Labor Juris (2014-2015)

1
LABOR JURIS
2014-20151
Benedict Guirey Kato
Labor Arbiter, Law Prof., Bar Reviewer
Online Bar Lecturer (Chan-Robles), MCLE Lecturer
I
LABOR PRINCIPLES
DUE PROCESS
Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. vs. Avestruz
G.R. No. 207010, February 18, 2015
Section 17 of the POEA-SEC prescribes the pre-termination procedure for seafarers. As explained in Skippers Pacific, Inc. v. Mira:
An erring seaman is given a written notice of the charge against him and is afforded an opportunity to explain or defend
himself. Should sanctions be imposed, then a written notice of penalty and the reasons for it shall be furnished the erring seafarer. It is
only in the exceptional case of clear and existing danger to the safety of the crew or vessel that the required notices are dispensed
with; but just the same, a complete report should be sent to the manning agency, supported by substantial evidence of the findings.
The statement given by Captain Woodward requiring Avestruz to explain in writing the events that transpired at the galley in the morning of June
22, 2011 hardly qualifies as a written notice of the charge against him, nor was it an opportunity for Avestruz to explain or defend himself. While Captain
Woodward claimed in his e-mail that he conducted a disciplinary hearing informing Avestruz of his inefficiency, no evidence was presented to support the
same.
Neither was Avestruz given a written notice of penalty and the reasons for its imposition. Instead, Captain Woodward verbally informed him that
he was dismissed from service and would be disembarked from the vessel.
SC Note: Only in the exceptional case of clear and existing danger to the safety of the crew or vessel that the required notices may be
dispensed with, and, once again, records are bereft of evidence showing that such was the situation when Avestruz was dismissed.
DOUBTS
Hocheng Philippines Corporation vs. Farrales
G.R. No. 211497, March 18, 2015
But where there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for termination of employment, the law considers the case a matter of illegal
dismissal. If doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and that of the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.
The employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause.
SOCIAL UTILITY
Milan, et. al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. No. 202961, February 4, 2015
Our laws provide for a clear preference for labor. This is in recognition of the asymmetrical power of those with capital when they are left to
negotiate with their workers without the standards and protection of law. In cases such as these, the collective bargaining unit of workers are able to get
more benefits and in exchange, the owners are able to continue with the program of cutting their losses or wind down their operations due to serious
business losses. The company in this case did all that was required by law.
The preferential treatment given by our law to labor, however, is not a license for abuse. It is not a signal to commit acts of unfairness that will
unreasonably infringe on the property rights of the company. Both labor and employer have social utility, and the law is not so biased that it does not find a
middle ground to give each their due.
FULL PROTECTION TO LABOR
Racelis vs. United Philippine Lines, Inc.
G.R. No. 198408, November 12, 2014
1
Acknowledgment: Labor Arbiters and Commissioners receive updates from LA Ady Umbac of the First Division of the NLRC via his regular
Supplements which he emails to them. Without those emailed materials, this handout would have taken longer to prepare. All citations in SC decisions
omitted.
While it is true that a medical repatriation has the effect of terminating the seafarers contract of employment, it is, however, enough that the workrelated illness, which eventually becomes the proximate cause of death, occurred while the contract was effective for recovery to be had.
Consistent with the States avowed policy to afford full protection to labor as enshrined in Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the
POEA-SEC was designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seafarers in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels. As
such, it is a standing principle that its provisions are to be construed and applied fairly, reasonably, and liberally in their favor.
SC Note: Guided by this principle, the Court, in the recent case of Canuel, recognized that a medical repatriation case constitutes an exception
to the second requirement under Section 20 (A) (1) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, i.e., that the seafarers death had occurred during the term of his employment,
in view of the terminative consequences of a medical repatriation under Section 18 (B) of the same. In essence, the Court held that under such
circumstance, the work-related death need not precisely occur during the term of his employment as it is enough that the seafarers work-related injury or
illness which eventually causes his death had occurred during the term of his employment.
II
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
Fonterra Brands Phils. Inc. vs. Largado
G.R. No. 205300, March 18, 2015
A person is considered engaged in legitimate job contracting or subcontracting if the following conditions concur:
1. The contractor or subcontractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes to perform the job, work or service on its own
account and under its own responsibility according to its own manner and method, and free from the control and direction of the principal in
all matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof;
2. The contractor or subcontractor has substantial capital or investment; and
3. The agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor assures the contractual employees entitlement to all labor and
occupational safety and health standards, free exercise of the right to self-organization, security of tenure, and social and welfare benefits.
On the other hand, contracting is prohibited when the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job,
work or service for a principal and if any of the following elements are present, thus:
1. The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to the job, work or service to be performed and
the employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which are directly related to the
main business of the principal; or
2. The contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of the contractual employee.
Note: Evidence of Job Contractorship:
1. Certificate of Business Registration;
2. Certificate of Registration with the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
3. Mayors Permit;
4. Certificate of Membership with the Social Security System;
5. Certificate of Registration with the Department of Labor and Employment;
6. Company Profile; and
7. Certifications issued by its clients.
Furthermore, A.C. Sicat has substantial capital, having assets totaling _5,926,155.76 as of December 31, 2006. Too, its Agreement with Fonterra
clearly sets forth that A.C. Sicat shall be liable for the wages and salaries of its employees or workers, including benefits, premiums, and protection due
them, as well as remittance to the proper government entities of all withholding taxes, Social Security Service, and Medicare premiums, in accordance with
relevant laws.
BGK Note: The contractor is the employer, i.e., for purposes of security of tenure. For unpaid wages and benefits, the principal is solidarily
liable (Meralco Industrial Engg Services Corp.v. NLRC, G.R. No. 145402, 14 March 2008).
III
REGULAR EMPLOYMENT
Basan, et. al. vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines
G.R. No. 174365-66, February 4, 2015
In Magsalin v. National Organization of Working Men, the Court categorically declared that the nature of work of route helpers hired by Coca
Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. is necessary and desirable in its usual business or trade thereby qualifying them as regular employees, to wit: Coca-Cola
Bottlers Phils., Inc., is one of the leading and largest manufacturers of softdrinks in the country. Respondent workers have long been in the service of
petitioner company. Respondent workers, when hired, would go with route salesmen on board delivery trucks and undertake the laborious task of loading
and unloading softdrink products of petitioner company to its various delivery points.
FIXED-TERM EMPLOYEES
G.R. No. 205300, March 18, 2015
Fixed-term employment contracts are not limited, as they are under the present Labor Code, to those by nature seasonal or for specific projects
with predetermined dates of completion; they also include those to which the parties by free choice have assigned a specific date of termination. The
determining factor of such contracts is not the duty of the employee but the day certain agreed upon by the parties for the commencement and termination
of the employment relationship.
In the case at bar, it is clear that respondents were employed by A.C. Sicat as project employees. In their employment contract with the latter, it is
clearly stated that [A.C. Sicat is] temporarily employing [respondents] as TMR[s] effective June 6[, 2006] under the following terms and conditions: The need
for your service being only for a specific project, your temporary employment will be for the duration only of said project of our client, namely to promote
FONTERRA BRANDS products x x x which is expected to be finished on or before Nov. 06, 2006.
PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEES
G.R. No. 174365-66, February 4, 2015
Considering, however, the possibility of abuse by employers in the utilization of fixed-term employment contracts, this Court, in Brent, laid down
the following criteria to prevent the circumvention of the employees security of tenure:
1) The fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties without any force, duress, or
improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent; or
2) It satisfactorily appears that the employer and the employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no
moral dominance exercised by the former or the latter.
It is rather unjustifiable to allow respondent to hire and rehire petitioners on fixed terms, never attaining regular status. Hence, in the absence of
proof showing that petitioners knowingly agreed upon a fixed term of employment, We uphold the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC and so rule
that petitioners are, indeed, regular employees, entitled to security of tenure. Consequently, for lack of any clear, valid, and just or authorized cause in
terminating petitioners' employment, We find respondent guilty of illegal dismissal.
EMPLOYEE STATUS
Regular employees, not project employees; project employment scheme circumvented the law and prevented employees from attaining regular
status.
Manalo, et. al. vs. TNS Philippines, Inc.
G.R. No. 208567, November 26, 2014
Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly defined a project employee as one whose employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the
work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. Additionally, a project employee is one whose
termination of his employment contract is reported to the DOLE everytime the project for which he was engaged has been completed.
Granting arguendo that petitioners were rehired intermittently, a careful review of the project employment contracts of petitioners reveals some
other vague provisions. Oddly, one of the terms and conditions in the said contract stated that:
1. The need for your services being determinable and for a specific project starting ____________ your employment will be for the
duration of said project of the Company, namely Project ___________ which is expected to be finished on _____________. The
Company shall have the option of renewing or extending the period of this agreement for such time as it may be
necessary to complete the project or because we need further time to determine your competence on the job.
To the Court, the phrase because we need further time to determine your competence on the job would refer to a probationary employment.
Such phrase changes the tenor of the contract and runs counter to the very nature of a project employment. TNS can, therefore, extend the contract which
was already fixed when it deemed it necessary to determine whether or not the employee was qualified and fit for the job. Corollarily, TNS can likewise preterminate the contract not because the specific project was completed ahead of time, but because of failure to qualify for the job. Consistently, the terms and
conditions of the contract, reads:
4. It is expressly agreed and understood that the Company may terminate your employment after compliance with
procedural requirements of law, without benefit of termination pay and without any obligation on the part of the Company, in the event
of any breach of any conditions hereof:
a) If the project is completed or cancelled before the expected date of completion as specified in paragraph 1 hereof;
b) If we should find that you are not qualified, competent or efficient in the above-stated positions for which you are hired in
accordance with the company standards made known to you at the start of your employment; x x x
For said reason, at the outset, the supposed project employment contract was highly doubtful.
PROJECT EMPLOYEES
FVR Skills and Services Exponents, Inc. vs. Seva, et. al.
G.R. No. 200857, October 22, 2014
If the petitioner really intended the respondents to be project employees, then the contracts should have been executed right from the time of
hiring, or when the respondents were first assigned to Robinsons, not when the petitioners service contract was winding up. The terms and conditions of the
respondents engagement should have been disclosed and explained to them from the commencement of their employment. The petitioners failure to do so
supports the conclusion that it had been in bad faith in evading the respondents right to security of tenure.
In Glory Philippines, Inc. v. Vergara, the Court rejected the validity of a fixed term contract belatedly executed, and ruled that its belated signing
was a deliberate employer ploy to evade the employees right to security of tenure. As the Court explained:
To us, the private respondents illegal intention became clearer from such acts. Its making the petitioners sign written employment
contracts a few days before the purported end of their employment periods (as stated in such contracts) was a diaphanous
ploy to set periods with a view for their possible severance from employment should the private respondent so willed it. If
the term of the employment was truly determined at the beginning of the employment, why was there delay in the signing of
the ready-made contracts that were entirely prepared by the employer? Also, the changes in the positions supposedly held by the
petitioners in the company belied the private respondents adamant contention that the petitioners were hired solely for the purpose of
manning PIS during its alleged dry run period that ended on October 20, 1998. We view such situation as a very obvious ploy of the
private respondent to evade the petitioners eventual regularization. [Emphasis ours]
Moreover, under Article 1390 of the Civil Code, contracts where the consent of a party was vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud, are voidable or annullable. The petitioners threat of nonpayment of the respondents salaries clearly amounted to intimidation. Under this
situation, and the suspect timing when these contracts were executed, we rule that these employment contracts were voidable and were effectively
questioned when the respondents filed their illegal dismissal complaint.
IV
EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION
THE 1992 MANUAL OF REGULATIONS FOR PRIVATE SCHOOLS
Leus vs. St. Scholasticas College Westgrove
G.R. No. 187225, January 28, 2015
Moreover, Section 69 of BP 232 specifically authorizes the Secretary of Education to prescribe and impose such administrative sanction as he
may deem reasonable and appropriate in the implementing rules and regulations for the [g]ross inefficiency of the teaching or non-teaching personnel of
private schools. Accordingly, contrary to the petitioners claim, the Court sees no reason to invalidate the provisions of the 1992 MRPS, specifically Section
94 thereof.
IMMORALITY
G.R. No. 187225, January 28, 2015
The CA and the labor tribunals affirmed the validity of the petitioners dismissal pursuant to Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS, which provides that:
Sec. 94. Causes of Terminating Employment In addition to the just causes enumerated in the Labor Code, the employment of school
personnel, including faculty, may be terminated for any of the following causes:
xxx
e. Disgraceful or immoral conduct;
xxx
The labor tribunals concluded that the petitioners pregnancy out of wedlock, per se, is disgraceful and immoral considering that she is
employed in a Catholic educational institution. In arriving at such conclusion, the labor tribunals merely assessed the fact of the petitioners pregnancy vis-vis the totality of the circumstances surrounding the sameThe fact of the petitioners pregnancy out of wedlock, without more, is not enough to
characterize the petitioners conduct as disgraceful or immoral. There must be substantial evidence to establish that pre-marital sexual relations and,
consequently, pregnancy out of wedlock, are indeed considered disgraceful or immoral.
INSUBORDINATION
G.R. No. 207010, February 18, 2015
Insubordination, as a just cause for the dismissal of an employee, necessitates the concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employees
assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable,
lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.
In this case, the contents of Captain Woodwards e-mails do not establish that Avestruzs conduct had been willful, or characterized by a wrongful
and perverse attitude. The Court concurs with the CAs observation that Avestruzs statement regarding the incident in the galley deserves more credence,
being corroborated by Kong, a mess man who witnessed the same.
Conversely, apart from Captain Woodwards e-mails, no other evidence was presented by the petitioners to support their claims. While rules of
evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies, petitioners should have offered additional proof to corroborate the
statements described therein. Thus, in Ranises v. NLRC which involved a seafarer who was repatriated to the Philippines for allegedly committing illegal
acts amounting to a breach of trust, as based on a telex dispatch by the Master of the vessel, the Court impugned and eventually vetoed the credence given
by the NLRC upon the telex.
INSUBORDINATION
St. Lukes Medical Center, Inc. vs. Sanchez
G.R. No. 212054, March 11, 2015
On a related point, the Court observes that there lies no competent basis to support the common observation of the NLRC and the CA that the
retention of excess medical supplies was a tolerated practice among the nurses at the Pediatric Unit. While there were previous incidents of hoarding, it
appears that such acts were in similar fashion furtively made and the items secretly kept, as any excess items found in the concerned nurses
possession would have to be confiscated. Hence, the fact that no one was caught and/or sanctioned for transgressing the prohibition therefor does not mean
that the so-called hoarding practice was tolerated by SLMC. Besides, whatever maybe the justification behind the violation of the company rules regarding
excess medical supplies is immaterial since it has been established that an infraction was deliberately committed. Doubtless, the deliberate disregard or
disobedience of rules by the employee cannot be countenanced as it may encourage him or her to do even worse and will render a mockery of the rules of
discipline that employees are required to observe.
Note: In this case, the SC adds 14 articles owing to insertions in the Labor Code. Hence, Art. 282 is now Art. 296. Rex Book Store adds 6
articles only.
ABSENCE OF ACTUAL DAMAGE
St. Lukes Medical Center, Inc. vs. Sanchez
G.R. No. 212054, March 11, 2015
While damage aggravates the charge, its absence does not mitigate nor negate the employees liability. Neither is SLMCs non-filing of the
appropriate criminal charges relevant to this analysis. An employees guilt or innocence in a criminal case is not determinative of the existence of a just or
authorized cause for his or her dismissal. It is well-settled that conviction in a criminal case is not necessary to find just cause for termination of employment,
as in this case. Criminal and labor cases involving an employee arising from the same infraction are separate and distinct proceedings which should not
arrest any judgment from one to the other.
RETRENCHMENT
Cabaobas, et. al. vs. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc.
G.R. No. 176908, March 25, 2015
Given that the financial statements are incomplete, the independent auditing firm, SGV & Co., aptly explained nonetheless that they were
derived from the PCPPI's accounting records, and were subject to further adjustments upon the completion of the audit of financial statements of the
company taken as a whole, which was then in progress. The Court thus agrees with the CA and the NLRC that the letter of SGV & Co., accompanied by a
consolidated Statement of Income and Deficit showing a net loss of P29,167,000. in the company's Tanauan Operations as of June 30, 1999, and
P22,328,000 as of June 2000, is sufficient and convincing proof of serious business losses which justified PCPPI's retrenchment program. After all, the
settled rule in quasi-judicial proceedings is that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in determining the legality of an employer's dismissal of an
employee, and not even a preponderance of evidence is necessary, as substantial evidence is considered sufficient. Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla of evidence or relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally
reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.
ABANDONMENT
Manarpiis vs. Texan Philippines, Inc.
G.R. No. 197011, January 28, 2015
We have laid down the two elements which must concur for a valid abandonment, viz: (1) the failure to report to work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor being
manifested by some overt acts. Abandonment as a just ground for dismissal requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to perform his
employment responsibilities. Mere absence or failure to work, even after notice to return, is not tantamount to abandonment.
Furthermore, it is well-settled that the filing by an employee of a complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement is proof enough of
his desire to return to work, thus, negating the employers charge of abandonment. An employee who takes steps to protest his dismissal cannot logically be
said to have abandoned his work.
Abandonment in this case was a trumped up charge, apparently to make it appear that petitioner was not yet terminated when she filed the illegal
dismissal complaint and to give a semblance of truth to the belated investigation against the petitioner. Petitioner did not abandon her work but was told not
to report for work anymore after being served a written notice of termination of company closure on July 27, 2000 and turning over company properties to
respondent Rialubin-Tan.
RESIGNATION
G.R. No. 205300, March 18, 2015
Here, it is obvious that respondents were no longer interested in continuing their employment with Zytron. Their voluntary refusal to renew their
contracts was brought about by their desire to continue their assignment in Fonterra which could not happen in view of the conclusion of Zytrons contract
with Fonterra. Hence, to be able to continue with their assignment, they applied for work with A.C. Sicat with the hope that they will be able to continue
rendering services as TMRs at Fonterra since A.C. Sicat is Fonterras new manpower supplier. This fact is even acknowledged by the CA in the assailed
Decision where it recognized the reason why respondents applied for work at A.C. Sicat. The CA stated that [t]o continuously work as merchandisers of
Fonterra products, [respondents] submitted their job applications to A.C. Sicat x x x. This is further bolstered by the fact that respondents voluntarily
complied with the requirements for them to claim their corresponding monetary benefits in relation to the cessation of their employment contract with Zytron.
In short, respondents voluntarily terminated their employment with Zytron by refusing to renew their employment contracts with the latter, applying
with A.C. Sicat, and working as the latters employees, thereby abandoning their previous employment with Zytron. Too, it is well to mention that for obvious
reasons, resignation is inconsistent with illegal dismissal. This being the case, Zytron cannot be said to have illegally dismissed respondents, contrary to the
findings of the CA.
V
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL: CONSEQUENCES
G.R. No. 207010, February 18, 2015
Section 10 (RA 8042) Money claims.
xxx
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, or any
unauthorized deductions from the migrant workers salary, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee
and the deductions made with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less. 2
2
The Court declared as unconstitutional the clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" provided in the 5th
paragraph of Section I 0 of RA 8042, for being violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution (Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 60 I
Phil. 245, 306 [2009] ). Note: Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Joy Cabiles, 5 Aug. 2014, resurrected Serrano which RA 10022 abandoned
by re-enacting the 3-month salary rule in 2010.
FULL BACKWAGES
G.R. No. 187225, January 28, 2015
Also, employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled to full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent, computed from the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement but if reinstatement is no
longer possible, the backwages shall be computed from the time of their illegal termination up to the finality of the decision. Accordingly, the petitioner is
entitled to an award of full backwages from the time she was illegally dismissed up to the finality of this decision.
Six percent (6%) per annum interest on the judgment award.
G.R. No. 187225, January 28, 2015
Finally, legal interest shall be imposed on the monetary awards herein granted at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this
judgment until fully paid.
60 OR 65?
University of Pangasinan, Inc. vs. Florentino Fernandez and Heirs of Nilda Fernandez
G.R. No. 211228, November 12, 2014
The petitioners point out that Florentino and Nilda turned 60 on December 11, 2002 and April 30, 2002, respectively. Thus, backwages and
separation pay could only be computed up to those dates since under both UPIs retirement plan and Article 287 of the Labor Code, 60 is the optional
retirement age. Further, on July 18, 2005, Florentino and Nilda filed separate claims for retirement benefits, hence, effectively admitting that 60 and not 65 is
the retirement age for UPIs faculty members.
Nilda and Florentino were born on April 30, 1942 and December 11, 1942, respectively. In 2002, both had turned 60 and can opt to retire. The
Court cannot, however, agree that this is the cut-off date for the computation of backwages and separation pay due them because of the reasons discussed
below.
First, 60 is merely an optional but not the mandatory retirement age. Second, the evidence submitted do not show at whose option it is to retire
the faculty members before the age of 65. Third, there is no proof whatsoever that the faculty members of UPI indeed retire at 60 years of age.
Fourth, Florentino and Nilda filed claims for retirement pay in 2005 when they were both 63, hence, their acts did not necessarily constitute an
admission that 60 is the retirement age for UPIs faculty members.
In view of the above, the Court finds that no mistake was committed by LA Flores and the CA in allowing the computation of backwages and
separation pay due Florentino and Nilda to include the period beyond 2002.
CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING

G.R. No. 207010, February 18, 2015
It is well-settled that the burden of proving that the termination of an employee was for a just or authorized cause lies with the employer. If the
employer fails to meet this burden, the conclusion would be that the dismissal was unjustified and, therefore, illegal. In order to discharge this burden, the
employer must present substantial evidence, which is defined as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion, and not based on mere surmises or conjectures.
BGK Note: ECO-CPC rule - Burden is imposed only after the employee has proven the fact of his dismissal as follows: (1) employer-employee
relationship; (2) complete severance of employer-employee relationship (ECO); and (3) overt act of dismissal. Proof must be clear, positive and
convincing (CPC).
IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL JUDGMENTS
Metroguards Security Agency Corporation vs. Hilongo
G.R. No. 215630, March 9, 2015
In Nacar v. Gallery Frames, we have held that:
x x x no essential change is made by a recomputation as this step is a necessary consequence that flows from the nature of
the illegality of dismissal declared by the Labor Arbiter in that decision. A recomputation (or an original computation, if no previous
computation has been made) is a part of the law specifically, Article 279 of the Labor Code and the established jurisprudence on this
provision that is read into the decision. By the nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add up until full satisfaction,
as expressed under Article 279 of the Labor Code. The recomputation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the
decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands;
only the computation of monetary consequences of this dismissal is affected, and this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of
final judgments.
Nacar reiterated the Courts ruling in the earlier cases of Session Delights and Gonzales.
BACKWAGES: ALLOWANCES
Villena vs. Batangas II Electric Cooperative, Inc.
G.R. No. 205755, February 4, 2015
Meanwhile, on the matter of the claimed allowances, it is clear from BATELEC IIs pleadings and submissions that representation allowance,
transportation allowance, and cellular phone usage allowance are given to the Finance Manager/Department Manager as part of their benefits, unlike the
separate entitlement to retirement pay which may be recovered only upon a meritorious subsequent application when the employee decides to retire.
Consequently, these allowances ought to be included in the other benefits pertaining to the position of Finance Manager to which Villena is entitled and
which were awarded to her under the final and executory CA Decision and NLRC Resolution.
With the award of the "other benefits pertaining to the position of Finance Manager" made by the CA in its August 31, 2001 Decision lapsing into
finality, the same had already become immutable and unalterable; this means that they may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. Thus, it was an error on the part of the CA to still consider, rule upon, and
vary the previous CA Ruling, i.e., August 31, 2001 CA Decision, on the entitlement of Villena to the benefits of representation, transportation, and cellular
phone usage allowances. On this score, therefore, the claim of Villena is granted.
BACKWAGES: OTHER BENEFITS
Villena vs. Batangas II Electric Cooperative, Inc.
G.R. No. 205755, February 4, 2015
As the Court sees it, the other benefits mentioned in these rulings cannot be construed to include retirement pay for the primary reason that
they adjudged awards relative to Villenas illegal dismissal complaint, which remains barren of a specific cause of action for retirement pay. In order for her
retirement pay claim to be considered, Villenas complaint should have contained substantial allegations which would show that she (a) had applied for the
same, and (b) her application squares with the requirements of entitlement under the terms of the companys retirement plan, i.e., Policy No. 03-003, which,
in fact, was issued on September 20, 2003, or after the August 31, 2001 CA Decision had already attained finality. However, based on the records, what she
sought for in her illegal dismissal complaint were the reliefs of reinstatement, payment of salary differentials, all benefits and allowances that she may have
received as Finance Manager, attorneys fees, and damages. Thus, as the matter left for determination is whether or not the aforesaid rulings, when
executed, should include retirement pay and representation, transportation, and cellular phone usage allowances, the Court will harken back only to the
context of the illegal dismissal complaint from which such awards of other benefits stemmed from.
Verily, the Court is not unaware of its rulings wherein it pronounced that retirement pay and separation pay are not mutually exclusive (unless
there is a specific prohibition in the collective bargaining agreement or retirement plan against the payment of both benefits); however, with Villenas
entitlement to retirement pay not included as an issue in an illegal dismissal case which had already been finally decided, it is quite absurd for Villena to
submit a contemporaneous claim for retirement pay on the execution phase of these proceedings. In fine, the plea to include retirement pay in the
execution of the final and executory August 31, 2001 CA Decision and March 22, 2007 NLRC Resolution, under the phrase other benefits, cannot be
granted.
REINSTATEMENT SALARIES
Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Paz
G.R. No. 192924, November 26, 2014
Par. 3, Art. 223 of the Labor Code provides:
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement
aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under
the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the
payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein. (Emphasis and
underscoring in the original)
The rule is that the employee is entitled to reinstatement salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the LA decision granting him said relief. In
Roquero v. Philippine Airlines, the Court underscored that it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed
employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. This is so because the order of reinstatement is immediately executory. Unless there
is a restraining order issued, it is ministerial upon the LA to implement the order of reinstatement. The unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate a
dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the employer failed to reinstate him.
In Garcia, however, the Court somehow relaxed the rule by taking into consideration the cause of delay in executing the order of reinstatement of
the LA. It was declared, thus:
After the labor arbiters decision is reversed by a higher tribunal, the employee may be barred from collecting the accrued
wages, if it is shown that the delay in enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal was without fault on the part of the employer.
The test is two-fold: (1) there must be actual delay or the fact that the order of reinstatement pending appeal was not
executed prior to its reversal; and (2) the delay must not be due to the employers unjustified act or omission. If the delay is due to the
employers unjustified refusal, the employer may still be required to pay the salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the Labor Arbiters
decision. (Italics ours and emphasis and underscoring deleted)
A scrutiny of the circumstances, however, will show that the delay in reinstating the respondent was not due to the unjustified refusal of PAL to
abide by the order but because of the constraints of corporate rehabilitation. It bears noting that a year before the respondent filed his complaint for illegal
dismissal on June 25, 1999, PAL filed a petition for approval of rehabilitation plan and for appointment of a rehabilitation receiver with the SEC. On June 23,
1998, the SEC appointed an Interim Rehabilitation Receiver. Thereafter, the SEC issued an Order dated July 1, 1998, suspending all claims for payment
against PAL.
DAMAGES
Hocheng Philippines Corporation vs. Farrales
G.R. No. 211497, March 18, 2015
10
Notwithstanding the LAs assertion to this effect, Farrales bare allegations of bad faith deserve no credence, and neither is the mere fact that he
was illegally dismissed sufficient to prove bad faith on the part of HPCs officers. But concerning the award of attorneys fees, Farrales was dismissed for a
flimsy charge, and he was compelled to litigate to secure what is due him which HPC unjustifiably withheld.
G.R. No. 187225, January 28, 2015
A dismissed employee is entitled to moral damages when the dismissal is attended by bad faith or fraud or constitutes an act oppressive to
labor, or is done in a manner contrary to good morals, good customs or public policy. Exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal is effected in a
wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.
Bad faith, under the law, does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.
It must be noted that the burden of proving bad faith rests on the one alleging it since basic is the principle that good faith is presumed and he
who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Allegations of bad faith and fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
The records of this case are bereft of any clear and convincing evidence showing that the respondents acted in bad faith or in a wanton or
fraudulent manner in dismissing the petitioner. That the petitioner was illegally dismissed is insufficient to prove bad faith. A dismissal may be contrary to law
but by itself alone, it does not establish bad faith to entitle the dismissed employee to moral damages. The award of moral and exemplary damages cannot
be justified solely upon the premise that the employer dismissed his employee without cause.
ATTORNEYS FEES
Eyana vs. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.
G.R. No. 193468, January 28, 2015
The petitioner is entitled to attorneys fees pursuant to Article 2208(8) of the Civil Code. The Court, however, notes that the respondents provided
the petitioner with medical treatment and offered to pay him disability benefits, albeit in the reduced amount. In other words, the acts of the respondents did
not evince bad faith. The respondents did not completely shirk from their duties to the petitioner. Although the petitioner was still thus compelled to litigate to
be entitled to total and permanent disability compensation, the Court finds the award of attorneys fees in the amount of US$1,000.00 as reasonable.
VI
SEAFARERS MONEY CLAIMS
THIRD PHYSICIAN RULE
Veritas Maritime Corporation vs. Gepanaga, Jr.
G.R. No. 206285, February 4, 2015
In this case, the parties entered into a contract of employment in accordance with the POEA-SEC. They also agreed to be bound by the CBA.
Thus, in resolving whether Gepanaga is entitled to disability compensation, the Court will be guided by the procedures laid down in the POEA-SEC and the
CBA.
Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC provides:
Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic
wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician
but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
11
Handout 001
Pre-Week Simplified Reader
TAKE NOTE OF THE UPDATES
SURVIVAL NOTES IN LABOR LAW3

