REMEDIAL LAW

MARCH 2013
LORNA CASTIGADOR v. DANILO M. NICOLAS
G.R. No. 184023, March 4, 2013

J. Reyes
The CA dismissed Castigadors complaint on the ground that there was no allegation
that the petition is based on extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Under Section 5, Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court, it is incumbent that when a court finds no substantial merit in a petition for
annulment of judgment, it may dismiss the petition outright but the specific reasons for such
dismissal shall be clearly set out.
The petition need not categorically state the exact words extrinsic fraud; rather, the
allegations in the petition should be so crafted to easily point out the ground on which it was
based.
FACTS:
Petitioner Lorna Castigador was the previous registered owner of a piece of land in
Tagaytay. The City Treasurer of Tagaytay sold the property to Respondent Danilo Nicolas at a
public auction for non-payment of real estate taxes. The RTC of Tagaytay City granted Nicolas
petition to issue a certificate of title to the property in his name after Castigador failed to redeem
the property. Castigador claimed that she was not notified of the public auction, the sale, and
the petition for the issuance of a certificate of title. The Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City
denied Castigadors notice of adverse claim on the ground of lack of privity between Castigador
and Nicolas.
Castigador filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the grounds that: 1) the petition is defective for failure
to comply with Rule 7, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended; and (2)
there is no allegation in the petition that it is based on extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, in
violation of Rule 47, Section 2 of the Rules. Castigador filed a Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Petition which the CA denied stating that the the
arguments posed by Castigador in support of the grounds cited for the allowance of the petition
are bereft of merit, as they do not constitute extrinsic fraud to annul the questioned decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA was justified in dismissing the petition
Ruling:
Petition granted.
Under Section 5, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, it is incumbent that when a court finds
no substantial merit in a petition for annulment of judgment, it may dismiss the petition outright
but the specific reasons for such dismissal shall be clearly set out.

The petition need not categorically state the exact words extrinsic fraud; rather, the
allegations in the petition should be so crafted to easily point out the ground on which it was
based.
The allegations in the petition filed with the CA sufficiently identify the ground upon which
the petition was based extrinsic fraud. Fraud is extrinsic where it prevents a party from having
a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters
pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding
consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing
litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.
IRENE VILLAMAR-SANDOVAL v. JOSE CAILIPAN, et al.
G.R. 200727, March 4, 2013

J. Perlas-Bernabe
Cailipan, et al. filed a petition for certiorari assailing the RTCs order of default and a
Notice of Appeal questioning the RTCs decision. It is well-settled that the remedies of appeal
and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. The simultaneous filing
of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be allowed since one remedy would necessarily cancel out the
other. The existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes resort to certiorari because
one of the requirements for availment of the latter is precisely that there should be no appeal.
The Court observes that Cailipan, et al. should have (a) withdrawn their certiorari
petition and instead raised the jurisdictional errors stated therein in their appeal or (b) at the
very least, informed the CAs Twenty-First Division of the Decision rendered on the main case
and the filing of their Notice of Appeal on January 22, 2011.
FACTS:
Petitioner Irene Villamar-Sandoval instituted a complaint for damages before the RTC
against respondent Jose Cailipan, et al. Due to the failure of Cailipan, et als counsel to attend
the hearing, the RTC declared Cailipan, et al. in default. Cailipan, et al. filed before the CA a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, asserting that the RTC gravely abused
its discretion in declaring them in default. Meanwhile, the RTC decided in favor of VillamarSandoval.
Cailipan, et al. then filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA, while its initially filed certiorari
petition was still pending resolution before the CA. They subsequently filed an Amended Notice
of Appeal Ad Cautelam and a Joint Notice of Appeal Ad Cautelam (Amended Notices of
Appeal), clarifying therein that they were not abandoning their petition for certiorari. The CA
denied that the venue was improperly laid but granted their petition on the impropriety of the
order of default. The CA set aside the RTCs Orders and directed the remand of the case to the
RTC to allow Cailipan, et al. to present their evidence.
Villamar-Sandoval filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that since the main
case had already been decided by the RTC and Cailipan, et al. have availed of the remedy of
appeal, the latters petition for certiorari filed with the CA was already moot and academic but
was denied by the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether Cailipan, et al.s petition for certiorari was an improper remedy and/or had become
moot and academic by virtue of the RTCs January 11, 2011 Decision
RULING:
Petition denied.
It is well-settled that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or successive. The simultaneous filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and
an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be allowed
since one remedy would necessarily cancel out the other. The existence and availability of the
right of appeal proscribes resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for availment of
the latter is precisely that there should be no appeal.
Corollary thereto, an appeal renders a pending petition for certiorari superfluous and
mandates its dismissal. As held in Enriquez v. Rivera:
The general rule is that certiorari will not lie as a substitute for an appeal, for relief
through a special action like certiorari may only be established when no remedy by appeal lies.
The exception to this rule is conceded only "where public welfare and the advancement of public
policy so dictate, and the broader interests of justice so require, or where the orders complained
of were found to be completely null and void, or that appeal was not considered the appropriate
remedy, such as in appeals from orders of preliminary attachment or appointments of receiver."
(Fernando v. Vasquez, L- 26417, 30 January 1970; 31 SCRA 288). For example, certiorari
maybe available where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual (Romero Sr. v. Court of Appeals, L29659, 30 July 1971; 40 SCRA 172)
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, it is clear that Cailipan, et al.s
January 11, 2011 petition for certiorari was rendered superfluous by their January 22, 2011
appeal.
Although Cailipan, et al. did not err in filing the certiorari petition with the CA on January
11, 2011 as they only received the RTCs Decision three days after the said date and therefore
could not have availed of the remedy of an appeal at that time the Court observes that
Cailipan, et al. should have (a) withdrawn their certiorari petition and instead raised the
jurisdictional errors stated therein in their appeal or (b) at the very least, informed the CAs
Twenty-First Division of the Decision rendered on the main case and the filing of their Notice of
Appeal on January 22, 2011. Prudence should have guided them to pursue either course of
action considering the well-entrenched conflict between the remedies of an appeal and a
petition for certiorari, of which they should have been well aware of.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REP. BY THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
DENR, REGION III v. HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ORIBELLO, JR., et al.
G.R. No. 199501, March 6, 2013

J. Carpio
An order declared that the Republic was deemed to have abandoned one of the cases
of a consolidated case but trial proceeded for the consolidated cases. There is no rule or law

prohibiting the appeal of a judgment or part of a judgment in one case which is consolidated
with other cases. Further, severance is within the sound discretion of the court for convenience
or to avoid prejudice.
FACTS:
Petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor General instituted a complaint for reversion and
cancellation of title which was consolidated with the civil case instituted by Enrique Oribello, Jr.
against Matilde Apog and Aliseo San Juan for recovery of possession over the same subject
property. The trial court warned the OSG that its failure to appear and present evidence will be
deemed as termination of the presentation of evidence. Atty. Oscar Pascua, representing the
OSG, presented a witness. However, on September 12, 1997, the OSG failed to appear and the
trial court issued an order declaring that its failure to appear was deemed an abandonment of
the case. Nevertheless, the trial for the consolidated cases proceeded but was dismissed due to
the non-substitution of the deceased Orilbello. The OSG moved for reconsideration on the
ground that the dismissal of the case for recovery of possession did not affect the case for
reversion of property. The trial court granted the motion and allowed the OSG to continue with
the presentation of its evidence in June 29, 2005.
The respondents, the Oribello Heirs, called the trial courts attention to the Order it
issued on September 12, 1997 where the trial court declared that the OSG was deemed to have
abandoned the reversion and that there being no question against it, the order was final. The
trial court granted the Oribello Heirs motion and recalled the order granted in June 29, 2005
and dismissed the case for reversion. The CA upheld the dismissal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the order is interlocutory
2. Whether the consolidated cases are subject to multiple appeals
RULING:
Petition granted.
1. Had the trial court declared, in no uncertain terms, that the reversion suit was
dismissed for failure to prosecute, there is no doubt that the OSG would have
questioned such ruling, as it now did with respect to the trial courts 29 June
2005 Order.
A final order is defined as one which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined by the court. Conversely, an interlocutory order does not
dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon by the court. Its
effects are merely provisional in character and substantial proceedings have to be further
conducted by the court in order to finally resolve the issue or controversy.
While the OSG failed to appear on the hearing of 12 September 1997, such failure does
not constitute a ground for the dismissal of the reversion complaint for failure to prosecute. The
OSGs non-appearance on that date should simply be construed as a waiver of the right to
present additional evidence. Termination of presentation of a partys evidence does not equate
to dismissal of the complaint for failure to prosecute. In fact, the trial court merely deemed the

OSG to have abandoned the case without stating expressly and unequivocally that the
complaint for reversion was dismissed. Had the trial court declared, in no uncertain terms, that
the reversion suit was dismissed for failure to prosecute, there is no doubt that the OSG would
have questioned such ruling, as it now did with respect to the trial courts 29 June 2005 Order.
While it is within the trial courts discretion to dismiss motu proprio the complaint on the
ground of plaintiffs failure to prosecute, it must be exercised with caution. Resort to such action
must be determined according to the procedural history of each case, the situation at the time of
the dismissal, and the diligence (or the lack thereof) of the plaintiff to proceed therein. As the
Court held in Gomez v. Alcantara, if a lesser sanction would achieve the same result, then
dismissal should not be resorted to.
2. There is no rule or law prohibiting the appeal of a judgment or part of a
judgment in one case which is consolidated with other cases.
Consolidation is a procedural device to aid the court in deciding how cases in its docket
are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with
economy while providing justice to the parties. To promote this end, the rule allows the
consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the courts docket, or the consolidation of
issues within those cases. The Court explained, thus:
In the context of legal procedure, the term consolidation is used in three different
senses:
1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which
case the judgment in the one trial is conclusive as to the others.
2) This is not actually consolidation but is referred to as such. (quasiconsolidation)
a. Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity,
and become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered. This
is illustrated by a situation where several actions are pending between the
same parties stating claims which might have been set out originally in
one complaint. (actual consolidation)
b. Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its
separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment.
3) This type of consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action, or cause
the parties to one action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial)
The reversion suit settles whether the subject land will be reverted to the State, while the
recovery of possession case determines which private party has the better right of possession
over the subject property. These cases, involving different issues and seeking different
remedies, require the rendition and entry of separate judgments.
The consolidation is merely for joint trial of the cases. Notably, the complaint for recovery
of possession proceeded independently of the reversion case, and was disposed of accordingly
by the trial court. Since each action does not lose its distinct character, severance of one action
from the other is not necessary to appeal a judgment already rendered in one action. There is
no rule or law prohibiting the appeal of a judgment or part of a judgment in one case which is

consolidated with other cases. Further, severance is within the sound discretion of the court for
convenience or to avoid prejudice. It is not mandatory under the Rules of Court that the court
sever one case from the other cases before a party can appeal an adverse ruling on such case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JAIME FERNANDEZ Y HERTEZ

G.R. No. 188841, MARCH 6, 2013
J. DEL CASTILLO
The prosecution needs to establish the identity of the prohibited drugs which constitute
the corpus delicti of the offense. The chain of custody of the seized items must be presented by
the prosecution as unbroken starting from the time the items were confiscated and eventually
marked until the time they are presented in court. It is the burden of the defense, meanwhile, to
prove that the chain of custody was broken.
FACTS:
A search warrant was implemented at the residence of appellant Jaime Fernandez
wherein police operatives found inside the house four transparent plastic sachets suspected to
contain shabu, one tin can containing dried marijuana leaves, 49 pieces of rolled suspected
dried marijuana leaves, one roll aluminum foil and cash money amounting to P3,840.00. After
seizing these items, an inventory was conducted in the presence of the Barangay Chairman and
a Barangay Kagawad; also, pictures of the seized items were taken by the police photographer
while said items were being marked, afterwards, said items were brought to the police office.
The seized items were later brought to the Camarines Sur Crime Laboratory wherein chemical
examinations made on the specimens yielded positive results for the presence of marijuana and
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, respectively.
On the basis thereof, Informations for illegal possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride and illegal possession of marijuana were filed against appellant and his son Erick
Fernandez for violation of Section 8, of R.A. No. 6425 as amended by R.A. No. 7659. Both
accused interposed denial and frame-up as their defenses. The RTC acquitted Erick Fernandez
but found appellant guilty of the charges. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CA affirmed
appellants conviction by giving full faith and credit to the evidence of the prosecution over that
of the defense.
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution was able to establish an unbroken chain of custody
RULING:
The RTC found the witnesses for the prosecution credible. There is no showing that the
members of the search team were actuated by any ill motive or that they planted the seized
items. The RTC gave full faith and credit to the prosecution witnesses version of the events that
transpired at the time of the search. Moreover, the evidence of the prosecution sufficiently
established that (1) by virtue of a lawful search, the authorities were able to seize from
appellants house suspected shabu and marijuana, among others; and, (2) when these

specimens were qualitatively examined, they yielded positive results for the said prohibited
drugs.
With regard to the alleged inconsistent statements with respect to appellants exact
location during the search and seizure, the number of rooms inside the house, and the place
where the shabu and rolled marijuana leaves were found, suffice it to say that these matters are
not vital and of such significance as compared to the circumstances and the very act of finding
the dangerous drugs in the possession of the appellant which constitute the elements of the
crime.
The prosecution established the identity of the prohibited drugs which constitute the
corpus delicti of the offense. The totality of the prosecutions evidence sufficiently proved the
identity of the seized prohibited items despite the intervening changes in their custody and
possession. The chain of custody of the seized items from the time they were confiscated and
eventually marked until the time they were presented during the trial has likewise been
established.
The fact that the dangerous drugs presented in court were the same items recovered
from appellant can be gleaned from the testimonies of police officers who narrated the incident
from the time the dangerous drugs were recovered from appellant, to the time the same were
inventoried in the presence of appellant and the witnesses, brought to the police station, and
finally referred to the forensic chemist for qualitative examination. The integrity and identity of
the confiscated items, particularly the dangerous drugs, were thus properly safeguarded.
The chain of custody was clearly not broken. Besides, the integrity of the evidence is
presumed preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will or proof that the evidence has
been tampered with in which the burden of proof falls on the appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUDGE RAFAEL R. LAGOS, et al.
G.R. No. 184658, March 6, 2013

C.J. Sereno
A motion to file a demurrer was granted after the prosecutions presentation of the
testimonies of the apprehending officers because the prosecution failed to present the
testimony of the confidential informant. It has long been settled that the grant of a demurrer is
tantamount to an acquittal. An acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct
consequence of the finality of his acquittal. This rule, however, is not without exception. The rule
on double jeopardy is subject to the exercise of judicial review by way of the extraordinary writ
of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court finds and so holds that the
grant of the demurrer for this reason alone was not supported by prevailing jurisprudence and
constituted grave abuse of discretion.
FACTS:
The Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force (AIDSOTF) of the Philippine
National Police (PNP), with the help of a confidential informant, conducted a buy bust operation
which led to the arrest of Castel Vinci Estacio. The buy-bust operation yielded 30 pink pills
(ecstasy) and the recovery of the buy-bust money. During trial, the prosecution presented the
testimonies of the officers involved in the buy bust operation, PO2 Marlo V. Frando, PO2 Ruel P.
Cubian, and PO3 Jose Rey Serrona and the forensic chemist, Police Senior Inspector Yelah C.

Manaog. Estacio, et al. filed a motion for leave to file a demurrer and a motion for the resolution
of the petition to bail. Judge Sagum denied the motions prompting Estacio to seek the inhibition
of Judge Sagum. The case was reraffled to respondent Judge Rafael Lagos, who issued an
order granting the petition for bail and allowing them to file their demurrer on April 23, 2008. On
June 24, 2008, Judge Lagos issued an order acquitting the accused. On July 24, 2008, Judge
Lagos denied the petitioners, the People, motion for reconsideration and inhibition and allowed
the accused to withdraw their cash bonds.
The prosecution argued that Judge Lagos committed grave abuse of discretion when he
granted the demurrer despite clear proof of the elements of illegal sale, the existence of the
corpus delicti, and the arrest was in flagrante delicto. Estacio, et al. countered that the petition
should be dismissed on the grounds that it would constitue double jeopardy and that it violates
the hierarchy of the courts.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Lagos committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion for leave to
file a demurrer to evidence
RULING:
Petition granted.
It has long been settled that the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal. An
acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his
acquittal. This rule, however, is not without exception. The rule on double jeopardy is subject to
the exercise of judicial review by way of the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. The Supreme Court is endowed with the power to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. Here, the party asking for the review
must show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an
exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a
blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very
power to dispense justice. In such an event, the accused cannot be considered to be at risk of
double jeopardy.
The trial court declared that the testimonies of PO2 Frando, PO2 Cubian, P S/Insp.
Manaog, and AIDSOTF Chief Leonardo R. Suan were insufficient to prove the culmination of the
illegal sale, or to show their personal knowledge of the offer to sell and the acceptance thereof.
In granting the demurrer filed by the accused, Judge Lagos surmised that it was the CI who had
initiated the negotiation of the sale and should have thus been presented at trial.
In the present case, the fact of the illegal sale has already been established by
testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team. Judge Lagos need not have characterized the
Cl's testimony as indispensable to the prosecution's case. The Court finds and so holds that the
grant of the demurrer for this reason alone was not supported by prevailing jurisprudence and
constituted grave abuse of discretion. The prosecution's evidence was, prima facie, sufficient to
prove the criminal charges filed against Estacio, et al., subject to the defenses they may present
in the course of a full-blown trial.

STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v. TOMAS CUENCA, et al.

G.R. No. 173297, March 6, 2013

J. Bersamin
Cuenca, et al. filed a complaint for damages sustained by the wrongful issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and the taking of the properties of Arc Cuisine, Inc. There is no dispute
that the properties subject to the levy on attachment belonged to Arc Cuisine, Inc. alone, not to
Cuenca, et al. in their own right. They were only stockholders of Arc Cuisine, Inc., which had a
personality distinct and separate from that of any or all of them. The damages occasioned to the
properties by the levy on attachment, wrongful or not, prejudiced Arc Cuisine, Inc., not them. As
such, only Arc Cuisine, Inc. had the right under the substantive law to claim and recover such
damages. This right could not also be asserted by Cuenca, et al. unless they did so in the name
of the corporation itself. But that did not happen herein, because Arc Cuisine, Inc. was not even
joined in the action either as an original party or as an intervenor.
FACTS:
Manuel D. Maraon, Jr. filed a collection suit against respondents Tomas Cuenca,
Marcelina Cuenca, Milagros Cuenca, and Bramie Tayactac along with an application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. The RTC granted the application after Maraon
posted the required bond issued by petitioner Stronghold Insurance Company, Incorporated
(SICI). The Sheriff levied upon the properties of Arc Cuisine, Inc. Cuenca, et al. filed a Motion to
Dismiss and Quash the Writ of Preliminary Attachment which was denied by the RTC but was
granted by the CA on appeal. The case was remanded to the RTC to hear the case for
damages that Cuenca, et al. sustained from the enforcement of the writ. The RTC ruled in favor
of Cuenca, et al. and held Maraon and SICI directly and solidarily liable. The CA sustained the
RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether Cuenca, et al. are the proper parties to recover damages from the wrongful attachment
of the properties of Arc Cuisine, Inc.
RULING:
Petition denied.
To ensure the observance of the mandate of the Constitution, Section 2, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court requires that unless otherwise authorized by law or the Rules of Court every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Under the same
rule, a real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or one who is entitled to the avails of the suit. Accordingly, a person, to be a real party in
interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, should appear to be the present real
owner of the right sought to be enforced, that is, his interest must be a present substantial
interest, not a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.
Where the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the ground for the motion to dismiss is lack of
cause of action. The reason for this is that the courts ought not to pass upon questions not
derived from any actual controversy. Truly, a person having no material interest to protect

cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an action. Nor does a court acquire
jurisdiction over a case where the real party in interest is not present or impleaded.
There is no dispute that the properties subject to the levy on attachment belonged to Arc
Cuisine, Inc. alone, not to the Cuencas and Tayactac in their own right. They were only
stockholders of Arc Cuisine, Inc., which had a personality distinct and separate from that of any
or all of them. The damages occasioned to the properties by the levy on attachment, wrongful or
not, prejudiced Arc Cuisine, Inc., not them. As such, only Arc Cuisine, Inc. had the right under
the substantive law to claim and recover such damages. This right could not also be asserted by
the Cuencas and Tayactac unless they did so in the name of the corporation itself. But that did
not happen herein, because Arc Cuisine, Inc. was not even joined in the action either as an
original party or as an intervenor.
RET. LT. GEN. JACINTO C. LIGOT, et al. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REPRESENTED BY THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL
G.R. No. 176944, March 6, 2013

Lt. Gen. Ligot, et al. filed a petition for certiorari when the CA extended the freeze order
against their properties. Ligot, et al. should have filed a petition for review on certiorari, and not
a petition for certiorari, to assail the CA resolution which extended the effectivity period of the
freeze order over their properties
FACTS:
The AMLC issued a Resolution directing the Executive Director of the AMLC Secretariat
to file an application for a freeze order against the properties of petitioners, Lt. Gen. Ligot and
his family with the CA. The Republic filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Application with the appellate
court for the issuance of a Freeze Order against the properties of the Ligots and Yambao. The
CA granted the application in its July 5, 2005 resolution, and issued a freeze order against the
Ligots and Yambaos various bank accounts, web accounts and vehicles, valid for a period of
20 days from the date of issuance.
The Republic filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Effectivity of Freeze Order, arguing
that if the bank accounts, web accounts and vehicles were not continuously frozen, they could
be placed beyond the reach of law enforcement authorities and the governments efforts to
recover the proceeds of the Ligots unlawful activities would be frustrated. The CA granted the
motion, extending the freeze order until after all the appropriate proceedings and/or
investigations have been terminated. On November 15, 2005, the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases
took effect. Under this rule, a freeze order could be extended for a maximum period of six
months.
Ligot argues that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it extended the
freeze order even though no predicate crime had been duly proven or established to support the
allegation of money laundering. He also maintains that the freeze order issued against them
ceased to be effective in view of the 6-month extension limit of freeze orders provided under the
Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases.
The Republic claims that the CAs resolution, granting the motion to extend the effectivity
of the freeze order, had already become final and executory, and could no longer be challenged.
The Republic notes that the Ligots erred when they filed what is effectively a second motion for

reconsideration in response to the CAs resolution, instead of filing a petition for review on
certiorari via Rule 45 with this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether petition for review on certiorari or a petition for certiorari should be filed to appeal the
extension of the effectivity period of a freeze order under the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases
RULING:
Petition denied.
Section 57 of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases explicitly provides the remedy available
in cases involving freeze orders issued by the CA: any party aggrieved by the decision or ruling
of the court may appeal to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. The appeal shall not stay the enforcement of the subject decision or final
order unless the Supreme Court directs otherwise.
From this provision, it is apparent that Ligot, et al. should have filed a petition for review
on certiorari, and not a petition for certiorari, to assail the CA resolution which extended the
effectivity period of the freeze order over their properties.
Even assuming that a petition for certiorari is available to Ligot, et al, a review of their
petition shows that the issues they raise (i.e., existence of probable cause to support the freeze
order; the applicability of the 6-month limit to the extension of freeze orders embodied in the
Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture) pertain to errors of judgment allegedly committed
by the CA, which fall outside the Courts limited jurisdiction when resolving certiorari petitions.
As held in People v. Court of Appeals:
In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope. It is
limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve
questions or issues beyond its competence such as errors of judgment. Errors of
judgment of the trial court are to be resolved by the appellate court in the appeal by and
of error or via a petition for review on certiorari in this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction. It is not a remedy to
correct errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in
the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible only by an appeal. Error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in
excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of
certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of
the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its
conclusions of law. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors
committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors
of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
RAMONCITA O. SENADOR v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 201620, March 6, 2013

J. Velasco, Jr.

Senador asserted that the person named as the offended party in the Information is not
the same person who made the demand and filed the complaint. In case of an error in the
designation of the offended party in crimes against property, Rule 110, Sec. 12 of the Rules of
Court mandates the correction of the information, not its dismissal.
If the subject matter of the offense is generic and not identifiable, an error in the
designation of the offended party is fatal and would result in the acquittal of the accused.
However, if the subject matter of the offense is specific and identifiable, an error in the
designation of the offended party is immaterial.
FACTS:
In an Information dated August 5, 2002, petitioner Ramoncita O. Senador was charged
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32 in Dumaguete City with the crime of Estafa under
Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
Senador asserted that the person named as the offended party in the Information is not
the same person who made the demand and filed the complaint. According to Senador, the
private complainant in the Information went by the name "Cynthia Jaime," whereas, during trial,
the private complainant turned out to be "Rita Jaime." Further, Cynthia Jaime was never
presented as witness. Hence, citing People v. Uba, et al. and United States v. Lahoylahoy and
Madanlog, Senador would insist on her acquittal on the postulate that her constitutional right to
be informed of the nature of the accusation against her has been violated. The trial court found
Senador guilty. The CA upheld the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether an error in the designation in the Information of the offended party violates, the
accuseds constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
her, thus, entitling her to an acquittal
RULING:
Petition denied.
On the contrary, in the instant case, Senador was charged with estafa, a crime against
property that does not absolutely require as indispensable the proper designation of the name of
the offended party. Rather, what is absolutely necessary is the correct identification of the
criminal act charged in the information. Thus, in case of an error in the designation of the
offended party in crimes against property, Rule 110, Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court mandates the
correction of the information, not its dismissal.
Interpreting the previously discussed cases, the Court concludes that in offenses against
property, if the subject matter of the offense is generic and not identifiable, such as the money
unlawfully taken as in Lahoylahoy, an error in the designation of the offended party is fatal and
would result in the acquittal of the accused. However, if the subject matter of the offense is
specific and identifiable, such as a warrant, as in Kepner, or a check, such as
in Sayson and Ricarze, an error in the designation of the offended party is immaterial.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGARDO ADRID Y FLORES

G.R. No. 201845, March 6, 2013

J. Velasco, Jr.
It is essential in the prosecution of drug cases that the identity of the prohibited drug be
established beyond reasonable doubt. This means that on top of the elements of possession or
illegal sale, the fact that the substance illegally sold or possessed is, in the first instance, the
very substance adduced in court must likewise be established with the same exacting degree of
certitude as that required sustaining a conviction. The chain of custody requirement performs
this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts respecting the identity of the evidence
are minimized if not altogether removed.
FACTS:
Two separate lnformations were filed charging Adrid with violation of RA No. 9165. The
accused was apprehended during a buy-bust operation conducted by the Manila Police District
(MPD) Anti-Illegal Drugs Unit (DAID) based from information that one "Jon Jon" is pushing
illegal drugs at Chesa, Tondo, Manila. The accused denied the allegation and averred that he
was mauled and forced to admit something regarding the sale of drugs as well as an alibi that
he was not the same "Jon Jon" stated in the information/tip given to the police. The Regional
Trial Court found the accused guilty in Crim. Case No. 06-247286 (sale of illegal drugs) but
acquitted him in Crim. Case No. 06-247287 (illegal possession of drugs) for insufficiency of
evidence to sustain a conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the chain of custody was broken
RULING:
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. In context, this would ideally include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered
into evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition it was delivered to the next
link in the chain.
The Courts also certainly cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the possibility of
substitution, alteration or contaminationwhether intentional or unintentionalof narcotic
substances at any of the links in the chain of custody thereof. That is why reasonable
safeguards are provided for in our drugs laws to protect the identity and integrity of narcotic
substances and dangerous drugs seized and/or recovered from drug offenders. Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 materially requires the apprehending team having initial custody and control of
the drugs to, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

The SC particularly notes that of the individuals who came into direct contact with or had
physical possession of the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from appellant, only SPO1
Marinda testified for the specific purpose of identifying the evidence. But his testimony failed to
sufficiently demonstrate an unbroken chain; he himself admits that he transferred the
possession of the specimens to an investigator at the MPD DAID, SPO1 Pama, who never
testified in court.
The custodial link ended with SPO1 Marinda. When he testified that the specimens were
submitted by SPO1 Pama for laboratory examination, he was veritably assuming the occurrence
of an event; he was not testifying on the fact of submission out of his personal knowledge
because he took no part in the transfer of the specimen from the police station to the laboratory.
This testimony of SPO1 Marinda alone, while perhaps perceived by the courts below as
straightforward and clear, is incomplete to satisfy the rule on chain of custody.
SPO1 Pamas testimony would have been the link to SPO1 Marindas testimony to that
of PS/Insp. Marianos testimony as the forensic chemist who performed the laboratory
examination. There is a considerable amount of time, from the time the seized items were
handed over to SPO1 Pama up to the time it reached the laboratory for testing, in which the
whereabouts of the illegal drugs were unaccounted for. This constitutes a clear but unexplained
break in the chain of custody.
Also, the prosecutions admission that the "Forensic Chemical Officer has no personal
knowledge as to where or from whom the specimen she examined originally came from puts
into serious question whether it was in fact the same SPO1 Pama who turned over the
specimen for laboratory testing, or some other police officer or person took possession of the
specimen before it was brought to the laboratory.
Also, The prosecution failed to reveal the identity of the person who had the custody and
safekeeping of the drugs after its examination and pending its presentation in court. This
unexplained link also created doubt as to the integrity of the evidence.
As for the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty relied upon by the
courts a quo, the same cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution failed to provide each and every link in
the chain of custody. This runs contrary to the rule that the corpus delicti should be identified
with unwavering exactitude.
RURAL BANK OF STA. BARBARA (ILOILO), INC. v. GERRY CENTENO
G.R. No. 200667, March 11, 2013

J. Perlas-Bernabe
Gerry Centeno, Spouses Centenos son, bought the property from his parents and
remained in possession. The Bank petitioned the RTC for the issuance of a writ of possession
after title to the property was consolidated in its name. After consolidation of title in the
purchasers name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchasers right to
possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a
writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title, to a purchaser in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale becomes merely a ministerial function, unless it appears that the property is in
possession of a third party claiming a right adverse to that of the mortgagor.

