is contrary to
Art. 265 of the Civil Code which provides that such status
shall be proven by the record of birth in the Civil Register, by
an authentic document or by final judgment. But in
accordance with Arts. 266 and 267, in the absence of titles
indicated in Art. 265, the filiation of children may be proven
by continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child
and by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court or
special laws. Thus the Civil Code provides:
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding

article, the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of
status of a legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic
document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate
filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.
Petitioners contend that there is no justification for

presenting testimonies as to the possession by private
respondents of the status of legitimate children because the
Book of Marriages for the years 1928-1929 is available.
What is in issue, however, is not the marriage of Gavino
and Catalina but the filiation of private respondents as their
children. The marriage of Gavino and Catalina has already
been shown in the preceding discussion. The treasurer of
Asturias, Cebu certified that the records of birth of that
municipality for the year 1930 could not be found,
presumably because they were lost or destroyed during the
war (Exh. L). But Matias Pogoy testified that Gavino and
Catalina begot three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at
the age of six. Catalina testified that private respondents
Ramonito and Generoso are her children by Gavino
Balogbog. That private
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VOL. 269, MARCH 7,

269
1997
respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina
Balogbog cannot therefore be doubted.
Moreover, the evidence in the record shows that petitioner
Gaudioso Balogbog admitted to the police of Balamban, Cebu
that Ramonito is his nephew. As the Court of Appeals found:
Ironically, it is appellant Gaudioso himself who supplies the
clincher that tips the balance in favor of the appellees. In an
investigation before the Police Investigating Committee of
6
Balamban, Cebu, held on March 8, 1968, conducted for the purpose

of inquiring into a complaint filed by Ramonito against a
patrolman of the Balamban police force, Gaudioso testified that
the complainant in that administrative case is his nephew.
Excerpts from the transcript of the proceedings conducted on that
date (Exhs. N, N-1, N-2, N-3 and N-4) read:
Atty.
May it please this
Kiamco investigative body.
Q.
Do you know the
complainant in this
Administrative
Case No. 1?
A.
Yes I know.
Q.
Why do you know
him?
A.
I know because he
is my nephew.
Q.
Are you in good
terms with you
nephew, the
complainant?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Do you mean to
say that you are
close to him?
A.
Yes. We are close.
Q.
Why do you say
you are close?
A.
We are close
because aside from
the fact that he is
my nephew we
were also leaving
(sic) in the same
house in Butuan
Q.
A.
City, and I even

borrow (sic) from
him money in the
amount of
P300.00, when I
return to
Balamban, Cebu.
xxx xxx
x
xx
Why is Ramonito
Balogbog your
nephew?
Because he is the
son of my elder
brother.
This admission of relationship is admissible against Gaudioso

although made in another case. It is considered as a reliable
declaration against interest (Rule 130, Section 22). Significantly,
Gaudioso did not try to offer any explanation to blunt the effects of
that declaration. He did not even testify during the trial. Such
silence can only
270
270
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
mean that Ramonito is indeed the nephew of Gaudioso, the former

being the son of Gavino.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman),Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes.The prohibition in Article 280 of the Civil Code
against the identification of the father or mother of a child
7
applies only in voluntary recognition and not in compulsory

recognition. (Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA
150[1995])
Children born prior to marriage cannot be legitimated nor
in any way considered legitimate if at the time they were
born there was an existing valid marriage between the father
and his first wife. (Abadilla vs. Tabiliran, Jr., 249 SCRA
447 [1995]).
The governments interest in molding the young into
patriotic and civic spirited citizens is not totally free from a
balancing process when it intrudes into other fundamental
rights such as those specifically protected by the Free
Exercise Clause, the constitutional right to education and the
unassailable interest of parents to guide the religious
upbringing of their children in accordance with the dictates
of their conscience and their sincere religious beliefs.
(Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of
Cebu, 251 SCRA 569 [1995])
o0o
G.R. No. 135216. August 19, 1999.

TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the
Intestate Estate of Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL,
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the Province of Camarines
Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of Balalong,
respondents.
*
Evidence; Best and Secondary Evidence;Authentication and

Proof of Evidence; Public and Private Documents; If the original
writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court,
upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or
unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by recollection of
witnesses.It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or
destroyed or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its
execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents
may be proved by a copy or a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by recollection of witnesses. Upon a
showing that the document was duly executed and subsequently
lost, without any bad faith on the part of the offeror, secondary
evidence may be adduced to prove its contents.
Same; Same; Same; Same;The execution of a document may be
proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by
witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or
even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the
execution thereof.Truly, the execution of a document may be
proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by
witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or
even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the
execution thereof. The Court
_______________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
773
VOL. 312, AUGUST

7
19, 1999
73
Vda. de Jacob vs. Court
of Appeals
has also held that [t]he loss may be shown by any person who
[knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the
judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or
places where the document or papers of similar character are
usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost
was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the
instrument [has] indeed [been] lost.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Since the due execution and the loss
of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence
presented, secondary evidencetestimonial and documentarymay
be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.In the present case, due
execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who
was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner
herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by
the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as well as by petitioners own declaration in court. These
are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due
execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown
by the evidence presented, secondary evidencetestimonial and
documentarymay be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Certificates; Failure to send a copy
of a marriage certificate for record purposes does not invalidate the
marriage.Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the
absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the Books of Marriage of
the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National Census and
Statistics Office (NCSO). He finds it quite bizarre for petitioner
to have waited three years before registering their marriage. On
both counts, he proceeds from the wrong premise. In the first
place, failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for record
purposes does not invalidate the marriage. In the second place, it
9
was not the petitioners duty to send a copy of the marriage

certificate to the civil registrar. Instead, this charge fell upon the
solemnizing officer.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Marriages; This
jurisprudential
attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.This
jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima
facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage. Given the undis774
7
74
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Vda. de Jacob vs. Court
of Appeals
puted, even accepted, fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived
together as husband and wife, we find that the presumption of
marriage was not rebutted in this case.
Trial Courts; Finality of Findings of Fact; As a rule, factual
findings of the trial court are accorded great weight and respect by
appellate courts except when it failed to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion.As
a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded great
weight and respect by appellate courts, because it had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and to note
telltale signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a testimony. The
rule, however, is not applicable to the present case, because it was
Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not the ponente, who heard the
testimonies of the two expert witnesses. Thus, the Court examined
the records and found that the Court of Appeals and the trial court
failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion. Hence, the present
case is an exception to the general rule that only questions of law

may be reviewed in petitions under Rule 45.
Same; Same; Adoption; The burden of proof in establishing
adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship.The
burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person
claiming such relationship. This Respondent Pilapil failed to do.
Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows that the
alleged adoption is a sham.

of Appeals.
Benito P. Fabie andNelson P. Paraiso for petitioner.
Coronado, Osorio & Associates for private respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The contents of a document may be proven by competent
evidence other than the document itself, provided that the
offeror establishes its due execution and its subsequent loss
or
775
VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 775

1999
Vda. de Jacob vs. Court of
Appeals
destruction. Accordingly, the fact of marriage may be shown
by extrinsic evidence other than the marriage contract.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated January 15, 1998, and its Resolution dated August 24,
1998, denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The
dispositive part of the CA Decision reads:
1
10
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision

appealed from it being more consistent with the facts and the
applicable law, the challenged Decision dated 05 April 1994 of the
RTC, Br. 30, Tigaon, Camarines Sur is AFFIRMED in toto.
2
The decretal portion of the trial court Decision is as follows:

3
WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered

in favor of [herein Respondent] Pedro Pilapil, and against [herein
Petitioner] Tomasa Guison as follows:
1. a)Declaring Exh. B, the so called reconstructed marriage
contract excluded under the best evidence rule, and
therefore declaring said Exh. B spurious and non-existent.
2. b)Declaring Exh. 3 Order dated July 18, 1961, and the
signature of the issuing Judge JOSE L. MOYA (Exh. 34) to
be genuine.
3. c)Permanently setting aside and lifting the provisional writ
of injunction earlier issued; and
________________
1
Sixth Division composed of J. Jesus M. Elbinias (chairman), J. Omar U.
Amin (ponente), and J. Hector L. Hofilea.

2
CA Decision, p. 10; rollo, p. 59.
Penned by Judge Angel S. Malaya. The case was heard by several judges;
namely, Judges Alfredo A. Cabral, Nilo A. Malanyaon, Ceferino P. Barcinas,

Bonifacio C. Initia, and Augusto O. Cledera.
776
776
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Appeals
d) To pay attorneys fees of P50,000.
And costs against [herein petitioner.]
The Facts
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:

Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the surviving
spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special
Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of
areconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the
deceased.
Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the
legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he
presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding
Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for
adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil.
During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Alfredo in Case No. T-46 (entitled Tomasa Vda. de Jacob
v. Jose Centenera, et al.) herein defendant-appellee Pedro sought
to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceaseds estate as
Alfredos adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro
questioned the validity of the marriage between appellant Tomasa
and his adoptive father Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and
filed a complaint for injunction with damages (Civil Case No. T-83)
questioning appellees claim as the legal heir of Alfredo.
The following issues were raised in the court a quo:
1. a)Whether the marriage between the plaintiff-appellant
and deceased Alfredo Jacob was valid;
2. b)Whether the defendant-appellee is the legally adopted son
of deceased Jacob.
On the first issue, appellant claims that the marriage between
her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana,
CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not
however present the original copy of the Marriage Contract stating
that the original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly
gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of the
11
original,
Tomasa
presented
as
secondary
areconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978.
evidence
reconstructed Marriage Contract, it was one Benjamin

Molina who signed on top of the typewritten name of Jose
Centenera. This belies the claim that Msgr. Yllana
allegedly gave the copies of the Marriage Contract to Mr.
Jose Centenera;
4. 4.Appellant admitted that there was no record of the
purported marriage entered in the book of records in San
Agustin Church where the marriage was allegedly
solemnized.
777
VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 777

1999
Appeals
During the trial, the court a quo observed the following
irregularities in the execution of the reconstructed Marriage
Contract, to wit:
1. 1.No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local
civil registrar by the solemnizing officer thus giving the
implication that there was no copy of the marriage
contract sent to, nor a record existing in the civil registry
of Manila;
2. 2.In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Jacob
merely placed his thumbmark on said contract
purportedly on 16 September 1975 (date of the marriage).
However, on a Sworn Affidavit executed between
appellant Tomasa and Alfredo a day before the alleged
date of marriage or on 15 September 1975 attesting that
both of them lived together as husband and wife for five
(5) years, Alfredo [af]fixed his customary signature. Thus
the trial court concluded that the thumbmark was
logically not genuine. In other words, not of Alfredo
Jacobs;
3. 3.Contrary to appellants claim, in his Affidavit stating the
circumstances of the loss of the Marriage Contract, the
affiant Msgr. Yllana never mentioned that he allegedly
gave the copies of the Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose
Centenera for registration. And as admitted by appellant
at the trial, Jose Centenera (who allegedly acted as
padrino) was not present at the date of the marriage since
he was then in Australia. In fact, on the face of the
Anent the second issue, appellee presented the Order dated 18

July 1961 in Special Proceedings No. 192 issued by then Presiding
Judge Moya granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased
Alfredo which declared therein Pedro Pilapil as the legally adopted
son of Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the
signature of Judge Moya.
778
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In an effort to disprove the genuineness and authenticity of

Judge Moyas signature in the Order granting the petition for
adoption, the deposition of Judge Moya was taken at his residence
on 01 October 1990.
In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer
remember the facts in judicial proceedings taken about twentynine (29) years ago when he was then presiding judge since he was
already 79 years old and was suffering from glaucoma.
The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to
test the authenticity and genuineness of Judge Moyas signature.
A handwriting examination was conducted by Binevenido C.
Albacea, NBI Document Examiner. Examiner Albacea used
12
thirteen (13) specimen signatures of Judge Moya and compared it

with the questioned signature. He pointed out irregularities and
significant
fundamental
differences
in
handwriting
characteristics/habits existing between the questioned and the
standard signature and concluded that the questioned and the
standard signatures JOSE L. MOYA were NOT written by one
and the same person.
On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moyas
signature, appellee presented the comparative findings of the
handwriting examination made by a former NBI Chief Document
Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui who examined thirty-two (32)
specimen signatures of Judge Moya inclusive of the thirteen (13)
signatures examined by Examiner Albacea. In his report, Atty.
Pagui noted the existence of significant similarities of unconscious
habitual pattern within allowable variation of writing
characteristics between the standard and the questioned
signatures and concluded that the signature of Judge Moya
appearing in the Order dated 18 July 1961 granting the petition
for adoption was indeed genuine.
Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court
sustained the findings of Atty. Pagui declaring the signature of
Judge Moya in the challenged Order as genuine and authentic.
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for
defendant-appellee sustaining his claim as the legally adopted
child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the
reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent.
(citations omitted, emphasis in the original)
4
_______________
4
CA Decision, pp. 3-7; rollo, pp. 52-56.
779
VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 779

