POLITICAL LAW CASE DIGEST

1. Tubbataha Incident: UNCLOS Non-Member US Govt Still Bound By The

Customary Laws of Navigation (Arigo vs Swift, 2014)
ARIGO VS SWIFT
GR 206510 Sept 14, 2014
Facts:
In 2013, the USS Guardian of the US Navy ran aground on an area near the
Tubbataha Reefs, a marine habitat of which entry and certain human activities are
prevented and afforded protection by a Philippine law. The grounding incident
prompted the petitioners to seek for issuance of Writ of Kalikasan with TEPO from
the SC.
Among those impleaded are US officials in their capacity as commanding officers of
the US Navy. As petitioners argued, they were impleaded because there was a
waiver of immunity from suit between US and PH pursuant to the VFA terms.
Petitioners claimed that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of
the USS Guardian violated their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology since these events caused and continue to cause environmental damage of
such magnitude as to affect other provinces surrounding the Tubbataha Reefs. Aside
from damages, they sought a directive from the SC for the institution of civil,
administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental
laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident. They also prayed for
the annulment of some VFA provisions for being unconstitutional.
Issue 1: W/N the US Government has given its consent to be sued through
the VFA
No. The general rule on states immunity from suit applies in this case.
First, any waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as for the issuance of the writ of
kalikasan. Hence, contrary to petitioners claim, the US government could not be
deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
Second, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding
officers of the US Navy who have control and supervision over the USS Guardian
and its crew. Since the satisfaction of any judgment against these officials would
require remedial actions and the appropriation of funds by the US government, the
suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. Thus, the principle of State Immunity
from suit bars the exercise of jurisdiction by the court over their persons.
Issue 2: W/N the US government may still be held liable for damages
caused to the Tubbataha Reefs
Yes. The US government is liable for damages in relation to the grounding incident
under the customary laws of navigation.
The conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in
violation of RA 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the
matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the UNCLOS. While historically, warships
enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the
UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the
rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latters
internal waters and the territorial sea.
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Although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing
policy, the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the
traditional uses of the oceans, which is codified in UNCLOS.
As to the non-ratification by the US, it must be noted that the US refusal to join the
UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS regime of deep seabed
mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by
mankind. Such has nothing to do with the acceptance by the US of customary
international rules on navigation. (Justice Carpio)
Hence, non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard
the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial
sea. It is thus expected of the US to bear international responsibility under Art. 31
in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the
Tubbataha reefs. ##
Other Issues
Claim for Damages Caused by Violation of Environmental Laws Must be
Filed Separately
The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is improper
considering that it is the VFA which governs disputes involving US military ships and
crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement.
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions. Since jurisdiction cannot be had over the
respondents for being immuned from suit, there is no way damages which resulted
from violation of environmental laws could be awarded to petitioners.
In any case, the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan provides that a criminal case against a
person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately.
Hence, a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction
provisions of the VFA to a US personnel who may be found responsible for the
grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a
petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
Challenging the Constitutionality of a Treaty Via a Petition for the Issuance
of Writ of Kalikasan is Not Proper
The VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as
a treaty by the US as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of
the US government. The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are
required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions. A
petition under the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan is not the proper remedy to assail the
constitutionality of its provisions.
Relevant Laws and Jurisprudence
States Immunity from Suit Extends to its Officials (Garcia vs Chief of Staff, 1966)
Exception to the Doctrine of States Immunity from Suit (Shauf vs CA, 1990)
Article 30, UNCLOS: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of
the coastal State
Article 31, UNCLOS: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship
or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes

2. PROHIBITION AGAINST HOLDING OF DUAL OR MULTIPLE OFFICES APPLY

AS WELL TO TEMPORARY DESIGNATIONS (FUNA VS AGRA, 2013)
FUNA VS AGRA
GR 191644 Feb 19 2013
Facts:
Agra was then the Government Corporate Counsel when Pres Arroyo
designated him as the Acting Solicitor General in place of former Sol Gen
Devanadera, who has been appointed as the Secretary of Justice. Again, Agra
was designated as the Acting Secretary in place of Secretary Devanadera
when the latter resigned. Agra then relinquished his position as Corporate
Counsel and continued to perform the duties of an Acting Solicitor General.
Funa, a concerned citizen, questioned his appointment. Agra argued that his
concurrent designations were merely in a temporary capacity. Even assuming
that he was holding multiple offices at the same time, his designation as an
Acting Sol Gen is merely akin to a hold-over, so that he never received
salaries and emoluments for being the Acting Sol Gen when he was appointed
as the Acting Secretary of Justice.
Issue 1: W/N Agras designation as Acting Secretary of Justice is valid
No. The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with
his position of Acting Solicitor General violates the constitutional prohibition
under Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution.
It is immaterial that Agras designation was in an acting or temporary
capacity. Section 13 plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the
Cabinet Members in so far as holding other offices or employments in the
Government or in GOCCs is concerned. The prohibition against dual or
multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all
appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, because the
objective of Section 13 is to prevent the concentration of powers in the
Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President,
the Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.
Issue 2: W/N Agra may concurrently hold the positions by virtue of the holdover principle
No. Agras designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an ex
officio capacity, by which he would have been validly authorized to
concurrently hold the two positions due to the holding of one office being the
consequence of holding the other.
Being included in the stricter prohibition embodied in Section 13, Agra cannot
liberally apply in his favor the broad exceptions provided in Article IX-B, Sec 7
(2) of the Constitution to justify his designation as Acting Secretary of Justice
concurrently with his designation as Acting Solicitor General, or vice versa. It
is not sufficient for Agra to show that his holding of the other office was
allowed by law or the primary functions of his position. To claim the
exemption of his concurrent designations from the coverage of the stricter
prohibition under Section 13, he needed to establish that his concurrent
designation was expressly allowed by the Constitution.
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Issue 3: W/N the offices of the Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice is in
an ex officio capacity in relation to the other
No. The powers and functions of the Solicitor General are neither required by
the primary functions nor included in the powers of the DOJ, and vice versa.
The OSG, while attached to the DOJ, is not a constituent of the latter, as in
fact, the Administrative Code of 1987 decrees that the OSG is independent
and autonomous. With the enactment of RA 9417, the Solicitor General is now
vested with a cabinet rank, and has the same qualifications for appointment,
rank, prerogatives, allowances, benefits and privileges as those of Presiding
Judges of the Court of Appeals. #
Relevant Provisions
Article VII, Sec 13 of the 1987 Constitution
Article IX-B, Sec 7 (2) of the 1987 Constitution
Notes
Distinction between Art VII, Sec 13 vs Art IX-B, Sec 7 (2
Exceptions from Prohibition against the Holding of Multiple Offices

3. PROMOTIONAL APPOINTMENT FROM COMMISSIONER TO CHAIRMAN

DOES NOT CONSTITUTE REAPPOINTMENT (FUNA VS VILLAR, 2012)
FUNA VS VILLAR
GR 192791 April 24 2012
Facts:
On February 15, 2001, Pres Arroyo appointed Carague as Chairman of the
COA for a term of 7 years. Caragues term of office started on February 2,
2001 to end on February 2, 2008. On February 7, 2004, Villar was appointed
as the third member of the COA for a term of 7 years starting February 2,
2004 until February 2, 2011.
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the
fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting
Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on
April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA.
Shortly thereafter, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his
appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in
the appointment papers, until the expiration of the original term of his office
as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011.
Issue 1: W/N a promotional appointment from the position of
Commissioner to Chairman is constitutionally permissible and does
NOT constitute reappointment as barred by the Article IX (D), Sec 1
(2) of the Constitution
Yes. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less
than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman
for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such
appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the
aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired
period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed 7 years and provided
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further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death,
resignation, disability or removal by impeachment.
Reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and
the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman).
On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different
position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new
appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment
barred under the Constitution.
Issue 2: W/N the appointment of Villar to the position of COA
Chairman which is made vacant by the expiration of term of the
predecessor is valid
No. The Constitution clearly provides that if the vacancy results from the
expiration of the term of the predecessor, the appointment of a COA member
shall be for a fixed 7-year term.
Here, the vacancy in the position of COA chairman left by Carague in
February 2, 2008 resulted from the expiration of his 7-year term. Under that
circumstance, there can be no unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor to speak of. Hence, in light of the 7-year aggregate rule, Villars
appointment to a full term is not valid as he will be allowed to serve more
than seven 7 years under the constitutional ban.
Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A
shorter term, however, to comply with the 7-year aggregate rule would also
be invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively breach the
clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed
subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years.

NOTES:
A. One of the doctrinal guidelines outlined in Matibag vs Benipayo
has been effectively abandoned by the Courts pronouncement in
this case.
In Matibag vs Benipayo, the Court outlined the following formulations in
which the constitutional ban on reappointment may apply:
The first situation is where an ad interim appointee after confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments serves his full 7-year term. Such person cannot
be reappointed whether as a member or as chairman because he will then be
actually serving more than 7 years.
The second situation is where the appointee, after confirmation, serves part
of his term and then resigns before his 7-year term of office ends. Such
person cannot be reappointed whether as a member or as chair to a vacancy
arising from retirement because a reappointment will result in the appointee
serving more than 7 years.
The third situation is where the appointee is confirmed to serve the unexpired
portion of someone who died or resigned, and the appointee completes the
unexpired term. Such person cannot be reappointed whether as a member or
as chair to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will
result in the appointee also serving more than 7 years.
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The fourth situation is where the appointee has previously served a term of
less than 7 years, and a vacancy arises from death or resignation. Even if it
will not result in his serving more than seven years, a reappointment of such
person to serve an unexpired term is also prohibited because his situation will
be similar to those appointed under the second sentence of Sec. 1(20), Art.
IX-C of the Constitution [referring to the first set of appointees (the 5 and 3
year termers) whose term of office are less than 7 years but are barred from
being reappointed under any situation].
The fourth formulation is basically predicated on the postulate that
reappointment of any kind is prohibited under any and all circumstances.
Since the principles laid down in this case is contrary to that, the
constitutional ban on reappointment under the fourth situation depicted in
the Matibag vs Benipayo case is now therefore effectively abandoned. As held
by the Court, a promotional appointment from the position of Commissioner
to that of Chairman is constitutionally permissible and not barred by Sec.
1(2), Art. IX (D) of the Constitution.
B. Article IX (D), Sec 1 (2) of the Constitution is re-outlined as
follows:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional
commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set
of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an
appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional.
The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7)
years in case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion
of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death,
resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion
of the term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than
the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid
down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were
appointed for a full term of seven years and who served the entire period, are
barred from reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the
first appointees in the Commission under the Constitution are also covered by
the prohibition against reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than
seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the
unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is
not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate
period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of
the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided
further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death,
resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that
reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and
the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman).
On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different
position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new
appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment
barred under the Constitution.

