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Postcommunist World
Author(s): Michael McFaul
Source: World Politics, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Jan., 2002), pp. 212-244
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054183
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in the
ByMICHAEL McFAUL*
communist
states
transitional
regimes.
some states abandon
did
Why
ers turned
One
to authoritarian
shades
of dictatorships
communism
rule?Why
are some
or unconsolidated
for democracy,
states stuck
while
oth
in between?
that answering
these questions
should be easy for
coun
in two dozen
science.
Simultaneous
change
regime
in
similar
but
moving
beginning
roughly
places
along very
over ten
the perfect data set for
trajectories
years?provides
would
political
tries?all
different
think
new
and developing
about regime
hypotheses
on the
a finite set of
Clear
with
variation
variable
change.
dependent
seem to offer a
to iso
would
variables
unique
laboratory
independent
a decade has
late causal patterns. Yet although
since
the
passed
collapse
of European
communism,
regime
theory
regarding
development
testing
extant
theories
pointed
failure"1
to the
to
inability
predict communism's
collapse
of political
science. Ten years later the paucity
as
of
Brinks, Valerie
World Politics
54 (January 2002),
212-44
THE
FOURTH WAVE
postcommunist
213
in the
postcommunist
world
in the
explain regime changes
the argument
actorcentric
endorses
wave of democ
analyses of the third
Although
that have dominated
approaches
some of the central
it also
of the ear
ratization,
challenges
hypotheses
lier literature concerning
the relationship
between mode
of transition
an
set of causal
and resulting
The
article
offers
alternative
regime type.
paths
ancien
be grouped under
a fourth wave of
A
tion
decommunization
regime change?to
democracy
claim of the earlier literature was
central
triggered
and
dictatorship.
that the mode
of transi
was
the resulting
that de
regime type. It
hypothesized
as a result of transitional
in
which
the
moments,
emerged
influenced
mocracy
balance
of power between
and opponents
of the authoritar
supporters
ian regime was
and
also
uncertain.
Because
neither
side
relatively equal
use of force,
had the capacity to achieve
its first preferences
the
through
the sides opted to negotiate
with
their op
arrangements
power-sharing
which
ponents,
called "pacts,"
transition were
outcomes
second-best
for both. Often
represented
these power-sharing
arrangements
negotiated
during
as a set of checks and balances
then institutionalized
in
the new
democracy.
role in these
countries
orientation
with
2
the postcommunist
transitions occurred within the time span typically referred to
Chronologically,
as the third wave of democratization.
some
The wave metaphor,
however, connotes
relationship be
tween cases that is only
to
in
Transitions
Southern
present.
weakly
democracy
Europe and Latin
America
did not cause, trigger, or inspire communist
regime change. The temporal proximity of these
cases was more accidental
than causal. As explored
in detail in this article, however,
the fact that
Southern European
and Latin American
transitions occurred first had significant path-dependent
for how we conceptualized
and explained the postcommunist
transitions. On waves, see
consequences
Samuel Huntington,
versity of Oklahoma
1991).
Century
(Norman: Uni
WORLD POLITICS
214
to emerge.
of regime
democrats
in countries
therefore
Democracy
emerged
a decisive power
advantage. And
hence
where
institutions
enjoyed
or checks and balances
of power
did not result from compro
sharing
mises between
the ancien r?gime and democratic
but rather
challengers
to
if
chose
the
democrats
them.
implement
emerged
only
hegemonic
a
in
in
countries
which
dictators maintained
decisive power
Conversely,
advantage,
dictatorship
countries inwhich
and
emerged.
this alternative
as follows.
communist
regime change
of the transitions
literature
theory
the noncooperative
communist
world,
mode
of transition
derscores
the weak
and resulting
resemblance
or absence
tion: the presence
West.
Section V concludes.
post
tenets
same time it un
type; at the
this relationship
and causal
IV exam
transitions
literature. Section
regime
between
structures
in Section
outlined
factors must
of territorial
II. To
account
to the equa
to the
and proximity
be added
disputes
to Regime Change
Approaches
I. Cooperative
invisible
for explaining
approach
I outlines
the basic
Section
III illustrates
the analytical power of
change. Section
in the post
for
model
regime change
explaining
the strong causal relationship
between
highlighting
in the earlier
identified
patterns
ines cases that do not fit the theory
for these anomalous
cases, two more
Inert,
were
and Southern
lier cooperative
of regime
two extremes
than producing
stale
relatively
equal. Rather
to
such situations
and pacted transitions
democracy,
world
resulted in protracted
confrontation,
yield
unstable
and autocracies.
partial democracies
mate, compromise,
in the postcommunist
ing unconsolidated,
This
article explores
model
these
was
its challengers
American
In between
do not make
democracies
or
dictatorships.
such as economic
cultural
development,
People
institutional
influence
the for
and historical
influences,
arrangements
mation
and power, but ultimately
these forces have
of actors' preferences
into human action. Individuals
and
causal significance
only if translated
do. Structural
factors
are
they make
especially
outcomes
result from similar
the decisions
vergent
The
theories
first
important
structural
for explaining
contexts.
how di
refocused
Dankwart
Rustow's
on actors,
seminal
and then
article
in
in 1970
the four-volume
THE FOURTHWAVE
Laurence
Whitehead,
as the central
elites
vision within
tion, while
establishes
the mode
of transition
resurrected
Rule,
school posits that di
Authoritarian
groups
to influence
these
intellectual
the course
tracks were
of regime change.3
laid down,
they have
framed
in
aside alter
regime change, pushing
levels
of
No
theories, metaphors,
analysis.4
single theory of
nor has an actorcentric
transition
has been universally
recognized,
several hy
of
democratization
been
formalized.5Nonetheless,
theory
of
have
wide
the postu
potheses
gained
acceptance.6
Strikingly, many
large
native
the thinking
and
are constructed
Elite
measure
from
emerges.
causal power
Since
Transitions
215
about
and
being generated
tradition.
by
3
and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Con
Guillermo
O'Donnell
clusions about Uncertain Democracies, vol. 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1986); John
University
and Michael
and Breakdowns," Ameri
Transitions
Burton, "The Elite Variable inDemocratic
Higley
can
in Latin
Sociological Review 54 (February 1989); Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization
America," Comparative Politics 23 (October 1990); Adam Przeworski, Democracy and theMarket: Po
litical and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University
in Scott Mainwaring,
and
of Transition,"
Guillermo
O'Donnell,
Press, 1991); idem, "The Games
in
eds., Issues inDemocratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies
J. Samuel Valenzuela,
Ind.: University
of Notre Dame
Press, 1993); and Josep
(Notre Dame,
Comparative
Perspective
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Strategic Transitions: Game Theory and Democratization
see Youssef Cohen, Radicals,
to democratic
breakdown,
2000). On an elite-centered
approach
in Latin America
and the Collapse ofDemocracy
The Prisoners Dilemma
Reformers, and Reactionaries:
Colomer,
Press,
in
of Chicago Press, 1994); and Juan Linz, Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibrium,
(Chicago: University
the series by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., The Breakdown ofDemocratic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns
Press, 1978).
University
Hopkins
4
In the postcommunist
world
the phenomenon
in question might be more appropriately
labeled
revolution or decolonization,
rather than democratization.
Illuminating
adaptations of these alternative
include Vladimir Mau and Irina Starodubrovskaya,
The Challenge ofRevolution: Contempo
metaphors
(Oxford: Oxford University
Lieven,
Press, 2001); and Dominic
rary Russia inHistorical Perspective
The Russian Empire and Its Rivals (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2001).
Empire:
5
and theMarket
Przeworski's
(fn. 3) comes the closest. See also Cohen
(fn. 3); and
Democracy
Colomer
(fn. 3).