1999
Appeals
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the Court of
Appeals ruled in this wise:
Dealing with the issue of validity of the reconstructedMarriage
Contract, Article 6, par. 1 of the Family Code provides that the
declaration of the contracting parties that they take each other as
husband and wife shall be set forth in an instrument signed by the
parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing
the marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage
must be anauthentic copy of the marriage contract.
And if the authentic copy could not be produced, Section 3 in
relation to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
xxx
xxx
xxx
Sec. 5. When the original document is unavailable. When the

original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of
its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by
a copy. Or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by
the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
As required by the Rules, before the terms of a transaction in

reality may be established by secondary evidence, it is necessary
that the due execution of the document and subsequent loss of the
original instrument evidencing the transaction be proved. For it is
the due execution of the document and subsequent loss that would
constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary
evidence to prove the contents of such document.
13
In the case at bench, proof of due execution besides the loss of

the three (3) copies of the marriage contract has not been shown
for the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents of
the recon780
780
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Appeals
structed contract. Also, appellant failed to sufficiently establish the

circumstances of the loss of the original document.
With regard to the trial courts finding that the signature of
then Judge Moya in the questioned Order granting the petition for
adoption in favor of Pedro Pilapil was genuine, suffice it to state
that, in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary,
the presumption applies that Judge Moya in issuing the order
acted in the performance of his regular duties.
Furthermore, since the signature appearing in the challenged
Order was subjected to a rigid examination of two (2) handwriting
experts, this negates the possibility of forgery of Judge Moyas
signature. The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert
depends not upon his mere statement of whether a writing is
genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing
out distinguishing marks, characteristics, and discrepancies in and
between genuine and false specimens of writing of which would
ordinarily escape notice or dete[c]tion from an unpracticed
observer. And in the final analysis, the assessment of the
credibility of such expert witnesses rests largely in the discretion
of the trial court, and the test of qualification is necessarily a
relative one, depending upon the subject under investigation and
the fitness of the particular witness. Except in extraordinary cases,
an appellate court will not reverse on account of a mistake of
judgment on the part of the trial court in determining
qualifications of this case.
Jurisprudence is settled that the trial courts findings of fact

when ably supported by substantial evidence on record are
accorded with great weight and respect by the Court. Thus, upon
review, We find that no material facts were overlooked or ignored
by the court below which if considered might vary the outcome of
this case nor there exist cogent reasons that would warrant
reversal of the findings below. Factual findings of the trial court
are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal especially when
established by unrebutted testimony and documentary evidence.
(citations omitted, emphasis in the original)
5
Disagreeing with the above, petitioner lodged her Petition for

Review before this Court.
6
______________
5
This case was deemed submitted for resolution on June 8, 1999, upon
receipt by the Court of respondents Memorandum.

781
VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 781

1999
Appeals
The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner presents the following issues
for the resolution of this Court:
1. a)Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff
Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was
valid; and
2. b)Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted
son of Alfredo E. Jacob.
7
The Courts Ruling

14
The Petition is meritorious. Petitioners marriage is valid,

but respondents adoption has not been sufficiently
established.
First
Issue:
Validity of Marriage
Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral
attack, while a voidable one may be assailed only in a direct
proceeding. Aware of this fundamental
distinction,
Respondent Pilapil contends that the marriage between Dr.
Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio, because there
was neither a marriage license nor a marriage ceremony. We
cannot sustain this contention.
To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the
marriage was void because the parties had no marriage
license. This argument is misplaced, because it has been
established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years. An affidavit to this
effect was
8
10
Code governs this case, because the questioned marriage and

the assailed adoption took place prior the effectivity of the
Family Code.
When Is Secondary Evidence Allowed?
It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or
destroyed or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its
execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its
contents may be proved by a copy or a recital of its contents
in some authentic document, or by recollection of witnesses.
Upon a showing that the document was duly executed and
subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the part of the
offeror, secondary evidence may be adduced to prove its
contents.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error when they (1) excluded the testimonies of
petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr. Florencio Yllana and (2)
disregarded the following: (a) photographs of the wedding
ceremony; (b) documentary evidence, such as the letter of
Monsi13
14
_______________
_______________
7
Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 11; rollo, p. 83.
Tolentino, Civil
Code
of
the
Philippines:
Commentaries
and
Jurisprudence, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 265.

9
10
11
See CA Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 54.
12
Art. 76 of the Civil Code provides:
Respondents Memorandum, p. 8; rollo, p. 120.
No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained
See note 34, infra.
the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and
782
wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall
782
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Appeals
state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oath. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall
also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. Clearly then, the

marriage was exceptional in character and did not require a
marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code. The Civil
11
12
13
De Guzman v. CA, 260 SCRA 389, 395, August 7, 1996, per Mendoza, J.
See Rule 130, 5, Rules of Court.

14
SeeDe Vera v. Aguilar, 218 SCRA 602, February 9, 1993.
15
783
VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 783

1999
Appeals
gnor Yllana stating that he had solemnized the marriage
between Dr. Jacob and petitioner, informed the Archbishop of
Manila that the wedding had not been recorded in the Book
of Marriages, and at the same time requested the list of
parties to the marriage; (c) the subsequent authorization
issued by the Archbishopthrough his vicar general and
chancellor, Msgr. Benjamin L. Marinoordaining that the
union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner be reflected through
a corresponding entry in the Book of Marriages; and (d) the
Affidavit of Monsignor Yllana stating the circumstances of
the loss of the marriage certificate.
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of
the marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua
non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,
were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded.
They have thus confused the evidence to show due execution
and loss as secondary evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez
v. Mcgrath, the Court clarified this misconception thus:
15
x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that

parol evidence of the execution of the instrument was barred. The
court confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It
is the contents, x x x which may not be prove[n] by secondary
evidence when the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the
execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of
the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs precede proofs
of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as
foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of the
contents.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis,

necessarily collateral or primary.It generally consists of parol
testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually
produced, its authenticity is not necessarily, if at all, determined
from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the
most, failure to produce the document, when available, to establish
its execution may affect the weight of the evidence presented but
not the admissibility of such evidence. (emphasis ours)
________________
15
91 Phil. 565, 573, July 9, 1952, per Tuason, J.
784
784
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Appeals
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to

justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v.
Ramolete. But even there, we said that marriage may be
prove[n] by other competent evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the
parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who
saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by
those to whom the parties have previously narrated the
execution thereof. The Court has also held that [t]he loss
may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss,
or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a
sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by
the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has
been unable to find it; or who has made any other
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the
instrument [has] indeed [been] lost.
16
17
18
19
16
In the present case, due execution was established by the

testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the
marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the
event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and
the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as
well as by petitioners own declaration in court. These are
relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due
execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence
testimonial and documentarymay be admitted to prove the
fact of marriage.
The trial court pointed out that on the face of the
reconstructed marriage contract were certain irregularities
sug_______________
Proof of Marriage
As early as Pugeda v. Trias we have held that marriage may
be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In that
case, we said:
21
Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the

witnesses to the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove
the fact of marriage.Theperson who officiated at the solemnization
is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage.
(emphasis supplied)
22
In Balogbog v. CA, we similarly held:

23
[A]lthough a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of

marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage
took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage.
(emphasis supplied, footnote omitted)
In both cases, we allowed testimonial evidence to prove the

fact of marriage. We reiterated this principle inTrinidad v.
CA, in which, because of the destruction of the marriage
contract, we accepted testimonial evidence in its
place. Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the
absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the Books of
Marriage
24
16
66 SCRA 425, August 29, 1975.
17
Ibid., p. 469, per Barredo, J.
18
De Vera v. Aguilar,supra, pp. 606-607, citing Michael & Co v.
25
Enriquez, 33 Phil. 87, 89-90, December 24, 1915. See also De Guzman v.
CA,supra.
19
Ibid., p. 607, citing Michael & Co v. Enriquez,supra. (emphasis ours)
_______________
785
VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 785

1999
Appeals
gesting that it had fraudulently been obtained. Even if we
were to agree with the trial court and to disregard the
reconstructed marriage contract, we must emphasize that
this certificate is not the onlyproof of the union between Dr.
Jacob and petitioner.
20
20
21
4 SCRA 849, 855, March 31, 1962, per Labrador, J.
22
Ibid., citing 55 CJS, p. 900.
23
269 SCRA 259, 266, March 7, 1997; per Mendoza, J.
24
289 SCRA 188, April 20, 1998.
25
Ibid., p. 204, per Panganiban, J.
786
786
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
17
Appeals
28
of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National

Census and Statistics Office (NCSO). He finds it quite
bizarre for petitioner to have waited three years before
registering their marriage. On both counts, he proceeds from
the wrong premise. In the first place, failure to send a copy of
a marriage certificate for record purposes does not invalidate
the marriage. In the second place, it was not the petitioners
duty to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the civil
registrar. Instead, this charge fell upon the solemnizing
officer.
Presumption in Favor of Marriage
Likewise, we have held:
26
27
28
29
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x

of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil
contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance
of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every
intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order
of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our
Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonioAlways
presume marriage. (emphasis supplied)
30
See Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1, 3, October 6, 1930; cited inJones v.
Hortigela, 64 Phil. 179, 184, March 6, 1937. Article 53 of the New Civil Code.
Cf. Petition, p. 22; rollo, p. 29.
29
Article 68, Civil Code.
30
Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97, 103, March 12, 1975, per Makalintal,C.J.,
citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56, March 3, 1922.
787
VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 787

1999
Appeals
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on
the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into
a lawful contract of marriage. Given the undisputed, even
accepted, fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as
husband and wife, we find that the presumption of marriage
was not rebutted in this case.
Second
Issue:
Validity of Adoption Order
In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr.
Jacob and that the signature of Judge Moya appearing on the
Adoption Order was valid, the Court of Appeals relied on the
presumption that the judge had acted in the regular
performance of his duties. The appellate court also gave
credence to the testimony of respondents handwriting
expert, for the assessment of the credibility of such expert
witness rests largely on the discretion of the trial court x x
x.
We disagree. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial
court are accorded great weight and respect by appellate
courts, because it had the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses and to note telltale signs indicating
the truth or the falsity of a testimony. The rule, however, is
not applicable to the present case, because it was Judge
31
32
33
34
35
______________
26
27
18
Augusto O. Cledera, not the ponente, who heard the

testimonies of the two expert witnesses. Thus, the Court
examined the records and found that the Court of Appeals
and the trial court failed
_______________
31
See Trinidad v. CA,supra;Balogbog v. CA,supra;People v. Borromeo, 133
SCRA 110, October 31, 1984; Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97, March 12, 1975.
32
Section 3 (aa), Rule 131, Rules of Court. Cf. Section 5 (bb), Rule 131,
1964 Rules of Court and Article 220 of the Civil Code.

33
34
This is evidenced by the Affidavit of Marriage Between a Man and
Woman Who Have Lived for at Least Five Years, the authenticity of which
was not questioned by respondent.
35
CA Decision, p. 9; rollo, p. 58.
788
788
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Appeals
39
Q. What was you[r]

response, sir?
A. I said I do not
remember.
Respondent Pilapils argument is misleading, because it took
the judges testimony out of its context. Considered with the
rest of the Deposition, Judge Moyas statements contained no
ambiguity. He was clear when he answered the queries in
the following manner:
Atty. Benito P. Fabie

Q. What else did she tell
you[?]
A. And she ask[ed] me if I
remembered having issued
the order.
Q. What was your response
sir[?]
A. I said I do not remember.
40
to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered,

will justify a different conclusion. Hence, the present case
is an exception to the general rule that only questions of law
may be reviewed in petitions under Rule 45.
Central to the present question is the authenticity of
Judge Moyas signature on the questioned Order of Adoption.
To enlighten the trial court on this matter, two expert
witnesses were presented, one for petitioner and one for
Respondent Pilapil. The trial court relied mainly on
respondents expert and brushed aside the Deposition of
Judge Moya himself. Respondent Pilapil justifies the trial
judges action by arguing that the Deposition was ambiguous.
He contends that Judge Moya could not remember whether
36
37
38
the signature on the Order was his and cites the following
portion as proof:
________________
36
Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 703, February 26, 1997, per
Panganiban, J.
37
Alcantara
v.
Court
of
Appeals,252
SCRA
353,
January
25,
1996;Cayabyab v. IAC, 232 SCRA 1, April 18, 1994.