Atty. Benedict G. Kato
Labor Arbiter, Professor of Law, Bar Reviewer, MCLE Lecturer
I
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a postemployment medical examination by a company-designated
physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to o, in which case, a written notice to
the agency within the same period is deemed a compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting
requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the
Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
[Emphasis supplied]
The CBA between the petitioners and the respondent states that:
20.1.3.2 The degree of disability which the employer, subject to this Agreement, is liable to pay shall be determined by a doctor
appointed by the Employer. If a doctor appointed by the seafarer and his Union disagrees with the assessment, a third
doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the Seafarer and his Union, and the third doctor's decision shall
be final and binding on both parties. The copy/ies of the medical certificate and other relevant medical reports shall be
made available by the Company to the seafarer.
[Emphasis supplied]
Interpreting an almost identical provision of the CBA, the Court ruled, in the recent case of Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag
(Dumadag), that a seafarer's non-compliance with the mandated procedure under the POEA-SEC and the CBA militates against his claims.
Note: The filing of the complaint constituted a breach of Dumadags contractual obligation to have the conflicting assessments of his
disability referred to a third doctor for a binding opinion. The petitioners could not have possibly caused the non-referral to a third doctor because
they were not aware that Dumadag secured separate independent opinions regarding his disability. Thus, the complaint should have been
dismissed, for without a binding third opinion, the fit-to-work certification of the company-designated physician stands, pursuant to the POEA-SEC
and the CBA.
CAUSE OF ACTION
G.R. No. 206285, February 4, 2015
Actually, Gepanagas filing of his claim was premature. The Court has held that a seafarer may have basis to pursue an action for total and
permanent disability benefits, if any of the following conditions is present:
(a) The company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea duty or disability even
after the lapse of the 120-day period and there is no indication that further medical treatment would address his temporary total
disability, hence, justify an extension of the period to 240 days;
(b) 240 days had lapsed without any certification issued by the company designated physician;
(c) The company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea duty within the 120-day or 240-day period, as
the case may be, but his physician of choice and the doctor chosen under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC are of a contrary
opinion;
(d) The company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially permanently disabled but other doctors who he
consulted, on his own and jointly with his employer, believed that his disability is not only permanent but total as well;
(e) The company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and permanently disabled but there is a dispute on the
disability grading;
12
PRINCIPLES AND POSTULATES

The Full Protection Clause
1.
Protection Outside Art. 136, PD 442 (Star Paper Corp. vs. Simbol, et al., April 12, 2006). No Couples Policy: Employees of
this company shall not marry one another. (1) If they do, the wife shall resign or shall be deemed resigned. This policy
violates Art. 136 as it amounts to disparate treatment) by reason of marriage (direct discrimination; hence, the policy is void. (2)
If they do, one of them shall resign or shall be deemed resigned. This policy does not single out the wife; hence, it is valid under
Art. 136 for being facially neutral. But it is void under the Full Protection Clause for its disparate impact (indirect discrimination).
2.
Protection Outside Art. 291, PD 442 (Accessories Specialist, Inc. vs. Alabanza, July 23, 2008). Pursuant to Art. 291, money
claims prescribe in 3 years. An unpaid employee dies on his claim after 5 years of promises of payment. If the claim is brought
(f) The company-designated physician determined that his medical condition is not compensable or work-related under the
POEA-SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the third doctor selected under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC found otherwise and
declared him unfit to work;
(g) The company-designated physician declared him totally and permanently disabled but the employer refuses to pay him
the corresponding benefits; and
(h) The company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled within the 120-day or 240-day
period but he remains incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after the lapse of said periods.
In this case, when Gepanaga filed his complaint with the arbitration office on March 25, 2009, he had yet to consult his own physician, Dr.
Villa.
120-DAY RULE
G.R. No. 206285, February 4, 2015
Let it be stressed that the seafarer's inability to resume his work after the lapse of more than 120 days from the time he suffered an injury and/or
illness is not a magic wand that automatically warrants the grant of total and permanent disability benefits in his favor. Both law and evidence must be on his
side.
1996 POEA-SEC: NO WORK-RELATION PROVISION
C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. vs. Perez
G.R. No. 194885, January 26, 2015
The parties agreed in their May 22, 2000 employment contract that they will comply with the 1996 POEA-SEC. Hence, we will apply the 1996
POEA-SEC and not the 2000 POEA-SEC which initially took effect on June 25, 2000 but whose implementation was suspended until the suspension was
lifted on June 5, 2002.
Under the 1996 POEA-SEC, respondent only needed to prove that his illness was acquired during the term of his employment to support his
claim for disability benefits. Section 20 of the 1996 POEA-SEC reads:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
xxxx
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
xxxx
We have ruled that under the 1996 POEA-SEC, it is enough that the seafarer proves that his or her injury or illness was acquired during the term
of employment to support a claim for disability benefits.
Here, it is not disputed that respondent became ill when the Rio Grande was in Singapore on November 1, 2000 or during the term of his 10month employment contract signed on May 22, 2000. The initial diagnosis at the Gleneagles Maritime Medical Center that respondent has acute psychosis
confirmed the observation of the Rio Grandes Master that respondent was confused when he showed up at the crewmess on November 1, 2000.
Respondents claim for disability benefits thus finds support from established facts. The Labor Arbiter was therefore correct that respondent suffered a
psychotic disorder during the term of his employment contract. We also note that respondent was not ill when he was hired by petitioners, as he passed the
13
after 3 years, it is not prescribed under the Principle of Promissory Estoppel. Elements: (1) employer makes a promise which
induces belief or inaction; (2) employee relies on the promise; and (3) his reliance on the promise is prejudicial to him.
3.
Protection Outside POEA-Approved Contract. (Datuman vs. First Cosmopolitan Manpower & Promotion Services, Inc., Nov. 14,
2008). Under POEA rules, a recruiters solidary liability with his foreign principal arises from violations of the terms of the POEAapproved contract. If the contract sued upon is a second contract executed abroad without the knowledge and consent of the
recruiter, the latter is not liable. Exception: the second contract is a continuing violation of the POEA-approved contract because
the OFW is forced to execute it with another employer to legalize her continuing stay overseas as her first employer has violated
the terms of her first contract.
4.
Protection Outside Philippine Territory (Sim vs. NLRC, Oct. 2, 2007). Jurisdiction over the person of a foreign employer is
acquired thru service of summons on his local agent. If no agent, acquisition of jurisdiction is impossible. Exception: both
pre-employment medical examination. The CA also noted the Labor Arbiters finding that respondent passed another medical and mental examination in
Germany which proved that he was fit for sea duty.
1996 POEA-SEC: NO CONCEALMENT PROVISION
G.R. No. 194885, January 26, 2015
We disagree with petitioners that respondent is not entitled to disability benefits because he is guilty of fraud in concealing his pre-existing
medical condition. Petitioners cannot rely on Section 20(E) of the 2000 POEA-SEC since, as discussed above, it is the 1996 POEA-SEC that is applicable to
the instant case. Section 20(E) of the 1996 POEA-SEC provides:
E. When requested, the seafarer shall be furnished a copy of all pertinent medical reports or records at no cost to the seafarer.
The above-quoted provision does not mention unconcealment. It only requires that the seafarer be furnished a copy of all pertinent medical
records upon request. On this point, the NLRC appears to have been misled in ruling that respondent is guilty of concealment.
PSYCHOTIC DISODER
G.R. No. 194885, January 26, 2015
The evidence on record likewise belies petitioners claim that respondent was eventually declared fit to work by their designated doctors. Notably,
Dr. Reyes and Dr. Abesamis both found respondent to be suffering from recurrent acute psychotic disorder. Dr. Reyes said that respondents psychotic
disorder will become manifest once triggered by an outside factor, while Dr. Abesamis said that recurrence of the same psychotic disorder is possible. Dr.
Abesamis even signed a medical certificate, SSS Form MMD-102, supporting respondents claim for disability benefits before the SSS. In said medical
certificate, Dr. Abesamis indicated her final diagnosis: respondent has acute psychotic disorder, recurrent. Hence, petitioners cannot claim that their
designated doctors declared respondent as fit to work after his repatriation and treatment.
Without a declaration that respondent is already fit to work or an assessment of the degree of respondents disability by petitioners own doctors,
respondents disability is therefore permanent and total. This is equivalent to a Grade 1 impediment/disability entitling respondent to US$60,000 as
permanent and total disability benefits under the 1996 POEA-SEC.
CBA
G.R. No. 193468, January 28, 2015
It has been oft-repeated that a party alleging a critical fact must support his allegation with substantial evidence, and any decision based on
unsubstantiated allegation cannot stand as it will offend due process.
In the case at bar, while the petitioner based his claims for full disability benefits upon the CBA, he presented no more than two unauthenticated
pages of the same. Hence, the CBA deserves no evidentiary weight and cannot be made as the basis for the award of disability compensation.
Consequently, the first issue raised herein is rendered moot, leaving the Court to resolve the petition in the light of the provisions of the POEA SEC and
relevant labor laws.
G.R. No. 193468, January 28, 2015
This Courts pronouncements in Vergara presented a restraint against the indiscriminate reliance on Crystal Shipping such that a seafarer is
immediately catapulted into filing a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits after the expiration of 120 days from the time he signed off from the
14
employee and employer are Filipino nationals (Corazon Sim & Equitable Bank) entering into an employment contract abroad
(Italy). In the event of an illegal dismissal, Sec. 10 of RA 8042, as amended, allows the employee to sue before the Labor Arbiter.
By virtue of said provision, Philippine Labor Relations Law has become extra-territorial. Therefore, the employer cannot interpose
lex ex contractu, or law of the place of the contract.
5.
Protection Outside the Substantial Evidence Rule (The Cate Case/GSIS vs. CA, Jan. 28, 2008). To be compensable, a
disability arising from disease must be work-related, i.e., the disease is occupational in nature. It is occupational if it is a listed
disease. If not listed, like Osteoblastic Osteosarcoma (not in Annex A, Employees Compensation Act) , the resulting disability
vessel to which he was assigned. Particularly, a seafarers inability to work and the failure of the company-designated physician to determine fitness or
unfitness to work despite the lapse of 120 days will not automatically bring about a shift in the seafarers state from total and temporary to total and
permanent, considering that the condition of total and temporary disability may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days.
DISABILITY GRADING
Maunlad Trans. Inc. vs. Camoral
G.R. No. 211454, February 11, 2015
The issue now before the Court is whether the disability grading provided by the petitioners for Camorals impediment must control. The Court
says no.
In Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., et al., the Court harmonized the POEA SEC with the Labor Code and the AREC in holding that:
(a) the 120 days provided in Section 20-B(3) of the POEA SEC is the period given to the employer to determine the fitness of the seafarer to work, during
which the seafarer is deemed to be in a state of total and temporary disability; (b) the 120 days of total and temporary disability may be extended by a
maximum of 120 days, or up to 240 days, should the seafarer require further medical treatment; and (c) a total and temporary disability becomes permanent
when so declared by the company-designated physician within 120 days or 240 days, as the case may be, or upon the expiration of the said periods without
a declaration of either fitness to work or permanent disability and the seafarer is still unable to resume his regular seafaring duties.
As noted in Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar, the POEA SEC provides merely the minimum acceptable terms in a seafarers employment
contract, and that in the assessment of whether a seafarers injury is partial and permanent, the same must be so characterized not only under the Schedule
of Disabilities found in Section 32 of the POEA SEC, but also under the relevant provisions of the Labor Code and the AREC implementing Title II, Book IV
of the Labor Code. Article 192(c) of the Labor Code provides that temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days, except as otherwise
provided in the AREC, shall be deemed total and permanent; Section 2(b) of Rule VII of the AREC also provides that:
[D]isability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a
continuous period exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided under Rule X of these Rules. (Italics ours)
Thus, according to Kestrel, while the seafarer is partially injured or disabled, he must not be precluded from earning doing the same work he had
before his injury or disability or that he is accustomed or trained to do. Otherwise, if his illness or injury prevents him from engaging in gainful employment for
more than 120 days or 240 days, as is the case here, then he shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled. In Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad, the
Court specifically ruled that it is of no consequence that he recovered, for what is important is that he was unable to perform his customary work for more
than 120 days, and this constitutes permanent total disability:
Petitioners tried to contest the above findings by showing that respondent was able to work again as a chief mate in March
2001. Nonetheless, this information does not alter the fact that as a result of his illness, respondent was unable to work as a chief
mate for almost three years. It is of no consequence that respondent was cured after a couple of years. The law does not require that
the illness should be incurable. What is important is that he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days which
constitutes permanent total disability. An award of a total and permanent disability benefit would be germane to the purpose of the
benefit, which is to help the employee in making ends meet at the time when he is unable to work.
In Alpha Ship Management Corporation v. Calo, the Court said:
An employees disability becomes permanent and total when so declared by the company-designated physician, or, in case
of absence of such a declaration either of fitness or permanent total disability, upon the lapse of the 120- or 240-day treatment period,
while the employees disability continues and he is unable to engage in gainful employment during such period, and the companydesignated physician fails to arrive at a definite assessment of the employees fitness or disability.
SUICIDE
15
would not be compensable. Exception: the GSIS member can adduce substantial evidence to prove work-connection. Exception
to the exception: if even medical science cannot explain the origin of Osteosarcoma, the condition to show work-connection with
substantial evidence is deemed not imposed, In fact, the condition is void.
Note:
Full protection means there is protection outside (1) statutory law (Star Paper case & Alabanza case); (2) employment
contract (Datuman case); (3) law of the place of execution (Sim case); and (4) substantial evidence rule (Cate case).
Preferential Use of Voluntary Modes
Jurisdiction by Stipulation
(Vivero vs. CA, Oct. 24, 2000)
Unicol Management Services, Inc. vs. Malipot