6
of strategic theories of democratization
do not universally recognize a single
Because proponents
to argue with
In
it
is
the
last
decade
difficult
many scholars have added useful
theory,
transitology.
to the earlier canons of transitology.
theoretical caveats and important definitional
Space
adjectives
limitations do not permit discussion of all these innovations and nuances. Instead, the focus here is on
a
the set of the core principles
that defines this literature as paradigm in the study of regime change
summarizes: "The 'transitions literature,' as this current work has come to be
today. As Ruth Collier
the founding essay by O'Donnell
and Schmitter
known, has as its best representative
(1986), which
established a framework that is implicitly or explicitly followed in most other contributions. Without
one could say that certain
and Schmit
emphases within O'Donnell
denying differences and subtleties,
ter's essay have been selected and elaborated by other authors so that it is possible to aggregate various
and in broad strokes map out a basic characterization
and set of claims in this literature
contributions
as awhole"; Collier, Paths towards
Democracy: The Working Class and Elites
ernAmerica
Press, 1999), 5.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University
216
WORLD
structural
recog
approaches,
transitologists
as identified
for democracy.
one,
Only
by
is salient: elites must have a common
of the
understanding
of the state in order to
with crafting new rules for gov
proceed
Rustow,
borders
erning
butions
POLITICS
contri
theoretical
this, one of the principal
on the third wave
concerns
the causal
state.7 Beyond
of the literature
this
success
to the mode
in determining
of transition
relationship
assigned
more ambitious
to
ful and unsuccessful
transitions
The
have
democracy.
even traced a causal
the mode
of transition
between
and
relationship
the type of democracy,8 on the basis of temporal path dependence?that
at certain critical
the course of regime
choices made
influence
junctures
as
formation.
and
The model?especially
by O'Donnell
developed
Schmitter,
Karl, Huntington,
actors in the
choice-making
and Przeworski?identifies
transition
drama:
four
soft-liners
sets of
and hard
and
the ruling elite of the ancien r?gime, and moderates
to the ancien
modes
of
the challengers
among
r?gime.9Many
liners within
radicals
transitions
outcome
have
received
ismost
the most
likely when
the transition
that navigate
is not pacted,
transition
theoretical
soft-liners
from
it is more
attention.
and moderates
to
10A democratic
enter
into pacts
n
If the
democracy.
dictatorship
to fail.12 In the earlier
likely
transi
7
Dankwart
Toward a Dynamic Model,"
Rustow, "Transition to Democracy:
Comparative Politics 2
a second
the decline of a land
precondition,
including Karl, have highlighted
(April 1970). Others,
in Social Origins ofDictatorships
and De
based aristocracy, an idea first discussed by Barrington Moore
countries had land-based aristocracies,
mocracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). Because few communist
in this article.
this variable is not discussed
8
in Southern and East
Karl (fn. 3); Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe Schmitter, "Modes of Transition
ern
(May 1991); idem,
Europe, Southern and Central America," International Social Science Journal128
and Risks," inMichael
Klare and Daniel Thomas,
"Democratization
around the Globe: Opportunities
and Carol Sklalnik Leff,
World Security (New York: St Martin's
Press, 1994); and Gerardo Munck
Politics 29
in Comparative
"Modes of Transition
and Democratization
Perspective,"
Comparative
1997).
(April
9
THE
FOURTH WAVE
217
to
transitions were considered most
revolutionary
likely
outcomes.
nondemocratic
As
defined
O'Donnell
and
produce
by
be
Schmitter,
pacts are interim arrangements
democracy-enhancing
tween a "select set of actors" that seek to "(1) limit the
agenda of policy
tions
literature
the participation
are critical
components
of outsiders
in decision-making."13
All
three
for success.
about
actors'
radical, majority
triumphant,
If
property
changes."14
rights, the territorial
integrity of
are threatened
a
the state, or international
alliances
by
revolutionary
force from below,
then the hard-liners
in the ancien
roll
r?gime will
wave
back democratic
of democratization
in Latin
the
gains.15 During
ment
by
drastic
America
and Southern
ous
sidered
contested
and destabilizing.17
dangerous
issues in which
the stakes
reversible
actors
are more
likely
are issues with
than
More
generally, negotiations
are indivisible
or the outcomes
to generate
divisible
irreconcilable
stakes
and
over
ir
among
preferences
reversible
outcomes.18
an
considered
Negotiated
interests
to
compromise
on
such
basic
issues
as to whether
new
important
democratic
in
Modeling
the Bases
of Compromise"
(Manu
WORLD POLITICS
218
"even
to
and whether
elections,
the
interest
score." Without
groups
can
have
grant
clemency
or
to
abusers
attempt
rights
fundamental
issues, powerful
to cooperate
the new democratic
with
to human
on
compromises
less incentive
such
regime.19
no side achieves
outcome
in pacted
transi
its optimal
although
over
the
nondemocratic
all
sides
achieve
relative
tions,
past. From
gains
are cen
and agreements"
this perspective,
compromises,
"negotiations,
Thus,
tral to making
democracy.20
Finally, these theorists have emphasized the need to limit the role of
the masses
in the negotiation
transitions
process. Pacted
masses
must
the
there
affairs; mobilized
party. Jacobins
spoil
is less
fore be sidelined,21 for if they are part of the equation,
democracy
radicals
and
are elite
no stable political
likely to result.22As Karl posited in 1990: "To date,
a limited
role
emerges.24
elites to materialize
causes
are considered
pacts
between
key compo
moderate
answer
this question
the
stated, analysts of the third wave
by examining
and challengers.
of power between
the challenged
balance
Negotiated
are most
is
the distribution
of power
transitions
likely, they find, when
19
Friedman
20
21Huntington
THE
219
FOURTH WAVE
relatively
O'Donnell
"The more
transitions:
heterogenous
in
objectives
Przeworski
power
are most
the more
outcome
to be a
likely is the
sides realize that they cannot
that provide partial victory
they settle for solutions
a stale
for both sides. Democratization
requires
process of constitutional
design,
democratic
constitution."26 When
prevail unilaterally,
(and partial defeat)
mate?"a
prolonged
evenly
in the bargaining
extends
likely
both
inconclusive
struggle."27
to
the argument
posit that uncertain balances
most
to
the
democratic
arrangements:
produce
and
of
"If
everyone is behind the Rawlsian veil, that is, if they know little about
democratic
their political
strength under the eventual
a
maximin
institutions
that introduce
solution:
opt for
ances
and maximize
lently, make
opinion."28
the political
influence
insensitive
policy highly
all
institutions,
bal
checks and
of minorities,
to fluctuations
or, equiva
in public
and
the probability
of compromise,
of power create uncertainty.
itself as the primary
the strategic process
enhances
Uncertainty
equal distributions
relatively
This
approach
emphasizes
causal variable
successful
transitions.29 As Roeder
argues:
producing
not
it
is
of
col
the
because
the
emerges
"Democracy
object
politicians'
it is a practical
lective ambition
but because
among politi
compromise
It is
cians blocked
from
their particular
achieving
objectives."30
not the actors and
of the strategic
the dynamics
situation,
their preferences,
that produce or fail to produce democracy. As Levine
sums up: "Democracies
fear among
emerge out of mutual
excellently
as the deliberate
outcome
of
concerted
commit
rather
than
opponents
therefore
ments
to make
democratic
processes
evolutionary
radical revolutionary
work."31 Moderate,
arrangements
for
democratic
emergence;
good
are considered
bad. Cooperative
bar
political
are considered
processes
25
O'Donnell
and Schmitter
(fn. 2), 167.
(fn. 3), 72. See also Huntington
26
inHarry Eckstein,
State-Centered
Roeder, "Transitions from Communism:
Approaches,"
eric Fleron, Erik Hoffman,
andWilliam
eds., Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet
Reisinger,
sia? (Lantham, Md.: Roman and Littlefield,
1998), 209.
Fred
Rus
27Rustow(fn.7),352.
28
87.
Przeworski
(fn. 3,1991),
29
Roeder
(fn. 26), 207.
30
Authoritarian
Ibid., 208. See also Philip Roeder, "Varieties of Post-Soviet
Regimes," Post-Soviet
10 (January 1994), 62; and Colomer
(fn.
3).
Affairs
31
to Democracy,"
World Politics 40 (April 1988),
Daniel H. Levine, "Paradigm Lost: Dependence
379.