38
See RTC Decision, p. 11; Records, Vol. III, p. 1,506.
39
Respondents Memorandum, pp. 13-14; rollo, pp. 125-126.
40
Deposition of Judge Jose L. Moya, p. 2, October 1, 1990; Records, Vol. 3,
p. 1,128.
789
VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 789

1999
19
Appeals
The answer I do not remember did not suggest that Judge
Moya was unsure of what he was declaring. In fact, he was
emphatic and categorical in the subsequent exchanges
during the Deposition:
Atty. Benito P. Fabie

Q. I am showing to you this
Order, Exh. A
deposition[;] will you
please recall whether you
issued this Order
andwhether the facsimile of
the signature appearing
thereon is your signature.
A. As I said, I do not
remember having issued
such an order and the
signature reading Jose[;] I
cant make out clearly
what comes after the
name[;] Jose Moya is not
my signature.
Atty. Paraiso
Q And were you able to
determine [w]hat purpose
you had in your
examination of this
document?
A Yes sir, [based on] my
conclusion, [I] stated that
the questioned and the
standard signature Jose L.
Moya were not written by
one and the same person.
On the basis of my findings
that I would point out in
detail, the difference in the
writing characteristics
[was] in the struc
_______________
Ibid. (Emphasis supplied).
41
42
41
Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the
Order of Adoption. More importantly, when shown the
signature over his name, he positively declared that it was
not his.
The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was
taken does not discredit his statements. At the time, he could
with medication still read the newspapers; upon the request
of the defense counsel, he even read a document shown to
him. Indeed, we find no reasonand the respondent has not
presented anyto disregard the Deposition of Judge Moya.
Judge Moyas declaration was supported by the expert
testimony of NBI Document Examiner Bienvenido Albacea,
who declared:
42
Ibid., p. 4; Records, Vol. 3, p. 1,130.
790
790
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Appeals
tural pattern of letters which is very apparent as shown in the

photograph as the capital letter J.
43
It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his

services having been sought without any compensation.
Moreover, his competence was recognized even by
Respondent Pilapils expert witness, Atty. Desiderio Pagui.
44
20
Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of

respondent. The alleged Order was purportedly made in open
court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that
he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only
decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in
which the accused pleaded guilty. Moreover, Judge Moya
insisted that the branch where he was assigned was always
indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned
Order did not contain this information. Furthermore,
Pilapils conduct gave no indication that he recognized his
own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he
signed and other acts that he performed thereafter. In the
same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated
him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of
Records Management in Manila and the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued
Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had
been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these
circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of
respondent.
45
46
47
48
49
The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the

person claiming such relationship. This Respondent Pilapil
failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner
shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.
Melo (Chairman),Vitug, Purisima andGonzaga-Reyes,

JJ.,concur.
Petition granted; Assailed decision reversed and set aside.
Notes.Although a marriage contract is considered
primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not
proof that no marriage took placeother evidence may be
presented to prove marriage. (Balogbog vs. Court of
Appeals, 269 SCRA 259 [1997])
An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made
from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a
wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a
wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitmentit
would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without an
exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice
its absence. (Ibid.)
To prove the fact of marriage, the following would
constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to
the matrimony, the couples public and open cohabitation as
husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the
baptismal certificates of children born during such union,
and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.
(Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 188 [1998])
50
o0o
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the

assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The marriage between Petitioner Tomasa Vda.
de Jacob and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby
recognized and declared VALID and the claimed adoption of
Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED NONEXISTENT.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
21
G.R. No. 103047. September 2, 1994.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.COURT
OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
*
Marriages; Absence of a marriage license renders the

marriage void ab initio.At the time the subject marriage was
solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations
was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage shall
be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local
civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid
marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab
initio.
Same; Evidence; Civil Registrars; The certification of due
search and inability to find issued by the civil registrar enjoys
probative value and sufficiently proves that his office did not issue
a particular marriage license.The above Rule authorized the
custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular
entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As
custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers
charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book
where they are required to enter all applications for marriage
licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the
marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. The
certification of due search and inability to find issued by the civil
registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any
circumstance of suspicion and
__________________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
258
2
58
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of
Appeals
pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a
certificate of due search and inability to find sufficiently proved
that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the
contracting parties.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Secret marriage is a
legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil
marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or
friends of either or both of the contracting parties.The fact that
private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of
her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The
failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is
mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be
remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony
performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of
those commonly known as a secret marriagea legally nonexistent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage
celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of
either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the
marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to
the parents of the former.

of Appeals.
Parungo, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Officesfor
private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private
respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional Trial Court of
22
Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her

marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas. As ground therefor, Castro
claims that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior
to the solemnization of their marriage. Despite notice,
defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer.
Consequently, he was declared in default. Trial proceeded
1
_______________
1
Filed on February 19, 1987 and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-50117.
259
VOL. 236, SEPTEMBER 259

2, 1994
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
in his absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F.
Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by
Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The
marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castros
parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the
processing of the documents required for the celebration of
the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage
license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that
marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the
contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband
and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castros
parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro
discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live
together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4)
months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19,
1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castros
brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow

her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital
status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a
lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible
annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyers efforts,
they discovered that there was no marriage license issued to
Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a
certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila.
It reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS
and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were allegedly married in
the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged
(s)upportive marriage license no. 3196182 allegedly issued in
the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as said
license no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.
260
260
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of
Appeals
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.

(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS
Senior Civil Registry Officer
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of
Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a
license. Neither did she sign any application therefor. She
affixed her signature only on the marriage contract on June
24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. It held that the above
certification was inadequate to establish the alleged nonissuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the
2
23
marriage between the parties. It ruled that the inability of

the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not
conclusive to show that there was no marriage license
issued.
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to
respondent appellate court. She insisted that the certification
from the local civil registrar sufficiently established the
absence of a marriage license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the
Decision of the trial court. It declared the marriage between
the contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil
Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that
respondent appellate court erred when it ruled that the
certification issued by the civil registrar that marriage
license no. 3196182 was not in their record adequately
proved that no such license was ever issued. Petitioner also
faults the respondent court for relying on the self-serving and
uncorroborated testimony of private respondent Castro that
she had no part in the procurement of the subject marriage
license. Petitioner thus insists that the certification and the
uncorroborated testimony of private respondent
3
are insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption regarding

the validity of a marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage
between the parties as null and void, respondent appellate
court disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing
officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar, regularly performed his
duties when he attested in the marriage contract that
marriage license no. 3196182 was duly presented to him
before the solemnization of the subject marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether
or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented
by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no
marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig
prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent
to Edwin F. Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June
24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New
Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local
civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid
marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage
void ab initio.
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil
registrar of due search and inability to find a record or entry
to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to
the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification
in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, viz:
4
_________________
2
Decision dated June 30, 1987, issued by Presiding Judge Antonio P.
Solano, Quezon City RTC, Branch LXXXVI; Rollo, pp. 46-48.

3
Sixteenth Division, penned by Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, with Mr.
Justices Ricardo J. Francisco and Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, concurring;

Decision dated November 27, 1991, Rollo, pp. 38-42.
261

2, 1994
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record.A written statement signed by an

officer having custody of an official record or by his deputy, that
after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
24
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the

records of his office contain no such record or entry.
_________________
4
Articles 53 (4) and 58, New Civil Code.
Article 80 (3), New Civil Code.
262
262
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to

certify that despite diligent search, a particular document
does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a
specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As
custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public
officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a
register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the
applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and
such other relevant data.
The certification of due search and inability to find
issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value,
he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of
all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and
pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a
certificate of due search and inability to find sufficiently
proved that his office did not issue marriage license no.
3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her
testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground
to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to
corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar
6
circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the

subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge
of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly
known as a secret marriagea legally non-existent phrase
but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated
without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of
either or both of the contracting parties. The records show
that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially
unknown to the parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro
testified during the trial cannot be held against her. Her
husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of
the proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt
thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer,
he was properly declared in default. Private respondent
cannot be faulted for her husbands lack of interest to
participate in the
__________________
6
Article 70, New Civil Code.
263

2, 1994
proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record to
show that there was collusion between private respondent
and her husband Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the
appellate court that the marriage between the contracting
parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not
discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license,
purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may
have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
25
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case,

the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
private respondent Castro sufficiently established the
absence of the subject marriage license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being
no showing of any reversible error committed by respondent
appellate court.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.,
Chairman), Padilla, Regaladoand Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Note.A marriage though void still needs a judicial
declaration of such fact under the Family Code even for
purposes other than remarriage. (Domingo vs. Court of
Appeals, 226 SCRA 572 [1993])
o0o
26
G.R. No. 174689. October 19, 2007.

ROMMEL
JACINTO
DANTES
SILVERIO,
petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
*
Change of Name; The State has an interest in the names borne

by individuals and entities for purposes of identification; A change
of name is a privilege, not a right.The State has an interest in
the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right.
Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 376. No
person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
Same; Clerical Error Law (RA 9048); Administrative
Law;Jurisdictions; RA 9048 now governs the change of first name,
and vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change
of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general concerned; The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the
change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of
Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied
in sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first
name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.RA
9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and
authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city
or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the
law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first
name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned
administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to
exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103
(Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding
venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily

administrative in nature, not judicial.
_______________
*
FIRST DIVISION.
374
3
74
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Silverio vs. Republic
Same; Same; Same; Same;Sex Change; A change of name does

not alter ones legal capacity or civil statusRA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his
first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first
name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself
into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter
ones legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a
change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather
than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his
declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil
registry and the public interest. Before a person can legally change
his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must
show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice
that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
Same; Same; A petition in the trial court in so far as it prays
for change of first name is not within that courts primary
jurisdiction as the petition should be filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, namely, where the birth certificate is kept.
The petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change
of petitioners first name was not within that courts primary
jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local
27
civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was

an improper remedy because the proper remedy was
administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also
filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept.
More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and
official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons,
the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition in so
far as the change of his first name was concerned.
Same; Same; Sex Change; No law allows the change of entry in
the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment;
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical errorit is a
substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a
clerical or typographical error is: SECTION 2. Definition of
Terms.As used in
375
VOL. 537,
3
OCTOBER 19, 2007
75
this Act, the following terms shall mean: x x x
xxx
xxx
(3) Clerical or typographical error refers to a mistake committed
in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying,
transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is
harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled
place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to
the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by
reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however,
That no correction must involve the change ofnationality, age,
status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied) Under RA
9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex
is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial
change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those

provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Words
and
Phrases; Statutory
Construction; No reasonable interpretation of Art. 407 of the Civil
Code can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the
ground of sex reassignment; To correct simply means to make or
set aright; to remove the faults or error from while to change
means to replace something with something else of the same kind
or with something that serves as a substitute.The acts, events or
factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
include even those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable
interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it
covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment. To correct
simply means to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error
from while to change means to replace something with something
else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute. The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error.
All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name
and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Status refers to the circumstances
affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his
family membership.Status refers to the circumstances affecting
the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his
family membership. The status of a person in law includes all his
personal qualities
376
3
76
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not

ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The
28
comprehensive term status include such matters as the

beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in
general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and
sometimes even succession. (emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; A persons sex is an essential factor
in marriage and family relationsit is a part of a persons legal
capacity and civil status; There is no such special law in the
Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.A persons
sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a
part of a persons legal capacity and civil status. In this connection,
Article 413 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 413. All other matters
pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws. But there is no such special law in the Philippines
governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to
petitioners cause.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Civil
Register
Law
(Act
3753);Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a
historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth
thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the
birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the
genitals of the infant; Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex
made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is
immutable.Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a
historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth.
Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by
the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the
genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex
made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is
immutable.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Same; Statutory Construction;When
words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common
and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative
intent; The words sex, male and female as used in the Civil
Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all
377
VOL. 537,
3
OCTOBER 19, 2007
77
other laws) should therefore be understood in their common
and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the
contrary; Sex is defined as the sum of peculiarities of structure and
function that distinguish a male from a female or the distinction
between male and female; The words male and female in
everyday understanding do not include persons who have
undergone sex reassignment; While a person may have succeeded in
altering his body and appearance through the intervention of
modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in
the civil registry for that reason. When words are not defined in a
statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning
in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words sex,
male and female as used in the Civil Register Law and laws
concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should
therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there
being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex
is defined as the sum of peculiarities of structure and function
that distinguish a male from a female or the distinction between
male and female. Female is the sex that produces ova or bears
young and male is the sex that has organs to produce
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova. Thus, the words male and
female in everyday understanding do not include persons who
have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, words that are
employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known
meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the
context compels to the contrary. Since the statutory language of
the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains
unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term sex as used then is
something alterable through surgery or something that allows a
29
post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the

category female. For these reasons, while petitioner may have
succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of
entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is
no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the
entries in his birth certificate.
Same; Same; Same;Marriage; To grant the changes in name
and sex sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and
greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relationsit will
allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).The
changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging
legal and
378
3
78
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself

found that the petition was but petitioners first step towards his
eventual marriage to his male fianc. However, marriage, one of
the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman. One of its essential
requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must
be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner
will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on
marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man
with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a maleto-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various
laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of
the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under
the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in
case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among
others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to
women which could be substantially affected if petitioners petition

were to be granted.
Same; Same; Same;Separation
of
Powers; Judicial
Legislation; Article 9 of the Civil Code which mandates that [n]o
judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the
silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law is not a license for
courts to engage in judicial legislation; In our system of
government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to
determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the
effects of sex reassignment.It is true that Article 9 of the Civil
Code mandates that [n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the
law. However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial
legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law,
not to make or amend it. In our system of government, it is for the
legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines
should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment.
The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important
in this case where the claims asserted are statutebased.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Same; If the legislature intends to
confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the
privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his
reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the
guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege; The
Supreme Court cannot enact a law
379
VOL. 537,
3
OCTOBER 19, 2007
79
where no law exists.To reiterate, the statutes define who
may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or
change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed,
what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and
what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to
30

guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege. It
might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on
when a person may be recognized as having successfully changed
his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on
that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law
where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written
word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Same; Same; Same; Same;The Court recognizes that there are
people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the
commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at
least for them, life is indeed an ordeal, but the remedies involve
questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature,
not by the courts.Petitioner pleads that [t]he unfortunates are
also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the]
realization of their dreams. No argument about that. The Court
recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation
do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social
convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal.
However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public
policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

of Appeals.
Benito R. Cuesta for petitioner.
The Solicitor Generalfor respondent.
380
380
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He

created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and
she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. Oh North Wind!
North Wind! Please let us out!, the voices said. She pecked the reed
once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open.
Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a
female. Amihan named the man Malakas (Strong) and the
woman Maganda (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and
Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In

particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a
physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to
a persons sex? May a person successfully petition for a
change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to
reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes
Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and
sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as
respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the
City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and
Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was
registered as Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio in his
certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was
registered as male.
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is,
anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female
and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood. Feeling trapped in a mans body, he consulted
several
1
_______________
31
Petitioner went for his elementary and high school, as well as his
Bachelor of Science in Statistics and Master of Arts, in the University of the

Philippines. He took up Population Studies Program,
381
Master of Arts in Sociology and Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology at the

University of Hawaii, in Manoa, Hawaii, U.S.A. Rollo, p. 48.
2
This consisted of penectomy [surgical removal of penis] bilateral
oschiectomy [or orchiectomy which is the surgical excision of the testes]
VOL. 537, OCTOBER

19, 2007
381
doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological

examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation.
His attempts to transform himself to a woman culminated
on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment
surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined
by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a
medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact
undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact
engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in
his birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to
Mely, and his sex from male to female.
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published
in the Peoples Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general
circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive
weeks. Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional
requirements were established. No opposition to the petition
was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also
presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fianc,
Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
2
_______________
penile skin inversion vaginoplasty [plastic surgery of the vagina] clitoral hood
reconstruction and augmentation mammoplasty [surgical enhancement of the
size and shape of the breasts]. Id.
3
On January 23, 2003, January 30, 2003 and February 6, 2003.
382
382
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor

of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
4
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or

judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but
solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with
his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the
relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition
would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and
equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has
always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the
physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a
mans body is not his own doing and should not be in any way
taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice
will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the
petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the
much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her
[fianc] and the realization of their dreams.
32
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground

to deny the present petition despite due notice and publication
thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to
interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the
petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the
entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner,
specifically for petitioners first name from Rommel Jacinto
to MELY and petitioners gender from Male to FEMALE.
to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court and RA 9048.
The petition lacks merit.
A
Persons
First
Name
Cannot
Be
Changed
On
the
Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his
petition for change of name and sex. As found by the trial
court:
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines

(Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or

judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but
10
_______________
_______________
7
Special Sixth Division.
Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok with Associate
Penned by Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr. Rollo, pp. 51-53.
Id., pp. 52-53 (citations omitted).
Justices Marina L. Buzon and Aurora Santiago-Lagman concurring.Rollo, pp. 25-
Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78824.
33.
383
VOL. 537, OCTOBER

19, 2007
383
10
of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need of a Judicial
An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul
General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change
change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex

alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial
courts decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing
the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on
the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the
Court of Appeals granted the Republics petition, set aside
the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP
Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but
it was denied. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name
and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407
8
Resolution dated September 14, 2006, id., pp. 45-46.
Order, Amending for the Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
384
384
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
solely for the purpose of making his birth records

compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical

features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry
changes sought. We disagree.
33
The State has an interest in the names borne by

individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A
change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for
change of name are controlled by statutes. In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
11
12
13
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without

judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical

Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error
and Change of First Name or Nickname.No entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name
or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned
city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance
with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations.
first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul

general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged
with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent
and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name
from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of
the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently
denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,
15
16
_______________
15
The last paragraph of Section 7 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 7. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar General.x x x
xxx
xxx
Where the petition is denied by the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul
general, the petitioner may either appealthe decision to the civil registrar general or
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the

power and authority to entertain petitions for change of
file the appropriate petition with the proper court.
_______________
error in an entry and/or change of first name or nickname in the civil register
14
16
SECTION 3. Who May File the Petition and Where.Any person having
direct and personal interest in the correction of a clerical or typographical

may file, in person, a verified petition with the local civil registry office of the
11
Wang v. Cebu City Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 159966, 30 March 2005, 454
SCRA 155.
city or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or changed

is kept.
12
Id.
In case the petitioner has already migrated to another place in the
13
K v. Health Division, Department of Human Resources, 277 Or. 371, 560
P.2d 1070 (1977).
country and it would not be practical for such party, in terms of

transportation expenses, time and effort to appear in person before the local
Under Section 2 (6) of RA 9048, first name refers to a name or
civil registrar keeping the documents to be corrected or changed, the petition
nickname given to a person which may consist of one or more names in
may be filed, in person, with the local civil registrar of the place where the
addition to the middle names and last names. Thus, the term first name
interested party is presently residing or domiciled. The two (2) local civil
will be used here to refer both to first name and nickname.
registrars concerned will then communicate to facilitate the processing of the
14
385
VOL. 537, OCTOBER

19, 2007
petition.
385
Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or domiciledin

foreign countries may file their petition, in person, with the nearest
Philippine Consulates.
34
The petitions filed with the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul
2. (2)At least two (2) public or private documents showing the correct
general shall be processed in accordance with this Act and its implementing
entry or entries upon which the correction or change shall be based;
rules and regulations.
and
386
386
3. (3)Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal civil
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the

proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change
of first name may be allowed:
17
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname.

The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed
in any of the following cases:
registrar or the consul general may consider relevant and necessary

for the approval of the petition.
In case of change of first name or nickname, the petition shall likewise be
supported with the documents mentioned in the immediately preceding
paragraph. In addition, the petition shall be published at least once a week
for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.
Furthermore, the petitioner shall submit a certification from the appropriate
law enforcement agencies that he has no pending case or no criminal record.
387
VOL. 537, OCTOBER

19, 2007
387
_______________
All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors and/or change of first
names or nicknames may be availed of only once.
17
SECTION 5. Form and Contents of the Petition.The petition shall be
in the form of an affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before any person

authorized by the law to administer oaths. The affidavit shall set forth facts
necessary to establish the merits of the petition and shall show affirmatively
that the petitioner is competent to testify to the matters stated. The
petitioner shall state the particular erroneous entry or entries, which are
sought to be corrected and/or the change sought to be made.
The petition shall be supported with the following documents:
1. (1)A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of the page of the
registry book containing the entry or entries sought to be corrected
or changed;
1. (1)The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be

ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce;
2. (2)The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been
publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or
3. (3)The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name

was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first
name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed
himself into through surgery. However, a change of name
does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048
does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing
petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only
18
35
create grave complications in the civil registry and the public

interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he
must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling
reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show
that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any
prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true
and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed
for the change of petitioners first name was not within that
courts primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been
filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it
could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided
under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the
19
20
_______________
18
Republic v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 97906, 21 May 1992, 209 SCRA
189.
19
Supra note 11.
20
Id.
388
388
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of

Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly,
it had no merit since the use of his true and official name doe
snot prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of
Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition in so far as
the change of his first name was concerned.
No
Law
Allows
The
Change
of
Entry
In
The
Birth
Certificate
As
To
Sex
On
the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth
certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the
statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code
provides:
21
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or

corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision

was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of
such matters can now be made through administrative
proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In
effect, RA 9048 removedfrom the ambit of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now
applies only to substantialchanges and corrections in entries
in the civil register.
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a clerical or
typographicalerror is:
22
23
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms.As used in this Act, the

following terms shall mean:
xxx
xxx
xxx
_______________
21
In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc.2d 6, 513 N.E.2d 828 (1987).
22
Lee v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 392; 367 SCRA 110 (2001).
23
Id.
389
VOL. 537, OCTOBER

19, 2007
389
(3) Clerical or typographical error refers to a mistake committed in the

performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing
36
an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as

misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible
to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or
changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided,
however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality,
age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving

the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical
error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11)
loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article

407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after
birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the
provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the
correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
25
_______________
24
Co v. Civil Register of Manila,G.R. No. 138496, 23 February 2004,423
SCRA 420.
25
Id.
390
390
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
To correct simply means to make or set aright; to remove

the faults or error from while to change means to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute. The birth certificate
of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including
those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all
correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the
civil registry of certainacts (such as legitimations,
acknowledgments
of
illegitimate
children
and
naturalization), events (such
as
births,
marriages,
naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal
separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity
of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of
filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and
judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon
the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their
effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in
Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by
any law, expressly or impliedly.
Status refers to the circumstances affecting the legal
situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and
his family membership.
26
27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities

and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not
ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The
comprehensive term status include such matters as the
37
beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in

general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipa_______________
26
Id.
27
Beduya v. Republic, 120 Phil. 114;11 SCRA 109 (1964).
391
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to

the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and
nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents
or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil
status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such
other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx
xxx
x x x (emphasis supplied)
_______________
VOL. 537, OCTOBER

