Constitutional law cases on political questions and succession of government

Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013
MACARIOLA vs. ASUNCION

FACTS:
Petitioners alleged that Judge Asuncion violated Art.14 of the Code of Commerce. The cited
provision prohibits public officers from engaging in business.
HELD: Judge Asuncion did not, or cannot, violate it since such provision is deemed abrogated
Although the cited provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce, it however,
partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the
government and certain public officials and employees.
Political law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the
organization and operations of the governmental organs of the state and defines the relations
of the State with the inhabitants of its territory. Political law embraces constitutional law, law
of public officers and corporations, administrative law. Specifically, Art.14 of the Code of
Commerce partakes more of the nature of administrative Law because it regulates the conduct
of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business, hence, political
in essence.
Note that the Code of Commerce took effect on 1888. Upon the transfer of sovereignty
from Spain to US and later from US to RP, Art.14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to
have been automatically abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the
political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new
sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly reenacted by affirmative
act of the new sovereign.
LAWYERS LEAGUE vs. AQUINO
FACTS:
The legitimacy of the Aquino Govt is questioned on the ground that it was not established
pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
HELD:
Petitioners had no personality to sue and petition states no cause of action.
RULING:
a.)Legitimacy of Aquino govt belongs to realm of politics where only the people of the
Philippines are the judge (not a justiciable matter)
b.) The people have made the judgment, accepting the Aquino govt w/c is in effective control
of the entire country.
c.) Aquino govt is not merely a de facto govt but in fact and law a de jure govt..
d.) Community of nations has recognized its legitimacy.
e.) All 11 members of SC have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under
Aquino govt.
The legitimacy of the Aquino admimistration is not a justiciable matter but a political one. It is
political because it belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are
the judge.
The Aquino government is a de jure and a de facto government for the people have made the
judgment and have accepted the government of President Aquino which is in effective control
of the entire country.
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government and all the
11 members of the Supreme Court have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic
under her government.
IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ
FACTS:
From the efforts of 4-manresa class 2013
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In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes
the first paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the
proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the
February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to
noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be
held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court "to
declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the
present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel and the
elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to
under the said Section 7
ISSUE: WON the provision is ambiguous?
HELD: No
The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack for cause of action.
The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or
vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public
record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to
incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other
persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of
synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the
holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and
Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution.
Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the
legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the
judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in
effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in
fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of tlie present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized,
have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government. (Lawyers
League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al)
For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, mutatis
mutandis, there can be no question that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President
Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate President and Vice-President of the
Republic of the Philippines.or the above-quoted reasons, which are fully applicable to the
petition at bar,
LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO of the Court of Appeals dated 14
November 1990.
FACTS:
The petitioner, Reynato S. Puno, was first appointed as Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals on 1980. On 1983, the Court of Appeals was reogranized and became the Intermediate
Appellate Court pursuant to BP Blg. 129. On 1984, petitoner was appointed to be Deputy
Minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice. Thus, he ceased to be a member of the Judiciary.
After February 1986 EDSA Revolution, there was a reorganization of the entire government,
including the Judiciary. A Screening Committee for the reorganization of the Intermediate
Appelate Court and lower courts recommended the return of petitioner as Associate Justice of
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the new court of Appeals and assigned him the rank of number 11 in the roster of appellate
court justices. When the appointments were signed by Pres. Aquino, petitioner's seniority
ranking changes from number 11 to 26.
Then, petitioner alleged that the change in seniority ranking was due to "inadvertence" of the
President, otherwise, it would run counter to the provisions of Section 2 of E.O. No. 33.
Petitioner Justice Reynato S. Puno wrote a letter to the Court seeking the correction of his
seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals.
The Court en banc granted Justice Puno's request.
A motion for reconsideration was later filed by Associate Justices Campos Jr. and Javellana who
are affected by the ordered correction.
They alleged that petioner could not claim reappointment because the courts where he had
previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.
ISSUE: WON the present Court of Appeals is merely a continuation of the old Court of Appeals
and Intermediate Appellate Court exisiting before the promulgation of E.O. No. 33.
HELD: The Court held that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior
to E.O. No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the 1987 Revolution. The
Court of Appeals that was established under E.O. No. 33 is considered as an entirely new court.
The present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the courts existing
before E.O. No. 33. It was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the
revolutionary goverment of Corazon Aqwuino in the aftermath of the people power in 1986.
Revolution is defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any country
or state by those who were previously subject to it." or "as suddent. radical and fundamental
change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence or at least some
acts of violence."
DE LEON vs. ESGUERRA
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners as
Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. Petitioner received a Memorandum
signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra designating respondent Florentino G.
Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC
Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government."
Respondent OIC Governor also signed a Memorandum designating other respondents as
members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality. So the OIC governor
in the memorandum ordered the replacement of all baranggay officials of all the baranggays in
the municipality of taytay rizal
Petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda be declared null and void and that respondents be
prohibited from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg.
222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and
shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June
7, 1988. That with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer
has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.
Respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution
shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon
the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is
made within a period of one year from February 25,1986.
Respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were
abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted provision and
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not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay
Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to
have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the Provisional
Constitution. So elective officials under the 1973 Constitution may continue in office but should
vacate their positions upon the occurrence of any of the events mentioned.
Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no proclamation or
executive order terminating the term of elective Barangay officials.
ISSUE: WON the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the
one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987.
HELD: Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8,
1977, should be considered as the effective date of replacement and not December 1,1986 to
which it was ante dated, in keeping with the dictates of justice.
But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the aforequoted
provision in the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27,
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading.
SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous
Constitutions.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative,
respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate
respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term
of office of six (6) years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 5should still govern.
Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6)
years for elective Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore,
be considered as still operative. Thus, Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor declared
to be of no legal force and effect
TANADA vs. TUVERA
FACTS:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in
the Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus
to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the OG of
various PDs, LOIs, general orders, proclamations, EOs, letters of implementation and
administrative orders.
Respondents contended that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus
submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the
date they are to take effect, publication in the OG is indispensable for their effectivity. The
point stressed is anchored on Art. 2 of NCC.
ISSUES: WON petitioners have legal standing? And WON various laws in question should be
published to be valid and enforceable?
HELD: The petitioners have legal standing. The SC has already decided in various cases that a
party has a cause of action when the question posed is one of public right and the object is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty.
The people are regarded as the real party in interest and need not show that he has any legal
or special interest in the result it being sufficient that he is a citizen and as such interested in
the execution of the laws.
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The SC also ruled that laws should be published. The clear object of such is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim ignorantia legis non excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever,
not even a constructive one.
The publication of all Presidential issuances pf a public nature or of general applicability is
mandated by law. PDs that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
impose a burden such as tax and revenue measures fall within this category. Other PDs which
apply only to particular persosn or calss of persons such as AOs and Eos need not be published
on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GSIS
FACTS:
The controversy arose when respondent GSIS decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51%
of the outstanding shares of Manila Hotel. Only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% shares at P41.58/
share, and a Malaysian firm, at P44.00/share. Pending the declaration of the winning bidder,
petitioner matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by the Malaysian Firm which
respondent GSIS refused to accept. The petitioner posits that since Manila Hotel is part of the
national patrimony, petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the
Malaysian firm invoking Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision
2. Granting that this provision is self-executing, WON Manila Hotel falls under the term national
patrimony.
3. Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of thenational patrimony, WON selling mere 51%
shares and not the land itself can be considered part of national patrimony.
4. WON GSIS committed grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
1. Yes. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is self-executing which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. It is per
sejudicially enforceable The Constitution mandates thatqualified Filipinos shall be preferred.
And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an
action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation
on the subject. Where there is a right there is a remedy.Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. Yes. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.35When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, but also to thecultural heritageof the Filipinos.
3. Yes. 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for
it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51%
will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot
be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
4. Yes. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by the foreign firm,
respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the shares of MHC in
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accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as
well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner
after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
Hence, GSIS(respondent) is ordered to accept the matching bid of petitioner and execute
the necessary clearances for the purchase of the subject 51% MHC shares.
Reasoning: The Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it
is deemed written in every statute and contract.
DOMINO vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative
of the Province of Sarangani indicating in his certificate that he had resided in the constituency
where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the
election. On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO
disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of Sarangani for lack of the oneyear residence requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON a summary proceeding for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters
declaring DOMINO a resident of the province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City acquire the
nature of res judicata.
2. WON DOMINO was a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least one year immediately
preceding the election.
3. Whether the COMELEC or the HRET has jurisdiction over the present petition of DOMINO.
4. WON, the candidate who received the next highest number of votes can be proclaimed as
the winning candidate in the light of DOMINOs disqualification?
RULING:
1.No. The contention of DOMINO that the decision in the exclusion proceedings declaring him a
resident of the Province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the
COMELEC cannot be sustained. It is not within the competence of the trial court, in an
exclusion proceeding, to declare the challenged voter a resident of another municipality. The
jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited only to determining the right of
voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to
vote in the precinct in which he is registered, specifying the ground of the voter's
disqualification.
Finally, the application of the rule onres judicatais unavailing.For the decision to be a basis
for the dismissal by reason ofres judicata, it is essential that there must be between the first
and the second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of causes of
action.
2. No. It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the
qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile," which
imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
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A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost
until a new one is established. 25 To successfully effect a change of domicile one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
c o r r e s p o n d w i t h t h e p u r p o s e . 2 6 I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e r e m u s t b a s i c a l l y
beanimusmanendicoupled withanimusnon revertendi.
3. The COMELEC, has jurisdiction over the present petition. The fact of obtaining the highest
number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the winning
candidate.41A candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he
can be considered a member of the House of Representatives. Considering that DOMINO has not
been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone Congressional District of the Province of
Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of the House of Representatives. Hence, it is the
COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility
as a candidate.
4. NO. The candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed
winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. It would be extremely repugnant to the
basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their
ballots that they do not choose him.
A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC July 31, 2012

Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by
the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court.
FACTS:
COA Opinion states that there was underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when 5
retired SC justices purchased from the SC the personal properties assigned to them during their
incumbency in the Court. The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property
Division of the SC of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased
vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised the subject motor
vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 and
its guidelines,when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98-569A.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT COA CAN IMPOSE ITS OWN COMPUTATION IN THE DISPOSAL OF COURT
PROPERTIES.
RULING: NO.
Separation of Powers
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains
not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within
its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept
separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks
and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
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effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law,
and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
The concept of the independence of the three branches of government, on the other hand,
extends from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration
of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch
from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry. To achieve this purpose, the
divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are equally capable
of independent action in exercising their respective mandates; lack of independence would
result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest
assertions of another or others. (Angara v. Electoral Commission)
Judicial Independence
Judicial independence encompasses the idea that individual judges can freely exercise their
mandate to resolve justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a whole, should work in
the discharge of its constitutional functions free of restraints and influence from the other
branches, save only for those imposed by the Constitution itself.
Thus, judicial independence can be broken down into two distinct concepts: decisional
independence and institutional independence. Decisional independence "refers to a judges
ability to render decisions free from political or popular influence based solely on the
individual facts and applicable law."On the other hand, institutional independence "describes
the separation of the judicial branch from the executive and legislative branches of
government."Simply put, institutional independence refers to the "collective independence of
the judiciary as a body."
Individual judicial independence focuses on each particular judge and seeks to insure his or her
ability to decide cases with autonomy within the constraints of the law. A judge has this kind of
independence when he can do his job without having to hear or at least without having to
take it seriously if he does hear criticisms of his personal morality and fitness for judicial
office. Institutional judicial independence focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a
branch of government and protects judges as a class.
A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of independence are
preserved - wherein public confidence in the competence and integrity of the judiciary is
maintained, and the public accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority.
Fiscal Autonomy
One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal
autonomy.
The fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Office
of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their
resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and
authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest
rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and
disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the
discharge of their functions. (Bengzon v. Drilon)
Application to the Present Case
The Judiciarys fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief Justice, as its head,
and of the Supreme Court En Banc, in the exercise of administrative control and supervision of
the courts and its personnel. As the Court En Bancs Resolution in A.M. No. 03-12-01 reflects,
the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary serves as the basis in allowing the sale of the Judiciarys
properties to retiring Justices of the Supreme Court and the appellate courts.
In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint
Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority to determine
the manner the granted retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of
interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not
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only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon
the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to
manage the Judiciarys own affairs.
G.R. No. 164763 February 12, 2008
ZENON R. PEREZvs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
PETITIONER Zenon R. Perez seeks a review of his conviction by the Sandiganbayan for
malversation of public fundsunder Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner argues that the penalty meted for the crime of malversation of public funds "that
have been replenished, remitted and/or returned" to the government is cruel and therefore
unconstitutional, "as government has not suffered any damage."
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE LAWRELIED UPON IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONERAND THE SENTENCE
IMPOSED IS CRUEL AND THEREFORE VIOLATES SECTION 19 OF ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS) OF
THE CONSTITUTION.
RULING: NO. The argument is specious on two grounds.
First. What is punished by the crime of malversation is the act of a public officer who, by
reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate
the same, or shall take and misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or
negligence shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or
partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property.
Payment or reimbursement is not a defense for exoneration in malversation; it may only be
considered as a mitigating circumstance. This is because damage is not an element of
malversation.
Second.There is strong presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes.
It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony
with, rather than in violation of, the Constitution. The presumption is that the legislature
intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be
necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.It is presumed that the legislature has
acted within its constitutional powers. So, it is the generally accepted rule that every statute,
or regularly accepted act, is, or will be, or should be, presumed to be valid and constitutional.
He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the onus probandi to show why such law is
repugnant to the Constitution. Failing to overcome its presumption of constitutionality, a claim
that a law is cruel, unusual, or inhuman, like the stance of petitioner, must fail.
G.R. No. 171101 July 5, 2011 and
November 22, 2011 (on MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION)
HACIENDA LUISITA, vs. PARC.
FACTS:
The hacienda luisita was comprised of 6,443 hectares and owned by Compaia General de
Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera). In 1957, Tabacalera sold the land to the Tarlac Development
Corporation (Tadeco) owned by the Cojuancos.
In 1980 martial law administration filed a suit before the RTC Manila against Tadeco for it to
surrender the hacienda to MAR (now DAR) so the land will be distributed to farmers. Manila RTC
ruled against Tadeco. Tadeco appealed to CA.
In 1988, OSG moved to withdraw the governments case against Tadeco, et al. Thus, the CA
dismissed the case. The dismissal action was, however, made subject to the obtention by
Tadeco of the PARCs approval of a stock distribution plan (SDP) that must initially be
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implemented after such approval shall have been secured and the case will be revived if any of
the conditions is not duly complied with by the TADECO.
Markedly, Section 10 of EO 229 allows corporate landowners, as an alternative to the actual
land transfer scheme of CARP, to give qualified beneficiaries the right to purchase shares of
stocks of the corporation under a stock ownership arrangement and/or land-to-share ratio.
Like EO 229, RA 6657, Sec. 31, also provides two (2) alternative modalities, i.e., land or stock
transfer, pursuant to either of which the corporate landowner can comply with CARP, but
subject to well-defined conditions and timeline requirements.
In 2003, two separate petitions reached the DAR. In the first,respondents Jose Julio Suniga and
Windsor Andaya, identifying themselves as head of the Supervisory Group of HLI (Supervisory
Group), and 60 other supervisors sought to revoke the SDOA, alleging violations by HLI of the
SDOAs terms. They prayed for a renegotiation of the SDOA, or, in the alternative, its
revocation.
Revocation and nullification of the SDOA and the distribution of the lands in the hacienda were
the call in the second petition. The Petition was ostensibly filed by Alyansa ng mga
Manggagawang Bukid ng Hacienda Luisita (AMBALA), where the handwritten name of
respondents Rene Galang as "Pangulo AMBALA" and Noel Mallari as "Sec-Gen. AMBALA"appeared.
As alleged, the petition was filed on behalf of AMBALAs members purportedly composing about
80% of the 5,339 FWBs of Hacienda Luisita.
On December 2, 2006, Noel Mallari, impleaded by HLI as respondent in his capacity as "SecGen. AMBALA," filed his Manifestation and stated that he has broken away from AMBALA with
other AMBALA ex-members and formed Farmworkers Agrarian Reform Movement, Inc.
(FARM). Should this shift in alliance deny him standing, Mallari also prayed that FARM be
allowed to intervene.
ISSUES:
I.
WHETHER THE PETITIONERS THEREIN ARE THE REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST TO FILE
SAID PETITIONS.
RULING: YES.
Supervisory Group, AMBALA and their
respective leaders are real parties-in-interest
The SDOA no less identifies "the SDP qualified beneficiaries" as "the farmworkers who appear in
the annual payroll, inclusive of the permanent and seasonal employees, who are regularly or
periodically employed by HLI." Galang, per HLIs own admission, is employed by HLI, and is,
thus, a qualified beneficiary of the SDP; he comes within the definition of a real party-ininterest under Sec. 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, meaning, one who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
The same holds true with respect to the Supervisory Group whose members were admittedly
employed by HLI and whose names and signatures even appeared in the annex of the SDOA.
Being qualified beneficiaries of the SDP, Suniga and the other 61 supervisors are certainly
parties who would benefit or be prejudiced by the judgment recalling the SDP or replacing it
with some other modality to comply with RA 6657.
Even assuming that members of the Supervisory Group are not regular farmworkers, but are in
the category of "other farmworkers" mentioned in Sec. 4, Article XIII of the Constitution,thus
only entitled to a share of the fruits of the land, this does not detract from the fact that they
are still identified as being among the "SDP qualified beneficiaries." As such, they are, thus,
entitled to bring an action upon the SDP.
Further, under Sec. 50, paragraph 4 of RA 6657, farmer-leaders are expressly allowed to
represent themselves, their fellow farmers or their organizations in any proceedings before the
DAR. Clearly, the respective leaders of the Supervisory Group and AMBALA are contextually real
parties-in-interest allowed by law to file a petition before the DAR or PARC.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT SEC. 31 OF RA 6657 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Page 10

RULING: NO.
FARM asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the corporation, as a
mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock distribution, an arrangement which, to FARM,
impairs the fundamental right of farmers and farmworkers under Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the
Constitution.
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review over, and pass upon the
constitutionality of, acts of the executive or legislative departments, it does so only when the
following essential requirements are first met, to wit:
(1) there is an actual case or controversy;
(2) that the constitutional question is raised at the earliest possible opportunity by a proper
party or one with locus standi; and
(3) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Not all the foregoing requirements are satisfied in the case at bar.
Raised at the earliest possible opportunity
While there is indeed an actual case or controversy, intervenor FARM, has yet to explain its
failure to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, since as early as November 21,
1989 when PARC approved the SDP of Hacienda Luisita or at least within a reasonable time
thereafter. FARM raised the constitutionality of Sec. 31 only on May 3, 2007 when it filed its
Supplemental Comment with the Court. Thus, it took FARM some 18 years from November 21,
1989 before it challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 which is quite too late in
the day. The FARM members slept on their rights and even accepted benefits from the SDP with
nary a complaint on the alleged unconstitutionality of Sec. 31 upon which the benefits were
derived. The Court cannot now be goaded into resolving a constitutional issue that FARM failed
to assail after the lapse of a long period of time and the occurrence of numerous events and
activities which resulted from the application of an alleged unconstitutional legal provision.
It has been emphasized in a number of cases that the question of constitutionality will not be
passed upon by the Court unless it is properly raised and presented in an appropriate case at
the first opportunity. FARM is, therefore, remiss in belatedly questioning the constitutionality
of Sec. 31 of RA 6657.
Very lis mota of the case
Thelis motaaspect is not present, the constitutional issue tendered not being critical to the
resolution of the case. The unyielding rule has been to avoid, whenever plausible, an issue
assailing the constitutionality of a statute or governmental act.If some other grounds exist by
which judgment can be made without touching the constitutionality of a law, such recourse is
favored.Garcia v. Executive Secretary explains why:
Lis Mota means that the Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality, although
properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the
application of the statute or the general law. The petitioner must be able to show that the
case cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional question raised is determined. This
requirement is based on the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality; to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.
The lis mota in this case, proceeding from the basic positions originally taken by AMBALA (to
which the FARM members previously belonged) and the Supervisory Group, is the alleged noncompliance by HLI with the conditions of the SDP to support a plea for its revocation. And
before the Court, thelis motais whether or not PARC acted in grave abuse of discretion when
it ordered the recall of the SDP for such non-compliance and the fact that the SDP, as couched
and implemented, offends certain constitutional and statutory provisions. To be sure, any of
these key issues may be resolved without plunging into the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA
6657. Moreover, looking deeply into the underlying petitions of AMBALA, et al., it is not the said
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section per se that is invalid, but rather it is the alleged application of the said provision in the
SDP that is flawed.
Moot and Academic
Sec. 5 of RA 9700,amending Sec. 7 of RA 6657, has all but superseded Sec. 31 of RA 6657 vis-vis the stock distribution component of said Sec. 31. In its pertinent part, Sec. 5 of RA 9700
provides: "That after June 30, 2009, the modes of acquisition shall belimited to voluntary
offer to sell and compulsory acquisition." Thus, for all intents and purposes, the stock
distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no longer an available option under existing
law. The question of whether or not it is unconstitutional should be a moot issue.
It is true that the Court, in some cases, has proceeded to resolve constitutional issues
otherwise already moot and academicprovided the following requisites are present:
First, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
Second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved;
Third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
Fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
These requisites do not obtain in the case at bar.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE IS APPLICABLE.
RULING: YES.
Applicability of the Operative Fact Doctrine
While We affirm the revocation of the SDP on Hacienda Luisita subject of PARC Resolution Nos.
2005-32-01 and 2006-34-01, the Court cannot close its eyes to certain "operative facts" that had
occurred in the interim. Pertinently, the "operative fact" doctrine realizes that, in declaring
alaworexecutive actionnull and void, or, by extension, no longer without force and effect,
undue harshness and resulting unfairness must be avoided. This is as it should realistically be,
since rights might have accrued in favor of natural or juridical persons and obligations justly
incurred in the meantime.The actual existence of a statute or executive act is, prior to such a
determination, an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored;
the past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
(a) Operative Fact Doctrine Not Limited to Invalid or Unconstitutional Laws
Contrary to the stance of respondents, the operative fact doctrine does not only apply to laws
subsequently declared unconstitutional or unlawful, as it also applies to executive acts
subsequently declared as invalid as embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals.
The Chicot doctrine advocates that, prior to the nullification of a statute, there is an
imperative necessity of taking into account its actual existence as an operative fact negating
the acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity." Whatever was done while the
legislative or the executive act was in operation should be duly recognized and presumed to be
valid in all respects.
Bearing in mind that PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2an executive actwas declared invalid in the
instant case, the operative fact doctrine is clearly applicable.
Nonetheless, the minority is of the persistent view that the applicability of the operative fact
doctrine should be limited to statutes and rules and regulations issued by the executive
department that are accorded the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasilegislative in nature that have the force and effect of law.
We disagree. While orders, rules and regulations issued by the President or the executive
branch have fixed definitions and meaning in the Administrative Code and jurisprudence, the
phrase "executive act" does not have such specific definition under existing laws. It should be
noted that in the cases cited by the minority, nowhere can it be found that the term "executive
act" is confined to the foregoing. Contrarily, the term "executive act" is broad enough to
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encompass decisions of administrative bodies and agencies under the executive department
which are subsequently revoked by the agency in question or nullified by the Court.
(b) The Operative Fact Doctrine as Recourse in Equity
Undeniably, the operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity.Remarkably, it is applied only in the
absence of statutory law and never in contravention of said law.
In the instant case, respondents argue that the operative fact doctrine should not be applied
since there is a positive law, particularly, Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which directs the distribution of
the land as a result of the revocation of the SDP. Pertinently, the last paragraph of Sec. 31 of
RA 6657 states:
If within two (2) years from the approval of this Act, the land or stock transfer envisioned
above is not made or realized or the plan for such stock distribution approved by the PARC
within the same period, the agricultural land of the corporate owners or corporation shall be
subject to the compulsory coverage of this Act.
Markedly, the use of the word "or" under the last paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 connotes that
the law gives the corporate landowner an "option" to avail of the stock distribution option or to
have the SDP approved within two (2) years from the approval of RA 6657. This interpretation is
consistent with the well-established principle in statutory construction that "the word or is a
disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things
enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a
disjunctive word."
In its elementary sense, "or", as used in a statute, is a disjunctive article indicating an
alternative. It often connects a series of words or propositions indicating a choice of either.
When "or" is used, the various members of the enumeration are to be taken separately.
Given that HLI secured approval of its SDP in November 1989, well within the two-year period
reckoned from June 1988 when RA 6657 took effect, then HLI did not violate the last paragraph
of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Pertinently, said provision does not bar Us from applying the operative
fact doctrine.
G. R. No. 180989 February 7, 2012
GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA,vs.CHAIRPERSON.
FACTS:
With the normalization of the political system and the stabilization of government operations,
the COA saw it fit to issue Circular No. 89-299, the circular in issue, which lifted the pre-audit
of government transactions of national government agencies (NGAs) and government-owned or
-controlled corporations (GOCCs).
On 15 January 2008, petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. He alleges that
the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that
pre-audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution. He further claims that, because of the lack of pre-audit by COA, serious
irregularities in government transactions have been committed, such as the P728-million
fertilizer fund scam, irregularities in the P550-million call center laboratory project of the
Commission on Higher Education, and many others.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has legal standing.
RULING: YES. This Petition has been filed as a taxpayers suit.
A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established
that public funds from taxation have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the
Constitution. Petitioner claims that the issuance of Circular No. 89-299 has led to the
dissipation of public funds through numerous irregularities in government financial
transactions. These transactions have allegedly been left unchecked by the lifting of the preaudit performed by COA, which, petitioner argues, is its Constitutional duty. Thus, petitioner
Page 13

has standing to file this suit as a taxpayer, since he would be adversely affected by the illegal
use of public money.
G.R. No. 185053 February 15, 2012
EUSTAQUIO CANDARIvs. ROLAND DONASCO
FACTS:
Respondents were members of the board of directors of Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
Cooperative, Incorporated (DARBCI). They were elected into office and their terms should have
ended on 12 July 2000. However, they continued to occupy their positions in a holdover
capacity.
On 23 November 2005, respondents instituted Civil Case in RTC of Polomolok, South Cotabato
to enjoin petitioners from holding a special general assembly (GA) and an election of officers.
Respondents alleged that the process by which the GA had been called was not in accordance
with Sec. 35 of Republic Act No. 6938, otherwise known as the Cooperative Code of the
Philippines.
The RTC issued a 72-hour TRO to restrain petitioners from holding the GA. Despite the TRO, but
without the participation of petitioners, 5,910 members or 78.68% of the total membership of
the cooperative went through with the GA and elected petitioners in absentia as new
members of the board.
During the 20 December 2008 meeting, the GA ratified the Amended Articles of Cooperation
and the Amended By-Laws of the cooperative. A Certificate of Registration to that effect was
issued by Cooperative Development Authority (CDA).
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents still have a cause of action to file the case.
RULING: NO. There is no cause of action since the issue has already become moot.
In the present case, the GA has clearly expressed its intentions through the subsequent
amendment of DARBCIs Articles of Cooperation and By-Laws and through the election of new
officers.
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy
one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible
of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other
similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic
when its purpose has become stale, such as the case before us.
The supervening events had rendered the case moot through the voluntary act of the GA as
the highest policy-making body of the cooperative to declare the contested positions vacant
and to elect a new set of officers. As a consequence, respondents no longer had the personality
or the cause of action to maintain the case against petitioners herein.
G.R. No. 193978 February 28, 2012
JELBERT B. GALICTO,vs. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
FACTS:
On July 26, 2010, Pres. Aquino made public in his first State of the Nation Address the alleged
excessive allowances, bonuses and other benefits of Officers and Members of the Board of
Directors of the Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System a government owned and controlled
corporation (GOCC) which has been unable to meet its standing obligations.
The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, conducted an
inquiry in aid of legislation on the reported excessive salaries, allowances, and other benefits
of GOCCs and government financial institutions (GFIs).
Based on its findings, the Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17 "urging the President to order
the immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently excessive allowances, bonuses,
incentives and other perks of members of the governing boards of GOCCs and GFIs.
Page 14

Pres. Aquino, issued EO 7, which provided for the guiding principles and framework to establish
a fixed compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs.
The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the implementation of
EO 7. To support his claim that he has locus standi the petitioner contends that as an employee
of PhilHealth, he "stands to be prejudiced by [EO] 7, which suspends or imposes a moratorium
on the grants of salary increases or new or increased benefits to officers and employees of
GOCC[s] and curtail[s] the prerogative of those officers who are to fix and determine his
compensation." The petitioner also claims that he has standing as a member of the bar in good
standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are
legally and validly issued and implemented.
Meanwhile, on June 6, 2011, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10149, otherwise known
as the "GOCC Governance Act of 2011." Section 11 of RA 10149 expressly authorizes the
President to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE SHOULD PROSPER.
RULING: NO.
I.
Petitioner has no legal standing
"Locus standior legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions." This requirement of standing relates to the constitutional
mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies.25
Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to "raise a constitutional question" when (1) he can
show that he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by
the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest."
In the present case, the petitioner has no material interest in the outcome of the case. The
curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized as
contingent events or expectancies. He has no vested rights to salary increases and, therefore,
the absence of such right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the petitioners claim that he is instituting the
present petition as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that
laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued. This supposed
interest has been branded by the Court "as too general an interest which is shared by other
groups and by the whole citizenry."
While the petition raises vital constitutional and statutory questions concerning the power of
the President to fix the compensation packages of GOCCs and GFIs with possible implications on
their officials and employees, the same cannot "infuse" or give the petitioner locus standi under
the transcendental importance or paramount public interest doctrine. In Velarde v. Social
Justice Society, we held that even if the Court could have exempted the case from the
stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic effort would be futile because the
transcendental issue could not be resolved any way, due to procedural infirmities and
shortcomings, as in the present case.In other words, giving due course to the present petition
which is saddled with formal and procedural infirmities, cannot but be an exercise in futility
that does not merit the Courts liberality.
Page 15

II. The petition has been mooted by supervening events.
A moot case is "one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value." "An action is
considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues
involved have become academic or dead, or when the matter in dispute has already been
resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be
raised again between the parties x x x. Simply stated, there is nothing for the x x x court to
resolve as its determination x x x has been overtaken by subsequent events."
This is the present situation here. Congress, thru R.A. No. 10149, has expressly empowered the
President to establish the compensation systems of GOCCs and GFIs. For the Court to still rule
upon the supposed unconstitutionality of EO 7 will merely be an academic exercise. Any further
discussion of the constitutionality of EO 7 serves no useful purpose since such issue is moot in
its face in light of the enactment of R.A. No. 10149.
G.R. No. 164987 April 24, 2012
LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP) vs. THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT
FACTS:
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded
together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in
the country, sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order to enjoin respondent Secretary of DBM from making, and releasing budgetary allocations
to individual members of Congress as "pork barrel" funds out of Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF). LAMP likewise aimed to stop the National Treasurer and COA from enforcing the
questioned provision.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE MANDATORY REQUISITES FOR THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ARE
MET
RULING: YES.
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case
or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act
must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise
stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the
verylis motaof the case.
An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of "ripeness." In our
jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff.
Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
According to LAMP, the practice of direct allocation and release of funds to the Members of
Congress and the authority given to them to propose and select projects is the core of the laws
flawed execution resulting in a serious constitutional transgression involving the expenditure of
public funds. Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be adversely affected by this. A
finding of unconstitutionality would necessarily be tantamount to a misapplication of public
funds which, in turn, cause injury or hardship to taxpayers. This affords "ripeness" to the
present controversy.
Anent locus standi, "the rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have
a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement.The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
Page 16

concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." In public suits, the plaintiff,
representing the general public, asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official
action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person, and
could be suing as a "stranger," or as a "citizen" or "taxpayer."Thus, taxpayers have been allowed
to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.21Of greater import than the damage caused
by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental
law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.
Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation
required in taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been
illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law,
LAMP should be allowed to sue.
FUNA VS. VILLAR 670 SCRA 570 (2012)

Facts: Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008
following the retirement of Chairman Carague. Villar was nominated and appointed as
Chairman of COA. He was to serve until February 2, 2011.
Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Villar as Chairman and prays that
the appointment be declared unconstitutional for violationg sec 1(2), Art IX(D).
Before the SC could resolve the petition, Villar vacated his position when Pres Aquino III named
Pulido-Tan as COA Chairman.
Issue: Whether or not the petition of Funa became moot and academic.
Held: Yes. A case is moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, or when it ceases
to present a justiciable controversy owing to the onset of supervening events, so that a
resolution of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. There
is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which will anyway
be negated by the dismissal of the basic petition. As a general rule, it is not within the SCs
charge and function to act upon and decide a moot case, except if: 1. there is grave violation
of the Constitution; 2. the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved; 3. when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; 4. the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.
The procedural requisites for the exercise of judicial review are: 1. there must be an actual
case or justiciable controversy before the court; 2. question before it must be ripe for
adjudication; 3. the person challenging the act must be a proper party; and 4. the issue of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very lis mota of the
case.
To have legal standing, a suitor must show that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury
as a result of a government action or have a material interest in the issue affected by the
challenged official act. However, the Court has acted liberally on the locus standi requirements
and has accorded certain individuals not otherwise directly injured or with material interest
affected by a Government act standing to sue provided a constitutional issue of critical
significance is at stake. The rule on locus standi is after all a mere procedural technicality.
The SC laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called non-traditional suitors may be
extended standing to sue: 1. cases involve constitutional issues; 2. for taxpayers, there must be
claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; 3. for
voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in
question; 4. for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
Page 17

transcendental importance which must be settled early; and 5. for legislators, there must be a
claim that the official action complained of infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
This case is of transcendental importance, since it has far-reaching implications and there is a
need to promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous
cases.
Note: The main issues in this case were the term of office of the commissioners, rotational
plan, etc.
CAPALLA VS. VILLAR 673 SCRA 1 (2012)
Page 18

Facts: Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase
the PCOS, both software and hardware for an Automated Election System for the May 10, 2010
Synchronized National and Local Elections (AES Contract). Comelec was given until December
31, 2010 to exercise the option but opted not to exercise the same except for the 920 units of
PCOS machines. Comelec seriously considered to exercise the option and so it was given until
March 31, 2012, the extended period to exercise the option to purchase.
According to Capalla, et al the extended option to purchase the PCOS, as well as the AES
Contract is contrary to law and the Constitution.
The SC already rendered a decision on June 13, 2012 dismissing the petitions of Capalla, et al.
This case is a motion for reconsideration of the SCs decision.
Issue: Whether or not Capalla, et al were correct.
Held: No. Comelec was given until December 31, 2010 within which to exercise the OTP. The
option was, however, not exercised within said period. But the parties later entered into an
extension agreement giving the Comelec until March 31, 2012 within which to exercise it. With
the extension of the period, the Comelec validly exercised the option and eventually entered
into a contract of sale of the subject goods. The extension of the option period, the subsequent
exercise thereof, and the eventual execution of the Deed of Sale became the subjects of the
petitions challenging their validity in light of the contractual stipulations of respondents and
the provisions of RA 9184.
Based on the AES Contract, we sustained the parties right to amend the same by extending the
option period. Considering that the performance security had not been released to SmartmaticTIM, the contract was still effective which can still be amended by the mutual agreement of
the parties, such amendment being reduced in writing. To be sure, the option contract is
embodied in the AES Contract whereby the Comelec was given the right to decide whether or
not to buy the subject goods listed therein under the terms and conditions also agreed upon by
the parties.
In this case, the contract is still effective because the performance security has not been
released. Thus, not only the option and warranty provisions survive but the entire contract as
well.
For a previously bidded contract to be nullified, the amendment must be substantial such that
the other bidders were deprived of the terms and opportunities granted to the winning bidder
after it won the same and that it is prejudicial to public interest. In our assailed decision, we
found the amendment not substantial because no additional right was made available to
Smartmatic-TIM that was not previously available to the other bidders; except for the
extension of the option period, the exercise of the option was still subject to same terms and
conditions such as the purchase price and the warranty provisions; and the amendment is more
advantageous to the Comelec and the public.
Hence, the determination of whether or not a modification or amendment of a contract bidded
out constitutes a substantial amendment rests on whether the contract, when taken as a
whole, would contain substantially different terms and conditions that would have the effect of
altering the technical and/or financial proposals previously submitted by other bidders.
It must be pointed out that public biddings are held for the best protection of the public and to
give the public the best possible advantages by means of open competition between the
bidders, and to change them without complying with the bidding requirement would be against
public policy. What are prohibited are modifications or amendments which give the winning
bidder an edge or advantage over the other bidders who took part in the bidding, or which
make the signed contract unfavorable to the government.
While movants may have apprehensions on the effect to government contracts of allowing
"advantage to the government" as justification for the absence of competitive public bidding, it
must be stressed that the same reasoning could only be used under similar circumstances. The
"advantage to the government," time and budget constraints, the application of the rules on
Page 19

valid amendment of government contracts, and the successful conduct of the May 2010
elections are among the factors looked into in arriving at the conclusion that the assailed
Resolutions issued by the Comelec and the agreement and deed entered into between the
Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM, are valid.
CHAVEZ VS. JBC 676 SCRA 579 (2012)

Facts: Art 8 sec 8 of the Constitution provides:
(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the SC
composed of x x x a representative of the Congress x x x
In compliance therewith, Congress designated one representative to sit in the JBC to act as one
of the ex officio members. Perhaps in order to give equal opportunity to both houses to sit in
the exclusive body, the HR and the Senate would send alternate representatives to the JBC. In
other words, Congress had only 1 representative.
In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only 7
members, an 8th member was added to the JBC as 2 representatives from Congress began
sitting in the JBC- 1 from HR and 1 from the Senate, with each having of a vote.
Chavez filed a petition alleging that JBC shall have only 1 representative from Congress as
mandated by Art 8 sec 8 par 1 of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial
review have been met in this case.
Held: Yes. Chavez seeks judicial intervention as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a nominee
to the position of Chief Justice of the SC. As a taxpayer, he invokes his right to demand that the
taxes he and the rest of the citizenry have been paying to the government are spent for lawful
purposes.
The SC disagrees with JBCs contention that Chavez lost his standing to sue because he is not
an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a personal stake on the
case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the
post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being
unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. It is
Page 20

not limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. More importantly, the
legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the
controversy. The SC considers this a constitutional issue that must be passed upon, lest a
constitutional process be plagued by misgivings, doubts and worse, mistrust. Hence, a citizen
has a right to bring this question to the Court, clothed with legal standing and at the same
time, armed with issues of transcendental importance to society.
With respect to the question of transcendental importance, it is not difficult to perceive from
the opposing arguments of the parties that the determinants established in jurisprudence are
attendant in this case: 1. The character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; 2.
The presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the
public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and 3. The lack of any other
party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised. The allegations of
constitutional violations in this case are not empty attacks on the wisdom of the other brances
of the government. The allegations are substantiated by facts, and therefore, deserve an
evaluation from the Court.
Page 21
IDEALS VS. PSALM 682 SCRA 602 (2012)

Facts: EPIRA (RA 9136) mandated PSALM to manage the orderly sale, disposition and
privatization of NPC generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets, and
Independent Power Producer contracts.
On May 5, 2010, and after a post-bid evaluation, PSALMs Board of Directors approved and
confirmed the issuance of a Notice of Award to the highest bidder, Korea Water Resources for
the sale of Angat Hydro-Electric Power including the Angat Dam, Angat Reservoir and the
outlying watershed areas.
IDEALS, et al contended that PSALM gravely abused its discretion when in conducting the bid, it
disregarded and violated the peoples right to information guaranteed under the Constitution.
It also alleged that PSALM violated the constitutional provisions on the appropriation and
utilization of water limiting water rights to Filipino citizens and corporations which are at least
60% Filipino-owned.
PSALM prayed for the dismissal of the petition because it was rendered moot by the issuance of
a Notice of Award in favor of K-Water.
Issue: Whether or not the petition had been mooted by the issuance of the Notice of Award to
K-Water.
Held: No. Though petitioners had sought the immediate issuance of injunction against the
bidding commenced by PSALM-specifically enjoining it from proceeding to the next step of
issuing a notice of award to any of the bidders- they further prayed that PSALM be permanently
enjoined from disposing of AHEPP through privatization. The petition was thus filed not only as
a means of enforcing the States obligation to protect the citizens right to water but also to
bar a foreign corporation from exploiting our water resources in violation of Art 12 sec 2 of the
1987 Constitution. If the impending sale of the AHEPP to K-Water indeed violates the
Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to annul the contract award as well as its
implementation. Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the
Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not IDEALS, et al possess the requisite.
Held: Yes. Legal Standing or locus standi is a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act
that is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance. The gist of the question
of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. The SC has adopted a
liberal attitude on locus standi if the issue is of transcendental significance to the people, as
when it is of paramount importance to the public. When the proceeding involves the assertion
of a public right, the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies the requirement of
personal interest.
Ensuring adequate water supply for domestic use is of paramount importance to the public.
That the continued availability of water in Metro Manila might be compromised if PSALM
proceeds with the privatization of the hydroelectric power plant confers upon IDEALS et al such
personal stake in the resolution of legal issues.
Page 22

Moreover, if the petition is about the peoples right to information on matters of public
concern, any citizen can be the real party in interest. Requirement of personal interest is
satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general
public which possesses the right.
ANNOTATION ON LOCUS STANDI 314 SCRA 641

In most cases filed to challenge the constitutional validity of any statute or order, the issue as
to whether the petitioners are the proper parties has been questioned. In JOSE C. MIRANDA,
ALFREDO S. DIRAGE, MANUEL H. AFIADO,
_______________
* Member, Board of Editorial Consultants, Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA).
642
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642
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review
MARIANO V. BABARAN and ANDRES R. CABUYADAO, Petitioners, vs. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,
in his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. EPIMACO VELASCO, in his capacity as Secretary of
Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity
as Governor of Isabela, THE HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF ISABELA, ATTY.
BALTAZAR PICIO, In his capacity as provincial Administrator, and MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in his
capacity as Provincial treasurer, G.R. NO. 133064, dated SEPTEMBER 16, 1999, the Mayor of the
City of Santiago, the President of the Liga ng mga Barangay ng Santiago City and three
residents of Santiago City filed a petition for Writ of Revision assailing the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 8028, converting the City of Santiago, Isabela from an independent component
city to a component city, the locus standi of the petitioners was questioned. The Court in said
case held that it is now an ancient rule that the constitutionality of law can be challenged by
one who sustained a direct injury as a result of the endorsement.
Annotations have been made on similar issues in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA)
such as Constitutionality of Statute or Action Must be Raised by Proper Party (Taxpayers Suit) in
15 SCRA 497-501, Judicial Deference to Political Questions in 21 SCRA 822-837, The Plebiscite
CasesPolitical or Justiciable Issues in 49 SCRA 180-193, Judicial Review of the Effectivity of a
New Constitution and the Political Doctrine in 50 SCRA 393-413, and Political or Justiciable
Question in 59 SCRA 652-673. The issues raised in said cases are justiciability, standing,
mootness, ripeness and political questions. This annotation will dwell on the rule of locus
standi of the petitioners in filing cases questioning the constitutional validity of statutes or
executive orders.
1. Locus Standi Defined
Locus standi generally means a place to stand. It refers to the standing of a person to file a
case. (Ballantine Law Dic643
VOL. 314, SEPTEMBER 16, 1999
643
tionary, p.771). It is a place to stand; a standing in law or a suit. (Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 73
SCRA 333 [1976]).
2. Early U.S. Doctrines on Judicial Review
The principle of judicial review which originated in the United States restricted the filing of
cases by individuals to challenge the constitutional validity of a statute. Early U.S. court
decisions formulated the conditions needed to adjudicate a case especially with respect to the
challenge of the validity of a statute. Decisions generally limited access by litigants to shield
judges from cases that threaten their independence and institutional effectiveness. They also
try to avoid trying cases that involve politically sensitive issues.
Chief Justice Marshall suggested that the boundaries for judicial action were quite fixed: It is
most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that it
must take jurisdiction if it should. (Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 [1821]). What the
Court should or should not accept is largely a matter of judicial discretion. Reflecting on his
work at the Supreme Court, Justice Brandeis confided: The most important thing we do is not
doing. (Alexander M. Bickel, The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis 17 [1957]). The
deliberate withholding of judicial power often reflects the fact that courts lack ballot-box
legitimacy. Although couched in technical jargon, jurisdictional requirements raise fundamental
questions of democratic theory. (cited in Fisher, American Constitutional Law, p. 96 [1990]).
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Judges invoked some rules to preserve public support and to avoid conflicts with other
branches of the government, and provide flexibility of action for judiciary. The doctrines used
to pursue those goals include justiciability, standing, mootness, ripeness, political questions,
and prudential considerations, all of which help protect an unelected and unrepresentative
judiciary. Although efforts are made to distinguish these doctrines, inevitably they overlap. As
noted by the Supreme Court: The standing question thus bears close affinity to
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644
questions of ripenesswhether the harm asserted has matured sufficiently to warrant judicial
interventionand of mootnesswhether the occasion for judicial intervention persists. (Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 n. 10 [1975]). (Fisher, Ibid.)
3. The Issue of Adverseness
To resolve a legal claim, courts need to know that parties have been adversely affected.
Abstract or hypothetical questions, removed from a concrete factual setting, prevent courts
from reaching an informed judgment. The words cases and controversies limit the federal
courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as
capable of resolution through the judicial process. (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 95 [1968])
American courts occasionally consider a case even when both parties agree on the issue. In
United States vs. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), the Justice Department agreed with the plaintiff
that a provision in a congressional statute was unconstitutional. To protect its interests,
Congress passed legislation to create a special counsel. Functioning officially as amicus curiae,
the counsel in effect served as counsel for the United States to assure adverseness. (328 U.S.
303, 304 [1946]). In other cases the courts have appointed a special counsel to satisfy the
requirement for a genuinely adversary proceeding. (Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S.
1,4 [1955]). (Fisher, Op. Cit., p. 97)
In affirming the judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court, the Supreme Court also refused to regard
the case as a friendly, non-adversary, proceeding between Chadha and the INS. As the Court
noted, it would be a curious result if, in the administration of justice, a person could be
denied access to the courts because the Attorney General of the United States agreed with the
legal arguments asserted by the individual. From the moment of Congress formal intervention
as amicus, adverseness was beyond doubt. Even prior to intervention
645
645
there was adequate Art. III adverseness. (INS vs. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 [1983])
4. Standing to Sue
To satisfy the requirement of a case or controversy, parties bringing an action must have
standing to sue. Generalizations about standing to sue, Justice Douglas said with customary
bluntness, are largely worthless as such. (Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
[1970]). After the Supreme Court announced that the requirements of standing are met if a
taxpayer has the requisite personal stake in the outcome of his suit, Justice Harlan chided
the Court: This does not, of course, resolve the standing problem; it merely restates
it. (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 121[1968]) (dissenting opinion).
To demonstrate standing, parties must show injury to a legally protected interest, an injury
that is rather than abstract or hypothetical. (OShea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 [1974]).
Injuries may be economic or non-economic. (Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 154
Page 25

[1970]). They may be actual or threatened. Injuries may afflict organizations as well as
persons. (Havens v. Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 n. 19 [1982]; Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 511[1978]). A threatened injury can be close cousin to the hypothetical. Five
members of the Supreme Court in 1973 held that allegations of injury were sufficient to
establish standing. Proof of actual injury was not necessary. On the other hand, actual injury
may be inadequate to establish standing if the Court wishes to defer to the states. (City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 [1983]). (Cited in Fisher, op. cit., p. 100).
5. Individuals StandingA Judge-Made Rule
Individuals, functioning in the role of private attorneys general, may have standing as
representatives of the public interest. (Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F. 2d
608, 615-616 [1965]). This principle sometimes permits one
646
646
party to assert the rights of third parties (jus tertii). Federal courts are reluctant to resolve a
controversy on the basis of the rights of third persons who are not parties to the litigation.
There are two reasons. First, the courts should not adjudicate such rights unnecessarily, and it
may be that in fact the holders of those rights either do not wish them, or will be able to enjoy
them regardless of whether the in-court litigant is successful or not . . . . Second, the third
parties themselves usually will be the best proponents of their own rights. The courts depend
on effective advocacy, and therefore should prefer to construe legal rights only when the most
effective advocates of those rights are before them. (Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-114
[1976]).
Although standing is basically a judge-made rule, courts recognize that Congress can, by
statute, confer standing upon an individual or a group, and courts may defer to Congress on
such matters. However, such statutory phrases as phrases as any person aggrieved or
adversely affected allow the courts broad discretion in interpreting what Congress means by
standing. Furthermore, Congress cannot compel the courts to grant standing. Furthermore,
Congress cannot compel the courts to grant standing for a suit that, in the opinion of judges,
lacks the necessary ingredients of a case or controversy. Congressional efforts to confer
standing are limited by the judiciarys exclusive responsibility to determine Article III
requirements.
6. Taxpayers Suit
The U.S. Supreme Court at first denied in 1923, the right of taxpayers to challenge the validity
of a statute. (Frothingham vs. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 [1923]). The Court reasoned that the
taxpayers interest as comparatively minute and indeterminable. There must be a direct
injury to evoke standing. The decision was based on a court policy as it will mean more cases
for the court to tackle. The decision was criticized as such a doctrine would put the
government in the position of conceding that a taxpayer lacked standing even if
647
647
Congress engaged in such palpably unconstitutional conduct as providing funds for the
construction of churches for particular sects. The Court decided to liberalize the rule on
standing but at the cost of creating substantial doctrinal confusion. It claimed that standing
focuses on the party, not the issue when standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is
whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication
Page 26

of a particular issue and not whether the issue is justiciable. It was feared that by lowering
the barrier for standing, the Supreme Court not only encouraged more lawsuits but invited
collisions with other branches of government. In a later case, Justice Powell warned that a
relaxed standing policy would expand judicial power: It seems to be inescapable that allowing
unrestricted taxpayer or citizen standing would significantly alter the allocation of power at
the national level, with a shift away from a democratic form of government. (United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 [1974]) (concurring opinion). (Fisher, op. cit., pp. 102-103)
7. Locus Standi of a Group
In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court also denied standing to an environmental group that wanted
to prevent construction of a ski resort in a national park. The Court was deeply split with four
Justices arrayed against three. (Sierra Club v. Morton, 404 U.S. 727 [1972]). In that same year,
it refused to decide whether the Armys surveillance of domestic activities constituted a
chilling effect on First Amendment liberties. A majority of five Justices, with four dissenting,
held that there was insufficient evidence of a direct injury to present a case for resolution in
the courts.
PHILIPPINE COURT DECISIONS
a. General Rule on Judicial Review
Since 1937, in People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937), reiterated in Luz Farms vs. Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian
648
648
Reform, 192 SCRA 51 (1990) and Dumlao vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), the Philippine
Supreme Court ruled that when issues of constitutionality are raised, the Court can exercise its
power of judicial review only if the following requisites are compresent: (1) the existence of an
actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. (PHILCONSA vs.
Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 [1994]).
b. Early Decisions of the Philippine Supreme Court Also Restricted the Rule on Locus Standi
In 1945, the Philippine Supreme Court in Custodio vs. President of Senate, 42 O.G. 1243 (1945)
held that a person who questions the validity of a statute or law must show that he has
sustained, or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. This rule was reiterated in Manila Race Horse Training Association vs. De la
Fuente, 88 Phil. 60 (1951).
In People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937), the Court ruled that there must be a showing that the
petitioners interests are or about to be adversely affected by the enforcement of the
ordinance in question. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights
by the operation of a statute or ordinance, he has no standing.
In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849
(1967), the Court held that the invocation of petitioner as motel operators of their alleged
right to being free from reasonable search and seizure need not be taken seriously.
c. The Relaxed Rule on Locus Standi
In Rodriguez contra El Tesoro de Filipinas, 84 Phil. 368 (1949), the Court ruled that if a taxpayer
cannot attack the validity of the executive order in question or a law requiring
649
649
Page 27

the expenditure of public money, no one under our laws could question the validity of such
laws or executive orders.
In Joya vs. PCGG, 225 SCRA 568 (1993), petitioners having failed to show that they were the
owners of the artwork, it was held that they were not to proper parties to enjoin the PCGG
from proceeding with the auction sale of old masters paintings and antique silverware seized
from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of
the Marcoses.
In Gonzales vs. Hechanova, et al., 9 SCRA 230 (1963), the petitioner, as a rice planter with a
riceland of substantial proportion and as taxpayer affected by the purchase of the commodity
effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation, is entitled to a chance to sell to the
Government the rice it seeks to buy abroad and has sufficient personality and interest to seek
judicial assistance with a view to restraining what he believes to be an attempt to unlawfully
disburse said funds.
d. Taxpayers Suit
A partys standing before the Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of
its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark
Emergency Powers Cases (Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 [1949]; Rodriguez vs. Gella, 92
Phil. 603 [1953]), the Court said that because the transcendental importance to the public of
these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, it brushes aside
technicalities of procedure. (Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr., 232 SCRA 111 [1994]).
Objections to taxpayers suits for lack of sufficient personality standing or interest are,
however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases
at bar, and in keeping with the Courts duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine
whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the
Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of
650
650
these petitions. (Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr., 232 SCRA 111 [1994]).
Taxpayer-Plaintiff must sufficiently show that he would be benefited or injured by the
judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real party interest. Before he can invoke the
power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a
result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has
merely a general interest common to all members of the public. (Bugnay Construction and
Development Corp. vs. Laron, 176 SCRA 243 [1989]).
However, in Kilosbayan vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540 (1995), the Court ruled that petitioners do not
possess the legal capacity to institute the action for the annulment of the Equipment Lease
Agreement (ELA) because they are without a present substantial interest as distinguished from
mere expectancy, or future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. The phrase
substantial present interest means such interest of a party in the subject matter of the
action as will entitle him, under substantive law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or
that he has legal title to defend and the defendant will be protected in payment to or recovery
from him.
Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces
have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to
question their alleged unauthorized disposition. Joya vs. PCGG, 225 SCRA 571 [1993]). In
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Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 (1994), the Court held that the
petitioner KMU has the standing to sue. Petitioner, whose members had suffered and continue
to suffer grave and irreparable injury and damage from the implementation of the questioned
memoranda, circulars and/or orders, has shown that it has a clear legal right that was violated
and continues to be violated with the enforcement of the challenged memoranda, circulars
and/or orders. KMU mem651
651
bers, who avail of the use of buses, trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the
burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passenger fares. They are part of the millions of
commuters who compromise the riding public. Certainly, their rights must be protected, not
neglected nor ignored. Assuming arguendo that petitioner is not possessed of the standing to
sue, the Court is ready to brush aside the barren procedural infirmity and recognize the legal
standing of the petitioner in view of the transcendental importance of the issues raised. And
this act of liberality is not without judicial precedent. As early as the Emergency Powers Cases,
this Court had exercised its discretion and waived the requirement of proper party. (KMU Labor
Center vs. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 [1994]).
e. Locus Standi of Associations or Groups
When associations or groups of individuals are composed of substantial taxpayers, and the
outcome will affect their vital interests, they are allowed to file suit. The petitioner, the
Philippine Constitution Association, is a non-profit, civic organization composed of several
leaders from all walks of life whose main objective is to uphold the principles of the
Constitution. As taxpayers, petitioner may bring an action to restrain officials from wasting
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (PHILCONSA vs.
Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 [1994]). A similar ruling was made in Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Assn.
vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 (1965).
f. Locus Standi of Public Officials as Petitioners
The Governor of the Province of Rizal, representing the most populated political subdivisions,
whose taxpayers bear a substantial portion of the burden of taxation in the Philippines justify
the action. (Pascual vs. The Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 110 Phil. 331
[1960]).
In Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965), Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the
Philippines and a
652
652
taxpayer, filed a case to question the validity of some Executive Orders.
In Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1962), the Court ruled that any public official claiming to be
adversely affected by a statute enacted under the police power of the state to promote
morality in public service and thereby limited in scope to officialdom may rely on the due
process clause to annul such statute or any portion thereof. Since the police power extends to
regulatory action affecting persons in public or private life, then anyone with an alleged
grievance can invoke the protection of due process or liberty as long as such requirement is
observed. To the extent then that the questioned section of the statute compels public officials
to do a certain act, there is an infringement on their liberty. However, under the Constitution,
such a restriction is allowable as long as due process is observed.
Page 29

g. The People of the Philippines as Petitioner
The People of the Philippines represented by the Solicitor General can be a proper party to
challenge the constitutionality of a statute (The Government of P.I. vs. Springer, 50 Phil. 259
[1927]). The People of the Philippines have a substantial interest in contesting the
constitutional validity of a law. Of a greater import than the damage caused by the illegal
expenditure of public funds is the moral wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge
the validity of its own laws. (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 66).
h. Locus Standi of Members of Congress
The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was recognized in Gonzales vs. Macaraig,
Jr., 191 SCRA 452 (1990). In said case, 23 Senators, comprising the entire membership of the
Upper House of Congress, filed a petition to nullify the presidential veto of Section 55 of the
GAA of 1989.
The Court then ruled that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for
that matter, has the legal
653
653
standing question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an
appropriation bill. (Id. at p. 519).
Where there is a constitutional question to resolve, a senator has usually been considered as
possessed of the requisite preconditions to bring a suit. (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677
[1972]).
However, in Bagatsing vs. Committee on Privatization, 246 SCRA 334 (1995), the Court held that
the absence of a claim that the contract in question violated the rights of petitioners or
impermissibly intruded into the domain of the Legislature, petitioners have no legal standing to
institute the instant action in their capacity as members of Congress.
In Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141 (1998), the standing of petitioner Senator Blas Ople was
questioned. The Court said that petitioner Ople, a distinguished member of our Senate, is
possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No.
308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), a petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public
funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308. (Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141
[1998]).
i. Free Access to Courts
A means of providing guarantee to the constitutional provision of free access to courts (Art. II,
sec. 11, Philippine Constitution), any person is allowed to question the validity of a law under
the principle of taxpayers suit. However, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional
question only when he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action, and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action. (Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Commission on
Elections, 289 SCRA 337 [1998]).
654
654
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Much less do they have an interest as taxpayers since this case does not involve the exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending power. (Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 289 SCRA 337 [1998]).
The mere fact that TELEBAP is composed of lawyers in the broadcast industry does not entitle
them to bring this suit in their name as representatives of affected companies.
(Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Commission on
Elections, 289 SCRA 337 [1998]).
o0o [Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review, 314 SCRA 641(1999)]
ANNOTATION ON LOCUS STANDI 548 SCRA 519

1.Introduction
Locus Standi means a place to standa standing in law or suit. (Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA
358 [1976])
A review of recent decisions show that the Supreme Court has been liberal in recognizing the
Locus Standi of persons or entities who file actions questioning the validity of a law or actions
of the government issuances. In Planters Producers, Inc. vs. Fertiphil Corporation, 548 SCRA 485
(2008):
_______________
* Member, Board of Editorial Consultants, Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA).
520
520
The Trend of Liberal Recognition of the Locus Standi of Litigants
Petitioner PPI and private respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated under
Philippine laws. They are both engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers,
pesticides and agricultural chemicals.
On June 3, 1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI
No. 1465 which provided, among others, for the imposition of a capital recovery component
(CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in the Philippines. The LOI provides:
3. The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include in its fertilizer pricing
formula a capital contribution component of not less than P10 per bag. This capital
contribution shall be collected until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable. Such capital
contribution shall be applied by FPA to all domestic sales of fertilizers in the Philippines.
Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic market
to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA). FPA then remitted the amount collected to the
Far East Bank and Trust Company, the depositary bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA
from July 8, 1985 to January 24, 1986.
After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. With the
return of democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI
No. 1465, but PPI refused to accede to the demand.
Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the RTC in
Makati. It questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable,
oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process of law.
Fertiphil alleged that the LOI solely favored PPI, a privately owned corpora521
Page 31
VOL. 548,
521
tion, which used the proceeds to maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer industry.
In its Answer, FPA, through the Solicitor General, countered that the issuance of LOI No. 1465
was a valid exercise of the police power of the State in ensuring the stability of the fertilizer
industry in the country. It also averred that Fertiphil did not sustain any damage from the LOI
because the burden imposed by the levy fell on the ultimate consumer, not the seller.
The Supreme Court said that the mere fact of payment of the levy imposed by Letter of
Instruction 1465 is sufficient to acquire locus standi:
Whether or not the complaint for collection is characterized as a private or public suit,
Fertiphil has locus standi to file it. Fertiphil suffered a direct injury from the enforcement of
LOI No. 1465. It was required, and it did pay, the P10 levy imposed for every bag of fertilizer
sold on the domestic market. It may be true that Fertiphil has passed some or all of the levy to
the ultimate consumer, but that does not disqualify it from attacking the constitutionality of
the LOI or from seeking a refund. As seller, it bore the ultimate burden of paying the levy. It
faced the possibility of severe sanctions for failure to pay the levy. The fact of payment is
sufficient injury to Fertiphil. Moreover, Fertiphil suffered harm from the enforcement of the
LOI because it was compelled to factor in its product the levy. The levy certainly rendered the
fertilizer products of Fertiphil and other domestic sellers much more expensive. The harm to
their business consists not only in fewer clients because of the increased price, but also in
adopting alternative corporate strategies to meet the demands of LOI No. 1465. Fertiphil and
other fertilizer sellers may have shouldered all or part of the levy just to be competitive in the
market. The harm occasioned on the business of Fertiphil is sufficient injury for purposes of
locus standi.
522
522
Ruling that the imposition of the P10 CRC was an exercise of the States inherent power of
taxation, the RTC invalidated the levy for violating the basic principle that taxes can only be
levied for public purpose.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals with some
modification. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
2.Meaning and Nature of Locus Standi
A party who suffered direct injury has a locus standi to challenge the validity of a law.
Rule 3, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In
private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section
2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Accordingly, the realparty-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is
based on his own right to the relief sought. (David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 [2006])
The Liberal trend is to allow citizens affected to file suits as interested parties. A real party-ininterest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules,
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
Page 32

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts
a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a repre523
VOL. 548,
523
sentative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any
other person. He could be suing as a stranger, or in the category of a citizen, or
taxpayer. In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial
protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the
public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer. (David vs. MacapagalArroyo, 489 SCRA 160 [2006])
3.Difficulty of Determining Locus Standi
The difficulty in determining locus standi arises in public. The petitioner asserts a public right.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and taxpayer standing in public
actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the
plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In
the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is
but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in
People ex rel Case v. Collins: In matter of mere public right, however . . . the people are the
real parties . . . It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see
that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be
remedied. With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held that the right of a citizen and
a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his
injury cannot be denied. (David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 [2006])
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official
policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental
agencies engaged in public service, the United States Supreme Court laid down the more
stringent direct injury
524
524
test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a
private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or
legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action,
and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public.
(Id.)
4.Locus Standi of petitioner in cases of mandamus
To be given due course, a petition for mandamus must have been instituted by a party
aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which
unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right. The Court will exercise its
power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal
standing to raise the constitutional or legal questions. Legal standing means a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as
a result of the government act that is being challenged. (Pimentel, Jr. vs. Office of the
Executive Secretary, 462 SCRA 622 [2005])
Legal standing or locus standi is a partys personal and substantial interest in such a case that
he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
Page 33

challenged. The term interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. (Jumamil vs. Cafe, 470 SCRA 475 [2005])
5.Locus Standi of Government Officials
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
525
VOL. 548,
525
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. (Province of Batangas vs.
Romulo, 429 SCRA 736 [2004])
In relation to the claim of a member of Congress to intervene, invoking his prerogative as
legislator to curtail the disbursement without appropriation of public funds to compensate
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as well as that as a taxpayer, it should
be noted that the amount which the Court directed to be paid by the Government to Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), was derived from money deposited by Manila
International Airport Authority, an agency which enjoys corporate autonomy and possesses a
legal personality separate and distinct from those of the National Government and agencies
thereof whose budgets have to be approved by Congress. (Republic vs. Gingoyon, 481 SCRA 457
[2006])
A national political party likewise meets the standing requirement, provided that it has
obtained three seats in the House of Representatives in a national elections, which entitles it
to participate in the legislative process. (Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1
[2006])
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question. (David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 [2006]; Baltazar vs. Ombudsman, 510
SCRA 74 [2006])
Being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the
Court in the exercise of its discretion, such as in cases of transcendental importance, or
where the issues raised have far-reaching implications. (Baltazar vs. Ombudsman, 510 SCRA
74 [2006])
When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an
interest in the execution of the laws. (Baltazar vs. Ombudsman, 510 SCRA 74 [2006])
A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he can show that he has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of
526
526
the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) a favorable
action will likely redress the injury. (Francisco, Jr. vs. Fernando, 507 SCRA 173 [2006])
A party invoking the transcendental importance exception to the standing requirement must
show, among others, the presence of a clear disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition. (Francisco, Jr. vs. Fernando, 507 SCRA 173 [2006])
This is one of the right cases where the Supreme Court held a liberal recognition of the locus
standi of a private citizen.
CONCLUSION
Page 34

The tendency of the Court in broadcasting the concept of locus standi is in consonance with the
constitutional principle of free access to courts.
Article III, Section 11 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution reads:
Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty.
This is only fitting as the courts of justice should be as available to the pauper as to the
affluent in the protection of their respective rights. Assuring him that the courts will protect
him but only if he is able to afford the prohibitive cost of litigation is like spreading a
Barmecide feast before the hapless indigent. It is at best a cruel deception, at worst a cynical
oppression of the impoverished suitor. (Cruz, Constitutional Law, p. 371)
The aforesaid constitutional provision is implemented by several rules in the Rules of Court
liberal to court procedure to enable citizens free easy access to courts.
527
VOL. 548,
527
Only recently, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno addressed in a forum vowed to further introduce
reform to comply with the constitutional principle of free access to courts.
JAVIER VS. COMELEC 144 SCRA 194 (1986)

Facts: Javier and Pacificador were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May
1984 elections. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two
came to a head when several followers of the Javier were ambushed and killed, allegedly by
the latter's men.
Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad Pacificadors proclamation, Javier went to
the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints
were dismissed and the Pacificadors was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said
body. Javier thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because
made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the
Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, Pacificador took his oath as a
member of the Batasang Pambansa.
The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, Javier was
gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight.
The Solicitor General moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of supervening events. Batas
Pambansa was abolished causing the disappearance of the office in dispute between Javier and
Pacificador.
Issue: Whether or not the petition should be dismissed because it was already moot and
academic.
Held: No. The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in
dispute could be a convenient justification for dismissing this case. But there are larger issues
Page 35

involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities
here raised.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of
the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The
two are not always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the
issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are
also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out
to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged
right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
Terrorism was a special feature in Antique, as demonstrated by the killings previously
mentioned. Opposition leaders were in constant peril of their lives even as their supporters
were gripped with fear of violence at the hands of the party in power.
What made the situation deplorable was the apparently indifferent attitude of the Commission
on Elections toward the anomalies being committed. It is a matter of record that the petitioner
complained against the terroristic acts of his opponents. All the electoral body did was refer
the matter to the Armed Forces without taking a more active step as befitted its constitutional
role as the guardian of free, orderly and honest elections.
Public confidence in the Commission on Elections was practically nil because of its transparent
bias in favor of the administration. This prejudice left many opposition candidates without
recourse except only to this Court.
Page 36
ABS-CBN VS. COMELEC 323 SCRA 811 (2000)

Facts: Comelec issued Resolution No. 98-1419 issuing a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any
other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey.
The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon information that ABS-CBN has
prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections
and to
make an exit survey of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly for
President and Vice President. The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with
the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for
Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABSCBN to undertake the exit survey.
ABS-CBN filed a petition before the SC arguing that Comelec acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing such resolution.
The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11,
1998 election has already been held and done with. Allegedly, there is no longer any actual
controversy.
Issue: Whether or not the petition was already moot and academic.
Held: No. The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to
the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of expression
transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our
democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside
the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that could well crop up again in future
elections.
The SC has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of
protection given by constitutional guarantees. Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and
of the press are being invoked here, we have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity,
whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived
therefrom.
ABS-CBN does not have to exhaust available remedies such as filing of motion of
reconsideration before the Comelec. The SC has ruled in the past that this procedural
requirement may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves
the principle of social justice or the protection of labor, when the decision or resolution sought
to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the
only adequate and speedy remedy available.
The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998, only
twenty (20) days before the election itself. Besides, the petitioner got hold of a copy thereof
only on May 4, 1998. Under the circumstances, there was hardly enough opportunity to move
Page 37

for a reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in time or the May 11, 1998 elections.
Moreover, not only is time of the essence; the Petition involves transcendental constitutional
issues. Direct resort to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari is therefore
justified.
CENTRAL BANK VS. BSP 446 SCRA 229 (2001)
Page 38

Facts: Almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, Central Bank (now BSP)
Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive
Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the
last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is
unconstitutional:
Provided, however, That compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall
under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under
Republic Act No. 6758 (Salary Standardization Law).
It is contended that this classification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based
on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP
personnel's position. Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section
15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish professionalism
and excellence at all levels in the BSP.
Issue: Whether or not Section 15(c), Art 2 of RA 7653 is unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade
or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with
the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. The
implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented
rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and
opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them
to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people
whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is
they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment
This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide
adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality
of life for all." Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum
deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster.
To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court. They
represent the more impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike employees in
the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit and
negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to
protest unfair labor practices. Not only are they impotent as a labor unit, but their efficacy to
lobby in Congress is almost nil as R.A. No. 7653 effectively isolated them from the other GFI
rank-and-file in compensation. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature to
act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting
time. Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the
Court's duty to save them from reasonless discrimination.
Issue: Whether or not the SC acted with propriety in making void the provisions.
Held: Yes. Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding
questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising
its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test, and the
legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the
perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection,
judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. This is true whether the actor committing the
unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities.
Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature of the actor.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the
issue on whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the
limitations respected, is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of
legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. What is more, the judicial inquiry into
Page 39

such issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of courts of justice and the
system of checks and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a consequence, We have neither
the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under the
ineluctable obligation - made particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as
members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution - to settle it.
DE AGBAYANI VS PNB
1971
Facts:
Plaintiff-appellee Agbayani obtained a loan in the amount of P450.00 from defendant-appellant
PNB dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate mortgage. In 1945,
Executive Order No. 32 was issued by then President Osmea suspending the enforcement of
payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable by war sufferers. In 1948, the
moratorium legislation continuing the executive order was enacted as Republic Act No. 342.
Thereafter, a were declared unconstitutional in July 26, 1948.
As of November 27, 1959, the balance due on said loan was in the amount of P1,294.00. As
early as July 13 of the same year, defendant-appellant instituted extra-judicial foreclosure on
the mortgaged property for the recovery of the balance of the loan remaining unpaid.
Plaintiff-appellee countered with his suit against defendant-appellant on August 10, 1959, her
main allegation being that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen
years having elapsed from the date of maturity, July19, 1944.
HELD:
Prior to the declaration of nullity of a challenged legislative or executive act, it must be
enforced and had to be complied with. It is entitled to obedience and respect until after the
judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity. Parties may have acted under it and
may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent
litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in
operation and presumed to be valid in all respects.
It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be
reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the
governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive
measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of
judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its
quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to
such adjudication. Therefore, during the eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and
Republic Act No. 342 were in force, prescription did not run.
In the case at bar, there is no need to deal with the effects of declaration of
unconstitutionality of EO and RA because when extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were
started by appellant Bank, the time consumed is six days short of fifteen years. Obviously then,
when resort was had extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the mortgage obligation, there was
time to spare before prescription could be availed of as a defense.
Page 40

ALDOVINO VS ALUNAN III
(1994)
Facts:
Herein petitioners and intervenors seek reinstatement and payment of back wages. Section 29
of Executive Order No. 120, which took effect upon its approval on 30 January
1987,reorganizing the then Ministry of Tourism, provides that incumbents whose positions are
not included in the new position structure and staffing pattern or who are not reappointed are
deemed separated from the service. Pursuant thereto, the then Ministry of Tourism (MOT, now
Department of Tourism, DOT) issued three various office orders and memoranda declaring all
positions thereat vacant, and effecting the separation of many of its employees.
All office orders and memoranda issued pursuant to E.O. 120 were subsequently declared null
and void by the Supreme Court.
Held:
An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been
passed. It is therefore stricken from the statute books and considered never to have existed at
all. Not only the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality
which means that no one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it
in subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a total nullity.
Plainly, it was as if petitioners and intervenors were never served their termination orders
and, consequently, were never separated from the service, The fact that they were not able to
assume office and exercise their duties is attributable to the continuing refusal of public
respondents to take them in unless they first obtained court orders, perhaps, for government
budgetary and accounting purposes. Under the circumstances, the more prudent thing that
public respondents could have done upon receipt of the decision in Mandani, if they were
earnest in making amends and restoring petitioners and intervenors to their positions, was to
inform the latter of the nullification of their termination orders and to return to work and
resume their functions. After all, many of them were supposed to be waiting for instructions
from the DOT because in their termination orders it promised to directly contact them
by17telephone, telegram or written notice as soon as funds for their separation would be
available.
The petition is granted. Petitioners are ordered to be reinstated immediately to their former
positions without loss of seniority rights and with back salaries, provided however, that no
supervening event which would otherwise disqualify them from such reinstatement. Provided,
further, that whatever benefits they may have received from the Government by reason of
their termination shall be reimbursed through reasonable salary deductions.
BROKENSHIRE VS. MINISTER OF LABOR
February 7, 1990
On the matter of the constitutionality of the Wage Orders, only the court can declare a law or
order unconstitutional and until so declared by the court, the Office of the Regional Director
is duly bound to enforce the law or order.
Page 41

Facts:
Respondents (Employees) filed a complaint against petitioner (Brokenshire Hospital) with the
Regional office of DOLE for non-compliance of Wage Order No.5 and Wage Order No.6 with
respect to living allowance.
In its answer, petitioner raised the affirmative defense of Unconstitutionality of Wage Orders
No. 5 and No. 6. The Regional Director resolved the matter in favor of the respondents stating
that "only the court can declare a law or order unconstitutional and until so declared by the
court, the Office of the Regional Director is duly bound to enforce the law or order."
Petitioner appealed the case before the Minister of Labor which was subsequently dismissed for
lack of merit. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was likewise
denied by the Minister of Labor. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling:
"x x x Petitioner's contention that the constitutionality of Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6 should be
passed upon by the National Labor Relations Commission, lacks merit. The Supreme Court is
vested by the Constitution with the power to ultimately declare a law unconstitutional.
Without such declaration, the assailed legislation remains operative and can be the source of
rights and duties.
The Regional Director is plainly, without authority to declare an order or law unconstitutional
and his duty is merely to enforce the law which stands valid, unless otherwise declared by this
Tribunal to be unconstitutional. The Court declared the assailed Wage Orders constitutional,
there being no provision of the 1973 Constitution (or even of both the Freedom Constitution
and the 1987 Constitution) violated by said Wage Orders, which Orders are without doubt for
the benefit of labor."
COCOFED VS REPUBLIC
January 24, 2012
Facts:
Petitioners assert that the refusal of the Sandiganbayan to recognize their vested rights
allegedly created under the coconut levy laws, constitutes taking of private property without
due process of law. They contended that to accord retroactive application to a declaration of
unconstitutionality would be unfair inasmuch as such approach would penalize the farmers who
merely obeyed then valid laws.
Ruling:
As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been
passed at all.
Page 42
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of
equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the
existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot always be ignored.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue

burden on those who have relied on the invalid law.
The Operative Fact Doctrine will not be applied as an exception when to rule otherwise would
be iniquitous and would send a wrong signal that an act may be justified when based on an
unconstitutional provision of law.
In the case at bar, the Court rules that the dictates of justice, fairness and equity do not
support the claim of the alleged farmer-owners that their ownership of the UCPB shares should
be respected due to the following:
1.
The farmers or claimants do not have any legal right to own the UCPB shares
distributed to them.
2.
To grant the said shares to petitioners would be iniquitous and prejudicial to the
remaining farmers who have not received the same.
3.
Due to operational problems, the intended beneficiaries of the shares were not able to
receive what was due them.
4.
The coconut farmers who sold copra did not get the receipts for the payment of the
coconut levy.
From the foregoing, it is highly inappropriate to apply the operative fact doctrine to the UCPB
shares. Public funds, which were supposedly given utmost safeguard, were haphazardly
distributed to private individuals based on statutory provisions that are found to be
constitutionally infirm on not only one but on a variety of grounds. Clearly, applying the
Operative Fact Doctrine would not only be iniquitous but would also serve injustice to the
Government, to the coconut industry, and to the people, who, whether willingly or unwillingly,
contributed to the public funds, and therefore expect that their Government would take
utmost care of them and that they would be used no less, than for public purpose.
FLORES VS. DRILON

June 22, 1993
Facts:
Petitioners, as taxpayers, question the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227,
otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which
respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). The proviso reads -
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(d) Chairman administrator The President shall appoint a professional manager as
administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the
Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided,
however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of
the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the
Subic Authority.
Held:
Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure . . .
As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position
of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto
pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He
however remains Mayor of Olongapo City. His acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and
void. He may be considered a de facto officer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful
officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the
interest of the public and third persons.
Where the duties of the office were exercised, under color of a known election or
appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power
in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise,
such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public, under color of an
election, or appointment or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, shall valid before the
same is adjudged to be such.
The proviso under R.A. 7227, which states that for the first year of its operations from the
effectivity of this Act, the Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman
and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority, is declared unconstitutional. Consequently,
the appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City, respondent Richard J.
Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID. However, all per diems, allowances and other
emoluments received by respondent Gordon, if any, as such Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer may be retained by him, and all acts otherwise legitimate done by him in the exercise
of his authority as officer de facto of SBMA are hereby UPHELD.
HACIENDA LUISITA INC. (HLI) V. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL

November 22, 2011
The Operative Fact Doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional law but also to
decisions made by the president or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect
of laws, especially if the said decisions produced acts and consequences that must be
respected.
Facts:
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the
petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLIs
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Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under
compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the
government.
The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that
there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly
ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the
operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkersbeneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose
actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
toimmediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects,
consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be
asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or
placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.
The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court
decision.
Ruling:
The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case
since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or
unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative
agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said
decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this
score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted
from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority
stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011
decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the
benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given
the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.
ONGSUCO VS. MALONES

October 27, 2009
Facts:
Petitioners are stall holders at the Municipal Public Market, which had just been newly
renovated. Respondent (Municipal Mayor) through a letter gave petitioners five days notice for
a meeting concerning the municipal market. One of the things discussed was the imposition of
a "goodwill fee" to pay for the loan made by the municipality for the renovation.
Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was later approved by the Sangguniang Bayan which imposed
the goodwill fee and which authorized the respondent to enter into lease contracts over the
said public market. Less than a year later, respondent wrote a letter to petitioners informing
them that they were occupying stalls in the newly renovated municipal public market without
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any lease contract. As a consequence of which, the stalls were considered vacant and open for
qualified and interested applicants. This prompted petitioners, together with other similarly
situated stall holders at the municipal Public Market, to file before the RTC a Petition for
Prohibition/Mandamus, with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, against respondent.
Petitioners prayed that respondent be enjoined from imposing the goodwill fees pending the
determination of the reasonableness thereof, and from barring petitioners from occupying the
stalls at the municipal public market. One of the main issues being raised by petitioners is the
validity of the Ordinance.
Held:
It is a well established rule that questions on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances
or revenue measures must be raised first in an Administrative case with the Secretary of Justice
before the courts judicial power can be sought following the Doctrine of Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies.
However, where the issue raised is a purely legal question, then it is well within the
competence and the jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative agency. Resolving
questions of law, which involve the interpretation and application of laws, constitutes
essentially an exercise of judicial power that is exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and
such lower courts the Legislature may establish.
The sole issue petitioners raised before the RTC is whether Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was
valid and enforceable despite the absence, prior to its enactment, of a public hearing held in
accordance with Article 276 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local
Government Code. This is undoubtedly a pure question of law, within the competence and
jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve.
XXX (c) No tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be enacted or approved in the absence of a
public hearing duly conducted in the manner provided under this Article.
In the case at bar, notice to the petitioners were made only five days before said public
hearing. This contravenes Article 277(b)(3) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Local Government Code which requires that the public hearing be held no less than ten days
from the time the notices were sent out, posted, or published.
YNOT VS IAC
1987
Facts:
Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one
province to another. The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for violation of Executive
Order No. 626-A while he was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged
the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. The government argued that Executive
Order No. 626-A was issued in the exercise of police power to conserve the carabaos that were
still fit for farm work or breeding.
Held:
All Courts can exercise judicial review
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This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the
same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction
under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or rules of court may provide, "final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among
others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the
resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
Other issues:
Police power
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power, because it is not reasonably
necessary for the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. It is difficult to see how
prohibiting the transfer of carabaos from one province to another can prevent their
indiscriminate killing. Retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter
there. Prohibiting the transfer of carabeef, after the slaughter of the carabaos, will not
prevent their slaughter either.
Due process
Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
Separation of powers
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers.
For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
QUA CHEE GAN VS. DEPORTATION BOARD (1963)

FACTS: Petitioners were charged before the Deportation Board, with having purchased
U.S. dollars without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines, and of
having clandestinely remitted the same to Hongkong. Petitioners, Qua Chee Gan, Chua Lim
PaoaliasJose Chua, and Basilio King, with having attempted to bribe officers of the Philippine
and United States in order to evade prosecution for said unauthorized purchase of U.S. dollars.
A warrant for the arrest of said aliens was issued by the presiding member of the Deportation
Board. Upon filing a bond, they were provisionally set at liberty. When their motion to dismiss
was denied, they filed for a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition. After filing a bond, a
writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the lower court, restraining the respondent
Deportation Board from hearing Deportation charges against petitioners, pending final
termination of thehabeas corpusand/or prohibition proceedings.
ISSUE: whether deportation board, as an agent of the President, has jurisdiction over the
charges
Page 47

Held: Under the present and existing laws, deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected
in two ways: by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code, and by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation
by the Board of Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613. This case
constitute economic sabotage which is a ground for deportation. The President may order the
deportation of these petitioners if after investigation they are shown to have committed the
act charged. This power of investigation may be delegated pursuant to Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
Issue: whether the board had authority to order their arrestas
HELD: No. Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon whose authority the President's
power to deport is predicated, does not provide for the exercise of the power to arrest. The
right of an individual to be secure in his person is guaranteed by the Constitution in the
following language:.
3. The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of Rights,
Philippine Constitution).
Unquestionably, the exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual
demands the exercise of discretion by the one issuing the same, to determine whether under
specific circumstances, the curtailment of the liberty of such person is warranted. This is
guaranteed in the Constitution and the statute. EO 398 which authorizes the board to issue
warrant for the arrests of alien and detain him during investigation unless he files a bond for
provisional release is illegal. An implied grant of power, considering that no express authority
was granted by the law on the matter under discussion, that would serve the curtailment or
limitation on the fundamental right of a person, such as his security to life and liberty, must be
viewed with caution, if we are to give meaning to the guarantee contained in the Constitution.
If this is so, then guarantee a delegation of that implied power, nebulous as it is, must be
rejected as inimical to the liberty of the people. The guarantees of human rights and freedom
can not be made to rest precariously on such a shaky foundation.
As a consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is
declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled.
Page 48
TECSON VS. COMELEC ( 2004)

FACTS: In 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"),
filed his COC for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. In his certificate
of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated
his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be20 August 1939and
his place of birth to beManila.
Victorino X. Fornier, filed a petition to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth,
according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an
American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a
Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child
of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on
two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and,second, even if no such prior marriage had existed,
Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
ISSUES: Whether FPJ is a natural born citizen; Whether he made a material misrepresentation
in his COC;
HELD: FPJs direct ascendant is his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou whose death certificate
identified him to be Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan. Any conclusion on the
Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died
in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence
upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en
masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe (date of birth: May 17,
1915), father of respondent FPJ.
The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage
to be on 16 September 1940.In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five
years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old,
unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was
born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie
Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married. The 1935 Constitution, during
which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
The 1935 Constitution is applicable to determine FPJs citizenship. The applicable provision is:
Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution.The following are citizens of the Philippines (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution
(2)Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3)Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5)Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Page 49

The totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and
evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so
ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,]must not only be material, but also deliberate and
willful.
GO, SR VS. RAMOS (2009)
FACTS: These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavitfor deportation initiated by Luis
T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration)
against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. To prove his
contention, Luis argued that birth certificate of Jimmy was tampered, which indicated Jimmys
citizenship as "FChinese." Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmys birth certificate
that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered
since all the other entries were typewritten except the entry on his citizenship which was
handwritten as FChinese.
Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother,
elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935
Constitution and CA 625. Jimmy added that he had even voted in the 1952 and 1955
elections. He denied that his father arrived in the Philippines as an undocumented alien,
alleging that his father has no record of arrival in this country as alleged in the complaintaffidavit precisely because his father was born and raised in the Philippines, and in fact, speaks
fluent Ilonggo and Tagalog. As to erroneous entry, he attributed it to the employees of the LCR.
ISSUE: whether Jimmy is a Filipino citizen = NO
HELD: Jimmy claims that he is a Filipino because Carlos, his father, is allegedly a citizen.Since
his citizenship hinges on that of his fathers, it becomes necessary to pass upon the citizenship
of the latter. However, neither the Philippine Bill of 1902 nor the Jones Law of 1916 make
Carlos a citizen of the Philippines. His bare claim that his father, Go Yin An, was a resident of
the Philippines at the time of the passage of the said laws, without any supporting evidence
whatsoever will not suffice. It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the
citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the
mother and follow her nationality.Moreover, we have also ruled that an illegitimate child of a
Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to
citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. However, it is our
considered view that absent any evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a
Filipina, the aforestated established rule could not be applied to him.
As to the question of whether the election of Philippine citizenship conferred on Carlos Filipino
citizenship, we find that the appellate court correctly found that it did not. The 1935
Constitution and CA 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine
citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made
"upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching 21
years. The proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was within "reasonable time (within
3 years)" after attaining the age of majority. It is true that we said that the 3-year period for
electing Philippine citizenship may be extended as when the person has always regarded
himself as a Filipino. Be that as it may, it is our considered view that not a single circumstance
was sufficiently shown meriting the extension of the 3-year period. The fact that Carlos
exercised his right of suffrage in 1952 and 1955 does not demonstrate such belief, considering
that the acts were done after he elected Philippine citizenship. On the other hand, the mere
fact that he was able to vote does not validate his irregular election of Philippine citizenship.
Page 50

At most, his registration as a voter indicates his desire to exercise a right appertaining
exclusively to Filipino citizens but does not alter his real citizenship, which, in this jurisdiction,
is determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The exercise of the rights and privileges granted only to
Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person may misrepresent himself to
be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and privileges of citizens of this country. It is incumbent
upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is
really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine
citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state.
As to the application of the doctrine of jus soli (citizenship by place of birth): The doctrine was
never extended to the Philippines. It was for a time the prevailing rule in the acquisition of
ones citizenship but it was abandoned in the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor. Since
then, said doctrine only benefited those who were individually declared to be citizens of the
Philippines by a final court decision on the mistaken application of jus soli.
Page 51
GONZALES VS. PENNISI (2010)

FACTS:
Michael Alfio Pennisi was born on 13 March 1975 in Queensland, Australia to Alfio
Pennisi, an Australian national, and Anita T. Quintos, allegedly a Filipino citizen. In March
1999, respondent filed a petition for recognition as Filipino citizen before the Bureau of
Immigration (BI). BI issued him a Recognition Order which was affirmed by DOJ Secretary on
March 3, 2000. Pursuant to such order, he was recognition as a citizen of the Philippines
pursuant to Article III, Sec. 1(2) of the 1973 Constitution and makes him entitled to all the
rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. Thereafter, respondent was drafted and played for
the Red Bull, a professional basketball team in the Philippine Basketball Association (PBA).
In 2004, DOJ issued a resolution revoking Pennisis certificate of recognition and directed BI to
begin summary deportation proceedings against respondent pursuant to a recommendation by
Senate to review recognition orders of Fil-foreign PBA players. Trial court subsequently issued a
Summary Deportation Order against him. Respondent filed a petition for review, with an
application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, before the Court of
Appeals. CA ruled in favor of Pennisi.
ISSUE: whether Pennisi is a Filipino citizen
HELD: Yes. The issuance of certificate of recognition to respondent has not attained finality.
Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following concur: (1) A persons
citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;
(2)The solicitor general or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution
thereof; and (3)The finding or citizenship is affirmed by this court.
Pennisi was able to present the birth certificate of his Filipino mother, Anita Tomeda Quintos
and a certification issued by the LCR Of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija stating that Quintos was born
on 14 august 1949 of Filipino parents in Panabingan, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija; and certified
true copy of the Letter Dated 14 July 1999 Of The Australian Department Of Immigration And
Multicultural Affairs, Stating That As Of 14 July 1999, Quintos Has Not Been Granted Australian
Citizenship. These documents have more probative value and must prevail over the statements
of Barangay Officials of Nueva Ecija that no Quintos and Tomedas have resided in the said
barangay and such family names do not exist in census or master list of voters. Documents
consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The Quintoses and Tomedas were not included
in the census, such as they could have been mere transients in the place. As for their absence
in the masters list of voters, they could have failed to register themselves as voters. The late
registration of Quintos birth (made 10 years after her birth) does not indicate fraud because it
was not issued at anytime near the filing of respondents petition for recognition as Filipino
citizen. Finally, the Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs itself
attested that as of 14 July 1999, Quintos has not been granted Australian citizenship.
Respondent submitted a certified true copy of Quintos Australian Certificate of Registration of
Alien, indicating her nationality as Filipino. These pieces of evidence should prevail over the
affidavits submitted by Barangay officials.
VILANDO VS. HRET (2011)
Page 52

FACTS: In 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her COC for the position of Representative of the
First District of Negros Oriental. She won over the other contender, Olivia Paras. Meanwhile,
petitions involving either the disqualification questioning her citizenship against her were filed
before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which reached the Court. Comelec ruled
against Limkaichong. On April 1, 2009, the Court granted the aforesaid petition of Limkaichong,
reversed the Joint Resolution of the Comelec and directed the petitioners to seek relief before
the HRET by way of a petition for Quo Warranto.
On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Renald F. Vilando (Vilando), as taxpayer; and
Jacinto Paras, as registered voter of the congressional district concerned, filed separate
petitions for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before the HRET. These petitions were
consolidated by the HRET as they both challenged the eligibility of one and the same
respondent. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the
office she was elected and proclaimed. They alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy),
whose naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese
citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter. On March 24, 2010, the HRET
dismissed both petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the House of
Representatives.
ISSUE: whether Limkaichong is a Filipino citizen
HELD: Yes. Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The governing law
is the citizenship provision under Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution.
Limkaichongs father was conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is a
Filipino citizen born to a Filipino father. It matters not whether the father acquired citizenship
by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following the line of transmission through the father
under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied with the requirement
for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the subsequent issuance of
certificate of naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong can still be considered a natural-born
Filipino citizen having been born to a Filipino mother and having impliedly elected Filipino
citizenship when she reached majority age under paragraph 4, Section 1, Article IV of the 1935
Constitution. Having failed to prove that Anesia Sy lost her Philippine citizenship, respondent
can be considered a natural born citizen of the Philippines, having been born to a mother who
was a natural-born Filipina at the time of marriage, and because respondent was able to elect
citizenship informally when she reached majority age.
Respondent participated in the
barangay elections as a young voter in 1976, accomplished voters affidavit as of 1984, and ran
as a candidate and was elected as Mayor of La Libertad, Negros Oriental in 2004. These are
positive acts of election of Philippine citizenship. The case of In re: Florencio Mallare,
elucidates how election of citizenship is manifested in actions indubitably showing a definite
choice. We note that respondent had informally elected citizenship after January 17, 1973
during which time the 1973 Constitution considered as citizens of the Philippines all those who
elect citizenship in accordance with the 1935 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution provisions,
i.e., Section 1(3), Article [IV] and Section 2, Article [IV] were enacted to correct the anomalous
situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically accorded
the status of a natural-born citizen, while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
would still have to elect Philippine citizenship yet if so elected, was not conferred natural-born
status. It was the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to treat equally those born
before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority either before or after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. Thus, those who would
Page 53

elect Philippine citizenship under par. 3, Section 1, Article [IV] of the 1987 Constitution are
now, under Section 2, Article [IV] thereof also natural-born Filipinos.
Holding an Alian Cert of Reg. by Limkaichongs mother was not tantamount to a
repudiation of her original citizenship.
Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be
express. Such express renunciation is lacking in this case. Accordingly, Limkaichongs mother,
being a Filipino citizen, can transmit her citizenship to her daughter.
b. Election of Philippine Citizenship
IN RE: CHING 316 SCRA 1 (1999)
Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born
of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon
reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to made a valid election of Philippine
citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect
Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by
the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with
the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
FACTS: Vicente Ching, born August 11, 1964, was a legitimate son of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother. He took the 1998 Bar Exams and passed but he was not allowed to take his
oath because of the questionable status of his citizenship. It was only on 15 June 1999, at
thirty-five (35) years old or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority,
when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625. In the Manifestation he filed
together with his Affidavit of Election and his Oath of Allegiance, he stated the fact of his
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public
accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official.
ISSUE: Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an
alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the
age of majority?
RULING:
NO.
The 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the
election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the
election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then
commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on
cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by
basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in
turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the US Government to the
effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of
majority. The phrase reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should
be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority
However, the SC held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice that the three (3) year period is not an
inflexible rule. But it cautioned that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship
Page 54

is not indefinite. Election in this case was only made over 7 years after reaching the age of
majority and the court did not consider it to have been made within a reasonable time.
Based on the interpretation of the phrase upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election
was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise
the privilege.
ISSUE: Would the special circumstances invoked by Ching be sufficient to vest in him
Philippine citizenship
RULING: NO as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by election.
Ching cannot take cannot find refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare where the court
considered the exercise of the right of suffrage sufficient to show his preference for Philippine
citizenship. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very different from those in the
present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625.
Hence, the
requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for
electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare
was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban
Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural
child of a Filipino mother.
Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship.
The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and
painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's
unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed
and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only
an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor,
enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect
Philippine citizenship and, as a result, this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
REPUBLIC VS LIM 419 SCRA 123 (2004)

FACTS: Chule Y. Lim, born October 29, 1954, filed a petition for correction of entries under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court alleging that: 1) her surname YU was misspelled as Yo, 2)
her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her
father and mother never got married. Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother
is Filipina and 3) it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate
child when she should have been described as illegitimate considering that her parents were
never married.
Placida Anto, respondents mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen as her parents
were both Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she and her daughters father were never
married because the latter had a prior subsisting marriage contracted in China. Also,
respondent presented a certification attested by officials of the local civil registries of Iligan
City and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte that there is no record of marriage between Placida Anto
and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the present.
The trial court granted the petition and ordered the correction. The Republic assailed
the decision stating that the respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirements of
Page 55

electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority citing Article IV, Section 1(3)
of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in ordering the correction of citizenship
RULING: No. The constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship
cited apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was
concededly an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were
never married. As such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory
requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother,
respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino
since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship
when she reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she
was 18 years old. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship
MA VS FERNANDEZ 625 SCRA 566 (2010)
ISSUE: Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien
father, who executed an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took their oath
of allegiance to the government upon reaching the age of majority, but who failed to
immediately file the documents of election with the nearest civil registry, be considered
foreign nationals subject to deportation as undocumented aliens for failure to obtain alien
certificates of registration?
FACTS: Petitioners are children of a Taiwanese father and a Filipino mother all of whom were
born under the 1935 Philippine Constitution. They were all raised in the Philippines and have
resided in this country for almost sixty (60) years; they spent their whole lives, studied and
received their primary and secondary education in the country; they do not speak nor
understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in Taiwan, and do not know any relative of
their father; they have not even traveled abroad; and they have already raised their respective
families in the Philippines
During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien
Certificates of Registration (ACRs).
Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship in
accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution. Thus, on 15 August 1969,
Felix, Jr. executed his affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took his oath of
allegiance. On 14 January 1972, Balgamelo did the same. In 1978, Valeriano took his oath of
allegiance.
Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have
the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of CA 625
(An Act Providing the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be
Declared by a Person whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen). It was only on 27 July 2005 or more
than thirty (30) years after they elected Philippine citizenship that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did
so.
RULING:
Page 56