5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a

temporary or acting capacity.
4. COCO LEVY FUND BELONGS NOT TO THE COCO FARMERS IN THEIR PRIVATE
CAPACITIES BUT TO THE GOVERNMENT (COCOFED VS REP, 2012)
Cocofed vs Republic
GR 177857-58 Jan 24 2012
Facts:
In 1971, RA 6260 created the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to
administer the Coconut Investment Fund, a fund to be sourced from levy on
the sale of copra. The copra seller was, or ought to be, issued COCOFUND
receipts. The fund was placed at the disposition of COCOFED, the national
association of coconut producers having the largest membership.
When martial law started in 1972, several presidential decrees were issued to
improve the coconut industry through the collection and use of the coconut
levy fund:
PD 276 established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) and
declared the proceeds of the CCSF levy as trust fund, to be utilized to
subsidize the sale of coconut-based products, thus stabilizing the price of
edible oil.
PD 582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to finance the
operation of a hybrid coconut seed farm.
In 1973, PD 232 created the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to accelerate
the growth and development of the coconut and palm oil industry.
Then came P.D. No. 755 in July 1975, providing under its Section 1 the policy
to provide readily available credit facilities to the coconut farmers at
preferential rates. Towards achieving this, Section 2 of PD 755 authorized PCA
to utilize the CCSF and the CIDF collections to acquire a commercial bank and
deposit the CCSF levy collections in said bank, interest free, the deposit
withdrawable only when the bank has attained a certain level of sufficiency in
its equity capital. It also decreed that all levies PCA is authorized to collect
shall not be considered as special and/or fiduciary funds or form part of the
general funds of the government.
Both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 also provide that the CCSF shall not be
construed by any law as a special and/or trust fund, the stated intention
being that actual ownership of the said fund shall pertain to coconut farmers
in their private capacities.
Shortly before the issuance of PD 755 however, PCA had already bought from
Peping Cojuangco 72.2% of the outstanding capital stock of FUB / UCPB. In
that contract, it was also stipulated that Danding Cojuanco shall receive
equity in FUB amounting to 10%, or 7.22 % of the 72.2%, as consideration for
PCAs buy-out of what Danding Conjuanco claim as his exclusive and personal
option to buy the FUB shares.
The PCA appropriated, out of its own fund, an amount for the purchase of the
said 72.2% equity. It later reimbursed itself from the coconut levy fund.
While the 64.98% (72.2 % 7.22%) portion of the option shares ostensibly
pertained to the farmers, the corresponding stock certificates supposedly
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representing the farmers equity were in the name of and delivered to PCA.
There were, however, shares forming part of the 64.98% portion, which
ended up in the hands of non-farmers. The remaining 27.8% of the FUB
capital stock were not covered by any of the agreements.
Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly
to various projects and/or was converted into different assets or investments.
Of particular relevance to this was their use to acquire the FUB / UCPB, and
the acquisition by UCPB, through the CIIF and holding companies, of a large
block of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) shares.
Issue 1: W/N the mandate provided under PD 755, 961 and 1468 that
the CCSF shall not be construed by any law as a special and/or trust
fund is valid
No. The coconut levy funds can only be used for the special purpose and the
balance thereof should revert back to the general fund.
Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the Constitution provides that all money collected
on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and
paid out for such purpose only, and if the purpose for which a special fund
was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be
transferred to the general funds of the Government. Here, the CCSF were
sourced from forced exactions with the end-goal of developing the entire
coconut industry. Therefore, the subsequent reclassification of the CCSF as a
private fund to be owned by private individuals in their private capacities
under P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 is unconstitutional.
Not only is it unconstitutional, but the mandate is contrary to the purpose or
policy for which the coco levy fund was created.
Issue 2:W/N the coco levy fund may be owned by the coconut
farmers in their private capacities
No. The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used
for public purpose. They cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks to be
given for free to private individuals. Even if the money is allocated for a
special purpose and raised by special means, it is still public in character.
Accordingly, the presidential issuances which authorized the PCA to
distribute, for free, the shares of stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut
farmers under such rules and regulations the PCA may promulgate is
unconstitutional.
It is unconstitutional because first, it have unduly delegated legislative power
to the PCA, and second, it allowed the use of the CCSF to benefit directly
private interest by the outright and unconditional grant of absolute ownership
of the FUB/UCPB shares paid for by PCA entirely with the CCSF to the
undefined coconut farmers, which negated or circumvented the national
policy or public purpose declared by P.D. No. 755.
Hence, the so-called Farmers shares do not belong to the coconut farmers in
their private capacities, but to the Government. The coconut levy funds are
special public funds and any property purchased by means of the coconut
levy funds should likewise be treated as public funds or public property,
subject to burdens and restrictions attached by law to such property.

5. EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL NOT APPLICABLE IN EXPROPRIATION

PROCEEDINGS
(CURATA VS PPA, 2014)
Curata vs Philippine Ports Authority
GR 154211-12 June 22 2009
Facts:
EO 385 and EO 431 Series of 1990 delineated the Batangas Port Zone and
placed it under the Philippine Ports Authority for administrative jurisdiction of
its proper zoning, planning, development, and utilization. Pursuant thereto,
the PPA instituted a complaint for expropriation of 185 lots before the RTC.
Owned by some 231 individuals or entities, the 185 lots, with a total area of
about 1,298,340 sqm, were intended for the development of Phase II of the
BPZ. The PPA alleged that, per evaluation of the Land Acquisition Committee
for Phase II of the BPZ project, the lots had a fair market value of P 336.83
per sqm. Prior to the filing of the complaint, PPA offered PhP 336.40 per sqm
as just compensation, but the lot owners rejected the offer. PPA prayed to be
placed in possession upon its deposit of the amount equivalent to the
assessed value for real estate taxation of the lots in question.
After proceedings, the RTC issued a compensation order directing PPA to pay
the lot owners the amount of P 5,500 per sqm as just compensation. Upon
motion, the RTC granted the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal
and issued the writ of execution thereafter. Subsequently, the sheriff served
the Notice of Garnishment to the LBP Batangas City Branch.
Issue 1:
W/N execution
expropriation proceedings

pending

appeal

is

applicable

to

No. Discretionary execution of judgments pending appeal under Sec. 2(a) of

Rule 39 simply does not apply to eminent domain proceedings. Since PPAs
monies, facilities and assets are government properties, they are exempt
from execution whether by virtue of a final judgment or pending appeal.
It is a universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by
private parties either by general or special law, it may limit the claimants
action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is
rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under
writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments. This is based on
obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must
be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The
functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate
and specific objects, as appropriated by law. (Commissioner of Public
Highways vs San Diego, 1970)
Issue 2: W/N RA 8974 is a substantial law that cannot be reapplied
retroactively
Yes. The appropriate standard of just compensation inclusive of the manner of
payment thereof and the initial compensation to the lot owners is a
substantive, not merely a procedural, matter. This is because the right of the
owner to receive just compensation prior to acquisition of possession by the
State of the property is a proprietary right. RA 8974, which specifically
prescribes the new standards in determining the amount of just
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compensation in expropriation cases relating to national government

infrastructure projects, as well as the payment of the provisional value as a
prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession, is a substantive law.
Further, there is nothing in RA No. 8974 which expressly provides that it
should have retroactive effect. Neither is retroactivity necessarily implied
from RA No. 8974 or in any of its provisions. Hence, it cannot be applied
retroactively in relation to this case.
NOTE:
RA 8974 amended Rule 67 effective November 26, 2000, but only with regard
to the expropriation of right-of-way sites and locations for national
government infrastructure projects. On the other hand, in all other
expropriation cases outside of right-of-way sites or locations for national
government infrastructure projects, the provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court shall still govern
6. STOCK DISTRIBUTION SCHEME CONSISTENT WITH THE CONSTITUTIONS
AGRARIAN REFORM (HACIENDA LUISITA VS PARC, 2011)
Hacienda Luisita vs PARC
Case Digest GR 171101 July 5 2011 Nov 22 2011
Facts:
In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is a program aimed at
redistributing public and private agricultural lands to farmers and
farmworkers who are landless. One of the lands covered by this law is the
Hacienda Luisita, a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-residential
expanse straddling several municipalities of Tarlac. Hacienda Luisita was
bought in 1958 from the Spanish owners by the Tarlac Development
Corporation (TADECO), which is owned and/or controlled by Jose Cojuanco Sr.,
Group. Back in 1980, the Martial Law administration filed an expropriation
suit against TADECO to surrender the Hacienda to the then Ministry of
Agrarian Reform (now DAR) so that the land can be distributed to the farmers
at cost. The RTC rendered judgment ordering TADECO to surrender Hacienda
Luisita to the MAR.
In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the governments case against TADECO.
The CA dismissed it, but the dismissal was subject to the condition that
TADECO shall obtain the approval of FWB (farm worker beneficiaries) to the
SDP (Stock Distribution Plan) and to ensure its implementation.
Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock transfer as two
alternative modes in distributing land ownership to the FWBs. Since the stock
distribution scheme is the preferred option of TADECO, it organized a spin-off
corporation, the Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI), as vehicle to facilitate stock
acquisition by the farmers.
After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms of the Stock
Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA) proposed by TADECO, the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), led by then DAR Secretary Miriam Santiago,
approved the SDP of TADECO/HLI through Resolution 89-12-2 dated Nov 21,
1989.
From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended those benefits to the
farmworkers. Such claim was subsequently contested by two groups
representing the interests of the farmers the HLI Supervisory Group and the
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AMBALA. In 2003, each of them wrote letter petitions before the DAR asking
for the renegotiation of terms and/or revocation of the SDOA. They claimed
that they havent actually received those benefits in full, that HLI violated the
terms, and that their lives havent really improved contrary to the promise
and rationale of the SDOA.
The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to the issues and to review
the terms of the SDOA and the Resolution 89-12-2. Adopting the report and
the recommendations of the Task Force, the DAR Sec recommended to the
PARC (1) the revocation of Resolution 89-12-2 and (2) the acquisition of
Hacienda Luisita through compulsory acquisition scheme. Consequently, the
PARC revoked the SDP of TADECO/HLI and subjected those lands covered by
the SDP to the mandated land acquisition scheme under the CARP law. These
acts of the PARC was assailed by HLI via Rule 65.
On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of
RA 6657, insofar as it affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance,
to resort to stock transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer. For
FARM, this modality of distribution is an anomaly to be annulled for being
inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art.
XIII of the Constitution.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Issue 1: W/N PARC has the authority to revoke the Stock Distribution
Plan or SDP
Yes. Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to
approve the plan for stock distribution of the corporate landowner belongs to
PARC. It may be that RA 6657 or other executive issuances on agrarian reform
do not explicitly vest the PARC with the power to revoke/recall an approved
SDP, but such power or authority is deemed possessed by PARC under the
principle of necessary implication, a basic postulate that what is implied in a
statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.
Following this doctrine, the conferment of express power to approve a plan
for stock distribution of the agricultural land of corporate owners necessarily
includes the power to revoke or recall the approval of the plan.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Issue 2: W/N the Court may exercise its power of judicial review
over the constitutionality of Sec 31 of RA 6657
No. First, the intervenor FARM failed to challenged the constitutionality of RA
6657, Sec 31 at the earliest possible opportunity. It should have been raised
as early as Nov 21, 1989, when PARC approved the SDP of HLI or at least
within a reasonable time thereafter.
Second, the constitutionality of RA 6657 is not the very lis mota of this case.
Before the SC, the lis mota of the petitions filed by the HLI is whether or not
the PARC acted with grave abuse of discretion in revoking the SDP of HLI.
With regards to the original positions of the groups representing the interests
of the farmers, their very lis mota is the non-compliance of the HLI with the
SDP so that the the SDP may be revoked. Such issues can be resolved
without delving into the constitutionality of RA 6657.