19, 2007
391
tion,
marriage,
divorce,
succession. (emphasis supplied)
28
Salonga, Jovito, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1995 Edition,
Rex Bookstore, p. 238.
and
sometimes
even
28
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family

relations. It is a part of a persons legal capacity and civil
status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil
status shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines

governingsex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to
petitionerscause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law)
provides:
SEC.
5. Registration
and
certification
of
births.The
declarationof the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth
or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the
newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in
the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from
documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar
not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or
midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the
newborn child.
392
392
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a

historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of
birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at
birth,visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering
that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her
birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be
given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of
a contrary legislative intent. The words sex, male and
female as used in the Civil Register Law and laws
concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should
therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage,
there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this
connection, sex is defined as the sum of peculiarities of
structure and function that distinguish a male from a
29
30
31
38
female or
the
distinction
between
female. Female is the sex that produces
32
male
and
33
_______________
29
This, of course, should be taken in conjunction with Articles 407 and 412
of the Civil Code which authorizes the recording of acts, events and judicial
decrees or the correction or change of errors including those that occur after
birth. Nonetheless, in such cases, the entries in the certificates of birth are
not be corrected or changed. The decision of the court granting the petition
shall be annotated in the certificates of birth and shall form part of the civil
register in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar. (Co v. Civil Register of
Manila, supra note 24)
30
The error pertains to one where the birth attendant writes male or
female but the genitals of the child are that of the opposite sex.
31
Moreover, petitioners female anatomy is all man-made. The body that
he inhabits is a male body in all aspects other than what the physicians have
supplied.
32
Blacks Law Dictionary, 8th edition (2004), p. 1406.
33
Words and Phrases, volume 39, Permanent Edition, p. 106.
393
allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be

included in the category female.
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in
altering his body and appearance through the intervention of
modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to
sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no
legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the
entries in his birth certificate.
Neither
May
Entries
in
the
Birth
Certificate
As
to
First
Name
or
Sex
Be Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It
believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm,
injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and
wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences.First, even
_______________
34
VOL. 537, OCTOBER

19, 2007
2002-T-0149, slip op., Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio App.
393
11 Dist., December 31, 2003), citing Websters II New College Dictionary

(1999).
ova or bears young and male is the sex that has organs to
produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova. Thus, the words
male and female in everyday understanding do not
include persons who have undergone sex reassignment.
Furthermore, words that are employed in a statute which
had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have
been used in that sense unless the context compels to the
contrary. Since the statutory language of the Civil Register
Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged,
it cannot be argued that the term sex as used then is
something alterable through surgery or something that
34
35
36
In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, 2003-Ohio7221 (No.
35
Id.
36
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), 31 S.Ct. 502, 55
L.Ed. 619.
394
394
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
the trial court itself found that the petition was but
petitioners first step towards his eventual marriage to his
male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
39
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between

a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is
the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a
male and a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner
will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on
marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a
man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment
(a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there
are various laws which apply particularly to women such as
the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of
women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and
the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws
underscore the public policy in relation to women which
could be substantially affected if petitioners petition were to
be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that
[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law.
However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial
legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the
law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature,
should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines
should
37
38
39
40
41
_______________
37
Article 1, Family Code.
38
Article 2(1), Id.
39
These are Articles 130 to 138 of the Labor Code which include
nightwork prohibition, facilities for women, prohibition on discrimination and

stipulation against marriage, among others.
40
These include Article 333 on adultery, Articles 337 to 339 on qualified
seduction, simple seduction and acts of lasciviousness with the consent of the
offended party and Articles 342 and 343 on forcible and consented abduction,
among others.
41
Section 3(jj)(4).
395
VOL. 537, OCTOBER

19, 2007
395
govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The

need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly
important in this case where the claims asserted are statutebased.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for
change of first name and for correction or change of entries in
the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may
be invoked, what proof must be presented and what
procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to
guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a
protocol on when a person may be recognized as having
successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no
authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything
else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It
can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal
branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that [t]he unfortunates are also entitled
to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of
their dreams. No argument about that. The Court
recognizes that there are people whose preferences and
orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them,
life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner
40
seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely

by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J.,
Chairperson), SandovalGutierrez, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.
396
396
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Land Bank of the Philippines
vs. Ascot Holdings and
Equities, Inc.
Petition denied.
Notes.Petitions for adoption and change of name have
no relation to each other, nor are they of the same nature or
character, much less do they present any common question of
fact or lawin short, they do not rightly meet the underlying
test of conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder
under the Rules. (Republic vs. Hernandez, 253 SCRA
509 [1996])
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that
there be proper and reasonable cause for which the change is
sought. Legitimate children shall principally use the
surname of their father. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 300
SCRA 138 [1998])
The subject of rights must have a fixed symbol for
individualization which serves to distinguish him from all
othersthis symbol is his name. (Republic vs. Capote, 514
SCRA 76 [2007])
o0o
41
G.R. No. 166676. September 12, 2008.*

REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
petitioner, vs.JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, respondent.
Civil Registry; Correction of Entries in Birth Certificates;
Clerical Error Law (R.A. No. 9048); R.A. No. 9048 removed from
the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errorsRule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register.The determination of a
persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and
the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412
of the Civil Code provides: ART. 412. No entry in a civil register
shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. Together
with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by
Republic Act No. 9048 in so far as clerical or typographicalerrors
are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be
made through administrative proceedings and without the need for
a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register.
Same; Same; The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil
Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code; The acts, events
or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
include even those that occur after birth.Under Rep. Act No.
9048, a
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
73
VOL. 565,
7
SEPTEMBER 12, 2008
3
Republic vs. Cagandahan
correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is

not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial
change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: ART. 407. Acts,
events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons
shall be recorded in the civil register. ART. 408. The following
shall be entered in the civil register: (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3)
deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural
children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of
filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes
of name. The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under
Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after
birth.
Same; Same; Intersexuality; Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
(CAH); Words and Phrases; During the twentieth century, medicine
adopted the term intersexuality to apply to human beings who
cannot be classified as either male or femalean organism with
intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and
female sexes.Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition
causes the early or inappropriate appearance of male
characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition
produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has
XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen
clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous
genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal
internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the
ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some
features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial
hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to
18,000 children are born with CAH. CAH is one of many conditions
42
that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century,

medicine adopted the term intersexuality to apply to human
beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. The term
is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality
is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex
chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are
determined to be neither exclusively male nor74
7
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
female. An organism with intersex may have biological

characteristics of both male and female sexes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The current state of Philippine
statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a
male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere
appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid
classification.Intersex individuals are treated in different ways
by different cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals have
been expected to conform to either a male or female gender role.
Since the rise of modern medical science in Western societies, some
intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia have had their
genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female
genitals. More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as
suffering from a disorder which is almost always recommended
to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime
medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible
into the category of either male or female. In deciding this case, we
consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to
outright denial. It has been suggested that there is some middle
ground between the sexes, a no-mans land for those individuals
who are neither truly male nor truly female. The current state
of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be
classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not
controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally

negates such rigid classification.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, having reached the age
of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex; Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusiveit is at maturity that the
gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.Biologically,
nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and
categorically female nor consistently and categorically male)
composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However,
respondents body system naturally produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous
genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male. Ultimately, we are
of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally
intersex the determining factor in his gender classifica-75
VOL. 565,
7
SEPTEMBER 12, 2008
5
tion would be what the individual, like respondent, having
reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that
his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is
preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.
Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the
gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; To the person with Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) belongs the human right to the pursuit
of happiness and of health, and to him should belong the
primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of
his sexual development and maturation.In the absence of a law
on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning
a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle
43
preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical

treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court
will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to
undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female.
Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and
to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society
commonly currently knows this gender of the human species.
Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy.
To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of
health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what
courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development
and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
incompetent and in the absence of evidence to show that
classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of
society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the
Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents position and
his personal judgment of being a male.
Same; Same; Names; There is merit in the change of name of a
person with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) where the same
is the consequence of the recognition of his preferred gender.As
for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has
held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial
discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and
the consequences that will follow. The trial courts grant of
respondents change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a
change of a feminine76
7
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that

respondents change of name merely recognizes his preferred
gender, we find merit in respondents change of name. Such a
change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth
certificate from female to male.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Siniloan, Laguna, Br. 33.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Edgard N. Smith for respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court raising purely questions of law and seeking a reversal
of the Decision1dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted
the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed
by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following
changes of entries in Cagandahans birth certificate: (1) the
name Jennifer Cagandahan changed to Jeff Cagandahan
and (2) gender from female to male.
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan
filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate2 before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13,
1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live
Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male
characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where
persons thus afflicted possess both male and female
characteris_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 29-32. Penned by Judge Florenio P. Bueser.
2 Id., at pp. 33-37.
77

12, 2008
44
tics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have

clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six,
underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she
has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her
ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing
and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then
alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in
mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she
prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her
gender be changed from female to male and her first name be
changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general
circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in
conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor
General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the
testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of
Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General
Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating
that respondents condition is known as CAH. He explained
that genetically respondent is female but because her body
secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop
normally and she has two sex organsfemale and male. He
testified that this condition is very rare, that respondents
uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female
hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further
testified that respondents condition is permanent and
recommended the change of gender because respondent has
made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and
the gender change would be advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated
January 12, 2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown
that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has
adequately presented to the Court very clear and convincing

proofs78
78
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
for the granting of his petition. It was medically proven that

petitioners body produces male hormones, and first his body as
well as his action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to
be male. He is a normal person and wants to be acknowledged and
identified as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil,
Laguna is hereby ordered to make the following corrections in the
birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the
prescribed fees:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to
JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records, voters
registry, baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are
hereby amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.3
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE
RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT
ALLOW CHANGE OF SEX OR GENDER IN THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE,
WHILE
RESPONDENTS
MEDICAL
CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA
DOES NOT MAKE HER A MALE.4
45
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 31-32.
4 Id., at p. 97.
the course of the proceedings,8 respondent is actually a male

person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to
reflect his true sex/gender,9 change of sex or gender is
allowed under
79

12, 2008
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in
ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male,
on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and
her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally
defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an
indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or
correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court, respondents petition before the court a quodid not
implead the local civil registrar.5 The OSG further contends
respondents petition is fatally defective since it failed to
state that respondent is a bona fideresident of the province
where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior
to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b),
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.6 The OSG argues that Rule
108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth
certificate and respondents claimed medical condition known
as CAH does not make her a male.7
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the
Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally
named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth
Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was
furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on
December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in
_______________
5 Id., at p. 99.
6 Id., at p. 103.
7 Id., at p. 104.
8 Id., at p. 136.
9 Id., at p. 127.
80
80
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rule 108,10 and respondent substantially complied with the

requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.11
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
Section 1. Venue.A person desiring to change his name
shall present the petition to the Regional Trial Court of the
province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
Sec. 2. Contents of petition.A petition for change of name
shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name
changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fideresident of
the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3)
years prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioners
name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
46
Sec. 3. Order for hearing.If the petition filed is sufficient in

form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of
the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and
shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the
hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some
newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the
court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be
within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4)
months after the last publication of the notice.
Sec. 4. Hearing.Any interested person may appear at the
hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or the
proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the
Government of the Republic.
Sec. 5. Judgment.Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the
date fixed in the order that such order has been published as
_______________
10 Id., at p. 134.
11 Id., at p. 136.
81

12, 2008
directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court
shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the
name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in
accordance with the prayer of the petition.
Sec. 6. Service of judgment.Judgments or orders rendered
in connection with this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of
the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is
situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
Section 1. Who may file petition.Any person interested in

any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of
persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located.
Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.Upon
good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register
may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths;
(d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of
name.
Sec. 3. Parties.When cancellation or correction of an entry
in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
shall be made parties to the proceeding.
Sec. 4. Notice and publication.Upon the filing of the
petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the
hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be
given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.82
82
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sec. 5. Opposition.The civil registrar and any person

having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation
or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file
his opposition thereto.
47
Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings.The court in which the

proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the
proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
Sec. 7. Order.After hearing, the court may either dismiss
the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or
correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who
shall annotate the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective

for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court because respondents petition did not implead the local
civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to
be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in
the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom
no final determination of the case can be had.12Unless all
possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the
proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too
short of the requirements of the rules.13 The corresponding
petition should also implead as respondents the civil
registrar and all other persons who may have or may claim to
have
any
interest
that
would
be
affected
thereby.14Respondent, however,
83

12, 2008
invokes Section 6,15 Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states
that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their
objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it. We
agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108
when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local
civil registrar.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth
certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the
statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 37616of the Civil Code, this provision

was amended by Republic Act No. 904817 in so far as clerical
or typographical errors are involved. The correction or
change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a
judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors. Rule 108 now
_______________
_______________
15 SEC. 6.
12 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103695, March 15, 1996, 255
SCRA 99, 106.
13 Ceruila v. Delantar, G.R. No. 140305, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA
134, 147.
14 Republic v. Benemerito, G.R. No. 146963, March 15, 2004, 425 SCRA
488, 492.
Construction.These Rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive

disposition of every action and proceeding.
16 Art. 376.
No person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority.
17 An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul
General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or
48
Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Registrar Without Need of a