The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election
under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines;
and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
Where the election of citizenship has in fact been done and documented within the
constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of election beyond
the frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have publicly,
consistently, and continuously been done. The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for
over half a century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is
equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.
In general, registration refers to any entry made in the books of the registry, including both
registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation, annotation, and even the
marginal notes. In strict acceptation, it pertains to the entry made in the registry which
records solemnly and permanently the right of ownership and other real rights. Simply stated,
registration is made for the purpose of notification
Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the instant case,
registration is the confirmation of election as such election. It is not the registration of the
act of election, although a valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will
confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact
that citizenship has been claimed.
Notably, the petitioners timely took their oath of allegiance to the Philippines. This
was a serious undertaking. It was commitment and fidelity to the state coupled with a pledge
"to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance" to any other state. This was unqualified
acceptance of their identity as a Filipino and the complete disavowal of any other nationality.
Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to
elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance.
The failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat the election and
resultingly negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. The lacking
requirements may still be complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate
administrative penalties, if any. The documents they submitted supporting their allegations
that they have already registered with the civil registry, although belatedly, should be
examined for validation purposes by the appropriate agency, in this case, the Bureau of
Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the administrative orders and other issuances of
the Bureau of Immigration and the Department of Justice shall be complied with within a
reasonable time.
VILANDO VS HRET 656 SCRA 17 (2011)
FACTS: Petitioners filed petition for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before the HRET
challenged her eligibility. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and
ineligible for the office she was elected and proclaimed. They alleged that she was born to a
father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who acquired
the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter. Also, they
invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of Limkaichongs citizenship, which
necessarily included an inquiry into the validity of the naturalization certificate of Julio Sy.
For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. She
averred that the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her father was regular and in order and
had already attained the status of res judicata. Further, she claimed that the validity of such
citizenship could not be assailed through a collateral attack.
HRET dismissed the petition and petitioners sought reconsideration.
Page 57

ISSUE: 1. WON the Quo Warranto petition operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship
of Limkaichongs father
RULING:
Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese citizen. To prove his
point, he makes reference to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichongs
father which, however, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the
citizenship of the father. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be
done through a direct action for its nullity. The proper proceeding to assail the citizenship of
Limkaichongs father should be in accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.
Under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute,
that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the
appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by
private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizens descendant.
ISSUE: 2. WON as an incident in determining the eligibility of Limkaichong, the HRET,
having the plenary, absolute and exclusive jurisdiction to determine her qualifications, can
pass upon the efficacy of the certificate of naturalization.
RULING: Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry
with it the authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the
pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on
the citizenship of the father which, as already stated, is not permissible.
The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957
and September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental, which
granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the
contrary.
ISSUE: 3. WON Limkaichong can derive Philippine citizenship from her mother at the time
of her birth, where her mother is already not a Filipino citizen as a result of her marriage
to her father as provided under Sec 1(7) of CA No. 63 in relation to Art 2(1) Chapter II of
the Chinese Revised Nationality Law of February 5, 1959
RULING: Vilando was not able to offer in evidence a duly certified true copy of the alleged
Chinese Revised Law of Nationality to prove that Limkaichongs mother indeed lost her
Philippine citizenship.
Also, an application for an alien certificate of registration (ACR) is not an indubitable proof of
forfeiture of Philippine citizenship. . It bears no indication of basis for foreign citizenship, nor
proof of change to foreign citizenship. It certifies that a person named therein has applied for
registration and fingerprinting and that such person was issued a certificate of registration
under the Alien Registration Act of 1950 or other special law. It is only evidence of registration.
Thus, obtaining an ACR by Limkaichongs mother was not tantamount to a repudiation of her
original citizenship. Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien citizenship. In a string of
decisions, this Court has consistently held that an application for, and the holding of, an alien
certificate of registration is not an act constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenship. For
renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. Such
express renunciation is lacking in this case. Accordingly, Limkaichongs mother, being a Filipino
citizen, can transmit her citizenship to her daughter.
Page 58

Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The governing law is the
citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution, the pertinent portion thereof, reads:
Article
IV
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority,
elect Philippine citizenship.
xxx
With Limkaichongs father having been conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino, it follows
that she is a Filipino citizen born to a Filipino father.
Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of
the Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father
acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following the line of transmission
through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied
with the requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the subsequent issuance of
certificate of naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong can still be considered a natural-born
Filipino citizen having been born to a Filipino mother and having impliedly elected Filipino
citizenship when she reached majority age. The HRET is, thus, correct in declaring that
Limkaichong is a natural-born Filipino citizen
REPUBLIC VS SAGUN 666 SCRA 321 (2012)
FACTS: Nora Sagun, born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City, is the legitimate child of a Chinese
father and a Filipino mother. She did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized by Atty.
Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was not recorded and registered with the Local Civil
Registrar of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her application
was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth
certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial
declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of
Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same on her birth certificate. The petition was granted
by the trial court.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine
citizenship is procedurally and jurisdictionally permissible
RULING: This Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or
the Rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual.
There is no
specific legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given
person is part of our citizenry. This was our ruling in Yung Uan Chu v. Republic citing the early
case of Tan v. Republic of the Philippines, where we clearly stated:
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies,
which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of
Page 59

said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident
only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon,
and make a pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is
beyond judicial power. x x x
Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of respondents
Filipino citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the courts competence.
ISSUE: 2. Whether respondent is required under the law to make an election and if so,
whether she has complied with the procedural requirements in the election of the
Philippine citizenship
RULING: Being a legitimate child, respondents citizenship followed that of her father who
is Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It is
a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that
illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality.
An illegitimate child of Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and
privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself.
But in the case of respondent, for her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election
under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines;
and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration
under C.A. No. 625 unless the party exercising the right of election has complied with the
requirements of the Alien Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he should first be required
to register as an alien. Pertinently, the person electing Philippine citizenship is required to
file a petition with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of
Immigration) for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration based on his aforesaid
election of Philippine citizenship and said Office will initially decide, based on the evidence
presented the validity or invalidity of said election. Afterwards, the same is elevated to the
Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final determination and review.
It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the
direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts.
The special proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on
Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows any interested party to
file an action for cancellation or correction of entry in the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and
recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the respondent.
Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial courts conclusion
that respondent duly elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the records undisputably
show that respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid election.
Specifically, respondent had not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine
citizenship. The only documentary evidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim
of alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached the age of
majority, which was unregistered.
As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondents oath of
allegiance suffices, its execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent
attained the age of majority and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as
required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625.
The phrase reasonable time has been
interpreted to mean that the election should be made generally within three (3) years from
reaching the age of majority. Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation proffered by
respondent for the delay and the failure to register with the nearest local civil registry.
Page 60

Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural
requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot
assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the
requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere exercise of suffrage,
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of
Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine citizenship.
5. Denaturalization
CO VS CIVIL REGISTER 423 SCRA 420 (2004)
FACTS: Hubert Tan Co born on March 23, 1974 and his sister, Arlene Tan Co, born on May 19,
1975. In their respective certificates of birth, it is stated that their parents Co Boon Peng and
Lourdes Vihong K. Tan are Chinese citizens.
Thereafter, Co Boon Peng filed an application for his naturalization as a citizen of the
Philippines with the Special Committee on Naturalization under Letter of Instruction (LOI) No.
270. His application was granted and he was conferred Philippine citizenship under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1055. The Chairman of the Committee issued on February 15, 1977
Certificate of Naturalization No. 020778 in his favor. Thus, on February 15, 1977, Co Boon Peng
took his oath as a Philippine citizen. In the meantime, Hubert and Arlene Co finished college
and earned their respective degrees in architecture and accountancy in Philippine schools.
On August 27, 1998, they filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a petition under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court for correction of entries in their certificates of birth. They alleged that :
Upon granting of Philippine citizenship by naturalization to Co Boon Peng in 1977, [the]
petitioners who were born in the Philippines and still minors at that time became Filipino
citizens through the derivative mode of naturalization. Our Naturalization Law, specifically
Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 535 provides
that: "Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof;"
The court a quo issued an order dismissing the petition outright on the ground that the
petition was insufficient, solely because the petitioners father Co Boon Peng applied for
naturalization under LOI No. 270 and was conferred Philippine citizenship by naturalization
under PD No. 1055 and not under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473)
ISSUE: Whether or not LOI No. 270 and CA No. 47are statutes in pari materia which should
be read together so that petitioners can claim the benefit of derivative mode of
naturalization under CA 473
RULING: LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are laws governing the naturalization of qualified aliens
residing in the Philippines. While they provide for different procedures, CA No. 473 governs
naturalization by judicial decree while LOI No. 270 governs naturalization by presidential
decree; both statutes have the same purpose and objective: to enable aliens permanently
residing in the Philippines, who, having demonstrated and developed love for and loyalty to the
Philippines, as well as affinity to the culture, tradition and ideals of the Filipino people, and
contributed to the economic, social and cultural development of our country, to be integrated
into the national fabric by being granted Filipino citizenship. Under the LOI, the procedure for
the acquisition of citizenship by naturalization is more expeditious, less cumbersome and less
expensive. The sooner qualified aliens are naturalized, the faster they are able to integrate
themselves into the national fabric, and are thus able to contribute to the cultural, social and
political well- being of the country and its people.
Page 61

Clearly, LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are, as the petitioners correctly posit, statutes in pari
materia. Absent any express repeal of Section 15 of CA No. 473 in LOI No. 270, the said
provision should be read into the latter law as an integral part thereof, not being
inconsistent with its purpose. Thus, Section 15 of CA No. 473,9 which extends the grant of
Philippine citizenship to the minor children of those naturalized thereunder, should be
similarly applied to the minor children of those naturalized under LOI No. 270, like the
petitioners in this case.
It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate of naturalization of
their father, Co Boon Peng, and of his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
to entitle them to Philippine citizenship. They are likewise mandated to prove the following
material allegations in their petition: (a) that they are the legitimate children of Co Boon
Peng; (b) that they were born in the Philippines; and, (c) that they were still minors when
Co Boon Peng was naturalized as a Filipino citizen;
REPUBLIC VS ONG 673 SCRA 485 (2012)

Naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest. Naturalization laws are
strictly construed in the governments favor and against the applicant. The applicant carries
the burden of proving his full compliance with the requirements of law.
FACTS: The Republic faulted the trial court for granting Ongs petition for naturalization
despite his failure to prove that he possesses a known lucrative trade, profession or lawful
occupation as required under Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Ong has proved that he has some known lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation in accordance with Section 2, fourth paragraph of the
Revised Naturalization Law.
RULING: Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of some known lucrative trade, profession,
or lawful occupation means not only that the person having the employment gets enough
for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an
income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be
able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or
disability to work and thus avoid ones becoming the object of charity or a public charge.
His income should permit him and the members of his family to live with reasonable comfort,
in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands of
human dignity, at this stage of our civilization.
Moreover, it has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative
income, the courts should consider only the applicants income; his or her spouses income
should not be included in the assessment. The spouses additional income is immaterial for
under the law the petitioner should be the one to possess some known lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen. Lastly, the
Court has consistently held that the applicants qualifications must be determined as of the
time of the filing of his petition.
The Court finds the appellate courts decision erroneous. First, it should not have included the
spouses income in its assessment of Ongs lucrative income. Second, it failed to consider the
following circumstances which have a bearing on Ongs expenses vis--vis his income: (a) that
Ong does not own real property; (b) that his proven average gross annual income around the
time of his application, which was only P106,000.00, had to provide for the education of his
Page 62

four minor children; and (c) that Ongs children were all studying in exclusive private schools in
Cebu City. Third, the CA did not explain how it arrived at the conclusion that Ongs income had
an appreciable margin over his known expenses.
Clearly, therefore, respondent Ong failed to prove that he possesses the qualification of a
known lucrative trade provided in Section 2, fourth paragraph, of
the Revised Naturalization Law
Loss and Reacquisition of Citizenship
AASJS VS DATUMANONG 523 SCRA 108 (2007)
FACTS: Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from
implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine
Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth
Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is
unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
ISSUE: By recognizing & allowing dual allegiance, is RA 9225 unconstitutional?
RULING: No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a
self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In
Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship
per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law
that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance.Until this is done,
it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues
pertaining to dual allegiance.
JOSE B. AZNAR vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Facts:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate of
candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the
January 18, 1988 local elections.
On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council, as represented by petitioner Jose
B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a
petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a
Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.
On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by
the then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that
private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration and
Immigrant Certificate of Residence, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958.The petitioner
also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order to temporarily enjoin the Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers from tabulating/
canvassing the votes cast in favor of private respondent and proclaiming him until the final
resolution of the main petition.
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that
he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President
Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103
issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth
Page 63

and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a
registered voter in the Philippines since 1965.
Issue: W/N private Respondent (Lito Osmea) is a Filipino citizen
Ruling: Yes.
Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore,
disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is
not supported by substantial and convincing evidence.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that
private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A.
No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express
renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent
Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by
any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of
America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien
certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by
the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the
foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being an American", private respondent "must
have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws.
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not.
Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States does
not concern Us here.By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that
private respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that
private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner
failed to positively establish this fact.
The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989)
andRamon L. Labo v. COMELEC et al(G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are not applicable to the
case at bar.
In theFrivaldocase, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States
in 1983 per certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California,
as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in
San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized in the United States but
claimed that he was forced to embrace American citizenship to protect himself from the
persecution of the Marcos government. The Court, however, found this suggestion of
involuntariness unacceptable, pointing out that there were many other Filipinos in the United
States similarly situated as Frivaldo who did not find it necessary to abandon their status as
Filipinos.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance
of the United States He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has
continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present,
both as a voter and as a candidate .Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of
his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.
De Guzman vs Comelec
Facts:
Page 64
Petitioner De Guzman and private respondent Angelina DG. Dela Cruz were candidates
for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in theMay 14, 2007elections.On April 3, 2007, private
respondent filed against petitioner a petitionfor disqualification docketed as SPA No. 07-211,
alleging that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines, but an immigrant and resident of
theUnited States of America.
In his answer, petitioner admitted that he was a naturalized American. However,

on January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No.
9225), otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003.[5] Upon
approval of his application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of thePhilippineson
September 6, 2006. He argued that, having re-acquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled
to exercise full civil and political rights. As such, he is qualified to run as vice-mayor of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
Issue: whether petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in
the May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his American citizenship in accordance
with R.A. No. 9225.
Ruling: We find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his
failure to renounce his American citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1)
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of thePhilippineswho, after the
effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are
deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance.[14]
Petitioner falls under the first category, being a natural-born citizen who lost his Philippine
citizenship upon his naturalization as an American citizen. In the instant case, there is no
question that petitioner re-acquired his Philippine citizenship after taking the oath of
allegiance onSeptember 6, 2006.However, it must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes
an additional requirement on those who wish to seek elective public office, as follows:
Section 5.Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:
xxxx
(2)Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Hence,Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225compelsnatural-born Filipinos, who

have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained
their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to
Page 65

additionally execute apersonal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of
candidacy,to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
GERALDINE GAW GUY and GRACE GUY CHEU,Petitioners,

vs.
ALVIN AGUSTIN T. IGNACIO,Respondent.
Facts:
The father of petitioners Geraldine Gaw Guy and Grace Guy Cheu became a
naturalized7Filipino citizen sometime in 1959. The said petitioners, being minors at that time,
were also recognized8as Filipino citizens.
Respondent Atty. Alvin Agustin T. Ignacio, filed a Complaint9 dated March 5, 2004 for
blacklisting and deportation against petitioners Geraldine and Grace before the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) on the basis that the latter two are Canadian citizens who are illegally working
in the Philippines, petitioners having been issued Canadian passports.
Acting upon the Complaint, respondent Maricel U. Salcedo, Special Prosecutor, Special Task
Force of the BI Commissioner, directed the petitioners, through the issuance of a subpoenae,
10to appear before her and to bring pertinent documents relative to their current immigration
status, to which the petitioners objected by filing with the Special Task Force of the BI
Commissioner a Comment/Opposition with Motion Ad Cautelam to Quash Re: Subpoena11dated
30 April 2004 (Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum), which was eventually denied by respondent
Salcedo in an Order12dated May 14, 2004.
Issue: W/N judicial intervention is allowed amidst deportation proceedings.
Ruling:
Yes.Basically, petitioners argue that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, relied upon by the CA
in its decision, does not apply in the present case because it falls under an exception.
Citing Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, petitioners assert that immediate judicial
intervention in deportation proceedings is allowed where the claim of citizenship is so
substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct. In
connection therewith, petitioners assail the applicability ofDwikarna v. Domingoin the present
case,which the CA relied upon in ruling against the same petitioners.
In BOC v. Dela Rosa, it is required that before judicial intervention is sought, the claim of
citizenship of a respondent in a deportation proceeding must be so substantial that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that such claim is correct. In the said case, the proof adduced by
the respondent therein was so substantial and conclusive as to his citizenship that it warranted
a judicial intervention.
In the present case, there is a substantial or conclusive evidence that petitioners are Filipino
citizens. Without necessarily judging the case on its merits, as to whether petitioners had lost
their Filipino citizenship by having a Canadian passport, the fact still remains, through the
evidence adduced and undisputed by the respondents, that they are naturalized Filipinos,
unless proven otherwise.
However, this Court cannot pass upon the issue of petitioners' citizenship as this was not raised
as an issue. The issue in this petition is on the matter of jurisdiction, and as discussed above,
the trial court has jurisdiction to pass upon the issue whether petitioners have abandoned their
Filipino citizenship or have acquired dual citizenship within the confines of the law.
Jacot vs Dal
Facts:
Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of
the US on 13 December 1989.3
Page 66

Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise
known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the
administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine
Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June
2006 an Order of Approval4 of petitioners request, and on the same day, petitioner took his
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo.5On 27
September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019
recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines.6
Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position
of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin.7
On 2 May 2007, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification8 before the
COMELEC Provincial Office in Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the latter failed to
renounce his US citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225.
In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner garnered
the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor.
Issue:
whether petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007 local
elections for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship.
Ruling:
This Court finds that petitioner should indeed be disqualified.
Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not
substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be complied with for different purposes.
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been
naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and
(2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized
public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy,to qualify as
candidates in Philippine elections.
Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of
the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have
presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines).:
EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ,

Vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in
the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign
citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy.
Facts:
Page 67

Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman
of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007.On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P.
Villanueva filed a petition before the Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo,
praying for the disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he is an American citizen,
hence, ineligible from running for any public office.In his Answer, petitioner argued that he is
a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the same time an American, by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. He
returned to thePhilippinesand resided in Barangay Bagacay.Thus, he said, he possessed all the
qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman. After the votes for Barangay Chairman were
canvassed, petitioner emerged as the winner.
Issue: W/N the petitioner is eligible to run as Barangay Captain.

Ruling:No. Petitioner was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American citizenship and
renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino
citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino
citizenship may run for a public office in thePhilippines.Section 5 of the said law states:
Section 5.Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of thePhilippinesand the following
conditions:
xxx x
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
the filing of the certificate of candidacy,make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. (Emphasis
added)
Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law explicitly
provides that should one seek elective public office, he should first make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement.
Republic vs Dela Rosa
Facts:
Raul Lee(Petitioner) was the official candidate of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP)
for the position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon in the May 1992 elections. Private
respondent (Frivaldo) was the official candidate of the Lakas-National Union of Christian
Democrats (Lakas-NUCD) for the same position.
Private respondent was proclaimed winner on May 22, 1992.
On June 1, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of private
respondent as Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon on the grounds: (1) that the
proceedings and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with
law; (2) that private respondent is an alien, whose grant of Philippine citizenship is being
Page 68

questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and (3) that private respondent is not a duly
registered voter. Petitioner further prayed that the votes case in favor of private respondent be
considered as stray votes, and that he, on the basis of the remaining valid votes cast, be
proclaimed winner.
Petitioner further claims that the grant of Filipino citizenship to private respondent is not yet
conclusive because the case is still on appeal before us.
Issue: W/N PR is eligible to run for Governor.
Ruling: No.Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru
naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure
prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the
requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those
which he believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish
between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a
citizen. It does not provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by
former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine
citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.
Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for
hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and
a newspaper of general circulation. Compliance therewith is jurisdictional (Po Yi Bo v. Republic,
205 SCRA 400 [1992]). Moreover, the publication and posting of the petition and the order must
be in its full test for the court to acquire jurisdiction (Sy v. Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]).
The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of the
Revised Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral character; (2)
that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years; (3) that he is able to
speak and write English and any one of the principal dialects; (4) that he will reside
continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition until his admission to
Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused
from said filing, the justification therefor.
The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400
[1992]).
Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons who
vouched for the good moral character of private respondent as required by Section 7 of the
Revised Naturalization Law. Private respondent also failed to attach a copy of his certificate of
arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of the said law.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its
promulgation and, insofar as the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted from
the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of First Instance of Albay,
60 SCRA 195 [1974]).
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization
proceedings shall be executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able
to observe if: (1) the applicant has left the country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself
continuously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) the applicant has not been convicted of any
offense or violation of government promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has committed any
act prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to government announced policies.
Sobejana Condon vs Comelec
Facts:
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August
8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her
marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
Page 69

On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the
Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise
known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003."5 The application was
approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenshipbefore the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra,
Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has
ceased to be an Australian citizen.6
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost
in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the
position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the
winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan7and Luis M. Bautista,
8(private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo
warranto questioning the petitioners eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought
the petitioners disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual
citizen and that she failed to execute a"personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath"as imposed by Section
5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The Petitioners Arguments
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on September 27,
2006, she no longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her
certificate of candidacy as early as the 2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens
seeking elective office does not apply to her.
Issue
For purposes of determining the petitioners eligibility to run for public office, whether the
"sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-forma
requirement.
Ruling:
Petitioner is disqualified from running for elective office for failure to renounce her
Australian
citizenship in accordance with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born
citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic, thus:
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
xxx---xxxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
xxxx--xxxxx
The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. InLopez v. COMELEC,21we declared its
categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any
elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she personallyswearsto a renunciation
Page 70

of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded
on the form of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained
in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an
oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship.
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their
Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath
simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been
naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2)
for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer
prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in
Philippine elections.
Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of
the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have
presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on
Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18 August 2003
(precursors of Republic Act No. 9225),
Willie Yu vs Santiago
Facts:
The present controversy originated with a petition forhabeas corpusfiled with the Court on 4
July 1988 seeking the release from detention of herein petitioner. 1 After manifestation and
motion of the Solicitor General of his decision to refrain from filing a return of the writ on
behalf of the CID, respondent Commissioner thru counsel filed the return. 2 Counsel for the
parties were heard in oral argument on 20 July 1988. The parties were allowed to submit
marked exhibits, and to file memoranda. 3An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred
the case to the Court en banc. In its 10 November 1988 resolution, denying the petition
forhabeas corpus, the Court disposed of the pending issues of (1) jurisdiction of the CID over a
naturalized Filipino citizen and (2) validity of warrantless arrest and detention of the same
person.
Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese passport in
1971, valid for five (5) years and renewed for the same period upon presentment before the
proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10
February 1978, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport No.
35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said
Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. While still a
citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever
all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to
"maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," he declared his
nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies
registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd.filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
Issue:
W/N Petitioner is a Filipino citizen
Ruling: No. To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an
express renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization.
InBoard of Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano,express renunciation was held to mean
Page 71

a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or
implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced
Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his
prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and
represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized
Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings with the Board of Special Inquiry,
CID. However, pleadings submitted before this Court after the issuance of said TRO have
unequivocally shown that petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The
material facts are not only established by the pleadings they are not disputed by petitioner. A
rehearing on this point with the CID would be unnecessary and superfluous. Denial, if any, of
due process was obviated when petitioner was given by the Court the opportunity to show
proof of continued Philippine citizenship, but he has failed.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when
required and suppressed when convenient. This then resolves adverse to the petitioner his
motion for clarification and other motions mentioned in the second paragraph, page 3 of this
Decision.
Vilando vs HRET August 23, 2011
Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1stDistrict of Negros Oriental. Because of this, her
opponent, Paras and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against
Limkaichong. They alleged that Limkaichong was not a natural born citizen of the Philippines
because when she was born her father was still a Chinese and that her mother,lost her Filipino
citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichongs father. After election, notwithstanding
their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing
Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted elections. This is
incompliancewithResolution No. 8062adopting the policy-guidelines ofnot suspending the
proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be
without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras
countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the COMELEC.
Held: The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. Limkaichong timely filed with the
COMELECEn Bancher motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated
directive suspending her proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively
suspended theexecutionof the COMELECs Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the Joint
Resolution was suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong
as the winner pursuant to Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichongs proclamation. The SC has invariably
held that once a winning candidatehas been proclaimed,taken his oath, andassumed officeas
a Member of the House of Representatives the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction
begins.
Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The
governing law is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution. The HRET, therefore,
correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959
Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental, which granted the petition and
declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the contrary. Respondent
Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of the
Page 72

Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father
acquiredcitizenship by birth or by naturalization.
Respondent had previously participated in the barangay elections, accomplished voter's
affidavit as of 1984, and was elected as Mayor. These are positive acts of election of
Philippine citizenship.
The case of In re: Florencio Mallare, elucidates how election
ofcitizenship is manifested in actions indubitably showing a definite choice.
Sobejana-Condon vs Comelec (2012)
Sobejano-Condon was a natural-born Filipino citizen on August 8, 1944 but became a
naturalized Australian citizen due to her marriage to one Kevin Thomas Condon on December
13, 1984. On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship
before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Sec. 3 of RA 9225, which was
approved and she took her oath of allegiance to the Republic on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia,
which in turn issued the order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be
an Australian citizen.
The Court held that petitioner Sobejana-Condon was disqualified from running for elective
office for failure to renounce her Australian citizenship under oath contrary to the exact
mandate of Sec. 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an
officer authorized to administer oath.
The language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It expresses a single, definite, and
sensible meaning and must thus be read literally. The foreign citizenship must be formally
rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath, the
Court held.
The Court further held that the petitioners act of running for public office does not suffice to
serve as an effective renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While the Court has previously
declared that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidate is already
considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship, such ruling was already adjudged superseded
by the enactment of RA 9255 on August 29, 2003 which provides for the additional condition of
a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Reacquisition or Repatriation
Republic vs dela Rosa (1994)
Frivaldo opted to reacquire Filipino citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised
Naturalization Law is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed in the said law.
The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of
the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order
advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six
months from the last publication of the petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of
allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance
without observing the two-year waiting period.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its
promulgation and, insofar as the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted from
the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of First Instance of Albay,
60 SCRA 195 [1974]).
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization
proceedings shall be executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able
to observe if: (1) the applicant has left the country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself
continuously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) the applicant has not been convicted of any
Page 73

offense or violation of government promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has committed any
act prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to government announced policies.
Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot implement any decision
granting the petition for naturalization before its finality.
Valles vs Comelec (2000)
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother.
Australia follows jus soli. She ran for governor. Opponent filed petition to disqualify her on
the ground of dual citizenship.
Dual citizenship as a disqualification refers to citizens with dual allegiance. The fact that she
has dual citizenship does not automatically disqualify her from running for public office. Filing
a certificate of candidacy suffices to renounce foreign citizenship because in the certificate,
the candidate declares himself to be a Filipino citizen and that he will support the Philippine
Constitution. Such declaration operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. The
mere fact that respondent was a holder of an Australian passport and has an alien certificate of
registration are not acts constituting express renunciation.
Bengzon III vs HRET (2001)
Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente,
Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the
1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United
States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among
other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.
He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine
citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over
petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement
that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born
citizen.
Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process of
naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place
where the person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who
lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship,
he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
Angat vs Republic (1999)
Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of the Philippines. He lost his citizenship by
naturalization in the United States of America. In 1991, he returned to the Philippines. On
March 11, 1996, he filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City a petition to
regain his status as a citizen of the Philippines. On September 20, 1996, upon motion of the
petitioner, he was allowed to take the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
Page 74

which was scheduled on October 3, 1996. On October 4, 1996, the trial judge issued an Order
declaring the petitioner as repatriated and a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant
to Republic Act No. 8171.
On March 19, 1997, the OSG filed a Motion asserting that the petition itself should have been
dismissed by the court aquofor lack of jurisdiction because the proper forum was the Special
Committee on Naturalization consistent with Administrative Order No. 285.
The Court ruled that when petitioner filed his petition on March 11, 1996, the Special
Committee on Naturalization constituted pursuant to LOI No. 270 under P.D. No. 725 was in
place. Administrative Order 285, promulgated on August 22, 1996 relative to R.A. No. 8171, in
effect, was merely then a confirmatory issuance. The Office of the Solicitor General was right
in maintaining that Angats petition should have been filed with the Committee, aforesaid, and
not with the RTC which had no jurisdiction thereover. The courts order of October 4, 1996 was
thereby null and void, and it did not acquire finality nor could be a source of right on the part
of petitioner.
Note, the petition in Case No. N-96-03-MK was one for repatriation, and it was thus incorrect
for petitioner to initially invoke Republic Act No. 965and R.A. No. 2630 since these laws could
only apply to persons who had lost their citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the armed forces of an allied foreign country or the armed forces of the United
States of America, a factual matter not alleged in the petition. Parenthetically, under these
statutes, the person desiring to re-acquire Philippine citizenship wouldnoteven be required to
file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his
residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.
Alterajos vs Comelec (2004)
Ciceron P. Altarejos, a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the
May 10, 2004 national and local elections was petitioned by the respondents to be disqualified
or cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and made a
false representation in his certificate of candidacy that he was not a permanent resident of or
immigrant to a foreign country.
Altejaros took his oath of allegiance as a repatriated Filipino on Dec. 17, 1997 before the
special Committee on Naturalization. However no copy of his oath was registered in the proper
civil registry and the Bureau of immigration until Feb. 18, 2004.
The registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of
Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen. In the case at bar,
petitioner completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of
candidacy for a mayoralty position but before the elections. Petitioners repatriation
retroacted to the date he filed his application and was, therefore, qualified to run for a
mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections.
Tabasa vs CA (2006)
When petitioner was seven years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen
of the United States. By derivative naturalization (citizenship derived from that of another as
from a person who holds citizenship by virtue of naturalization), petitioner also acquired
American citizenship. Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because
he is a child of a natural-born Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by derivative
naturalization when he was still a minor.
The only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following: a. Filipino women
who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and b. Natural-born Filipinos
including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or
Page 75

economic necessity. Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA
8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political
or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos.
Tabasa lost his citizenship by operation of law and not due to political and economic
exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated by political and economic reasons
in deciding to apply for naturalization.
MERCADO vs. MANZANO

307 SCRA 630
Facts:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for
vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V.
Daza III. The results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275 1
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not
a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
Issue: Whether or not private respondent is qualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati
City.
Ruling:
Yes, he is qualified. To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The
former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance,
such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres
to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a
person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a
citizen of both states.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have
said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under
oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his
Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings.
Page 76

REPUBLIC vs. VILLASOR (54 SCRA 83)
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding challenges the
validity of an order issued by respondent Judge Guillermo P. Villasor, then of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch I, declaring a decision final and executory and of an alias writ of
execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines subsequently issued
in pursuance thereof, the alleged ground being excess of jurisdiction, or at the very least,
grave abuse of discretion.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the State is immune from suit.
2. Whether or not the writ of execution directed against the funds of the AFP was validly
issued.
Ruling:
1.
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of
sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its
consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: "A
sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on
the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends."
Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was indicated in a recent
decision, Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, with its
affirmation that "a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored
for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental
efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if
such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not
thus restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the
least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the
absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be
imagined."
2.
No, it was not validly issued. A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a
basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the
consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. The universal
rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or
special law, it may limit claimant's action 'only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to
the stage of execution' and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered,
since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required
by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law. A rule which has never been seriously questioned, is that
money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due government employees, is not
liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that
the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by express
authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit
indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as
long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the
latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof.
And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public
policy forbids it."
Page 77

PROFESSIONAL VIDEO vs. TESDA (591 SCRA 83)
Facts:
TESDAs Pre-Qualification Bids Award Committee (PBAC) conducted two (2) public biddings on
June 25, 1999 and July 22, 1999 for the printing and encoding of PVC cards. A failure of bidding
resulted in both instances since only two (2) bidders PROVI and Sirex Phils. Corp. submitted
proposals.
Due to the failed bidding, the PBAC recommended that TESDA enter into a negotiated contract
with PROVI. On December 29, 1999, TESDA and PROVI signed and executed a Contract
Agreement for the provision of goods and services in the printing and encoding of PVC cards.
On August 24, 2000, the two parties executed an Addendum to the Contract Agreement Project
whose terms bound PROVI to deliver one hundred percent (100%) of the specified supplies to
TESDA.
On July 11, 2001, PROVI filed with the RTC a complaint for sum of money with damages against
TESDA. PROVI additionally prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment/
garnishment against TESDA.
Issues:
1. Whether TESDA, as an agency of the State, can be sued without its consent.
2. Whether or not the writ of attachment against TESDA and its funds, to cover PROVIs
claim against TESDA, is valid.
Ruling:
1. No. TESDA is an instrumentality of the government undertaking governmental functions.
R.A. No. 7796 created the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority or TESDA under
the declared "policy of the State to provide relevant, accessible, high quality and efficient
technical education and skills development in support of the development of high quality
Filipino middle-level manpower responsive to and in accordance with Philippine development
goals and priorities."
Under constitutional and statutory terms, we do not believe that the role and status of TESDA
can seriously be contested: it is an unincorporated instrumentality of the government, directly
attached to the DOLE through the participation of the Secretary of Labor as its Chairman, for
the performance of governmental functions i.e., the handling of formal and non-formal
education and training, and skills development. As an unincorporated instrumentality operating
under a specific charter, it is equipped with both express and implied powers, and all State
immunities fully apply to it.
2.
The writ of attachment against TESDA and its funds was not valid. TESDAs funds are
public in character, hence exempt from attachment or garnishment.
Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contract with PROVI and thereby gave its
implied consent to be sued, TESDAs funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be the
valid subject of a writ of garnishment or attachment. Under Section 33 of the TESDA Act, the
TESDA budget for the implementation of the Act shall be included in the annual General
Appropriation Act; hence, TESDA funds, being sourced from the Treasury, are moneys belonging
to the government, or any of its departments, in the hands of public officials.
HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN vs. ATO (629 SCRA 451)
Facts:
In 1935, spouses Mateo Pidacan and Romana Bigo, predecessors-in-interest of petitioners-heirs
namely, Pacita Pidacan Vda. de Zubiri and Adela Pidacan Vda. de Robles, acquired a parcel of
land with an area of about 22 hectares, situated in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Thereafter,
Original Certificate of Title No. 2204 was issued in favor of said spouses.
However, in 1948, respondent Air Transportation Office (ATO) used a portion of the property as
an airport. In 1974, the ATO constructed a perimeter fence and a new terminal building on the
Page 78

property. It also lengthened, widened, and cemented the airport's runway. Petitioners
demanded from ATO the payment of the value of the property as well as the rentals for the use
thereof but ATO refused. Eventually in 1988, OCT No. 2204 was cancelled and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-7160 was issued in favor of petitioners. Despite this development, ATO
still refused to pay petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not the Principle of State Immunity finds application in this case.
Ruling:
No, it does not apply. Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the
constitutional doctrine of non-suability of the state, otherwise known as the Royal Prerogative
of Dishonesty and conveniently hide under the state's cloak of invincibility against suit,
considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. True enough, the rule, in
any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any
circumstance.
To be sure, this Court as the staunch guardian of the citizens' rights and welfare cannot
sanction an injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the
perpetration thereof. Justice and equity sternly demand that the State's cloak of invincibility
against suit be shred in this particular instance, and that petitioners-contractors be duly
compensated on the basis of quantum meruit for construction done on the public works
housing project.
It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and the end of the suit and is the life of the
law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing
party. Litigation must end sometime and somewhere. An effective and efficient administration
of justice requires that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not deprived
of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must, therefore, guard against any scheme calculated to
bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should
frown upon any attempt to prolong them. Petitioners have been deprived of the beneficial use
and enjoyment of their property for a considerable length of time. Now that they prevailed
before this Court, it would be highly unjust and inequitable under the particular circumstances
that payment of just compensation be withheld from them. We, therefore, write finis to this
litigation.
ATO vs. RAMOS (644 SCRA 36)
Facts:
Spouses David and Elisea Ramos discovered that a portion of their land registered under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-58894 of the Baguio City land records with an area of 985
square meters, more or less, was being used as part of the runway and running shoulder of the
Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air Transportation Office (ATO). On August 11,
1995, the respondents agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale
to the ATO in consideration of the amount of P778,150.00. However, the ATO failed to pay
despite repeated verbal and written demands.
Thus, on April 29, 1998, the respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some
of its officials in the RTC. In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an
affirmative defense the issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had
reserved certain parcels of land that included the respondents affected portion for use of the
Loakan Airport. They asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action without
the States consent considering that the deed of sale had been entered into in the performance
of governmental functions.
Issue: Whether the ATO could be sued without the States consent.
Ruling:
Page 79

Yes, the ATO can be sued. Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate,
are immune from suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the objects for
which the entity was organized.
Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in
private or non-governmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by
the state for public purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of
ordinary business rather than functions of a governmental or political character, are not
regarded as suits against the state. The latter is true, although the state may own stock or
property of such a corporation for by engaging in business operations through a corporation,
the state divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and by implication consents to suits
against the corporation.
The CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the
Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead
involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not
the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to
the States immunity from suit.
We further observe the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to
defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and
without the proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs property.
Lastly, the issue of whether or not the ATO could be sued without the States consent has been
rendered moot by the passage of Republic Act No. 9497, otherwise known as the Civil Aviation
Authority Act of 2008. With the CAAP having legally succeeded the ATO pursuant to R.A. No.
9497, the obligations that the ATO had incurred by virtue of the deed of sale with the Ramos
spouses might now be enforced against the CAAP.
CHINA NATIONAL vs. SANTAMARIA (665 SCRA 189)
Facts:
On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group)
(CNMEG), represented by its chairperson, Ren Hongbin, entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding with the North Luzon Railways Corporation (Northrail), represented by its
president, Jose L. Cortes, Jr. for the conduct of a feasibility study on a possible railway line
from Manila to San Fernando, La Union (the Northrail Project).
On 30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the Department of
Finance of the Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (Aug 30 MOU),
wherein China agreed to extend Preferential Buyers Credit to the Philippine government to
finance the Northrail Project. The Chinese government designated EXIM Bank as the lender,
while the Philippine government named the DOF as the borrower. Under the Aug 30 MOU, EXIM
Bank agreed to extend an amount not exceeding USD 400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable
in 20 years, with a 5-year grace period, and at the rate of 3% per annum.
On 13 February 2006, respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Injunction
against CNMEG, the Office of the Executive Secretary, the DOF, the Department of Budget and
Management, the National Economic Development Authority and Northrail. Respondents
alleged that the Contract Agreement and the Loan Agreement were void for being contrary
to (a) the Constitution; (b) Republic Act No. 9184, otherwise known as the Government
Procurement Reform Act; (c) Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the
Government Auditing Code; and (d) Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code.
Issue: Whether CNMEG is entitled to immunity, precluding it from being sued before a local
court.
Ruling:
Page 80

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the
legal nature of the act involved whether the entity claiming immunity performs
governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions. The restrictive application of State
immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the
foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may
be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
A thorough examination of the basic facts of the case would show that CNMEG is engaged in a
proprietary activity. The parties executed the Contract Agreement for the purpose of
constructing the Luzon Railways. Despite petitioners claim that the EXIM Bank extended
financial assistance to Northrail because the bank was mandated by the Chinese government,
and not because of any motivation to do business in the Philippines, it is clear from the
foregoing provisions that the Northrail Project was a purely commercial transaction.
It is readily apparent that CNMEG cannot claim immunity from suit, even if it contends that it
performs governmental functions. Its designation as the Primary Contractor does not
automatically grant it immunity, just as the term "implementing agency" has no precise
definition for purposes of ascertaining whether GTZ was immune from suit. Although CNMEG
claims to be a government-owned corporation, it failed to adduce evidence that it has not
consented to be sued under Chinese law. Thus, following this Courts ruling in Deutsche
Gesellschaft, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is to be presumed to be a
government-owned and -controlled corporation without an original charter. As a result, it has
the capacity to sue and be sued under Section 36 of the Corporation Code.
HEIRS OF GAMBOA vs. TEVES (682 SCRA 397)
Facts:
This resolves the motions for reconsideration of the 28 June 2011 Decision filed by (1) the
Philippine Stock Exchange's President, (2) Manuel V. Pangilinan, (3) Napoleon L. Nazareno ,and
(4) the Securities and Exchange Commission (collectively, movants).
Movants contend that the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution has long
been settled and defined to refer to the total outstanding shares of stock, whether voting or
non-voting. In fact, movants claim that the SEC, which is the administrative agency tasked to
enforce the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in the Constitution and
various statutes, has consistently adopted this particular definition in its numerous opinions.
Movants point out that with the 28 June 2011 Decision, the Court in effect introduced a "new"
definition or "midstream redefinition"9 of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution.
Issue: How should the term capital be construed?
Ruling:
Pursuant to the express mandate of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, Congress
enacted Republic Act No. 7042 or the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (FIA), as amended,
which defined a "Philippine national" as follows:
SEC. 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act:
The term "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines; or a domestic
partnership or association wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty percent (60%) of the
capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the
Philippines; or a corporation organized abroad and registered as doing business in the
Philippines under the Corporation Code of which one hundred percent (100%) of the capital
stock outstanding and entitled to vote is wholly owned by Filipinos or a trustee of funds for
Page 81

pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine
national and at least sixty percent (60%) of the fund will accrue to the benefit of Philippine
nationals: Provided, That where a corporation and its non-Filipino stockholders own stocks in a
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registered enterprise, at least sixty percent (60%) of
the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote of each of both corporations must be owned
and held by citizens of the Philippines and at least sixty percent (60%) of the members of the
Board of Directors of each of both corporations must be citizens of the Philippines, in order
that the corporation, shall be considered a "Philippine national."
Thus, the FIA clearly and unequivocally defines a "Philippine national" as a Philippine citizen,
or a domestic corporation at least "60% of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote"
is owned by Philippine citizens.
The Constitution expressly declares as State policy the development of an economy
"effectively controlled" by Filipinos. Consistent with such State policy, the Constitution
explicitly reserves the ownership and operation of public utilities to Philippine nationals, who
are defined in the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 as Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least 60 percent of whose capital with voting rights belongs to Filipinos. The
FIAs implementing rules explain that "for stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine
citizens or Philippine nationals, mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino
equity. Full beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is
essential." In effect, the FIA clarifies, reiterates and confirms the interpretation that the term
"capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers to shares with voting rights,
as well as with full beneficial ownership. This is precisely because the right to vote in the
election of directors, coupled with full beneficial ownership of stocks, translates to effective
control of a corporation.
Any other construction of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
contravenes the letter and intent of the Constitution. Any other meaning of the term "capital"
openly invites alien domination of economic activities reserved exclusively to Philippine
nationals. Therefore, respondents interpretation will ultimately result in handing over
effective control of our national economy to foreigners in patent violation of the Constitution,
making Filipinos second-class citizens in their own country.
Note: The FIA is the basic law governing foreign investments in the Philippines, irrespective of
the nature of business and area of investment. It spells out the procedures by which nonPhilippine nationals can invest in the Philippines.
c. Consent to be sued
How consent is given.
Veterans vs CA (1992)
Facts: VMPSI was operating as a security agency. By virtue of the provisions of RA 5487, the
Private Security Agency Law, the then Pt. Chief Lt. Fidel Ramos issued Rules and Regulations
requiring that all private security agencies/company security forces must register as members
of any PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region where their main offices are located. On
May 12, 1086, a Memorandum Argreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which
fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for 8 hours of security service per day at
P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside. On June 29, 1987, Odin Security Agency
filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat competition. PADPAO found VMPSI
guilty and recommended its expulsion from PADPAO and cancellation of its license to operate a
security agency. The PC-SUSIA (Phil. Constabulary Supervisory Unit for Security and
Investigation Agencies) made similar findings.
When VMPSI requested the issuance of a clearance/certificate of membership, PADPAO
refused to issue one. VMPSI wrote to the PC Chief on March 10 1988 but as the latter did not
reply and VMPSIs license was expiring in March 31, VMPSI filed a civil case in the RTC against
Page 82

the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA. The RTC issued a restraining order enjoining the defendants from
committing acts that would result in the cancellation or non-renewal of VMPSIs license. The PC
Chief and PC-SUSIA moved to dismiss on the ground, inter alia, that the case is against the
State which had not given its consent thereto. On June 10, 1988, the RTC issued a writ of
preliminary injunction restraining the defendants from cancelling or denying renewal of VMPSIs
license, until further orders from the court. On August 11, 1989, the CA granted the petition for
certiorari filed by the defendants, ordering the RTC to dismiss the complaint against the PC
Chief and PC-SUSIA for lack of jurisdiction. Hence, this petition for review.
Issues: W/N VMPSIs complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the state
without its consent.
How is consent given?
Ruling: The petition for review is denied and the judgment appealed form is affirmed. The
complaint is a suit against the state without its consent. The PC Chief and the PC-SUSIA being
instrumentalities of the national government exercising a primary governmental function of
regulation the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen, or security guard
agencies, said official and agency may not be sued without the Governments consent. The
consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence, from a
legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. In the instant case, the Memorandum of
Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and the PADPAO did not constitute an implied consent
by the State to be sued; it was intended to professionalize the industry and to standardize the
salaries of security guards as well as the current rates of security services, clearly a
governmental function. The execution of said agreement is incidental to the purpose of RA
5487, as amended, which is to regulate the organization and operation of private detective
watchmen or security guard agencies. The correct test for the application of state immunity is
not the conclusion of the contract by the State by the legal nature of the act.
DA vs NLRC (1993)
Facts: The Department of Agriculture (herein petitioner) and Sultan Security Agency entered
into a contracton 01 April 1989 for security services to be provided by the latter to the said
governmental entity. On 13 September 1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed
a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances,
night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages,before the
Regional Arbitration Branch X of Cagayan de Oro City against the Department of Agriculture and
Sultan Security Agency. The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 31 May finding
herein petitioner andjointlyandseverally liable with Sultan Security Agency for the payment
of money claims, aggregating P266,483.91, of the complainant security guards. On 18 July
1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution. Commanding the City Sheriff to enforce and
execute the judgment against the property of the two respondents.
A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of
injunction was filed by the petitioner with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
Cagayan de Oro, alleging, inter alia, that the writ issued was effected without the Labor
Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner, and that, therefore, the decision
of the Labor Arbiter was null and void and all actions pursuant thereto should be deemed
equally invalid and of no legal, effect. The petitioner also pointed out that the attachment or
seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize petitioner's governmental functions to the
prejudice of the public good.
Petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of
execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against
the Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on
Page 83

Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on
the non-suability of the State.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its
immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
Issue: 1. W/N the DA can be sued.
2. W/N the writ of execution was valid.
Ruling: 1. Yes. The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that "(t)he State may not be
sued without its consent,"reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of
the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the
jurisdiction of courts. True, the doctrine, not too infrequently, is derisively called "the royal
prerogative of dishonesty" because it grants the state the prerogative to defeat any legitimate
claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability.
The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not
be sued under any circumstances. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only
conveys, "the state may not be sued without its consent;" its clear import then is that the State
may at times be sued. The States' consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express
consent may be made through a general lawor a special law.In this jurisdiction, the general
law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine
government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising
from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private
parties." Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences
litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In this
situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting
party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied upon by the NLRC
and the private respondents, is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts
entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still
be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another
which is done in its proprietary capacity.
In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a
capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned
contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character.
But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e. for underpayment of wages,
holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other items, arising from the Contract for Service, clearly
constitute money claims. Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be "sued
upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied.
2. No. Pursuant to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree
("P.D.") No. 1145, the money claim first be brought to the Commission on Audit. The Labor
code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the legal basis for the State liability but the
prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the
rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445. When the state gives
its consent to be sued, it does thereby necessarily consent to unrestrained execution against it.
tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party
an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a liability.
Page 84

In Republic vs. Villasor this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of execution
directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and
executory judgment, has explained, thus
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties
either by general or special law, it may limit the claimant's action "only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when
the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under
writs or execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
correspondent appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by
the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from
their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
1.
Express Consent
a. Money claims arising from contract
SAYSON vs SINGSON (1973)

Facts: Singson was the sole proprietor of Singkier Motor Service. In January 1967, the Office of
the District Engineer requisitioned various spare parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer. After a
public bidding was conducted on May 5, the Committee on Awards accepted the bid of Singkier
Motors for the sum of P43,530. On May 16, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
sent a letter-order to Singkier requesting it to immediately deliver the items listed therein. In
due course, Voucher No. 07806 reached the hands of Highway Auditor Sayson for preaudit.
Sayson approved it for the payment of P34,824, with the retention of P8,706. On June 9, 1967,
the Voucher was paid to Singson in the amount of P34,824. However, it would appear that when
the Voucher and supporting papers reached the General Auditing Office (GAO), a canvass was
made of the spare parts among the suppliers in Manila. Quotations were submitted at P2529.64
only, which was P40,000 less than the price of Singkier. In view of the overpricing, the GAO
took up the matter with the Secretary of Public Works. The Secretary then held the district
engineer responsible for overpricing and charges for malversation were filed against the latter
and the civil engineer involved. It was the failure of the Highways Auditor that led to the filing
of the mandamus suit below, with respondent Singson being adjudged as entitled to collect the
balance of P8,700, the contract in question having been upheld. Hence, this appeal by
certiorari.
Issue: What is the proper remedy to enforce collection of money claim against the Government
arising from contract? Will mandamus apply?
Ruling: Mandamus us not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the State
but an ordinary action for specific performance. Actually, the suit disguised as one for
mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the
State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of the
State. In other words, respondent Singson should have filed his claims against the State may be
filed. It is true that once consent is secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing to
prevent the State, however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain administrative
proceedings be had and exhausted. Also, the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be
specified if thereafter on appeal would be taken by the party aggrieved. Here, there was no
ruling of the Auditor General. Even had there been such, the Court to which the matter should
have been elevated is this Tribunal; the lower court could not legally act on the matter. What
transpired was anything but that. It is quite obvious then that it does not have the imprint of
validity.
Page 85
b.
Incorporation of Government Owned and /or Controlled Corporations
NHA vs HEIRS of GUIVELONDO

Facts: On February 23, 1999, petitioner National Housing Authority filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City Complaint for eminent domain against Associacion Benevola de Cebu,
Engracia Urot and the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo. On November 12, 1999, the Heirs of Isidro
Guivelondo, respondents herein, filed a Manifestation stating that they were waiving their
objections to petitioners power to expropriate their properties. On August 7, 2000, the trial
court rendered Partial Judgment adopting the recommendation of the Commissioners and fixing
the just compensation of the lands of respondent Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo at P11,200.00 per
square meter. Petitioner NHA filed two motions for reconsideration. One of which assailed the
amount of just compensation. The lower court denied such motion. Subsequently, respondent
Heirs filed a Motion for Execution, which was granted on November 22, 2000. Prior to the
aforesaid denial of the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner filed with the trial court a Motion
to Dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-23386, complaint for eminent domain, alleging that the
implementation of its socialized housing project was rendered impossible by the
unconscionable value of the land sought to be expropriated, which the intended beneficiaries
cannot afford. The Motion was denied on September 17, 2001, on the ground that the Partial
Judgment had already become final and executory and there was no just and equitable reason
to warrant the dismissal of the case. On May 27, 2002, respondent sheriff served on the
Landbank of the Philippines a Notice of Third Garnishment against the deposits, moneys and
interests of petitioner therein. Subsequently, respondent sheriff levied on funds and personal
properties of petitioner. Hence, the matter before the SC.
Issues: 1. W/N the State can be compelled and coerced by the courts to exercise or continue
with the exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain.
2. W/N writs of execution and garnishment may be issued against the State in an
expropriation wherein the exercise of the power of eminent domain will not serve public use or
purpose.
Ruling: 1. Notably, the foregoing cases refer to the dismissal of an action for eminent domain
at the instance of the plaintiff during the pendency of the case. The rule is different where
the case had been decided and the judgment had already become final and executory.
Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is
determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the
determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by
the court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners. The outcome of the first
phase of expropriation proceedings, which is either an order of expropriation or an order of
dismissal, is final since it finally disposes of the case. On the other hand, the second phase
ends with an order fixing the amount of just compensation. Both orders, being final, are
appealable. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to
expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned.
In the case at bar, petitioner did not appeal the Order of the trial court dated
December 10, 1999, which declared that it has a lawful right to expropriate the properties of
respondent Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo. Hence, the Order became final and may no longer be
subject to review or reversal in any court.
Petitioner, in essence, contends that there are just and equitable grounds to allow dismissal or
discontinuance of the expropriation proceedings. The argument is tenuous. Socialized housing
has been recognized as public use for purposes of exercising the power of eminent domain. The
public purpose of the socialized housing project is not in any way diminished by the amount of
just compensation that the court has fixed. Respondent landowners had already been
prejudiced by the expropriation case. Petitioner cannot be permitted to institute
Page 86

condemnation proceedings against respondents only to abandon it later when it finds the
amount of just compensation unacceptable.
2. Generally, funds and properties of the government cannot be the object of garnishment
proceedings even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability
adjudged. However, if the funds belong to a public corporation or a government-owned or
controlled corporation which is clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct
from that of the government, then its funds are not exempt from garnishment. This is so
because when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign
capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. In the case of petitioner NHA, the
matter of whether its funds and properties are exempt from garnishment has already been
resolved squarely against its predecessor, the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation
(PHHC). Hence, it is clear that the funds of petitioner NHA are not exempt from garnishment or
execution. Petitioners prayer for injunctive relief to restrain respondent Sheriff Pascual
Abordo from enforcing the Notice of Levy and Garnishment against its funds and properties
must, therefore, be denied.
2.
Implied Consent
a. Government enters into business contracts
PTA vs PGDEI (2012)

Facts: PTA, an agency of the Department of Tourism, whose main function is to bolster and
promote tourism, entered into a contract with Atlantic Erectors, Inc.(AEI)for the construction
of the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects. Since AEI was incapable of constructing the
golf course aspect of the project, it entered into a sub-contract agreement with PHILGOLF,a
duly organized domestic corporation, to build the golf course. The sub-contract agreement also
provides that PHILGOLF shall submit its progress billings directly to PTA and, in turn, PTA shall
directly pay PHILGOLF.
PHILGOLF filed a collection suit against PTA plus interest, for the construction of the golf
course. PTA failed to answer the complaint. Hence, the RTC rendered a judgment of default.
Issue: W/N PTA is immune from the suit.
Ruling: PTA erred in invoking state immunity simply because it is a government entity. The
application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of sovereign
transactions and not in cases of commercial activities or economic affairs. The State, in
entering into a business contract, descends to the level of an individual and is deemed to have
tacitly given its consent to be sued. Since the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects
partakes of a proprietary character entered into between PTA and PHILGOLF, PTA cannot avoid
its financial liability by merely invoking immunity from suit.
b.
Inequitable claim to immunity
EPG CONSTRUCTION vs VIGILAR (2001)

Facts: In 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlement, through the BLISS Development Corporation,
initiated a housing project. The Ministry of Public Works and Highways forged individual
contracts with herein petitioners EPG Construction Co., Ciper Electrical and Engineering, Septa
Construction Co., Phil. Plumbing Co., Home Construction Inc., World Builders Inc., Glass World
Inc., Performance Builders Development Co. and De Leon Araneta Construction Co., for the
construction of the housing units.
After complying with the terms of said contracts, and by reason of the verbal request
and assurance of then DPWH Undersecretary Aber Canlas that additional funds would be
available and forthcoming, petitioners agreed to undertake and perform additional
constructions[4]for the completion of the housing units, despite the absence of appropriations
Page 87

and written contracts to cover subsequent expenses for the additional constructions.
Petitioners then received payment for the construction work duly covered by the individual
written contracts, thereby leaving an unpaid balance of P5,918,315.63, which amount
represents the expenses for the additional constructions for the completion of the existing
housing units.On 14 November 1988, petitioners sent a demand letter to the DPWH Secretary.
The money claims were then referred to COA which returned the same to the DPWH Auditor for
auditorial action. On the basis of the Inspection Report of the Auditors Technical Staff, the
DPWH Auditor interposed no objection to the payment of the money claims subject to whatever
action the COA may adopt.
The COA returned the documents to the DPWH, stating that funds should first be made
available before COA could pass upon and act on the money claims. Then DPWH Secretary Jose
De Jesus requested the Secretary of Budget and Management to release public funds for the
payment of petitioners money claims. P5,819,316.00 was then released for the payment of
petitioners money claims.
In a letter dated 26 August 1996, respondent DPWH Secretary Gregorio Vigilar denied
the subject money claims prompting herein petitioners to file before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, , a Petition for Mandamus praying that herein respondent be ordered to pay.
Issue: 1. W/N petitioners-contractors have the right to be compensated for a public works
housing project.
2. W/N DPWH is immune from suit.
Ruling: 1. YES. Respondents posits that the existence of appropriations and availability of
funds as certified to and verified by the proper accounting officials are conditions sine qua
non for the execution of government contracts. According to respondent, sans showing of
certificate of availability of funds, the implied contracts are considered fatally defective and
considered inexistent and void ab initio. Respondent concludes that inasmuch as the
additional work done was pursued in violation of the mandatory provisions of the laws
concerning contracts involving expenditure of public funds and in excess of the public officials
contracting authority, the same is not binding on the government and impose no liability
therefor.
We find the instant petition laden with merit and uphold,in the interest of substantial
justice, petitioners-contractors right to be compensated for the "additional constructions" on
the public works housing project, applying the principle of quantum meruit. The peculiar
circumstances present in the instant case buttress petitioners claim for compensation for the
additional constructions, despite the illegality and void nature of the implied contracts
forged between the DPWH and petitioners-contractors. On this matter, it bears stressing that
the illegality of the subject contracts proceeds from an express declaration or prohibition by
law, and not from any intrinsic illegality.
To our mind, it would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable for us to defeat
petitioners-contractors right to be duly compensated for actual work performed and services
rendered, where both the government and the public have, for years, received and accepted
benefits from said housing project and reaped the fruits of petitioners-contractors honest toil
and labor.
2. NO. Incidentally, respondent likewise argues that the State may not be sued in the
instant case, invoking the constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the State,[17] otherwise
known as theRoyal Prerogative of Dishonesty. Respondents argument is misplaced inasmuch
as the Principle of State Immunity finds no application in the case before us. Under these
circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty and
conveniently hide under the States cloak of invincibility against suit, considering that this
principle yields to certain settled exceptions. True enough, the rule, in any case, is not
absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. the
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating
Page 88

an injustice on a citizen.It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal
norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained.
To be sure, this Court as the staunch guardian of the citizens rights and welfare
cannot sanction an injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the
perpetration thereof. Justice and equity sternly demand that the States cloak of invincibility
against suit be shred in this particular instance, and that petitionerscontractors be duly
compensated on the basis of quantum meruit for construction done on the public works
housing project.
REPUBLIC vs UNIMEX (2007)
Facts: Respondent Unimex Micro-Electronics GmBH (Unimex) shipped a 40-foot container and
171 cartons of Atari game computer cartridges, duplicators, expanders, remote controllers,
parts and accessories to Handyware Phils., Inc. After the shipment arrived in the Port of Manila
on July 9, 1985, the Bureau of Customs (BOC) agents discovered that it did not tally with the
description appearing on the cargo manifest. As a result, BOC instituted seizure proceedings
against Handyware and later issued a warrant of seizure and detention against the shipment.
The Collector of Customs issued a default order against Handyware for failing to appear. The
Collector then forfeited the goods in favor of the government.
Respondent filed a petition for review against petitioner Commissioner of Customs (BOC
Commissioner) in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CTA reversed the forfeiture decree and
ordered the release of the subject shipment to respondent subject to the payment of customs
duties. The CTA decision became final and executor. Unfortunately, however, respondents
counsel failed to secure a writ of execution to enforce the CTA decision. Respondent filed in
the CTA a petition for the revival of its June 15, 1992 decision. It prayed for the immediate
release by BOC of its shipment or, in the alternative, payment of the shipments value plus
damages.
BOC informed the court that the subject shipment could no longer be found at its warehouses.
The CTA declared that its June 15, 1992 decision could no longer be executed due to the loss of
respondents shipment so it ordered the BOC Commissioner to pay respondent the commercial
value of the goods based on the prevailing exchange rate at the time of their importation. The
dispositive portion of the decision read: xxx payment shall be taken from the sale or sales of
the goods or properties seized or forfeited by the Bureau of Customs. BOC appealed. The CA
held that the BOC Commissioner was liable for the value of the subject shipment as the same
was lost while in its custody.
Issue: 1. W/N the state is liable for the loss.
2. W/N government funds can be charged with respondents claim without a corresponding
appropriation.
Ruling: 1. Yes and yes. Petitioner argues that a money judgment or any charge against the
government requires a corresponding appropriation and cannot be decreed by mere judicial
order. Although it may be gainsaid that the satisfaction of respondents demand will ultimately
fall on the government, and that, under the political doctrine of state immunity, it cannot be
held liable for governmental acts (jus imperii),we still hold that petitioner cannot escape its
liability. The circumstances of this case warrant its exclusion from the purview of the state
immunity doctrine.
The Court cannot turn a blind eye to BOCs ineptitude and gross negligence in the
safekeeping of respondents goods.
The situation does not allow us to reject respondents claim on the mere invocation of
the doctrine of state immunity. Succinctly, the doctrine must be fairly observed and the State
should not avail itself of this prerogative to take undue advantage of parties that may have
legitimate claims against it. Justice and equity now demand that the States cloak of
invincibility against suit and liability be shredded.
Page 89

Accordingly, we agree with the lower courts directive that, upon payment of the
necessary customs duties by respondent, petitioners payment shall be taken from the sale or
sales of goods or properties seized or forfeited by the Bureau of Customs.(no appropriation
needed)
c. Government initiates a complaint. Open to counterclaim.
FROILAN vs PAN (1950)
Facts: On February 3, 1951, Froilan filed a complaint against Pan Oriental Shipping Co.,
alleging that: Foilan purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel FS-197 for P200T,
paying P50T down and agreeing to pauy the balance in installments; that, Foroilan mortgaged
said vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission to secure the pauyment of the balance; for
failure to pay the installments, the Shipping Commission took possession of the vessel and
cancelled the contract of sale; that Shipping Commission chartered and delivered the vessel to
Part Oriental; that Foilan appealed to the President and the Cabinet restored him to his rights
under the original contract of sale with the Shipping Commission; that Pan Orental refused to
deliver the vessel to Froilan; Froilan prayed that a writ of replevin be issued for the seizure of
said vessel and that he be adjudged to have the rightful possession thereof. The lower court
issued the writ of replevin and Pan Oriental was divested of its possession of the vessel. On
November 10, 1951, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint-inintervention alleging that: Froilan failed to pay to the Shipping Commission; that Pan Oriental
refused to deliver the vessel to Froilan; Froilan prayed that a writ of replevin be issued for the
seizure of said vessel and that he be adjudicated to have the rightful possession thereof. The
lower court issued the writ of replevin and Pan Oriental was divested of its possession of the
vessel. On March 21, 1951, the latter filed its answer denying the right of Froilan to the
possession of said vessel.
On November 10, 1951, the government filed a complaint-in-intervention alleging that: Froilan
failed to pay to the Shipping Commission the balance due on the purchase price of the vessel;
the Intervenor was entitled to the possession of the vessel either under the terms of the
original contract or in order that it may cause the extrajudicial sale thereof under the Chattel
Mortgage Law. Intervenor prayed that Froilan be ordered to deliver the vessel to the Board of
Liquidators.
On Novemeber 29, 1951, Pan Oriental filed an Answer to the complainant-in-intervention
alleging that: The Republic was obligated to deliver the vessel to it vy virtue of a contract of
bareboat charter with option to purchase executed on June 16, 1949 by the Republic in favor of
Pan Oriental; that Pan Oriental had made necessary and useful expenses on the vessel and
claimed the right of retention; that Pan Oriental prayed that, if the Republic succeeded in
obtaining possession of said vessel, the Republic must comply with its obligation of delivering
to the former or causing its delivery by recovering it from Froilan. The Republic filed a motion
to dismiss the counterclaim of Pan Oriental on the ground that its purpose was to compel the
government to deliver the vessel to Pan Oriental in the event that the government recovers the
vessel from Froilan. It was also alleged that moven was not subject to the jurisdiction of the
court in connection with the counterclaim. The lower court granted the motion and dismissed
the counterclaim. It is from this order that Pan Oriental filed the present appeal.
Issue: W/N the lower court erred in dismissing the counterclaim on the ground that the state is
immune from suit.
Ruling: This is untenable because by filing its complaint-in-intervention, the Government in
effect waived its right of non-suability. Hence, the appealed order is reversed and set aside and
the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. The immunity of the State from
suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The State as
Page 90

plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by
taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged
position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires,
within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have
against the State.
REPUBLIC vs SANDIGANBAYAN (2006)
Facts: Civil Case No. 0034 entitled Republic of the Philippines, plaintiff, v. Roberto S.
Benedicto, et al., defendants, is a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
reconstitution and damages. The case is one of several suits involving ill-gotten or unexplained
wealth that petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, filed with the Sandiganbayan against
private respondent Roberto S. Benedicto.
PCGG issued writs placing under sequestration all business enterprises, entities and
other properties, real and personal, owned or registered in the name of private respondent
Benedicto, or of corporations in which he appeared to have controlling or majority interest.
Among the properties thus sequestered and taken over by PCGG fiscal agents were the 227
shares in NOGCCI owned by private respondentBenedictoand registered in his name or under
the names of corporations he owned or controlled.
Following the sequestration process, PCGG representatives sat as members of the
Board of Directors of NOGCCI. As sequestrator of the 227 shares of stock in question, PCGG did
not pay the corresponding monthly membership due thereon totalingP2,959,471.00. On account
thereof, the 227 sequestered shares were declared delinquent to be disposed of in an auction
sale. PCGG filed a complaint for injunction with the Regional Trial Court. The complaint,
however, was dismissed, paving the way for the auction sale for the delinquent 227 shares of
stock. OnAugust 5, 1989, an auction sale was conducted.
On November 3, 1990, petitioner Republic and private respondent Benedicto entered
into a Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. 0034. The agreement contained a general
release clausewhereunderpetitionerRepublicagreed and bound itself to lift the sequestration
on
the
227
NOGCCI
shares,
among
other
B e n e d i c t o s
p r o p e r t i e s , p e t i t i o n e r Re p u b l i c a c k n o w l e d g i n g t h a t i t w a s w i t h i n p r i v a t e
respondent Benedictos capacity to acquire the same shares out of his income from business
and the exercise of his profession.
The Sandiganbayan approved the Compromise Agreement and accordingly rendered
judgment in accordance with its terms and subsequently ordered the return of the sequestered
shares or in default thereof, to pay their value which can be deducted from the Republics cash
share in the Compromise Agreement.
Owing to PCGGs failure to comply with the above directive, Benedicto filed in Civil
Case No. 0034aMotion for Compliance.
PCGG filed a motion for reconsideration which the SB denied. Hence, this recourse
before the SC.
Issue: W/N the PCGG is liable? Can it invoke immunity from suit?
Ruling: PCGG itself does not dispute its being considered as a receiver insofar as the
sequestered 227 NOGCCI shares of stock are concerned. PCGG also acknowledges that as such
receiver, one of its functions is to pay outstanding debts pertaining to the sequestered entity or
property, in this case the 227 NOGCCI shares in question. It contends, however, that
membership dues owing to a golf club cannot be considered as an outstanding debt for which
PCGG, as receiver, must pay. Petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes state immunity
from suit. But, as private respondent Benedicto correctly countered, the PCGG fails to take
stock of one of the exceptions to the state immunity principle, i.e., when the government
itself is the suitor, as inCivil Case No. 0034.
Page 91

Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the
maincase,immunityfrom suit cannot be effectively invoked.For, asjurisprudence teaches,
when
the
State,
through
its
duly
authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a private party, it thereby
descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens itself to whatever counterclaims or
defenses the latter may have against it.PetitionerRepublics act offiling its complaint inCivil
Case No. 0034constitutes a waiver of its immunity from suit. Being itself the plaintiff in that
c a s e , p e t i t i o n e r R e p u b l i c c a n n o t s e t u p i t s i m m u n i t y a g a i n s t p r i v a t e
respondentBenedictosprayers in the same case.
In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private respondent Benedicto,
petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself in the
same level of its adversary. When the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents,
in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative
authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise
therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by
entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent to be
sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract, breach of which on its part
gives the corresponding right to the other party to the agreement.
3. Scope of Consent
a. Under Act No. 3083
G.R. No. L-30098 February 18, 1970
THE COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS vs. HON. LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO
FACTS: On 1940, the Government of the Philippines filed a complaint for eminent domain for
the expropriation of a parcel of land belonging to N. T. Hashim, needed to construct a public
road, now known as Epifanio de los Santos Avenue.
The parties thereafter worked out a compromise agreement, respondent estate having
proposed on April 28, 1966, the total amount of P209,076.00, equivalent to the land's total
assessed value, which was confirmed, ratified and approved in November, 1966 by the
Commissioner of Public Highways and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
On the same date, October 14, 1968, respondent Garcia, as special sheriff, forthwith served a
Notice of Garnishment, on respondent Philippine National Bank, notifying said bank that levy
was thereby made upon funds of petitioners Bureau of Public Highways and the Auditor General
on deposit, with the bank to cover the judgment of P209,076.00 in favor of respondent estate.
ISSUE: w/n the government funds maybe garnished to satisfy a money claim arising from an
expropriation proceeding?
HELD: NO. the Court holds that respondent Court's two questioned orders are null and void on
the fundamental ground that government funds are not subject to execution or garnishment.
As early as 1919, the Court has pointed out that although the Government, as plaintiff in
expropriation proceedings, submits itself to the jurisdiction of the Court and thereby waives its
immunity from suit, the judgment that is thus rendered requiring its payment of the award
determined as just compensation for the condemned property as a condition precedent to the
transfer to the title thereto in its favor, cannot be realized upon execution. The Court there
added that it is incumbent upon the legislature to appropriate any additional amount, over and
above the provisional deposit, that may be necessary to pay the award determined in the
judgment, since the Government cannot keep the land and dishonor the judgment.
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is
rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
Page 92

garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of Public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required
objects, as appropriated by law.
This doctrine was again stressed by. the Court in Republic vs. Palacio, setting aside as null and
void the order of garnishment issued by the sheriff pursuant to the lower Court's writ of
execution on funds of the Pump Irrigation Trust Fund in the account of the Government's
Irrigation Service Unit with the Philippine National Bank. The Court emphasized then and reemphasizes now that judgments against the State or its agencies and instrumentalities in cases
where the State has consented to be sued, operate merely to liquidate and establish the
plaintiff's claim; such judgments may not be enforced by writs of execution or garnishment and
it is for the legislature to provide for their payment through the corresponding appropriation,
as indicated in Act 3083.
. Under a Charter
G.R. No. L-32667 January 31, 1978
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATION
FACTS: What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation deposited at petitioner's branch in Quezon City, to satisfy a decision of respondent
Court which had become final and executory. 1 A writ of execution in favor of private
respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had previously been issued. 2 He was the counsel of the
prevailing party, the United Homesite Employees and Laborers Association, in the
aforementioned case. The validity of the order assailed is challenged on the ground that the
funds subject of the garnishment "may be public in character."
ISSUE: w/n the funds of People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (a government owned
entity) may be garnished?
HELD: YES. The premise that the funds could be spoken of as public in character may be
accepted in the sense that the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation was a governmentowned entity. It does not follow though that they were exempt from garnishment. National
Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. court of Industrial Relations is squarely in point. As was
explicitly stated in the opinion of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion: "The
allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the government, and
that, as such, the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable for, as a
government owned and controlled corporation. The NASSCO has a personality of its own,
distinct and separate from that of the Government. It has pursuant to Section 2 of Executive
Order No. 356, dated October 23, 1950 ..., pursuant to which the NASSCO has been established
'all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law ...' Accordingly, it may sue and be
sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation (Section 13, Act
No. 1459), as amended.
In a 1941 decision, Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company, this Court,
through Justice Ozaeta, held: "On the other hand, it is well settled that when the government
enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like
any other corporation. By engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a
corporation, the governmnent divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to
render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations."
The invocation of Republic v. Palacio, as well as Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego,
did not help the cause of petitioner at all The decisions are not applicable. The funds
appertained to a governmental office, not to a government-owned or controlled corporation
with a separate juridical personality. In neither case therefore was there an entity with the
Page 93

capacity to sue and be sued, the funds of which could thereafter be held liable to execution
and garnishment in the event of an adverse judgment.
Both the Palacio and the Commissioner of Public Highways decisions, insofar as they reiterate
the doctrine that one of the coronaries of the fundamental concept of non-suability is that
governmental funds are immune from garnishment, refer to Merritt v. Insular Government, a
1916 decisio. Since then such a principle has been followed with undeviating rigidity, the latest
case in point being Republic v. Villasor, promulgated in 1973. It is an entirely different matter
if, according to Justice Sanchez in Ramos v. Court of Industrial Relations, the office or entity is
"possessed of a separate and distinct corporate existence." Then it can sue and be sued.
Thereafter, its funds may be levied upon or garnished. That is what happened in this case.
c. Execution
[ G.R. No. 113191. September 18, 1996
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
FACTS: On 27 January 1993, private respondent initiated NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-01-0690-93
for his alleged illegal dismissal by ADB and the latter's violation of the "labor-only" contracting
law. Forthwith, the ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as
its President and Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal process except for
borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the
Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank.
The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived
its diplomatic immunity from suit. The ADB did not appeal the decision.. Petitioner was later
constrained to make an application for a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
following the issuance, on 16 March 1994, by the Labor Arbiter of a writ of execution.
ISSUE: w/n the writ of execution is enforceable against ADB?
HELD: No. Article 50(1) of the Charter provides:
"The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in cases arising out of
or in connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to guarantee obligations, or
to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of securities.
The above stipulations of both the Charter and Headquarters Agreement should be able, nay
well enough, to establish that, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee
operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities, the ADB enjoys
immunity from legal process of every form. The Banks officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in
respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the
Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and
commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government which must be respected.
"It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers
that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look
beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of
diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government x x
x it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion
by the principal law officer of the government, x x x or other officer acting under his direction.
Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction x
x x as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is
accepted doctrine that `in such cases the judicial department of government follows the action
of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic
jurisdiction.'
Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is
independent of the municipal law.
Page 94

"One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local
jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of
the country where it is found. (See Jenks, Id., pp. 37-44). The obvious reason for this is that
the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a
convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even
influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to
local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities
impartially on behalf of its member-states
"The Supreme Court has long settled the matter of diplomatic immunities. In WHO vs. Aquino,
SCRA 48, it ruled that courts should respect diplomatic immunities of foreign officials
recognized by the Philippine government. Such decision by the Supreme Court forms part of the
law of the land.
REPUBLIC v. NLRC
263 SCRA 290 (1996)
FaCTS: The full ownership of PNEI was transferred to its creditor, the National Investment
Development Corporation ("NIDC"), a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank ("PNB"),
following the latter's foreclosure of PNEI assets. PNEI was one among several companies placed
under sequestration by the Presidential Commission on Good Government ("PCGG") shortly after
the historic 1986 events in EDSA. The sequestration order was lifted to give way to the sale of
PNEI by the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) which, in the meanwhile, had taken over the
management of the company. The continuing deterioration of its financial condition prompted
PNEI to lodge a Petition for Suspension of Payments with the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"), a move calculated to prevent further dissipation of PNEI's assets and to
make PNEI a viable source of income for the government.
The management committee, which was created to handle the business operations of PNEI,
presented a report to the SEC that recommended, in a move to best serve the interest of all
parties concerned (creditors, employees of PNEI and the government), the sale of the company
through privatization in accordance with the rules of the APT. As a cost saving measure, the
management committee also recommended to the SEC the retrenchment of some 500
employees of PNEI. The retrenchment was carried out.
The filing of various labor complaints against PNEI was the immediate result where PNEI lost
against the employees. By virtue of the writ of execution, various pieces of property of PNEI
were levied upon and sold at public auction. Meanwhile, APT filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Quash Execution. By then, the proceeds of the sale of some property had amounted to
P1,200,000.00. The amount was deposited with the NLRC pending resolution of APT's motion.
On the other hand, the employees filed a Motion for Intervention before Labor Arbiter Aquino
claiming interest over the same property of PNEI because of the union's own monetary claim
against the latter. Proceeds from the sale though were not enough to cover these claims,
together with the claims of the creditors.
Issue: Whether or not APT can be sued to be held liable to the obligation of PNEI
HELD Proclamation No. 50, creating APT which has been mandated to "take title to and
possession of, conserve, provisionally manage and dispose of assets" that have been identified
for privatization or disposition, clearly provides that said instrumentality, among other things,
can "sue and be sued." This provision indubitably shows that APT can be haled to court.
Nonetheless, we have likewise since explained that suability does not necessarily mean liability
on the part of the particular instrumentality or agency of the government. The liability of APT
under this particular arrangement should be co-extensive with the amount of assets taken over
from the privatized firm.
Page 95
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JUDGE VICENTE A. HIDALGO

FACTS: On 02 June 1999, Tarcila Laperal Mendoza filed an action for the annulment or
declaration of nullity of the title and deed of sale, reconveyance and/or recovery of ownership
and possession of a four thousand nine hundred twenty-four-square meter (4,924.60 sq. m. to
be exact) property against the Republic of the Philippines (in whose name the title to the
property was transferred and registered. The property in question is located at 1440 Arlegui
Street, San Miguel, Manila.
On 27 August 2003, Judge Hidalgo rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff Mendoza. A
certificate of finality[8] of judgment was issued by the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Michael B.
Robles, on 27 November 2003. On 10 December 2003, respondent issued an order[9] directing
the issuance of a writ of execution. On 07 January 2004, Sheriff Cachero further directed the
National Treasurer to cause payment of P1,942,576,312.45, thus:
ISSUE: w/n the writ of execution can be enforced against the state? NO
-w/n the state can be held liable for attorneys fees? - NO
HELD: In the present case, respondent Judge patently committed two inexcusable procedural
errors the pronouncement of costs against the government and the subsequent issuance of
the writ of execution, in violation of settled rules and jurisprudence.
In the decision dated 27 August 2003, respondent Judge declared the Republic liable for
payment of attorneys fees and cost of suit, pertinent portion of which reads: 7. Ordering the
defendant Republic of the Philippines to pay the plaintiff attorneys fee, in an amount
equivalent to FIFTEEN (15%) PER CENT of the amount due to the plaintiff.
In declaring the government answerable to the attorneys fees of the plaintiff and other
costs of the suit, the respondent utterly disregarded the well-established rule that costs of suit
are not recoverable against the government (Section 1, Rule 142, Rules of Court). As early as
15 November 1918, we ruled in the case of Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v.
Rafferty that no costs shall be allowed against the government of the Philippine Islands where
the government is the unsuccessful party. This was reiterated in the case of Philippines
Veterans Affairs Office v. Anover and The Philippine Veterans Affairs Office v. Tamayo, when we
ruled that court costs are not recoverable from a government agency.
It is settled that when the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby
necessarily consent to an unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put, when the State waives
its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can,
that the state has a liability. In Republic v. Villasor this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an
alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
satisfy a final and executory judgment, has explained, thus . . . The universal rule that where
the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may
limit claimants action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since
government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
public funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law. The
functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to paralyzed or
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law.
4. Suability vs Liability
E. MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Page 96

FACTS: The plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle and collided with the General Hospital ambulance.
As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor,
and he had to give up a contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco building."
The court find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his
part, is P18,075.
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:
An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands
and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit.
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the
responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled
on account of said collision, . . . ." These were the two questions submitted to the court for
determination.
ISSUE: Does the Act authorize us to hold that the Government is legally liable for that amount?
HELD: No.
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability
to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting
liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any
lawful defense.
Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on the part
of the state for the acts of its officers, and that the suit now stands just as it would stand
between private parties. It is difficult to see how the act does, or was intended to do, more
than remove the state's immunity from suit. It simply gives authority to commence suit for the
purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with the estate. Nowhere in the act is there a
whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit shall depart from
well established principles of law, or that the amount of damages is the only question to be
settled. The act opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the question
of liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's immunity from
suit.
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to
any cause not previously recognized.
That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts
through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed,
is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the
duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being
bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not
apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his
own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his
office and which are regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18,
1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only
liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of
its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of
paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General
Hospital was not such an agent.
Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above
set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its
employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not
called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.
Page 97

MUN. OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION v. FIRME
195 SCRA 692 (1991)
FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando is a municipal corporation existing under and in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Judge Firme is
impleaded in his official capacity as the Presiding Judge of the CH. Private respondents are
heirs of the deceased Laureano Banina, Sr. and plaintiffs in the civil case before the aforesaid
Court. On Dec. 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Balagot
and owned by the Estate of Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Nianandog and owned
by Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fentando and driven by Bislig. Due to
the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Banina, Sr. died and 4 others
suffered physical injuries. On Dec. 11, 1966, private respondents instituted a complaint for
damages against the Estate of Nieveras and Balagot, owlter and driver, respectively, of the
passenger jeepney. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the
petitioner and the driver of the dump truck of petitioner. Private respondents amended the
complaint wherein the petitioner and its regular employee, Bishg, were impleaded as
defendants. Petitioner invoked, among others, nonsuability of the State.
On Oct. 10, 1979, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs (private
respondents) ordering defendants Municipality of San Fernando and Bislig to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiffs for funeral expenses, actual damages, attorney's fees and costs of the
suit, dismissing the complaint against the Estate of Nieveras and Balagot. In an order dated
Nov. 7, 1979, the respondent Judge Firme denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioner. Hence this petition. (Respondent Judge failed to resolve the issue of nonsuability of
the state in the guise of the municipality.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality of San Fernando is liable for quasidelict committed by
its regular employee?
HELD: We arrive at the conclusion that the Municipality cannot be held liable for the torts
committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental
functions. Hence, the death of the passenger imposed on the Municipality no duty to pay
monetary compensation. Accordingly, the petition is granted.
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters
grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for
torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held
answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In
permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that
the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or
that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot
recover.
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the Municipality insist that "he was on his
way to the Naguilian River to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's
municipal streets." In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the
performance of official duty is presumed. We rule that the driver of the dump truck was
performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN VS. HON. SIMEON P. DUMDUM, JR

G.R. No. 168289
FACTS: The case stems from a Complaint filed by herein private respondent Emily Rose Go Ko
Lim Chao against herein petitioners, the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan and its chief
executive, Felix V. Ople (Ople) for collection of a sum of money and damages. It was alleged
that sometime in the middle of the year 2000, respondent, doing business as KD Surplus and as
Page 98

such engaged in buying and selling surplus trucks, heavy equipment, machinery, spare parts and
related supplies, was contacted by petitioner Ople.
Respondent had entered into an
agreement with petitioner municipality through Ople for the delivery of motor vehicles, which
supposedly were needed to carry out certain developmental undertakings in the municipality.
However, despite having made several deliveries, Ople allegedly did not heed respondents
claim for payment.
ISSUE: W/N the municipality maybe held liable? YES.
HELD: The general rule spelled out in Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution is that the state
and its political subdivisions may not be sued without their consent. Otherwise put, they are
open to suit but only when they consent to it. Consent is implied when the government enters
into a business contract, as it then descends to the level of the other contracting party; or it
may be embodied in a general or special law[34] such as that found in Book I, Title I, Chapter
2, Section 22 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which vests local government units with
certain corporate powers one of them is the power to sue and be sued.
Be that as it may, a difference lies between suability and liability. As held in City of Caloocan
v. Allarde,[35] where the suability of the state is conceded and by which liability is ascertained
judicially, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to satisfy the judgment or not.
Execution may not issue upon such judgment, because statutes waiving non-suability do not
authorize the seizure of property to satisfy judgments recovered from the action. These
statutes only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final
and make provisions for its full satisfaction. Thus, where consent to be sued is given by
general or special law, the implication thereof is limited only to the resultant verdict on the
action before execution of the judgment.[36]
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit claimants action only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment
is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution
or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriations as required
objects. x x x
VOL. 323, JANUARY 28, 2000

699
Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
ANNOTATION
VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY FROM LOCAL JURISDICTION
By
JORGE R. COQUIA*
________________
1.Introduction, p. 699
2.Historical Background of Diplomatic Immunity, p. 700
3.The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, p. 702
4.Absolute and Relative Immunity, p. 702
5.Theory of Absolute Immunity, p. 703
6.Immunities of Diplomatic Agents, p. 704
7.Immunities of Consuls, p. 704
8.Honorary Consuls, p. 705
Page 99

9.Immunity of Officials Representing a Sovereign State, p. 706
10.Immunity of Officials of International Organizations, p. 708
11.Immuntiy of Intergovernmental International Organizations, p. 709
12.Immunity of Non-Governmental International Organizations, p. 710
13.The Doctrine of Restrictive Immunity, p. 712
14.Immunity of Ad Hoc Diplomats, p. 714
15.The Proper Procedure in the Jeffrey Liang Case, p. 714
1. Introduction
The concept of diplomatic immunity or exemption of individuals from local jurisdiction
originally started from the immunity of diplomatic envoys such as ambassadors, minis________________
* Member, Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA).
700
700
ters, our counselors representing their countries abroad. Heads of states or sovereign rulers
traveling abroad enjoy inviolability from local jurisdiction. As international relations developed
with the formation of the family of nations, the concept of immunity persons from local
jurisdiction has very much broadened. Immunity has extended to consuls, ad hoc diplomats,
international organizations and their officers. International law now recognizes a system of
granting immunity from local jurisdiction not only intergovernmental organizations but also
international non-governmental organizations and their officials.
The nature of diplomatic immunity granted to officials of intergovernment organizations was
the issue in JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), Petitioner, versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent, G.R. No. 125865, promulgated on January 28, 2000 now under annotation.
The petitioner in said case, an employee of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), an
intergovernmental banking organization who allegedly committed a crime of oral defamation
invoked immunity from suit, citing a provision of the Headquarters Agreement between the
Philippine government and the ADB, that: Officers and staff of the Bank including for the
purpose of this Article experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the
following privileges and immunities:
(a) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official
capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.
2. Historical Background of Diplomatic Immunity
Diplomatic immunity with the law on diplomatic relations among States was developed much
earlier than all other aspects of international law. Even before the emergence of Greek
civilization, the records of ancient China, India and Egypt showed practices observing respect
for emissaries and recognizing the sacred character of their office. Although no
701
VOL. 323, JANUARY 28, 2000
701
permanent embassies were established, the Greeks and the Romans sent and received envoys
who were accorded respect and personal inviolability. By then, traces of the principle of
Page 100

exterritoriality as now understood in modern international law had already been recognized.
(Grotius, Book II, ch. XVII on Right to Legation, trans. by FCG Kelsley, Carnegie Endorsement for
International Peace, Oxford, 1925).
Up to the fall of Roman Empire, ambassadors were regarded only as personal representatives of
the kings or princes. With the development of the Italian states in the fourteenth century,
embassies took on a more formal character, especially in the case of the representatives of the
Holy See to the various secular courts. By the fifteenth century, resident embassies were
established and some form of diplomatic procedure developed. Eventually, questions of
precedence and inviolability of envoys arose, which resulted in serious disputes among States.
(De Vattel, Book IV, ch. V-IX [1773] Law of Nations).
By custom and tradition antedating all other rules of international law, the diplomatic agents
sent by one state to another have been regarded as possessing a peculiarly sacred character, in
consequence of which they have been accorded special privileges and immunities. The ancient
Greeks regarded an attack upon the person of an ambassador as an offense of the gravest
nature. The writers of ancient Rome were unanimous in considering an injury to envoys as
deliberate infraction of the jus gentium. Grotius wrote in 1625 that there were two points
with regard to ambassadors which are everywhere recognized as prescribed by the law of
nations, first that they be admitted, and then that they be not violated. The basis upon which
this personal immunity rested was generally found in the principle that the ambassador
personified the state or sovereign he represented. From this principle developed not only the
custom of according special protection to the person of the ambassador but also a
comprehensive exemption from the local jurisdiction. In explanation of the privileges and
immunities thus granted, writers worked out the fiction of exterritoriality, which held that the
ambas702
702
sador and his suite, together with his residence and the surrounding property, were legally
outside the territory of the state. This fiction obtained for a time of foothold in international
law and served the useful purpose, on one hand, of explaining the actual immunities granted to
foreign representatives and, on the other hand, of emphasizing the sovereignty and equality of
the several states. It was, however, open to the disadvantage not only of being a fiction but of
permitting inferences more comprehensive than the position of the ambassador called for. The
conception is abandoned in the Vienna Convention; which offers no theoretical basis for the
privileges and immunities it grants. (Fenwick, Charles G., International Law, Appleton-Century
Co., Inc., New York [1965]).
3. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Relations
The law on diplomatic intercourse in general as now codified in the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations. Likewise the law in consular immunities and privileges are provided with
the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
4. Absolute and Relative Immunity
Immunity from the exercise of local jurisdiction may be generally classified as absolute or
relative. According to the classical, or absolute, theory of sovereign immunity, a foreign
sovereign could not, without his consent, be made a defendant in the courts of another
sovereign. But according to a newer and restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, such
exemption has been recognized only with respect to sovereign or public acts of state and not
necessarily with respect to its so-called private acts.
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Long ago, the principle of sovereign immunity embraced both the government of a foreign
sovereign (state immunity) and the individual head of the state in question (personal
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703
immunity). Today the two forms of immunity are quite distinct and have to be discussed
separately.
5. Theory of Absolute Immunity
Regardless of whether an individual is constitutionally the actual head of a state or only its
nominal head, he or she enjoys complete immunity from suit in the territory of another state.
This principle applies equally to crowned heads of state and elected heads of state. And
whatever the sovereign may do in the territory of another state, he is immune from all
prosecution, civil or criminal. This principle was applied in Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, Queens
Bench Division (1894) 1 Q. B. 149. The Sultan of Johore, a young man visiting England was sued
by a woman for breach of promise to marry. Although the Sultan was not exactly a head of a
state, the English Court dismissed the case on the ground that the Sultan of Johore is immune
from suit. The Court held that (1) certification of the status of a foreign sovereign by means of
an official communication from an adviser of the British sovereign binds English courts and is to
be accepted as conclusive as far as those courts are concerned, and (2) the relationship
existing between Great Britain and the Sultanate of Johore was based on a treaty of protection
by which the Sultan was to enjoy the protection of Great Britain, engaging, on his part, not to
enter into treaties with any foreign states. In the opinion of the court, the agreement by the
sultan not to enter into treaties with other Power does not seem. . . to be abnegation of his
right to enter into such treaties, but only a condition upon which the protection stipulated for
is to be given. If the sultan disregards it, the consequences may be the loss of that protection,
or possibly other difficulties with this country; but I do not think that there is anything in the
treaty which qualifies or disproves the statement in the letter that the Sultan of Johore is an
independent sovereign.
Similarly, the Gaekwar of Baroda, named as correspondent in the divorce suit of Statham v.
Statham and the Gaekwar of Barosa, (Great Britain, Probate Court, 1912, p. 12, cited in
704
704
Glahn, Law Among Nations, p. 138) was declared by a British court to be immune from suit
because of his position as sovereign of an independent state in India.
A foreign sovereign or head of state not only enjoys personal immunity from suit but also
cannot be named as a party defendant to a suit brought against him in his official capacity as
the representative of his state. This was brought out clearly in the case of De Haber v. Queen
of Portugal, (Great Britain, Court of Queens Bench, 1851, 17 Q. B., 196) in which a British
court dismissed on grounds of immunity of a suit for money allegedly wrongfully paid to the
government of Portugal.
6. Immunities of Diplomatic Agents
The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomats Relations exempts the heads of diplomatic missions,
such as acting ambassadors or nuncios, or internuncios and charges daffaires from the exercise
of local jurisdiction. The diplomatic representatives enjoy personal inviolability. They are
exempted from exercise of jurisdiction of the receiving state. Even if they commit an offense
they may not be arrested. The remedy of the local state is to consider him a persona non grata
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and will be asked to leave the country. Should he refuse to leave the country he will be treated
as an ordinary individual and the local laws can be applied on him.
7. Immunities of Consuls
Consuls do not belong to the class of diplomatic agents. They look mainly on the commercial
interests of their own states and perform non-political matter such as issuing passports and
visas taking deportees and verification of documents. Generally, they are not clothed with
diplomatic privilege.
However, 1963 Vienna Convention of Consular Relations grants the privileges and immunities in
so far as they are performing their curricular duties. Consuls do not enjoy im705
VOL. 323, JANUARY 28, 2000
705
munity from local jurisdiction from private or commercial transactions not connected with the
consular duties. This rule was followed in Schneckenburger v. Moran, 63 Phil. 249 (1936). The
consul of Uruguay in Manila invoked the immunity from criminal prosecution for falsification of
private documents. The Supreme Court ruled that the crime committed was not in the
performance of his consular duties hence, he cannot claim immunity from suit.
8. Honorary Consuls
By agreement among states honorary consuls are appointed to perform limited curricular
duties. They may be citizens of the receiving state and are non-career consuls of a special
category distinguished from career consuls. Various national criteria define honorary consuls as
persons who are not regularly salaried. They may not be nationals of the sending state, and can
engage in private gainful occupation, and permitted to perform only certain limited functions.
In view of the wide use of honorary consuls, the Vienna Convention deals in detail with their
status. (See Chap. III, Arts. 58-68.) The drafters of the Convention refrained from defining
honorary consuls and merely attempted to codify the existing practice of strictly limiting their
immunities to a minimum level necessary for the proper exercise of official consular functions,
for example, freedom of communication, immunity from local jurisdiction with reference to
official acts. Other immunities are limited so as to prohibit the granting of special benefits to
honorary consuls acting in private capacities. For example, consular archives of a consular post
headed by an honorary consul are inviolable provided that private and official documents are
separated; tax exemption extends only to renumeration received from the sending state for the
exercise of consular functions. Consular employees at a post headed by an honorary consul and
members of the honorary consuls family are granted none of the privileges provided in the
Convention.
706
706
9. Immunity of Officials Representing a Sovereign State
The traditional absolute theory of immunity exempted a state in every way from the
jurisdiction of other countries: its government could not be sued abroad without its consent; its
public property could not be attached; its public vessels could not be arrested, boarded, or
sued; nor could any property or real state owned by the state be taxed or attached in whatever
country it might be located.
Under the doctrine of immunity of the State from suit even officers representing the sovereign
state are exempted from local jurisdiction. This principle was followed in the Philippines in
several cases at the time the US Military Bases were present in the country.
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One of the earliest decisions on this subject was Syquia vs. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949).
The US military commander was sued to restore the apartment buildings they owned and
leased plus rentals. The Supreme Court in dismissing the case held that the real party in
interest as defendant in the original case is the United States of America. The lessee in each of
the three lease agreements was the United States of America and the lease agreements
themselves were executed in her name by her officials acting as her agents. The consideration
of rentals was always paid by the US Government not only because, as already stated, the
contracts of lease were entered into by such Government but also because the premises were
used by officers of her armed forces during the war and immediately after the termination of
hostilities.
The Supreme Court held that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of
Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of
jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The US Government
has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in
name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government
without the latters consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a
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707
foreign government without said governments consent, which renders more obvious the lack of
jurisdiction of the courts of his country.
In an earlier case (Raquiza v. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 [1945]), the Supreme Court declared that it
is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to be
stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and
criminal jurisdiction of the place.
In Marvel Building Corporation v. Philippine War Damage Commission, 87 Phil. 328 (1950), the
respondent, a United States agency established to compensate damages suffered by the
Philippines during World War II, was held as falling within the above doctrine as the suit against
it would eventually be a charge against or financial liability of the United States Government
because x x x, the Commission has no funds of its own for the purpose of paying money
judgments.
In Philippine Alien Property Administration v. Castelo, 89 Phil. 568 (1951), a suit against the
Alien Property Custodian and the Attorney General of the United States involving vested
property under the Trading with the Enemy Act was a suit against the US. Similar rulings were
held in Parreo v. Mc Grannery, 92 Phil. 791 (1953) and Johnson v. Turner, 94 Phil. 807 (1954),
Miquiabas v. Commanding General, 282 C 1948).
In Baer v. Tizon, 57SCRA 1(1974) a suit filed against the US Naval Base Commander in Subic
Bay was dismissed under the doctrine of immunity from suit without its consent.
In US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 482 (1985) the suit filed against the US Naval Base Commander for
breach of contract was likewise dismissed on the doctrine of state immunity state immunity
from suit.
In US v. Ceballos, 182 SCRA 644 (1990), the US Air Force Officer who was sued for conducting
buy bust operations, to prevent the distribution, and possession of prohibited drugs in the US
military base was considered as an official function. As US government officials they are
immune from suit.
708
708
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Likewise in US v. Alarcon, 182 SCRA 646 (1990) the suit filed against the US military officials for
damages due to injuries suffered by complainants who were bitten by their dogs was dismissed
as the suit was in effect against US government. The complainants were committing theft of
government property within the military base.
In1994, the Supreme Court in Holy See, The v. Rosario, Jr., 238 SCRA 524 (1994) reiterated the
settled jurisprudence that the Vatican as a state represented by the Holy See may not be sued.
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The
Holy See, through its ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with
the Philippine government since 1957.
10. Immunity of Officials of International Organiza tions
Historically, the present law on international immunities of international organization started
from the experience of the International Labor Organization and League of Nations and
eventually the United Nations and its agencies.
The immunities enjoyed by the United Nations includes immunity for United Nations assets,
wherever located, from any legal process; immunity of all United Nations premises from
search, requisition, expropriation, confiscation, and any other sort of interference; immunity
of archives; complete freedom from all financial controls, moratoriums, or other monetary
regulations; freedom to hold funds in any desired currency or metal; freedom to transfer funds;
an absolute exemption of all assets and revenue from all direct taxes; exemption from all
customs duties as well as from any foreign trade prohibitions on goods needed for the official
use of the organization; a guarantee of most favored diplomatic treatment as far as rates,
priorities, and so on, connected with all media of communications, are concerned; exemption
from all forms of censorship; the right to use codes; and the privilege of transporting
correspondence by courier or otherwise under
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VOL. 323, JANUARY 28, 2000
709
the full complement of customary diplomatic immunities (Glahn, Law of Nations, p. 154.)
Officers in UN agencies also enjoy immunities from local jurisdiction. When engaged in their
official functions, judges of the International Court of Justice enjoy diplomatic privileges and
immunities.
Similarly, the representatives of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic
Energy (EURATOM) possess customary diplomatic privileges and immunities in the States where
they are located.
Special diplomatic missions are usually sent to States the purpose of which are specified by
mutual consent between the sending and receiving States. Members of these special missions
normally enjoy privileges in international law, except in respect of personal actions, or
professional or commercial activities. They enjoy civil and criminal immunities, and are
exempted from customs duties and inspections.
In World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Supreme Court sustained the
position of the Department of Foreign Affairs that the WHO official was entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of diplomatic envoys and order the quashing of the search warrant on
him issued by a lower court. The Supreme Court said in said case that the executive branch of
the Philippine Government has expressly recognized that the petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to
diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The Department of
Foreign Affairs formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine Governments official
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position that accordingly, Dr. Verstuyft cannot be the subject of a Philippine court summons
without violating an obligation in international law of the Philippine Government.
11. Immunity of Intergovernmental International Organizations
The growth of intergovernmental international organizations dedicated to specific universal
endeavors such as health, agriculture, science, technology and environment has broadened the
concept of international immunities. The reason
710
710
behind the grant of privileges and immunities to international rights organizations, its officials
and functionaries, is to secure them legal and practical independence in the performance of
their duties. (Jenks, International Immunities, London [1961])
The Philippine Supreme Court has ruled on this type of immunity. In Southeast Asian Fisheries
Development CenterAquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AOD) v. National Labor Organization,
206 SCRA 289 (1992). The Court in said case held that the SEAFDEC, being an international
organization enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose
territory it is located.
In Lasco v. United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration, 241 SCRA 681
(1995), the Court ruled that the United Nations Revolving Funds for Natural Resources
Exploration, which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations enjoyed
immunity from suit. The United Nations Revolving Funds is involved in a joint project of the
Philippine Government and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island. The
Labor Arbiter of the Department of Labor has no jurisdiction to try the case involving labor
disputes.
12. Immunity of Non-Governmental International Organizations
The principle of immunity from said suit has been extended even to non-governmental
international organizations which are performing meritorious services to assist countries in the
promotion of health, protection of environment, and development of natural resources. By
agreement with the government, non-governmental international organizations which
volunteer are exempted from local jurisdiction in order to give them freedom in the
performance of their activities.
In response to the plight of Vietnamese refugees an agreement was forged in 1981 between the
Philippine Government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees whereby an
operating center processing Indo-Chinese refu711
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711
gees for eventual resettlement to other countries was to be established in the Philippines. The
International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), a non-profit international humanitarian
agency incorporated in New York, was accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the
refugee center in the Philippines. Duly organized under the United Nations Economic and Social
Council where it enjoys consultative status, category II in the U.N., the ICMC was granted
status as specialized agency with corresponding diplomatic privileges accorded by the
Philippine Government.
In view of a certification election of employees union of the ICMC issued by the Director of
Bureau of Labor Relations of the Philippine Government, the ICMC filed a petition for certiorari
with the Philippine Supreme Court invoking its status as recognized agency with corresponding
Page 106

diplomatic privileges and immunities. The Department of Foreign Affairs through its Legal
Adviser intervened in the case on the ground that as the highest executive department with
authority and competence to act on matters involving diplomatic immunity and privileges, it
has legal interest in the outcome of the case. The Supreme Court sustained the intervention of
the Legal Adviser of the Department of Foreign Affairs that the certification election of
laborers and employees union violated the diplomatic immunity of the ICMC as an international
organization. The court reiterated the principle in WHO vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 [1972], that
the determination of diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question which is conclusive
on courts. (International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]).
The Philippine Supreme Court made a similar ruling in the case of International Rice Research
Institute, Inc., a Ford and Rockefeller Foundation-supported international organization, with
the principal objective of conducting research on rice production. The Supreme Court sustained
a ruling of the Secretary of Labor that an application of the Philippine Labor Law on the
employees and the laborers violated the immunities and privileges of IRRI as a recognized
international or712
712
ganization. (Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa at TAC sa IRRI v. International Rice Institute, 190
SCRA 130 [1990]).
13. The Doctrine of Restrictive Immunity
The privileges and immunities of diplomatic officials are not altogether unlimited.
The theory of restrictive immunity was raised for the first time in the Philippines in US v. Ruiz,
136 SCRA 487 (1985). In the dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar, he averred that the US Naval
Commander of Subic Bay should not hide himself behind the cloak of immunity since when he
entered into contracts with private individuals, he went down to the level of a private. Justice
Abad Santos, writing that the majority opinion of the case, however, ruled that the US Naval
Commander was entering into a contract which involved public and sovereign function of the
US government which is the maintenance of naval facilities for the use of the US Navy.
Since 1952, US Government has followed the policy of recognizing the restrictive immunity of a
State. Through a letter of Jack B. Tate, then acting legal adviser to the Department of State, to
the Acting Attorney General, a policy was laid down that, thenceforth, private activities of
foreign sovereigns would be denied immunity in American courts. Several United States court
decisions followed the new policy (Bishop, New United States Policy Limiting Sovereign
Immunity, 47 American Journal of International La, 93 [1953]).
The United States Congress enacted into law the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
which took effect on January 19, 1977. Said law codifies the re strictive theory of sovereign
immunity by limiting the latter to public acts and excluding all commercial or private acts. It
also laid down the procedure to be followed in filing a case against a foreign State. The
decision of vesting sovereign immunity is exclusively with the courts, thereby eliminating
political questions in the Department of State.
The principle of restrictive immunity was applied by the Supreme Court in US v. Guinto, 182
SCRA 644 (1990). In said
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713
Page 107

case, the private respondent sued the US Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection
with the bidding for contract for barbering services. The Supreme Court held that barbershops
subject of the concessions granted by the State Government are commercial enterprises. They
are not agencies of the United States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a
matter of right by the American servicemen. These establishments provide for the grooming
needs of their customers and offer not only the basic haircut and shave (as required in most
military organizations) but such similar indulgences, all for a fee. Interestingly, one of the
concessionaires, private respondent Valencia, was even sent abroad to improve his tonsorial
business, presumably for the benefit of his customers. No less significantly, if not more so, all
the barbershop concessionaires are, under the terms of their contracts, required to remit to
the United States government fixed commissions in consideration of the exclusive concessions
granted to them in their respective areas.
This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the
private respondents in the court below. The contracts in question being decidedly commercial,
the conclusion reached in the United States of America v. Ruiz case cannot be applied here.
In US v. Rodrigo, 182 SCRA 644 (1990), the court also ruled that the US Air Force operating the
open mess complex at Camp John Hay is a business enterprise opened to the public and that
the principle of immunity of suit will not apply. The business was proprietary in character. Such
services are not extended to the American servicemen for free as a prerequisite of membership
in the Armed Forces of the United States. Neither does it appear that they are exclusively
offered to these servicemen; on the contrary, it is well known that they are available to the
general public as well, including the tourists in Baguio City, many of whom make it a point to
visit John Hay for this reason. All persons availing themselves of this facility pay for the
privilege like all other customers as in ordinary restaurants. Although the prices are concededly
reasonable and relatively low, such services are
714
714
undoubtedly operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity.
The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state
immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove. For that matter,
not even the United States government itself can claim such immunity. The reason is that by
entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary
functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
14. Immunity of Ad Hoc Diplomats
Members of official missions and delegates traveling abroad to attend international conference
are accorded diplomatic immunity while in the performance of their official functions. The
principle of restrictive immunity applies to them, however, for acts not directly connected with
their official duties.
15. The Proper Procedure in the Jeffrey Liang Case
In the case under annotation, the proper procedure was for the municipal court to inquire
whether the petitioner had committed the crime in connection with the performance of his
official duties as an officer of the Asian Development Bank. Sec. 45 (a) of the Headquarters
agreement between the Government of the Philippines and the Asian Development Bank states
that the immunity applies to the performance of their duties in their official capacities.
The immunity of Jeffrey Liang was not absolute. The principle of restrictive immunity applies
to him. The municipal judge in outrightly dismissing the case on the ground of immunity of the
petitioner from local jurisdiction was not proper. It will be different if the person enjoyed full
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diplomatic immunity as what happened in the case of WHO vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 243 (1972) the
official was a U.N. officer with full diplomatic immunity. Thus, the certifications of
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715
Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the WHO officials enjoyed diplomatic immunity are conclusive
on the courts. It was a political act of the executive which should be respected by the court.
For that matter, had there been a preliminary investigation as averred by the petitioner, the
case should not have reached the Supreme Court. The preliminary investigation could have
clarified whether the petitioner committed oral defamation in connection with his official
duties as an ADB official.
o0o
Sabili v COMELEC, Librea [G.R. No. 193261. April 24, 2012.]