FACTS:
Spouses Centeno defaulted on the loan, prompting petitioner, Rural Bank of Sta.
Barbara (Bank) to cause the extrajudicial foreclosure of the said mortgage. Consequently, the
subject lots were sold to the Bank being the highest bidder at the auction sale. It obtained a
Certificate of Sale at Public Auction which was later registered with the Register of Deeds of
Iloilo City. Sps. Centeno failed to redeem the subject lots within the one year redemption
period. Respondent Gerry Centeno, son of Sps. Centeno, purchased the said lots from his
parents. While Centeno was in possession of the subject lots, the Bank secured a Final Deed of
Sale thereof and was able to obtain the corresponding tax declarations in its name.
The Bank filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession before the RTC,
claiming entitlement to the said writ by virtue of the Final Deed of Sale covering the subject lots.
Centeno opposed the petition claiming that he purchased the lot, forgery of the deed of sale,
and prescription. The RTC ruled the Bank as the lawful owner of the subject lots whose rights
became absolute due to Centenos failure to redeem the same. Consequently, it found the
issuance of a writ of possession ministerial on its part. The CA reversed the RTC and ruled
against the issuance of a writ of possession. It considered Centeno as a third party who is
actually holding the property adverse to the judgment obligor and as such, has the right to
ventilate his claims in a proper judicial proceeding i.e., an ejectment suit or reinvindicatory
action.
ISSUE:
Whether the Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara is entitled to a writ of possession over the subject lots
RULING:
Petition granted.
It is well-established that after consolidation of title in the purchasers name for failure of
the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchasers right to possession ripens into the
absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon
proper application and proof of title, to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes
merely a ministerial function, unless it appears that the property is in possession of a third party
claiming a right adverse to that of the mortgagor. The foregoing rule is contained in Section 33,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
In this case, Centeno acquired the subject lots from his parents, Sps. Centeno, on March
14, 1988 after they were purchased by petitioner and its Certificate of Sale at Public Auction
was registered with the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City in 1971. It cannot therefore be disputed
that Centeno is a mere successor-in-interest of Sps. Centeno. Consequently, he cannot be
deemed as a "third party who is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor"
under legal contemplation. Hence, the RTC had the ministerial duty to issue as it did issue
the said writ in the Rural Bank of Sta. Barbaras favor.
EFREN S. ALMUETE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 179611, March 12, 2013

J. Del Castillo

The practice of requiring convicts to appear before the trial courts for promulgation of the
affirmance or modification by this Court or the CA of judgments of conviction in criminal cases is
no longer allowed. Hence, the absence of the convicts on the day of promulgation of judgment
did not affect its validity. The RTC did not err in denying the Motion for Repromulgation of its
judgment.
FACTS:
Petitioner Efren D. Almuete, Johnny Ila and Joel Lloren were charged with violation of
Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, as amended by E.O. No. 277. On
the day of promulgation of judgment, Almuetes counsel informed the trial court that Almuete
and Lloren were ill while Ila was not notified of the scheduled promulgation. The RTC, however,
found their absence inexcusable and proceeded to promulgate its Decision as scheduled,
finding them guilty. Accordingly, the RTC cancelled the bail bonds of Almuete, Ila and Lloren and
issued warrants of arrest against them.
Almuete and his co-accused moved for reconsideration, questioning the validity of the
promulgation, the factual and legal bases of their conviction, and the correctness of the penalty
imposed which was denied by the RTC. Almuete and his co-accused filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the CA. The CA granted the petition and acquitted Almuete. The Supreme Court
reversed Almuetes acquittal and reinstated the RTCs September 8, 1998 Decision and its
October 12, 1998 Order. Almuete moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied. The
Supreme Court issued an Entry of Judgment. Almuete filed a Motion for Clarification on whether
he could still appeal the RTCs September 8, 1998 Decision. This Court noted without action his
Motion for Clarification. Almuete filed with the RTC a Motion for Repromulgation of the
September 8, 1998 Decision which the RTC denied. The RTC also denied Almuetes motion for
reconsideration. The CA dismissed Almuetes Petition for Certiorari for lack of merit and denied
his motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the promulgation of the Decision of the RTC convicting Almuete was valid despite his
absence and regardless of his intention to be present at the promulgation of the Decision
RULING:
Petition granted.
The practice of requiring the convict to appear before the trial court for "promulgation" of
the judgment of the appellate court should, therefore, be immediately discontinued. It is not only
an unauthorized surplusage entailing unnecessary expense, but it could also create security
problems where the convict was already under detention during the pendency of the appeal,
and the place of confinement is at some distance from the station of the court. Upon receipt of
the certified copy of the judgment of the appellate court if the convict is under detention, the trial
court should issue forthwith the corresponding mittimus or commitment order so that the
prisoner may be considered remitted or may be transferred to the corresponding prison facility
for confinement and service of sentence. When the convict is out on bail, the trial court shall
immediately order the bondsman to surrender the convict to it within ten (10) days from notice
and thereafter issue the corresponding mittimus. In both cases, the trial court shall submit to this
Court proof of the execution of judgment within fifteen (15) days from date of such execution.

It is clear from the foregoing that the practice of requiring convicts to appear before the
trial courts for promulgation of the affirmance or modification by this Court or the CA of
judgments of conviction in criminal cases is no longer allowed. Hence, the Supreme Court finds
no error on the part of the RTC in denying the Motion for Repromulgation of the RTCs
September 8, 1998 Decision which was reinstated in People v. Court of Appeals.
SPOUSES NERIO AND SOLEDAD PADOR AND REY PADOR v. BARANGAY CAPTAIN
BERNABE ARCAYAN, et al.
G.R. No. 183460, March 12, 2013

CJ. Sereno
The writ of amparo does not envisage the protection of concerns that are purely property
or commercial in nature. Hence, the writ of amparo filed by Spouses Nerio, et al. after
Barangay officials raided their ampalaya farm to search for marijuana plants cannot be issued.
FACTS:
Petitioners Spouses Nerio, Soledad Pador and Rey Pador alleged that respondents
Alberto Alivio, Carmelo Revales and Roberto Alimorin raided their ampalaya farm to search for
marijuana plants, but found none. After the raid, Spouses Nerio et al. received invitation letters
for a conference from respondent Barangay Captain Arcayan and sent a letter-reply for which
Arcayan refused to sign a receipt. Spouses Nerio et al. concluded that based on the events that
their right to life, liberty and security was gravely threatened and filed a petition for the issuance
of a writ of amparo. The RTC issued the Writ and directed Alivio, et al. to make a verified return.
Alivio, et al. filed their Verified Return claiming that Nerio threatened to kill Revales after
accusing him of uprooting the marijuana plants. They proceeded to patrol the area despite
Nerios threats. Arcayan sent invitation letters in response to the threats and that he did not sign
as he already received a copy of the letter-reply. After hearing the petition, the RTC denied the
petition finding that the claims were based merely on hearsay, speculations, surmises and
conjectures, and that Alivio, et al. had sufficiently explained the reason for the letters of
invitation.
ISSUE:
Whether a writ of amparo will issue for the protection of property or commercial rights
RULING:
Petition denied.
In Tapuz v. Del Rosario, the Supreme Court ruled that the writ of amparo does not
envisage the protection of concerns that are purely property or commercial in nature. In the
same case, the Court held that the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived
lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended
to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property
or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.

EBRENCIO F. INDOYON, JR., MUNICIPAL TREASURER, LINGIG,

SURIGAO DE SUR v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 193706, March 12, 2013

CJ. Sereno
The CA dismissed Indoyons petition for review on certiorari under Rule 43 for being
non-compliant with the Rules of Court and various Supreme Court Circulars. Under Section 1,
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the proper remedy to question the CAs judgment, final order or
resolution is a petition for review on certiorari. The petition must be filed within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment, final order or resolution appealed from; or of the denial of
petitioners motion for reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment.
Under Supreme Court Circular 2-90, an appeal taken to the Supreme Court or to the CA
by a wrong or an inappropriate mode merits outright dismissal. Certiorari cannot be allowed
when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy.
Certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ebrencio F. Indoyon, Jr., the municipal treasurer of the Municipality of Lingig,
Surigao del Sur, incurred a cash shortage. The Regional Legal and Adjudication-Commission on
Audit recommended to the Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao) the filing of a criminal case for
malversation and an administrative case for dishonesty and grave misconduct against Indoyon.
The Ombudsman found Indoyon guilty of serious dishonesty and grave misconduct and
imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service. Indoyon filed a motion for
reconsideration claiming that the administrative Complaint filed before the Ombudsman had first
been acquired by the BLGF-DOF and that the two administrative cases were one and the same
because of their identity of issues, facts and parties. The Ombudsman, however, maintained
that the two cases were not identical and denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
Indoyon filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 43 with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the CA.
The Petition was dismissed on the ground that it suffered not just one technical infirmity, but
several technical infirmities that violated various circulars and issuances of this Court. Indoyons
Motion for Reconsideration, was denied by the CA. The BLGF-DOF sent a letter to the ICORegional Director, BLGF-DOF, Caraga, directing the implementation of the Ombudsmans
Decision dismissing Indoyon from the service.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Indoyons Rule 43 Petition
for Review on Certiorari on the ground of noncompliance with the Rules of Court and Supreme
Court circulars
RULING:
Petition denied.
Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the proper remedy to question the CAs
judgment, final order or resolution, as in the present case, is a petition for review on certiorari.

The petition must be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment, final order or
resolution appealed from; or of the denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration filed in due
time after notice of the judgment.
By filing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, Indoyon therefore clearly
availed himself of the wrong remedy. Under Supreme Court Circular 2-90, an appeal taken to
the Supreme Court or to the CA by a wrong or an inappropriate mode merits outright
dismissal. On this score alone, the instant Petition may be dismissed.
As already discussed earlier, the proper remedy of Indoyon should have been to file a
petition for review on certiorari. The Court cannot help but suspect that his failure to avail
himself of that remedy within the reglementary period of 15 days was the reason he filed,
instead, the present special civil action. A special civil action provides for a longer period of 60
days from notice of the assailed judgment, order or resolution. The Court notes that the instant
Petition was filed 35 days after that notice, by which time Indoyon had therefore lost his appeal
under Rule 45. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Court dismissed a Rule 65
Petition on the ground that the proper remedy for Indoyon should have been an appeal under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In
that case, the Court stressed how it had time and again
reminded members of the bench and the bar that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 lies only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Thus, certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a
judgment despite the availability of that remedy. Certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.
MIKE ALVIN PIELAGO Y ROS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 202020, March 13, 2013

J. Reyes
What controls is not the title of the Information or the designation of the offense but the
actual facts recited in the Information. In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission
of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, which determines the crime being charged
in the information. Hence, the fact that Pielago was charged with acts of lasciviousness did not
preclude his conviction of rape by sexual assault.
FACTS:
Petitioner Mike Alvin Pielago y Ros was charged with acts of lasciviousness for kissing
the vagina and inserting one of his fingers into the vagina of a 4 year old girl. The RTC found
Pielago guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by sexual assault. The CA affirmed
the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether Pielago can be convicted of rape by sexual assault despite being charged in the
Information with acts of lasciviousness
RULING:
Petition denied.

It is well-settled that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of

the nature and cause of the accusation against him. In this respect, the designation in the
Information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to
afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. In the instant case, the
designation of the offense in the Information against Pielago was changed from the crime of
acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 to the crime of rape by sexual
assault penalized under Article 266-A(2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
8353. It cannot be said, however, that his right to be properly informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him was violated. This Court is not unaware that the Information was
worded, as follows: "commit an act of lasciviousness upon the person of AAA, a minor being
four (4) years old, by kissing the vagina and inserting one of his fingers to the vagina of AAA."
And, as correctly explained by the CA, the factual allegations contained in the Information
determine the crime charged against the accused and not the designation of the offense as
given by the prosecutor which is merely an opinion not binding to the courts. As held in Malto v.
People: what controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense but the
actual facts recited in the information. In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission
of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, which determines the crime being charged
in the information.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GERALD SORIANO ALIAS PEDRO
G.R. No. 191271, March 13, 2013
CJ. Sereno
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction when the concurrence of the following factors obtain: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as would prove the crime beyond reasonable
doubt. These circumstances and facts must be absolutely incompatible with any reasonable
hypothesis propounding the innocence of the accused. However, in the present case, the
circumstances presented by the prosecution do not form a solid and cohesive narrative that
proves with moral certainty its contention that Soriano perpetrated these heinous acts. To
synthesize, the only circumstances cited to implicate him in the crime are the following: (a) he
passed through the shortcut to Wao around 3:00 p.m. on 31 December 1998; (b) Vicky did not
see anyone else use that road from 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on that day; and (c) the soiled
garments confiscated from him were identified to have been the same ones he was wearing
then.
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerald Soriano was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of AAA an
eight year old girl. According to the prosecution, Alice Hibaya saw Soriano leave Noel
Quinatadacans house at approximately 3:00 P.M. Vicky Bearneza saw Soriano, in a yellow shirt
and blue denim, walking drunkenly towards the shortcut to Wao and claimed that she did not
see anyone else pass by until 5:00 P.M. when she left. BBB, AAAs mother saw Soriano pass by
their house towards the shortcut around 3:30 P.M. which was also the time that BBB expected
AAA to be home. BBB asked for help looking for AAA at approximately 6:00 P.M. but was
unsuccessful. Tomas Bearneza, Vickys husband, found AAAs body in a canal the next day at
8:00 A.M. The trial court and the CA found him guilty.

Soriano claims that the estimated time of death of AAA did not preclude the possibility
that other culprits had perpetrated the crime; that the prosecution failed to establish that he had
caused the bite marks found on AAA; that he had never been found to be in the company of the
victim; that it was not shown that he had gone to the place where her cadaver was found; that
while he was seen going towards the direction of the crime scene, this fact does not
conclusively prove that he had raped and killed the victim; and that his soiled clothes were not
found at or near the area where the crime was committed, but were taken from his house
without the benefit of a search warrant.
ISSUE:
Whether the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict Gerald Soriano of rape with
homicide
RULING:
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction when the concurrence of the following factors obtain: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as would prove the crime beyond reasonable
doubt. These circumstances and facts must be absolutely incompatible with any reasonable
hypothesis propounding the innocence of the accused.
The foregoing findings unquestionably establish that AAA was raped and
killed. However, the circumstances presented by the prosecution do not form a solid and
cohesive narrative that proves with moral certainty its contention that Soriano perpetrated these
heinous acts. To synthesize, the only circumstances cited to implicate him in the crime are the
following: (a) he passed through the shortcut to Wao around 3:00 p.m. on 31 December 1998;
(b) Vicky did not see anyone else use that road from 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on that day; and (c)
the soiled garments confiscated from him were identified to have been the same ones he was
wearing then.
BENEDICTO MARQUEZ Y RAYOS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 197207, March 13, 2013
J. BRION
For the successful prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following
essential elements must be established: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object
that is identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. As regards the failure of
the police to strictly comply with the provisions of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, it is settled that
the failure to strictly follow the directives of this section is not fatal and will not necessarily
render the items confiscated from an accused inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
FACTS:
Petitioner Benedicto Marquez y Rayos Del Sol was charged with violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In September 2005, upon receipt of reports from some parents that

an employee of the school had been selling drugs to the students, the guidance counselor
showed pictures of janitors and other non-teaching personnel of the school. One student
identified the petitioner as the person who had been selling drugs to the students. On the same
day, the counselor saw a group of students talking to the petitioner; upon trying to approach
them, the students scampered away. The counselor noticed that the petitioner was holding a
piece of paper and when she tried to get said piece of paper, it fell to the ground. The piece of
paper contained two tea bag-like sachets containing dried leaves inside. They then went to the
principals office and showed the sachets to the principal and to the schools administrative
officer. Afterwards, the school officials called the police. The police inspected the items seized
from the petitioner and after further questioning, brought the petitioner and the seized marijuana
to the police station. The plastic sachets confiscated from the petitioner were examined and
found to contain a total of 1.49 grams of marijuana.
The Regional Trial Court found the petitioner guilty of illegal possession of 1.49 grams of
marijuana, penalized under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the chain of custody provided for in R.A. No. 9165 has been broken
RULING:
The chain of custody over the confiscated marijuana was shown not to have been
broken. To recall, when the counselor got hold of the piece of paper containing two sachets of
marijuana, she immediately went to the principals office, and showed these sachets to the
principal and to the schools administrative officer. When the police arrived, she handed the
seized sachets for inspection. Thereafter, the police officers brought the petitioner and the
seized sachets to the station for investigation. When they arrived, the sachets were handed to
the desk officer who in turn forwarded the two sachets to the investigator who marked the
seized evidence. It was explained that the investigator is the officer "responsible to put the
markings." On the same day, the District Station Commander prepared a request from
laboratory examination and personally delivered this request together with the plastic sachets to
the Crime Laboratory where they were received, examined and found positive for the presence
of marijuana. This finding was noted by Police District Chief. From the sequence of events, the
prosecution established the crucial links in the chain of custody of the seized items.
As regards the failure of the police to strictly comply with the provisions of Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165, it is settled that the failure to strictly follow the directives of this section is not
fatal and will not necessarily render the items confiscated from an accused inadmissible. What
is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. In the present case, the succession of events, established by evidence, shows that the
items seized were the same items tested and subsequently identified and testified to in court.
Thus, the integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs seized from the petitioner were duly
proven not to have been compromised. Moreover, the police officers explained during trial the
reason for their failure to strictly comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
ISABEL N. GUZMAN v. ANIANO N. GUZMAN AND PRIMITIVA G. MONTEALTO
G.R. No. 172588, March 13, 2013

J. Brion
Isabel filed 3 motions for reconsideration which were denied by the RTC. The CA
dismissed her petition on the ground that she lost her right to appeal when she filed a second
motion for reconsideration. When the RTC issues its decision and orders, in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, the proper remedy therefrom is a Rule 42 petition for review. A second
motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules
of Court and the right to appeal is lost.
The RTC ruled on the issue of Isabels transfer of rights even if it was not raised as an
error. Under Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the RTC is mandated to decide the
appeal based on the entire record of the MTC proceedings and such pleadings submitted by the
parties or required by the RTC. Nonetheless, even without this provision, an appellate court is
clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on
appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case, or
is closely related to an error properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the question
raised by error properly assigned is dependent.
The RTC also denied the motions for reconsideration on the ground that a notice of
hearing was not attached. A motion unaccompanied by a notice of hearing is considered a mere
scrap of paper that does not toll the running of the period to appeal. The requirement of notice
of hearing is an integral component of procedural due process that seeks to avoid "surprises
that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the
arguments in the motion before a resolution by the court."
FACTS:
Petitioner Isabel Guzman filed a complaint for ejectment against her children
respondents, Aniano Guzman and Primitiva Montealto. The MTC ruled in favor of Isabel but the
RTC reversed the MTC and ruled in favor of Aniano and Primitiva. On June 16, 2005, Isabel
received a copy of the RTC decision. Isabel filed three (3) motions for reconsiderations, all of
which were denied by the RTC. Isabel filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA
dismissed the petition noting that a Rule 42 petition for review, not a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari, was the proper remedy to assail an RTC decision rendered in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. It found that Isabel lost her chance to appeal when she filed a second
motion for reconsideration, a prohibited pleading under Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court.
The CA denied her motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA erred in dismissing Isabel Guzmans petition for certiorari
2. Whether the RTC acted within its appellate jurisdiction
3. Whether the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it strictly enforced the
notice of hearing requirement
RULING:
Petition denied.
1. Isabels resort to a Rule 65 petition for certiorari to assail the RTC decision and
orders is misplaced.

Isabels resort to a Rule 65 petition for certiorari to assail the RTC decision and orders is
misplaced. When the RTC issued its decision and orders, it did so in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction; the proper remedy therefrom is a Rule 42 petition for review. Instead,
Isabel filed a second motion for reconsideration and thereby lost her right to appeal; a second
motion for reconsideration being a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 5, Rule 37 of the
Rules of Court. Isabels subsequent motions for reconsideration should be considered as mere
scraps of paper, not having been filed at all, and unable to toll the reglementary period for an
appeal.
The RTC decision became final and executory after fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
denial of the first motion for reconsideration. It is elementary that once a decision becomes final
and executory, it is "immutable and unalterable, and can no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of
fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court
rendering it or by the highest court of the land." Thus, the RTC decision, even if allegedly
erroneous, can no longer be modified.
2. The RTC acted within its jurisdiction in considering the matter of the Isabels
transfer of rights, even if it had not been raised as an error.
Besides, the RTC acted within its jurisdiction in considering the matter of the Isabels
transfer of rights, even if it had not been raised as an error. Under Section 18, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, the RTC is mandated to decide the appeal based on the entire record of the
MTC proceedings and such pleadings submitted by the parties or required by the RTC.
Nonetheless, even without this provision, an appellate court is clothed with ample authority to
review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case, or is closely related to an
error properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the question raised by error properly
assigned is dependent. The matter of the Isabels transfer of rights, which was in the records of
the case, was the basis for the RTCs decision.
Ejectment cases are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of
protecting actual possession or right of possession of property. Title is not involved, hence, it is
a special civil action with a special procedure. The only issue to be resolved in ejectment cases
is the question of entitlement to the physical or material possession of the premises or
possession de facto. Thus, any ruling on the question of ownership is only provisional, made
solely for the purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto. Accordingly, any
ruling on the validity of Isabels transfer of rights is provisional and should be resolved in a
proper proceeding.
3. The RTC did not also commit a grave abuse of discretion in strictly enforcing
the requirement of notice of hearing.
The RTC did not also commit a grave abuse of discretion in strictly enforcing the
requirement of notice of hearing. The requirement of notice of hearing is an integral component
of procedural due process that seeks to avoid "surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse
party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a
resolution by the court." Given the purpose of the requirement, a motion unaccompanied by a
notice of hearing is considered a mere scrap of paper that does not toll the running of the period
to appeal. This requirement of notice of hearing equally applies to Isabels motion for

reconsideration. Isabels alleged absence of counsel is not a valid excuse or reason for noncompliance with the rules.
ANCHOR SAVINGS BANK (FORMERLY ANCHOR FINANCE AND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION) v. HENRY H. FURIGAY, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 191178, March 13, 2013
J. Mendoza
Before an action can properly be commenced, all the essential elements of the cause of
action must be in existence, that is, the cause of action must be complete. All valid conditions
precedent to the institution of the particular action, whether prescribed by statute, fixed by
agreement of the parties or implied by law must be performed or complied with before
commencing the action, unless the conduct of the adverse party has been such as to prevent or
waive performance or excuse non-performance of the condition. Failure to make a sufficient
allegation of a cause of action in the complaint, such as the failure to allege exhaustion of all
legal remedies in the complaint warrants dismissal.
FACTS:
Petitioner Anchor Savings Bank (ASB) filed a verified complaint for sum of money and
damages with application for replevin against Ciudad Transport Services, Inc. (CTS), its
president, respondent Henry H. Furigay, his wife, Gelinda C. Furigay; and a "John Doe." While
the civil case was pending, Spouses Furigay donated their registered properties in Alaminos,
Pangasinan, to their minor children, respondents Hegem G. Furigay and Herriette C. Furigay.
Claiming that the donation of these properties was made in fraud of creditors, ASB filed a
Complaint for Rescission of Deed of Donation, Title and Damages against Spouses Furigay and
their children. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss filed by the Spouses Furigay but upon
reconsideration, dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription and failure to pay docket
fees. The CA dismissed the complaint on the ground that ASB failed to allege in the complaint
that it had resorted to all legal remedies to obtain satisfaction of its claim.
ISSUE:
Whether a complaint that fails to allege exhaustion of all legal remedies is dismissible
RULING:
Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that every ordinary civil action
must be based on a cause of action. Section 2 of the same rule defines a cause of action as an
act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. In order that one may claim to
have a cause of action, the following elements must concur: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of
the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the
part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. In other words, "a cause of action arises when
that should have been done is not done, or that which should not have been done is done."
In Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Sweet Lines, Inc., it was held that
"before an action can properly be commenced, all the essential elements of the cause of action

must be in existence, that is, the cause of action must be complete. All valid conditions
precedent to the institution of the particular action, whether prescribed by statute, fixed by
agreement of the parties or implied by law must be performed or complied with before
commencing the action, unless the conduct of the adverse party has been such as to prevent or
waive performance or excuse non-performance of the condition."
The rules of procedure require that the complaint must contain a concise statement of
the ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. "The test of the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the
court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of plaintiff." The
focus is on the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. Failure to make a
sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the complaint warrants its dismissal.
In all, it is incorrect for ASB to argue that a complaint need not allege all the elements
constituting its cause of action since it would simply adduce proof of the same during trial.
"Nothing is more settled than the rule that in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action, the inquiry is "into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations." The
inquiry is confined to the four comers of the complaint, and no other. Unfortunately for ASB, the
Court finds the allegations of its complaint insufficient in establishing its cause of action and in
apprising Spouses Furigay of the same so that they could defend themselves intelligently and
effectively pursuant to their right to due process.
NOVATEKNIK LAND CORPORATION v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK AND THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILA CITY
G.R. No. 194104, March 13, 2013
J. Mendoza
NLC filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA without filing a motion for
reconsideration before the RTC. Before a petition for certiorari can prosper, the petitioner must
be able to show, among others, that he does not have any other "plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law." This remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a
motion for reconsideration of the questioned order.
FACTS:
Petitioner Novateknik Land Corporation (NLC), entered into a Credit Agreement with
respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB). NLC failed to pay the loan despite repeated
demands. PNB filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties covered by the real
estate mortgage and chattel mortgage. The RTC of Manila issued the Notice of Extrajudicial
Sale, announcing the sale of NLC properties. The properties were awarded to PNB, as the sole
bidder, and the bid amount was applied in partial satisfaction of the outstanding obligation of the
borrowers. The RTC granted NLC petition for a Temporary Restraining Order against PNB but
later denied its petition for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. NLC filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA citing extreme urgency. The CA dismissed the petition
for failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether NLC was justified in elevating the case to the CA without filing the requisite motion for
reconsideration before the RTC

RULING:
Petition denied.
Unmistakably, before a petition for certiorari can prosper, NLC must be able to show,
among others, that he does not have any other "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law." This remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for
reconsideration of the questioned order.
Well established is the rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite
to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari, subject to certain exceptions, to wit: a) where
the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; b) where the questions
raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or
are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; c) where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of
the government or the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; d) where,
under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; e) where petitioner
was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable; g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; h)
where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
In the case at bench, the proper recourse of NLC was to have filed a motion for
reconsideration of the June 22, 2010 Order of the RTC denying its application for injunctive
relief. Only after the denial of such motion can it be deemed to have exhausted all available
remedies and be justified in elevating the case to the CA through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.
ROLANDO Z. TIGAZ v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 180681, March 18, 2013
CJ Sereno
Tigaz filed three pleadings assailing the Ombudsmans decision finding probable cause
to indict him for violation of Sec. 3(b) of R.A. 3019 and the Sandiganbayans resolution denying
his motion to quash the information and suspending him pendent lite.
In the determination of probable cause, absolute certainty of evidence is not required,
for opinion and reasonable belief are sufficient. Besides, any other defense contesting the
finding of probable cause that is highly factual in nature must be threshed out in a full-blown
trial, and not in a special civil action for certiorari before this Court.
A Rule 65 petition is an inappropriate remedy to question the refusal of the
Sandiganbayan to quash an information and, its imposition of suspension pendente lite. The
remedy is not the filing of a special civil action for certiorari, but the continuance of the case in
due course.
FACTS:

Petitioner, Ronaldo Tigaz, a municipal mayor, filed the following: (1) a Petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a
temporary restraining order; (2) a Supplemental Petition; and (3) a Second Supplemental
Petition.
Filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, these pleadings assail the Ruling of the Office
of the Ombudsman, finding probable cause to indict Tigaz and his Sangguniang Bayan
members for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. 3019 as well as the Resolutions of the Fourth
Division of the Sandiganbayan, denying his plea to quash the criminal Information filed against
him. Tigaz also questions the resolution of the Sandiganbayan granting the prosecutions Motion
to suspend him pendente lite.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Ombudsman acted with bias in prosecuting Tigaz
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan erred when it refused to quash the information
RULING:
Petition denied.
1. Since the imputation of bias to the Office of the Ombudsman is without
support, this Petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a temporary restraining order, fails.
To impute bias in no less than a special civil action for certiorari Tigaz must show not
only strong grounds stemming from extrajudicial sources, but also palpable error that may be
inferred from the decision or order itself.
Firstly, the Court has squarely held in Galario v. Office of the Ombudsman
(Mindanao) that there is nothing inherently irregular or illegal in filing an indictment against the
Ombudsman for an offense different from that charged in the initiatory complaint, if the
indictment is warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary investigation.
Secondly, as regards the finding of probable cause, it appears extant that the exercise of
the wide prerogative by the Office of the Ombudsman was not whimsical, capricious or
arbitrary, given the supporting documentary evidence it had appreciated together with the NBI
and the Sandiganbayan. In the determination of probable cause, absolute certainty of evidence
is not required, for opinion and reasonable belief are sufficient. Besides, any other defense
contesting the finding of probable cause that is highly factual in nature must be threshed out in a
full-blown trial, and not in a special civil action for certiorari before this Court.
Thirdly, Tigaz's election victory over the Ombudsman's brother does not clearly establish
prejudice. In De la Cruz v. DECS, this Court has declared that kinship alone does not establish
bias and partiality. There must be convincing proof to show bias, otherwise, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty prevails.
Since the imputation of bias to the Office of the Ombudsman is without support, this
Petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or a temporary restraining order, fails.

2. In any event, the OSG correctly argues that a Rule 65 petition is an

inappropriate remedy to question the refusal of the Sandiganbayan to quash
an information and, its imposition of suspension pendente lite.
And because the first petition holds no water, his Supplemental Petition and Second
Supplemental Petition have no basis to rely upon. In any event, the OSG correctly argues that a
Rule 65 petition is an inappropriate remedy to question the refusal of the Sandiganbayan to
quash an information and, its imposition of suspension pendente lite. The remedy still available
to Tigaz is not the filing of a special civil action for certiorari, but the continuance of the case in
due course.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NAZARENO VILLAREAL y LUALHATI
G.R. No. 201363, March 18, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
Villareal was arrested by PO3 de Leon while holding a plastic sachet and because PO3
de Leon recognized him as someone he arrested for illegal possession before. A previous
arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same offense, will not suffice to satisfy the
exacting requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to justify a lawful warrantless
arrest. "Personal knowledge" of the arresting officer that a crime had in fact just been committed
is required. To interpret "personal knowledge" as referring to a persons reputation or past
criminal citations would create a dangerous precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority
and power of police officers to effect warrantless arrests based solely on knowledge of a
persons previous criminal infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites laid out under
Section 5.
FACTS:
PO3 Renato de Leon was riding his motorcycle when he saw respondent Nazareno
Villareal holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet. PO3 de Leon approached Villareal
and recognized him as someone he had previously arrested for illegal drug possession. Despite
Villareals attempt to escape, PO3 de Leon apprehended him with the help of a tricycle driver.
Villareal was brought to the 9th Avenue Police Station and proceeded to the SAID-SOU office
where the plastic sachet was marked with PO3 de Leon and Villareals initials and Villareals
date of arrest. Villareal was turned over to the investigator and a letter request was prepared for
the laboratory examination of the contents of the plastic sachet. The qualitative examination
resulted in the finding that the contents were 0.03 gram of shabu.
ISSUE:
Whether Villareals arrest was a lawful warrantless arrest provided for under the Rules of Court
RULING:
Petition granted.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the basic
rules on lawful warrantless arrests, either by a peace officer or a private person, which provided
that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: a) when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to

commit an offense; b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, paragraph (b)
of Section 5 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just
been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
appellant had committed it.
The factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had personal
knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by Villareal. It is not enough that PO3
de Leon had reasonable ground to believe that Villareal had just committed a crime; a crime
must in fact have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case.
However, a previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same offense, will
not suffice to satisfy the exacting requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to
justify a lawful warrantless arrest. "Personal knowledge" of the arresting officer that a crime had
in fact just been committed is required. To interpret "personal knowledge" as referring to a
persons reputation or past criminal citations would create a dangerous precedent and
unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect warrantless arrests
based solely on knowledge of a persons previous criminal infractions, rendering nugatory the
rigorous requisites laid out under Section 5.
In fine, Villareals acts of walking along the street and holding something in his hands,
even if they appeared to be dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge for the same
offense, are not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create
probable cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 above-quoted. "Probable
cause" has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Specifically with respect to
arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested, which
clearly do not obtain in Villareals case.
ENGR. ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 170863, March 20, 2013
J. Brion
Section 6, Rule 110 and Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provide
that when the date given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, it need not be
proven as alleged; thus, the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was
committed at any date within the period of the statute of limitations and before the
commencement of the action. Hence,
the fact that the Information did not state the
precise date of the commission of the crime did not automatically render the charge against
Engr. Zapanta for qualified theft invalid.

FACTS:
An information was filed against petitioner, Engr. Anthony Zapanta with qualified theft
committed sometime in October 2001. The RTC convicted him. The CA affirmed the RTC. On
appeal to the Supreme Court by way of Rule 45, Engr. Zapanta submits that, while the
information charged him for acts committed "sometime in the month of October, 2001," he was
convicted for acts not covered by the information, i.e., November 2001, thus depriving him of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
ISSUE:
Whether an Information must state the precise date of the commission of the offense
RULING:
Conformably with Section 6, Rule 110 and Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, when the date given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, it need not
be proven as alleged; thus, the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense
was committed at any date within the period of the statute of limitations and before the
commencement of the action.
In this case, Engr. Zapanta had been fully apprised of the charge of qualified theft since
the information stated the approximate date of the commission of the offense through the words
"sometime in the month of October, 2001." Engr. Zapanta could reasonably deduce the nature
of the criminal act with which he was charged from a reading of the contents of the information,
as well as gather by such reading whatever he needed to know about the charge to enable him
to prepare his defense. The Court stresses that the information did not have to state the precise
date when the offense was committed, as to be inclusive of the month of "November 2001"
since the date was not a material element of the offense. As such, the offense of qualified theft
could be alleged to be committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its
commission. Clearly, the month of November is the month right after October.
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHIL. RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION BENEFITS SYSTEM v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 188956, March 20, 2013
J. Villarama, Jr.
The RTC dismissed the application for land registration of AFP-RSBS for failure to
prosecute after it presented all its evidence and after it decided in its favor. An action may be
dismissed for failure to prosecute in any of the following instances: (1) if the plaintiff fails to
appear at the time of trial; or (2) if he fails to prosecute the action for an unreasonable length of
time; or (3) if he fails to comply with the Rules of Court or any order of the court. Once a case is
dismissed for failure to prosecute, this has the effect of an adjudication on the merits and is
understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another action unless otherwise provided in the
order of dismissal. In other words, unless there be a qualification in the order of dismissal that it
is without prejudice, the dismissal should be regarded as an adjudication on the merits and is
with prejudice.

AFP-RSBS presented Ms. Alma Aban as its witness but her testimony was not
considered because she did not present an authorization to testify from AFP-RSBS. There is no
substantive or procedural rule which requires a witness for a party to present some form of
authorization to testify as a witness for the party presenting him or her. No law or jurisprudence
would support the conclusion that such omission can be considered as a failure to prosecute on
the part of the party presenting such witness. All that the Rules require of a witness is that the
witness possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided therein.
FACTS:
Petitioner Armed Forces of the Philippines-Retirement and Separation Benefits System
(AFP-RSBS) filed an Application for Registration of Title over three parcels of land before the
RTC of Pasig City, through its then Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Mr.
Honorio S. Azcueta. There being no opposition despite due notice and publication, the trial court
issued an order of general default against the whole world, and AFP-RSBS was allowed to
present evidence ex-parte.
AFP-RSBS then presented as its witness, Ms. Alma P. Aban, Vice President and Head of
its Asset Enhancement Office. AFP-SBS submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence, following
which, the trial court granted the application. In response, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the AFP-RSBS failed to prove that it has
personality to own property in its name and AFP-RSBS failed to show that the witness it
presented was duly authorized to appear for and in its behalf. The trial court granted the Motion
for Reconsideration of the OSG on the ground that AFP-RSBS failed to prosecute its case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether AFP-RSBS failed to prosecute
2. Whether a witness must present an authorization to testify from the party presenting her
RULING:
Petition granted.
1. That the RTC dismissed the application for land registration of AFP-RSBS for
failure to prosecute after it presented all its evidence and after said court has
rendered a decision in its favor, is highly irregular.
Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides only
three instances wherein the Court may dismiss a case for failure to prosecute.
Jurisprudence has elucidated on this matter in De Knecht v. CA:
An action may be dismissed for failure to prosecute in any of the following
instances: (1) if the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of trial; or (2) if he fails to
prosecute the action for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply with
the Rules of Court or any order of the court. Once a case is dismissed for failure to
prosecute, this has the effect of an adjudication on the merits and is understood to be
with prejudice to the filing of another action unless otherwise provided in the order of
dismissal. In other words, unless there be a qualification in the order of dismissal that it

is without prejudice, the dismissal should be regarded as an adjudication on the merits

and is with prejudice.
Indeed, there was no basis for the court a quos ruling that AFP-RSBS failed to
prosecute the subject case, because none of the grounds provided in the Rules for dismissing a
case due to failure to prosecute is present. That the RTC dismissed the application for land
registration of AFP-RSBS for failure to prosecute after it presented all its evidence and after said
court has rendered a decision in its favor, is highly irregular.
2. There is no substantive or procedural rule which requires a witness for a party to
present some form of authorization to testify as a witness for the party presenting
him or her.
However, there is no substantive or procedural rule which requires a witness for a party
to present some form of authorization to testify as a witness for the party presenting him or her.
No law or jurisprudence would support the conclusion that such omission can be considered as
a failure to prosecute on the part of the party presenting such witness. All that the Rules require
of a witness is that the witness possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided therein.
In Cavili v. Judge Florendo, it was held that Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for
specific disqualifications. Section 19 disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and
children whose tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of being witnesses. Section 20
provides for disqualification based on conflicts of interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides
for disqualifications based on privileged communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a
rule on disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may be impeached
by the party against whom he was called.
The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of
disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. It is a maxim of recognized utility and merit in
the construction of statutes that an express exception, exemption, or saving clause excludes
other exceptions. (In Re Estate of Enriquez, 29 Phil. 167) As a general rule, where there are
express exceptions these comprise the only limitations on the operation of a statute and no
other exception will be implied. (Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Fourth Edition, Vol. 2A, p.
90) The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein.
A reading of the pertinent law and jurisprudence would show that Ms. Aban is qualified to
testify as a witness for the petitioner since she possesses the qualifications of being able to
perceive and being able to make her perceptions known to others. Furthermore, she possesses
none of the disqualifications described above.
MARIE CALLO-CLARIDAD v. PHILIP RONALD P. ESTEBAN AND TEODORA ALYN
ESTEBAN
G.R. No. 191567, March 20, 2013
J. Bersamin
Courts do not reverse the Secretary of Justices findings and conclusions on the matter
of probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion. The CA correctly ruled
that no prima facie evidence existed that sufficiently indicated Philip and Teodoras involvement
in the commission of the crime. The circumstantial evidence linking Philip to the killing of Chase

was derived from the bare recollections of Ariane, and of Guray and Corpus. For circumstantial
evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with
one another and must constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that a crime has been committed and that Philip and Teodora are probably guilty
thereof.
Out of the total of 16 statements/affidavits corresponding to the respective witnesses,
only nine were sworn to before a competent officer. The lack of the requisite certifications from
the affidavits of most of the other witnesses was in violation of Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court. The rule was designed to avoid self-serving and unreliable evidence from being
considered for purposes of the preliminary investigation, the present rules for which do not
require a confrontation between the parties and their witnesses; hence, the certifications were
mandatory.
FACTS:
Petitioner Marie Callo-Claridad, mother of the deceased Cheasare Armani Chase
Claridad filed a complaint against respondents, Philip Esteban and Teodora Esteban for the
death of her son. The complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
The complaint alleged that Chase was in his home in Ferndale Homes, Quezon City when his
sister Ariane, saw a white Honda Civic car parked outside their house and that she recognized
the driver as Philip Esteban. The security guards of the subdivision logged in Philips arrival
noting the presence of a male companion in the car. Marivic Rodriguez, a househelper of
Shellane Yukoko, the resident of No. 9 Cedar Place, Ferndale Homes, along with Jennylyn Buri
and her ward, Joei Yukoko, heard cries for help but did not bother to check. The guards noted
the arrival of Teodora. One of the security guards, Abelardo Sarmiento, Jr., while patrolling
noticed that one of the three cars parked parallel to one another at the carpark of No. 10, Cedar
Place bore red streaks. Upon a closer inspection, Sarmiento, Jr. found the lifeless body of
Chase. SG Solis received a phone call from a Mr. Esteban Larry saying that a kid met an
accident at Cedar Place and after a search around the area, there was no such incident.
The OCP of Quezon City dismissed the complaint for lack of evidence, motive and
circumstantial evidence to charge Philip with homicide or murder. The Secretary of Justice
affirmed the dismissal. The CA denied Claridads petition for review.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the court can reverse the Secretary of Justices finding of probable cause
2. Whether the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to constitute probable cause
3. Whether unsworn affidavits may be considered during the preliminary investigation
RULING:
Petition denied.

1. Consistent with this policy, courts do not reverse the Secretary of Justices
findings and conclusions on the matter of probable cause except in clear
cases of grave abuse of discretion.
A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be taken only to review the
decisions, resolutions or awards by the quasi-judicial officers, agencies or bodies, particularly

those specified in Section 1 of Rule 43. In the matter before us, however, the Secretary of
Justice was not an officer performing a quasi-judicial function. In reviewing the findings of the
OCP of Quezon City on the matter of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice performed an
essentially executive function to determine whether the crime alleged against Philip and
Teodora was committed, and whether there was probable cause to believe that Philip and
Teodora were guilty thereof.
On the other hand, the courts could intervene in the Secretary of Justices determination
of probable cause only through a special civil action for certiorari. That happens when the
Secretary of Justice acts in a limited sense like a quasi-judicial officer of the executive
department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law. But the requirement for such
intervention was still for the petitioner to demonstrate clearly that the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Unless such a
clear demonstration is made, the intervention is disallowed in deference to the doctrine of
separation of powers. As the Court has postulated in Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.
(Metrobank) v. Tobias III:
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide
matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of
the Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch,
represented in this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will
not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an
information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
Under the circumstances presented, the Court concludes to be correct the CAs
determination that no prima facie evidence existed that sufficiently indicated Philip and
Teodoras involvement in the commission of the crime. It is clear that there was no eyewitness
of the actual killing of Chase; or that there was no evidence showing how Chase had been
killed, how many persons had killed him, and who had been the perpetrator or perpetrators of
his killing. There was also nothing that directly incriminated the respondents in the commission
of either homicide or murder.
2. But there was nothing else after that, because the circumstances revealed by
the other witnesses could not even be regarded as circumstantial evidence
against Philip.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances
must be consistent with one another and must constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair
and reasonable conclusion that a crime has been committed and that Philip and Teodora are
probably guilty thereof. The pieces of evidence must be consistent with the hypothesis that the
respondents were probably guilty of the crime and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that they were innocent, and with every rational hypothesis except that of
guilt. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient, therefore, if: (a) there is more than one circumstance,
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven, and (c) the combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The records show that the circumstantial evidence linking Philip to the killing of Chase
derived from the bare recollections of Ariane (sister of Chase), and of Guray and Corpus

(respectively, the househelp and nanny in the household of a resident of the subdivision) about
seeing Chase board the white Honda Civic at around 7:00 p.m. of February 27, 2007, and about
Philip being the driver of the Honda Civic. But there was nothing else after that, because the
circumstances revealed by the other witnesses could not even be regarded as circumstantial
evidence against Philip. To be sure, some of the affidavits were unsworn. The statements
subscribed and sworn to before the officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP) having the
authority to administer oaths upon matters connected with the performance of their official
duties undeniably lacked the requisite certifications to the effect that such administering officers
had personally examined the affiants, and that such administering officers were satisfied that the
affiants had voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
3. The lack of the requisite certifications from the affidavits of most of the other
witnesses was in violation of Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
The lack of the requisite certifications from the affidavits of most of the other witnesses
was in violation of Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, which pertinently provided that the
preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner: a) the complaint shall state
the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant
and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause. They
shall be in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official
file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official
authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each
of who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
The CA explained that the requirement for the certifications under the aforecited rule was
designed to avoid self-serving and unreliable evidence from being considered for purposes of
the preliminary investigation, the present rules for which do not require a confrontation between
the parties and their witnesses; hence, the certifications were mandatory.
In the case at bar, a perusal of the statements/affidavits accompanying the complaint
shows that out of the total of 16 statements/affidavits corresponding to the respective witnesses,
only nine (9) thereof were sworn to before a competent officer. These were the affidavits of the
following: (1) SG Sarmiento; (2) SG Solis; (3) SG Fabe; (4) SG Marivic Rodriguez; (5) Jennylyn
Buri; (6) Richard Joshua Sulit; (7) Marites Navarro; (8) Pamela-Ann Que; and (9) Edbert Ylo,
which were sworn to or subscribed before a competent officer.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ZENAIDA SORIANO AND MYRNA SAMONTE
G.R. No. 189843, March 20, 2013
J. Perez
The chain of custody provided for in Section 21(1), Art. II of R.A. 9165, to wit: (1) there
must be a showing that a physical inventory was conducted in the presence of the accused or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official; and (2) there must be photograph(s) of the seized
items taken in the presence of the above-enumerated representatives. It was ruled that
omission(s) in strictly following the provision are not fatal to the prosecutions case as long as
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved and established with moral
certainty.

FACTS:
Zenaida Soriano and Myrna Samonte were charged for violation of Sections 5 (illegal
sale) and 11 (illegal possession) of Article II of R.A. No. 9165. During the trial, the prosecution
witness positively identified both accused as well as all the pieces of evidence presented by the
State. The witness, however, admitted that there were no barangay officials present when they
recovered the plastic sachets from the accused neither was there any formal report made to the
barangay regarding the buy bust operation. The accused used denial and alibi for their defense.
The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a legitimate buy-bust operation with regard to the chain of custody not being
followed when there were no Barangay Officials present during the operation
RULING:
That the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti because the arresting team
failed to comply with Section 21(1), Art. II of R.A. 9165 is rejected by the Supreme Court. The
SC has time and again ruled that such omissions are not fatal to the prosecutions case as long
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved and established with
moral certainty.
Such omissions to wit: (1) there is no showing that a physical inventory was conducted
in the presence of the accused or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official; and (2) no
photograph of the seized items was taken in the presence of the above-enumerated
representatives.
The prosecution has accounted for the chain of custody of the subject substances.
Absent a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof of tampering with the evidence, the presumption
that the integrity of the evidence had been preserved lies.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TRINIDAD DIAZ-ENRIQUEZ, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 181458, March 20, 2013
CJ. Sereno
The Republic has been actively involved in the trial for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth
for two decades but was absent for one hearing. Due to this single absence, the
Sandiganbayan dismissed the case. Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that the
court may dismiss a complaint in case there are no justifiable reasons that explain the plaintiff's
absence during the presentation of the evidence in chief. The word "may" in Rule 17, Section 3
of the Rules of Court, operates to confer on the court the discretion to decide between the
dismissal of the case on technicality vis--vis the progressive prosecution.
The Sandiganbayan denied the Republics Motion for Reconsideration on the ground
that it failed to observe the three day notice requirement. Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court, does not require that the court receive the notice three days prior to the hearing date.
Rule 13, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, states that the date of the mailing of motions through

registered mail shall be considered the date of their filing in court, it follows that the Republic
filed the motion to the court 10 days in advance of the hearing date. In so doing, it observed the
10-day requirement under Rule 15, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, which provides that the time
and date of the hearing must not be later than ten days after the filing of the motion.
FACTS:
On 23 July 1987, petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Complaint against respondents, Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez, et al. for the recovery of
ill-gotten wealth from respondents for the benefit of the Republic. Allegedly, these properties
were illegally obtained during the reign of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and were the
subject of sequestration orders. The Sandiganbayan resolved the case in favor of DiazEnriquez, et al. and lifted the sequestration orders. The Republic filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 with the Supreme Court.
The counsels for the Republic, Special PCGG
Counsel Maria Flora A. Falcon attended to the civil case, while OSG Senior State Solicitor
Derek R. Puertollano handled the case before the Supreme Court. Pending the pre-trial of the
case, Atty. Falcons contract with the PCGG ended. She informed Atty. Puertollano that she was
no longer connected with the PCGG and turned over to him the records of the civil case.
However, Atty. Puertollano was appearing in the case before the Supreme Court and belatedly
received the letter regarding Atty. Falcon.
No representative appeared on behalf of the Republic. Consequently, the
Sandiganbayan dismissed the case without prejudice. Atty. Mary Charlene Hernandez took over
the case from PCGG's previous special counsel and only after a while did she learn of the trial
dates. She also knew nothing about the dismissal of the case and filed an Urgent Motion for
Postponement of the hearing. The OSG came to know of the dismissal of the civil case only
when it received the Order on 15 November 2007. It filed a Motion for Reconsideration with a
notice for hearing on 7 December 2007. This motion was served on the Sandiganbayan and
Enriquez-Diaz, et al. on 29 November 2007 via registered mail. Unfortunately, the court received
the motion only on 10 December 2007.
The Sandiganbayan denied the Motion for Reconsideration on the ground of failure to
observe the three-day notice requirement. With this instant dismissal, the Sandiganbayan no
longer considered the reasons adduced by the Republic to explain the latter's absence in court.
The Republic argued that Falcon had diligently attended to the civil action. But since she was no
longer connected to the PCGG, and given that the OSG only learned of this circumstance seven
days after the hearing, counsels for the Republic failed to appear during the hearing.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Republic failed to prosecute the case warranting the dismissal of the case
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan correctly dismissed the motion for reconsideration on the
ground of lack of notice
RULING:
Petition granted.

1. These circumstances should have easily persuaded the Sandiganbayan that the
Republic intended to advance the ill-gotten wealth case.

As worded, Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that the court may dismiss
a complaint in case there are no justifiable reasons that explain the plaintiff's absence during the
presentation of the evidence in chief. Generally speaking, the use of "may" denotes its directory
nature, especially if used in remedial statutes that are known to be construed liberally. Thus, the
word "may" in Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, operates to confer on the court the
discretion to decide between the dismissal of the case on technicality vis--vis the progressive
prosecution thereof.
Firstly, based on the records, the Republic's counsels have actively participated in the
case for two decades. The Sandiganbayan has not made any remark regarding the attendance
of the Republic, save for this single instance. Secondly, after the latter received the assailed
Order, it duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration. These circumstances should have easily
persuaded the Sandiganbayan that the Republic intended to advance the ill-gotten wealth case.
2. Plainly, the rule does not require that the court receive the notice three days
prior to the hearing date.
The Sandiganbayan is incorrect. By the very words of Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court, the moving party is required to serve motions in such a manner as to ensure the receipt
thereof by the other party at least three days before the date of hearing. The purpose of the rule
is to prevent a surprise and to afford the adverse party a chance to be heard before the motion
is resolved by the trial court. Plainly, the rule does not require that the court receive the notice
three days prior to the hearing date.
Likewise, the Republic mailed the motion to the Sandiganbayan on 29 November 2007.
Since Rule 13, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, states that the date of the mailing of motions
through registered mail shall be considered the date of their filing in court, it follows that the
Republic filed the motion to the court 10 days in advance of the hearing date. In so doing, it
observed the 10-day requirement under Rule 15, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that the time and date of the hearing must not be later than ten days after the filing of
the motion.
Considering that the Motion for Reconsideration containing a timely notice of hearing
was duly served in compliance with Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court, the fact
that the Sandiganbayan received the notice on 10 December 2007 becomes trivial. The court
cannot also blame the Republic for this belated receipt of the registered mail since it followed
the rules.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GILBERT PENILLA Y FRANCIA
G.R. No. 189324, March 20, 2013
J. Perez
In rape cases, the moral character of the victim is immaterial. Physical resistance need
not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed, and the victim submits
herself to her attacker because of fear. Physical resistance is not an essential element of rape.
Also, delay in revealing the commission of a crime such as rape does not necessarily render
such charge unworthy of belief. This is because the victim may choose to keep quiet rather than
expose her defilement to the cruelty of public scrutiny. Only when the delay is unreasonable or
unexplained may it work to discredit the complainant. Neither does an inconclusive medical

report negate the finding of rape. A medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a
prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict
the accused of the crime and the medical certificate will then be rendered as merely
corroborative.
FACTS:
Gilbert Penilla was charged with the crime of rape and with the use of deadly weapon
against the complainant AAA against her will and consent. At the time of the incident, AAA was
renting a room at a boarding house owned by Penillas grandmother. Around midnight, she was
sleeping alone in her room and was suddenly awakened by Penillas angry voice berating her
for the loud volume of her television which was disturbing his sleep and rest in the adjacent
room. AAA rose and was surprised to see Penilla by her bedside, naked and holding a kitchen
knife of about eight (8) inches long. Penilla then pushed her towards the bed, knelt on top of her
and poked the knife at the right side of her body. Paralyzed with fear and physically
overpowered by Penilla, AAA remained silent and did not shout for help while Penilla forced
himself on AAA. After four days, AAA filed a complaint for rape against Penilla before the
Barangay. Penilla denied having raped AAA and instead, claimed that the act was consensual.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Penilla of rape. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTCs finding of guilt.
ISSUE:
Whether the crime of rape has actually occurred
RULING:
Rape case principles have not changed: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with
facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to
disprove; (2) in view of the nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and, (3) the
evidence for the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the defense.
Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the complainant's credibility becomes the single most
important issue. In rape cases, the accused may be convicted based solely on the testimony of
the victim, provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things. By the very nature of the crime of rape,
conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant's testimony
because of the fact that, usually, only the participants can directly testify as to its occurrence.
Since normally only two persons are privy to the commission of rape, the evaluation of the
evidence thereof ultimately revolves around the credibility of the complaining witness.
The dictum in rape cases is that the moral character of the victim is immaterial. Rape
may be committed not only against single women and children but also against those who are
married, middle-aged, separated, or pregnant. Even a prostitute may be a victim of rape.
Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are
employed, and the victim submits herself to her attacker because of fear. Failure to shout or
offer tenacious resistance does not make voluntary the victims submission to the perpetrators

lust. Besides, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman
involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused; it is not an essential element of rape. Rape
victims react differently. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated
to offer any resistance at all. Thus, the law does not impose upon the private complainant the
burden of proving resistance.
On the matter of evaluating the credibility of witnesses, it depends largely on the
assessment of the trial court. When it comes to credibility, the trial courts assessment deserves
great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. Thus, appellate courts rely heavily on the
weight given by the trial court on the credibility of a witness as it had a first-hand opportunity to
hear and see the witness testify. Also, delay in revealing the commission of a crime such as
rape does not necessarily render such charge unworthy of belief. This is because the victim
may choose to keep quiet rather than expose her defilement to the cruelty of public scrutiny.
Only when the delay is unreasonable or unexplained may it work to discredit the complainant.
Neither does an inconclusive medical report negate the finding of rape. A medical
examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victims
testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime. In fact, a doctors
certificate is merely corroborative in character and not an indispensable requirement in proving
the commission of rape.
SPOUSES LEHNER AND LUDY MARTIRES v. MENELIA CHUA
G.R. No. 174240, March 20, 2013
J. Peralta
Spouses Martires filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration and reckoned the 15 day
period for filing an appeal with the Supreme Court from the date the CA denied the Second
Motion for Reconsideration. Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition
for review on certiorari under the said Rule "shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from or of the denial of the petitioner's motion
for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment." Relative thereto,
Section 2, Rule 52 of the same Rules provides that "no second motion for reconsideration of a
judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained." Since a second motion for
reconsideration is not allowed, then unavoidably, its filing does not toll the running of the period
to file an appeal by certiorari.
The validity of the contents and the regularity of the notarization of the Deed of Transfer
were challenged. A defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and
reduce it to a private instrument. When there is a defect in the notarization of a document, the
clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly-notarized document is
dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such document is preponderance of
evidence. While indeed a notarized document enjoys the presumption of regularity, the fact that
a deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. The validity of the contents
and execution of the subject Deed of Transfer were challenged in the proceedings where its
prima facie validity was subsequently overthrown by the questionable circumstances attendant
in its supposed execution.
FACTS:

Respondent Menelia Chua entered into a loan agreement with petitioner Spouses
Lehner and Ludy Martires secured by a real estate mortgage over 24 memorial lots at Holy
Cross Memorial Park. Chua filed a complaint for the annulment of the mortgage against
Spouses Martires on the ground that the interest rates imposed are unjust and exorbitant. She
amended her complaint after finding out that the lots were transferred in the name of Spouses
Martires through a forged Deed of Transfer and Affidavit of Warranty which was not opposed by
Spouses Martires. The trial court ruled in favor of Spouses Martires. At first the CA affirmed the
ruling of the trial court but later modified its decision finding that the Deed of Transfer and the
Affidavit of Warranty are void ab initio upon Chuas motion for reconsideration. The CA denied
the two motions for reconsideration filed by Spouses Martires.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the petition was properly filed within the 15-day period
2. Whether a defectively notarized document will enjoy the presumption of regularity
RULING:
Petition denied.
1. For this reason, Spouses Martires' failure to file this petition within the 15-day
period rendered the assailed Amended CA Decision and Resolutions final and
executory, thus, depriving this Court of jurisdiction to entertain an appeal
therefrom.
At the outset, the instant petition should be denied for being filed out of time. Spouses
Martires admit in the instant petition that: (1) on July 18, 2006, they received a copy of the July
5, 2006 Resolution of the CA which denied their Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed
Amended Decision; (2) on July 26, 2006, they filed a Motion to Admit Second Motion for
Reconsideration attaching thereto the said Second Motion for Reconsideration; (3) on
September 5, 2006, they received a copy of the August 28, 2006 Resolution of the CA which
denied their Motion to Admit as well as their Second Motion for Reconsideration; and (4) they
filed the instant petition on October 20, 2006.
Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for review on certiorari
under the said Rule "shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final
order or resolution appealed from or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment." Relative thereto, Section 2, Rule
52 of the same Rules provides that "no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final
resolution by the same party shall be entertained." Based on the abovementioned dates, the
start of the 15-day period for the filing of this petition should have been reckoned from July 18,
2006, the time of petitioners' receipt of the CA Resolution denying their Motion for
Reconsideration, and not on September 5, 2006, the date when they received the CA
Resolution denying their Second Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, Spouses Martires should
have filed the instant petition not later than August 2, 2006. It is wrong for Spouses Martires to
reckon the 15-day period for the filing of the instant petition from the date when they received
the copy of the CA Resolution denying their Second Motion for Reconsideration. Since a second
motion for reconsideration is not allowed, then unavoidably, its filing did not toll the running of
the period to file an appeal by certiorari. Spouses Martires made a critical mistake in waiting for
the CA to resolve their second motion for reconsideration before pursuing an appeal.