Judicial Order, Amending for this Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. Approved, March 22, 2001.
ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female;

(2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive
tract such as
84
84
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries

in the civil register.18
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry
involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.19
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the
civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11)
loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under

Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur
after birth.20
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes
the early or inappropriate appearance of male
characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition
produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn
who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a
(1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an
_______________
18 Silverio v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174689, October 19,
2007, 537 SCRA 373, 388.
19 Id., at p. 389.
20 Id., at p. 389.
85

12, 2008
the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows
older, some features start to appear male, such as deepening
of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty.
About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions21 that involve intersex
anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine adopted
the term intersexuality to apply to human beings who
cannot be classified as either male or female.22 The term is
now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia,
intersexuality is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic
species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary
sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively
male nor female. An organism with intersex may have
biological characteristics of both male and female sexes.
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different
cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals have been
expected to conform to either a male or female gender
role.23 Since the rise of modern medical science in Western
societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external
genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to
49
resemble either male or female genitals.24 More commonly, an

intersex indi_______________
21 (1) 5-alpha reductase deficiency; (2) androgen insensitivity syndrome;
(3) aphallia; (4) clitoromegaly; (5) congenital adrenal hyperplasia; (6) gonadal
dysgenesis (partial & complete); (7) hypospadias; (8) Kallmann syndrome; (9)
Klinefelter syndrome; (10) micropenis; (11) mosaicism involving sex
chromosomes; (12) MRKH (mullerian agenesis; vaginal agenesis; congenital
absence of vagina); (13) ovo-testes (formerly called true hermaphroditism);
(14) partial androgen insensitivity syndrome; (15) progestin induced
virilization; (16) Swyer syndrome; (17) Turner syndrome. [Intersexuality
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited August 15, 2008).]
22 Intersexuality
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual>
(visited
August 15, 2008).

23 Intersexuality<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual>
(visited
August 15, 2008), citing Gagnon and Simon 1973.

24 Intersexuality
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual>
(visited
August 15, 2008).

86
86
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
vidual is considered as suffering from a disorder which is

almost always recommended to be treated, whether by
surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold
the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either
male or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls
for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as
variations which should not be subject to outright denial. It
has been suggested that there is some middle ground
between the sexes, a no-mans land for those individuals
who are neither truly male nor truly female. 25 The current
state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person

be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is
not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself
fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a
female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth
certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on
medical testimony and scientific development showing the
respondent to be other than female, then a change in the
subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed
(neither consistently and categorically female nor
consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent
has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondents body
system naturally produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia
and the phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is
biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in
his gender classification would be what the individual, like
respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of
himself as a male and considering that his body produces
high levels
_______________
25 M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J. Super 77 355 A. 2d 204.
87

12, 2008
of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological
support for considering him as being male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
50
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the

gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and
has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with
what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already
ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have
undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong
medication,26 to force his body into the categorical mold of a
female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has
instead taken its due course in respondents development to
reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not
dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately
private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less
on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse
the
_______________
26 The goal of treatment is to return hormone levels to normal. This is
done by taking a form of cortisol (dexamethasone), fludrocortisone, or
hydrocortisone) every day. Additional doses of medicine are needed during
times of stress, such as severe illness or surgery.
xxxx
Parents of children with congenital adrenal hyperplasia should be aware
of the side effects of steroid therapy. They should report signs of infection and
stress to their health care provider because increases in medication may be
required. In additional, steroid medications cannot be stopped suddenly,
or adrenal insufficiencywill result.
xxxx
The outcome is usually associated with good health, but short stature
may result even with treatment. Males have normal fertility. Females may
have a smaller opening of the vagina and lower fertility. Medication to treat
this disorder must be continued for life. (Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
<http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medline
plus/encyclopedia.html>.)
88
88
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider

respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo
treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither
will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to
take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society
commonly currently knows this gender of the human species.
Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex
anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of
happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the
primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the
path of his sexual development and maturation. In the
absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent27 and
in the absence of evidence to show that classifying
respondent as a male will harm other members of society
who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the
Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents position
and his personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the
diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with
what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect
respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to
be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person.
We cannot but respect how respondent deals with
his unordinarystate and thus help make his life easier,
considering the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this
Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right
_______________
51
27 The word incompetent includes persons suffering the penalty of civil

interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are
unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they
have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of
age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside
aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an
correction of entries in the civil registry. (Republic vs. Capote,

514 SCRA 76 [2007])
No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate
as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. (Silverio vs.
Republic, 537 SCRA 373 [2007])
o0o
easy prey for deceit and exploitation. (See Sec. 2 of Rule 92 of the Rules of
Court)
89

12, 2008
_______________
28 Yu v. Republic of the Philippines, 123 Phil. 1106, 1110; 17 SCRA 253,
256 (1966).
but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the

reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.28 The
trial courts grant of respondents change of name from
Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a
masculine name. Considering the consequence that
respondents change of name merely recognizes his preferred
gender, we find merit in respondents change of name. Such a
change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth
certificate from female to male.
WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales,
Tinga,
Velasco,
Jr. and Brion,
JJ.,concur.
Petition denied, judgment of RTC of Siniloan, Laguna, Br.
33 affirmed.
Notes.The subject of rights must have a fixed symbol
for individualization which serves to distinguish him from all
othersthis symbol is his name. The appropriate remedy for
change of name is covered by Rule 103, a separate and
distinct proceeding from Rule 108 on mere cancellation and
52
G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000.

FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner,vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI,
and FERNANDO SY, respondents.
*
Actions; Appeals; Pleadings and Practice; Although the

Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an
issue for the first time on appeal, as this would contravene the basic
rules of fair play and justice, the observance of procedural rules
may be relaxed, noting that technicalities are not ends in
themselves but exist to protect and promote the substantive rights of
litigants.Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants
cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this would
contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice, in a number of
instances, we have relaxed observance of procedural rules, noting
that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect
and promote substantive rights of litigants. We said that certain
rules ought not to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so
doing, the very reason for their existence would be defeated.
Hence, when substantial justice plainly requires, exempting a
particular case from the operation of technicalities should not be
subject to cavil. In our view, the case at bar requires that we
address the issue of the validity of the marriage between Filipina
and Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the beginning
for lack of a marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution
of a deeply seated and violent conflict between the parties. Note,
however, that here the pertinent facts are not disputed; and what
is required now is a declaration of their effects according to
existing law.
Husband and Wife;Marriage; Marriage License; A marriage
license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage
void ab initio.November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of
marriage of the parents in both their sons and daughters birth
certificates, which are also attached as Annexes B and C in the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the
trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibits B and C in the

course of the trial. These pieces of evidence on record plainly and
indubitably show that
_______________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
551
VOL. 330, APRIL

5
12, 2000
51
Sy vs. Court of Appeals
on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage
license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence
renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage
contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was
issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private
respondent ever resided in Carmona.
Evidence; Pleadings and Practice; Although the marriage
certificate, the marriage license and other pieces of documentary
evidence were only photocopies, the fact that these have been
examined and admitted by the trial court, with no objections
having been made as to their authenticity and due execution,
means that these documents are deemed sufficient proof of the
facts contained therein.We note that their marriage certificate
and marriage license are only photocopies. So are the birth
certificates of their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll.
Nevertheless, these documents were marked as Exhibits during
the course of the trial below, which shows that these have been
examined and admitted by the trial court, with no objections
having been made as to their authenticity and due execution.
Likewise, no objection was interposed to petitioners testimony in
open court when she affirmed that the date of the actual
celebration of their marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of
the view, therefore, that having been admitted in evidence, with
53
the adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these documents

are deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein.

of Appeals.
Benjamin H. Razon for petitioner.
Cario & Gargantos Law Office for private respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44144, which affirmedthe deci1
_____________
1
CA Records, at 51-59.
552
552
Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber and

hardware business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal
dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately, and their
two children were in the custody of their mother. However,
their son Frederick transferred to his fathers residence at
Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15, 1988, and from then
on, lived with his father.
On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal
separation, docketed asCivil Case No. 7900 before the
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later,
upon motion of petitioner, the action was later amended to a
petition for separation of property on the grounds that her
husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have
been living separately for more than one year; and that they
voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated
September 29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern
the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. Judgment was
rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and
6
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
_________________
sion of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,

Pampanga, denying the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando
Sy.
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando
Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church
of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22
years old. Their union was blessed with two children,
Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975
and February 14, 1978, respectively.
The spouses first established their residence in Singalong,
Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga, and later at San Matias,
2
Records, at 136-143.
Id. at 1-5.
Exh. A; Id. at 6.
Exhs. B & C; Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 136.
Ibid.
Id. at 10-11.
553
VOL. 330, APRIL 12,

553
2000
54
approving a regime of separation of properties based on the

Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. The
trial court also granted custody of the children to Filipina.
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted
parricide against her husband, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 88-68006, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Filipina testified that in the afternoon of May 15, 1988, she
went to the dental clinic at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila,
owned by her husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch
her son and bring him to San Fernando, Pampanga. While
she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her and continued
playing with the family computer. Filipina got mad, took the
computer away from her son, and started spanking him. At
that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son,
and punched her in the different parts of her body. Filipina
also claimed that her husband started choking her when she
fell on the floor, and released her only when he thought she
was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions
on different parts of her body as a result of the blows inflicted
by her husband, evidenced by a Medical Certificate issued by
a certain Dr. James Ferraren. She said it was not the first
time Fernando maltreated her.
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its
decision dated April 26, 1990, convicted Fernando only of
the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and sentenced
him to 20 days imprisonment.
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation
against private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 8273,
on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2)
sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent against her life;
and (4) abandonment of her by her husband without
justifiable cause for more than one year. The Regional Trial
Court
9
10
11
12
Exh. E, Id. at 10-18.
10
Id. at 18.
11
Id. at 23-24.
12
Exh. G; Id. at 23-26.
554
554
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision dated December

4, 1991, granted the petition on the grounds of repeated
physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of
legal separation. It awarded custody of their daughter
Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son Frederick to
respondent.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition for the
declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando
on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that
the final judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in
her favor, in her petitions for separation of property and legal
separation, and Fernandos infliction of physical violence on
her which led to the conviction of her husband for slight
physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity.
She also cites as manifestations of her husbands
psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual
alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on her
part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3)
refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only
to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such
psychological incapacity of her husband existed from the time
of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest
thereafter.
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in
its decision dated December 9, 1993, denied the petition of
Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her
13
14
15
16
_______________
55
marriage to Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of the

respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not constitute
psychological incapacity which may warrant the declaration
of absolute nullity of their marriage.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the decision of the trial court. In the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the
testimony of petitioner concerning respondents purported
psychological
filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of

Appeals denied in its resolution dated November 21, 1996.
Hence, this appeal by certiorari wherein petitioner now
raises the following issues:
19
20
21
1. 1)WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE FACT
THAT ON THE DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE
PARTIES MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT
DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO, THERE
WAS NO MARRIAGE LICENSE THERETO;
APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF
FACTS BY STATING THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED
UPON BY APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT
CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS
WOULD
JUSTIFY
NULLIFICATION
OF
HER
MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein respondent];
APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF
FACTS BY STATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO
SHOW
THAT
THE
ALLEGED
UNDESIRABLE
ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD EX-
17
______________
13
Exh. H; Id. at 27-46.
14
Id. at 1-5.
15
Id. at 3.
16
Id. at 136-143.
17
Supra, note 1.
555
VOL. 330, APRIL 12,

555
2000
incapacity falls short of the quantum of evidence required to
nullify a marriage celebrated with all the formal and
essential requisites of law. Moreover, the Court of Appeals
held that petitioner failed to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at the
time of the celebration of their marriage in 1973. It
reiterated the finding of the trial court that the couples
marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years
from the date of the celebration of their marriage. And prior
to their separation in 1983, they were living together
harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the lower court which it found to be in
accordance with law and the evidence on record. Petitioner
18
_______________
18
Id. at 59.
19
Id. at 60-64.
20
Id. at 76.
21
Rollo, pp. 10-55.
556
556
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
56
1. ISTED OR WERE PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR

MARRIAGE WAS CELEBRATED IN 1973;
APPEALS
COMMITTED
GRAVE
ABUSE
OF
DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS
RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THERE IS A
REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN TO THE COURT BY
RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH RESPECT TO HIS
CHILDREN
AND
ALSO
BELIEVES
THAT
RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT A
REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND
3. 5)WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V. COURT
OF APPEALS (240 SCRA 20) IS APPLICABLE
HERETO.
22
In sum, two issues are to be resolved:

1. 1)Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and
private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a
marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2. 2)Whether or not private respondent is psychologically
incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to
warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage
being void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of
its celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of
the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of
issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license
are different and incongruous.
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot
raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this would
contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice, in a
number of instances, we have relaxed observance of
23
procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not ends in

themselves but exist
_______________
22
Id. at 31
23
Sumbad. v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 106060, June 21, 1999, p. 23, 308
SQRA 575; Modina vs. CA,G.R. No. 109355, October 29, 1999, p. 13, 317
SCRA 696; citing Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of
Appeals, 269 SCRA 145(1997).
557
VOL. 330, APRIL 12,

557
2000
to protect and promote substantive rights of litigants. We
said that certain rules ought not to be applied with severity
and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their existence
would be defeated. Hence, when substantial justice plainly
requires, exempting a particular case from the operation of
technicalities should not be subject to cavil. In our view, the
case at bar requires that we address the issue of the validity
of the marriage between Filipina and Fernando which
petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of a
marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a
deeply seated and violent conflict between the parties. Note,
however, that here the pertinent facts are not disputed; and
what is required now is a declaration of their effects
according to existing law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically
state in her petition for annulment of marriage before the
trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the marriage
license and the celebration of the marriage itself would lead
to the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void
from the beginning, she points out that these critical dates
were contained in the documents she submitted before the
24
25
57
court. The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage

certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their
marriage contract which was attached as Annex A in her
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before
the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibit A in the
course of the trial. The date of celebration of their marriage
at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November
15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private
respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioners
petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
before the trial court, and private
26
_______________
24
Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA
187, 198 (1997); Mauna vs. Civil Service Commission, 232 SCRA 388, 398
(1994).
25
GSIS vs. CA, at 198, citingAguilar vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA
371 (1995).
26
Exhibit A, Records, p. 6; Rollo, p. 72.
558
558
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
certificates which are also attached as Annexes B and C in

the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibits B
and C in the course of the trial. These pieces of evidence on
record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the
marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A
marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders
the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage
contract shows that the marriage license, numbered
6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither
petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona.
Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on
record, we find that indeed petitioner did not expressly state
in her petition before the trial court that there was
incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of
their marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage
license. From the documents she presented, the marriage
license was issued on September 17, 1974, almost one year
after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The
ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed
contracted without a marriage license. Nowhere do we find
private respondent denying these dates on record. Article 80
of the Civil Code is
29
30
31
respondents answer admitting it. This fact was also

affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993,
during her direct examination, as follows:
_______________
27
28
ATTY. RAZON:
In the last
hearing, you said that you
were married on
November 15, 1973?
FILIPINA SY:
Yes, Sir.
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of
the parents in both their sons and daughters birth
27
Records, at 1 and 53.
28
TSN, 22 January 1993, p. 4.
29
Records, pp. 7 & 8; Exh. A, Rollo, p. 72.
30
Rollo, at 20.
31
Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
559
VOL. 330, APRIL 12,

559
2000
58
clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of an

exceptional character, the purported marriage between
petitioner and private respondent could not be classified
among those enumerated in Articles 72-79 of the Civil Code.
We
32
ART. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree
upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains,
complete separation of property, or any other regime. In the absence of
marriage settlements, or when the regime agreed upon is void, the system of
absolute community of property as established in this Code shall govern.
ART. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may
_________________
560
xxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character;
xxx
32
be valid, it must be made before the celebration of the
ART. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the
conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury
to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for
relief.
ART. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other. The latter
may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:
1. (1)The objection is proper, and
2. (2)Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or
thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting
obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the
spouse who has not obtained consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who
acted in good faith.
ART. 74. The property relations between husband and wife shall be
governed in the following order:
1. (1)By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;
2. (2)By the provisions of this Code; and
3. (3)By the local customs.
560
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
thus conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the

marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void
from the beginning.
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage
license are only photocopies. So are the birth certificates of
their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll.
Nevertheless, these documents were marked as Exhibits
during the course of the trial below, which shows that these
have been examined and admitted by the trial court, with no
objections having been made as to their authenticity and due
execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to
petitioners testimony in open court when she affirmed that
the date of the actual celebration of their marriage was on
November 15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore, that
having been admitted in evidence, with the adverse party
failing to timely object thereto, these documents are deemed
sufficient proof of the facts contained therein.
33
_________________
marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136.
ART. 77. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall be
in writing, signed by the parties and executed before the celebration of the
59
marriage. They shall not prejudice third persons unless they are registered in
the local civil registry where the marriage contract is recorded as well as in
the proper registries of property.
ART. 78. A minor who according to law may contract marriage may also
enter into marriage settlements, but they shall be valid only if the persons
designated in Article 14 to give consent to the marriage are made parties to
the agreement, subject to the provisions of Title DC of this Code.
ART. 79. For the validity of any marriage settlements executed by a
person upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been pronounced or
who is subject to any other disability, it shall be indispensable for the
guardian appointed by a competent court to be made a party thereto.
33
Notes.Secret marriage is a legally non-existent phrase

but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated
without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of
either or both of the contracting parties. (Republic vs. Court
of Appeals, 236 SCRA 257[1994])
A judge who solemnizes a marriage without the required
marriage license dismally fails to live up to his commitment
to be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence. (Moreno vs. Bernabe, 246 SCRA 120 [1995])
o0o
See also Son vs. Son, 251 SCRA 556 (1995); Tison vs. CA, 276 SCRA
582 (1997); Quebral vs. CA, 252 SCRA 353 (1996).

561
VOL. 330, APRIL 12,

561
2000
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of
private respondent need no longer detain us. It is mooted by
our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent
is void ab initiofor lack of a marriage license at the time their
marriage was solemnized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, dated
December 9, 1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on
May 21, 1996 by the Court of Appeals and its Resolution
dated November 21, 1996 in CA-G.R. No. 44144 are set aside.
The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between
petitioner Filipina Yap and private respondent Fernando Sy
is hereby declared void ab initiofor lack of a marriage license
at the time of celebration. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman),Mendoza, Buena and De Leon,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment set aside.
60
G.R. No. 167684. July 31, 2006.*

JAIME O. SEVILLA, petitioner, vs. CARMELITA
CARDENAS, respondent.
N.
Civil Law; Marriages; Marriage License; The certification to be

issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the
document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could
not be found in the register despite diligent search.The
certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must
categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or
the particular entry could not be found in the register despite
diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack
or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court.
Presumption of Regularity of Performance of Official Duty;
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that
utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where
Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the
presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the
Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively
rebutted. According to Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court, the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed is among the disputable presumptions. The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is
disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as in the case at
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
429
VOL. 497, JULY 31,

4
2006
29
Savilla vs. Cardenas
bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by
the tenor of the first and second certifications.
Marriages; The rule is settled that every intendment of the law
or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility
of the marriage bonds; Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage.The rule is settled that every
intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts
look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. The
Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect
and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Same; Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is
not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is
vitally interested.Our Constitution is committed to the policy of
strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family
law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but
a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The
State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy
families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral
fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family
members alone.
Same; Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract,
but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which
the public is deeply interested; Every intendment of the law leans
toward legalizing matrimony.The basis of human society
throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans
61
toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in

apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Ceferino Padua Law Office for petitioner.430
430
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Cervantes, Blanco, Jurisprudencia, Neri, Sta. Romana

and Partners for respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review onCertiorari seeks the reversal of
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in
Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O.
Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969,
through machinations, duress and intimidation employed
upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latters father,
retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of
Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo
D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said
date, the father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to
sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the
Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage
license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did
they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry,
consequently, no marriage license was presented to the
solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime,

and claims that she and Jaime were married civilly on 19
May 1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May
19695 at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City.
Both
_______________
1 Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74416, penned by Associate Justice

Vicente S.E. Veloso with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Amelita
G. Tolentino, concurring;Rollo, pp. 20-31.
2 Rollo, p. 46. Penned by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar.
3 Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-4.
4 Id., at p. 5.
5 Id., at p. 232.
431
VOL. 497, JULY 31,

2006
431
marriages were registered with the local civil registry of

Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped
from invoking the lack of marriage license after having been
married to her for 25 years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on
May 19, 1969, he and defendant [Carmelita] appeared before a
certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the
city hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh.
A) in civil rites. A certain Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff
alleged, was an aide of defendants father accompanied them, and
who, together with another person, stood as witness to the civil
wedding. That although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly
issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the
62
marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he never applied for
any marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made by
him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil
Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh.
E) was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, that no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued
by said office. On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again
wed, this time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at
the Most Holy Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon
City, where they executed another marriage contract (Exh. F)
with the same marriage license no. 2770792 used and indicated.
Preparations and expenses for the church wedding and reception
were jointly shared by his and defendants parents. After the
church wedding, he and defendant resided in his house at Brixton
Hills until their first son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970.
As his parents continued to support him financially, he and
defendant lived in Spain for some time, for his medical studies.
Eventually, their marital relationship turned bad because it
became difficult for him to be married he being a medical student
at that time. They started living apart in 1976, but they
underwent family counseling before they eventually separated in
1978. It was during this time when defendants second son was
born whose paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff obtained a
divorce decree against defendant in the United States in 1981 and
later secured a judicial separation of their conjugal partnership in
1983.432
432
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself

manifested that when his service was engaged by plaintiff, and
after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of his marriage,
he made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan
where the supposed marriage license was obtained and with the
Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the religious

wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request letters dated March
3, 1994 (Exh. J), March 7, 1994 (Exh. L), March 9, 1994 (Exh.
M) and March 11, 1994 (Exh. K) were all sent to and received
by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued
Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. I), and March 11, 1994
(Exh. E) and September 20, 1994 (Exh. C), that no marriage
license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office. Upon his
inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued him a certified
copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant (Exh. F)
and a Certificate of Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. G),
wherein it noted that it was a purely religious ceremony, having
been civilly married on May 19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila,
under Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal on
May 19, 1969.
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry
of San Juan, identified the Certificates dated March 4, 1994,
March 11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael Aliscad,
Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to
locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have
been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff
had a steady romantic relationship after they met and were
introduced to each other in October 1968. A model, she was
compelled by her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty
pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to lose her, asked her to run
away with him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she turned
back on her family and decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio. When
they came back to Manila, she and plaintiff proceeded to the
latters home in Brixton Hills where plaintiffs mother, Mrs.
Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her parents were hostile when they
learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla convinced them that she
will take care of everything, and promised to support plaintiff and
defendant. As plaintiff was still fearful he may lose her, he asked
her to marry him in civil rites, without the knowledge of her
63
family, more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969,

before a minister and where she was made to sign documents.
After the civil wedding, they had lunch and later
433
VOL. 497, JULY 31,

2006
433
each went home separately. On May 31, 1969, they had the church
wedding, which the Sevilla family alone prepared and arranged,
since defendants mother just came from hospital. Her family did
not participate in the wedding preparations. Defendant further
stated that there was no sexual consummation during their
honeymoon and that it was after two months when they finally
had sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiffs physician and
one of their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing
psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some
traumatic problem compounded by his drug habit. She found out
plaintiff has unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over her
knees of which he would take endless pictures of. Moreover,
plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in between the knees which
she called intrafemural sex, while real sex between them was far
and between like 8 months, hence, abnormal. During their
marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior which
defendant attributed to plaintiffs drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98,
pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who breaks
things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like
amphetamines, benzedrine and the like, speed drugs that kept
him from sleep and then would take barbiturates or downers, like
mogadon. Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff away from
drugs but failed as it has become a habit to him. They had no fixed
home since they often moved and partly lived in Spain for about
four and a half years, and during all those times, her mother-inlaw would send some financial support on and off, while defendant
worked as an English teacher. Plaintiff, who was supposed to be
studying, did nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as
plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a break
up in their marriage. Later, she learned that plaintiff married one
Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not
aware of the civil wedding of his daughter with the plaintiff; that
his daughter and grandson came to stay with him after they
returned home from Spain and have lived with him and his wife
ever since. His grandsons practically grew up under his care and
guidance, and he has supported his daughters expenses for
medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs. 9 and 10).
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendants sister, testified and
corroborated that it was plaintiffs family that attended to all the
preparations and arrangements for the church wedding of her
sister with plaintiff, and that she didnt know that the couple wed
in civil
434
434
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
rites some time prior to the church wedding. She also stated that
she and her parents were still civil with the plaintiff in spite of the
marital differences between plaintiff and defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that
because of irreconcilable differences with defendant and in order
for them to live their own lives, they agreed to divorce each other;
that when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the
United States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. 13), it was with the
knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact authorized a
certain Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21).
During his adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent
certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. EE) issued by the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the marriage license no. 2770792,
the same marriage license appearing in the marriage contract
(Exh. A), is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious.6
64
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the

nullity of the marriage of the parties, the trial court made
the following justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the
marriage, the lack or absence of a license renders the marriage
voidab initio. It was shown under the various certifications (Exhs.
I, E, and C) earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil
Registrar of the Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent one
issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. EE) that no marriage license no.
2770792 was ever issued by that office, hence, the marriage license
no. 2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts executed on May
19, 1969 (Exh. A) and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. F) was fictitious.
Such a certification enjoys probative value under the rules on
evidence, particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, x
x x.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage
between Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized
by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19,
1969 as well as their contract of marriage solemnized under
religious rites by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the Holy Redeemer
Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite
marriage license. Let the
_______________
6 Rollo, pp. 47-50.

