CM615- STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT IN BUILT

ENVIRONMENT

MAJOR PROJECT
Bandra-Worli Sea Link
04 NOV 2014

SUBMITTED BY
S. No
1
2
3
4
5

Enrollment Numbers
A13567114013
A13567114019
A13559014077
A13559014076
A13559014074

Names
RafayBaqtiar Ahmad
B.Harsha Vardhan
Sonia Osik
Shashank Bharadwaj
Shushant Gosh

MBA CPM & CE-QS (SEC-B) (GROUP-2)

SCHOOL OF CONSTRUCTION
RICS SCHOOL OF BUILT ENVIRONMENT
AMITY UNIVERSITY, NOIDA

Table of Contents
1

INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................. 3

PROJECT SPECIFICS.........................................................................................................3

STAKEHOLDERS INVOLVED.............................................................................................3
3.1

INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS.......................................................................................3

3.2

EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS......................................................................................3

DYNAMISM IN STAKEHOLDER INFLUENCE.....................................................................3

4.1

POWER INTEREST GRID PHASE 1..........................................................................3

4.2

POWER INTEREST GRID PHASE 2..........................................................................3

4.3

POWER INTEREST GRID PHASE 3 ........................................................................3

ACTION................................................................................................................................ 3
5.1

ENGAGEMENT RISK PROFILE....................................................................................3

EVALUATION AND LEARNING............................................................................................4

STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT PLAN...............................................................................4

OBSERVATIONS..............................................................................................................4

CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................................4

10

REFERENCES.................................................................................................................4

11

APPENDIX........................................................................................................................ 4

Table of Abbreviations

BWSLP Bandra-Worli sea link project

EIA - Environmental impact assessment
MoEF - Ministry of environment and forest
EPA - Environment protection act
MPCB - Maharashtra pollution control board
BEAG - Bombay environmental action group
MMRDA - Mumbai municipal road development authority
IPT Indian Peoples Tribunal
CRZ - coastal regulation zone
CWPRS - Central power and research institute

1 INTRODUCTION

The BandraWorli Sea Link, also officially the Rajiv Gandhi Sea Link, is a cablestayed bridge with pre-stressed concrete viaduct approaches, which links Bandra and
the western suburbs of Mumbai with Worli and central Mumbai. The Sea Link reduces
travel time between Bandra and Worli from 4560 minutes to 7 minutes. The link has an
average daily traffic of around 37,500 vehicles per day and is 4.7kms long. The Bandra
Worli Sea Link Road Project (BWSLP) is a part of the Western Freeway Sea Project,
which, in turn, is part of a larger proposal of upgrade the road transportation network of
greater Mumbai as per the report prepared by the Central Road Research Station,
which had been commissioned by the Maharashtra Government. The project is planned
with a view to provide an additional corridor for the free flow of traffic from Bandra to
Worli in the first phase and Worli to Nariman Point in the second phase. The link is
meant primarily to provide an alternative to the Mahim Causeway route that is presently
the only connection between the Island-city and the Western and Central suburbs.
The cost of the project 1634 crore rupees though the project was estimated to be about
300 crore (430% cost overrun). The project was 5 years behind schedule. Project was
completed in 2010. Construction began in the year 2000 and was completed on 24th
march 2010. Charging a toll of almost Rs 10 per one kilometre, the 5.6-km sea link is
one of the highest tolled roads in the state.

BandraWorli Sea-Link.

2 PROJECT SPECIFICS
The project was commissioned by Maharshtra state road Development Corporation
(MSRDC). HCC (Hindustan Construction Corporation) was the contractor for the
project. The contract has been given on Build-Operate-Transfer basis. In 2001 Dar-AlHandasah was chosen as the project management consultants after replacing
Severdup consultants were dropped for failure to provide a competent project
management. It is India's first bridge to be constructed in open-sea conditions. It is 4.7
km long, with twin, 4-lane independent carriageway bridge across the open sea. Some
further engineering specifications are as follows:

16-lane toll plaza with 20-m wide promenade together with state-of-the-art traffic

monitoring, surveillance, information and control systems

Up to 25-m high pier in open sea, giving ample headroom to marine traffic.
2342 pre-cast segments for total bridge with varied width.
Largest span for cable-stayed bridge in India.

