Jarco Marketing Co. v.

CA
Facts:
Petitioner is the owner of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City. Petitioners
Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store's branch manager,
operations manager, and supervisor, respectively. Private respondents
Conrado and Criselda Aguilar are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar.
On May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the department store. Criselda
was signing her credit card slip when she heard a loud thud. She looked
behind her and beheld her daughter pinned beneath the gift-wrapping counter
structure. She was crying and shouting for help. He was brought to Makati
Medical Center, where she died after 14 days. She was 6 years old.
Private respondents demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of the
hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses which they had
incurred. Petitioners refused to pay. Consequently, private respondents filed a
complaint for damages wherein they sought the payment of P157,522.86 for
actual damages, P300,000 for moral damages, P20,000 for attorney's fees
and an unspecified amount for loss of income and exemplary damages. The
trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the proximate cause of the fall
of the counter was Zhieneths act of clinging to it. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court. It found that petitioners were negligent
in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter. The counter was defective,
unstable and dangerous. It also ruled that the child was absolutely incapable
of negligence or tort. Petitioners now seek for the reversal of this decision.
Issues:
(1) Whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to
negligence
(2) In case of a finding of negligence, whether the same was attributable to
private respondents for maintaining a defective counter or to CRISELDA and
ZHIENETH for failing to exercise due and reasonable care while inside the
store premises
Held:
(1) An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence
attaches to the defendant. It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening;

an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or

partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is
unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens." On the other hand,
negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do. Negligence is "the failure to observe, for the protection of the
interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury."
The test in determining the existence of negligence is: Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then
he is guilty of negligence. We rule that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH
was no accident and that ZHIENETH's death could only be attributed to
negligence.
(2) It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and
statements made to a physician are generally considered declarations and
admissions. All that is required for their admissibility as part of the res
gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence of a startling event
before the declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as
witnessed by the person who testified in court. Under the circumstances thus
described, it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in
extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. We
therefore accord credence to Gonzales' testimony on the matter, i.e.,
ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. Sadly,
petitioners did, through their negligence or omission to secure or make stable
the counter's base.
Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were
personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet, neither
initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of
the store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man
would have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably
failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family.
Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive
presumption that favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are
incapable of contributory negligence. Even if we attribute contributory
negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter, no
injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter
was stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not
have caused the counter to collapse. The physical analysis of the counter by

both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on
record reveal otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all. Shaped like an
inverted "L," the counter was heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica. It
protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base was not secured.
CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence.
Initially, ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand.
CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when she
signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable and
usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at the time ZHIENETH
was pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away from her mother;
and the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from CRISELDA.
The time and distance were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her mother
and did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon us. She even
admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did not do
anything; the counter just fell on her.

Barredo vs Garcia and

Almario
July 17, 2011
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ADVERTISEMENTS

73 Phil 607
Torts and Damages Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes

At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanillas taxi collided with a kalesa thereby killing the
16 year old Faustino Garcia. Faustinos parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and
reserved their right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the
criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo the owner of the taxi (employer of
Fontanilla). The suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of employers in
the selection of their employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only
subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been filed against Fontanilla primarily
and not him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.
HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against
negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right
to file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious because by the time of the SC
judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property. It was also proven
that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had
had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him something he failed to
overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action,
Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for
damages arising from a criminal act (his drivers negligence) but rather for his own
negligence in selecting his employee (Article 1903).

Calalas v. CA
Facts:

Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned

and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full,
Calalas gave Sunga an stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the
vehicle. Along the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga
stepped down to give way when an Isuzu truck owned by Francisco Salva and
driven by Iglecerio Verena bumped the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was
injured. Sunga filed a complaint against Calalas for violation of contract of
carriage. Calalas filed a third party complaint against Salva. The trial court
held Salva liable and absolved Calalas, taking cognisance of another civil case
for quasi-delict wherein Salva and Verena were held liable to Calalas. The
Court of Appeals reversed the decision and found Calalas liable to Sunga for
violation of contract of carriage.
Issues:
(1) Whether the decision in the case for quasi delict between Calalas on one
hand and Salva and Verena on the other hand, is res judicata to the issue in
this case
(2) Whether Calalas exercised the extraordinary diligence required in the
contract of carriage
(3) Whether moral damages should be awarded
Held:
(1) The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490
finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the
fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res
judicata does not apply. Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the
present case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and
his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to
petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether
petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also
known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the
negligence of the tortfeasor. Thesecond, breach of contract or culpa
contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a
contractual obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault
should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in
breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the

existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common
carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case of
death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to
the common carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial that the proximate
cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of
the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions
for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a
device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between
him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself.
But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is
the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is
merely to regulate the relation thus created.
(2) We do not think so. First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear
portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the
highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. Second, it
is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the
allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. The fact that Sunga was seated in an
"extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other
passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to
overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury
sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in
transporting passengers. We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's
contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied
assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of
the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those
passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded
ferry. This is also true of petitioner's contention that the jeepney being
bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso
fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
was inevitable. This requires that the following requirements be present: (a)
the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible
for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor
did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have

foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two
meters into the highway.
(3) As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for
damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items
enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such damages
are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a
passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil
Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as
provided in Art. 2220. In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral
damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that
petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage.

FGU Insurance Corp. v. CA

Facts:
On April 21, 1987, a car owned by private respondent FILCAR Transport Inc.,
rented to and driven by Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, swerved into the right
and hit the car owned by Lydia Soriano and driven by Benjamin Jacildone.
Dahl-Jensen did not possess a Philippine drivers license. Petitioner, as the
insurer of Sorianos car, paid the latter P25,382.20 and, by way of
subrogation, sued FILCAR, Dahl-Jensen, and Fortune Insurance Corporation,
FILCARs insurer, for quasi-delict. The trial court dismissed the petition for
failure to substantiate the claim for subrogation. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision, but on the ground that only Dahl-Jensens negligence
was proven, not that of FILCAR. Hence, this instant petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether an action based on quasi-delict will prosper against a rent-a-car
company and, consequently, its insurer for fault or negligence of the car lessee
in driving the rented vehicle
(2) Whether the ruling in MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Vda. de Caldo
is applicable in the case at bar
Held:

(1) We find no reversible error committed by respondent court in upholding

the dismissal of petitioner's complaint. The pertinent provision is Art. 2176 of
the Civil Code which states: "Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . . . ". To sustain a claim based
thereon, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the
plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause
and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage
incurred by the plaintiff. We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed
to prove the existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or negligence of
defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was
sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR. It should be noted that the
damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought about by the
circumstance that Dahl-Jensen swerved to the right while the vehicle that he
was driving was at the center lane. It is plain that the negligence was solely
attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the other
vehicle his personal liability. Respondent FILCAR did not have any
participation therein. Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car
business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there
was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. Respondent
FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen,
the former not being an employer of the latter.
(2) Petitioner's insistence on MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation is rooted in a
misapprehension of our ruling therein. In that case, the negligent and reckless
operation of the truck owned by petitioner corporation caused injuries to
several persons and damage to property. Intending to exculpate itself from
liability, the corporation raised the defense that at the time of the collision it
had no more control over the vehicle as it was leased to another; and, that the
driver was not its employee but of the lessee. The trial court was not
persuaded as it found that the true nature of the alleged lease contract was
nothing more than a disguise effected by the corporation to relieve itself of the
burdens and responsibilities of an employer. We upheld this finding and
affirmed the declaration of joint and several liability of the corporation with its
driver.

Air France vs Rafael

Carrascoso
March 4, 2014
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Civil Law Torts and Damages Negligence Malfeasance Quasi-Delict

Remedial Law Evidence Hearsay Rule Res Gestae Startling Event
In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en route to
Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip ticket by Air France. But
during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of Air France to vacate
his seat because a white man allegedly has a better right than him. Carrascoso protested
but when things got heated and upon advise of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave
up his seat and was transferred to the planes tourist class.
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air France
for damages for the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court, Carrascoso

testified, among others, that he when he was forced to take the tourist class, he went to the
planes pantry where he was approached by a plane purser who told him that he noted in
the planes journal the following:
First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene
The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually awarded
damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the issuance of
a first class ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be seated in first class
because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true intent between the parties.
Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascosos testimony regarding the note
made by the purser because the said note was never presented in court.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the testimony of Carrasoso regarding the note which was not
presented in court is admissible in evidence.
HELD 1: Yes. It appears that Air Frances liability is based on culpa-contractual and on
culpa aquiliana.
Culpa Contractual
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a
contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract was
breached when Air France failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok;
and Third, that there was bad faith when Air Frances employee compelled Carrascoso to
leave his first class accommodation berth after he was already, seated and to take a seat
in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and
humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and
social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.
The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air Frances claim that the issuance of a first
class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first class seat. Such
claim is simply incredible.

Culpa Aquiliana
Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and
Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not
contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carriers
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be
protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from
such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees
towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Air Frances
contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascosos action
is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air France
a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
HELD: 2: Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based on res gestae. The
subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not
come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is
admissible. Besides, when the dialogue between Carrascoso and the purser happened, the
impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement
had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of
the res gestae. The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was
spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness
has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the
res gestae.
FACTS
Natividad Agana was rushed to Medical City because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal
discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from cancer of the sigmoid. Dr. Ampil performed
an anterior resection surgery on her, and finding that the malignancy spread on her left ovary, he
obtained the consent of her husband, Enrique, to permit Dr. Fuentes to perform hysterectomy on her.
After the hysterectomy, Dr. Fuentes showed his work to Dr. Ampil, who examined it and found it in
order, so he allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil was about to complete the
procedure when the attending nurses made some remarks on the Record of Operation: sponge
count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search done but to no avail continue for closure
(two pieces of gauze were missing). A diligent search was conducted but they could not be found. Dr.
Ampil then directed that the incision be closed.
A couple of days after, she complained of pain in her anal region, but the doctors told her that it
was just a natural consequence of the surgery. Dr. Ampil recommended that she consult an oncologist
to examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation. After months of
consultations and examinations in the US, she was told that she was free of cancer. Weeks after
coming back, her daughter found a piece of gauze (1.5 in) protruding from her vagina, so Dr. Ampil
manually extracted this, assuring Natividad that the pains will go away. However, the pain worsened,
so she sought treatment at a hospital, where another 1.5 in piece of gauze was found in her vagina.
She underwent another surgery.