435
VOL. 497, JULY 31,

2006
435
marriage contract of the parties under Registry No. 601 (e-69) of

the registry book of the Local Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil

and property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family
Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the Office of the
Solicitor General for its record and information.7
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a

Decision dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals
disagreed with the trial court and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994),
the Supreme Court explained that: The presumption of regularity
of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption,
however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption
is rebutted, it becomes conclusive.
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the
local civil registry of San Juan testified that they failed to locate
the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is
registered, for the reason that the employee handling is
already retired. With said testimony We cannot therefore just
presume that the marriage license specified in the parties
marriage contract was not issued for in the end the failure of the
office of the local civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of
the marriage license was attributable not to the fact that no such
marriage license was issued but rather, because it failed to locate
the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered.
Simply put, if the pertinent book were available for scrutiny, there
is a strong possibility that it would have contained an entry on
marriage license no. 2720792.
xxxx
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties
marriage on the basis of a mere perception of plaintiff that his
union with defendant is defective with respect to an essential
requisite of a
_______________
65
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the

negative.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law
in force at the time of the marriage of the parties are Articles
53,10
7 Id., at pp. 50-52.

436
436
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
marriage contract, a perception

substantiated with facts on record.8
_______________
that
ultimately
was
not
8 Id., at pp. 29-31.
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January

2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution
dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by
Jaime.
He raises the following issues for Resolution.
are complied with:
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in

accordance with law to the parties herein prior to the celebration
of the marriages in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and
relied on the presumption of regularity of officials acts,
particularly the issuance of a marriage license, arising solely from
the contents of the marriage contracts in question which show on
their face that a marriage license was purportedly issued by the
Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon
the presumption of validity of a marriage arising from the
admitted fact of marriage.9
5811 and 80.12

Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an
essential requisite for the validity of marriage. The marriage
between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.
At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed
as one involving a marriage that is null and void on the
ground of absence of a marriage license based on the
certifications issued by the Local Civil Registar of San Juan.
As ruled by this Court in the case of Cario v. Cario:13
At the core of this controversy is the determination of

whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License No.
2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties
was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null
and void ab initio.
9 Id., at pp. 80-81.

10 ART. 53.
No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites
437
VOL. 497, JULY 31,

2006
437
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro

Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license.
InRepublic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a
certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present
case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep
a record of all date relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
66
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of

petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then
became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is
valid
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between

petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized
without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the
marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is
undoubtedly voidab initio.
_______________
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the

certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar should be
read in line with the decision in the earlier case ofRepublic v.
Court of Appeals,14 where it was held that:
(1)
Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2)
Their consent, freely given;
(3)
Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4)
A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
11 ART. 58.
Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in
Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be
solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.
12 ART. 80.
The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3)
Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character.
13 G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA 127, 133-134.
438
438
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she
was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have
squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage
license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this
Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to
refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in
jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot
stand.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to

certify that despite diligent search, a particular document
does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a
specified tenor was not to be found in a register.As
custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers
charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book
where they are required to enter all applications for marriage
licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the
marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil

Registrar must categorically state that the document does
not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be
found in the register despite diligent search. Such
certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of
record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record.A written statement signed
by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his
deputy
_______________
14 G.R. No. 103047, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 257, 262.

439
67
VOL. 497, JULY 31,

2006
439
16 Atty. Josa Ma. Abola, counsel for Jaime Sevilla testified before the
trial court that in his letter requesting for the issuance of a certification,
addressed to the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, he mistakenly read the
that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is

found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or entry.
Marriage License No. as 2880792 instead of 2770792. (Records, Vol. II, pp.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the

certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan in
connection with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied with
the foregoing requirements and deserved to be accorded
probative value.
The first Certification15issued by the Local Civil Registrar
of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated 11 March 1994. It
reads:
440

No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by
this Office. With regards (sic) to Marriage License Number
2880792,16 we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full
force locating the above problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
March 11, 1994
(SGD) RAFAEL D. ALISCAD,
JR.
Local Civil Registrar
The second certification17was dated 20 September 1994

and provides:
_______________
15 Records, Vol. I, p. 103.
725-726).
17 Id., at p. 228.
440
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED

This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792
were ever issued by this Office with regards to Marriage License
Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said
number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full
force locating the above problem.
September 20, 1994
(SGD.) RAFAEL D. ALISCAD,
JR.
The third Certification,18issued on 25 July 2000, states:

This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no
Marriage License Application was filed and no Marriage License
No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this
Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA
CARDENAS-SEVILLA.
This is to further certify that the said application and license do
not exist in our Local Civil Registry Index and, therefore, appear to
be fictitious.
This certification is being issued upon the request of the
interested party for whatever legal intent it may serve.
68

July 25, 2000
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court
among other things the register of application of/or (sic) for marriage
(SGD.) RAFAEL D. ALISCAD,
licenses received by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
JR.
Province of Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did you bring with
Note that the first two certifications bear the statement

that hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you
our full force locating the above problem. It could be easily
you those records?

A
I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena?
A
Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Q Did you bring that with you?
_______________
18 Records, Vol. II, p. 888.
441
VOL. 497, JULY 31,

2006
No, sir.
Q Why not?
441
implied from the said statement that the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and
determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792
due to its loaded work. Likewise, both certifications failed
to state with absolute certainty whether or not such license
was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the
representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot
locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of
the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony
of the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not
appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook
was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be
secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the
logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been
exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage

applications that your office maintains as required by the manual of the
office of the Local Civil Registrar?442
442
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
COURT
May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.
xxxx
COURT
Why dont you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is
the number issued by their office while with respect to license no. 2770792
the office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan is very definite about it it
was never issued. Then ask him how about no. 2880792 if the same was
ever issued by their office. Did you ask this 2887092, but you could not find
the record? But for the moment you cannot locate the books? Which is which
now, was this issued or not?
A
The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the

effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the
logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been
entered, the presumption of regularity of performance of
69
official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the

certifications, is effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed is among the disputable presumptions.
In one case, it was held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of
evidence that may be accepted and acted on where there is no
other
_______________
19 Id., at pp. 735-737.
20 Rule 131.
BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
xxxx
SEC. 3.
Disputable presumptions.The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by

other evidence;
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive

proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It
can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that
the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing
of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot
easily accept that absence of the same also means nonexistence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the
law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon
this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great
weight.24
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution
to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the fam_______________
xxxx
(m)
That official duty has been regularly performed;
VOL. 497, JULY 31,

2006
21 People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 106025, 9 February 1994, 229 SCRA

795, 798-799.
443
443
evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one which

may
be
overcome
by
other
evidence.
One
such
disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official act or duty
has been regularly performed. x x x.21
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be

rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty.22
The presumption of regularity of performance of official
duty is disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as
in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively
defeated by the tenor of the first and second certifications.
22 Mabsucang v. Judge Balgos, 446 Phil. 217, 224; 398 SCRA 158, 163
(2003).
23 Article 220 Civil Code, Bobis v. Bobis, 391 Phil. 648, 655; 336 SCRA
747 (2000).
24 Ricardo J. Francisco, BASIC EVIDENCE (2nd ed., 1999), p. 77.
444
444
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
ily. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the

validity of the marriage.25
The parties have comported themselves as husband and
wife and lived together for several years producing two
70
offsprings,26now adults themselves. It took Jaime several

years before he filed the petition for declaration of nullity.
Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in
1991.27 We are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the
nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the
process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.28
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of
strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our
family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere
contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally
interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on
good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families
weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their
preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.29
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world
is x x x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a
civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony.Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties
VOL. 497, JULY 31,

2006
445
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based

on the prima faciepresumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into
a lawful contract of marriage.31
By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not
trifling with his emotion or deepest sentiments. As we have
said in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,32regrettably, there are
situations like this one, where neither law nor society can
provide the specific answers to every individual problem.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is
DEnied. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20
December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinezand Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Note.Our Constitution is committed to the policy of
strengthening the family as a basic social institution.
(Ancheta vs. Ancheta, 424 SCRA 725 [2004])
o0o
_______________
30 Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 709; 312 SCRA 772,
786 (1999).
31 Id.
32 G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA 422, 439.
were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they
would be living in the constant violation of decency and of
law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil
Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always
presume marriage.30
71

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G.R. No. 83598. March 7, 1997.

LEONCIA BALOGBOG and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG,

Marriages; Presumptions;Civil Code of 1889; Articles 42 to 107

marriage. Nonetheless, evidence consisting of the testimonies of

VOL. 269, MARCH

may be proven by continuous possession of the status of a legitimate

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court

The facts are as follows. Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso

Per Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo,J., concurred in by Justices Ricardo J.

Francisco and Jose C. Campos, Jr.

TSN, December 3, 1969, pp. 2-6.

VOL. 269, MARCH 7,

TSN, July 9, 1970, pp. 3-28.

TSN, July 25, 1980, pp. 3-28.

no record of birth of Ramonito in the church, the records of

who requested him to testify, was also his bondsman in a

TSN, Aug. 12, 1972, pp. 5-18.

TSN, Aug. 28, 1972, p 13.

TSN, Sept. 16, 1972, pp. 4-20.

TSN, July 7, 1983, pp. 3-5.

VOL. 269, MARCH 7,

and wife are in fact married, that a child is presumed to be

1964 Rules of Court, Rule 131, 5 (z), (bb), and (cc).

Balogbog vs. Court of Appeals

the marriage must be determined in accordance with the

Alavado v. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230, 235

(1985);Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97, 102-103 (1975).

4 SCRA 849 (1962). SeeMadridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1(1930); Jones v.

Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425 (1975).

525 (1983); United

Memoracion, 34 Phil. 633 (1916);People v. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106(1984).

VOL. 269, MARCH 7,

Civil Code, Art. 2270.

1964 Rules of Court, Rule 131, 5(bb).

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that

dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the

Civil Code, Art. 55.

43 Phil. 43, 56 (1922). Accord, Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).

476; Son Cui vs. Guepangco,supra; U.S. vs. Memorancion and

Second. Petitioners contend that private respondents

ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding

Petitioners contend that there is no justification for

VOL. 269, MARCH 7,

Balamban, Cebu, held on March 8, 1968, conducted for the purpose

City, and I even

This admission of relationship is admissible against Gaudioso

mean that Ramonito is indeed the nephew of Gaudioso, the former

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

applies only in voluntary recognition and not in compulsory

G.R. No. 135216. August 19, 1999.

Evidence; Best and Secondary Evidence;Authentication and

VOL. 312, AUGUST

was not the petitioners duty to send a copy of the marriage

case is an exception to the general rule that only questions of law

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court

VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 775

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision

The decretal portion of the trial court Decision is as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered

Sixth Division composed of J. Jesus M. Elbinias (chairman), J. Omar U.

Amin (ponente), and J. Hector L. Hofilea.

CA Decision, p. 10; rollo, p. 59.

namely, Judges Alfredo A. Cabral, Nilo A. Malanyaon, Ceferino P. Barcinas,

The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus: