CHI MING TSOI vs.

COURT OF
APPEALS, GINA LAO-TSOI
FACTS:
Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the
Manila Cathedral, Intramuros, Manila as
evidenced by their marriage contract. After the
celebration they had a reception and then
proceeded to the house of the Ching Ming
Tsois mother. There they slept together on the
same bed in the same room for the first night
of their married life. Ginas version: that
contrary to her expectations that as newlyweds
they were supposed to enjoy making love that
night of their marriage, or having sexual
intercourse, with each other, Ching however
just went to bed, slept on one side and then
turned his back and went to sleep. There was
no sexual intercourse between them that night.
The same thing happened on the second, third
and fourth nights. In an effort to have their
honey moon in a private place where they can
enjoy together during their first week as
husband and wife they went to Baguio City. But
they did so together with Chings mother, uncle
and nephew as they were all invited by her
husband. There was no sexual intercourse
between them for four days in Baguio since
Ching
avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta
time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair
located at the living room. They slept together
in the same room and on the same bed since
May 22, 1988 (day of their marriage) until
March 15, 1989 (ten months). But during this
period there was no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. Gina claims that
she did not even see her husbands private
parts nor did he see hers. Because of this, they
submitted themselves for medical
examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag. Results
were that Gina is healthy, normal and still a
virgin while Chings examination was kept
confidential up to this time. The Gina claims
that her husband is impotent, a closet
homosexual as he did not show his penis. She
said she had observed him using an eyebrow
pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of
his mother. She also said her husband only
married her to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to

publicly maintain the appearance of a normal

man Chings version: he claims that if their
marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with
Gina. He does not want their marriage annulled
for reasons of (1) that he loves her very much
(2) that he has no defect on his part and he is
physically and psychologically capable (3)
since the relationship is still very young and if
there is any differences between the two of
them, it can still be reconciled and that
according to him, if either one of them has
some incapabilities, there is no certainty that
this will not be cured. Ching admitted that
since his marriage to Gina there was no sexual
contact between them. But, the reason for this,
according to the defendant, was that everytime
he wants to have sexual intercourse with his
wife, she always avoided him and whenever he
caresses her private parts, she always removed
his hands.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ching is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage
RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the
decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals
in rendering as VOID the marriage entered into
by Ching and Gina on May 22, 1988. No costs.
RATIO:
The Supreme Court held that the prolonged
refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse
with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although
physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute
the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted
refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. One of the essential marital
obligations under the Family Code is to
procreate children basedon the universal
principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar,
the senseless and protracted refusal of one of
the parties to fulfill this marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. While

the law provides that the husband and the wife

are obliged to live together, observer mutual
love, respect and fidelity, the sanction
therefore is actually the spontaneous, mutual
affection between husband and wife and not
any legal mandate or court order (Cuaderno vs.
Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless
unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no
man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner
in marriage is to say I could not have cared
less. This is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but
himself. In the natural order, it is sexual
intimacy that brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation
and ensures the continuation of family
relations.

Whether or not petitioner may claim damages

for failure to comply with marital obligations of
the respondent.

TY VS. CA

Should they grant her prayer, they would have

a situation where the husband pays the wife
damages from conjugal or common funds. To
do so, would make the application of the law
absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates
against such incongruity.

G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000

Facts:
Edgardo Reyes, private respondent, married to
Anna Maria Villanueva both in a civil and
church ceremony respectively. However, the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Quezon City declared their marriage null and
void ab initio for lack of marriage of license.
Before the decree of was issued in nullifying
the marriage of said spouses, private
respondent wed Ofelia Ty, petitioner, in the City
Court of Pasay and thereafter in a church
wedding in Makati. Out of their union bore two
daughters. Until private respondent petition
that their marriage be declared null and void
for lack of marriage of license and that at the
time they got married, he was still married to
Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he
married petitioner the decree of nullity of his
marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued.
Ofelia defended that lack of marriage license in
their marriage is untrue. She submitted the
marriage license in court and private
respondent did not question the evidence.
However, RTC and CA affirmed their decision in
favor of private respondent.
Issue:

Ruling:
There can be no action for damages merely
because of a breach of marital obligation.
Supreme Court also viewed that no damages
should be awarded in the present case, but for
another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage
to private respondent held valid and subsisting.
She is suing to maintain her status as
legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks
for damages from her husband for filing a
baseless complaint for annulment of their
marriage which caused her mental anguish,
anxiety, besmirched reputation, social
humiliation and alienation from her parents.

VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO JR.

139 SCRA 139
Facts:
Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton,
an American, in Hongkong in 1972. They
established residence in the Philippines and
had two children. In 1982, the wife sued for
divorce in Nevada, U.S.A., on the ground of
incompatibility. She later married Theodore Van
Dorn in Nevada in 1983. Upton sued her before
RTC, Branch LXV in Pasay City asking that she
be ordered to render an accounting of her
business, which Upton alleged to be conjugal
property. He also prayed that he be declared
with a right to manage the conjugal property.
The defendant wife moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the cause of
action was barred by a previous judgment in
the divorce proceedings wherein he had
acknowledged that the couple had no
community property.
Issue:

Whether or not absolute divorce decree

granted by U.S. court, between Filipina wife
and American husband held binding upon the
latter.
Ruling:
The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada
Divorce of the parties. There can be no
question as to the validity of that Nevada
divorce in any states of the U.S. The decree is
binding on Upton as an American citizen.
Hence, he cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any state of the United States. It is
true that owing to the nationality principle
under article 15 of the civil code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorce abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released Upton
from the marriage from the standards of
American law. Thus, pursuant to his national
law, he is no longer the husband of the
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in
the case as petitioner husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. He is also
estopped by his own representation before the
Nevada court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property. He should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property.

DE CASTRO VS DE CASTRO G.R.

NO. 160172
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent met and became
sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get
married, thus they applied for a marriage
license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Pasig City in September 1994. They had their
first sexual relation sometime in October 1994,
and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter.
When the couple went back to the Office of the
Civil Registrar, the marriage license had
already expired. Thus, in order to push through
with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they
executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995

stating that they had been living together as

husband and wife for at least five years. The
couple got married on the same date, with
Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after
the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went
back to their respective homes and did not live
together as husband and wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is valid.
HELD:
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of
the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in
any of the essential requisites shall render the
marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is
clear from the evidence presented that
petitioner and respondent did not have a
marriage license when they contracted their
marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit
stating that they had been living together for
more than five years. However, respondent
herself in effect admitted the falsity of the
affidavit when she was asked during crossexamination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot
be considered as a mere irregularity in the
formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license
requirement for a man and a woman who have
lived together and exclusively with each other
as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before
the marriage. The aim of this provision is to
avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with
the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside
a valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicants name for a marriage license. In the
instant case, there was no "scandalous
cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which
petitioner and respondent executed so they
could push through with the marriage has no
value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper.
They were not exempt from the marriage
license requirement. Their failure to obtain and
present a marriage license renders their
marriage void ab initio.