2. In the present case, the presumption cannot be made to apply, because aside from
the regularity of its notarization, the validity of the contents and execution of the
subject Deed of Transfer was challenged in the proceedings below where its prima
facie validity was subsequently overthrown by the questionable circumstances
attendant in its supposed execution.
Anent the first assigned error, Spouses Martires are correct in pointing out that notarized
documents carry evidentiary weight conferred upon them with respect to their due execution
and enjoy the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong
and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to falsity. However, the presumptions that attach
to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization
was regular. A defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and reduce it
to a private instrument. Consequently, when there is a defect in the notarization of a document,
the clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly-notarized document is
dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such document is preponderance of
evidence.
In the present case, the CA has clearly pointed out the dubious circumstances and
irregularities attendant in the alleged notarization of the subject Deed of Transfer, to wit: (1) the
Certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the Notarial Section of the RTC of Makati City which
supposedly attested that a copy of the subject Deed of Transfer is on file with the said court,
was contradicted by the Certification issued by the Administrative Officer of the Notarial Section
of the same office as well as by the testimony of the court employee who prepared the
Certification issued by the Clerk of Court, to the effect that the subject Deed of Transfer cannot,
in fact, be found in their files; (2) respondent's categorical denial that she executed the subject
Deed of Transfer; and (3) the subject document did not state the date of execution and lacks the
marital consent of respondent's husband.
While indeed a notarized document enjoys the presumption of regularity, the fact that a
deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. The presumption is not
absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In the present
case, the presumption cannot be made to apply, because aside from the regularity of its
notarization, the validity of the contents and execution of the subject Deed of Transfer was
challenged in the proceedings below where its prima facie validity was subsequently overthrown
by the questionable circumstances attendant in its supposed execution. These circumstances
include: (1) the alleged agreement between the parties that the ownership of the subject
property be simply assigned to Spouses Martires instead of foreclosure of the contract of
mortgage which was earlier entered into by them; (2) the Deed of Transfer was executed by
reason of the loan extended by Spouses Martires to Chua, the amount of the latter's
outstanding obligation being the same as the amount of the consideration for the assignment of
ownership over the subject property; (3) the inadequacy of the consideration; and (4) the claim
of respondent that she had no intention of transferring ownership of the subject property to
Spouses Martires.
EDITHA PADLAN v. ELENITA DINGLASAN and FELISIMO DINGLASAN
G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013
J. Peralta
Spouses Dinglasan filed an action for cancellation of title involving real property valued
at Php. 4,000.00 with the RTC. Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to

real property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of
the property subject thereof. Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by Spouses Dinglasan
for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action.
Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void.
FACTS:
Petitioner Editha Padlan purchased a parcel of land registered under the names of
petitioner Spouses Elenita and Felisimo Dinglasan. However, the deed of sale was falsified
through the forged signatures of Spouses Dinglasan by Maura Passion, who caused the sale.
Padlan transferred the title to the property under her name. Spouses Dinglasan demanded that
Padlan surrender the lots causing Spouses Dinglasan to file a case before the RTC of Bataan
for the cancellation of title. The RTC found that Padlan was a buyer in good faith and dismissed
the complaint. The CA ruled in favor of Spouses Dinglasan. Padlan filed a motion for
reconsideration arguing that the complaint lacks merit as the trial court failed to acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over her person. The CA denied the motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the subject property
RULING:
Petition denied.
However, in order to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, an
examination of the complaint is essential. Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over
the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's
cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it,
is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein.
What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the
relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the
assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine
which court has jurisdiction over the action. In the case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the
subject property is the value alleged in the complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner
in the amount of P4,000.00. No tax declaration was even presented that would show the
valuation of the subject property. In fact, in one of the hearings, respondents counsel informed
the court that they will present the tax declaration of the property in the next hearing since they
have not yet obtained a copy from the Provincial Assessors Office. However, they did not
present such copy.

To reiterate, where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property,
it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property
subject thereof. Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by Spouses Dinglasan for the
disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action.
Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void.
APRIL 2013
SIXTO N. CHU v. MACH ASIA TRADING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 184333, April 1, 2013

J. Peralta
It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating
that the person who received the summons in the defendant's behalf was one with whom the
defendant had a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter would actually receive the
summons.
It was not shown that the security guard who received the summons in behalf of Chu
was authorized and possessed a relation of confidence that Chu would definitely receive the
summons. This is not the kind of service contemplated by law. Thus, service on the security
guard could not be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted
service.
Facts:
Respondent Mach Asia Trading Corporation filed a complaint against petitioner Sixto Chu for a
sum of money, replevin and damages due to the non-payment of the purchase price of a Hitachi
Excavator. The RTC issued a writ of replevin against Chus heavy equipment. Sherriff Doroteo
P. Cortes failed to serve the summons personally upon Chu and resorted to substituted service
by having the summons received by the security guard Rolando Bonayon.
The RTC ruled in favor of Mach Asia. Chu filed an appeal with the CA arguing that the
substituted service of summons was invalid and that the declaration of default, in proceeding
with the trial of the case, and rendering an unfavorable judgment against him were erroneous.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC arguing that due process was duly served with the
substituted service and that the process servers inadvertence or neglect should not unduly
prejudice Mach Asias right to speedy justice.
Issue:
Whether a substituted service of summons upon a security guard is valid
Ruling:
Petition denied.
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand,
jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons
upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority.
As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only when summons

cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted service may be
resorted to.
It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the
person who received the summons in the defendant's behalf was one with whom the defendant
had a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summons.
Also, impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that efforts have been
made to find the defendant personally and that such efforts have failed. This is necessary
because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method
extraordinary in character, hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances
authorized by statute. The statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly,
faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by statute is
considered ineffective.
Clearly, it was not shown that the security guard who received the summons in behalf of Chu
was authorized and possessed a relation of confidence that Chu would definitely receive the
summons. This is not the kind of service contemplated by law. Thus, service on the security
guard could not be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted
service.
Hence, if Chu had actually received the summons through his security guard, the requirement of
due process would have nevertheless been complied with. Based on the presumption that a
person takes ordinary care of his concerns, the security guard would not have allowed the
sheriff to take possession of the equipments without the prior permission of Chu; otherwise he
would be accountable to Chu for the said units. Chu, for his part, would not have given his
permission without being informed of the fact of the summons and the writ of replevin issued by
the lower court, which permission includes the authority to receive the summons and the writ of
replevin.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. ARLIC ALMOJUELA
G.R. No. 194368, April 2, 2013

J. Brion
It is necessary for the petitioning government agency or its authorized representatives to
certify against forum shopping, because they, and not the OSG, are in the best position to know
if another case is pending before another court. If the OSG is compelled by circumstances to
verify and certify the pleading in behalf of a client agency, the OSG should at least endeavor to
inform the courts of its reasons for doing so, beyond simply citing cases where the Court
allowed the OSG to sign the certification.
Facts:
Ding Cang Hui a.k.a. Tony Lao / Tony Ling, a Chinese inmate charged with violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act was discovered to have escaped from his cell at the Makati City Jail.
SJO2 Arlic Almojuela was among the officers of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology
(BJMP) National Capital Region Office (NCRO) who were on third shift custodial duty when
Lao escaped. A BJMP Investigation Report conducted on the incident concluded that SJO2
Almojuela and the rest of the jail officers on third shift custodial duty all colluded to facilitate
Laos getaway. Based on the reports recommendation, the Intelligence and Investigation
Division of the BJMP filed an administrative complaint against the abovementioned

BJMP/NCRO members and CESO IV Director Arturo Walit, the BJMP hearing officer, found
them liable. The CA denied SJO2 Almojuelas petition but upon a motion for reconsideration
lowered the penalty imposed.
SJO2 Almojuela argues that the certificate of non-forum shopping, instead of having been
signed by the CSC, was signed by the assistant solicitor general, in violation of the rule on
certification against forum shopping; that the CSC is not the proper party to appeal the CAs
decision because it must maintain its impartiality as a judge and disciplining authority in
controversies involving public officers; and that, he had been deprived of due process during the
BJMP investigation, as he was not given the opportunity to submit his evidence and to present
his witnesses while the prosecution was allowed to adduce its evidence under a trial-type
arrangement.
Issues:
1. Whether the CSCs petition for review on certiorari should be dismissed for failure to
comply with Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court;
2. Whether the CSCs petition for review on certiorari should be dismissed as the CSC is
not the proper party to appeal the CAs amended decision;
3. Whether SJO2 Almojuela had been deprived of due process when he was not allowed to
present his evidence and witnesses during the BJMP investigation
Ruling:
Petition partially granted.
1. The CSCs petition failed to comply with Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
The rule is different when the OSG acts as a government agencys counsel of record. It is
necessary for the petitioning government agency or its authorized representatives to certify
against forum shopping, because they, and not the OSG, are in the best position to know if
another case is pending before another court. The reason for this requirement was succinctly
explained in Hon. Constantino-David et. al. v. Pangandaman-Gania:
The fact that the OSG under the 1987 Administrative Code is the only lawyer for a government
agency wanting to file a petition or complaint does not automatically vest the OSG with the
authority to execute in its name the certificate of non-forum shopping for a client office. In some
instances, these government agencies have legal departments which inadvertently take legal
matters requiring court representation into their own hands without the OSGs intervention.
Consequently, the OSG would have no personal knowledge of the history of a particular case so
as to adequately execute the certificate of non-forum shopping; and even if the OSG does have
the relevant information, the courts on the other hand would have no way of ascertaining the
accuracy of the OSGs assertion without precise references in the record of the case. Thus,
unless equitable circumstances which are manifest from the record of a case prevail, it becomes
necessary for the concerned government agency or its authorized representatives to certify for
non-forum shopping if only to be sure that no other similar case or incident is pending before
any other court.
To be sure, there may be situations when the OSG would have difficulty in securing the
signatures of government officials for the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping. But
these situations cannot serve as excuse for the OSG to wantonly undertake by itself the

verification and certification of non-forum shopping. If the OSG is compelled by circumstances

to verify and certify the pleading in behalf of a client agency, the OSG should at least endeavor
to inform the courts of its reasons for doing so, beyond simply citing cases where the Court
allowed the OSG to sign the certification. In Hon. Constantino-David et. al. v. PangandamanGania, the Court dealt with this situation and enumerated the following requirements before the
OSG can undertake a non-forum shopping certifications as counsel of record for a client
agency:
(a) allege under oath the circumstances that make signatures of the concerned officials
impossible to obtain within the period for filing the initiatory pleading;
(b) append to the petition or complaint such authentic document to prove that the partypetitioner or complainant authorized the filing of the petition or complaint and
understood and adopted the allegations set forth therein, and an affirmation that no
action or claim involving the same issues has been filed or commenced in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency; and,
(c) undertake to inform the court promptly and reasonably of any change in the stance
of the client agency
2. The CSC is the proper party to raise an appeal against the CAs amended petition
More than ten years have passed since the Court first recognized in CSC v. Dacoycoy the
CSCs standing to appeal the CAs decisions reversing or modifying its resolutions seriously
prejudicial to the civil service system. Since then, the ruling in Dacoycoy has been subjected to
clarifications and qualifications, but the doctrine has remained the same: the CSC has standing
as a real party in interest and can appeal the CAs decisions modifying or reversing the CSCs
rulings, when the CA action would have an adverse impact on the integrity of the civil service.
As the governments central personnel agency, the CSC is tasked to establish a career service
and promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the
civil service; it has a stake in ensuring that the proper disciplinary action is imposed on an erring
public employee, and this stake would be adversely affected by a ruling absolving or lightening
the CSC-imposed penalty. Further, a decision that declares a public employee not guilty of the
charge against him would have no other appellant than the CSC. To be sure, it would not be
appealed by the public employee who has been absolved of the charge against him; neither
would the complainant appeal the decision, as he acted merely as a witness for the
government. The Court thus finds no reason to disturb the settled Dacoycoy doctrine.
3. SJO2 Almojuela was afforded due process in the BJMP investigations
In SJO2 Almojuelas case, he was informed of the charges against him, and was given the
opportunity to refute them in the counter-affidavit and motion for reconsideration he filed before
the BJMP hearing officer, in the appeal and motion for reconsideration he filed before the CSC,
in his petition for review on certiorari, in his memorandum on appeal, and, finally, in the motion
for reconsideration he filed before the CA.
These circumstances sufficiently convince the Court that SJO2 Almojuela had been given ample
opportunity to present his side, and whatever defects might have intervened during the BJMP
investigation have been cured by his subsequent filing of pleadings before the CSC, the CA,
and before this Court.
DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN, JR. v. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al.

G.R. No. 197291, April 3, 2013

J. Bersamin
A petition for mandamus was filed to compel the Secretary of Justice to charge Dalandag for
multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the Witness
Protection Program of the DOJ. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion,
mandamus cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way the judgment and
discretion are to be exercised. Consequently, the Secretary of Justice may be compelled by writ
of mandamus to act on a letter-request or a motion to include a person in the information, but
may not be compelled by writ of mandamus to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such
letter-request or motion.
Facts:
Following the Maguindanao Massacre, the Department of Justice constituted a Special Panel of
Prosecutors that charged 196 individuals in a joint resolution. The Panel partly relied on the twin
affidavits of Kenny Dalandag. Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of
the DOJ and was listed as one of the prosecutions witnesses in the pre-trial order. Petitioner
Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr. wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice, Secretary Leila de Lima
requesting that Dalandag be included in the information as he already confessed his
participation. Secretary De Lima denied the request. Ampatuan, Jr. filed a petition for
mandamus to compel Secretary De Lima to charge Dalandag with the RTC of Manila. The RTC
dismissed the petition for mandamus.
Issue:
Whether the Secretary of Justice may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag as an
accused for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to
the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ
Ruling:
Petition denied.
A participant in the commission of the crime, to be discharged to become a state witness
pursuant to Rule 119, must be one charged as an accused in the criminal case. The discharge
operates as an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall be a bar to his future prosecution
for the same offense, unless he fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance
with his sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge. The discharge is expressly left
to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has the exclusive responsibility to see to it that
the conditions prescribed by the rules for that purpose exist.
While it is true that, as a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of a co-accused from the
information in order that he may be utilized as a Prosecution witness rests upon the sound
discretion of the trial court, such discretion is not absolute and may not be exercised arbitrarily,
but with due regard to the proper administration of justice. Anent the requisite that there must be
an absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is sought, the trial court
has to rely on the suggestions of and the information provided by the public prosecutor. The
reason is obvious the public prosecutor should know better than the trial court, and the
Defense for that matter, which of the several accused would best qualify to be discharged in
order to become a state witness. The public prosecutor is also supposed to know the evidence

in his possession and whomever he needs to establish his case, as well as the availability or
non-availability of other direct or corroborative evidence, which of the accused is the most
guilty one, and the like
On the other hand, there is no requirement under Republic Act No. 6981 for the Prosecution to
first charge a person in court as one of the accused in order for him to qualify for admission into
the Witness Protection Program. The admission as a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981
also operates as an acquittal, and said witness cannot subsequently be included in the criminal
information except when he fails or refuses to testify. The immunity for the state witness is
granted by the DOJ, not by the trial court. Should such witness be meanwhile charged in court
as an accused, the public prosecutor, upon presentation to him of the certification of admission
into the Witness Protection Program, shall petition the trial court for the discharge of the
witness. The Court shall then order the discharge and exclusion of said accused from the
information.
The admission of Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of the Government as a state
witness since August 13, 2010 was warranted by the absolute necessity of his testimony to the
successful prosecution of the criminal charges. Apparently, all the conditions prescribed by
Republic Act No. 6981 were met in his case. That he admitted his participation in the
commission of the Maguindanao massacre was no hindrance to his admission into the Witness
Protection Program as a state witness, for all that was necessary was for him to appear not the
most guilty. Accordingly, he could not anymore be charged for his participation in the
Maguindanao massacre, as to which his admission operated as an acquittal, unless he later on
refuses or fails to testify in accordance with the sworn statement that became the basis for his
discharge against those now charged for the crimes.
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to
the discretion of the tribunal or officer. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and
discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct the manner or
the particular way discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the retraction or reversal of an
action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion.
As such, the Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of Ampatuan,
Jr., but may not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request.
Considering that the Secretary of Justice already denied the letter-request, mandamus was no
longer available as Ampatuan Jr.'s recourse.
FILM DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.
G.R. No. 197937, April 3, 2013
J. Villarama, Jr.
Under the established jurisprudence on litis pendentia, the following considerations
predominate in the ascending order of importance in determining which action should prevail:
(1) the date of filing, with preference generally given to the first action filed to be retained; (2)
whether the action sought to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the later action or to
anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal; and (3) whether the action is the
appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the parties. There can be no doubt Civil
Case No. CEB-35529 is the appropriate vehicle to determine the rights of FDCP and SM Prime.

Facts:
Cebu City passed a local tax ordinance mandating that amusement tax shall be paid to the Office of
the City Treasurer. Petitioner Film Development Council of the Philippines (FDCP) is
empowered by R.A. 9167 to receive proceeds of the amusement tax collected by the local
government. FDCP, through the OSG, sent respondent SM Prime Holdings a demand letter for
the payment of amusement tax rewards of films shown at SM Cinemas from September 11,
2003 to November 4, 2008. The City of Cebu filed a petition for declaratory relief with
application for a writ of preliminary injunction and sought to declare R.A. 9167 as
unconstitutional before the RTC of Cebu (CEB-35529) and a TRO was issued against FDCP.
FDCP filed a collection suit against SM Prime before the RTC of Pasig City (Civil Case 72238).
SM Prime filed a motion for intervention with the RTC of Cebu which the trial court granted. The
RTC of Pasig City granted SM Primes motion to dismiss ruling that the proper vehicle for
litigating the collection suit is before the RTC of Cebu and that all the elements of litis pendentia
are present.
Issues:

1.
2.

Whether the case filed in Cebu City and in Pasig City constitute litis pendentia
Whether the action filed in Pasig City should prevail

Ruling:
Petition granted.
1.
There could be no doubt that a judgment in either case would constitute res
judicata to the other.
Among the several tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits relate to a single or
common cause of action are: (1) whether the same evidence would support and sustain both
the first and second causes of action; and (2) whether the defenses in one case may be used to
substantiate the complaint in the other.
The determination of whether there is an identity of causes of action for purposes of litis
pendentia is inextricably linked with that of res judicata, each constituting an element of the
other. In either case, both relate to the sound practice of including, in a single litigation, the
disposition of all issues relating to a cause of action that is before a court.
The interpleader action of SM Prime, anchored on its defense of prior payment, would be
considered by the Cebu City RTC in its final determination of the parties rights and interests as
it resolves the legal questions. The Pasig City RTC is likewise confronted with the legal and
constitutional issues in the collection suit, alongside with SM Primes defense of prior payment.
It is evident that FDCPs claim against the SM Prime hinges on the correct interpretation of the
conflicting provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 and R.A. No. 9167. There could be
no doubt that a judgment in either case would constitute res judicata to the other. Sound
practice thus dictates that the common factual and legal issues be resolved in a single
proceeding.
2. In this case, all things considered, there can be no doubt Civil Case No. CEB35529 is the appropriate vehicle to determine the rights of FDCP and SM Prime.

Under the established jurisprudence on litis pendentia, the following considerations predominate
in the ascending order of importance in determining which action should prevail: (1) the date of
filing, with preference generally given to the first action filed to be retained; (2) whether the
action sought to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the later action or to anticipate its
filing and lay the basis for its dismissal; and (3) whether the action is the appropriate vehicle for
litigating the issues between the parties.
Moreover, considering the predicament of respondent, the Court also finds relevant the criterion
of the consideration of the interest of justice it enunciated in Roa v. Magsaysay. In applying this
standard, what was asked was which court would be "in a better position to serve the interests
of justice," taking into account (a) the nature of the controversy, (b) the comparative accessibility
of the court to the parties and (c) other similar factors.
In this case, all things considered, there can be no doubt Civil Case No. CEB-35529 is the
appropriate vehicle to determine the rights of FDCP and SM Prime. In that declaratory relief
case instituted by the City of Cebu, to which SM Prime had been remitting the subject
amusement taxes being claimed by FDCP in Civil Case No. 72238, the issue of validity or
constitutionality of Sections 13 and 14 of R.A. No. 9167 was directly pleaded and argued
between FDCP and the City of Cebu, with subsequent inclusion of SM Prime as intervenor.
Moreover, the presence of City of Cebu as party plaintiff would afford proper relief to SM Prime
in the event the Cebu City RTC renders judgment sustaining the validity of the said provisions.
SM Prime had vigorously asserted in both courts that it had remitted the amusement taxes in
good faith to the City of Cebu which had threatened sanctions for non-compliance with City Tax
Ordinance No. LXIX, and that it should not be made to pay once again the same taxes to FDCP.
As equally dire consequences for non-compliance with the demand for payment having been
made by FDCP, such defense of good faith is best ventilated in Civil Case No. CEB-35529
where the City of Cebu is a party.
SEGUNDINA A. GALVEZ v. SPS. HONORIO C. MONTAO AND SUSANA P. MONTAO, et
al.
G.R. No. 157445, April 3, 2013
J. Bersamin
The mere failure to attach copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the
record as would support the allegations of the petition for review is not necessarily fatal as to
warrant the outright denial of due course when the clearly legible duplicate originals or true
copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court
of the RTC, and other attachments of the petition sufficiently substantiate the allegations.
Facts:
Respondents Spouses Honorio and Susana Montao purchased a parcel of property from
Philippine National Bank following an extrajudicial foreclosure. Segundina Galvez, one of the
original owners, refused to vacate the land claiming that it was sold without by her husband,
Eustacio Galvez without her consent. Spouses Montao filed a complaint for recovery of
ownership and possession with the MTC of Batbangon, Leyte. The MTC ruled in favor of
Spouses Montao. The RTC affirmed the MTCs decision. On appeal, the CA dismissed
Galvezs petition on the ground that no copies of pleadings and other material portions of the
record as would support the allegations thereof were attached as annexes in violation of Section

2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA also denied her motion for
reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether failure to attach the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would
support the allegations of the petition merits its dismissal
Ruling:
Petition granted.
The foregoing rulings show that the mere failure to attach copies of the pleadings and other
material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition for review is not
necessarily fatal as to warrant the outright denial of due course when the clearly legible
duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified
correct by the clerk of court of the RTC, and other attachments of the petition sufficiently
substantiate the allegations.
For the guidance of the CA, therefore, the Court has laid down three guideposts in determining
the necessity of attaching the pleadings and portions of the records to the petition in Air
Philippines Corporation v. Zamora, which involved the dismissal of a petition for certiorari
assailing an unfavorable decision in a labor dispute for failing to attach copies of all pleadings
(like the complaint, answer, position paper) and other material portions of the record as would
support the allegations in the petition, to wit:
First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition. Only
those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the
document in question will support the material allegations in the petition, whether said document
will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to give
due course to the petition.
Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it
is shown that the contents thereof can also found in another document already attached to the
petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned
judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached.
Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be
given due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted
the documents required, or that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be
decided on the merits.
The guideposts, which equally apply to a petition for review filed in the CA under Rule 42, reflect
that the significant determinant of the sufficiency of the attached documents is whether the
accompanying documents support the allegations of the petition.
SOLID BUILDERS, INC. AND MEDINAJ FOODS INDUSTRIES, INC. v. CHINA BANKING
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 179665, April 3, 2013
J. Leonardo-De Castro

Foreclosure of mortgaged property is not an irreparable damage that will merit for the
debtor-mortgagor the extraordinary provisional remedy of preliminary injunction.
Facts:
China Banking Corporation (CBC) granted several loans to Solid Builders, Inc. (SBI). To secure
the loans, Medina Foods Industries, Inc. (MFII) executed in CBCs favor several surety
agreements and contracts of real estate mortgage over parcels of land in the Loyola Grand
Villas in Quezon City and New Cubao Central in Cainta, Rizal. SBI and MFII filed a Complaint
"To Compel Execution of Contract and for Performance and Damages, With Prayer for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order" in the RTC of Pasig City
claiming that the interests, penalties and charges imposed by CBC were iniquitous and
unconscionable and to enjoin CBC from initiating foreclosure proceedings. The trial court issued
the writ of preliminary injunction and denied CBCs motion for reconsideration and a motion to
dissolve injunction. The CA reversed the RTC and dissolved the injunctive writ.
Issue:
Whether a writ of preliminary injunction will issue against the foreclosure of mortgaged property
Ruling:
Petition denied.
A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted only in the face
of actual and existing substantial rights. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an
injunction are present in the case before it. In this connection, a writ of preliminary injunction is
issued to preserve the status quo ante, upon the applicants showing of two important requisite
conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be
enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented
would cause an irreparable injury.
As no clear right that warrants the extraordinary protection of an injunctive writ has been shown
by SBI and MFII to exist in their favor, the first requirement for the grant of a preliminary
injunction has not been satisfied. In the absence of any requisite, and where facts are shown to
be wanting in bringing the matter within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ of
injunction must be struck down for having been rendered in grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the
Court of Appeals did not err when it granted the petition for certiorari of CBC and ordered the
dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.
In the first place, any injury that SBI and MFII may suffer in case of foreclosure of the mortgaged
properties will be purely monetary and compensable by an appropriate judgment in a proper
case against CBC. Moreover, where there is a valid cause to foreclose on the mortgages, it
cannot be correctly claimed that the irreparable damage sought to be prevented by the
application for preliminary injunction is the loss of the mortgaged properties to auction sale. The
alleged entitlement of SBI and MFII to the "protection of their properties put up as collateral for
the loans" they procured from CBC is not the kind of irreparable injury contemplated by law.
Foreclosure of mortgaged property is not an irreparable damage that will merit for the debtormortgagor the extraordinary provisional remedy of preliminary injunction.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WELVIN DIU y KOTSESA, et al.

G.R. No. 201449, April 3, 2013
J. Leonardo-De Castro
It has been consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity
of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against
him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the
procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
Facts:
Respondents Welvin Diu and Dennis Dayaon were charged with robbery with homicide for
taking the bag of Perlie Salvador and stabbing Nely Salvador. Perlie, the surviving victim, was
presented as one of the prosecutions witnesses and positively identified the Diu as the one who
attacked her and Dayaon as the one who stabbed her sister, Nely. The RTC found them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide. The CA affirmed with modification the RTCs
decision.
Issues:
1. Whether Diu and Dayaon can question the legality of their warrantless arrests on
appeal
Ruling:
Petition denied.
Lastly, nothing on record shows that Diu and Dayaon questioned the legality of their arrests
prior to entering their pleas of "not guilty" during their arraignment. Hence, applicable herein is
the following pronouncements of the Court in Rebellion v. People:
Petitioners claim that his warrantless arrest is illegal lacks merit. We note that nowhere in the
records did we find any objection interposed by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest prior to
his arraignment. It has been consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing any
irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information
against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the
procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. In this case,
petitioner was duly arraigned, entered a negative plea and actively participated during the trial.
Thus, he is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused
is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint
after a trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.
Indeed, in the more recent case of People v. Trestiza, the Court pronounced that "the fatal flaw
of an invalid warrantless arrest becomes moot in view of a credible eyewitness account."
NEMESIO FIRAZA, SR., v. SPS. CLAUDIO AND EUFRECENA UGAY
G.R. No. 165838, April 3, 2013
J. Reyes

Spouses Ugay filed an action for quieting of title while Firaza, Jr. filed a counterclaim.
Such counterclaim is a permissible direct attack to the validity of the adverse partys torrens
title. As such counterclaim, it involves a cause of action separate from that alleged in the
complaint; it has for its purpose the vindication of a right in as much as the complaint similarly
seeks the redress of one.
Facts:
Spouses Claudio and Eufrecena Ugay filed a complaint for Quieting of Title alleging that they
are the registered owners of a parcel of land. The complaint prayed for the annulment of the tax
declaration issued in the name of petitioner Nemesio Firaza, Sr. on the ground that it creates a
cloud upon Spouses Ugays title. Firaza, Sr. set up the affirmative defense that Spouses Ugay
obtained their title through fraud and misrepresentation and on the basis of the said affirmative
defense, Firaza also filed a counterclaim praying for the nullification of the title to the parcel of
land and reconveyance to him of the ownership of the subject lot.
The RTC denied Firazas affirmative defense on the ground that the same can be better
ventilated along with the allegations of the complaint and answer in a full-blown trial. While on
direct examination, Firaza, Sr.s counsel questioned Land Management Officer, a hostile witness
for Spouses Ugay, on the circumstances attending the issuance of Free Patent Application.
Counsel for Spouses Ugay objected to the questioning on the ground that the same constitutes
a collateral attack to the respondents land title. Firaza, Sr. argued that the questions are
necessary for him to establish his defenses of fraud and misrepresentation and to substantiate
his counterclaim for reconveyance. The RTC required the parties to file, as they did so file, their
respective position papers on whether Firaza Sr.s counterclaim constitutes a direct or a
collateral attack to the validity of Spouses Ugays title.
The RTC disallowed any issue pertaining to Firaza Sr.s counterclaim as it was deemed to be a
direct attack on the validity of Spouses Ugays title. The RTC denied his motion for
reconsideration. The CA affirmed the RTCs decision and denied his motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether Nemesio Firaza Sr.s counterclaim constitutes a collateral attack of the Spouses
Ugays land title and thus bars the former from introducing evidence thereon in the latters civil
action for quieting of title
Ruling:
Petition granted.
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree proscribes a
collateral attack to a certificate of title and allows only a direct attack
In Arangote v. Maglunob, the Court, after distinguishing between direct and collateral attack,
classified a counterclaim under former, viz:
The attack is considered direct when the object of an action is to annul or set aside such
proceeding, or enjoin its enforcement. Conversely, an attack is indirect or collateral when, in an
action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the proceeding is nevertheless made as an

incident thereof. Such action to attack a certificate of title may be an original action or a
counterclaim, in which a certificate of title is assailed as void.
In the recent case of Sampaco v. Lantud, the Court applied the foregoing distinction and held
that a counterclaim, specifically one for annulment of title and reconveyance based on fraud, is
a direct attack on the Torrens title upon which the complaint for quieting of title is premised.
Earlier in, Development Bank of the Philippines v. CA, the Court ruled similarly and explained
thus:
Nor is there any obstacle to the determination of the validity of TCT No. 10101. It is true that the
indefeasibility of torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. In the instant case, the original
complaint is for recovery of possession filed by petitioner against private respondent, not an
original action filed by the latter to question the validity of TCT No. 10101 on which petitioner
bases its right. To rule on the issue of validity in a case for recovery of possession is tantamount
to a collateral attack. However, it should not be overlooked that private respondent filed a
counterclaim against petitioner, claiming ownership over the land and seeking damages. Hence,
we could rule on the question of the validity of TCT No. 10101 for the counterclaim can be
considered a direct attack on the same.
From the foregoing, it is immediately apparent that the courts a quo erred in their
conclusions. The CA erroneously classified the herein counterclaim as a collateral attack. On
the other hand, the RTC correctly adjudged the same as a direct attack to the Spouses Ugays
land title but mistakenly declared it as a prohibited action.
As clearly pronounced in the above-cited jurisprudence, Firaza Sr.s counterclaim is a
permissible direct attack to the validity of Spouses Ugays torrens title. As such counterclaim, it
involves a cause of action separate from that alleged in the complaint; it has for its purpose the
vindication of a right in as much as the complaint similarly seeks the redress of one. As the
plaintiff in his own counterclaim, Firaza Sr. is equally entitled to the opportunity granted the
plaintiff in the original complaint, to establish his cause of action and to prove the right he
asserts.
SPS. WELTCHIE RAYMUNDO AND EMILY RAYMUNDO v. LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES., substituted by ASSET ASIA PACIFIC (SPV-AMC) 2, INC.
G.R. No. 195317, April 3, 2013
J. Reyes
A case which has been suspended for 8 years due to LBPs opposition to the admission
of an amended and supplemental complaint may be continued. It is incumbent that trial should
continue to settle the issues between the parties once and for all. Court litigation which is
primarily a search for truth must proceed; and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both
parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth.
Facts:
Petitioner Spouses Weltchie and Emily Raymundo filed a complaint for annulment of loan
documents against respondent Land Bank of the Philippines. During the pre-trial stage,
Spouses Raymundo manifested that they were exploring the possibility of settling the case and
that they will file their manifestation for the withdrawal or continuation of the proceedings within
30 days. Spouses Weltchie filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended and Supplemental
Complaint and Admission of the Same which was denied by the RTC on the ground that it was

intended to delay the proceedings. The RTC denied their motion for reconsideration. The CA
affirmed the RTC.
LBP prayed that it be substituted by Philippine Distressed Asset Asia Pacific (PDAS2) in the
case as it sold and conveyed its interest in the case to the PDAS2. The substitution was granted
by the Supreme Court. PDAS2 manifested the removal of its opposition to the admission of the
amended and supplemental complaint as it has caused suspension of the proceedings for more
than 8 years. Spouses Raymundo joined PDAS2 in its withdrawal and prayed that its amended
and supplemental complaint be granted.
Issue:
Whether the proceedings may continue despite its suspension for 8 years
Ruling:
Petition granted.
The Court also notes PDAS2s withdrawal of its opposition to the admission of the Spouses
Raymundo amended and supplemental complaint, just so the proceedings before the RTC
which have been suspended for more than eight years may continue. As the records show, the
case below is still at its pre-trial stage. Indeed, the inordinate delay is no longer justified by
Spouses Raymundos persistence to have their amended complaint admitted. It is incumbent
that trial should continue to settle the issues between the parties once and for all. Court litigation
which is primarily a search for truth must proceed; and a liberal interpretation of the rules by
which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out
such truth. Concomitantly, neither the parties nor their lawyers should be allowed to dictate the
pace by which a case proceeds. The Judge shall see to it that the proceedings are expedited by
all means available to him, including the issuance of orders to force the parties to go to trial if a
settlement could not be reached within a reasonable time.
With the mutual agreement of the parties to allow the admission of the amended
complaint, the Court finds no bar for the proceedings in the R TC to continue.
FRANKLIN ALEJANDRO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FACT-FINDING AND
INTELLIGENCE BUREAU
G.R. No. 173121, April 3, 2013
J. Brion
In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining
authorities, the body where the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the
case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
In instances where a complaint against a Punong Barangay is filed with the Ombudsman first,
the Office of the Ombudsman exercises jurisdiction over the complaint to the exclusion of the
Sandiganbayan, which exercises concurrent jurisdiction.
Facts:
Petitioner Franklin Alejandro, the Punong Barangay of Barangay 293, Zone 28, Binondo,
interfered with the PNP-CIDGs anti-water pilferage operation when he ordered the confiscated
containers of his sons car wash business to be unloaded. Respondent Office of the

Ombudsman Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau, after conducting its initial investigation, filed
with the Office of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman an administrative complaint against Alejandro
for his blatant refusal to recognize a joint legitimate police activity, and for his unwarranted
intervention. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found Alejandro guilty of grave misconduct
and ordered his dismissal from the service. Alejandro filed a motion for reconsideration which
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman denied. Alejandro appealed to the CA via a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court which the CA dismissed for premature filing. The CA
ruled that Alejandro failed to exhaust proper administrative remedies because he did not appeal
the Deputy Ombudsmans decision to the Ombudsman. The CA denied Alejandros motion for
reconsideration.
Alejandro argues that filing a motion for reconsideration with the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman can be considered as exhaustion of administrative remedies and that the Office of
the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction as an elective local official can only be removed from office
by order of a court as stated in the Local Government Code of 1991. The OSG contends that
Alejandro failed to exhaust administrative remedies as he did not appeal the decision of the
Deputy Ombudsman to the Ombudsman and that the Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary
authority over all elective and appointive officials.
Issues:
1. Whether the principle of exhaustion of remedies requires for reconsideration from the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman to the Office of the Ombudsman for the purpose of
a Rule 43 Review
2. Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over elective officials
Ruling:
Petition granted.
1. No further need exists to exhaust administrative remedies from the decision of the
Deputy Ombudsman because he was acting in behalf of the Ombudsman.
Administrative Order No. 07 did not provide for another appeal from the decision of the Deputy
Ombudsman to the Ombudsman. It simply requires that a motion for reconsideration or a
petition for certiorari may be filed in all other cases where the penalty imposed is not one
involving public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month, or a fine
equivalent to one (1) month salary. This post-judgment remedy is merely an opportunity for the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, or the Office of the Ombudsman, to correct itself in certain
cases. To the Courts mind, Alejandro has fully exhausted all administrative remedies when he
filed his motion for reconsideration on the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman. There is no
further need to review the case at the administrative level since the Deputy Ombudsman has
already acted on the case and he was acting for and in behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman.
2. The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases which are
within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agencies.
The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or
employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction
extends only to public officials occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher.