WORLD POLITICS
220
democratic
do
institutions;
processes
gains produce
noncooperative
cannot be dictated;
it emerges from bargaining."33
not.32 "Democracy
set of arguments
accounts
This
of
has a close affinity with positivist
institutionalism
The
crafting
game, inwhich
cooperative
is framed
in the negotiation
setde for second-best
may
outcomes
both
outcome
preferred
an
represent
but
from
over
the
status
of rules plays
institutions.35
These
also emphasize
institutional
emergence
from new
emerge
sides
improvement
the crafting
tainty during
or liberal
ficient
game
theory.34
as a
positive-sum
not obtain their most
bargain
the importance
arrangements.
that provides gains
II.A Noncooperative
Model
quo
that nonetheless
for both
sides. Uncer
role in producing
ef
positive
to institutional
approaches
of shared benefits
Above
all
else,
for everyone.
that result
institutions
of Transition
to democratization
offer a useful
cooperative
approaches
of postcommunist
for explaining
transformations
starting
point
cause
in
this
Actors
did
and
part of the world,
regime changes
regimes.
to
transi
of
the
because many
them claimed
be building
democracy,
Actorcentric,
to
third-wave
Rustow's
transition
democracy
world.
do indeed apply to the postcommunist
hypotheses
on territorial
as a
for
democratic
prerequisite
emphasis
clarity
consensus
is still salient. Though
about borders was not nec
in the communist
liberalization
world
essary to begin political
processes
a democratic
and some transitions
have continued
along
trajectory
of major
all border
without
issues, the resolution
sovereignty
settling
32
See Hardin's
review and then rejection of this approach in Russell Hardin, Liberalism, Constitu
tionalism, and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999).
33
Przeworski
90.
(fn. 3,1991),
34
and the Royal Fiscal Policy dur
Hilton Root, "Tying the King's Hands: Credible Commitments
and Society 1 (October 1989); Kenneth
ing the Old Regime," Rationality
Shepsle, "Discretion, Institu
in Pierre Bourdieu
and James Coleman,
eds.,
tions, and the Problem of Government
Commitment,"
:
Social Theory for a Changing Society (Boulder, Colo. Westview
Press, 1991); Douglass North and Barry
and Commitment:
The Evolution
of Institutions Governing
Public Choice
"Constitutions
Weingast,
"
in Seventeenth-Century
Journal ofEconomic History 49 (December 1989); Kenneth Shepsle,
England
no. 2
"Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach," Journal of 'Politics 1,
on Positive Political
(1989); James Alt and Kenneth
Economy
(Cambridge:
Shepsle, eds., Perspectives
of Democracy
"The Political Foundations
Press, 1990); and Barry Weingast,
University
Cambridge
and the Rule of Law," American Political Science Review 91 (June 1997).
35
Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan, The Reason ofRules (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press,
1985),
30.
THE
was a
precondition
Three
multiethnic
region.
to
and Yugoslavia?had
for new
contests
221
FOURTH WAVE
states?the
in most
of the
regime emergence
Soviet Union,
Czechoslovakia,
or autocratic
before
democratic
collapse
regimes could consolidate.
Further
of the third-wave
application
distort
rather
than
however, begins to
hypotheses,
this fourth wave of regime change. Most
raises real
of nondemocracies
questions
illuminate
the preponderance
importandy,
about why postcommunist
transitions
should be subsumed
under the
at all. In addition,
third wave of democratization
the causal pathways
in the fourth
of the third wave do not produce
the "right" outcomes
wave transitions
from communist
transitions
rule. Imposed
from above
in the former
not
produced
partial
transitions?the
revolutionary
communist
world
It is instead
dictatorship.
but
democracy
tran
mode
of
democracies
transitions?those
democracy-enhancing
instead
rope?have
the autocratic
causal
the most
have actually produced
stable and
in the postcommunist
world. Balanced,
stale
most
to facilitate
the emergence
of
likely
in
American
and
Eu
Latin
Southern
pacts
theorists?that
consolidated
paths
led to unstable
in the
postcommunist
and
negotiation,
crafting,
variety
prominently.
postcommunist
a minor
only
world,
role in explaining
in the
world.
successful
of change fre
The danger of multiple
agendas
in the earlier literature on democratization
has not
quently
trumpeted
seen clear
empirical
crumbling
economic
and
regime change.
on the
earlier, third-wave
agenda of change,
the agenda-limiting
function
of pacts because
they
and political
reform could not be under
that economic
presupposed
taken simultaneously.
communism
the democratic
limits
regarding
celebrated
analysts
of both
Even
First,
regimes
confirmation
the political
of communism
occurred
bundled
in the postcommunist
and the economic
so
world.
Because
and because
the
and
dicted
rapidly, sequencing
political
had pre
Thus,
although many
change proved
impossible.
at the
of eco
that the reorganization
of the decade
beginning
nomic
institutions
not
tries
necessarily
that moved
achieved
would
turned
undermine
the fastest
the greatest
success
on
that has
transitions,
the contrary, those coun
have also
transformation
democratic
in consolidating
democratic
institutions.37
36
was Przeworski
The most theoretically
(fn. 3,1991).
rigorous prediction of failure
37
in Postcommunist
Transi
"Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform
Joel S. Hellman,
and Edda Zoli, "Does
tions," World Politics 50 (January 1998); Jean-Jacques Dethier, Hafez Ghanem,
WORLD POLITICS
222
Second,
the literature
on
pacts
assumed
that
of transi
the benefits
issues were
not
easily divisible.
Empires
of third ways.38
models
are no successful
a com
between
midpoints
over borders
In
negotiations
economy.39
has been
distribution
of benefits
the
region,
or economy
type in this
in favor of one
skewed
highly
ical institutions
resulted
or efficient
in skewed
distributional
over
polit
to the win
battles
benefits
mocratization
mass
actors
so
instrumental
to de
damaging
in its successes
in
Fourth,
stalemated
force
next
section,
small subset
tion
power
from
pacts produced
of successful
democratic
stalemate
played
transitions. The
was
that most
a role
mode
in only a
of transi
an imbalance
democracy
frequently
produced
to the ancien
in favor of the democratic
challengers
of
r?gime. Rev
inAfrica: Regime
1997), 198-200.
Transitions
in Comparative
Perspective
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
University
THE FOURTHWAVE
olutionary
communist
movements
from
below?not
223
elites
from
above?toppled
institutions. As feared
regimes
on democratization,
masses
these mobilized
did often
by earlier writers
confrontational
such
and
but
tactics
tactics,
pro
employ
uncooperative
events such as
moted
rather than impeded democratic
change. When
or street demonstrations
was
elections
proved that the balance of power
on
in the
their will
antidemocratic
favor, they imposed
opposition's
and created
new democratic
in the new
the old regime acquiesced
no power to resist.
had
they
Not all transitions
from communism
resulted in democracy,
however.
A second mode
is when
of transition
the distribution
of power favors
elites.
rulers
Communist
democratic
from
rules because
r?gime,
that results
configuration
in autocracy.
As is the case with the first path just described, the stronger side dic
tated
em
in this situation
of the game. Only
the stronger
or reconstituted
ideas and preserved
authoritarian
to situations
Like
the first path, and in stark contrast
in
the rules
braced
autocratic
institutions.
of power was
relatively
equal, these imposed
a new
transitions
from above reached
rather quickly.
In
equilibrium
are
as
as
these
consolidated
the
liberal
democ
many cases,
regimes
just
the distribution
which
literature,
since
regime
change
from
dictatorship
to dicta
research
agenda.
In a third mode
of power
of regime change, when
the distribution
was more
outcomes
in
the
of
the
range
equally divided,
postcommunist
than liberal democracy. These
world has been wider
strategic situations
or pro
to
leading
partial democracy,
to either
violent
confrontations
leading
partial
or
a
transition
A
democracy
resulting from
partial dictatorship.
pacted
new
can
of
distribution
between
the
old
and
the
power
relatively equal
at least one
in
be identified
transition,
postcommunist
possibly
as
in
countries
well.