Doctrine
There is nothing wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run for an elective
post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a
change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law.
Facts
Meynard Sabili ran as Mayor in Lipa City, Batangas for the May 2010 elections. He stated in his
COC that he had been a resident of Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City for 2 years, 8 months. According
to him, he was previously a resident of Brgy. Sico, San Juan, Batangas but he changed his
residence to Lipa City thereafter.
Librea contested the truth of the contents of Sabilis COC and prayed for its cancellation. He
alleged that Sabili made material misrepresentations of fact in his COC and also failed to
comply with the one-year residency requirement since he falsely declared under oath therein
that he had already been a resident of Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City.
COMELEC disqualified Sabili and cancelled his COC. Sabili filed an MR. Pending its resolution, he
won the 2010 elections as Lipa City Mayor. However, his MR was denied. So, he filed this
petition before the SC. The SC issued a Status Quo Ante Order.
Issues/Held
1.
Librea presented as proof tax declarations proving that the Lipa City property of Sabili
was owned by Sabilis common-law wife. Librea claims that the same should have been
owned by Sabili as positive proof of intent to change actual residence. Is Librea
correct?
Held: No. Property ownership is not among the qualifications required of candidates for local
election. Rather, it is a candidate's residence in a locality through actual residence in whatever
capacity. In another case, the SC even sustained a candidates claim of residency even if he
was a mere lessee of an apartment in the same province where he ran for governor. Also, in
Mitra v. COMELEC, the SC ruled that a candidate's sparsely furnished, leased room on the
mezzanine of a feedmill could be considered as his residence for the purpose of complying with
the residency requirement.
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We have long held that it is not required that a candidate should have his own house in
order to establish his residence or domicile in a place. It is enough that he should live in
the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative. What is of central
concern then is that petitioner identified and established a place in Lipa City where he
intended to live in and return to for an indefinite period of time.
2.
Librea presented a Certification from the DepEd, Lipa City Division, indicating that
Sabilis children do not appear on the list of graduates of Lipa City. Is this material?
Held: No. The issue at hand is Sabilis residence, not the educational record of his family.
It must be stressed that the children, like the wife, do not dictate the family domicile. Even in
the context of marriage, the family domicile is jointly decided by both husband and wife. In
addition, we note that the transfer to Lipa City occurred in 2007, when Sabilis children were
already well into college and could very well have chosen to study elsewhere than in Lipa City.
3.
Sabili purportedly did not maintain any business in Lipa City, nor did he own any
property there. Is this material?
Held: No. Again, property ownership (and similarly, business interest) in the locality where one
intends to run for local elective post is not a requirement of the Constitution.
4.
Librea had several affidavits of Lipa City residents claiming that he was rarely seen by
them. Is this material?
No. Even assuming the truth of the allegation in the Affidavits that Sabili was "rarely seen" in
the area, this does not preclude the possibility of his residence therein. In a case, it was held
that the averments of certain barangay health workers that they failed to see a particular
candidate whenever they made rounds of the locality of which he was supposed to be a
resident is of no moment. It is possible that the candidate was out of the house to attend to
his own business at the time. The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four
(24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement.
5.
Sabili offered several income tax returns proving that he resided in Lipa City. This was
not considered by COMELEC. Are the ITRs material?
Held: Yes. Under the NIRC, ITRs may be filed either in the place where a person resides or
where his principal place of business is located. The fact that Sabili was filing his ITRs in Lipa
City notwithstanding that he had no business therein showed that he had actively elected to
establish his residence in that city.
A simple perusal of the Income Tax Returns and Revenue Official Receipts for 2007 and 2008
shows that Sabili invariably declares his residence to be Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, rather than
San Juan, Batangas.
6.
Sabili also presented a Barangay Captain's Certification proving that he had been
residing in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan since 2007. This was not considered by the COMELEC. Is
this material?
Held: Yes. The Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government Code to "keep an
updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay. It is the business of a punong barangay to
know who the residents are in his own barangay. Finally, the Barangay Captain's exercise of
powers and duties concomitant to his position requires him to be privy to these records kept by
the Barangay Secretary.
7.
Whether Sabili had complied with the one-year residency requirement for local
elective officials?
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Held: YES. Thus, Sabili has not misrepresented his residence at Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City and
the duration thereof.
It is clear that collectively, the pieces of evidence offered by Sabili tend to sufficiently
establish his residence in Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City.
His actual physical presence in Lipa City is established not only by the presence of a place
(Pinagtong-ulan house and lot) he can actually live in, but also the affidavits of various persons
in Pinagtong-ulan, and the Certification of its barangay captain. His substantial and real
interest in establishing his domicile of choice in Lipa City is also sufficiently shown not only by
the acquisition of additional property in the area and the transfer of his voter registration, but
also his participation in the community's socio-civic and religious life, as well as his declaration
in his ITR that he is a resident thereof.
In view of this Court's finding that petitioner has not misrepresented his residence at
Pinagtong-ulan.
Aldovino v COMELEC, Asilo [G.R. No. 184836. December 23, 2009.]
Doctrine
Preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective
official's stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be an
interruption of a term because the suspended official continues to stay in office. He is merely
barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension
period.
Facts
Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004,
and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his 2004-2007 term, the Sandiganbayan preventively
suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. The SC subsequently
lifted the Sandiganbayan's suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his
office and finished his term. In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the
same position.
Aldovino et al. sought to deny due course to Asilo's COC or to cancel it on the ground that he
had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore
violated the three-term limit rule. This was denied by the COMELEC and eventually by the
COMELEC en banc on MR.
Issue
Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of office
for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and
Section 43 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local Government Code)?
Held
1.
NO. Asilo, therefore, is disqualified. The "interruption" of a term exempting an elective

official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary
LOSS OF TITLE to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office
for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur.
Thus, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even
if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does
not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the
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office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his
office for a reason provided by law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to hold
on to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs
during an office holder's term when he retains title to the office but cannot exercise his
functions for reasons established by law.
Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-controlled conditions
and gives a premium to the protection of the service rather than to the interests of the
individual office holder. Even then, protection of the service goes only as far as a temporary
prohibition on the exercise of the functions of the official's office; the official is reinstated to
the exercise of his position as soon as the preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a
temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public
official is preventively suspended. This was what exactly happened to Asilo.
2.
As worded, Section 8, Article X of the Constitution fixes the term of a local elective
office and limits an elective official's stay in office to no more than three consecutive
terms.
The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law
describes that an officer may hold an office. The term of office is the period during which an
office may be held. Upon expiration of the officer's term his rights, duties and authority as a
public officer must ipso facto cease. The most and natural frequent method by which a public
officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the terms for which he was elected or
appointed.
A voluntary renunciation of office "shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected."
3.
There are two requisites for the application of the disqualification:

a.
That the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post; and
b.
That he has fully served three consecutive terms.
In Lonzanida v. COMELEC, the disqualification was not applied because Lonzanida vacated his
post not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of
execution issued by the COMELEC. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of
continuity of service.
In Adormeo v. COMELEC, the disqualification was not applied because the official in this case
lost in the elections for his third term but was able to succeed to the same office by reason of
a recall election. Thus, for nearly two years, the official was a private citizen; hence, the
continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the election for the third term.
In Socrates v COMELEC, the disqualification was not applied because the candidate, who had
fully served his three terms, DID NOT run for the same office in a REGULAR ELECTION. He filed
his COC DURING A RECALL ELECTION against the incumbent.
In Montebon v. COMELEC, the disqualification was not applied where the candidate, a
councilor, succeeded the office of vice-Mayor. Thus, when he ran as councilor for the fourth
term, this was allowed by the SC, ruling that that an interruption had intervened so that he
could again run as councilor. In this case, the elective official vacated the office of councilor
and assumed the higher post of vice-mayor by operation of law. Thus, for a time he ceased to
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be councilor an interruption that effectively placed him outside the ambit of the three-term
limit rule.
Ruby Talaga v COMELEC (2012) [G.R. No. 196804. October 9, 2012.]
Doctrine
The existence of a valid COC is a condition sine qua non for a valid substitution.
Facts
Ramon Talaga filed his COC for the 2010 Mayoralty elections in Lucena City. His opponent,
Castillo filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Y.
Talaga, Jr. contesting the validity of Ramons COC in view of the fact that he had already
served 3 terms as city mayor.
Ramon claimed that when he was preventively suspended by the Sandiganbayan during his
previous terms, his term of office was interrupted. But when Aldovino v COMELEC (supra) was
promulgated, he filed a Manifestation with Motion to Resolve where he expressly recognized
his disqualification to run as Mayor. The COMELEC disqualified him as a candidate but did not
expressly cancel his COC. This decision became final and executory.
6 days prior to the elections (the OEC requires the filing of COCs 60 days prior the elections),
Barbara Ruby, Ramons wife, filed her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of
Ramon. On election day, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots. The votes cast in
his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute. Barbara won against Castillo.
Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with the COMELEC alleging that Barbara
Ruby could not substitute Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled and denied due
course; and Barbara Ruby could not be considered a candidate because the COMELEC En
Banc had approved her substitution three days after the elections; hence, the votes cast
for Ramon should be considered stray.
Barbara countered that the COMELEC En Banc did not deny due course to or cancel Ramon's
COC, despite a declaration of his disqualification, because there was no finding that he had
committed misrepresentation, the ground for the denial of due course to or cancellation of his
COC.
Issue/Held
1.
Was Ramons COC cancelled?
Yes. The declaration of Ramon's disqualification rendered his COC invalid. The denial of due
course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves a finding not only that a
person lacks a qualification but also that he made a material representation that is false.
Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid
substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear,
too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a
person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any person
who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate.
OEC Section 78 vs OEC Section 68
It is underscored, however, that a Section 78 petition should not be interchanged or confused
with a Section 68 petition. The remedies under the two sections are different, for they are
based on different grounds, and can result in different eventualities. A person who is
disqualified under Section 68 is prohibited to continue as a candidate, but a person whose CoC
is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not considered as a candidate at all
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because his status is that of a person who has not filed a CoC. Miranda v. Abaya has clarified
that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can be validly substituted pursuant to
Section 77 because he remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has
been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he is
not considered a candidate.
2.
Was there a valid substitution in this case?
No. The existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua non for a valid substitution.
Ramon was absolutely precluded from asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for
the fourth consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC was invalid and ineffectual ab initio for
containing the incurable defect consisting in his false declaration of his eligibility to run.
Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation with Motion
to Resolve. That sufficed to render his CoC invalid, considering that for all intents and purposes
the COMELEC's declaration of his disqualification had the effect of announcing that he was no
candidate at all. We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his
substitute.
The concept of a substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for how
can a person take the place of somebody who does not exist or who never was.
All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of
candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and
seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was
not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to
allow the so-called "substitute" to file a "new" and "original" certificate of candidacy beyond the
period for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an
act abhorred by our Constitution.
QUINTO and TOLENTINO, JR. vs. COMELEC. [G.R. No. 189698. December 1, 2009.]1
Doctrine in the 2 Quinto cases
An appointive official who files his COC is deemed automatically resigned, while an elective
official is not deemed automatically resigned.
Facts
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and
Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10,
2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person holding a public appointive
office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other
officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon
the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or
position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file
their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive
1
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positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant
petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a)
of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No.
9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions.
These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration
that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.
Issue
Whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section
4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause.
Held
Yes. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts
upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants,
specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact
alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and
those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may
pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of
valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the
classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public
Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other
motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll
ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equala two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and
more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second
requirementif it is not germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present
but as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last
requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are
not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment
of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane
to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental
position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the
electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline
of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be
motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is
also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while
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still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they
would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot
be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the
requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether
one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the
measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that
matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is
appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to
take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and local government,
and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid
justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the
present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for
President, retains his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources
of his office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his
appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files
his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to
show his fitness for the position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective
ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes
of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section
13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR. vs. COMELEC.
RECONSIDERATION.) [G.R. No. 189698. February 22, 2010.]
(MOTION FOR
Facts
This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter moved to
question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the COMELEC resolution, and Section 4(a)
of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. The resolution provides that, Any person
holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
RA 9369 provides that:
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who
files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at
the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That,
unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing
of his/her certificate of candidacy.
Issue
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Whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section
4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause and therefore
unconstitutional.
Held
No. To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the
laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence
here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the
first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion
that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis--vis elected officials is not germane
to the purpose of the law, because "whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one,
the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain."
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the
operation of the deemed resigned provisions? There is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the
sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office
by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a
definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed
resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words,
complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such
officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such
expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the
purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and
discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial
scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling,
interest of deferring to the sovereign will.
Thus, the Court declares as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369,
and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Mitra v COMELEC (2010) [G.R. No. 191938. July 2, 2010.]
Mitra was the incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan. He was elected
Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and represented the legislative district
for 3 terms immediately before the 2010 elections.
On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for
the transfer of his Voter's Registration Record from Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to
Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the
position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.
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His opponents filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitra's COC. They argued that
Mitra remains a resident of Puerto Princesa City who has not yet established residence in
Aborlan. They claimed that his residence at the Maligaya Feedmill as a mere lessee is not
indicative of his intention to stay in Aborlan. Thus, he duly misrepresented in his COC that he
resides in Aborlan warranting the denial/cancellation of his COC.
The COMELEC granted the petition. It found that Mitra has not established his domicile in
Abrolan since he dwelled in a room in Maligaya Feedmill, a small, sparsely furnished room that
is evidently unlived in, located at the second floor of a structure that appears to be a factory
or a warehouse; the residence appears hastily set-up, cold, and utterly devoid of any indication
of Mitra's personality such as old family photographs and memorabilia collected through the
years. What the supposed residence lacks, in COMELECs perception, are the loving attention
and details inherent in every home to make it one's residence; perhaps, at most, this small
room could have served as Mitra's resting area whenever he visited the locality, but nothing
more than this.
Issue
Are the grounds relied upon by COMELEC to deny due course/cancel Mitras COC valid?
Held
No. Such assessment, in our view, based on the interior design and furnishings of a dwelling as
shown by and examined only through photographs, is far from reasonable; the COMELEC
thereby determined the fitness of a dwelling as a person's residence based solely on very
personal and subjective assessment standards when the law is replete with standards that
can be used. Where a dwelling qualifies as a residence i.e., the dwelling where a person
permanently intends to return to and to remain his or her capacity or inclination to decorate
the place, or the lack of it, is immaterial.
Examined further, the COMELEC's reasoning is not only intensely subjective but also flimsy, to
the point of grave abuse of discretion when compared with the surrounding indicators showing
that Mitra has indeed been physically present in Aborlan for the required period with every
intent to settle there. Specifically, it was lost on the COMELEC majority that Mitra made
definite, although incremental transfer moves, as shown by the undisputed business interests
he has established in Aborlan in 2008; by the lease of a dwelling where he established his base;
by the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; by his transfer of registration as a voter in
March 2009; and by the construction of a house all viewed against the backdrop of a bachelor
Representative who spent most of his working hours in Manila, who had a whole congressional
district to take care of, and who was establishing at the same time his significant presence in
the whole Province of Palawan.
From these perspectives, we cannot but conclude that the COMELEC's approach i.e., the
application of subjective non-legal standards and the gross misappreciation of the evidence
is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, as the COMELEC used wrong considerations and
grossly misread the evidence in arriving at its conclusion. In using subjective standards, the
COMELEC committed an act not otherwise within the contemplation of law on an evidentiary
point that served as a major basis for its conclusion in the case.
Asistio v Hon. Aguirre, Echiverri (2010) [G.R. No. 191124. April 27, 2010.]
Facts
Echiverri filed against Asistio a Petition for Exclusion of Voter from the Permanent List of Voters
of Caloocan City. He alleged that Asistio is not a resident of Caloocan City, specifically not of
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123 Interior P. Zamora St., Barangay 15, Caloocan City. Echiverri found out that Asistio's address
is non-existent. Judge Aguirre ordered the exclusion of Asistio.
Issue
Whether Asistio should be excluded from the permanent list of voters of of Caloocan City for
failure to comply with the residency required by law.
Held
Under Section 117 of The Omnibus Election Code and 9 of The Voters Registration Act of 1996 or
R.A. 8189, the residency requirement of a voter is at least one (1) year residence in the
Philippines and at least six (6) months in the place where the person proposes or intends to
vote.
"Residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective
office, is doctrinally settled to mean "domicile," importing not only an intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention inferable from a person's acts, activities, and utterances. "Domicile" denotes a fixed
permanent residence where, when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one
intends to return. Three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a person must have a
residence or domicile somewhere; (2) once established, it remains until a new one is acquired;
and (3) that a person can have but one residence or domicile at a time.
Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1)
an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that
purpose. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must
be actual.
Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more than 72 years.
His family is known to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan City. In fact,
Asistio served in public office as Caloocan City Second District representative in the House of
Representatives, having been elected as such in the 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004 elections. In
2007, he also sought election as City Mayor. In all of these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the
same city. Taking these circumstances into consideration, gauged in the light of the doctrines
above enunciated, it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to qualify, as a
voter of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has established domicile elsewhere, or that
he had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in Caloocan City. He should,
therefore, remain in the list of permanent registered voters of Precinct No. 1811A, Barangay
15, Caloocan City.
That Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor, both for the 2007 and
2010 elections, a non-existent or false address, or that he could not be physically found in the
address he indicated when he registered as a voter, should not operate to exclude him as a
voter of Caloocan City. These purported misrepresentations in Asistio's COC, if true, might
serve as basis for an election offense under the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), 38 or an
action to deny due course to the COC. But to our mind, they do not serve as proof that Asistio
has abandoned his domicile in Caloocan City.
Sema v COMELEC [G.R. No. 177597. July 16, 2008.]2
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Facts
On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces
under Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201)
creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan in the first district of Maguindanao. The voters of
Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on October 29, 2006.
On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999
requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the
First District of Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act 201.
In an answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 maintaining
the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District
of Maguindanao.
However, in preparation for the May 14, 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution
No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City
because of the enactment of MMA Act No. 201. On May 10, 2007, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 7902 amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in
question as Shariff Kabunsan Province with Cotabato City.
Sema, who was a candidate for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City
prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from the canvassing of
votes cast in Cotabato for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to
one representative in Congress under Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution and Sec.3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Issues/Held
1.
Whether Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is constitutional.
Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional

Assembly the power to create provinces and cities,for being contrary to Sec. 5 of Art.VI and
Sec.20 of Art. X of the Constitution, as well as Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution.
The creation of LGUs is governed by Sec.10, Art.X of the Constitution:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or
its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code (LGC) and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any LGU must comply with 3 conditions: First, the creation of an LGU
must follow the criteria fixed in the LGC. Second, such creation must not conflict with any
provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional/legislative bodies the power to create
LGUs.However, under its plenary powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the
power to create LGUs subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any
provisions of the Constitution. In fact, the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the
power to create municipalities and barangays is constitutional, provided the criteria
established in the LGC and the plebiscite requirement in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution is
complied.
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However, the creation of provinces is another matter. Under the LGC, only x x x an Act of
Congress can create provinces, cities, or municipalities.
According to, Sec. 5 (3), Art.VI of the Constitution:
Each City with a population of at least 250,000, or each province, shall have at least 1
representative in the House of Representatives.
Similarly, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides,
Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter
increase to more than 250,000 shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at
least 1 Member.
Thus, only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and
cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can
exercise under Sec. 5, Art.VI of the Constitution and Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution.
2.
Whether a province created under Sec. 19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating
a legislative district for such province.
No. Legislative Districts are created or reapportioned only by an act of Congress. Under the
Constitution, the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives,
and to apportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.
Sec. 5 (1), Art.VI of the Constitution vests Congress the power to increase the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives. Sec. 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion
legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the
power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers
through a law the Congress itself enacts, not through a law enacted by regional/local
legislative bodies. The power of redistricting xxx is traditionally regarded as part of the power
(of Congress) to make laws, and is thus vested exclusively in (it) [Montejo v. COMELEC, 242
SCRA 415 (1995)].
An inferior legislative body cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body
which created it. Congress is a national legislature, and any changes in its membership through
the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in national law.
The power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress
but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.
The ARMM cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution
mandates that every province shall have a legislative district.
But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested
solely in Congress.
Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office because
Sec. 20, Art.X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional
assemblies are limited only within its territorial jurisdiction. (Nothing in Sec. 20, Art.X of the
Constitution authorizes autonomous regions to create/apportion legislative districts for
Congress.)
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
Constitution. Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating
to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in
national elections.
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At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces. Thus, MMA Act 201
enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly, creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
Aldaba v COMELEC [G.R. No. 188078. January 25, 2010.]
Doctrine
A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the
immediately following election. Thus, a city must first attain the 250,000 population, and
thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative.
Facts
Before 1 May 2009, Bulacan was represented in Congress through four legislative districts. The
First Legislative District comprised of the city of Malolos and several municipalities. On 1 May
2009, RA 9591 was passed, amending Malolos' City Charter, by creating a separate legislative
district for the city.
The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that
the law was based on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director (Miranda) of the
NSO that "the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year
2010.
Petitioners contended that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum
population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit additional representation in Congress as
provided under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Issues/Held
1.
Whether RA 9591 is unconstitutional.
RA 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
The Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have "a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand." The only issue here is whether the City of
Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or projected, for the purpose of
creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections.
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is
without legal effect because Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification.
The Certification is also void on its face because based on its own growth rate assumption, the
population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. A city whose population has
increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the "immediately
following election" after the attainment of the 250,000 population.
Certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared
official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Certifications based on
demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying officer. Intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year.
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda also does not state that the demographic
projections he certified have been declared official by the National Statistics Coordination
Board as required under the law. . The Certification, which states that the population of
Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year 2010," violates the requirement that intercensal
demographic projections shall be "as of the middle of every year."
Moreover, the Certification states that "the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1,
2000 is 175,291." The Certification also states that the population growth rate of Malolos is
Page 122

3.78% per year between 1995 and 2000. Based on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the
population of Malolos of 175,291 in 2000 will grow to only 241,550 in 2010.
There is no showing in the present case that the City of Malolos has attained or will attain a
population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10 May 2010 elections.
2.
Whether Congress' choice of means (e.g. reliance on an NSO certification, among

others) to comply with the population requirement in the creation of a legislative
district is non-justiciable.
The issue is justiciable. The resolution of such questions falls within the checking function of
this Court under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Even under the 1935 Constitution, this Court had already ruled, "The overwhelming weight of
authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts." Compliance
with constitutional standards on the creation of legislative districts is important because the
"aim of legislative apportionment is 'to equalize population and voting power among districts.'"
Aldaba v COMELEC [G.R. No. 188078. March 15, 2010.] Motion for Reconsideration
In this case, COMELEC reasserts its ground that Congress' reliance on the Certification of
Alberto N. Miranda (Miranda), Region III Director, National Statistics Office (NSO), projecting
Malolos City's population in 2010, is non-justiciable.
Held
It will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the reliability and authoritativeness of the
population indicators Congress used in enacting RA 9591 are non-justiciable. If laws creating
legislative districts are unquestionably within the ambit of this Court's judicial review power, 5
then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary questions impacting on their
constitutionality, such as their compliance with a specific constitutional limitation under
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that only cities with at least 250,000
constituents are entitled to representation in Congress. To fulfill this obligation, the Court, of
necessity, must inquire into the authoritativeness and reliability of the population indicators
Congress used to comply with the constitutional limitation.
Navarro v Ermita [G.R. No. 180050. February 10, 2010.]
Facts
In a May 12, 2010 Resolution, the Supreme Court struck down R.A. 9355 as unconstitutional
when it created the Dinagat Islands province in violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution in relation to Sec. 461 of the LGC. In this MR, the petitioners contend that the
province of the Dinagat Islands is exempted from the requirement of territorial contiguity,
when the intended province consists of two or more islands. In the same vein, this includes the
exemption from the application of the minimum land area requirement.
The constitutional provision on the creation of a province in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution states:
SEC. 10.
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Page 123

Pursuant to the Constitution, the Local Government Code of 1991 prescribed the criteria for
the creation of a province, thus:
SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by
the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified
by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of
the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province.
Issue
Is the creation of Dinagat Islands as a separate province constitutional?
Held
YES. The SC reversed its May 12, 2010 Resolution.
Under the law, the territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities that do not contribute to the income of the province.
It must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or
more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442
and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a
component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites
for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated
under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and
municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the
Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would
form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or
municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was
expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC,
but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was
expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the
congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true legislative intent. It
would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
Moreover, the earlier decisions show a very restrictive construction which could trench on the
equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the purpose of local autonomy and
decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution.Hence, the land area requirement should be
read together with territorial contiguity.
Aquino III, Robredo v COMELEC [G.R. No. 189793. April 7, 2010.]
Doctrine
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Section 5 (3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be
entitled to a representative, but the same population requirement does not apply to a
province.
Facts
Petitioners pray that RA 9716 be declared unconstitutional. The law created an additional
legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and
second legislative districts of the province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by RA 9716, violates the explicit
constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a
legislative district. They claim that the reconfiguration by RA 9716 of the first and second
districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up
with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
x x x (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact,
and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative. x x x
Petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the provision is the minimum population
requirement for the creation of a legislative district. They theorize that, save in the case of a
newly created province, each legislative district created by Congress must be supported by a
minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid.
Under this view, existing legislative districts may be reapportioned and severed to form new
districts, provided each resulting district will represent a population of at least 250,000. On the
other hand, if the reapportionment would result in the creation of a legislative seat
representing a populace of less than 250,000 inhabitants, the reapportionment must be
stricken down as invalid for non-compliance with the minimum population requirement.
Issue
Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the
creation of a new legislative district in a province.
Held
No. There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population
that must compose a legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district
on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province
is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must
first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to
no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is ONLY REQUIRED FOR A
CITY, but NOT FOR A PROVINCE.
Plainly read, Section 5 (3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only
for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
Page 125

We do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and second legislative districts of
Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district should not be
considered. Our ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just one of several
other factors in the composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord with
both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the
Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this petition.
BANAT VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the
NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have
recently been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall
implement theVeteransruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating partylist seats."
Veteransexplaining the First Party Rule:
Formula for Determining

Additional Seats for the First Party
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The
only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall
be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of
votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latters number of seats and so on.
The formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled
is as follows:
Number of votes
of first partyProportion of votes of
--------------------=first party relative to
Total votes fortotal votes for party-list system
party -list system
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional
seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number of additional
seats of the other qualified parties.
Formula for Additional
Seats of Other Qualified Parties
Step ThreeThe next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the
other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is
encompassed by the following complex fraction:
No. of votes of
concerned party
-----------------Total no. of votes
Additional seatsfor party-list systemNo. of additional
for concerned=-----------------------xseats allocated to
partyNo. of votes ofthe first party
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first party
-------------Total no. of votes
for party list system
In simplified form, it is written as follows:
No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned
partyNo. of additional
for concerned=------------------xseats allocated to
partyNo. of votes ofthe first party
first party
x x x
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of
the number of votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end
result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC
Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC
Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC,
to reconsider its decision to use theVeterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution
No. 07-60 because theVeteransformula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic
Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration
during the proceedings of the NBC.
ISSUE:
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we
defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI
of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one
seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the partylist elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the
party-list elections?
HELD:
WHEREFOREwePARTIALLY GRANTthe petition. WeSET ASIDEthe Resolution of the COMELEC
dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC
No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of
additional party-list seats.
RATIO:
1 & 2. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941mandates the filling-up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. However, we cannot allow
the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the
Page 127

constitutionally allocated20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap,
as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy,
remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list
elections.
3.
We rule that, in computing the allocation ofadditional seats, the continued operation
of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second
clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two
percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The
continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
frustrates the attainment of the permissiveceiling.
4.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our
allocation of additional seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each
party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by
15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the
second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available
seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List
System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of
the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the
remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in
rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38
seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine
the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
5.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system.On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly
intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral
wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any
permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the
sectoral groups. In defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a
political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political
parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in partylist elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and
judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in
patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
ABAYON PALPARAN VS THE HRET
FACTS:
Abayon and Palparan were the duly nominated party list representatives of AAngat Tayo and
Bantay respectively. A quo warranto case was filed before the HRET assailing the jurisdiction of
HRET over the Party list.. and its representatives.. HRET dismissed the proceeding but upheld
the jurisdiction over the nominated representatives whonow seeks certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE:
W/N HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifivcations of petitioners.
HELD: Affirmative.
Page 128
The HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the
disqualifications of Aangat Tayo andBa nt a y. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not
elected into office but were chosen by their respective organizations under their internal rules,
the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate theirqualifications as nominees.
Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5,
Article VI of the
Constitution, identifies who the members of that House are representatives of districts and
party list.
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in
like manner. The Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as members of the
House ofRepresentatives, a party-list representative is in every sense an elected member of
the House of Representatives.
Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would
be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of
Representatives. Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Actset the qualifications and
grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the
Constitution.
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nomineethe
need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list
organizationin the context of the facts
that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayoa nd
Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they
presumably embody.
By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the
party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office
as member of the House ofRepresentatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed
the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld
its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

FACTS:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and
trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public
respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To
Page 129

buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their
decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy,
they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the
Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion
by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the
establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and
equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and
genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was
validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT
sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that
petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.
ISSUE:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.
HELD:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to
said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals)
may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the enumeration of marginalized
and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a
sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with
the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At
bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in
religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation of
the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a
secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to
justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so
harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
Page 130
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil
laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a
nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else
which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which are a
prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or
abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws
is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the
institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or
culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient

governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a
tool to further any substantial public interest.
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION
(CIBAC) vs COMELEC and the House of Representatives (2010)
FACTS:
The Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly
registered under the party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to
participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. Together
with its manifestation of intent to participate,CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel
Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives
would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes. The
nominees, in the order that their names appeared in the certificate of nomination
dated March 29, 2007, were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner
Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L.
Galang.
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of
nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7,
2007,whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted
Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC
thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje.
On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en
bancsitting as the National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of
Lokin as its second nominee.The right of CIBAC to a second seat as well as the right of
Lokin to be thus proclaimed were purportedly based on Party-List Canvass Report No.
26, which showed CIBAC to have garnered a grand total of 744,674 votes. Using all
relevant formulas, the motion asserted that CIBAC was clearly entitled to a second
seat and Lokin to a proclamation.
The motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.
Notwithstanding Villanuevas filing of the certificate of nomination, substitution and

amendment of the list of nominees and the petitions of more than 81% of CIBAC
members, the COMELEC failed to act on the matter, prompting Villanueva to file a
petition to confirm the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the
list of nominees of CIBAC on June 28, 2007.
Page 131
On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219,whereby it resolved to set
the matter pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin,
Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing. The
case was docketed as E.M. No. 07-054.
With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de
los Santos, purportedly as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno,
Secretary General of the House of Representatives, of the promulgation of NBC
Resolution No. 07-72 and requested that Lokin be formally sworn in by Speaker Jose de
Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office. Nazareno replied, however, that the
request of Delos Santos could not be granted because COMELEC Law Director Alioden
D. Dalaig had notified him of the pendency of E.M. 07-054.
The COMELEC approved the withdrawal of nomination of Atty. Luis Lokin. Hence, this
present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the
Party-List System Act.
RULING:
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states:

o Section 13. Substitution of nominees. A party-list nominee may be substituted
only when he dies, or his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes
incapacitated to continue as such, or he withdraws his acceptance to a
nomination.In any of these cases, the name of the substitute nominee shall be
placed last in the list of nominees.
No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls.
Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four instances, the
fourth being when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party."
Lokin insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in expanding to four the
three statutory grounds for substituting a nominee.
We agree with Lokin.
The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election, has neither the authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add
anything to the law it seeks to implement thereby. The IRRs the COMELEC issues for
that purpose should always accord with the law to be implemented, and should not
override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain consistent
with the law they intend to carry out.
Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government

under legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and
should be for the sole purpose of carrying the laws general provisions into effect. The
law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRs, because an administrative agency cannot
amend an act of Congress.
The COMELEC explains that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 has added nothing to
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, because it has merely reworded and rephrased the
statutory provisions phraseology.
The explanation does not persuade.
To reword means to alter the wording of or to restate in other words; torephraseis to

phrase anew or in a new form. Both terms signify that the meaning of the original word
or phrase is not altered.
However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A.
No. 7941, because it established an entirely new ground not found in the text of the
provision. The new ground granted to the party-list organization the unilateral right to
Page 132
withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC, which Section 8 of R.A.
No. 7941 did not allow to be done.
Considering that Section 13 of the Resolution No. 7804 to the extent that it allows
the party-list organization to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the
COMELEC was invalid, CIBACs withdrawal of its nomination of Lokin ang the others
and its substitution of them with new nominees were also invalid and ineffectual. It is
clear enough that any substitution of Lokin and the others could only be for any
grounds expressly stated in section 8 of RA 7941.
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it
authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it
has submitted to the COMELEC.
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. and TERESITA F. PLANAS vs COMELEC, CIBAC PARTY LIST represented by
VIRGINIA S. JOSE SHERWIN N. TUGNA, and CINCHONA CRUZ-GONZALES (2012)
FACTS:
On 5 July 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution expunging the
Certificate of Nomination which included herein petitioners as representatives of the
party-list group known as Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC). The COMELECen
banc affirmed the said Resolution, prompting Luis Lokin, Jr. and Teresita F. Planas to
file the present Petition for Certiorari. Petitioners allege grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the COMELEC in issuing both Resolutions, praying that they be recognized
as the legitimate nominees of CIBAC party-list, and that petitioner Lokin, Jr. be
proclaimed as the CIBAC party-list representative to the House of Representatives.
Respondent CIBAC party-list is a multi-sectoral party registered under Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 7941, otherwise known as the Party- List System Act. As stated in its constitution
and bylaws, the platform of CIBAC is to fight graft and corruption and to promote
ethical conduct in the countrys public service. Under the leadership of the National
Council, its highest policymaking and governing body, the party participated in the
2001, 2004, and 2007 elections.
On 20 November 2009, two different entities, both purporting to represent CIBAC,

submitted to the COMELEC a "Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List
System of Representation in the May 10, 2010 Elections." The first Manifestation was
signed by a certain Pia B. Derla, who claimed to be the partys acting secretarygeneral. At 1:30 p.m. of the same day, another Manifestationwas submitted by herein
respondents Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales and Virginia Jose as the partys vice-president and
secretary-general, respectively.
On 15 January 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8744 giving due course to
CIBACs Manifestation, "WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO the determination which of the two
factions of the registered party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations which filed two
(2) manifestations of intent to participate is the official representative of said partylist/coalitions/sectoral organizations xxx."
On 19 January 2010, respondents, led by President and Chairperson Emmanuel Joel J.

Villanueva, submitted the Certificate of Nomination of CIBAC to the COMELEC Law
Department. The nomination was certified by Villanueva and Virginia S. Jose. On 26
March 2010, Pia Derla submitted a second Certificate of Nomination, which included
petitioners Luis Lokin, Jr. and Teresita Planas as party-list nominees. Derla affixed to
the certification her signature as "acting secretary-general" of CIBAC.
Claiming that the
nomination of petitioners Lokin, Jr. and Planas was unauthorized, respondents filed
with the COMELEC a "Petition to Expunge From The Records And/Or For
Page 133
Disqualification," seeking to nullify the Certificate filed by Derla. Respondents

contended that Derla had misrepresented herself as "acting secretary-general," when
she was not even a member of CIBAC; that the Certificate of Nomination and other
documents she submitted were unauthorized by the party and therefore invalid; and
that it was Villanueva who was duly authorized to file the Certificate of Nomination on
its behalf.
COMELEC granted the Petition, ordered the Certificate filed by Derla to be expunged
from the records, and declared respondents faction as the true nominees of CIBAC.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification and
recognizing respondents as the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC party-list.
RULING:
By virtue of the mandate of the Party-List Law vesting the COMELEC with jurisdiction
over the nomination of party-list representatives and prescribing the qualifications of
each nominee, the COMELEC promulgated its "Rules on Disqualification Cases Against
Nominees of Party-List Groups/ Organizations Participating in the 10 May 2010
Automated National and Local Elections." Adopting the same qualifications of party-list
nominees listed above, Section 6 of these Rules also required that:
The party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence in
consonance with the Constitution, R.A. 7941 and other laws to duly prove that the
nominees truly belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral
party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent.
A careful perusal of the records readily shows that Pia B. Derla, who has signed and
submitted, as the purported Acting Secretary General of CIBAC, the Certificates of
Nomination of Respondents, has no authority to do so. Despite Respondents repeated
claim that Ms. Derla is a member and officer of CIBAC, they have not presented any
proof in support of the same. We are at a loss as to the manner by which Ms. Derla has
assumed the post, and We see nothing but Respondents claims and writings/
certifications by Ms. Derla herself that point to that alleged fact. Surely, We cannot
rely on these submissions, as they are the very definition of self-serving declarations.
Pia Derla, who is not even a member of CIBAC, is thus a virtual stranger to the partylist, and clearly not qualified to attest to petitioners as CIBAC nominees, or certify
their nomination to the COMELEC. Petitioners cannot use their registration with the
SEC as a substitute for the evidentiary requirement to show that the nominees,
including Derla, are bona fide members of the party. Petitioners Planas and Lokin, Jr.
have not even presented evidence proving the affiliation of the so-called Board of
Trustees to the CIBAC Sectoral Party that is registered with COMELEC.
WHEREFORE , finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in

issuing the assailed Resolutions, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. This Court AFFIRMS
the judgment of the COMELEC expunging from its records the Certificate of Nomination
filed on 26 March 2010 by Pia B. Derla. The nominees, as listed in the Certificate of
Nomination filed on 19 January 2010 by Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, President and
Chairman of Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) Party List, are recognized as
the legitimate nominees of the said party.
MILAGROS E. AMORES vs HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and EMMANUEL
JOEL J. VILLANUEVA
FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that, among other things, private respondent assumed office
without a formal proclamation issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC); he
Page 134

was disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the
filing of his certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or
beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941,
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act; and his change of affiliation from
CIBACs youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector was not
effected at least six months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to
represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA No. 7941.
ISSUE:
WON Mr. Villanuevas assumption of office is legal.

RULING:
the Court shall first discuss the age requirement for youth sector nominees under
Section 9 of RA No. 7941 reading:
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as

party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year
immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide
member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety
(90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of
age on the day of the election.
In case of anominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) butnot
more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term.
As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at
least be twenty-five (25) butnot more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election, so it must be that a candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not
qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since this mandate is contained in RA No.
7941, the Party-List System Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-list
representative seats.
As petitioner points out, RA No. 7941 was enacted only in March, 1995. There is thus no
reason to apply Section 9 thereof only to youth sector nominees nominated during the
first three congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution in 1987. Under
this interpretation, the last elections where Section 9 applied were held in May, 1995
or two months after the law was enacted. This is certainly not sound legislative intent,
and could not have been the objective of RA No. 7941.
Respecting Section 15 of RA No. 7941, the Court fails to find even an iota of textual
support for public respondents ratiocination that the provision did not apply to private
respondents shift of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its overseas Filipino
workers and their families sector as there was no resultant change in party-list
affiliation. Section 15 reads:
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who
changes hispolitical party or sectoral affiliationduring his term of office shall forfeit
his seat: Provided, That if he changes hispolitical party orsectoral affiliationwithin six
(6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list
representative under his new party or organization. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)
What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political party
and sectoral affiliation. And the latter may occur within the same party since multisectoral party-list organizations are qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list
system. Hence, a nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party
will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has
Page 135
been effected at least six months before the elections. Again, since the statute is clear
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. This is the plain meaning rule or verba legis, as expressed in
the maxim index animi sermo or speech is the index of intention.
It is, therefore, beyond cavil that Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private
respondent.
The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of either
the youth sector or the overseas Filipino workers and their families sector in the May,
2007 elections.
The records disclose that private respondent was already more than 30 years of age in
May, 2007, it being stipulated that he was born in August, 1975.Moreover, he did not
change his sectoral affiliation at least six months before May, 2007, public respondent
itself having found that he shifted to CIBACs overseas Filipino workers and their
families sector only on March 17, 2007.
That private respondent is the first nominee of CIBAC, whose victory was later upheld,
is of no moment. A party-list organizations ranking of its nominees is a mere indication
of preference, their qualifications according to law are a different matter.
RONALDO LAYUG vs COMELEC, MARIANO VELARDE (alias BROTHER MIKE) and BUHAY
PARTY-LIST
FACTS:
On March 31, 2010, petitioner Rolando D. Layug (Layug), in his capacity as a taxpayer
and concerned citizen, filed pro se a Petition to Disqualify (SPA No.
10-016 [DCN]) Buhay Party-List from participating in the May 10, 2010 elections, and
Brother Mike from being its nominee. He argued that Buhay Party-List is a mere
extension of the El Shaddai, which is a religious sect. As such, it is disqualified from
being a party-list under Section 5, Paragraph 2, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution4, as
well as Section 6, Paragraph 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, otherwise known as
theParty-List System Act.Neither does Brother Mike, who is allegedly a billionaire
real estate businessman and the spiritual leader of El Shaddai, qualify as one who
belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sector xxx, as required of partylist nominees under Section 6 (7) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807, the Rules on
Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/Organizations
Participating in the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
In their Answerthereto, Buhay Party-List and Brother Mike claimed that Buhay PartyList is not a religious sect but a political party possessing all the qualifications of a
party-list. It is composed of groups for the elderly, the women, the youth, the
handicapped, as well as the professionals, and Brother Mike belongs to the
marginalized and underrepresented elderly group. They likewise argued that nominees
from a political party such as Buhay Party-List need not even come from the
marginalized and underrepresented sector.
On June 15, 2010, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution denying the
petition for lack of substantial evidence.
As a consequence of such entry, the COMELECEn Banc, sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers for Party-List, promulgated on July 30, 2010 NBC Resolution No.
10-034proclaiming Buhay Party-List as a winner entitled to two (2) seats in the House
of Representatives. Being the fifth nominee, however, Brother Mike was not proclaimed
as the representative of Buhay Party-List.
ISSUE:
WON the HRET has jurisdiction over the present petition.
Page 136

RULING:
The Court not the HRET has jurisdiction over the present petition.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its Members. Section 5 (1) of the
same Article identifies who the "members" of the House are:
o Sec. 5.(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,who shall be
elected from legislative districtsapportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,and
those who, as provided by law,shall be elected through a partylist system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1) members
who shall be elected from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.1 In this case, Buhay Party-List was entitled to two seats in the House
that went to its first two nominees, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin
C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother Mike, being the fifth nominee, did not get a seat
and thus had not become a member of the House of Representatives. Indubitably,
theHREThas no jurisdiction over the issue of Brother Mike's qualifications
Neither does theHREThave jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay Party-List, as

it is vested by law, specifically, theParty-List System Act, upon the COMELEC.Section
6 of saidActstates thatthe COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of
any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration
of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition xxx.Accordingly,
in the case of Abayon vs. HRET, We ruled that the HRET did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it dismissed the petitions forquo warrantoagainstAangat Tayopartylist andBantayparty-list insofar as they sought the disqualifications of said party-lists.
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTION AND OTHER CASES (G.R. NO. 203766
ETC., 02 APRIL 2013, CARPIO, J.)
(pasensya na...pertinga taasa man uyy)
Facts:
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition
filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list
system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution
Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested
their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second
Divisions resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bidas (PBB) registration and accreditation as
a political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the
13 May 2013 party-list elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-list group; and PBB
failed to establish its track record as an organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the
"marginalized and underrepresented."
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM,
KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from
Page 137

this Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the
names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary
evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed
manifestations of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the 39 groups and organizations from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections:
These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI, 1GANAP/
GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY,
BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA,
SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, A-IPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st
KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this
Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of
the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Issue:
1.
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the
party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as
party-list organizations
2. Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong
Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v.
Commission on Elections49 (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13
May 2013 party-list elections.
Ruling:
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the
qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we
remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are
qualified to register under the partylist system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
The objective of the party list system under the 1987 constitution is to democratize political
power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to
win seats in the house of representatives.
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system ofrepresentation. Simply put,
the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that
cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives.50 The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one
for his or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of
choice.
Both sectoral and well as non-sectoral parties are included in the party list system.
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-listsystem to include not
only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to
constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner
Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system [F]or as long
as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall
designate in this Constitution.53
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Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was
outvoted. Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the
first three consecutive terms.
There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected
the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they
clearly intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect
to win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the
same number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The
party-list system will be the entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for
both these non-traditional parties that could not compete in legislative district elections.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along
sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
What is the proof that the party list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties?
Section 5(2), article VI of the 1987 constitution which mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of congress after the ratification of the 1987 constitution, one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. This provision
clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two
obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be
open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list
system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the marginalized and
underrepresented. Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral
parties applies only for the first three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, clearly making the party-list system fully
open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period,
there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three
groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1)
and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not
for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government.
A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector.
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a party as either a political party or a sectoral party
or a coalition of parties. Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section
3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a political party refers to an organized group of
citizens advocating an
Page 139

ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government. On
the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a sectoral party refers to an
organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof
whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they
are separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. To require all national and regional
parties under the party-list system to represent the marginalized and underrepresented is to
deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the
party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in
legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the
party-list system? To exclude them from the partylist system is to prevent them from joining
the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them
from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the
clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. Under the partylist system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a
sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not
represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or
regional political party must represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector. It is
sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or
platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status
as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals.56 The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all
necessarily marginalized and underrepresented. For sure, professionals are not by
definition marginalized and underrepresented, not even the elderly, women, and the youth.
However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth may lack well-defined political
constituencies, and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the
special interests andconcerns of their respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not
require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No.
7941, to represent the marginalized and underrepresented. Section 6 provides the grounds
for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due
notice and hearing.
On the contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are marginalized
and underrepresented would lead to absurdities.
The phrase marginalized and underrepresented should refer only to the sectors in section 5
that are, by their nature, economically marginalized and underrepresented.
These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors.
For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented.
The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track
record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector does not mean one must wallow in poverty, destitution or
infirmity. It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More
specifically, the economically marginalized and underrepresented are those who fall in the
low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.58
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How about sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, do they need to
be marginalized?
No. They belong to ideology-based and cause oriented parties. Allowing them to run as party
list will give give small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined
political constituencies a chance to win seats in the house of representatives.
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals,
the elderly, women and the youth, need not be marginalized and underrepresented will
allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political
constituencies a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand,
limiting to the marginalized and underrepresented the sectoral parties for labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will
give the marginalized and underrepresented an opportunity to likewise win seats in the
House of Representatives. This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A.
No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party system where those marginalized and
underrepresented, both in economic and ideological status, will have the opportunity to
send their own members to the House of Representatives.
Political parties can participate in the party-list elections through their sectoral wings.
They cannot directly participate because they neither lack well defined political
constituencies nor represent marginalized and undderpresented sectors.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections.
Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack
well-defined political constituencies nor represent marginalized and underrepresented
sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily
those that do not belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the national
and regional parties under the party-list system to those who lack well-defined political
constituencies, giving them the opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives.
Political parties are allowed to participate in the party list elections through their sectoral
wings in order to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
marginalized and underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political
constituencies.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in partylist elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to
the marginalized and underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political
constituencies. The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be
geared towards the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the marginalized
and underrepresented and those who lack well-defined political constituencies, giving them
a voice in lawmaking.
Thus, to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the
legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system.
The qualification of a party-list nominee
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she
seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one
must either belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such
sector.
THE NEW PARAMETERS TO BE FOLLOWED BY COMELEC
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in partylist elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented
or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers.
The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who
lack well-defined political constituencies, either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members
of such parties or organizations.
National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified.
ALDOVINO VS. COMELEC

Facts:
Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of office
for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and
Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local Government Code)?
The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is an
effective interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide
complete service for the full term; thus, such term should not be counted for the purpose of
the three-term limit rule.
The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for
the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his
2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation
with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the
Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office
and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The
petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners)
sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that
he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore
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violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section
43(b) of RA 7160.
The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour in its
Resolution of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply,
as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the
Sandiganbayan had ordered.
Issue:
Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term
limit rule; and . Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as
contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160
Held:
NEGATIVE. Petition is meritorious.
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an
elective officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first
branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time three years during which
an official has title to office and can serve
The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law
describes that an officer may hold an office., preventive suspension is not a qualified
interruption
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections7 presented the question of whether the disqualification
on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the public official (to be strictly
accurate, the proclamation as winner of the public official) for his supposedly third term had
been declared invalid in a final and executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for
the application of the disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected
for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2. that he has fully served
three consecutive terms The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next
mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of
writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from
office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve
the 1995-1998 mayoral term.(EXCEPTION)
"Interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one
that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have
involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to
occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be
faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous stay in office to no more than
three consecutive terms, using "voluntary renunciation" as an example and standard of what
does not constitute an interruption.
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension
should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond
three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the
suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the
functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the
suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the
lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.
TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Following Senator Guingona's confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution
No. 84 ("Resolution No. 84") certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution
No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held
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simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term
each, were due to be elected in that election. 1 Resolution No. 84 further provided that the
"Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the
unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.," which ends on 30 June 2004.
On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results from all the provinces but
one (Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13
candidates as the elected Senators. Resolution No. 01-005 also provided that "the first twelve
(12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve
the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed
Vice-President." Respondents Ralph Recto ("Recto") and Gregorio Honasan ("Honasan") ranked
12th and 13th, respectively, in Resolution No. 01-005.
Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without jurisdiction because:
(1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as
required under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6645 ("R.A. No. 6645");
(2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy
whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under
Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; 5 and, consequently,
(3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under
the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4
of Republic Act No. 6646 ("R.A. No. 6646").
In view of the issuance of Resolution No. 01-006, the Court required petitioners to file an
amended petition impleading Recto and Honasan as additional respondents. Petitioners
accordingly filed an amended petition in which they reiterated the contentions raised in their
original petition and, in addition, sought the nullification of Resolution No. 01-006.
COMELEC and Honasan further raise preliminary issues on the mootness of the petition and on
petitioners' standing to litigate. Honasan also claims that the petition, which seeks the nullity
of his proclamation as Senator, is actually a quo warranto petition and the Court should dismiss
the same for lack of jurisdiction. For his part, Recto, as the 12th ranking Senator, contends he
is not a proper party to this case because the petition only involves the validity of the
proclamation of the 13th placer in the 14 May 2001 senatorial elections.
Issues:
W/N a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly held on 14 May
2001.
Held: WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco ("Senator Roco"), the Senate agreed to
amend Resolution No. 84 by providing, as it now appears, that "the senatorial candidate
garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term
of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr." Senator Roco introduced the amendment to spare
COMELEC and the candidates needless expenditures and the voters further inconvenience.
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and
important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be
hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible
organization. The Commission may err, so may this Court also. It should be allowed
considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of
the great objective for which it was created free, orderly and honest elections. We may not
agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross
abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere.
The calling of a special election, if necessary, and the giving of notice to the electorate of
necessary information regarding a special election, are central to an informed exercise of the
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right of suffrage. While the circumstances attendant to the present case have led us to
conclude that COMELEC's failure to so call and give notice did not invalidate the special
senatorial election held on 14 May 2001, COMELEC should not take chances in future elections.
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any
vacancy in the Senate and the House of Representatives "in the manner prescribed by law,"
thus: In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election
may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member
of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term
A survey of COMELEC's resolutions relating to the conduct of the 14 May 2001 elections reveals
that they contain nothing which would amount to a compliance, either strict or substantial,
with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. Thus, nowhere in its
resolutions 24 or even in its press releases 25 did COMELEC state that it would hold a special
election for a single three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections on
14 May 2001. Nor did COMELEC give formal notice that it would proclaim as winner the
senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the special election.
The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its occurrence,
whether made by the legislature directly or by the body with the duty to give such call, is
indispensable to the election's validity. In a general election, where the law fixes the date of
the election, the election is valid without any call by the body charged to administer the
election.
In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an
election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the
special election is to be held and operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an
election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged
by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so. This is because the right and duty
to hold the election emanate from the statute and not from any call for the election by some
authority and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the
election.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. This makes mandatory the requirement in Section 2 of
R.A. No. 6645, as amended, for COMELEC to "call . . . a special election . . . not earlier than 60
days nor longer than 90 days after the occurrence of the vacancy" and give notice of the office
to be filled. The COMELEC's failure to so call and give notice will nullify any attempt to hold a
special election to fill the vacancy.
More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of Honasan, the party who stands most
prejudiced by the instant petition. We simply cannot disenfranchise those who voted for
Honasan, in the absence of proof that COMELEC's omission prejudiced voters in the exercise of
their right of suffrage so as to negate the holding of the special election.
Neither is there basis in petitioners' claim that the manner by which COMELEC conducted the
special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 is a nullity because COMELEC failed to document
separately the candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No
such requirements exist in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. No.
6645 is that COMELEC "fix the date of the election," if necessary, and "state, among others, the
office or offices to be voted for." Similarly, petitioners' reliance on Section 73 of B.P. Blg. 881
on the filing of certificates of candidacy, and on Section 4(4) of R.A. No. 6646 on the printing of
election returns and tally sheets, to support their claim is misplaced. These provisions govern
elections in general and in no way require separate documentation of candidates or separate
canvass of votes in a jointly held regular and special elections.
PHILCONSA VS MATHAY
G.R. No. L-25554, October 4, 1966
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FACTS:Philippine Constitution Association (Philconsa), non-stock, non-profit association, whose
members are Filipino citizens and taxpayers has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor
General of the Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to
permanently enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased
salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives
before December 30, 1969.
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the
House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner
contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the
Constitution which provides xxx No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after
the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such, increase. The reason given being that the term of the 8
senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired
only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in
the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.
ISSUE:Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the
members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have
fully expired before the increase becomes effective?
RULING: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased
compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to all
members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the same sentence, as a single
unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by
the fact that the provision speaks of the expiration of the full term of the Senators and
Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form and not the plural, thereby
rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible
components of one single Legislature. The use of the word term in the singular, when
combined with the following phrase all the members of the Senate and the House,
underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental
consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the
measure must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative.
The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not
operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House
that approved it will have expired.
LIGOT VS MATHAY
G.R. No. L-34676 (April 30, 1974)
56 SCRA 823
FACTS: Petitioner LIGOT served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress
of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from
December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969.
During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134 "fixing the salaries of
constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government" was enacted into
law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of
Congress (senators and congressman) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to
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P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases "shall take effect in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution."
Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) but was
held not entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third term by virtue of this
Court's unanimous decision inPhilconsa vs. Mathay "that the increased compensation provided
by Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969 when the full term of all
members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired" by
virtue of the constitutional mandate in Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which
provides that "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of
thefull termof all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving
such increase."
Petitioner lost his bid for a consecutive fourth term in the 1969 elections and his term having
expired on December 30, 1969, filed a claim for retirement under Act 186, section 12 (c) as
amended by R.A 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee,
appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of
which are continuous on the basis therein provided "in case of employees based on thehighest
rate receivedand in case of elected officials on therates of pay as provided by law."
On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in the sum of
P122,429.86 in petitioner's favor as his retirement gratuity, using the increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum. Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant.
On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco formally requested petitioner to return the
warrant and its supporting papers for a recomputation of his retirement claim. Petitioner's
request for reconsideration was denied in due course. Hence the present petition for review by
way of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners claim for retirement gratuity be computed on the basis of
the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress.
RULING: No. Ligots contention is untenable for the following reasons:
1. Since the salary increase to P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress under Republic
Act 4134 could be operative onlyfromDecember 30, 1969 for incoming members of Congress
when the full term of all members of Congress (House and Senate) that approved the increase
(such as petitioner) will have expired, by virtue of the constitutional mandate of Article VI,
section 14 of the 1935 Constitution, it is self-evident that the "rate of pay as provided by law"
for members of Congress retiring on December 30, 1969 such as petitioner must necessarily be
P7,200.00 per annum, the compensation they received "as provided by law" and the
Constitution during their term of office.
2. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30,
1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum would be to pay
them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were
permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor
General in his decision in the similar case of petitioner's colleague, ex-Congressman Singson,
"(S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited
result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly what can not be done directly."
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3. Petitioner's contention that since the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum was already
operative when his retirement took effect on December 30, 1969 cannot be sustained as far as
he and other members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December
30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of
compensation.
PEOPLE VS JALOSLOS
324 SCRA 689
FACTS: Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of
lasciviousness on six countsis pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion (Motion
To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of House of Representatives) asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a
non-bailable offense.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will. He states that the
sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their
representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to
perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made
possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable
procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
Jalosjos also invoked the doctrine of condonation citing Aguinaldo v. Santos.
Jalosjos further argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted
several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical
reasons.
Jalosjos avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their
voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of
Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate.
ISSUE: Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to
validly incarcerated persons in general?
RULING: No. True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the
exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the
perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights
arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The privilege of immunity from arrest has always been granted in a restrictive sense.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The provision granting an
exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms.
It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
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Section 11, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution provides A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. xxx
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation
of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement
of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is
not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
Aguinaldo doctrine does not apply to criminal cases.
Neither can he rely on Aguinaldo doctrine. The Aguinaldo case involves the administrative
removal of a public officer for acts donepriorto his present term of office. It does not apply to
imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that
preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains
a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of Congress.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at
the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings will
virtually make him a free man.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he
could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of
prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he
is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer
serve his full term in office.
To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5
days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant
to his position.Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that
of aspecial class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal
protection.
The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
laws." This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights
enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue
favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accusedappellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?
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The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison.
The Court cannotvalidatebadges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
TRILLANES VS PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 179817
556 SCRA 471 (June 27, 2008)
FACTS: On July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in
Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.
Later that day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring
a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. A series of
negotiations quelled the teeming tension and eventually resolved the impasse with the
surrender of the militant soldiers that evening.
In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident," petitioner Antonio
F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup detat defined under Article
134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.
Close to four years later, Trillanes has remained in detention, threw his hat in the political
arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.
Before the commencement of his term, Trillanes filed an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to
be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests" Among his requests were: (a) To be
allowed togo to the Senate to attend all official functions of the Senate xxx (d) To be allowed
to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or opinions to the press, (e) With
prior notice to the Honorable Court and to the accused and his custodians, to be allowed to
receive, on Tuesdays and Fridays,reporters and other members of the mediawho may wish to
interview him. xxx
(NB: letters (b), (c), (f) were withdrawn upon his MR when the court denied this Omnibus
Motion)
Trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration. The trial court just the same denied the motion. Hence, the present petition
forcertiorari.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Trillanes case is different from that of the Jalosjos case.
(2) Whether or not Trillanes election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to
work and serve his mandate as senator.
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(3) Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of
detention prisoners who are held without bail as in the case of Former Pres. Estrada & Former
ARMM Gov. Misuari.
HELD:The petition is bereft of merit.
No distinction between Trillanes case and that of Jalosjos case.
Trillanes in attempting to strike a distinction between his case against Jaloslos argues that the
latter was already convicted albeit his conviction was pending appeal, whereas he is a mere
detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the
presumption of innocence is still in his favor.
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that
election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class
of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The Rules also
state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape
and coup dtat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the
class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no
distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether
ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of
conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to
provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such
cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies
equally to detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. The
Court in People v. Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or
serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary
consequence of arrest and detention. The trial court thus correctly concluded that the
presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
Trillanes election as Senator not a legislative justification to allow him to serve his
mandate.
The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak
of. SC categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases.
Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge.
Petitioner's electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the
Senate, "they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x
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with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison.
It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the
voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution
and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching
tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves
ordained to govern all under the rule of law. The performance of legitimate and even essential
duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties
imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that
the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is
only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of
the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty
lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by
law.
Trillanes case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves.
Petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners who have
also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and former
Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend "social functions." He harps on an alleged
violation of the equal protection clause.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at
the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely abused,
petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as
a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on
May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In
a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a
complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists on
unending concessions and blanket authorizations.
JIMENEZ VS CABANGBANG
17 SCRA 876
FACTS: This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of
several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of
defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the
complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were,
said letter is a privileged communication. This motion having been granted by the lower court,
plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal.
ISSUES: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; and, if not,
(2) whether it is libelous or not.
RULING:
(1) No. The publication is not a privileged communication.
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The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was a
member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense,
and that Article VI, Section 15 of the 1935 Constitution it states that The Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach
of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress,
and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall
not be questioned in any other place. The determination of the first issue depends on whether
or not the aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate
therein.
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the
complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14,
1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be
published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date.
It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing
his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof.
Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not
absolutely privileged.
(2) Supreme Court are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs'
action for damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the
unnamed persons therein alluded to as "planners", and that, having been handpicked by
Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique",
it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs
"are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge". In other
words, the very document upon which plaintiffs' action is based explicitly indicates that they
might beabsolutely unawareof the alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely
unwitting tools of the planners. SC do not think that this statement is derogatory to the
plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers
of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that
the group therein described as "planners" include these two (2) high ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by the
defendant, knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to
expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them from
their associates, but these allegations are mere conclusions which are inconsistent with the
contents of said letter and can not prevail over the same, it being the very basis of the
complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in their complaint that said communication is false,
they could not have possibly meant that they were aware of the alleged plan to stage acoup
d'etator that they were knowingly tools of the "planners". Again, the aforementioned passage
in the defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of
saidcoup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be "tools", much less, unwittingly on their part,
of said "planners".
OSMEA VS PENDATUN
G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960
109 PHI 863
FACTS: Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., filed a verified petition for "declaratory relief,
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K.
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Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special
Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on
the ground of infringenment of his parliamentary immunity.
HR 59 created a special committee to investigate the truth of the charges against the President
of the Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr., in his privilege speech of June 23,
1960. Said charges emanated from his one-hour privileged speech entitled A Message to
Garcia, which constituted a serious assault upon the dignity of Garcia as the then President.
Congressman Osmea alleged; first, the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute
parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no
actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House
took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other
business has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate,he shall not
be heldto answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.
The respondents challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, defended
the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Osmea parliamentary immunity was violated.
(2) Whether or not SC has jurisdiction to entertain this petition.
RULING:
(1) There was no violation of Osmeas parliamentary immunity.
(2) SC has no jurisdiction.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress,
the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other
place. Furthermore, the Rules of the House recognize the House's power to hold a member
responsible "for words spoken in debate.
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished
in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its
purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust
with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest
liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however
powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may occasion offense."Such immunity has come to
this country from the practices of Parliamentary as construed and applied by the Congress of
the United States. Its extent and application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to
the question before us. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without
fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forumoutsideof the Congressional Hall. But is does not protect him from responsibility before
the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter
disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes
disorderly conduct for which Osmea may be discipline, many arguments pro and con have
been advanced. We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes
disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but
also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows
Page 154

best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by
the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmea
conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate
jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the
Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands
in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, had
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.
LIBAN VS GORDON
G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009
593 SCRA 68
CASE: This is a petition to declare Senator Richard J. Gordon (respondent) as having forfeited
his seat in the Senate.
FACTS: Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari (petitioners)
filed with this Court aPetition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the
Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross
Chapter while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of
Governors.
During respondents incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines,he was elected
Chairman of the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors,
respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of
the Constitution, which reads:
SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term
without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been
created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC, which held that the PNRC is a government-owned or
controlled corporation. Petitioners claim thatin accepting and holding the position of Chairman
of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate,
pursuant toFlores v. Drilon,which held that incumbent national legislators lose their elective
posts upon their appointment to another government office.
Among others, Respondent asserts that petitioners have no standing to file this petition which
appears to be an action for quo warranto, since the petition alleges that respondent committed
an act which, by provision of law, constitutes a ground for forfeiture of his public office and
further insists that the PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation and that the
prohibition under Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution does not apply in the present case
since volunteer service to the PNRCis neither an office nor an employment.
ISSUES:
1.W/n petitioners have legal standing.
Page 155

2. Whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government- owned or controlled
corporation;
3. Whether Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution applies to the case of
respondent who is Chairman of the PNRC and at the same time a Member of the Senate
RULING: We find the petition without merit.
(1) Petitioners Have No Standing to File this Petition.
A careful reading of the petition reveals that it is an action for quo warranto.
Petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short, petitioners
filed an action for usurpation of public office against respondent, a public officer who
allegedly committed an act which constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his public office.
Clearly, such an action is for quo warranto, specifically under Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules
of Court.
The person institutingquo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to
show that he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed at any
stage. In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of
respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the present petition.
Even if the Court disregards the infirmities of the petition and treats it as a taxpayers suit,
the petition would still fail on the merits.
(2) PNRC isa Private Organization Performing Public Functions
On 22 March 1947, President Manuel A. Roxas signed Republic Act No. 95,otherwise known as
the PNRC Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian
organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian
assistance for the most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender,
social status, or political affiliation.
The PNRC, as a member National Society of the Movement, has the duty to uphold the
Fundamental Principles and ideals of the Movement. In order to be recognized as a National
Society, the PNRC has to beautonomousand must operate in conformity with the Fundamental
Principles of the Movement.
The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted by warring belligerents as
neutral workers during international or internal armed conflicts, the PNRC volunteers must not
be seen as belonging to any side of the armed conflict. In the Philippines where there is a
communist insurgency and a Muslim separatist rebellion, the PNRC cannot be seen as
government-owned or controlled, and neither can the PNRC volunteers be identified as
government personnel or as instruments of government policy. Otherwise, the insurgents or
separatists will treat PNRC volunteers as enemies when the volunteers tend to the wounded in
the battlefield or the displaced civilians in conflict areas.
Thus, the PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral and
independent in order to conduct its activities in accordance with the Fundamental Principles.
Page 156

The PNRC must not appear to be an instrument or agency that implements government policy;
otherwise, it cannot merit the trust of all and cannot effectively carry out its mission as a
National Red Cross Society. It is imperative that the PNRC must be autonomous, neutral, and
independent in relation to the State.
To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot be owned
or controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine government does not own the PNRC.
The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the
Philippine Congress.
An overwhelming four-fifths majority of the PNRC Board are private sector individuals elected
to the PNRC Board by the private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Board exercises all
corporate powers of the PNRC.The PNRC is controlled by private sector individuals. Decisions
or actions of the PNRC Board are not reviewable by the President. The President cannot
reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Board. Neither can the President
reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. It is the PNRC Board that
can review, reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. This proves again
that the office of the PNRC Chairman is a private office, not a government office.
(3) The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription against the Creation
ofPrivate Corporations by Special Law
The 1935 Constitution, as amended, was in force when the PNRC was created by special
charter on22 March 1947. Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, as amended,reads:
SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except bygeneral law, provide for the formation, organization,
or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the
Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter. Such
legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law.
If the corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a general law.Stated differently,
only corporations created under a general law can qualify as private corporations. Under
existing laws, the general law is the Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code
governs the incorporation of cooperatives.
Although PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered a government-owned
or controlled corporation in the absence of the essential elements of ownership and control by
the government. In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a
private corporation. However, the constitutional prohibition against the creation of private
corporations by special charters provides no exception even for non-profit or charitable
corporations. Consequently, the PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private
corporation and grants it corporate powers,is void for being unconstitutional.Thus,Sections
1, 2,3, 4(a),5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12, and 13of the PNRC Charter, as amended,are void.
In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office
in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. However, since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it
creates the PNRC as a private corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation
Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private
corporation.
Page 157
LIBAN VS GORDON (MOTION FOR RECON)

G. R. No.175352, January 18, 2011
639 SCRA 703
CASE: Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration filed on August 10, 2009 by
respondent Richard J. Gordon (respondent) of the Decision promulgated by this Court on
July 15, 2009 (the Decision), the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed on August 27,
2009bymovant-intervenorPhilippine National Red Cross (PNRC), and the lattersManifestation
and Motion to Admit Attached Position Paper filed on December 23, 2009.
FACTS: The Court held that respondent did not forfeit hisseat in the Senatewhen he accepted
the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, as the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a
government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes
of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.[5]The Decision, however,
further declared void the PNRC Charter insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private
corporation and consequently ruled that the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation
Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private
corporation.
Respondent raises the following grounds: (1) as the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 95 was not raised by the parties, the Court went beyond the case in deciding such
issue; and (2) as the Court decided that Petitioners did not have standing to file the instant
Petition, the pronouncement of the Court on the validity of R.A. No. 95 should be
consideredobiter.
Respondent argues that the validity of R.A. No. 95 was a non-issue; therefore, it was
unnecessary for the Court to decide on that question. Respondent cites Laurel v.
Garcia, wherein the Court said that it will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground and
goes on to claim that since this Court, in the Decision, disposed of the petition on some other
ground,i.e.,lack of standing of petitioners, there was no need for it to delve into the validity
of R.A. No. 95, and the rest of the judgment should be deemedobiter.
ISSUE: Whether to sustain the constitutionality of the PNRC Chapter.
RULING: As correctly pointed out in respondents Motion, the issue of constitutionality
ofR.A.No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body
of the Decision; thus, it was not the verylis motaof the case.
This Court should not have declared void certain sections of R.A. No. 95, as amended by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos. 1264 and 1643, the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should
have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other ground
upon which the Court could have based its judgment.Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most
adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a
party to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly
reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of
existence in this country.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11,
1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855,
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R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws
relating to the PNRCs corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional
proscription on the creation of private corporations by law, is a recognition that the PNRC is
not strictly in the nature of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional
ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it not just in terms
of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the
State and the international community. There is merit in PNRCs contention that its structure
issui generis.
PUYAT VS DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. L-51122, March 25, 1982
113 SCRA 31
CASE: This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised against the
Order of respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.
FACTS: An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation
(IPI) a private corporation, was held where Puyat and his group won.
The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quo warranto
proceedings, questioning the election. They claimed that the stockholders' votes were not
properly counted.
The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with respondent SEC Commissioner
de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat
Group objected on Constitutional grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution,
then in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ... any
administrative body", and SEC was an administrative body. Incidentally, the same prohibition
was maintained by the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The cited Constitutional prohibition being clear,
Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.
When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that, May 15, Fernandez had purchased from
Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero
to qualify him to run for election as a Director. The deed of sale, however, was notarized only
on May 30 and was sought to be registered on said date. The next day, May 31, the latter had
filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of ten (10) IPI shares
alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation.
The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez' ownership of the said ten
shares.It is this Order allowing intervention that precipitated the instant petition for certiorari
and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may intervene in
the SEC Case without violating Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution.
Section 11. No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court
inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, before any court in any civil case wherein the
Page 159

government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or
before any administrative body. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially
in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by, the government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of
the government for his pecuniary benefit.
RULING: Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be
said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although
he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for
the protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation
and not for the protection of the petitioners nor respondents who have their respective
capable and respected counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman
Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing
ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May
30, after the contested election of Directors on May 14, after thequo warrantosuit had been
filed on May 25 before SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the
SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his
intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, but which was objected
to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to
"intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an
indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a
circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to
enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed
purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of
an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear as
counsel indirectly.
Election of Officers
Santiago vs Guingona 298 SCRA 756 (1998)
Facts:
During the election of officers of the Senate, Senator Santiago nominated Senator Tatad as
Senate President. Senator Ople, on the other hand, nominated Senator Fernan for the same
position. Senator Fernan was voted Senate President with a vote of 20-2.
Senator Ople was voted president pro tempore while Senator Drilon was voted majority leader.
Senator Tatad manifested that, as the only ones who voted for him were himself and Senator
Santiago, the two of them comprised the minority and that an agreement was entered into
between them that he will be the minority leader.
The Senate was grouped as follows:
10 members Laban ngMasang Pilipino (LAMP)
7 members Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United
Muslim Democrats of the Philippines (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP)
1 member Liberal Party (LP)
1 member AksyonDemokrasya
1 member People's Reform Party (PRP)
1 member Gabay Bayan
2 members Independent
Page 160
23 total number of senators (The last six members are all classified by petitioners as
"independent".)
According to Senator Flavier, the members of the Lakas NUCD-UMDP is also a minority since
there are only 7 members and that they had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader.
Senator Guingona was thereafter formally recognized by the Senate President as the minority
leader.
A petition for quo warranto was filed by Senators Tatad and Santiago alleging that Senator
Guingona had been usurping ,unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issue: Whether or not it was proper for the Senate President to recognize Senator Guingona as
the minority leader.
Held:
History would also show that the "majority" in either house of Congress has referred to the
political party to which the most number of lawmakers belonged, while the "minority" normally
referred to a party with a lesser number of members.
Let us go back to the definitions of the terms "majority" and "minority." Majority may also refer
to "the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes," not necessarily more than
one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast,minorityis "a group, party, or
faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority."Betweentwounequal
parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the
majority while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal
groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader
representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the
Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties,
one of which has to be indentified by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for
purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate,
members either belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or
statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the independents or a
combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House
Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both
chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary." 43 To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such
other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate
itself, not by this Court.
The Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders.
Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the
manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof, At any rate, such offices, by
tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine
the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic
concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the
legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work.
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Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and
obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they "are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them." Being merely matters of procedure, their
observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative bodyat will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
Quorum
Avelino vs Cuenco 83 Phil 17 (1949)
Facts:
In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Taada requested that his
right to speak on the next session day, February 21, 1949, to formulate charges against the
then Senate President Jose Avelino be reserved. His request was approved.
However, on the day of the session, the opening of the session was delayed. He was not given
the chance to speak despite his attempts to claim his right to speak. A commotion broke
outside the Senate gallery which prompted them to adjourn. Nevertheless, Senator Tanada
opposed the motion to adjourn. This led Senate President Avelino and seven of his followers to
leave and abandon the session. The remaining senators continued the session which was then
chaired by the Senate President Pro-Tempore.
Senator Taada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his
privilege speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution
(No. 68), and submitted his motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously
approved.
With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had
yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring
vacant the position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus
Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously
approved.
Senator Cuenco took the oath.
The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting president of
the Philippines Senate.
Note: Except for Senator Sotto who was confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in
the United States, all the Senator were present. 22 Senators were present at the opening of
session.
Issue: Whether or not there was quorum?
Held:
The session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority
of ten senators may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a
resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the
resolution been approved only by ten or less.
If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In
other words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the
business of the Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because
the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least
fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the
absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of
the Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each
House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House does not mean "all" the members. Even a
majority of all the members constitute "the House". (Missouri Pac.vs.Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U.
S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less
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number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate
less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum,
they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so
arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected
just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.
In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation
that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days
immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most,
eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the
rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon
the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of
that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with
thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of
opinion here about quorumand for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who
approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them
beyond the shadow of a doubt.
Rules of Proceedings
Arroyo vs de Venecia 277 SCRA 258 (1997)
Facts:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of
Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners
claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its
report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to
adjourn for lack of quorum. But after arollcall, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum.
The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the
conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the
Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this,
Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders
motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared
by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill wassignedby theSpeaker of the House of Representativesand the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of bothHouses ofCongress.
The enrolled bill wassignedinto law by President Ramos.
Issue:Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of
the House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
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revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has
agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to
be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question
presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a
casewhereprivate rightsare involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who,
instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the
Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep.
Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos
earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call
established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviouslypresentfor the purpose of delaying the business of the
House.
Garcillano vs HR Committee 575 SCRA 170 (2008)
Facts:
A few years ago, the Garci tapes (alleged conversation of GMA and Garcillano) became the
subject of Congressional hearings and joint investigation of different HR Committees. The
hearings were indefinitely suspended; however, the they decided to submit reports based on
the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons.
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this
Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction4docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the
respondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally
obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He
further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the
records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further
using the recordings in any of the House proceedings.5
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of
the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,10docketed as
G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry.
They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section
3, Article III of the Constitution.
Held:
The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative
inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional
requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the
House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of
publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice
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whatsoever, not even a constructive one.What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2
of the Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the
completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines."
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that
the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006.45 With respect to the present
Senate of the 14thCongress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on
June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first
opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v. Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,46we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise
violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance
with the "duly published rules of procedure." We quote the OSGs explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to publish
its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct
from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for
one-half of the Senates membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of
each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit.Not having
published itsRules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the
14thSenate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.
Dela Paz vs Senate Committee 579 SCRA 521 (2009)
Facts:
On October 6, 2008, a Philippine delegation of eight (8) senior Philippine National Police (PNP)
officers arrived in Moscow, Russia to attend the 77th General Assembly Session of the
International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO)-INTERPOL in St. Petersburg from October
6-10, 2008. With the delegation was Gen. Dela Paz, then comptroller and special disbursing
officer of the PNP. Gen. Dela Paz, however, was to retire from the PNP on October 9, 2008.
On October 11, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz was apprehended by the local authorities at the Moscow
airport departure area for failure to declare in written form the 105,000 euros
[approximatelyP6,930,000.00] found in his luggage. In addition, he was also found to have in
his possession 45,000 euros (roughly equivalent toP2,970,000.00).
Petitioners were detained in Moscow for questioning. After a few days, Gen. Dela Paz and the
PNP delegation were allowed to return to the Philippines, but the Russian government
confiscated the euros.
On October 21, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz arrived in Manila, a few days after Mrs. Dela Paz. Awaiting
them were subpoenae earlier issued by respondent Committee for the investigation it was to
conduct on the Moscow incident on October 23, 2008.
On October 23, 2008, respondent Committee held its first hearing. Instead of attending the
hearing, petitioners filed with respondent Committee a pleading denominated Challenge to
Jurisdiction with Motion to Quash Subpoena.2 Senator Santiago emphatically defended
respondent Committees jurisdiction and commanded Balajadia to arrest petitioners.
Issue: whether or not the respondent Committee has jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow
incident.
Held: Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states:
"Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings."
This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the
Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the
exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except
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on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a
denial of due process.
Paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules provides:
12) Committee on Foreign Relations. Fifteen (15) members. All matters relating to the
relations of the Philippines with other nations generally; diplomatic and consular services; the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations; the United Nations Organization and its agencies; multilateral organizations, all international agreements, obligations and contracts; and overseas
Filipinos.
A reading of the above provision unmistakably shows that the investigation of the Moscow
incident involving petitioners is well within the respondent Committees jurisdiction.
Pursuant to paragraph 36, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules, the Blue Ribbon Committee
may conduct investigations on all matters relating to malfeasance, misfeasance and
nonfeasance in office by officers and employees of the government, its branches, agencies,
subdivisions and instrumentalities, and on any matter of public interest on its own initiative or
brought to its attention by any of its members. It is, thus, beyond cavil that the Blue Ribbon
Committee can investigate Gen. Dela Paz, a retired PNP general and member of the official
PNP delegation to the INTERPOL Conference in Russia, who had with him millions which may
have been sourced from public funds.
Subsequent to Senator Santiagos verbal command to Balajadia to arrest petitioners, the
Philippine Senate issued a formal written Orderof arrest, signed by ten (10) senators, with the
Senate President himself approving it, in accordance with the Senate Rules.
Discipline of Members
Alejandrino vs Quezon 46 Phil 63 (1924)
Senator Alejandrino, appointed by the Government General to represent the 12th Senatorial
District, was deprived of all the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his office for the
period of one year from the first of January, 1924. The resolution was adopted by herein
respondents.
Senator Alejandrino prayed before the court: (1) To issue a preliminary injunction against the
respondents enjoining them from executing the resolution; (2) to declare the aforesaid
resolution of the Senate null and void; and (3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a
final writ ofmandamusand injunction against the respondents ordering them to recognize the
rights of the petitioner to exercise his office as Senator and that he enjoy all of his
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, and prohibiting them from preventing the petitioner
from exercising the rights of his office, and from carrying the order of suspension, into effect.
Issue: whether the court has jurisdiction over the matters prayed for by Alejandrino.
Held:
the general rule ofmandamusis that the writ will not lie from one branch of the government
to a coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that neither is inferior to the
other. Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to
compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain
to their legislative, functions and over which they have exclusive control. The courts cannot
dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of power. So it has been held that
there where a member has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts have no power,
irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his
reinstatement.
the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, is granted the power to "punish its
members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective
Page 166

member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either House may thus punish an appointive member for
disorderly behavior. Neither House may expel an appointive member for any reason. As to
whether the power to "suspend" is then included in the power to "punish," a power granted to
the two Houses of the Legislature by the Constitution, or in the power to "remove," a power
granted to the Governor-General by the Constitution, it would appear that neither is the
correct hypothesis. The Constitution has purposely withheld from the two Houses of the
Legislature and the Governor-General alike the power to suspend an appointive member of the
Legislature.
Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its members for disorderly
behavior does not authorize it to suspend on appointive member from the exercise of his office
for one year, conceding what has been so well stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner,
conceding all this and more, yet the writ prayed for cannot issue, for the all-conclusive reason
that the Supreme Court does not possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate
take any particular action. If it be said that this conclusion leaves the petitioner without a
remedy, the answer is that the judiciary is not the repository of all wisdom and all power. It
would hardly be becoming for the judiciary to assume the role of either a credulous inquisitor,
a querulous censor, or a jaunty knight, who passes down the halls of legislation and of
administration giving heed to those who have grievances against the Legislature and the Chief
Executive.
Osmena vs Pendatun 109 Phil 863 (1960)
Facts:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition
for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against
Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as
members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for
annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity; he
also asked, principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined from
proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to
substantiate his charges against the President with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he
must show cause why the House should not punish him.
In support of his request, Congressman Osmea alleged; first, the Resolution violated his
constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second,
his words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable
speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House
provides that if other business has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words
in debate,he shall not be heldto answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.
Issue: whether or not the House has the authority to censure petitioner.
Held:
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress,
the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other
place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the
United States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although
exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of
Congress may, nevertheless, be questionedin Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be
questioned in any other place" than Congress.
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Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7),
recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate. its
purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust
with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest
liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however
powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may occasion offense."
Issue: whether the House may still bring action against him when it had taken up other business
after his speech.
Held:
Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, and such approval amounted to a
suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice may done
by unanimous consent. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observancem,
the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body."
Consequently, "mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
(taken by a deliberative body) when the requisited number of members have agreed to a
particular measure."
Issue: whether a speech attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct.
Held:
the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the
Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on
factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black
and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court
assumed the power to determine whether Osmea conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it
would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to
confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers
fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere.
Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction
and is supreme within its own sphere.
Santiago vs Sandiganbayan356 SCRA 636 (2001)
Facts:
Review of the act of Sandiganbayan in ordering the preventive suspension of Senator

Defensor-Santiago in connection with pending criminal cases filed against her for her
alleged violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
Issue:
Held:
Authority of the Sandiganbayan to issue to decree a 90-day preventive suspension of

Senator Santiago from any government position.
It is the ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon

determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information
is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of
suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be no ifs and buts about it.
"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title
7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense
and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court,
shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose
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all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed
against him.
"In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the
service, has already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the
Government. (As amended by BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982)."
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned
must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts
with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word
"office" would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be
holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused.
Nature of preventive suspension it is not a penalty because it is not imposed in

judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension. (BayotvsSandiganbayan)
The Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law,
as well as the jurisprudence in which this Court has, more than once, upheld
Sandiganbayans authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees
indicted before it.
Order of suspension prescribed by RA 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to

discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each
xxx house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of its members, suspend or expel a Member.
A penalty of suspension, when imposed shall not exceed sixty days.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively
excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The
maxim simply recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit
coordinate, branches of the government the Legislative, the Executive and the
Judiciary has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of
influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal
affairs of either branch.
RA 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive
suspension order.
ARROYO VS DE VENECIA 277 SCRA 268 (1997)

-
ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE
Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against
respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are
"constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.
In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question
on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
Page 169

President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress
as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November
21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22,
1996.
Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of
the House;
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and
spurious;
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated House Rules;
and
Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.
Held: After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that
Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is
therefore dismissed.
Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due
the other two departments of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the
prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as
void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow
those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners
can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be
acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it
to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners
can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the
absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof
acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather
than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and
the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress
that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.
This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if
old-fashioned democratic theory: Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an
inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not
to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do
impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and
honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon
the name of popular government.
FARINAS VS THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 417 SCRA 503

-ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE
Page 170

A petition was filed seeking the Court to declare unconstitutional Section 14 of RA 9006 or The
Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections Through
Fair Election Practices as it repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code mandating the
ipso jure resignation from public office of one who filed his certificate of candidacy, except for
President and Vice-President.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities
attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null
and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that "[t]his Act shall take effect upon its
approval" is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence,
which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.
Invoking the "enrolled bill" doctrine, the respondents refute the petitioners allegations that
"irregularities" attended the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9006. The signatures of the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House, appearing on the bill and the certification signed by
the respective Secretaries of both houses of Congress, constitute proof beyond cavil that the
bill was duly enacted into law.
The Enrolled Bill Doctrine
Is Applicable In this Case
Not content with their plea for the nullification of Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, the
petitioners insist that the entire law should be nullified. They contend that irregularities
attended the passage of the said law particularly in the House of Representatives catalogued
thus:
xxx
The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is
not persuaded. Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the
House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of
Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. A review of cases reveals the
Courts consistent adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the
salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the
internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by
the House. This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of
Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their
observance the courts have no concern. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal
validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its ruling in
Arroyo v. De Venecia, viz.:
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the
power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply
with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional
provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate,
courts have declared that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. And it has been said that
Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no
concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere
failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure."
ABAKADA VS PURISIMA 562 SCRA 251 (2008)
ENROLLED BILL THEORY
Page 171
FACTS: This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and
enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a
system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund)
and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board).It covers all officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue
targets for the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee
(DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in
proportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance
(DOF) or his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the Director General of the National Economic Development
Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the
BOC or their Deputy Commissioners, two representatives from the rank-and-file employees and
a representative from the officials nominated by their recognized organization.
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution
and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials
and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in
accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance
evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6)
submit an annual report to Congress.
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to
promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335,to be approved by a
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created for such purpose.
Petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the
congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law.
In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argues that the
creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances, rather than
violates, separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy and serves as
a check to any over-accumulation of power on the part of the executive and the implementing
agencies.
ISSUE: WON Section 12 of RA 9335 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
Page 172

SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. There is hereby created a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate and seven
Members from the House of Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be appointed
by the Senate President, with at least two senators representing the minority. The Members
from the House of Representatives shall be appointed by the Speaker with at least two
members representing the minority. After the Oversight Committee will have approved the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter become functus officio and
therefore cease to exist.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of
approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA,
BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR.
The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as
a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism
and the rule on presentment.52
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to
the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. (emphasis supplied)
Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws)53 is vested in
Congress which consists of two chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives. A valid
exercise of legislative power requires the act of both chambers. Corrollarily, it can be
exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a committee of either or both
chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a legislative veto, both a single-chamber legislative
veto and a congressional committee legislative veto are invalid.
Additionally, Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto
it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter
the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it
shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a
law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined byyeas or nays, and the
names of the members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the
date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it. (emphasis
supplied)
Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or veto. In the
absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law. In this
sense, law-making under the Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and of the Executive.
Assuming that legislative veto is a valid legislative act with the force of law, it cannot take
effect without such presentment even if approved by both chambers of Congress.
In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law. First, it must be approved by
both Houses of Congress.54Second, it must be presented to and approved by the President.55As
summarized by Justice Isagani Cruz56 and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.57, the following is the
procedure for the approval of bills:
Page 173

A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives or the Senate except for
some measures that must originate only in the former chamber.
The first reading involves only a reading of the number and title of the measure and its referral
by the Senate President or the Speaker to the proper committee for study.
The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be recommended for approval, with or
without amendments, sometimes after public hearings are first held thereon. If there are other
bills of the same nature or purpose, they may all be consolidated into one bill under common
authorship or as a committee bill.
Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. It is at this stage that the
bill is read in its entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and amended when desired. The second
reading is the most important stage in the passage of a bill.
The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies thereof are
distributed at least three days before the third reading. On the third reading, the members
merely register their votes and explain them if they are allowed by the rules. No further
debate is allowed.
Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, where it will also undergo
the three readings. If there are differences between the versions approved by the two
chambers, a conference committee58 representing both Houses will draft a compromise
measure that if ratified by the Senate and the House of Representatives will then be submitted
to the President for his consideration.
The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the Congress, thereafter authenticated
with the signatures of the Senate President, the Speaker, and the Secretaries of their
respective chambers59
The Presidents role in law-making.
The final step is submission to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law
after the required publication.
Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it has enacted
pursuant to sufficient standards established in the said law, the law must be complete in all its
essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. And it may be
deemed to have left the hands of the legislature when it becomes effective because it is only
upon effectivity of the statute that legal rights and obligations become available to those
entitled by the language of the statute. Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication
under the due process clause,61the determination as to when a law takes effect is wholly the
prerogative of Congress.62 As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may be executed
and the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law. Before that
point, the role of the executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to approving or
vetoing the law.
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or
any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates
the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a
provision that requires Congress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law
after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress
or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive
branch charged with the implementation of the law.
Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as unconstitutional. While
there may be similar provisions of other laws that may be invalidated for failure to pass this
Page 174

standard, the Court refrains from invalidating them wholesale but will do so at the proper time
when an appropriate case assailing those provisions is brought before us
US V PONS, 34 PHIL. 729 (1916)

-PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE JOURNAL
Pons was charged with the crime of illegal importation of opium, in violation of Act 2381. Pons
via his counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special session of the
Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381, under which
Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on the 28th of February but
on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null and void. The validity of the Act
is not otherwise questioned. As it is admitted that the last day of the special session was, under
the
Governor-General's proclamation, February 28 and that the appellant is charged with having
violated the provisions of Act No. 2381, the vital question is the date of adjournment of the
Legislature, and this reduces itself to two others, namely,
(1) how that is to be proved, whether by the legislative journals or extraneous evidence and
(2) whether the court can take judicial notice of the journals.
While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon the exact question whether the
courts may take judicial notice of the legislative journals, it is well settled in the United States
that such journals may be noticed by the courts in determining the question whether a
particular bill became a law or not. (The State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith, 44 Ohio, 348, and
cases cited therein.) The result is that the law and the adjudicated cases make it our duty to
take judicial notice of the legislative journals of the special session of the Philippine
Legislature of 1914. These journals are not ambiguous or contradictory as to the actual time of
the adjournment. They show, with absolute certainty, that the Legislature adjourned sine die55
at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914.
Counsel for the appellant, in order to establish his contention, must necessarily depend upon
the memory or recollection of witnesses, while the legislative journals are the acts of the
government or sovereign itself. From their very nature and object the records of the
Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary, and to inquiry into the veracity of the
journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would
be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department
of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the
Legislature. But counsel in his argument says that the public knows that the Assembly's clock
was stopped on February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so until the determination of the
discussion of all pending matters. Or, in other words, the hands of the clock were stayed in
order to enable the Assembly to effect an adjournment apparently within the time fixed by the
Governor's proclamation for the expiration of the special session, in direct violation of the Act
of Congress of July 1, 1902. If the clock was, in fact, stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant
evil might be slight as compared with that of altering the probative force and character of
Page 175

legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action depend upon uncertain oral
evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery of
memory.
Long, long centuries ago, these considerations of public policy led to the adoption of the rule
giving verity and unimpeachability to legislative records. If that character is to be taken away
for one purpose, it must be taken away for all, and the evidence of the laws of the state must
rest upon a foundation less certain and durable than that afforded by the law to many
contracts between private individuals concerning comparatively trifling matters."
ASTORGA VS VILLEGAS 56 SCRA 714 (1974)

-JOURNAL ENTRY RULE VS ENROLLED BILL THEORY
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of
Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964.
Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate
Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M.
Roxas. The committee favorably recommended approval with a minor amendment, suggested
by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the President Protempore of the
Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as
Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964,
substantial amendments to Section 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those
amendments were approved in totoby the Senate. The amendment recommended by Senator
Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon.
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that
House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments."
Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended
by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by
the Senate.
The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted by
respondent City Mayor drew immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964
issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the
President of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate
because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate
floor.
Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since it was not
the bill actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body and not
the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the issue.
Page 176
Issue: Whether the "enrolled bill" doctrine or the "journal entry" rule should be adhered to in
this jurisdiction.
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as
follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the
Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such
bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their
presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the
sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in
obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be
presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the
public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed
complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by
Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate,
and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the
legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty
of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal
and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and
to
accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the
courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is
in conformity with the Constitution.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal
and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in
other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a
statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due
enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, although they are
silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding
officers is present.
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the
disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting it to have been validly made, would only
mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of the statute
This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or absence of
the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute. The inquiry,
however, goes farther.
Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled
bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly
enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.
Page 177
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to
the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is
merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive
was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and
circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the
purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on
the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the
President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the
alleged law, which admittedly is a risky
undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become
law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when
they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and
subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court
to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill
has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body.
FIELD VS. CLARK

- JOURNAL ENTRY VS ENROLLED BILL THEORY
Facts:
Duties were assessed and collected, according to the rates established by the Tariff Act of
October 1, 1890 on goods imported by the appellant.
The appellant alleged that the enrolled act in Custody of the Secretary of the State is missing a
Section 30 as evidenced by the Congressional record of proceedings, reports of committees of
each house, reports of committees of conference, and other papers printed by authority of
Congress therefore it should not become a law even if the said enrolled act is signed by the
required signatories in the Constitution (American).
The facts which were presented in support of the contention that the bill never became a law
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution were three.
1)
That in engrossing the bill, a clause known as section 30, relating to a rebate of taxes
on tobacco, which was shown by the journals of both the House of Representatives and
the Senate to have been regularly passed by both Houses of Congress, was omitted,
and that the engrossed act, as attested by the Vice-President and the Speaker of the
House, as approved by the President and as deposited with the Secretary of State, was
not the act which passed the two Houses of Congress, and was therefore not a statute
of the United States in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
2)
That the first five paragraphs of Schedule E, section 1, of the act, providing for
bounties to producers of American sugar (paragraphs 231 to 235) were unconstitutional
and void, no power to enact legislation of this character having been vested in
Congress by the Constitution.
Page 178

3)
That section 3 of said act was unconstitutional and void in that it delegates to the
President the power of laying taxes and duties, which power, by Sections 1 and 8 of
Article I of the Constitution, is vested in Congress.
Issues:
Based on the evidence of the Congressional record of proceedings, reports of committees of
each house, reports of committees of conference, and other papers printed by authority of
Congress, should the act be declared null and void, with reference to the standard set by the
Constitution of passage of a bill into law?
Held:
NO. The enrolled act, authenticated by the signature of the presiding officers of both House of
Representatives and the Senate, is sufficient evidence that it passed Congress.
In regard to certain matters, the Constitution expressly requires that they shall be entered on
the journal. To what extent the validity of legislative action may be affected by the failure to
have those matters entered on the journal we need not inquire. No such question is presented
for determination. But it is clear that in respect to the particular mode in which, or with what
fullness, shall be kept the proceedings of either house relating to matters not expressly
required to be entered on the journals; whether bills, orders, resolutions, reports, and
amendments shall be entered at large on the journal, or only referred to and designated by
their titles or by numbers -- these and like matters were left to the discretion of the respective
houses of Congress. Nor does any clause of that instrument either expressly or by necessary
implication prescribe the mode in which the fact of the original passage of a bill by the House
of Representatives and the Senate shall be authenticated or preclude Congress from adopting
any mode to that end which its wisdom suggests. Although the Constitution does not expressly
require bills that have passed Congress to be attested by the signatures of the presiding
officers of the two houses, usage, the orderly conduct of legislative proceedings, and the rules
under which the two bodies have acted since the organization of the government require that
mode of authentication.
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of the Senate,
in open session, of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as
one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding
officers, to the President that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of
the legislative branch of the government and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the
constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And
when a bill thus attested receives his approval and is deposited in the public archives, its
authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and
unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an
enrolled act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President
of the United States carries on its face a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and
executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and
independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to
accept as having passed Congress all bills authenticated in the manner stated, leaving the
courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the act so authenticated is in
conformity with the Constitution.
It is admitted that an enrolled act thus authenticated is sufficient evidence of itself -- nothing
to the contrary appearing upon its face -- that it passed Congress. But the contention is that it
cannot be regarded as a law of the United States if the journal of either house fails to show
Page 179

that it passed in the precise form in which it was signed by the presiding officers of the two
houses and approved by the President. It is said that under any other view, it becomes possible
for the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate to impose
upon the people as a law a bill that was never passed by Congress. But this possibility is too
remote to be seriously considered in the present inquiry. It suggests a deliberate conspiracy to
which the presiding officers, the committees on enrolled bills, and the clerks of the two houses
must necessarily be parties, all acting with a common purpose to defeat an expression of the
popular will in the mode prescribed by the Constitution. Judicial action based upon such a
suggestion is forbidden by the respect due to a coordinate branch of the government. The evils
that may result from the recognition of the principle that an enrolled act in the custody of the
Secretary of State, attested by the signatures of the presiding officers of the two houses of
Congress and the approval of the President, is conclusive evidence that it was passed by
Congress according to the forms of the Constitution would be far less than those that would
certainly result from a rule making the validity of congressional enactments depend upon the
manner in which the journals of the respective houses are kept by the subordinate officers
charged with the duty of keeping them.
The conclusion was that, upon grounds of public policy as well as upon the ancient and well
settled rules of law, a copy of a bill bearing the signatures of the presiding officers of the two
houses of the legislature and the approval of the governor, and found in the custody of the
Secretary of State, was conclusive proof of the enactment and contents of a statute, and could
not be contradicted by the legislative journals or in any other mode.
GUEVERA VS INOCENTES 16 SCRA 379 (1966)

-REGULAR SESSIONS
FACTS: The petitioner, Onofre Guevara was extended an ad interim appointment as

Undersecretary of Labor by the former Executive on November 18, 1965. Took his oath of office
on November 25th same year. The incumbent Executive issued Memorandum Circular No. 8
dated January 23, 1966 declaring that all ad interim appointments made by the former
Executive lapsed with the adjournment of the special session of Congress at about midnight of
January 22, 1966. The respondent, Raoul Inocentes was extended an ad interim appointment
for the same position by the incumbent Executive on January 23, 1966. Guevara filed before
the court an instant petition for Quo Warranto seeking to be declared person legally entitled to
the said Officer of the Undersecretary of Labor under Art. VII Sec. 10 (4) of the 1935
Constitution. which states that:
The president shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.
Since there was no Commission on Appointments organized during the special session which
commenced on January 17, 1966, the respondent contended that the petitioners ad interim
appointment as well as other made under similar conditions must have lapsed when the
Congress adjourned its last special session. But the petitioner stated that (1) the specific
provision in the Constitution which states that: until the next adjournment of Congress
means adjournment of a regular session of Congress and not by a special session and (2) only
the Senate adjourned sine die at midnight of January 22, 1966 and the House of the
Representative merely suspended its session and to be resumed on January 24, 1966 at 10:00
Page 180

AM. The petitioner therefore concludes that Congress has been in continuous session without
interruption since January 17.
ISSUE/S:1. Whether or not, the petitioners contention regarding the next adjournment of
Congress specifically provides for regular session only.
2. Whether or not, the petitioners contention that Congress is still in continuous session?
HELD: 1. NO. The phrase until the next adjournment of Congress does not make any
reference to specific session of Congress, whether regular or special. But a well-know Latin
maxim is statutory construction stated that when the law does not distinguish we should not
distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. It is safe to conclude that the
authors of the 1935 Constitution used the word adjournment had in mind either regular or
special and not simply the regular one as the petitioner contended.
2. NO. The mere fact that the Senate adjourned sine die at midnight of January 22, 1966, the
House of the Representative is only a part of the Congress and not the Congress itself. So
logically, the adjournment of one of its Houses is considered adjournment of the Congress as a
whole. And the petitioners ad interim appointment must have been lapsed on January 22, 1966
upon adjournment of the Senate.
Barbers v. COMELEC, 460 SCRA 569 (2005)

On June 2, 2004, the Commission on Elections sitting as the National Board of Canvassers
proclaimed Biazon as the duly elected 12th Senator in the May 10, 2004 National Elections.
While failure of elections were declared in some precincts, COMELEC reasoned that they would
not materially affect the results. Barbers, who ranked next to Biazon, filed a petition before
the COMELEC to annul the proclamation. When this was denied, he raised the issue before the
Supreme Court. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction?
Held: No. The word sole in Sec. 17, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution underscores the
exclusivity of the Senate Electoral Tribunals (SET) jurisdiction over election contests relating
to members of the Senate. The authority conferred upon the SET is categorical and complete.
It is therefore clear that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant
petition. Since Barber contests Biazons proclamation as the 12 winning senatorial candidate,
it is the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers complaint
Hernandez vs. HRET 2009
Petitioner filed for candidacy as Representative of the First Legislative District of
theProvinceofLagunain the May 14, 2007 elections.In his Certificate of Candidacy (COC), he
indicated his complete/exact address as No. 13 Maharlika St., Villa Toledo Subdivision,
Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa City, Laguna (alleged Sta. Rosa residence).[5]
Private respondent Jesus L. Vicente (private respondent) filed a Petition to Deny Due Course
to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and Petition for Disqualification before the Office
of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Laguna. This was forwarded to the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) and docketed therein asSPA No. 07-046 (PES).Private respondent sought
the cancellation of petitioners COC and the latters disqualification as a candidate on the
ground of an alleged material misrepresentation in his COC regarding his place of residence,
because during past elections, he had declared Pagsanjan, Laguna as his address, and
Pagsanjan was located in the Fourth Legislative District of the Province of Laguna. Private
Page 181

respondent likewise claimed that petitioner maintained another house in Cabuyao, Laguna,
which was also outside the First District.[

which was also outside the First District.[6]The COMELEC (First Division) dismissed said petition
for lack of merit
On July 5, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET,
docketed as HRET CASE No. 07-034, praying that petitioner be declared ineligible to hold
office as a Member of the House of Representatives representing the First Legislative District of
the Province of Laguna, and that petitioners election and proclamation be annulled and
declared null and void.[9]
Private respondents main ground for thequo warrantopetition was that petitioner lacked the
required one-year residency requirement provided under Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution
Held:
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI, Section 17 thereof that the HRET and
the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. The authority conferred
upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes
the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals,[33]which is conferred upon the HRET and
the SET after elections and the proclamation of the winning candidates. A candidate who has
not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of
the House of Representatives.[34]
Thus, private respondent correctly pointed out that a petition forquo warrantois within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if, as in this
case, the COMELEC had already passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the
issue of the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives while the latter was
still a candidate.
Page 182

Private respondent concludes from the above that petitioner had no legal basis to claim that
the HRET, when reference to the qualification/s of Members of the House of Representatives is
concerned, is co-equal to the COMELEC, such that the HRET cannot disregard any ruling of
COMELEC respecting the matter of eligibility and qualification of a member of the House of
Representatives. The truth is the other way around, because the COMELEC is subservient to
the HRET when the dispute or contest at issue refers to the eligibility and/or qualification of a
Member of the House of Representatives. A petition forquo warrantois within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HRET as sole judge, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if
another body may have passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of
the Members qualification while the Member was still a candidate. There is forum-shopping
only where two cases involve the same parties and the same cause of action. The two cases
here are distinct and dissimilar in their nature and character.
Mendoza vs. Comelc (2009)
Facts:
Petitioner Mendoza and respondent Pagdanganan vied ofr the position of Governor of the
Province of Bulacan in the May 14, 2007 elections. The petitioner was proclaimed winning
candidate and assumed the office of Governor.
- The respondent seasonably filed an election protest with the COMELEC.
- Revision of ballots involving the protested and counter-protested precincts soon followed.
- The revision was conducted at COMELECs office in Intamuros.
- Thereafter, both parties submitted their other evidences. The formal offer of evidences was
approved and COMELEC ordered the parties to submit their memoranda.
- Mendoza and Pagdanganan complied with the order and the case was then submitted for
resolution.
- March 2, 2009: the COMELEC transferred the Bulacan ballot boxes, including those involved in
the provincial election contest, to the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET).
- The petitioner filed to dismiss further proceedings.
- April 29, 2009: The motion filed by petitioner Mendoza was dismissed by COMELEC 2nd
Division. According to the latter, COMELEC has plenary powers to find alternative methods to
facilitate the resolution of the election protest; thus, it concluded that it would continue the
proceedings after proper coordination with the SET.
- The petitioner moved to reconsider the order but still COMELEC 2nd Division denied the
motion on May 26, 2009.
- Allegedly alarmed by information on COMELEC action on the provincial election contest within
the SET premises without notice to him and without his participation, the petitioners counsel
wrote the SET Secretary, Atty. Irene Guevarra, a letter dated June 10, 2009 to confirm the
veracity of the reported conduct of proceedings.
- The Secretary responded that the action was authorized by then Acting Chairman of the
Tribunal, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, upon formal request of the Office of Commissioner Lucenito
N. Tagle.
- The petitioner argues that the proceedings before the COMELEC in election protests are
judicial in nature and character. Thus, the strictures of judicial due process specifically, (a)
opportunity to be heard and (b) that judgment be rendered only after lawful hearing apply.
- The petitioner claims that without notice to him of the proceedings, the due process element
of the right to have judgment only after lawful hearing is absent.
- Mendoza asserts that an important element of due process is that the judicial body should
have jurisdiction over the property that is the subject matter of the proceedings (2nd issue).
- Private respondent Pagdanganan argues that the proceeding referred to by Mendoza was
COMELECs decision-making process.
- Public respondent COMELEC further argues that in the absence of a specific rule on whether it
Page 183

can conduct appreciation of ballots outside its premises or official custody, the issue boils down
to one of discretion the authority of the COMELEC to control as it deems fit the processes or
incidents of a pending election protest.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC violated due process by conducting proceedings without giving
due notice to the petitioner.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to an excess of
jurisdiction in appreciating ballots which are not in its official custody and are outside its own
premises, authority and control.
Held:
While COMELEC jurisdiction over the Bulacan election contest is not disputed, the legality of
subsequent COMELEC action is assailed for having been undertaken with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Thus, our standard of review is grave
abuse of discretion, a term that defies exact definition, but generally refers to capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
After due consideration, the Supreme Court held that the petition is bereft of merit.
These are the powers of the COMELEC as mentioned by the 1987 Constitution:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections.
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials.
(3) Decide, save those involving the right to vote, administrative questions affecting elections,
including the determination of the number and location of polling places, the appointment of
election officials and inspectors, and the registration of voters.
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC are the cardinal primary
rights in administrative proceedings (Ang Tibay Requirements 1-7).
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence
must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at
hearing stage of the proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due process is to give an
opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of.
Page 184
A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential; in the
case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure defines the requirements for a hearing and
these serve as the standards in the determination of the presence or denial of due process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are
reinforcements of the right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the
deliberative stage, as the decision-maker decides on the evidence presented during the
hearing.
These standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case and are
the material and substantial components of decision-making. Briefly, the tribunal must consider
the totality of the evidence presented which must all be found in the records of the case (i.e.,
those presented or submitted by the parties); the conclusion, reached by the decision-maker
himself and not by a subordinate, must be based on substantial evidence.
In the present case, the petitioner invokes both the due process component rights at the
hearing and deliberative stages and alleges that these component rights have all been violated.
In these proceedings, the petitioner stood head-to-head with the respondent in an

adversarial contest where both sides were given their respective rights to speak, make their
presentations, and controvert each others submission, subject only to established COMELEC
rules of procedures. Under these undisputed facts, both parties had their day in court, so to
speak, and neither one can complain of any denial of notice or of the right to be heard.
The SC said The COMELEC is under no legal obligation to notify either party of the
steps it is taking in the course of deliberating on the merits of the provincial election contest.
In the context of our standard of review for the petition, we see no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the COMELEC in its deliberation on
the Bulacan election contest and the appreciation of ballots this deliberation entailed.
We state at the outset that the COMELEC did not lose jurisdiction over the provincial
election contest, as the petitioner seems to imply, because of the transmittal of the provincial
ballot boxes and other election materials to the SET. The Constitution conferred upon the
COMELEC jurisdiction over election protests involving provincial officials. The COMELEC in this
case has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter, i.e., the provincial election
contest, as well as over the parties.
Since the COMELEC action, taken by its Second Division, is authorized under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the Second Division cannot in any sense be said to be intruding
into the COMELEC en banc rule-making prerogative when the Second Division chose to
undertake ballot appreciation within the SET premises side by side with the SET revision of
ballots. To be exact, the Second Division never laid down any new rule; it merely acted
pursuant to a rule that the COMELEC en banc itself had previously enacted.
FACTS: Abayon and Palparan were the duly nominated party list representatives of AAngat
Tayoand Bantay respectively. A quo warranto case was filed before the HRET assailing the
jurisdiction of HRET over the Party list, andits representatives. HRET dismissed the proceeding
but upheld the jurisdiction over the nominated representatives who now seeks certiorari
beforethe SC
Issue:W/N HRET has jurisdiction over the question ofqualifications of petitioners..
HELD:Affirmative. The HRET dismissed the petitions forquo warranto
filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since
petitioners Abayon and Palparanwere not elected into office but were chosen by their
Page 185

respective
organizations
under
their
internal
rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as
nominees. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not
the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives.Section
5,Article VI of the Constitution, identifies who the members of that House are
representatives of districts and party list Once elected, both the district representatives and
the party-list representatives are treated in like manner. The Party-List System Act itself
recognizes party-list nominees as members of the House of Representatives, a party-list
representative is in every sense an elected member of the House of Representatives.
Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the
end,would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the
House of Representatives.Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the
qualifications and grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941,
echoing the Constitution.It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular
qualification of a nomineethe need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a
representative of his party-list organizationin the context of the facts that characterize
petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay , respectively, and the
marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody. By analogy with
the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization ofthe party-list nominee
has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the
House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. The Court holds that respondent
HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto
against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay
party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over
thequestion of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon andPalparan
Layug vs. Comelec (2012)

Facts: On March 31, 2010, petitioner Rolando D. Layug (Layug), in his capacity as a taxpayer
and concerned citizen, filed pro se a Petition to Disqualify3 (SPA No. 10-016[DCN]) Buhay
Party-List from participating in the May 10, 2010 elections, and Brother Mike from being its
nominee. He argued that Buhay Party-List is a mere extension of the El Shaddai, which is a
religious sect. As such, it is disqualified from being a party-list under Section 5, Paragraph 2,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution4,as well as Section 6, Paragraph 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
79415, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Neither does Brother Mike, who is
allegedly a billionaire real estate businessman and the spiritual leader of El Shaddai, qualify as
one who belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sector xxx, as required of partylist nominees under Section 6 (7) of COMELEC Resolution No. 88076, the Rules on
Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/Organizations Participating in
the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. On June 15, 2010, the COMELEC
Second Division issued a Resolution3denying the petition for lack of substantial evidence.
Layug moved for reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010 before the COMELECEn
Banc claiming denial of due process for failure of the COMELEC to serve him, his
representatives or counsels a copy of said Resolution. He alleged that it was only on July 26,
2010, after learning about it in the newspapers, that he personally secured a copy of the
Resolution from the COMELEC.4 His motion for reconsideration, however, was denied by the
COMELEC Second Division in its Order5dated August 4, 2010 for being filed out of time.
Held:
The Court not the HRET has jurisdisdiction
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
Page 186

returns, and qualifications of its Members. Section 5 (1) of the same Article identifies who the
"members" of the House are:
Sec. 5.(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring
added).
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1) members who shall
be elected from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.1 In this case,
Buhay Party-List was entitled to two seats in the House that went to its first two nominees,
Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother Mike,
being the fifth nominee, did not get a seat and thus had not become a member of the House of
Representatives. Indubitably, the HRET has no jurisdiction over the issue of Brother Mike's
qualifications.

it is vested by law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the COMELEC.Section 6 of
said Act states that the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition xxx. Accordingly, in the case
of Abayon vs. HRET,1 We ruled that the HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list
insofar as they sought the disqualifications of said party-lists.
Thus, it is the Court, under its power to review decisions, orders, or resolutions of the
COMELEC provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution2andSection 1, Rule 37
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure3that has jurisdiction to hear the instant petition.
Jalosjos vs. Comelec (2012)
Facts: In May 2007 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr., petitioner in G.R. 192474, ran for Mayor of
Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, and won. While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he bought a
residential house and lot inBarangayVeteransVillage, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay and renovated
and furnished the same. In September 2008 he began occupying the house. On November 28,
2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the
Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 10, 2010 National Elections. This prompted
Erasmo to file a petition to deny due course to or cancel his COC before the COMELEC,
[7]claiming that Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in that COC when he indicated in it
that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. The COMELEC, on June 3, 2010 the En Banc granted
Erasmos motion for reconsideration and declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek election as
Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that Jalosjos did not
satisfy the residency requirement since, by continuing to hold the position of Mayor of
Tampilisan, Zamboanga Del Norte, he should be deemed not to have transferred his residence
from that place to Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Jalosjos challenges
the COMELECs finding that he did not meet the residency requirement and its denial of his
right to due process.
Held: While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power todecide all questions affecting
elections,[15]such power is not without limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to
Page 187

the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and the
Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the appropriate
Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives.[16]
The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and
when that of the HRET begins. The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the
election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET.[17]
The fact is that on election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet to resolve Erasmos
appeal from the Second Divisions dismissal of the disqualification case against Jalosjos.Thus,
there then existed no final judgment deleting Jalosjos name from the list of candidates for the
congressional seat he sought. The last standing official action in his case before election day
was the ruling of the COMELECs Second Division that allowed his name to stay on that
list. Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc did not issue any order suspending his proclamation
pending its final resolution of his case. With the fact of his proclamation and assumption of
office, any issue regarding his qualification for the same, like his alleged lack of the required
residence, was solely for the HRET to consider and decide.
Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010, Jalosjos had already
been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the election.[18] Thus, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue of his qualification and declared him
ineligible for the office of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.
Tanada vs. Cuenco
After the 1955 elections, members of the Senate were chosen. The Senate was overwhelmingly
occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo. Diosdado on the
other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the SET.
But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET
should be composed of 9 members; 3 justices, 3 senators from the majority party and 3
senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two
SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Lorenzo assailed
this process. So did Diosdado because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP
senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista will not have any chance in his election
contest. Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the SC cannot take cognizance of the
issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members
of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Lorenzo and Diosdado is not to
raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
Held:
Although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators
who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the
manner in which the authority shall be exercised.
Under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the
Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of Congress 1 And, since judicial power includes the authority to
inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by
the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like
that of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions.
Thus, in the exercise of the so-called "judicial supremacy", this Court declared that a resolution
of the defunct National Assembly could not bar the exercise of the powers of the former
Electoral Commission under the original Constitution. 2 (Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
supra), and annulled certain acts of the Executive 3 as incompatible with the fundamental law.
Page 188

In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled
without inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts
have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot
be evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual
destruction.
Abbas vs. SET (1988)
Facts:
On 9 Oct 1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest docketed against 22
candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987
congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3)
Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification
of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said election protest on the ground that all of
them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and
the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To
accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following amendment:
Tribunals Rules (Section 24) - requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption
of resolutions of whatever nature - is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are
disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3)
including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions.
Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in
the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members
who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.
ISSUE:Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight.
HELD:The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of
the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members
of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and legislative
components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be
totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without
doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in
saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in
judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his
conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely
feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial
judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally
function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules
can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial
election contest.
Page 189
Pimentel, Jr. v. HRET, 393 SCRA 231 (2002)

During the May 11, 1998 elections, 14 party-lists representatives from 13 organizations
were proclaimed winners. Subsequently, the house of Representatives constituted the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and also named 12 members to represent it in the
Commission on Appointments. No one from the party-list was named to either constitutional
body. Petitioner now seeks the inclusion of party-list representatives to the two bodies arguing
that under the Constitution, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the
HRET and 2.4 seats in the CA based on proportional representation.
Held: Under Sec. 17 and Sec. 18, Art. VI of the Constitution, the House and the Senate
exercise the power to choose who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 slots of
their respective electoral tribunal, as well as the 12 seats in the Commission on Appointments.
Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have
agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse rests
with the House, not with the Court. The discretion of the House to choose the members is not
absolute, being subject to the mandatory rule on proportional representation. However, under
the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court will not interfere, absent a clear violation of
the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion. The present petition does not allege that the
House barred party-list representatives from seeking membership in then HRET or the CA.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, direct recourse to the Supreme Court is premature.
Codilla vs. Comelec (2002)

Petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. was mayor of Ormoc City, while respondent Ma. Victoria L.
Locsin was the incumbent representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Both were
candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections for the position of representative of the 4th legislative
district of Leyte.
A registered voter of Kananga, Leyte filed with COMELEC a petition for disqualification against
petitioner alleging that petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned by the city
government of Ormoc to extract, haul, and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of
Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to
vote for him.
The case was assigned to the COMELECs Second Division, which issued an order delegating the
hearing and reception of evidence on the disqualification case to the Office of the Regional
Director of Region VIII. The same division sent notice to the petitioner through telegram.
At the time of the elections, the Regional Election Director had yet to hear the case.
Eventually, petitioner was included in the list of candidates and voted for; initial results
showed that petitioner was the winning candidate.
Respondent filed a Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent with the
COMELEC Second Division. A copy was allegedly served on the petitioner by registered mail but
no registry receipt was attached thereto. She also filed a second motion, a copy of which was
sent to petitioner with the corresponding registry receipt; however, theres no indication when
petitioner received the motion.
Page 190

The COMELEC Second Division issued an Ex-Parte Order directing the (a) Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of the petitioner and (b) the Regional Election
Director to speed up the reception of evidence and to forward immediately the complete
records together with its recommendation to the office of the Clerk of the Commission. At this
time, petitioner has yet to be summoned to answer the petition for disqualification.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension alleging that (a) he did not receive a copy
of the Motion to Suspend his Proclamation, hence he was denied of his right to rebut and refute
the allegations against him; (b) he did not receive a copy of the summons on the petition for
disqualification; and (c) he received the telegraph order of the COMELEC Second Division
suspending his proclamation four days after it was sent to him. Said motion was not resolved;
instead, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated its Resolution that found the petitioner
guilty of indirect solicitation of votes and ordered his disqualification. The same order declared
the votes cast in favor of the petitioner as stray votes and directed the immediate
proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes. As a result,
respondent was declared as having the highest number of votes and she was proclaimed, took
her oath of office, and assumed office as the duly elected representative of the 4th district of
Leyte. A copy of the said Resolution was sent by fax to petitioners counsel.
The petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Motion for Reconsideration and a petition for
declaration of nullity of proclamation. Said motion was granted and the COMELEC en banc (a)
reversed the resolution of the Second Division and (b) declared the proclamation of respondent
null and void. Respondent did not appeal from this decision.
Eventually, petitioner was proclaimed the duly-elected representative of the 4th district of
Leyte. Petitioner took his oath of office before the Executive Judge of the Ormoc Regional Trial
Court. Petitioner wrote a letter-appeal to the House of Representatives through respondent De
Venecia, but no action was taken by the latter. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1.
2.
3.
WON the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid.

WON the proclamation of respondent Locsin directed the COMELEC en banc of
jurisdiction to review its validity.
WON it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to recognize the petitioner
as the legally elected representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
Held:
1. NO. First, the petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings leading to the
proclamation of respondent Locsin. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard.
When a party is deprived of that basic fairness, any decision by any tribunal in prejudice of his
rights is void.
Second, the votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered stray and respondent
cannot be validly proclaimed on that basis.
The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence the votes cast in favor of the petitioner
cannot be considered stray. Considering the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration, the
COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its discretion in ordering the immediate
disqualification of the petitioner and ordering the exclusion of the votes cast in his favor.
Page 191
Also, Respondent Lim, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed. It is a settled doctrine
that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed
winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. In every election, the peoples choice is
the paramount consideration and their expressed will must at all times be given effect. When
the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving him the highest number of
votes cast in the election for the office, no one can be declared elected in his place.
2. NO. The petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of the Second
Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him; hence, the COMELEC en banc was
not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division.
The said order was yet enforceable as it has not attained finality; thus, it cannot be used as
the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of
the 4th Legislative district of Leyte. For these reasons, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction
over the matter.
3. YES. If the Law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or
when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official
discretion or judgment. In the case, the administration of oath and the registration of the
petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives is no longer a matter of
discretion on the part of the public respondents because of the following reasons: the
petitioner garnered the highest number of votes; the order of the COMELEC Second Division,
which ordered the proclamation of Respondent Locsin was set aside by the COMELEC en banc
which ordered the proclamation of the petitioner; said decision by the COMELEC en banc was
not challenged by the respondent and has become final and executory.
Barbers v. COMELEC, 460 SCRA 569 (2005)

On June 2, 2004, the Commission on Elections sitting as the National Board of Canvassers
proclaimed Biazon as the duly elected 12th Senator in the May 10, 2004 National Elections.
While failure of elections were declared in some precincts, COMELEC reasoned that they would
not materially affect the results. Barbers, who ranked next to Biazon, filed a petition before
the COMELEC to annul the proclamation. When this was denied, he raised the issue before the
Supreme Court. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction?
Held: No. The word sole in Sec. 17, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution underscores the
exclusivity of the Senate Electoral Tribunals (SET) jurisdiction over election contests relating
to members of the Senate. The authority conferred upon the SET is categorical and complete.
It is therefore clear that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant
petition. Since Barber contests Biazons proclamation as the 12 winning senatorial candidate,
it is the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers complaint
Hernandez vs. HRET 2009
Page 192

which was also outside the First District.[
which was also outside the First District.[6]The COMELEC (First Division) dismissed said petition
for lack of merit
On July 5, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET,
docketed as HRET CASE No. 07-034, praying that petitioner be declared ineligible to hold
office as a Member of the House of Representatives representing the First Legislative District of
the Province of Laguna, and that petitioners election and proclamation be annulled and
declared null and void.[9]
Private respondents main ground for thequo warrantopetition was that petitioner lacked the
required one-year residency requirement provided under Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution
Held:
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI, Section 17 thereof that the HRET and
the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. The authority conferred
upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes
the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals,[33]which is conferred upon the HRET and
the SET after elections and the proclamation of the winning candidates. A candidate who has
not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of
the House of Representatives.[34]
Thus, private respondent correctly pointed out that a petition forquo warrantois within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if, as in this
Page 193

case, the COMELEC had already passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the
issue of the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives while the latter was
still a candidate.
Private respondent concludes from the above that petitioner had no legal basis to claim that
the HRET, when reference to the qualification/s of Members of the House of Representatives is
concerned, is co-equal to the COMELEC, such that the HRET cannot disregard any ruling of
COMELEC respecting the matter of eligibility and qualification of a member of the House of
Representatives. The truth is the other way around, because the COMELEC is subservient to
the HRET when the dispute or contest at issue refers to the eligibility and/or qualification of a
Member of the House of Representatives. A petition forquo warrantois within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HRET as sole judge, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if
another body may have passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of
the Members qualification while the Member was still a candidate. There is forum-shopping
only where two cases involve the same parties and the same cause of action. The two cases
here are distinct and dissimilar in their nature and character.
Mendoza vs. Comelc (2009)
Facts:
Petitioner Mendoza and respondent Pagdanganan vied ofr the position of Governor of the
Province of Bulacan in the May 14, 2007 elections. The petitioner was proclaimed winning
candidate and assumed the office of Governor.
- The respondent seasonably filed an election protest with the COMELEC.
- Revision of ballots involving the protested and counter-protested precincts soon followed.
- The revision was conducted at COMELECs office in Intamuros.
- Thereafter, both parties submitted their other evidences. The formal offer of evidences was
approved and COMELEC ordered the parties to submit their memoranda.
- Mendoza and Pagdanganan complied with the order and the case was then submitted for
resolution.
- March 2, 2009: the COMELEC transferred the Bulacan ballot boxes, including those involved in
the provincial election contest, to the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET).
- The petitioner filed to dismiss further proceedings.
- April 29, 2009: The motion filed by petitioner Mendoza was dismissed by COMELEC 2nd
Division. According to the latter, COMELEC has plenary powers to find alternative methods to
facilitate the resolution of the election protest; thus, it concluded that it would continue the
proceedings after proper coordination with the SET.
- The petitioner moved to reconsider the order but still COMELEC 2nd Division denied the
motion on May 26, 2009.
- Allegedly alarmed by information on COMELEC action on the provincial election contest within
the SET premises without notice to him and without his participation, the petitioners counsel
wrote the SET Secretary, Atty. Irene Guevarra, a letter dated June 10, 2009 to confirm the
veracity of the reported conduct of proceedings.
- The Secretary responded that the action was authorized by then Acting Chairman of the
Tribunal, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, upon formal request of the Office of Commissioner Lucenito
N. Tagle.
- The petitioner argues that the proceedings before the COMELEC in election protests are
judicial in nature and character. Thus, the strictures of judicial due process specifically, (a)
opportunity to be heard and (b) that judgment be rendered only after lawful hearing apply.
- The petitioner claims that without notice to him of the proceedings, the due process element
of the right to have judgment only after lawful hearing is absent.
- Mendoza asserts that an important element of due process is that the judicial body should
Page 194

have jurisdiction over the property that is the subject matter of the proceedings (2nd issue).
- Private respondent Pagdanganan argues that the proceeding referred to by Mendoza was
COMELECs decision-making process.
- Public respondent COMELEC further argues that in the absence of a specific rule on whether it
can conduct appreciation of ballots outside its premises or official custody, the issue boils down
to one of discretion the authority of the COMELEC to control as it deems fit the processes or
incidents of a pending election protest.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC violated due process by conducting proceedings without giving
due notice to the petitioner.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to an excess of
jurisdiction in appreciating ballots which are not in its official custody and are outside its own
premises, authority and control.
Held:
While COMELEC jurisdiction over the Bulacan election contest is not disputed, the legality of
subsequent COMELEC action is assailed for having been undertaken with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Thus, our standard of review is grave
abuse of discretion, a term that defies exact definition, but generally refers to capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
After due consideration, the Supreme Court held that the petition is bereft of merit.
These are the powers of the COMELEC as mentioned by the 1987 Constitution:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections.
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials.
(3) Decide, save those involving the right to vote, administrative questions affecting elections,
including the determination of the number and location of polling places, the appointment of
election officials and inspectors, and the registration of voters.
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC are the cardinal primary
rights in administrative proceedings (Ang Tibay Requirements 1-7).
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence
must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
Page 195
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at
hearing stage of the proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due process is to give an
opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of.
A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential; in the
case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure defines the requirements for a hearing and
these serve as the standards in the determination of the presence or denial of due process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are
reinforcements of the right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the
deliberative stage, as the decision-maker decides on the evidence presented during the
hearing.
These standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case and are
the material and substantial components of decision-making. Briefly, the tribunal must consider
the totality of the evidence presented which must all be found in the records of the case (i.e.,
those presented or submitted by the parties); the conclusion, reached by the decision-maker
himself and not by a subordinate, must be based on substantial evidence.
In the present case, the petitioner invokes both the due process component rights at the
hearing and deliberative stages and alleges that these component rights have all been violated.
In these proceedings, the petitioner stood head-to-head with the respondent in an

adversarial contest where both sides were given their respective rights to speak, make their
presentations, and controvert each others submission, subject only to established COMELEC
rules of procedures. Under these undisputed facts, both parties had their day in court, so to
speak, and neither one can complain of any denial of notice or of the right to be heard.
The SC said The COMELEC is under no legal obligation to notify either party of the
steps it is taking in the course of deliberating on the merits of the provincial election contest.
In the context of our standard of review for the petition, we see no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the COMELEC in its deliberation on
the Bulacan election contest and the appreciation of ballots this deliberation entailed.
We state at the outset that the COMELEC did not lose jurisdiction over the provincial
election contest, as the petitioner seems to imply, because of the transmittal of the provincial
ballot boxes and other election materials to the SET. The Constitution conferred upon the
COMELEC jurisdiction over election protests involving provincial officials. The COMELEC in this
case has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter, i.e., the provincial election
contest, as well as over the parties.
Since the COMELEC action, taken by its Second Division, is authorized under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the Second Division cannot in any sense be said to be intruding
into the COMELEC en banc rule-making prerogative when the Second Division chose to
undertake ballot appreciation within the SET premises side by side with the SET revision of
ballots. To be exact, the Second Division never laid down any new rule; it merely acted
pursuant to a rule that the COMELEC en banc itself had previously enacted.
FACTS: Abayon and Palparan were the duly nominated party list representatives of AAngat
Tayoand Bantay respectively. A quo warranto case was filed before the HRET assailing the
jurisdiction of HRET over the Party list, andits representatives. HRET dismissed the proceeding
but upheld the jurisdiction over the nominated representatives who now seeks certiorari
beforethe SC
Issue:W/N HRET has jurisdiction over the question ofqualifications of petitioners..
Page 196
HELD:Affirmative. The HRET dismissed the petitions forquo warranto

filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since
petitioners Abayon and Palparanwere not elected into office but were chosen by their
respective
organizations
under
their
internal
rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as
nominees. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not
the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives.Section
5,Article VI of the Constitution, identifies who the members of that House are
representatives of districts and party list Once elected, both the district representatives and
the party-list representatives are treated in like manner. The Party-List System Act itself
recognizes party-list nominees as members of the House of Representatives, a party-list
representative is in every sense an elected member of the House of Representatives.
Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the
end,would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the
House of Representatives.Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the
qualifications and grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941,
echoing the Constitution.It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular
qualification of a nomineethe need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a
representative of his party-list organizationin the context of the facts that characterize
petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay , respectively, and the
marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody. By analogy with
the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization ofthe party-list nominee
has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the
House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. The Court holds that respondent
HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto
against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay
party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over
thequestion of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon andPalparan
Layug vs. Comelec (2012)

Facts: On March 31, 2010, petitioner Rolando D. Layug (Layug), in his capacity as a taxpayer
and concerned citizen, filed pro se a Petition to Disqualify3 (SPA No. 10-016[DCN]) Buhay
Party-List from participating in the May 10, 2010 elections, and Brother Mike from being its
nominee. He argued that Buhay Party-List is a mere extension of the El Shaddai, which is a
religious sect. As such, it is disqualified from being a party-list under Section 5, Paragraph 2,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution4,as well as Section 6, Paragraph 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
79415, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Neither does Brother Mike, who is
allegedly a billionaire real estate businessman and the spiritual leader of El Shaddai, qualify as
one who belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sector xxx, as required of partylist nominees under Section 6 (7) of COMELEC Resolution No. 88076, the Rules on
Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/Organizations Participating in
the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. On June 15, 2010, the COMELEC
Second Division issued a Resolution3denying the petition for lack of substantial evidence.
Layug moved for reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010 before the COMELECEn
Banc claiming denial of due process for failure of the COMELEC to serve him, his
representatives or counsels a copy of said Resolution. He alleged that it was only on July 26,
2010, after learning about it in the newspapers, that he personally secured a copy of the
Resolution from the COMELEC.4 His motion for reconsideration, however, was denied by the
COMELEC Second Division in its Order5dated August 4, 2010 for being filed out of time.
Page 197

Held:
The Court not the HRET has jurisdisdiction
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of its Members. Section 5 (1) of the same Article identifies who the
"members" of the House are:
Sec. 5.(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring
added).
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1) members who shall
be elected from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.1 In this case,
Buhay Party-List was entitled to two seats in the House that went to its first two nominees,
Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother Mike,
being the fifth nominee, did not get a seat and thus had not become a member of the House of
Representatives. Indubitably, the HRET has no jurisdiction over the issue of Brother Mike's
qualifications.

it is vested by law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the COMELEC.Section 6 of
said Act states that the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition xxx. Accordingly, in the case
of Abayon vs. HRET,1 We ruled that the HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list
insofar as they sought the disqualifications of said party-lists.
Thus, it is the Court, under its power to review decisions, orders, or resolutions of the
COMELEC provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution2andSection 1, Rule 37
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure3that has jurisdiction to hear the instant petition.
Jalosjos vs. Comelec (2012)
Facts: In May 2007 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr., petitioner in G.R. 192474, ran for Mayor of
Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, and won. While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he bought a
residential house and lot inBarangayVeteransVillage, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay and renovated
and furnished the same. In September 2008 he began occupying the house. On November 28,
2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the
Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 10, 2010 National Elections. This prompted
Erasmo to file a petition to deny due course to or cancel his COC before the COMELEC,
[7]claiming that Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in that COC when he indicated in it
that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. The COMELEC, on June 3, 2010 the En Banc granted
Erasmos motion for reconsideration and declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek election as
Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that Jalosjos did not
satisfy the residency requirement since, by continuing to hold the position of Mayor of
Tampilisan, Zamboanga Del Norte, he should be deemed not to have transferred his residence
from that place to Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Jalosjos challenges
Page 198

the COMELECs finding that he did not meet the residency requirement and its denial of his
right to due process.
Held: While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power todecide all questions affecting
elections,[15]such power is not without limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and the
Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the appropriate
Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives.[16]
The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and
when that of the HRET begins. The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the
election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET.[17]
The fact is that on election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet to resolve Erasmos
appeal from the Second Divisions dismissal of the disqualification case against Jalosjos.Thus,
there then existed no final judgment deleting Jalosjos name from the list of candidates for the
congressional seat he sought. The last standing official action in his case before election day
was the ruling of the COMELECs Second Division that allowed his name to stay on that
list. Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc did not issue any order suspending his proclamation
pending its final resolution of his case. With the fact of his proclamation and assumption of
office, any issue regarding his qualification for the same, like his alleged lack of the required
residence, was solely for the HRET to consider and decide.
Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010, Jalosjos had already
been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the election.[18] Thus, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue of his qualification and declared him
ineligible for the office of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.
Tanada vs. Cuenco
After the 1955 elections, members of the Senate were chosen. The Senate was overwhelmingly
occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo. Diosdado on the
other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the SET.
But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET
should be composed of 9 members; 3 justices, 3 senators from the majority party and 3
senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two
SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Lorenzo assailed
this process. So did Diosdado because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP
senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista will not have any chance in his election
contest. Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the SC cannot take cognizance of the
issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members
of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Lorenzo and Diosdado is not to
raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
Held:
Although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators
who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the
manner in which the authority shall be exercised.
Under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the
Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of Congress 1 And, since judicial power includes the authority to
inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by
the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like
that of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions.
Page 199

Thus, in the exercise of the so-called "judicial supremacy", this Court declared that a resolution
of the defunct National Assembly could not bar the exercise of the powers of the former
Electoral Commission under the original Constitution. 2 (Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
supra), and annulled certain acts of the Executive 3 as incompatible with the fundamental law.
In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled
without inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts
have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot
be evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual
destruction.
Abbas vs. SET (1988)
Facts:
On 9 Oct 1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest docketed against 22
candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987
congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3)
Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification
of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said election protest on the ground that all of
them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and
the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To
accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following amendment:
Tribunals Rules (Section 24) - requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption
of resolutions of whatever nature - is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are
disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3)
including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions.
Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in
the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members
who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.
ISSUE:Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight.
HELD:The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of
the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members
of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and legislative
components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be
totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without
doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in
saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in
judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his
conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely
feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial
Page 200

judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally
function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules
can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial
election contest.
Pimentel, Jr. v. HRET, 393 SCRA 231 (2002)
During the May 11, 1998 elections, 14 party-lists representatives from 13 organizations
were proclaimed winners. Subsequently, the house of Representatives constituted the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and also named 12 members to represent it in the
Commission on Appointments. No one from the party-list was named to either constitutional
body. Petitioner now seeks the inclusion of party-list representatives to the two bodies arguing
that under the Constitution, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the
HRET and 2.4 seats in the CA based on proportional representation.
Held: Under Sec. 17 and Sec. 18, Art. VI of the Constitution, the House and the Senate
exercise the power to choose who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 slots of
their respective electoral tribunal, as well as the 12 seats in the Commission on Appointments.
Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have
agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse rests
with the House, not with the Court. The discretion of the House to choose the members is not
absolute, being subject to the mandatory rule on proportional representation. However, under
the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court will not interfere, absent a clear violation of
the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion. The present petition does not allege that the
House barred party-list representatives from seeking membership in then HRET or the CA.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, direct recourse to the Supreme Court is premature.
Codilla vs. Comelec (2002)
Petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. was mayor of Ormoc City, while respondent Ma. Victoria L.
Locsin was the incumbent representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Both were
candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections for the position of representative of the 4th legislative
district of Leyte.
A registered voter of Kananga, Leyte filed with COMELEC a petition for disqualification against
petitioner alleging that petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned by the city
government of Ormoc to extract, haul, and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of
Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to
vote for him.
The case was assigned to the COMELECs Second Division, which issued an order delegating the
hearing and reception of evidence on the disqualification case to the Office of the Regional
Director of Region VIII. The same division sent notice to the petitioner through telegram.
At the time of the elections, the Regional Election Director had yet to hear the case.
Eventually, petitioner was included in the list of candidates and voted for; initial results
showed that petitioner was the winning candidate.
Respondent filed a Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent with the
COMELEC Second Division. A copy was allegedly served on the petitioner by registered mail but
no registry receipt was attached thereto. She also filed a second motion, a copy of which was
Page 201

sent to petitioner with the corresponding registry receipt; however, theres no indication when
petitioner received the motion.
The COMELEC Second Division issued an Ex-Parte Order directing the (a) Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of the petitioner and (b) the Regional Election
Director to speed up the reception of evidence and to forward immediately the complete
records together with its recommendation to the office of the Clerk of the Commission. At this
time, petitioner has yet to be summoned to answer the petition for disqualification.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension alleging that (a) he did not receive a copy
of the Motion to Suspend his Proclamation, hence he was denied of his right to rebut and refute
the allegations against him; (b) he did not receive a copy of the summons on the petition for
disqualification; and (c) he received the telegraph order of the COMELEC Second Division
suspending his proclamation four days after it was sent to him. Said motion was not resolved;
instead, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated its Resolution that found the petitioner
guilty of indirect solicitation of votes and ordered his disqualification. The same order declared
the votes cast in favor of the petitioner as stray votes and directed the immediate
proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes. As a result,
respondent was declared as having the highest number of votes and she was proclaimed, took
her oath of office, and assumed office as the duly elected representative of the 4th district of
Leyte. A copy of the said Resolution was sent by fax to petitioners counsel.
The petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Motion for Reconsideration and a petition for
declaration of nullity of proclamation. Said motion was granted and the COMELEC en banc (a)
reversed the resolution of the Second Division and (b) declared the proclamation of respondent
null and void. Respondent did not appeal from this decision.
Eventually, petitioner was proclaimed the duly-elected representative of the 4th district of
Leyte. Petitioner took his oath of office before the Executive Judge of the Ormoc Regional Trial
Court. Petitioner wrote a letter-appeal to the House of Representatives through respondent De
Venecia, but no action was taken by the latter. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1.
2.
3.
WON the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid.

WON the proclamation of respondent Locsin directed the COMELEC en banc of
jurisdiction to review its validity.
WON it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to recognize the petitioner
as the legally elected representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
Held:
1. NO. First, the petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings leading to the
proclamation of respondent Locsin. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard.
When a party is deprived of that basic fairness, any decision by any tribunal in prejudice of his
rights is void.
Second, the votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered stray and respondent
cannot be validly proclaimed on that basis.
Page 202

The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence the votes cast in favor of the petitioner
cannot be considered stray. Considering the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration, the
COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its discretion in ordering the immediate
disqualification of the petitioner and ordering the exclusion of the votes cast in his favor.
Also, Respondent Lim, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed. It is a settled doctrine
that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed
winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. In every election, the peoples choice is
the paramount consideration and their expressed will must at all times be given effect. When
the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving him the highest number of
votes cast in the election for the office, no one can be declared elected in his place.
2. NO. The petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of the Second
Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him; hence, the COMELEC en banc was
not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division.
The said order was yet enforceable as it has not attained finality; thus, it cannot be used as
the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of
the 4th Legislative district of Leyte. For these reasons, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction
over the matter.
3. YES. If the Law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or
when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official
discretion or judgment. In the case, the administration of oath and the registration of the
petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives is no longer a matter of
discretion on the part of the public respondents because of the following reasons: the
petitioner garnered the highest number of votes; the order of the COMELEC Second Division,
which ordered the proclamation of Respondent Locsin was set aside by the COMELEC en banc
which ordered the proclamation of the petitioner; said decision by the COMELEC en banc was
not challenged by the respondent and has become final and executory.
HON. WALDO FLORES, in his capacity as Senior capacity as Senior Deputy Executive Secretary in
the Office of the President, HON. ARTHUR P. AUTEA, in his capacity as Deputy Executive
Secretary in the Office of the President, and the PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION (PAGC)
vs ATTY. ANTONIO MONTEMAYOR
FACTS:
(I sincerely apologize na taas ni, procedural ang case. Please focus on the Doctrine
of Non-delegation of Powers)
Respondent Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor was appointed by the President as Regional

Director II of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Region IV, in San Fernando,
Pampanga.
OnJanuary 30, 2003, the Office of the President received a letter from a concerned
citizen dated January 20, 2003 relating Montemayors ostentatious lifestyle which is
apparently disproportionate to his income as a public official. The letter was referred
to Dario C. Rama, Chairman of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) for
appropriate action. The Investigating Office of the PAGC immediately conducted a
fact-finding inquiry into the matter and issued subpoenas duces tecum to the
responsible personnel of the BIR and the Land Transportation Office (LTO). In
compliance with the subpoena, BIR Personnel Division Chief Estelita Datu submitted to
the PAGC a copy of Montemayors appointment papers along with a certified true copy
Page 203
of the latters Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL) for the year
2002. Meanwhile, the LTO, through its Records Section Chief, Ms. Arabelle O. Petilla,
furnished the PAGC with a record of vehicles registered to Montemayor, to wit: a 2001
Ford Expedition, a 1997 Toyota Land Cruiser, and a 1983 Mitsubishi Galant.
During the pendency of the investigation, the Philippine Center for Investigative
Journalism, a media organization which had previously published an article on the
unexplained wealth of certain BIR officials, also submitted to the PAGC copies of
Montemayors SSAL for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001.In Montemayors 1999 and 2000
SSAL, the PAGC noted that Montemayor declared his ownership over several motor
vehicles, but failed to do the same in his 2001 SSAL.
On the basis of the said documents, the PAGC issued a Formal Charge against
Montemayor on May 19, 2003 for violation of Section 7 ofRepublic Act (RA) No. 3019in
relation to Section 8 (A) of RA No. 6713 due to his failure to declare the 2001 Ford
Expedition with a value ranging from 1.7 million to 1.9 million pesos, and the 1997
Toyota Land Cruiser with an estimated value of 1 million to 1.2 million pesos in his
2001 and 2002 SSAL. The charge was docketed as PAGC-ADM-0149-03. On the same
date, the PAGC issued an Order directing Montemayor to file his counter-affidavit or
verified answer to the formal charge against him within ten (10) days from the receipt
of the Order. Montemayor, however, failed to submit his counter-affidavit or verified
answer to the formal charge lodged against him.
On June 4, 2003, during the preliminary conference, Montemayor, through counsel,
moved for the deferment of the administrative proceedings explaining that he has filed
a petition for certiorari before the CA questioning the PAGCs jurisdiction to conduct
the administrative investigation against him. The PAGC denied Montemayors motion
for lack of merit, and instead gave him until June 9, 2003 to submit his counteraffidavit or verified answer.Still, no answer was filed.
OnJune 23, 2003, the CA issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in CA-G.R. SP No.
77285 enjoining the PAGC from proceeding with the investigation for sixty (60)
days. On September 12, 2003, shortly after the expiration of the sixty (60)-day TRO,
the PAGC issued a Resolution finding Montemayor administratively liable as charged
and recommending to the Office of the President Montemayors dismissal from the
service.
On March 23, 2004, the Office of the President, through Deputy Executive Secretary
Arthur P. Autea, issued a Decision adoptingin totothe findings and recommendation of
the PAGC.
Montemayor sought reconsideration of the said decision. This time, he argued that he
was denied his right to due process when the PAGC proceeded to investigate his case
notwithstanding the pendency of his petition for certiorari before the CA, and its
subsequent elevation to the Supreme Court. The motion was eventually denied.
Aggrieved, Montemayor brought the matter to the CAviaa petition for reviewunder
Rule 43 of the1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE PAGC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RECOMMEND RESPONDENTS DISMISSAL

FROM THE SERVICE;
WHETHER THE ASSUMPTION BY THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN OF ITS JURISDICTION

TO INVESTIGATE RESPONDENT FOR THE SAME OFFENSE DEPRIVED THE PAGC [WITH ITS
JURISDICTION] FROM PROCEEDING WITH ITS INVESTIGATION.
RULING:
The PAGC was created by virtue of EO No. 12, signed on April 16, 2001 to speedily
address the problem on corruption and abuses committed in the government,
particularly by officials appointed by the President. Under Section 4 (b) of EO No. 12,
Page 204
the PAGC has the power to investigate and hear administrative complaints provided (1)
that the official to be investigated must be a presidential appointee in the government
or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, and (2) that the said official must be
occupying the position of assistant regional director, or an equivalent rank, or higher.
Respondent contends that he was deprived of his right to due process when the PAGC
proceeded to investigate him on the basis of an anonymous complaint in the absence
of any documents supporting the complainants assertions.
Section 4 (c) of EO No. 12 states that the PAGC has the power to give due course to
anonymous complaints against presidential appointees if there appears on the face of
the complaint or based on the supporting documents attached to the anonymous
complaint a probable cause to engender a belief that the allegations may be
true. Respondent also assails the PAGCs decision to proceed with the investigation
process without giving him the opportunity to present controverting evidence.
We find nothing irregular with the PAGCs decision to proceed with its investigation
notwithstanding the pendency of Montemayors petition for certiorari before the CA.
The filing of a petition for certiorari with the CA did not divest the PAGC of its
jurisdiction validly acquired over the case before it.
First, it must be remembered that the PAGCs act of issuing the assailed resolution
enjoys the presumption of regularity particularly since it was done in the performance
of its official duties. Mere surmises and conjectures, absent any proof whatsoever, will
not tilt the balance against the presumption, if only to provide constancy in the
official acts of authorized government personnel and officials. Simply put, the timing
of the issuance of the assailed PAGC resolution by itself cannot be used to discredit,
much less nullify, what appears on its face to be a regular performance of the PAGCs
duties.
Second, Montemayors argument, as well as the CAs observation that respondent was
not afforded a second opportunity to present controverting evidence, does not hold
water. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to
explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. So long as the party is given the opportunity to explain his side, the
requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with.
Significantly, the records show that the PAGC issued an order informing Montemayor of
the formal charge filed against him and gave him ten (10) days within which to present
a counter-affidavit or verified answer. When the said period lapsed without
respondent asking for an extension, the PAGC gave Montemayor a fresh ten (10)-day
period to file his answer, but the latter chose to await the decision of the CA in his
petition for certiorari. During the preliminary conference, Montemayor was again
informed that he is given a new ten (10)-day period, or until June 19, 2003 within
which to file his memorandum/position paper as well as supporting evidence with a
warning that if he still fails to do so, the complaint shall be deemed submitted for
resolution on the basis of available documentary evidence on record. Again, the
deadline lapsed without any evidence being presented by Montemayor in his defense.
We stress that the PAGCs findings and recommendations remain as recommendations
until finally acted upon by the Office of the President. Montemayor, therefore, had two
(2) choices upon the issuance of the PAGC resolution: to move for a reconsideration
thereof, or to ask for another opportunity before the Office of the President to present
his side particularly since the assailed resolution is merely recommendatory in nature.
Having failed to exercise any of these two (2) options, Montemayor cannot now be
allowed to seek recourse before this Court for the consequences of his own
shortcomings.
Page 205

The cases filed against respondent before the Ombudsman were initiated after
the Office of the President decided to dismiss Montemayor.More importantly,
the proceedings before the PAGC were already finished even prior to the
initiation and filing of cases against him by the Ombudsman. In fact, it was the
PAGCs findings and recommendations which served as the basis in the Office
of the Presidents decision to dismiss Montemayor from government service.
Clearly then, the exercise by the Office of the President of its concurrent
investigatory and prosecutorial power over Montemayor had already been
terminated even before the Ombudsman could take cognizance over the
matter. The Ombudsman, therefore, cannot take over a task that is already
afait accompli.
As to the substantive aspect, i.e., whether the PAGCs recommendation to dismiss
Montemayor from government service is supported by substantial evidence, we find in
favor of petitioners.
o
REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARYEDUARDO ERMITA
FACTS:
There was a report that handwritten copies of two sets of 2006 Nursing Board
examination were circulated during the examination period among examinees
reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center. The examinees
were provided with a list of 500 questions and answers in two of the examinations
five subjects, particularly Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing) and V (Medical-Surgical
Nursing). The PRC later admitted the leakage and traced it to two Board of Nursing
members. Exam results came out but Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from
proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful examinees.
President GMA ordered for a re-examination and issued EO 566 which authorized the
CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and similar
entities in the Philippines. CHED Chairman Puno approved CHED Memorandum Order
No. 49 series of 2006 (Implementing Rules and Regulations).
Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an organization of
independent review centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR
arguing, among other things, that giving permits to operate a review center to Higher
Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will
effectively abolish independent review centers. CHED Chairman Puno however
believed that suspending the implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with
the mandate of EO 566.
A dialogue between the petitioner and CHED took place. Revised IRR was approved.
Petitioner filed before the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend RIRR praying to exclude
independent review center from the coverage of the CHED; to clarify the meaning of
the requirement for existing review centers to tie-up with HEIs; to revise the rules to
make it conform with RA 7722 limiting the CHEDs coverage to public and private
institutions of higher education.
In 2007, then CHED Chairman Neri responded to the petitioner that: to exclude the
operation of independent review centers from the coverage of CHED would clearly
contradict the intention of the said Executive Order No.566; As to the request to
clarify what is meant by tie-up/be integrated with an HEI, tie-up/be integrated simply
means, to be in partner with an HEI.
Page 206
Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this Court praying for
the annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional
exercise of legislative power, and the prohibition against CHED from implementing the
RIRR. Motion to intervene filed by other organizations/institutions were granted by the
Court.
On 21 May 2008, CHED issued CHED Memorandum Order No. 21, Series of 2008 (CMO
21, s. 2008) extending the deadline for six months from 27 May 2008 for all existing
independent review centers to tie-up or be integrated with HEIs in accordance with
the RIRR. On 25 November 2008 Resolution, SC resolved torequire the parties to
observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of EO 566, the RIRR, and CMO
21, s.2008.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power
as it expands theCHEDs jurisdiction; and
2.
Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executives rule-making power.
HELD:
1.
Yes, it expands CHEDs jurisdiction, hence unconstitutional. The scopes of EO 566 and
the RIRR clearly expand the CHEDs coverage under RA 7722. The CHEDs coverage
under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of higher education and
degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary educational
institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of
review centers and similar entities. The definition of a review center under EO 566
shows that it refers to one which offers "a program or course of study that is intended
to refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees
obtained in the formal school setting in preparation for the licensure examinations"
given by the PRC. It does not offer a degree-granting program that would put it under
the jurisdiction of the CHED.
A review course is only intended to "refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and
skills of reviewees." Thus, programs given by review centers could not be considered "programs
x x x of higher learning" that would put them under the jurisdiction of the CHED. "Higher
education," is defined as "education beyond the secondary level or "education provided by a
college or university." Further, the "similar entities" in EO 566 cover centers providing "review
or tutorial services" in areas not covered by licensure examinations given by the PRC, which
include, although not limited to, college entrance examinations, Civil Services examinations,
and tutorial services. These review and tutorial services hardly qualify as programs of higher
learning.
2.
Yes, it is invalid. The exercise of the Presidents residual powers under Section 20,
Title I of Book III of EO (invoked by theOSG to justify GMAs action) requires legislation;
as the provision clearly states that the exercise of the Presidents other powers and
functions has to be "provided for under the law." There is no law granting the President
the power to amend the functions of the CHED. The President has no inherent or
delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722. The
line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative
power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal
them."
Page 207

The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity,
has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. Any power, deemed to be legislative
by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged
it elsewhere.The President has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices.
Meaning, he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department,
bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of itsofficials. Corollary to the power of
control, he is granted administrative power. Administrative power is concerned with the work
of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It
enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the
official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and
regulations.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific
aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and
should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of
the CHEDs quasi-legislative power.
Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the
promulgation of rules and regulations. The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power
within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. But The RIRR covers review centers and
similar entities.
FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
FACTS:
Before us is respondents Motion for Reconsideration of our Decision dated April 2,
2009 which granted the consolidated petitions of petitioner Fort Bonifacio

Development Corporation, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and
the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are hereby (1) restrained from
collecting from petitioner the amount of P28,413,783.00 representing the transitional input tax
credit due it for the fourth quarter of 1996; and (2) directed to refund to petitioner the
amount of P347,741,695.74 paid as output VAT for the third quarter of 1997 in light of the
persisting transitional input tax credit available to petitioner for the said quarter, or to issue a
tax credit corresponding to such amount. No pronouncement as to costs.
The Motion for Reconsideration raises the following arguments:
1.
Section 100 of the Old National Internal Revenue Code (old NIRC), as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7716, could not have supplied the distinction between the
treatment of real properties or real estate dealers on the one hand, and the
treatment of transactions involving other commercial goods on the other hand, as said
distinction is found in Section 105 and, subsequently, Revenue Regulations No. 7-95
which defines the input tax creditable to a real estate dealer who becomes subject to
vat for the first time.
2.
Section 4.105.1 and paragraph (a) (iii) of the transitory provisions of revenue
regulations no. 7-95 validly limit the 8% transitional input tax to the improvements on
real properties.
3.
Revenue Regulations no. 6-97 did not repeal Revenue Regulations No. 7-95.
Page 208

ISSUE: Whether or not allowable transitional input tax credit is limited to improvements on
real properties.
HELD: The instant motion for reconsideration lacks merit.
The first VAT law, found in Executive Order (EO) No. 273 [1987], took effect on January
1, 1988. It amended several provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1986
(Old NIRC). EO 273 likewise accommodated the potential burdens of the shift to the
VAT system by allowing newly VAT-registered persons to avail of a transitional input tax
credit as provided for in Section 105 of the Old NIRC.
RA 7716 took effect on January 1, 1996. It amended Section 100 of the Old NIRC by
imposing for the first time value-added-tax on sale of real properties. The amendment
reads:
Sec. 100. Value-added-tax on sale of goods or properties. (a) Rate and base of tax. There
shall be levied, assessed and collected on every sale, barter or exchange of goods or
properties, a value-added tax equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in
money of the goods, or properties sold, bartered or exchanged, such tax to be paid by the
seller or transferor.(1) The term 'goods or properties' shall mean all tangible and intangible
objects which are capable of pecuniary estimation and shall include: (A) Real properties held
primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of trade or business; xxx
The provisions of Section 105 of the NIRC, on the transitional input tax credit, remain
intact despite the enactment of RA 7716. Section 105 however was amended with the
passage of the new National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (New NIRC), also officially
known as Republic Act (RA) 8424. The provisions on the transitional input tax credit
are now embodied in Section 111(A) of the New NIRC.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) disallowed Fort Bonifacio Development
Corporations (FBDC) presumptive input tax credit arising from the land inventory on
the basis of Revenue Regulation 7-95 (RR 7-95) and Revenue Memorandum Circular
3-96 (RMC 3-96).
However, in the case of real estate dealers, the basis of the presumptive input tax
shall be the improvements, such as buildings, roads, drainage systems, and other
similar structures, constructed on or after the effectivity of EO 273 (January 1, 1988).
The transitional input tax shall be 8% of the value of the inventory or actual VAT paid,
whichever is higher, which amount may be allowed as tax credit against the output tax
of the VAT-registered person.
In the April 2, 2009 Decision sought to be reconsidered, the Court struck down Section
4.105-1 of RR 7-95 for being in conflict with the law. It held that the CIR had no power
to limit the meaning and coverage of the term "goods" in Section 105 of the Old NIRC
sans statutory authority or basis and justification to make such limitation. This it did
when it restricted the application of Section 105 in the case of real estate dealers only
to improvements on the real property belonging to their beginning inventory.
A law must not be read in truncated parts; its provisions must be read in relation to
the whole law. It is the cardinal rule in statutory construction that a statutes clauses
and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole
and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in
order to produce a harmonious whole. Every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered
together with other parts of the statute and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment.
In construing a statute, courts have to take the thought conveyed by the statute as a
whole; construe the constituent parts together; ascertain the legislative intent from
the whole act; consider each and every provision thereof in the light of the general
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purpose of the statute; and endeavor to make every part effective, harmonious and
sensible.
The statutory definition of the term "goods or properties" leaves no room for doubt. It
states: Sec. 100. Value-added tax on sale of goods or properties. (a) Rate and base of
tax. xxx. (1) The term goods or properties shall mean all tangible and intangible
objects which are capable of pecuniary estimation and shall include: (A) Real
properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course
of trade or business; xxx.
The term "goods or properties" by the unambiguous terms of Section 100 includes "real
properties held primarily for sale to costumers or held for lease in the ordinary course
of business." Having been defined in Section 100 of the NIRC, the term "goods" as used
in Section 105 of the same code could not have a different meaning. Goods, as
commonly understood in the business sense, refers to the product which the VATregistered person offers for sale to the public. With respect to real estate dealers, it is
the real properties themselves which constitute their "goods." Such real properties are
the operating assets of the real estate dealer.
However, in the case of real estate dealers, the basis of the presumptive input tax
shall be the improvements, such as buildings, roads, drainage systems, and other
similar structures, constructed on or after the effectivity of EO 273 (January 1, 1988).
As mandated by Article 7 of the Civil Code, an administrative rule or regulation cannot
contravene the law on which it is based. RR 7-95 is inconsistent with Section 105
insofar as the definition of the term "goods" is concerned. This is a legislative act
beyond the authority of the CIR and the Secretary of Finance. The rules and
regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a
delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have
the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the
legislature to the objects and purposes of the law, and should not be in contradiction
to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.
To be valid, an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict, the
provisions of the enabling law. An implementing rule or regulation cannot modify,

expand, or subtract from the law it is intended to implement. Any rule that is not
consistent with the statute itself is null and void. While administrative agencies, such
as the Bureau of Internal Revenue, may issue regulations to implement statutes, they
are without authority to limit the scope of the statute to less than what it provides, or
extend or expand the statute beyond its terms, or in any way modify explicit
provisions of the law. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for
that matter cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy
between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law
prevails.
To recapitulate, RR 7-95, insofar as it restricts the definition of "goods" as basis of
transitional input tax credit under Section 105 is a nullity. It is clear, therefore, that
the allowable transitional input tax credit is not limited to improvements on real
properties. The particular provision of RR 7-95 has effectively been repealed by RR
6-97 which is now in consonance with Section 100 of the NIRC, insofar as the definition
of real properties as goods is concerned. The failure to add a specific repealing clause
would not necessarily indicate that there was no intent to repeal RR 7-95. The fact
that the aforequoted paragraph was deleted created an irreconcilable inconsistency
and repugnancy between the provisions of RR 6-97 and RR 7-95
VICTORIA GUTIERREZ
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM)
Page 210
FACTS:
These consolidated cases question the inclusion of certain allowances and fringe
benefits into the standardized salary rates for offices in the national government,
state universities and colleges, and local government units as required by the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 and implemented through the
challenged National Compensation Circular 59 (NCC 59).
Congress enacted in 1989 Republic Act (R.A.) 6758, called the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 to rationalize the compensation of government

employees. Its Section 12 directed the consolidation of allowances and additional
compensation already being enjoyed by employees into their standardized salary
rates. But it exempted certain additional compensations that the employees may be
receiving from such consolidation.
Pursuant thereto, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued NCC 59
dated September 30, 1989, covering the offices of the national government, state
universities and colleges, and local government units. NCC 59 enumerated the specific
allowances and additional compensations which were deemed integrated in the basic
salaries and these included the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) and Inflation
Connected Allowance (ICA). The DBM re-issued and published NCC 59 on May 3, 2004.
The DBM also issued Corporate Compensation Circular (CCC) 10 dated October 2, 1989,
covering all government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial

institutions. The DBM re-issued this circular on February 15, 1999 and published it on
March 16, 1999. Accordingly, the Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed the payments
of honoraria and other allowances which were deemed integrated into the
standardized salary rates. Employees of government-owned or controlled corporations
questioned the validity of CCC 10 due to its non-publication.
Meanwhile, the DBM also issued Budget Circular 2001-03 dated November 12, 2001,
clarifying that only the exempt allowances under Section 12 of R.A. 6758 may continue
to be granted the employees; all others were deemed integrated in the standardized
salary rates. Thus, the payment of allowances and compensation such as COLA,
amelioration allowance, and ICA, among others, which were already deemed
integrated in the basic salary were unauthorized.
On May 16, 2002 employees of the Office of the Solicitor General filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus in G.R. 153266, questioning the propriety of integrating their
COLA into their standardized salary rates. Employees of other offices of the national
government followed suit. In addition, petitioners in G.R. 159007 questioned the
disallowance of the allowances and fringe benefits that the COA auditing personnel
assigned to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) used to get. Petitioners
in G.R. 173119 questioned the disallowance of the ICA that used to be paid to the
officials and employees of the Insurance Commission.
On October 26, 2005 the DBM issued National Budget Circular 2005-502 which provided
that all Supreme Court rulings on the integration of allowances, including COLA, of
government employees under R.A. 6758 applied only to specific government-owned or
controlled corporations since the consolidated cases covering the national government
employees are still pending with this Court. Consequently, the payment of allowances
and other benefits to them, such as COLA and ICA, remained prohibited until
otherwise provided by law or ruled by this Court. The circular further said that all
agency heads and other responsible officials and employees found to have authorized
the grant of COLA and other allowances and benefits already integrated in the basic
salary shall be personally held liable for such payment.
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ISSUES:
Whether or not the non-publication of NCC 59 dated September 30, 1989 in the Official Gazette
or newspaper of general circulation nullifies the integration of the COLA into the standardized
salary rates; and
HELD:
1.
Petitioners argue that since CCC 10 dated October 2, 1989 covering all governmentowned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions was ineffective
until its re-issuance and publication on March 16, 1999, its counterpart, NCC 59 dated
September 30, 1989 covering the offices of the national government, state universities
and colleges, and local government units should also be regarded as ineffective until
its re-issuance and publication on May 3, 2004. Thus, the COLA should not be deemed
integrated into the standardized salary rates from 1989 to 2004. Respondents counter
that the fact that NCC 59 was not published should not be considered as an obstacle to
the integration of COLA into the standardized salary rates. Accordingly, Budget
Circular 2001-03, insofar as it reiterates NCC 59, should not be treated as ineffective
since it merely reaffirms the fact of consolidation of COLA into the employees salary
as mandated by Section 12 of R.A. 6758.
It is a settled rule that publication is required as a condition precedent to the effectivity of a

law to inform the public of its contents before their rights and interests are affected by the
same. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Nonetheless, as previously discussed, the integration of COLA into the standardized salary rates
is not dependent on the publication of CCC 10 and NCC 59. This benefit is deemed included in
the standardized salary rates of government employees since it falls under the general rule of
integrationall allowances.
More importantly, the integration was not by mere legal fiction since it was factually integrated
into the employees salaries. Records show that the government employees were informed by
their respective offices of their new position titles and their corresponding salary grades when
they were furnished with the Notices of Position Allocation and Salary Adjustment (NPASA). The
NPASA provided the breakdown of the employees gross monthly salary as of June 30, 1989 and
the composition of his standardized pay under R.A. 6758. Notably, the COLA was considered
part of the employees monthly income.
In truth, petitioners never really suffered any diminution in pay as a consequence of the
consolidation of COLA into their standardized salary rates. There is thus nothing in these cases
which can be the subject of a back pay since the amount corresponding to COLA was never
withheld from petitioners in the first place.
Consequently, the non-publication of CCC 10 and NCC 59 in the Official Gazette or newspaper
of general circulation does not nullify the integration of COLA into the standardized salary rates
upon the effectivity of R.A. 6758. The validity of R.A. 6758 should not be made to depend on
the validity of its implementing rules.
COCOFED VS REPUBLIC 663 SCRA 514 (2012)
FACTS:
In 1971, Republic Act No. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Fund
(CIF). The source of the CIF was a P0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra. The
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Philippine Coconut Administration was tasked to collect and administer the Fund. Out of the
0.55 levy, P0.02 was placed at the disposition of the COCOFED, the recognized national
association of coconut producers declared by the PCA. Cocofund receipts were ought to be
issued to every copra seller. During the Martial Law regime, then President Ferdinand Marcos
issued several Presidential Decrees purportedly for the improvement of the coconut industry.
The most relevant among these is P.D. No. 755 which permitted the use of the Fund for
theacquisition of a commercial bank for the benefit of coconut farmers and the distribution
of the shares of the stock of the bank it [PCA] acquired free to the coconut farmers (Sec.2).
Thus, the PCA acquired the First United Bank, later renamed the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB). The PCA bought the 72.2% of PUBs outstanding capital stock or 137,866
shares at P200 per share (P27, 573,200.00) from Pedro Cojuangco in behalf of the coconut
farmers. The rest of the Fund was deposited to the UCPB interest free. Farmers who had paid
the CIF and registered their receipts with PCA were given their corresponding UCPB stock
certificates. Only 16 million worth of COCOFUND receipts were registered and a large number
of the coconut farmers opted to sell all/part of their UCPB shares to private individuals. Simply
put, parts of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to various projects and/or was
converted into different assets or investments through the years.
After the EDSA Revolution, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order 1which
created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).The PCGG aimed to assist
the President in the recovery of ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the Marcoses and their
cronies. PCGG was empowered to file cases for sequestration in the Sandiganbayan. Among the
sequestered properties were the shares of stock in the UCPB registered in the name of over a
million coconut farmers held in trust by the PCA. TheSandiganbayan allowed the sequestration
by ruling in a Partial Summary Judgment that the Coconut Levy Funds are prima facie public
funds and that Section 1 and 2 of PD No. 755 (and some other PDs) were unconstitutional.
Now, petitioners come to this Court contending that, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred
in concluding that Section 1 of PD No. 755 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
insofar as it authorizes the PCA to promulgate rules and regulations governing the distribution
of the UCPB shares to the coconut farmers. Section 1 of PD 755 was complete in itself,
prescribed sufficient standards that circumscribed the discretion of the PCA and merely
authorized the PCA to fill matters of detail an execution through promulgated rules and
regulations
ISSUE: WON Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 is an invalid delegation of legislative power.
RULING:
YES. Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 is an invalid delegation of legislative power.
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a
sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out
the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be
sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegates authority, announce the
legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
In this case, the requisite standards or criteria are absent in P.D. No. 755. This decree
authorizes PCA to distribute to coconut farmers, for free, the shares of stocks of UCPB and to
pay from the CCSF levy the financial commitments of the coconut farmers under the Agreement
for the acquisition of such bank. Yet, the decree does not even state who are to be considered
as coconut farmers. Would, say, one who plants a single coconut tree be already considered a
coconut farmer and, therefore, entitled to own UCPB shares? If so, how many shares shall be
given to him? The definition of a coconut farmer and the basis as to the number of shares a
farmer is entitled to receive for free are important variables to be determined by law and
cannot be left to the discretion of the implementing agency.
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Moreover, P.D. No. 755 did not identify or delineate any clear condition as to how the
disposition of the UCPB shares or their conversion into private ownership will redound to the
advancement of the national policy declared under it. P.D. No. 755 seeks to accelerate the
growth and development of the coconut industry and achieve a vertical integration thereof so
that coconut farmers will become participants in, and beneficiaries of, such growth and
development. The said law gratuitously gave away public funds to private individuals, and
converted them exclusively into private property without any restriction as to its use that
would reflect the avowed national policy or public purpose. Conversely, the private individuals
to whom the UCPB shares were transferred are free to dispose of them by sale or any other
mode from the moment of their acquisition. P.D. No. 755 did not provide for any guideline,
standard, condition or restriction by which the said shares shall be distributed to the coconut
farmers that would ensure that the same will be undertaken to accelerate the growth and
development of the coconut industry pursuant to its national policy. Thus, P.D. No. 755, insofar
as it grants PCA a veritable carte blanche to distribute to coconut farmers UCPB shares at the
level it may determine, as well as the full disposition of such shares to private individuals in
their private capacity without any conditions or restrictions that would advance the laws
national policy or public purpose, present a case of undue delegation of legislative power.
Commissioner of Customs and the District Collector of the Port of Subic vs Hypermix Feeds
Corporation
G.R. No 179579, February 1, 2012
Facts:
The Commissioner of Customs issued CM 27-2003 classifying wheat as (1)importer or
consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge and depending on these factors,
wheat would be classified further as either food grade with a tariff rate of 3% or feed grade
with a tariff rate of 7%.
The regulation also provides for an exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge,
commodity descriptions and countries of origin. On December 19, 2003, the respondent filed a
Petition for Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas contending the
following: (1) the regulation was issued without following the mandate of the Revised
Administrative Code, (2) that the regulation classified them to be a feed grade supplier without
prior assessment and examination, (3)the equal protection clause of the Constitution was
violated when the regulation treated the non-flour millers differently from flour millers for no
reason at all, and(4) the retroactive application of the regulation is confiscatory. The
petitioners thereafter filed a motion to dismiss contending that: (1) the RTC does not have
jurisdiction of the subject matter, (2) an action for declaratory relief was improper,(3) CM
27-2003 was an internal administrative rule and not legislative in nature; and (4) the claims of
the respondent were speculative and premature.
On March10, 2005, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision ruling in favour of the
respondent. It held that, on matters relating to the validity of the regulation, the court held
that the regulation is invalid because the basic requirements of hearing and publication were
not complied with. The petitioners then appealed to Court of Appeals but it was, however,
dismissed. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision of
the Court of Appeals.
Issue: WON the issuance of CMO 27-2003 is valid?
Held:
Customs Memorandum Order No. 27-2003 (CMO 23-2007) is invalid. The Commissioner
of Customs (1) violated the right to due process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when he failed
to observe the requirements under the Revised Administrative Code, (2) violated the right to
equal protection of laws when he provided for an unreasonable classification in the application
of the regulation, and (3) went beyond his powers of delegated authority when the regulation
limited the powers of the customs officer to examine and assess imported articles.
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CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative
Code on public participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of
the Philippines Law Center. For tariff purposes, CMO 27-2003 classified wheat according to the
following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. This is a
violation of the equal protection clause under the Constitution. The Court does not see how the
quality of wheat is affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it came
from.
Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003 have imported
food grade wheat, the product would still be declared as feed grade wheat, a classification
subjecting them to 7% tariff. On the other hand, even if the importers listed under CMO
27-2003 have imported feed grade wheat, they would only be made to pay 3% tariff, thus
depriving the state of the taxes due. The regulation, therefore, does not become
disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state. Section 1403 of the Tariff and
Customs Law, as amended mandates that the customs officer must first assess and determine
the classification of the imported article before tariff may be imposed.
Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified the article even before the customs
officer had the chance to examine it. Finally, Commissioner of Customs diminished the powers
granted by the Tariff and Customs Code with regard to wheat importation when it no longer
required the customs officers prior examination and assessment of the proper classification of
the wheat.
Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255
Facts:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House
of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners
claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with
certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee
submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption
and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence
of a quorum.
The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of
the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the
conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the
Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this,
Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders
motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared
by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of
the House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
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waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has
agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to
be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question
presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case
where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member
who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with
which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only
that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep.
Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll
call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised
repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the
business of the House.
ABAKADA vs PURISIMA
FACTS: This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and
enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a
system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund)
and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board).It covers all officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue
targets for the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee
(DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in
proportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance
(DOF) or his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the Director General of the National Economic Development
Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the
BOC or their Deputy Commissioners, two representatives from the rank-and-file employees and
a representative from the officials nominated by their recognized organization.
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution
and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials
and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in
accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance
evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6)
submit an annual report to Congress.
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to
promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335,to be approved by a
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created for such purpose.
Petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the
congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law.
In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argues that the
creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances, rather than
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violates, separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy and serves as
a check to any over-accumulation of power on the part of the executive and the implementing
agencies.
ISSUE: WON Section 12 of RA 9335 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. There is hereby created a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate and seven
Members from the House of Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be appointed
by the Senate President, with at least two senators representing the minority. The Members
from the House of Representatives shall be appointed by the Speaker with at least two
members representing the minority. After the Oversight Committee will have approved the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter become functus officio and
therefore cease to exist.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of
approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA,
BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR.
The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as
a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism
and the rule on presentment.52
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to
the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. (emphasis supplied)
Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws)53 is vested in
Congress which consists of two chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives. A valid
exercise of legislative power requires the act of both chambers. Corrollarily, it can be
exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a committee of either or both
chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a legislative veto, both a single-chamber legislative
veto and a congressional committee legislative veto are invalid.
Additionally, Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto
it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter
the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it
shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a
law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined byyeas or nays, and the
names of the members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the
date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it. (emphasis
supplied)
Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or veto. In the
absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law. In this
sense, law-making under the Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and of the Executive.
Assuming that legislative veto is a valid legislative act with the force of law, it cannot take
effect without such presentment even if approved by both chambers of Congress.
In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law. First, it must be approved by both
Houses of Congress.54 Second, it must be presented to and approved by the President.55 As
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summarized by Justice Isagani Cruz56 and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.57, the following is the
procedure for the approval of bills:
A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives or the Senate except for
some measures that must originate only in the former chamber.
The first reading involves only a reading of the number and title of the measure and its referral
by the Senate President or the Speaker to the proper committee for study.
The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be recommended for approval, with or
without amendments, sometimes after public hearings are first held thereon. If there are other
bills of the same nature or purpose, they may all be consolidated into one bill under common
authorship or as a committee bill.
Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. It is at this stage that the
bill is read in its entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and amended when desired. The second
reading is the most important stage in the passage of a bill.
The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies thereof are
distributed at least three days before the third reading. On the third reading, the members
merely register their votes and explain them if they are allowed by the rules. No further
debate is allowed.
Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, where it will also undergo
the three readings. If there are differences between the versions approved by the two
chambers, a conference committee58 representing both Houses will draft a compromise
measure that if ratified by the Senate and the House of Representatives will then be submitted
to the President for his consideration.
The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the Congress, thereafter authenticated
with the signatures of the Senate President, the Speaker, and the Secretaries of their
respective chambers59
The Presidents role in law-making.
The final step is submission to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law
after the required publication.
Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it has enacted
pursuant to sufficient standards established in the said law, the law must be complete in all its
essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. And it may be
deemed to have left the hands of the legislature when it becomes effective because it is only
upon effectivity of the statute that legal rights and obligations become available to those
entitled by the language of the statute. Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication
under the due process clause,61the determination as to when a law takes effect is wholly the
prerogative of Congress.62 As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may be executed
and the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law. Before that
point, the role of the executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to approving or
vetoing the law.
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or
any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates
the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a
provision that requires Congress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law
after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress
or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive
branch charged with the implementation of the law.
Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as unconstitutional. While
there may be similar provisions of other laws that may be invalidated for failure to pass this
standard, the Court refrains from invalidating them wholesale but will do so at the proper time
when an appropriate case assailing those provisions is brought before us
Page 218

SENATE vs ERMITA
FACTS: The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the
President has abused such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September
28, 2005. They thus pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia,
the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices
including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to
various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail
Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the
contract covering the North Rail Project.
The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations2 dated
September 22, 2005 to the officials of the AFP. Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled
on September 28 2005 was the AFP Chief of Staff, General Generoso S. Senga.
On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of
Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights
of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution,
and For Other Purposes,"7which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.
The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. In accordance with Article
VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the
separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments
of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either House of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in
writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita
a copy of E.O. 464, and another letter informing him "that officials of the Executive
Department invited to appear at the meeting [regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able
to attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said
officials have not secured the required consent from the President."
On even date which was also the scheduled date of the hearing on the alleged wiretapping,
Gen. Senga sent a letter to Senator Biazon informing him "that per instruction of [President
Arroyo], thru the Secretary of National Defense, no officer of the [AFP] is authorized to appear
before any Senate or Congressional hearings without seeking a written approval from the
President" and "that no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear
before the public hearing of the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled
[on] 28 September 2005."
Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the
investigation scheduled by the Committee on National Defense and Security pushed through,
with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending.
For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative
inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their
military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings.
Page 219

On October 3, 2005, three petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660, and 169667, for
certiorari and prohibition, were filed before this Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O.
464.
On October 11, 2005, Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging that it has a vital interest in
the resolution of the issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and
material injury, as it has already sustained the same with its continued enforcement since it
directly interferes with and impedes the valid exercise of the Senates powers and functions
and conceals information of great public interest and concern, filed its petition for certiorari
and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169777 and prays that E.O. 464 be declared
unconstitutional.
In another investigation conducted jointly by the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food
and the Blue Ribbon Committee on the alleged mismanagement and use of the fertilizer fund
under the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani program of the Department of Agriculture (DA), several
Cabinet officials were invited to the hearings but most of them failed to attend having invoked
E.O. 464.
Petitioners submit that E.O. 464 violates Article VII, Section 21 and 22 of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether E.O. 464 violates Article VII, Section 22 of the Constitution
RULING:
Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered by them to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. There are significant differences
between the two provisions, however, which constrain this Court to discuss the validity of these
provisions separately.
Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior
determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has,
through the challenged order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also
Section 3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the
department heads possession of any information which might be covered by executive
privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis--vis Section 2, there is no reference to
executive privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on
Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour.
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide,
appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments.
Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House
of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall
not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security
of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22
of Article VI. Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis--vis
Section 21 which provides for the power of either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation."An excerpt of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission shows that the
framers were aware that these two provisions involved distinct functions of Congress.
In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the "question hour" has a definite
meaning. It is a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and
the other ministers accountable for their acts and the operation of the government,
corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question period. There was a specific provision
for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution which made the appearance of ministers
mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the parliamentary system established by that
Constitution, where the ministers are also members of the legislature and are directly
accountable to it.
Page 220

An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate
accountability of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. They shall be
responsible to the National Assembly for the program of government and shall determine the
guidelines of national policy. Unlike in the presidential system where the tenure of office of all
elected officials cannot be terminated before their term expired, the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet remain in office only as long as they enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly.
The moment this confidence is lost the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during
the question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of
separation of powers. To that extent, the question hour, as it is presently understood in this
jurisdiction, departs from the question period of the parliamentary system. That department
heads may not be required to appear in a question hour does not, however, mean that the
legislature is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in all circumstances. In fact,
in light of the absence of a mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress right to
executive information in the performance of its legislative function becomes more imperative.
As Schwartz observes:
Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to tell us on the subject under discussion, it is
that the Congress has the right to obtain information from any source even from officials of
departments and agencies in the executive branch. In the United States there is, unlike the
situation which prevails in a parliamentary system such as that in Britain, a clear separation
between the legislative and executive branches. It is this very separation that makes the
congressional right to obtain information from the executive so essential, if the functions of
the Congress as the elected representatives of the people are adequately to be carried out.
The absence of close rapport between the legislative and executive branches in this country,
comparable to those which exist under a parliamentary system, and the nonexistence in the
Congress of an institution such as the British question period have perforce made reliance by
the Congress upon its right to obtain information from the executive essential, if it is
intelligently to perform its legislative tasks. Unless the Congress possesses the right to obtain
executive information, its power of oversight of administration in a system such as ours
becomes a power devoid of most of its practical content, since it depends for its effectiveness
solely upon information parceled out ex gratia by the executive. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should
not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that
may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour,
the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the
President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation
of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the
inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21,
the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the
extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under
Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of
powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate
the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.
Page 221

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact
that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power
the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress
except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the
executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is
sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry.
Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof
is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the
constitutional independence of the judiciary. This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for
the Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it during the oral argument upon interpellation of the
Chief Justice.
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee vs Majaducon,