11

Hence, the essential requirements in passing upon the constitutionality of

acts of the executive or legislative departments have not been met in this
case.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Issue 3: W/N Sec 31 of RA 6657 is consistent with the Constitutions
concept of agrarian reform
Yes. The wording of the Art XIII, Sec 4 of the Constitution is unequivocal: the
farmers and regular farmworkers have a right to own directly or collectively
the lands they till.
The basic law allows two (2) modes of land distribution: direct and indirect
ownership. Direct transfer to individual farmers is the most commonly used
method by DAR and widely accepted. Indirect transfer through collective
ownership of the agricultural land is the alternative to direct ownership of
agricultural land by individual farmers. Sec. 4 EXPRESSLY authorizes
collective ownership by farmers. No language can be found in the 1987
Constitution that disqualifies or prohibits corporations or cooperatives of
farmers from being the legal entity through which collective ownership can
be exercised.
The word collective is defined as indicating a number of persons or things
considered as constituting one group or aggregate, while collectively is
defined as in a collective sense or manner; in a mass or body. By using the
word collectively, the Constitution allows for indirect ownership of land and
not just outright agricultural land transfer. This is in recognition of the fact
that land reform may become successful even if it is done through the
medium of juridical entities composed of farmers.
The stock distribution option devised under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 hews with the
agrarian reform policy, as instrument of social justice under Sec. 4 of Article
XIII of the Constitution. Albeit land ownership for the landless appears to be
the dominant theme of that policy, the Court emphasized that Sec. 4, Article
XIII of the Constitution, as couched, does not constrict Congress to passing an
agrarian reform law planted on direct land transfer to and ownership by
farmers and no other, or else the enactment suffers from the vice of
unconstitutionality. If the intention were otherwise, the framers of the
Constitution would have worded said section in a manner mandatory in
character.
* The SC, through a resolution dated Nov 21 2011 of the motion for reconsideration
filed by HLI, affirmed the revocation of HLIs SDP and the placing of Hacienda Luisita
under the compulsory land distribution scheme of the CARP law. It was also held
that the date of taking was Nov 21 1989, when the PARC, by Resolution 89-12-2,
approved the SDP of HLI.
7. EDCA IS IN THE FORM OF AN EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT NOT
NEEDING SENATE CONCURRENCE (SAGUISAG VS EXEC SECRETARY, 2016)
Saguisag vs Executive Secretary
Case Digest: GR 212426 Jan 12, 2016
Facts:
Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before
the SC the constitutionality of EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation
12

Agreement), an agreement entered into by the executive department with

the US and ratified on June 6, 2014. Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide
the US forces the access and use of portions of PH territory, which are called
Agreed Locations. Aside from the right to access and to use the Agreed
Locations, the US may undertake the following types of activities within the
Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and combined training
activities; humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and such other activities
that as may be agreed upon by the parties.
Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of
agreement with US violated the constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25
since the EDCA involves foreign military bases, troops and facilities whose
entry into the country should be covered by a treaty concurred in by the
Senate. The Senate, through Senate Resolution 105, also expressed its
position that EDCA needs congressional ratification.
Issue 1:
W/N the petitions as citizens suit satisfy the
requirements of legal standing in assailing the constitutionality of
EDCA
No. In assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act, petitioners suing
as citizens may dodge the requirement of having to establish a direct and
personal interest if they show that the act affects a public right. But here,
aside from general statements that the petitions involve the protection of a
public right, and that their constitutional rights as citizens would be violated,
the petitioners failed to make any specific assertion of a particular public
right that would be violated by the enforcement of EDCA. For their failure to
do so, the present petitions cannot be considered by the Court as citizens
suits that would justify a disregard of the aforementioned requirements.
Issue 2: W/N the petitioners have legal standing as taxpayers
No. Petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers because EDCA is neither meant to
be a tax measure, nor is it directed at the disbursement of public funds.
A taxpayers suit concerns a case in which the official act complained of
directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from
taxation. Here, those challenging the act must specifically show that they
have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public money,
and that they will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the
assailed act. Applying that principle to this case, they must establish that
EDCA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. A
reading of the EDCA, however, would show that there has been neither an
appropriation nor an authorization of disbursement.
Issue 3: W/N the petitions qualify as legislators suit
No. The power to concur in a treaty or an international agreement is an
institutional prerogative granted by the Constitution to the Senate. In a
legislators suit, the injured party would be the Senate as an institution or any
of its incumbent members, as it is the Senates constitutional function that is
allegedly being violated. Here, none of the petitioners, who are former
senators, have the legal standing to maintain the suit.
Issue 4: W/N the SC may exercise its Power of Judicial Review over
the case

13

Yes.
Although petitioners lack legal standing, they raise matters of
transcendental importance which justify setting aside the rule on procedural
technicalities. The challenge raised here is rooted in the very Constitution
itself, particularly Art XVIII, Sec 25 thereof, which provides for a stricter
mechanism required before any foreign military bases, troops or facilities
may be allowed in the country. Such is of paramount public interest that the
Court is behooved to determine whether there was grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Executive Department.
Brion Dissent
Yes, but on a different line of reasoning. The petitioners satisfied the
requirement of legal standing in asserting that a public right has been
violated through the commission of an act with grave abuse of discretion. The
court may exercise its power of judicial review over the act of the Executive
Department in not submitting the EDCA agreement for Senate concurrence
not because of the transcendental importance of the issue, but because the
petitioners satisfy the requirements in invoking the courts expanded
jurisdiction. Read more
Issue 5: W/N the non-submission of the EDCA agreement for concurrence by
the Senate violates the Constitution
No. The EDCA need not be submitted to the Senate for concurrence because
it is in the form of a mere executive agreement, not a treaty. Under the
Constitution, the President is empowered to enter into executive agreements
on foreign military bases, troops or facilities if (1) such agreement is not the
instrument that allows the entry of such and (2) if it merely aims to
implement an existing law or treaty.
EDCA is in the form of an executive agreement since it merely involves
adjustments in detail in the implementation of the MTD and the VFA. These
are existing treaties between the Philippines and the U.S. that have already
been concurred in by the Philippine Senate and have thereby met the
requirements of the Constitution under Art XVIII, Sec 25. Because of the
status of these prior agreements, EDCA need not be transmitted to the
Senate.
De Castro Dissent
No. The EDCA is entirely a new treaty, separate and distinct from the VFA and
the MDT. Whether the stay of the foreign troops in the country is permanent
or temporary is immaterial because the Constitution does not distinguish.
The EDCA clearly involves the entry of foreign military bases, troops or
facilities in the country. Hence, the absence of Senate concurrence to the
agreement makes it an invalid treaty.
8. ENDANGERED SPECIES MAY BE IMPLEADED AS THE REAL PARTIES-ININTEREST IN A CITIZENS SUIT (RESIDENT VS DOE, 2015)
Resident Marine Mammals vs Secretary of Department of Energy
Case Digest GR 180771 April 21 2015
Facts:
In 2002, the Department of Energy entered into a Geophysical Survey and
Exploration Contract with JAPEX, a 100% Japanese corporation, which was later
converted to a service contract, known as SC-46, for the exploration, development
14

and utilization of petroleum resources in an area that basically affects the Tanon
Strait. The President at that time was not a signatory to the SC-46 and such
contract was not submitted to the Congress for review.
Tanon Strait is a narrow passage of water in Cebu which harbors a biodiversity of
marine life and is declared by laws as a protected seascape. When JAPEX started
its seismic surveys and drilling activities over the area, petitions were filed
assailing the constitutionality of SC-46. One petition protesting the activities for
its ecological impact was in the name of Resident Marine Mammals which are
literally toothed whales, turtles and such, joined in by human petitioners referred
to as Stewards, in their representative as well as personal capacity. Pres. Arroyo
was also impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner, purportedly because of her
express declaration and undertaking under the ASEAN Charter to protect habitats
and other environmental concerns.
FIDEC, an organization committed to the welfare of marginal fisherfolk in the area,
also questioned the SC-46 on the ground that service contracts are no longer
allowed under the 1987 Constitution, and that if it were, SC-46 is still null and void
because it did not comply with the Constitution, most especially the safeguards
that the Court laid down in La Bugal Blaan case.
Remedial Law
Issue 1: W/N the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general,
have standing as the real party-in-interests in this suit
Yes. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizens suit.
A citizens suit under this rule allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for the
enforcement of environmental law on behalf of minors or generations yet unborn.
It is essentially a representative suit that allows persons who are not real parties in
interest to institute actions on behalf of the real party in interest.
Leonen Dissent:
No. The animals cannot be real party-in-interests because Rule 3, Sec 1 of ROC
requires parties to an action to be either natural or juridical persons.
Extending the application of real party in interest to them through a judicial
pronouncement will potentially result in allowing petitions based on mere concern
rather than an actual enforcement of a right. It is impossible for animals to tell
humans what their concerns are. At best, humans can only surmise the extent of
injury inflicted, if there be any. Petitions invoking a right and seeking legal redress
before this court cannot just be a product of mere guesswork.
To allow citizens suits to enforce environmental rights of others, including future
generations, is dangerous for three reasons: First, they run the risk of foreclosing
arguments of others who are unable to take part in the suit, putting into question
its representativeness.
Second, varying interests may potentially result in
arguments that are bordering on political issues, the resolutions of which do not
fall upon this court. Third, automatically allowing a class or citizens suit on behalf
of minors and generations yet unborn may result in the oversimplification of what
may be a complex issue, especially in light of the impossibility of determining
future generations true interests on the matter.
Issue 2: W/N the name of former President Arroyo impleaded in the
petition as an unwilling co-plaintiff is proper