But
other
with
and
Moldova,
Mongolia
perhaps
have
produced
pacted
tracted and oftentimes
transitions
pacts
or liberal democracies.
to
their will
Instead, opposing
until one side won.
forces
The
in these
countries
impose
fought
at best, civil war at worst.
of transition was partial, unstable
democracy
can
of power should not
conflict
result from equal distributions
That
be surprising. Analysts
of the third wave focused on the successful cases
cases. If all
of democratization
and deliberately
ignored unsuccessful
are
transitions
into the analy
stalemated
brought
undergoing
the causal influence
of this mode
of transition
becomes
sis, however,
countries
WORLD POLITICS
224
less clear. Angola,
between
resulted.
stalemate
instance, has for decades
experienced
no
to
transition
has
but
powers,
democracy
competing
pacted
can
to
but
negotiate,
Equal distributions
compel both sides
for
especially
forces facilitated
the emergence
of
In this reformulation,
institutions.
this same uncertainty
the
effect?conflict.
the two other tran
produced
opposite
Conversely,
sition pathways
certain distributions
had more
of power and therefore
much
less confrontation.
democratic
In the
three modes
situations
strategic
or the other. The
of
transition
usually
just described,
noncooperative
institutions
that favored one side
produced
is the opposite
of democracy
without
demo
crats. So unlike
who
asserted
that "negotiation
and com
Huntington,
elites were at the heart of the democratization
among political
promise
one side took
in fact they were not.43 In
processes,"
imposed transitions,
more
to
craft institutions
that bene
of its
advantage
powerful
position
process
fited itself more than they benefited theweak. If the powerful adhered
to democratic
distribute
tutional
promise,
institutions
then they imposed
principles,
of the new polity. Such decisions
the benefits
were undertaken
design
or even
but
interest
that widely
insti
about
not out of
initially
obligation,
out of a normative
commitment
com
to
in democratic
If the powerful
then they
believed
democracy.
principles,
in autocratic
institutions.
democratic
But if they believed
prin
imposed
autocratic
institutions.
then
they imposed
ciples,
The
bears
logic of these arguments
accounts
distributional
of institutional
stitutions?democratic
or otherwise?is
strong
resemblance
to realist or
new in
design.44 The crafting of
framed as a zero-sum
game, in
42
The Causes ofWar (New York: Free Press, 1973), 246.
43Blaney,
(fn. 2), 165.
44Huntington
of California Press, 1990); Stephen D. Kras
George Tsebelis, Nested Games (Berkeley: University
and National
Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics 43
ner, "Global Communications
Press,
(April 1991);Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge
University
Institutions
1992); and Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational
(Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2000).
THE FOURTHWAVE
one
which
must
side obtains
its most
outcome
preferred
and third-best
225
outcomes.
side
institutions
These
the welfare
relative
gains
the losers' gains
over
the status
are much
to
less
quo ante.46 In transitions
dictatorship,
is not a bargain
substantial.
The
transition
but a confrontation
with
winners
is often em
and losers. Though
the social-contract
metaphor
to describe
and stability, institutional
constitutional
emergence
ployed
that maximize
arrangements
world.47
everyone's
utility
to the
and spiritual
analytic
democratization.
For democratic
thrust
of the
philosophers
stalemate,
theorists,
moderation,
negotiation,
bargaining,
mise are the stuff of successfiil democratic
systems, whereas
are
literature
on
and political
and compro
confronta
to
hegemony
approach
in
world
the
(and maybe
regime
postcommunist
change
explaining
of earlier
leaves out many
also deliberately
elsewhere)
components
is
For instance,
the design of institutions
theories of democratization.
or
either
little
power regarding
regime emergence
explanatory
assigned
it does not mat
If
the
democrats
draft
rules,
regime stability.
powerful
tion,
violence,
and
its enemies.
This
or pres
a
system is adopted or whether
parliamentary
can work
is
kinds
of
established.48
Different
system
democracy
matters most
is that
and endure equally long. What
equally effectively
are committed
to the democratic
the powerful
project.
ter what
electoral
idential
III. Causal
Paths of Postcommunist
Regime Change
This
alternative,
45
Douglass
Bank, 2000).
226
WORLD
POLITICS
at the center of
By placing power and ideas
analysis and relax
on
the
and
for a successful
ing
primacy placed
negotiation
cooperation
a
set of causal
democratic
this model
different
transition,
yields
paths
or
over the last
to either
from communism
democracy
dictatorship
sitions.
decade.
ment
distribution
of transition
later. A
distribution
of power
has helped
of power
at the mo
favoring democrats
ten years
liberal democracy
produce
of the ancien
dictators
clearly favoring
clearly
to
outcome
democracy
by the earlier actorcentric
predicted
on democratization.
to the first two causal
In contrast
paths,
countries
that experienced
ten years later.49
stable
this mode
of transition
are still
relatively
un
The
the balance
on the
legislative
based
elections
elections
the composition
of a
transition period, roughly
that determined
at least some
with
participation
Within
the Soviet Union most
nist opposition.51
of these elections
took
a clear communist
in
vic
If
1990.
the
election
produced
place
spring
or
its
communist
direct
successor?with
for
the
old
tory
party
ruling
as
more
60 percent of the vote?then
the
defined
than
victory
winning
case
is classified
as a balance
of power
r?gime.52
If
49
Such regimes may be the norm rather than the exception in the world today. See Larry Diamond,
Press, 1999).
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Democracy: Toward Consolidation
Developing
50
Steven Fish uses a similar method
of
(with slightly different results); see Fish, "The Determinants
Economic
Reform
in the Post-Communist
East European Politics and Society 12 (Winter
World,"
to these election results, but unfortunately
such data
1998). Polling data would add a nice complement
were not collected at the time.
51
In certain cases it is not so clear that the most temporally proximate election should be used, be
are coded as more
cause the results were overhauled within the next year or so. Albania and Azerbaijan
balanced cases and not clear victories over the ancien r?gime due to the tremendous change in the bal
ance of power
votes. In Albania
the parliament
elected in 1991 fell into
immediately
following first
1992 the democratic challengers (the PDS) won a two
discord. In new general elections held inMarch
the Supreme Soviet elected in 1990 voted to disband after independence
thirds majority. In Azerbaijan
(inMay 1992) in favor of a new National Assembly, which was then split equally between communists
is coded as a case inwhich
the anticommunist
and the Popular Front opposition. Georgia
challengers
to the landslide victory of Zviad Gamsakhurdia
inMay 1991.
due
support
enjoyed overwhelming
52CPSU
is not always a sufficient guide for coding "communist." In many cases
party membership
of the CPSU. Yet they are coded as anticommunist.
Popular Front leaders were still members
Partial
Dictatorships
? ?
Democracies
Armenia
Croatia
Bosnia
Czech Republic
Estonia
Herzegovina
t?
Ph
Democracies1
Georgia
Hungary
Latvia
t? O
^
Lithuania
u.
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Tajikistan
<-m G
? S?3
.S
h
P
rt
Bulgaria
Russia
Mongolia
Ukraine
^
G
Albania
73 15
^ Ph
g
Azerbaijan
Macedonia
Belarus
Romania
Yugoslavia/Serbia
'So
Kazakhstan
t?
t?
u
t?
Kyrgyzstan
Turkmenistan
Moldova
Uzbekistan
PQ
Typology
a
This
Figure
1
of Postcommunist
Regimes
to include
in between
countries
somewhere
democracy
loosely
deployed
electoral
If dissected
find in this one residual category
further, one might
and
democracies,
autocracies,
democracies,
democracies,
competitive
quasi
pseudo
partial
is an
intellectual
autocracies.
the differences
task, but is both beyond
Specifying
important
see Diamond
On
the distinctions,
the scope of this paper and not central to its arguments.
label
is
and dictatorship.
(fn. 49); Jeffrey Herbst, "Political Liberalization inAfrica afterTen Years," Comparative
Politics 33 (April 2001); Steven Levitsky and LucanWay, "Competitive Authoritarianism:
Hybrid Regimes in Peru andUkraine inComparative Perspective" (Manuscript, 2001); and
David
Collier
and
Steven
Levitsky,
"Democracy
with
Adjectives:
Conceptual
Innovation
228
WORLD
the election
POLITICS
a clear
victory
produced
for noncommunist
forces?with
is classified
in which
as a balance
neither
communist
jority
are classified
partite
typology
as countries
on
the
is adapted
democracy
of power. The
tri
from Freedom
House
balances
equal
measures.53
Imposition
The
Democrats
is most
in East
above
apparent
path outlined
ne
states. In some of these transitions
and the Baltic
transition
first
Central
Europe
an
role
gotiations
important
played
and impeding potential
authoritarian
was
dynamic
new societal
was
critical.
confrontation,
challengers.