G.R. No. 206562, January 21, 2015
All told, taking the Medico-Legal Report and the Death Certificate, together with the Investigation Report, log book extracts, and Masters Report,
we find that petitioners were able to substantially prove that seaman Glicerios death was attributable to his deliberate act of killing himself by committing
suicide.
Section 20 of the POEA Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going
Ships, provides:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
xxx
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH
1. In case of work-related death of the seafarer, during the term of his contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the
Philippine currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars (US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven
Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four (4) children, at the
exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment.
xxx
D. No compensation and benefits shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death of the seafarer resulting from
his willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties, provided however, that the employer can prove that such injury,
incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to the seafarer.
DEATH AFTER EMPLOYMENT
One Shipping Corp. vs. Penafiel
G.R. No. 192406, January 21, 2015
In Southeastern Shipping v. Navarra, Jr., this Court declared that in order to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee should occur
during the effectivity of the employment contract. The death of a seaman during the term of employment makes the employer liable to his heirs for death
compensation benefits. Once it is established that the seaman died during the effectivity of his employment contract, the employer is liable. In the present
case, Ildefonso died after he pre-terminated the contract of employment. That alone would have sufficed for his heirs not to be entitled for death
compensation benefits.
The CA, in reversing the rulings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, stated that the fact that One Shipping hired Ildefonso despite a waiver and
prior knowledge of his heart ailment behooves petitioners to accept liability for said death in the course of his employment is misguided. Granting that
petitioners were made aware of Ildefonso's prior heart ailment, the fact still remains that he died after the effectivity of his contract. There is even no reason
given why Ildefonso asked for a pre-termination of his contract which resulted in his repatriation. To surmise that he asked for the pre-termination of his
contract due to a medical condition is highly speculative and must not be considered as a fact.
Therefore, this Court finds no substantial evidence to prove that Ildefonso's illness which caused his death was aggravated during the term of his
contract. [T]he death of a seaman several months after his repatriation for illness does not necessarily mean that: (a) the seaman died of the same illness;
(b) his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the illness which caused his death; and (c) the death is compensable, unless there is some
reasonable basis to support otherwise.
16
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law, e.g., Art. 217, PD 442 (Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter). Parties
are not at liberty to stipulate where to litigate. Exception: Parties to a CBA can stipulate to bring cases listed under Art. 217 to voluntary
arbitration. However, is must be by express stipulation. This is allowed by Sec. 3, Art. XIII of the Constitution which requires preferential use
of voluntary modes of settling labor disputes.
UPDATE: RA 10396 Pre-litigation conference (SEnA conference) is a pre-requisite for filing of labor complaints. Labor agencies
shall not accept complaints unless the parties have undergone mediation.
Just and Humane Conditions of Work
1.
Anti-Sexual Harassment Act (RA 7877)
BGK Note: In the 13 Oct. 2014 Anita Canuel v. Magsaysay Maritime Corp. case, death after expiration of contract was held to be
compensable due to the fact that the disease was contracted during the term of the seafarers contract.
Death 2 years after repatriation due to AIDS not compensable as pre-existing disease was concealed (Lydia Escharcha v. Leonis Navigation Co.,
G.R. No. 182740, 5 July 2010).
BELATED REPATRIATION
Bahia Shipping Services, Inc. vs. Hipe, Jr.
G.R. No. 204699, November 12, 2014
Two (2) elements must concur for an injury or illness of a seafarer to be compensable: (a) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (b) that
the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarers employment contract.
In the present case, Hipe was made to continuously perform work aboard the vessel beyond his six-month contract without the benefit of a formal
contract. Considering that any extension of his employment is discretionary on the part of respondents and that the latter offered no explanation why Hipe
was not repatriated when his contract expired on June 5, 2008, the CA correctly ruled that he was still under the employ of respondents when he sustained
an injury on June 22, 2008. Consequently, the injury suffered by Hipe was a work-related injury and his eventual repatriation on August 5, 2008, for which he
was treated/rehabilitated can only be considered as a medical repatriation.
SOLIDARY LIABILITY
Sealanes Marine Services, Inc. vs. De La Torre
G.R. No. 214132, February 18, 2015
Concerning the joint and solidary liability of the manning agency, Sealanes, its foreign principal, Arklow Shipping Netherland, and Sealanes
President Dumatol, Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended
by Section 7 of R.A. No. 10022, reads:
SEC. 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the
filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damage. Consistent with this
mandate, the NLRC shall endeavor to update and keep abreast with the developments in the global services industry.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and
several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its
approval. The performance bond to [be] filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all
money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate
officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or
partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract and shall not be affected by any
substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of the said contract.
xxx
Thus, every applicant for license to operate a seafarers manning agency shall, in the case of a corporation or partnership, submit a written
application together with, among others, a verified undertaking by officers, directors and partners that they will be jointly and severally liable with the
company over claims arising from employer-employee relationship. Laws are deemed incorporated in employment contracts and the contracting parties
need not repeat them. They do not even have to be referred to. Every contract, thus, contains not only what has been explicitly stipulated, but also the
statutory provisions that have any bearing on the matter.
17
Background: Women had no right to work. In the rare instances they were given work, they had to answer with their dignity in a
quid pro quo (I give, You give) relational set-up. (I give you work if you sleep with me, cum 4 with me, etc...) RA 7877, which
applies to both sexes, punishes this practice. Sexual harassment is committed: (1) in a WET envt (work, education, training); (2)
by Pastor TETE (pastors/priests, teachers, employers, trainors, employees) with MIA (moral ascendancy, influence or authority);
(3) thru DRR 4 sexual favor (demand, request, requirement); (4) with promise of WCOER (in a work envt: continuing
employment, other considerations, employment, re-employment); or ET-GASHOS (in an education/training envt: grade,
allowance, scholarship, honors, other considerations, stipend); (5) where the DRR 4 sexual favor may either be ACCEPTED or
REJECTED; (6) provided, the rejection turns the WET envt into a HOI envt (hostile, offensive, intimidating); (7) as manifested by
the victims SCD (segregation, classification, or discrimination).
Note: Acceptance of DRR is not a defense. What the law punishes is not the violation of the sexuality of the offended party but
abuse by the offender of his MIA.
VII
LABOR STANDARDS LAW
G.R. No. 202961, February 4, 2015
Requiring clearance before the release of last payments to the employee is a standard procedure among employers, whether public or private.
Clearance procedures are instituted to ensure that the properties, real or personal, belonging to the employer but are in the possession of the separated
employee, are returned to the employer before the employees departure.
Art. 113. Wage deduction. No employer, in his own behalf or in behalf of any person, shall make any deduction from the wages of his
employees, except:
1. In cases where the worker is insured with his consent by the employer, and the deduction is to recompense the employer for the
amount paid by him as premium on the insurance;
2. For union dues, in cases where the right of the worker or his union to check-off has been recognized by the employer or authorized
in writing by the individual worker concerned; and
3. In cases where the employer is authorized by law or regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Civil Code provides that the employer is authorized to withhold wages for debts due:
Article 1706. Withholding of the wages, except for a debt due, shall not be made by the employer.
Debt in this case refers to any obligation due from the employee to the employer. It includes any accountability that the employee may have to
the employer. There is no reason to limit its scope to uniforms and equipment, as petitioners would argue.
VIII
OFWS
FAILURE TO DEPLOY
Abosta Ship Management vs. Hilario
G.R. No. 195792, November 24, 2014
The contract was already perfected on the date of its execution, which occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and the
cause, as well as on the rest of the terms and conditions therein. Naturally, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of
certain rights and obligations, a breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. Also, the POEA Standard Contract must be
recognized and respected. Thus, neither the manning agent nor the employer can simply prevent a seafarer from being deployed without a valid reason.
True, the promotion and choice of personnel is an exercise of management prerogative. In fact, this Court has upheld management prerogatives,
so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employers interest, and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of
the employees under special laws or under valid agreements. However, there are limitations on the exercise of management prerogatives, such as existing
laws and the principle of equity and substantial justice.
Under the principle of equity and substantial justice, change of mind was not a valid reason for the non-deployment of respondent. He lost the
opportunity to apply for other positions in other agencies when he signed the contract of employment with petitioner. Simply put, that contract was binding on
the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind of either one of them.
18
Phil. Aeolus Automotive United Corp. vs. NLRC, April 28, 2000: Employers verbal acts: I luv u, I mis u mwah, mwah,
mwah Physical acts: tatz hir, tatz dr. Reaction: Rejection. Reaction to reaction: If I have no space in your heart, you have no
space in my office PLUS dismissal. Guilty: WET became HOI.
Atty. Susan Aquino vs. Justice Ernesto Acosta (CTA), April 2, 2002: Physical act: beso beso, nothing else more. WET did not
become HOI. Exonerated with a simple admonition: Nxt tym, b crcumspct. N do nt 4get 2 brsh ur teeth!
Erlinda Alcuizar vs. Judge Emmanuel Carpio (RTC Davao), Aug. 7, 2007, en banc: Physical acts: kissed stenographer,
signalled to her to enter the CR to kiss inside; and gave her P500.00 - no more!. WET did not become HOI. Evidence:
stenographer continued going inside the judges chamber. This was taken against her.
The unilateral and unreasonable failure to deploy respondent constitutes breach of contract, which gives rise to a liability to pay actual damages.
The sanctions provided for non-deployment do not end with the suspension or cancellation of license or the imposition of a fine and the return of all
documents at no cost to the worker. They do not forfend a seafarer from instituting an action for damages against the employer or agency that has failed to
deploy him.
Considering that it was petitioner who entered into the contract of employment with respondent for and on behalf of the foreign principal, it has
the primary obligation to ensure the implementation of that contract. Furthermore, in line with the policy of the state to protect and alleviate the plight of the
working class, Section 1, paragraph f (3) of Rule II of the POEA Rules and Regulations, clearly provides that the private employment agency shall assume
joint and solidary liability with the employer. Indeed, this Court has consistently held that private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable
with the foreign-based employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment. This joint and solidary liability imposed by law on
recruitment agencies and foreign employers is meant to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due him.
IX
SSS AND GSIS
Bartolome vs. Social Security System
G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014
Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j)
of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase dependent parents to refer to legitimate parents.
It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was resolved by this Court in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court in this wise: It is
Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation.
The term parents in the phrase dependent parents in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is used and ought to be taken in its general
sense and cannot be unduly limited to legitimate parents as what the ECC did. The phrase dependent parents should, therefore, include all parents,
whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, dependent
parents are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need of support or assistance.
Moreover, the same Article 167 (j), as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not intend to limit the phrase dependent parents to solely
legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167 provides that in their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on
dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are secondary beneficiaries. Had the lawmakers contemplated dependent
parents to mean legitimate parents, then it would have simply said descendants and not legitimate descendants. The manner by which the provision in
question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase dependent parents was intended to cover all parents legitimate, illegitimate or parents by nature or
adoption.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the legitimate ones, there can be no other course of action to take other
than to strike down as unconstitutional the phrase illegitimate as appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation.
BIOLOGICAL PARENT
Bartolome vs. Social Security System
G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioners parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it
be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelios death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the
adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
19
Digitel vs. Mariquit Soriano, June 26, 2006 (The Digitel Sex Scandal) : Effect of delay on credibility of complaint. 11
months after resigning, following a superior act of poking her pussy 5 with his finger and another superiors act of pressing her
body against his while dancing, Mariquit filed her complaint. Defense: Delay. Argument of Mariquit: The delay of Miss Cortez in
the Phil. Aeolus Automotive Case ( supra ) was 4 years, yet it was not taken against her. Hers was 11 months only. SC:
Mariquits case was different. In the case of Miss Cortez, she was still employed. So it was reasonable not to expect her to file
her complaint while she was still employed; otherwise, she would have lost her job sooner than she did. In Mariquits case, she
resigned; hence, she had nothing to protect anymore. Yet she incurred in delay. Note: When her pussy was being poked,
Mariquit did not run or slap Mr. Go. When Mr. Go asked for a dance, she did not flee, although her pussy had been poked earlier.
SC said this was against human experience. Harry Roque sued the SC before the UN for rendering judgment against the
CEDAW. According to him (galit na naman si pogi), the SC based its judgment on stereotyped human experience whereas the
CEDAW requires elimination of stereotyping. Note also: Mr. Go died while the criminal case against him was pending. Lesson:
Poke not a pussy. When it meows, you die!
Johns minority at the time of his adopters death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be
deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and
that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act
No. 8552 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission. If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's
biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or
incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished. (emphasis
added)
Cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are considered as occupational diseases under Nos. 19 and 29, respectively, of Annex A
of the Implementing Rules of P.D. No. 626, as amended.
BGK Note: Under the POEA-SEC, disability or death arising from an occupational disease is compensable if: (1) the seafarers work involves
the risks described in Sec. 32; (2) the disease was contracted as a result of his exposure to the described risks; (3) the disease was contracted within a
period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and (4) there was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.
Government Service Insurance System vs. Calumpiano
G.R. No. 196102, November 26, 2014
While some of the above conclusions are not definitive, it must be stressed that probability, not certainty, is the test of proof in compensation
cases. It does not preclude the Court from concluding that respondents hypertension apart from her age, work, and working conditions impaired her
vision as a result.
The Court likewise disregards the ECCs finding, which petitioner relies upon, that the primary and important risk factors for developing
hypertension are smoking, excess body weight, high salt intake, nutritional factors, high alcohol consumption, physical inactivity and psychological factors,
including stress. As the Court held in De Castro, these are not the sole causes of hypertension; age, gender, and work stress significantly contribute to its
development, and the nature and characteristics of the employment are as important as raw medical findings and a claimants personal and social history.
Finally, while the ECC possesses the requisite expertise and knowledge in compensation cases, its decision in respondents case is nonetheless
erroneous and contrary to law. The Court cannot uphold its findings; its specialized training, experience and expertise did not serve justice well in this case.
In arriving at the above conclusions, the Court is well guided by the principles, declared in Baul and De Castro, that probability, not certainty, is
the test of proof in compensation cases; that the primordial and paramount consideration is the employees welfare; that the strict rules of evidence need not
be observed in claims for compensation; that medical findings of the attending physician may be received in evidence and used as proof of the facts in
dispute; that in any determination of compensability, the nature and characteristics of the job are as important as raw medical findings and a claimants
personal and social history; that where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from
the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimants own negligence or
misconduct; and that the policy is to extend the application of the law on employees compensation to as many employees who can avail of the benefits
thereunder.
X
LABOR PROCEDURE
JURISDICTION
G.R. No. 202961, February 4, 2015
20
Domingo vs. Rayala, Feb. 18, 2008 (The NLRC Sex Scandal): Evidence of DRR 4 Sexual Favor. Under the Three-fold Liability
Rule, an act may result in 3 types of liabilities: administrative, civil and criminal. To establish these liabilities, these are the quanta
of proof: substantial evidence, preponderance of evidence, and proof beyond reasonable doubt following order of appearance.
Rayala, who was before the SC to contest his dismissal for grave misconduct under Civil Service Law, cried: Whr s d pruf
beyond reasonable doubt of my DRR? I jst tatzd hr shldr n sed may bf k n?; bkit laki2 balakang m? Justice Nachura
(ponente) answered: Your case is administrative. Im just looking for substantial evidence. Based on the totality of the
circumstances, I find you liable for sexual harassment. That the work environment of Lotlot became hostile takes the place of
DRR.
2.
The Kasambahay Act
The National Labor Relations Commission has jurisdiction to determine, preliminarily, the parties rights over a property, when it is necessary to
determine an issue related to rights or claims arising from an employer-employee relationship.
Petitioners claim that they have the right to the immediate release of their benefits as employees separated from respondent Solid Mills is a
question arising from the employer-employee relationship between the parties.
PRESCRIPTION
Montero, et. al. vs. Times Transportation Co., Inc.
G.R. No. 190828, March 16, 2015
In like manner, while the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, its voluntary
withdrawal left the petitioners in exactly the same position as though no complaint had been filed at all. The withdrawal of their complaint effectively erased
the tolling of the reglementary period.
TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES
G.R. No. 187225, January 28, 2015
In Chua-Qua v. Clave, the Court stressed that to constitute immorality, the circumstances of each particular case must be holistically considered
and evaluated in light of the prevailing norms of conduct and applicable laws. Otherwise stated, it is not the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
conduct per se that determines whether the same is disgraceful or immoral, but the conduct that is generally accepted by society as respectable or moral. If
the conduct does not conform to what society generally views as respectable or moral, then the conduct is considered as disgraceful or immoral . Tersely put,
substantial evidence must be presented, which would establish that a particular conduct, viewed in light of the prevailing norms of conduct, is considered
disgraceful or immoral.
Thus, the determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or immoral involves a two-step process: first, a consideration of the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the conduct; and second, an assessment of the said circumstances vis--vis the prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the
society generally considers moral and respectable.
SC Note: Religious morality is not the standard.
APPEAL BOND
Balite, et. al. vs. SS Ventures International, Inc.
G.R. No. 195109, February 4, 2015
In line with Sara Lee and the objective that the appeal on the merits to be threshed out soonest by the NLRC, the Court holds that the appeal
bond posted by the respondent in the amount of P100,000.00 which is equivalent to around 20% of the total amount of monetary bond is sufficient to perfect
an appeal. With the employer's demonstrated good faith in filing the motion to reduce the bond on demonstrable grounds coupled with the posting of the
appeal bond in the requested amount, as well as the filing of the memorandum of appeal, the right of the employer to appeal must be upheld. This is in
recognition of the importance of the remedy of appeal, which is an essential part of our judicial system and the need to ensure that every party litigant is
given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause freed from the constraints of technicalities.
BGK Note: Motion to reduce appeal bond must be on meritorious grounds and accompanied with a reasonable bond. 20% of the monetary
award (excluding damages and attorneys fees) is reasonable bond.
21
(1)
(2)
(3)
A kasambahay renders domestic work and says HelLau GarCya. (Helper, Laundry person, Gardener, Cook, Yaya)
EXCEPT Foster (children under foster family arrangement who are given access to education plus allowance) and those
engaged sporadically or _______.
The K rights are 13 Sleeps with Orgs then Rest and Rest , inter alia. (13 th month pay, service incentive leave
(SIL), self-organization, 8 hours daily rest, weekly rest period). Others: privacy, education, board & lodging, medical
attendance, no privileged communication when suing employer & just & humane conditions (no massage).
His/her hours of Work are:
if 15 17 years old (law says below 18) - 8 Hours only (absolutely no extra work). If 18 & above - Not expressly
provided.
Note:
If, as provided by the Kasambahay Act, the monthly pay is fixed at P2,500.00, or P2,000.00, or P1,000.00
depending on place of work - then normal hours of work must also be fixed. Therefore, it is either 8 hours (Art. 83, PD
442 which is a special law) or 10 hours (Art. 1596, NCC which is a general law). Which prevails? You know what to do.
EVIDENCE ON APPEAL
Unicol Management Services, Inc. vs. Malipot
G.R. No. 206562, January 21, 2015
In Sasan, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission 4th Division, We held that our jurisprudence is replete with cases allowing the NLRC to
admit evidence, not presented before the Labor Arbiter, and submitted to the NLRC for the first time on appeal. The submission of additional evidence before
the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure considering that rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor
cases. The NLRC and Labor Arbiters are directed to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively,
without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice. In keeping with this directive, it has been held that the NLRC
may consider evidence, such as documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal.
Moreover, among the powers of the Commission as provided in Section 218 of the Labor Code is that the Commission may issue subpoenas
requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of such books, papers, contracts, records, statement of accounts, agreements, and
others. In addition, the Commission may, among other things, conduct investigation for the determination of a question, matter or controversy within its
jurisdiction, proceed to hear and determine the disputes in the absence of any party thereto who has been summoned or served with notice to appear,
conduct its proceedings or any part thereof in public or in private, adjourn its hearings to any time and place, refer technical matters or accounts to an expert
and to accept his report as evidence after hearing of the parties upon due notice. From the foregoing, it can be inferred that the NLRC can receive evidence
on cases appealed before the Commission, otherwise, its factual conclusions would not have been given great respect, much weight, and relevance when
an adverse party assails the decision of the NLRC via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA and then to this Court via a
petition for review under Rule 45.
Accordingly, if we take into consideration the Investigation Report, log book extracts and Masters Report submitted by petitioners, the same all
strongly point out that seaman Glicerio died because he committed suicide.
FINAL JUDGMENTS
G.R. No. 192406, January 21, 2015
The first two issues raised by petitioners are technical in nature. They argue that the CA has no jurisdiction over the present case because the
resolutions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have become final and executory. They claim that both resolutions have become final and executory as early
as June 16, 2008, before respondent filed her petition for certiorari with the CA on June 25, 2008. Petitioner's argument is meritorious. In Aliviado v. Procter
and Gamble Phils., Inc. this Court has extensively discussed the finality of a judgment, thus:
It is a hornbook rule that once a judgment has become final and executory, it may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land, as what remains to be done is the purely ministerial
enforcement or execution of the judgment.
The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that at
the risk of occasional errors, the judgment of adjudicating bodies must become final and executory on some definite date fixed by law.
[...], the Supreme Court reiterated that the doctrine of immutability of final judgment is adhered to by necessity notwithstanding
occasional errors that may result thereby, since litigations must somehow come to an end for otherwise, it would 'even be more
intolerable than the wrong and injustice it is designed to correct.
SC Note: The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2)
the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments. (CNV Exceptions)
22
But before doing what you are about to do, the first thing to do is to harmonize these laws. The Kasambahay Act
provides that the parties shall agree on hours of work. Either this is the wisdom of the law or its accidental virtue. If the
agreement is to fix normal hours of work at 8 hours/day then the P2,500.00, or P2,000.00, or P1,500.00 would be
reasonable. If 10 hours, or more (but not in excess of 16 hours because the daily rest must not be less than 8 hours)
then the pay must be increased. With this, there is no need for PDD 442 and NCC to quarrel.
3.
RA 9231
Note:
Under PD 442, (1) less than 15 cannot be employed except by parents or guardian , provided opportunity for
schooling is not impaired; provided further that hours of work shall not exceed 4 hours on any given day and 20 hours a
week; whereas, (2) 15-18 can be employed provided with DOLE supervision and child is not exposed to hazardous and
deleterious work conditions; provided further that hours of work shall not exceed 8 hours on any given day and 40 hours
a week. This said, why is Ryzza Mae, who is less than 15, employed by a juridical person such as GMA? RA 9231
allows it for public entertainment under these conditions, inter alia: DOLE permit; opportunity for schooling not impaired;
CERTIORARI
Seacrest Maritime Management, Inc. vs. Picar, Jr.
G.R. No. 209383, March 11, 2015
Adhering to the pronouncement in Leonis Navigation, the Court, in Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. Legaspi (Transmarine), held that the
satisfaction of the monetary award by the employer did not render the petition for certiorari moot before the CA.
BGK Note: Under the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended, satisfaction of judgment pending resolution of a Rule XII petition for
extraordinary remedy is required to be reported by the LA to the NLRC as basis for the dismissal of the petition.
G.R. No. 192406, January 21, 2015
Petitioner is, however, correct in its argument that the filing of the petition for certiorari does not interrupt the course of the principal case. Section
7 of Rule 65 provides:
Sec. 7. Expediting proceedings; Injunctive relief. - The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the
proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of
the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued enjoining the public respondent from further proceeding with the case.
The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with
a higher court or tribunal absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, or upon its expiration. x x x
VERIFICATION
Manarpiis vs. Texan Philippines, Inc.
G.R. No. 197011, January 28, 2015
We first address petitioners contention on the alleged formal infirmity of the petition for certiorari filed before the CA. Petitioner argued that the
same was defective as the jurat therein was based on the mere community tax certificate of respondent Rialubin-Tan, instead of a government-issued
identification card required under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Such ground was never raised by herein petitioner in her comment on the CA petition,
thus, it cannot be validly raised by the petitioner at this stage.
Furthermore, we have consistently held that verification of a pleading is a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement intended to secure the
assurance that the matters alleged in a pleading are true and correct. Thus, the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them
and waive strict compliance with the rules. It is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification; and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
G.R. No. 174365-66, February 4, 2015
23
cannot promote alcohol, cigarette, violence; cannot be employed underground, in high-rise buildings, under water;
cannot produce dynamites, etc
Due Process Clause & Equal Protection Clause
2009 Serrano Doctrine vs. RA 10022
(Operative Fact Doctrine vs. Raison detre ; Sec. 4(3), Art. VIII, Constn; 2011 Yap vs. Thenamaris )
Sec. 10, RA 8042: In the event of an illegal pre-termination of an OFW contract, salaries for the un-worked portion of the contract
must be paid. The money award shall either be (a) number of months x salary, or (b) 3 months salary x the number of years there are in the
remaining months whichever is lesser.
What is wrong with the formula? In the 2009 Serrano case, the SC held that it violated the Due Process Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause. How? As to the first, if letter (B) were awarded for the reason that the contract is at least 1 year ( 1999 Marsaman ruling),
salaries for the excluded months will be taken away without rhyme or reason except that it is what RA 8042 provides and nothing else
more. Since salaries for those excluded months are property to the OFW, they are deemed taken without due process of law. As to the
second, RA 8042 makes a distinction between OFWs with less than 1 year or contract and those with at least 1 year then treats them
differently as to amount of salaries. This is a classification. To be valid, it must serve a State interest. Under the Strict Judicial Scrutiny Test,
a classification and the State interest it seeks to protect must have a necessary connection. In Serrano, the Solgen revealed that the
purpose of the law was to minimize the legal injury suffered by recruiters/local agents who ended up dragged to court to answer for acts
committed by their foregoing principals, over which they had no control. This was not State but private interest; hence, the classification
was void.
Serrano was a perfect ruling, except that Congress re-enacted the formula in 2010 when it passed RA 10022. Which prevails
now, case law or statutory law? In 2011, the SC decided Yap vs. Thenamaris. It still applied the Serrano ruling. However, it cannot be said
that the SC upheld the primacy of Serrano over RA 10022. Truth is, it was not aware of the new law because it was never pleaded. If Sec.
4(3), Art. VIII of the Constitution were applied, the only way the Serrano ruling can be undone is for the SC to render a contrary ruling in a
decision rendered en banc. Congress cannot undo it by passing RA 10022.
Meantime, two (2) theories present themselves for consideration, viz.: Operative Fact Doctrine and Raison detre. Under the first,
the re-enacted formula is valid and will continue to produce legal effects until nullified, i.e., in a case similar to Serrano. Under the second,
the reason for the existence of the Serrano ruling must be kept in view at all times, viz., the violation of the Due Process Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause. Hence, what was void in 2009 is still void up to now. Obviously, the first favors recruiters, whereas the second
favors OFWs. Advice: Wait for your instruction. If the examiner directs you to lawyer for the OFW, you apply Raison detre; otherwise, you
apply the Operative Fact Doctrine. If he says DECIDE, you will surely earn credit regardless of your choice of theory full credit if your
answer has LLL (Law, Language & Logic).
The general rule is that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the petitioners in a case, the signature of
only one of them may be deemed substantial compliance with the procedural requirement. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that the rule on
verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition
signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct. Similarly, this Court has consistently
held that when under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, as when all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or
defense, as in this case, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the certification
requirement.
SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Michelin Asia Pacific Application Support Center, Inc. vs. Ortiz
G.R. No. 189861, November 19, 2014
To compound his mistakes, Ortiz even filed a second motion for reconsideration, which is a prohibited pleading under the NLRC Rules. As a
prohibited pleading, the filing of said motion could not have tolled the running of the 60-day reglementary period for the filing of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. Thus, since the NLRCs June 24, 2008 Resolution assailed by Ortizs second motion for reconsideration was
received by him on July 8, 2008, while his petition for certiorari before the CA was filed more than 60 days thereafter, or on December 12, 2008, his
certiorari petition should have been dismissed outright for having been filed out of time.
GOOD LUCK
CAVEAT: For mature readers only. The memory tools are