The entire project was originally conceived as one large project comprising, different
components, but in order to accelerate the overall construction schedule, the project
has been divided into five construction phases :

Phase I: Construction of flyover over Love Grove junction at Worli.

Phase II: Construction of cloverleaf interchange at Mahim intersection.
Phase III: Construction of solid approach road from the Mahim intersection up to

the start of the Toll Plaza on the Bandra side and a public promenade.
Phase IV: Construction of Cable-Stayed Bridges together with viaduct
approaches extending from Worli up to the Toll Plaza at Bandra end, Intelligent

Bridge System (IBS).

Phase V: Improvement to Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan Road.

Phase IV is the largest and main phase of Bandra-Worli Sea Link Project. The work
under this phase was awarded to HCC. Main features of this technically challenging
phase were:

Cable-Stayed Bridge including viaduct approaches extending from Worli up

to Toll Plaza at Bandra end

Modern Toll Plaza

Goals of Bandra-Worli sea link:

1. Savings in travelling time and reduction of vehicular traffic.
2. Reduction in air and noise pollution near residential areas of Mahim, Prabhadevi,
Dadar.
3. Reduction in number of accidents by upgrading the road transportation network.

The History of the Project till commencement of project:

1983:
Central Road Research Institute commissioned by the state of Maharashtra to carry out
a study of the road transportation network of the Mumbai Metropolitan Region. Four
major roads proposed as an integrated solution including the West Island Freeway
linking the Bandra-Nariman Point road of which the Bandra-Worli Sea Link forms an
integral part.
February 1991:
The Central Government through its Ministry of Environment and Forests issues a
notification regarding the Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) Notification which prohibits
reclamation between the high tide line and the low tide line and which would create any
obstruction in the flow of tidal waves of the sea.
16 March 1991:
Mangroves and nature park areas of around 184.14 ha. In Mahim creek declared as
protected forest by a Maharashtra Gazette Notification under the Indian Forest Act
October 1992:
BMRDA prepares a new plan and prepares a feasibility report for the sea route link
between Bandra and Worli. At this point no notice was issued inviting public objections
and suggestions and no plan was published.

June 1993:
Maharashtra Government, through its public works department, approached the Centre
for Environmental clearance of the project. The Union Government declines to sanction
the project.
September 1993:
BMRDA invites 30 select persons for a seminar on the Bandra-Worli project most of
whom are either government or municipal officials and only five representing NGOs.
27 January 1994:
Ministry of Environment and Forest Notification under the Environment Protection Act
prescribing that no modernization of any activity which would increase the pollution level
or any new project which would fall under Schedule 1 to the Notification would be
undertaken in any part of India without being given environmental clearance by the
Central Government in accordance with the procedure prescribed.
4 May 1994:
Further notification of the MoEF modifying the notification dated 27 January, 1994,
giving the Central Government discretion to dispense with the requirements of public
notice if satisfied that the same was in the public interest.
1995:
The Maharashtra government forwards its Coastal Zone Management Plan to the
Central Government for its approval as required by the CRZ notification. This plan
include the possible construction of the Bandra-Worli Sea Link project but the alignment
as quoted in the report may be accepted as part of the CZMP.
27 September 1996:
The Central Ministry of Environment and Forests, approves the Coastal Zone
Management Plan subject to terms and conditions, as a result of which the sanction to
the said Bandra Worli Sea Link is refused and all mangroves with an area of 1000 sq.