407 SCRA 356
July 29, 2003
Where the senate conducts legislative inquiries in aid of

legislation, and persons were subpoenaed and invited
thereto, the latter cannot go to the court of justice
because it has no authority to prohibit (issue a writ of
injunction) the committee from requiring that person
from appearing and testifying before it; otherwise it will
be inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers
as the same is an encroachment to ones prerogatives.
FACTS
Senator Blas F. Ople filed Senate Resolution No.157 directing the Committee on National
Defense and Security to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the charges of then
Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado that a group of active and retired military officers were
organizing a coup d 'etat to prevent the administration of then President Joseph Estrada from
probing alleged fund irregularities in the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Senator Vicente C.
Sotto III also filed Resolution No.160, "directing the appropriate senate committee to conduct
an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the alleged mismanagement of the funds and investment
portfolio of the Armed Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS).
During the public hearings conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, it appeared that
the AFP-RSBS purchased a lot in General Santos City, designated as Lot X, MR-1160, for
P10,500.00 per square meter from private respondent Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano. However, the deed
of sale filed with the Register of Deeds indicated that the purchase price of the lot was only
P3,000.00 per square meter. The Committee thereafter caused the service of a subpoena to
respondent Atty. Flaviano, directing him to appear and testify before it. Respondent refused to
appear at the hearing. Instead, he filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction
with prayer for temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City
Page 222

Atty. Flaviano contends that the trial court may properly intervene into investigations by
Congress pursuant to the power of judicial review vested in it by the Constitution. He avers
that he has a valid cause of action to file the petition for prohibition considering that the
Committees investigation will delve into the validity of the patenting and titling of Lot X,
MR-1160-D which, as admitted by petitioner, falls within the competence of judicial courts.
The trial court issued a Temporary Restraining Order directing the Committee "to CEASE and
DESIST from proceeding with the inquiry on matters affecting the patenting/titling and sale of
Lot X,MR-1160-D to AFP-RSBS," and "from issuing subpoenas to witnesses from Region XI,
particularly from General Santos City, pending the hearing of the petition for prohibition and
injunction."
The Committee filed a motion to dismiss thepetition on the grounds of (a) lack of jurisdiction,
and (b) failure to state a valid cause of action.
The trial court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss and granted the writ of preliminary
injunction
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent Judge Jose Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion in
granting the writ of preliminary injunction.
RULING
YES.
The principle of separation of powers essentially means that legislation belongs to Congress,
execution to the Executive, and settlement of legal controversies to the Judiciary. Each is
prevented from invading the domain of the others. When the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
served subpoena on respondent Flaviano to appear and testify before it in connection with its
investigation of the alleged misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, it did so
pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in
Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, thus:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of
persons appearing inor affected by such inquiries
shall be
respected.
There was in this case a clear legislative purpose, as stated in Senate Resolution No. 160, and
the appropriate Senate Committee was directed to look into the reported misuse and
mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, with the intention of enacting appropriate legislation
to protect the rights and interests of the officers and members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
Hence, the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, or any court for that matter, had no
authority to prohibit the Committee from requiring respondent to appear and testify before it.
Bengzon vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991
Inquiry in Aid of Legislation: When not Allowed

FACTS:
Page 223

It was alleged that Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses
unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they
obtained with the help of the Bengzon law office and Ricardo Lopa Corys brother in law,
among others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the country including
MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation. Sen. Enrile
subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various government
owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained
in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee
hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a pending
civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa however
sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless
and malicious. Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senates privilege hour upon which he
insisted to have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopas and Bengzons plea.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their
attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction
and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to
their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the Bengzon et al filed
the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
injunctive relief.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.
HELD:
No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of
Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In other
words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find
out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection
with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There
appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by
the SBRC is not really in aid of legislation because it is not related to a purpose within the
jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the
relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts
rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa
died during the pendency of this case.
As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16 the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction
of the legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the exervise of a power in it
vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member.
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006
Page 224
A proper claim of executive privilege requires a specific

description of the documents within its scope as well as
the precise reasons for preserving their confidentiality.
Without this specificity, it is impossible for a court to
analyze the claim.
FACTS:
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the
Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the
said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate
committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before
the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department
heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention.
AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted
the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and
scheduled.
Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately. EO 464 basically prohibited
Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the
department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of
Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank
of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of
the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the
judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such
other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings
conducted by Congress without first securing the presidents approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee
then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded
with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring military
personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani
and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial
proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the
rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct
oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: WON EO 464 is constitutional
E.O. 464, Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule
on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes,
Page 225
E.O. 464, Ensuring Observance of the Principle of

Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive
Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes,
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before

Congress. In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of
the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional
provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal
branches of the government, all heads of departments of
the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either
House of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so

requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive

Privilege.
(a) Nature and Scope. The rule of confidentiality based

on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of
government and rooted in the separation of powers under
the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23
May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees
shall not use or divulge confidential or classified
information officially known to them by reason of their
office and not made available to the public to prejudice
the public interest.
Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified

information between the President and the public officers
covered by this executive order, including:
Conversations and correspondence between the President

and the public official covered by this executive order
(Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995;
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July
2002);
Page 226

RULING:
The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are valid. The rest invalid.
To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21
from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly
recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the
Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations
and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and
effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other
words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in
the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect
or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information
which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Section 22 on
the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the
legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative
Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in
the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers
only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of
legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can
be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of
legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the
question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore,
while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining
to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation,
while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to
obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function.
Ultimately, the power of
Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it
under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive
branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its
power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a
valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom
executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of
impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the
due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a longstanding custom.
The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1,
limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section
22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is
discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of
department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to
respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of
privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the
President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation
of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the
Page 227

inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21,
the appearance is mandatory.
The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege.
The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a
matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being,
by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to
Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in
enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is
sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground
that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be
respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
Gudangi vs Senga
GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006
FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election
fraud and the surfacing of the Hello Garci tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of
the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any
legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum,
prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee
without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact
that a directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments
for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the Chain of
Command. Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial
proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP
preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.
RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is
liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the
appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate
remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons
to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so
inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the
military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President
has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior
consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing.
In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and
Page 228

affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability
of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on
executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the
actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as
commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear
before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of
the legislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is illadvised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is
similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct
legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners
testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its
pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members
of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the
appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed
with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is
nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.
CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340,
October 17, 2006,
504 SCRA 704
Facts:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate
Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455), directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the
anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC),
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings
Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective
Board of Directors.
Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Sen Gordon, wrote Chairman Sabio of the PCGG inviting him
to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman
Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same time, he invoked
Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 (creating PCGG) No member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding
concerning matters within its official cognizance. Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGGs
unhampered performance of its task. Gordons Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly
ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.
ISSUE:
Page 229

May Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 be invoked by Chairman Sabio to justify non-appearance on
legislative investigations?
RULING:
No.
The Congress power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends
to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the
power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in
the absence of any constitutional basis.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution
stating that: Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public
accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and
other administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public accountability, the same provision
only institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-accountability.
Said provision of EO No. 1 violates Section 28, Art. II of the Constitution which mandates that
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy
of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Standard Chartered Bank (Philippine Branch) vs. Senate Committee on Banks, Financial
Institutions and Currencies
FACTS:
Petitioner, Standard Chartered Bank, is an institution incorporated in England with limited
liability licensed to engage in banking, trust, and other related operations in the country. It
violated RA 8799 for selling unregistered foreign securities. Senator Enrile in his privilege
speech introduced a Resolution to attend to the matter. The respondent-committees
chairperson Sen. Angara set an initial hearing to investigate in aid of legislation thereto.
Respondent invited petitioners to attend the hearing and submit their written position paper.
Petitioners, in response, submitted to respondent a letter stressing their position that there
were cases already pending in court which involved the same issues that the respondent is
subjecting to legislative inquiry. The petitioner thereby poses a challenge to the jurisdiction of
respondent committee to continue the inquiry since there are cases of a similar subject filed in
Page 230

court of which are still pending. Respondent still commenced the investigation. Its vice
chairperson moved for the issuance of a subpoena to those who did not attend the hearing.
Said motion was approved thereby thec ause of a petition. Standard Chartered Bank, petitioned
for a TRO
to direct the Senate Committee on Banks from:
1.Proceeding with its inquiry pursuant to a Senate Resolution
2.Compelling the Banks officers to attend and testify before any further hearing called by the
respondent Committee
3.Enforcing any Hold-departure order (HDO) and/or putting the petitioners on the Watch list
Petitioner-Bank also prays that judgment be rendered annulling the subpoena ad testificandum
and duces tecum issued to them and prohibit the Committee from compelling them to appear
and testify in the inquiry being conducted pursuant to the Resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committee acted without jurisdiction and/or acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, purportedly in aid of legislation
RULING:
No.
Respondent has jurisdiction to conduct the inquiry although the subject matter involved is the
very same subject matter pending in court. The respondent-committees action does not
encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely on the courts. The petitioners reliance to the
Bengzon case is misplaced to the extent that, in the case at bar, there are a number of cases
already pending in various courts and administrative bodies involving the petitioners, relative
to the alleged sale of unregistered foreign securities, there is a resemblance between this case
and Bengzon. However, the similarity ends there.
Central to the Courts ruling in Bengzon was the courts determination that the intended
inquiry was not in aid of legislation. The petitioners erred in alleging that the inquiry was
simply to denounce the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered
foreign securities. This fallacy is made more glaring at the conclusion of Sen. Enriles privilege
speech urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to
prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future.
Page 231
Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasijudicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise,
it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient
ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign
legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component,
cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC

OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND
SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a
contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment
and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $
329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples
Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007
hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers
were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted
that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN
project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and
that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner
refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,

(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring
that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid
down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and
Page 232

an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his
testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?
HELD:
YES
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry
relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area
of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the
doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable

presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational
proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be

overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains
important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation
and correspondence between the President and public officials necessary in her executive
and policy decision-making process and, that the information sought to be disclosed might
impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China.
Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on
matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
Page 233

communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are
received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test,
petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And
third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of
the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive
privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern. We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not
appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September
26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly
manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only
of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of
Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters

of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis
for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.
ROMULO L. NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND

INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE
ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
FACTS:
In these proceedings, this Court has been called upon to exercise its power of review and
arbitrate a hotly, even acrimoniously, debated dispute between the Courts co-equal branches
of government. On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees
and testified for about eleven (11) hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project
(the NBN Project), a project awarded by the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE). Petitioner
disclosed that then Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered
him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he
Page 234

informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him
not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and petitioners
discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive
privilege. To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not
President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize
it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it.
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioners answers to these three questions by
requiring him to appear and testify once more on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007,
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent Committees and requested them to
dispense with petitioners testimony on the ground of executive privilege.
The senate thereafter issued a show cause order, unsatisfied with the reply, therefore, issued
an Order citing Neri in contempt and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the
Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order. He also mentioned the petition
for certiorari he previously filed with this Court on December 7, 2007. Petitioner then filed his
Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction)
on February 1, 2008. In the Courts Resolution dated February 4, 2008, the parties were
required to observe the status quo prevailing prior to the Order dated January 30, 2008.
On March 25, 2008, the Court granted his petition for certiorari.
Hence, respondent Committees filed the present motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES:
(1) whether or not there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in
our legal system;
(2) whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications elicited by
the three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege;
(3) whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are critical to the exercise of their functions; and
(4) Is the contempt and arrest Order of Neri valid?
HELD:
Page 235

There Is a Recognized Presumptive Presidential Communications Privilege
The right to information does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information
under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations,
correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings.
In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita, who invoked
executive privilege on a specific matter involving an executive agreement between the
Philippines and China, which was the subject of the three (3) questions propounded to
petitioner Neri in the course of the Senate Committees investigation. Thus, the factual setting
of this case markedly differs from that passed upon in Senate v. Ermita.
A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of
shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express
except privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for
Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.
II
There Are Factual and Legal Bases to Hold that the Communications Elicited by the Three (3)
Questions Are Covered by Executive Privilege
A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a quintessential and non-delegable

presidential power.
First, respondent Committees contend that the power to secure a foreign loan does not relate
to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power, because the Constitution does not
vest it in the President alone, but also in the Monetary Board which is required to give its prior
concurrence and to report to Congress.
This argument is unpersuasive.
The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such
power less executive. The power to enter into an executive agreement is in essence an
executive power. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without
the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Now, the fact that the President has to secure the prior concurrence of the
Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its decision before
contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power.
In the same way that certain legislative acts require action from the President for their validity
does not render such acts less legislative in nature.
Page 236

B. The doctrine of operational proximity was laid down precisely to limit the scope of the
presidential communications privilege but, in any case, it is not conclusive.
Second, respondent Committees also seek reconsideration of the application of the doctrine
of operational proximity for the reason that it maybe misconstrued to expand the scope of
the presidential communications privilege to communications between those who are
operationally proximate to the President but who may have no direct communications with
her.
It must be stressed that the doctrine of operational proximity was laid down precisely to
limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege. In the case at bar, the danger of
expanding the privilege to a large swath of the executive branch (a fear apparently
entertained by respondents) is absent because the official involved here is a member of the
Cabinet, thus, properly within the term advisor of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a
member of her official family.
C. The Presidents claim of executive privilege is not merely based on a generalized interest;
and in balancing respondent Committees and the Presidents clashing interests, the Court did
not disregard the 1987 Constitutional provisions on government transparency, accountability
and disclosure of information.
The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita specified presidential
communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic relations with another
sovereign nation as the bases for the claim. Even in Senate v. Ermita, it was held that Congress
must not require the Executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to
compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter
of respect for a coordinate and co-equal department.
Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations
The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority and expedition of decision which
are inherent in executive action. Another essential characteristic of diplomacy is its
confidential nature.
With respect to respondent Committees invocation of constitutional prescriptions regarding

the right of the people to information and public accountability and transparency, the Court
finds nothing in these arguments to support respondent Committees case.
There is no debate as to the importance of the constitutional right of the people to information
and the constitutional policies on public accountability and transparency. These are the twin
postulates vital to the effective functioning of a democratic government. In the case at bar,
this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific questions, did not
Page 237

in any way curb the publics right to information or diminish the importance of public
accountability and transparency.
This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of
legislation. There is nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent Committees from
inquiring into the NBN Project. They could continue the investigation and even call petitioner
Neri to testify again.
III.
Respondent Committees Failed to Show That the Communications Elicited by the Three
Questions Are Critical to the Exercise of their Functions
The jurisprudential test laid down by this Court in past decisions on executive privilege is that
the presumption of privilege can only be overturned by a showing of compelling need for
disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege.
In the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Committees argue that the information elicited
by the three (3) questions are necessary in the discharge of their legislative functions, among
them, (a) to consider the three (3) pending Senate Bills, and (b) to curb graft and corruption.
We remain unpersuaded by respondents assertions.
The burden to show this is on the respondent Committees, since they seek to intrude into the
sphere of competence of the President in order to gather information which, according to said
respondents, would aid them in crafting legislation. Clearly, the need for hard facts in
crafting legislation cannot be equated with the compelling or demonstratively critical and
specific need for facts which is so essential to the judicial power to adjudicate actual
controversies.
For sure, a factual basis for situations covered by bills is not critically needed before
legislatives bodies can come up with relevant legislation unlike in the adjudication of cases by
courts of law. Interestingly, during the Oral Argument before this Court, the counsel for
respondent Committees impliedly admitted that the Senate could still come up with
legislations even without petitioner answering the three (3) questions. In other words, the
information being elicited is not so critical after all.
Oversight Function of the Congress
Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be stressed that respondent
Committees need for information in the exercise of this function is not as compelling as in
instances when the purpose of the inquiry is legislative in nature. This is because curbing graft
and corruption is merely an oversight function of Congress. And if this is the primary objective
Page 238

of respondent Committees in asking the three (3) questions covered by privilege, it may even
contradict their claim that their purpose is legislative in nature and not oversight. In any event,
whether or not investigating graft and corruption is a legislative or oversight function of
Congress, respondent Committees investigation cannot transgress bounds set by the
Constitution.
The Office of the Ombudsman is the body properly equipped by the Constitution and our laws
to preliminarily determine whether or not the allegations of anomaly are true and who are
liable therefor.
IV. No
No. There being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of the contempt Order
suffers from constitutional infirmity. The respondent Committees did not comply with the
requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita that the invitations should contain the possible
needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry, along with the usual indication of
the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof. The SC also
find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees violated Section 21 of
Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the duly
published rules of procedure. The respondent Committees issuance of the contempt Order is
arbitrary and precipitate. It must be pointed out that respondent Committees did not first pass
upon the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they curtly
dismissed his explanation as unsatisfactory and simultaneously issued the Order citing him in
contempt and ordering his immediate arrest and detention.
Motion for Reconsideration Denied.
NOTES:
Restrictions on the right to information: (1) national security matters, (2) trade secrets and
banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information. National
security matters include state secrets regarding military and diplomatic matters, as well as
information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements. It was further held that even where there is no need to protect such state secrets,
they must be examined in strict confidence and given scrupulous protection.
V I R G I L L O G A R C I L L A N O V S . H O U S E O F R E E P R E S E N TAT I V E S C O M M I T T E E S O N
PUBLICINFORMATION ET AL, December 23, 2008
Page 239
Congress must have a duly published Rules; otherwise, the

Senate or the House of Representatives could not
investigate in aid of legislation.
Facts:
In 2005, tapes which allegedly contained a conversation between GMA and COMELEC
Commissioner Garcillano surfaced. The said conversation contained a plan to rig the elections
to favor GMA. The recordings then became subject to legislative hearings conducted separately
by each House. In his privilege speech, Sen. Escudero motioned a congressional investigation
jointly conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National
Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped
conversation emerged. Lacsons motion for a senate inquiry was referred to the Committee on
National Defense and Security headed by Biazon. Garci subsequently filed two petitions: One
to prevent the playing of the tapes in the each house for they are alleged to be inadmissible in
violation of RA 4200 or the anti-wire tapping law and the other to prohibit and stop the conduct
of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation for the basic reason that there was no
proper publication of the senate rules, empowering them to make such investigation of the
unlawfully seized documents.
Issue:
Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to empower the senate to further
proceed with their investigation?
Held:
None.
The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative
inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional
requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "the Senate or the House
of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of
publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.Publication
is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which
provides that "laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."
Page 240

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by
arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are
published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the
Senates internet web page.
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the
Senates defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of
procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone
amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any
custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the
internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an
electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary
purposes.In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their
being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.It does not make
the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of
the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be
deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of legislation cannot proceed for the
reason that the rules that they will observe was not properly published as provided by the
Fundamental Law of the land. Such inquiry if allowed without observance of the required
publication will put a persons life, liberty and property at stake without due process of law.
Also, the further assertion of the senate that they already published such rules through their
web page, in observance of the RA 8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act was only viewed by
the court as matter of evidence and still does not conforme with what the constitution
propounded.
In this regard the high court granted the petition for injunction preventing the senate to
conduct such inquiry in aid of legislation.
First petition of Garci denied but the second, granted.
G.R. No. 180308
June 19, 2012
PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION, vs. SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, SENATE
Page 241

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES, HON. SEN. RICHARD GORDON AND HON. SEN. JUAN PONCE
ENRILE,
Facts:
PHILCOMSAT is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications

Corporation (POTC), a government-sequestered organization in which the Republic of the
Philippines holds a 35% interest in shares of stocks. Petitioner PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation
(PHC) is a private corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws and a holding
company whose main operation is collecting the money market interest income of PHILCOMSAT.
For the period from 1986 to 1996, the government, through the PCGG, regularly received cash
dividends from POTC. However, POTC suffered losses in subsequent years. In view of the losses
that the government continued to incur and in order to protect its interests in POTC,
PHILCOMSAT and PHC, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, introduced Proposed Senate
Resolution (PSR) No. 4555 directing the conduct of an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the
anomalous losses incurred by POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC and the mismanagement committed
by their respective board of directors. PSR No. 455 was referred to respondent Committee.
Respondents Senate Committees then submitted the assailed Committee Report No. 312, where
it found overwhelming mismanagement by the PCGG and its nominees over POTC, PHILCOMSAT
and PHC. Committee Report No. 312 recommended, inter alia, the privatization and transfer of
the jurisdiction over the shares of the government in POTC and PHILCOMSAT to the
Privatization Management Office (PMO) under the Department of Finance (DOF) and the
replacement of government nominees as directors of POTC and PHILCOMSAT.
Petitioners filed the instant petition before the Court, questioning, in particular, the haste with
which the respondent Senate approved the challenged Committee Report No. 312.
Issues:
1) whether the respondent Senate committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction in approving Committee Resolution No. 312; and
2) whether it should be nullified, having proposed no piece of legislation and having been
hastily approved by the respondent Senate.
Held:
NO.
The respondents Senate Committees' power of inquiry relative to PSR No. 455 has been passed
upon and upheld in the consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Page 242

Camilo L. Sabio. Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution conferred of the legislative power of
inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this case the respondents Senate Committees,
which must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. The wide
latitude given to Congress with respect to these legislative inquiries has long been settled,
otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 would be rendered pointless.
G.R. NO. 163193, JUNE 15, 2004

SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., ET.AL, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
RESPONDENT.
Facts:
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the COMELEC to
use an automated election system (AES). It also required the COMELEC to acquire automated
counting machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials and adopt new
electoral forms and printing materials.
The COMELEC initially intended to implement the said automation during the May 11, 1998
presidential elections, particularly in counting the votes collected from the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However, the failure of the machines to correctly read a number
of automated ballots discontinued its implementation.
The Supreme Court resolved the COMELEC to maintain the old and manual voting and counting
system for the May 10, 2004 elections after contract negations with companies Mega Pacific
Consortium (the supplier of the computerized voting/counting machines) were discontinued.
Despite this impediment, the COMELEC nevertheless continued the electronic transmission of
advanced unofficial results of the 2004 elections for national, provincial and municipal
positions, also dubbed as an "unofficial quick count."
Petitioner contends that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of Jurisdiction in the issuance of Resolution No. 6712. Petitioners claimed
that the resolution would allow the preemption and usurpation of the exclusive power of
Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and would likewise encroach
upon the authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens accredited arm, to conduct the "unofficial"
quick count as provided under pertinent election laws.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 6712 dated April 28, 2004 issued by the COMELEC in authorizing
the use of election funds in consolidating the election results for the May 10, 2004 elections
should be declared VOID, as it is unconstitutional.
Held:
Yes. The said Resolution No. 6712 preempts the sole authority of the Congress to canvass the
votes of the election returns for the President and the Vice-President.
Page 243

Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered by RA 8436, vest upon Congress the
sole and exclusive authority to officially canvass the votes for the elections of President and
Vice-President. Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and
reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, solely authorize NAMFREL, the duly-accredited
citizens arm to conduct the unofficial counting of votes for the national or local elections.
The quick count under the guise of an unofficial tabulation would not only be preemptive of
the authority of congress and NAMFREL, but would also be lacking constitutional and/or
statutory basis.
The contention of the COMELEC that its tabulation of votes is not prohibited by the
Constitution and Rep. Act No. 8436 as such tabulation is unofficial, is puerile and totally
unacceptable. If the COMELEC is proscribed from conducting an official canvass of the votes
cast for the President and Vice-President, the COMELEC is, with more reason, prohibited from
making an unofficial canvass of said votes.
MANTE
MANZANO
CIR v. CA, CTA & YMCA, 298 SCRA 83.
Facts: YMCA is a non- stock, non- profit institution that conducts various programs and
activities which are beneficial to the public, especially the young people, pursuant to its
religious, educational and charitable objectives. Thus,YMCAdeclared itself as charitable and,
at the same time, educational institution.
In conjunction with its operation,YMCAis, on the other hand, earning revenues

from its leased spaces to other private individuals and parking fees from non- members, among
others.
In 1980, YMCA generated, inter alia, an income of P676,829.80 from rentals of the
leased premises, and P44,259.00 from parking fees on non- members. On July 2, 1984, the CIR
issued an assessment to YMCA.
Issue:Is the income derived from the rentals of real property owned byYMCAestablished
as a welfare, educational and charitable non- profit corporation- subject to income tax under
the National Internal Revenue Code and the Constitution?
HELD:Section 27of theNIRC,viz:
Exemptions from Tax on Corporation.- The following organizations shall not be taxed under
this Title in respect to income received by them as such
xxxxxxxxx
(g) Civic league or organization not organized for profit but operated exclusively for
the promotion of social welfare;
(h) Club organized and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes, not part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any private
stockholder or member.
Page 244
xxxxxxxxx
Notwithstanding the provisions in the preceding paragraphs, the income of whatever kind and
character of the foregoing organizations from any of their properties, real or personal, or from
any of their activities conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income,
shall be subject to the tax imposed under this Code (As amended by P. D. No. 1457).
A reading of said paragraph ineludibly shows that the income from any property of
exempt organization, as well as the arising from any activity it conducts for profit, is taxable.
The phrase any of their activities conducted for profit does not qualify the word
properties. This makes income from the property of the organization taxable, regardless of
how that income is used- whether for profit or for lofty non- profit purposes.
Article VI,Section 28of par. 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides exemption not the
institution itself, but from real estate taxes of all lands, buildings and improvement actually,
directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes.
Neither an exemption be given in light ofArticle XIV,Section 4,par. 3of the

Charter. We reiterate thatYMCAis exempt from the payment of property tax, but not income
tax on the rentals from its property. The bare allegation alone that it is a non- stock, nonprofit educational institution is insufficient to justify its exemption from the payment of the
income tax.
To avail of the exemption,YMCAmust prove by substantial evidence that (1) it falls

under the classification non- stock, non- profit educational institution; and, (2) the income it
seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational
purposes.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744.
Facts: Francisco I. Chavez (Chavez later, for brevity), as tax payer, citizen and former
government official who initiated the prosecution Marcoses anf their cronies who committed
unmitigated plunder of the public treasury, alleges that what impelled him to bring this action
were several news reports bannered in a number of broadsheets sometimes in September
1997,viz:
1) The alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded
accounts in Swiss bank; and,
2) The reported execution of a compromise between the government (through PCGG) and
the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.
Invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the State
to disclose publicly all its transaction involving the national interest, Chavez demands
thatPCGGmake publicly any and all negotiations and agreement pertaining toPCGGs task of
recovering the Marcoses ill- gotten wealth.
ThePCGGinterposes several oppositions for the denial of the reliefs being sought
by Chavez, however, admits forging a compromise with the Marcoses, stipulating, among
others,viz:
Page 245
2. Based on the inventory, the FIRST PARTY shall determine which shall be
ceded to the FIRST PARTY, and which shall be assigned to/retained by the PRIVATE PARTY. The
assets of the PRIVATE PARTY shall be net of, and exempt from, any form of taxes due to the
Republic of the Philippines. xxx.
Issue:Was the said compromise agreement valid?
Held:Legal Restraint on a Marcos- PCGG Compromise:
xxxxxxxxx
Second, PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be
retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the Constitution. The power to tax and
to grant tax exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local
legislative bodies. Section 28(4), Article VI of the Constitution, specifically provides, No law
granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of the Congress. The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax exemption, even
under the cover of its authority to compromise ill- gotten wealth cases.
Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoses from paying taxes
on their properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal protection clause
under the Bill of Rights. Any special grant of tax exemption in favour only of the Marcos heirs
will constitute class legislation. It will also violate constitutional rule that taxation shall be
uniform and equitable.
Neither can the stipulation be construed to fall within the power of the
commissioner of internal revenue to compromise taxes. Such authority may be exercised only
when (1) there is reasonable doubt as to the validity of the claim against the taxpayer, and (2)
the taxpayers financial position demonstrates a clear inability to pay. xxx. Nor can the PCGG
grant of tax exemption fall within the power of the commissioner to abate or cancel a tax
liability. This power can be exercised only when (1) the tax appears to be unjustly or
excessively assessed, or (2) the administration and collection costs involved do not justify the
collection of the tax due.
LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES v. QUEZON CITY & THE CITY ASSESSOR, 433 SCRA 119
Facts: Lung Center of the Philippines(LCPlater, for brevity)is a non- stock, non- profit
entity, established by virtue of P. D. No. 1823. It stood in Lot No. PR- 3- B- 34- 1- B- 1, SWO 04000495, registered in its name, measuring 121, 463 sq. mtrs., and situated in Quezon City. A
wide portion of the said hospital at the ground floor is being leased to private parties and being
utilized as canteen, small store spaces, offices of some professionals, medical clinics, and the
like.
LCPcontends as a charitable institution being committed to provide free medical

services to indigent patients, and must thus be exempted from real property taxes. It
reinforces its claim by saying that it is being subsidized by the government. And, such character
shall not lose by mere fact of collecting fees from the paying patients.
Page 246

Issues: Whether the LCP is a charitable institution; and, (2)Whether the real properties of
the LCP are exempt from real property taxes.
Held:1) We hold that the LCP is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions.xxxxxxxxx
2) Even as we find that the petitioner is a charitable institution, we hold, anent the
second issue, that those portions of its real property that are leased to private entities are not
exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for
charitable purposes.
In order to be entitled to the exemption, the real property is ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY
and EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes. Exclusive is defined as possessed and enjoyed to
the exclusive of others; debarred from participation and enjoyment; and exclusively is
defined in a manner to exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively. If real property is used for
one or more commercial purposes, it is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is
subject to taxation. The words dominant use or principal use cannot be substituted for the
words used exclusively without doing violence to the constitution and the law. Solely is
synonymous withexclusively.
What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for charitable
purposes is the direct and immediate and actual application of the property itself to the
purpose for which the charitable institution is organized. It is not the use of the income from
the real property that is determinative of whether the property is used for tax exempt
purposes.
Accordingly, we hold that the portions of the land leased to private entities as well
as those parts of the hospital leased to private individuals are not exempt from such taxes. On
the other hand, the portions of the land occupied by the hospital and portions of the hospital
used for its patients, whether paying or non- paying, are exempt from real property taxes.
EXEC. SECRETARY, et. al. v. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC, et. al., GR No. 164171; GR
No. 164172; GR No. 168741 (482 SCRA 673).
Facts:On December 12, 2002, Pres. GMA, through Exec. Sec. Alberto G. Romulo, issued EO
156 entitled Providing for a Comprehensive Industrial Policy and Directions for the Motor
Vehicle Development Program and its Implementing Guidelines, that provides, among
others,viz:
3.1 The importation into the country, inclusive of the Freeport, of all types of used
motor vehicles is prohibited, except for the following:
xxxxxxxxx
The above- cited Order is being bombarded with suits for declaratory reliefs from
Subic- based used vehicles importers and traders, among those is herein Southwing Heavy
Industries, Inc., before the RTC of Olongapo City, unanimously seeking, inter alia, for the
nullity/invalidity thereof for being transgressing to the constitution.
Page 247

Issues:(1) Whether there is statutory basis for the issuance of EO 156; (2) If the answer is in
the affirmative, whether Section 3.1 of EO 156 is reasonable and within the scope provided by
law.
Held:The main thrust of the petition is that EO 156 is constitutional because it was issued
pursuant to EO 226, the Omnibus Investment Code of the Philippines and that its application
should be extended to the Freeport because the guarantee of R.A. 7227 on the free flow of
goods into the said zone is merely an exemption from customs duties and taxes on items
brought into the Freeport and not an open floodgate for all kinds of goods and materials
without restriction.
Concomitantly, the prohibition on the importation of used motor vehicles is an

exercise of police power, which is vested on the legislature. Absent any enabling law, the
exercise thereof by the President through an executive issuance, is void. Such delegation
confers upon the President quasi- legislative power which may defined as the authority
delegated by the law- making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations
intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative policy. To be valid, an
administrative issuance, such as an executive order, must comply with the following requisites:
1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;

2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and,
4) It must be reasonable.
EO 156 actually satisfied the first requisite of a valid administrative order. xxx.
There are thus explicit constitutional and statutory permission authorizing the President to ban
or regulate importation of articles and commodities into the country.
xxxxxxxxx.
With respect to the third and fourth issues, an examination of the nature of a
Freeport under R.A. 7227 and the primordial purpose of the importation ban under the
questioned EO is necessary.
R.A. 7227 was enacted providing for, among other things, the sound and balanced
conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservation and their extensions into alternative
productive uses in the form of Special Economic and Freeport Zone, or the Subic Bay Freeport,
in order to promote the economic and social development of Central Luzon in particular and
the country in general.
The Freeport was designed to ensure free flow or movement of goods and capital
within a portion of the Philippine territory in order to attract investors to invest their capital in
a business climate with the least governmental intervention.
With minimum interference from the government, investors can, in general, engaged
in any business as well as import and export any article into and out of the Freeport. These are
among the rights accorded to Subic Bay Freeport Enterprises under Section 39, Rules and
Regulation Implementing R.A. 7227.
In given discussions, we hold that the importation ban runs afoul the third requisite
for a valid administrative order. To be valid, an administrative issuance must not be ultra
Page 248

vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It must not supplant or modify the
Constitution, its enabling statute and other existing laws for such is the sole function of the
legislature which the other branches of the government cannot usurp.
In the instant case, the subject matter of the laws authorizing the President to
regulate or forbid importation of used motor vehicles, is the domestic industry. EO 156,
however, exceeded the scope of its application by extending the prohibition on the importation
of used cars to the Freeport, which R.A. 7227, considers to some extent, a foreign territory.
The proscription in the importation of used motor vehicles should be operative only
outside the Freeport and the inclusion of said zone within the ambit of the prohibition is an
invalid modification of R.A. 7227.
This brings us to the fourth requisite. It is an axiom in administrative law that

administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules
and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adopted
to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purpose for which
they were authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid.
SEN. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, et. al. v. EXEC. SEC. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., et. al., 252
SCRA 695
Facts: On April 18, 1993, House Representative Antonio Abaya filed HB No. 8817, entitled
An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be
known as the City of Santiago. After public hearings on the said bill were conducted, the same
was passed by the House of Representatives on Second Reading, and was approved on Third
Reading on December 17, 1993. Then, it was transmitted to the Senate.
However, prior to the transmission of the said HB No. 8817 to the Senate on January
18, 1994, Sen. Vicente Sotto III previously filed before the Senate SB No. 1243, entitled An Act
Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as
the City of Santiago. Public hearings were also conducted by the Senate Committee on Local
Government on SB No. 1243. Later, the Senate Committee on Local Government submitted
Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817 approving the same without amendment considering
that HB No. 8817 was all fours with SB No. 1243.
Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on Second Reading and was
approved on Third Reading, with amendment proposed by the Senate which, on the other hand,
the House of Representatives approved the same.
The enrolled bill was signed by the Chief Executive as R.A. No. 7720.
Issue:In the enactment of RA No. 7720, was there a compliance with Section 24, Article VI
of theConstitution?
Held: Although a bill of local application like BH No. 8817 should be constitutional
prescription, originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners
that R.A. No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the Houseof Representatives because a bill
of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be
denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was
Page 249

filed in the Senate. xxx. HB No. 8817 was the bill that initiated the legislative process that
culminated in the enactment of R.A. No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the
1987 Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant controversy.
xxx. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the
bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local
application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not
act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
JOKER P. ARROYO, et. al., v. JOSE DE VENECIA, et. al., G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997.
Facts: A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing

provisions of the House and Senate versions of the approved bill, which originated in the House
of Representatives as HB No. 7198.
During the session on November 21, 1996, a number of representatives delivered

sponsorship speech, after interpellation. During Rep. Rogelio Sarmientos turn, he was
interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. After the head count, it
turned out that there was really a quorum.
The transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives,
as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996, showed the
factual accounts thereof,viz:
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference committee
report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza).Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO.What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza).There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the
question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for approval of
the report, and the Chair called for the motion.
MR. ARROYO.Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza).The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza).The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO.Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four oclock, Wednesday, next week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza).The session is adjourned until four oclock, Wednesday, next
week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
The bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having
been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21,
1996.The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Page 250

Issue: Whether or not the House rules were violated that would render the enactment of
R.A. No. 8240 nulland void
Held: The Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of
discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240.
First.It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated
in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather
than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law,i.e.,Art. VI, 26-27. Petitioners
do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation
of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence
of a quorum.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the
courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed
to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a
constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun, it was
held: At any rate, courts have declared that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.And
it has been said that Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance,
the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
(taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief
Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules
of proceedings.He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to
waived or disregarded by the legislative body.Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have
agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this
qualification.Where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members
of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its
validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO v. THE SECRETARY OF FINCNE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE, 235 SCRA 630.
Facts: A HB No. 11197, seeking to amend certain provisions of NIR pertaining to Value
Added- Tax (VAT) was instituted before the House of Representatives, entitled:
An Act Restructuring the Value Added Tax System to widen its Tax Base and Enhance its
Administration, amending for these purposes Sections 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107,
108 and 110 of Title IV, 112, 115 and 116 of Title V, and 236, 237 and 238 of Title IX, and
Repealing Sections 113 and 114 of Title V, all of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended.
Page 251

After the same was considered on the second reading, it was approved by the House
of Representatives after the third reading.
After the HB No. 11197 was transmitted to the Senate, the latter came up with
another version and recommended the approval of SB No. 1630, entitled:
An Act Restructuring the Value Added Tax System to widen its Tax Base and Enhance its
Administration, amending for these purposes Sections 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108 and
110 of Title IV, 112 of Title V, and 236, 237 and 238 of Title IX, and Repealing Sections 113, 114
and 116 of Title V, all of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and for other
purposes.
After considering the HB No. 11197 and SB No. 1630, the conference committee
ended up with the endorsement of another/third version of the bill, entitled:
An Act Restructuring the Value Added Tax System, Widening its Tax Base and Enhancing its
Administration and for these Purposes Amending and Repealing the Relevant Provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as Amended and for Other Purposes.
The enrolled bill was then presented to the President of the Philippines, and became
R.A. No. 7716.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. No. 7716 is void for it did not exclusively originate from the
House ofRepresentatives.
Held: To begin with, it is not the law- but the revenue bill- which is required by the
Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. It is important to
emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in
the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. xxx. At this point, what is
important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To
insist that a revenue statute- and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law- must substantially be the same as the House bill
would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to
propose amendments. It would be to violate the equality of legislative power of the two
houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO v. THE SECRETARY OF FINCNE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, 249 SCRA 630.
Held: (On Motion for Reconsideration). While Article VI, Section 24 provides that all
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills must originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, it
also adds, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. In the exercise of this
power, the Senate may propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure. As petitioner
Tolentino states in a high school text, a committee to which a bill is referred may do any of the
following: (1) to endorse the bill without changes; (2) to make changes in the bill omitting or
adding sections or altering its language; (3) to make and endorse an entirely new bill as a
substitute, in which case it will be known as a committee bill; or, (4) to make no report at all.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST OFFICERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA and ED VINCENT S. ALBANO v.
EXEC. SEC. ERMITA, et. al., 469 SCRA 1.
Page 252
Facts:
Article VII Executive Department
C. Prohibitions
Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary (194 SCRA 317)
FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the President
allowing cabinet members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of
the executive department to hold 2 positions in the government and government corporations
and to receive additional compensation. They find it unconstitutional against the provision
provided by Section 13, Article VII prohibiting the President, Cabinet members and their
deputies to hold any other office or employment. Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states
that Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their
subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor General, the said Executive
Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated unless otherwise allowed by
law which is construed to be an exemption from that stipulated on Article VII, section 13, such
as in the case of the Vice President who is constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet
member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
ISSUE: Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an exemption to Article VII, Section 13 of the
constitution.
RULING: The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both Constitutional
provisions is to prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the government
for self enrichment which a betrayal of public trust. Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay
down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees,
while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the
Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. Thus the phrase unless
otherwise provided by the Constitution in Section 13, Article VII cannot be construed as a
broad exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to the legislative intent of both
constitutional provisions. Such phrase is only limited to and strictly applies only to particular
instances of allowing the VP to become a cabinet member and theSecretary of Justice as exofficio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The court thereby declared E.O 284 as null and
void.
National Amnesty Commission vs. COA 437 SCRA 655
Petitioner National AmnestyCommission(NAC) is a government agency created on March 25,

1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to
receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is composed of seven members: a
Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice,
National Defense and Interior and Local Government asex officiomembers.
It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the threeex
officio members turned over said responsibility to their representatives who were
paid honoraria beginning December 12, 1994. However, on October 15, 1997, NAC resident
auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment ofhonoraria to these representatives
amounting to P255,750 for the period December 12, 1994 to June 27, 1997, pursuant to COA
Memorandum No. 97-038.
Page 253

Issue: Whether representatives can be entitled to payment intended for ex-officio members
Ruling:
We hold that the position of petitioner NAC is against the law and jurisprudence. The COA is
correct that there is no legal basis to grantper diem, honorariaor any allowance whatsoever
to the NACex officiomembers' official representatives.
In Civil Liberties Union, we elucidated on the two constitutional prohibitions against holding
multiple positions in the government and receiving double compensation: (1) the blanket
prohibition of paragraph 2, Section 7, Article IX-B on all government employees against holding
multiple government offices, unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of their
positions, and (2) the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII on the President and his
official family from holding any other office, profession, business or financial interest, whether
government or private, unless allowed by the Constitution.
The NAC ex officio members representatives who were all appointive officials with ranks
below Assistant Secretary are covered by the two constitutional prohibitions.
First, the NACex officiomembers representatives are not exempt from the general prohibition
because there is no law or administrative order creating a new office or position and
authorizing additional compensationtherefor.
Bitoniovs.COA 425 SCRA 437 G.R. No. 147392
Facts: In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of the
Bureau of Labor Relations in the DOLE. In a Letter dated May 11, 1995, Acting Secretary Jose S.
Brilliantes of the DOLE designated the petitioner to be the DOLE representative to the Board of
Directors of PEZA. in pursuance to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7916, otherwise known as the
Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA,
the petitioner was receiving aper diemfor every board meeting he attended during the years
1995 to 1997.
After a post audit of the PEZAs disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the payment
ofper diemsto the petitioner.
The uniform reason for the disallowance was stated in the Notices, as follows:
Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants holding other offices in addition to their
primary office and to receive compensation therefore was declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court in the Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary. Disallowance is in pursuance
to COA Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997 implementing Senate Committee
Report No. 509
Hence, this petition.
Issue: whether or not the COA correctly disallowed theper diemsreceived by the petitioner
for his
attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors meetings as representative of the Secretary of
Labor.
Ruling: We rule in the affirmative.

The COA anchors the disallowance ofper diemsin the case ofCivil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretarywhere the Court declared Executive Order No. 284 allowing government officials to
hold multiple positions in government, unconstitutional. Thus, Cabinet Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, and their Assistant Secretaries, are prohibited to hold other government
offices or positions in addition to their primary positions and to receive compensation therefor,
except in cases where the Constitution expressly provides It must be noted that the petitioners
presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as representative of the
Secretary of Labor. As the petitioner himself admitted, there was no separate or special
appointment for such position. Since the Secretary of Labor is
Page 254

prohibited from receiving compensation for his additional office or employment, such
prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the
Secretary
of Labor.
InDela Cruz v. Commission on Audit., it was held that
"The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it
follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his
services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered
by the compensation attached to his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the
Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof,
he is actually and in legal contemplation performing the primary function of his principal office
in defining policy in monetary banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his
department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra
compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or
some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation
is prohibited by the Constitution."
Similarly in the case at bar, we cannot allow the petitioner who sat as representative of the
Secretary of Labor in the PEZA Board to have a better right than his principal. As the
representative of the Secretary of Labor, the petitioner sat in the Board in the same capacity as
his principal. Whatever laws and rules the member in the Board is covered, so is the
representative; and whatever prohibitions or restrictions the member is subjected, the
representative is, likewise, not exempted. Thus, his position as Director IV of the DOLE which
the petitioner claims is not covered by the constitutional prohibition set by theCivil Liberties
Unioncase is of no moment. The petitioner attended the board meetings by the authority given
to him by the Secretary of Labor to sit as his representative. If it were not for such designation,
the petitioner would not have been in the Board at all.
Public Interest v. Elma 494 SCRA 53 (2006)G.R. No. 138965June 30, 2006
*concurrent appointments, incompatible office

Nature: CPM + TRO to declare null and void the concurrent appointments of ELMA as PCGG
Chair and as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel
Facts: Elma was appointed as PCGG Chair Oct 1998. Later on he was appointed as CPLC (Jan
1999 during his term), but waived any remuneration that he may receive as CPLC.
Supervening events: Theres actually no more controversy involved: In 2001, Elma was replaced
by Sabio as PCGG. Nachura was then appointed as CPLC but pending resolution of the case, he
was appointed SOLGEN.
Arguments: Public Interest Center

CLU vs. Exec Sec: Art IX-B, Sec 7, par2 and Art VII, Sec13 are violated by concurrent
appointmentsCPLC and PCGG Chair are incompatible offices.
Arguments: Elma
As interpreted in CLU vs. Exec Sec, the mentioned consti provisions dont cover other public
officials given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary. His appointment
falls
under
the
exceptions
in
Art
IX-B,
Section
7
The 2 positions are not incompatible.
Page 255

NOTE: even if issue already moot, SC still took cognizance of the case because the case is
capable of repetition, and to serve as a guide to the bench.(Symbolic or Teaching Function of
Judicial Review)
Issue 1: whether such appointments violate the other constitutional provision regarding
multiple offices, Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
NOif based on position.

YESif based on primary functions test.
The strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to
the PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an
assistant secretary, even if the former may have the same rank as the latter positions.
CLU vs. Exec Sec: The language of Section 13, Article VII is a definite and unequivocal negation
of the privilege of holding multiple offices or employment.The Court cautiously allowed only
two exceptions to the rule against multiple offices:
(1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the
Vice President to become a member of the Cabinet; or
(2) posts occupied by the Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of said officials office. The Court further qualified that additional duties
must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the officials primary functions.
Moreover, the additional post must be exercised in an ex-officio capacity, which denotes an
act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other
appointment or authority than that conferred by the office.[18] Thus, it will not suffice that
no additional compensation shall be received by virtue of the second appointment, it is
mandatory that the second post is required by the primary functions of the first appointment
and is exercised in an ex-officio capacity.
*Even Section 13, Article VII does not sanction this dual appointment. Appointment to the
position of PCGG Chairman is not required by the primary functions of the CPLC, and vice
versa.
In sum, the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply to
respondent Elma since neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a Cabinet secretary,
undersecretary, or assistant secretary. Even if this Court assumes, arguendo, that Section 13,
Article VII is applicable to respondent Elma, he still could not be appointed concurrently to the
offices of the PCGG Chairman and CPLC because neither office was occupied by him in an exofficio capacity, and the primary functions of one office do not require an appointment to the
other post. Moreover, even if the appointments in question are not covered by Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, said appointments are still prohibited under Section 7,
Article IX-B, which covers all appointive and elective officials, due to the incompatibility
between the primary functions of the offices of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC.
Issue 2: whether the position of the PCGG Chairman or that of the CPLC falls under the
prohibition against multiple offices imposed by Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution.
YES.
The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices was laid out
in People v. Green[13] - whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one
office has the right to interfere with the other.
Page 256
[I]ncompatibility between two offices, is an inconsistency in the functions of the two; x x x

Where one office is not subordinate to the other, nor the relations of the one to the other such
as are inconsistent and repugnant, there is not that incompatibility from which the law
declares that the acceptance of the one is the vacation of the other. The force of the word, in
its application to this matter is, that from the nature and relations to each other, of the two
places, they ought not to be held by the same person, from the contrariety and antagonism
which would result in the attempt by one person to faithfully and impartially discharge the
duties of one, toward the incumbent of the other. x x x The offices must subordinate, one
[over] the other, and they must, per se, have the right to interfere, one with the other, before
they are incompatible at common law. x x x
***In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the
CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the
actions of the heads of various executive departments and agencies and to review
investigations involving heads of executive departments and agencies, as well as other
Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency under the Executive
Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the CPLC.
*note: Memorandum Order No. 152, issued on 9 July 2004 (provides that CPLC review Decision
on investigation involving Cabinet Secretaries, agency heads, or Presidential appointees with
the rank of Secretary conducted by the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC)
Public Interest v. Elma 517 SCRA 336 (March 5, 2007)G.R. No.138965
Facts:
Elma sought - the reconsideration of the Decision in the case ofPublic Interest Center, Inc., et
al. v.MagdangalB. Elma, et al.(G.R. No. 138965), promulgated on 30 June 2006.
In its Decision, the Court declared that the concurrent appointments of the respondent as
PCGG Chairman and CPLC were unconstitutional. It ruled that the concurrent appointment to
these offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, since
these are incompatible offices. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and
impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive departments and
agencies and reviewing investigations involving heads of executive departments. Since the
actions of the PCGG Chairman, a head of an executive agency, are subject to the review of the
CPLC, such appointments would be incompatible.
The Court also decreed that the strict prohibition under Section 13 Article VII of the
1987 Constitution wouldnotapply to the present case, since neither the PCGG Chairman nor
the CPLC is a secretary, undersecretary, or assistant secretary. However, had the
rule thereunder been applicable to the case, the defect of these two incompatible offices
would be made more glaring. The said section allows the concurrent holding of positions only
when the second post is required by the primary functions of the first appointment and is
e x e r c i s e d i n a n e x - o f f i c i o c a p a c i t y. A l t h o u g h r e s p o n d e n t E l m a w a i v e d
receiving renumeration for the second appointment, the primary functions of the PCGG
Chairman do not require his appointment as CPLC.
Issue: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration be granted.
Ruling: DENIED
Page 257

After reviewing the arguments propounded in respondents Omnibus Motions, we find that the
basic issues that were raised have already been passed upon. No substantial arguments were
presented.Thus, the Court denies the respondents motion for reconsideration.
In response to the respondents request for clarification, the Court ruled that
respondent Elmas concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional,
for being incompatible offices.This ruling does not render both appointments void.Following
the common-law rule on incompatibility of offices, respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated his
first office as PCGG Chairman when he accepted the second office as CPLC.
There also is no merit in the respondents motion to refer the case to the Courten
banc. What is in question in the present case is the constitutionality of respondent Elmas
concurrent appointments, and not the constitutionality of any treaty, law or agreement.
[2]The mere application of constitutional provisions does not require the case to be heard and
decideden banc. Contrary to the allegations of the respondent, the decision of the Court in
this case does not modify the ruling inCivil LibertiesUnionv. Executive Secretary. It should
also be noted that Section 3 of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated7 February 1989clearly
provides that the Courten bancis not an Appellate Court to which decisions or resolutions of a
Division may be appealed.
D. Succession
Estrada vs. Desierto
Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President
while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President.
In the heat of people power , At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath
to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family
hurriedly left Malacanang Palace.29 He issued the following press statement:
"20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as
President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our
country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of
unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this
country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave
the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our
people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of
our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged
the powers the duties of the Presidency On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator
Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice President.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent
Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo claims she is the President..
Page 258

Issue: 1. Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner
Estrada is a
President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President
Rule: Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements
are beyond
quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to
form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
Using this totality test,we hold that petitionerresigned as President.In sum, we hold that
the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving
Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oathtaking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality;
(2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability
and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he
expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was
referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that
he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our
country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His
presidency is
now in the part tense. It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a
temporary leave dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel
and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:
"Sir.
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting
this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation
of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting president.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery. The pleadings filed by the petitioner
in the cases at bar did not discuss, may even intimate, the circumstances that led to its
preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances
during the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value,
was never referred to by the petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not
the slightest hint of its existence
when he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in
his press release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of
government to
respondent Arroyo for the time bearing. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious
letter cannot
negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the
petitioner
clearly as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press released, still, it commands
scant legal
Page 259

significance. Petitioner's resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing
caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his reputation by the
people.
Issue 2: Was Estrada merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the
presidency, and hence is a President on leave?
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the
inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant
submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine
whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in
section 11 of article VII. Considering the operative facts:
1. Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate
President and Speaker of the House;
2. Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20,
2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;
3. Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House
Resolution No. 175
4. Also, House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 176 stating that expressed
its support to the assumption into office by Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines,
5. Further, bills were already sent by the Congress to the Office of GMA as president.
6. Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition
from any sector of government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his
inability to govern is only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have
recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the
premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada. Is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly
rejected petitioner's claim of inability. In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not
resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he
is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the
decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
Borja v. COMELEC 295 SCRA 157 September 3, 1998

* In case of temporary disability
Facts: Jose Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term
ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the
death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a
term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor
for another term of three years ending June 30, 1998.
Jose Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998
elections. Benjamin Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos
disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three
consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term
after that.
COMELEC ruled in favor of petitioner and declared Capco disqualified from running for
reelection as mayor of Pateros. On motion, the COMELEC en banc reversed the decision and
declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. It ruled that Capcos succession into office is not
Page 260

counted as one term for purposes of the computation of the three term limitation under the
Constitution and Local Government Code.
Capco was voted for in the elections.He received 16,558 votes against petitioners 7,773 votes
and was proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
Issue: WON Capco is eligible to run for mayor
Held: Yes
Ratio: Purpose of the three term rule: First, to prevent the establishment of political
dynasties is not the only policy embodied in the constitutional provision in question. The other
policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the people. To consider, therefore, only
stay in office regardless of how the official concerned came to that office whether by
election or by succession by operation of law would be to disregard one of the purposes of the
constitutional provision in question.
Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution reveals that
the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the
freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political
power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that
after serving three consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for
local and legislative officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner
Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the
succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term. Monsod warned
against prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose as a result of the
proposed
absolute disqualification, considering that the draft constitution provision
recognizing peoples power.
Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission. The first is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the
accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea
ofelection, derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose those whom they
wish to govern them be preserved.
It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so
on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of reelection.
Indeed, a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people should be allowed
to choose whom they please to govern them. To bar the election of a local official because he
has already served three terms, although the first as a result of succession by operation of law
rather than election, would therefore be to violate this principle.
Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the
COMELEC that Art. X, 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as
a result of election. The first sentence speaks of the term of office ofelectivelocal officials
and bars such official[s] from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second
sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his full
term of office, states that voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the fullterm for which he
was elected. The term served must therefore be one for which [the official concerned] was
elected. The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the
number of terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for
which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds,
such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term now withstanding his
voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
Page 261

Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas comment on Art. VI, 7, which similarly bars
members of the House of Representatives from serving for more than three terms.
Commissioner Bernas states that if one is elected Representative to serve the unexpired term
of another, that unexpired term, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the
purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed. This is actually based on the
opinion expressed by Commissioner Davide: Yes, because we speak of term and if there is a
special election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion of that particular term plus one
more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower House.
There is a difference, however, between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the
House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is
removed from office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. On the
other hand, the Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. In a real sense, therefore, such
Representative serves a term for which he was elected. As the purpose of the constitutional
provision is to limit the right ot be elected and to serve in Congress, his service of the
unexpired term is rightly counted as his first term. Rather than refute what we believe to be
the intendment of Art. X, 8 with regard to elective local officials, the case of a Representative
who succeeds another confirms the theory.
Petitioner also cites Art. VII, 4 of the Constitution which provides for succession of the VicePresident to the Presidency in case of vacancy in that office. This provision says that No
person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be
qualified for election to the same office at any time. Petitioner contends that, by analogy,
the vice-mayor should likewise be considered to have served a full term as mayor if he
succeeds to the latters office and serves for the remainder of the term.
The framers of the Constitution included such a provision because, without it, the VicePresident, who simply steps into the Presidency by succession would be qualified to run for
President even if he has occupied that office for more than four years. The absence of a
similar provision in Art. X, 8 on elective local officials throws in bold relief the difference
between the two cases. It underscores the constitutional intent to cover only the terms of
office to which one may have beenelectedfor purpose of the three-term limit on local
elective officials, disregarding for this purpose service by automaticsuccession.
There is another reason why the Vice-President who succeeds to the Presidency and serves
in that office for more than four years is ineligible for election as President. The VicePresident is elected primarily to succeed the President in the event of the latters death,
permanent disability, removal or resignation. While he may be appointed to the cabinet,
his becoming so is entirely dependent on the good graces of the President. In running for
Vice-President, he may thus be said to also seek the Presidency. For their part, the
electors likewise choose as Vice-President the candidate who they think can fill the
Presidency in the event it becomes vacant. Hence, service in the presidency for more than
four years may rightly be considered as service for a full term.
This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under the local Government Code, he is the
presiding officer of the Sanggunian and he appoints all officials and employees of such local
assembly. He has distinct powers and functions, succession to mayorship in the event of
vacancy therein being only one of them. It cannot be said of him, as much as of the VicePresident in the event of a vacancy in the Presidency, that in running for vice-mayor, he also
seeks the mayorship. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of vacancy is more a
matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the
application of any term limit.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to theright to
be electedas well asthe right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not
enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he
Page 262

must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.
MUNEZ
OMELIO
EFFECTS OF PARDON
CRISTOBAL v. LABRADOR
71 PHIL 34 (1940)
FACTS: On March 15, 1930, the CH found respondent Santos guilty of the crime of estafa and
sentenced him to 6 months of arresto mayor and the accessories provided by law, to return to
the offended parties the amounts of P375 and P125 respectively, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. On appeal, the judgment Of conviction was
affirmed and the respondent was accordingly confined in the provincial jail from March 14,
1932 to Aug. 18, 1932. Notwithstanding his conviction, respondent continued to be a registered
elector and was, for the period comprised between 19~4 and 1937, seated as the municipal
president of Malabon, Rizal.
On Aug. 22, 1938, CA 357 (Election Code) was approved by the National Assembly, Sec.
94 of which disqualifies the respondent from voting for having been "declared by final
judgment guilty of any crime against property." The respondent forthwith applied to the
president for an absolute pardon. On Dec. 24, 1939, the Chief Executive granted the petition
restoring the respondent to his "full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the
right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to positions
which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property responsibility."
On Nov. 16, 1940, petitioner Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of respondent
Santos from the list of voters, citing Sec. 94 of CA 357. The CFI denied the petition. Hence, this
petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the lower court sustaining the right of
respondent to remain in the list of registered voters.
ISSUE: Whether or not the pardon granted by the President restores the respondent to the full
enjoyment of his political rights.
HELD: An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities
resulting from the conviction. While the pardon extended to respondent is conditioned in the
sense that "he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in
nature involving no money or property responsibility," it is absolute insofar as it "restores the
respondent to full civil and political rights."
1.
Under Section 11(6), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, there are two
limitations upon the exercise of this Constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, to wit:
(a) that the power be exercised after conviction; and, (b) that such power does not extend to
cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Court, the pardoning power
cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign
authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted.
2.
The disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no basis
for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law
imposes upon those who violate its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities,
and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of
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imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes an that is left of the consequences of
conviction.
FELOBELLO v. PALATINO
72 PHIL 441 (1941)
FACTS: Petitioner Pelobello instituted quo warranto proceedings in the CFI against respondent
Palatino, the mayorelect of Torrijos, Marinduque. He alleged that the respondent, having been
criminally convicted by final judgment in 1912 and sentenced to imprisonment, was
disqualified from voting and being voted upon for the contested municipal office, such
disqualification not having been removed by plenary pardon granted by the President on Dec.
25,1940. From the records, it is admitted that the respondent committed the offense more
than 25 years ago; that he had already been merited conditional pardon from the Gov. General
in 1915; that thereafter he had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor for the
period 19181921; was elected municipal president of Torrijos three times in succession
(19221931) and finally elected mayor in the 1940 local elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute pardon had the effect of removing the disqualification
incident to criminal conviction under Sec. 94 of Election Code, the pardon having been granted
after the election but before the date fixed by law for assuming office.
HELD: We adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal v. Labrador that subject to the
limitations imposed by the constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled
by the legislative action; that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but
removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction; and that when granted after the term of
imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of
conviction.
Under the existing circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him
absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will; and
the pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned above and before the date fixed in the
Election Code for assuming office. We see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a
restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief Executive. We,
therefore, give efficacy to executive action and disregard what at bottom is a teclu'lical
objection
LACUNA v. ABES
24 SCRA 780 (1968)
FACTS: Respondent Abes had been convicted of the crime of counterfeiting treasury warrants
and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 1 day to 8 years, 8 months and 1 day
of prision mayor. After he had partially served his sentence, he was released from confinement
on 7 April 1959 by virtue of conditional pardon granted by the president, remitting only the
unexpired portion of the prison term and fine. Without the pardon, his maximum sentence
would have been served on 13 Oct. 1961.
In view of the forthcoming 1967 elections,
respondent applied for registration as a voter but the Election Registration Board denied his
application. The denial notwithstanding, he filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of
mavor and won the election. Petitioner Lacuna placed second.
Petitioner filed his petition for quo warranto with application for preliminary
injunction, challenging the eligibility of the respondent to the position of mayor to which he
was duly proclaimed elected. On the same day when hearing was held for the application for
preliminary injunction, the President granted to respondent an absolute and unconditional
pardon and restored him "full civil and political rights." Thereafter the lower court dismissed
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the petition and declared the eligibility of mayorelect Abes to his position. Petitioner
appealed.
In this present petition, petitioner raised the following arguments: (1) That the
restoration to him of his civil and political rights by the presidential plenary pardon on Dec.
7,1967 did not retroact to remove the disqualification existing anterior to the grant of the
pardon; and, (2) That by reason of his conviction and nonregistration as avoter, Abes was not a
qualified voter at the time of the election, and was therefore ineligible to the position of
mayor under Sec. 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code. On the other hand, respondent
contended that the absolute pardon blotted out all the consequences of his conviction,
including his disqualification.
ISSUE: Whether or not a plenary pardon, granted after election but before the date fixed by
law for assuming office, had the effect of removing the disqualification prescribed by both the
criminal and electoral codes.
HELD: We conclude that the pardon granted to respondent Abes has removed his
disqualification, and his election and assumption of office must be sustained.
1. The new rule consistently adopted in this jurisdiction is that the pardon's effect
should not be necessarily limited as it would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power,
which was not contemplated in the constitution. "We adopt the broad view in Cristobal v.
Labrador that subject to the limitations imposed by the constitution, the pardoning power not
only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from conviction; and
that when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all
that is left of the consequences of conviction.xxx We are of the opinion that the better view fii
the light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair
the power of the Chief Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at
liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving completely the party or
parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction (Felobello
v. Palatino).
2. Petitioner emphasizes the nonregistration of Abes as a voter in order to differentiate
the case at bar from Pelobello case. The fact stressed does not, however, make the case
dissimilar because registration as a voter is not a qualification for a candidate or a voter, within
the meaning of "qualified voter" in Sec. 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code; it is merely a
step towards voting. Moreover, the nonregistration of Abes as a voter was predicated upon the
same disqualifying effects of his previous conviction that were blotted out by the plenary
pardon.
MONSANTO v. FACTORAN
170 SCRA 190 (1989)
FACTS: On March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Mosanto (then assistant
treasurer) and 3 other accused, of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents and sentenced them to imprisonment of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision
correccional as minimum, to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum. On appeal, her
conviction was affirmed by this court. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but pending
said motion, she was extended by the President absolute pardon which she accepted. By
reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the city treasurer requesting that she be restored to
her former post since the same was still vacant. In a resolution, the Ministry of Finance ruled
that petitioner may be reinstated to her former position without the necessity of a new
appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. It also directed
the city treasurer to see to it that the amount of P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbavan had
Page 265

required to be indemnified in favor of the government be satisfied. In her motion for
reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner stressed that the full pardon bestowed on
her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never been
interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her
preventive suspension; and that she is entitled to back pay for the entire period of her
suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the sum of P4,892.50.
The Office of the President, to which the petitioner's letter was referred for further
review, adopted the resolution of Sandiganbavan and held that petitioner is not entitled to an
automatic reinstatement on the basis of her absolute pardon but must secure an appointment
to her former position and that she is liable for the civil liability concomitant to her previous
conviction. In this present petition, petitioner contended that the general rules on pardon
cannot apply to her case because she was extended executive clemency while her conviction
was still pending appeal. Without that final judgment of conviction, the accessory penalty of
forfeiture of office did not attach and the status of her employment remained suspended.
According to her, when pardon was issued before the final verdict of guilt, it was an acquittal
because there was no offense to speak of. In effect, the Pres. declared her not guilty.
ISSUE: Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new
appointment.
HELD: The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from
holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as asst.
treasurer, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
1. While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so
that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the
offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or
remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the
crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain It involves forgiveness
and not forgetfulness.
While we are prepared to concede that pardon may remit all the penal consequences
of a criminal indictment if ordy to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential
prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the
fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he
should be treated as if he were innocent.
2. The rationale is plainly evident. Public officers are intended primarily for the
collective protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot be compromised to
favor private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that
the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A
pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing
appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable
by reason of the pardoned conviction.
3. The 1981 amendments to the 1973 constitution had deleted the earlier rule that
clemency could be extended only upon final conviction, implying that clemency could be given
even before conviction. Thus, petitioner's unconditional pardon was granted even as her appeal
was pending in the High Court. It is worth mentioning that under the 1987 constitution, the
former limitation of final conviction was restored. But be that as it may, it is our view that in
the present case, it is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after
conviction, for the result would still be the same. Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is
deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan
assumed the character of finality.
Page 266

4. A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the
past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon
the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. This would
explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost
earnings and benefits.
SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS OF CONDITIONAL PARDON

TORRES v. GONZALES
152 SCRA 272 (1987)
FACTS: Sometime before the 1979, petitioner was convicted of the crime of estafa (two
counts), and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term from 11 years, 10 months and 22 days
to 38 years, 9 months and 1 day. These convictions were affirmed by the CA. On April 19, 1939,
a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President on condition that
petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this
condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law.
"Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement.
On March 22, 1982, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President
the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. On September 8, 1986,
the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner who was accordingly arrested
and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Claiming that he
has been deprived of his rights under the due process clause of the Constitution since he was
not given an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison and
that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final
judgment of the 2 counts of estafa nor the crime of sedition, petitioner files this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before
the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his
conditional pardon.
HELD: No, a conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is not necessary before the
petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his
conditional pardon. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of
a conditional pardon are purely executive acts and which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
DOES PARDONING POWER APPLY TO ADMINISTRATIVE CASES?

LLAMAS v. EXEC. SEC.
202 SCRA 844 (1991)
FACTS: Sometime in 1989, petitioner Llamas, the incumbent Vice Governor of Tarlac, filed with
the Department of Local Government verified complaint against the respondent Governor
Campo for alleged violation of some provisions of BP 337 (Local Government Code). Prior to
that, he had instituted with the office of the Ombudsman a verified complaint against the same
respondent for alleged violation of RA 3019 (AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act). After that,
the DLG Secretary imposed the penalty of suspension for a period of 90 days upon the
respondent upon his finding that the latter is guilty of serious neglect of duty and/or abuse of
authority for entering into a loan contract with the Lingkod Tarlac Foundation grossly
Page 267

manifestly disadvantageous to Tarlac province. Respondent's appeal was dismissed by
respondent ExSecretary Orbos. Pursuant to Sec. 66, Chapter 4 of BP 337, petitioner, on March
1, 1991 took his oath of office as Acting Governor. Respondent Governor accepted his
suspension and turned over his office to petitioner. However, on March 9, 1991, respondent
issued an "administrative order" in which he signified his intention to continue in office in view
of the pendency of his motion for reconsideration of the DLG's decision. Without ruling on the
repondent's motion for reconsideration, respondent Orbos granted Executive Clemency in favor
of respondent governor in the sense that the latter's 90day suspension was reduced to the
period alreadv served. ' Thereupon, respondent Governor reassumed the governorship of the
province, allegedly without any notification made to the petitioner. Petitioner questioned that
grant of executive clemency on the ground that executive clemency could be granted by the
president only in criminal case as there is nothing in the statute books or even in the
constitution which allows the grant thereof in administrative cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not the president has the power to grant executive clemency in
administrative cases.
HELD: It is the court's considered view that if the president can grant reprieves, commutation,
and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal case, with much more reason can she
grant executive clemency in administrative cases which are clearly less serious than criminal
offenses.
1. Applying the doctrine Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos," we
cannot sustain petitioner's view. In other words, if the law does not distinguish, so we must not
distinguish. The constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may
be exercised by the president, with the sole exception of impeachment cases. By the same
token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would be indeed
unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article
VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of
impeachment are automatically excluded in as much as the same do not necessarily involve
criminal offenses.
2. A number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize or support the exercise of
executive clemency in administrative cases. Under Section 43 of PD 807, "in meritorious cases,
the president may commute or remove administrative penalties or disabilities issued upon
officers and employees, in disciplinary cases, subject to such terms and conditions as he may
impose in the interest of service. "
3. In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof
beyond reasonable doubt, but the constitution grants to the President the power to pardon the
act done by the proved criminal and in the process exempts him from the punishment therefor.
On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is a mere
substantial evidence to support the decision, not to mention that as to the admissibility of
evidence, administrative bodies are not bound by technical and rigid rules of admissibility
prescribed in criminal cases. It will be unjust and unfair for those found guilty administratively
of some charge if the same effects of pardon or executive clemency cannot be extended to
them, even in the case of modifying a decision to sub serve the interest of the public.
WHO MAY AVAIL OF AMNESTY?
PEOPLE vs. PATRIARCA
341 SCRA 164 (2000)
Page 268

FACTS: Accused, member of the New Peoples Army, was convicted of murder and sentence to
reclusion perpetua He appealed to the Supreme Court. While his appeal was pending, he
applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 347 of March 25, 1992. His application was
favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board.
ISSUE: What happens to his appeal?
HELD: The approval of his application for amnesty serves to put an end to his appeal. Amnesty
commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses.
Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks
and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty
stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. The conviction of
accused is therefore reversed, and he is acquitted of the crime of murder.
POWERS OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
LANSANG v. GARCIA
42 SCRA 448 (1971)
FACTS: On August 21, 1971, while the Liberal Party was holding a public meeting at Plaza
Miranda, Manila, 2 hand grenades were thrown. As a consequence, 8 persons died and
numerous persons were seriously injured. On August 23, the President of the Philippines
announced the issuance of Proclamation No. 889 suspending the writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioners assail the validity of Proclamation No. 889.
ISSUE: Whether or not Proclamation No. 889 is unconstitutional.
HELD: The SC has the authority (under the 1973 Constitution) to inquire into the existence of
a factual basis for the issuance of a presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of determining the constitutional sufficiency thereof.
Far from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is
circumscribed, confined and restructed, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions
essential to its existence, but also as regards the time when and the place where it may be
exercised. The requisite for a valid suspension is outlined in Sec. 10 of Art. VII of the 1935
Constitution. The President declared in Proclamation No. 889, as amended, that both
conditions are present. Upon the basis of the evidence presented, the court rules on the
validity of Proclamation No. 889.
Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying the system of Government
of the Philippines, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of
powers, under the Constitution, is NOT ABSOLUTE. It goes hand in hand with the system of
checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the
privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law
(Constitution), and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the
Judiciary Department, which, in this aspect is in turn constitutionally supreme. In the exercise
of such authority, the function of the Judiciary is merely to check, NOT to supplant the
Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act.
GARCIA v. ENRILE
Page 269

121 SCRA 472 (1983)
FACTS: This was a petition for habeas corpus and mandamus filed in behalf of 14 detainees.
The 14 had been under surveillance for sometime as members of the CPP. Nine (9) were
arrested on July 6, 1982 while holding a meeting in the residence of one of them, Aurora
Porong, in Nueva Ecija. Taken during the said were materials said to be subversive documents,
detailing how the group would infiltrate youth and student organizations. Also found were a .38
caliber revolver, live bullets and several rounds of ammunitions and P18,650 cash. Four (4)
were arrested the following day, July 7,1982, while one of them was arrested on July 15.
The petition for habeas corpus alleged that the arrest of the detainees was illegal on
ground that it was affected without a warrant and that their detention was likewise illegal
because no criminal charges had been filed against them within the period provided by law. In
their return, the respondents alleged that shortly after the arrest of the detainees, Presidential
Commitment Orders (PCO) were issued against them and it was by virtue of these orders that
the detainees were being held in custody. The SC denied the petition.
HELD: We hold that upon the issuance of PCO against the petitioners, the continued detention
is rendered valid and legal, and their right to be released over after the filing of charges
against them in court, to depend on the President, who may order the release of a detainee or
his being placed under house arrest, as he has done in meritorious cases.
1. The function of the PCO is to validate, on constitutional ground, the detention of a
person for any of the offenses covered by Proclamation No. 2045 which continues in force the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, if the arrest has been made initially
without any warrant. Its legal effect is to render the writ unavailing as a means of judicially
inquiring into the legality of the detention in view of the suspension of the privilege of the
writ. The grant of power to suspend the said privilege provides the basis for continuing with
perfect legality the detention as long as the invasion/ rebellion has not been repelled or
quelled, and the need therefore in the interest of public safety continues.
The significance of the conferment of this power, constitutionally upon the President as
Commanderinchief, is that the exercise thereof is not subject to judicial inquiry, with a view to
determining its legality in the light of bill of rights guarantee to individual freedom. This must
be so because the suspension of the privilege is a military measure the necessity of which the
President alone may determine as an incident of his grave responsibility as the
Commanderinchief of the Armed Forces, of protecting not only public safety but the very life of
the State, the government and duly constituted authorities.
2. From the clear language of Lansang vs. Garcia (42 SCRA 488), "the function of the
court is merely to checknot to supplant the executive or to ascertain merely whether he has
gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in
him or to determine the wisdom of his act." If, however, the constitutional right to bail is
granted to herein petitioners by the court, thus the procedure laid down under Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court what inevitably results is the supplanting of the decision of the President to
detain pursuant to Proclamation No. 2045, of person's who come under its coverage.
3. What has been said above shows the need of reexamining the Lansang case with a
view to reverting to the ruling of Barcelon vs. Baker (5 Phil 87) and Montenegro vs. Castaeda
(91Phil 882), that the President's decision to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
is "final and conclusive upon the courts, and all other persons." This wellsettled ruling was
diluted in the Lansang case which declared that the "function of the court is merely to check
not to supplant
the Executive, or ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine
the wisdom of his act." Judicial interference was thus held permissible, and the test laid down
therein is not whether the President acted correctly but whether he acted arbitrarily.
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This would seem to be pure semanticism. If we consider that with particular reference
to the nature of the actions the President would take on the occasion of the grave emergency
he has to deal with, which partakes of military measures, the judiciary can, with becoming
modesty, ill afford to assume the authority to check or reverse or supplant the presidential
actions. On these occasions, the President takes absolute command, for the very life of the
nation and its government, which, incidentally, includes the courts, is in grave peril. In so
doing, the President is answerable only to his conscience, the people and to God. For their
part, in giving him the supreme mandate as their President, the people can only trust and pray
that, giving him their own loyalty with utmost patriotism, the President will not fail them.
CASE DIGESTS
f. Power and Function of the President
MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
Facts:
Before the Court is a controversy of grave national importance. While ostensibly only legal
issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would undeniably have a profound effect
on the political, economic and other aspects of national life.
This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the
respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. to issue a travel documents to former Pres.
Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the
President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of
the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically
Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of
abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor
the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
Issue:
The issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by
the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Held:
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the
laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers
inherent in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it.
Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the
powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the
execution of any provision of law,e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations
on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally
considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President
cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In
other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated
Page 271

The Power Involved
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the
protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are
essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty
words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in
directing implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any
decision as President of the Republic, the President has to consider these principles, among
other things, and adhere to them.
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good
against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's
residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the
President, as steward of the people.
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the
peace. RossiterThe American Presidency].The power of the President to keep the peace is not
limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to
leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not
only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending
to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in
times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in
fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want
of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President
commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the
President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces,
or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to
keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.
That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcose's from returning
has been recognized by members of the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution
proposed in the House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members urging the
President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish gesture for
true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to
uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our laws." [House
Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.1 The Resolution does not question the President's power to
bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's sense of
compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his country.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to
return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional
provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions,
or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the
present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual
unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty
residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request
or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President
to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases
for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the
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Marcoses to the Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or
acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.
It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will cause the
escalation of violence against the State, that would be the time for the President to step in
and exercise the commander-in-chief powers granted her by the Constitution to suppress or
stamp out such violence. The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from
taking preemptive action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are
perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the people is the essence of the
duty of government. The preservation of the State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is
an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the
Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.
OPLE vs TORRES
Facts:
Petitioner Ople prays that invalidation of Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional
grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
Issue:
Whether or not Administrative Order No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and
hence, beyond the power of the President to issue.
Held:
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. The
executive power is vested in the Presidents. It is generally defined as the power to enforce
and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance
.
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the
government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees
of his department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This
means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department,
bureau and office or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of
control, the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the
maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over
bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs.It enables the President to fix a uniform standard
of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can
issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
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Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated
in administrative orders.
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code
of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference
System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies
the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by
government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that
the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of thought.
As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenryvisa-visthe State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to
make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a
subject that should be covered by law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is not a law because it confers
no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a
citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the
people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this
identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight
that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his
privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no
duty cannot stand.
KMU vs DIRECTOR GENERAL
FACTS:
In April 13, 2005, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order 420 requiring all
government agencies and government-owned corporations to streamline and harmonize their
Identification Systems. The purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to
reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability and ensure compatibility and provide
convenience to the people served by government entities.
Petitioners allege that EO420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative
functions by the executive branch of the government. Furthermore, they allege that EO420
infringes on the citizens rights to privacy.
ISSUE: IS EO420 a valid exercise of executive power?
Held:
A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either of two
ways. First, the heads of these existing government entities can enter into a memorandum of
agreement making their systems uniform.If the government entities can individually adopt a
format for their own ID pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws, they can also
adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID format, especially if the uniform format will result in
substantial savings, greater efficiency, and optimum compatibility. This is purely an
administrative matter, and does not involve the exercise of legislative power.
Page 274

Second, the President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities
under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format.Section 17,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all
executive departments, bureaus and offices. The same Section also mandates the President
to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all government
entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data
collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and
convenience to the public. The Presidents constitutional power of control is self-executing
and does not need any implementing legislation.
Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government
and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions.Thus,
EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also
authorized to issue voters ID cards.This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national
ID system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all
branches of government.
The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed. There are several laws mandating government entities to reduce costs, increase
efficiency, and in general, improve public services. The adoption of a uniform ID data
collection and format under EO 420 is designed to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in
general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing EO 420, the President is simply performing
the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO
420, the President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed
existing laws.EO 420 reduces costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and
user-friendliness in the implementation of current ID systems of government entities under
existing laws.Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation.
Difference in AO 308 re: Ople vs Torres:
EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards
pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws.
EO 420 does not grant such
government entities any power that they do not already possess under existing laws.
In
contrast, the assailed executive issuance in Ople v. Torres sought to establish a National
Computerized Identification Reference System,[19] a national ID system that did not exist
prior to the assailed executive issuance.
Obviously, a national ID card system requires
legislation because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system where
none existed before.
In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but makes the existing
sectoral card systems of government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more
efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the public.
Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of
executive issuance under the Presidents constitutional power of control over government
entities in the Executive department, as well as under the Presidents constitutional duty to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
REVIEW CENTER vs ERMITA
Page 275
Facts:
There was a report that handwritten copies of two sets of 2006 Nursing Board examination
were circulated duringthe examination period among examinees reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz
Review Center and Inress Review Center.The examinees were provided with a list of 500
questions and answers in two of the examinations five subjects, particularly Tests III
(Psychiatric Nursing) and V (Medical-Surgical Nursing). The PRC later admitted the leakageand
traced it to two Board of Nursing members. Exam results came out but Court of Appeals
restrained the PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful examinees.
Subsequently, President GMA ordered for a re-examination and issued EO 566 which authorized
the CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and similar
entities in the Philippines.
On 3 November 2006, the CHED, through its then Chairman Carlito S. Puno (Chairman Puno),
approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49, series of 2006 (IRR).
In a letter dated 24 November 2006, the Review Center Association of the Philippines
(petitioner), an organization of independent review centers, asked the CHED to amend, if not
withdraw the IRR arguing, among other things, that giving permits to operate a review center
to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will
effectively abolish independent review centers.
On 26 October 2007, petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this Court
praying for the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional, and the prohibition
against CHED from implementing the same.
Issue/s:
1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as it
expands the CHEDs jurisdiction; and
2.Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executives rule-making power.

Held:
The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHEDs coverage under RA 7722. The
CHEDs coverage under RA 7722 is limited topublic and private institutions of higher education
and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary educational
institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review
centers and similar entities.
The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows that it refers to one which offers a
program or course of study that is intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or
competencies and skills of reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in preparation for
the licensure examinations given by the PRC. It also covers the operation or conduct of
review classes or courses provided by individuals whether for a fee or not in preparation for the
licensure examinations given by the PRC.
A review center is not an institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722. It does

not offer a degree-granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED. A
review course is only intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and
skills of reviewees. A reviewee is not even required to enroll in a review center or to take a
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review course prior to taking an examination given by the PRC.Even if a reviewee enrolls in a
review center, attendance in a review course is not mandatory.The reviewee is not required to
attend each review class.He is not required to take or pass an examination, and neither is he
given a grade. He is also not required to submit any thesis or dissertation. Thus, programs
given by review centers could not be considered programs x x x of higher learning that would
put them under the jurisdiction of the CHED.
Further, the similar entities in EO 566 cover centers providing review or tutorial services
in areas not covered by licensure examinations given by the PRC, which include, although not
limited to, college entrance examinations, Civil Services examinations, and tutorial
services.These review and tutorial services hardly qualify as programs of higher learning.
The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the
CHED under RA 7722. Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal
them,] and this power is vested with the Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution
Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the
promulgation of rules and regulations. The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power
within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. The RIRR covers review centers and
similar entities which are neither institutions of higher education nor institutions offering
degree-granting programs.
Hence, both the EO 566 and RIRR are unconstitutional.

ANGELES vs GAITE
Facts
Petitioner was given custody of her grand niece, Maria Mercedes Vistan, to take care and
provide for as she grew up. Petitioner became attached to such child and took care of her as
her own. Petitioner also gave the same attention to the half-brother of the grand niece. The
latter would seek petitioners financial support ranging from daily subsistence to
hospitalization expenses.
After one incident wherein the half-brother of the grand niece, Michael Vistan, failed to do an
important task, the petitioner and the Michael Vistan had a falling out. Since no more support
was given to the latter, he took his half-sister away. He brought her to different provinces while
asked the help of certain individuals to mislead the petitioner and the police. The police was
able to apprehend Michael Vistan through a dragnet operation.
The petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for five counts of Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA
7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act, and for four counts of Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of
PD 1829. She likewise filed a complaint for Libel against Maria Cristina Vistan, aunt of Michael
and Maria Mercedes.
The Investigating prosecutor issued a resolution to continue with the filing of the case. This
was however denied by the provincial prosecutor who also issued a decision to dismiss the
case. Petitioner filed a petition for review with USEC. Teehankee but was denied. Petitioner
then filed a petition for review with SEC Perez and was also denied
Page 277
She tried appealing to the Office of the President but was dismissed by such on the ground of
Memorandum Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for review of decisions/orders/
resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua or death
Petitioner went to the CA which sustained the dismissal
Petitioner contends that such Memo Circular was unconstitutional since it diminishes the power
of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer,
almost unfettered power.
Issue:
W/N Memorandum Circular No. 58 is unconstitutional since it diminishes the power of the
President?
Held:
No. it does not diminish the power of the President
The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said
Memorandum Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency,
long been established in our jurisdiction.
Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive;
and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through
the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed
and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by
the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive."The CA cannot be deemed
to have committed any error in upholding the Office of the President's reliance on the
Memorandum Circular as it merely interpreted and applied the law as it should be.
Memorandum Circular No. 58, promulgated by the Office of the President on June 30, 1993
reads:
In the interest of the speedy administration of justice, the guidelines enunciated in
Memorandum Circular No. 1266 (4 November 1983) on the review by the Office of the President
of resolutions/orders/decisions issued by the Secretary of Justice concerning preliminary
investigations of criminal cases are reiterated and clarified.
No appeal from or petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of
Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the
President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death x x x.
Henceforth, if an appeal or petition for review does not clearly fall within the jurisdiction of
the Office of the President, as set forth in the immediately preceding paragraph, it shall be
dismissed outright x x x.
Page 278
It is quite evident from the foregoing that the President himself set the limits of his power to
review decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order to expedite the
disposition of cases. Petitioner's argument that the Memorandum Circular unduly expands the
power of the Secretary of Justice to the extent of rendering even the Chief Executive helpless
to rectify whatever errors or abuses the former may commit in the exercise of his discretion is
purely speculative to say the least. Petitioner cannot second- guess the President's power and
the President's own judgment to delegate whatever it is he deems necessary to delegate in
order to achieve proper and speedy administration of justice, especially that such delegation is
upon a cabinet secretary his own alter ego.
BUT THERE ARE LIMITATIONS:
These restrictions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our fundamental law. There
are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised,
would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of
executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The
declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the
pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall
within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the
constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing
that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.
In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the Decision of the Secretary of Justice
dealing with the preliminary investigation of cases cannot be considered as falling within the
same exceptional class which cannot be delegated. Besides, the President has not fully
abdicated his power of control as Memorandum Circular No. 58 allows an appeal if the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher. Certainly, it would be unreasonable to
impose upon the President the task of reviewing all preliminary investigations decided by the
Secretary of Justice. To do so will unduly hamper the other important duties of the President
by having to scrutinize each and every decision of the Secretary of Justice notwithstanding the
latters expertise in said matter.
The Constitutional interpretation of the petitioner would negate the very existence of cabinet
positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would
unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running the government.
BUKLOD vs ZAMORA
Facts:
During the time of President Corazon Aquino, she created the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to primarily conduct anti-smuggling operations in areas outside the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In the year 2000, President Estrada issued an order
deactivating the EIIB. He subsequently ordered the employees of EIIB to be separated from the
service. Thereafter, he created thru EO 196 the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force
Aduana, which EIIB employees claim to be essentially the same as EIIB. The employees of
EIIB, through the Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, invoked the Supreme Courts power of judicial
review in questioning the said orders. EIIB employees maintained that the president has no
Page 279

power to abolish a public office, as that is a power solely lodged in the legislature; and that
the abolition violates their constitutional right to security of tenure.
Issue:
WON the president has the power to abolish such public office.
Held:
Yes.
An examination of the pertinent Executive Orders shows that the deactivation of EIIB and the
creation of Task Force Aduana were done in good faith.It was not for the purpose of removing
the EIIB employees, but to achieve the ultimate purpose of E.O. No. 191, which is
economy.While Task Force Aduana was created to take the place of EIIB, its creation does not
entail expense to the government.
Firstly,there is no employment of new personnel to man the Task Force. E.O. No. 196 provides
that the technical, administrative and special staffs of EIIB are to be composed of people who
are already in the public service, they being employees of other existing agencies. Their
tenure with the Task Force would only be temporary, i.e., only when the agency where they
belong is called upon to assist the Task Force. Since their employment with the Task force is
only by way of detail or assignment, they retain their employment with the existing
agencies. And should the need for them cease, they would be sent back to the agency
concerned.
Secondly, the thrust of E.O. No. 196 is to have a small group of military men under the direct
control and supervision of the President as base of the governments anti-smuggling
campaign. Such a smaller base has the necessary powers 1) to enlist the assistance of any
department, bureau, or office and to use their respective personnel, facilities and resources;
and 2) to select and recruit personnel from within the PSG and ISAFP forassignment to the
Task Force. Obviously, the idea is to encourage the utilization of personnel, facilities and
resources of the already existing departments, agencies, bureaus, etc., instead of maintaining
an independent office with a whole set of personnel and facilities. The EIIB had proven itself
burdensome for the government because it maintained separate offices in every region in the
Philippines.
And thirdly, it is evident from the yearly budget appropriation of the government that the
creation of the Task Force Aduana was especially intended to lessen EIIBs expenses.
While basically, the functions of the EIIB have devolved upon the Task Force Aduana, we find
the latter to have additional new powers.The Task Force Aduana, being composed of elements
from the Presidential Security Group (PSG) and Intelligence Service Armed Forces of the
Philippines (ISAFP),[36] has the essential power to effect searches, seizures and arrests. The
EIIB did not have this power. The Task Force Aduana has the power to enlist the assistance of
any department, bureau, office, or instrumentality of the government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations; and to use their personnel, facilities and resources. Again,
the EIIB did not have this power. And, the Task Force Aduana has the additional authority to
conduct investigation of cases involving ill-gotten wealth. This was not expressly granted to
the EIIB.
Page 280

Consequently, it cannot be said that there is a feigned reorganization. In Blaquera v. Civil
Sevice Commission,we ruled that a reorganization in good faith is one designed to trim the fat
off the bureaucracy and institute economy and greater efficiency in its operation.
Lastly, we hold that petitioners right to security of tenure is not violated. Nothing is better
settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate
body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity.Valid abolition of offices is neither removal
nor separation of the incumbents.
Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office.Except constitutional offices
which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have
any vested right in an office or its salary.
Page 281
SECRETARY vs MABALOT
Facts:
The Sec. of DOTC issued to LTFRB Chairman Memorandum Order No. 96-735, transferring the
regional functions of that office to DOTCCAR Regional Office, pending creation of a Regional
LTFRO. Later, the new Sec. of DOTC issued Department Order No. 97-1025, establishing the
DOTCCAR Regional Office as the Regional Office of the LTFRB to exercise regional functions of
the LTFRB in the CAR subject to the direct supervision and control of the LTFRB Central Office.
Mabalot protested.
Issue:
W/N the MO and DO are violative of the provision of the Constitution against encroachment on
the powers of the
legislative department
Held:
SC upheld the validity of the issuance of the challenged orders.
In the absence of any patent or latent constitutional or statutory infirmity attending the
issuance of the challenged orders, Court upholds. The President, through his duly constituted
political agent and alter ego, may legally and validly decree the reorganization of the
Department, particularly the establishment of the DOTCCAR as the LTFRB Regional Office of
CAR with the concomitant transfer and performance of public functions and responsibilities
appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.
There are three modes of establishing an administrative body: (1) Constitution; (2) Statute; and
(3) by authority of law. This case falls under the third category.
The DOTC Secretary, as alter ego of the President, is authorized by law to create and establish
the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office. This is anchored on the Presidents power of control under
sec. 17, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution.
By definition, control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what
a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former for that of the latter. It includes the authority to order the doing of an act by a
subordinate or to undo such act or to assume a power directly vested in him by law.
Under sec. 20, Bk. III, E.O. 292, the Chief Executive is granted residual powers, stating that
unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and
functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws xxx
What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is PD 1772 which amended PD 1416. These
decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize
the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and
agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and
activities and to standardize salaries and materials.
Granted that the President has the power to reorganize, was the reorganization of DOTCCAR
valid?
Page 282

In this jurisdiction, reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. As a
general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or
to make bureaucracy more efficient. The reorganization in the instant case was decreed in
the interest of service and for purposes of economy and more effective coOrdination of the
DOTC functions in the Cordillera Administrative Region. It thus bear the earmarks of good
faith.
DENR vs DENR EMPLOYEES
Facts:
On November 15, 1999, Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources for Region XII, Israel C. Gaddi, issued a Memorandum directing the
immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal (formerly
Marbel), South Cotabato.The Memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Administrative Order
No. 99-14, issued by then DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles.
Respondents, employees of the DENR Region XII who are members of the employees
association, COURAGE, represented by their Acting President, Baguindanai A. Karim, filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato, a petition for nullity of orders with prayer for
preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether DAO-99-14 and the Memorandum implementing the same were valid; and Whetherthe
DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR.
Held:
The DAO and Memorandum are valid. The acts of the DENR Secretary are likewise valid.
It isaproposto reiterate the elementary doctrine of qualified political agency, thus:
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the
various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in
cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated
in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Article VII,
Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices.He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
However, as head of the Executive Department, the President cannot be expected to exercise
his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the time. He may delegate some of his
powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person
or the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally.
Page 283
Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the President to reorganize the
National Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet members exercising control over
a particular executive department. Thus, in DOTC Secretary v. Mabalot, we held that the
President through his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary may
legally and validly decree the reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment
of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB Regional Office at the Cordillera Administrative Region, with the
concomitant transfer and performance of public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a
regional office of the LTFRB.
Similarly, in the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering
the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South
Cotabato.The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to
be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.
In Chiongbian v. Orbos, this Court stressed the rule that the power of the President to
reorganize the administrative regions carries with it the power to determine the regional
centers. In identifying the regional centers, the President purposely intended the effective
delivery of the field services of government agencies.[23] The same intention can be gleaned
from the preamble of the assailed DAO-99-14 which the DENR sought to achieve, that is, to
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the DENR in delivering its services.
It may be true that the transfer of the offices may not be timely considering that: (1) there are
no buildings yet to house the regional offices in Koronadal, (2) the transfer falls on the month
of Ramadan, (3) the children of the affected employees are already enrolled in schools in
Cotabato City, (4) the Regional Development Council was not consulted, and (5) the
Sangguniang Panglungsond, through a resolution, requested the DENR Secretary to reconsider
the orders.However, these concern issues addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than
to its legality. It is basic in our form of government that the judiciary cannot inquire into the
wisdom or expediency of the acts of the executive or the legislative department, for each
department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority not only
to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other department, but
also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures
taken or decisions made by the other departments.
CONSTANTINO vs CUISA
Facts:
During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a scheme to reduce the countrys
external debt.
The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring programs were sought
to initiate the program for foreign debts they are basically buyback programs & bondconversion programs. Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of his minor children who are
Filipino citizens, together w/ Freedom from Debt Coalition averred that the buyback and bondconversion schemes are onerous and they do not constitute the loan contract or guarantee
contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the Constitution.
And assuming that the President has such power unlike other powers which may be validly
delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the
Constitution in the person of the President.
Page 284

They argue that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation
requires that the President alone must exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of
prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the Constitutionthe Monetary Board
reinforces the submission that not respondents but the President alone and personally can
validly bind the country.
Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the scheme.
Issue: Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt power to the respondents.
(Governor of BSP)
Held:
Petitioners position is negated both by explicit constitutionaland legalimprimaturs, as well as
the doctrine of qualified political agency.
The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the
President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of
establishing and executing a strategy for managing the governments debt is deep within the
realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required
amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt
management goals.
If, as petitioners would have it, the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the
foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough to
focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activitiesthe propriety of incurring/guaranteeing
loans, studying and choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this end,
meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence
of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more
often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the documents. This sort of
constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the
respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the
Presidents effectivity in running the government.
Necessity thus gave birth to the doctrine of qualified political agency, later adopted in
Villena v. Secretary of the Interiorfrom American jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, there are powers vested in the President by the Constitution which may not be
delegated to or exercised by an agent oralter ego of the President. Justice Laurel, in
hisponenciainVillena, makes this clear:
Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible under the
circumstances, it should be observed that there are certain acts which, by their very nature,
cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are certain
constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be
exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise
of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (PAR. 3, SEC. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by
him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem).[58]
Page 285

These distinctions hold true to this day. There are certain presidential powers which arise
out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of
fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over
those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power
notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special
class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested
power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power
in question is of similargravitasand exceptional import.
We cannot conclude that the power of the President to contract or guarantee foreign debts
falls within the same exceptional class. Indubitably, the decision to contract or guarantee
foreign debts is of vital public interest, but only akin to any contractual obligation undertaken
by the sovereign, which arises not from any extraordinary incident, but from the established
functions of governance.
Another important qualification must be made. The Secretary of Finance or any

designated alter ego of the President is bound to secure the latters prior consent to or
subsequent ratification of his acts. In the matter of contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans,
the repudiation by the President of the very acts performed in this regard by thealter egowill
definitely have binding effect. Had petitioners herein succeeded in demonstrating that the
President actually withheld approval and/or repudiated the Financing Program, there could be
a cause of action to nullify the acts of respondents. Notably though, petitioners do not assert
that respondents pursued the Program without prior authorization of the President or that the
terms of the contract were agreed upon without the Presidents authorization.Congruent with
the avowed preference of then President Aquino to honor and restructure existing foreign
debts, the lack of showing that she countermanded the acts of respondents leads us to
conclude that said acts carried presidential approval.
With constitutional parameters already established, we may also note, as a source of

suppletory guidance, the provisions of R.A. No. 245. The afore-quoted Section 1 thereof
empowers the Secretary of Finance with the approval of the President and after consultationof
the Monetary Board, to borrow from time to time on the credit of the Republic of the
Philippines such sum or sums as in his judgment may be necessary, and to issue therefor
evidences of indebtedness of the Philippine Government. Ineluctably then, while the
President wields the borrowing power it is the Secretary of Finance who normally carries out its
thrusts.
It bears emphasis that apart from the Constitution, there is also a relevant statute, R.A. No.
245, that establishes the parameters by which thealter egomay act in behalf of the President
with respect to the borrowing power. This law expressly provides that the Secretary of Finance
may enter into foreign borrowing contracts. This law neither amends nor goes contrary to the
Constitution but merely implements the subject provision in a manner consistent with the
structure of the Executive Department and thealter egodoctine. In this regard, respondents
have declared that they have followed the restrictions provided under R.A. No. 245, which
include the requisite presidential authorization and which, in the absence of proof and even
allegation to the contrary, should be regarded in a fashion congruent with the presumption of
regularity bestowed on acts done by public officials.
Moreover, in praying that the acts of the respondents, especially that of the Secretary of
Finance, be nullified as being in violation of a restrictive constitutional interpretation,
Page 286

petitioners in effect would have this Court declare R.A. No. 245 unconstitutional. Wewill
not strikedown a law or provisions thereof without so much as a direct attack thereon when
simple and logical statutory construction would suffice.
RUFINO V. ENDRIGA, July 21, 2006