unconventional.
3
4
5
Come pala.
Legal term: citadel of virtue; Debatable term: private part.
24
UPDATE: The lesser amount rule is void. Serrano Doctrine is revived ( Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. Joy Cabiles,
G.R. No. 193652, 5 Aug. 2014).
Social Justice Clause
(Catchphrases for Essay Questions)
1.
Meaning: Social justice is the humanization of laws and equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice
in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. ( Calalang vs. Williams, Dec. 2, 1940)
2.
Postulate: The basis of labor law is police power; its purpose is social justice.
3.
Application:
Pro Labor: Articles 4, 110, 106-109, 287, etc. (humanizing provisions of PD 442)
Pro Employer - Social authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of an employer.
Balanced Application: Justice is for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and applicable law and
doctrine.
CIVIL LAW PRINCIPLES
Principle of Abuse of Rights (Edgardo Eviota vs. CA, July 29, 2003). Application: The right to resign is one thing. It is quite another to
exercise it in accordance with Art. 285, PD 442, by giving the required 30-day notice. Eviota omitted service of the required notice, abusing
of his right to resign (Art. 19, NCC). Besides omitting the required notice before joining his new employer, he uttered derogatory remarks
against his first employer. Liable for civil damages. RTC has jurisdiction.
Principle of Least Transmission of Rights (Gerlach vs. Reuters Ltd., Phil, Jan. 17, 2005). Application: In the interpretation of a noncontributory retirement plan , where none of the provisions of the NCC on the interpretation of gratuitous contracts applies, the construction
that will transmit the least rights and interests shall be adopted (Art. 1378, NCC).
Theory of Imputed Knowledge (SUNACE Intl Mgt Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, Jan. 25, 2006). Application:
knowledge of his principal not the other way around.
Knowledge of the agent is
The Necessitous Man