15

No. The name of Pres Arroyo as an unwilling plaintiff impleaded in the petition
should be stricken from the title of the case.
First, under Rule 3, Sec 10 of the ROC, when the consent of a party who should be
joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or she may be made a party defendant.
This will put the unwilling party under the jurisdiction of the court, which may
properly implead him or her through its processes. The unwilling partys name
cannot be simply included in the petition without her knowledge or consent, as
this would be a denial of due process.
Second, impleading the former President for an act she made in performance of
the functions of her office is contrary to the public policy against embroiling
Presidents in suits.
Political Law
Issue 3: W/N service contracts are no longer allowed by the 1987
Constitution
No. As settled in the La Bugal case, the deletion of the words service contracts
in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, the
deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission show that in
deliberating on Art XII Sec 2(4), they were actually referring to service contracts as
understood in the 1973 Constitution. The framers, in short, used the term service
contracts in referring to agreements involving technical or financial assistance.
Issue 4: W/N SC-46 is valid
No. The SC-46 is not valid because it did not comply with the Art XII, Sec 2 (4) of
the Constitution. First, it was not crafted in accordance with a general law that
provides standards, terms and conditions; second, it was not signed by the
President for and on behalf of the Philippine government; and third, it was not
reported by the President to the Congress within 30 days of execution.
RELEVANT LAWS
Article XII National Economy and Patrimony

Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such
activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.
The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
16

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by

Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
*** The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and
technical resources. The President shall notify the Congress of every contract
entered into in accordance with this provision, within 30 days from its execution.
La Bugal Blaan vs Ramos:
Service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils, subject to three important safeguards:

The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set
standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a
certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms
disadvantageous to the country
The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before
an agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted
several times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can
withstand public scrutiny.
Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to
Congress to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the
agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.
9. ILLEGALLY-PROCURED GOVERNMENT PROJECTS
TAXPAYERS SUIT (JACOMILLE VS DOTC, 2015)
Jacomille vs Secretary of DOTC

SUBJECT

TO

GR 212381 Apr 22 2015

Facts:
The LTO formulated the Motor Vehicle License Plate Standardization Program
(MVPSP) to supply the new license plates for both old and new vehicle registrants.
The DOTC, in its invitation for bidders on Feb 20, 2013, announced that it intends to
apply the sum of 3.8 billion for the contract. The award was granted to JKG Power
Plates on July 22, 2013. The contract signing, however, was halted. It was made
only on February 2014 when sufficient funds from the GAA 2014 were already made
available for the project.
Jacomille instituted a taxpayer suit questioning the procurement process on the
ground that it did not comply with the requirements of RA 9184 and its
implementing laws, and that when DOTC commenced the MVPSP, there was no
sufficient funding as reflected in the GAA 2013. Jacomille saw this as a clear
misrepresentation or even a deception by the said DOTC against the government
and the general public as a whole.
JKG Power Plates averred that the case was not a proper subject of taxpayer suit
because no taxes would be spent for this project. The money to be paid for the
plates would not come from taxes, but from payments of vehicle owners, who would
pay P450.00 for every pair of motor vehicle license plate, and P120.00 for every
17

motorcycle license plate. Out of the P450.00, the cost of the motor vehicle plate
would only be P380.00. In effect, the government would even earn P70.00 from
every pair of plate.
Issue: W/N Jacomillo has legal standing to maintain the suit
Held:
Yes. Jacomillo as a taxpaying citzen is a proper party because the MVPSP involves
the expenditure of public funds. While the motor vehicle registrants will pay for the
license plates, the bid documents and contract for MVPSP indicate that the
government shall bear the burden of paying for the project.
As a rule, a person suing as a taxpayer must show that the act complained of
directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.
Jacomillo satisfies this requirement when he alleges that public funds in the amount
of P3 .851 billion shall be used in a project that has undergone an improper
procurement process. ##
Note:
Because of irregularities in the procurement, the MVPSP was rendered null and void,
but was also made moot and academic by the appropriation for the full amount of
the project fund in GAA 2014. Said appropriation cured whatever defect the process
had.

10. PROHIBITION ON MAKING MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS NOT APPLICABLE

TO LOCAL EXECUTIVES (PROVINCE VS MARCO, 2015)
Province of Aurora vs Marco

GR 202331 Apr 22 2015

Facts:
Marco was permanently appointed as Corporate Development Specialist II by Gov.
Ong 5 days before the end of her term in June 30, 2004. His appointment, along
with 25 other appointments, was accompanied by a certification stating that funds
were available for the position. When the new Gov took over, the appointments
made by Gov Ong were revoked based on the recall made by Budget Officer
regarding the availability of funds for the position. Marcos sought reconsideration
from the CSC Regional Office but was denied. On appeal, the CSC through a
resolution dated Apr 14 held the validity of the appointment on the ground that it
complied with the CSC rules and that the recall of the certification did not affect its
validity because evidence was not presented.

Instead of filing an MR, the Province filed a petition for relief. It was denied by the
CSC because it was not allowed by the rules. Meanwhile, Marco filed a motion to
implement the Apr 14 Resolution, which was granted. The Province filed an MR of
the Apr 14 Resolution but was again denied because it was not filed within the 15day reglementary period. Finally, the Province filed before the CA a petition for
certiorari via Rule 43 against the CSCs second order implementing the Apr 14
resolution, invoking the constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments.
The CA denied the petition and upheld the CSC decision.
Political Law
18

Issue:
W/N the prohibition on midnight
appointments made by local executives

appointments

apply

to

No. The prohibition under Article VII, Sec 15 applies only to presidential
appointments, and not to those made by local executives. In this case, the
appointment is valid because there is no law that prohibits local elective officials
from making appointments during the last days of his/her tenure.
Remedial Law
Issue: W/N the CA is correct in taking cognizance over the case
No. The court should have dismissed the petition outright because no appeal may
be taken over an order of execution.
Under Rule 50, Sec 1 of the Rules of Court, the CA is allowed to dismiss an appeal
where the order appealed from is not appealable. This rule is based on the doctrine
of immutability of judgment, which states that a final and executory removes from
the court which renders it the power and jurisdiction to further alter or amend it,
much less revoked it. Thus, even if a judgment is later on discovered to be
erroneous, it remains immutable
RELEVANT LAWS:
Article VII, Sec 15 of the Constitution
SECTION 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Rule 50, Sec 1 of the Rules of Court
RULE 50: Dismissal of Appeal
Section 1.
Grounds for dismissal of appeal. An appeal may be dismissed by
the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following
grounds:
(a)
Failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that the appeal was taken
within the period fixed by these Rules;
(b)
Failure to file the notice of appeal or the record on appeal within the period
prescribed by these Rules;
(c)
Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in
section 5, Rule 40 and section 4 of Rule 41; (Bar Matter No. 803, 17 February 1998)
(d)
Unauthorized alterations, omissions or additions in the approved record on
appeal as provided in section 4 of Rule 44;
(e)
Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his
brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;
(f)
Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellants brief, or of page
references to the record as required in section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d) and (f) of
Rule 44;

(g)
Failure of the appellant to take the necessary steps for the correction or
completion of the record within the time limited by the court in its order;
19

(h)
Failure of the appellant to appear at the preliminary conference under Rule
48 or to comply with orders, circulars, or directives of the court without justifiable
cause; and
(i)

The fact that the order or judgment appealed from is not appealable. (1a)

11. DESPITE LACK OF PROCEEDINGS, COMPENSATION-DETERMINED-AT-THETIME-OF-TAKING RULE REMAINS (DPWH VS HERACLEO, 2015)
Secretary of DPWH vs Heracleo

GR 179334 Apr 21 2015

Facts:
Spouses Heracleo are the co-owners of a land which is among the private
properties traversed by MacArthur Highway in Bulacan, a government project
undertaken sometime in 1940. The taking was taken without the requisite
expropriation proceedings and without their consent. In 1994, Heracleo demanded
the payment of the fair market value of the property. The DPWH offered to pay 0.70
centavos per sqm., as recommended by the appraiser committee of Bulacan.
Unsatisfied, Heracleo filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages.
Favorable decisions were rendered by the RTC and the CA, with valuation of P 1,500
per sqm and 6% interest per annum from the time of filing of the until full payment.
The SC Division reversed the CA ruling and held that computation should be based
at the time the property was taken in 1940, which is 0.70 per sqm. But because of
the contrasting opinions of the members of the Division and transcendental
importance of the issue, the case was referred to the En Banc for resolution.
Issue 1: W/N the taking of private property without due process should be
nullified
No. The governments failure to initiate the necessary expropriation proceedings
prior to actual taking cannot simply invalidate the States exercise of its eminent
domain power, given that the property subject of expropriation is indubitably
devoted for public use, and public policy imposes upon the public utility the
obligation to continue its services to the public. To hastily nullify said expropriation
in the guise of lack of due process would certainly diminish or weaken one of the
States inherent powers, the ultimate objective of which is to serve the greater
good.
Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the
return of the property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of
compensation.
Issue 2: W/N compensation is based on the market value of the property
at the time of taking
Yes. While it may appear inequitable to the private owners to receive an outdated
valuation, the long-established rule is that the fair equivalent of a property should
be computed not at the time of payment, but at the time of taking. This is because
the purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the property taken
but to compensate him for the loss thereof. The owner should be compensated only
for what he actually loses, and what he loses is the actual value of the property at
the time it is taken.
Issue 3: W/N the principle of equity should be applied in this case
No. The Court must adhere to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the
application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called for
20

only when such literal application is impossible. To entertain other formula for
computing just compensation, contrary to those established by law and
jurisprudence, would open varying interpretation of economic policies a matter
which this Court has no competence to take cognizance of. Equity and equitable
principles only come into full play when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence.
Velasco Dissent:
The States power of eminent domain is not absolute; the Constitution is clear that
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law.
As such, failure of the government to institute the necessary proceedings should
lead to failure of taking an individuals property. In this case, since the property was
already taken, the complainants must be equitably compensated for the loss
thereof.
For purposes of just compensation, the value of the land should be determined
from the time the property owners filed the initiatory complaint, earning interest
therefrom. To hold otherwise would validate the States act as one of expropriation
in spite of procedural infirmities which, in turn, would amount to unjust enrichment
on its part. To continue condoning such acts would be licensing the government to
continue dispensing with constitutional requirements in taking private property.