It produced
were
bergis?who
in starting liberalization
processes
the dominant
rollbacks. However,
not
between
the old elite and
compromise,
In most
cases
of these
societal
mobilization
transitional
leaders?Walesa,
Havel,
of the elite and who
members
not
Lands
became
previously
actors
of their widespread
societal
support.
important
only because
new
When
the balance
of power became
actors,
clear, these
political
aided by the support of society, imposed
their will on the weaker
elites,
whether
process
soft-liners
itself was
or hard-liners,
not
always
the ancien
from
the
democratic,
the
r?gime. Though
commitment
ideological
with
power,
regimes. The
Emboldened
the process of
of regime
process
evolutionary.55
not
by Gorbachev's
reforms
and Poland's
eco
53
Adrian Karanycky, ed., Freedom in theWorld: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Lib
how
and Transaction
erties, 2000-2001
(New York: Freedom House
Books, 2001). Freedom House,
not free.
ever, uses different labels?free,
ratings
imperfect, Freedom House
partly free, and
Though
if the degree of specificity needed is only three regime types. In contrast to the
offer clear categories,
rat
is based on assessments
from a decade ago, the Freedom House
index, which
balance-of-power
are from 2000.
ings used here
54
were these
not fascists or communists? Why
did they have soci
challengers democrats and
Why
etal support in some places and not others? The explanation cannot simply be culture, history, or loca
states also produced autocratic leaders with
tion, since much of East-Central
Europe and the Baltic
fascist ideas earlier in the century. A full exploration of the origins of democracy as the ideology of op
at this
moment
in this region is beyond the scope of this article. As a preliminary
position
particular
however, it is important to remember the balance of ideologies in the international system
hypothesis,
at the time. The enemies of communism
the challengers to
called themselves democracies. Therefore,
these regimes adopted the ideological orientation of the international enemies of
communism within
their internal enemies.
55
In an argument in the same spirit as that advanced here, Bunce prefers the term "breakage" to dis
tinguish transitions in the "east" from the bridging transitions in the "south." See Valerie Bunce, "Re
inDemocratization:
The East versus the South," Post-Soviet Affairs 14, no. 3 (1998).
gional Differences
THE
nomic
crisis,
FOURTH WAVE
to the Polish
challengers
229
communist
regime
initially
tip
most,
the chief
power?always
in the region?was
change
on all
revolutionary
a constant.
But the
constraint
now
a variable,
not
also uncertain. There
was
power of the democrats
mass demonstrations
and no free and fair elections
measures
of the power
balance.
Challengers
of the power
and fore
First
had been
no recent
that could
provide
to this
ambigu
responded
about
of power
to fuel unrealistic
also helped
expectations
within the Polish communist elite, who believed that they could win a
of seats
majority
were
if elections
held. The
initial
compromise
was
Yet
tions
of the concessions
resulted
a limited
tested. Likewise,
and another
30 per
the balance
seats,
apparent and thereby
from the roundtable
negotiations.
election
in which
only
portion
concession
the roundtable
Poland
never
again had
con
freely
the Polish dic
to be elected
tator, Wojciech
Jaruzelski,
to maintain
control over
the election
sides became
had
reserved
provided
clear
its challengers
and after Gorbachev
made
in Poland's
intervene
internal affairs, the democratic
new rules. In the
run the Polish
to dictate
winners
the
long
began
in
roundtable
tried but failed to restrict "the scope of representation
the ancien
r?gime
not
that he would
order
to reassure
and
traditional
dominant
classes
that
their vital
interests
in a rela
be respected."56
these events also occurred
Importantly,
was
so
not
of
time
for
the
there
short
time,
enough
pacted
tively
period
to become
institutional
arrangements
sticky.
will
more
The Hungarian
experience
but is still better understood
model
below.
opposition
Organized
in
while
than
Poland,
Hungary
in anticommunist
Membership
when
56
Karl
negotiations
(fn. 3), 11.
began.
soft-liners
groups
Hungary's
reflects
the government.
in the mere hundreds
dominated
numbered
last opposition
uprising
was
in
230
WORLD POLITICS
the more
1956, compared with
in Poland
bilization
in 1980-81.
recent
experience
mo
opposition
from the an
soft-liners
with
Consequendy,
were
to craft a set of
in a much
better position
r?gime
political
reforms that protected
their interests.57 Hungarian
communist
officials
secured their preferences
the electoral
law, the creation of a
regarding
and the timing of elections.
presidency,
cien
But
these
short-term
did not
advantages
translate
into a
long-term
became
generally
increasingly
evident.
Even
be
a
the new Hungarian
Socialist
that occurred
Party,
renaming
in most postcommunist
countries when
elites
realized
that their
ruling
old methods
of rule were no longer viable. Yet even this recognition
of
become
the changing power distribution did not help those from the ancien
as the renamed
of the popular
party captured
r?gime,
only 8 percent
vote in the
one
vote and won
district.
party-list
only
single-mandate
won a massive
Democrats
electoral victory, an event that clearly shifted
the balance
of power
between
this vote
the
to Poland
kia, Estonia,
Latvia,
whatsoever.
pacting
was
openly
and Hungary,
in Czechoslova
the transitions
no elements
and
East
had
of
Lithuania,
Germany
the
in
mode
of
transition
these
countries
Instead,
confrontational.
The
to the ancien
challengers
r?gime
were
before
demonstrations,
thorities?not
were
actors
strikes,
roundtable
and confrontational
and violent
discussions
moments
the
tactics
clashes with
produced
the authoritarian
in government
street
au
offices?which
in these
regime changes.
the confrontation
between
the state and
pivotal
In Czechoslovakia
was
The
leaders
of power
of the ancien
among
society
did not dis
r?gime
the country's political
forces.
grew
were
57
Miklos
Haraszti,
"Decade
of the Handshake
1999), 290.
(Spring
58
The
central committee
wisely
vetoed
Transition,"
East European
24,1989.
Politics
and Societies 13
THE FOURTHWAVE
231
power.
won
Communist
old communist
consulting
leaders.
for
into a prolonged
stalemate
with Moscow.
and entered
pendence
to
the
and
soft-liners
moderates
Instead of compelling
compromise,
stalemate
fueled confrontation.
In January 1991 the Soviet government
escalated
armed
fiance
the confrontation
more
forces, killing
of the Soviet soldiers
allow
their
Latvia
and Lithuania
by invading
than a dozen people. Demonstrations
ensued.
to
leaders
assembled
People
at the barricades
Polarization
negotiate.
with
in de
ended
only
in all three
In the first post-Soviet
elections
lapse of the Soviet Union.
no
new states, the old Communist
Party ruling elite made
significant
showings.
In all of these
cases
societal
actors
to
(to varying degrees)
ene
over their communist
committed
democratic
mies
cratic
and used
institutional
new
mented
lines. That
process.
design
rules
antiliberal
such practices
Some
of these
that restricted
could
occur
new
regimes
the franchise
further
also
imple
along ethnic
illuminates
the basic
59
a
tried to negotiate
the moderate Communist
In Lithuania
Party leader, Algirdas Brazauskas,
not distinguish
the Lithuanian
transition and even split with the Soviet Communist
Party. This did
in any appreciable way, however. In some respects, his ap
transition from that of Latvia or Estonia
was the result of
making him the result of the shifting balance of
popular mobilization,
pointment
power, not the cause.
232
WORLD
POLITICS
Imposition
Scholars
of noncommunist
is a common
above
communist
imposition
world
transitions
of the new
rules,
Autocrats
have noted
that imposition
from
But in the post
path toward democratization.60
new kinds of
this mode
of transition
has produced
not
in Kazakhstan,
occurred
dictatorship,
democracy?as
Kyrgystan,
and
Belarus.
Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan,
The moment
of transition
from communist
rule to authoritarian
rule
for these
four Central
Asian
states
is the
same
and December
and well
defined?the
in
1991 and the
dissolu
August
subsequent
state nor societal
in December
1991, neither
elections
in 1989
liberalizing
events
in
the beginning
hoped/hypothesized
to
guide
regime
change
in these
countries,
analysts
an
to
In
along
evolutionary
democracy.
path
in 1990 between
the distribution
of power
reformers
and
was
more balanced
than in other central Asian
relatively
their
Kyrgyzstan
conservatives
of
countries
a coalition
to be elected
that allowed Askar Akaev
states, a situation
by
of reformers
and clan elites as the country's first president
in August
THE
233
FOURTH WAVE
tolerance
toward a free press and independent
polit
in the aftermath
ical organizations
of independence.