metres or more are to be classified as CRZ-I with a buffer of at least 50 meters and
areas in the Mithi river estuary also classified as CRZ-I
10 April 1997:
MoEF notification prescribing that every application for Environmental Clearance was
required to be accompanied by details of public hearing.
9 July 1997:
CRZ notification amended so as to permit reclamation and bunding for the construction
of bridges, sea links and other facilities essential for activities permissible under the
notification or for coastal erosion, cleaning of water waves, storm water drains etc.
8 May 1998:
Letter from the National Fish Workers Forum to the Secretary Urban Development
Department asking for the Project Report and Plans No response was received from
the Government.
1998:
Hearing given to the Mumbai Environmental Action Group with regard to the Bandra
Worli Project without providing them with any particulars, plans, maps or information.
7 January 1999:
The Central government grants Environmental Clearance of the said project without
holding a public hearing, subject to strict compliance of its terms and conditions.
11 January 1999:
Mr. Suresh Prabhu announced the sanctioning of the project in Mumbai
12 January 1999:
Maharashtra Machimar Kriti Samitis letter to the Chief Minister objecting to the
clearance of the project

June 1999:
Work on the Bandra-Worli Sea link commences.
9 July 1999:
Hundreds of fishermen hold demonstrations on the site of the project and demand its
cancellation.
2 October 1999:
Peaceful demonstration of hundreds of fisherfolk held on General Arun Kumar Vaidya
Road near Mahim Causeway.
23 November 1999:
Morcha held by fisher folk, and other social and environmental groups, Labour Unions
etc. Around 400 persons arrested and put in Bandra police custody.

After Commencement:
The project was approved in May 1991 after 7 years of delays and feasibility
studies. The budget approved in 1999 was 650 crore up from initial 300 crores with
slated completion in in mid-2001. But the work did not commence till December 1999.

The work was delayed uptil 2001 and was facing construction issues in monsoon. In
late 2001 the projects prime consultant Severdup was dropped for failure to provide a
competent project management. The replacement Dar Consultants modified the project
design by adding 2.8 kms to its length and splitting the two eight lane bridge into two 4
lane bridges. By 2002 the scheduled delivery date had shifted to 2004. In October 2004
the cost the cost increased by 50 crores. Due to paucity of fund the project was
delayed. A later bad monsoons and unpredictable work played spoil sport stopping
work. Meantime fishermans concern about interference and loss of livelihood issues
created uncertainty over project completion. Fishermen cried foul over loss of boat
parking space and the need had risen for them to walk daily to an alternative boat
parking causing lot dissatisfaction among the fishermen. The project delivery was now
in 2005. Meanwhile complaints from environmentalists regarding damage to marine
ecology grew. HCC the primary contractor requested an additional 300 crores to cover
delays and design changes but the government was ready to offer 120 crores. By June
2005 the project cost had risen to 1,306. But it was not until June 2009 that the project
was completed. The project in the end is completed in 1600 crores. A detailed summary
is explained further ahead in the paper.

Bandra-Worli Sea-Link Location.

Image from msrdc.org

3 STAKEHOLDERS INVOLVED
The project had faced strong delays by the fishermen from Mumbai on claims of
possible loss in their livelihood. Ministry of environmental affairs was approached by
these communities. Another such community was Save Worli Sea face committee;
they were the residents of the Worli sea frontage and opposed the construction to save
their frontage view. Heavy opposition was done to the project based on the ecological
disturbance that the bridge might cause. NGOs and environmentalists have claimed
possible flooding in Bandra area due to reclamation and narrowing of Mithi River. Hence
the project took a lot of time in getting the environmental clearances. The state body
Maharashtra pollution control board was made responsible by the ministry of external
affairs to hold public hearings and meetings. The external stakeholders claimed
objections to the project on 3 issues:
Illegality of the Project (based on permissions and clearances)
Impact of the Project on Livelihood, Environment and Traffic; and
Undesirability of the Project.

Illegality of the Project:

1.
2.
3.
4.

No Public hearing.
Incomplete environment assessment plan.
Project reports unavailable to the public.
CRZ violations due to reclamation.

Impact of the Project on Livelihood, Environment and Traffic:

1. Danger to protected species due to tree felling.
2. Impact on livelihood of communities.
3. Impact of additional traffic - congestion in south Mumbai.

Undesirability of project:
1. Impact due to blockage of Mithi River.