12. COMELEC CANNOT REGULATE ACTS OF OWNERSHIP EXERCISED BY

PUVS AND TRANSPORT TERMINAL OWNERS (1 UTAK VS COMELEC, 2015)
1 Utak vs CoMELEC GR 206020 April 14 2015
Facts:
In 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution 9615 providing rules that would
implement Sec 9 of RA 9006 or the Fair Elections Act. One of the provisions of the
Resolution provide that the posting of any election propaganda or materials during
the campaign period shall be prohibited in public utility vehicles (PUV) and within
the premises of public transport terminals. 1 UTAK, a party-list organization,
questioned the prohibition as it impedes the right to free speech of the private
owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC may impose the prohibition on PUVs and public
transport terminals during the election pursuant to its regulatory powers
delegated under Art IX-C, Sec 4 of the Constitution
No. The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate and not the
ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals.
The posting of election
campaign material on vehicles used for public transport or on transport terminals is
not only a form of political expression, but also an act of ownership it has nothing
to do with the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or transport terminal.
A franchise or permit to operate transportation utilities pertains to considerations
affecting the operation of the PUV as such, e.g., safety of the passengers, routes or
zones of operation, maintenance of the vehicle, of reasonable fares, rates, and
other charges, or, in certain cases, nationality. Thus, a government issuance, which
purports to regulate a franchise or permit to operate PUVs, must pertain to the
considerations affecting its operation as such. Otherwise, it becomes a regulation
or supervision not on the franchise or permit to operate, but on the very ownership
of the vehicle used for public transport.
21

The expression of ideas or opinion of an owner of a PUV, through the posting of

election campaign materials on the vehicle, does not affect considerations pertinent
to the operation of the PUV. Surely, posting a decal expressing support for a certain
candidate in an election will not in any manner affect the operation of the PUV as
such. Regulating the expression of ideas or opinion in a PUV, through the posting of
an election campaign material thereon, is not a regulation of the franchise or permit
to operate, but a regulation on the very ownership of the vehicle.
Issue 2: W/N the regulation is justified by the captive audience doctrine
No. A government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be
justified if the supposed captive audience may avoid exposure to the otherwise
intrusive speech. Here, the commuters are not forced or compelled to read the
election campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they
incapable of declining to receive the messages contained in the posted election
campaign materials since they may simply avert their eyes if they find the same
unbearably intrusive. Hence, the doctrine is not applicable.
A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise of censorship,
which undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the
ground that they are more offensive than others. Such selective restrictions have
been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home or the
degree of captivity makes it either impossible or impractical for the unwilling viewer
or auditor to avoid exposure.
Issue 3: W/N the regulation constitutes prior restraints on free speech
Yes. It unduly infringes on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of
speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals such as the owners
of PUVs and private transport terminals to express their preference, through the
posting of election campaign material in their property, and convince others to
agree with them.
Issue 4: W/N the regulation is a valid content-neutral regulation
No. The prohibition under the certain provisions of RA 9615 are content-neutral
regulations since they merely control the place where election campaign materials
may be posted, but the prohibition is repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails
to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation.
The restriction on free speech of owners of PUVs and transport terminals is not
necessary to a stated governmental interest. First, while Resolution 9615 was
promulgated by the COMELEC to implement the provisions of Fair Elections Act, the
prohibition on posting of election campaign materials on PUVs and transport
terminals was not provided for therein. Second, there are more than sufficient
provisions in our present election laws that would ensure equal time, space, and
opportunity to candidates in elections. Hence, one of the requisites of a valid
content-neutral regulation was not satisfied.
Requisites of a Valid Content-Neutral Regulation
A content-neutral regulation, for example, that which is merely concerned with the
incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and
under well-defined standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the
right to free speech, provided that the following requisites concur: first, the
government regulation is within the constitutional power of the Government;
second, it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; third, the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and fourth,
22

the incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to

the furtherance of that interest.
Art IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution:
The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of
transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all
grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any GOCC or its subsidiary.
Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and
space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public
information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
Sec 9 of RA 9006 Fair Elections Act:
Sec. 9. Posting of Campaign Materials. The COMELEC may authorize political
parties and party-list groups to erect common poster areas for their candidates in
not more than ten (10) public places such as plazas, markets, barangay centers and
the like, wherein candidates can post, display or exhibit election propaganda:
Provided that the size of the poster areas shall not exceed twelve (12) by sixteen
(16) feet or its equivalent.
Independent candidates with no political parties may likewise be authorized to erect
common poster areas in not more than ten (10) public places, the size of which shall
not exceed four (4) by six (6) feet or its equivalent.
Candidates may post any lawful propaganda material in private places with the
consent of the owner thereof, and in public places or property which shall be
allocated equitably and impartially among the candidates.
13. Due Process is Demandable as a Matter of Right in JBC Proceedings
(Jardeleza vs Sereno, 2014)
Jardeleza vs Sereno
GR 213181 August 19, 2014
Facts:
Following Justice Abads compulsory retirement, the JBC announced the application
or recommendations for the position left by the Associate Justice. Jardeleza, the
incumbent Sol-Gen at the time, was included in the list of candidates. However, he
was informed through telephone call from some Justices that the Chief Justice
herself CJ Sereno, will be invoking Sec 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 or the so-called
unanimity rule against him. Generally, the rule is that an applicant is included in
the shortlist when s/he obtains affirmative vote of at least a majority of all the
members of the JBC. When Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, however, is invoked
because an applicants integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote is required.
Jardeleza was then directed to make himself available on June 30, 2014 before the
JBC during which he would be informed of the objections to his integrity.
Jardeleza wrote a letter-petition asking the SC to exercise its supervisory power and
direct the JBC to, among others, give Jardeleza a written notice and sworn written
statements of his oppositors or any documents in the JBC hearings, and to disallow
CJ Sereno from participating in the voting process for nominees on June 30, 2014.
23

During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, Justice Carpio appeared and disclosed
a confidential information which, to CJ Sereno, characterized Jardelezas integrity as
dubious. Jardeleza demanded that CJ Sereno execute a sworn statement specifying
her objections and that he be afforded the right to cross-examine her in a public
hearing. He also requested deferment of the JBC proceedings, as the SC en banc has
yet to decide in his letter-petition.
However, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote for the
nominees to be included in the shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC released the shortlist of
4 nominees. It was revealed later that there were actually 5 nominees who made it
to the JBC shortlist, but 1 nominee could not be included because of the invocation
of the unanimity rule..
Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus via Rule 65 with prayer for TRO to
compel the JBC to include him in the list of nominees on the grounds that the JBC
and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having
garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.
Political Law
Issue: W/N the right to due process is demandable as a matter of right in
JBC proceedings
Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not mean that
an applicants access to the rights afforded under the due process clause is
discretionary on the part of JBC.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings.
Notwithstanding being a class of its own, the right to be heard and to explain
ones self is availing. In cases where an objection to an applicants qualifications is
raised, the observance of due process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBCs
duty to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the
nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process supports
and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently
denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is
presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding
the body from making an unsound and capricious assessment of information
brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in
its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side
of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only
test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.
Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been
included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of
Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 per se, but from the violation by the JBC of its own
rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process. By no means does the Court
intend to strike down the unanimity rule as it reflects the JBCs policy and,
therefore, wisdom in its selection of nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to turn a
blind eye on the palpable defects in its implementation and the ensuing treatment
that Jardeleza received before the Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a
nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe
the minimum requirements of due process. ##
Remedial Law
Issue 1: W/N the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case
24

Yes. Jardelezas allegations in his petitions merits the exercise of the Courts
supervisory authority over the JBC. Under Sec 8, Art VIII of the Constitution, the JBC
shall function under the supervision of the SC. It follows that such supervisory
authority covers the overseeing of whether the JBC complies with its own rules or
not.
Issue 2: W/N a writ of mandamus is available against the JBC
No. The JBCs duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not be compelled to do
something.
Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but
not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to
control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes
upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to
any matter in which he is required to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised
and not that of the court.
Issue 3: W/N a writ of certiorari under Sec 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is available against the JBC (which is not exercising quasi-judicial
functions)
Yes. Under the expanded jurisdiction or expanded power of judicial review vested to
the SC by the 1987 Constitution, a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to
question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the ground
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any
branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions

14. Distinction Between the Supreme Courts Expanded Jurisdiction and

Power of General Supervision Over the JBC (Villanueva vs JBC, 2015)
Villanueva vs JBC
GR 211833 April 7, 2015
Facts:
After about a year from being appointed as a MCTC judge, Judge Villanueva applied
for the vacant position of presiding judge in some RTC branches. The JBC however
informed him that he was not included in the list of candidates for such position
because the JBCs long-standing policy requires 5 years of service as judge of firstlevel courts before one can apply as judge for second-level courts. Before the SC,
he assailed via Rule 65 and Rule 63 with prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction
the policy of JBC on the ground that it is unconstitutional and was issued with grave
abuse of discretion. Allegedly, the policy also violates procedural due process for
lack of publication and non-submission to the UP Law Center Office of the National
Administrative Register (ONAR), adding that the policy should have been published
because it will affect all applying judges.
On the other hand, one of the JBCs arguments was that the writ of certiorari and
prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function
under the Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is
not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function.
Issue 1: W/N the policy of JBC requiring 5-year service is constitutional