Orchard Golf & Country Club vs. Francisco, March 18, 2013. Background: The operative fact in constructive dismissal is the employees
act of quitting (Phil. Japan Active Corp. vs. NLRC, ), resigning ( ), foregoing with his job ( ), or ceasing to be employed ( ). The
bottomline is self-termination because continued employment has been made impossible by the employer, or continued employment has
become prejudicial to the worker who is left with no option except to self-terminate (resign, forego, cease) to avoid involuntary servitude.
Note: In the Orchard case, the employee continued to report for work (although she was demoted) and to receive her salaries (although
reduced). In other words, there was no complete severance of employer-employee relationship which is the touchstone of dismissal.
However, the SC ruled that she was constructively dismissed. Why: ill-treated by her company which imposed on her suspension after
suspension until she was finally demoted from the position of Club Accountant to accounts officer, she had no option except to continue
working. She was a necessitous person. Except to continue is the exact opposite of except to forego. But the SC is always correct
and, in the few instances it is wrong, it is still correct.
II
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
Tests
1.
2.
3.
4.
Control Test (CT). Question to ask Who is the master of the alleged employees means and methods of performance?
Economic Reality Test (ERT). Question to ask Is the alleged employee economically dependent on his alleged employer?
Contra-indications: he has other employers or principals (PDI case, 2006).
Two-tier Test. The ERT is used to confirm CT.
Ecclesiastical Affair Test. If the dispute arises from the relation between church and member (e.g. pastor), LA has jurisdiction if
the dispute is an employer-employee affair (dismissal for a just cause under Art. 282, old). If the dispute is an ecclesiastical affair
(e.g., suspension of the faculties of a priest for preaching that Mary Magdalene was Jesus GF) then LA has no jurisdiction. An
25
ecclesiastical affair (as contrasted to employer-employee affair) has something to do with: faith, religious belief, dogma,
governance of the faithful, ordination, or ex-communication (Austria vs. NLRC).
Note Art. 280 (desirable & necessary) is not a test of employer-employee relationship but of regularity of employment. ( Atok Big
Wedge Mining Co. vs. Gison, Aug. 8, 2011 ). One may be engaged to perform work necessary and desirable but it does not follow
that he is an employee. He may be an independent contractor. In this connection, Art. 157 which requires employers to provide
medical services does not require employment of doctors and nurses as regular employees. They may be engaged as contractual
employees only ( Cinco ruling).
Not employees: (a) PBA Referee; master of means and methods (Bernate vs. PBA, Sept. 14, 2011); (b) Masiador/, Sentenciador
of cockfights; experts in their own right (Semblante, et al. vs. CA, Aug. 15, 2011).
Characteristics
(CRISI & I Relationship full of Questions)
C
R
I
S
I
I
Contractual (Art. 1700, NCC)

Relation between Master & Servant (prerogative to adopt rules; can dismiss for insubordination under Art.
282)
In personam (no successor employer, except: piercing the veil, instrumentality rule, express agreement)
Shared-responsibility (Sec. 3, Art. XIII, Constn)
Impressed with public interest (correlate to Art. 263g)
Inter-party relationship. Industrial peace cannot be achieved thru State compulsion. Hence, parties to a
labor dispute must be left to themselves to resolve it with minimum State interference (Prof. Azucena).
Question of fact. Labor tribunals determine its factual existence. Courts must respect and accord finality to
their finings if based on substantial evidence.
Question of law. Law determines when it exists. Parties to a contract (e.g. service agreement between a
principal and job contractor) cannot stipulate against its existence.
III
JURISDICTION
A
Jurisdictional Tests
Reasonable Causal Connection Rule & Reference to Labor Law Rule. It is not enough that the issue born of the allegations of the
complaint and relief prayed for has a reasonable causal connection to employer-employee relationship. For labor tribunals to have
jurisdiction, said issue must be resolvable thru the application of the labor Code, other labor statutes or labor contracts. If other laws are
needed to resolve it, the courts have jurisdiction.
Relationship Test & Nature of Controversy Test. In terminations, the first question to ask is : Who are the disputants? Answer: (a)
corporation & corporate officer (in general, RTC); (b) corporation and corporate employee (in general, LA ). You do not stop here. Second
question to ask: What law is needed to resolve the issue born of the allegations of the complaint and relief sought ? Answer: (a) corporate
law (RTC); (b) Labor Law (Labor tribunal).
Relationship Test & Ecclesiastical Affair Test, supra.
NOTE:
Rules on Immunity
1.
2.
3.
GTZ v. CA, G.R. No. 152318, 16 April 2009
Bar 2014
Forum Non Conveniens
B
Interplay of Jurisdiction
26
SOLE & BLR: Two Instances

1.
SOLE to BLR.
Inter-union disputes involving WACLIU (workers associations, chapters, locals & independent
unions) and intra-union disputes get initiated before the DOLE RD. Appeal is to the BLR (Art. 226, PD 442). In Barles, et al. vs.
Bitonio, June 16, 1999, the appeal was taken to the SOLE who transmitted it to the BLR. The appellant questioned the move as
an abdication of appellate power in favor of an inferior body. The SC ruled that it was BLR which had appellate jurisdiction.
2.
BLR to SOLE. Petitions for the cancellation of union CRs are initiated with the DOLE RD. Appeal from cancellation
orders are taken to the BLR. In Heritage Hotel Mla vs. NUWHRAIN-HHMSC, Jan 12, 2011, the BLR Director inhibited because
he used to be counsel for the respondent. The appeal was elevated to the SOLE who resolved it. No grave abuse. SOLE can
resolve the appeal in the exercise of her power of control and supervision over the BLR.
DOLE RD (Art. 128, PD 442) and LA (Art. 217, PD 442).
1
Under Art. 128, the RD may be ousted of his jurisdiction on two grounds: (a) cessation of employer-employee relationship,
provided it takes place before he takes cognizance of the dispute; and (b) the employer raises issues which are supported by
documents which were not considered in the course of summary inspection, although these were verifiable. The result of ouster is
the transmittal of the case to the LA for reception of the ignored evidence via position paper, etc. On his own, the RD may also
oust himself for lack of jurisdiction due to cessation of employer-employee relationship by issuing a referral order in favor of the
LAs jurisdiction. Note: The RD issued a referral order which the employee challenged before the SOLE who ruled that the RD
had jurisdiction. When the case was transmitted back to the RD, the employer moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata.
Allegedly, the order was more than 10 days old; hence, it attained finality already. SC: a referral order is not a judgment on the
merits; hence, it cannot ripen to res judicata.
DOLE RD (Art. 128 & 129); LA (Art. 217) and NLRC (Arts. 218 & 223)
1
Appeals & Periods of Appeal. Appeals from the LA are taken to the NLRC within 10 days by (a) filing of appeal memo; (b) posting
of appeal bond; and (c) payment of docket fee. Appeals from 129 decisions (P5K & below) are also taken to the NLRC by
performing same acts within the shorter period of 5 days. Both 217 and 129 appeals are governed b y the same 2011 Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC.
Appeals from 128 orders are taken to the SOLE within 10 days.
2
Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond. Under the NLRC Rules, the appellant employer has the remedy of filing a motion to reduce
appeal bond, subject to the posting of a reasonable accompanying bond. This remedy is available for appeals taken from 217 and
129 but not 128 because there is no equivalent remedy under the rules of the DOLE (Yanson vs. Hon. Secretary, Feb. 11, 2008).
3
Employer-employee relationship. The determination of the factual existence of employer-employee relationship is co-extensive
with the RDs/SOLE expanded visitorial power. Therefore, the view that the RD makes a determination in a preliminary manner
only while the LA/ NLRC makes the final determination must be reviewed. (SC on MR in Bombo Radyo case, March 6, 2012)
SOLE (Art. 263,g) and NLRC (Art. 218).
1
In national interest cases, or HEAT d WET BEDS 5R cases (hospital, energy, air traffic control, transportation, water production,
export, tire production, banking, education, drugs & pharmaceuticals, support services, 5-star hotels, roof production), the SOLE
can assume jurisdiction. Either (a) he resolves the dispute himself; or (b) certifies it to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. If
certified to the NLRC, the case cannot be dismissed by the NLRC on the ground that it does not involve a national interest. Only
the SOLE is given the prerogative to make a determination because Art. 263(g) uses the term if in his opinion. The opinion of the
NLRC is irrelevant.
2
If SOLE finds that there is employer-employee relationship, it takes cognizance of the matter to the exclusion of the NLRC. The
SOLE would have no jurisdiction only if employer-employee relationship has already been terminated, or it appears upon review
that no employer-employee relationship existed at all. (Peoples Broadcasting Service vs. Sec. of the DOLE, March 6, 2012).
27
LA (Art. 217) and VA (Arts. 261 & 262).

1
Conferment of Jurisdiction. The rule is law vests jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case. Parties cannot stipulate where
to litigate. The LAs original and exclusive jurisdiction is defined by Art. 217. But by express stipulation in a CBA, his cases can be
brought to the VA (Art. 262). This is valid under Sec. 3, Art. XIII of the Constitution which requires the preferential use of voluntary
modes of settling labor disputes (Vivero ruling).
2
Acquisition of Jurisdiction. The LA acquires jurisdiction thru the filing of a verified complaint, subject to SEnA (single entry
approach or mediation) as reinforced by RA 10396, March 14, 2013. The VA acquires jurisdiction as follows: (1) Both parties are
willing to comply with their contractual obligation to go to the VA - thru a Submission Agreement; (2) one party is unwilling = thru
service of a Notice to Arbitrate; (c) if both parties are unwilling, thru the appointment of a VA.
Note: Notice to Arbitrate. Only the exclusive bargaining representative (EBR) can serve it, not any union even if registered. Art.
255 which provides that, for purposes of collective bargaining, the workers shall be represented by the EBR but without prejudice
to the right of a worker or group of workers to present their grievances to the employer at any time does not include the right of
such group of workers to serve a notice to arbitrate (Tabigue, et al. vs. Intl Copra Export Corp., Dec. 23, 2009).
RD and Med-Arbiter: Problems
1
Union A files a CE petition with the Med-Arb. Rival Union B moves to dismiss the petition on the ground that Union A submitted
falsified registration documents for which reason its legal personality should be disregarded. This cannot be done as it constitutes
a collateral attack. Only direct attacks are allowed (D.O. 40-03). Why? The RD is the office vested with the power to cancel CRs;
hence, cancellation cannot be asked from the Med-Arb.
2
Its motion to dismiss denied, Union B goes to the RD for CR cancellation. It returns to the Med-Arb. with a motion to suspend the
CE proceedings on the ground that its complaint for cancellation is a prejudicial question. Motion to suspend should be denied.
No more prejudicial questions under D.O. 40-03 unlike under the Fortune Tobacco case. CE shall proceed subject to the outcome
of the cancellation proceedings. If no cancellation, CBA negotiations will not be stopped also - but subject also to the outcome f
the cancellation proceedings. If, finally, the RD issues an order of cancellation and it attains finality, the next move is to seek CBA
deregistration with the RD.
Note: RD has jurisdiction over: (1) CR cancellation; (2) CBA deregistration; (3) complaints/petitions involving WACLIU, supra.
(BLR has jurisdiction over FINTCAM cases: federations, industry unions, national unions, trade unions & their chapters, affiliates
and members) ; (4) 128 & 129 cases; and (5) complaints for violation of apprenticeship agreements that are first ventilated before
the Plant Apprenticeship Committee (non-exhaustion of administrative remedies rule applies) .
C
Updates on 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure
Situationer 1. A, a seafarer, files a complaint for maximum disability benefits of US$60,000.00 with the LA. LA grants the relief
sought. The respondent manning agent takes appeal to the NLRC which affirms the LAs decision. Likewise, it denies the
appellants MR. Unless the CA issues a TRO, the NLRC decision will become final and executory, and judgment will be entered,
after the lapse of 60 days (period for certiorari). The case will then be transmitted back to the LA for execution.
Remedies:
1
Motion to Quash Writ of Execution. If denied, no appeal. The remedy is to petition for the nullification of the writ of execution
under Rule XII, infra.
2
Petition under Rule XII, 2011 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. A verified petition based on grave abuse of discretion , serious
error/s, or any irregularity during the execution stage which, if not corrected, will cause serious and irreparable damage and injury
to the petitioner must be filed in 10 days from receipt of order denying the motion to quash. From date of filing, the Sheriff cannot
enforce judgment within the next 15 days. Thereafter, he can pursue execution, unless the NLRC issues a TRO.
28
Note:
Execution will not be stopped by mere filing of (a) a petition for certiorari with the CA; (b) a motion to quash with the LA;
and (c) a petition for extraordinary remedy with the NLRC. A TRO is required.
Situationer 2. Judgment is enforced due to non-issuance of a TRO. Later, the manning agent gets a favorable decision from the
CA which attains finality because the seafarer is not interested in challenging the decision before the SC. After all, he has already
received his US$60,000.00.
Remedy:
File a motion for restitution with the LA (Sec. 18 , Rule XI, 2011 Rules). Do not run after the lawyers fees in the same motion
because the LA has no jurisdiction over him. Serve him a demand letter. If he does not return his attorneys fees, bring the matter
to the IBP. (This will not be asked in the BAR).
IV
EVIDENCE IN LABOR PROCEEDINGS
A
Substantial Evidence Rule
1.
2.
3.
4.
Vessel Logbook, its entries constitute substantial evidence.