Consequently, as the Court held in Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez, any act or omission
of a public officer or employee occupying a salary grade lower than 27 is within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and of the regular courts or other investigative agencies.
In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining
authorities, the body where the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the
case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent
jurisdiction. In this case, Alejandro is a Barangay Chairman, occupying a position corresponding
to salary grade 14. Under RA 7160, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan has
disciplinary authority over any elective barangay official.
Since the complaint against Alejandro was initially filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, the
Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the Sangguniang Bayan whose
exercise of jurisdiction is concurrent.
MARCELINO AND VITALIANA DALANGIN v. CLEMENTE PEREZ, et al.
G.R. No. 178758, April 3, 2013
J. Del Castillo
Under the 1964 Rules of Court, notice of the execution sale to the judgment obligor was
not required, or was merely optional; publication and posting sufficed. It was only in 1987 that
the Court, via Circular No. 8 amending Rule 39, Section 18 of the Rules of Court, required that
written notice be given to the judgment debtor.
Facts:
Respondent Spouses Clemente and Cecilia Gonzales Perez filed a complaint against petitioner
Spouses Marcelino and Vitaliana Dalangin for recovery of a sum of money after they failed to
pay for the purchase of a parcel of land. The trial court ruled in favor of Spouses Perez and the
decision became final as no appeal was taken. A writ of execution was issued. The Provincial
Sheriff of Batangas then levied upon and sold Spouses Dalangins properties at auction. The
execution sale was conducted on March 15, 1972 and a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor
of Spouses Perez covering several properties. For failure to redeem, the sheriff executed a
Final Deed of Conveyance over said properties, and a Writ of Possession was issued by the
trial court. The Writ of Possession was received by Emmanuel Dalangin, Spouses Dalangins
son and Spouses Perez possessed the riceland and one-half of a 5 ha. property.
Twelve years after the issuance of the Writ of Possession, Spouses Dalaingin filed a case for
annulment of the sheriffs sale arguing that the sheriffs sale, Certificate of Sale and the Final
Deed of Conveyance be nullified and voided for lack of publication and notice of the sheriffs
sale, and for inadequacy of the purchase price of the subject properties. The trial court upheld
the validity of the sheriffs sale, issued an amended decision partially dismissing the complaint
with respect to two properties and ordering the issuance of tax declarations in the names of
Spouses Dalangin. On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition.
Spouses Dalangin contend that under Rule 39, Section 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
a written notice of sale on execution should have been given to them. They insist that the lack of
notice of the sheriffs sale renders the same of no effect. Spouses Perez claim that under the
1964 Rules then applicable to the sheriffs sale which was held on March 15, 1972, particularly
Rule 39, Section 18, notice to the judgment obligor was not required.

Issues:
1. Whether the 1997 Rules of Court are applicable
2. Whether the presumption of regularity of the execution sale applies
Ruling:
Petition denied.

1. The applicable rule at the time of the execution sale on March 15, 1972 is Rule
39, Section 18 of the 1964 Rules of Court. This rule does not require personal
written notice to the judgment debtor.
At the time of the execution sale on March 15, 1972, the applicable rule is Rule 39, Section 18
of the 1964 Rules of Court. Rule 39, Section 18 of the 1964 Rules of Court does not require
written notice to the judgment obligor. Spouses Perez are thus correct in their argument that at
the time of the execution sale on March 15, 1972, personal notice to the Spouses Dalangin was
not required under Rule 39, Section 18 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Indeed, notice to the
judgment obligor under the 1964 Rules of Court was not required, or was merely optional;
publication and posting sufficed.
It was only in 1987 that the Court required that written notice of the execution sale be given to
the judgment debtor, via Circular No. 8 amending Rule 39, Section 18 of the Rules of Court on
notice of sale of property on execution. Thus, the alleged failure on the part of the respondents
to furnish petitioners with a written notice of the execution sale did not nullify the execution sale
because it was not then a requirement for its validity.
2. The presumption of regularity of the execution sale and the sheriffs
performance of his official functions prevail in the absence of evidence to the
contrary and in light of the self- serving allegations and bare denials of
petitioners to the effect that they were not served with notice of the sheriffs
sale.
There was substantial compliance with Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court: the
documents in support thereof, i.e., the Certificate of Posting issued by Sheriff Legaspi and the
Affidavit of Publication executed by the publisher of The Times Newsweekly, appear to be in
order. In this case, the purpose of giving notice through posting and publication under Section
15(c) of the same ruleto let the public know of the sale to the end that the best price or a
better bid may be made possible to minimize prejudice to the judgment debtorwas realized.
Applying Reyes to this case, the Court affirms the view that petitioners may no longer question
the conduct of the execution proceedings below. As correctly held by the CA, the presumption of
regularity of the execution sale and the sheriffs performance of his official functions prevail in
the absence of evidence to the contrary and in light of the self-serving allegations and bare
denials of petitioners to the effect that they were not served with notice of the sheriffs sale, and
given that the entire record covering the sale could no longer be located.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GERRY OCTAVIO y FLORENDO and REYNALDO
CARIO y MARTI
G.R. No. 199219, April 3, 2013
J. Velasco, Jr.

Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires
the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of an objection. Without
such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.
Facts:
Respondent Gerry Octavio was charged with violation of Secs. 5 and 11 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 while respondent Reynaldo Cario was charged with violation of Sec. 11 of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Octavio and Cario were apprehended in a buy-bust
operation conducted by the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council in coordination with the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency. Octavio and Cario and the confiscated items were brought to the
SAID-SOTF office for further investigation and later to the PNP Crime Laboratory for drug test
and examination, respectively. The RTC convicted Octavio and Cario which was affirmed by
the RTC.
Octavio and Cario, on appeal, argued that no photograph was taken of the items seized from
them. Further, Barangay Captain Del Prado, an elected public official, was not present during
the alleged buy-bust operation. He was only asked to sign the inventory of the seized items
shortly after his arrival at the scene of the buy-bust operation. Thus, he has no personal
knowledge as to whether the drugs allegedly seized from them were indeed recovered from
them. The CA affirmed the RTC.
Issue:
Whether the issue on the break of chain of evidence raised on appeal for the first time may be
taken into consideration by the CA
Ruling:
Petition denied.
Barangay Captain Del Prado, not only positively identified both Octavio and Cario but also
identified the items contained in the inventory receipt. Such testimony clearly established
compliance with the requirement of Section 21 with regard to the presence and participation of
the elected public official.
Furthermore, this Court has consistently ruled that even if the arresting officers failed to take a
photograph of the seized drugs as required under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such procedural
lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible in evidence. What is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items,
as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In
other words, to be admissible in evidence, the prosecution must be able to present through
records or testimony, the whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from the time these were seized
from the accused by the arresting officers; turned-over to the investigating officer; forwarded to
the laboratory for determination of their composition; and up to the time these are offered in
evidence. For as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, as in this case, even though
the procedural requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not faithfully
observed, the guilt of the accused will not be affected.

Finally, the Court notes and agrees with the observation of the CA that the issue regarding the
break in the chain of custody of evidence was raised belatedly and only for the first time on
appeal. In People v. Mateo, this Court brushed aside the accused's belated contention that the
illegal drugs confiscated from his person was inadmissible because the arresting officers failed
to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police
officers from literally complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because accused did not
question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Objection to evidence cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence
offered, he must so state in the form of an objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the
question for the first time on appeal.
SPS. MONTANO T. TOLOSA AND MERLINDA TOLOSA v. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS
BANK
G.R. No. 183058, April 3, 2013
J. Perez
The purchaser remains entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice, of course, to
the eventual outcome of the pending annulment case. Otherwise stated, the issuance of the writ
of possession remains the ministerial duty of the RTC until the issues raised in the annulment
case are, once and for all, decided by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Facts:
Petitioners Spouses Montano and Merlinda Tolosa entered into a credit agreement with
respondent United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) secured by real estate mortgages over four
properties in Aklan. When Spouses Tolosa failed to pay, UCPB filed a petition for extrajudicial
sale with the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex- Officio Sheriff of Kalibo. After due notice and
publication, the mortgaged properties were sold at a public auction to UCPB, being the highest
bidder. UCPB registered the Certificate of Sale with the Register of Deeds and when Spouses
Tolosa failed to redeem the properties within one year, it consolidated its ownership over the
properties. UCPB filed an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession in the
cadastral case before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. Spouses Tolosa filed their opposition to the
petition by pointing out a pending civil case for the nullity of the foreclosure sale and issuance of
the certificate of sale. The RTC held the petition for a writ of possession in abeyance on the
ground that its issuance might unduly prejudice the rights of Spouses Tolosa. The CA reversed
the RTC and granted the writ of possession as its issuance was ministerial in nature and was
not subject to the discretion of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether a pending case for nullity of promissory notes, foreclosure sale and the issuance of a
certificate sale may suspend the issuance of a writ of possession after the expiration of the one
year redemption period
Ruling:
Petition denied.
The rule is likewise settled that the proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex-parte
and summary in nature. As one brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by
the court to any person adverse of interest, it is a judicial proceeding wherein relief is granted
without giving the person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard. The

issuance of the writ of possession is, in turn, a ministerial function in the exercise of which trial
courts are not granted any discretion. Since the judge to whom the application for writ of
possession is filed need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its
foreclosure, it has been ruled that the ministerial duty of the trial court does not become
discretionary upon the filing of a complaint questioning the mortgage. Corollarily, any question
regarding the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale and the resulting cancellation of the
writ may, likewise, be determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8 of Act No.
3135.
Gauged from the foregoing principles, the Court finds that the CA committed no reversible error
in ordering the issuance of the writ of possession sought by UCPB. The record shows that
UCPB caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage on the subject realties as a
consequence of the Spouses Tolosas default on their mortgage obligation. As the highest
bidder at the 4 January 2000 foreclosure sale, UCPB consolidated its ownership on 22 January
2001 or upon failure of the Spouses Tolosa to exercise their right of redemption within the oneyear period therefor prescribed. Subsequent to the issuance of the certificates of title and tax
declarations over the same properties in its name, UCPB complied with the requirements under
Act 3135 by filing its ex-parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession before the RTC on 2
September 2004. Since UCPB had already become the absolute and registered owner of said
properties, the CA correctly ruled that it was the ministerial duty of the RTC to issue the writ of
possession in favor of the former.
Given the ministerial nature of the RTCs duty to issue the writ of possession after the purchaser
has consolidated its ownership, it has been ruled, moreover, that any question regarding the
regularity and validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be raised as justification for
opposing the issuance of the writ. More to the point, a pending action for annulment of mortgage
or foreclosure does not stay the issuance of a writ of possession. Regardless of the pendency of
such suit, the purchaser remains entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice, of course, to
the eventual outcome of the pending annulment case. Otherwise stated, the issuance of the writ
of possession remains the ministerial duty of the RTC until the issues raised in the annulment
case are, once and for all, decided by a court of competent jurisdiction.
To be sure, the foregoing rule admits of a few jurisprudential exceptions. In Cometa v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, the judgment debtor filed a separate action to invalidate the
auction sale of properties approximately worth P500,000.00 for the unusually low price
of P57,396.85. Citing equitable considerations, this Court upheld the deferment of the issuance
of the writ of possession sought by the judgment creditor on the ground that the validity of the
auction sale is an issue that requires pre-emptive resolution to avoid injustice. In the case of
Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court, on the other hand, the Court ruled that the duty ceases
to be ministerial where the property mortgaged had been, in the meantime, sold to third parties
who had assumed the mortgagors indebtedness and took possession of the property. In Sulit v.
Court of Appeals, the mortgagees failure to deliver the surplus from the proceeds of the
foreclosure sale equivalent to at least 40% of the mortgage debt was likewise found sufficient
justification for the non-issuance of the writ of possession sought.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDMUNDO VITERO
G.R. No. 175327, April 3, 2013
J. Leonardo-De Castro
The testimony of a rape victim must be given weight and credence. When the issue
focuses on the credibility of the witnesses or the lack of it, the assessment of the trial court is

controlling because of its unique opportunity to observe the witness and the latters demeanor,
conduct, and attitude especially during the cross-examination unless cogent reasons dictate
otherwise.
Facts:
AAA was raped 6 times by her father, respondent Edmundo Vitero in her grandparents house at
night when her siblings were asleep. Vitero was charged with qualified rape. The RTC convicted
Vitero of qualified rape which was affirmed by the CA with modifications to the penalty imposed.
Issue:
Whether AAAs testimony should be given weight and credence.
Ruling:
Petition denied.
As to the third element of the crime, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals ruled that it was
duly proven as well, giving weight and credence to AAAs testimony. AAA was able to describe in
detail how Vitero mounted her, undressed her, and successfully penetrated her against her will,
one night in April 1998. The RTC described AAAs testimony to be "frank, probable, logical and
conclusive," while the Court of Appeals declared it to be "forthright and credible" and
"impressively clear, definite, and convincing." Relevant herein is the Courts pronouncements in
People v. Manjares that:
In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of
the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course
of things, as in this case. There is a plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the accused in a
rape case by holding that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect
all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed and, where her testimony passes
the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof. Furthermore, the Court
has repeatedly declared that it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young
woman to concoct a story which would put her own father to jail for the rest of his remaining life
and drag the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame. For this reason, courts
are inclined to give credit to the straightforward and consistent testimony of a minor victim in
criminal prosecutions for rape.
When the issue focuses on the credibility of the witnesses or the lack of it, the assessment of
the trial court is controlling because of its unique opportunity to observe the witness and the
latters demeanor, conduct, and attitude especially during the cross-examination unless cogent
reasons dictate otherwise. Moreover, it is an established rule that findings of fact of the trial
court will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been
overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted which would otherwise materially affect the
disposition of the case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALBERTO GONZALES y SANTOS aka TAKYO
G.R. No. 182417, April 3, 2013
J. Bersamin

The indeterminateness of the identities of the individuals who could have handled the
sachet of shabu after PO1 Dimlas marking broke the chain of custody, and tainted the integrity
of the shabu ultimately presented as evidence to the trial court.
Facts:
Acting on a tip by an informant, a buy bust operation was planned. PO1 Eduardo Dimla acted as
the poseur-buyer and marked the buy bust money, two Php. 100.00 bills with his initials ED.
PO1 Dimla, along with the rest of the team, proceeded to respondent Alberto Gonzales house.
Gonzales handed PO1 Dimla a small plastic sheet containing a white substance and PO1 Dimla
gave Gonzales the marked money. PO1 Dimla gave the signal and Gonzales was arrested.
PO1 Dimla marked the sachet with his initials, ED. The Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory
Office certified that the contents was 0.194 gram of shabu. With only PO1 Dimla as the sole
prosecution witness, the RTC convicted Gonzales which the CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether the sachet was properly marked according to the rules on the chain of custody
Ruling:
Petition granted.
Given the high concern for the due recording of the authorized movements and custody of the
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment, the presentation as evidence in court of the dangerous drugs subject of and
recovered during the illegal sale is material in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs. Without such dangerous drugs being presented as evidence, the State does not
establish the corpus delicti, which, literally translated from Latin, refers to the body of the crime,
or the actual commission by someone of the particular offense charged.
The first stage in the chain of custody is the marking of the dangerous drugs or related items.
Marking, which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items by the apprehending
officer or the poseur-buyer of his initials or signature or other identifying signs, should be made
in the presence of the apprehended violator immediately upon arrest. The importance of the
prompt marking cannot be denied, because succeeding handlers of the dangerous drugs or
related items will use the marking as reference. Also, the marking operates to set apart as
evidence the dangerous drugs or related items from other material from the moment they are
confiscated until they are disposed of at the close of the criminal proceedings, thereby
forestalling switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. In short, the marking immediately
upon confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drugs or related items is indispensable in the
preservation of their integrity and evidentiary value.
Although PO1 Dimla, the States lone witness, testified that he had marked the sachet of shabu
with his own initials of "ED" following Gonzales arrest, he did not explain, either in his court
testimony or in the joint affidavit of arrest, whether his marking had been done in the presence
of Gonzales, or done immediately upon the arrest of Gonzales. Nor did he show by testimony or
otherwise who had taken custody of the sachet of shabu after he had done his marking, and
who had subsequently brought the sachet of shabu to the police station, and, still later on, to the
laboratory. Given the possibility of just anyone bringing any quantity of shabu to the laboratory
for examination, there is now no assurance that the quantity presented here as evidence was

the same article that had been the subject of the sale by Gonzales. The indeterminateness of
the identities of the individuals who could have handled the sachet of shabu after PO1 Dimlas
marking broke the chain of custody, and tainted the integrity of the shabu ultimately presented
as evidence to the trial court. The Court hardly needs to reiterate that the chain of custody,
which Section 1(b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, supra, explicitly describes as "the
duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or
plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court
for destruction," demands such record of movements and custody of seized items to include the
identities and signatures of the persons who held temporary custody of the seized item, the
dates and times when such transfers of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and
use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
By way of exception, Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR both state that the non-compliance with
the procedures thereby delineated and set would not necessarily invalidate the seizure and
custody of the dangerous drugs provided there were justifiable grounds for the non-compliance,
and provided that the integrity of the evidence of the corpus delicti was preserved. But the noncompliance with the procedures, to be excusable, must have to be justified by the States
agents themselves. Considering that PO1 Dimla tendered no justification in court for the noncompliance with the procedures, the exception did not apply herein. The absolution of Gonzales
should then follow, for the Court cannot deny that the observance of the chain of custody as
defined by the law was the only assurance to him that his incrimination for the very serious
crime had been legitimate and insulated from either invention or malice. In this connection, the
Court states that the unexplained non-compliance with the procedures for preserving the chain
of custody of the dangerous drugs has frequently caused the Court to absolve those found guilty
by the lower courts
HEIRS OF FAUSTINO MESINA and GENOVEVA S. MESINA, rep. by NORMAN MESINA v.
HEIRS OF DOMINGO FIAN, SR., rep. by THERESA FIAN YRAY, et al.
G.R. No. 201816, April 8, 2013
J. Velasco, Jr.
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At
any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the
motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead
an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for
the plaintiffs failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to
be indispensable.
Facts:
During their lifetime, Spouses Mesina bought two parcels of land on installment basis from
Spouses Fian. When Spouses Fian died, their heirs, respondents, claimed ownership and
possession of the land and refused to receive payments claiming that there was no sale.
Petitioners, the Heirs of Mesina filed an action for quieting of title and damages before the RTC
impleading the Heirs of Mesina as Heirs of Domingo, Sr. represented by Theresa Fian Yray as
defendants. Yray moved for the dismissal of the complaint for failure to implead all the heirs of
Spouses Fian and that Heirs of Fian is not a juridical person with a separate personality. The
RTC dismissed the complaint. The CA dismissed the complaint on the ground that all the heirs
of Spouses Fian are indispensable parties and should have been impleaded in the complaint
and that the complaint was improperly verified, as found by the RTC.

Issues:
1. Whether the non-joinder of indispensable party constitutes a failure to state a cause
of action
2. Whether a verification that omits the phrase or based on authentic records is
defective
Ruling:
Petition granted.
1. As such, this is properly a non-joinder of indispensable party, the
indispensable parties who were not included in the complaint being the other
heirs of Fian, and not a failure of the complaint to state a cause of action.
Non-joinder means the "failure to bring a person who is a necessary party or in this case an
indispensable party into a lawsuit." An indispensable party, on the other hand, is a party-ininterest without whom no final determination can be had of the action, and who shall be joined
either as plaintiff or defendant.
As such, this is properly a non-joinder of indispensable party, the indispensable parties who
were not included in the complaint being the other heirs of Fian, and not a failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action.
Having settled that, the Courts pronouncement in Pamplona Plantation Company, Inc. v. Tinghil
is instructive as regards the proper course of action on the part of the courts in cases of nonjoinder of indispensable parties, viz:
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any
stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the
motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead
an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for
the plaintiffs failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to
be indispensable.
Thus, the dismissal of the case for failure to state a cause of action is improper. What the trial
court should have done is to direct Norman Mesina to implead all the heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr.
as defendants within a reasonable time from notice with a warning that his failure to do so shall
mean dismissal of the complaint.
2. That the verification of the complaint does not include the phrase "or based on
authentic records" does not make the verification defective.
That the verification of the complaint does not include the phrase "or based on authentic
records" does not make the verification defective. Notably, the provision used the disjunctive
word "or." The word "or" is a disjunctive article indicating an alternative. As such, "personal
knowledge" and "authentic records" need not concur in a verification as they are to be taken
separately.

Also, verification, like in most cases required by the rules of procedure, is a formal requirement,
not jurisdictional. It is mainly intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged
are done in good faith or are true and correct and not of mere speculation. Thus, when
circumstances so warrant, as in the case at hand, "the court may simply order the correction of
unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends
of justice may thereby be served."
JOSEFINA F. INGLES, et al. v. HON. ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA, etc., et al./JOSEFINA F.
INGLES, et al. v. HON. ARSENIO J. MAGPALE, etc., et al./JOSEFINA F. INGLES, et al. v.
CHARLES J. ESTEBAN
G.R. No. 141809/G.R. No. 147186/G.R. No. 173641, April 8, 2013
J. Perez
An order for extrajudicial foreclosure given by an executive judge in the exercise of her
administrative function is not a civil action of the Regional Trial Courts that may be the proper
subject of an action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
A petition for the issuance of a writ of possession cannot be consolidated with an action
for annulment of mortgage where title to the property has already been consolidated in favor of
the mortgagor following the expiration of the one year redemption period except when title has
not yet consolidated in favor of the mortgagor and this presumed right of ownership is contested
and made the basis of another action, in which case, the actions must be consolidated.
It suffices, according to Altres v. Empleo, that the verification and certification was
signed by at least one of Ingles, et al.who was competent to do so. The certiorari petition was
verified by Josefina and Hector F. Inglesboth of whom the Court finds competent to attest to
the truth of the allegations of their petition, considering that they are unquestionably principal
parties-in-interest to their certiorari petition.
Facts:
G.R. No. 141809
Respondent Charles Esteban filed a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged
property of petitioner Josefina Ingles and the Heirs of Jose Ingles before the RTC of Quezon
City with respondent Executive Judge Estrella Estrada. Judge Estrada granted Estebans
petition and Esteban was the highest bidder at the public auction. Ingles, et al. filed a petition for
Annulment of Final Orders granting the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings pursuant to Rule
47 of the Rules of Court before the CA. The CA dismissed their petition on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 147186
Ingles, et al. filed complaint for Annulment of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage against Esteban
with the RTC of Quezon City Branch 225 presided by respondent Judge Arsenio Magpale.
Estebans petition to file an Ex Parte Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession was
consolidated with the case in Branch 225. Estebans petition was granted by Judge Magpale
upon a Motion for Reconsideration and was allowed to present evidence ex parte. Ingles, et al.
also filed petition for certiorari against the Order granting the writ of possession and allowing
Esteban to present evidence ex parte. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground of failure to
comply with the verification and certification against forum shopping.