Article VII, Section 16
Presidential Decree No. 15 (PD 15) created the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP)
for the primary purpose of propagating arts and culture in the Philippines. PD 15
increased the members of CCP's Board from seven to nine trustees. Later, Executive
Order No. 1058, increased further the trustees to 11.
Eventually, during the term of Ramos, the CCP Board included the Endriga Group
Estrada appointed seven new trustees to the CCP Board for a term of four years to
replace the Endriga group as well as two other incumbent trustees. The Rufino group
took their oaths of office and assumed the performance of their duties.
the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto questioning Estrada's appointment
of seven new members to the CCP Board. They claimed that it is only when the CCP
Board is entirely vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such vacancies,
acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP.
o The clear and categorical language of Section 6(b) of PD 15 states that
vacancies in the CCP Board shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining
trustees. Should only one trustee survive, the vacancies shall be filled by the
surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP.
Should the Board become entirely vacant, the vacancies shall be filled by
the President of the Philippines acting in consultation with the same ranking
officers of the CCP. Thus, the remaining trustees, whether one or more, elect
their fellow trustees for a fixed four-year term. On the other hand, Section
6(c) of PD 15 does not allow trustees to reelect fellow trustees for more than
two consecutive terms.
o The Endriga group asserted that when former President Estrada appointed the
Rufino group, only one seat was vacant due to the expiration of Maosa's term.
The CCP Board then had 10 incumbent trustees. They maintained that under
the CCP Charter, the trustees' fixed four-year term could only be terminated
"by reason of resignation, incapacity, death, or other cause." Presidential
action was neither necessary nor justified since the CCP Board then still had
10 incumbent trustees who had the statutory power to fill by election any
vacancy in the Board.
o The Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was under the supervision
and control of the President. The Endriga group cited Section 3 of PD 15, which
states that the CCP "shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x x."
Rufino Group: that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the power to appoint
officers lower in rank than the trustees of the Board. Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing
the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees should be declared unconstitutional
being repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allowing the
appointment only of "officers lower in rank" than the appointing power.
CA: Endriga group entitled to the office.
Issue: w/n Section 6(b) of PD 15 is unconstitutional considering that:
A. [it] is an invalid delegation of the President's appointing power under the Constitution;
B. [it] effectively deprives the President of his constitutional power of control and supervision
over the CCP
Held: UNCONSTITIONAL
Page 287

POWER TO APPOINT
The source of the President's power to appoint, as well as the Legislature's authority to
delegate the power to appoint, is found in Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which provides: the President shall nominate and, with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested
in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.The President shall have the power
to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. (Emphasis
supplied)
The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except in those instances
when the Constitution provides otherwise. Usurpation of this fundamentally Executive
power by the Legislative and Judicial branches violates the system of separation of
powers that inheres in our democratic republican government.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three
groups of officers.
1. heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the
Constitution. ! w/ the Commission of Appointments consent
2. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. ! consent
not required
3. all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided by law. ! consent not required
appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the
appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department,
agency, commission, or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional.
Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found unconstitutional, the
President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board because the
trustees fall under the third group of officers.
o * there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress
may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards.
The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards
is a matter of legislative grace. Congress has the discretion to grant to, or withhold
from, the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards the power to appoint lowerranked officers. If it so grants, Congress may impose certain conditions for the exercise
of such legislative delegation, like requiring the recommendation of subordinate
officers or the concurrence of the other members of the commission or board.
This is in contrast to the President's power to appoint which is a self-executing
power vested by the Constitution itself and thus not subject to legislative limitations
or conditions.28 The power to appoint conferred directly by the Constitution on the
Supreme Court en banc29 and on the Constitutional Commissions30 is also self-executing
and not subject to legislative limitations or conditions.
Page 288

-
The framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly intended that Congress could by law vest
the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. these inferior or lower in rank officers are the subordinates
of the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards who are vested by
law with the power to appoint. The express language of the Constitution and the
clear intent of its framers point to only one conclusion the officers whom the heads
of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards may appoint must be of lower rank
than those vested by law with the power to appoint.
Also, the power to appoint can only be vested in the HEADS of the named offices. The
word "heads" refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not to their
members, for several reasons:
o a plain reading of the last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 16, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution shows that the word "heads" refers to all the
offices succeeding that term, namely, the departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. This plain reading is consistent with other related
provisions of the Constitution.
o agencies, like departments, have no collegial governing bodies but have only
chief executives or heads of agencies. Thus, the word "heads" applies to
agencies. Any other interpretation is untenable.
o all commissions or boards have chief executives who are their heads. Since the
Constitution speaks of "heads" of offices, and all commissions or boards have
chief executives or heads, the word "heads" could only refer to the chief
executives or heads of the commissions or boards.
o the counterpart provisions of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions uniformly refer to "heads" of offices. The 1935
Constitution limited the grant of the appointment power only to "heads of
departments."32 The 1973 Constitution expanded such grant to other officers,
namely, "members of the Cabinet, x x x, courts, heads of agencies,
commissions, and boards x x x."33 If the 1973 Constitution intended to extend
the grant to members of commissions or boards, it could have followed the
same language used for "members of the Cabinet" so as to state "members of
commissions or boards." Alternatively, the 1973 Constitution could have placed
the words commissions and boards after the word "courts" so as to state
"members of the Cabinet, x x x, courts, commissions and boards." Instead, the
1973 Constitution used "heads of agencies, commissions, and boards."
o the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions make a clear distinction whenever
granting the power to appoint lower-ranked officers to members of a collegial
body or to the head of that collegial body. Thus, the 1935 Constitution speaks
of vesting the power to appoint "in the courts, or in the heads of
departments." Similarly, the 1973 Constitution speaks of "members of the
Cabinet, courts, heads of agencies, commissions, and boards."
o As an enumeration of offices, what applies to the first office in the
enumeration also applies to the succeeding offices mentioned in the
enumeration. Since the words "in the heads of" refer to "departments," the
same words "in the heads of" also refer to the other offices listed in the
enumeration, namely, "agencies, commissions, or boards."
Thus, the Chairman of the CCP Board is the "head" of the CCP who may be vested by
law, under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, with the power to appoint
lower-ranked officers of the CCP.
Page 289

-
the CCP is a public corporation governed by a Board of Trustees. The CCP, being
governed by a board, is not an agency but a board for purposes of Section 16, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution.
** Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus irreconcilably inconsistent with Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers the
remaining trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing them
to elect their fellow trustees. On the other hand, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution allows heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint
only "officers lower in rank" than such "heads of departments, agencies, commissions,
or boards." This excludes a situation where the appointing officer appoints an officer
equal in rank as him. Thus, insofar as it authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to
elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is unconstitutional because it
violates Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
o It does not matter that Section 6(b) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees
to "elect" and not "appoint" their fellow trustees for the effect is the same,
which is to fill vacancies in the CCP Board. A statute cannot circumvent the
constitutional limitations on the power to appoint by filling vacancies in a
public office through election by the co-workers in that office. Such manner of
filling vacancies in a public office has no constitutional basis.
Further, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP trustees the independent
appointing power of their fellow trustees. The creation of an independent appointing
power inherently conflicts with the President's power to appoint. This inherent conflict
has spawned recurring controversies in the appointment of CCP trustees every time a
new President assumes office.
POWER OF CONTROL OVER THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of government extends to
all executive employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk.35 This
constitutional power of the President is self-executing and does not require any
implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the President's power of control
over the Executive branch.36
The CCP falls under the Executive branch. Since the President exercises control over
"all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices," the President necessarily
exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the Executive branch. In mandating
that the President "shall have control of all executive x x x offices," Section 17,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office one
performing executive functions outside of the independent constitutional bodies
from the President's power of control. There is no dispute that the CCP performs
executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions.
The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts a government office in the
Executive branch outside the control of the President in the guise of insulating that
office from politics or making it independent. If the office is part of the Executive
branch, it must remain subject to the control of the President. Otherwise, the
Legislature can deprive the President of his constitutional power of control over "all
the executive x x x offices." If the Legislature can do this with the Executive branch,
then the Legislature can also deal a similar blow to the Judicial branch by enacting a
law putting decisions of certain lower courts beyond the review power of the Supreme
Court. This will destroy the system of checks and balances finely structured in the 1987
Constitution among the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to fill
vacancies in the Board, runs afoul with the President's power of control under Section
Page 290

17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The intent of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is to
insulate the CCP from political influence and pressure, specifically from the President.
44 Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually
outside the control of the President. Such a public office or board cannot legally exist
under the 1987 Constitution.
MMDA v Viron Transport G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007
Facts:
GMA declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 operational, thereby creating the MMDA
in 2003. Due to traffic congestion, the MMDA recommended a plan to decongest
traffic by eliminating thebus terminals now located along major Metro Manila
thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the mass transport
system. The MMC gave a go signal for the project. Viron Transit, a bus
company assailed the move. They alleged that the MMDA didnt have the power to
direct operators to abandon their terminals. In doing so they asked the court to
interpret the extent and scope of MMDAs power under RA 7924. They also asked if the
MMDA law contravened the Public Service Act.
Another bus operator, Mencorp, prayed for a TRO for the implementation in a trial
court. In the Pre-Trial Order17 issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed
down to whether 1) the MMDAs power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila included the
power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon and close their duly established
and existingbus terminalsin order to conduct business in a common terminal; (2) the
E.O. is consistent with the Public Service Act and the Constitution; and (3) provincial
bus operators would be deprived of their real properties without due process of law
should they be required to use the common bus terminals. The trial court sustained
theconstitutionality.
Bothbus linesfiled for a MFR in the trial court. It, on September 8, 2005, reversed its
Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of police
power"; that the authority of the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not
include the power to orderthe closureof Virons and Mencorps existingbus terminals;
and that the E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service Act.
MMDA filed a petition in the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that there is no justiciable
controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the E.O. mentions or
orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro
Manila. To them, Viron and Mencorp failed to produce any letter or communication from the
Executive Department apprising them of an immediate planto closedown theirbus terminals.
And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government
agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use government property
along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that the only relation created by the E.O.
is that between the Chief Executive and the implementing officials, but not between third
persons.
Issue: Is the elimination ofbus terminalsunconstitutional?
Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.
Page 291
Under E.O. 125 A, the DOTC was given the objective of guiding government and private
investment in the development of the countrys intermodal transportation
and communications systems. It was also tasked to administer all laws, rules and
regulations in the field of transportation and communications.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the
DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project
such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to
establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority
through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing
and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of
transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as
the Project in question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President
clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No.
179 ultra vires. There was no grant of authority to MMDA. It was delegated only to set
the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the
implementation of all programs and projects concerning traffic management,
specifically pertaining to enforcement, engineering and education.
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of
authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have
been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project.
MMDAs move didnt satisfy police power requirements such as that (1) the interest of
the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its
exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Stated
differently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the means.
As early as Calalang v. Williams, this Court recognized that traffic congestion is a

public, not merely a private, concern. The Court therein held that public welfare
underlies the contested statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to promulgate
rules and regulations to regulate andcontrol trafficon national roads.
Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at the
bottom of any regulatory measure designed "to relieve congestion of traffic, which is,
to say the least, a menace to public safety." As such, measures calculated to promote
the safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of
vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the exercise of police power.
Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern that
needs to be addressed immediately. Are the means employed appropriate and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly
oppressive?
De la Cruz v. Paras-Bus terminalsper se do not, however, impede or help impede the

flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals,
Page 292

apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to
solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened
In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the
maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide
facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all.
Finally, an order for the closure of respondents terminals is not in line with the
provisions of the Public Service Act.
Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC (now the ltfrb)was empowered to
"impose such conditions as to construction, equipment, maintenance, service, or
operation as the public interests and convenience may reasonably require" in approving
any franchise or privilege. The law mandates the ltfrb to require any public service to
establish, construct, maintain, and operate any reasonable extension of its existing
facilities.
Anak Mindanao vs Executive Secretary (Aug. 29, 2007)

Facts:
AMIN charges the Executive Department with transgression of the principle of separation of
powers.
Under the principle of separation of powers, Congress, the President, and the Judiciary may
not encroach on fields allocated to each of them. The legislature is generally limited to the
enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws, and the judiciary to their
interpretation and application to cases and controversies. The principle presupposes mutual
respect by and between the executive, legislative and judicial departments of the government
and calls for them to be left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit.19
AMIN contends that since the DAR, PCUP and NCIP were created by statutes,20they can only be
transformed, merged or attached by statutes, not by mere executive orders.
While AMIN concedes that the executive power is vested in the President21 who, as Chief
Executive, holds the power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices,
22it posits that this broad power of control including the power to reorganize is qualified and
limited, for it cannot be exercised in a manner contrary to law, citing the constitutional
duty23 of the President to ensure that the laws, including those creating the agencies, be
faithfully executed.
AMIN cites the naming of the PCUP as a presidential commission to be clearly an extension of
the President, and the creation of the NCIP as an "independent agency under the Office of the
President."24 It thus argues that since the legislature had seen fit to create these agencies at
separate times and with distinct mandates, the President should respect that legislative
disposition.
In fine, AMIN contends that any reorganization of these administrative agencies should be the
subject of a statute.
Issue: W/N the President has the power to reorganize administrative agencies without need of
an enacting Statute?
Held: Yes
The Constitution confers, by express provision, the power of control over executive
departments, bureaus and offices in the President alone. And it lays down a limitation on the
legislative power.
The line that delineates the Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power
is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." The
Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has
Page 293

vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress
is broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary power for all
purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is
necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In
fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power
embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. The
executive power is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. It is thepower of carrying the laws into practical operationand enforcing
their due observance.
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the
government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees
of his department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This
means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department,
bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of
control, the President also has the duty of supervising and enforcement of laws for the
maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over
bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.25(Italics
omitted, underscoring supplied)
The Constitutions express grant of the power of control in the President justifies an executive
action to carry out reorganization measures under a broad authority of law.26
In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have deliberated with full knowledge of all
existing laws and jurisprudence on the subject.27 It is thus reasonable to conclude that in
passing a statute which places an agency under the Office of the President, it was in
accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence on the Presidents power to reorganize.
In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the legislature necessarily ordains
an executive agencys position in the scheme of administrative structure. Such determination is
primary,28but subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure. As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned,
the power of control may justify the President to deactivate the functions of a particular
office. Or a law may expressly grant the President the broad authority to carry out
reorganization measures.
In carrying out the laws into practical operation, the President is best equipped to assess
whether an executive agency ought to continue operating in accordance with its charter or the
law creating it. This is not to say that the legislature is incapable of making a similar
assessment and appropriate action within its plenary power. The Administrative Code of 1987
merely underscores the need to provide the President with suitable solutions to situations on
hand to meet the exigencies of the service that may call for the exercise of the power of
control.
x x x The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every
President to reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of
the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient,
the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in
the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the
President is the command post of the President. This is the rationale behind the Presidents
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President.32
The Office of the President consists of the Office of the President proper and the agencies
under it.33It is not disputed that PCUP and NCIP were formed as agencies under the Office of
the President.34The "Agencies under the Office of the President" refer to those offices placed
under the chairmanship of the President, those under the supervision and control of the
President, those under the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, those
Page 294

attached to the Office for policy and program coordination, and those that are not placed by
law or order creating them under any special department.35
As thus provided by law, the President may transfer any agency under the Office of the
President to any other department or agency, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and
in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. Gauged against these guidelines,36the
challenged executive orders may not be said to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion
or in violation of the rule of law.
ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA, et. al vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary
FACTS:
The present controversy arose from a Petition for Certiorari and prohibition challenging
the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 378 dated October 25, 2004, issued by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
Petitioners characterize their action as a class suit filed on their own behalf and on
behalf of all their co-employees at the National Printing Office (NPO).
President Arroyo issued the herein assailed Executive Order No. 378, amending Section
6 of Executive Order No. 285 by,inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NPO over the printing services requirements of government agencies and
instrumentalities.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are
allowed to source their printing services from the private sector through competitive
bidding, subject to the condition that the services offered by the private supplier be of
superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was offered by the NPO.
Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPOs appropriation in the General Appropriations
Act to its income.
Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees
of the NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that:
(1) it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive
Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter still exercised
legislative powers; and
(2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners security of tenure, because it paves the
way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.
ISSUE: WON the 2 contentions of petitioners have merit
HELD:
Anent the first ground raised in the petition, we find the same patently without merit.
It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to

reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the
Presidents constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by
virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices
under existing statutes.
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press
Secretary (which in various times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of
the Press Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of
the Office of the President.
Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 quoted
above authorizes the President (a) torestructure the internal organization of the
Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the President Special
Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to
another, and (b) to transfer functions or offices from the Office of the President to any
other Department or Agency in the Executive Branch, and vice versa.
Page 295
Concomitant to such power to abolish, merge or consolidate offices in the Office of the
President Proper and to transfer functions/offices not only among the offices in the
Office of President Proper but also the rest of the Office of the President and the
Executive Branch, the President implicitly has the power to effect less radical or less
substantive changes to the functional and internal structure of the Office of the
President, including the modification of functions of such executive agencies as the
exigencies of the service may require.
In the case at bar, there was neither an abolition of the NPO nor a removal of any of its
functions to be transferred to another agency.
Under the assailed Executive Order No. 378, the NPO remains the main printing arm of
the government for all kinds of government forms and publications but in the interest
of greater economy and encouraging efficiency and profitability, it must now compete
with the private sector for certain government printing jobs, with the exception of
election paraphernalia which remains the exclusive responsibility of the NPO, together
with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, as the Commission on Elections may determine
At most, there was a mere alteration of the main function of the NPO by limiting the
exclusivity of its printing responsibility to election forms.
To be sure, an inclusive and broad interpretation of the Presidents power to
reorganize executive offices has been consistently supported by specific provisions
ingeneral appropriations laws.
Notably, in the present case, the 2003 General Appropriations Act, which was
reenacted in 2004 (the year of the issuance of Executive Order No. 378), likewise gave
the President the authority to effect a wide variety of organizational changes in any
department or agency in the Executive Branch.
The President has the powerto reorganize even executive offices already funded by the
said appropriations act, including the power to implementstructural, functional, and
operational adjustments in the executive bureaucracy and, in so doing, modify or
realign appropriations of funds as may be necessary under such reorganization.
Petition is herebyDISMISSED.
RODOLFO T. GANZON vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS
FACTS:
Consolidation of three cases.
The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the
Secretary of Local Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials.
The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City and a member of the Sangguniang
Panglunsod thereof, respectively.
The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints,

ten in number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various
charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful
and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and
arbitrary detention.
Opinion Court of Appeals: Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued
a preventive suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11,1988 for a
period of sixty (60) days.
The respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon
for another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and designating meantime
Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor.
Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary, that the Department of Local Government in

hearing the ten cases against him, had denied him due process of law and that the
respondent Secretary had been "biased, prejudicial and hostile" towards him arising
Page 296

from his (Mayor Ganzon's) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
party and the running political rivalry they maintained in the last congressional and
local elections and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in Iloilo City.
He also alleges that he requested the Secretary to lift his suspension since it had come
ninety days prior to an election (the barangay elections of November 14,
1988), notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded with the hearing and meted out
two more suspension orders of the aforementioned cases.
He likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were held in
Manila) in order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his
request.
He states that he asked for postponement on "valid and justifiable" grounds, among
them, that he was suffering from a heart ailment which required confinement; that his
"vital"witness was also hospitalized16but that the latter unduly denied his request.
It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution no longer allows the
President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension
and/or removal over local officials.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can
suspend and/or remove local officials
HELD:
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the
constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right
or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide
administrative sanctions against local officials.
It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing
more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from congress and to break
Congress' "control" over local government affairs.
The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive
the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning
discipline.
It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local
government under the general supervision of the Executive.
It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local
government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress
may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done,
delegate its exercise to the President.
As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to
stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by
severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like
the power of local legislation.
he Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing legislation

authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed
against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition.
The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of
the Constitutional Commission to defeat the President's powers.
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization."
The Constitution as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of
the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political
adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila."
Page 297

HON. EDUARDO NONATO JOSON vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN D. TORRES
FACTS:
The case at bar involves the validity of the suspension from office of petitioner
Eduardo Nonato Joson as Governor of the province of Nueva Ecija.
Private respondent Oscar C. Tinio is the Vice-Governor of said province while private
respondents Loreto P. Pangilinan, Crispulo S. Esguerra, Solita C. Santos, Vicente C.
Palilio and Napoleon G. Interior are members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Private respondents filed with the Office of the President a letter-complaint charging
petitioner with grave misconduct and abuse of authority.
Private respondents alleged that in the morning of September 12, 1996, they were at
the session hall of the provincial capitol for a scheduled session of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan when petitioner belligerently barged into the Hall.
Petitioner angrily kicked the door and chairs in the Hall and uttered threatening words
at them; close behind petitioner were several men with long and short firearms who
encircled the area.
Private respondents claim that this incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a
pending legislative measure supported by petitioner that the province of Nueva Ecija
obtain a loan of P150 million from the Philippine National Bank.
Petitioner's acts were intended to harass them into approving this loan.
Private respondents prayed for the suspension or removal of petitioner.
That the presence of his private army posed grave danger to private respondents' lives
and safety.
The letter was endorsed by Congressmen Eleuterio Violago and Pacifico Fajardo of the
Second and Third Districts of Nueva Ecija, former Congressman Victorio Lorenzo of the
Fourth District, and Mayor Placido Calma, President of the Mayors' League of said
province.
Immediately thereafter, Secretary Barbers proceeded to Nueva Ecija and summoned

petitioner and private respondents to a conference to settle the controversy.
The parties entered into an agreement whereby petitioner promised to maintain peace
and order in the province while private respondents promised to refrain from filing
cases that would adversely affect their peaceful co-existence.
On recommendation of Secretary Barbers (DILG Secretary), Executive Secretary Ruben

Torres issued an order, by authority of the President, placing petitioner under
preventive suspension for 60 days pending investigation of the charges against him.
He contends that under the law, it is the Office of the President that has jurisdiction
over the letter-complaint and that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the alter-ego
principle because the power to discipline elective local officials lies with the
President, not with the DILG Secretary.
ISSUE: WON the DILG Secretary is authorized and has jurisdiction over the petitioner
HELD:
Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective local officials are governed by

the Local Government Code of 1991, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991, and Administrative Order No. 23 entitled "Prescribing the
Rules and Procedures on the Investigation of Administrative Disciplinary Cases Against
Elective Local Officials of Provinces, Highly Urbanized Cities, Independent Component
Cities, and Cities and Municipalities in Metropolitan Manila."
An administrative complaint against an erring elective official must be verified and

filed with the proper government office.
A complaint against an elective provincial or city official must be filed with the Office
of the President.
Page 298
A complaint against an elective municipal official must be filed with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan while that of a barangay official must be filed before the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan.
The letter-complaint against him was therefore properly filed with the Office of the
President.
Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials is
lodged in two authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the Investigating Authority.
The Disciplining Authority is the President of the Philippines, whether acting by himself
or through the Executive Secretary.
The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is the Investigating Authority, who
may act by himself or constitute an Investigating Committee.
The Secretary of the DILG, however, is not the exclusive Investigating Authority. In lieu
of the DILG Secretary, the Disciplining Authority may designate a Special Investigating
Committee.
The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local
officials is derived from his power of general supervision over local governments.
The power to discipline and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be
construed to authorize the President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of
local officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.
A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special
Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is
not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson's claim.
The President remains the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the power to
investigate, not the power to discipline.
Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based on
the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency.
o "Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive,
all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive
is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through
the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,
are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively
the acts of the Chief Executive."
The Office of the President did not comply with the provisions of A.O. No. 23. The
Office should have first required petitioner to file his answer.
Thereafter, the
complaint and the answer should have been referred to the Investigating Authority for
further proceedings. Be that as it may, this procedural lapse is not fatal.
The filing of the answer is necessary merely to enable the President to make a
preliminary assessment of the case. The President found the complaint sufficient in
form and substance to warrant its further investigation.
The judgment of the
President on the matter is entitled to respect in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion.
In view of petitioner's inexcusable failure to file answer, the DILG did not err in
recommending to the Disciplining Authority his preventive suspension during the
investigation.
Pimentel vs. Aguirre
Page 299

FACTS:
Before us is an original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking (1) to annul
Section 1 of Administrative Order (AO) No. 372, insofar as it requires local government
units to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent of their authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services; and (2) to enjoin respondents from
implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal
revenue allotments.
Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada issued AO 43,
amending Section 4 of AO 372, by reducing to five percent (5%) the amount of internal
revenue allotment (IRA) to be withheld from the LGUs.
Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising the
power ofcontrolover LGUs.The Constitution vests in the President, however, only the
power of general supervision over LGUs, consistent with the principle of local
autonomy. Petitioner further argues that the directive to withhold ten percent (10%)
of their IRA is in contravention of Section 286 of the Local Government Code and of
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, providing for theautomatic releaseto each of
these units its share in the national internal revenue.
The solicitor general, on behalf of the respondents, claims on the other hand that AO
372 was issued to alleviate the "economic difficulties brought about by the peso
devaluation" and constituted merely an exercise of the President's power of supervision
over LGUs. It allegedly does not violate local fiscal autonomy, because it
merely directs local governments to identify measures that will reduce their total
expenditures for non-personal services by at least 25 percent. Likewise, the
withholding of 10 percent of the LGUs IRA does not violate the statutory prohibition on
the imposition of any lien or holdback on their revenue shares, because such
withholding is "temporary in nature pending the assessment and evaluation by the
Development Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal situation."
ISSUE:
WON (a) Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25
percent; and (b) Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal
revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of general supervision over
local governments
HELD: YES
"Sec. 4.The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. x x x" This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of
control.
"x x xIn administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of
an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or
neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that
of the latter."
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal
matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2)
consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance,
Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any
Page 300
adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the
collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the
current one.
AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his
power of supervision over local governments. It is intended only to advise all
government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that
will help maintain economic stability in the country, which is facing economic
difficulties.Besides, it does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance.Being
merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of the
President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be
characterized as an exercise of the power of control. The language used, while
authoritative, does not amount to a command that emanates from a boss to a
subaltern.
Bito-onon vs. Fernandez

FACTS:
The petitioner, Joel Bito-Onon is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay
Tacras, Narra, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality
of Narra, Palawan. The private respondent, Elegio Quejano, Jr. on the other hand, is
the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the
Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Magsaysay, Palawan. Both
Onon and Quejano were candidates for the position of Executive Vice-President in the
August 23, 1997 election for the Liga ng Barangay Provincial Chapter of the province of
Palawan. Onon was proclaimed the winning candidate in the said election prompting
Quejano to file a post proclamation protest with the Board of Election Supervisors
(BES), which was decided against him on August 25, 1997.
Not satisfied with the decision of the BES, Quejano filed a Petition for Review of the
decision of the BES with the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City
(RTC).On April 26, 1999, Onon filed a motion to dismiss the Petition for Review raising
the issue of jurisdiction.Onon claimed that the RTC had no jurisdiction to review the
decisions rendered by the BES in any post proclamation electoral protest in connection
with the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election of officers and directors.In his motion to
dismiss, Onon claimed that the Supplemental Guidelines for the 1997 Liga ng mga
Barangay election issued by the DILG on August 11, 1997 in its Memorandum Circular
No. 97-193, providing for review of decisions or resolutions of the BES by the regular
courts of law is anultra viresact and is void for being issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction, as its issuance is not a mere act of supervision but rather an exercise of
control over the Ligas internal organization.
The RTC denied Onons motion to dismiss. In its order, the RTC ratiocinated that the
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government is vested with the
power to establish and prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances and
implementing laws on the general supervision of local government units and the
promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance thereof by said units.The RTC
added that DILG Circular No. 97-193 was issued by the DILG Secretary pursuant to his
rule-making power as provided for under Section 7, Chapter II, Book IV of the
Administrative Code.
ISSUE:
WON the questioned provision in memorandum circular 97-193 was issued by the DILG Secretary
in excess of his authority
HELD: YES
Page 301
The Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the DILG insofar as it authorizes the filing a
Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts in a post
proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful constitutionality.We agree with both the
petitioner and the Solicitor General that in authorizing the filing of the petition for
review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts, the DILG Secretary in effect
amended and modified the GUIDELINES promulgated by the National Liga Board and
adopted by the LIGA which provides that the decision of the BES shall be subject to
review by the National Liga Board.The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an
exercise of the power of supervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which
the President does not have over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power to
prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its
authority to merely monitoring compliance by local government units of such
issuances.[27] To monitor means to watch, observe or check and is compatible with
the power of supervision of the DILG Secretary over local governments, which is
limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers
thereof perform their duties as per statutory enactments.[28]Besides, any doubt as to
the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in
favor of the greater autonomy of the local government.[
National Liga vs. Paredes

FACTS:
On 11 June1997, Rayos, Punong Barangay of Barangay 52, District II, Zone5, District
II, Caloocan City, filed apetition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for awrit
ofpreliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and damages before the
RTC of Caloocan, alleging that David, Punong Barangay of Barangay 77, Zone
7, Caloocan City and then president of the Liga Chapter of Caloocan City and of the
Ligang mga Barangay National Chapter, committed certain irregularities in the notice,
venue and conduct of the proposed synchronized Liga ng mga Barangay elections in
1997.
On 13 June 1997, the Executive Judge issued a temporary restraining order (TRO),
effectivefor seventy-two (72) hours, enjoining the holding ofthe general membership
and election meeting of Liga Chapter of Caloocan City on 14 June 1975. However, the
TRO was allegedly not properly served on herein petitioner David, and so theelection
for the officers of the Liga-Caloocan was held as scheduled. Petitioner David was
proclaimed President of the Liga-Caloocan, and thereafter took hisoath and assumed
the position of ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan.
On 17 July1997, respondent Rayos filed a second petition, this time for quo warranto,
mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order and damages, against David, Nancy Quimpo, Presiding
Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of CaloocanCity, and Secretary Barbers. Rayos
alleged that he was elected President of the Liga Caloocan Chapter in the elections
held on14 June 1997 by the members of the Caloocan Chapter pursuant to their
Resolution/Petition No. 001-97.8 On 18 July 1997, the presiding judge granted the
TRO, enjoining therein respondents David, Quimpo and Secretary Barbers from
proceeding with the synchronized elections for the Provincial and Metropolitan
Chapters of the Liga scheduled on 19 July 1997, but only for the purpose of
maintaining the status quo and effectivefor a period not exceeding seventy-two(72)
hours.
Eventually, on 18 July 1997, at petitioner Davids instance, Special Civil Action (SCA)
No. C-512 pending before Branch 126 was consolidated with SCANo. C-508 pending
before Branch 124. Before the consolidation of the cases, on 25 July 1997, the DILG
Page 302

through respondentSecretary Barbers, filed in SCA No. C-512 an Urgent Motion,
invoking the Presidents power of general supervision over all local government units
and seeking that theDILG pursuant to its delegated powerof general supervision, be
appointed as the Interim Caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga,
until such time that the new setof National Liga Officersshall have been duly elected
andassumed office.
ISSUE:
WON the Liga ngmga Barangay is subject to DILG supervision
HELD:
The controlling provision on the issues at hand is Section 4, Article X of the

Constitution, which reads in part:
o Sec. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over
local governments.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions uniformly differentiate the Presidents power of
supervision over local governments and his power of control of the executive
departments bureaus and offices. Similar to the counterpart provisions in the earlier
Constitutions, the provision in the 1987 Constitutionprovision has been interpreted to
exclude the power of control.
In the early case of Mondano v. Silvosa, et al., this Court defined supervision as
overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties, and to take such action as prescribed by law to compel his
subordinates to perform their duties.Control, on the other hand, means the power of
an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that
of the latter. In Taule v. Santos, the Court held that the Constitution permits the
President to wield no more authority than that of checking whether a local government
or its officers perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Supervisory
power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior
body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body.
The case ofDrilon v. Limclearly defined the extent of supervisory power, thus:
The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself
does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If
the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the
prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no
judgment on this matter except to see that the rules are followed
In Section 4, Article X of the Constitution applicable to the Liga ng mga

Barangay?Otherwise put, is theLigalegally susceptible to DILG suspension?
This question was resolved inBito-Onon v. Fernandez,where the Court ruled that the
Presidents power of the general supervision, as exercised therein by the DILG
Secretary as hisalter ego, extends to theLiga ng mga Barangay.
Does the Presidents power of general supervision extend to the liga ng mga barangay,
which is not a local government unit?
We rule in the affirmative. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of
Justice ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a government organization, being an
association, federation, league or union created by law or by authority of law, whose
members are either appointed or elected government officials.The Local Government
Code defines the liga ng mga barangay as an organization of all barangays for the
primary purpose of determining the representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and
Page 303
for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government

administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.
The rationale for making theLigasubject to DILG supervision is quite evident, whether
from the perspectives of logic or of practicality. The Liga is an aggroupment
of barangays which are in turn represented therein by their respective punong
barangays. The representatives of the Liga sit in an ex officio capacity at the
municipal, city and provincial sanggunians. As such, they enjoy all the powers and
discharge all the functions of regular municipal councilors, city councilors or provincial
board members, as the case may be. Thus, the Liga is the vehicle through which
thebarangayparticipates in the enactment of ordinances and formulation of policies
at all the legislative local levels higher than the sangguniang barangay, at the same
time serving as the mechanism for the bottom-to-top approach of development.
[G.R. No. 107369. August 11, 1999]
JESULITO A. MANALO, petitioner, vs. PEDRO G. SISTOZA, REGINO ARO III, NICASIO MA.
CUSTODIO, GUILLERMO DOMONDON, RAYMUNDO L. LOGAN, WILFREDO R. REOTUTAR, FELINO C.
PACHECO, JR., RUBEN J. CRUZ, GERONIMO B. VALDERRAMA, MERARDO G. ABAYA, EVERLINO B.
NARTATEZ, ENRIQUE T. BULAN, PEDRO J. NAVARRO, DOMINADOR M. MANGUBAT, RODOLFO M.
GARCIA and HONORABLE SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ II In His Capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.
Facts: On December 13, 1990, Republic Act 6975 creating the Department of Interior and Local
Government was signed into law by former President Corazon C. Aquino. Sections 26 and 31 of
RA 6975 provided that the appointments of PNP Chief, Senior Superintendent to Deputy
Director General, and Director General shall be subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
In accordance therewith, on March 10, 1992, the President of the Philippines, through then
Executive Secretary Franklin M. Drilon, promoted fifteen (15) respondent police officers, by
appointing them to positions in the Philippine National Police with the rank of Chief
Superintendent to Director. The appointments of respondent police officers were in a
permanent capacity.
Without their names submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, the said
police officers took their oath of office and assumed their respective positions. Thereafter, the
Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez III,
authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments.
On October 21, 1992, the petitioner brought before this Court this present original petition for
prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of subject appointments and disbursements
made therefor.
Issue: WON the appointments extended to police officers require the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.
Ruling: NO
Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the
government to be appointed by the President:
Page 304

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers
who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. As held in the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress cannot by law expand the
power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of
appointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Consequently, unconstitutional are Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empower the
Commission on Appointments to confirm the appointments of public officials whose
appointments are not required by the Constitution to be confirmed. But the unconstitutionality
of the aforesaid sections notwithstanding, the rest of Republic Act 6975 stands. It is wellsettled that when provisions of law declared void are severable from the main statute and the
removal of the unconstitutional provisions would not affect the validity and enforceability of
the other provisions, the statute remains valid without its voided sections.
It is settled that the police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and
the ranks in the military are not similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus,
directors and chief superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein respondent police officers,
do not fall under the first category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
[G.R. No. 149036. April 2, 2002]
MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, RESURRECCION Z. BORRA,

FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., VELMA J. CINCO, and GIDEON C. DE GUZMAN in his capacity as
Officer-In-Charge, Finance Services Department of the Commission on Elections, respondents.
Facts: On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelecs
EID by then Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. On March 2001,
respondent Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman together with other commissioners in
an ad interim appointment. While on such ad interim appointment, respondent Benipayo in his
capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandum address transferring petitioner to the Law
Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID
and her reassignment to the Law Department. She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and
detail of employees are prohibited during the election period. Benipayo denied her request for
reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6,
2000, exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo Circular.
Page 305
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. She
also filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Department against Benipayo,
alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC
Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent
administrative and civil service laws, rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant
petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that
the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions
on the independence of the COMELEC.
Issue: WON the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad
interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited
by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
Held: NO.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately

and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office.
The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter
its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent
in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of Congress.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the
vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of
Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity, unlike
Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac and Solicitor General Felix Bautista in
Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista. The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are
expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of
Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately.
While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent", this provision
should be harmonized with the Presidents power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold
that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first
confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the
Presidents power to make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory
construction to give meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to
the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution.
[G.R. No. 153881. March 24, 2003]
ELPIDIO G. SORIANO III, petitioner, vs. REUBEN S. LISTA, DOMINGO T. ESTERA, ELPIDIO B.
PADAMA, MIGUEL C. TABARES, ARTHUR N. GOSINGAN, EFREN L. TADURAN, CESAR A. SARILE,
DANILO M. VILDA and HONORABLE EMILIA T. BONCODIN, in her capacity as Secretary of Budget
and Management, respondents.
Facts: Public respondents were promoted by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to different
Page 306

ranks in the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) on different dates as follows:
Reuben S. Lista Vice Admiral, Philippine Coast Guard
Domingo T. Estera Rear Admiral, Philippine Coast Guard
Miguel C. Tabares Commodore, Philippine Coast Guard
Arthur N. Gosingan Commodore, Philippine Coast Guard
Efren L. Taduran Naval Captain, Philippine Coast Guard
Cesar A. Sarile Naval Captain, Philippine Coast Guard
Danilo M. Vilda Naval Captain, Philippine Coast Guard
Elpidio B. Padama Commodore, Philippine Coast Guard
Petitioner bewails the fact that despite the non-submission of their names to the Commission
on Appointments (CA) for confirmation, all of the said respondent officers of the PCG had
assumed their duties and functions. According to petitioner, their respective appointments are
illegal and unconstitutional for failure to undergo the confirmation process in the CA. Thus,
they should be prohibited from discharging their duties and functions as such officers of the
PCG.
Issue: WON the appointments of the respondents need the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.
Held: NO.
The PCG is under the DOTC and no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, the promotions and appointments of respondent officers of the PCG, or any
PCG officer from the rank of captain and higher for that matter, do not require confirmation by
the CA.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
The enumeration of appointments subject to confirmation by the CA under Section 16, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution is exclusive. The clause officers of the armed forces from the rank
of colonel or naval captain refers to military officers alone. This is clear from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the proposed text of said Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution. Since the promotions and appointments of respondent officers are not
covered by the above-cited provision of the Constitution, the same need not be confirmed by
the CA.
Page 307

G.R. No. 164978 October 13, 2005
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., EDGARDO J. ANGARA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LUISA P. EJERCITOESTRADA, JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S. LIM, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL,
and SERGIO R. OSMEA III, Petitioners, - versus- EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA,
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., MICHAEL T. DEFENSOR, JOSEPH H. DURANO, RAUL
M. GONZALEZ, ALBERTO G. ROMULO, RENE C. VILLA, and ARTHUR C. YAP, Respondents.
Facts: This is a petition to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita
(Secretary Ermita) to Florencio B. Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H.
Durano, Raul M. Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa, and Arthur C. Yap (respondents)
as acting secretaries of their respective departments.
On August 2004, Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their

respective departments. Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004.
On 23 September 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to respondents as

secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity.
Issue: Is President Arroyos appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the

consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session, constitutional?
Held: Yes. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not
interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the
Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint are
construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of the legislatures interference in the
executives power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an
appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint
any particular person to an office.
However, even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the

exercise of its powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission on Appointments does
not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold consent to presidential
appointments.
Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have appointed respondents as acting
secretaries because in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an
Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary.
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap

measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent
occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the
President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint
an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice
could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint
automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary
or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of
Page 308

prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should
be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a
department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice
even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee,
but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the
permanent appointee.
The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter
5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that [t]he President may temporarily designate an officer
already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of
an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity
a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person
competent.
Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible
to abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that acting appointments cannot exceed one year as
expressly provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The law has
incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a way to
circumvent confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both

of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during
a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a
vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments
for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if
abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments.
However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from
President Arroyos issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the
recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.
G.R. No. 83216 September 4, 1989
TERESITA QUINTOS-DELES, GLORIA T. ARAGON (M.D.), LOURDES V. MASTURA, TRINIDAD A.

GOMEZ, ADUL DE LEON, JOSEFINA AZARCON-DELA CRUZ, TRINIDAD M. DOMINGO, MARIA MAYET T.
LEDANO, LOLIT ANTONIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSIONS, AND OFFICES (C.A.), COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, THE SECRETARY GENERAL
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS: The petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the
President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the
Constitution. Due to the opposition of some congressmen-members of the Commission on
Appointments, who insisted that sectoral representatives must first be confirmed by the
respondent Commission before they could take their oaths and/or assume office as members of
Page 309

the House of Representatives, Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. suspended the oathtaking of the four
sectoral representatives which was scheduled at the Session Hall of Congress after the Order of
Business.
In view of this development, Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. transmitted on April 25,
1988, a letter dated April 11, 1988 of the President addressed to the Commission on
Appointments submitting for confirmation the appointments of the four sectoral
representatives.
Meanwhile, petitioner in a letter dated April 22, 1988 addressed to Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr.
(Annex V) appealed to the House of Representatives alleging, among others, that since no
attempt was made to subject the sectoral representatives ** already sitting to the confirmation
process, there is no necessity for such confirmation and subjection thereto of the present
batch would certainly be discriminatory.
On May 10, 1988, petitioner Deles received an invitation from the Commission on
Appointments for the deliberation of her appointment as sectoral representative for women.
Petitioner sent a reply dated May 11, 1988 explaining her position and questioning the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments over the appointment of sectoral
representatives.
In the May 12, 1988 meeting of the Committee of the Constitutional Commissions and Offices of
the Commission on Appointments, chaired by Sen. Edgardo J. Angara, the Committee ruled
against the position of petitioner Deles.
ISSUE: Does the Constitution require the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House
of Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments?
HELD: NO.
The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Since the seats
reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by
appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it
is undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the
other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution, referred
to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are-subject to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. The records show that
petitioners appointment was made on April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in recess (March 26,
1988 to April 17, 1988); hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of Section 16, Art. VII in
the appointment extended to her.
Implicit in the invocation of paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII as authority for the appointment
of petitioner is, the recognition by the President as appointing authority, that petitioners
appointment requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. As a matter of fact,
the President had expressly submitted petitioners appointment for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Considering that Congress had adjourned without respondent
Commission on Appointments having acted on petitioners appointment, said appointment/
nomination had become moot and academic pursuant to Section 23 of the Rules of respondent
Commission and unless resubmitted shall not again be considered by the Commission.
Page 310
[G.R. No. 131429. August 4, 1999]
OSCAR BERMUDEZ, ARTURO A. LLOBRERA and CLAUDIO L. DAYAON, petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY RUBEN TORRES, BUDGET SECRETARY SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., JUSTICE SECRETARY
TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., and ATTY. CONRADO QUIAOIT, respondents.
FACTS: The vacancy in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac impelled the main
contestants in this case, petitioner Oscar Bermudez and respondent Conrado Quiaoit, to take
contrasting views on the proper interpretation of a provision in the 1987 Revised Administrative
Code. Bermudez was a recommendee of then Justice Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., for the
position of Provincial Prosecutor. Quiaoit, on the other hand, had the support of then
Representative Jose Yap. On 30 June 1997, President Ramos appointed Quiaoit to the coveted
office. Quiaoit received a certified xerox copy of his appointment and, on 21 July 1997, took
his oath of office before Executive Judge Angel Parazo of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 65)
of Tarlac, Tarlac. On 23 July 1997, Quiaoit assumed office and immediately informed the
President, as well as the Secretary of Justice and the Civil Service Commission, of that
assumption.
On 10 October 1997, Bermudez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, a petition for
prohibition and/or injunction, and mandamus, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
injunction/temporary restraining order, against herein respondents, challenging the
appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment lacks the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code
of 1987. After hearing, the trial court considered the petition submitted for resolution and, in
due time, issued its now assailed order dismissing the petition. The subsequent move by
petitioners to have the order reconsidered met with a denial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the
President can be held fatal to the appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit.
HELD: NO.
An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one

having the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions
of an office or trust. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the
appointing authority has been complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in
order to render it effective.
Indeed, it may rightly be said that the right of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. In
the exercise of the power of appointment, discretion is an integral part thereof.
When the Constitution or the law clothes the President with the power to appoint a
subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an
ample discretion of whom to appoint. It should be here pertinent to state that the President is
the head of government whose authority includes the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices.
It is the considered view of the Court that the phrase upon recommendation of the Secretary,
found in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the Revised Administrative Code, should be
interpreted to be a mere advise, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in
Page 311

character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The President,
being the head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with the
action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority,
and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his authority.
G.R. No. 139554 July 21, 2006
ARMITA B. RUFINO, ZENAIDA R. TANTOCO, LORENZO CALMA, RAFAEL SIMPAO, JR., and FREDDIE
GARCIA, petitioners, vs. BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA, MA. PAZ D. LAGDAMEO, PATRICIA C. SISON, IRMA
PONCE-ENRILE POTENCIANO, and DOREEN FERNANDEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 139565 July 21, 2006
BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA, MA. PAZ D. LAGDAMEO, PATRICIA C. SISON, IRMA PONCE-ENRILE

POTENCIANO, and DOREEN FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. ARMITA B. RUFINO, ZENAIDA R.
TANTOCO, LORENZO CALMA, RAFAEL SIMPAO, JR., and FREDDIE GARCIA, respondents.
Facts: The consolidated petitions in the case at bar stem from a quo warranto proceeding
involving two sets of CCP Boards. The controversy revolves on who between the contending
groups, both claiming as the rightful trustees of the CCP Board, has the legal right to hold
office. The resolution of the issue boils down to the constitutionality of the provision of PD 15
on the manner of filling vacancies in the Board.
On 25 June 1966, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order No. 30 (EO 30)
creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines as a trust governed by a Board of Trustees of
seven members to preserve and promote Philippine culture. The original founding trustees, who
were all appointed by President Marcos, were Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, Juan Ponce-Enrile,
Andres Soriano, Jr., Antonio Madrigal, Father Horacio Dela Costa, S.J., I.P. Soliongco, and
Ernesto Rufino.
On 5 October 1972, or soon after the declaration of Martial Law, President Marcos issued PD
15,9 the CCP's charter, which converted the CCP under EO 30 into a non-municipal public
corporation free from the "pressure or influence of politics."10 PD 15 increased the members of
CCP's Board from seven to nine trustees. Later, Executive Order No. 1058, issued on 10 October
1985, increased further the trustees to 11.
On 22 December 1998, then President Joseph E. Estrada appointed seven new trustees to the
CCP Board for a term of four years to replace the Endriga group as well as two other incumbent
trustees. The seven new trustees were:
1. Armita B. Rufino - President, vice Baltazar N. Endriga
2. Zenaida R. Tantoco - Member, vice Doreen Fernandez
3. Federico Pascual - Member, vice Lenora A. Cabili
4. Rafael Buenaventura - Member, vice Manuel T. Maosa
5. Lorenzo Calma - Member, vice Ma. Paz D. Lagdameo
6. Rafael Simpao, Jr. - Member, vice Patricia C. Sison
7. Freddie Garcia - Member, vice Irma Ponce-Enrile Potenciano
Except for Tantoco, the Rufino group took their respective oaths of office and assumed the
performance of their duties in early January 1999.
On 6 January 1999, the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto before this Court
Page 312

questioning President Estrada's appointment of seven new members to the CCP Board. The
Endriga group alleged that under Section 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the CCP Board "shall be
filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the next regular meeting x x
x." In case "only one trustee survive[s], the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee
acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the [CCP]." The Endriga group claimed that it
is only when the CCP Board is entirely vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such
vacancies, acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP.
The Rufino group asserted that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the power to
appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees of the Board. The law may not validly confer on
the CCP trustees the authority to appoint or elect their fellow trustees, for the latter would be
officers of equal rank and not of lower rank. Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees
to elect their fellow trustees should be declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section
16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allowing the appointment only of "officers lower in rank"
than the appointing power.
Issue: WON the appointments extended by then President Estrada to the "Rufino Group" are
valid.
Held: YES.
The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except in those instances when the
Constitution provides otherwise. Usurpation of this fundamentally Executive power by the
Legislative and Judicial branches violates the system of separation of powers that inheres in
our democratic republican government.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of
officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the
Constitution. The second group refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law
to appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided by law.
Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose
appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions,
or boards. The present case involves the interpretation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution with respect to the appointment of this fourth group of officers.
The President appoints the first group of officers with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. The President appoints the second and third groups of officers without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the third group of officers
if the law is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a
department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees
of the CCP Board because the trustees fall under the third group of officers.
Further, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution authorizes Congress to vest "in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards" the power to appoint lower-ranked
officers.
Page 313

The head of the CCP is the Chairperson of its Board. PD 15 and its various amendments
constitute the Chairperson of the Board as the head of CCP. Thus, the Chairman of the CCP
Board is the "head" of the CCP who may be vested by law, under Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers of the CCP.
Under PD 15, the CCP is a public corporation governed by a Board of Trustees. Section 6 of PD
15, as amended,states:
Board of Trustees. The governing powers and authority of the corporation shall be vested in,
and exercised by, a Board of eleven (11) Trustees who shall serve without compensation.
The CCP, being governed by a board, is not an agency but a board for purposes of Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus irreconcilably inconsistent with Section 16, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees of the
CCP Board to fill vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing them to elect their fellow trustees. On
the other hand, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allows heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint only "officers lower in rank" than such "heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards." This excludes a situation where the
appointing officer appoints an officer equal in rank as him. Thus, insofar as it authorizes the
trustees of the CCP Board to elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
It does not matter that Section 6(b) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees to "elect" and
not "appoint" their fellow trustees for the effect is the same, which is to fill vacancies in the
CCP Board. A statute cannot circumvent the constitutional limitations on the power to appoint
by filling vacancies in a public office through election by the co- workers in that office. Such
manner of filling vacancies in a public office has no constitutional basis.
Further, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP trustees the independent appointing
power of their fellow trustees. The creation of an independent appointing power inherently
conflicts with the President's power to appoint. This inherent conflict has spawned recurring
controversies in the appointment of CCP trustees every time a new President assumes office.
In the present case, the incumbent President appointed the Endriga group as trustees, while
the remaining CCP trustees elected the same Endriga group to the same positions. This has
been the modus vivendi in filling vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing the President to appoint
and the CCP Board to elect the trustees. In effect, there are two appointing powers over the
same set of officers in the Executive branch. Each appointing power insists on exercising its
own power, even if the two powers are irreconcilable. The Court must put an end to this
recurring anomaly.
There is another constitutional impediment to the implementation of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD
15. Under our system of government, all Executive departments, bureaus, and offices are
under the control of the President of the Philippines.
The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of government extends to all
executive employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk.35 This constitutional
power of the President is self-executing and does not require any implementing law. Congress
cannot limit or curtail the President's power of control over the Executive branch.
Page 314
The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government. The CCP is also
not one of the independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-judicial body nor a
local government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall under the Executive branch. Under the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, any agency "not placed by law or order creating them under any
specific department" falls "under the Office of the President."
Since the President exercises control over "all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices," the President necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the
Executive branch. In mandating that the President "shall have control of all executive x x x
offices," Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office
one performing executive functions outside of the independent constitutional bodies from
the President's power of control. There is no dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not
legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies
in the Board, runs afoul with the President's power of control under Section 17, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution. The intent of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is to insulate the CCP from
political influence and pressure, specifically from the President.44 Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15
makes the CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of the President. Such a
public office or board cannot legally exist under the 1987 Constitution.
Section 3 of PD 15, as amended, states that the CCP "shall enjoy autonomy of policy and
operation x x x."45 This provision does not free the CCP from the President's control, for if it
does, then it would be unconstitutional. This provision may give the CCP Board a free hand in
initiating and formulating policies and undertaking activities, but ultimately these policies and
activities are all subject to the President's power of control.
The CCP is part of the Executive branch. No law can cut off the President's control over the CCP
in the guise of insulating the CCP from the President's influence. By stating that the "President
shall have control of all the executive x x x offices," the 1987 Constitution empowers the
President not only to influence but even to control all offices in the Executive branch, including
the CCP. Control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence.
G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012
EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting
through and represented by EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO, Officer in Charge, Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGANSANCHEZ, and ATTY. CARLITOD. CATAYONG, Respondents.
G.R. No. 196232
WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ATTY. DENNIS F. ORTIZ, ATTY. CARLO D.SULAY
and ATTY. FROILAN MONTALBAN, .JR., in their capacities as CHAIRMAN and MEMBERS of the
OFFICE OF MALACAANG LEGAL AFFAIRS, Respondents.
Facts: G.R. No. 196231
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In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight
HongKong Chinese nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando
Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of government officials prompted the creation
of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC), chaired by Justice Secretary Leila
de Lima and vice-chaired by Interior and Local Government Secretary Jesus Robredo. It was
tasked to determine accountability for the incident through the conduct of public hearings and
executive sessions. However, petitioner, as well as the Ombudsman herself, refused to
participate in the IIRC proceedings on the assertion that the Office of the Ombudsman is an
independent constitutional body.
Sifting through testimonial and documentary evidence, the IIRC eventually identified petitioner
Gonzales to be among those in whom culpability must lie. In its Report, the IIRC made the
following findings:
Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation
of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish
for more than nine (9) months without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman
prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases
within five (5) days from submission. The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition
thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking.
Ombudsman Gutierrez and Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious disregard of due
process, manifest injustice and oppression in failing to provisionally suspend the further
implementation of the judgment of dismissal against Mendoza pending disposition of his
unresolved motion for reconsideration.
By enforcing the judgment of dismissal without resolving the motion for reconsideration for
over nine months, the two Ombudsman officials acted with arbitrariness and without regard to
due process and the constitutional right of an accused to the speedy disposition of his case. As
long as his motion for reconsideration remained pending and unresolved, Mendoza was also
effectively deprived of the right to avail of the ordinary course of appeal or review to
challenge the judgment of dismissal before the higher courts and seek a temporary restraining
order to prevent the further execution thereof.
As such, if the Ombudsman cannot resolve with dispatch the motion for reconsideration, it
should have provisionally suspended the further enforcement of the judgment of dismissal
without prejudice to its re- implementation if the reconsideration is eventually denied.
Otherwise, the Ombudsman will benefit from its own inaction. Besides, the litigant is entitled
to a stay of the execution pending resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Until the
motion for reconsideration is denied, the adjudication process before the Ombudsman cannot
be considered as completely finished and, hence, the judgment is not yet ripe for execution.
But instead of acting decisively, the two Ombudsman officials merely offered to review a
pending motion for review of the case, thereby prolonging their inaction and aggravating the
situation. As expected, Mendoza - who previously berated Deputy Gonzales for allegedly
demanding Php150,000 in exchange for favorably resolving the motion for reconsideration rejected and branded as trash ("basura") the Ombudsman [sic] letter promising review,
triggering the collapse of the negotiations. To prevent the situation from getting out of hand,
the negotiators sought the alternative option of securing before the PNP-NCRPO an order for
Mendoza's provisional reinstatement pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration.
Unfortunately, it was already too late. But had the Ombudsman officials performed their duty
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under the law and acted decisively, the entire crisis may have ended differently.
On October 15, 2010, the OP instituted a Formal Charge15 against petitioner Gonzales for Gross
Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty under Rule XIV, Section
22 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 and other pertinent Civil Service
Laws, rules and regulations, and for Misconduct in Office under Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner filed his Answer thereto in due time.
Meanwhile, the OP notified20 petitioner that a Preliminary Clarificatory Conference relative to

the administrative charge against him was to be conducted at the Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA) on February 8, 2011. Petitioner Gonzales
alleged,21 however, that on February 4, 2011, he heard the news that the OP had announced
his suspension for one year due to his delay in the disposition of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for
reconsideration. Hence, believing that the OP had already prejudged his case and that any
proceeding before it would simply be a charade, petitioner no longer attended the scheduled
clarificatory conference. Instead, he filed an Objection to Proceedings22 on February 7, 2011.
Despite petitioner's absence, however, the OP pushed through with the proceedings and, on
March 31, 2011, rendered the assailed Decision,23 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Office finds Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzales
III guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust,
and hereby meted out the penalty of DISMISSAL from service. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196232
In December of 2003, 28-year-old Juan Paolo Garcia and 23-year-old Ian Carl Garcia were
caught in the United States smuggling $100,000 from Manila by concealing the cash in their
luggage and making false statements to US Customs Officers. The Garcia brothers pleaded
guilty to bulk cash smuggling and agreed to forfeit the amount in favor of the US Government
in exchange for the dismissal of the rest of the charges against them and for being sentenced
to time served. Inevitably, however, an investigation into the source of the smuggled currency
conducted by US Federal Agents and the Philippine Government unraveled a scandal of military
corruption and amassed wealth -- the boys' father, Retired Major General Carlos F. Garcia,
former Chief Procurement Officer of the Armed Forces, had accumulated more than P 300
Million during his active military service. Plunder and Anti-Money Laundering cases were
eventually filed against Major General Garcia, his wife and their two sons before the
Sandiganbayan.
On January 7, 2010, the Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's urgent petition for bail
holding that strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant of bail. On March 16,
2010, however, the government, represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor Wendell
Barreras-Sulit ("Barreras-Sulit") and her prosecutorial staff sought the Sandiganbayan's approval
of a Plea Bargaining Agreement (hereinafter referred to as "PLEBARA") entered into with the
accused. On May 4, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the change of plea
warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential guidelines.
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the hook with
nothing but a slap on the hand notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently strong evidence of
his culpability for serious public offenses, the House of Representatives' Committee on Justice
conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA. At the conclusion of these public hearings, the
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Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee Resolution No. 3,24 recommending to
the President the dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of
appropriate charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate government
office for having committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and grounds for removal from office under the Ombudsman Act.
The Office of the President initiated OP-DC-Case No. 11-B-003 against petitioner Barreras-Sulit.
In her written explanation, petitioner raised the defenses of prematurity and the lack of
jurisdiction of the OP with respect to the administrative disciplinary proceeding against her.
The OP, however, still proceeded with the case, setting it for preliminary investigation on April
15, 2011.
Issue: Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative
disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the
constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.
Held: YES.
The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prose-cutor is not exclusive.
Sec. 21, RA 6770. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the
Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members
of Congress, and the Judiciary.
While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all
government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials
removable by impeachment, the members of congress and the judiciary, such authority is by no
means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 declares the Ombudsman's
disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the
President express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. Thus:
Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy.-
xxxx
(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of
the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.
Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and
Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the
person of the President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional
and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and employees. Such
legislative design is simply a measure of "check and balance" intended to address the
lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one
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another from administrative liabilities.
Unquestionably, the Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to discipline his own people and
mete out administrative sanctions upon them, including the extreme penalty of dismissal from
the service. However, it is equally without question that the President has concurrent authority
with respect to removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, albeit
under specified conditions. Considering the principles attending concurrence of jurisdiction
where the Office of the President was the first to initiate a case against petitioner Gonzales,
prudence should have prompted the Ombudsman to desist from proceeding separately against
petitioner through its Internal Affairs Board, and to defer instead to the President's assumption
of authority, especially when the administrative charge involved "demanding and soliciting a
sum of money" which constitutes either graft and corruption or bribery, both of which are
grounds reserved for the President's exercise of his authority to remove a Deputy Ombudsman.
In any case, assuming that the Ombudsman's Internal Affairs Board properly conducted a
subsequent and parallel administrative action against petitioner, its earlier dismissal of the
charge of graft and corruption against petitioner could not have the effect of preventing the
Office of the President from proceeding against petitioner upon the same ground of graft and
corruption. After all, the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers.
By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious gap in the law.
While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution,
which is by impeachment under Section 244 of the same Article, there is, however, no
constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman,
or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply
filled a gap in the law without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing
statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for
the removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment.
The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is Implied
from his Power to Appoint.
Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove. As
a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also removable by him.
The exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise - that is, when the power to
remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other than the appointing power. In some
cases, the Constitution expressly separates the power to remove from the President's power to
appoint.
In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor,
Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the
President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military
watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that affect the general morale and
professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial importance in relation to the
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President's own role asCommander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous
for Congress, therefore, to grant the President concurrent disciplinary authority over the
Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement offices.
Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not Diminish the
Independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to remove a
Deputy Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates the independence
of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence which the Office of the
Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing its
constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What the Constitution secures for the
Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political independence. This means nothing more than
that "the terms of office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the
office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians. The cloak of independence is
meant to build up the Office of the Ombudsman's institutional strength to effectively function
as official critic, mobilizer of government, constitutional watchdog and protector of the
people. It certainly cannot be made to extend to wrongdoings and permit the unbridled acts of
its officials to escape administrative discipline.
Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the Ombudsman from
political influences and the discretionary acts of the executive, Congress laid down two
restrictions on the President's exercise of such power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman,
namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds
provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due
process. Reiterating the grounds for impeachment laid down in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770 states that the Deputy Ombudsman may
be removed from office for the same grounds that the Ombudsman may be removed through
impeachment, namely, "culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust." Thus, it cannot be rightly said that
giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor for
that matter, would diminish or compromise the constitutional independence of the Office of
the Ombudsman. It is, precisely, a measure of protection of the independence of the
Ombudsman's Deputies and Special Prosecutor in the discharge of their duties that their
removal can only be had on grounds provided by law.
Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where the questioned acts, falling short of
constitutional standards, do not constitute betrayal of public trust.
At the outset, the Court finds no cause for petitioner Gonzales to complain simply because the
OP proceeded with the administrative case against him despite his non-attendance thereat.
Petitioner was admittedly able to file an Answer in which he had interposed his defenses to the
formal charge against him. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge
against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative
proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged
to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process.
Due process is simply having the opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is

substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla and means such relevant evidence as
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a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.The fact, therefore, that
petitioner later refused to participate in the hearings before the OP is not a hindrance to a
finding of his culpability based on substantial evidence, which only requires that a decision
must "have something upon which it is based."
Factual findings of administrative bodies are controlling when supported by substantial

evidence. The OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and the
imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of removal from office was based on the
finding of gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct in office amounting to a betrayal of
public trust, which is a constitutional ground for the removal by impeachment of the
Ombudsman (Section 2, Article XI, 1987 Constitution), and a statutory ground for the President
to remove from office a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor Section 8(2) of the
Ombudsman Act.
The OP held that petitioner's want of care and wrongful conduct consisted of his unexplained
action in directing the PNP-NCR to elevate P/S Insp. Mendoza's case records to his office; his
failure to verify the basis for requesting the Ombudsman to take over the case; his
pronouncement of administrative liability and imposition of the extreme penalty of dismissal on
P/S Insp. Mendoza based upon an unverified complaint-affidavit; his inordinate haste in
implementing P/S Insp. Mendoza's dismissal notwithstanding the latter's non-receipt of his copy
of the Decision and the subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration; and his apparent
unconcern that the pendency of the motion for reconsideration for more than five months had
deprived P/S Insp. Mendoza of available remedies against the immediate implementation of the
Decision dismissing him from the service.
The invariable rule is that administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction
can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. In the instant
case, while the evidence may show some amount of wrongdoing on the part of petitioner, the
Court seriously doubts the correctness of the OP's conclusion that the imputed acts amount to
gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct constitutive of betrayal of public trust. To say that
petitioner's offenses, as they factually appear, weigh heavily enough to constitute betrayal of
public trust would be to ignore the significance of the legislature's intent in prescribing the
removal of the Deputy Ombudsman or the Special Prosecutor for causes that, theretofore, had
been reserved only for the most serious violations that justify the removal by impeachment of
the highest officials of the land.
Betrayal of public trust is a new ground for impeachment under the 1987 Constitution added to
the existing grounds of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption and other high crimes. While it was deemed broad enough to cover any violation of
the oath of office, the impreciseness of its definition also created apprehension that "such an
overarching standard may be too broad and may be subject to abuse and arbitrary exercise by
the legislature." Indeed, the catch-all phrase betrayal of public trust that referred to "all acts
not punishable by statutes as penal offenses but, nonetheless, render the officer unfit to
continue in office" could be easily utilized for every conceivable misconduct or negligence in
office. However, deliberating on some workable standard by which the ground could be
reasonably interpreted, the Constitutional Commission recognized that human error and good
faith precluded an adverse conclusion.
The Constitutional Commission eventually found it reasonably acceptable for the phrase
betrayal of public trust to refer to "acts which are just short of being criminal but constitute
gross faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusable negligence of
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duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary powers." In other words, acts that should
constitute betrayal of public trust as to warrant removal from office may be less than criminal
but must be attended by bad faith and of such gravity and seriousness as the other grounds for
impeachment.
A Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor are not impeachable officers. However, by
providing for theirremoval from office on the same grounds as removal by impeachment, the
legislature could not have intended to redefine constitutional standards of culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, as well as betrayal
of public trust, and apply them less stringently. Hence, where betrayal of public trust, for
purposes of impeachment, was not intended to cover all kinds of official wrongdoing and plain
errors of judgment, this should remain true even for purposes of removing a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor from office. Hence, the fact that the grounds for
impeachment have been made statutory grounds for the removal by the President of a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor cannot diminish the seriousness of their nature nor the
acuity of their scope. Betrayal of public trust could not suddenly "overreach" to cover acts that
are not vicious or malevolent on the same level as the other grounds for impeachment.
The tragic hostage-taking incident was the result of a confluence of several unfortunate events
including system failure of government response. It cannot be solely attributed then to what
petitioner Gonzales may have negligently failed to do for the quick, fair and complete
resolution of the case, or to his error of judgment in the disposition thereof. Neither should
petitioner's official acts in the resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's case be judged based upon the
resulting deaths at the Quirino Grandstand. The failure to immediately act upon a party's
requests for an early resolution of his case is not, by itself, gross neglect of duty amounting to
betrayal of public trust. Records show that petitioner took considerably less time to act upon
the draft resolution after the same was submitted for his appropriate action compared to the
length of time that said draft remained pending and unacted upon in the Office of Ombudsman
Merceditas N. Gutierrez. He reviewed and denied P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for
reconsideration within nine (9) calendar days reckoned from the time the draft resolution was
submitted to him on April 27, 2010 until he forwarded his recommendation to the Office of
Ombudsman Gutierrez on May 6, 2010 for the latter's final action. Clearly, the release of any
final order on the case was no longer in his hands.
Even if there was inordinate delay in the resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion and an
unexplained failure on petitioner's part to supervise his subordinates in its prompt disposition,
the same cannot be considered a vicious and malevolent act warranting his removal for
betrayal of public trust. More so because the neglect imputed upon petitioner appears to be an
isolated case.
Similarly, petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the
Ombudsman without citing any reason therefor cannot, by itself, be considered a manifestation
of his undue interest in the case that would amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all,
taking cognizance of cases upon the request of concerned agencies or private parties is part
and parcel of the constitutional mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be the "champion
of the people." The factual circumstances that the case was turned over to the Office of the
Ombudsman upon petitioner's request; that administrative liability was pronounced against P/S
Insp. Mendoza even without the private complainant verifying the truth of his statements; that
the decision was immediately implemented; or that the motion for reconsideration thereof
remained pending for more than nine months cannot be simply taken as evidence of
petitioner's undue interest in the case considering the lack of evidence of any personal grudge,
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social ties or business affiliation with any of the parties to the case that could have impelled
him to act as he did. There was likewise no evidence at all of any bribery that took place, or of
any corrupt intention or questionable motivation.
Accordingly, the OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and

the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set
aside, as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal of
public trust. Hence, the President, while he may be vested with authority, cannot order the
removal of petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the
grave and serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust.
The Office of the President is vested with statutory authority to proceed administratively
against petitioner Barreras-Sulit to determine the existence of any of the grounds for her
removal from office as provided for under the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act.
Petitioner Barreras-Sulit, on the other hand, has been resisting the President's authority to
remove her from office upon the averment that without the Sandiganbayan's final approval and
judgment on the basis of the PLEBARA, it would be premature to charge her with acts and/or
omissions "tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,"
which are grounds for removal from office under Section 8, paragraph (2) of the Ombudsman
Act of 1989; and which also constitute a violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act
No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) - causing undue injury to the Government or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. With reference to the doctrine of
prejudicial procedural antecedent, petitioner Barreras-Sulit asserts that the propriety of taking
and continuing to take administrative disciplinary proceeding against her must depend on the
final disposition by the Sandiganbayan of the PLEBARA, explaining that if the Sandiganbayan
would uphold the PLEBARA, there would no longer be any cause of complaint against her; if
not, then the situation becomes ripe for the determination of her failings.
The approval or disapproval of the PLEBARA by the Sandiganbayan is of no consequence to an

administrative finding of liability against petitioner Barreras-Sulit. While the court's
determination of the propriety of a plea bargain is on the basis of the existing prosecution
evidence on record, the disciplinary authority's determination of the prosecutor's
administrative liability is based on whether the plea bargain is consistent with the
conscientious consideration of the government's best interest and the diligent and efficient
performance by the prosecution of its public duty to prosecute crimes against the State.
Consequently, the disciplining authority's finding of ineptitude, neglect or willfulness on the
part of the prosecution, more particularly petitioner Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit, in
failing to pursue or build a strong case for the government or, in this case, entering into an
agreement which the government finds "grossly disadvantageous," could result in administrative
liability, notwithstanding court approval of the plea bargaining agreement entered into.
Plea bargaining is allowable when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to
establish the guilt of the accused of the crime charged.74 However, if the basis for the
allowance of a plea bargain in this case is the evidence on record, then it is significant to state
that in its earlier Resolution75 promulgated on January 7, 2010, the Sandiganbayan had
evaluated the testimonies of twenty (20) prosecution witnesses and declared that "the
conglomeration of evidence presented by the prosecution is viewed by the Court to be of
strong character that militates against the grant of bail."
Page 323

Notwithstanding this earlier ruling by the Sandiganbayan, the OSP, unexplainably, chose to plea
bargain with the accused Major General Garcia as if its evidence were suddenly insufficient to
secure a conviction. At this juncture, it is not amiss to emphasize that the "standard of strong
evidence of guilt which is sufficient to deny bail to an accused is markedly higher than the
standard of judicial probable cause which is sufficient to initiate a criminal case." Hence, in
light of the apparently strong case against accused Major General Garcia, the disciplining
authority would be hard-pressed not to look into the whys and wherefores of the prosecution's
turnabout in the case.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act has, nonetheless,
failed to obtain the necessary votes to invalidate the law, thus, keeping said provision part of
the law of the land. To recall, these cases involve two distinct issues: (a) the constitutionality
of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act; and (b) the validity of the administrative action of
removal taken against petitioner Gonzales. While the Court voted unanimously to reverse the
decision of the OP removing petitioner Gonzales from office, it was equally divided in its
opinion on the constitutionality of the assailed statutory provision in its two deliberations held
on April 17, 2012 and September 4, 2012. There being no majority vote to invalidate the law,
the Court, therefore, dismisses the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the
Ombudsman Act in accordance with Section 2(d), Rule 12 of the Internal Rules of the Court.
Indeed, Section 4(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires the vote of the majority of
the Members of the Court actually taking part in the deliberation to sustain any challenge to
the constitutionality or validity of a statute or any of its provisions.
PALO
DRILON VS CA 202 SCRA 378 (1991)
FACTS:
Ganzon and Paredes (private respondents) were charged with double murder before Military
Commission for the death of Ireneo Longno and Lonely Chavez during early martial law. On July
27, 1973, the military promulgated a decision acquitting Raul Paredes but sentencing Rodolfo
Ganzon to life imprisonment with hard labor.
Paredes was thereupon released from custody while Ganzon was made to serve sentence until
he was released on March 25, 1978 and placed under house arrest under guard.
In 1988, administration having changed, then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoez directed
State Prosecutor Aurelio Trampe to conduct a preliminary investigation against Ganzon and
Paredes for the above murders.
They moved for the dismissal of the case, in Ganzon's case, on the ground that he, Ganzon, had
been extended an absolute pardon by the President Ferdinand Marcos, and he, having been
previously convicted, can no longer be tried anew, and in Paredes' case, on the ground that he,
Paredes, had been acquitted.
ISSUE: W/N a Ganzon can be tried anew for the murders before the civil court despite earlier
verdict rendered by the military court?
RULING: NO
Page 324
In the case of Cruz vs Enrile the SC ruled that that all the petitioners in said proceedings "who
have been serving (but not yet completed) their sentence imprisonment" shall have "the option
either to complete the service their sentence, or be tried anew by the civil courts. Upon
conviction they should be credited in the service of their sentence for the period of their
previous imprisonment. Upon acquittal, they should set free."
The records show that the private respondents had been arraigned by the military court,
pleaded not guilty, and, with respect to Raul Paredes, acquitted, and with respect to Ganzon,
convicted and sentenced. The records also show that Ganzon had served time until 1978, when
he was placed under "house arrest" by then President Marcos. He also claims that in 1986, he
was pardoned by the then President, an alleged pardon he is invoking to deter the
reinvestigation by the Department of Justice. To the mind of the Court, Ganzon has accepted
the judgment against him, and asTanasked, "why should [he] who has accepted the justness of
the verdict of the military court who is satisfied that he had a fair hearing, and who is willing
to serve his sentence in full, be dragged through the harrow of another hearing in a civil court
to risk being convicted a second time perchance to serve a heavier penalty?"
Apparently, the question is whether or not, with respect to Ganzon, he has completed the
service of his sentence, since as we held inCruz,civilians serving sentences "may be given the
option either to complete the service of their sentence," the option Ganzon has apparently
accepted, "or be tried anew by the civil courts,"the option he is obviously rejecting. The Court
believes that the question is material since if he, Ganzon, has completed the service of his
sentence, Tan and Cruz are with more reason applicable, and second, if he has served his
sentence, the question of pardon is moot and academic.
Ganzon served six years in the stockades of the military no doubt as a result of his conviction
but was released in 1978 and put under so-called house arrest (although then President
Marcos never apparently carried this out seriously as Ganzon was free apparently, to move in
and out of his residence). The Court is of the considered opinion that these twin developments
six-year service of sentence and subsequent release are significant, since if then President
Marcos ordered Ganzon's release after six years of imprisonment, he then President Marcos,
unavoidably commuted Ganzon's imprisonment to six years (give or take a few days), although
as a condition, Ganzon shall remain under "house arrest." Court is of the opinion that if
Ganzon's sentence had been commuted, he, Ganzon, has therefore served his sentence and if
he has served his sentence fully, he can no longer be reinvestigated, or, as the Cruz cases
decreed, be made to "complete the service of [his] sentence."
Under the 1973 Constitution, as is under the present Charter the "pardoning power" of the
President (that is, to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures)
is final and unappealableso is commutation of sentence, in which the Chief Executive reduces
a sentence. It extinguishes criminal liability partially, and has the effect changing the
penaltyto a lesser one.
The Court does not believe, in Ganzon's case, that commutation of sentence need be in a
specific form. It is sufficient, to mind, that Ganzon was voluntarily released in 1978 with terms
or conditions, except that he should remain under house arrest.
The Court can not consider Ganzon's house arrest as a continuation of his sentence, first,
because in no way is arrest a penalty, but rather a mere means of "taking ... a person custody
in order that he may be forthcoming to answer for commission of an offense,"or, during early
martial law, a means to carry out Proclamation No. 1881,and second, because of the records
own scant condition as the exact terms of his "house arrest" (which, parenthetically, no longer
exists. ) Hence, the view of the Court is that irrespective of the "pardon," Ganzon has served
his sentence and to reiterate, he can no longer be reinvestigated for the same offense, much
more undergo further imprisonment to complete his service.
Page 325

The fact that Ganzon might have gotten off too lightly, so to speak, is immaterial, and even as
we sympathize with his victims' bereaved families, we cannot ignore the legal effects of then
President Marcos' acts as we did not ignore the legal implications of trials by military tribunals,
although void,asfaits accomplis.
The Court therefore need not consider whether or not Rodolfo Ganzon had been pardoned, and
whatever "pardon" the former President may have extended to him did not erase the fact that
as early as 1978, he was a free man. Of course, he was supposed to have remained under house
arrest but as we said, not as a continuation of his sentence, but pursuant to Marcos' vast arrest
and commitment powers during martial rule. The question of whether or not he should
continue to remain under house arrest is also a moot question as we noted, and arrests
except upon lawful judicial orders are no longer possible.
Page 326
PEOPLE VS SALLE, JR. 250 SCRA 378 (1991)

FACTS:
Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and each is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay an indemnity. The appellants
seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. On 24 March 1993, the Court accepted the appeal. On 6
January1994, however, appellant Francisco Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw
Appeal. They were granted a conditional pardon that with their acceptance of theconditional
pardon, the appellants will be released from confinement, the appellants impliedly admitted
their guilt and accepted their sentence, and hence, the appeal should be dismissed.They were
discharged from the New Bilibid Prison on 28
December 1993. Atty. Lao further in
formed the Court that appellant Ricky Mengote left for his province without consulting her. She
then prays that the Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and consider it withdrawn
upon his acceptance of the conditional pardon. Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mengotes conditional pardon

is valid?
RULING:
No. Since pardon is given only to one whose conviction is final, pardon has no effect until the
person withdraws his appeal and thereby allows his conviction to be final and Mengote has not
filed a motion to withdraw his appeal.
WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntadois hereby given thirty
(30) days from notice hereof within which to secure from the latter the withdrawal of his
appeal and to submit it to this Court. The conditional pardon granted the said appellant shall
be deemed to take effect only upon the grant of such withdrawal. In case of non-compliance
with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections must exert every possible effort
totake back into his custody the said appellant, for which purpose he may seek the assistance
of the Philippine NationalPolice or the National Bureau of Investigation.
Page 327
IN RE TORRES, 251 SCRA 709 (1995)

FACTS:
Torres was convicted for estafa. The sentence would expire on November 2, 2000. On April 18,
1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President of the Philippines on
condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines.
Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement.
The Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of
the conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been charged with twenty counts
of estafa before, and convicted of sedition by, the RTC of Quezon City.
President cancelled the conditional pardon of Torres. On October 10, 1986, then Minister of
Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and
Recommitmentagainst petitioner.
Now, Torres, apparently through his wife and children, seeks anew relief from this court. His
wife and children filed for an original petition for habeas corpus and pray for his immediate
release from prison on the ground that the exercise of the President's prerogative under Section
64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a
condition of a pardon in violation of pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional
presumption of innocence, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: W/N the petition of Torres should be granted?
RULING: NO
A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief
Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter
subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be
recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. By
the pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has thereby
placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound
to see to it that the pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon. Under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order
"the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply
with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." It is now a
well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential judgment is beyond
judicial scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively
in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his
liberty on conditional pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot
invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his
recommitment was ordered.
It matters not that in the case of Torres, he has allegedly been acquitted in two of the three
criminal cases filed against him subsequent to his conditional pardon, and that the third case
remains pending for thirteen (13) years in apparent violation of his right to a speedy trial.
Habeas corpuslies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as
illegal or unlawful. In the instant petition, the incarceration of Torres remains legal considering
Page 328

that, were it not for the grant of conditional pardon which had been revoked because of a
breach thereof, the determination of which is beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served
his final sentence for his first conviction until November 2, 2000.
Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was the exclusive author
of the conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corrollary prerogative to reinstate the
pardon if in his own judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee from the subsequent charges filed
against him, warrants the same. Courts have no authority to interfere with the grant by the
President of a pardon to a convicted criminal. It has been our fortified ruling that a final
judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to
determine whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon. There
is likewise nil a basis for the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional pardon
revoked by the President in the exercise of powers undisputedly solely and absolutely lodged in
his office.
Page 329
People vs. Casido G.R. No. 116512, March 7, 1997
Facts:
In an effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, accused-appellants William
Casido and Franklin Alcorin applied for pardon before the Presidential Committee on the Grant
of Bail, Release or Pardon (PCGBRP), as well as for amnesty before the National
Amnesty Commission (NAC). The PCGBRP was constituted in line with the confidence-building
measures of the government. Thereafter, accused-appellants were granted conditional pardon.
But the Court ruled in resolution that the conditional pardon granted to accused-appellants is
void for having been extended during the pendency of their appeal. Prior to the resolution, the
NAC favorably acted onthe applicationsfor amnesty of accused-appellants.
Issue:W/N the release of accused-appellants is valid
Held:The release of accused-appellants was valid solely on the ground of the amnesty granted
them and not by the pardon.
Pardon is granted by theChief Executiveand as such it is a private act which must be pleaded
and proved by the person pardoned because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty
by theProclamation of theChief Executivewith the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public
act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction;
while amnesty is to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses,
generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after
conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an
offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and
for that reason it does not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right
ofsuffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no
case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence. While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself,
it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by
amnesty stands before the lawprecisely as though he had committed no offense.
While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency of the
appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph
of Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution, the grant of amnesty, for which accused-appellants
voluntarily applied underProclamationNo. 347 was valid. ThisProclamationwas concurred in
by bothHouses ofCongress.
Page 330
PEOPLE VS PATRIARCA 341 SCRA 464 (2000)

FACTS:
Jose Patriarca, Jr., a member of the NPA, was found guilty by the trial court of the crime
ofmurder forthe death ofAlfredo Arevalo andwas sentencedto suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. He then appealed the decision of the RTC.
Subsequently, he applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724. His application was
favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board concluding that his activities were done in
pursuit of his political beliefs.
Issue:What is the effect ofthe grant of amnesty to the conviction of the accused-appellant?
Held: Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high
political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another,
who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and
abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense
with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty standsbefore the lawprecisely
as though he had committed no offense.
Paragraph 3 of Art. 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
The grant of amnesty serves to put an end to the appeal. Jose Patriarca is acquitted of
thecrime ofmurder.
NOTE: SC DISTINGUISHED PARDON FROM AMNESTY
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive. It is a private act, which must be pleaded and proved
by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by
Proclamation of the CE with the concurrence of Congress is a public act of w/c the courts
should take judicial notice.
Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of person or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of
the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which
he has been convicted, it abolishes or forgives the punishment thus it does not work the
restoration of the rights to hold public office or right of suffrage unless such rights be expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of
the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (Art 36).
Page 331
MAGDALO VS COMELEC673 SCRA 651 (2012)

FACTS:
Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the
COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the
National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections.
COMELECSecond Division issued its Resolution denying the Petition for Registration on the
ground that they employed violence and used unlawful means to achieve their goals in the
process defying the laws of organized societies.
Magdalo filed for Motion for Reconsideration and a Manifestation and Motion for Early
Resolution, while the case is under examination, the May 2010 election was held without
Magdalo on the list of registered political parties.
During the pendency of the case there was a subsequent Grant of Amnesty to the Military
Personnel involved in the Oakwood standoff.
ISSUE: What is the effect of the subsequent grant of amnesty?
RULING:
This Court, in People v. Patriarca,explained the concept of amnesty, to wit:
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political
offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grant to the subjects of another, who have
offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts
into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is
charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
committed no offense.
In the case of People vs. Casido, the difference between pardon and amnesty is given:
"Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded
and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty
by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of
which the courts should take judicial notice. x x x"51(Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, SECTION 4.Effects. (a) Amnesty pursuant to this proclamation shall extinguish
any criminal liability for acts committed in connection, incident or related to the July 27, 2003
Oakwood Mutiny, the February 2006 Marines Stand-Off and the November 29, 2007 Peninsula
Manila Hotel Incident without prejudice to the grantees civil liability for injuries or damages
caused to private persons.
(b) Except as provided below, the grant of amnesty shall effect the restoration of civil and
political rights or entitlement of grantees that may have been suspended, lost or adversely
affected by virtue of any executive, administrative or criminal action or proceedings against
the grantee in connection with the subject incidents, including criminal conviction or (sic) any
form, if any.
xxx
In light of the foregoing, to still sustain the finding, based on the participation of its members
in the Oakwood incident, that MAGDALO employs violence or other harmful means would be
inconsistent with the legal effects of amnesty. Likewise, it would not be in accord with the
express intention of both the Executive and the Legislative branches, in granting the said
amnesty, to promote an atmosphere conducive to attaining peace in line with the governments
peace and reconciliation initiatives.
Nevertheless, this Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions of the COMELEC as regards the
use of violence. Thus, should MAGDALO decide to file another Petition for Registration, its
Page 332

officers must individually execute affidavits renouncing the use of violence or other harmful
means to achieve the objectives of their organization. Further, it must also be underscored that
the membership of MAGDALO cannot include military officers and/or enlisted personnel in
active service, as this act would run counter to the express provisions of the Constitution.
NOTE: (these principles were discussed in this case)
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade
the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first,
there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when [the] constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.25(Emphasis supplied.)
The second and fourth exceptions are clearly present in the case at bar. The instant action
brings to the fore matters of public concern, as it challenges the very notion of the use of
violence or unlawful means as a ground for disqualification from party registration. Moreover,
considering the expressed intention of MAGDALO to join subsequent elections, as well as the
occurrence of supervening events pertinent to the case at bar, it remains prudent to examine
the issues raised and resolve the arising legal questions once and for all.
The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice has been
explained as those facts that are "so commonly known in the community as to make it
unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known x x x as to make it indisputable among
reasonable men."
Page 333
People of the Philippines & HSBC vs Judge Jose Vera & Mariano Cu Unjieng 65 PHIL 56
(1987)
FACTS:
Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was
elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While
awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he
was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation
Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by Cu
Unjieng allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that
Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act
No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to
provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is
applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are
covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of
the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to
provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said
probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon
because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.
ISSUE:Whether or not equal protection is violated when the Probation Law provides that only
in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a
probation officer may the probation system be applied.
HELD:The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a
way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set
standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of
probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the
constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of
equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11
which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than
those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the
Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only
means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have
a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in
provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to
probation.The SC declared the old probation law as unconstitutional.
Page 334
G.R. No. L-46437 May 23, 1939 EUFEMIO P. TESORO vs. THE
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
FACTS:
Tesoro, a convict of the crime of Falsification of Public Documents, accepted the parole
granted by the governor
general. The same included the condition that he shall not commit any crime and will conduct
himself in an orderly
manner. Subsequently, he was charged with adultery. He was arrested and recommitted to
prison.
Rule: 1. Appellant also contends that the Board of Indeterminate Sentence has no legal
authority to investigate
the conduct of the petitioner, and recommend the revocation of his parole. By the terms of his
parole, petitioner agreed to report the executive secretary of the board once a month during
the first year of his parole, and, thereafter, once every three months. By his consent to this
condition, petitioner has placed himself under the supervision of the board. The duty to report
on the part of the petitioner implies a corresponding power on the part of the board to inquire
into his conduct, and a fortiori to make recommendations to the President by whose
authority it was acting. Besides, the power to revoke paroles necessarily carries with it the
power to investigate and to inquire into the conduct of the parolees, if such power of
revocation is to be rational and intelligent. In the exercise of this incidental power of inquiry
and investigation, the President of the Philippines is not precluded by law or by the
Constitution from making use of any agency of the government, or even of any individual, to
secure the necessary assistance.
2. Appellant further contends that judicial pronouncement to the effect that he has committed
a crime is necessary before he can be properly adjudged as having violated his conditional
parole. Under condition No. 2 of his parole, petitioner agreed that he "will not commit any
other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly manner." (Emphasis ours.) It was, therefore,
the mere commission, not his conviction by court, of any other crime, that was necessary in
order that the petitioner may be deemed to have violated his parole. And under section 64 (i)
of the Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and reincarceration of any such
person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of his
pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence."
3. Appellant impugns the findings of the President regarding the violation of the conditional
parole. He claims that,
according to the weight of the evidence, the violation took place, not "in the latter part of
September, 1937," as found by the President, but after October 28, 1937, the date when the
parole was supposed to expire. But that as it may, where, as in the instant case, the
determination of the violation of the conditional parole rests exclusively in the sound judgment
of the Chief Executive, the courts will not interfere, by way of review, with any of his findings.
The petitioner herein having consented to place his liberty on parole upon the judgment of the
power that has granted it, he cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the
findings may be upon which his
recommitment was ordered.
Page 335

4. When a conditional pardon is violated, the prisoner is placed in the same state in which he
was at the time the pardon was granted. He may be rearrested and recommitted to prisons
(See U.S. vs. Ignacio [1916}, 33 Phil., 202, 204; U.S. vs. Villalon [1917], 37 Phil., 322.) And the
rule is well-settled that, in requiring the convict to undergo so much of the punishment
imposed by his original sentence as he had not suffered at the time of his release, the court
should not consider the time during which the convict was at large by virtue of the pardon as
time served on the original sentence.
TORRES vs. GONZALES 152 SCRA 272 (1987)

FACTS: Sometime before the 1979, petitioner was convicted of the crime of estafa (two
counts), and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term from 11 years, 10 months and 22 days
to 38 years, 9 months and 1 day. These convictions were affirmed by the CA. On April 19, 1939,
a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President on condition that
petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this
condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law.
"Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement.
On March 22, 1982, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President
the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. On September 8, 1986,
the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner who was accordingly arrested
and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Claiming that he
has been deprived of his rights under the due process clause of the Constitution since he was
not given an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison and
that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final
judgment of the 2 counts of estafa nor the crime of sedition, petitioner files this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before
the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his
conditional pardon.
HELD: No, a conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is not necessary before the
petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his
conditional pardon. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of
a conditional pardon are purely executive acts and which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper
consequences of such
breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64
(i) of the Revised
Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of
violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the
President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by
final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his
conditional pardon.
Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process, and because the conditionally
pardoned convict had
already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which
he was conditionally
Page 336

pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a
constitutional vice.
BARRIOQUINTO vs. FERNANDEZ (January 21, 1949)
FACTS: Petitioners Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of murder. As
Barrioquinto had not yet been arrested, the case was proceeded against Jimenez, upon which
the CFI of Zamboanga sentenced him to life imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an
appeal has expired, defendant Jimemeze became aware of Proclamation No. 8, dated
September 7, 1946. The Proclamation granted amnesty in favor of all persons who may be
charged with an act penalized under the Revised Penal Code. Provided, it is in furtherance of
the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, which
was committed from December 8, 1941 to the date when each particular area of the
Philippines where the offense was actually committed was liberated from enemy control and
occupation. Jimenez decided to submit his case to the Guerilla Amnesty Commission presided
by the respondents herein, and the other petitioner Barrioquinto, who had then been already
apprehended, did the same.
After a preliminary hearing had started, the Amnesty Commssion, presided by the
respondents, issued an order, returning the cases of the petitioners to the CFI of Zamboanga.
However, the commission did not decide whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the
benefits of the said Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground that inasmuch as neither Barrioquinto
nor Jimenez have admitted having committed the offense as Barrioquinto alleged that it was
Hipolito Tolention who shot and killed the victim, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to invoke the benefits of amnesty
RULING: YES, the petitioners are entitled to invoke the benefits of amnesty.
The theory of the respondents is predicated on a wrong conception of the nature or
character or an amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon:
1.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be
pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while
amnesty is granted by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress,
and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice.
2.
Pardons are granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of
persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the
institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
3.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of
which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that
reason it does not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon and it in no
case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him the
sentence. While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense
itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that, in order to entitle a
person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is not necessary that he should, as a
condition must admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is
charged and allege the amnesty as a defense. It is sufficient that the evidence, either of
the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms
of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that invocation of the benefits
of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance. Although the accused does
Page 337

not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty
Commission entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or confesses
having committed the offense, with which he is charged, the Commissions, if necessary or
requested by the interested party, should conduct summary hearing of the witnesses for both
he complainants and the accused.
Whether or not the defendant has admitted the commission of the offense, he can
invoke the benefit of amnesty. It is because there is no law, which makes such admission
or confession not admissible as evidence against him in the courts of justice in case the
Amnesty Commission finds that the offense not come within the terms of the Amnesty
Proclamation.
TREATY MAKING
BAYAN vs. EXECUTIVE
342 SCRA 449 (2002)
FACTS: On Oct. 5, 1998, President Estrada ratified the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
between the Philippines and the United States of America. The VFA provides for regulating the
circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be
present in the Philippines. The President submitted the Agreement for concurrence by the
Senate under Sec. 21, Art. VI, instead of Sec. 25, Art XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Considering that the agreement is not a basing agreement but covers only temporary
presence of troops and facilities, is the President correct?
HELD: No. Sec. 21, Art VII, applies to treaties in general regardless of the subject matter or
coverage. In contrast, Sec. 25, Art. XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which
involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. It is not
right to argue that the latter section is inapplicable to mere transient agreements for the
reason that there is no permanent placing of structures for the establishment of a military
bases, troops, or facilities. The conjunction is or. Stated otherwise, the provision applies to
entry of troops without any foreign bases being established.
PIMENTEL vs. OFFICE
462 SCRA 265 (2005)
FACTS: The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court with power to exercise
jurisdiction over persons for the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and
the crime of aggression. While the Philippines signed the Statute on Dec. 28, 2000, the Office
of the President did not ratify it in accordance with its terms and did not transmit it to the
Senate for its concurrence.
ISSUE: May a petition for mandamus lie to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and
the DFA to bring the signed copy to the Senate for its concurrence?
HELD: No. The President, being the head of the state, is regarded as the sole organ and
authority in external relations and is the countrys sole representative with foreign nations. In
the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence
of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. The
role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or
Page 338

concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to
submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify
it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a
serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the
President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus.
DEPORTATION OF UNDESIRABLE ALIENS