Company ID is evidence of employer-employee relationship and not just as security measure.
Payroll sheets are not the best evidence of abandonment . Under the best evidence rule, the original document must be
produced to prove its contents. So if the entries of the payroll sheets are not at issue then the invocation of the rule is misplaced.
(Tegimenta Chemical Phil vs. Oco, Feb. 27, 2013).
Affidavits cannot be trusted because the person preparing them reduces to writing what is just communicated to him, using his
language. (Eagle Ridge Golf and Country Club vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 178989, 18 March 2010). Take note, however,
that Rule V of the 2011 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC requires testimonies to be reduced to affidavits and attached to position
papers. Take note also of the Judicial Affidavit Rule.
5.
Affidavit of Assumption of Responsibility. A seafarer is not privy to it; hence, it does not bind him. The original manning agent
is still solidarily liable to him even if another has fully assumed liability because of the undertaking of the original manning agent,
as required by law, to be solidarily liable for all violations of the contract of the seafarer ( Skippers United Pacific, Inc. vs. Maguad,
et al., Aug. 15, 2006).
6.
Foreign Law must be proven as a fact; otherwise, it will be presumed to be the same as Philippine law. ( EDI-STAFF BUILDERS
INTL, INC. vs. NLRC, Oct. 26, 2007: Presumed Identity Approach/Processual Presumption).
7.
Evidence from Instigation. Evidence even if procured thru instigation can be used against an erring employee because
instigation is a defense only in criminal procceedings, not in labor proceedings (Roquero vs. PAL, April 22, 2003)
Graphology. The testimony of a handwriting expert is not needed to establish serious misconduct because the erring employees
liability is being determined in an administrative proceeding only where the quantum of proof required is substantial evidence only
(Mitsubishi vs. Simon, et al., April 16, 2008)
Conspiracy. Conspiracy cannot be presumed. It should be established as clearly, positively and convincingly as the act itself
(Sargasco Construction & Devt Corp. vs. NLRC, Feb. 9, 2010; Domingo vs. Rayala, March 2, 2008.)
8.
9,
B
Three-fold Liability Rule & Totality of Circumstances Rule
(Domingo vs. Rayala, Feb. 18, 2008)
There was no direct evidence of DRR in Domingo vs. Rayala. But Justice Nachura considered the totality of the circumstances in arriving
at his finding of liability. There were nasty verbal acts, as well as physical acts, like touching the complainants shoulder while dictating
something to her. These acts, taken in their entirety, amounted to substantial evidence.
C
Third Physician Rule
(Phil Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. vs. Dumadag, J. Brion, June 26, 2013)
29
Note:
The compensability of a seafarers disability resulting from illness or injury is governed by (a) Art. 191, PD 442; (b) the POEASEC; and (c) medical evidence. Requisites: (a) work-related; and (b) degree of disability ( whether Grade 1 (total & permanent), Grade 2,
etc) is certified to by the company-designated physician.
Rules: (1) Within 3 days from medical repatriation, the seafarer must report to manning agent. If phsycally impossible, notify
the latter within the same period. Non-compliance will bar claim. (2) Seafarer must submit himself to company-designated
physician for examination and treatment. Unjustifiable abandonment of treatment will disqualify him. (3) Opinion of companydesignated physician is controlling, subject to the right of the seafarer to seek medical opinion elsewhere. (4) In case of conflict in
medical findings, the parties shall agree on a third physician whose findings will be final and binding.
Brion ruling. Dumadag filed his complaint without first disclosing the medical findings of his own physician. Due to his nondisclosure, the manning agent was not able to avail of the third physician remedy. Hence, at the time he filed his complaint he had
no cause of action.
Note:
Philman Marine Agency, Inc. vs. Cabanban, July 29, 2013. No cause of action if opinion if personal physician is sought after filing
of complaint.
UPDATE: Non-use of a third physician has the effect of according the medical opinion of the company-designated physician
binding effect (as against lack of cause of action).
MCQ:
The legal effect of non-referral to a third physician is as follows:

(a) lack of cause of action;
(b) finality of the medical opinion of the company physician;
(c) appointment by the Labor Arbiter of a third physician;
(d)
D
Burden of Proof vs. Burden of Evidence
(1) For money claims: Employee must first set forth his claims with particularity, or establish the credit clearly, before the burden
of proving payment can be imposed on the employer. Once some form of payment is presented, the burden of evidence is
shifted to the employee.
(2) For illegal dismissal: Employee must first establish the fact of his dismissal with clear, positive and convincing evidence
before the burden of proving the validity of his dismissal can be imposed on his employer.
E
Doubts Arising From Evidence
Extent of the Liberal Interpretation Rule: Doubts and ambiguities arising from (a) PD 442 provisions; and ORILC provisions (Art.
4, PD 442); (b) labor contracts (Art. 1702, NCC); and (c) evidence in labor proceedings (Duty Free Phil. V. Trias, 27 June 2012).
V
MONEY CLAIMS
Jurisdictional Rules
Reasonable Causal Connection Rule. The money claim must have reasonable causal relation to employer-employee relationship. If it
arises from some other relationship, like a civil contract (e.g., Sonza vs. ABS-CBN), labor tribunals have no jurisdiction.
Reference to Labor Law Rule. Not all disputes arising from the affairs between employers and employees are for labor tribunals to resolve.
Only claims resolvable thru the application of the Labor Code, other labor statutes, and labor contracts are under their jurisdiction.
Outside Jurisdiction of LA: (a) reimbursement of training expenses (U-BIX case); (b) recovery of car , replevin (Astorga Case ); (c)
damages arising from violation of Art. 19, NCC (Eviota case); (d) damages arising from quasi delict (Tolosa case); ( e) cross-claim between
principal and service contractor (SSS case ); petition for declaratory relief to nullify a CBA provision ( Halaguena, et al. vs. PAL, Oct. 2,
2009). In all these cases, it was held that the issue was resolvable thru the application of other laws.
30
Labor Standards Claims

Coverage:
Art. 80
(a) All employees in all establishments; (b) whether for profit or not; (c) no distinction between daily-paid and
monthly-paid; (d) except ur MOM, GF & Western Police District (WPD).
31
Not Covered:
MOM (Managerial employees, Officers/Members of managerial staff; Members of the family of the employer
dependent on him for support)
GF (Govt employees, Field Personnel)
WPD (Workers paid by result, Persons in the personal service of another, Domestic workers), subject to K
Law.
Note:
Under the Kasambahay Act, HelLauGarCya (Helpers, Laundry personnel, Gardeners, Cooks, Yaya)
are now entitled to weekly rest period (also 8 hours daily rest), SIL & OT)
Holiday Pay & 13th Month Pay

Pieceraters: Pro labor : Although workers paid by result, they are entitled to holiday pay (Sec. 8(b), Rule IV,
Bk III, ORILC + Labor Congress of the Philippines ruling 1998. Pro employer: Not entitled for being workers
paid by result (Art. 82, Villuga vs. NLRC, 1993 + Mark Roche Intl, 1999). As to 13th month pay, they are entitled
because their employers are not exempt.
Paid on Commission basis: Entitled to holiday pay and 13 th month pay IF receiving basic salary also. In
computing 13th month pay, commissions shall be added if wage type (basis for commission is the performance
of the worker), but not if bonus type (incentive).
Paid on task basis. Not entitled to holiday pay and 13th month pay. No qualifications.
Hours of Work : Flexible Work Schedule (must be NeVoTe - Necessary, Voluntary & Temporary). See Kasambahay notes.
Solo Parents Welfare Act. Aspects: (1) Can arrange with employer over time-in & time-out; (2) Can leave
work to attend to dependent subject to these conditions: (a) must come back to complete normal hours of
work; (b) cannot exercise right during core work hours; (c) right not available if it will impair individual or
company productivity.
DOLE Advisory 2, s. 2009: (a) Compressed Work Week; (b) Reduced Work Days (subject to 6 months cap);
(c) Rotation; (d) Broken Time; ( e) Forced Leave.
Service Incentive Leave (It is a curious animal because it does not prescribe like other claims do, Autobus ruling, 2006)
Options: (a) use 5 days vacation with pay; (b) monetize it after 1 year; or (c) get money equivalent of all SILs
upon retirement or separation (Art. 291 will not bar more than 3 years old SILs).
Wage Distortion Adjustment
1
Wage Distortion: (a) 2/more wage groups (inter-wage group); (b) each wage group has its wage rate based on some rational
consideration; (c) wage gap/wage advantage of one wage group over the other is either eliminated or compressed; and (d) the
elimination/compression is caused by a wage order, CBA renegotiation or merger of companies.
2
Wage Distortion Adjustment.
WDA = Minimum Wage x Prescribed Increase
Actual Salary (of disadvantaged wage group)
Note: Add the result to the wage rate of the wage group that has lost its wage advantage in order to restore it.
Attorneys Fees
1
Masmud vs. NLRC, 2009. Ordinary Attorneys Fees vs. Extraordinary Attorneys Fees. Extraordinary - species of damages
awarded to worker for being compelled to litigate against his employer and incur expenses; it is awarded to a worker; it is limited to
10% only (Art. 110). Ordinary - compensation for legal services; it is paid by employee to his lawyer; its amount is governed by
agreement; in the absence of an agreement, Quantum Meruit applies; hence, it can be more than 10%.
2
32
Exodus Intl Construction Corp. Vs. Biscocho, Feb. 23, 2011. 10% attorneys fees can be awarded even if lawyer does not attend
many stages of the proceedings. Reason: the 10% is not based on rendition of legal services but compulsion to litigate on the part
of the client.
UPDATE: Workers can enter into a compromise agreement with employer even without their counsel as long as they comply with
their contractual obligation to pay the agreed attorneys fees ( ).
Workers Preference (Art. 110). Requisites of first preference: (a) remaining funds or properties cannot cover all outstanding
obligations; and (b) the unpaid claim is brought in a bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding, or any proceeding of similar import
(judicial settlement of estate, but not extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage).
Note: Art. 110 does not affect the order of preference established in Art. 2241 and 2242, NCC. Hence, the State and mortgagee
are always ahead of the unpaid worker (Peralta & DBP cases). Under Art. 2241, the unpaid worker is No. 6 only. Under Art. 2242,
he is No. 3. What Art. 110 affects is Art. 2244 only under which the unpaid worker is No. 2. No. 1 is funeral expenses. What the
unpaid worker enjoys is a mere preference; whereas, the State and mortgagee enjoy liens. The special nature of a lien is that it
attaches to a specific property. Therefore, Art. 110 cannot take away the mortgaged property and deliver it to the unpaid worker,
just as it cannot take away taxable property to deliver it to the worker. These properties are protected for the owners of the tax lien
and mortgage lien .
Crew Claims
Disability Claims
See Third Physician Rule, supra.
Death Claims
Benefits: (a) US$50,000.00 as death benefits; (b) US$7,000.00 for every child not over 21 and unemployed; and (c)
US$1,000.00 funeral expenses.
Requisites: (a) death is work-connected; and (b) it must occur during the effectivity of contract. Note: Death occurred 6 months
after repatriation. Not compensable (Sea Power Shipping Ent., Inc. vs. Salazar, Aug. 28, 2013)
OFW Claims
Unpaid Salaries: Pre-terminated OFW Contracts (see Due Process Clause & Equal Protection Clause, supra.)
OFW Waivers
Basic rule: Waivers are void for being contrary to public policy, but not when they represent a fair and reasonable compromise and
they are supported with substantial consideration (Periquet vs. NLRC). For OFW waivers to be valid, they must: (a) be written in
a language understood by the OFW; (b) be witnessed by 2; (c) be notarized; (d) state the amount of the actual money claim; and
(e) state the amount of the compromised claim (to aid the courts in determining if substantial or unconscionable).
Retirement Benefits
Article 287. Formula: 22.5 days x average daily salary x length of service
Note:
22.5 days = 15 days (half month salary); 5 days (SIL); and 2.5 days (1/12 of 13th month pay). Always give the 15 days.
But before giving the others, find out if the retiree is entitled to SIL and 13 th month pay. If not, do not include 5 & 2.5. Example: a
taxi driver is paid on task basis according to the SC. As a worker paid by result, he is not entitled to SIL; so take away the 5
days. He is not also entitled to 13th month pay. So take away the 2.5 days. (Refer to Diagram of Art. 82 & 13 th Month Pay)
SSS. PD442 retirement benefits are apart from SSS retirement benefits (Chan vs. Rogelio, April 27, 2011). Employer cannot argue
that an employee should not get two retirement benefits for retiring just once.
Pag-Ibig. Pag-Ibig retirement benefits are substitute retirement benefits. Any difference between PD442 computation and Pag-Ibig
computation shall be paid by the employer (Sec. 21, Pag-Ibig Fund Act).
SSS Claims
Beneficiaries.
Bart was married to Celia who started cohabiting with another man. They had a child, Isa, who died at an early age.
Bart, in turn, cohabited with Libby with whom he had 2 children, Dalawa and Tatlo - aged 24 and 22. Then he fathered 2 more children with
another woman, Delia. These children named Apat and Lima were aged 15 and 17. In time, Bart died. Death benefits were claimed: (a)
by Celia; (b) Libby and her 2 children; and (c) Apat and Lima. Whose claim must be granted?
33
Deny: (a) Celias claim because, at the time of Barts death, she was not living with him. (Qualifications of spouse: legitimate +
living with); (b) Libbys claim because she may be living with Bart but she was not his legitimate spouse; (c) Dalawa & Tatlos
claim because, at the time of Barts death, they were above 21. (Qualifications of children: below 21, unemployed, and
unmarried).
Grant:
Apat & Lima;s claim because, at the time of Bart;s death, they were below 21, unemployed and unmarried.
Note: In the Sygney case, the first paramour presented a fake marriage contract. When disqualified, she presented a waiver
signed by the legitimate wife. Both were dishonored. The 2 children of the second paramour were allegedly disqualified too
because, at the time of Barts death, they were not living with him. SC said living with is not a requisite for children.
GSIS Claims
The AOO Rule (not a legal term; just a memory tool; do not use it in the Bar).
AOO (arose out of employment). For disability or death arising from disease to be compensable, the disease must be AOO, i.e.,
occupational in nature. It is occupational if listed in Annex A of the Employees Compensation Act, as amended. If not listed,
compensation can be based on substantial evidence of work-connection with the use of the Increased Risk Theory or Proximate Cause
Theory. In the Cate case, the disease was unlisted. However, Cate could not present medical evidence to comply with the substantial
evidence rule. SC ruled that his disability caused by Osteoblastic Osteosarcoma was compensable because even medical science could
not explain the origin of his disease
The ICO Rule. (same)
ICO (in the course of employment). For disability or death caused by injury/accident to be compensable, the injury/accident must
occur in the course of employment. If outside, not compensable - subject to the so-called off-premises rules, e.g. Reasonable Nexus Rule.,
Reasonable Nexus Rule. Question to ask: Does the members absence from his place of work have a reason able connection to his
presence at the place of contingency (injury/accident)? Answer: YES - compensable.
The answer is YES in the following:
(1) Hinoguin was assigned in Nueva Ecija. He was accidentally shot to death by a fellow soldier in Nueva Vizcaya. Travel
outside place of work was by authority of a night pass given by his commander.
(2) Nitura fell off a wooden bride outside camp. He was dispatched by his commander to locate his fellow soldiers who went to
a dance in an nearby town. Besides, a soldier is deemed on 24-hour duty (24-Hour Duty Rule) . Unless on leave of
absence, he is deemed on duty wherever he is.
(3) Alvaran, assigned in Pasig as a jail guard, was shot to death by a fellow policeman in Muntinlupa on the occasion of the
investigation of his son whom he accompanied to Muntinlupa. He was on a peacekeeping mission, not a personal mission.
(4) Rogrin. His mission order directed him to arrest criminal elements at Place A. While proceeding to that place, he received
reliable info that the criminals had relocated to Place B. To reach the place, he and convoy had to drive thru a private
subdivision where he was shot to death by a security guard. Death compensable under the Liberal Interpretation Rule.
The answer is NO in the following:
(1) Alegre, instead if manning the police precinct he was assigned to, ferried passengers aboard his tricycle. He was shot to
death by a fellow policeman. He was on a purely personal mission.
(2) De la Rea. He was shot to death with a .45 caiber as he alighted from a passenger jeep. At the time of his death, he was on
official leave. 24-Hour Duty Rule does not apply.
Limited Portability Law
What is portable? (a) service credits; and (b) contributions. A member carries them with him when he moves from one system to the
other (SSS to GSIS, vice versa). If he cannot avail of a benefit by reason of insufficient length of service (and for this reason ONLY), his SSS
service credits and GSIS service credits can be combined so that he can avail thereof.
Gamogamo Case (Portability Law not applied). In 1963, Gamagamo joined the DOH as dental aid. In 1967, he became Dentist 1. After
14 years, he joined a private company which PNOC absorbed later. In his contract with PNOC, his years of service with the company were
aknowledged but not those with DOH. In time, PNOC floated a retrenchment package under which he would have been paid 2 months
34
salary for every year of service. However, his application for retrenchment was denied. He continued working until he reached retirement
age. He was paid 1 month salary for every year of service. After retiring, he discovered that 2 of his co-employees were paid 2 months
salary x length of service. He sued PNOC to recover 1 more month and his service credits under DOH, invoking the Limited Portability Law.
Held: Law not applicable because he was not disqualified from receiving SSS/GSIS benefits by reason of lack of service credits.
VI
LAW ON RECRUITMENT
Modes of Commission
1
CUTE CPAs Have Cute Red Peanuts (Art. 13(b), PD 442) + No License/Authority
(Canvassing, Utilizing, Transporting, Enlisting, Contract, Promising, Advertizing, Hiring, Contract, Referring, Procuring)
2
With License/Authority + Prohibited Act (Art. 34, PD 442 + RA 10022)
Bad Defenses
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
1.
2.
3.
Pp. vs. Jamilosa, Non-Presentation of Receipts for Placement Fees, SC: no need; Art. 13(b) says whether for profit or not)
Rodolfo vs, People. Lack of Profit. SC: (same)
Pp. vs. Panis. 1 recruit only. SC: 2 or more not an element; just a rule of evidence.
Pp. vs. Chua. POEA subsequently issued recruitment license. SC: License is prospective only; hence, it cannot legitimize a
recruitment done without license.
Pp. vs. Comila. Lack of Knowledge that his passengers were recruited by his wife. SC: lack of knowledge is equivalent to
defense of good faith which is not available in mala prohibita prosecututions.
Pp. vs. Navarra. Less than 3 recruiters; hence, no economic sabotage. SC: there are 6 victims; hence, it may not be by a
syndicate, but it is still economic sabotage because it is large scale.
Improper Venue. Complainant has 2 options: file case with court having territorial jurisdiction over place of commission; or with
court having territorial jurisdiction over place of residence at the time he was recruited.
Good Defenses
Visa Assistance (Darvin vs. CA)
Fault of Recruit that he was not deployed (RA 10022).
Local Recruitment. Note: RA 10022 says abroad whereas Art. 13(b) says local or overseas. Later law prevails. Recruitment of
domestic helpers governed by Kasambahay Act.
VII
TERMINATION DISPUTES
1.
Fact of Dismissal
Control Test. No dismissal without pre-existence of employer-employee relationship.
Complete Severance Test. No dismissal without complete severabce of employer-employee relationship.
Note: No complete severance in: (a) Art. 286 unless 6-month period of suspension of business operations exceeded; (b)
preventive suspension; (c) lockout; (d) on leave without pay employees.
Overt Act Test. No dismissal unless the employer commits an overt act resulting in actual termination or constructive termination.
Note: No overt act in: (a) resignation; (b) abandonment; (c) desertion by a seaman; (d) expiration of contract; (e) completion of
project.
2.
3.
Validity of Dismissal. Just/Authorized Cause ONLY.

Pre-termination Procedures.
(a)
Probationary employees. If dismissal is grounded on Failure to qualify - Notices not required if regularization standards were ade known upon hiring (PDI, 2007).
Just/Authorized cause - same procedures
Expiration - notices not required.
(b)
Abandonment. Even if there is no intent to dismiss on the ground of abandonment, notice to last known address
requirement must still be complied with. No distinction between abandonment as a ground for dismissal and
abandonment as a defense. (Tugade Bros. case)
(c)
Union member. Employer to verify ground for expulsion first before complying with its duty to dismiss per union security
clause.
35
(d)
(e)
Union officer. Employer may dismiss union officer upon demand of union members even pending his investigation
before the DOLE RD for misuse of union funds (Tagaytay Country Club case). Proceedings before RD not prejudicial
question.
Seaman. To be served charge sheet (equivalent of 1 st notice under Art. 282); investigated; and served schedule of
penalties (2nd notice under Art. 282). Minutes of proceedings shall be registered with the vessel logbook (substantial
evidence) and transmitted to local agent in the Phil. (for its ready use in case of litigation). This procedure may be
dispensed with if its observance will endanger either vessel or crew.
VIII
SELF-ORGANIZATION
Coverage: STAKINGS (Security guards, Terminated employees, Aliens, Kasambahay, INC members New employees Govt employees &
Supervisors)
The Confidential Employee Rule. A reports to or assists B. Their relationship is fiduciary. A is disqualified if: (a) B possesses labor
relations information; and (b) A has access to said information which access is inherent in his position. Not disqualified if: (a) As access is
to information which is not labor relations in nature (e.g., purely business); or (b) As access to labor relations info is accidental only.
The Extension Rule under Art. 245. Main rule: Supervisors can organize but cannot join the rank-n-file union. Extension rule - a union
composed of rank-n-filers and one composed of supervisors cannot join the same federation if (a) the members of the first are under the
supervision of the members of the second; and (b) the second conducts trade union activities in the same establishment. Note: Under RA
9481, they can join the same federation as long as they belong to the same establishment.
Cert. Election & CB-CN.
1. Certification Elections
When Valid:
Who wins:
Not barred Contract Bar. Certification Year Bar, or Deadlock Bar, Negotiation Bar or Appeal Bar AND
Major ELVOT CASVOT (majority of the eligible voters casts its vote)
Union with Major VOT VALVOT (majority vote of the valid votes)
2.
Run-Off Election
(a) Valid CE;
(b) 3/more choices (including No Union);
(c) None got major VOT VALVOT;
(d) Total votes of participants (excluding No Union) is at least 50% of CASVOT;
(e) No election contest that would materially alter the CE result.
3.
Collective Bargaining (CB) & Collective Negotiations (CN). Under Art. 255 (old), collective bargaining is the function of the
EBR. But any group of workers can bring their grievances to the employer (aspect of CN). CB is subject to jurisdictional
preconditions; CN is not. The end product of CB is a CBA; that of CN is a CNA. Art. 3, PD 442 CB guarantees CB but not
CN which is found in Sec. 3, Art. XIII of the Constn only.
Rights of Exclusive Bargaining Representative (EBR)

1, Notice of Strike ;
2. Strike Vote;
3, Notice to Arbitrate
Law on Strikes
Factual Issue: 3 Elements (a) temporary stoppage of work; (b) concerted activity; and (c) labor dispute.
Validity Issue: MISPAP Test (a) Means Test; (b) Injunction Test; (c) Statutory Prohibition Test; (d) Procedure Test; (e) Agreement
Test; (f) Purpose Test.
Collective Bargaining Agreements
1.
Mandatory Provisions: Union Security Clause
When the SOLE crafts a CBA for the parties, following commenced but failed CBA negotiations, stipulations already reached
cannot just be disregarded. If the union security clause agreed upon was a union shop, it is grave abuse of discretion if the SOLE changes
36
it to closed-shop because the latter is more onerous to the company. In a union-shop agreement, the company can hire non-union
members subject to the duty of the new hire to join the EBR. In a closed-shop agreement, the company is under obligation to hire from the
membership of the EBR, regardless of qualifications vis--vis the actual manpower requirements of its business. So, a closed-shop
agreement is more onerous (Meralco cases).
2.
Effectivity of Economic Provisions. CLUE: Vol O, Vol U; Invol O, Invol U

A.
Voluntary CBAs (crafted by the parties):

1. Organized (6-month Rule applies):
(a)
New eco provisions are perfected w/in 6 months following date of expiration of old eco. Provisions new eco provision will retroact to the day following date of expiration.
(b)
Outside 6 months, as agreed upon by the parties, e.g.:
(i)
To retroact; or
(ii)
To take effect on a later date. Period not covered by the new agreement will continue to be
governed by the old provisions (Hold-Over Doctrine).
2. Unorganized
(a)
SOLE will give parties the opportunity to agree on date of effectivity;
(b)
Absent agreement, date fixed by the SOLE.
B.
Involuntary CBAs (crafted by the SOLE):

1. Organized
(as agreed upon in the CBA, not the date of the CBA)
2. Unorganized (to take effect like a judicial decision)
X
SPECIAL LAWS
Double Indemnity Law.
Unpaid salary increase doubled + criminal prosecution. Payment does not bar prosecution.
Magna Carta for Women
2 months full salary if woman undergoes surgical procedure by reason of a gynecological disorder.
Magna Carta for Persons with Disability
Vilification/insulting of disabled is now a crime.
Solo Parents Welfare Act
1
Solo Parent = Assumes parental responsibility alone; hence, IF NO DADS Undo Coitus (Insanity, Family member, Nullity,
Other person, Death, Abandonment, Detention, Separation, Unmarried, Crime) PLUS Dependent who is less than 18 and DULU
( dependent, unmarried, living with parent & unemployed).
2
Rights: (a) 7 days parental leave; (b) against discrimination; and (c) flexible work schedule.

Labor Juris (2014-2015)

Încărcat de

Informații document

Titlu original

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Labor Juris (2014-2015)

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

1

CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING

SURVIVAL NOTES IN LABOR LAW3

PRINCIPLES AND POSTULATES

Unicol Management Services, Inc. vs. Malipot

Anti-Sexual Harassment Act (RA 7877)

The Kasambahay Act

CAVEAT: For mature readers only. The memory tools are

Knowledge of the agent is

The Necessitous Man

Contractual (Art. 1700, NCC)

GTZ v. CA, G.R. No. 152318, 16 April 2009

SOLE & BLR: Two Instances

LA (Art. 217) and VA (Arts. 261 & 262).

Vessel Logbook, its entries constitute substantial evidence.

The legal effect of non-referral to a third physician is as follows:

Labor Standards Claims

Holiday Pay & 13th Month Pay

Validity of Dismissal. Just/Authorized Cause ONLY.

Rights of Exclusive Bargaining Representative (EBR)

Mandatory Provisions: Union Security Clause

Effectivity of Economic Provisions. CLUE: Vol O, Vol U; Invol O, Invol U

Voluntary CBAs (crafted by the parties):

Involuntary CBAs (crafted by the SOLE):

S-ar putea să vă placă și