2. Financial Viability and Absence of Realistic Projections of Cost Recovery.

3. Problems with the Planning and Implementation of the Project.

Here is a list of stakeholders for the projects with their power interest gradation
marked:

S. No
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Stakeholder

Role

Maharasthra state
Government
Maharasthra state road
development
corporation(MSRDC)

Stake keeper and

supervision
Initiator of the
project

Hindustan construction
company (HCC
Dar-Al Handasah
Central Water and
Power Research Station
(CWPRS)
Bombay youth
Association
Bombay high court
Central government

9.

Ministry for environment

and forest (MoEF)
10.
Save Worli sea-face
Samitee
11.
Bajaj electrical
12.

Mumbai Metropolitan
Region Development
Authority

Akhil Maharashtra
Machhimar Kriti Samiti
(AMMKS)
Maharashtra State
14.
Electricity Board
Briham Mumbai
15.
municipal corporation
(BMC)
13.

16.

Media

Bombay Environmental
Action Group
(BEAG)
18. Jacob engineering India
pvt limited
19.
Lachel Felice &
17.

Interest/ Expectations
ranking
4/4

Power ranking
4.5/5

5/5

5/5

5/5

4/5

Contractor
Project mangers

Research and
feasibility
Has opposed the
project
Stake keeper
Stake keeper
Stake watcher
In opposition of
the project
Subcontractor
Initiator and
planner for the
city
Stakeholder as
residents of the
vicinity

4/5
4/5
3/5
3/5
2/5
4/5
4/5
3/5

Stake watcher
Activist group
watching the
project
Design
consultants
Geotechnical
engineering

2/5
2/5
4/5
5/5
4/5
3/5
2/5

2.5/5

3.5/5

4/5

2/5

2/5
Municipal
corporation of the
city

4/5

3/5
4/5
3/5
2/5
2/5

2/5
3.5/5
2/5

2/5
2/5
2/5

Associates, Inc.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Shivaji Park Dakshita

samiti
Indian Peoples Tribunal
on Environment and
Human Rights (IPT)
State pollution control
board (SPCB)
Ratan J Batliboi
Architects PVT Limited
Consortium of Sverdrup
Civil Inc.,
Shrikhande Consultants,
KPMG
HNTB
Mott Mc Donald
Schlaich Bergermann
Society for Clean
Environment
(SOCLEEN)
Public Works
Department (PWD)
Central Road Research
Institute (CRRI)
W.S. Atkins
Kirloskar pvt ltd
Walkers ecological
movement

Activist group

Activist committee
Mediator
Consulting
architect
Original project
management
Consultants
Consultants
Consultants
Consultants

3/5
3.5/5
3/5
3/5
2/5
3/5
2/5
2/5
2/5

3/5

3.5/5
3/5
1/5
2/5

3/5
1.5/5
1.5/5
1.5/5

Consultants

Environmentalists

Guidance
Feasibility
World band
consultants
Consultants
Environmentalists

3/5
2/5
3/5
2.5/5
2.5/5
2/5

2/5

1.5/5
1/5
1/5
1/5
2.5/5

1. INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS
The project management of BWSL comprised of the internal stakeholders. HCC,
MSRDC, and project management Dar-al-Hansdah were the core member of the
projects. It is interesting to note that the original project management Severdup was
dropped from the PMC role in 2001 on differences on proviso of engineering issues.
The funds require by MSRDC was raised by the Maharashtra state government.
Maharashtra state government was responsible for giving the project to the MSRDC
over MMRDA which is the body responsible for development of the metropolitan region.
As mentioned SPCB was responsible for holding public hearings and was assigned by
the ministry of environmental affairs to play this role. Ratan J Batliboi was the architect
hired by the BSWL to gives consultancy. Apart from them there were few other internal
stakeholders with relatively less interests in the project. BMC was one such stakeholder.
The municipal corporation wanted success for the project so as to ease up the already
congested roads. Mumbai metropolitan region development authority was another such
stakeholder. MMRDA proposes plans and oversees construction of infrastructure and
other projects in Mumbai metropolitan regions.
Some of the suppliers as mentioned by H.C.C in its report on Bandra-Worli sea link
are as follows:
1. VSL Singapore Pvt Ltd: Technical Consultants
2. Ultra Tech: Supplier of cement
3. Metco group of companies: Supplier of bearings
4. Tata Steel, RIN Ltd & SAIL: Supplier of steel
5. ELKEM International Ltd.: Norway-based company supplier of micro silica
6. SPCC: China-based company supplier of stay cable
7. DOKA Australia: supplier of Plyon formwork

2. EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS
The external stakeholders were many and had gained considerable power through
the course of construction. The nature of the project was of a very high profile nature
hence lot of public attention was bestowed upon the project. Lot of external
stakeholders were dissatisfied with the project, and claimed biased in the feasibility
reports towards the car owning elite public. This project was considered by them as a
show of strength for the city of Mumbai to equal engineering projects worldwide. Indian
peoples tribunal on environment and human rights (IPT) was the social activist body
which was able to mobilize other activist groups and build a case against the project.
Noted architect Darryl DMonte voiced his concerns through the IPT and through forum
of Environmental Journalists of India (FEJI) claiming that when 80% of the people travel
by bus and local trains and only 20% travelling by car and intermediate transport it was
unfair on art of the authorities to incur such huge amounts of money on the minority
section (private car transport is 11% as of 2005). A report prepared by W.S.Atkins
international and Kirloskar consultants in 2004 criticized the planning of the whole of
west island freeway of which Bandra worli sea link is a part. The report further claimed
that constructing on the line of North-South axis will further troubles for the Island city
rather an weak east-west corridor must be developed if at all. The World Bank gave this
assignment to W.S. Atkins who submitted their Report in 1994 recommending a
comprehensive Transport Strategy for MMR and based on this strategy a Transport
Investment Plan for the period 1995-2011. The report suggested 72% funding on
railways and metro and only 21% funding for private vehicles. This further agitated the
activists and they felt that peoples tax money was being wasted.

4 DYNAMISM IN STAKEHOLDER INFLUENCE

The power and interest of stakeholders has changed throughout the project. As the
project progressed the resident and activist committees gained interest and power in
the project. Backed by the media the stake watchers were able to increase the interest
of more activists and were able to engage the ministry of environmental affairs and

Bombay high court. At the final stages of the project the influence of these activists
reduced based on the decisions and resolutions passed by the high court and ministry
of environmental affairs. MSRDC, BWSL and HCC had initially high power but reduced
as the project went into further stages.

5 ACTION
1. ENGAGEMENT RISK PROFILE
The basis of the construction of Bandra-Worli sea link was prepared by Central
power and water institute (CPWRS), the report that they made in 1984 was based on a
hydraulic model study which does not account for the phenomenon of high and low
tides, undercurrent, temperature variations, impact on marine life, impact on mangroves
and on the shores. Seasonal changes were also not factored. The plan of action for the
project lacked accuracy of the daily usage, the project estimated a usage of 75,000 cars
per day but the project is able to achieve only 35,000 cars per day. Hence the action
plan for this project should include more robust pre-feasibility analysis and engagement
of the citizens and committees at the inception stage.

6 EVALUATION AND LEARNING

Bandra-Worli sea link project as of now is considered as best alternative or shortest
route for travelling from south Mumbai to west Mumbai and is also included in one of
India's marvel engineering, but it is evident that it was not a properly managed project in
terms of its planning phases (which also includes negligence of stakeholders) and
execution phases as well.
Apart from engineering challenges there were many issues like, the initial cost of
the project was estimated to be INR 300 Cr and completion in 2004 which severely got
delayed because of numerous public interest litigation and was completed on 24th of
March 2010. Also the estimated cost overshot to INR 1600 Cr that is five times more
than the initial estimation cost.