As he consolidated
to con
his power, however, Nazarbaev
has used his dictatorial
powers
trol the press and political
and harass nongovern
parties, rig elections,
also demonstrated
mental
In Turkmenistan
former first secretary
of the
organizations.
now
never pre
Communist
and
Party
president
Niyazov
Saparmurad
to adhere to any liberal
tended
and
instead
crafted a dicta
principles
of the Communist
former first
Islam Karimov
secretary
Party
president
allowed only one, fixed election,
in December
he cap
1991, in which
tured 86 percent
of the vote.63 In all of these countries,
there was a
paucity of powerful
fore little in the way
at the transitional
democrats
of democratic
moment
and
there
thereafter.
practice
above. Hard-liners
opposition,
Soviet,
Supreme
of the seats while
1991
strikes
Front.
Popular
the Communist
Party
the
r?gime
In the 1990
against
elections
a weak
to the
of Belarus
mass mobilization,
undermined
the ancien
dominated
the Belarussian
86 percent
captured
less than 8 percent.
In
April
that society was capable of
of the hard-liners
in power, who
had
en
the coup
leaders. A moderate,
Stanislav
thusiastically
supported
more
suc
contrast
to
the
In
benefited
from
failed
Shushkevich,
coup.
s
to
cessful transitions
first postcommunist
however, Belarus
democracy,
leader was not a leader of the democratic
but rather was a
opposition
reformer
divided
from within
elite
allowed
in June-July
1994,
dency,
third-wave
democratization
an
to be
cited in the
competitive,
opening
emer
literature as positive
for democratic
a democrat
an
to bubble up
for
opportunity
Instead of creating
gence.
the split in Belarus opened
from society, however,
the way for the emer
autocratic
who
Lukashenko,
leader, Aleksandr
gence of an even more
won the election. Had
a more
movement
democratic
emerged
powerful
at the time, the
have been very dif
trajectory of this transition might
ferent. The
old hard-liners
from
of Lukashenko,
moved
quickly
rule.
authoritarian
dating
the ancien
to work
with
initially wary
r?gime, while
the new leader in consoli
63
came to power before the Soviet
as a
between Uzbek
Karimov
clans. In
compromise
collapse
the period of political
Uzbekistan
years, but was over by
instability occurred in the early Gorbachev
the time of transition after Karimov had consolidated
his political power. See Collins
(fn. 62).
WORLD POLITICS
234
Protracted
Stalemated Transitions:
and Imposition
the first
Unlike
and
second
regime types,
transitions?has
predictable
stalemated
Confrontation
led to consistent,
transition
paths, which
transition
the third postcommunist
path?
outcomes
in
different
radically
produced
world:
electoral
the postcommunist
democracies
and
golia, fragile
partial
inMoldova
democracy
in Russia
and Mon
and civil
and Ukraine,
democratization
were
supposed to be most
would
have
transitions
Stalemated
predicted.
democracies.
all the postcommunist
transitions, Moldova
may be the closest
a
Like
other
of
transition.64
every
regime change
approximation
pacted
an exogenous
shock?
in the region, the one inMoldova
began with
Of
initiated by Moscow
reforms. These
changes
liberalizing
eventu
of nongovernmental
allowed for the emergence
groups, which
one umbrella
Moldovan
the
under
consolidated
Pop
organization,
ally
Gorbachev's
democratic
and
or
Hungary,
not
in
the
did
Lithuania,
support
society.
enjoy widespread
opposition
seats to the
one-third
of
the
the contrary,
the MPF won
On
roughly
a
closer
much
Soviet in the spring 1990 elections,
percentage
Supreme
to the Democratic
than to the clear
total in Russia
Russia Movement's
nate
majorities
elections
however,
cooperate
were
with
not
communist
the opposition.
MPF s
stalwarts
When
opponents
but were
another
in the ancien
soft-liners
external
r?gime,
to
seeking
factor?August
the coup
inMoldova
than
and declare
in control
independ
at the time
to the coup
plotters. While
64
a close second. See M. Steven Fish, "Mongolia: Democracy
without Prereq
Mongolia
might be
uisites," Journal ofDemocracy 9 (July 1998).
65
in Karen
in Post-Communist
"The Politics of Democratization
William
Moldova,"
Crowther,
in Russia, Ukraine,
Reactions
and Bruce Parrot, eds., Democratic Changes and Authoritarian
Dawisha
Belarus, andMoldova
Press, 1997), 293.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University
THE FOURTHWAVE
235
from the an
them, soft-liners
to craft a
cien
smooth
relatively
cooperated
to
transition
Presidential
from communism
power changed
democracy.
a very
in 1996, and the
hands peacefully
election
competitive
following
balance of power in parliament
has since shifted between
left and right
over the course of several elections. Relative
stalemate, however, has not
no formal
ever codified
pact was
MPF moderates
r?gime and
between
institutions.
of power be
the basic players and distribution
respects
to Gor
In response
and Russia.
them were
similar inMoldova
In several
tween
in Russia
also formed
reforms, anticommunist
political groups
into a united front?Democratic
Russia. Elec
and eventually
coalesced
bachev's
tions in 1989 and 1990 and strikes in 1989 and 1991 helped to mobi
lize mass
New
opportunities
against the ancien r?gime.
and re
action
also attracted
defectors
political
demonstrations
for nontraditional
Yeltsin.
Within
Eduard
Yakovlev,
ative interlocutors
the Soviet
importantly
such as Alexander
state, soft-liners
himself were cooper
and Gorbachev
Shevardnadze,
for Russia's democratic
challengers.
Throughout
the
fall of 1990 and spring of 1991, stalemate appeared to force both sides
toward
compromise.
from the Soviet
the anticipated
pact proved elusive. Soft-liners
to
from
Russian
and
moderates
the
government
opposition
attempted
Yet
negotiate new economic and political rules in the fall of 1990 under the
rubric of the 500-Day Plan, but they failed. Again in the summer of
1991,
they
to
implementing
another
cooperative
agree
state
Before
this
signatory
republics.
hard-liners
Soviet
however,
agreement
government
to
the negotiated
impose their pref
interrupted
path and instead tried
use of force. Their
erence for the old status quo
the
coup at
through
the central
could
and
the nine
be enacted,
236
WORLD
POLITICS
at the bar
his regime. This new stalemate, which
challenge
crystallized
con
in
ricades again in September-October
also
ended
violent
1993,
he dictate
referendum.
The
democracy, which
clivities
of Russia's
set of
rules that the population
ratified in a
political
was a
to emerge
regime
subsequently
fragile electoral
not
to
be
able
withstand
the
authoritarian
may
pro
new
of
equal distribution
president.66 A relatively
a
not
its
the
old
and
power
regime
challengers
produced
path
a
that ended
of negotiated
and violent transition
change but
protracted
with
of an unstable
the imposition
electoral democracy.
a balance
the transition
from communism
with
of
Ukraine
began
between
power
ancien
between
r?gime
to that in Russia.
similar
and challengers
The failed coup of August 1991 altered the political orientations of key
in Ukrainian
players
politics.
Like
their Central
Asian
the
comrades,
coup
champion
permitted
as a way
a
to stay in power. Kravchuk
became
In December
1991 he
nationalism
overnight.
a referendum
on Ukrainian
which
independence,
passed
attempt
of Ukrainian
This
overwhelmingly.
of elites within
reorientation
nationalist
the old
friends
r?gime
that had
sparked
con
open
experienced
transition
from
communism.
At
the prolonged domination of the old CPSU leaders has stymied the de
cases in the Baltics
with
of liberal democracy.
velopment
Compared
won
in which
and East-Central
the
democrats
overwhelm
Europe
the new terms of the democratic
the past, dictated
ingly, broke with
polity, and
still unstable
on to
produce
and unconsolidated.
stable
is an extreme
of a violent,
equal distribution
went
Tajikistan
tion resulting
from
regimes,
example
Ukrainian
democracy
confrontational
is
transi
of power among
the
the surface the 1990 elections
relatively
forces in the country. On
political
a solid
to
ancien r?gime.
victory for the communist
produce
appeared
a
the ruling elite devel
In fact, however,
based split within
regionally
as a result of
which
then deepened
after
liberalization,
political
oped
main
Moscow's
attempt. Thus,
civil war.
