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DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
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Plaintiffs,
DEFENDANT MARICOPA COUNTY,
ARIZONAS RESPONSE TO THE
COURTS AMENDED ORDER OF
JUNE 8, 2016 (DOC. 1708)
vs.
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At the hearing on May 31, 2016, this Court expressed skepticism regarding the
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position set forth in the May 27, 2016 response brief of Defendant MARICOPA
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COUNTY (the County) (Doc. 1688 at 4-7) that it lacks authority under Arizona law to
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provide funding for remedial measures imposed as a result of findings by this Court that
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Transcript of May 31, 2016 Hearing (Tr.) at p. 9, l. 21 p. 14, l. 13. The Court also
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aspects of the Courts May 13, 2016 Findings (Doc. 1677) that the County asserts are
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factually inaccurate. Tr. P. 165, ll. 14-23. The County takes this opportunity to address
both of these issues below.
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embedded in Arizona law that counties have only such authority as has been delegated to
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them by the Arizona Legislature. See Doc. 1688 at 5-6; see also Hartford Accident &
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Indemnity Co. v. Wainscott, 41 Ariz. 439, 445-46, 19 P.2d 328, 330 (1933) (Arizonas
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counties have no power to engage in any activities of any nature unless there is a statute
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so authorizing them expressly or by strong implication, and . . . they are only liable for
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the acts of their agents when liability is expressly imposed by statute or follows as a
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matter of law from the exercise of powers clearly conferred on the county.) (emphasis
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added). This fundamental principle has never been challenged by any other party to this
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proceeding.
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Arizona Sheriffs and employees working under their direction and supervision, the
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Legislature has authorized, indeed required, that counties provide funding for:
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With respect to remedies for claims and losses sustained by third parties, the
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A.R.S. 11-981(A)(2). Apart from the inherently limited nature of the language chosen
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by the Legislature in conferring this statutory authorization, it underscored the fact that
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the authority conferred was narrowly circumscribed by expressly stating in the same
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statute that counties with self-insurance trust funds2 may [n]ot make any expenditure
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from the trust fund for any purpose not specified in this article. A.R.S. 11-981(B)(4).
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liability insurance or to create liability trust funds, and this is the only authority conferred
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on the counties to fund remedies for any property loss sustained or lawful claim of
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liability or fortuitous loss arising out of the conduct of elected or appointed officials
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County has established a self-insured trust fund under this grant of authority, but the
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Legislature has expressly prohibited any expenditure from the trust fund for any
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As explained in the Countys response brief, Arizonas counties are not liable under
Arizona law for the tortious conduct of law enforcement officers committed in their
performance of law enforcement functions. Doc. 1688 at 5.
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Maricopa County is one of the counties authorized by A.R.S. 11-981 to establish a
self-insurance trust fund, and it has done so. See the currently operative Revised Restated
Declaration of Trust for Maricopa County, Arizona Self-Insured Trust Fund (Trust
Declaration), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
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purposes not specified in the statute. A.R.S. 11-981(B)(4).3 This prohibition plainly
would extend to providing compensation arising out of conduct of county elected or
appointed officials not acting within the scope of employment or authority.
If this Court were to order the County to provide funding for remedies deemed
necessary to redress contemptuous conduct that it has found to have been willful and/or
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intentional, the Court would be requiring the County to exercise authority the Legislature
has not seen fit to confer upon Arizonas counties. In effect, then, the Court would be by
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judicial fiat abrogating or rewriting State law, overriding legislative choices unrelated to
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this action that are undeniably within the province of State sovereignty, and thereby
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running afoul of principles of federalism and comity embodied, in part, in the Tenth
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Amendment and the Guarantee Clause (art. IV, 4) of the United States Constitution.
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In Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), a 1983 action brought against the
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respects to those in issue in this case, the Supreme Court pointedly admonished:
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Id. at 378 (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951)). The Rizzo Court
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rejected the notion, espoused by the district court in that case, that the legal authority of
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At the May 31, 2016 hearing, counsel for the Sheriff and the Court were both heard to
say that they dont care what the Countys self-insurance agreement says. Tr. at 15.
The contents of the Countys Trust Declaration, however, are beside the point. The Trust
Declaration is relevant only to show that the County exercised the limited authority
conferred by the Legislature to make such a self-insurance arrangement, and the County
is accordingly subject to the terms of that legislative authorization.
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federal courts to supervise the functioning of police departments was well established,
finding that [w]hen it injected itself by injunctive decree into the internal disciplinary
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affairs of this state agency, the District Court departed from these [governing federalism]
precepts. Id. at 380.
The allocation of powers in our federal system preserves the integrity, dignity,
and residual sovereignty of the States. The federal balance is, in part an end in itself, to
ensure that States function as political entities in their own right. Bond v. U.S., 564 U.S.
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211, 221 (2011). It is far from apparent how a federal court order requiring the County to
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exercise authority it does not have under State law is consistent with preservation of the
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found to be contemptuous conduct are injuries that flow from constitutional torts and
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may be redressable under 1983. What is currently before the Court is not 1983
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claims, but fashioning appropriate remedies for conduct found to have been
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contemptuous. The compensatory relief that has been discussed among the parties and
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with the Court is expressly contemplated as an alternative to the assertion and litigation
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pursue it unless they choose to waive the right and participate in the victim compensation
program that has been proposed to the Court. The fact that that program is intended as an
alternative to that course does not convert the contemptuous conduct in issue itself into a
violation of 1983.
There is a further problem with any remedy for willful and/or intentional
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contemptuous conduct that would override State law and require of the County the
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exercise of authority it has not been given. It must be remembered that, during most or
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all of the period when the conduct the Court has found to have been contemptuous
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occurred, the County was not even a party to this litigation. Plaintiffs like to sound the
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familiar refrain that the Sheriff was sued in his official capacity, he is the chief
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policymaker for the County on law enforcement matters,4 and suit against a public
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official in his official capacity is essentially the same as a suit against the underlying
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entity. The contempt with which the Sheriff and others have been charged, however, is
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with this Courts Orders. There has been no evidence adduced that the Sheriff or any of
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his subordinates were in any way authorized to set policy for the County with regard to
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compliance with court orders. The conduct at issue, to the extent it was intentional
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and/or willful, was individual and beyond the scope of employment or authority. The
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responsibility for that conduct should be borne by the individuals who engaged in it or, at
most, by the constitutional office of the Sheriff.
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To remedy the inaccuracies in the Courts Findings pointed out in the Countys
responsive brief (Doc. 1688 at 2-4), the County proposes that Paragraph 76 be amended
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I hereby certify that on June 30, 2016, I electronically filed Defendant Maricopa
County, Arizonas Response to the Courts Amended Order of June 8, 2016 (Doc. 1708),
with the Clerk of the Court for filing and uploading to the CM/ECF system, which will
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