G.R. No. 173641

After Judge Magpale inhibited himself, the cases were re raffled to Branch 97 presided by
Judge Oscar Leviste. Esteban was granted a writ of possession which was contested by Ingles,
et al. through a Motion for Reconsideration. Esteban filed a petition for mandamus before the
CA where he sought to compel the trial court to rule on the Motion for Reconsideration. The CA
granted Estebans petition for mandamus. The Motion for Reconsideration was resolved by
Judge Corpuz-Cabochan, who replaced the retired Judge Leviste, ruling that the proceedings
before Branch 97 were suspended due to the pendency of proceedings in the CA involving the
same property.
Issues:
G.R. No. 141809
1. Whether an order granting a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure is a civil action that
allows for the filing of a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court
G.R. No. 147186
2. Whether Ingles, et al. substantially complied with the requirements of the verification
and certification against forum shipping when only two of them signed
3. Whether the issuance of a writ of possession may be consolidated with an action for
annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure
4. Whether Esteban had already consolidated his title over the property
G.R. No. 173641
5. Whether the petition for mandamus should be granted
Ruling:
G.R. No. 141809
1. The assailed Orders dated 8 October 1997, 20 November 1997 and 27 July 1998
of Executive Judge Estrada are not the final orders in "civil actions" of
"Regional Trial Courts" that may be the subject of annulment by the Court of
Appeals under Rule 47.
Section 1 of Rule 47 sets forth in no unclear terms that only judgments, final orders and
resolutions in "civil actions" of "Regional Trial Courts" may be the subject of a petition for
annulment before the Court of Appeals. Against this premise, it becomes apparent why the
Heirs of Ingles petition for Annulment of Final Orders must fail.
The subject of the Ingleses petition for Annulment of Final Orders are not the proper subjects of
a petition for annulment before the Court of Appeals. The assailed Orders dated 8 October
1997, 20 November 1997 and 27 July 1998 of Executive Judge Estrada are not the final orders
in "civil actions" of "Regional Trial Courts" that may be the subject of annulment by the Court of
Appeals under Rule 47. There is a clear-cut difference between issuances made in a "civil

action" on one hand and orders rendered in a proceeding for the extrajudicial foreclosure of a
mortgage on the other.
"Civil actions" are suits filed in court involving either the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong. They are commenced by the filing of an original complaint
before an appropriate court and their proceedings are governed by the provisions of the Rules
on Court on ordinary or special civil actions. Civil actions are adversarial in nature;
presupposing the existence of disputes defined by the parties that are, in turn, submitted before
the court for disposition. Issuances made therein, including and most especially judgments, final
orders or resolutions, are therefore rendered by courts in the exercise of their judicial function.
In contrast, proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages, as the name already
suggests, are not suits filed in a court. They are commenced not by the filing of a complaint, but
by submitting an application before an executive judge who, in turn, receives the same neither
in a judicial capacity nor on behalf of the court. The conduct of such proceedings is not
governed by the rules on ordinary or special civil actions, but by Act No. 3135, as amended, and
by special administrative orders issued by this Court. Proceedings for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgages are also not adversarial; as the executive judge merely performs
therein an administrative function to ensure that all requirements for the extrajudicial foreclosure
of a mortgage are satisfied before the clerk of court, as the ex-officio sheriff, goes ahead with
the public auction of the mortgaged property. Necessarily, the orders of the executive judge in
such proceedings, whether they be to allow or disallow the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage, are not issued in the exercise of a judicial function but, in the words of First Marbella
Condominium Association, Inc. v. Gatmaytan, issued by the RTC Executive Judge in the
exercise of his administrative function to supervise the ministerial duty of the Clerk of Court as
Ex Officio Sheriff in the conduct of an extrajudicial foreclsoure sale
G.R. No. 147186

2. Ingles, et al.s certiorari petition contains a substantially valid verification and

contains a substantially compliant certificate against forum shopping.
In the seminal case of Altres v. Empleo, the Court laid out guiding principles that synthesized
the various jurisprudential pronouncements regarding non-compliance with the requirements on,
or submission of a defective, verification and certification against forum shopping. The Court
quotes them at length:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on
or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its
submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are
such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the
ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition
signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made
in good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect
therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent

submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the
ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or
compelling reasons."
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or
petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties
to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all
the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause
of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against
forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the partypleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the
party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney
designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
Verily, the signatures of all of Ingles, et al. were not required to validly verify their certiorari
petition. It suffices, according to Altres, that the verification was signed by at least one of Ingles,
et al.who was competent to do so. In this case, the certiorari petition was verified by Josefina
and Hector F. Inglesboth of whom the Court finds competent to attest to the truth of the
allegations of their petition, considering that they are unquestionably principal parties-in-interest
to their certiorari petition. Hence, their certiorari petition contains a substantially valid
verification.
Ingles, et al.s certiorari petition likewise contains a substantially compliant certificate against
forum shopping. Altres articulates the rule where a certification against forum shopping is
required to be attached in a petition or complaint that names several petitioners or plaintiffs, as
follows:
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or
petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties
to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all
the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause
of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against
forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
3. The consolidation of the petition for the writ of possession and annulment of
judgment had already ceased to become proper by the time the RTC allowed
Esteban to present ex-parte evidence in support of his application for the
issuance of a writ of possession.
As a rule, a petition for the issuance of a writ possession may not be consolidated with any
other ordinary action. It is well-settled that a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is
ex-parte, summary and non-litigious by nature; which nature would be rendered nugatory if such
petition was to be consolidated with any other ordinary civil action.
The exception to the foregoing rule is the case of Active Wood Products, Co., Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals. In Active Wood, the Court allowed the consolidation of a petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession with an ordinary action for the annulment of mortgage. In doing so, Active
Wood justified such consolidation as follows:
It is true that a petition for a writ of possession is made ex-parte to facilitate proceedings, being
founded on a presumed right of ownership. Be that as it may, when this presumed right of

ownership is contested and made the basis of another action, then the proceedings for writ of
possession would also become seemingly groundless. The entire case must be litigated and if
need be as in the case at bar, must be consolidated with a related case so as to thresh out
thoroughly all related issues.
But perhaps the most crucial refinement of Active Wood was in the case of Espinoza v. United
Overseas Bank Phils. Espinoza declared that the mere fact that the purchasers "presumed right
of ownership is contested and made the basis of another action" does not mean that such
action ought to be consolidated with the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. For
Espinoza, the application of the Active Wood doctrine must be limited only to cases with the
same factual circumstances under which the latter was rendered.
Espinoza called attention to the fact that in Active Wood the petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession was "filed before the expiration of the one-year redemption period" and that "the
litigated property had not been consolidated in the name of the mortgagee."
Hence, Espinoza invalidated the consolidation of an action for the annulment of the extrajudicial
sale with a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession after finding that the latter petition
was filed after the expiration of the one-year redemption period and after the purchaser had
already consolidated his title over the auctioned property. This must be, Espinoza explained,
because when:
title to the litigated property had already been consolidated in the name of respondent,
the issuance of a writ of possession becomes a matter of right. Consequently, the
consolidation of the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession with the proceedings
for nullification of foreclosure would be highly improper. Otherwise, not only will the very
purpose of consolidation (which is to avoid unnecessary delay) be defeated but the
procedural matter of consolidation will also adversely affect the substantive right of
possession as an incident of ownership.
Applying the foregoing judicial pronouncements to the case at bar, this Court discerns that the
consolidation of LRC Case No. Q-10766 (98) and Civil Case No. Q-98-33277 had already
ceased to become proper by the time the RTC allowed Esteban to present ex-parte evidence in
support of his application for the issuance of a writ of possession. Separation of the two cases is
moreover warranted.
4. It is uncontested that by the time Esteban filed his Motion for Issuance of a
Writ of Possession, which was before the RTC allowed him to present ex-parte
evidence in support of his application for the issuance of a writ of possession,
Esteban had already consolidated his title over the ten (10) lots.
The ruling in Espinoza applies. It is uncontested that by the time Esteban filed his Motion for
Issuance of a Writ of Possession, which was before the RTC allowed him to present ex-parte
evidence in support of his application for the issuance of a writ of possession, Esteban had
already consolidated his title over the ten (10) lots. At that time, Esteban was already the
absolute owner of the ten (10) lots and, as such, his right to possess the same becomes a
matter of right on his part. Charles claim of possession is no longer merely based on a
"presumed right of ownership" as Ingles, et al. have evidently failed to exercise their right of
redemption within the period provided by law. By then, the consolidation of Estebans
application for a writ of possession with Ingles, et al.s action for the annulment of mortgage had
already lost its basis and, therefore, ceased to become proper. Consequently, no grave abuse of

discretion may be imputed on the part of the RTC in allowing Esteban to present ex-parte
evidence in support of his application for the issuance of a writ of possession.
Even though Esteban filed his original Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ Possession still
within the redemption period, Espinoza would nevertheless apply. Estebans subsequent filing of
his Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Possession at a time that he was already absolute owner of
the auctioned lots supplemented his earlier Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ Possession
thus making his application for a writ of possession similar to that in the Espinoza case.
G.R. No. 173641
5. The two cases are ordered deconsolidated.
In view of the Courts above discussions in G.R. Nos. 141809 and 147186, there is no longer
any legal reason on which the suspension of the proceedings before the RTC in LRC Case No.
Q-10766 (98) and Civil Case No. Q-98-33277 may be anchored on. The two cases are ordered
deconsolidated. Civil Case No. Q-98-33277 should proceed and be resolved with dispatch. In
LRC Case No. Q-10766 (98), the Writ of Possession in favor of Charles J. Esteban should be
issued immediately. This is line with the order issued on 12 July 2001 by the Regional Trial
Court granting the Ex Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession after evaluating
Estebans Memorandum and Ingles, et al.s comment thereon.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANUEL TOLENTINO y CATACUTAN
G.R. No. 187740, April 10, 2013

J. Perez
Findings of fact of the trial court are not to be disturbed on appeal since conclusions as
to the credibility of witnesses in rape cases depends heavily on the sound judgment of the trial
court which is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying.
Facts:
Respondent Manuel Tolentino was charged in an Information with rape for raping AAA, an 11
year old minor. Tolentino raped AAA by pointing a knife at her chest and threatening her that he
would kill her and her family if she told her parents. The RTC convicted him of rape which was
affirmed by the CA. Tolentino assails the credibility of AAA as a witness claiming that she did not
resist or try to escape.
Issue:
Whether the CA can pass upon the credibility of witnesses
Ruling:
Petition denied.
On this score, findings of fact of the trial court are not to be disturbed on appeal since
conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in rape cases depends heavily on the sound
judgment of the trial court which is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the
witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying.

The factual findings of the RTC are further strengthened by the affirmation of the Court of
Appeals.
AAAs testimony is indeed clear and straightforward. Her sworn Statement taken before the
police station jived in all material details with her testimony during trial. Moreover, the medicolegals finding of fresh laceration bolstered AAAs claim that she was raped only a few hours
before she underwent medical examination.
AAAs failure to shout for help, although her siblings were sleeping beside her and her parents
were on the other room, does not detract from the credibility of her claims. She explained to the
courts satisfaction that Tolentino, while holding a knife, had threatened to kill her family if she
reported the incident. An 11-year old child like AAA can only cower in fear and submission in the
face of a real threat to her life and her familys posed by an armed assailant.
FRANCISCO C. ADALIM v. ERNESTO TANINAS, et al.
G.R. No. 198682, April 10, 2013
J. Carpio
In instances where appeals are filed out of time, appeal fees paid on the day of
promulgation of a resolution, or when issues not raised in the pleadings are admitted, the
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service themselves provide that
administrative investigations shall be conducted without strict recourse to the technical rules of
procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings.
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco Adalim was declared by the RTC as mayor of Taft, Eastern Samar.
However despite the court declaration and grant of motion for execution pending appeal, his
rival Diego Lim still held office at the municipal building. Adalim issued a memorandum
mandating all municipal employees to submit their daily time records and respondents, Ernesto
Taninas, et al. were listed as those without daily time records. Adalim issued a memorandum
dropping Taninas, et al. from the rolls due to absence without official leave.
Taninas, et al. filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission Regional Office which the
CSCRO ordered their reinstatement. The CSC, upon a motion for reconsideration by Taninas, et
al. ordered the reinstatement of the employees. The CA affirmed the resolutions of the CSCRO
and the CSC. Adalim opposed the resolutions on the ground that they were filed out of time as
they were filed more than 6 months from the date of dismissal; that the appeal fee was paid on
the same day as the day of promulgation; and that the CSC admitted issues that were not
alleged in the pleadings.
Issue:
Whether the CSC can relax the application of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in
Civil Service
Ruling:
Petition denied.

At the outset, Adalim assails the CSCs liberal application of its rules. In a number of cases, the
Court upheld the CSCs decision relaxing its procedural rules to render substantial justice. The
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service themselves provide that
administrative investigations shall be conducted without strict recourse to the technical rules of
procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings. The case before the CSC involves
the security of tenure of public employees protected by the Constitution. Public interest requires
a resolution of the merits of the appeal instead of dismissing the same based on a rigid
application of the CSC Rules of Procedure. Accordingly, both the CSC and the CA properly
allowed respondent employees appeal despite procedural lapses to resolve the issue on the
merits.
HEIRS OF LAZARO GALLARDO, et al. v. PORFERIO SOLIMAN, et al.
G.R. No. 178952, April 10, 2013

J. Del Castillo
The Heirs of Lazaro Gallardo are immediate relatives, who share a common interest in
the property subject of the action and the fact that only one of the heirs executed the verification
or certification of non-forum shopping will not deter the court from proceeding with the action.
Facts:
Petitioners, Heirs of Lazaro Gallardo filed a complaint for collection of land amortizations,
dispossession, ejectment, and cancellation of Deed of Transfer against respondents, Porfirio
Soliman, Vivian Valete, and Antonio Soliman before the Provinicial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) of Tarlac. The PARAD ruled in favor of Heirs Gallardo. The DARAB affirmed the
decision of the PARAD with modifications. The CA dismissed the Heirs Gallardos petition for
review on the ground that the verification and certification against forum shopping was signed
by only four out of six petitioners. The CA held that it must be signed by all of the petitioners or
else it is insufficient.
Issue:
Whether one petitioner may sign the Verification/Certification of non-forum shopping in behalf of
his co-petitioners who are his immediate relatives sharing a common interest
Ruling:
Petition granted.
Here, all the petitioners are immediate relatives who share a common interest in the land sought
to be reconveyed and a common cause of action raising the same arguments in support thereof.
There was sufficient basis, therefore, for Domingo Hernandez, Jr. to speak for and in behalf of
his co-petitioners when he certified that they had not filed any action or claim in another court or
tribunal involving the same issue. Thus, the Verification/Certification that Hernandez, Jr.
executed constitutes substantial compliance under the Rules.
Similarly, in Traveo v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative the Court held
that:
5) The certification against forum shopping must be
signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case;

otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as

parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or defense, the signature of
only one of them in the certification against forum
shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
The same position was taken in Medado v. Heirs of the Late Antonio Consing, where the Court
held that "where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common interest in the
property subject of the action, the fact that only one of the petitioners executed the verification
or certification of non-forum shopping will not deter the court from proceeding with the action."
BOARDWALK BUSINESS VENTURES, INC. v. ELVIRA A. VILLAREAL (deceased)
substituted by REYNALDO P. VILLAREAL, JR., et al.
G.R. No. 181182, April 10, 2013

J. Del Castillo
Boardwalks appeal was not perfected because of its failure to timely file the Petition and
to pay the docket and other lawful fees before the proper court which is the CA. The perfection
of an appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional as well, hence failure to perfect the same renders the judgment final and
executory.
Facts:
Petitioner Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. filed an Amended Complaint for replevin against
respondent Elvira A. Villareal, one of Boardwalks distributors of RTW merchandise for his
alleged failure to pay a car loan obtained from Boardwalk with the MeTC of Manila. The MeTC
ruled in favor of Boardwalk but was reversed by the RTC. Boardwalk through counsel filed with
the Manila RTC a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, praying that it be
granted 30 day to file its Petition for Review and paid the docket and other legal fees. Boardwalk
also filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC which the RTC denied for being the wrong mode of
appeal. The CA dismissed Boardwalks petition. The CA held that Boardwalk erred in filing its
Motion for Extension and paying the docket fees with the RTC and that the subsequent filing of
its Petition with the CA was late and beyond the reglementary 15-day period provided for under
Rule 42.
The CA also found that Boardwalks prayer for a 30-day extension in its Motion for Extension
irregular, because the maximum period that may be granted is only 15 days pursuant to Section
1 of Rule 42. It held that Boardwalks Petition for Review failed to include a board resolution or
secretarys certificate showing that its representative, Ma. Victoria M. Lo, was authorized to sign
the Petition or represent Boardwalk in the proceedings, rendering the Verification and
Certification against forum-shopping defective. Finally, the CA faulted Boardwalk for its failure to
attach to its Petition copies of the Complaint, Answer, position papers, memoranda and other
relevant pleadings, as required in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 42, thus meriting the outright
dismissal of its Petition for Review.
Issues:
1.

Whether Boardwalk properly paid the docket fees

2.
3.

Whether the CA may grant an extension of 30 days

Whether Boardwalks appeal is perfected

Ruling:
1. Boardwalk erroneously paid the docket fees and other lawful fees with the RTC.
Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court specifically states that payment of the docket fees and
other lawful fees should be made to the clerk of the CA. A plain reading of the Rules leaves no
room for interpretation; it is categorical and explicit. It was thus grave error on the part of
Boardwalk to have misinterpreted the same and consequently mistakenly remitted its payment
to the RTC clerk. Boardwalks subsequent payment to the clerk of the CA of the docket fees and
other lawful fees did not cure the defect. The payment to the CA was late; it was done long after
the reglementary period to file an appeal had lapsed. It must be stressed that the payment of
the docket fees and other lawful fees must be done within 15 days from receipt of notice of
decision sought to be reviewed or denial of the motion for reconsideration. In this case,
Boardwalk remitted the payment to the CA clerk long after the lapse of the reglementary period.
2. The CA may grant an extension of 15 days only. The grant of another 15-days
extension, or a total of 30-days extension is allowed only for the most
compelling reason.
Boardwalk sought an extension of 30 days within which to file its Petition for Review with the
CA. This is not allowed. Section 1 of Rule 42 allows an extension of only 15 days. "No further
extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason." Boardwalk never cited any
compelling reason.
Thus, even on the assumption that the CA granted Boardwalk a 15-day reprieve from February
3, 2007, or the expiration of its original reglementary period, it still failed to file its Petition for
Review on or before the February 19, 2007 due date. Records show that the Petition was
actually filed only on March 7, 2007, or way beyond the allowable February 19, 2007 deadline.
The appellate court thus correctly ruled that this may not simply be brushed aside.
3. Boardwalks appeal is not deemed perfected.
More significantly, Section 8 of Rule 42 provides that the appeal is deemed perfected as to the
petitioner "upon the timely filing of a petition for review and the payment of the corresponding
docket and other lawful fees." Undisputably, Boardwalkss appeal was not perfected because of
its failure to timely file the Petition and to pay the docket and other lawful fees before the proper
court which is the CA. Consequently, the CA properly dismissed outright the Petition because it
never acquired jurisdiction over the same. As a result, the RTCs Decision had long become
final and executory.
To stress, the right to appeal is statutory and one who seeks to avail of it must comply with the
statute or rules. The requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period
specified in the law must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions
against needless delays. Moreover, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, hence failure to perfect the
same renders the judgment final and executory. And, just as a losing party has the privilege to
file an appeal within the prescribed period, so also does the prevailing party have the correlative
right to enjoy the finality of a decision in his favor.

ROYAL SAVINGS BANK, formerly COMSAVINGS BANK, now GSIS FAMILY BANK v.
FERNANDO ASIA, et al.
G.R. No. 183658, April 10, 2013
CJ Sereno
The obligation of a court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial, once it appears that there is a third party
who is in possession of the property and is claiming a right adverse to that of the
debtor/mortgagor.
Facts:
Petitioner Royal Savings Bank (RSB) secured a final order from the CA in its favor for the
issuance of a certificate of title in its name. The RTC granted RSBs petition and issued a writ of
possession in its favor. Respondents Fernando Asia, et al. claimed to have been in open and
continuous possession of the property for 40 years and that they were not aware of any
proceeding against the property. In order to stay the Notice to Vacate given by the Sheriff, Asia,
et al. filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Possession and Writ of Execution which the RTC
granted. After 6 months of inaction by the RTC on the Motion for Reconsideration that RSB filed,
it filed a motion for early resolution where the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration. RSB
filed an appeal directly with the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1.
Whether the RTC can grant a motion to quash a writ of possession when there is doubt
as to who has the better right to possess a property
2.
Whether a pairing judge can quash the writ of possession issued by the presiding judge
Ruling:
1. The Court finds that it was only proper for the RTC to quash the Writ of
Possession until a determination is made as to who, between RSB and Asia, et
al., has the better right to possess the property.
In the eyes of this Court, the RTC did not err in issuing the herein assailed Orders on the basis
of its initial finding that Asia, et al. are third parties who are actually holding the property
adversely vis--vis the judgment debtor. The RTC did not err in applying the doctrine laid down
in Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court, in which the Court ruled that the obligation of a court
to issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases
to be ministerial, once it appears that there is a third party who is in possession of the property
and is claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor.
The Court explained in Philippine National Bank v. Austria that the foregoing doctrinal
pronouncements are not without support in substantive law, to wit:
Notably, the Civil Code protects the actual possessor of a property, to wit:
Art. 433.Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of
ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the
property.

Under the aforequoted provision, one who claims to be the owner of a property possessed by
another must bring the appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery. The term "judicial
process" could mean no less than an ejectment suit or reivindicatory action, in which the
ownership claims of the contending parties may be properly heard and adjudicated.
The Court finds that it was only proper for the RTC to quash the Writ of Possession until a
determination is made as to who, between RSB and Asia, et al., has the better right to possess
the property.
2. The pairing judge, who issued the Order quashing the Writ of Possession,
issued it in her capacity as the judge of Branch 222 of Quezon City-the same
branch, albeit then under a different judge, that issued the Writ of Possession.
Lastly, RSB alleges that the pairing judge violated the hierarchy of courts when she quashed the
writ of possession validly issued by the then presiding Judge of the RTC Quezon City, a coequal body.
No court has the power to interfere by injunction in the issuance or enforcement of a writ of
possession issued by another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to issue that writ.
However, as correctly pointed out by Asia, et al. in their Comment, it was the same trial court
and "not another court or co-equal court body that quashed the subject writ of possession." The
pairing judge, who issued the Order quashing the Writ of Possession, issued it in her capacity
as the judge of Branch 222 of Quezon City-the same branch, albeit then under a different judge,
that issued the Writ of Possession.
SANDOVAL SHIPYARDS, INC., and RIMPORT INDUSTRIES, INC., represented by ENGR.
REYNALDO G. IMPORTANTE v. PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY (PMMA)
G.R. No. 188633, April 10, 2013

CJ Sereno
Although the RTC has legal basis under A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA in relation to
Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court to order the dismissal of the case, the Court finds this
sanction too severe to be imposed on PMMA where the records of the case is devoid of
evidence of willful or flagrant disregard of the rules on mediation proceedings.
Facts:
Respondent Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA) filed a Complaint for Rescission of
Contract with Damages against petitioners Sandoval Shipyards, Inc. and Rimport Industries,
Inc. (SSI and RII) before the RTC. The RTC and CA ruled in favor of PMMA. In their Rule 45
Petition, SSI and RII contend that the judge who wrote the Decision was not present during the
trial and did not have the advantage of firsthand assessment of the testimonies of the
witnesses, thus warranting a factual review.
Issues:
1.
Whether a factual review is warranted, considering that the trial judge who penned the
Decision was different from the judge who received the evidence of the parties
2.
Whether failure to attend mediation proceedings warrants a dismissal of the case

Ruling:
1.
The fact that the trial judge who penned the Decision was different from the one
who received the evidence is not one of the exceptions that warrant a factual review of
the case.
The fact that the trial judge who penned the Decision was different from the one who received
the evidence is not one of the exceptions that warrant a factual review of the case. SSI and RII
cannot carve out an exception when there is none. We have already addressed this matter in
Decasa v. CA, from which the Court quotes:
We have held in several cases that the fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not the
one who rendered the judgment; and that for the same reason, the latter did not have the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during the trial but merely relied on the
records of the case does not render the judgment erroneous. Even though the judge who
penned the decision was not the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses, such is not
enough reason to overturn the findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses. It
may be true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in a better position to
ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, but it does not necessarily follow
that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid and just decision. The
efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer only took over from a
colleague who had earlier presided at the trial. That a judge did not hear a case does not
necessarily render him less competent in assessing the credibility of witnesses. He can rely on
the transcripts of stenographic notes of their testimony and calibrate them in accordance with
their conformity to common experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such
reliance does not violate substantive and procedural due process of law
2. SSI and RII are likewise mistaken in their assertion that the trial court should
have dismissed the Complaint for PMMAs failure to attend the mediation
session.
SSI and RII are likewise mistaken in their assertion that the trial court should have dismissed
the Complaint for PMMAs failure to attend the mediation session. In Chan Kent v. Micarez, in
which the trial court dismissed the case for failure of the plaintiff and her counsel to attend the
mediation proceedings, this Court held:
To reiterate, A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA regards mediation as part of pre-trial where parties
are encouraged to personally attend the proceedings. The personal non-appearance, however,
of a party may be excused only when the representative, who appears in his behalf, has been
duly authorized to enter into possible amicable settlement or to submit to alternative modes of
dispute resolution. To ensure the attendance of the parties, A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA
specifically enumerates the sanctions that the court can impose upon a party who fails to
appear in the proceedings which includes censure, reprimand, contempt, and even dismissal of
the action in relation to Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The respective lawyers of the
parties may attend the proceedings and, if they do so, they are enjoined to cooperate with the
mediator for the successful amicable settlement of disputes so as to effectively reduce docket
congestion.
Although the RTC has legal basis to order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13-2007, the Court
finds this sanction too severe to be imposed on the petitioner where the records of the case is
devoid of evidence of willful or flagrant disregard of the rules on mediation proceedings. There is

no clear demonstration that the absence of petitioner's representative during mediation

proceedings on March 1, 2008 was intended to perpetuate delay in the litigation of the case.
Neither is it indicative of lack of interest on the part of petitioner to enter into a possible amicable
settlement of the case.
Here, there was no finding that the absence of PMMA was in willful or flagrant disregard of the
rules on mediation, that the absence was intended to effect a delay in litigation, or that PMMA
lacked interest in a possible amicable settlement of the case. In fact, the CA found that all efforts
had been exerted by the parties to amicably settle the case during the pretrial. Thus, RTC's
nondismissal of PMMA's Complaint was but appropriate.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROBERT P. NARCEDA
G.R. No. 182760, April 10, 2013

CJ Sereno
No appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It
goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to
question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Facts:
Respondent Robert Narceda married Marina. However, Marina went to Singapore and has
never returned. Robert learned from a friend that Marina married a Singaporean. With this,
Robert filed with the RTC a petition for the judicial declaration of presumptive death and/or
absence of Marina. The RTC granted Roberts petition. The CA dismissed the Republics appeal
ruling that the hearing of a petition for the declaration of presumptive death is a summary
proceeding under the Family Code and is thus governed by Title XI thereof. Article 247 of the
Family Code provides that the judgment of the trial court in summary court proceedings shall be
immediately final and executory.
Issue:
Whether an appeal from a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Art. 41 of the Family Code may be filed
Ruling:
As explained in Republic v. Tango, the remedy of a losing party in a summary proceeding is not
an ordinary appeal, but a petition for certiorari, to wit:
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of
the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such
concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the
decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which
the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the
proper subject of an appeal.
When the OSG filed its notice of appeal under Rule 42, it availed itself of the wrong remedy. As
a result, the running of the period for filing of a Petition for Certiorari continued to run and was
not tolled. Upon lapse of that period, the Decision of the RTC could no longer be questioned.
Consequently, petitioner's contention that respondent has failed to establish a well-founded
belief that his absentee spouse is dead may no longer be entertained by this Court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LOLITA QUESIDO y BADARANG
G.R. No. 189351, April 10, 2013

J. Leonardo-De Castro
Non-compliance with Sec. 21, R.A. 9165 does not necessarily render the arrest illegal or
the items seized inadmissible because what is essential is that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are preserved which would be utilized in the determination of the guilt
or innocence of the accused.
Facts:
Respondent Lolita Quesido was apprehended in a buy-bust operation conducted by District
Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force, Manila Police District (DAID-SOTG) with SPO1
Chua as the poseur-buyer. SPO1 Chua marked the buy-bust money with an x. SPO1 Chua
exchanged the money for one of the three sachets with white crystalline substance and he gave
the signal for his companions to come forward to effect the arrest. Quesido and the confiscated
items were turned over to the investigator. The confiscated item was subjected to a laboratory
test where it tested positive for shabu. The RTC convicted Quesido, which was affirmed by the
CA.
Quesido argues that the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the procedural
requirements of R.A. 9165 and she insists that the chain of custody for the supposed seized
drug was not properly established.
Issues:
1. Whether the chain of custody was strictly complied with
2. Whether the trial court correctly appreciated the credibility of the testimony of the
police officers
Ruling:
1. The Court finds that the procedural guidelines laid out in Section 21(1), Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165 were not strictly complied with. In spite of this, the
Court can still conclude that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
illegal drugs used in evidence in this case were duly preserved in consonance
with the chain of custody rule.
Nonetheless, despite the apparent mandatory language that is expressed in Section 21(1),
Article II of R.A. 9165, the Court has always reiterated in jurisprudence that non-compliance with
Section 21 does not necessarily render the arrest illegal or the items seized inadmissible

because what is essential is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
preserved which would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
In People v. Remigio, the Court restated the enumeration of the different links that the
prosecution must prove in order to establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation,
namely:
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist
for laboratory examination; and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic
chemist to the court.
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the procedural guidelines laid out in Section 21(1), Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165 were not strictly complied with. In spite of this, the Court can still
conclude that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the illegal drugs used in evidence in this
case were duly preserved in consonance with the chain of custody rule.
2. The testimonies of SPO1 Chua and PO3 Jimenez were properly given
significant probative weight by the trial court and, subsequently, by the Court
of Appeals.
Furthermore, the testimonies of SPO1 Chua and PO3 Jimenez were properly given significant
probative weight by the trial court and, subsequently, by the Court of Appeals. In People v.
Lapasaran, we elaborated on the importance of the credible testimony of police officers in the
prosecution of cases involving illegal drugs through the following:
Moreover, this Court has often said that the prosecution of cases involving illegal drugs depends
largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. It is
fundamental that the factual findings of the trial courts and those involving credibility of
witnesses are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misappreciation of facts, or
speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The
trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their
testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The rule
finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of
Appeals.
ALBERT CHUA, JIMMY CHUA CHI LEONG and SPOUSES EDUARDO SOLIS and GLORIA
VICTA v. B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC./LORENZANA FOOD CORPORATION v. B.E. SAN DIEGO,
INC.
G.R. No. 165863/G.R. No. 165875. April 10, 2013

J. Mendoza
To allow the presentation of evidence on a piece-meal basis, thereby needlessly causing
a delay in the resolution of the case would be anathema to the purpose of delivering justice.