QUA CHEEGAN v. DEPORT.BD
9 SCRA 27 (1963)
FACTS: Petitioners-appellants contest the power of the President to deport aliens and,
consequently, the delegation to the Deportation Board of the ancillary power to investigate, on
the ground that such power is vested in the Legislature. In other words, it is claimed, for the
power to deport to be exercised, there must be a legislation authorizing the same.
ISSUE: Does the President have the power to deport aliens?
If so, what is the extent of such power and may the President delegate the said power
to the Deportation Board?
What is the extent of such authority that the President may delegate?
Does the power of the President to conduct investigation for purposes of finding
grounds for deportation carries with it the power to order the arrest of the alien complained
of?
If so, may such power to order arrest be delegated?
HELD:
Under the present and existing laws, deportation of an undesirable alien may be
effected in two ways: (1)
by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, and (2) by the Commissioner of Immigration,
upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act
No. 613.
The President may only exercise the power to deport only upon the grounds
enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, and on no other, as it would be
unreasonable and undemocratic to hold that an alien may be deported upon an unstated or
undefined ground depending merely on the unlimited discretion of the Chief Executive.
The President's power of investigation may be delegated. This is clear from a reading of
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides for a "prior investigation,
conducted by said Executive (the President) or his authorized agent." . . . By virtue of
Executive Order No. 33 dated May 29, 1936, President Quezon created the Deportation Board
primarily to receive complaints against aliens charged to be undesirable, to conduct
investigation pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and the rules and
regulations therein provided, and make the corresponding recommendation. Since then, the
Deportation Board has been conducting the investigation as the authorized agent of the
President.
On whether the authority of the President to conduct investigation herein, carries with
it the power to order the arrest of the alien complained of, since the Administrative Code is
silent on the matter, and if it does, whether the same may be delegated to the respondent
Deportation Board.
Page 339
The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to
carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, --there is
already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously
has the power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is
not indispensable that the alien be arrested. It is enough, as was true before the executive
order of President Quirino, that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien
during the investigation, as was authorized in the executive order of President Roxas.
And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be delegated,
official functions requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment, may not be so delegated.
Indeed, an implied grant of power, considering that no express authority was granted by the
law on the matter under discussion, that would serve as a curtailment or limitation on the
fundamental right of a person, such as his security to life and liberty, must be viewed with
caution, if we are to give meaning to the guarantee contained in the Constitution. If this is so,
then a delegation of that implied power, nebulous as it is, must be rejected as inimical to the
liberties of the people.
Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board
to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fix
bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal.
As a consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared
null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled.
GO TEK v. DEPORT. BD
79 SCRA 17 (1976)
FACTS: On March 3, 1964, the Chief Prosecutor of the Deportation Board (Board) filed a
complaint against the petitioner Go Tek, a resident Chinaman. It was alleged that:
"In December, 1963, the NBI searched an office believed to be the headquarters of a
guerilla unit of the " Emergency Intetligence Section, Armv of the US", and that Go Tek was
among those arrested, an alleged Sector Commander and Intelligence and Record Officer of
that guerilla unit; Fake dollar checks were found in Go Tek's possession in violation of Art. 168
of the RPC, rendering himself an undesirable alien.
The prosecutor prayed that the Board recommend to the President the alien's
immediate deportation as an undesirable alien, his presence in this country having been and
will always be inimical and a menace to the peace, welfare, and security of the community. In
a motion to dismiss, petitioner raised the argument that the complaint was premature because
there was a pending case against him for violation of Art. 168 and that the Board lacked
jurisdiction over the case in view of the obiter dictum in the Qua Chee Gan case that the
President may deport aliens only on the grounds specified in the law. The Board denied the
motion arguing that a criminal conviction is not a prerequisite before the State may exercise its
right to deport an undesirable alien and that the Board is only a fact finding body whose
function is to make a report and recommendation to the President in whom is lodged the
exclusive power to deport an alien or dismiss a deportation proceeding. The trial court, in
granting the writ of prohibition applied for by petitioner, ordered the Board to desist from
taking cognizance of the said complaint and held that the President may deport only on
grounds enumerated by law; that mere possession of forged dollar checks is not a ground for
deportation; that a criminal conviction is necessary; and that the Board lacks jurisdiction over
the case.
Page 340
ISSUE: Whether the Board can entertain a deportation proceeding based on a ground which is
not specified in Sec. 37 of the Immigration Law and although the alien has not yet been
convicted of the offense imputed to him.
HELD: We hold that the Board has jurisdiction to investigate Go Tek for illegal possession of
fake dollar checks (as well as his alleged "guerilla" activities) inspite of the fact that he has not
yet been convicted of illegal possession thereof under Art. 168 of the RPC and notwithstanding
that the act is not among the grounds for the deportation of undesirable aliens as enumerated
under the law. The charge against Go Tek before the Board was not premature.
1.
2.
The aforementioned obiter dictum in the Qua Chee Gan case is not decisive of
this case. In the said case, the aliens were charged with economic sabotage
which is a ground for deportation under RA 503. The ratio decidendi of that
case is that the provision of EO 398, series of 1951, empowering the Board to
issue a warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien, is
illegal or unconstitutional because it is contrary to section 1(3), Art. III of the
1935 Constitution that warrants shall issue upon probable cause to be
determined by the JUDGE after examining under oath the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce.
The President's power to deport aliens and the investigations of aliens subject
to deportation are provided under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code. On the other hand, Section 37 of the Immigration Law provides that
certain aliens may be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner or of any
other officer designated by him for the purpose, and deported upon the
Commissioner's warrant "after a determination by the Board of Commissioners
of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien." 13
classes of aliens who may be deported by the Commissioner are specified in
Section 37.
So, under existing law, the deportation of undesirable aliens may be effected: (1) by order Of
the President, after due investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code; and (2) by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation of the Board of
Commissioners under section 37 of the Immigration Law.
3.
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens. That power
may be exercised by the Chief Executive when he deems such action necessary
for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation. When the Chief finds that
there are aliens whose continued presence in the country is injurious to the
public interest, he may, even in the absence of express law, deport them.
It has been held that the Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of the
facts which warrant the deportation of aliens, as disclosed in an investigation conducted in
accordance with section 69. No other tribunal is at liberty to reexamine or to controvert the
sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted.
DOMINGO vs. SCHEER
421 SCRA 468 (2004)
FACTS: Herbert Scheer, a German national, was granted a permanent resident status by the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation in 1986, however, it was discovered that he had police
Page 341

records an financial liabilities, as well as a pending arrest warrant in Germany so that he was
ordered deported from the Philippines.
ISSUE: Is the power of the President to determine whether an alien may be deported from the
Philippines subject to judicial review?
HELD: The authority to exclude or expel aliens by a power affecting international relation is
vested in the political department of the government, and is to be regulated by treaty or by an
act of Congress, and to be executed by executive authority, except insofar as the judicial
department has been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the Constitution to
intervene. Although the courts are without power to directly decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch, the court
may resolve questions of whether or not such judgment has been made with the Board of
Commissioners acted with grave abuse of discretion in causing Scheers arrest and detention.
Indeed, it deprived him of due process in issuing the order of deportation without even
conducting a summary hearing. The BOC merely concluded that Scheer was involved in illegal
activities in Palawan without affording him the right to be heard.
BENGZON v. DRILON
208 SCRA 133 (1992)
FACTS: On June 20, 1953, RA 910 was enacted to grant pensions to retired Justices of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. This was amended by RA 1797 which provided for an
automatic adjustment of the pension rates. Identical benefits were also given to the Members
of the Constitutional Commission under RA 1568, as amended by RA 3595. President Marcos
signed PD 578, on Nov. 12, 1974, which extended similar retirement benefits to the Members of
the Armed Forces giving them also the automatic readjustment features of RA's 1797 and 3595.
However, on Jan. 25, 1975, President Marcos issued PD 644 repealing Sec. 3A of RA's 1797 and
3595 which authorized the adjustment of the pensions of the retired justices of the SC, CA,
Chairman & Members of the Constitutional Commission and the officers and members of the
Armed Forces to the prevailing rates of salaries. Significantly, while the adjustment of the
retirement pensions for members of the Armed Forces was restored by President Marcos, those
of the retired justices of the SC and CA, were not. This led to the passage by Congress of House
Bill 16297 for the reenactment of the repealed provisions of RA's 1797 and 3595 restoring the
said retirement pensions and privileges of the retired justices and Members of the
Constitutional Commission. President Aquino, however vetoed House Bill 16297, citing the
policy on standardization of compensation as reason for such veto.
Prior to the instant petition, however, some retired justices of the CA filed a petition
dated April 22, 1991 asking this Court for a readjustment of their monthly pensions in
accordance with RA 1797, contending that PD 644 repealing the latter law did not become a
law for lack of publication.
The Court acted favorably on the request in a resolution dated Nov. 28, 1991. Pursuant
to such resolution, Congress included in the General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1992
(House Bill No. 34925) a certain appropriation for the Judiciary intended for the payment of
the adjusted pension rates due the retired justices of the SC and CA. On Jan. 15, 1992, the
President vetoed some portions of Sec. 1 and the entire Sec. 4 of the Special Provisions for the
SC and the lower courts, some portions of Sec. 1 and the entire Sec. 2 of the Special Provisions
for the CA, and some portions of Sec. 3 of Art. XLV of the Special Provisions of the General Fund
Adjustments (General Appropriations Act, FY 1992). Hence, the instant petition filed by the
Page 342

petitioners as retired Justices of the SC and CA questioning the constitutionality of the veto by
the President of certain provisions in the General Appropriations Act for FY 1992 relating to the
payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices of the SC and CA. The petitioners assert
that said veto is not an item veto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto by the President of certain provisions in the General
Appropriations Act, FY 1992, relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired
justices of the SC and CA, is unconstitutional.
HELD: The questioned veto is set aside as illegal and unconstitutional. The vetoed provisions
of the 1992 Appropriations Act are valid and subsisting.
The veto power is not absolute. In the exercise of the veto power, the executive must
veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He cannot act like an editor crossing out specific lines,
provisions, or paragraphs in a bill that he or she dislikes. However, when it comes to
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the Administration needs the money to run the machinery
of the government and it cannot veto the entire bill even if it may contain objectionable
features. The President is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including
its undesirable parts. It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the "item
veto power" to avoid inexpedient riders being attached to an indispensable appropriation or
revenue measure. The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be
vetoed. The power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriation bill does not grant the
authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the item.
The Presidential veto is unconstitutional because:
a) The President did not veto the "general fund adjustment" which is an item which
appropriates P 500M to enable the government to meet certain unavoidable obligations which
may have been inadequately funded by the specific items for the different branches,
departments, bureaus, agencies, and offices of the government. What were vetoed were
methods or systems placed by Congress to insure that permanent and continuing obligations to
certain officials would be paid when they fell due;
b) An examination of all the sections and the underlined portions which were vetoed
will readily show that portions of the item have been chopped up into vetoed and unvested
parts. Less than all of an item has been vetoed;
c) The vetoed portions are NOT ITEMS. They are PROVISIONS. Thus, the AUGMENTATION
of specific appropriations found inadequate to pay retirement payments, by transferring
savings from other items of appropriation is a provision and not an item. It gives power to the
Chief Justice to transfer funds from one item to another. There is no specific appropriation of
money involved.
In the same manner, the provision which states that, in compliance with decisions of
the SC and the COA, funds still undetermined in amount may be drawn from the general fund
adjustment is not an item. It is the "general fund adjustment" itself which is the item. It was
not vetoed.
No President may veto the provisions of a law enacted 35 years before his term of
office. Neither may the President set aside or reverse a final and executory judgment of the SC
through the exercise of veto power.
GARCIA v. EXEC. SEC
211 SCRA 219 (1992)
Page 343
FACTS: The President issued EO 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and
charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5%
ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles,
including crude oil and other products imported in the Philippines. EO 443 subsequently
increased this additional duty from 5% to 9% ad valorem.
The Tariff Commission, following the procedures set forth by the Tariff and Customs
Code for the imposition of a special levy on crude oil and other petroleum products, scheduled
a public hearing to give interested parties an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence
in support of their respective positions.
Meantime, the President issued EO 475 reducing the rate of additional duty from 9% to
5% ad valorem, except in the cases of crude oil and other oil products. Upon completion of the
public hearings, the Commission submitted to the President a "Report" for consideration and
appropriate action. A week later, the President issued EO 478 which levied (in addition to the
aforementioned duty of 9% ad valorem and all other existing ad valorem duties) a special levy
of 95 centavos per liter or 151.05 pesos per barrel of imported crude oil and P 1 per liter of
imported oil products.
Petitioner filed a petition assailing the validity of EO No.'s 475 and 478 as violative of
Sec. 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. He contended that since the Constitution vests the
authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power by
issuing EO No.'s 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenuegenerating measures. He further
argued that EO No.'s 475 and 478 contravene Sec. 401 of the Tariff & Customs Code which
authorized the President to increase, reduce or remove tariff duties or to impose additional
duties ONLY when necessary to protect local industries or products but NOT for the purpose of
raising additional revenue for the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO No.'s 475 and 478 are violative of the Constitution and whether or
not they contravene the TCC.
HELD: We believe and so hold that EO No.'s 475 and 478 which may be conceded to be
substantially moved by the desire to generate additional revenues, are not, for that reason
alone, either constitutionally flawed, or legally infirm under Sec. 401 of the TCC. Petitioner has
not successfully overcome the presumptions of constitutionality and legality to which these
EO's are entitled.
1.
2.
Under Sec. 24, Art. VI, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff
bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the legislative
rather than the Executive department. There is an explicit constitutional
permission to Congress to authorize the President "subject to such limitations
and restrictions as Congress may impose" to fix "within specific limits tariff
rates and other duties or imposts" (Sec. 28, Par. 2, Art. VI).
The Court is not persuaded by petitioner's contention that the President is
authorized to act under the TCC ONLY to protect local industries and products
for the sake of the national economy, general welfare and/or national security
for the following reasons:
a. There is nothing in the language of either Sec. 104 or 401 of the TCC
that suggests such a sharp and absolute limitation of authority. The
words "protective" and "protection", being relied upon by petitioner,
Page 344
b.
c.
d.
are simply not enough to support the very broad and encompassing
limitation which the latter seeks to rest on those two words;
Petitioner's singular theory collides with a very practical fact of which
this Court may take judicial notice thai the Bureau of Customs which
administers the TCC is one of the principal traditional generators of
producers of governmental revenue, the other being the BIR;
Customs duties which are assessed at the prescribed tariff rates are
very much like taxes which are frequently imposed for revenueraising
and for regulatory purposes. The levying of customs duties on imported
goods may have in some measure the effect of protecting local
industries. Simultaneously,, however, the very same customs duties
inevitably have the effect of producing governmental revenues. In the
instant case, since the Philippines in fact produces 10 to 15 % of the
crude oil consumed here, the imposition of increased tariff rates and a
special duty on imported crude oil and imported oil products may be
seen to have SOME 11protective" impact upon indigenous oil production
for the effective price of imported crude oil and oil products is
increased. At the same time, it cannot be gainsaid that substantial
revenues for the government are raised by the imposition of such
increased tariff rates or special duty;
Sec. 401 of the TCC establishes general standards with which the
exercise of the authority delegated by that provision to the President
must be consistent: that authority must be exercised in the interest of
national economy, general welfare and/or national security. Petitioner,
however, insists that the "protection of local industries" is the only
permissible objective that can be secured by the exercise of that
delegated authority. We find it extremely difficult to take seriously
such a confined and closed view of the legislative standards and
policies summed up in Sec. 401.
SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION v. CEMENT

MANUFACTURERS, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF TRADE, et al.
G.R. No. 158540, 3 August 2005, En Banc (Tinga, J.)
PRINCIPLE: Nowhere in the SMA does it state that the DTI Secretary may impose general
safeguard measures without a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission, or that the
DTI Secretary may reverse or even review the factual determination made by the Tariff
Commission. Congress has the putative authority to abolish the Tariff Commission or the DTI. It
is similarly empowered to alter or expand its functions through modalities which do not align
with established norms in the bureaucratic structure. The Court is bound to recognize the
legislative prerogative to prescribe such modalities, no matter how atypical they may be, in
affirmation of the legislative power to restructure the executive branch of government.
ISSUE: Positive Final Determination By the Tariff Commission an Indispensable Requisite to the
Imposition of General Safeguard Measures
HELD: The second core ruling in theDecisionwas that contrary to the holding of the Court of
Appeals, the DTI Secretary was barred from imposing a general safeguard measure absent a
positive final determination rendered by the Tariff Commission. The fundamental premise
rooted in this ruling is based on the acknowledgment that the required positive final
determination of the Tariff Commission exists as a properly enacted constitutional limitation
Page 345

imposed on the delegation of the legislative power to impose tariffs and imposts to the
President under Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution.
Congressional Limitations Pursuant To Constitutional Authority on the
Delegated Power to Impose Safeguard Measures
The safeguard measures imposable under the SMA generally involve duties on imported
products, tariff rate quotas, or quantitative restrictions on the importation of a product into
the country. Concerning as they do the foreign importation of products into the Philippines,
these safeguard measures fall within the ambit of Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution,
which states:
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government.[49]
The Court acknowledges the basic postulates ingrained in the provision, and, hence, governing
in this case. They are:
(1)It is Congress which authorizes the President to impose tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts. Thus, the authority cannot
come from the Finance Department, the National Economic Development Authority, or the
World Trade Organization, no matter how insistent or persistent these bodies may be.
(2) The authorization granted to the President must be embodied in a law. Hence, the
justification cannot be supplied simply by inherent executive powers. It cannot arise from
administrative or executive orders promulgated by the executive branch or from the wisdom or
whim of the President.
(3)The authorization to the President can be exercised only within the specified limits set
in the law and is further subject to limitations and restrictions which Congress may
impose. Consequently, if Congress specifies that the tariff rates should not exceed a given
amount, the President cannot impose a tariff rate that exceeds such amount. If Congress
stipulates that no duties may be imposed on the importation of corn, the President cannot
impose duties on corn, no matter how actively the local corn producers lobby the President.
Even the most picayune of limits or restrictions imposed by Congress must be observed by the
President.
There is one fundamental principle that animates these constitutional postulates. These
impositions under Section 28(2), Article VI fall within the realm of the power of taxation, a
power which is within the sole province of the legislature under the Constitution.
Without Section 28(2), Article VI, the executive branch has no authority to impose tariffs
and other similar tax levies involving the importation of foreign goods. Assuming that
Section 28(2) Article VI did not exist, the enactment of the SMA by Congress would be voided on
the ground that it would constitute an undue delegation of the legislative power to tax. The
constitutional provision shields such delegation from constitutional infirmity, and should be
recognized as an exceptional grant of legislative power to the President, rather than the
affirmation of an inherent executive power.
This being the case, the qualifiers mandated by the Constitution on this presidential authority
attain primordial consideration. First, there must be a law, such as the SMA. Second, there
must be specified limits, a detail which would be filled in by the law. And further, Congress is
Page 346

further empowered to impose limitations and restrictions on this presidential authority. On this
last power, the provision does not provide for specified conditions, such as that the limitations
and restrictions must conform to prior statutes, internationally accepted practices, accepted
jurisprudence, or the considered opinion of members of the executive branch.
The Court recognizes that the authority delegated to the President under Section 28(2), Article
VI may be exercised, in accordance with legislative sanction, by the alter egos of the
President, such as department secretaries. Indeed, for purposes of the Presidents exercise of
power to impose tariffs under Article VI, Section 28(2), it is generally the Secretary of Finance
who acts asalter egoof the President. The SMA provides an exceptional instance wherein it is
the DTI or Agriculture Secretary who is tasked by Congress, in their capacities asalter egosof
the President, to impose such measures. Certainly, the DTI Secretary has no inherent power,
even asalter egoof the President, to levy tariffs and imports.
Concurrently, the tasking of the Tariff Commission under the SMA should be likewise construed
within the same context as part and parcel of the legislative delegation of its inherent power
to impose tariffs and imposts to the executive branch, subject to limitations and restrictions.
In that regard, both the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary may be regarded as agents of
Congress within their limited respective spheres, as ordained in the SMA, in the implementation
of the said law which significantly draws its strength from the plenary legislative power of
taxation. Indeed, even the President may be considered as an agent of Congress for the
purpose of imposing safeguard measures. It is Congress, not the President, which possesses
inherent powers to impose tariffs and imposts. Without legislative authorization through
statute, the President has no power, authority or right to impose such safeguard measures
because taxation is inherently legislative, not executive.
When Congress tasks the President or his/her alter egos to impose safeguard measures
under the delineated conditions, the President or thealter egosmay be properly deemed
as agents of Congress to perform an act that inherently belongs as a matter of right to the
legislature. It is basic agency law that the agent may not act beyond the specifically delegated
powers or disregard the restrictions imposed by the principal. In short, Congress may establish
the procedural framework under which such safeguard measures may be imposed, and assign
the various offices in the government bureaucracy respective tasks pursuant to the imposition
of such measures, the task assignment including the factual determination of whether the
necessary conditions exists to warrant such impositions. Under the SMA, Congress assigned the
DTI Secretary and the Tariff Commission their respective functions[50] in the legislatures
scheme of things.
There is only one viable ground for challenging the legality of the limitations and restrictions
imposed by Congress under Section 28(2) Article VI, and that is such limitations and restrictions
are themselves violative of the Constitution. Thus, no matter how distasteful or noxious these
limitations and restrictions may seem, the Court has no choice but to uphold their validity
unless their constitutional infirmity can be demonstrated.
What are these limitations and restrictions that are material to the present case? The entire
SMA provides for a limited framework under which the President, through the DTI and
Agriculture Secretaries, may impose safeguard measures in the form of tariffs and similar
imposts. The limitation most relevant to this case is contained in Section 5 of the SMA,
captioned Conditions for the Application of General Safeguard Measures, and stating:
The Secretaryshall apply a general safeguard measure upon a positive final determination
of the [Tariff] Commission that a product is being imported into the country in increased
Page 347

quantities, whether absolute or relative to the domestic production, as to be a substantial
cause of serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry; however, in the case of nonagricultural products, the Secretary shall first establish that the application of such safeguard
measures will be in the public interest.[51]
IMMUNITY FROM SUITS
GLORIA v. CA
338 SCRA 5 (2000)
FACTS: Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed by President Aquino as Schools Division
Superintendent, Division of City Schools in Quezon City. He was reassigned as a superintendent
of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology as recommended y DECS Sec. Ricardo Gloria
on June 17, 1994. In October 1994 Director Roxas informed Icasiano of the reassignment but
Icasiano requested reconsideration of the assignment. Request was denied and CA granted a
TRO. CA found that the reassignment as violative of Icasianos security of tenure. However,
Sec. Gloria and Director Roxas contend that the prohibition is improper because it attacks as
act of the President in violation of the Doctrine of Presidential immunity from suit.
HELD: The contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against
the petitioners and not against the President.
The questioned acts are those of the petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore,
Presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of
discretion or that the President has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
ESTRADA vs. DESIERTO
356 SCRA 108
FACTS: Following the aborted impeachment trial and the resignation of majority of the
members of the cabinet and the defection of the military and police at about noon of Jan. 20,
2001, Vice-President Arroyo was sworn into Office as President of the Philippines, while
President Estrada with his family left Malacaang. In the days that followed, various criminal
complaints were filed against Estrada before the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation.
ISSUE: Is Estrada, a non-sitting President, still immune from suit?
HELD: No. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination, can these crimes, especially
plunder, which carries the death penalty, covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a nonsitting President. There is no decision licensing the President to commit criminal acts and
wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that
immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that
unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is
not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.
ESTRADA V. DESIERTO
353 SCRA 424
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit Assuming he enjoys immunity,
the
Page 348

extent of the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the
respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the
impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit,
whether criminal or civil. [Estrada vs. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452(2001)]
HELD: We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first
be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada
was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the
presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83
Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio109 Since the Impeachment Court
is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be
impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a
perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it
will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to
impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the
debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings
have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases
may already be filed against him, incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being
brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond.
Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has
been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a
condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted
in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance on the case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan112 and
related cases113 are inapropos for they have a different factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting
President.
The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially
plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a
non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President
to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be
anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and
omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the
officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other
trespasser.
Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial
disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs
the vindication of a right.
David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 scra 160

Facts: These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in
issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) declaring state of national emergency and
General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed
Page 349

efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very
freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for
being unconstitutional.
Ruling: The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless
violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declaredUNCONSTITUTIONAL.
In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII
of the Constitution isCONSTITUTIONAL,but such declaration does not authorize the President
to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without
prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP
should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and measures
to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have
not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declaredUNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless
arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that
these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and
violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the
press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its
articles for publication and other materials, are declaredUNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Rubrico vs. Arroyo, 613 scra 233

Writ of amparo case..
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and
dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
Petitioners first take issue on the Presidents purported lack of immunity from suit during her
term of office. The 1987 Constitution, so they claim, has removed such immunity heretofore
enjoyed by the chief executive under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
Ruling: Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under
our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing
a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an
express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already
understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure.9The
Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise
resolved under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys
immunity during her incumbency, and why this must be so:
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,
may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of
State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is
Page 350

important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable
him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the
legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which
impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon
him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.10x x x
And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to what specific
presidential act or omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners protected rights.
Lozada vs. Arroyo, 670 scra 664

Whether the Court a [q]uo erred in dropping as respondent Pres. Gloria Arroyo despite her
failure to submit a verified return and personally claim presidential immunity in a way not in
accord with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
It is settled in jurisprudence that the President enjoys immunity from suit during his or her
tenure of office or actual incumbency.68 Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity
cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even for acts committed during his or her tenure.
69
In the case at bar, the events that gave rise to the present action, as well as the filing of the
original Petition and the issuance of the CA Decision, occurred during the incumbency of former
President Arroyo. In that respect, it was proper for the court a quo to have dropped her as a
respondent on account of her presidential immunity from suit.
It must be underscored, however, that since her tenure of office has already ended, former
President Arroyo can no longer invoke the privilege of presidential immunity as a defense to
evade judicial determination of her responsibility or accountability for the alleged violation or
threatened violation of the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada.
Public interest vs. Elma, 517 scra 336

Facts: Respondent Elma was appointed as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) on 30 October 1998. Thereafter, during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, he
was appointed as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He accepted the second
appointment, but waived any renumeration that he may receive as CPLC. Petitioners sought to
have both appointments declared as unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
Ruling: the Supreme Court declared that the concurrent appointments of the respondent as
PCGG Chairman and CPLC were unconstitutional. It ruled that the concurrent appointment to
these offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, since
these are incompatible offices. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and
impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive departments and
agencies and reviewing investigations involving heads of executive departments. Since the
actions of the PCGG Chairman, a head of an executive agency, are subject to the review of the
CPLC, such appointments would be incompatible.
The Court also decreed that the strict prohibition under Section 13 Article VII of the 1987
Constitution would not apply to the present case, since neither the PCGG Chairman nor the
Page 351

CPLC is a secretary, undersecretary, or assistant secretary. However, had the rule thereunder
been applicable to the case, the defect of these two incompatible offices would be made more
glaring. The said section allows the concurrent holding of positions only when the second post
is required by the primary functions of the first appointment and is exercised in an ex-officio
capacity. Although respondent Elma waived receiving renumeration for the second
appointment, the primary functions of the PCGG Chairman do not require his appointment as
CPLC
City of Tagaytay vs. Guerrero, 600 scra 33

Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation (TTTDC) is the registered owner of two (2)
parcels of land situated in the Province of Batanggas. TTTDC incurred real estate tax liabilities
on the said properties for the tax years 1976 to 1983.the City Government of Tagaytay (City of
Tagaytay) offered the properties for sale at public auction. Being the only bidder, a certificate
of sale was executed in favor of the City of Tagaytay and was correspondingly inscribed on the
titles of the properties. It then filed an unnumbered petition for entry of new certificates of
title in its favor before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite, Branch XVIII, Tagaytay City.
Subsequently, theses lands were sold to Melencios.
, TTTDC filed a petition for nullification of the public auction involving the disputed properties
on the ground that the properties were not within the jurisdiction of the City of Tagaytay and,
thus, beyond its taxing authority.15 The case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1196 before the
RTC of Cavite. The auction sale was nullified. Said decision became final and executor.
Petitioners filed an MR. Denied..
Issue: ) whether the RTC of Cavite had jurisdiction to settle the alleged boundary dispute;
Ruling: the subject properties that are situated in Barrio Birinayan, Municipality of Talisay, are
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Province of Batangas. This factual finding binds this
Court and is no longer subject to review
There is no boundary dispute in the case at bar. The RTC did not amend the existing territorial
limits of the City of Tagaytay and the Province of Batangas. The entire Barrio Birinayan was
transferred to the Municipality of Talisay, Province of Batangas, by virtue of R.A. No. 1418. At
present, Barrio Birinayan forms part of the Municipality of Laurel, also in the Province of
Batangas, pursuant to R.A. No. 5689. The RTC acted well within its powers when it passed
judgment on the nullification of the auction sale of the contested properties, considering that
the City of Tagaytay has no right to collect real estate taxes on properties that are not within
its territorial jurisdiction.
In re Valenzuela, 298 scra 408
De castro vs. JBC, 615 scra 666
Page 352

Issue: Whether the incumbent President is constitutionally proscribed from appointing the
successor of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010 until the ban
ends at 12:00 noon of June 30, 2010
Ruling: Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and
surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents
term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended point in
order to suit the purposes of any quarter.
(note: The Valenzuela case cited as authority for the position that the election ban provision
applies to the whole Judiciary, only decided the issue with respect to lower court judges,
specifically, those covered by Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution. Any reference to the
filling up of vacancies in the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII constitutes
obiter dictum as this issue was not directly in issue and was not ruled upon).
RE: Seniority Among the Fou (4) Most Recent Apppointments to the Position of Associate
Justices of the Court of Appeals
Newly appointed justices. After some initial confusion, the four Justices were finally listed in
the roster of the CA Justices in the following order of seniority: Justice Fernandez (as most
senior), Justice Peralta, Jr., Justice Hernando and Justice Antonio-Valenzuela (as most junior).
The ranking was based in a letter dated March 25, 2010 submitted by the members of the CA
Committee on Rules to CA Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
Ruling: An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act, of one who has the authority,
of designating or selecting an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of
an office or trust.3 Where the power of appointment is absolute and the appointee has been
determined upon, no further consent or approval is necessary and the formal evidence of the
appointment, the commission, may issue at once.4The appointment is deemed complete once
the last act required of the appointing authority has been complied with.5
In Valencia v. Peralta,6the Court ruled that a written memorial that can render title to public
office indubitable is required. This written memorial is known as the commission. For purposes
of completion of the appointment process, the appointment is complete when the commission
is signed by the executive, and sealed if necessary, and is ready to be delivered or transmitted
to the appointee.7 Thus, transmittal of the commission is an act which is done after the
appointment has already been completed. It is not required to complete the appointment but
only to facilitate the effectivity of the appointment by the appointees receipt and acceptance
thereof.
For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, therefore, the date the commission has been
signed by the President (which is the date appearing on the face of such document) is the date
of the appointment. Such date will determine the seniority of the members of the Court of
Appeals in connection with Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246. In other
Page 353

words, the earlier the date of the commission of an appointee, the more senior he/she is over
the other subsequent appointees. It is only when the appointments of two or more appointees
bear the same date that the order of issuance of the appointments by the President becomes
material.
Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil 522

Facts:Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax
upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount (P802),
he instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment
was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would
reduce it in violation of the Constitution.
Ruling: judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because
the collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or diminution of their salaries during
their continuance in office, a thing which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution
Endencia vs. David, 93 Phil 696

Congress promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to counteract the ruling in that decision, at
least now to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial
officers. section 13 of Republic Act No. 590:
SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines
shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not
to be dimunition of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.
A joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring section 13 of
Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector
of Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia representing the income tax
collected on his salary and to Justice Fernando Jugo.
Ruling: When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by
the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they
cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain
the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing.
When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from payment of
income tax on his salary, as a privilege . It is already attached to his office, provided and
secured by the fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest, to
secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. The exemption was not
primarily intended to benefit judicial officers, but was grounded on public policy
1.
Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, GR L-78780, 23 July 1987
FACTS: Petitioners David Nitafan, Wenceslao Polo and Maximo Savellano Jr., were duly
appointed and qualified Judges of the RTC National Capital Judicial Region. They seek to
Page 354

prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, (CIR and the Financial Officer of the Supreme
Court) from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. Petitioners submit
that any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes
a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUE: Is a deduction of withholding tax a diminution of the salaries of Judges/Justices?
HELD: The SC hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in PERFECTO VS.
MEER (88 Phil 552) and ENDENCIA VS. DAVID (93 Phil 696), that declared the salaries of
members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of the income tax and considered such
payment as a diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office. The Court hereby
reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are property subject to general income tax
applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such income tax by Justices and
Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries
during their continuance in office.
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in
question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the
Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of
the people adopting it should be given effect.
The ruling that the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a diminution thereof,
and so violates the Constitution in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David, must be
deemed discarded.
2.
Gualberto J. De La Llana, et. al. vs. Manuel Alba, et. al., GR No. L-57883, 12 March
1982
FACTS: De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition,
seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the
Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129, which mandates that Justices
and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan
and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be
considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for
petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being alleged that the security of tenure
provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.
ISSUES: W/N BP 129 is unconstitutional for impairing the security of tenure of the justices and
judges in this case?
HELD: The SC ruled that the Court is empowered:
to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their
dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it
was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished
from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a nonexistent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an
office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the
standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation.
As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.
Page 355

Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the
implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted
principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are
concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No
fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that
this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the
case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter
has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant
positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom
it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial
power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any
plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the
inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is
ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional
taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust.
Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the
choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a
statute, the former is to be preferred.
3. In Re First Indorsemet From Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez Dated 16 March 1988
Requesting Honorable Justice Marcelo B. Fernan To Comment On An Anonymous
Letter-Complaint, A.M. No. 88-4-5433 April 15, 1988
Facts: Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor, Raul M. Gonzales, endorsed an anonymous letter
complaint with enclosure dated 14 December 1987, against Justice Marcelo B. Fernan.
The mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments. First, an anonymous letter by
"Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court" addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez referring to
charges for disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Justice Marcelo B. Fernan. The
second attachment is a copy of a telegram from Mr. Miguel Cuenco addressed to Hon. Raul M.
Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he apparently filed on 29 February 1988 with
the Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. 3135 against Justice Fernan.
Issue: W/N disbarment proceeding will prosper against a justice of the Supreme Court whose
position is constitutionally classified as impeachable?
Held: The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988 in Administrative
Case No. 3135 in the following terms:
There is another reason why the complaint for disbarment must be dismissed. Members of the
Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine
Bar and may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution) To
grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency,
would in effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that
Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of
certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution...
The provisions of the 1973 Constitution quoted in Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan are substantially
reproduced in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution:
Sec. 2 The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, may be
removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public
trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law,
but not by impeachment. (underscoring supplied)
It is important to make clear that the Court is not saying that Members of the other
constitutional offices we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possible
criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed
Page 356

misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirement
that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. A Member of the
Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment
under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme
Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either
criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that
may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.
4. Civil Service Commission, Petitioner, Vs. Department Of Budget And Management,
Respondent, G.R. No. 158791, July 22, 2005
Facts: Petitioner Civil Service Commission filed a petition for mandamus which seeks to compel
the respondent Department of Budget and Management to release the balance of its budget for
fiscal year 2002. It also seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional
concept of fiscal autonomy.
The petitioner claimed that the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2002 appropriated
P215,270,000.00 for its Central Office, with a total allocation from all sources, amounting to
P285,660,790.44.[1] It complained, however, that the total fund released by the respondent to
the petitioner during the fiscal year 2002 was only P279,853,398.14, leaving an unreleased
balance of P5,807,392.30.
The balance was intentionally withheld by respondent on the basis of its no report, no
release policy, whereby allocations for agencies are withheld pending their submission of the
documents mentioned in Sections 3.8 to 3.10 and Section 7.0 of National Budget Circular No.
478 on Guidelines on the Release of the FY 2002 Funds.
Issue: W/N, the application of the no report, no release policy upon independent
constitutional bodies like the petitioner, CSC, a violation of the principle of fiscal autonomy,
and therefore, unconstitutional.
Held: The SC held that the no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against
offices vested with fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the
Constitution which provides:
Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.
By parity of construction, automatic release of approved annual appropriations to petitioner,
a constitutional commission, which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to
mean that no conditions for fund releases may be imposed. This conclusion is consistent with
the June 3, 1993 Resolution of this Court which effectively prohibited the enforcement of a no
report, no release policy against the Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal autonomy by
the Constitution.[10]
The Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commissions of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that
petitioner may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue
shortfall would, to that extent, place petitioner and the other entities vested with fiscal
autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby
reducing to naught the distinction established by the Constitution.
Page 357

The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be given
priority in the release of their approved appropriations over all other agencies not similarly
vested when there is a revenue shortfall.
Significantly, pertinent General Provisions of the Year 2002 GAA read as follows:
Sec. 63. Unmanageable National Government Budget Deficit. Retention or reduction of

appropriations authorized in this Act shall be effected only in cases where there is
unmanageable national government budget deficit. (underscoring supplied)
Unmanageable national government budget deficit as used in this Section shall be construed
to mean that the actual national government budget deficit has exceeded the quarterly budget
deficit targets consistent with the full-year target deficit of P130.0 billion as indicated in the
FY 2002 Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing submitted by the President to
Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution or there are clear economic
indications of an impending occurrence of such condition, as determined by the Development
Budget Coordinating Committee and approved by the President. (underscoring supplied)
In contrast, the immediately succeeding provision of the Year 2002 GAA, which specifically
applied to offices vested with fiscal autonomy, stated:
Sec. 64. Appropriations of Agencies Vested with Fiscal Autonomy. Any provision of law to
the contrary notwithstanding, the appropriations authorized in this Act for the Judiciary,
Congress of the Philippines, the Commission on Human Rights, the Office of the Ombudsman,
the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit and the Commission on Elections shall
be automatically and regularly released. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, while the retention or reduction of appropriations for an office is generally allowed
when there is an unmanageable budget deficit, the Year 2002 GAA, in conformity with the
Constitution, excepted from such rule the appropriations for entities vested with fiscal
autonomy. Thus, even assuming that there was a revenue shortfall as respondent claimed, it
could not withhold full release of petitioners funds without violating not only the Constitution
but also Section 64 of the General Provisions of the Year 2002 GAA.
This Court is not unaware that its above-cited June 3, 1993 Resolution also states as a guiding
principle on the Constitutional Mandate on the Judiciarys Fiscal Autonomy that:
After approval by Congress, the appropriations for the Judiciary shall be automatically and
regularly released subject to availability of funds. (underscoring supplied)
This phrase subject to availability of funds does not, however, contradict the present ruling
that the funds of entities vested with fiscal autonomy should be automatically and regularly
released a shortfall in revenues notwithstanding. What is contemplated in the said quoted
phrase is a situation where total revenue collections are so low that they are not sufficient to
cover the total appropriations for all entities vested with fiscal autonomy. In such event, it
would be practically impossible to fully release the Judiciarys appropriations or any of the
entities also vested with fiscal autonomy for that matter, without violating the right of such
other entities to an automatic release of their own appropriations. It is under that situation
that a relaxation of the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly release
appropriations is allowed. (underscoring supplied)
Page 358
Considering that the budget for agencies enjoying fiscal autonomy is only a small portion of the
total national budget, only in the most extreme circumstances will the total revenue
collections fall short of the requirements of such agencies.
With respect to the Judiciary, Art. VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution explicitly provides:
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not
be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and,
after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.[16] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
On the other hand, in the parallel provision granting fiscal autonomy to Constitutional
Commissions, a similar proscription against the reduction of appropriations below the amount
for the previous year is clearly absent. Article IX (A), Section 5 merely states:
Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations
shall be automatically and regularly released.
The plain implication of the omission of the provision proscribing such reduction of
appropriations below that for the previous year is that Congress is not prohibited from reducing
the appropriations of Constitutional Commissions below the amount appropriated for them for
the previous year.
In light of all the foregoing discussions, respondents act of withholding the subject funds from
petitioner due to revenue shortfall is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
5. Re: Clarifying And Strengthening The Organizational Structure and Administrative

Set-Up of the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA), A.M. No. 01-1-04-SC-PHILJA,
January 31, 2006
Facts: The Court promulgated a Resolution on February 24, 2004, clarifying and strengthening
the organizational structure and administrative set-up of the Philippine Judicial Academy
(PHILJA).1 Pursuant to said resolution, the positions of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer and
Supervising Judicial Staff Officer with Salary Grades (SG) 25 and 23, respectively, were created
in the following Divisions of the PHILJA: Publications Division, and External Linkages Division
(Research, Publications and Linkages Office); Mediation Education and Management Division
(Judicial Reforms Office); Corporate Planning Division, and Administrative Division
(Administrative and Finance Office). However, in its Notice of Organization, Staffing, and
Compensation Action (NOSCA) dated May 5, 2005, the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) downgraded said positions and their corresponding salary grades, as follows:
Position Title/SG Position Title/SG
per A.M. No.
per
Remarks
01-1-04-SC
DBM NOSCA
SC Chief Judicial A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Title downgraded
Staff Officer/ SG Officer V/SG 24
and SG reduced
25
S u p e r v i s i n g A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Title downgraded
J u d i c i a l S t a f f Officer IV/SG22
and SG reduced2
Officer/SG 23
Page 359

On July 5, 2005, the Court issued a Resolution, retaining "the originally proposed titles and
salary grades of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer (SG 25) and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer (SG
23) in the [PHILJA]".
Issue: W/N, DBMs issuance of the NOSCA downgrading the Courts proposed positions and
reducing its corresponding salary grades "undermine the independence of the Judiciary and
impinge on the Supreme Courts exercise of its fiscal autonomy expressly granted by the
Constitution."
Held: The SC held that the primary role of the DBM is to breathe life into the policy behind the
Salary Standardization Law of "providing equal pay for substantially equal work and to base
differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification
requirements of the positions." Pursuant to its mandate, the DBM is authorized to evaluate and
determine whether a proposed reclassification and upgrading scheme is consistent with
applicable laws and regulations.5 The task of the DBM is simply to review the compensation and
benefits plan of the government agency or entity concerned and determine if it complies with
the prescribed policies and guidelines issued in this regard. Thus, the role of the DBM is
"supervisorial in nature, its main duty being to ascertain that the proposed compensation,
benefits and other incentives to be given to [government] officials and employees adhere to
the policies and guidelines issued in accordance with applicable laws."6
As such, the authority of the DBM to review Supreme Court issuances relative to court
personnel on matters of compensation is even more limited, circumscribed as it is by the
provisions of the Constitution, specifically Article VIII, Section 37 on fiscal autonomy and Article
VIII, Section 68 on administrative supervision over court personnel. Fiscal autonomy means
freedom from outside control9, as the Court explained in Bengzon v. Drilon.10
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices
allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy
and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the
Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of
our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme
Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to
constant reminders. XXX
Clearly then, in downgrading the positions and salary grades of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer
and SC Supervising Judicial Staff Officer in the PHILJA, the DBM overstepped its authority and
encroached upon the Courts fiscal autonomy and supervision of court personnel as enshrined in
the Constitution; in fine, a violation of the Constitution itself.
Moreover, the General Provisions of the General Appropriations Act reiterates the constitutional
provision on fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary. In matters affecting court personnel and
compensation, the Court is guided by the Special Provision for the Judiciary under the General
Appropriations Act for FY 2003 (Republic Act No. 9206), which was deemed reenacted for FY
2004, and hence governed during the issuance of the Resolution of 24 February 2004. The
Special Provision vests the Chief Justice with the authority to "formulate and implement the
organizational structure of the Judiciary, to fix and determine the salaries, allowances and
other benefits of their personnel, and whenever public interest so requires, makes adjustments
in the personal services itemization, including but not limited to the transfer of item or
creation of new positions in the Judiciary." (underscoring supplied)
It is therefore clear that when the Court exercises its administrative authority over matters
affecting its personnel, it does so within parameters prescribed by pertinent laws. It cannot be
presumed that the Court will violate budgetary laws or go beyond the ambit of its authority or
issue administrative resolutions in derogation of the law. The exercise of such authority should
not in any case be absolute or outside the law as, being the ultimate interpreter of the law, the
Page 360

Court is constitutionally bound to observe the Constitution and the law it is mandated to
interpret. On the other hand, the DBM is duty-bound not only to accord respect for the
issuances of the highest Court in the Judiciary, the third branch of government, but also to
implement them. For the DBM to even venture to alter a Resolution of the Court is to violate
the basic principle of separation of powers. xxx
xxx
Thus, the authority of the DBM to "review" the plantilla and compensation of court personnel
extends only to "calling the attention of the Court" on what it may perceive as erroneous
application of budgetary laws and rules on position classification. The DBM may not overstep its
authority in such a way as to cause the amendment or modification of Court resolutions even if
these pertain to administration of compensation and position classification system. Only after
its attention to an allegedly erroneous application of the pertinent law or rule has been called
by the DBM may the Court amend or modify its resolution, as its judgment and discretion may
dictate under the law.
In this instance, the change of two position titles was made apparently to conform to position
titles indicated in the personnel services itemization for all government positions, clearly
oblivious of the fact that positions in the Judiciary are peculiar only to that branch of
government. It appearing that the salary grades of 25 and 23 are proper positions equivalent to
those of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer, respectively,
under the Salary Standardization Law, and that the Court prescribed those position titles only
after consideration of the nature of work and functions that the holders of those positions must
perform, there is no reason to amend the Resolutions of 24 February 2004, and of 5 July 2005,
so as to reflect the position titles and salary grades stated in the NOSCA for the same positions.
12
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Department of Budget and Management is DIRECTED to

implement the Resolutions of the Court dated February 24, 2004 and July 5, 2005, retaining the
originally proposed titles and salary grades of the positions of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer
(SG 25) and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer (SG 23) in the Philippine Judicial Academy.
6. Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties
Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, A.M. No.
11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012
Facts: On June 8, 2010, the Legal Services Sector of the Office of the General Counsel of the
Commission on Audit (COA), issued an opinion which found the underpayment amounting to
P221,021.50, which resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the
Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court.
The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme Court
of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles by applying
the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997
and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 23,
2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01,3 when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum
No. 98-569-A4 dated August 5, 1998.
Issue: W/N, the Commission on Audit (COA) encroached into the Courts judicial prerogative in
light of the Courts fiscal autonomy, when it questions and attempts to substitute the Courts
policy in the disposal of its property.
Held: The Judiciarys fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief Justice, as its
head, and of the Supreme Court En Banc, in the exercise of administrative control and
supervision of the courts and its personnel. As the Court En Bancs Resolution (dated March 23,
2004) in A.M. No. 03-12-01 reflects, the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary serves as the basis in
allowing the sale of the Judiciarys properties to retiring Justices of the Supreme Court and the
appellate courts:
Page 361

XXX by the constitutional mandate of fiscal autonomy as defined in Bengzon v. Drilon (G.R. No.
103524, 15 April 1992, 208 SCRA 133, 150) the Judiciary has "full flexibility to allocate and
utilize (its) resources with the wisdom and dispatch that (its) needs require";
XXX the long-established tradition and practice of Justices or Members of appellate courts of
purchasing for sentimental reasons at retirement government properties they used during their
tenure has been recognized as a privilege enjoyed only by such government officials; and
XXX the exercise of such privilege needs regulation to the end that respect for sentiments that
a retiring Justice attaches to properties he or she officially used during his or her tenure should
be in consonance with the need for restraint in the utilization and disposition of government
resources.
Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy and its independence, the Chief
Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what, where, when and how of
the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel
within the parameters of the Courts granted power; they determine the terms, conditions and
restrictions of the grant as grantor.
In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint
Resolution No. 35 is part of the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the
manner the granted retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of
interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not
only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon
the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to
manage the Judiciarys own affairs. (underscoring supplied)
As a final point, we add that this view finds full support in the Government Accounting and
Auditing Manual (GAAM), Volume 1, particularly, Section 501 of Title 7, Chapter 3, which states:
Section 501. Authority or responsibility for property disposal/divestment. The full and sole
authority and responsibility for the divestment and disposal of property and other assets owned
by the national government agencies or instrumentalities, local government units and
government-owned and/or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries shall be lodged in the
heads of the departments, bureaus, and offices of the national government, XXX. (underscoring
supplied)
This provision clearly recognizes that the Chief Justice, as the head of the Judiciary, possesses
the full and sole authority and responsibility to divest and dispose of the properties and assets
of the Judiciary; as Head of Office, he determines the manner and the conditions of
disposition, which in this case relate to a benefit. As the usual practice of the Court, this
authority is exercised by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Court En Banc. However,
whether exercised by the Chief Justice or by the Supreme Court En Banc, the grant of such
authority and discretion is unequivocal and leaves no room for interpretations and insertions.
ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the in-house computation of the appraisal value made by
the Property Division, Office of `Administrative Services, of the properties purchased by the
retired Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, based on CFAG Joint
Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997, as directed under the Court Resolution dated March 23,
2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01, is CONFIRMED to be legal and valid. Let the Commission on Audit be
accordingly advised of this Resolution for its guidance.
7. Annotation Supreme Court re: Jose Suan, Petitioner, Vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, Irma Fishing And Trading Inc., Roberto Del Rosario And Emiliano
Oripaypay, Respondents, G.R. No. 141441, June 19, 2001
Facts: Jose Suan filed a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the
decision dated August 17, 1999 of the respondent Court of Appeals1 which affirmed the decision
of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter dismissing the petitioners illegal dismissal case against
private respondents and the resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.2
Page 362

Issue: W/N, petitioners remedy of filing the petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court was proper.
Held: The SC ruled that the petition was without merit. The Court found the petition was
essentially raising a factual issue, whether petitioner was illegally dismissed from his
employment by the private respondents.
In petitions for review of decisions of the Court of Appeals, the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court is confined to a review of questions of law, except where the findings of fact are not
supported by the record or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of
discretion.8 It is a settled ruling that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.9 (underscoring
supplied)
The arguments herein raised are mere rehash of petitioners contentions in his memorandum
filed with the NLRC and in his petition for certiorari filed with the respondent court. We find no
cogent reason to disturb the findings of the respondent Court of Appeals that no grave abuse of
discretion was committed by the respondent NLRC and Labor Arbiter in finding and declaring
that petitioner was not dismissed by the private respondent and hence not entitled to
backwages.
8. Evelyn Ongsuco And Antonia Salaya, Petitioners, V. Hon. Mariano M. Malones, Both
In His Private And Official Capacity As Mayor Of The Municipality Of Maasin, Iloilo,
Respondent, G.R. No. 182065, October 27, 2009
Facts: Petitioners, Evelyn Ongsuco and Antonia Salaya, filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 28
November 2006, affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 39, of Iloilo
City, dated 15 July 2003, in a Civil Case dismissing the special civil action for Mandamus/
Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, filed by the petitioners against respondent Mayor Mariano Malones of
the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo.
Petitioners are stall holders of the newly renovated Maasin Public Market, which imposes an
increased goodwill fees of P20,000.00/month in contrast with the previous P45.00/month
rent prior to the renovation, as sanctioned by the Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, entitled "The
Municipal Revised Revenue Code" approved on 17 August 1998. The same Code authorized
respondent to enter into lease contracts over the said market stalls,5 and incorporated a
standard contract of lease for the stall holders at the municipal public market. On 18
September 1988, the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin passed a Resolution No. 68 declaring the
public hearing dated 11 August 1988 inoperative because majority of the persons affected by
the imposition of the goodwill fee failed to agree to the said measure. However, the
respondent Mayor vetoed the resolution. Thereafter, the respondent Mayor sent a letter to the
petitioners informing them that the stalls were considered vacant and open for any qualified
and interested applicants, due to the fact that they did not have a new lease contract required
by the new ordinance.
Issue: W/N, petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision of the CA
before the SC is proper, where petitioners raise the following issues:
I WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE EXHAUSTED ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE
FILING THE INSTANT CASE IN COURT;
II WHETHER OR NOT EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE;
AND
III WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLEE MARIANO MALONES WHO WAS THEN THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR
OF MAASIN, ILOILO HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.25
Held:
1. On issues 1 and 2, the Court determines that there is no need for petitioners to
exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the courts.
Page 363

The findings of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the Petition for Prohibition/
Mandamus in the Civil Case was premature is anchored on Section 187 of the Local Government
Code, which reads:
Section 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures;
Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue
measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public
hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided, further,
That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures
may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of
Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the
appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the
effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied
therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse
of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved
party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
It is true that the general rule is that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative
processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity
to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be
exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of
the intervention of the court is fatal to one's cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will
shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and
complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct
its error and dispose of the case. However, there are several exceptions to this rule.26
The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to preclude a court from
arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Thus, a case where the
issue raised is a purely legal question, well within the competence; and the jurisdiction of the
court and not the administrative agency, would clearly constitute an exception.27 Resolving
questions of law, which involve the interpretation and application of laws, constitutes
essentially an exercise of judicial power that is exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and
such lower courts the Legislature may establish.28
In this case, the parties are not disputing any factual matter on which they still need to present
evidence. The sole issue petitioners raised before the RTC in Civil Case No. 25843 was whether
Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was valid and enforceable despite the absence, prior to its
enactment, of a public hearing held in accordance with Article 276 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the Local Government Code. This is undoubtedly a pure question of law,
within the competence and jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve.
Paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly establishes the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court, and impliedly recognizes the original jurisdiction of lower courts over
cases involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
Page 364

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
is in question. (underscoring supplied)
Although not raised in the Petition at bar, the Court is compelled to discuss another procedural
issue, specifically, the declaration by the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that
petitioners availed themselves of the wrong remedy in filing a Petition for Prohibition/
Mandamus before the RTC.
Sections 2 and 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of the Rules of Court lay down under what circumstances
petitions for prohibition and mandamus may be filed, to wit:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein, XXX.
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus . - When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be
specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner,
and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent. (Emphases ours.)
In a petition for prohibition against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person - - whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions - - who has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner prays that judgment be
rendered, commanding the respondent to desist from further proceeding in the action or
matter specified in the petition.32 On the other hand, the remedy of mandamus lies to compel
performance of a ministerial duty.33 The petitioner for such a writ should have a well-defined,
clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act, and it must be the clear and
imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.34
In this case, petitioners' primary intention is to prevent respondent from implementing
Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, i.e., by collecting the goodwill fees from petitioners and
barring them from occupying the stalls at the municipal public market. Obviously, the writ
petitioners seek is more in the nature of prohibition (commanding desistance), rather than
mandamus (compelling performance).
For a writ of prohibition, the requisites are:
(1) the impugned act must be that of a "tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions"; and
(2) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."35
The exercise of judicial function consists of the power to determine what the law is and what
the legal rights of the parties are, and then to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. The
term quasi-judicial function applies to the action and discretion of public administrative
officers or bodies that are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature. In implementing Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, respondent is
Page 365

not called upon to adjudicate the rights of contending parties or to exercise, in any manner,
discretion of a judicial nature.
A ministerial function is one that an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of
facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his or its own judgment,
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.36
The Court holds that respondent herein is performing a ministerial function.
The Court further notes that respondent already deemed petitioners' stalls at the municipal
public market vacated. Without such stalls, petitioners would be unable to conduct their
businesses, thus, depriving them of their means of livelihood. It is imperative on petitioners'
part to have the implementation of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 by respondent stopped the
soonest. As this Court has established in its previous discussion, there is no more need for
petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies, considering that the fundamental issue
between them and respondent is one of law, over which the courts have competence and
jurisdiction. There is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy for petitioners in the
ordinary course of law, except to seek from the courts the issuance of a writ of prohibition
commanding respondent to desist from continuing to implement what is allegedly an invalid
ordinance.rl
2. On the validity of Municipal Ordinance N. 98-01, the SC ruled that:
While the respondent maintains that the imposition of goodwill fees upon stall holders at the
municipal public market is not a revenue measure that requires a prior public hearing, and that
rentals and other consideration for occupancy of the stalls at the municipal public market are
not matters of taxation, the SC rules that respondent's argument is specious.
Article 219 of the Local Government Code provides that a local government unit exercising its
power to impose taxes, fees and charges should comply with the requirements set in Rule XXX,
entitled "Local Government Taxation":
Article 219. Power to Create Sources of Revenue. Consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy, each LGU shall exercise its power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy
taxes, fees, or charges, subject to the provisions of this Rule. Such taxes, fees, or charges shall
accrue exclusively to the LGU.
Article 221(g) of the Local Government Code of 1991 defines "charges" as:
Article 221. Definition of Terms.
xxx
(g) Charges refer to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against persons or property.
Evidently, the revenues of a local government unit do not consist of taxes alone, but also other
fees and charges. And rentals and goodwill fees, imposed by Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 for
the occupancy of the stalls at the municipal public market, fall under the definition of charges.
(underscoring supplied)
For the valid enactment of ordinances imposing charges, certain legal requisites must be met.
Section 186 of the Local Government Code identifies such requisites as follows:
Section 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. Local government units may exercise
the power to levy taxes, fees or charges on any base or subject not otherwise specifically
enumerated herein or taxed under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended, or other applicable laws: Provided, That the taxes, fees or charges shall not be
unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to declared national policy: Provided,
further, That the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or charges shall not be enacted without
any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose. (underscoring supplied.)
Section 277 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code
establishes in detail the procedure for the enactment of such an ordinance, relevant provisions
of which are reproduced below:
Section 277. Publication of Tax Ordinance and Revenue Measures. x x x.
xxx
Page 366

(b) The conduct of public hearings shall be governed by the following procedure:
xxx
(2) In addition to the requirement for publication or posting, the sanggunian concerned shall
cause the sending of written notices of the proposed ordinance, enclosing a copy thereof, to
the interested or affected parties operating or doing business within the territorial jurisdiction
of the LGU concerned.
(3) The notice or notices shall specify the date or dates and venue of the public hearing or
hearings. The initial public hearing shall be held not earlier than ten (10) days from the sending
out of the notice or notices, or the last day of publication, or date of posting thereof,
whichever is later;
xxx
(c) No tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be enacted or approved in the absence of a
public hearing duly conducted in the manner provided under this Article. (underscoring
supplied)
It is categorical, therefore, that a public hearing be held prior to the enactment of an
ordinance levying taxes, fees, or charges; and that such public hearing be conducted as
provided under Section 277 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government
Code.
There is no dispute herein that the notices sent to petitioners and other stall holders at the
municipal public market were sent out on 6 August 1998, informing them of the supposed
"public hearing" to be held on 11 August 1998. Even assuming that petitioners received their
notice also on 6 August 1998, the "public hearing" was already scheduled, and actually
conducted, only five days later, on 11 August 1998. This contravenes Article 277(b)(3) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code which requires that the
public hearing be held no less than ten days from the time the notices were sent out, posted,
or published.
When the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin sought to correct this procedural defect through
Resolution No. 68, series of 1998, dated 18 September 1998, respondent vetoed the said
resolution. Although the Sangguniang Bayan may have had the power to override respondent's
veto,37 it no longer did so.
The defect in the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 98 was not cured when another public
hearing was held on 22 January 1999, after the questioned ordinance was passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan and approved by respondent on 17 August 1998. Section 186 of the Local
Government Code prescribes that the public hearing be held prior to the enactment by a local
government unit of an ordinance levying taxes, fees, and charges.
Since no public hearing had been duly conducted prior to the enactment of Municipal
Ordinance No. 98-01, said ordinance is void and cannot be given any effect. Consequently, a
void and ineffective ordinance could not have conferred upon respondent the jurisdiction to
order petitioners' stalls at the municipal public market vacant.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 28
November 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86182 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 is DECLARED void and ineffective, and a writ of prohibition is
ISSUED commanding the Mayor of the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo, to permanently desist from
enforcing the said ordinance. Petitioners are also DECLARED as lawful occupants of the market
stalls they occupied at the time they filed the Petition for Mandamus/Prohibition XXX. In the
event that they were deprived of possession of the said market stalls, petitioners are entitled
to recover possession of these stalls. (underscoring supplied)
9. Henlin Panay Company And/Or Edwin Francisco/Angel Lazaro III, Petitioners, vs.
National Labor Relations Commission (Nlrc) And Nory A. Bolanos, Respondents, G.R.
No. 180718 , October 23, 2009
Page 367

Facts: Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court questioning
the Decision1 dated October 9, 2007 and the Resolution2 dated November 26, 2007 of the Court
of Appeals affirming the Resolution3 dated January 31, 2007 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) declaring petitioners liable for illegally dismissing respondent Nory A.
Bolanos.
Issue: W/N, the CA erred in affirming the decision of the NLRC declaring the petitioners liable
for the illegal dismissal of the respondent.
Held: The SC affirmed and modified the decision of the CA confirming the resolution of the
NLRC in declaring the petitioners liable for the illegal dismissal of the respondent. The Court
held that:
To constitute abandonment, there must be a clear and deliberate intent to discontinue one's
employment without any intention of returning. Two elements must concur:
(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and
(2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as
the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts.13 It is the employer
who has the burden of proof to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to
resume his employment without any intention of returning.14
In the instant case, petitioners failed to prove that it was Bolanos who refused to report for
work despite being asked to return to work. Petitioners merely presented the affidavits of the
officers of Henlin Panay narrating their version of the facts. These affidavits, however, are not
only insufficient but also undeserving of credit as they are self-serving. Petitioners failed to
present memoranda or show-cause letters served on Bolanos at her last known address
requiring her to report for work or to explain her absence, with a warning that her failure to
report would be construed as abandonment of work. Also, if indeed Bolanos abandoned her
work, petitioners should have served her a notice of termination as required by law. Petitioners'
failure to comply with said requirement bolsters Bolanos's claim that she did not abandon her
work but was dismissed.
Clearly, Bolanos's case is one of illegal dismissal. First, there is no just or authorized cause for
petitioners to terminate her employment. Her alleged act of dishonesty of "passing out" food
for free was not proven. Neither was there incompetence on her part when some food items
were not punched in the cash register as she was not the cashier manning it when the food
items were ordered. In fact, the other cashier even owned up to said mistake. Second, Bolanos
was not afforded due process by petitioners before she was dismissed. A day after the incident,
she was verbally dismissed from her employment without being given the chance to be heard
and defend herself.
Article VIII, Section 5 (e)
Central Mindanao University v. Executive Secretary

631 SCRA 30 (2010)
FACTS: Central Mindanao University is a chartered educational institution owned and run by the
State. In 1958, President Garcia issued PP 476 reserving 3401 hectares of lands of the public
domain as school site for CMU. Eventually, CMU obtained title in its name over 3080 hectares of
those lands. On 2003, President Arroyo issued PP 310 that takes 670 hectares from CMUs
registered lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities. CMU filed a
Page 368

petition for prohibition against Executive Secretary et.al. before the RTC of Malaybalay seeking
to stop the implementation of PP 310 and have it declared unconstitutional. Respondents
moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Malaybalay RTC since the
act sought to be enjoined relates to an official act of the Executive done in Manila. Initially the
RTC denied the motion to dismiss but on reconsideration, but after the hearing the preliminary
injunction incident, it granted the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. However, the RTC
still ruled that PP 310 is not unconstitutional. CMU filed an appeal before the CA. The latter
dismissed CMUs appeal holding among others that CMUs recourse should have been a petition
for review on certiorari filed directly with the SC since it raised pure questions of law, bearing
mainly on the constitutionality of PP 310.
ISSUE: W/N the CA correctly dismissed CMUs appeal on the ground that it raised purely
questions of law that are proper for a petition for review filed directly with the SC NO
RULING: Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 vests in the CA appellate
jurisdiction over the final judgments or orders of the RTCs and quasi-judicial bodies. But where
an appeal from the RTC raises purely questions of law, recourse should be by a petition for
review on certiorari filed directly with this Court. The question in this case is whether or not
CMUs appeal from the RTCs order of dismissal raises purely questions of law.
CMUs action was one for injunction against the implementation of PP 310 that authorized the
taking of lands from the university. The fact that the President issued this proclamation in
Manila and that it was being enforced in Malaybalay City where the lands were located were
facts that were not in issue. These were alleged in the complaint and presumed to be true by
the motion to dismiss. Consequently, the CMUs remedy for assailing the correctness of the
dismissal, involving as it did a pure question of law, indeed lies with this Court.
The CMU claimed that the Malaybalay RTC deprived it of its right to due process when it
dismissed the case based on the ground that PP 310 was constitutional. CMU points out that the
issue of the constitutionality of the proclamation had not yet been properly raised and heard.
Respondents had not yet filed an answer to join issue with CMU on that score. What
respondents filed was merely a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
Malaybalay RTC over the injunction case. Whether the RTC in fact prematurely decided the
constitutionality of the proclamation, resulting in the denial of CMUs right to be heard on the
same, is a factual issue that was proper for the CA to hear and ascertain from the parties.
Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the action on the ground that it raised pure questions
of law.
On the merits, the lands by their character have become inalienable from the moment
President Garcia dedicated them for CMUs use in scientific and technological research in the
field of agriculture. They have ceased to be alienable public lands. Section 56 of the IPRA
provides that property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon
its effectivity shall be recognized and respected. Ownership over the subject lands had been
vested in CMU as early as 1958. Transferring the lands in 2003 to the indigenous peoples around
the area is not in accord with the IPRA. Petition granted. PP 310 declared null and void for
being contrary to law and public policy.
Abalos and DBP v. Darapa
Page 369

646 SCRA 200 (2011)
FACTS: In 1962, the spouses Lomantong Darapa and Sinab Dimakuta obtained a loan from DBP
secured by a real and chattel mortgage over a lot situated at Linamon, Lanao del Norte
covered by Tax Declaration No. A-148. In 1970, the spouses applied for the renewal and
increase of their loan using Dimakutas TCT No. T-1997 as additional collateral. The DBP
disapproved the loan application without returning, however, Dimakutas TCT. When the
spouses failed to pay their loan, DBP foreclosed the mortgages in 1971, which, unknown to the
spouses, included TCT No. T-1997. The spouses failed to redeem the land under TCT No.
T-1997, which led to its cancellation and eventual issuance of another TCT in DBPs name. In
1984, the spouses discovered all these and they demanded to DBP the reconveyance of the
land. DBP assured them of the return of the land. But in 1994, DBP sold the land to Abalos. On
the same year, the spouses instituted an action for annulment of title and recovery of
possession. The spouses averred that TCT No. T-1997 was not one of the mortgaged properties
and thus its foreclosure by DBP and its eventual sale to Abalos was null and void. The DBP
countered that TCT No. T-1997 had its roots in Tax Declaration No. A-148. The RTC annulled
DBPs foreclosure of the land under TCT No. T-1997 and declared Dimakuta as the lawful owner.
DBP went to the CA but the latter affirmed the RTCs decision. DBP now wants to convince the
SC that the land covered by the Tax Declaration mortgaged in 1962, then untitled, is the same
land now covered by TCT No. T-1997.
RULING: It is fundamental procedural law that a petition for review oncertiorarifiled with this
Courtunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure shall, as a general rule, raise only questions
of law.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts
this is in contradistinction from a question of fact which arises from doubt as to the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts. A question of law does not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them and the resolution of the issue
must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.
The DBPs insistence that TCT No. T-1,997 is the same land covered by Tax Declaration No.
A-148 is to ask the Court to evaluate the pieces of evidence passed upon by the RTC and the
Court of Appeals. To grant this petition will entail the Court's review and determination of the
weight, credence, and probative value of the evidence presented at the trial court matters
which, without doubt, are factual and, therefore, outside the ambit of Rule 45.
Petitioners ought to remember that the Court of Appeals factual findings, affirming that of the
trial court, are final and conclusive on this Court and may not be reviewed on appeal, except
for the most compelling of reasons, such as when: (1) the conclusion is grounded on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of
specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the findings of absence of facts
are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11)
such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. None of the exceptions is present
in this petition.
Page 370

In any event, records reveal that the land covered by the TCT was not among the properties
the spouses mortgaged in 1962. The land covered by the TCT is situated in Barrio Buru-an,
Iligan, Lanao del Norte. DBPs former property examiner and appraiser who examined the lands
which the spouses mortgaged to DBP testified that he never examined any land in Barrio Buruan, Iligan.
Republic v. De Guzman
652 SCRA 101 (2011)
FACTS: Respondent De Guzman is the proprietress of Montaguz General Merchandise (MGM), a

contractor accredited by the Philippine National Police for the supply of office and construction
materials and equipment, and for the delivery of various services such as printing and rental,
repair of various equipment, and renovation of buildings, facilities, vehicles, tires, and spare
parts. In 1995, MGM and the PNP entered into a contract wherein MGM, for the price
ofP2,288,562.60, undertook to procure and deliver to the PNP the construction materials for
the construction of a condominium building at Camp Crame. MGM proceeded with the delivery
of the construction materials. MGM was not however paid. Respondent sued the PNP for sum of
money. But according to the PNP, a Landbank check was in fact released in favor of respondent.
Respondent claims however that the check was issued in favor of Montaguz Builders, a separate
entity owned by respondent, and that the warrant registry of the PNP shows that it was a
certain Edgardo Cruz who claimed the check, not her. At various stages of the proceedings, the
former counsel of PNP admitted that MGM had in fact delivered the construction materials, and
that for purposes of expediting the proceedings, the sole issue that would be resolved was
whether or not respondent had been paid. On the strength of the documentary evidence
presented and offered in court and on petitioners own stipulations and admissions during
various stages of the proceedings, the RTC ruled that there was no payment. It ordered PNP to
pay respondent the contract price. The CA affirmed this ruling.
RULING: It is worthy to note that while this petition was filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the assertions and arguments advanced herein are those that will necessarily require
this Court to re-evaluate the evidence on record.
It is a well-settled rule that in a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of law may
be raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court.
When there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, then it is a question of
law; but when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts, then it is a
question of fact. "Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or
not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a question of law."
One test to determine if there exists a question of fact or law in a given case is whether the
Court can resolve the issue that was raised without having to review or evaluate the evidence,
in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it will be a question of fact. Thus, the petition
must not involve the calibration of the probative value of the evidence presented. In addition,
the facts of the case must be undisputed, and the only issue that should be left for the Court to
decide is whether or not the conclusion drawn by the CA from a certain set of facts was
appropriate.
Page 371

In this case, the circumstances surrounding the controversial LBP check are central to the issue
before us, the resolution of which, will require a perusal of the entire records of the case
including the transcribed testimonies of the witnesses. Since this is an appeal via certiorari,
questions of fact are not reviewable. As a rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
final and conclusive and this Court will only review them under certain recognized exceptions.
Although petitioners sole ground to support this petition was stated in such a manner as to
impress upon this Court that the Court of Appeals committed an error in law, what the
petitioner actually wants us to do is to review and re-examine the factual findings of both the
RTC and the Court of Appeals.
Since the petitioner has not shown this Court that this case falls under any of the enumerated
exceptions to the rule, we are constrained to uphold the facts as established by both the RTC
and the Court of Appeals, and, consequently, the conclusions reached in the appealed decision.
Cua v. People
660 SCRA 235 (2011)
FACTS: Guillermo Cua is a Revenue Collection Agent of the BIR in Olongapo City. He was
charged with Malversation of Public Funds after an audit disclosed that he incurred a cash
shortage amounting to P291,783. Initially he admitted his cash shortage purportedly to get
even with the BIR which failed to promote him but promised to pay the amount as soon as
possible. A special arrangement was made between the BIR and him wherein the BIR would
withhold his salary and apply the same to the shortage incurred until full payment of the
accountability was made. Nonetheless, an Information for Malversation of public funds was
filed against him. Cua did not testify and instead adduced documentary evidence showing that
he had paid for the shortage by means of deductions from his salary. The RTC convicted him.
The CA affirmed his conviction. Now before the SC, Cua claims among others that he is not
criminally liable because the PNB confirmed the authenticity of the pertinent documents and
that his payment of the shortage was involuntary and without his consent.
RULING: At the outset, it should be stressed that in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised. Thus, questions of fact are not reviewable.
It is not the Courts function to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence already considered
in the proceedings below, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may
have been committed by the lower court. As such, a question of law must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants. The resolution
of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings on these matters are accorded
respect.
A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A
question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of
reviewing the probative value of the evidence. Thus, the issue to be resolved must be limited
to determining what the law is on a certain set of facts. Once the issue invites a review of the
evidence, the question posed is one of fact.
Page 372

Petitioner raises the sole issue that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt on the ground that the evidence shows that he did not incur a shortage
of P 291,783.00. He argues that as an exception to the rule that factual findings and
conclusions of the CA are binding on this Court, the CA plainly overlooked certain facts of
substance and value which, if considered, would alter the result of the case.
The Court disagrees.
The resolution of the issue raised by petitioner necessarily requires the re-evaluation of the
evidence presented by both parties. This is precisely a question of fact proscribed under Rule
45. Petitioner has failed to establish that the present case falls under any of the exceptions to
said rule. On the other hand, the factual findings of the RTC were affirmed by the CA, and as
such, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. On this ground alone, the
petition must be denied.
Lorzano v. Tabayag
665 SCRA 38 (2012)
FACTS: The petitioner and the respondent are two of the children of the late Juan Tabayag.
Tabayag owned a parcel of land situated in Iriga City. Right after the burial of their father, the
petitioner allegedly requested from her siblings that she be allowed to take possession of and
receive the income generated by the subject property until after her eldest son could graduate
from college. The petitioners siblings acceded to the said request. After the petitioners eldest
son finished college, her siblings asked her to return to them the possession of the subject
property so that they could partition it among themselves. However, the petitioner refused to
relinquish her possession of the subject property claiming that she purchased the subject
property from their father as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property.
Respondent filed an action for annulment of the sale on the ground that the signature of their
father was forged. The RTC ruled in favor of respondent. It also awarded moral damages and
attorneys fees in favor of respondent. CA affirmed this decision.
RULING: Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition
filed shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question of law
arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a
question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a
question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the
issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.
That the signature of Tabayag in the deed of sale was a forgery is a conclusion derived by the
RTC and the CA on a question of fact. The same is conclusive upon this Court as it involves the
truth or falsehood of an alleged fact, which is a matter not for this Court to resolve. Where a
petitioner casts doubt on the findings of the lower court as affirmed by the CA regarding the
existence of forgery is a question of fact.
For the same reason, we would ordinarily disregard the petitioners allegation as to the
propriety of the award of moral damages and attorneys fees in favor of the respondent as it is
Page 373

a question of fact. Thus, questions on whether or not there was a preponderance of evidence
to justify the award of damages or whether or not there was a causal connection between the
given set of facts and the damage suffered by the private complainant or whether or not the
act from which civil liability might arise exists are questions of fact.
Essentially, the petitioner is questioning the award of moral damages and attorneys fees in
favor of the respondent as the same is supposedly not fully supported by evidence. However, in
the final analysis, the question of whether the said award is fully supported by evidence is a
factual question as it would necessitate whether the evidence adduced in support of the same
has any probative value. For a question to be one of law, it must involve no examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.
Chavez v. JBC
676 SCRA 579 (2012)
FACTS: Frank Chavez filed a petition for prohibition before the SC questioning the
constitutionality of the present composition of the JBC.
RULING: Before addressing the above issues in seriatim, the Court deems it proper to first
ascertain the nature of the petition. Pursuant to the rule that the nature of an action is
determined by the allegations therein and the character of the relief sought, the Court views
the petition as essentially an action for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and construction of Section 8 (1),
Article VIII as the issue raised, the petition should properly be considered as that which would
result in the adjudication of rights sans the execution process because the only relief to be
granted is the very declaration of the rights under the document sought to be construed. It
being so, the original jurisdiction over the petition lies with the appropriate Regional Trial
Court (RTC). Notwithstanding the fact that only questions of law are raised in the petition, an
action for declaratory relief is not among those within the original jurisdiction of this Court as
provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
At any rate, due to its serious implications, not only to government processes involved but also
to the sanctity of the Constitution, the Court deems it more prudent to take cognizance of it.
After all, the petition is also for prohibition under Rule 65 seeking to enjoin Congress from
sending two (2) representatives with one (1) full vote each to the JBC.
Article VII, Section 4 paragraph 7
Tecson v. Comelec
Page 374

424 SCRA 277
FACTS: Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in taking cognizance of and
deciding the citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe Jr. They asserted that under Section 4(7),
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of the case.
ISSUE: As the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction
over the qualifications of presidential candidates? - NO
RULING: An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court on April 1992 categorically
speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates"
for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an
action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In
Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third
highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a postelection scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it,
questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held.
Legarda v. De Castro
542 SCRA 125 (2008)
In the 2004 elections, Congress as National Board of Canvassers proclaimed Noli de Castro the
duly elected Vice President of the Philippines. Legarda who placed second filed this protest
before the PET. De Castro moved for its outright dismissal. But the PET confirmed its
jurisdiction over the protest. De Castro moved for reconsideration on the ground that the
protest failed to allege a cause of action as the protest did not specify the contested precincts.
The PET ruled that since the protest enumerated all the provinces, municipalities and cities
where she questions all the results in all the precincts therein, the protest is sufficient in form
and substance. The protest was assigned to Justice Pardo as Hearing Commissioner. In the
meantime, Legarda run and won a seat in the Senate in the 2008 elections. The PET dismissed
the protest on the ground that the contested certificates of canvass would not affect the
results, and because of abandonment as held in Santiago v. Ramos.
Page 375

Macalintal v. PET
651 SCRA 239 (2011)
FACTS: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Supreme Court, sittingen
banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other
courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
Macalintal questions the constitutionality of the PET. He chafes at the creation of a purportedly
separate tribunal complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set personnel and
confidential employees, to effect the constitutional mandate.
Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the
Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET. According to him, the designation of
the justices of the SC as members of the PET violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution since
the PET exercises quasi judicial powers.
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis
of the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for
the President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.
ISSUES and RULING:

Is the PET unconstitutional? No. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional
Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring
that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they
constitutionalized what was statutory. Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the
same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional
jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to
decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to
carry it into effect.
Does the PET exercise quasi judicial powers? No. The traditional grant of judicial power is
found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The set
up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests
as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a
presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial
power.
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIWASA MANUFACTURING, INC.
Facts: BOI granted First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of
registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic
tiles." Eventually, Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while Fil-
Page 376

Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Mariwasa
filed a petition for review with respondent Court of Appeals pursuant to Circular 1-91.
CA required the BOI and First to comment on Mariwasa's petition and to show cause why no
injunction should issue. On February 17, 1993, respondent court temporarily restrained the BOI
from implementing its decision. This temporary restraining order lapsed by its own terms on
March 9, 1993, twenty (20) days after its issuance, without respondent court issuing any
preliminary injunction.
On February 24, 1993, petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss Petition and to Lift Restraining
Order" on the ground that respondent court has no appellate jurisdiction over BOI Case No.
92-005, the same being exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the
Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.
On May 25, 1993, respondent court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss.
Upon receipt of a copy of the resolution on June 4, 1993, First Lepanto decided not to file any
motion for reconsideration as the question involved is essentially legal in nature and
immediately filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the SC.
Held: Under this contextual backdrop, this Court, pursuant to its Constitutional power under
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, and by way of implementation of B.P. 129, issued Circular
1-91 prescribing the rules governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from final orders or
decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to eliminate unnecessary
contradictions and confusing rules of procedure.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, although a circular is not strictly a statute or law, it has,
however, the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. In Inciong v. de Guia, a
circular of this Court was treated as law. In adopting the recommendation of the Investigating
Judge to impose a sanction on a judge who violated Circular No. 7 of this Court dated
September 23, 1974, as amended by Circular No. 3 dated April 24, 1975 and Circular No. 20
dated October 4, 1979, requiring raffling of cases, this Court quoted the ratiocination of the
Investigating Judge, brushing aside the contention of respondent judge that assigning cases
instead of raffling is a common practice and holding that respondent could not go against the
circular of this Court until it is repealed or otherwise modified, as "(L)aws are repealed only by
subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
customs or practice to the contrary."
The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91 because
the former grants a substantive right which, under the Constitution cannot be modified,
diminished or increased by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers is not entirely
defensible as it seems. Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the right
of appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI and in granting such right, it also provided
where and in what manner such appeal can be brought. These latter portions simply deal with
procedural aspects which this Court has the power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional
rule-making powers.
Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the BOI should be
brought pertains only to procedure or the method of enforcing the substantive right to appeal
granted by E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal from decisions or final orders of the
BOI under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the
venue of appeals from decisions of this agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a
different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make an incursion into
the substantive right to appeal.
Page 377

The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list of quasi-judicial agencies found in the
third sentence of Section 1 of Circular 1-91 does not mean that said circular does not apply to
appeals from final orders or decision of the BOI.
Since in DBP v. CA , we upheld the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the Court
of Tax Appeals despite the fact that the same is not among the agencies reorganized by B.P.
129, on the ground that B.P. 129 is broad and comprehensive, there is no reason why BOI should
be excluded from Circular 1-91, which is but implementary of said law.
Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the
manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned.
Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly
with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.
TERESITA G. FABIAN vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as ombudsman; HON.
JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V.
AGUSTIN
Facts: Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development
Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business w/ Agustin. Agustin was
the incumbent District Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses
for which he was administratively charged in the Office in the office of the Ombudsman.
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when Fabian
tried to terminate their relationship, Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the
extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the
aforementioned administrative case against him. A case ensued which eventually led an appeal
to the Ombudsman who inhibited himself later the case led to the deputy Ombudsman. The
deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and executory. Fabian
appealed the case to the SC. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman
Act of 1989) pertinently provides that -In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives
or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.
HELD: Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore,
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which
increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been
cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition. That
constitutional provision was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed
under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation
enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.
JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR. vs. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN and JUDGE FLORENTINO M.
ALUMBRES
Facts: On May 23, 1997, Florentino M. Alumbres, filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, a
Criminal Complaint for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the destruction of
complainants eyeglasses, and assault upon a person in authority. It was alleged that he
requested Caoibes to return the executive table he borrowed from respondent; that Caoibes
Page 378

did not answer so respondent reiterated his request but before he could finish talking,
petitioner blurted Tarantado ito ah, and boxed him at his right eyebrow and left lower jaw
so that the right lens of his eyeglasses was thrown away, rendering his eyeglasses
unserviceable; and that respondent had the incident blottered with the Las Pias Police
Station. He prayed that criminal charges be filed before the Sandiganbayan against the
petitioner.
On June 13, 1997, respondent Judge lodged another administrative case with the Supreme
Court, praying for the dismissal of petitioner from the judiciary on the ground of grave
misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer.
The Office of the Ombudsman required petitioner to file a counter-affidavit. But instead of
filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner filed on July 7, 1997 and Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to
the Honorable Supreme Court, praying that the Office of the Ombudsman hold its
investigation of Case No. OMB-0-97-0903 in abeyance, and refer the same to the Supreme Court
.Petitioner contended that the Supreme Court, not the Office of the Ombudsman, has the
authority to make a preliminary determination of the respective culpability of petitioner and
respondent Judge who, both being members of the bench, are under its exclusive supervision
and control.
Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman must defer action on a criminal complaint against a
judge, or a court employee where the same arises from their administrative duties, and refer
the same to this Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted
within the scope of their administrative duties.
Held: It appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciary who were
entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office furniture. Under Section 6,
Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the
Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a
judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to
have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court
for determination as to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should
hold true regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act subject of the
complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact
that the Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed of it, he should give
due respect for and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court, because in
determining whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court passes upon not only
administrative liabilities but also other administrative concerns, as is clearly conveyed in the
case of Maceda vs. Vasquez.
The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case before it
does or does not have administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the
exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not
constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial
independence.
Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision
over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to
the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges
and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action
against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Page 379

JUDGE RENATO A. FUENTES, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO, GRAFT
INVESTIGATION OFFICER II, MARIVIC A. TRABAJO-DARAY, ANTONIO E. VALENZUELA in his
capacity as the Director for Fact Finding and Intelligence of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Mindanao, and MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy
Ombudsman for Mindanao
Facts: Pursuant to the governments plan to construct its first fly-over in Davao City, the
Republic of the Philippines filed an expropriation case against the owners of the properties
affected by the project. The expropriation case was presided by Judge Renato A. Fuentes. The
government won the expropriation case. DPWH still owed the defendants-lot owners. The
lower court granted Tessie Amadeos motion for the issuance of a writ of execution against the
DPWH to satisfy her unpaid claim. On May 3, 1994, respondent Sheriff Paralisan issued a Notice
of Levy, addressed to the Regional Director of the DPWH, Davao City, describing the properties
subject of the levy as All scrap iron/junks found in the premises of the Department of Public
Works and Highways depot at Panacan, Davao City. The auction sale pushed through and Alex
Bacquial emerged as the highest bidder. Meanwhile, Alex Bacquial, together with respondent
Sheriff Paralisan, attempted to withdraw the auctioned properties on May 19, 1994. They
were, however, prevented from doing so by the custodian of the subject DPWH properties, a
certain Engr. Ramon Alejo, who claimed that his office was totally unaware of the auction sale,
and informed the sheriff that many of the properties within the holding area of the depot were
still serviceable and were due for repair and rehabilitation.
On the basis of letters from Congressman Manuel M. Garcia of the Second District of Davao City
and Engineer Ramon A. Alejo, the Court Administrator, Supreme Court directed Judge Renato A.
Fuentes and Sheriff Norberto Paralisan to comment on the report recommending the filing of an
administrative case against the sheriff and other persons responsible for the anomalous
implementation of the writ of execution. The Department of Public Works and Highways,
through the Solicitor General, filed an administrative complaint against Sheriff Norberto
Paralisan for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended that Judge Renato A. Fuentes be
charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e) and
likewise be administratively charged before the Supreme Court with acts unbecoming of a
judge.
Director Valenzuela filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao a criminal
complaint charging Judge Rentao A. Fuentes with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3
(e).
Fuentes filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to dismiss complaint and/
or manifestation to forward all records to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner alleged that the respondent Ombudsman-Mindanao committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he initiated a criminal complaint
against petitioner for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3 [e]. And he conducted an
investigation of said complaint against petitioner. Thus, he encroached on the power of the
Supreme Court of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel.
The Solicitor General submitted that the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation because the
Supreme Court is not in possession of any record which would verify the propriety of the
issuance of the questioned order and writ. Moreover, the Court Administrator has not filed any
administrative case against petitioner judge that would pose similar issues on the present
inquiry of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.
Page 380

Issue: Whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise
of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in
the absence of an administrative charge for the same acts before the Supreme Court.
Held: No.
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this
primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases.
Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint
before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers.
The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action.
Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and
take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of
the land. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of
the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers.
Petitioners questioned order directing the attachment of government property and issuing a
writ of execution were done in relation to his office, well within his official functions. The
order may be erroneous or void for lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, whether or not
such order of execution was valid under the given circumstances, must be inquired into in the
course of the judicial action only by the Supreme Court that is tasked to supervise the courts.
No other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of
any other branch, not any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or
decision--whether final and executory or not--and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis
for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order. That
prerogative belongs to the
Luz Adajar vs Teresita Develos
Facts: Luz C. Adajar filed a complaint against Teresita Develos, Cyrus Ellorin and Celsa Ellorin,
who are government employees stationed at the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8,
Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Complainant alleged that she delivered pieces of jewelries on a
consignment basis amounting to 70,000 pesos to Mrs. Teresita Develuz at her office at RTC
Branch 8 Staff Room, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon with the agreement that she will pay the said
amount within Three (3) Months. Mrs. Develuz made partial payments in the total amount of
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos. However, when demanded from to pay the balance of
P20,000.00 Pesos, she refused. On February 6, 2002 complainant, again, went to RTC Branch 8
to collect the account from Mrs. Develuz when the latter, in an angry and loud voice said, Dili
ba nga gihatagan ta naman ka sa listahan sa mga nakakuha sa alahas? Ikaw na ang maningil sa
ila, (which in English literally means IS IT NOT THAT I HAVE ALREADY GIVEN YOU THE LIST OF
THOSE WHO GOT THE JEWELRIES? YOU COLLECT IT YOURSELF). While having a verbal tussle,
Mr. Cyrus Ellorin who is a co-employee of Mrs. Develuz, with the designation of court
interpreter of Branch 8, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, allegedly, went near and shouted. Mr.
Page 381

Cyrus Ellorin violently pushed complainant of the staff room, practically driving her out as if
she was a leper. Employees of the office of the Clerk of Court brought her to their office and
gave her water and comforted her. The incident was reported to the police and entered into
the blotter.
Respondents contend that the acts of respondents Celsa Ellorin and Teresita Develos being
complained of by complainant were not in relation to their functions as court employees but
were in connection with the pecuniary activity of complainant. Respondents further assert that
complainant is guilty of dishonesty for certifying that she did not commence any other action
before any tribunal or body except before this Court when in fact she also filed a complaint for
misconduct with the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao. Respondents also submitted in
evidence a Joint-Affidavit executed by persons who were indebted to complainant stating
therein that respondent Develos simply facilitated the sale of jewelry made by complainant.
Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao, acting on the complaint for misconduct filed by herein
complainant, rendered a Decision dismissing the administrative case against herein respondents
as well as the counter-complaint filed by the latter against herein complainant.
The Investigating Judge adopted the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao and,
accordingly, recommended that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should take cognizance of this case
Held:
No, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao should not have taken cognizance of the instant
case the same being administrative in nature. As correctly pointed out by the OCA, it has been
settled as early as the case of Maceda vs. Vasquez that:
Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is
only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all
laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation
thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of
the doctrine of separation of power.
Pursuant to the above-settled rule, the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao should have
referred the instant complaint to this Court for appropriate action, instead of resolving the
same. Hence, we agree with the OCA that the Decision rendered by the Office of the
Ombudsman, Mindanao in OMB-M-A-02-126-E does not have any force and effect on the present
administrative case before us.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANNY GODOY
JUDGE EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR vs. MAURICIO REYNOSO, JR. and EVA P. PONCE DE LEON
Page 382

Facts: A complaint was filed by judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of
Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, to cite for indirect contempt Mauricio Reynoso,
Jr., a columnist, and Eva P. Ponce de Leon, publisher and chairman of the editorial board,
respectively, of the Palawan Times. His Honor's plaint is based on an article written by
respondent Reynoso, Jr. in his column, "On the Beat," and published in the July 20, 1994 issue
of said newspaper which is of general circulation in Puerto Princesa City. The complaint avers
that the article tends to impede, obstruct, belittle, downgrade and degrade the administration
of justice; that the article contains averments which are disrespectful, discourteous, insulting,
offensive and derogatory; that it does not only cast aspersions on the integrity and honesty of
complainant as a judge and on his ability to administer justice objectively and impartially, but
is an imputation that he is biased and he prejudges the cases filed before him; and that the
article is sub judice because it is still pending automatic review.
Issue: Who has jurisdiction in contempt proceedings where the alleged contumely is committed
against a lower court while the case is pending in the Appellate or Higher Court
Held: In whatever context it may arise, contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the
failure to do an act, in such a manner as to create an affront to the court and the sovereign
dignity with which it is clothed. As a matter of practical judicial administration, jurisdiction
has been felt properly to rest in only one tribunal at a time with respect to a given controversy.
Partly because of administrative considerations, and partly to visit the full personal effect of
the punishment on a contemnor, the rule has been that no other court than the one contemned
will punish a given contempt.
The rationale that is usually advanced for the general rule that the power to punish for
contempt rests with the court contemned is that contempt proceedings are sui generis and are
triable only by the court against whose authority the contempt are charged; the power to
punish for contempt exists for the purpose of enabling a court to compel due decorum and
respect in its presence and due obedience to its judgments, orders and processes: and in order
that a court may compel obedience to its orders, it must have the right to inquire whether
there has been any disobedience thereof, for to submit the question of disobedience to another
tribunal would operate to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency.
There are, however, several jurisprudentially and statutorily recognized exceptions to the
general rule, both under Philippine and American jurisprudence, viz.:
1. Indirect contempt committed against inferior court may also be tried by the proper regional
trial court, regardless of the imposable penalty.
2. Indirect contempt against the Supreme Court may be caused to be investigated by a
prosecuting officer and the charge may be filed in and tried by the regional trial court, or the
case may be referred to it for hearing and recommendation where the charge involves
questions of fact.
3. In People vs. Alarcon, et al., supra, this Court ruled that "in the interrelation of the
different courts forming our integrated judicial system, one court is not an agent or
representative of another and may not, for this reason, punish contempts in vindication of the
authority and decorum which are not its own. The appeal transfers the proceedings to the
appellate court , and this last court becomes thereby charged with the authority to deal with
contempts committed after the perfection of the appeal." The apparent reason is that both the
moral and legal effect of a punishment for contempt would be missed if it were regarded as
the resentment of personal affronts offered to judges. Contempts are punished as offenses
against the administration of justice, and the offense of violating a judicial order is punishable
by the court which is charged with its enforcement, regardless of the court which may have
made the order. However, the rule presupposes a complete transfer of jurisdiction to the
Page 383

appellate court, and there is authority that where the contempt does not relate to the subject
matter of the appeal, jurisdiction to punish remains in the trial court.
4. A court may punish contempts committed against a court or judge constituting one of its
parts or agencies, as in the case of a court composed of several coordinate branches or
divisions.
5. The biggest factor accounting for the exceptions is where the singular jurisdiction of a given
matter has been transferred from the contemned court to another court. One of the most
common reasons for a transfer of jurisdiction among courts is improper venue. The cases
involving venue deal primarily with the question whether a change of venue is available after a
contempt proceeding has been begun. While generally a change of venue is not available in a
contempt proceeding, some jurisdictions allow such a change in proper circumstances.
6. A new court wholly replacing a prior court has jurisdiction to punish for violations of orders
entered by its predecessor, although where the successor court is created by a statute which
does not extinguish jurisdiction in the predecessor, an affirmative transfer of jurisdiction
before the contempt occurs is necessary to empower the successor court to act.
7. Transfers of jurisdiction by appellate review have produced numerous instances where
contempt against the trial court has been punished in the appellate court, and vice versa.
Some appellate courts have taken the view that a contempt committed after an appeal is taken
is particularly contemptuous of the appellate court because of the tendency of such contempts
to upset the status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of such court.
8. A judge may disqualify himself, or be disqualified, on a contempt hearing or in the main
case, which circumstance may require a transfer of jurisdiction, but where a judge is
disqualified only in the main case, because of matters which do not disqualify him in a
contempt proceeding, the regular judge should sit in the contempt proceeding. Likewise,
where the regular judge, is absent or otherwise unavailable and an order is entered by another
judge and made returnable to the proper court, the regular judge may punish for violations of
orders so entered.
9. Where the same act is a contempt against two or more courts, it is no bar to contempt
proceedings in one of them that there is also a contempt against the other.
10. While professional disciplinary proceedings have been resorted to as a punishment for
contempt, the more recent view is that punishment is of secondary importance to the need to
protect the courts and the people from improper professional practice. To the substantial
extent that disciplinary action remains a punishment, disciplinary measures imposed by another
court than the one contemned furnish an exception to the rule against punishing for contempt
of another court.
11. Some contemptuous acts are also crime, usually misdemeanors, which are often punishable
in other courts than those against which the contemptuous act was done.
12. Finally, a conviction for contempt against another court has been allowed to stand on the
basis that the failure of the defendant to make timely objection operated as a waiver of the
right to be tried before the court actually contemned.
The rule, as now accepted and deemed applicable to the present incident, is that where the
entire case has already been appealed, jurisdiction to punish for contempt rests with the
appellate court where the appeal completely transfers the proceedings thereto or where there
is a tendency to affect the status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of the
appellate court. Accordingly, this Court having acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for
Page 384

indirect contempt against herein respondents, it has taken judicial cognizance thereof and has
accordingly resolved the same.
IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS NORTE

PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.
Facts:
On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch
19, sent the Supreme Court a letter which reads:
xxx
By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the Honorable Provincial Governor of
Ilocos Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C. Farinas, I was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No. 856 of 12
December 1986, as amended by Executive Order No. 326 of June 1, 1988. In consonance with
Executive Order RF6-04, the Honorable Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte issued my
appointment as a member of the Committee. For your ready reference, I am enclosing
herewith machine copies of Executive Order RF6-04 and the appointment.
Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the powers and duties of
the position as member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, may I have the
honor to request for the issuance by the Honorable Supreme Court of a Resolution, as follows:
(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to as assume and discharge the powers and
duties attached to the said position;
(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither violative of the Independence of

the Judiciary nor a violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of Section .
7, Article IX (B), both of the Constitution, and will not in any way amount to an abandonment
of my present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial
Region, and as a member of the Judiciary; and
(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part of the primary functions of an
Executive Judge.
Issue:
Whether Judge Manzano can serve concurrently as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial
Committee on Justice
Page 385
Held:
No. Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or
administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution). Considering that membership of
Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges a
administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, his request must be denied.
While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced

with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire
application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or
perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a
plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a
higher court can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative
official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such
a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn
responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with
nothing less.
This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic
insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent
RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in
the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they
are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on
Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable
purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to
the fulfillment of their judicial duties.
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17,2012
Facts: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC
as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the
JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives
from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator
Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit
in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has
questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase
a representative of Congress. It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the
House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of Congress, such that
the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the
Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses
exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate.
Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of a representative from
Congress, it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire
Congress.
Page 386