Sps. Agana filed a complaint for damages against PSI (owner of Medical City), Dr. Ampil, and
Dr. Fuentes, alleging that the latter are liable for negligence for leaving 2 pieces of gauze in
Natividads body, and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence. Enrique Agana also filed
an administrative complaint for gross negligence and malpractice against the two doctors with the
PRC (although only the case against Dr. Fuentes was heard since Dr. Ampil was abroad). Pending the
outcome of the cases, Natividad died (now substituted by her children). RTC found PSI and the
two doctors liable for negligence and malpractice. PRC dismissed the case against Dr.
Fuentes. CA dismissed only the case against Fuentes.

ISSUE AND HOLDING

1.
WON CA erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and malpractice. NO; DR. AMPIL IS
GUILTY
2.
WON CA erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability. NO
3.
WON PSI may be held solidarily liable for Dr. Ampils negligence. YES
RATIO
DR. AMPIL IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE AND MALPRACTICE
His arguments are without basis [did not prove that the American doctors were the ones who put / left
the gauzes; did not submit evidence to rebut the correctness of the operation record (re: number of
gauzes used); re: Dr. Fuentes alleged negligence, Dr. Ampil examined his work and found it in order].
Leaving foreign substances in the wound after incision has been closed is at
least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. Even if it has been shown that a surgeon
was required to leave a sponge in his patients abdomen because of the dangers attendant upon
delay, still, it is his legal duty to inform his patient within a reasonable time by advising her of what he
had been compelled to do, so she can seek relief from the effects of the foreign object left in her body
as her condition might permit. Whats worse in this case is that he misled her by saying that the pain
was an ordinary consequence of her operation.

Medical negligence; standard of diligence

To successfully pursue this case of medical negligence, a patient must only prove that a health care
provider either failed to do something [or did something] which a reasonably prudent health care
provider would have done [or wouldnt have done], and that the failure or action caused injury to the
patient.

Duty to remove all foreign objects from the body before closure of the incision; if he fails to
do so, it was his duty to inform the patient about it

Breach failed to remove foreign objects; failed to inform patient

Injury suffered pain that necessitated examination and another surgery

Proximate Causation breach caused this injury; could be traced from his act of closing the
incision despite information given by the attendant nurses that 2 pieces of gauze were still missing ;
what established causal link: gauze pieces later extracted from patients vagina
DR. FUENTES NOT LIABLE
The res ipsa loquitur [thing speaks for itself] argument of the Aganas does not convince the court.
Mere invocation and application of this doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of
negligence.

MANSION BISCUIT CORPORATION, respresented by its president,

petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, TY TECK SUAN substituted
ROSENDA TY, ELIZABETH TY KOH, EDWARD TY, EDMUND TY, EDGAR
LIM,
EDWIN
TY
and
EDISON
TY,
and
SIY
GUI,

ANG CHO HONG,

by his heirs,
TY, EVELYN T.
respondents.

G.R. No. 94713 November 23, 1995

FACTS: Sometime in 1981, Ty Teck Suan, as president of Edward Ty Brothers

Corporation, ordered numerous canons of nutria-wafer biscuits from Mansion
Biscuit Corporation, before the delivery of the goods on November 12, 1981, Ty
Teck Suan issued to Ang Cho Hong, president of Mansion Biscuit Corp., four
postdated checks totaling P404,980.00 as payment for the nutria-wafer
biscuits. Four other postdated checks in the amount of P100,000.00 each were
issued by Ty Teck Suan with Siy Gui as Co-signor in December of the same year.
Accordingly, Mansion Biscuit Corp. delivered the goods. When the first four
checks were deposited, they were all dishonored due to insufficiency of funds.
Ang Cho Hong informed Ty Teck Suan of the dishonor and requested him to
replace the checks with good cash or good checks. Ty Teck Suan failed to heed
said request. Subsequently, Ty Teck Suan delivered a total of 1,150 sacks of
Australian flour to Mansion Biscuits plus cash advance by Suan and the amount
paid was applied as payment for the first postdated check. Hong sent Suan a
formal demand letter requesting the latter to make good the value of the
remaining dishonored checks within five days from the receipt thereof.
Thereafter, the second batch of checks were issued by Suan and Gui but were
all dishonored again. Mansion Biscuit Corporation filed a case against Suan
and Gui for violation of Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law)
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of Ty Teck Suan that the subject checks
were issued merely to guarantee or secure fulfillment of the agreement with
the
complaint.
HELD: The court concludes of the above-mentioned checks by the accused subject
to these two criminal cases, and their subsequent dishonor, cannot be
considered in violation of the Batasang Pambansa Blg.22 because one important
element of the offense is missing: that the check is made or drawn and issued
to apply on account or for value and because these were issued to guarantee
the fulfillment of an agreement to deliver biscuits by complaint when accused
Suan would place orders. Accused are hereby declared not guilty of the offense
charged.