Facts:
Petitioners, Albert Chua, Jimmy Chua Chi Leong, Spouses Eduardo and Gloria Solis, and
Lorenzana Food Corporation (LFC) filed a petition to reopen a case docketed as G.R. No.
105027 decided by the Supreme Court with respondent B.E. San Diego, Inc. as one of the
parties. Chua, et al. attached to their petition several documents among which are 1) flow charts
tracing the subdivision and partition of Cuencas land into the present parcels of land purchased
by petitioners from the heirs of Cuenca himself; the partitions were made with approval of the
court; 2) a certification by the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of Bacoor,
Cavite that Barrio Niog and Barrio Talaba are actually adjacent to each other; and 3) a
certification and sketch from the Land Registration Authority that the lot described in the alleged
OCT No. 0-490 of Teodora Dominguez sits upon and encroaches on the National Highway
(Aguinaldo Highway). The Supreme Court granted the petition and remanded the case to the
CA. The CA dismissed the petition ruling that the documents were not exactly "newly discovered
evidence" because all of them could have been previously obtained and presented at the
hearing before the lower court.
Issue:
Whether the evidence adduced in the petition to reopen are newly discovered evidence
Ruling:
Petition denied.
The Court sustains the ruling of the CA that the alleged new documents submitted by Chua, et
al. cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence. The documents attached by Chua, et
al. in their petition to re-open were the following: 1] Certified true copies of notices of hearing
pertaining to Juans application for registration and confirmation of title; 2] Certification by the
Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of Bacoor, Cavite, that Barrios Niog and
Talaba are adjacent; and 3) certification from the LRA regarding the encroachment of San
Diegos property. These are not newly discovered and they cannot affect the Courts ruling in its
April 22, 1994 Decision in G.R. No. 105027. The Court quotes with approval the ruling of the CA
on this matter:
A common characteristic shared by all the foregoing documents is that they are not exactly
"newly discovered evidence" as plaintiffs claim they are. By their nature, all of them could have
been previously obtained and presented by plaintiffs at the hearings before the lower court. For
plaintiffs failure to present these documents there is no one else to blame but themselves. It
appears that they did not exert their best efforts to get hold of evidence which was already
available, or at the very least, obtainable, to buttress their claim. To allow the presentation of
evidence on a piece-meal basis, thereby needlessly causing a delay in the resolution of the
case would be anathema to the purpose of delivering justice.
ROGELIO DANTIS v. JULIO MAGHINANG, JR.
G.R. No. 191696, April 10, 2013

J. Mendoza
Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its
affiant/maker did not take the witness stand. The affidavit was not identified and its averments

were not affirmed by affiant Ignacio. Accordingly, Exhibit "3" must be excluded from the judicial
proceedings being an inadmissible hearsay evidence. Exhibit "4," on the other hand, is
considered secondary evidence being a mere photocopy which, in this case, cannot be
admitted to prove the contents of the purported undated handwritten receipt.
Facts:
Petitioner Rogelio Dantis filed a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with
damages against respondent Julio Maghinang, Jr. Dantis inherited the property through an
extrajudicial partition of Emilio Dantis estate. Maghinang, Jr. presented an affidavit executed on
September 3, 1953 by Ignacio Dantis, Rogelios grandfather and father of Emilio Dantis. It
alleged that Emilio agreed to sell 352 sq.m. to Ignacio. Julio admitted that the affidavit was
signed by Emilio. The receipt he presented was merely a photocopy. Julio was only 11 years
old. The RTC ruled in favor of Rogelio. The CA reversed the RTC ruling that Exhibit "4" was an
indubitable proof of the sale of the 352-square meter lot between Emilio and Julio, Sr.
Rogelio submits that Exhibit "3" and Exhibit "4" are devoid of evidentiary value and, hence,
deserve scant consideration. He stresses that Exhibit "4" is inadmissible in evidence being a
mere photocopy, and the existence and due execution thereof had not been established.
Issue:
Whether the affidavit of Ignacio and the photocopy of the receipt are admissible
Ruling:
Petition granted.
To begin with, Exhibit "3," the affidavit of Ignacio, is hearsay evidence and, thus, cannot be
accorded any evidentiary weight. Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends on the
competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to be
produced. The exclusion of hearsay evidence is anchored on three reasons: 1) absence of
cross-examination; 2) absence of demeanor evidence; and 3) absence of oath.
Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its affiant/maker did
not take the witness stand. The sworn statement of Ignacio is of this kind. The affidavit was not
identified and its averments were not affirmed by affiant Ignacio. Accordingly, Exhibit "3" must be
excluded from the judicial proceedings being an inadmissible hearsay evidence. It cannot be
deemed a declaration against interest for the matter to be considered as an exception to the
hearsay rule because the declarant was not the seller (Emilio), but his father (Ignacio). Exhibit
"4," on the other hand, is considered secondary evidence being a mere photocopy which, in this
case, cannot be admitted to prove the contents of the purported undated handwritten receipt.
The best evidence rule requires that the highest available degree of proof must be produced.
For documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best proved by the production of the
document itself to the exclusion of secondary or substitutionary evidence, pursuant to Rule 130,
Section 3.
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which
states that: when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad
faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some

authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the
offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof,
namely: (1) the execution or existence of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original
or its non-production in court; and (3) the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on
the part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent
loss would constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence. In MCC Industrial
Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, it was held that where the missing document is
the foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is required than where the document is
only collaterally involved.
The claim of Julio, Jr. that Emilio affixed his signature on the original of Exhibit "4" in 1953 is
highly improbable because record shows that Emilio died even before that year, specifically, on
November 13, 1952.
It is quite strange that two receipts were prepared for the initial payment of 100.00 in
connection with the sale of the subject lot. The Court notes that the contents of Exhibit "4" were
similar to those of Annex "A" of Julio, Jr.s Answer, dated June 9, 2002. Annex "A," however, was
typewritten and the name of the recipient indicated therein was a certain Cornelio A. Dantis,
whose identity and participation in the alleged sale was never explained.
Apart from the lone testimony of Julio, Jr., no other witness who knew or read Exhibit "4," much
less saw it executed, was presented. In the absence of any shred of corroborative evidence, the
Court cannot help but entertain doubts on the truthfulness of Julio, Jr.s naked assertion.
EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N. NAVAL and CRISPIN I.
OBEN v. CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC.
G.R. No. 204700, April 10, 2013

J. Leonen
Under Section 17, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court, when part of a writing or record
is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the
other, and when a detached writing or record is given in evidence, any other writing or record
necessary
to
its
understanding
may
also
be
given
in
evidence.
Facts:
Export Industry Bank (EIB) filed a collection suit against petitioners, Eagleridge Development
(EDC) Corporation, Marcelo Naval, and Crispin Oben with the RTC of Makati City. The EIB,
through a Deed of Assignment, transferred EDCs outstanding loan obligations to EDC, to
respondent Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc. (Cameron), which included a Loan
Sale and Purchase Agreement (LSPA) between EDC and Cameron. Cameron substituted EIB.
EDC filed a Motion for the Production/Inspection of the LSPA but was denied by the RTC for
failing to show good cause for the production of the LSPA. The CA dismissed EDCs petition
for Obens lack of Verification and Certification Against Forum-Shopping and Failure to Attach a
Copy of the Complaint.
Issues:
1.
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition on technicality, i.e. on a defective
verification and certification against forum shopping and the attachment to the petition of a mere
machine copy of the complaint

2.
Whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying the production and/or
inspection of the LSPA
Ruling:
1.
The Court agrees with EDC, that the appellate court erred in ruling that Oben's
Verification and Certification was defective for lack of a Board Resolution authorizing
Oben to sign on behalf of EDC.
The Court agrees with EDC, that the appellate court erred in ruling that Oben's Verification and
Certification was defective for lack of a Board Resolution authorizing Oben to sign on behalf of
EDC. Oben executed and signed the Verification and Certification in his personal capacity as an
impleaded party in the case, and not as a representative of EDC. The Court notes that an earlier
Verification and Certification signed by Naval, for himself and as a representative of EDC, and a
Secretary Certificate containing his authority to sign on behalf of EDC, were already filed with
the appellate court together with the petition for certiorari. As such, what was only lacking was
Oben's Verification and Certification as pointed out in the August 29, 2012 Resolution of the CA.
On the other hand, contrary to EDCs assertion, a reading of the CA Resolution dated
November 27, 2012 shows that the appellate court merely noted the belated attachment of a
machine copy, not a certified true copy, of the complaint to petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. Although not expressly stated, the machine copy of the complaint is in fact
acceptable, as Rule 65 provides that one may attach to the petition mere machine copies of
other relevant documents and pleadings. More importantly, the CA's dismissal of the petition for
certiorari was anchored on its finding that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the RTC in denying the production of the LSPA, that the errors committed by Judge Ruiz were, if
at all, mere errors of judgment correctible not by the extraordinary writ of certiorari and an
ordinary appeal would still be available in the action below for sum of money.
2. Since the Deed of Assignment was produced in court by Cameron and marked
as one of its documentary exhibits, the LSPA which was made a part thereof by
explicit reference and which is necessary for its understanding may also be
inevitably inquired into by EDC.
The provision on production and inspection of documents is one of the modes of discovery
sanctioned by the Rules of Court in order to enable not only the parties, but also the court to
discover all the relevant and material facts in connection with the case pending before it.
Generally, the scope of discovery is to be liberally construed so as to provide the litigants with
information essential to the fair and amicable settlement or expeditious trial of the case. All the
parties are required to lay their cards on the table so that justice can be rendered on the merits
of the case.
Although the grant of a motion for production of document is admittedly discretionary on the part
of the trial court judge, nevertheless, it cannot be arbitrarily or unreasonably denied because to
do so would bar access to relevant evidence that may be used by a party-litigant and hence,
impair his fundamental right to due process.
The test to be applied by the trial judge in determining the relevancy of documents and the
sufficiency of their description is one of reasonableness and practicability.

Furthermore, under Section 17, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court, when part of a writing or
record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by
the other, and when a detached writing or record is given in evidence, any other writing or
record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence. Since the Deed of
Assignment was produced in court by Cameron and marked as one of its documentary exhibits,
the LSPA which was made a part thereof by explicit reference and which is necessary for its
understanding may also be inevitably inquired into by EDC.

THE SPECIAL AUDIT TEAM, COMMISSION ON AUDIT v. COURT OF APPEALS AND

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
G.R. No. 174788, April 11, 2013

CJ Sereno
A preliminary injunction is proper only when the plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled to
the relief sought and has substantial interest in the right sought to be defended. Factually, there
must exist a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are
violative of the said right. As the Supreme Court has previously ruled, while the existence of the
right need not be conclusively established, it must be clear.
Facts:
Respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) filed a Petition for Prohibition with
the CA against petitioner Special Audit Team (SAT) of the Commission on Audit (COA) with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO), a writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction, and a writ of prohibition to restrain the SAT from conducting an audit of GSIS
transactions. GSIS also submitted a Manifestation and Motion detailing the urgency of
restraining the SAT as SATs supervisor had said that notices for disallowance were available at
the COAs Records Division. The CA granted the prayer of GSIS for the issuance of a TRO
effective 60 days from notice. The CA granted the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction upon the posting of an injunction bond.
Issue:
Whether the writ of preliminary injunction was properly issued
Ruling:
Petition denied.
Writs of injunction do not perfunctorily issue from the courts.
For the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to be proper, it must be shown that the
invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of
complainant is clear and unmistakable and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the
injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. In this case, respondents failed to show that
they have a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are
violative of the said right.
From its ruling, it is clear that the CA erred in granting a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction. A
preliminary injunction is proper only when the plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled to the relief
sought and has substantial interest in the right sought to be defended. Factually, there must
exist "a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are
violative of the said right." As this Court has previously ruled, "while the existence of the right
need not be conclusively established, it must be clear."
Lacking a clear legal right, the provisional remedy should not have been issued, all the more
because the factual support for issuing the writ had not been established. In giving injunctive

relief, courts cannot reverse the burden of proof, for to do so "would assume the proposition
which the petitioner is inceptively duty bound to prove." This concern is not a mere technicality,
but lies at the heart of procedural law, for every case before a court of law requires a cause of
action.
Moreover, there was no urgency in the request of the GSIS for injunctive relief, because no
notice of disallowance had been issued. The CA held that since there was a question on the
validity of the SAT and a corresponding threat of a notice of disallowance, then the status quo
must be preserved. Its criteria falls short of the "clear legal right" standard. Even if there was a
notice of disallowance, the COAs rules for contesting the issuance would have been the proper
remedy; otherwise, any administrative dispute settlement procedure would be rendered useless
by the simple filing of an injunctive suit in court.
CARLITO C. ENCINAS v. PO1 ALFREDO P. AGUSTIN, JR., and PO1 JOEL S. CAUBANG
G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013

CJ Sereno
The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not
to the exercise of administrative powers. Administrative powers here refer to those purely
administrative in nature, as opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial
character.
Facts:
Respondents PO1 Alfredo Agustin, Jr. and PO1 Joel Caubang filed with the Bureau of Fire
Protection a letter-complaint for illegal transfer of personnel under the Department of Interior
and Local Government Act of 1990 against petitioner Carlito Encinas with the BFP. PO1 Agustin
and PO1 Caubang also filed a similar complaint with the CSC Regional Office in San Fernando,
Pampanga and the CSC Field Office in Cabanatuan accusing Encinas of violation of Sec. 4(c)
of R.A. 6713. Encinas was formally charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service. The BFP complaint was dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence. The CSCRO found Encinas administratively liable. Encinas appealed to the CSC
claiming that PO1 Agustin and PO1 Caubang were guilty of forum shopping as they filed a
complaint before the CSCRO and the BFP. The CSC denied the petition as the CSCRO
complaint was for violation of R.A. 6713 and the BFP complaint was for violation of R.A. 6975.
Hence there was no forum shopping. The CA denied Encinas appeal and held that there was
no forum shopping.
Issue:
Whether PO1 Agustin and PO1 Caubang are guilty of forum shopping
Ruling:
Petition denied.
The Court does not agree with Encinas. In Yu v. Lim, this Court enumerated the requisites of
forum-shopping as follows:
Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the

concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those
representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two
preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other
case.
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it determines the rights
and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or
dilatory objections; "or when the judgment is rendered "after a determination of which party is
right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely
technical point."
In this case, there is no "judgment on the merits" in contemplation of the definition above. The
dismissal of the BFP Complaint in the Resolution dated 05 July 2005 was the result of a factfinding investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an administrative
offense should be filed. Hence, no rights and liabilities of parties were determined therein with
finality.
The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasijudicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers. Administrative powers
here refer to those purely administrative in nature, as opposed to administrative proceedings
that take on a quasi-judicial character.
Indeed, the public prosecutor exercises investigative powers in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation to determine whether, based on the evidence presented, further action should be
taken through the filing of a criminal complaint in court. Similarly, in the instant case, the BFP
exercised its investigative or fact-finding function to determine whether, based on the facts and
the evidence presented, further administrative actionin the form of a formal chargeshould
be taken against petitioner. In neither instance is there in adjudication upon the rights,
obligations, or liabilities of the parties before them.
SPOUSES OSCAR AND THELMA CACAYORIN v. ARMED FORCES AND POLICE MUTUAL
BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R. No. 171298, April 15, 2013
J. Del Castillo
A complaint for the consignation of a loan payment of a subdivision lot does not fall
within the jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. Consignation is
necessarily judicial, as the Civil Code itself provides that consignation shall be made by
depositing the thing or things due at the disposal of judicial authority.
Facts:
Petitioner Spouses Oscar and Thelma Cacayorin entered into a loan agreement with the Rural
Bank of San Teodoro, along with a PAG-IBIG loan facility, to purchase a piece of property from
the Armed Forces and Police Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. (AFPMBAI). AFPMBAI prepared
the Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title in Spouses Cacayorins name. The
Rural Bank was closed and placed under the receivership of the PDIC. AFMBAI took
possession of the loan documents of the Spouses Cacayorin and demanded payment for the
loan. With the Rural Bank closed, Spouses Cacayorin could not pay the loan. Spouses

Cacayorin filed a complaint for consignation of loan payment, recovery of title, and cancellation
of mortgage annotation against AFPMBAI before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). AFPMBAI
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the complaint falls within the jurisdiction of
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and not the Puerto Princesa RTC, as it
was filed by Spouses Cacayorin in their capacity as buyers of a subdivision lot and it prays for
specific performance of contractual and legal obligations decreed under P.D. 957. The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss. The CA reversed the trial court.
Issue:
Whether the HLURB has no jurisdiction over a complaint involving consignation
Ruling:
Petition granted.
On the question of jurisdiction, Spouses Cacayorins case should be tried in the Puerto Princesa
RTC, and not the HLURB. Consignation is necessarily judicial, as the Civil Code itself provides
that consignation shall be made by depositing the thing or things due at the disposal of judicial
authority
Article 1258 clearly precludes consignation in venues other than the courts. Elsewhere, what
may be made is a valid tender of payment, but not consignation.
While it may be true that Spouses Cacayorins claim relates to the terms and conditions of the
sale of AFPMBAIs subdivision lot, this is overshadowed by the fact that since the Complaint in
Civil Case No. 3812 pleads a case for consignation, the HLURB is without jurisdiction to try it,
as such case may only be tried by the regular courts.
RICARDO CHU, JR. and DY KOK ENG v. MELANIA CAPARAS and SPOUSES RUEL AND
HERMENEGILDA PEREZ
G.R. No. 175428, April 15, 2013

J. Brion
A petition filed under Rule 45 required the evaluation of the factual findings of the RTC
and the CA. The question, to be one of law, must rest solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances and should avoid the scrutiny of the probative value of the parties
evidence. Once the issue invites a review of the factual findings of the RTC and of the CA, as in
this case, the question posed is one of fact that is proscribed in a Rule 45 petition.
Facts:
Petitioners Ricardo Chu and Dy Kok Eng filed a complaint to recover the possession of a parcel
of land in Cavite against respondents Melania Caparas and Spouses Ruel and Hermenegilda
Perez. The RTC allowed Chu and Eng to present their evidence ex parte following Caparas et
als failure to file an answer. The RTC ruled in Chu and Engs favor but disapproving the survey
plan for lack of authority. Caparas, et al. filed a petition for relief from judgment on the ground of
excusable negligence. The RTC reversed its decision. The CA upheld the RTC.
Issue:

Whether the petition under Rule 45 raises questions of fact

Ruling:
Petition denied.
At the outset, the Court finds that the resolution of the petition necessarily requires the reevaluation of the factual findings of the RTC and of the CA. Essentially, what Chu and Eng seek
in this petition is a relief from the Court on the issue of encroachment, as well as the issues of
prematurity and propriety of the award of damages that are intertwined with the issue of
encroachment. On this point alone, the petition must fail, as a Rule 45 petition bars the Court
from the consideration of factual issues.
The question, to be one of law, must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances and should avoid the scrutiny of the probative value of the parties
evidence. Once the issue invites a review of the factual findings of the RTC and of the CA, as in
this case, the question posed is one of fact that is proscribed in a Rule 45 petition.
The Courts jurisdiction under a Rule 45 review is limited to reviewing perceived errors of law,
which the lower courts may have committed. The resolution of factual issues is the function of
the lower courts whose findings, when aptly supported by evidence, bind this Court. This is
especially true when the CA affirms the lower courts findings, as in this case. While this Court,
under established exceptional circumstances, had deviated from the above rule, the Court does
not find this case to be under any of the exceptions.
REY CASTIGADOR CATEDRILLA v. MARIO and MARGIE LAURON
G.R. No. 179011, April 15, 2013

J. Peralta
A person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the same
upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
Facts:
Petitioner Rey Catedrilla filed a complaint for ejectment against respondent Spouses Mario and
Margie Lauron with the MTC of Lambunao, Iloilo. Spouses Lauron claimed that Catedrilla had
no cause of action against them as they are not the owners of the residential building standing
on his lot but Mildred Kascher, as shown in the tax declaration. Catedrilla claims that he
inherited the property from his mother Lilia Catedrilla and that Spouses Lauron are merely
staying on the property through mere tolerance. Spouses Lauron claimed that Catedrillas
father, Maximo entered into an amicable settlement with Kascher where Maximo offered to sell
the property to Kascher. However, Maximo was unable to comply and Spouses Lauron argued
that the amicable settlement should have force and effect of a final judgment of the court. The
MTC ruled in favor of Catedrilla which was affirmed by the RTC. The CA reversed the lower
courts and ruled that Kascher should have been impleaded being an indispensable party.
Issues:
1.
2.

Whether the amicable settlement between Maximo and Margie is still enforceable
Whether Spouses Lauron were correctly impleaded as defendants

Ruling:
1.
The settlement is considered rescinded in accordance with the provision of Article
2041 of the Civil Code.
The Court has held that a compromise agreement which is not contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals or good customs is a valid contract which is the law between the parties
themselves. It has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata even if not judicially
approved, and cannot be lightly set aside or disturbed except for vices of consent and forgery.
However, in Heirs of Zari, et al. v. Santos, the Court clarified that the broad precept enunciated
in Art. 2037 is qualified by Art. 2041 of the same Code, which provides that if one of the parties
fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the compromise
or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.
In exercising the second option under Art. 2041, the aggrieved party may, if he chooses, bring
the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand, as if there had never been any
compromise agreement, without bringing an action for rescission. This is because he may
regard the compromise as already rescinded by the breach thereof of the other party.
While the amicable settlement executed between Maximo and Margie before the Barangay had
the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, it appears that there was non-compliance
thereto by Margie on behalf of her parents which may be construed as repudiation. The
settlement is considered rescinded in accordance with the provision of Article 2041 of the Civil
Code. Since the settlement was rescinded, Catedrilla, as a co-owner, properly instituted the
action for ejectment to recover possession of the subject lot against Spouses Lauron who are in
possession of the same.
2.
It is indeed Spouses Lauron who are the real parties-in-interest who were
correctly impleaded as defendants in the unlawful detainer case filed by Catedrilla.
In ejectment cases, the only issue to be resolved is who is entitled to the physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of
the party-litigants. In an action for unlawful detainer, the real party-in-interest as party-defendant
is the person who is in possession of the property without the benefit of any contract of lease
and only upon the tolerance and generosity of its owner. Well settled is the rule that a person
who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand,
failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. His status is
analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy
continued by tolerance of the owner.
Here, records show that the subject lot is owned by Catedrilla's mother, and Catedrilla, being an
heir and a co-owner, is entitled to the possession of the subject lot. On the other hand, Spouses
Lauron are the occupants of the subject lot which they do not own. Spouses Laurons
possession of the subject lot was without any contract of lease as they failed to present any,
thus lending credence to Catedrilla's claim that their stay in the subject lot is by mere tolerance
of Catedrilla and his predecessors. It is indeed Spouses Lauron who are the real parties-ininterest who were correctly impleaded as defendants in the unlawful detainer case filed by
Catedrilla.

ROYAL PLANT WORKERS UNION v. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC.

G.R. No. 198783, April 15, 2013

J. Mendoza
An Arbitration Committee rendered a decision which was contested by the other party as
a judgment or a final order under the Labor Code, hence the Rules of Court do not apply. A
decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the CA via a petition for review under
Rule 43.
Upon receipt of the Voluntary Arbitrators Resolution denying RPWUs motion for
reconsideration, RPWU should have filed with the CA, within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary
period, a petition for review, not a petition for certiorari.
Facts:
Petitioner Royal Plant Workers Union (RPWU) agreed with respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc. (CCBPI) to submit their dispute to an Arbitration Committee. The Arbitration
Committee ruled in favor of RPWU. CCBPI filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 before the
CA. The CA set aside the decision of the Arbitration Committtee. RPWU argues that the proper
remedy should have been a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and that the decision of the
Arbitration Committee is a judgment or a final court order under the Labor Code. It also argued
that the 1997 Rules of Procedure does not cover cases under the Labor Code.
Issue:
Whether an appeal to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is a proper remedy to question the decision of the Arbitration Committee
Ruling:
Petition granted.
CCBPI is correct. This procedural issue being debated upon is not novel. The Court has already
ruled in a number of cases that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the
CA via a petition for review under Rule 43. The recent case of Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa
Sa Hyatt (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN) v. Hon. Voluntary Arbitrator Buenaventura C. Magsalin and
Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines reiterated the well-settled doctrine on this issue, to wit:
In the case of Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL v. Bacungan, we
repeated the well-settled rule that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is appealable to
the CA via petition for review under Rule 43. We held that:
"The question on the proper recourse to assail a decision of a voluntary arbitrator has already
been settled in Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank
Employees, where the Court held that the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel
of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure
outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (now embodied in Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure), just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions
enumerated therein, and consistent with the original purpose to provide a uniform procedure for
the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities.

Hence, upon receipt on May 26, 2003 of the Voluntary Arbitrators Resolution denying RPWUs
motion for reconsideration, RPWU should have filed with the CA, within the fifteen (15)-day
reglementary period, a petition for review, not a petition for certiorari.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN
FAVOR OF NORIEL RODRIGUEZ: NORIEL RODRIGUEZ v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL
ARROYO, et al
G.R. No. 191805/G.R. No. 193160, April 16, 2013

CJ Sereno
The writ of amparos curative role is an acknowledgment that the violation of the right to
life, liberty, and security may be caused not only by a public officials act, but also by his
omission. Accountability may attach to Arroyo, et al. who are imputed with knowledge relating to
the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but
have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance. The duty to investigate must be undertaken in a serious manner and
not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective.
Facts:
Following the Decision of the Supreme Court in 2011, the Ombudsman sent a letter to the
Supreme Court requesting for a two month period to make the report and stating that Noriel
Rodriguez and his family has refused to cooperate due to security reasons. Respondents filed a
motion for reconsideration arguing that they cannot be held accountable as they were not
mentioned by name as having performed acts violative of the rights, life, liberty and security of
Rodriguez and his family.
Issues:
1.
Whether the unwillingness of Rodriguez to participate in the proceedings affect the grant
of the writ of amparo
2.
Whether Arroyo, et al. may be held accountable
Ruling:
1.
The purported unwillingness of Rodriguez to appear or participate at this stage of
the proceedings due to security reasons does not affect the rationale of the writ granted
by the CA, as affirmed by this Court.
The purported unwillingness of Rodriguez to appear or participate at this stage of the proceedings
due to security reasons does not affect the rationale of the writ granted by the CA, as affirmed
by this Court. In any case, the issue of the existence of criminal, civil, or administrative liability
which may be imputed to Arroyo, et al. is not the province of amparo proceedings -- rather, the
writ serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the
commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment
of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action. In this case then,
the thrust of ensuring that investigations are conducted and the rights to life, liberty, and security
of Rodriguez, remains.
2.

Accountability may attach to Arroyo, et al. who are imputed with knowledge

relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those
who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance.
The writ of amparo partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to
make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. As explained in
the Decision, it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable
doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or even administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence. The totality of evidence as a standard for the grant
of the writ was correctly applied by this Court, as first laid down in Razon v. Tagitis:
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their
totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be
admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce
our rules to the most basic test of reason i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at
hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay
evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.
Arroyo, et al.s claim that they were not competently identified as the soldiers who abducted and
detained Rodriguez, or that there was no mention of their names in the documentary evidence,
is baseless. The CA rightly considered Rodriguezs Sinumpaang Salaysay as a meticulous and
straightforward account of his horrific ordeal with the military, detailing the manner in which he
was captured and maltreated on account of his suspected membership in the NPA.
Arroyo, et al. conveniently neglect to address the findings of both the CA and this Court that
aside from the abduction of Rodriguez, Arroyo, et al., specifically 1st Lt. Matutina, had violated
and threatened the formers right to security when they made a visual recording of his house, as
well as the photos of his relatives. The CA found that the soldiers even went as far as taking
videos of the photos of Rodriguezs relatives hung on the wall of the house, and the innermost
portions of the house. There is no reasonable justification for this violation of the right to privacy
and security of Rodriguezs abode, which strikes at the very heart and rationale of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo. More importantly, Arroyo, et al. also neglect to address the Courts ruling
that the failure to conduct a fair and effective investigation similarly amounted to a violation of,
or threat to Rodriguezs rights to life, liberty, and security.
The writs curative role is an acknowledgment that the violation of the right to life, liberty,
and security may be caused not only by a public officials act, but also by his omission.
Accountability may attach to Arroyo, et al. who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have
failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance. The duty to investigate must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a
mere formality preordained to be ineffective.
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y
CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA
G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013
Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any proclamation of the winner.
Facts:

Respondent Lino Baluag, a rival mayoralty candidate of respondent Rommel Arnado, filed a
petition to disqualify and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy as municipal mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. Arnado won the 2010 elections as the new municipal mayor.
However, the COMELEC First Division annulled Arnados election changes. Arnado filed a
motion for reconsideration while petitioner Casan Maquiling, another mayoralty candidate who
placed 2nd filed a motion for intervention and motion for reconsideration. The COMELEC En
Banc, in granting Maquilings motion for intervention, cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which
allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final judgment
has been rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not
be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the
Resolution of the First Division allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code to take effect. The COMELEC En Banc granted Arnados motion for
reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether intervention is allowed in a disqualification case
Ruling:
Petition granted.
Mercado v. Manzano clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the
Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate
who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and
the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared
by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this
provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after
election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En
Banc has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the
second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC are present and therefore would not be
prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the
matter before this Court.
Arnados claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents
therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The
elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court
has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally
filed by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.

EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO v. EMERSON S. CARLOS

G.R. No. 194994, April 16, 2013
CJ Sereno
A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts jurisdiction is allowed only when there are
special and important reasons that are clearly and specifically set forth in a petition. A disregard
of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the outright dismissal of a petition.
Facts:
Petitioner Emmanuel De Castro filed petition for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto seeking
to oust respondent Emerson Carlos from the position of assistant general manager for
operations (AGMO) of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA). De Castro filed
the petition directly with the Supreme Court citing urgent demands of public interest, particularly
the veritable need for stability in the civil service and the protection of the rights of civil servants.
Moreover, considering that no other than the President of the Philippines is the appointing
authority, De Castro doubts if a trial court judge or an appellate court justice, with a prospect of
promotion in the judiciary would be willing to go against a presidential appointment.
Issue:
Whether a presidential appointee can file a petition for quo warranto under Rule 66 directly with
the Supreme Court
Ruling:
Petition denied.
Although Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the Supreme
Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus, the jurisdiction of this Court is not exclusive but is concurrent with that of
the Court of Appeals and regional trial court and does not give petitioner unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum. The hierarchy of courts must be strictly observed.
Settled is the rule that "the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial
tradition." A disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the outright
dismissal of a petition.
A direct invocation of this Courts jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and
important reasons that are clearly and specifically set forth in a petition. The rationale behind
this policy arises from the necessity of preventing (1) inordinate demands upon the time and
attention of the Court, which is better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction;
and (2) further overcrowding of the Courts docket.
In this case, De Castro justified his act of directly filing with this Court only when he filed his
Reply and after Carlos had already raised the procedural infirmity that may cause the outright
dismissal of the present Petition. De Castro likewise cites stability in the civil service and
protection of the rights of civil servants as rationale for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.