25

Yes. As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend

appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially
transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in
the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued
with public interest as it determines the men and women who will sit on the judicial
bench. While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of
the judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and
procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.
Issue 2: W/N JBC committed grave abuse of discretion in laying down such
policy
No. The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and
incidental to the JBCs principal function of choosing and recommending nominees
for vacancies in the judiciary for appointment by the President. However, the
Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow
in determining applicants qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC
has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every
vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the
Constitution and law for every position. The search for these long held qualities
necessarily requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine who is most fit
among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in
performing its duties.
Issue 3: W/N the violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
No. The equal protection clause is not violated because the classification created by
the challenged policy satisfies the rational basis test.
Substantial distinctions do exist between lower court judges with five year
experience and those with less than five years of experience, like the petitioner, and
the classification enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its
legitimate purpose. The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a
second-level court, which is five years experience as judge of a first-level court, is a
direct adherence to the qualities prescribed by the Constitution. Placing a premium
on many years of judicial experience, the JBC is merely applying one of the stringent
constitutional standards requiring that a member of the judiciary be of proven
competence.
In determining competence, the JBC considers, among other
qualifications, experience and performance.
CIVIL LAW
Issue 1: W/N the policy of JBC should have been published in the ONAR
No. The JBC policy need not be filed in the ONAR because the publication
requirement in the ONAR is confined to issuances of administrative agencies under
the Executive branch of the government. Since the JBC is a body under the
supervision of the Supreme Court, it is not covered by the publication requirements
of the Administrative Code.
Issue 2: W/N the policy of JBC should have been published
Yes. As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes,
including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing
laws, attain binding force and effect. Exempted from requirement of publication are
interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, which regulate only
the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, and the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
26

Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules and
regulations exempted from the publication requirement. It involves a qualification
standard by which the JBC shall determine proven competence of an applicant. It is
not an internal regulation, because if it were, it would regulate and affect only the
members of the JBC and their staff. Notably, the selection process involves a call to
lawyers who meet the qualifications in the Constitution and are willing to serve in
the Judiciary to apply to these vacant positions. Thus, naturally it follows that
potential applicants be informed of the requirements to the judicial positions, so
that they would be able to prepare for and comply with them.
Jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a statute should be published. Thus,
by analogy, publication is also required for the five-year requirement because it
seeks to implement a constitutional provision requiring proven competence from
members of the judiciary.
REMEDIAL LAW
Issue 1: W/N the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are applicable to
JBC (Remedial)
Yes. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and
reach. Under Rule 65, Sec 1(par 1), the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be
issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation,
board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to
set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if
the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
Consequently, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to
raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials.
Here, the JBC indeed does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and
screening applicants, the JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity
nor assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative.
However, since the formulation of guidelines and criteria is necessary and incidental
to the exercise of the JBCs constitutional mandate, a determination must be made
on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.
Issue 2: W/N the remedy of mandamus is proper in assailing the policy of
the JBC
No. First, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly
compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound discretion
by the JBC. Second, petitioner has no clear legal right since there is no law that
grants him the right of promotion to second-level courts.
Issue 3: W/N the remedy of declaratory relief is proper
No. First, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy.
Rather, the petition specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has
the right to be included in the list of applicants although he failed to meet JBCs fiveyear requirement policy. Again, no person possesses a legal right under the
Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant judicial positions. The
opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially
enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person. The inclusion in the
list of candidates, which is one of the incidents of such appointment, is not a right
27

either. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim any right that could have been affected by
the assailed policy.
Second, the SC does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory
relief even if only questions of law are involved. The special civil action of
declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC
pursuant to BP 129, Sec 19, as amended by R.A. No. 7691.
The SC assumes jurisdiction over the petition only because of the Courts
supervisory duty over the JBC and in the exercise of its expanded judicial power.
But in any event, even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant
petition should still be dismissed. ##
Issue 4: W/N the Court may exercise its supervisory jurisdiction over the JBC
separate from the exercise of its expanded jurisdiction over acts of grave abuse of
discretion of government agencies

15. Foundlings are Natural-Born Filipino Citizens (Grace Poe vs COMELEC,

2016)
Grace Poe vs COMELEC : GR 221697, GR 221698-700 March 8, 2016)
Facts:
In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is
a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before
9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from 24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the
PH for good. Before that however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and
fro between US and Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in
Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was
naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her
petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225.
She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before
assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her
American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she
stopped using her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the
ground particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born
Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them
were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that
she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed
material misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as
a candidate for Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the
natural-born citizenship issue.
Issue 1:
W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of
qualifications of candidates (Read Dissent)
Held:
No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of
the COMELEC, and deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is
not one among them.
28

In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have
sole jurisdiction over the election contests, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members, whereas over the President and Vice President, only the SC en
banc has sole jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of candidates for such positions,
the Constitution is silent. There is simply no authorized proceeding in determining
the ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such lack of provision cannot be
supplied by a mere rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for ineligibility
into grounds for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures would be
contrary to the intent of the Constitution.
Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the
qualification issue of Grace as a candidate in the same case for cancellation of her
COC.
Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen
(Read Dissent)
Held:
Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she
satisfies one of the constitutional requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may
run for presidency.
First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. Her physical
features are typical of Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a
municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such
that there would be more than 99% chance that a child born in such province is a
Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her parents nationality. That probability
and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not
the virtually impossible, as the norm.
Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, naturalborn citizens. This is based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered
by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitutions enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with
respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the intent of the framers.
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is
supported by treaties and the general principles of international law. Although the
Philippines is not a signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres to the customary
rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is
found.
Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement
Held:
Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus
revertendi in acquiring a new domicile.
Grace Poes domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July
18, 2006 when her application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. COMELECs
reliance on cases which decree that an aliens stay in the country cannot be
counted unless she acquires a permanent resident visa or reacquires her Filipino
citizenship is without merit. Such cases are different from the circumstances in this
case, in which Grace Poe presented an overwhelming evidence of her actual stay
29

and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled with her
eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her familys actual
continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe
returned on May 24, 2005, it was for good.
Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poes candidacy should be denied or cancelled for
committing material misrepresentations in her COC
Held:
No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented
facts as to her citizenship and residency because such facts refer to grounds for
ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide upon. Only when
there is a prior authority finding that a candidate is suffering from a disqualification
provided by law or the Constitution that the COMELEC may deny due course or
cancel her candidacy on ground of false representations regarding her
qualifications.
In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced
qualified as a candidate for the presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false
representations in her COC regarding her citizenship and residency.
GRACE POE VS COMELEC (SUMMARY)
CARPIO DISSENT: GR 221697 MARCH 8, 2016
Emotional pleas invoking the sad plight of foundlings conveniently forgets the
express language of the Constitution reserving those high positions, particularly the
Presidency, exclusively to natural-born Filipino citizens. Even naturalized Filipino
citizens, whose numbers are far more than foundlings, are not qualified to run for
President. The natural-born citizenship requirement under the Constitution to
qualify as a candidate for President must be complied with strictly. To rule otherwise
amounts to a patent violation of the Constitution.
A Mockery of National Election Process
There is no majority of the Supreme Court that holds Grace Poe is a natural-born
Filipino citizen since 7 5 justices voted that Grace Poe is a natural-born, while the
three others withheld their opinion.
Allowing a presidential candidate with uncertain citizenship status to be potentially
elected to the Office of the President, an office expressly reserved by the
Constitution exclusively for natural-born Filipino citizens, will lead to absurd results.
This ruling implies that the majority of this Court wants to resolve the citizenship
status of petitioner after the elections, and only if petitioner wins the elections,
despite petitioner having already presented before the COMELEC all the evidence
she wanted to present to prove her citizenship status.
If petitioner wins the elections but is later disqualified by this Court (acting as PET)
for not possessing a basic qualification for the Office of the President that of being
a natural-born Filipino citizen those who voted for petitioner would have utterly
wasted their votes.
On Comelecs All-Encompassing Jurisdiction
The initial determination of who are qualified to file COC with the Comelec clearly
falls within the all-encompassing constitutional mandate of the Comelec to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
The Constitution also empower the Comelec to decide, except those involving the
right to vote, all questions affecting elections. The power to decide all questions
30

affecting elections necessarily includes the power to decide whether a candidate

possesses the qualifications required by law for election to public office. This broad
constitutional power and function vested in the Comelec is designed precisely to
avoid any situation where a dispute affecting elections is left without any legal
remedy.

If one who is obviously not a natural-born Philippine citizen, like Arnold

Schwarzenneger, runs for President, the Comelec is certainly not powerless to
cancel the certificate of candidacy of such candidate. There is no need to wait until
after the elections before such candidate may be disqualified.

