Bangayan v.

Bangayan
Facts: On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan filed a petition for declaration of a
non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC.
Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena (Azucena) in
Caloocan City. In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally who
was a customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamins family.
In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In February 1982,
Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sallys father was against
the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought
Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported
marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamins marital status, assured him that the
marriage contract would not be registered. Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation
produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of their cohabitation,
they acquired real properties. The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994
when Sally left for Canada. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and
falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage
contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a nonexistent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on
the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal
requisites to a valid marriage. The trial court ruled in favor of Benjamin. The trial
court gave weight to the certification from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, that only
Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of
February 1982 and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to
Benjamin and Sally. The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with
the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be
registered due to Benjamins subsisting marriage with Azucena. The trial court ruled
that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court
ruled that the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first
marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license.
Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case.
CA affirmed.
Issues: Whether the marriage is null and void ab initio and non-existent?
Ruling: Yes. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally is null and void ab initio and,
at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage
solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is
necessary, shall be void from the beginning. In this case, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that
no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did
not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig
City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article
35 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent
contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely
simulated or fictitious are inexistent and void from the beginning.

For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential
requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. In this case, there
was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported
marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and
represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Carino v. Carino
Facts: The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two
marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death
benefits is now the subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he
married. During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two
marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario
(Susan Bicdao), and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan
Yee Cario (Susan Yee). In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden
due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis and died. Both petitioner
and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance
pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan
Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
NAPOLCOM, Pag-ibig, while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00
from GSIS and SSS. On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the
instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying,
inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one
hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as death
benefits which she (petitioner) received from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to
the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a
judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased.
She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and
that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met
petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action
for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized
without the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1)
the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage
license number;5 and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses
SANTIAGO CARIO (Sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on
June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription of
Marriage License number from the records of this archives.
RTC ruled in favor of Susan Yee, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff P73,000, half
of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the
death of SPO4 Carino.CA affirmed in toto.

Issue: Whether the two marriages are valid?

Ruling: Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be
free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto,
and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon
the validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the
determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject death benefits of the
deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is
a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions,
renders the marriage void ab initio.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of
the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of
the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was
solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent
Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. One of the effects of the
declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses
according to the applicable property regime. Considering that the two marriages are
void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or
conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without
Marriage.
Morigo v. People
Lucio and Lucia got married. Then, Lucia went to Canada for work leaving Lucio
behind. Later on, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against
appellant which was granted by the court. On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio
Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago. On September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a
complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage with Lucia on the ground that

no marriage ceremony took place. On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with
Bigamy in an Information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran. The RTC found
Lucio guilty of Bigamy. Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the CA. While an
appeal was pending before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in
Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio
since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this
decision, which then became final and executory. CA affirmed in toto the decision of
RTC that Lucio was guilty of Bigamy.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon
the divorce decree of the Ontario court. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies
punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and
lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. For the respondent, the
OSG submits that good faith in the instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse.
The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which held
that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur,
stressing that under Article 4019 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity
is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of
said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG
counters that petitioners contention that he was in good faith because he relied on
the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No.
6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Issue: Whether petitioner committed Bigamy?
Held:
No. The elements of bigamy: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the first
marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) he contracts
a subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid
had it not been for the existence of the first.
There was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts
to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes,
reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to
the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of
the law, never married.
In the instant case, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a
marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract
bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of
nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly
valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first
secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
Accused acquitted.