Issue:
Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8)
members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of
the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
Yes. The word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its
generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House
of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative
may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical
purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting.
It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary function
in government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the
distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress nonlegislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of
these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however,
cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses
exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the
entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven
(7) members only.
The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in
the JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from
the Senate or the House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the
entire Congress. It may be a constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an absurdity.
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception of the Doctrine of Operative Fact
applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the
current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.
The Court has no power to add another member by judicial construction.
The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court tasked to guard the
Constitution against usurpation. The Court remains steadfast in confining its powers in the
sphere granted by the Constitution itself. Judicial activism should never be allowed to become
judicial exuberance. In cases like this, no amount of practical logic or convenience can
convince the Court to perform either an excision or an insertion that will change the manifest
intent of the Framers. To broaden the scope of congressional representation in the JBC is
tantamount to the inclusion of a subject matter which was not included in the provision as
enacted. True to its constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor constitutional
provisions in order to accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the
proposed solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court declines.
LEAGUE OF CITIES VS COMELEC
Facts: During the 11th Congress] fifty-seven (57) cityhood bills were filed before the House of
Representatives. Of the fifty-seven (57), thirty-three (33) eventually became laws. The twentyfour (24) other bills were not acted upon.
Later developments saw the introduction in the Senate of Senate Bill (S. Bill) No. 2157 to
amend Sec. 450 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code
(LGC) of 1991. The proposed amendment sought to increase the income requirement to qualify
Page 387

for conversion into a city from PhP 20 million average annual income to PhP 100 million locally
generated income.
In March 2001, S. Bill No. 2157 was signed into law as RA 9009 to take effect on June 30, 2001
xxx
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the Lower House of the 12th Congress adopted in July 2001
House (H.) Joint Resolution No. 29 which, as its title indicated, sought to exempt from the
income requirement prescribed in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose conversions into cities
were not acted upon during the previous Congress. The 12th Congress ended without the
Senate approving H. Joint Resolution No. 29.
Then came the 13th Congress (July 2004 to June 2007), which saw the House of Representatives
re-adopting H. Joint Resolution No. 29 as H. Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarding it to the
Senate for approval.
The Senate, however, again failed to approve the joint resolution. During the Senate session
held on November 6, 2006, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. asserted that passing H. Resolution
No. 1 would, in net effect, allow a wholesale exemption from the income requirement imposed
under RA 9009 on the municipalities. For this reason, he suggested the filing by the House of
Representatives of individual bills to pave the way for the municipalities to become cities and
then forwarding them to the Senate for proper action.
Heeding the advice, sixteen (16) municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors,
individual cityhood bills.
Common to all 16 measures was a provision exempting the
municipality covered from the PhP 100 million income requirement.
As of June 7, 2007, both Houses of Congress had approved the individual cityhood bills, all of
which eventually lapsed into law on various dates. Each cityhood law directs the COMELEC,
within thirty (30) days from its approval, to hold a plebiscite to determine whether the voters
approve of the conversion.
Issue: The instant petitions seek to declare the cityhood laws unconstitutional for violation of
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal-protection clause.
[Issue in relation to Article VIII of the Constitution is with respect to the votes required in
a case assailing the constitutionality of a law. Please see (3)]
Held:
(1) RE: Constitutionality of Exempting Municipalities from the Requirement of RA 9009:
By constitutional design and as a matter of long-established principle, the power to create
political subdivisions or LGUs is essentially legislative in character. But even without any
constitutional grant, Congress can, by law, create, divide, merge, or altogether abolish or alter
the boundaries of a province, city, or municipality. We said as much in the fairly recent case,
Sema v. CIMELEC. The 1987 Constitution, under its Art. X, Sec. 10, nonetheless provides for
the creation of LGUs xxx
Page 388

As may be noted, the afore-quoted provision specifically provides for the creation of political
subdivisions in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code,
subject to the approval of the voters in the unit concerned. The criteria referred to are the
verifiable indicators of viability, i.e., area, population, and income, now set forth in Sec. 450
of the LGC of 1991, as amended by RA 9009. The petitioners would parlay the thesis that
these indicators or criteria must be written only in the LGC and not in any other statute.
Doubtless, the code they are referring to is the LGC of 1991. Pushing their point, they conclude
that the cityhood laws that exempted the respondent LGUs from the income standard spelled
out in the amendatory RA 9009 offend the Constitution.
Petitioners posture does not persuade.
The supposedly infringed Art. X, Sec. 10 is not a new constitutional provision. Save for the
of the term barrio in lieu of barangay, may be instead of shall, the change of
phrase unit or units to political unit and the addition of the modifier directly to
word affected, the aforesaid provision is a substantial reproduction of Art. XI, Sec. 3 of
1973 Constitution, which reads:
use
the
the
the
Section 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged,

abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears notice, however, that the code similarly referred to in the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions is clearly but a law Congress enacted. This is consistent with the aforementioned
plenary power of Congress to create political units. Necessarily, since Congress wields the
vast poser of creating political subdivisions, surely it can exercise the lesser authority of
requiring a set of criteria, standards, or ascertainable indicators of viability for their creation.
Thus, the only conceivable reason why the Constitution employs the clause in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code is to lay stress that it is
Congress alone, and no other, which can impose the criteria. xxx
It remains to be observed at this juncture that when the 1987 Constitution speaks of the
LGC, the reference cannot be to any specific statute or codification of laws, let alone the
LGC of 1991. Be it noted that at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, Batas
Pambansa Blg. (BP) 337, the then LGC, was still in effect. Accordingly, had the framers of the
1987 Constitution intended to isolate the embodiment of the criteria only in the LGC, then they
would have actually referred to BP 337. Also, they would then not have provided for the
enactment by Congress of a new LGC, as they did in Art. X, Sec. 3 of the Constitution.
Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via either a
consolidated set of laws or a much simpler, single-subject enactment, impose the said
verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need not be embodied in the local government
code, albeit this code is the ideal repository to ensure, as much as possible, the element of
uniformity. Congress can even, after making a codification, enact an amendatory law, adding to
the existing layers of indicators earlier codified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce the
same. In this case, the amendatory RA 9009 upped the already codified income requirement
from PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million. At the end of the day, the passage of amendatory laws
is no different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically exempting a
particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the
exempting law/s, effectively decreased the already codified indicators.
Page 389
Petitioners theory that Congress must provide the criteria solely in the LGC and not in any
other law strikes the Court as illogical. For if we pursue their contention to its logical
conclusion, then RA 9009 embodying the new and increased income criterion would, in a way,
also suffer the vice of unconstitutionality. It is startling, however, that petitioners do not
question the constitutionality of RA 9009, as they in fact use said law as an argument for the
alleged unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws.
As it were, Congress, through the medium of the cityhood laws, validly decreased the income
criterion vis--vis the respondent LGUs, but without necessarily being unreasonably
discriminatory, as shall be discussed shortly, by reverting to the PhP 20 million threshold what it
earlier raised to PhP 100 million. The legislative intent not to subject respondent LGUs to the
more stringent requirements of RA 9009 finds expression in the following uniform provision of
the cityhood laws:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income
requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.
In any event, petitioners constitutional objection would still be untenable even if we were to
assume purely ex hypothesi the correctness of their underlying thesis, viz: that the conversion
of a municipality to a city shall be in accordance with, among other things, the income
criterion set forth in the LGC of 1991, and in no other; otherwise, the conversion is invalid. We
shall explain.
Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws subject of contention, the
Court finds that the LGC-amending RA 9009, no less, intended the LGUs covered by the
cityhood laws to be exempt from the PhP 100 million income criterion. In other words, the
cityhood laws, which merely carried out the intent of RA 9009, adhered, in the final analysis,
to the criteria established in the Local Government Code, pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. X of the
1987 Constitution. We shall now proceed to discuss this exemption angle.
Among the criteria established in the LGC pursuant to Sec.10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution
are those detailed in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 under the heading Requisites for Creation.
The section sets the minimum income qualifying bar before a municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be considered for cityhood. Originally, Sec. 164 of BP 337 imposed an average
regular annual income of at least ten million pesos for the last three consecutive years as a
minimum income standard for a municipal-to-city conversion. The LGC that BP 337 established
was superseded by the LGC of 1991 whose then Sec. 450 provided that [a] municipality or
cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual
income, x x x of at least twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for at least two (2) consecutive
years based on 1991 constant prices x x x. RA 9009 in turn amended said Sec. 450 by further
increasing the income requirement to PhP 100 million, thus: xxx
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the
resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a
statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice.
To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the
law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.
It is in this respect that the history of the passage of RA 9009 and the logical inferences
derivable therefrom assume relevancy in discovering legislative intent. Xxx
Page 390
Congress to be sure knew, when RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, of the pendency of
several bills on cityhood, wherein the applying municipalities were qualified under the
then obtaining PhP 20 million-income threshold. These included respondent LGUs. Thus,
equally noteworthy is the ensuing excerpts from the floor exchange between then Senate
President Franklin Drilon and Senator Pimentel, the latter stopping short of saying that the
income threshold of PhP 100 million under S. Bill No. 2157 would not apply to municipalities
that have pending cityhood bills xxx
Given the foregoing perspective, it is not amiss to state that the basis for the inclusion of the
exemption clause of the cityhood laws is the clear-cut intent of Congress of not according
retroactive effect to RA 9009.
Not only do the congressional records bear the legislative
intent of exempting the cityhood laws from the income requirement of PhP 100 million.
Congress has now made its intention to exempt express in the challenged cityhood laws.
(2) WON there was a violation of the equal protection clause
In the proceedings at bar, petitioner LCP and the intervenors cannot plausibly invoke the
equal protection clause, precisely because no deprivation of property results by virtue of
the enactment of the cityhood laws. The LCPs claim that the IRA of its member-cities will be
substantially reduced on account of the conversion into cities of the respondent LGUs would
not suffice to bring it within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. Indeed, it is
presumptuous on the part of the LCP member-cities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it
were their property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated. For the same reason, the municipalities
that are not covered by the uniform exemption clause in the cityhood laws cannot validly
invoke constitutional protection. For, at this point, the conversion of a municipality into a city
will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as such.
(1) Congress did not intend the increased income requirement in RA 9009 to apply to the
cityhood bills which became the cityhood laws in question. In other words, Congress intended
the subject cityhood laws to be exempted from the income requirement of PhP 100 million
prescribed by RA 9009;
(2) The cityhood laws merely carry out the intent of RA 9009, now Sec. 450 of the LGC of
1991, to exempt respondent LGUs from the PhP 100 million income requirement;
(3) The deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are
extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
It is really immaterial if
Congress is not a continuing body. The hearings and deliberations during the 11th and 12th
Congress may still be used as extrinsic reference inasmuch as the same cityhood bills which
were filed before the passage of RA 9009 were being considered during the 13th Congress.
Courts may fall back on the history of a law, as here, as extrinsic aid of statutory construction
if the literal application of the law results in absurdity or injustice.
(4) The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact that each had pending
cityhood bills long before the enactment of RA 9009 that substantially distinguish them from
other municipalities aiming for cityhood. On top of this, each of the 16 also met the PhP 20
million income level exacted under the original Sec. 450 of the 1991 LGC.
And to stress the obvious, the cityhood laws are presumed constitutional. As we see it,
petitioners have not overturned the presumptive constitutionality of the laws in question.
Page 391

__________
(3) RE: Votes needed
Xxx But first, we set and underscore some basic premises:
(1) The initial motion to reconsider the November 18, 2008 Decision, as Justice Leonardo-De
Castro noted, indeed raised new and substantial issues, inclusive of the matter of the
correctness of the factual premises upon which the said decision was predicated. The 6-6 vote
on the motion for reconsideration per the Resolution of March 31, 2009, which denied the
motion on the sole ground that the basic issues have already been passed upon reflected a
divided Court on the issue of whether or not the underlying Decision of November 18, 2008 had
indeed passed upon the basic issues raised in the motion for reconsideration of the said
decision;
(2) The aforesaid May 14, 2009 Motion to Amend Resolution of April 28, 2009 was precipitated
by the tie vote which served as basis for the issuance of said resolution. This May 14, 2009
motionwhich mainly argued that a tie vote is inadequate to declare a law unconstitutional
remains unresolved; and
(3) Pursuant to Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, all cases involving the
constitutionality of a law shall be heard by the Court en banc and decided with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues in the case and voted thereon.
The basic issue tendered in this motion for reconsideration of the June 2, 2009 Resolution boils
down to whether or not the required vote set forth in the aforesaid Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII is
limited only to the initial vote on the petition or also to the subsequent voting on the
motion for reconsideration where the Court is called upon and actually votes on the
constitutionality of a law or like issuances. Or, as applied to this case, would a minute
resolution dismissing, on a tie vote, a motion for reconsideration on the sole stated
groundthat the basic issues have already been passed suffice to hurdle the voting
requirement required for a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws in
question?
The 6-6 vote on the motion to reconsider the Resolution of March 31, 2009, which denied the
initial motion on the sole ground that the basic issues had already been passed upon
betrayed an evenly divided Court on the issue of whether or not the underlying Decision of
November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration
of the said decision. But at the end of the day, the single issue that matters and the vote
that really counts really turn on the constitutionality of the cityhood laws. And be it
remembered that the inconclusive 6-6 tie vote reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolution was
the last vote on the issue of whether or not the cityhood laws infringe the Constitution.
Accordingly, the motions of the respondent LGUs, in light of the 6-6 vote, should be
deliberated anew until the required concurrence on the issue of the validity or invalidity of
the laws in question is, on the merits, secured.
It ought to be clear that a deadlocked vote does not reflect the majority of the Members
contemplated in Sec. 4 (2) of Art. VIII of the Constitution xxx
Page 392

Sec. 4 of Art. VIII, as couched, exacts a majority vote in the determination of a case involving
the constitutionality of a statute, without distinguishing whether such determination is
made on the main petition or thereafter on a motion for reconsideration.
Xxx
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the rule on a tie-vote situation, i.e., Sec. 7, Rule 56
and the complementary A.M. No. 99-1-09- SC, respectively, providing that:
SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. Where the court en banc is equally divided in
opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall again be deliberated on, and if
after such deliberation no decision is reached, the original action commenced in the court shall
be dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed;
and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.
A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC x x x A motion for reconsideration of a decision or resolution of the
Court En Banc or of a Division may be granted upon a vote of a majority of the En Banc or of a
Division, as the case may be, who actually took part in the deliberation of the motion.
If the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied.
But since the instant cases fall under Sec. 4 (2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, the aforequoted
provisions ought to be applied in conjunction with the prescription of the Constitution that
the cases shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the instant cases and voted thereon. To repeat,
the last vote on the issue of the constitutionality of the cityhood bills is that reflected in the
April 28, 2009 Resolutiona 6-6 deadlock.
xxx Without belaboring in their smallest details the arguments for and against the procedural
dimension of this disposition, it bears to stress that the Court has the power to suspend its
own rules when the ends of justice would be served thereby. In the performance of their
duties, courts should not be shackled by stringent rules which would result in manifest
injustice. Rules of procedure are only tools crafted to facilitate the attainment of justice.
Their strict and rigid application must be eschewed, if they result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. xxx. When a case is impressed with public
interest, a relaxation of the application of the rules is in order. Time and again, this Court
has suspended its own rules or excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the
higher interests of justice so require.
The Court, by a vote of 6-4, grants the respondent LGUs motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution of June 2, 2009, as well as their May 14, 2009 motion to consider the second motion
for reconsideration of the November 18, 2008 Decision unresolved, and also grants said second
motion for reconsideration.
MANGELEN VS. CA
215 SCRA 230 (1992)
Facts: Civil Case No. 84-22306 involved an action for the recovery of the amount of
P600,000.00 which defendant, now private respondent Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc., represented
by its President, private respondent Pedro Habaluyas, bound itself to pay plaintiff, now
Page 393

petitioner, by virtue of a Compromise Agreement. Instead of filing an Answer within the
reglementary period private respondents submitted a motion to dismiss xxx
On 24 July 1984, defendant filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to hold in
abeyance further proceedings on the ground that they had filed with the then Intermediate
Appellate Court on 12 July 1984 a petition for certiorari raising the issues of improper venue,
lack of jurisdiction and litis pendencia. That case was docketed as A.C.-G.R. No. 03742. xxx
IAC - In said decision, public respondent practically adopted the factual findings of the trial
court, and explicitly declared that the latter simply acted "in accordance with the provisions of
the rules of court" 12 and committed no reversible error "in declaring the defendents (sic) in
default xxx Still unable to accept the verdict, defendants-appellants filed a motion to
reconsider the decision, xxx On 12 July 1989, public respondent promulgated a resolution
reversing its earlier decision of 30 January 1989. Because of its brevity, the resolution is quoted
in full:
It appearing (sic) from the motion for reconsideration that defendants-appellants have good
and valid defenses as a amplified in their motion for reconsideration and their reply to
Opposition which in fairness to the lower court, We will not point out, since this is default case
so that any decision of the lower court will not in any way be preempted in the interest of
justice.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the decision of this Court promulgated on
January 30, 1989 is hereby granted and the said decision is hereby reversed. Let this case be
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
Issue: WON IAC followed the requirement of Article VII Section 14 of the Constitution.
Held: NO.
The challenged decision leaves much to be desired. What was filed before the public
respondent was an ordinary appeal from a judgment by default. This necessitated a fullblown decision taking into account the five (5) assigned errors which touch on both substantive
and procedural matters. Accordingly, public respondent promulgated its 30 January 1989
decision following a meticulous review of the proceedings had before the trial court and
careful re-appraisal of the evidence adduced before it. Thus, that decision faithfully complied
with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that no decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts of the law on
which it is based. Now, if such decision had to be completely overturned or set aside, upon the
filing of a motion for reconsideration, in a subsequent action via a resolution or modified
decision, such resolution or decision should likewise state the factual and legal foundation
relied upon. The reason is obvious: aside from being required by the Constitution, the court
should be able to justify such a sudden change of course; it must be able to convincingly
explain the taking back of its solemn conclusions and pronouncements in the earlier decision.
In the instant case, the public respondent miserably failed to do so; this is reflected in the
quoted resolution of 12 July 1989 which leaves in limbo the trial court's challenged decision
because it is not the latter which is reserved but rather the public respondent's own decision of
30 January 1989. Public respondent simply restore the parties to the status quo obtaining
prior to 30 January 1989. Clearly, therefore, an amended decision on the appeal proper or on
the merits of the decision of the trial court would be in order.
Page 394

There is more to the confusion. Public respondent ordered the remand of the case to the trial
court for further proceedings, thereby placing the latter in a quandary as to what it was
supposed to do. The trial court would not know what "further proceedings" means as the public
respondent neither nullified the order of default nor set aside the evidence received ex parte.
Thus, the former would be hard pet at finding a satisfactory solution to the problem presented
for its resolution.
GERMAN MACHINERIES VS. ENDAYA

444 SCRA 323 (2004)
Facts: Complainant [Eddie Endaya] alleged that he was employed by respondent company on
January 18, 1993, [as a] car painter xxx he filed a complaint with the Social Security System
against respondent company for failure to remit his SSS premiums; that when management
learned about his complaint, he was reprimanded and became the object of harassment xxx
Complainant, thus, contends that he was illegally dismissed. Xxx
On January 8, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of herein respondent
(Endaya) xxx Aggrieved by the Labor Arbiters decision, herein petitioner filed an appeal with
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
In a decision promulgated on February 28, 2002, the NLRC affirmed, with modification, the
Labor Arbiters decision. Accordingly, it disposed of the case as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Decision of January 8, 2001 is hereby MODIFIED in that the award of
10% attorneys fees shall be based on awards representing 13th month pay and service
incentive leave pay.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the NLRC in a
resolution promulgated on April 19, 2002.
On July 3, 2002, herein petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals assailing the
aforementioned decision and resolution of the NLRC. On November 14, 2002, the Court of
Appeals issued the herein assailed resolution dismissing the petition for certiorari, to wit:
It is axiomatic that for a writ of preliminary injunction to prosper, it must be shown that the
invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of
complainant is clear and unmistakable, and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage.
In the present petition, the foregoing circumstances are not present. The findings of fact by
the Labor Arbiter were affirmed by public respondent to the effect that private respondent
Eddie Endaya was illegally dismissed by petitioner. It therefore pains us to conclude that
private respondent stands to suffer more due to the said illegal dismissal. Such that, it is the
private respondent who may suffer irreparable injury should the writ for preliminary injunction
be issued. Such being the case, the prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction is hereby DENIED for LACK OF MERIT.
Page 395

Insofar as the prayer of private respondent for the immediate dismissal of the instant petition
is concerned, we find merit in the same. The factual issues raised in the instant petition had
already been passed upon by public respondent. As such, we give our imprimatur to the same
since it is in agreement with that of the Labor Arbiter, and hence deems (sic) binding and
conclusive on us.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for LACK OF MERIT and that the
questions raised are too UNSUBSTANTIAL to require consideration. SO ORDERED.
Issue: CA has violated the constitutional provision that no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
Held: NO. Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals issued the above-quoted resolution
without any analysis of the evidence of the parties or reference to any legal basis. As such, it
violated Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution
The assailed resolution is not the decision contemplated under Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution. The mandate embodied in this constitutional provision is applicable only
in cases submitted for decision i.e., given due course and after the filing of briefs or
memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where a resolution is issued denying due course
to a petition and stating the legal basis thereof. Thus, when the court, after deliberating on a
petition and subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due course to the petition and states that
the questions raised are factual or there is no reversible error in the respondent courts
decision, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. In the present
case, the Court of Appeals denied due course and outrightly dismissed the petition for
certiorari filed by herein petitioner on the grounds that the factual issues had already been
passed upon by the NLRC, and since its factual findings are in agreement with the findings of
the labor arbiter, the same are binding and conclusive upon the Court of Appeals; and that the
questions raised are too unsubstantial to require consideration. We find these legal bases in
conformity with the requirements of the Constitution.
The writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a prerogative writ, never
demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion.
Moreover, the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the
court may dismiss a petition for certiorari if it finds the same to be patently without merit,
prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to
require consideration.
Furthermore, a reading of the petition filed with the Court of Appeals shows that the main
issue raised is factual as it questions the finding of the NLRC that respondent Endaya was
illegally dismissed from his employment. Petitioner brought up issues the resolution of which
necessarily involves a review of the evidence presented by both parties. It is settled that resort
to a judicial review of the decisions of the NLRC in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court is confined only to issues of want or excess of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the rendering tribunal, board or office.[18] It does not
include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence which was the basis of
the labor official or officer in determining his conclusion It is not for the appellate court to
reexamine conflicting evidence, reevaluate the credibility of witnesses nor substitute the
findings of fact of an administrative tribunal which has gained expertise in its specialized field.
Considering that the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are supported by
evidence on record, the same must be accorded due respect and finality
Page 396
PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

628 SCRA 502 (2010)
Facts: This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision dated
May 6, 2002 of the Sandiganbayan granting the Demurrer to Evidence of Mayor Henry E. Barrera
(Mayor Barrera) and dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 25035-25037, 25039-25041, 25043,
25045-25047, 25049-25050, and 25053-25054, on the ground that the elements of the offense
under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as amended, were not established beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: WON CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in promulgating the assailed decision as it
never expressed clearly and distinctly the facts and the evidence on which it is based, in
violation of Article VIII Section 14 of the Constitution
Held: NO.
Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that "[n]o decision shall be rendered
by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based." The purpose of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution is to inform the person
reading the decision, and especially the parties, of how it was reached by the court after
consideration of the pertinent facts and examination of the applicable laws. The losing
party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should
he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly
state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was
reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible
errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. Thus, a decision is adequate if a party
desiring to appeal therefrom can assign errors against it.
Our review of the Sandiganbayan Decision dated May 6, 2006 reveals that said judgment
actually contained a summary of the antecedent facts and proceedings; as well as a discussion
on the relevant statutory provisions, the elements of the offense charged, and the testimonial
and documentary evidence presented by the People. The factual and legal bases of the
assailed Sandiganbayan Decision, granting Mayor Barrera's Demurrer to Evidence, are readily
evident xxx
In the instant cases, the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to prove actual injury
and damage suffered by the private complainants, as one of the elements of the crime herein
charged, in that it failed to specify, quantify and prove to the point of moral certainty the
purported "undue injury". Xxx Likewise, the prosecution's evidence failed to prove manifest
partiality and/or evident bad faith on the part of the accused, as the fourth of the abovestated requisites for the commission of the crime herein charged.
The evidence presented by the prosecution falls short of that quantum of proof necessary to
establish the fact that the accused acted with manifest partiality or with evident bad faith. On
the contrary, what is clear from the evidence adduced, was that herein accused simply
exercised his legitimate powers under the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) which
provides that a municipal mayor has the power to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to
the governance of the municipality and the exercise of its corporate powers" and, for this
purpose, he shall have the power to "issue such executive order as are necessary for the proper
Page 397

enforcement and execution of the laws and ordinances." Ex-Mayor Elamparo's acts of entering
into lease contracts, when his term was about to expire and herein accused-movant's term was
about to commence, being the mayor-elect, was not only in violation of the Local Government
Code provision that "no contract may be entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of
the local government unit without prior authorization by the sangguniang concerned," but also
of the other requirements of law such as, a verified application from the complainants,
payment of application fees, drawing of lots and the opening of bids, since not all the
displaced vendors can be accommodated in the thirty-two stalls in the new public market. The
intent of such a maneuvering was obviously to tie the hands of the incoming administration.
The undue haste of awarding stalls in the new public market by Ex-Mayor Elamparo was
flagrant, because from 26 June to 30 June, 1998, former stall holders of the old market that
burned down, held a rally to denounce the allegedly unfair awarding of contracts of lease over
the new stalls, complaints ranging from awards to new comers, to instances of two stalls, being
awarded to one lessee.
It was precisely in this state of affair that prompted herein accused-movant Barrera to cause
the issuance of Memorandum No. 1, Series of 1998, after he had taken his oath as mayor of
Candelaria, Zambales, to wit:
"You are hereby advised that effective 1:00 PM, June 30, 1998, the transferring to and
occupancy of stalls inside the Public Market shall be temporarily suspended.
For your strict implementation and compliance."
Lastly, of significance is the fact that Memorandum No. 1 applied to all stallholders at the new
public market, be they supporters or not of Mayor Barrera during the 1998 mayoralty elections
just past. These admissions of the complaining witnesses in open court, thus, refute their
allegations in their affidavits that the purpose of the memorandum was to award the new stalls
to Mayor Barrera's supporters.
In the light of all the foregoing, We find that herein accused-movant Henry E. Barrera cannot in
fairness be held liable under the indictment. In this connection, it has been held that the
prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense; the burden of proof is never on the accused to disprove the facts necessary to
establish the crime charged. "It is safely entrenched in our jurisprudence" says the Supreme
Court, "that unless the prosecution discharges its burden to prove the guilt of an accused
beyond reasonable doubt, the latter need not even offer evidence in his behalf.
In fact, based on the foregoing, the People was able to identify and discuss with
particularity in its present Petition the grave abuse of discretion allegedly committed by the
graft court in granting Mayor Barrera's Demurrer to Evidence. Thus, contrary to the People's
contention, the aforequoted Sandiganbayan judgment did not violate the mandate of
Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution.
LUMANOG VS. PEOPLE
630 SCRA 42 (2010)
Page 398

Facts: Appellants were the accused perpetrators of the ambush-slay of former Chief of the
Metropolitan Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine Constabulary (now the
Philippine National Police), Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla.
The principal witness for the prosecution was Freddie Alejo, a security guard employed
assigned at 211 Katipunan Avenue, Blue Ridge, Quezon City, where the ambush-slay happened.
As a purported eyewitness, he testified on what he saw during the fateful day, including the
faces of the accused.
All the accused raised the defense of alibi, highlighted the negative findings of ballistic and
fingerprint examinations, and further alleged torture in the hands of police officers and denial
of constitutional rights during custodial investigation.
The trial court however convicted the accused-appellants. The CA affirmed with modification
the decision of the trial court. The CA upheld the conviction of the accused-appellants based
on the credible eyewitness testimony of Alejo, who vividly recounted before the trial court
their respective positions and participation in the fatal shooting of Abadilla, having been able
to witness closely how they committed the crime.
Issue: Did the CA decision comply with the constitutional standard that [n]o decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based
Held: YES, the CA decision complied with the constitutional standard that [n]o decision shall
be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based.
Perusing the CA decision, we hold that it cannot be deemed constitutionally infirm, as it
clearly stated the facts and law on which the ruling was based, and while it did not
specifically address each and every assigned error raised by appellants, it cannot be said
that the appellants were left in the dark as to how the CA reached its ruling affirming the
trial courts judgment of conviction. The principal arguments raised in their Memorandum
submitted before this Court actually referred to the main points of the CA rulings, such as the
alleged sufficiency of prosecution evidence, their common defense of alibi, allegations of
torture, probative value of ballistic and fingerprint test results, circumstances qualifying the
offense and modification of penalty imposed by the trial court. What appellants essentially
assail is the verbatim copying by the CA of not only the facts narrated, but also the arguments
and discussion including the legal authorities, in disposing of the appeal. On such wholesale
adoption of the Office of the Solicitor Generals position, as well as the trial courts insufficient
findings of fact, appellants anchor their claim of failure of intermediate review by the CA
DUQUE VS. GARRIDO
580 SCRA 321 (2009)
Facts: In a verified letter-complaint dated February 7, 2006 complainant Marietta Duque
charged respondent, Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7,
Tacloban City, Leyte, with gross violation of Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution for
rendering a decision beyond ninety (90) days in Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 entitled People
v Reynaldo Caones y Royo Sr., et al.
Page 399

Complainant is the alleged common-law wife of the murdered victim in the aforementioned
Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580. She claimed that the respondent Judge violated Section 15,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution for rendering a decision beyond the 90 day reglementary
period without requesting an extension of time from this Court.
She alleged that the
prosecution filed its Memorandum submitting the case for resolution on August 10, 2005, but
the respondent issued a Decision on December 12, 2005 which was promulgated on January 27,
2006. Complainant further alleged that neither the offended party nor the handling prosecutor
was notified of the promulgation.
Issue: WON the respondent judge violated Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution
Held: Time and again, the Court has emphasized that the office of a judge exacts nothing less
than faithful observance of the Constitution and the law in the discharge of official duties.
Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide a case
within the reglementary period of 90 days xxx
Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 dictates as follows:
Rule 3.05 A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods.
Indeed, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to
prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the 90-day
period within which to decide cases is mandatory. The Court has consistently emphasized
strict observance of this rule in order to minimize the twin problems of congestion and delay
that have long plagued our courts. Any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how
brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case, for, not only does it
magnify the cost of seeking justice, it undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the
judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.
As readily gleaned from the records, the last pleading submitted i.e., the Memorandum for
the Prosecution, was filed on August 10, 2005. Thus, the case was deemed submitted for
decision on that date. Accordingly, the decision should have been rendered not later than
November 8, 2005. However, respondent issued it only on December 12, 2005 which was more
than four months after the case had been submitted for decision.
Respondent Judge Garrido clearly violated both the Constitution and the Code of Judicial
Conduct when he failed to decide Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 within the 90-day period
to decide cases prescribed for the lower courts.
Whenever a judge cannot decide a case promptly, all he has to do is to ask the Court for a
reasonable extension of time to resolve it. In this case, granting that it was for a justifiable
reason to render a decision or resolve a matter beyond the reglementary period, the
respondent could have sought additional time by simply filing a request for extension.
Respondent, however, did not avail of such relief.
Administrative Circular No. 28 issued by this Court on July 3, 1989 regarding the submission of
memoranda for purposes of deciding cases, clearly provides:
Page 400

x x x The ninety (90) day period for deciding the case shall commence to run from submission
of the case for decision without memoranda; in case the court requires or allows its filing, the
case shall be considered submitted for decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or
upon the expiration of the period to do so, whichever is earlier. (Emphasis ours)
A judge cannot even justify his delay in deciding a case on the excuse that he was still awaiting
the parties' memoranda. In Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 55, Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, the Court held:
x x x judges should decide cases even if the parties failed to submit memoranda within the
given periods. Non-submission of memoranda is not a justification for failure to decide cases.
The filing of memoranda is not a part of the trial nor is the memorandum itself an essential,
much less indispensable pleading before a case may be submitted for decision. As it is merely
intended to aid the court in the rendition of the decision in accordance with law and evidence which even in its absence the court can do on the basis of the judges personal notes and the
records of the case - non-submission thereof has invariably been considered a waiver of the
privilege. (Emphasis ours)
Failure of a judge, such as respondent herein, to decide a case within the prescribed
period is inexcusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting a disciplinary sanction.
Under Section 9(1), Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, of the Revised Rules of
Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is categorized as a less serious charge.
Under Section 11(B) [21] of the same Rule, the penalty for such charge is suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3)
months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.
COCOFED VS. REPUBLIC
663 SCRA 514 (2012)
Facts: The case revolved around the provisional take-over by the PCGG of COCOFED and its
assets, and the sequestration of shares of stock in United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)
purportedly issued to and/or owned by over a million coconut farmers, Cojuangco, the six (6)
Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) corporations[6] and the fourteen (14) CIIF holding
companies[7] (hereafter collectively called "CIIF companies"). These CIIF companies are so
called for having been organized and/or acquired as UCPB subsidiaries with the use of the CIIF
levy.
Concurrently, on June 7, 1990, the PCGG issued a memorandum stating that, pursuant to the
Decision dated October 29, 1989[11] promulgated by the Court in G.R. No. 75713 entitled
Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc., (COCOFED) v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government[12] (COCOFED v. PCGG), it was appointing the Executive Committee, Directors of
the National Board and Regional Directors of COCOFED. This prompted COCOFED to query the
Sandiganbayan as to the validity of such memorandum and ask for a temporary restraining
order to stop the PCGG from implementing the memorandum. For ease of reference, G.R. No.
75713, a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, sought to nullify the sequestration
and other orders issued by the PCGG against COCOFED and other enterprises, culminated in the
dismissal of said petition. However, in the assailed Order dated June 15, 1990, the
Page 401

Sandiganbayan ruled that the PCGG-designated board of directors shall operate COCOFED,
stating:
Upon verbal inquiry by Atty. Manuel Laserna, Jr. as to which board should be recognized in the
interim until a resolution of the matter pending before this Court, the Court is of the view and
so hold that those designated by the PCGG as of June 11, 1983 (sic), in the afternoon, will be
the operating board of the COCOFED. As earlier stated, this recognition by this Court is without
prejudice to any other act or acts which the parties might wish to refer to this Court and which
this Court will respond to at the interim.
Aggrieved, COCOFED and others who claimed to have been prejudiced by the designation of the
board of directors issued by the PCGG interposed the instant petition to challenge said PCGG
appointments.
The PCGG discovered later that the sequestered properties involved in the case were
registered in the name of the corporate-owners and not in the name of the individual
defendants; thus, there was a need to further amend the complaint pursuant to Section 26,
Article XVIII of the Constitution. Under this constitutional provision, failure to include
corporate defendants which own the sequestered properties would result in the automatic
lifting of the writs of sequestration. Thus, 78 corporate defendants were included in the newly
amended complaint entitled Third Amended Complaint [Expanded per Court-approved
Plaintiff's Manifestation/Motion dated December 8, 1987] dated August 19, 1991. COCOFED was
then included as a party defendant.
In 1995, during the pendency of the instant petition, the Republic moved for the
subdivision of CC 0033 into separate trials on the various sequestered assets, attaching the
corresponding amended complaints. On March 24, 1999, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution granting the Republic's motion and subdividing CC 0033 into eight (8) separate
complaints on the various subject matters
Issue:
GROUNDS IN SUPPORT OF THIS PETITION
The series of acts and omissions of respondent Honorable Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No.
0033 culminating in the Order of 15 June 1990 are without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The refusal of Respondent Honorable Sandiganbayan Court to receive petitioners' evidence
is a whimsical and capricious evasion of a positive duty under the law and particularly enjoined
in this Honorable Court's Decision in G.R. No. 75713.
The inaction of Respondent Honorable Sandiganbayan on the Class Action Omnibus Motion
serves to perpetuate the unlawful acts of respondent PCGG.
The failure of Respondent Honorable Sandiganbayan to afford Petitioners speedy justice is
tainted with such unfairness and arbitrariness as to amount to a lack or excess of jurisdiction.
[14]
Held: This petition must be dismissed.
Superseding events have rendered the instant case moot and academic
Page 402

In Mendoza v. Villas, the Court explained the concept of mootness, citing Gunsi, Sr. v.
Commissioners:
In Gunsi, Sr. v. Commissioners, The Commission on Elections, the Court defined a moot and
academic case as follows:
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As
a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
Sec. 8, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically provides for the effect of the amendment of
pleadings, to wit:
Section 8. Effect of amended pleadings. An amended pleading supersedes the pleading
that it amends. However, admissions in superseded pleadings may be received in evidence
against the pleader, and claims or defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the amended
pleading shall be deemed waived.
Thus, the Court considered the issue of whether an original complaint should have been
dismissed for having become moot with the admission of an amended complaint in Lu v. Lu Ym,
Sr. The Court ruled in this wise:
With the issue of admission of the amended complaint resolved, the question of whether or
not the original complaint should have been dismissed was mooted. Section 8, Rule 1.0 of the
Rules of Court specifically provides that an amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it
amends. In this case, the original complaint was deemed withdrawn from the records upon
the admission of the amended complaint. This conclusion becomes even more pronounced in
that the RTC already rendered a decision on the merits of the said amended complaint, not to
mention the Lu Ym father and sons' concurrence in the mootness of the issue in the instant
petition. (Emphasis supplied.)
Evidently, with the admission of the subdivided complaints in the instant case, the original
complaint in CC 0033 is deemed withdrawn from the records, such that CC 0033 no longer
exists. Correlatively, the issues pending in CC 0033 must be likewise considered moot and
academic.
OCA VS. MANTUA
665 SCRA 253
Facts: Travel Order No. 103-2008 dated 11 November 2008 ordered the conduct of a judicial
audit in Branch 17 from 24 to 25 November 2008. The judicial audit team submitted a
memorandum dated 14 January 2009, five days after Judge Mantuas retirement, to Deputy
Court Administrator Nimfa C. Vilches (DCA Vilches). The judicial audit team quantified Branch
17s caseload as follows:
As of audit date, the Court has a total caseload of 356 cases consisting of 230 criminal cases
and 126 civil cases based on the records actually presented to and examined by the team xxx
The judicial audit team also found that Branch 17s case records were not in order.
Page 403

The team noted that the case records are stitched together with pagination. However, the
criminal records are not chronologically arranged. Also, the records attached to criminal cases
jointly tried are incomplete (Crim. Cases 1129, 1131, 1189, 1190, 1185, 1186, 1033, 1205,
among a few). The courts docket books are not updated. There are no log book[s] on arrest
and search warrants, exhibits, disposed/decided/archived cases and incoming documents.
There is no order on payment of postponement fee in proper cases.
It was also noticed that alias warrants of arrest were issued without archiving cases. xxx
In a letter dated 27 April 2009 addressed to DCA Vilches, Atty. Mape informed the OCA of the
status of the cases enumerated in the report of the judicial audit team and submitted the
Orders, Resolutions and Notices of Hearing issued by Branch 17. Atty. Mape also stated that
Branch 17 already complied with all other items mentioned by the judicial audit team in their
recommendation. However, the wearing of uniform was considered optional starting 1 April
2009 in view of a memorandum issued by the OCA. Atty. Mape begged for the OCAs indulgence
and explained that the delay in the submission of his reply was brought about by two
substitutions of the judge assigned to Branch 17. At the time of audit, Judge Mantua presided
over the court. Pursuant to Judge Mantuas retirement on 9 January 2009, Administrative
Order No. 180-2008 designated Judge Maraya, Presiding Judge of Branch 11, Regional Trial
Court, Calubian, Leyte, as Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 17 to replace Judge Mantua.
Administrative Order No. 23-2009 dated 3 March 2009 revoked Judge Marayas designation and
Judge Rogelio R. Joboco (Judge Joboco), Presiding Judge of Branch 27, Catbalogan, Samar, took
over as acting presiding judge of Branch 17.
Issue: WON Judge Mantua was remiss in his duty to promptly dispose the cases in his sala
Held: The report of the judicial audit team, and consequently that of the OCA, suffers from
inaccuracies and a slant towards mere fault-finding. Civil Case No. PN-0354, Mingasca v.
Omega-Reyes, was entered twice, but in consecutive numbers, in the table for civil cases
without further setting. Because of this double entry, the judicial audit team and OCA probably
overlooked Judge Mantuas action dated 27 November 2008. Furthermore, despite Atty. Mapes
submissions dated 19 January 2009 and 27 April 2009 of copies of the Orders, Resolutions and
Notices of Hearing issued by Branch 17, the OCA failed to state in their Memorandum that out
of the 126 cases listed, Judge Mantua took action on 114 cases, or 90.48%, before he
retired on 9 January 2009.
It should be noted that the judicial audit team submitted their report to DCA Vilches five days
after Judge Mantuas retirement. The OCA, in turn, submitted their Memorandum to CJ Puno on
12 May 2009, or a little over four months after Judge Mantuas retirement. During his
incumbency, Judge Mantua was never given a chance to explain the results of the judicial
audit report. With the knowledge that the judicial audit report will be submitted only after
Judge Mantuas retirement, the judicial audit teams recommendations were directed only to
Atty. Mape, the Acting Clerk of Court and Legal Researcher II of Branch 17, and Judge Maraya,
Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 17 at the time of the reports submission. In its Memorandum,
the OCA recommended that Judge Mantua be fined for gross incompentency and inefficiency.
The report of the judicial audit team showed that no appropriate action was done in 68 cases,
23 cases remained unresolved after a sufficient amount of time, and 10 cases were not decided
within the reglementary period. In contrast, there is no showing that Judge Mantua ever
requested this Court for a reasonable period of extension to dispose of these cases.
Page 404

We issued a Resolution dated 15 August 2011 which redocketed the case as a regular
administrative matter and required Judge Mantua to comment on the OCAs 12 May 2009
Memorandum. The pertinent portions of Judge Mantuas comment read:
When I assumed office as Judge of RTC, Branch 17, Palompon, Leyte in August 2005, my court
then had no Clerk of Court. xxx
This comment is not an excuse for the findings of the Judicial Audit team of my performance,
but is made only to show the state of affairs of the court during my stewardship of the same for
a period of a little over three (3) years. However, despite my earnest efforts, there were things
which have been overlooked due to inadvertence and these were just product [sic] of human
weakness and imperfection.
This Court has always impressed upon judges the necessity of deciding cases with dispatch.
Section 5 of Canon 6 of the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that
[j]udges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions,
efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness. Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
states that [a] judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within
the required periods. Canon 6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics provides that [a judge] should
be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice delayed is
often justice denied. Section 15(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires that judges
of lower courts decide cases within three months from the date of submission.10
This Court has repeatedly reminded judges that they must resolve matters pending before
them promptly and expeditiously within the constitutionally mandated three-month period.
If they cannot comply with the same, they should ask for an extension from the Supreme
Court upon meritorious grounds. The rule is that the reglementary period for deciding cases
should be observed by all judges, unless they have been granted additional time.
Judges must dispose of the courts business promptly. Delay in the disposition of cases erodes
the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it to
disrepute. Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so
constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions on them.
11
Undue delay in rendering a decision or order is a less serious charge,12 penalized either by
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than
three months; or by a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.13 We
consider, however, that Judge Mantuas earnest efforts in attending to the pending cases in his
docket during his incumbency serve to negate his liability.
This Court concedes that there are no promulgated rules on the conduct of judicial audit.
However, the absence of such rules should not serve as license to recommend the imposition of
penalties to retired judges who, during their incumbency, were never given a chance to explain
the circumstances behind the results of the judicial audit. Judicial audit reports and the
memoranda which follow them should state not only recommended penalties and plans of
action for the violations of audited courts, but also give commendations when they are due. To
avoid similar scenarios, manual judicial audits may be conducted at least six months before a
judges compulsory retirement. We recognize that effective monitoring of a judges
observance of the time limits required in the disposition of cases is hampered by limited
Page 405

resources. These limitations, however, should not be used to violate Judge Mantuas right
to due process.
WHEREFORE, the complaint against Judge Celso L. Mantua is DISMISSED

HIPE VS. LITERARTO
671 SCRA 9 (2012)
OCA VS. SANTOS
684 SCRA 1 (2012)
Facts: In a Letter, Judge Santos requested from theOffice of the Court Administrator (OCA)
additional time to try and decide two election cases, namely: (a) Special Proceedings No.
2007-02 (Election Protest No. 2007-02) filed by a certain Felicisimo Gavino against Raymundo
Jucutan; and (b) Special Proceedings No. 2007-03 (Election Protest No.2007-03) initiated by
Angel Marinas against Edgardo Corre.
The OCA, favorably recommended the extension requested by Judge Santos which was adopted
by the Court in its July 21, 2008 Resolution.Judge Santos was granted an extension of thirty
(30) days or until June 7, 2008 to decide both election cases and was directed to furnish the
Court with copies of his decisions on said cases within ten (10) days from the promulgation of
judgment.
Thereafter, in a Letter Judge Santos provided the Court with a copy of his February 16, 2009
Decision in Election Protest No. 2007-03. The OCA, however, noticed that the said decision was
rendered eight (8) months beyond the extension granted to Judge Santos. Inits March 11, 2009
Report, the OCA recommended Warning.
In a letter, dated July 10, 2009, Judge Santos sought another extension of thirty (30) days or
until August 10, 2009 to decide Special Proceedings No. 2007-02 as he apparently needed more
time to evaluate the voluminous records of the case. The OCA, in its Memorandum required
Judge Santos to explain xxx
Issue:
Held: Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires lower courts to decide or
resolve cases or matters for decision or final resolution within three (3) months from date of
submission. Corollary to this constitutional mandate, Canon 1, Rule 1.02, of the Code of
Judicial Conduct directs that a judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.
Specifically, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to dispose of
their business promptly and to decide cases within the required period. All cases or matters
must be decided or resolved by all lower courts within a period of three (3) months from
submission.
To stress the importance of prompt disposition of cases, the Court, in Administrative Circular
No. 3-99, dated January 15, 1999, reminded all judges to strictly follow the periods prescribed
by the Constitution for deciding cases because failure to comply with the said period violates
Page 406

the parties constitutional right to speedy disposition of their cases. Hence, failure to decide
cases within the ninety (90)-day reglementary period may warrant imposition of administrative
sanctions on the defaulting judge.
In this case, Judge Santos failed to render the decision in 294 cases within the reglementary
period or to even ask for extension. The Court,
in its aim to dispense speedy justice, is not unmindful of circumstances that justify the delay in
the disposition of the cases assigned to judges. It is precisely for this reason why the Court has
been sympathetic to requests for extensions of time within which to decide cases and resolve
matters and incidents related thereto. When a judge sees such circumstances before the
reglementary period ends, all that is needed is to simply ask the Court, with the appropriate
justification, for an extension of time within which to decide the case. Thus, a request for
extension within which to render a decision filed beyond the 90-day reglementary period is
obviously a subterfuge to both the constitutional edict and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Judge Santos could have easily asked the Court or an extension of time to decide on these
cases like what he had done in the two election cases. He, however, opted not to do so. The
Court cannot understand why Judge Santos asked for extension in the two election cases but
not in the 294 cases already waiting for disposition in his sala. The Court can only surmise that
it was deliberate so he could not be directed by the Court to immediately resolve all of them.
The fact that the cases were mentioned in the monthly report of cases and semestral docket
inventories is not extenuating. The indelible fact is that he was in delay in resolving those
cases. Under the circumstances, it was inexcusable.
A.M. No. 10-4-22-SC September 28, 2010

RE: Seniority Among the Four (4) Most Recent Appointments to the Position of Associate
Justices of the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
On March 10, 2010, the Office of the President transmitted to the SC the appointments of Court
of Appeals Justices:
Appointees
Positions
Hon. Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela
Associate Justice, CA
Hon. Myra G. Fernandez
Hon. Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr.
Hon. Ramon Paul L. Hernando
The appointment papers of the Justices bore the following dates:

Name of Associate Justice
Date of Appointment
Hon. Myra G. Fernandez
February 16, 2010
Hon. Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr.
February 16, 2010
Page 407

Hon. Ramon Paul L. Hernando
February 16, 2010
Hon. Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela
February 24, 2010
The four Justices were finally listed in the roster of the CA Justices in the following order of
seniority: Justice Fernandez (as most senior), Justice Peralta, Jr., Justice Hernando and Justice
Antonio-Valenzuela (as most junior).
The conflict stems from certain provisions of the 2009 Internal Rues of the CA (IRCA). Rule 1,
Sec.1 provides: The date and sequence of the appointment of the Justices determine
their seniority courtwide.. On the other hand, Rule 2, Sec. 1 provides: The Associate
Justices shall have precedence according to the order of their appointments as officially
transmitted to the Supreme Court.
According to the CA Committee on Rules, Rule 2, Sec.1 should prevail as the conflict should be
reckoned with BP 129 (Sec 3. Organization) which states that: There is hereby created a Court
of Appeals which shall consist of a Presiding Justice and sixty-eight (68) Associate Justices who
shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Presiding Justice shall be so
designated in his appointment, and the Associate Justicesshall have precedence according to
the dates of their respective appointments, or when the appointments of two or more of them
shall bear the same date, according to the order in which their appointments were issued by
the President."
Judge Antonio-Valenzuela (ranked most junior) insisted that she is the most senior among the
four newly appointed CA Associate Justice pursuant to Rule2, Sec.1 IRCA. ." She argued that
"the final act in the process of appointing a member of the Judiciary is the transmittal of the
appointment to the Supreme Court."
Issue: whether or not Judge Antonio-Valenzuelas contention is correct.
Ruling: No.
For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, the date the commission has been signed by the
President (which is the date appearing on the face of such document) is the date of the
appointment. Such date will determine the seniority of the members of the Court of Appeals in
connection with Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246. In other words, the
earlier the date of the commission of an appointee, the more senior he/she is over the other
subsequent appointees. It is only when the appointments of two or more appointees bear the
same date that the order of issuance of the appointments by the President becomes material.
This provision of statutory law (Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246) controls
over the provisions of the 2009 IRCA which gives premium to the order of appointments as
transmitted to this Court.
Page 408
De La Llana v. Alba G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982

Facts:
Article VIII, Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution states that: The Members of the Supreme
Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the
age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The
Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at
least eight Members, order their dismissal." Subsequently, Batas Pambansa blg. 129 was
promulgated. It mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals
to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax
Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered
separated from the judiciary. Petitionerssought to bolster their claim by imputing lack of good
faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue delegation of legislative power to the
President his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges
thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the reorganization shall be
deemed completed.
Issue:
1.
2.
Whether or not the Congress has the power to reorganize the judiciary
Whether or not the enactment of BP blg 129 violated the security of tenure provision
Held:
1.
Yes. On August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization was

organized. 12This Executive Order was later amended by Executive Order No. 619-A.,
dated September 5 of that year. It clearly specified the task assigned to it: "1. The
Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization of the Judiciary which shall be
submitted within seventy (70) days from August 7, 1980 to provide the President
sufficient options for the reorganization of the entire Judiciary which shall embrace all
lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City and
Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts, but excluding the Sandigan Bayan."
The mere creation of an entirely new district of the same court is valid and constitutional.
Such conclusion flowing "from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish
courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or
otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions." The challenged statute
creates an intermediate appellate court,regional trial courts,metropolitan trial courts of the
national capital region,and other metropolitan trial courts,municipal trial courts in cities,as
well as in municipalities,and municipal circuit trial courts.There is even less reason then to
doubt the fact that existing inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the
establishment of such new inferior courts was the appropriate response to the grave and urgent
problems that pressed for solution. Certainly, there could be differences of opinion as to the
appropriate remedy. The choice, however, was for the Batasan to make, not for this Court,
which deals only with the question of power.
2.
No. Petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with
the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X,
Page 409

Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision in the 1935 Constitution. It
did not, however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise
administratively inferior courts. Moreover, the Supreme Court is empowered to
discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order
their dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the
Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of
course, to be distinguished fromtermination by virtue of the abolition of the office.
There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no
occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby
lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question
of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the
incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its
effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary.
Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by
the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs.
There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. In the
exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle inferior courts, the power of removal of
the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act
would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint.
Page 410
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT

Facts:
An administrative case was filed against Judge Eustaquio Gacott Jr. for gravely abusing his
discretion in dismissing a criminal case. The Second Division of the Court reprimanded and
fined him in the amount of P10,000 for gross ignorance of the law. He filed this motion for
reconsideration, contending that according to the second sentence of Art 8, Sec. 11 of the
Constitution, The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of the Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted in thereon. He argues that it is only the
full Court, not a division thereof, that can administratively punish him.
Issue: whether or not only the Full Court, not a division, can administratively punish the lower
court judge.
Ruling: No.
The very text of the present Section 11 of Article VIII clearly shows that there are actually two
situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that "the Supreme Court en
bancshall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts," is a declaration of the grant of
that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by,
the Court en banc. The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated
therein and is intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand
that the Courten banccan "order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein." Evidently, in
this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court
itself.
Pursuant to the first clause, a CourtEn Bancresolution was adopted, entitled "Bar Matter No.
209. It provides that the following are considereden banccases:
xxx xxx xxx
6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of
the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of
more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00, or both.
xxxxxxx
Only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are specifically required to be decided
by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for a thorough and judicious evaluation of
serious charges against members of the judiciary, it is only when the penalty imposed does not
exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the
administrative matter may be decidedin division.
It must not also be overlooked that as early as February 7, 1989, the Court promulgated
Circular No. 2-89 which clarifies that:
2. A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred in by a majority of its
members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon,
and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members, is a decision or
resolution of the Supreme Court (Section 4[3], Article VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Page 411
YNOT vs. IAC

Facts:
In 1980, Marcos issued Executive Order No. 626-A which forbade the transportation and
slaughtering of carabaos. Ynot transported 6 carabaos in a pumpboat from Masbate to Iloilo.
The police officers caught him and immediately confiscated his carabaos. He filed a case for
replevin before the RTC. The carabaos were returned to him upon filing of a superseades bond
of P12,000.00. After hearing, the court sustained the confiscation.
Issue:
whether or not the administrative authorities encroached on the power of the judiciary.
Held: Yes.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander,
were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given
asupersedeasbond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce
the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition,
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out
forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a
chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been
pronounced not by the police only but by acourt of justice, which alone would have had the
authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.
However, Executive Order No. 626-A authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commissionmay see fit,in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." The
phrase"may see fit"is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is
laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. To sum up, we
find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and,
worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt
of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against
the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative
powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
Page 412

ADAO vs. Judge LORENZO
Facts:
This complaint (year 1999) was filed against Judge Lorenzo for failing to act upon
complainants objection to the dismissal of a civil case filed in 1997. Judge Lorenzo reasoned
that it was almost physically impossible for him to act on complainants objection to the
notice of dismissal of said case because of his multifarious duties as Presiding Judge of Branch
1, Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 2, and Judge-Designate of Branch 4 at Dolores and Branch 5
at Oras, Eastern Samar; and that he did not resolve the matter because he thought it best that
it be resolved by the permanent judge of the RTC, Branch 2, Borongan, considering that
complainant had filed both an administrative and a criminal complaint against him.
Issue: whether or not Judge Lorenzo acted with grave abuse of discretion in failing to act upon
said objection.
Ruling: Yes. Judge Lorenzos excuse is unjustifiable. The fact that respondent judge presides
over four branches of the RTC is not a valid excuse for his inaction.
A heavy caseload may excuse a judges failure to decide cases within the reglementary period,
but not his/her failure to request an extension of time within which to decide the case on
time.
Nor can respondent use as an excuse the administrative and criminal complaints filed against
him by complainant as the complaints were filed only in May, 1999, more than a year after
complainant filed his memorandum in opposition to the notice of dismissal on September,
1997.Under Art. VIII,15(1) of the Constitution, judges of lower courts are required to decide
cases or resolve matters within three months from the date of their submission for resolution.
Page 413
DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL BAR COUNCIL

20306799/1179705776/name/de+castro+vs+JBC.doc.)
(http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/
G.R. No. 191002 | March 17, 2010

FACTS
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that
has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010
or seven days after the presidential election.
Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a
letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice
be commenced immediately.
JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of
filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of
the incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for
application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star.
Subsequently, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the
names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written
report, or opposition. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of
Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit
to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being
unresolved.
The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors to call for either the
prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist or mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist.
ISSUE
W/N mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees
by the JBC?
RULING: No.
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed
to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of
a judgment or discretion in a particular way.
For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a
clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the
act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of
the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e)
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.
Section 8(5) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the JBC to submit a list of at least three
nominees to the President for every vacancy in the Judiciary. However, Section 4(1) and Section
9, Article VIII, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court within 90 days
from the occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90 days from the submission of the list, in the
case of the lower courts. The 90-day period is directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus,
Page 414

the JBC should start the process of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Courtbeforethe occurrence of the vacancy.
Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of
nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court in order to enable the President to appoint one
of them within the 90-day period from the occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has no
discretion to submit the list to the Presidentafterthe vacancy occurs, because that shortens
the 90-day period allowed by the Constitution for the President to make the appointment. For
the JBC to do so will be unconscionable on its part, considering that it will
thereby effectively and illegally deprive the President of the ample time granted under the
Constitution to reflect on the qualifications of the nominees named in the list of the JBC
before making the appointment.
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nomineesbeforethe start of the Presidents mandatory
90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose names will be
in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The object of
the petitions for mandamusherein should only refer to the duty to submit to the President the
list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful
neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in performing that duty.
[88]Formandamusto lie against the JBC, therefore, there should be an unexplained delay on its
part in recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President.
The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 191342 is similarly devoid of merit. The challenge
mounted against the composition of the JBC based on the allegedly unconstitutional allocation
of a vote each to theex officiomembers from the Senate and the House of Representatives,
thereby prejudicing the chances of some candidates for nomination by raising the minimum
number of votes required in accordance with the rules of the JBC, is not based on the
petitioners actual interest, because they have not alleged in their petition that they were
nominated to the JBC to fill some vacancies in the Judiciary. Thus, the petitioners lacklocus
standion that issue.
Page 415
De Castro vs. Judicial Bar Council (April 20, 2010)

Ruling:
Article VIII, Section 8(1) and (5) of the Constitution provide that "A Judicial and Bar Council is
hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court It may exercise such other
functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it." Supervision, as a legal concept,
more often than not, is defined in relation with the concept of control.20 In Social Justice
Society v. Atienza,21we defined "supervision" as follows:
[Supervision] means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take
such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the
other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former for that of the latter.
Under this definition, the Court cannot dictate on the JBC the results of its assigned task, i.e.,
who to recommend or what standards to use to determine who to recommend. It cannot even
direct the JBC on how and when to do its duty, but it can, under its power of supervision,
direct the JBC to "take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties," if the duties are not being performed because of JBCs fault or inaction, or because of
extraneous factors affecting performance. Note in this regard that, constitutionally, the Court
can also assign the JBC other functions and duties a power that suggests authority beyond
what is purely supervisory.
Where the JBC itself is at a loss on how to proceed in light of disputed constitutional provisions
that require interpretation,22the Court is not legally out of line as the final authority on the
interpretation of the Constitution and as the entity constitutionally-tasked to supervise the JBC
in exercising its oversight function by clarifying the interpretation of the disputed
constitutional provision to guide the JBC. In doing this, the Court is not simply rendering a
general legal advisory; it is providing concrete and specific legal guidance to the JBC in the
exercise of its supervisory authority, after the latter has asked for assistance in this regard.
That the Court does this while concretely resolving actual controversies (the Tolentino and
Soriano petitions) on the same issue immeasurably strengthens the intrinsic correctness of the
Courts action.
Page 416
Chavez vs. JBC

Facts:
Chavez seeks judicial intervention with regard to JBC composition. Article VIII, Sec. 8 of the
1987 Constitution provides that, A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme
Court, and a representative of the private sector. In compliance, Congress, from the moment of
JBC creation, had only 1 representative (the HR and Senate would send alternate
representatives to the JBC). Subsequently, in 1994, the composition of the JBC was
substantially altered. Instead of having only 7 members, an 8th member was added to the JBC
as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC - one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then,
curiously, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House
of Representatives one full vote each.
Issue: Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8)
members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of
the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling: Yes.
The use of the singular letter "a" preceding "representative of Congress" is unequivocal and
leaves no room for any other construction. Congress may designate only one (1) representative
to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the
legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers of the Constitution could have, in no uncertain
terms, so provided.
The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a
solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads the Court to
conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of
Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned
practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle the JBCs voting process, especially
in the event a tie is reached.
The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word "Congress" in
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and the
House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded because at the time the said
provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of Congress.
A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the composition of the
JBC reflects the Commissions desire "to have in the Council a representation for the major
elements of the community." xxx The ex-officio members of the Council consist of
representatives from the three main branches of government while the regular members are
composed of various stakeholders in the judiciary. The unmistakable tenor of Article VIII,
Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-officio member as representing one co-equal branch of
government. xxx Thus, the JBC was designed to have seven voting members with the
threeex-officiomembers having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees.
To ensure judicial independence, the framers of the Constitution adopted a holistic approach
and hoped that, in creating a JBC, the private sector and the three branches of government
would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary.
Page 417

Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having
more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would, as
one former congressman and member of the JBC put it, "negate the principle of equality among
the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution."53
Page 418
Republic vs. Asuncion (http://www.scribd.com/doc/149333067/Republic-vs-Asuncion)

Facts:
Alexander Manio, a member of PNP, shot T/Sgt. Romeo Sadang. He was charged in the RTC with
the crime of Homicide. The respondent Judge dismissed said Criminal Case for re-filing with
the Sandiganbayan" on the ground that it is the Sandiganbayan and not the Regional Trial Court,
has the jurisdiction over the case. This is in view with the SC decision in the case of Deloso vs.
Domingo, quoted that The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public
officials when penalty prescribed by law for the offense is higher than prision correccional,
the offense charged in the herein case carries penalty of reclusion temporal maximum to
death thus cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to
investigate it. Petitioner opposed the RTC dismissal of the case due to Courts jurisdiction. He
asserted that crimes committed by PNP members are not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
because they fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts" as provided in Section
46 of R.A. No. 6975 and the Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special court."
ISSUE:
1.
Whether the term regular courts includes the Sandiganbayan
2.
Whether all offenses commited by public officer or employee with
penalty higher than prision correctional would automaticaly be cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.
HELD:
1.
Yes, Sandiganbayan is a regular Court. Regular courts are those within the
judicial department of the government, namely, the Supreme Court and such lower courts
which as established by law, under Section 16, Chapter 4, Book II of the Administrative Code of
1987, includes the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, Regional Trial
Courts, Shari'a District Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts, and Shari'a Circuit Courts."
Accordingly, the termregular courtsin Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 meanscivil courts. This is
in line with the purpose of the law to remove the jurisdiction of Court- Martial over criminal
cases involving PNP members due to reorganization and turning PNP into civilian in character
which in return mandates the transfer of criminal cases against members of the PNP to
thecivilian courts.
2.
No, If the allegation in the information of the offense of any public officer is not
related to his function in his public office then RTC has the exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
Therefore in the case at bar the dismissal of criminal case purposely to transfer Court
jurisdiction solely on the basis of Deloso vs. Domingo case was erroneous. Any officer
authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation who is investigating an offense or felony
committed by a public officer or employee (including a member of the PNP) where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher thanprision correccionalor imprisonment for six years, or a fine of
P6,000.00, must determine if the crime was committed by the respondent in relation to his
office. If it was, the investigating officer shall forthwith inform the Office of the Ombudsman
which may either (a) take over the investigation of the case pursuant to Section 15(1) of R.A.
No. 6770, or (b) deputize a prosecutor to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in
the investigation and prosecution of the case pursuant to Section 31 thereof. If the
investigating officer determines that the crime was not committed by the respondent in
relation to his office, he shall then file the information with the proper court.
Page 419

CAYETANO v. MONSOD
201 SCRA 210 (1991)
FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Commission on Appointments. Petitioner Cayetano
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification
of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.
On June 5, 1991, the CA confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On
June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day he assumed office as Chairman of
the COMELEC. Hence, this petition by Cayetano, as citizen and taxpayer, praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of COMELEC be declare
null and void.
HELD:
Section 1(1), Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides that: There shall be a Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least 35 years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any election position in the
immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall
be members of the Philippine Bar who have engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
While there seems to be no Jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal
qualification to an appointive office, Black defines practice of law as The rendition of
services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and techniques to serve
the interest of another with his comment. It is not limited to appearing in Court, or advising
and assisting in the conduct of litigation but embraces the preparations of pleadings, and other
papers incidents to actions and special proceedings, conveyance, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of legal advises to clients. xxx
The practice of law means any activity, In or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. To engage in the practice of law is
to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is
to give notice or render any kind of service, which devise or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill.
Interpreted in the light of various definitions of the term practice of law, particularly the
modem concept of law practice, Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poorverily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirementthat he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. These are added to the fact that Mr. Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, has been
dues-paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-1973
and has also been paying his professional license fees as a lawyer for more than 10 years.
Practice of law- to include any activity in and out of court which should require the use of legal
skills, knowledge or expertise. But this is qualified by the phrase member of the Philippine
Bar.
Because of the law student practice rule that law students who have finished at least
3rd year, not 3 years, in law school, to be accepted in the law student practice. The law student
would be technically performing tasks which require the use of legal skills, but he is not yet a
member of the Philippine bar, he cannot be qualified to the position.
Page 420

There is a common disqualification on appointments. They must not have been
candidates for any elective position, in the elections immediately preceding their appointment.
2 things:
(1)
It does not refer to the 1 year usual laying back prohibition
that if you have ran in the last election, you cannot be appointed to any government office
within a period of 1 year for the Commissioners, it is in the immediately preceding elections
if youre a candidate, you cannot be appointed within a period of 3 years.
(2)
What election are we talking about-national election, or local election?

-if youre 35, you cannot run for youth (SK)
-for example you ran in 1998 for Congress, then theres the 2001, no problem, you can be
appointed after May 14, 2001 can you be appointed after next year? The immediately preceding
elections would not be the 2001 elections if the barangay election is considered.
-it should be a national election
Theres a special rule with respect to the COA, all members must not belong to the
same profession. So 2:1 in favor of the CPAs and lawyers.
(2)
Appointment & Term of Commissioners
(a)
Rule against Reappointment
Art. IX-C, Sec. 1(2): The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointment for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven
years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
The President shall make the appointment for 7 years, no reappointment with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments (CA).
No reappointment because it would not be in consonance with the rule on
independence.
Page 421
NACIONALISTA v. ANGELO
85 PHIL 101 (1949)
FACTS:
On Nov. 9, 1949, while respondent Bautista held the Office of the Solicitor General of the
Philippines, President Quirino designated him as acting member of the COMELEC. He took his
oath of office and forthwith proceeded to assume and perform the duties of the office while at
the same time continued to exercise all the powers and duties as Solicitor General.
Petitioner Nacionalista Party instituted this proceeding praying that after due hearing, a writ of
prohibition be issued commanding the respondent Solicitor General to desist forever from
acting as member of the COMELEC unless is legally appointed as regular Member of said
Commission. Petitioner alleged that membership in the Commission is a permanent
constitutional office with a fixed tenure, and, therefore, no designation of a person or officer
in an acting capacity could and can be made because a member of the Commission cannot at
the same time hold any other office; and because the respondent as Solicitor General belongs
to the Executive Department and cannot assume the powers and duties of a member in the
Commission.
HELD:
Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is an independent body or institution. By the very nature
of their functions, the members of the COMELEC must be independent. They must be made to
feel that they are secured in the tenure of their office and entitled to fixed emoluments during
their incumbency, so as to make them impartial in the performance of their functions, their
powers, and their duties. That independence and impartiality mal- IV shaken and by
designation of a person or officer to act temporarily in the COMELEC. It would be more in
keeping with the intent, purpose and aim of the framers of the Constitution to appoint a,
permanent Commission than to designate one to act temporarily.
Moreover, the permanent office of the respondent as Solicitor General is the broad sense
incompatible with the temporary one to which he has been designated, because his duties and
functions as Solicitor General require that all his time be devoted to their efficient
performance. Nothing short of that is required and expected of him.
The Supreme Court said that the appointment to the Commission is permanent, they cannot
be temporary or in an acting capacity. Only permanent appointees are secured in their offices.
A person not secured in his office may retain from exercising his duties in such a manner that
he will clash with the appointing authority. There may be hesitation on his part, that is not
conducive to the independence of the Commission. Only a permanent appointment can make
the person secured from the appointing authority.
BRILLANTES v. YORAC
GR 93867 (Dec. 18, 1990)
FACTS:
Petitioner Brillantes is challenging the designation by the President of the Philippines of
Associate Commissioner Haydee Yorac as acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in
place of Chairman Hilario Davide, who had been named Chairman of the fact-finding
Commission to investigate the 1989 December coup dtat attempt.
ISSUE:
Page 422

Whether or not the President has the power to make the challenged designation.
HELD:
No. The President does not have the power to make the challenged designation. Art. IX-C of the
1987 Constitution provides that: In no case shall any Member of the Commission on Elections
be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Art. IX-A, Section 1 of the
Constitution, likewise expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as independent.
Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the
Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts
its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and the exercise of its own
discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President
of the Philippines. The choice of the acting Chairman is an internal matter that should be
resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the President violates their
independence.
This case talks about the designation of the appointment of the temporary chairperson.
Who shall be the acting chairperson. Because the permanent chairperson is appointed
President, how about the acting? Should the President make the appointment?
It is within the discretion of the remaining members, who in the meantime will be the
acting chairperson. Because:
1st- the Constitution prohibits appointment in a temporary or acting capacity
2nd- it is still not conducive to the independence of the Commission.
NP v. VERA
85 PHIL 149 (1951)
FACTS:
This is a special civil action for prohibition filed by the Nacionalista Party and its official
candidates for Senators against Vicente de Vera, Chairman of the COMELEC to enjoin him from
sitting or taking part in the deliberations of said Commission in connection with the elections of
the Liberal Party for the position of Senator in the last elections, and for that reason, he is
disqualified from acting on all matters connected with said elections, the Nacionalista Party
also argued that his appointment as Chairman of the COMELEC is a violation of the constitution
and, therefore, it is void ab initio. It was found out that de Vera was already a member of the
Commission when he is appointed its chairman. Nacionalista Party argued that such
appointment was in fact a reappointment which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution.
HELD:
The Supreme Court pronounced that the ground invoked by petitioners would be proper in quo
warrant to proceedings but not in a petition for prohibition because it is inquiring into a
persons title he is holding under color of right. Nevertheless, the Court gave its view on the
1985 Constitutional appointment of COMELEC that There shall be an independent Commission
on Elections composed of a chairman and two other members to be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, who shall hold office for a term of nine
years and may not be reappointed. xxx it must be noticed from this provision that the
prohibition against reappointment comes as a continuation of the requirement that the
Commissioners shall hold office for a term of 9 years. This imports that the Commissioners may
not be reappointed only after they have held office only for, say, 3 or 6 years, provided his
term will not exceed 9 years at all.
Page 423
REP v. IMPERIAL
96 PHIL 770 (1955)
FACTS:
The Solicitor General filed this quo warrant to proceeding against respondents Hon. Imperial
and Hon. Perez, to test the legality of their continuance in office of as Chairman and Member,
respectively, of the COMELEC. According to the Solicitor General, the first Commissioners of
COMELEC were duly appointed and qualified on July 12, 1945 with the following terms of
office:
Hon. Vito, Chairman, for 9 years, expiring on July 12, 1954;
Hon. Enage, Member, for 6 years, expiring on July 12, 1951;
Hon. Vera, Member, for 3 years, expiring on July 12, 1948;
Upon death of chairman Vito in May 1947, Member Vera was promoted Chairman on May 26,
1947.The Solicitor General argued that based on the case of NP V. Bautista, the term of office
of Vera would have expired on July 12, 1954 or the date when the term of office if the late Vito
would have expired. But Chairman Vera also died in August, 1951 and the respondent Hon.
Imperial was appointed Chairman to serve for a full term of 9 years or to expire on July 12,
1960 despite the theory that he could legally server as Chairman only up to July 12. 1954.
Respondent Hon. Perez was appointed member on Dec.8, 1949 again for a full term of 9 years
expiring on Nov. 24, 1958. The solicitor General argued that Hon. Perez could serve only up to
July 12, 1951 or the date when the term of office of Member Enage who was his predecessor
would have expired.
HELD:
Sec 1. Par. 1 of Art. X of the 1935 Constitution provides that: There shall be an independent
Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and two other members to be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, who shall hold office for a
term of nine years and may not be reappointed. Of the Members of the Commission first
appointed, one shall hold office for a term of nine years, another for six years, and the third
for three years. The Chairman and the other Members of the Commission on Elections may be
removed from office only by impeachment in the manner provided in this Constitution.
The provision that of the first 3 Commissioners appointed one shall hold office for nine years,
another for 6 years and the third for 3 years when taken together with the prescribed term of
office for 9 years, without reappointment, evidences a deliberate plan to have a regular
rotation or cycle in the membership of the Commission, by having subsequent members
appointable only once every 3 years, so that no President can appoint more than one
Commissioner, thereby preserving and safeguarding the independence and impartiality of the
Commission as a body. The rotation plan and selection of the fixed term of 9 years for all
subsequent appointees were evidently for the purpose of preserving it from hasty and
irreflexive changes.
The operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions, both indispensable to its
workability: (1) That the terms of the first 3 Commissioners should start on a common date;
and, (2) That any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the
term should be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term.
Page 424

The starting date, however, should be June 21, 1941 since that is the date of the organization
of the Constitutional COMELEC under CA 657 ( which was formerly, a purely statutory
commission under CA 607), not July 12, 1945 as pointed out by the Solicitor General. Hence,
the terms of office of the first appointees are as follows:
Hon. Vito, Chairman, for 9 years, expiring on June 20, 1950;
Hon. Enage, Member, for 6 years, expiring on June 20 1947.
The first 3-year term expiring on June 20, 1944 was not filled (because Hon. Vera was
appointed on July 12, 1945).
Hence, when Hon. Vera was appointed on July 12, 1945, the first 3-year had already expired
and so his appointment must be deemed for the full 9 years, expiring on June 20, 1953.
When Chairman Vito died on May 7, 1947, Commissioner Vera was appointed Chairman. Such
appointment could only be for the unexpired period of Veras term or up to June 20, 1953.
Chairman Veras tenure as Chairman expired on June 20, 1950 and his reappointment was
expressly prohibited by the Constitution. The next Chairman was respondent Hon. Imperial
whose terms of 9 years must be deemed to have begun on June 21, 1950, expiring only on June
20, 1959.
As to Perezs case, he succeeded Hon. Enage whose initial 6-year term expired on June 21,
1947. Perez was to serve for a 9-year term which must be deemed to have started on June 21,
1947, expiring only on June 20, 1956.
Hence, the legal terms of office of the respondents Hon. Imperial and Hon. Perez have not yet
expired.
They were trying to discuss whether reappointment is possible. The term before is 9
years. If you are appointed for only 3 years, you can be reappointed for another 6 years. or if
you have been appointed to serve the unexpired term of the incumbent Commissioner who has
died or becomes incapacitated or has been removed, you can be reappointed provided it does
not exceed 9 years.
Supreme Court said in those cases that reappointment is still not possible because of
the so-called rotation plan.
The purpose of the rotation plan is to afford the independence and to protect and safeguard
the independence of the Constitutional Commissions. They are performing executive functions
but not under the executive branch. They are strictly independent from the executive.
If theres a vacancy before the expiration of the term- the appointees shall serve only for the
unexpired term and that appointee cannot be reappointed.
No Member shall be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. This is also
traceable to the independence of the Commision.
Page 425
GAMINDE v. COA
347 SCRA 655 (2000)
FACTS:
On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde, ad
interim, Commissioner, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. She assumed office on June 22, 1993, after
taking an oath of office. On September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointment (CA),
Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment also informing her that her will expire
on February 2, 1999.
On February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President as to the
expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel,
opined that petitioners term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on February 02,
1999. Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in office after February 02, 1999.
On February 04, 1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de Leon, wrote the COA requesting opinion
on whether or not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminous staff may be paid
their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02, 1999. On
February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, COA, issued an opinion that the term of Commisioner
Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with the
constitutional extent. Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U.
Felipe issued notice of disallowance, disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments
pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminous staff, effective February 02, 1999. On April 5,
1999, petitioner appealed the disallowance to the COA en banc. On June 15, 1999, the COA
dismissed petitioner appeal. The COA affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that
the issue of petitioners term of office may be properly addressed by mere reference to her
appointment paper which set the expiration date on February 02, 1999, and that the
Commission is bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the
implied acquiescence of the Office of the President. In time, petitioner moved for
reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999, the COA denied the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, CSC, to which she
was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment
paper, or on February 02, 2000, as claimed by her.
HELD:
The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, CSC, under an appointment
extended to her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999.
The term of office of the Chairman and members of the CSC is prescribed in the 1987
Constitution, as follows:
Section 1 (2). The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of 7 years without reappointment.
Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for 7 years, a Commissioner for 5 years,
and another Commissioner for 3 years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy
Page 426

shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
In Republic vs. Imperial, we said that the operation of the rotational plan requires 2
conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1) that the terms of the first three (3)
Commissioners should start on a common date, and, (2) that any vacancy due to death,
resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should only be filled only for the
unexpired balance of the term.
The terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the CC under the 1987 Constitution must
start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and
qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of 7, 5 and 3
years should lead to the regular recurrence of the 2-year interval between the expiration of
the terms.
Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate starting point
of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Cc under the 1987 Constitution must be on
February 02, 1987, the date of adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case of a belated
appointment or qualification, the interval between the start of the term and the actual
qualification of the appointee must be counted against the latter.
In concluding that February 02, 1987 is the proper starting point of the terms of office of the
first appointees to the CC of a staggered 7-5-3 year terms, we considered the plain language of
Article IX (B), Section 1 (2), Article IX (C), Section 1 (2) and Article IX (D), Section 1(2) of the
1987 Constitution that uniformly prescribed a 7-year term of office for Members of the CC,
without re-appointment, and for the first appointees terms of 7, 5 and 3 years, without reappointment. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity. There is no need to expressly state the beginning of the term of office as this is
understood to coincide with effectivity of the Constitution upon its ratification.
(3) Appointment of Personnel
Art. IX-A, Sec. 4: The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in
accordance with law.
(4) Salary
Art. IX-A, Sec.3: The salary of the Chairman and Commissioners should be fixed by law and
shall not be decreased during their tenure.
Art XVIII, Sec. 17: Until the Congress provides otherwise, the President shall receive an annual
salary of three hundred thousand pesos; the Vice-President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representative and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, two
hundred forty thousand pesos each: the Senators, the Members of the House of the
Representatives, the Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Chairmen of the
Constitutional Commissions, two hundred four thousand pesos each; and the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos each.
Salaries of members of the Commissions are just like the judiciary- not to be decrease during
their tenure, but no prohibition on increase. They can be increase even during their terms
because they have no hand on the passage of the bill.
(5) Disqualifications
Art. IX-A, Sec. 2: No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any
other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the
activity management or control of any business which in any way maybe affected by the
functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in contact
with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries.
(6) Impeachment
Page 427

Art. XI, Sec 2: The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office, an impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public
officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment.
(7) Appeal
Eugenio S. Capablanca vs.Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 179370, November 18, 2009.
FACTS
Capablanca was appointed into the PNP service with the rank of PO1 with a temporary
statusand was assigned at the PNP Station inButuanCity. After two years, he took the PNP
Entrance Examination conducted by the NAPOLCOMand passed the same.On 2000, he took the
Career Service Professional Examination-Computer Assisted Test (CSP-CAT) given by the CSCand
likewise passed the same. Thereafter, the Police Regional Office XIII conferred upon him the
permanent status as PO1.
On2001, The CSC Caraga informed PO1 Capablanca about certain alleged irregularities
relative to the CSP-CAT which he took on 2000. According to the CSC, the person in the
picture pasted in the Picture Seat Plan (PS-P) is different from the person whose picture is
attached in the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) and that the signature appearing in the PS-P was
different from the signature affixed to the PDS.
During the preliminary investigation, Capablanca, represented by a counsel, moved to
dismiss the proceedings. He argued that it is the NAPOLCOM which has sole authority to
conduct entrance and promotional examinations for police officers to the exclusion of the CSC.
Thus, the CSP-CAT conductedwas void.Moreover, he alleged that the administrative discipline
over police officers falls under the jurisdiction of the PNP and/or NAPOLCOM.
In an Order, the CSC Caraga held that there was no dispute as to the sole authority of
NAPOLCOM as argued by him. However, since he submitted a CSC Career Service Professional
eligibility to support his appointment on a permanent status, then the CSC had jurisdiction to
conduct the preliminary investigation. So, the motion was denied.
PO1 Capablanca, then, filed a Petition for prohibition and injunction with a prayer for the
issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC. Instead of filing its Answer,
the CSC Caraga moved to dismiss the case. It argued that, other than not exhausting
administrative remedies, the CSC was not stripped of its original disciplinary jurisdiction over
all cases involving civil service examination anomalies. The court denied CSCs motion, and
later, ruled that that the CSC had no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation,
much less to prosecute PO1 Capablanca.
The CSC filed a Petition forCertiorari before the CA. The CA granted CSC Petition.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT IT HAS ONLY APPELLATE
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE AND IT IS THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION (NAPOLCOM) WHICH
HAS THE JURISDICTION TO CONDUCT INITIATORY INVESTIGATION OF THE CASE.
RULING
The petition lacks merit.
Page 428
It is clear that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it initiated the conduct of a
preliminary investigation on the alleged civil service examination irregularity committed by the
petitioner.Petitioner anchors his argument that the heads of departments, agencies, offices or
bureaus should first commence disciplinary proceedings against their subordinates before their
decisions can be reviewed by the CSC.
It has already been settled inCruz v. Civil Service Commission that the appellate power of the
CSC will only apply when the subject of the administrative cases filed against erring employees
is in connection with the duties and functions of their office, and not in cases where the acts of
complainant arose from cheating in the civil service examinations.
Moreover, inCivil Service Commission v. Albao, we rejected the contention that the
CSC only has appellate disciplinary jurisdiction on charges of dishonesty and falsification of
documents in connection with an appointment to a permanent position in the government
service.
Finally, petitioners reliance onCivil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals, is misplaced. In
said case, the NAPOLCOM assailed Item 3 of CSC Resolution No. 96-5487, which provides:
3. Appointees to Police Officer and Senior Police Officer positions in the Philippine National
Police must have passed any of the following examinations:
a)PNP Entrance Examination;

b)Police Officer 3rdClass Examination; and
c)CSC Police Officer Entrance Examination.
The NAPOLCOM took exception to this provision, particularly letter (c), arguing that
the requirement of taking a CSC Police Officer Entrance Examination is only applicable to
entrance in the first-level position in the PNP,i.e., the rank of PO1. NAPOLCOM stressed that
what would entitle a police officer to the appropriate eligibility for his promotion in the PNP
are the promotional examinations conducted by the NAPOLCOM, and not the CSC Police Officer
Entrance Examination.
The Court of Appeals found in favor of the NAPOLCOM and held that the CSC, by issuing
Item 3 of CSC Resolution No. 96-5487 encroached on the exclusive power of NAPOLCOM under
RA 6975 to administer promotional examinations for policemen and to impose qualification
standards for promotion of PNP personnel to the ranks of PO2 up to Senior Police Officers 1-4.
On the contrary, the issue in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the CSC
with regard to anomalies or irregularities in the CSP-CAT, which is a totally different matter.
TAY
Powers of COA
VELOSO et al. vs. COA
G.R. No. 193677, September 6, 2011
FACTS:
Page 429

The City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040, authorizing the conferment of
Exemplary Public Service Award (EPSA) to elective local officials of Manila who have been
elected for three consecutive terms in the same position. Pursuant to the ordinance, the City
made partial payments in favor of a number of former councilors.
However, the Supervising Auditor of the City of Manila issued an Audit Observation
Memorandum, with the following observations: that the Ordinance is without legal basis; the
monetary reward is excessive and tantamount to double compensation in contravention to the
IRR of RA 7160; and that the appropriations to implement the Ordinance was improperly
classified.
Thereafter, a Notice of Disallowance (ND) was issued.
The councilors filed a Motion to Lift the Notice of Disallowance, which was granted by the
Legal Adjudication Office-Local of the COA. Upon review however, the COA rendered the
assailed Decision, sustaining the Notice of Disallowance.
ISSUE: whether the COA has the authority to disallow the disbursement of local government
funds.
RULING: YES.
It was the contention of the petitioners that the power and authority of the COA to audit
government funds and accounts does not carry with it in all instances the power to disallow a
particular disbursement. CitingGuevara v. Gimenez,they claim that the COA has no discretion
or authority to disapprove payments on the ground that the same was unwise or that the
amount is unreasonable.
The SC however disagreed. As held in National Electrification v. COA, the ruling
inGuevaracited by petitioners has already been overturned inCaltex Philippines, Inc. v. COA.
It was explained that under the 1935 Constitution, the Auditor General could not correct
irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures of public funds, but could only
bring the matter to the attention of the proper administrative officer. Under the 1987
Constitution, however, the COA is vested with the authority to determine whether government
entities, including LGUs, comply with laws and regulations in disbursing government funds, and
to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of these funds.
Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution gives a broad outline of the powers and functions of
the COA, to wit:
Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine,
audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or
uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any
of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies,
commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b)
autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or
equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law or
the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However,
where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may
Page 430

adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and
appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government
and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting
papers pertaining thereto.
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to
define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required
therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those forthe
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.
Under the first paragraph of the above provision, the COA's audit jurisdiction extends to the
government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including governmentowned or controlled corporations with original charters. Its jurisdiction likewise covers, albeit
on a post-audit basis, the constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been
granted fiscal autonomy, autonomous state colleges and universities, other government-owned
or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, and such non-governmental entities receiving
subsidy or equity from or through the government. The power of the COA to examine and audit
government agencies cannot be taken away from it as Section 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution
mandates that "no law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary
in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the COA."
Pursuant to its mandate as the guardian of public funds, the COA is vested with broad powers
over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public
funds and property. This includes the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods for such review, and promulgate accounting
and auditing rules and regulations. The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine,
prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures of government funds.
Thus, LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit jurisdiction of the
COA.
AGRA et al. vs. COA
G.R. No. 167807, December 6, 2011
This case involves the grant of rice allowance to employees of the National Electrification
Administration (NEA) by virtue of RA 6758 (the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989). A group of NEA employees, claiming that they did not receive such allowances, filed a
special civil action for mandamus against NEA before the RTC which later decided in their favor
and directed NEA to settle said claims. This decision was issued a certificate to the effect that
is has become final and executory.
This decision was questioned by NEA before the CA which ordered the implementation of a writ
of execution against the funds of NEA. This was reversed by the SC on the following grounds:
COA had alreadypassed upon claims similarto the subject of the case in their earlier
resolution. COA opined that the court may have exceeded its jurisdiction when it
entertained the petition for the entitlement of the employees which had already been
passed upon by COA. Thus, employees, pursuant to the above COA decision, cannot
defy that decision by filing a petition for mandamus in the lower court. PD 1445 and
the 1987 Constitution prescribe that the only mode for appeal from decisions of COA is
Page 431
on certiorari to the Supreme Court in the manner provided by law and the Rules of
Court. Clearly, the lower court had no jurisdiction when it entertained the subject case
of mandamus. And void decisions of the lower court can never attain finality, much less
be executed.
NEA is a GOCC. As such GOCC, NEA cannot evade execution; its funds may be garnished
or levied upon in satisfaction of a judgment rendered against it. However, before
execution may proceed against it, a claim for payment of the judgment award must
first be filed with the COA.
Under CA 327, as amended by PD 1445, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction to
examine, audit and settle "all debts and claims of any sort" due from or owing the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. With respect to
money claims arising from the implementation of R.A. No. 6758, their allowance or
disallowance is for COA to decide, subject only to the remedy of appeal by petition
forcertiorarito the SC.
As to the grant of the allowance under said final and executory decision, NEA requested for a
legal opinion before the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) which opined for
the approval of the release of the allowance. Hence, NEA issued a Resolution approving the
same and the release of the funds.
However, the resident auditor of COA did not allow the payment of rice allowance for a
particular period. The Notice of Allowance was appealed, but the same was denied by COA.
They went again to the SC questioning the disallowance of their rice subsidy.
RULING:
(Discussion is primarily on the entitlement to the subsidy. The following are the matters
relating to the powers of COA)
The immutability rule applies only when the decision is promulgated by a court possessed of
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Undoubtedly, the petition in the guise of a case for
mandamus is a money claim falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of COA. Noting
the propensity of the lower courts in taking cognizance of cases filed by claimants in violation
of such primary jurisdiction, the SC issued Administrative Circular 10-2000 dated October 23,
2000 enjoining judges of lower courts to exercise caution in order to prevent "possible
circumvention of the rules and procedures of the Commission on Audit" and reiterating the
basic rule that: "All money claims against the Government must be filed with the Commission
on Audit which shall act upon it within sixty days. Rejection of the claim will authorize the
claimant to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari and in effect sue the State
thereby."
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, when an administrative body is clothed with
original and exclusive jurisdiction, courts are utterly without power and authority to exercise
concurrently such jurisdiction. Accordingly, all the proceedings of the court in violation of that
doctrine and all orders and decisions reached thereby are null and void. It will be noted in the
cited Supreme Court Circular that money claims are cognizable by the COA and its decision is
appealable only to the Supreme Court. The lower courts have nothing to do with such genus of
transactions.
COCOFED vs. REPUBLIC
Page 432

663 SCRA 514 (2012)
RULING:
Jurisdiction over coconut levy funds.
The Constitution, by express provision, vests the COA with the responsibility for state audit. As
an independent supreme state auditor, its audit jurisdiction cannot be undermined by any law.
Indeed, under Article IX (D), Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, [n]o law shall be passed
exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any
investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of [COA]. Following the mandate of the COA
and the parameters set forth by the foregoing provisions, it is clear that it has jurisdiction over
coconut levy funds, being special public funds. Conversely, the COA has the power, authority
and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the coconut levy funds and,
consequently, to the UCPB shares purchased using said funds. However, declaring the said funds
as partaking the nature of private funds, ergo subject to private appropriation, removes them
from the coffer of the public funds of the government, and consequently, renders them
impervious to the COA audit jurisdiction. Clearly, the pertinent provisions of PD Nos. 961 and
1468 divest the COA of its constitutionally-mandated function and undermine its constitutional
independence. Accordingly, Article III, Section 5 of both PD Nos. 961 and 1468 must be struck
down for being unconstitutional.
VERZOSA vs. COA

G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012
FACTS:
This resolves the MFR of the SCs Decision affirming COA decision which substantially held that
petitioner (as former Executive Director of the Cooperative Development Authority or CDA) is
personally and liable for the amount ofP881,819.00 covered by a COA Notice of Disallowance
and involved overpriced computer units.
Among others, the MFR is anchored on the following ground: whether brand should be
considered by COA as one basis of comparison, in light of compliance with intellectual property
laws on software piracy and hardware imitation.
RULING:
The COA, under the Constitution, is empowered to examine and audit the use of funds by an
agency of the national government on a post-audit basis. For this purpose, the Constitution has
provided that the COA shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article,
to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods
required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including
those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.
As such, CDAs decisions regarding procurement of equipment for its own use, including
computers and its accessories, is subject to the COAs auditing rules and regulations for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant
Page 433

expenditures.Necessarily, CDAs preferences regarding brand of its equipment have to conform
to the criteria set by the COA rules on what is reasonable price for the items purchased.
In this case, the brand informationwas found by the COA as irrelevant to the determination of
the reasonableness of the price of the computers purchased by CDA. Hence, on this ground, the
MFR is dismissible.
FUNA vs. COA

G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012
FACTS:
Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Villar as Chairman of the COA.
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as
COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to
April 14, 2008.
Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA.
Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his
appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment
papers, until the expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on
February 2, 2011.
Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold on the
chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of 7
years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such chairman,
is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to
that position.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter to President Aquino III, signified
his intention to step down from office upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his
word, Villar vacated his position when President Aquino III named Tan as COA Chairman. This
development has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein moot and
academic.
Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and the
resignation of Villar, the SC consider the instant case as falling within the requirements for
review of a moot and academic case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villars appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and
after having served for 4 years of his 7-year term as COA commissioner, is valid in light of the
term limitations imposed under Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution
RULING:
Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment.
Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for
Page 434

five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment
to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no
case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Petitioner argues that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes reappointment of
any kind within the commission, the point being that a second appointment, be it for the same
position (commissioner to another position of commissioner) or upgraded position
(commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited reappointment and is a nullity ab initio.
This is however incorrect. The flaw lies in regarding the word reappointment as, in context,
embracing any and all species of appointment. The rule is that if a statute or constitutional
provision is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation.
The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be appointed by the
President for a term of 7 years, and if he has served the full term, then he can no longer be
reappointed or extended another appointment. In the same vein, a Commissioner who was
appointed for a term of 7 years who likewise served the full term is barred from being
reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner shall have served the full term of 7
years, then he can no longer be reappointed to either the position of Chairman or
Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is to prevent the president from dominating
the Commission by allowing him to appoint an additional or two more commissioners.
On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional appointment
from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the full term of 7
years, further qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that the appointment
to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In
addition, such promotional appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the
rotational plan or the staggering of terms in the commission membership such that the
aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be
appointed to the position of Chairman must not exceed 7 years so as not to disrupt the
rotational system in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a promotional
appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under the aforestated
circumstances or conditions.
The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villars proposition that his promotional appointment as
COA Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7- year termfrom February 2008 to February
2015given his four (4)-year tenure as COA commissioner devalues all the past pronouncements
made by this Court. While there had been divergence of opinion as to the import of the word
reappointment, there has been unanimity on the dictum that in no case can one be a COA
member, either as chairman or commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an aggregate term
of more than 7 years. A contrary view would allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year
service limitation and would be constitutionally offensive as it would wreak havoc to the spirit
of the rotational system of succession.
In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any circumstance,
validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year appointment, as the Constitution
decrees, was not legally feasible in light of the 7-year aggregate rule. Villar had already served
4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with said
Page 435

rule would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively breach the clear
purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first
set of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner
like respondent Villar who serves for a period less than 7 years cannot be appointed as
chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term of
the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as
the appointee will be allowed to serve more than 7 years under the constitutional ban.
To sum up, the SC restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the
expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always
be for a fixed term of 7 years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and
unconstitutional. The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of 7
years in case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the
rotational system prescribed by the Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability
or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this
will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full
term of 7 years and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to
any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission
under the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than 7 years is
eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of
the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on
reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as
commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed
7 years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted
from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies
that reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the
same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other
hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or office
(Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in
the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.
Appeals
REYES vs. COA
G.R. No. 125129, March 29, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner Reyes filed this petition with the SC as an appeal by certiorari under Rule 44 of the
Revised Rules of Court, assailing the decision of the COA disallowing the refund of the
government share in the fund to them as employee-members of TLRC, and the denial of the
motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners mode of appeal is correct.
Page 436
RULING: Incorrect.
Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that decision, orders of rulings of the
Commission on Audit may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party.Under Rule 64, Section 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, judgment or final order of the
Commission on Audit may be brought by an aggrieved party to this Court on certiorari under
Rule 65. However, the petition in this case was filed on June 17, 1996, prior to the effectivity
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.Nevertheless, the mode of elevating cases decided by the
Commission on Audit to this Court was only by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as provided
by the 1987 Constitution. The judgments and final orders of the Commission on Audit are not
reviewable by ordinary writ of error or appeal via certiorari to this Court. Only when the
Commission on Audit acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this Court entertain a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. Hence, a petition for review on certiorari or appeal by certiorari to
the Supreme Court under Rule 44 or 45 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court is not allowed from
any order, ruling or decision of the Commission on Audit.
[But note that in this case, the SC set aside the proceduralerror pro hac vice,and treated the
petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit not finding that the COA committed grave
abuse of discretion in disallowing the distribution of the government share in the aborted TLRC
Provident Fund to its members.]
VALLES
Page 437
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