In fact, the COMELEC is empowered to motu proprio cancel COCs of nuisance

candidates.
It cannot be disputed that a person, not a natural-born Filipino citizen, who files a
certificate of candidacy for President puts the election process in mockery and is
therefore a nuisance candidate. Such persons certificate of candidacy can motu
proprio be cancelled by the COMELEC under Section 69 of the OEC, which empowers
the COMELEC to cancel motu proprio the COC if it has been filed to put the election
process in mockery. (Timbol vs Comelec, 2015)
Who are Natural-Born Filipino Citizens
The following are deemed natural-born Filipino citizens: (1) those whose fathers or
mothers are Filipino citizens, and (2) those whose mothers are Filipino citizens and
were born before 17 January 1973 and who elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.
The 1987 constitutional provision treating as natural-born Filipino citizens those
born before 17 January 1973 of Filipino mothers and alien fathers, and who elected
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, has a retroactive effect. (Co
vs HRET, 1991)
The Court declared that this constitutional provision was enacted to correct the
anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was
automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. Under
earlier laws, if one so elected, he was not conferred the status of a natural-born.
Those whose fathers or mothers are neither Filipino citizens are not natural-born
Filipino citizens. If they are not natural-born Filipino citizens, they can acquire
Philippine citizenship only under Article IV, Sec 1 (5) of the 1935 Constitution which
refers to Filipino citizens who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Intent of the Framers of 1935 Constitution
There is no silence of the Constitution on foundlings because the majority of the
delegates to the 1934 Constitutional Convention expressly rejected the proposed
amendment of Delegate Rafols to classify children of unknown parentage as Filipino
citizens.
1.
Three delegates voiced their objections to Rafolss amendment, namely
Delegates Buslon, Montinola, and Roxas. Delegate Teofilo Buslon suggested that the
subject matter be left in the hands of the legislature, which meant that Congress
would decide whether to categorize as Filipinos ( 1) natural or illegitimate children
of Filipino mothers and alien fathers who do not recognize them; and (2) children of
unknown parentage / foundlings.
31

 If that were the case, foundlings were not and could not validly be considered as
natural-born Filipino citizens as defined in the Constitution since Congress would
then provide the enabling law for them to be regarded as Filipino citizens.
Foundlings would be naturalized citizens since they acquire Filipino citizenship in
accordance with law under paragraph (5), Section 1 of Article IV of the 193 5
Constitution.
Significantly, petitioner and the Solicitor General, conveniently left out Delegate
Buslons opinion.
2. None of the framers of the 1935 Constitution mentioned the term natural-born
in relation to the citizenship of foundlings. Again, under the 1935 Constitution, only
those whose fathers were Filipino citizens were considered natural-born Filipino
citizens. Those who were born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers were still
required to elect Philippine citizenship, preventing them from being natural-born
Filipino citizens.
If the framers intended that foundlings be considered natural-born Filipino
citizens, this would have created an absurd situation where a child with unknown
parentage would be placed in a better position than a child whose mother is
actually known to be a Filipino citizen. The framers of the 1935 Constitution could
not have intended to create such an absurdity.
3. Delegate Rafolss amendment, when put to a vote, was clearly rejected by the
majority of the delegates to the 1934 Constitutional Convention.

The rejection of the Rafols amendment not only meant the non-inclusion in the
text of the Constitution of a provision that children with unknown parentage are
Filipino citizens, but also signified the rejection by the delegates of the idea or
proposition that foundlings are Filipino citizens at birth just like natural-born citizens.
While the framers discussed the matter of foundlings because of Delegate Rafolss
amendment, they not only rejected the Rafols proposal but also clearly manifested
that foundlings could not be citizens of the Philippines at birth like children of
Filipino fathers.
4. Only the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws, which articulated the presumption on the place of birth of
foundlings, existed during the deliberations on the 1935 Constitution. The 1930
Hague Convention does not guarantee a nationality to a foundling at birth.
Therefore, there was no prevailing customary international law at that time, as there
is still none today, conferring automatically a nationality to foundlings at birth.
International Laws Applicable to Foundlings
There is no conventional or customary international law automatically conferring
nationality to foundlings at birth
There are only two general principles of international law applicable to foundlings.
First is that a foundling is deemed domiciled in the country where the foundling is
found. A foundling is merely considered to have a domicile at birth, not a
nationality at birth. Stated otherwise, a foundling receives at birth a domicile of
origin which is the country in which the foundling is found.
Second, in the absence of proof to the contrary, a foundling is deemed born in the
country where the foundling is found. These two general principles of international
law have nothing to do with conferment of nationality.
32

There is a difference between citizenship at birth because of jus soli, and citizenship
at birth because of jus sanguinis. The former may be granted to foundlings under
Philippine statutory law pursuant to Art IV, Sec 1 (5) of the 1935 Constitution but
the Philippine citizenship thus granted is not that of a natural-born citizen but that
of a naturalized citizen. Only those citizens at birth because of jus sanguinis, which
requires blood relation to a parent, are natural-born Filipino citizens under the 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Any treaty, customary international law, or generally accepted international law
principle has the status of municipal statutory law. As such, it must conform to our
Constitution in order to be valid in the Philippines.
Foundlings are Deemed Naturalized Filipino Citizens
If a childs parents are neither Filipino citizens, the only way that the child may be
considered a Filipino citizen is through the process of naturalization in accordance
with statutory law under Art IV, Sec 1 (5) of the 193 5 Constitution.
If a childs parents are unknown, as in the case of a foundling, there is no basis to
consider the child as a natural-born Filipino citizen since there is no proof that either
the childs father or mother is a Filipino citizen. Thus, the only way that a foundling
can be considered a Filipino citizen under the 1935 Constitution, as well as under
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is for the foundling to be naturalized in
accordance with law.
On the Ruling that Grace Poe Might be a Filipino Citizen
There is no law or jurisprudence which supports the contention that natural-born
citizenship can be conferred on a foundling based alone on statistical probability.
On Adoption Laws
Philippine laws and jurisprudence on adoption is simply not determinative of
natural-born citizenship.
On Burden of Proof
Since the Constitution requires that the President of the Philippines shall be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, it is imperative that petitioner prove that she
is a natural-born Filipino citizen, despite the fact that she is a foundling. The burden
of evidence shifted to her when she admitted her status as a foundling with no
known biological parents. At that moment, it became her duty to prove that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen.
Grace Poe is NOT a Natural-born Filipino Citizen
1. There is no Philippine law automatically conferring Philippine citizenship to a
foundling at birth. Even if there were, such a law would only result in the foundling
being a naturalized Filipino citizen, not a natural-born Filipino citizen.
2. Second, there is no legal presumption in favor of Philippine citizenship, whether
natural-born or naturalized. Citizenship must be established as a matter of fact and
any doubt is resolved against the person claiming Philippine citizenship.
3. Third, the letter and intent of the 1935 Constitution clearly excluded foundlings
from being considered natural-born Filipino citizens. The Constitution adopts the jus
sanguinis principle, and identifies natural-born Filipino citizens as only those whose
fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens. Petitioner failed to prove that either her
father or mother is a Filipino citizen.
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4. Fourth, there is no treaty, customary international law or a general principle of

international law granting automatically Philippine citizenship to a foundling at birth.
Petitioner failed to prove that there is such a customary international law. At best,
there exists a presumption that a foundling is domiciled, and born, in the country
where the foundling is found.
5. Fifth, even assuming that there is a customary international law presuming that
a foundling is a citizen of the country where the foundling is found, or is born to
parents possessing the nationality of that country, such presumption cannot prevail
over our Constitution since customary international law has the status merely of
municipal statutory law. This means that customary international law is inferior to
the Constitution, and must yield to the Constitution in case of conflict. Since the
Constitution adopts the jus sanguinis principle, and identifies natural-born Filipino
citizens as only those whose fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens, then petitioner
must prove that either her father or mother is a Filipino citizen for her to be
considered a natural-born Filipino citizen. Any international law which contravenes
the jus sanguinis principle in the Constitution must of course be rejected.
6. Sixth, petitioner failed to discharge her burden to prove that she is a naturalborn Filipino citizen. Being a foundling, she admitted that she does not know her
biological parents, and therefore she cannot trace blood relation to a Filipino father
or mother. Without credible and convincing evidence that petitioners biological
father or mother is a Filipino citizen, petitioner cannot be considered a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
7. Seventh, a foundling has to perform an act, that is, prove his or her status as a
foundling, to acquire Philippine citizenship. This being so, a foundling can only be
deemed a naturalized Filipino citizen because the foundling has to perform an act to
acquire Philippine citizenship. Since there is no Philippine law specifically governing
the citizenship of foundlings, their citizenship is addressed by customary
international law, namely: the right of every human being to a nationality, and the
States obligations to avoid statelessness and to facilitate the naturalization of
foundlings.
GRACE POE VS COMELEC
BRION DISSENT: GR 221697 MARCH 8, 2016
Summary
On COMELECs Jurisdiction
COMELECs quasi-judicial power in resolving a Section 78 proceeding includes the
determination of whether a candidate has made a false material representation in
his CoC, and the determination of whether the eligibility he represented in his CoC is
true.
1. In Tecson v. COMELEC, the Court has recognized the COMELECs jurisdiction in
a Section 78 proceeding over a presidential candidate.

2. The Courts conclusion in this case would wreak havoc on existing jurisprudence
recognizing the COMELECs jurisdiction to determine a candidates eligibility in the
course of deciding a Section 78 proceeding before it. The ponencia disregarded the
cases involving Section 78 since the year 2012 (when 2012 COMELEC Rules was
published) where it recognized the COMELECs jurisdiction to determine eligibility as
part of determining false material representation in a candidates CoC.
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 In Ongsiako-Reyes v. COMELEC, the Court affirmed the COMELECs cancellation

of Ongsiako-Reyes CoC and affirmed its determination that Ongsiako-Reyes is
neither a Philippine citizen nor a resident of Marinduque.
The Court even affirmed the COMELECs capability to liberally construe its own
rules of procedure in response to Ongsiako-Reyes allegation that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in admitting newly-discovered evidence that had not
been testified on, offered and admitted in evidence.
In Cerafica, the Court held that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
holding that Kimberly Cerafica (a candidate for councilor) did not file a valid CoC
and subsequently cannot be substituted by Olivia Cerafica. Kimberlys CoC is
considered valid unless the contents therein (including her eligibility) is impugned
through a Section 78 proceeding.
2. The ponencias reliance on Fermins is out of context.

Fermin clarified that Section 78 of the OEC is to be read in relation to the

constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office.
If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is
false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or
cancel such certificate.
A proceeding under Section 78 is likened to a quo warranto proceeding under
Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a
candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a Section 78 petition is filed
before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of
the winning candidate.
3. Rules 23 of the 2012 COMELEC Rules of Procedure does not limit the COMELECs
jurisdiction in determining the eligibility of a candidate in the course of ruling on a
Section 78 proceeding.
The second paragraph in Rule 23 delineates the distinction between a Section 78
cancellation proceeding and a Section 68 disqualification proceeding; to avoid the
muddling or mixing of the grounds for each remedy, the COMELEC opted to provide
that petitions that combine or substitute one remedy for the other shall be
dismissed summarily. Naturally, the text of this second paragraph also appears in
Rule 25, which provides for the grounds for a petition for disqualification.
The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under section 78, the
qualifications for elective office are misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy
and the proceedings must be initiated before the elections, whereas a petition for
quo warranto under section 253 may be brought on the basis of two grounds (1)
ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, and must be initiated
within 10 days after the proclamation of the election results.
Under section 253, a candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to
office, and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office.
4. If we were to follow the ponencias limitation on the COMELECs function to
determine Poes eligibility to become President in a Section 78 proceeding, the
logical result would be that even this Court itself cannot rule on Poes citizenship
and residence eligibilities in the course of reviewing a Section 78 COMELEC ruling;
any declaration regarding these issues would be obiter dictum.