CPWRS report also states that the construction of the bridge will not create any adverse
condition along the coast, which totally was wrong.
When it comes to implementation, toll plaza was shifted about 1.5 km from original
location, whereas the environmental clearance was given for the proposed location

7 STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT PLAN

As mentioned in the stakeholder engagement plan below it was essential for the project
management to involve the general public and residents by way of public briefings, community
fairs, field trips and media releases. This would result in reduction of dissatisfaction in the
general public would resulted in considerable amount of savings for the management by way of
time and money. Citizen committees, fish bowling, consensus conference are required to be
done under the consultation process for the stakeholder which were legitimate as well as
interested in the project. Public involvement, scenario testing and consensus conferences is
required for stake holder which have little power and interest and legitimacy.
The powerful stakeholders were already looked at properly in the project. Enough visioning
was done by the project management and their concerns were taken forward. Brainstorming
was done by CWPRS and many consultants including TCS and ATKINS with help of World
Bank. Indian peoples tribunal on environmental and human rights had clubbed all the conflict
causing stakeholders from different sections and problems on one platform to increase the level
of dissatisfaction among the residents of Mumbai

8 OBSERVATIONS
Starting from its planning phase BWSLP lacks proper management, it has violated
various norms for environmental compliances that has to be followed in India. And they
are as listed below:

1. Public hearing:
It is to be noted that public participation is an extremely crucial component of
governance and has to be treated seriously. Above all the affected population has a
right to be informed about any project that has been undertaken. But all the members of
local community and other concerned citizens have stated that they were not consulted.
Bombay environmental action group initiated and sent a letter to Mumbai municipal road
development authority (MMRDA) regarding their objections, comments and suggestions
however no response was received.
BEAG also sent a letter dated 8th of September 1998 to ministry of environment and
forest stating their objections and suggestions and even this time there was no
response.
All these incidents clearly point to the fact that the environmental clearance was given to
the project without holding a mandatory public hearing.

2. Project report not accessible for public:

According to schedule(iv) of notice dated 10th April 1997 issued by ministry of
environment and forest, whoever applies for environmental projects has to submit 20
sets of summary of the salient features of the project to the concerned state pollution
control board. So that it can be made accessible for public hearing. But no particulars,
maps or other information was furnished to BEAG by MoEF.

3. Coastal regulation zone violation:

The state of Maharashtra and MMRDA gave an undertaking that no reclamation should
be carried out in the Bandra-Kurla complex area and no mangrove in the Mithi River or
its estuary would be destroyed. However there has been a blatant violation of the terms
and conditions of the environmental clearance dated 7th January 1999.

4. Local communities not consulted:

The fishermen affected by this project were neither consulted nor their consent
obtained. No attempts were made to adequately rehabilitate and compensate these
fishermen for the resultant loss of their livelihood. Reclamation caused change in the
regular parking of boats in the near the Mahim bay to shift further away causing the
fishermen to walk more to reach to their boats.

5. Environmental impact assessment:

EIA is a tool to ensure that finite natural resources are utilized within the carrying
capacity of the ecosystem. It is used to minimize the harmful effects of the development
activity on the environment. According to the notification dated 10th April 1997 issued by
the MoEF, the Impact assessment agency should prepare a set of recommendations
based on the technical assessment of documents and data furnished by the project
authorities and supplemented by data collected during visits to factories and sites if
undertaken and details of the public hearing. Further EPA of 1986 and CRZ of 1991
were also not considered.

9 CONCLUSIONS
The project was a success on an engineering and architectural level, but has failed
on project management level. The cost recovery estimation of the project has fallen
short of the expectations. The project was conceived with a daily traffic of 75,000
vehicles, but only 35,000 vehicles travel daily affecting the revenue generation. Better

project management would have made the project an overall success more than the
symbolic success that it has achieved.

10 REFERENCES
DMonte, Darryl (2001). An enquiry into the Bandra Worli sea link project. Mumbai: the
Indian peoples tribunal on environment and human rights.
John M. Nicholas and Herman Steyn (2008). Project Management for Engineering
Business and Technology: Chapter 8, Pg 286.
Joshi, Charu (2014). EIA of Bandra Worli Sea Link. International journal of innovative
journal of innovative research and development: Vol 3 Issue 8.