66
For elaboration,
instead
seeMcFaul
of stalemate
producing
negotiations,
1991 coup
it produced
THE FOURTHWAVE
237
of democratic,
and religious
ideas. Under
the
nationalistic,
states
to
of
Khakhor Makhkamov,
the
these groups
response
leadership
in sev
and
After
swung between
cooperative
acquiescing
repressive.67
eral liberal
reforms
free expression,
lamic uprisings
ocratic
and religious
state and
opposition
tivated. For decades
The
strands of the opposition.
cleavage between
mo
actors was more clan based than
ideologically
the Khodjenti
with
Moscow's
clan,
support, had
challengers to Khodjenti
consolidated
especially
temporarily
transition
and
and
the distribution
after
to reestablish
auto
share power. Instead,
they pushed
an
new
in
first
election
favor
of
their
rule,
by rigging
preferred
in turn used his new office to crack
who
leader, Rakhman
Nabiyev,
down on opposition
leaders and organizations.
similar to his
However,
cratic
inMoscow,
overestimated
the power of
counterparts
Nabiyev
putschist
forces
his clan and state. Opposition
with
frustrated
lead
groups joined
ers from other,
clans to resist old guard repression. Civil war
minority
foes.68 By the end of the first year
ensued between
relatively balanced
thousand
eight hundred
kered, but the result was
Though
tion from
tween
Moldova,
communism
ancien
with
relatively
equal distributions
and
of power be
a
of
variety
of a variety of
r?gime
they experienced
challengers,
in turn influenced
the formation
paths, which
Other
of
each
type can be found throughout
regime types.
examples
the region, ranging from relatively democratic
and Mongolia
Bulgaria
transition
in Albania
and Azerbaijan.
to the
led
power
asymmetric
imposi
or
from below, many of the
tion of dictatorship
from above
democracy
of power are
distributions
from more balanced
that emerged
regimes
a few cases did
in
between
still unstable.
negotiations
only
Strikingly,
democratic
transitions
In contrast
to
distributions
challenged
type. The
and
a causal
challengers
play
countries most
successful
that
in determining
regime
in
liberal
democracy
consolidating
role
67
Collins
(fn. 62), 231.
68
cause gave the op
to the oppositions
Rifle Division
The defection of the Soviet 201st Motorized
access to weapons
that opposition groups in other republics did not enjoy.
position
238
WORLD POLITICS
experienced
transitions.
confrontational
in
Countries
which
most
successful
democracies
nor
while
the mode
of transition
does
on
the most
stable
to have
appear
the causal
that emerges,
little resemblance
regimes.
a
strong
patterns
to the modalities
Therefore,
causal effect
in the post
in
identified
literature.
are the
causes of the balances of power and ideolo
underlying
that produced
these different modes
of transition?
Some contend
What
gies
that
as
of power
is best addressed
part of the outcome
than as a cause of the outcome.69 The
between
strong correlation
and regime
that deeper
structural variables
type suggests
geography
the balance
rather
might
orientation
regime type, and the ideological
of power
influenced
the particular
balances
the need
for a careful
ac
history,
of enemies
and
in the postcommunist
and dictatorship
world. Future
democracy
to
must
of power.
these transitional
balances
research
seek
explain
this article treats balance of power as an independent
variable
However,
duced
rather
First, this
this arti
literature, which
cle seeks to challenge. That
the earlier literature posited different
causal
same set of variables
from
for
the
that
suggests
hypotheses
relationships
and not tautological.
both theories are falsifiable
struc
in this article is that these
the argument
advanced
Second,
big
tural variables
specific
cases
consequences
only in historically
path-dependent
moment
transition
for all of these
The
of
settings.70
have
strategic
was exogenous
and therefore not caused
(except perhaps Russia)
friends and foes of the regime.
directly by the balance of power between
in
The
confluence
of the forces
that produced
democrats
powerful
was
autocrats
in Turkmenistan
Poland
and powerful
only causally sig
cen
moment
at the end of the twentieth
at a
in
time
nificant
unique
same
After
Poland
had
the
and
cultural
all,
tury.
religious
practices,
a century ago, but these
same location, and the same enemies
nearly the
factors
did not
interact
to
produce
democracy
then.
Imagine
even
if
69
for Outcomes
of Post-Communist
Herbert
Kitschelt,
Regime Change: Causal
"Accounting
or Shallowness
in Rival Explanations"
1999).
Depth
(Manuscript,
70
to institutional
in
The logic draws on the idea of punctuated
emergence
equilibrium
applied
to the State: Alternative
and Historical Dynamics,"
Com
Conceptions
Stephen Krasner, "Approaches
parative Politics 16 (January 1984).
THE FOURTHWAVE
239
in the postcommunist
the pattern
of regime variation
such as Russia
and
with
shared cultures and histories,
or Romania
and Moldova,
have produced
very different
with
Countries
Belarus
regimes
culture
while
have
countries
with
erected
no common
similar
very
regimes.
or even So
of the communist
the causal significance
generally,
viet legacy is not uniform
type. The
regime
regarding postcommunist
of
within
of
the
former
Soviet
very diversity
type
regime
subregions
or
versus Armenia?calls
versus Ukraine
into
Union?Belarus
Georgia
a
of
shared communist
the causal significance
history. Con
question
More
upon closer analysis, "similar" prior regimes also look very dif
rule in communist
of autocratic
For
the degree
instance,
or
more
in
the Soviet Union
that
Czechoslovakia
closely approximated
or
Yet a decade
than that in Poland, Hungary,
Romania
Yugoslavia.
ismore
sim
in
the
Czech
after decommunization,
democracy
Republic
to
in Poland,
ilar to democracy
and
Slovenia
than
democracy
Hungary,
or even Slovakia.
in Russia, Romania,
versely,
ferent.
Decades
ment,
culture,
mocratization
explanations.
generalizations
uncover.
they
like economic
now, big structural variables
develop
and geography may correlate cleanly with patterns of de
and thereby provide more
around the world
sweeping
from
broad
for the short span of only one decade,
However,
based on deep structural causes hide as much history as
IV. Explaining
Anomalies:
Borders
and the
"West"
a causal
of power
between
balances
positing
relationship
at the time of transition
later
and regime type a decade
and ideologies
are
cases
can
not
in
There
boxes
the
but
all,
many
region.
explain many,
1 that should be empty but are
in Figure
matrix
in the three-by-three
The
model
not. Other
factors must
ure to meet
Rustow's
of defined
240
WORLD
override
the causal
ing neighboring
Disputed
influence
states
POLITICS
incentives
to
join
of transition
the norm
by offer
of the region.
Borders
The
not
fully democratic.
and, until
Georgia,
This
list includes Armenia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina,
last year, Croatia. These
countries
share one com
in the region
that the more
successful
democracies
mon
problem
lacked?border
wars
territorial
These
debates
territorial
sparked
conflicts
in turn
credentials.
The
by geogra
cases. Anti
nationalist
leaders with poor democratic
empowered
are not
actions of leaders, however,
predetermined
a role even in these
and
choice
still
Ideas,
leaders,
phy.
play
in
Soviet sentiment
fused with militant
nationalism
Georgia
Zviad Gamsakhurdia.
to
produce
InMay
85 percent
of the vote. But his
winning
non
movements
ideas quickly
fueled
among
separatist
war within
then
civil
the
minorities
and
Georgian
Georgian
Republic.
to the more
A change
in leadership
from Gamsakhurdia
democratic
the total collapse
and less nationalistic
Eduard
Shevardnadze
prevented
elected
cratically
nationalist
president,
of the Georgian
over borders
No
decades.
ternational
in
ethnic war on a scale not witnessed
produced
Europe
to slow the violence
democratic
leaders emerged
until
forces intervened.