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 The effect would be that any pronouncements outside the COMELECs limited
jurisdiction in Section 78 would only be expressions of the COMELECs opinion and
would have no effect in the determination of the merits of the Section 78 case
before it. Findings of ineligibility outside of the limits do not need to be resolved or
even be touched by this Court. Thus, in the present case, Poe can simply be a
candidate for the presidency, with her eligibilities open to post-election questions, if
still necessary at that point.

On the Citizenship of Foundlings

It was never the intent of the framers of 1935 Constitution to presume that
foundlings are natural born citizens.
1. Ironically, the ponencia s citation of Jose M. Aruegos recounting of the
deliberations even reinforces the position that the framers never intended to include
foundlings within the terms of the 1935 Constitutions parentage provisions.
Aruego said that the Rafols amendment was defeated primarily because the
Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a
provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory
legislation.
2. The ponencias ruling thus does not only disregard the distinction of citizenship
based on the father or the mother under the 1935 Constitution; it also misreads
what the records signify and thereby unfairly treats the children of Filipino mothers
under the 1935 Constitution who, although able to trace their Filipino parentage,
must yield to the higher categorization accorded to foundlings who .do not enjoy
similar roots.
On Burden of Proof
Procedural Aspect of the Burden of Proof
1. The original petitioners before the COMELEC (the respondents in the present
petitions) from the perspective of procedure carried the burden under its Section
78 cancellation of CoC petition, to prove that Poe made false material
representations.
2. Since Poe could not factually show that either of her parents is a Philippine
citizen, the COMELEC concluded that the original petitioners are correct in their
position that they have discharged their original burden to prove that Poe is not a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. To arrive at its conclusion, the COMELEC
considered and relied on the terms of the 1935 Constitution.
3. With this original burden discharged, the burden of evidence then shifted to Poe
to prove that despite her admission that she is a foundling, she is in fact a naturalborn Filipino, either by evidence (not necessarily or solely DNA in character) and by
legal arguments supporting the view that a foundling found in the Philippines is a
natural-born citizen.

Substantive Aspect: Citizenship Cannot be Presumed

4. From the substantive perspective, too, a sovereign State has the right to
determine who its citizens are.

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5. The list of Filipino citizens under the Constitution must be read as exclusive and
exhaustive.
In Paa v. Chan, this Court categorically ruled that it is incumbent upon the
person who claims Philippine citizenship, to prove to the satisfaction of the court
that he is really a Filipino. This should be true particularly after proof that the
claimant has not proven (and even admits the lack of proven) Filipino parentage.
6. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship,
and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State.

7. The exercise by a person of the rights and/or privileges that are granted to
Philippine citizens is not conclusive proof that he or she is a Philippine citizen.
8. Based on these considerations, the Court majoritys ruling on burden of proof at
the COMELEC level appears to be misplaced. On both counts, procedural and
substantive (based on settled jurisprudence), the COMELEC closely hewed to the
legal requirements. Thus, the Court majoritys positions on where and how the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion are truly puzzling. With no grave
abuse at the COMELEC level, the present petitioners own burden of proof in the
present certiorari proceedings before this Court must necessarily fail
HRET HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER DISQUALIFICATION ISSUES INVOLVING A
NON-MEMBER CANDIDATE (WIGBERTO TANADA VS HRET, 2016)
Wigberto Tanada vs HRET
GR 217012 March 1, 2016
Facts:
Wigberto Tanada filed twin petitions before the COMELEC to cancel the COC of Alvin
John Tanada for false representations and to declare him as a nuisance candidate.
They were both candidates for the position of Congress Representative. A COMELEC
division denied both his petitions, but on reconsideration, the COMELEC en banc on
April 13, 2013 granted to cancel the COC of Alvin John for false representations.
The petition to declare him as nuisance candidate however was denied. Wigberto
again sought reconsideration of the denial of his petition on the basis of a newly
discovered evidence. Comes election day and the name of Alvin John remained in
the ballots, whichafter Angelica Tan was the winning candidate, and Wigberto only
second.
Wigberto filed before the PBOC a petition to correct manifest mistakes concerning
the cancelled candidacy of Alvin John and a motion to consolidate Alvin Johns votes
with the votes he garnered. The PBOC denied the motion to consolidate the votes
because Alvin John was not a nuisance candidate. PBOC then proclaimed Angelica
as the winner.
On May 21, 2013, Wigberto filed a supplemental petition before the COMELEC to
annul the proclamation of Tan, which was granted and affirmed by the COMELEC en
banc. However, Angelica had by then taken her oath and assumed office past noon
time of June 30, 2013, thereby rendering the adverse resolution on her proclamation
moot.
On May 27, 2013, before the SC, Wigberto filed a certiorari assailing the April 25,
2013 COMELEC en bancs ruling declaring Alvin John not a nuisance candidate and
an election protest claiming that fraud has been perpetrated. The SC, noting that
the proclaimed candidate has already assumed office, dismissed the election
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protest and directed Wigberto to file the protest before the proper tribunal which is
the HRET. The certiorari was also dismissed for being filed beyond the 5-day
reglementary period.
Before the HRET, the election protest was dismissed for being insufficient in form
and substance and for lack of jurisdiction over John Alvin who was not a member of
the House of Representatives.
Issue 1: W/N the votes for Alvin John should be credited in favor of
Wigberto as a result of the cancellation of Alvin Johns candidacy
Held:
No, the votes cast for Alvin John whose COC was cancelled are stray votes only. A
COC cancelled on ground of false representations under Sec 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, unlike in being a nuisance candidate in Sec 69, does not have the
effect of crediting the votes in favor of another candidate.
Issue 2: W/N the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC en
bancs ruling is proper
Held:
No, the motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Rule 13 Sec 1(d) of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure specifically prohibits the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in election
offense cases. Consequently, when a COMELEC en banc ruling become final and
executory, it precludes a party from raising again in any other forum the nuisance
candidacy as an issue.
Issue 3: W/N Wigbertos petition for certiorari of the COMELEC en bancs
ruling was timely
Held:
No, the petition assailing the COMELECs en banc ruling was filed beyond the 5-day
period provided by COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Rule 37, Sec 3 thereof provides
that decisions in pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course to or
cancel COC, to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate or to disqualify a
candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall become final and executory
after the lapse of 5 days from their promulgation, unless restrained by the SC.
The COMELEC en banc promulgated its resolution on Alvin Johns alleged nuisance
candidacy on April 25 2013. When Wigberto filed his petition for certiorari before
the SC on May 27,2013, the COMELEC en bancs resolution was already final and
executory.
Issue 4: W/N the SC has jurisdiction to resolve issues on the conduct of
canvassing after the proclamation of a winning candidate
Held:
No. The SC no longer has jurisdiction over questions involving the elections, returns
and qualifications of candidates who have already assumed their office as members
of House of Representatives. Issues concerning the conduct of the canvass and the
resulting proclamation of candidates are matters which fall under the scope of the
terms election and returns and hence, properly fall under the HRETs sole
jurisdiction.

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Issue 5: W/N the HRET has jurisdiction over the election protest filed by
Wigberto regarding the cancelled candidacy of John Alvin
Held:
No. Article VI, Sec 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 15 of the 2011 HRET Rules
declare that HRETs power to judge election contests is limited to Members of the
House of Representatives. Alvin John is not a Member of the House of
Representatives
Wigberto Tanada vs HRET
Perez Concurring: GR 217012 March 1, 2016
Summary of Justice Perez Concurring Opinion
1. HRET lacks the authority to rule whether a candidate is indeed a nuisance
candidate.
2. Under the HRET Rules, the electoral tribunal only has jurisdiction over two types
of election contests: election protests and quo warranto cases.
3. An election protest is the proper remedy against acts or omissions constituting
electoral frauds or anomalies in contested polling precincts, and for the revision of
ballots.
4. On the other hand, the eligibility of a member representative is impugned in a
quo warranto case. But the HRET Rules do not prescribe procedural guidelines on
how the COC of a political aspirant can be cancelled on the ground that he or she is
a nuisance candidate. Rather, this remedial vehicle is instituted in the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, particularly Rule 245 thereof, by virtue of Sec. 69 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
5. HRET is not vested with appellate jurisdiction over rulings on cancellation cases
promulgated by the COMELEC en banc. It is the SC which has jurisdiction and the
power to review such rulings from the Commission.
6. The the jurisdiction of the HRET, as circumscribed under Article VI, Section 1 7 of
the Constitution, is limited to the election, returns, and qualification of the members
of the House of Representatives. Thus, it cannot rule over an election protest
involving a non-member.
7. To be considered a member of the Lower House, there must be a concurrence of
the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3)
assumption of office

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VOTER VERIFIED PAPER AUDIT TRAIL (VVPAT) OR

ISSUANCE OF VOTE RECEIPTS IS MANDATORY (BAGUMBAYAN-VNP VS
COMELEC, 2016)

Bagumbayan-VNP vs COMELEC GR 222731, March 8 2016

Facts:
Bagumbayan-VNP and former Senator Gordon filed before the SC a petition for
mandamus to compel COMELEC to implement the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail
(VVPAT) which is a security feature provided under RA 8346, as amended by RA
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9369, to ensure the sanctity of the ballot. The VVPAT functionality is in the form of a
printed receipt and a touch screen reflecting the votes in the vote-counting
machine. For the 2016 elections, the COMELEC opted to use vote-counting
machines instead of PCOS. The vote-counting machines are capable of providing
the VVPAT functionality, and for that the COMELEC is now being petitioned to have
the vote-counting machines issue receipts once the person has voted.
The
COMELEC, however, refused to enable this feature for reasons that the receipts
might be used by candidates in vote-buying and that it might increase the voting
time in election precincts.
Issue: W/N the COMELEC must activate the VVPAT feature of the votecounting machines
Held:
Yes. The minimum functional capabilities enumerated under Section 6 of Republic
Act 8436, as amended, are mandatory.
The law is clear that a voter verified paper audit trail requires the following:
(a) individual voters can verify whether the machines have been able to count their
votes; and (b) that the verification at minimum should be paper based. Under the
Constitution, the COMELEC is empowered to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of election, and one of the laws that it must
implement is RA 8346 which requires the automated election system to have the
capability of providing a VVPAT. The COMELECs act of not enabling this feature
runs contrary to why the law requires this feature in the first place

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