Border
and ethnic conflicts
disputes
in
in
in
another
After
August
an
nationalist.
antidemocratic
quickly
in the opposite
transition
peaceful
Armenia's
attempt,
country's
within
the armed
This
new
elite
the Armenian
former
resources
forces
in turn has
Since Tudjman's
toward European
death, how
and more
integration
direction,
away from democracy.
to
accelerated
democracy,
by the
war with Azerbai
decade-long
an alternative
also produced
elite
the
that
of
embattled
challenge
republic.
but has
to
articulated
a less democratic
the leadership
regime. Under
the
of
Nagorno-Karabakh
president
of Robert
republic,
of
conception
the
Kocharian,
it forced Ter Pet
THE
FOURTH WAVE
241
to
1998. Since the palace coup and Kochar
resign in February
as
in 1998 in a rigged vote, Armenia's
ian's election
regime
president
contributed
factors
have
has become
authoritarian.
Many
increasingly
rosian
to
crisis
political
in Armenia,
the territorial
but
dispute
has been
espe
cially destabilizing.71
The
"West"
alous
mania
overachievers
comprise
to the
outlined
general model
two countries
and Bulgaria,
communism
mania
of cases anom
category
a category
that includes Ro
the transition
from
started
a second
Democratic
above,
that
leaders from
mobilization
the ancien
r?gime.
the
destroyed
In Ro
ancien
r?gime but did not take the next step of filling the void with new soci
In December
etal leaders and organizations.
1989, after only two weeks
most
in
totalitarian
of popular
the
Romanian
revolt,
dictatorship?the
was
the Romanian
Nicolae
the region?collapsed.
leader,
Ceau^escu,
were no
banned.
There
and the Romanian
killed
Communist
Party
pacts,
no
perished,
no
the Ceau^escu
After
regime
compromises.
negotiations,
a
the National
Sal
however,
organization,
phantom
political
vation Front (nsf), rushed in to fill the political vacuum. Quasi dissi
allied with
and societal
leaders
poets,
initially
front had been created
clear
that
this
became
gradually
dents,
munist
officials
the
as a means
last communist
in power. After
"people
regime, communist
apparatchiks
to democratic
and not committed
of staying
destroyed
vated by their own interests
dominated
the first postcommunist
was less dramatic
in Bulgaria,
r?gime
was
power"
moti
norms
the ancien
regime. The break with
but the resilience of the old guard
for Bulgarian
and Ro
the prospects
a decade
later, both
countries
have
liberal democracy.
countries has benefited
from prox
there is
the postcommunist
world,
and regime type.72
from theWest
at the mo
not
to theWest
does
Closeness
certainly
explain regime type
was
ment of transition. Before
Serbia's dictatorship
the fall of Milosevic,
Democratic
consolidation
in both
to theWest.
Indeed, throughout
imity
a
between
distance
correlation
positive
71
Diffusion
of
242
much
WORLD
to Berlin
closer
cratic Belarus
POLITICS
than Georgia's
electoral
and auto
democracy,
to theWest
than semidemocratic
Russia. Over
is closer
in Romania
and Bulgaria
countries
have
because both
democracy,
institutions.
these Western
now
democracy
seems
After
poised
have
a lost decade
to benefit
real incentives
a reasonable
chance
even Croatian
from European
to
deepen
of joining
and Serbian
integration.
V. Conclusion
This
article
lenges many
on
erature
has outlined
an actorcentric
of the principal
assumptions
third-wave
democratization.
occurred
at the same
changes
the causal mechanisms
at
time
were
that chal
theory of transition
of the earlier actorcentric
lit
as other
Temporally,
third-wave
these
regime
transitions. Yet
so different
so varied
the approach
in this
outlined
and the cases discussed
Furthermore,
in
article call into question
the historical
of
third-wave
transitions
place
more
the development
of theories
about democratization
generally.
from below in which
is the mode
confrontation
imposition
to the
is not a new phenomenon,
unique
postcommunist
world. On the contrary,
there is a tradition
of democratic
revolutions
some of the most
case studies in democratiza
that includes
important
tion. Certainly,
the American
transitions were not pacted
and French
were
transitions.
confrontational
armed strug
Rather,
they
protracted,
new
in which
the victors
the
rules of the game.73 In
then dictated
gles
Democratic
of transition
73
Bruce Ackerman,
We the People: Transformations,
vol. 1 (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press,
between
liberal and antiliberal
elites in the United
1998). To be sure, negotiations
(slave-owning)
States helped to produce partial democratic
institutions. These compromises,
however, were not ne
from the British ancien r?gime.
gotiated with moderates
THE
FOURTH WAVE
243
several
and decades-long
"transi
uncertain,
respects, France's violent,
more
tion" from autocratic
rule looks
like Russia's ongoing
transforma
tion than like
Likewise,
Spain's negotiated
externally
path.
imposed
in Germany,
such as the democratic
transitions
Aus
regime changes,
no
or
and
involved
tria,
Decolonization,
pacting
negotiation.
Japan,
discussed
in
In the long
to de
communism
here
stretch
of history,
the successful
transitions
from
more
like the norm, while
the pacted transitions
mocracy may look
transitions
from above in Latin America
and Southern
Europe
look more
like the aberration.
and
may
must
seek to spec
theory
can facilitate
which
pacts
under which
pacts are inconse
next
after. The
of democratization
generation
the
conditions
under
precisely
more
ify
democratization
the conditions
and
In other words,
a
comprehensive
quential.
the third
must
be fused
to
In addition, without
generate
theory
to
this
research
agency altogether,
abandoning
agenda should attempt
arrow
to
account
in
for the factors that
backward
order
push the causal
of transition.
of transition
should
therefore
strategic
States
and
framed
the
communist
the normative
tionaries
Soviet
choices
and reactionaries.
is, communism?did
tization
that many
not
the balance
of power
and
dependent
consequences
At
about
Union
during
the
cold war
made
also
by revolu
regime change
the same time, prior regime type?that
or uniform
role in democra
the negative
play
true causal
of the
had predicted.75 The
significance
can be
moment
when
the
transition
understood
only
deeper
fully
are
causes of these modes
article has argued that
fully specified. This
at the time of transition had
path
ideologies
Yet the
for subsequent
regime emergence.
74
(fn. 2), 112.
75Huntington
Przeworski
(fn. 3,1991); Ken Jowitt, The New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction
(Berkeley:
Processes
in East Cen
of California Press, 1992); and Grzegorz
Ekiert, "Democratization
University
tral Europe: A Theoretical
British Journal of Political Science 21 (July 1991), 288.
Reconsideration,"
WORLD POLITICS
244
can be determined
of these contingent
variables
only if
importance
can be measured
their causal weight
of
independently
deeper factors
cause
that
and impede democracy.76 While
democratization
theorists
have
devoted
given
The
serious
attention
to
of transition
and
a
may
project of constructing
general
theory of democratization
causes
in Poland may be distinct
fail.
The
of
well
democratization
very
in
from the causes
in
let alone from those that predominate
Spain,
on
France. This
article's emphasis
temporal
path dependence
implies
that different
historical
democratization.
contexts
The
may
create
unique patterns
in the postcommunist
regime change
search for a general
theory of democratization
be a long one.
against
wave
of
unique
factors
for and
generated
by the fourth
world
that the
suggest
and autocratization
will
76
can become the
Every independent variable
dependent variable of another study. In journal arti
cles especially, asMichael Taylor argues, the "explanatory buck has to stop somewhere"; Taylor, "Struc
in the Explanation
of Social Change," Politics and Society 17 (1989), 199. To
ture, Culture and Action
avoid tautology and claim causal significance of more proximate variables, however, requires the re
to more important
searcher to demonstrate
that the independent variables selected are not endogenous
prior variables but rather that they have some independent causal impact.
77
Recent studies that have pushed the causal arrow back one step prior include Wood
(fn. 22); Va
lerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The
and Destruction
of Socialism and the State (Cambridge:
Design
"What Do We Know about Democratization
Press, 1999); Barbara Geddes,
Cambridge
University
after Twenty Years?" Annual Review
of Political Science 2 (1999); Alexander Motyl, Revolutions, Na
tions, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities
Press,
(New York: Columbia University
in East-Central
1999); Grzegorz
Ekiert, The State against Society: Political Crises and Their Aftermath
(Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1996); and Bratton and van deWalle
(fn. 41).
Europe