De Castros excuses are not special and important circumstances that would allow a direct
recourse to this Court. More so, mere speculation and doubt to the exercise of judicial discretion
of the lower courts are not and cannot be valid justifications to hurdle the hierarchy of courts.
Thus, the Petition must be dismissed.
AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLE RIGHTS ALLIANCE (A-IPRA) v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, et al.
G.R. No. 204591, April 16, 2013
J. Reyes
The Supreme Courts jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is
exercised only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal. Otherwise,
the Supreme Court shall not interfere with the electoral tribunals exercise of its discretion or
jurisdiction.
Facts:
Petitioner Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance (A-IPRA) is a sectoral political party
whose primordial objectives are the recognition, protection and promotion of the rights of the
indigenous people. It was allowed registration and accreditation by the COMELEC Second
Division in January 13, 2010. A-IPRA participated in the May 2010 elections with the Insigne
group, headed by Atty. Eugenio Insigne as its nominees but failed to win a seat. For the May
2013 elections, A-IPRA filed Manifestation of Intent to participate in the May 2013 elections with
the Lota Group headed by Melvin G. Lota, as its nominees. However, the Insigne Group
opposed on the ground that they were never replaced by the Lota Group in accordance with the
bylaws of A-IPRA and that they were the legitimate representatives.
On November 7, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc cancelled the registration and accreditation of
A-IPRA.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the Resolution dated November
7, 2012
Ruling:
Petition denied.
It is a well-settled principle that this Courts jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of
electoral tribunals is exercised only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the
tribunal; otherwise, the Court shall not interfere with the electoral tribunals exercise of its
discretion or jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as the capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment, the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner, where the abuse
is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty.
In Atong Paglaum, the Court specifically ruled that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its
discretion, thus:
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following
prevailing decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the

coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this
Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties
under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by
the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present
petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the partylist
system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new
parameters prescribed in this Decision.
With a definite ruling of this Court on the absence of grave abuse of discretion in the
consolidated cases of Atong Paglaum, the instant petition had become moot and academic and
must therefore be dismissed.
As regards the legitimacy of the nomination of the Lota Group raised by the Insigne group in
their petition for intervention and opposition, the same is more aptly addressed to the
COMELEC. The determination of who is the rightful representative of a political party or the
legitimate nominee of a party-list group lies with the COMELEC, as part and parcel of its
constitutional task of registering political parties, organizations and coalitions under Section
2(5), Article IX(C) of the 1987 Constitution.
Apparently, the COMELEC failed to resolve the issue of the legitimacy of the nomination of the
Lota Group in its Resolution dated November 7, 2012 and this was raised as an issue by the
Insigne Group in the instant petition. However, with the remand of all the petitions to the
COMELEC and the directive for it to redetermine the qualifications of the petitioning party-list
groups, it is only appropriate that the Insigne Group present their challenge to the legitimacy of
the Lota Groups nomination before the Commission to give it the opportunity to rule on the
matter at the same time that it reevaluates A-IPRAs qualifications to run in the May 2013
elections based on the new set of guidelines in Atong Paglaum.
PAGLAUM MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. AND HEALTH MARKETING
TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, NOTARY PUBLIC JOHN
DOE, AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE; J. KING &
SONS. CO., INC.
G.R. No. 179018, April 17, 2013
CJ Sereno
Issues raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration before the Supreme Court
are deemed waived, because these should have been brought up at the first opportunity.
Facts:
Respondent Union Bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the Supreme Courts
Decision dated 18 June 2012 raising three new arguments.
Issue:
Whether issues can be raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration before the
Supreme Court
Ruling:
Petition denied.

Issues raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration before this Court are deemed
waived, because these should have been brought up at the first opportunity. Nevertheless, there
is no cogent reason to warrant a reconsideration or modification of the 18 June 2012 Decision.
Union Bank raises three new issues that require a factual determination that is not within the
province of this Court. These questions can be brought to and resolved by the RTC as it is the
proper avenue in which to raise factual issues and to present evidence in support of these
claims.
Anent Union Bank's last contention, there is no need for the Court to discuss and revisit the
issue, being a mere rehash of what it has already resolved in its Decision.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDUARDO M. CACAYURAN
G.R. No. 191667, April 17, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
Funds coming from private sources become impressed with the characteristics of public
funds when they are under official custody. In Mamba v. Lara, it has been held that a taxpayer
need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity; as long as taxes are involved,
people have a right to question contracts entered into by the government.
Facts:
Respondent Eduardo Cacayuran, along with residents of the municipality, launched a signature
campaign opposing the construction of a commercial center at the Agoo Plaza in La Union.
They claimed that the conversion of the Agoo Plaza into a commercial center, as funded by the
proceeds from the loans extended by petitioner Land Bank were "highly irregular, violative of the
law, and detrimental to public interests, and will result to wanton desecration of the said
historical and public park." Cacayuran sent the officials a letter expressing the residents
concern and that they be furnished with copies of the pertinent documents however, his letter
was unheeded. Cacayuran then filed a complaint, in his capacity as a taxpayer, against the
Implicated Officers and Land Bank, assailing, among others, the validity of the Loans on the
ground that the Plaza Lot used as collateral thereof is property of public dominion and therefore,
beyond the commerce of man. The RTC and CA ruled in favor of Cacayuran.
Land Bank claims that Cacayuran did not have any standing to contest the construction of the
APC as it was funded through the proceeds coming from the Subject Loans and not from public
funds. Besides, Cacayuran was not even a party to any of the Subject Loans and is thus,
precluded from questioning the same.
Issue:
1. Whether Cacayuran has the standing to sue:
2. Whether the funds are public funds
3. Whether Cacayuran must be privy to the contract
Ruling:
1. Cacayuran has standing to file the instant suit.

It is hornbook principle that a taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds
are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that
there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. A
person suing as a taxpayer, however, must show that the act complained of directly involves the
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. In other words, for a taxpayers suit to
prosper, two requisites must be met namely, (1) public funds derived from taxation are
disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some
irregularity is committed; and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act.
2. The proceeds from the Subject Loans had already been converted into public
funds by the Municipalitys receipt.
First, although the construction of the APC would be primarily sourced from the proceeds of the
Subject Loans, which Land Bank insists are not taxpayers money, there is no denying that
public funds derived from taxation are bound to be expended as the Municipality assigned a
portion of its IRA as a security for the foregoing loans. Needless to state, the Municipalitys IRA,
which serves as the local government units just share in the national taxes, is in the nature of
public funds derived from taxation. The Court believes, however, that although these funds may
be posted as a security, its collateralization should only be deemed effective during the
incumbency of the public officers who approved the same, else those who succeed them be
effectively deprived of its use.
In any event, it is observed that the proceeds from the Subject Loans had already been
converted into public funds by the Municipalitys receipt thereof. Funds coming from private
sources become impressed with the characteristics of public funds when they are under official
custody.
3. A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity; as long as
taxes are involved, people have a right to question contracts entered into by the
government.../../G480/Documents/Paula
Azurin/Dean's
Circle/G.R.
No.
191667.htm - fnt33
Second, as a resident-taxpayer of the Municipality, Cacayuran is directly affected by the
conversion of the Agoo Plaza which was funded by the proceeds of the Subject Loans. It is wellsettled that public plazas are properties for public use and therefore, belongs to the public
dominion. As such, it can be used by anybody and no one can exercise over it the rights of a
private owner. In this light, Cacayuran had a direct interest in ensuring that the Agoo Plaza
would not be exploited for commercial purposes through the APCs construction. Moreover,
Cacayuran need not be privy to the Subject Loans in order to proffer his objections thereto. In
Mamba v. Lara, it has been held that a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge
its validity; as long as taxes are involved, people have a right to question contracts entered into
by the government.
Therefore, as the above-stated requisites obtain in this case, Cacayuran has standing to file the
instant suit.
APOLONIO GARCIA, in substitution of his deceased mother, Modesta Garcia, and
CRISTINA SALAMAT v. DOMINGA ROBLES vda de CAPARAS
G.R. No. 180843, April 17, 2013
J. Del Castillo

Under the Dead Man's Statute Rule, if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded
from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the
undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction. Thus, the alleged admission of the deceased Pedro Caparas that he entered into a
sharing of leasehold rights with Modesta Garcia and Cristina Salamat cannot be used as
evidence against Dominga Caparas as the latter would be unable to contradict or disprove the
same.
Facts:
Flora Makapugay owned a farm tilled by Eugenio Caparas as an agricultural lessee under a
leasehold agreement. Before Makapugay died, she appointed Amanda de la Paz, her niece, as
her attorney-in-fact. After Eugenio died, Amanda entered into an Agricultural Leasehold Contract
with Pedro Caparas, Eugenios son, installing Pedro as the sole and lone cultivator of the land.
When Pedro died, his wife Dominga Caparas took over as the agricultural lessee.
Petitioners Modesta Garcia, substituted by her son, Apolonio Garcia, and Cristina Salamat
claimed that during the lifetime of Pedro, their brother, they agreed that they would farm the land
on an alternate basis and that Makapugay was aware of this arrangement. They also claimed
that Pedro excluded them from farming the land and deceived Amanda into agreeing that he be
the sole lessee but upon learning of his deception Amanda recognized them as co-lessees of
Pedro.
The PARAD and DARAB, on appeal, ruled that Dominga was the lessee and the rightful
successor tenant. The CA denied Garcia and Salamats appeal.
Issue:
Whether the agreement entered into between Amanda and Garcia and Salamat prior to the
death of Pedro is admissible
Ruling:
Petition denied.
DARAB Case No. R-03-02-3520-96, which was filed in 1996 or long after Pedros death in 1984,
has no leg to stand on other than Amandas declaration in her July 10, 1996 Affidavit that Pedro
falsely represented to Makapugay and to her that he is the actual cultivator of the land, and that
when she confronted him about this and the alleged alternate farming scheme between him and
petitioners, Pedro allegedly told her that "he and his two sisters had an understanding about it
and he did not have the intention of depriving them of their cultivatory rights." Garcia and
Salamat have no other evidence, other than such verbal declaration, which proves the existence
of such arrangement. No written memorandum of such agreement exists, nor have they shown
that they actually cultivated the land even if only for one cropping. No receipt evidencing
payment to the landowners of the latters share, or any other documentary evidence, has been
put forward.
What the PARAD, DARAB and CA failed to consider and realize is that Amandas declaration in
her Affidavit covering Pedros alleged admission and recognition of the alternate farming
scheme is inadmissible for being a violation of the Dead Mans Statute, which provides that "if

one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other
mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction." Thus, since Pedro is deceased,
and Amandas declaration which pertains to the leasehold agreement affects the 1996
"Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" which she as assignor entered into with Garcia and Salamat,
and which is now the subject matter of the present case and claim against Pedros surviving
spouse and lawful successor-in-interest Dominga, such declaration cannot be admitted and
used against the latter, who is placed in an unfair situation by reason of her being unable to
contradict or disprove such declaration as a result of her husband-declarant Pedros prior death.
AMELIA AQUINO, et al. v. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 181973, April 17, 2013
J. Perez
Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one
case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though
the parties may be different. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have
been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by
a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.
Facts:
Petitioners Amelia Aquino, Rodolfo Taggueg, Jr., Adelaida Hernandez, and Leopoldo Biscocho,
Jr., who are second category Philippine Ports Authority officials filed a Petition for Mandamus
and Prohibition before the RTC of Manila. They claim that they are entitled to RATA in the
amount not exceeding 40% of their respective basic salaries based on recent developments
allegedly brought about by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of De Jesus v.
Commission on Audit, et al. which was decided almost six (6) years after the Courts decision in
PPA v. COA, et al. They further claim that certain issuances were released by the COA and the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM), which in effect, extended the cut-off date in the
grant of the 40% RATA, thus entitling them to these benefits.
Respondent Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res
judicata under paragraph (f), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. It argued that a case involving the
same parties, subject matter and cause of action had already been resolved by this Court in
PPA v. COA, et al. The RTC ordered the dismissal of the petition. The CA granted Aquino, et
al.s appeal ruling that res judicata is not applicable in light of the existence of COA and DBM
issuances. The case was remanded to the RTC for trial and the RTC ruled in favor of Aquino, et
al. The CA reversed the RTC.
Issue:
Whether the petition must be dismissed on the basis of res judicata or stare decisis
Ruling:
Although the principle of res judicata is not applicable, the petition must still fail because
the Courts ruling must adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis.
The Court notes that when the petition was elevated to the CA in the first instance in CA-G.R.
SP No. 64702, the matter submitted to be resolved by the appellate court was simply the issue

on whether the trial court was correct in granting the motion to dismiss and in declaring that the
case is barred by the principle of res judicata. Despite the non-appeal by PPA of the appellate
courts ruling that res judicata is not applicable, the case did not attain finality in view of the
order of the CA remanding the case to the trial court for continuation of hearing. The appellate
courts ruling in CA G.R. SP No. 91743, therefore, was not barred by the ruling in CA G.R. SP
No. 64702 since the ruling in the second instance was already a ruling after trial on the merits.
Although the principle of res judicata is not applicable, the petition must still fail because the
Courts ruling must adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis. In Chinese Young Men's Christian
Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation, the Court expounded on
the importance of this doctrine in securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:
Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that
when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the
same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is
settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one
case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though
the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any
powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the
same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly
situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.
HOLY TRINITY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. SPOUSES CARLOS
ABACAN AND ELIZABETH ABACAN
G.R. No. 183858, April 17, 2013
CJ Sereno
It is well-settled that the sole issue in ejectment cases is physical or material possession
of the subject property, independent of any claim of ownership by the parties. The argument of
Spouses Abacan that they subsequently acquired ownership of the subject property cannot be
considered as a supervening event that will bar the execution of the questioned judgment, as
unlawful detainer does not deal with the issue of ownership.
Facts:
Petitioner Holy Trinity Realty Development Corporation (HTRDC) acquired the property from
Santiago, but later found that the lot was already occupied by some individuals, among them
respondents Spouses Carlos and Elizabeth Abacan. HTRDC commenced a complaint with the
DARAB for cancellation of emancipation patents against some of the occupants of the land. The
provincial adjudicator ordered the cancellation of the emancipation patents of the occupants of
the land. The DARAB later affirmed the decision of the provincial adjudicator. HTRDC filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer and damages with the MTCC of Malolos against the occupants
of the land, again including Spouses Abacan. HTRDC made both verbal and written demands
on the occupants to vacate the property. The occupants failed to vacate the property. Thus,
HTRDC had to resort to the filing of an ejectment case against them. The MTCC decided in
favor of HTRDC.
In order to prevent the enforcement of the writ of execution and demolition, Spouses Abacan
filed several actions in the RTC but all were dismissed without appeal. The MTCC issued an

Alias Writ of Execution, and an Alias Special Order of Demolition. Spouses Abacan moved to
quash both writs on the ground that Emancipation Patent had been issued in their favor during
the pendency of the case. As such, they argued that they had now acquired ownership of
relevant portions of the subject property. The MTCC denied their motion on the ground that
Spouses Abacans acquisition of ownership is not a supervening event that will bar the
execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case. The CA held that the MTCC had no
jurisdiction over the matter.
Issues:
Whether the subsequent acquisition of ownership is not a supervening event that will bar the
execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case
Ruling:
The MTCC correctly denied their motion, citing our ruling in Oblea v. Court of
Appeals and Chua v. Court of Appeals to the effect that the subsequent acquisition of
ownership is not a supervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment in the
unlawful detainer case.
In this case, the motion to quash was grounded on the sole argument that the judgment should
no longer be enforced because of the occurrence of a material supervening event. Spouses
Abacan alleged that before the alias writs were issued, but after the MTCC rendered judgment
in the unlawful detainer case, they had acquired ownership over the subject property as
evidenced by Emancipation Patent Nos. 00780489 and 00780490.
The MTCC correctly denied their motion, citing our ruling in Oblea v. Court of Appeals and Chua
v. Court of Appeals to the effect that the subsequent acquisition of ownership is not a
supervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case.
According to the MTCC:
This court gives due weight to the ruling of the Supreme Court in the cases of Oblea vs. Court
of Appeals (244 SCRA 101) and Chua vs. Court of Appeals (271 SCRA 564), wherein it made a
categorical pronouncement that the subsequent acquisition of ownership by any person is not a
supervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case. True
it is that the sole issue in an action for unlawful detainer x x x is physical or material possession.
Such issue of physical or material possession was already passed upon by this court during
trial. As held in the case of Dizon vs. Concina (30 SCRA 897), the judgment rendered in an
action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in
no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar
an action between the parties respecting title to the land or building. (Sec. 18, Rule 70, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure)
It is well-settled that the sole issue in ejectment cases is physical or material possession of the
subject property, independent of any claim of ownership by the parties. The argument of
Spouses Abacan that they subsequently acquired ownership of the subject property cannot be
considered as a supervening event that will bar the execution of the questioned judgment, as
unlawful detainer does not deal with the issue of ownership.

SPOUSES ARMANDO SILVERIO, SR. and REMEDIOS SILVERIO v. SPOUSES RICARDO

and EVELYN MARCELO/SPOUSES EVELYN and RICARDO MARCELO v. SPOUSES
ARMANDO SILVERI, SR. and REMEDIOS SILVERIO
G.R. Nos. 184079/184490, April 17, 2013
J. VILLARAMA, JR.
It must be stated that the purpose of an action of forcible entry and detainer is that,
regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror.
Facts:
Respondents, Spouses Ricardo and Evelyn Marcelo filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer
against petitioners, Spouses Armando Silverio, Sr., and his mother, Remedios Silverio before
the MeTC of Paraaque City Branch 78. Spouses Marcelo represented themselves as the
lawful owners and possessors of Lot 3976, a residential land in Marcelo Compound, Paraaque
City. They claimed ownership over said lot by virtue of a DENR Decision and a Tax Declaration.
Spouses Marcelo alleged that Spouses Silverio sought permission to construct a house within
Lot 3976 to which Spouses Marcelo agreed on the condition that they will vacate the moment
they need the land. Subsequently, Spouses Marcelo made an oral demand on Spouses Silverio
to leave the house and return possession of the lot within 15 days from notice but the demand
was unheeded. Aside from this, Spouses Marcelo filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer against
respondents Armando Silverio, Sr., and Remedios Silverio before the MeTC of Paraaque City
Bracnh 78. The complaint bore the same allegations in their complaint except that Spouses
Marcelo asked for Spouses Silverios permission to construct a house and that Spouses
Marcelo improved the house and operated a sari sari store.
The MeTC of Paraaque City Branches 77 and 78, decided in favor of Spouses Marcelo. The
Paraaque RTC Branches 258 and 257 affirmed the ruling of the MeTC Branches 77 and 78
respectively. The CA affirmed the MeTC and RTC. The CA found Spouses Marcelo guilty of
forum shopping and splitting of a cause of action. It observed that the two cases for unlawful
detainer filed by Spouses Marcelo are based on a single claim of ownership over Lot 3976
which embraces the subject properties.
Spouses Silverio and Remedios Silverio claim that a DENR Decision annulled and cancelled the
Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) of Spouses Marcelo and that Lot 3976 remained as
public land.
Issues:
1. Whether the filing of separate complaints for unlawful detainer against the same
lessees who refuse to vacate, on demand, two different houses constitutes forum
shopping and splitting of a cause of action
2. Who between the spouses Marcelo and the Silverios have better right to the physical
possession of Lot 3976?
Ruling:

1. Evidently, the Spouses Marcelo engaged in forum shopping by filing separate

cases for unlawful detainer based on a single claim of ownership over Lot

3976. Said act is likewise tantamount to splitting a cause of action which, in

this case, is a cause for dismissal on the ground of litis pendentia.
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under
any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is
originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. In
an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. Where the issue
of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to
determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely
provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to
the property.
Evidently, the Spouses Marcelo engaged in forum shopping by filing separate cases for unlawful
detainer based on a single claim of ownership over Lot 3976. Said act is likewise tantamount to
splitting a cause of action which, in this case, is a cause for dismissal on the ground of litis
pendentia. On this score alone, the petition for review on certiorari filed by the Spouses Marcelo
in G.R. Nos. 184490 must fail, alongside their averments in G.R. No. 184079.
2. In any case, even if the Court confronts the issue as to who between the
Spouses Marcelo and the Silverios have better right of possession over the
subject properties, Spouses Marcelo would still not prevail.
As earlier stated, the DENR-NCR had canceled the MSA filed by the spouses Marcelo in its
Decision dated July 11, 2007. The Department found that the spouses Marcelo failed to satisfy
the requirements for the acquisition of Lot 3976 under the Public Land Act. The DENR-NCR
clarified that the Decision dated December 12, 1996 gave due course to the application, not
only of the spouses Marcelo, but also those of other applicants. It gave weight to the findings in
the ocular inspection that the spouses Marcelo are actually occupying only 50 square meters of
Lot 3976 while the remaining portions are inhabited by 111 families. The DENR-NCR adds that
the spouses Marcelo cannot claim the entire Lot No. 3976 since Republic Act No. 730 limits the
area of land that may be applied for to 1,000 square meters. In conclusion, the DENR-NCR held
that Lot 3976 remains a public land and its dwellers may apply for the purchase of those
portions that they are actually occupying.
Factual considerations relating to lands of the public domain properly rest within the
administrative competence of the Director of Lands and the DENR. Findings of administrative
agencies, which have acquired expertise because of their jurisdiction, are confined to specific
matters and are accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts. Even if they are not binding to
civil courts exercising jurisdiction over ejectment cases, such factual findings deserve great
consideration and are accorded much weight.
Nonetheless, the declaration by the DENR-NCR that Lot 3976 is still part of the public domain
does not mean that neither of the parties is entitled to the possession of the subject properties.
In Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, we reiterated the policy behind the summary action of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer, thus:
It must be stated that the purpose of an action of forcible entry and detainer is that, regardless
of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall
not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. In affording this remedy of restitution the

object of the statute is to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which would
ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable hope such withdrawal would
create that some advantage must accrue to those persons who, believing themselves entitled to
the possession of property, resort to force to gain possession rather than to some appropriate
action in the courts to assert their claims. This is the philosophy at the foundation of all these
actions of forcible entry and detainer which are designed to compel the party out of possession
to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is
his.../../G480/Documents/Paula Azurin/Dean's Circle/G.R. No. 184079.htm - fnt56
It is undisputed by the spouses Marcelo that the Silverios presently occupy those portions of Lot
3976 which are the subjects of the consolidated petitions before us. In particular, the Silverios
tie their possession of the parcel at issue in G.R. No. 184490 to Florante Marcelo who
appropriated a portion of Lot 3976 for himself, and with his wife, constructed a house thereon in
1986. As regards the portion of Lot 3976 subject of G.R. No. 184079, the Silverios have
established their dwelling thereon in 1987 - long after Lot 3976 was classified as alienable and
disposable public land on January 3, 1968.
Considering that the Silverios are in actual possession of the subject portions of Lot 3976, they
are entitled to remain on the property until a person who has a title or a better right lawfully
ejects them. The ruling in this case, however, does not preclude the Silverios and the spouses
Marcelo from introducing evidence and presenting arguments before the proper administrative
agency to establish any right to which they may be entitled under the law.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT FO THE PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) v. SPOUSES WILLIAM AND REBECCA GENATO
G.R. No. 187677, April 17, 2013
CJ Sereno
The existence of doubt or obscurity in the title of the person or persons claiming
ownership of the properties to be expropriated would not preclude the commencement of the
action nor prevent the court from assuming jurisdiction thereof. The Rules merely require, in
such eventuality, that the entity exercising the right of eminent domain should state in the
complaint that the true ownership of the property cannot be ascertained or specified with
accuracy.
Facts:
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines represented by the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) filed a complaint against several defendants including respondents, Spouses
William and Rebecca Genato. The Republic was informed that the land of Spouses Genato
overlapped government property causing it to file a Manifestation and Motion to have the
property declared or considered of uncertain ownership or subject of conflicting claims. The
RTC admitted the amended complaint and deferred the release of the amount and deposited it
with the bank as well as declaring the property as subject of conflicting claims. The RTC ruled
that the issue of the validity of the title would be properly ventilated in a separate proceeding
and barred the Republic from presenting further evidence. The CA dismissed the Republics
appeal.
Issue:

Whether the trial court has the jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of the ownership of the land in
an expropriation proceeding
Ruling:
Petition granted.
Indeed, this Court first had the occasion to interpret Section 9, Rule 67 in the case of Republic.
In addressing the issue of "whether or not the court that hears the expropriation case has also
jurisdiction to determine, in the same proceeding, the issue of ownership of the land sought to
be condemned," the Court answered in the affirmative:
The sole issue in this case, i.e., whether or not the court that hears the expropriation case has
also jurisdiction to determine, in the same proceeding, the issue of ownership of the land sought
to be condemned, must be resolved in the affirmative. That the court is empowered to entertain
the conflicting claims of ownership of the condemned or sought to be condemned property and
adjudge the rightful owner thereof, in the same expropriation case, is evident from Section 9 of
the Revised Rule 69, which provides:
SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership. Conflicting claims. If the ownership of the property taken is
uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or
sums awarded as compensation for the property to be paid to the clerk of court for the benefit of
the persons adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall
require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the clerk before the
plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already
been made.
In fact, the existence of doubt or obscurity in the title of the person or persons claiming
ownership of the properties to be expropriated would not preclude the commencement of the
action nor prevent the court from assuming jurisdiction thereof. The Rules merely require, in
such eventuality, that the entity exercising the right of eminent domain should state in the
complaint that the true ownership of the property cannot be ascertained or specified with
accuracy.
However, the authority to resolve ownership should be taken in the proper context. The
discussion in Republic was anchored on the question of who among the respondents claiming
ownership of the property must be indemnified by the Government:
Now, to determine the person who is to be indemnified for the expropriation of Lot 6, Block 6,
Psd-2017, the court taking cognizance of the expropriation must necessarily determine if the
sale to the Punzalan spouses by Antonio Feliciano is valid or not. For if valid, said spouses must
be the ones to be paid by the condemnor; but if invalid, the money will be paid to someone else.
Thus, such findings of ownership in an expropriation proceeding should not be construed as
final and binding on the parties. By filing an action for expropriation, the condemnor (petitioner),
merely serves notice that it is taking title to and possession of the property, and that the
defendant is asserting title to or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to
prove a right to compensation for the taking.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DANTE L. DUMALAG
G.R. No. 180514, April 17, 2013

J. Leonardo-De Castro
The failure of police officers to mark the items seized from an accused in illegal drugs
cases immediately upon its confiscation at the place of arrest does not automatically impair the
integrity of the chain of custody and render the confiscated items inadmissible in
evidence. Marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest
police station or office of the apprehending team.
Facts:
A buy-bust operation was organized composed of PO3 Albano, PO2 Valdez, SPO4 Salvatierra
and PO2 Harold Nicolas, with PO3 Albano acting as the poseur-buyer. PO3 Albano marked the
buy bust money with the letter R. The team proceeded to the respondent, Dante Dumalags
room, Room 03 at the beach resort. Dumalag gave a sachet with white substance to PO3
Albano and PO3 Albano gave the marked money to Dumalag. PO3 Albano gave the signal and
Dumalag was apprehended. They brought Dumalag to the Laoag police station where the
sachet was marked R on one side and DD by PO3 Albano. PO2 Valdez marked the items he
confiscated DUV and brought the items to the laboratory for examination along with a letter
request. The laboratory examination yielded a positive result for metamphetamine
hydrochloride.
During his testimony, PO3 Albano identified their Joint Affidavit of arrest, the extract of the police
blotter showing the pre-operation activity; the extract of the police blotter containing the post
operations report, the two pieces of P100 bills buy bust money, the three plastic confiscated
from the possession of the accused with the marking letter "R" and "DD", the P50 bill in which
the three sachets were supposedly rolled, the plastic sachet containing crystalline substance
that was sold by the suspect and the Certification of Seized Items. PO2 Valdez identified those
that he confiscated: the five (5) pieces of crumpled aluminum foil, the Nokia 3210 cellphone, the
Winston cigarette pack, a stick of Winston cigarette and a purple cigarette lighter. Both
witnesses also identified the letter request for laboratory examination and the letter request for
urine examination. The RTC and CA convicted Dumalag.
Dumalag argued that the police officers who arrested him and purportedly confiscated the
sachets of shabu from his possession failed to strictly comply with the mandated procedure
under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Dumalag claimed that the sachets of shabu
supposedly seized from his possession were marked when he was already at the police station
and not at the place of his arrest.
Issues:
Whether the chain of custody rule has been complied with
Ruling:
The Court finds that the chain of custody of the sachets of shabu seized from Dumalag
had been duly established by the prosecution, in compliance with Section 21 of Republic
Act No. 9165.
In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the following elements must
concur: (1) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment thereof. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of

dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually occurred, coupled with the
presentation in court of the substance seized as evidence.
In this case, prosecution witnesses, PO3 Albano and PO2 Valdez, categorically stated under
oath that as members of the buy-bust team, they caught accused-appellant in flagrante delicto
selling and possessing shabu. The prosecution was able to establish that (a) Dumalag had no
authority to sell or to possess any dangerous drugs; (b) during the buy-bust operation
conducted by the police on January 5, 2005 at the Sexy Beach Resort in Barangay Estancia,
Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte, accused-appellant sold and delivered to PO3 Albano, acting as a
poseur-buyer, for the price of Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00), one heat-sealed plastic sachet
containing 0.023 grams of white crystalline substance, chemically confirmed to be shabu; and
(c) as a result of a search incidental to the valid warrantless arrest of accused-appellant, he was
caught in possession of three more heat-sealed plastic sachets containing 0.01, 0.015, and 0.04
grams of white crystalline substance, all chemically confirmed also to be shabu. The two
marked One Hundred Peso (P100.00) bills used as buy-bust money, as well as the
aforementioned sachets of shabu were among the object evidence submitted by the prosecution
to the RTC.
As for the non-presentation by the prosecution of the informant, this point need not be
belabored. The Court has time and again held that "the presentation of an informant in an illegal
drugs case is not essential for the conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution
because his testimony would be merely corroborative and cumulative." The informant's
testimony is not needed if the sale of the illegal drug has been adequately proven by the
prosecution.
Furthermore, the Court finds that the chain of custody of the sachets of shabu seized from
Dumalag had been duly established by the prosecution, in compliance with Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165. As pertinently summarized by the Court of Appeals, the prosecution had
proven each and every link of the chain of custody of the sachets of shabu from the time they
were seized from Dumalag, kept in police custody then transferred to the laboratory for
examination, and up to their presentation in court.
It has already been settled that the failure of police officers to mark the items seized from an
accused in illegal drugs cases immediately upon its confiscation at the place of arrest does not
automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody and render the confiscated items
inadmissible in evidence. In, People v. Resurreccion, the Court explained that "marking" of the
seized items "immediately after seizure and confiscation" may be undertaken at the police
station rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of an accused
in illegal drugs cases. It was further emphasized that what is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The Court elaborated in
this wise:
Jurisprudence tells us that the failure to immediately mark seized drugs will not automatically
impair the integrity of chain of custody.
The failure to strictly comply with Sec. 21(1), Art. II of RA 9165 does not necessarily render an
accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

There is no question herein that the confiscated sachets of shabu and related paraphernalia
were inventoried and marked in the presence of Dumalag at the police station where he was
brought right after his arrest.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALBERTO DELIGERO y BACASMOT
G.R. No. 189280, April 17, 2013
J. Leonardo-De Castro
The granduncle, or more specifically the brother of the victims grandfather, is a relative
of the victim in the fourth civil degree, and is thus not covered by Article 266-B, paragraph 5(1)
of the Revised Penal Code.
Facts:
Respondent Alberto Deligero was charged with qualified rape in an Information for raping his
granddaughter, AAA, a minor of 15 years of age. The Information alleged him as AAAs
grandfather. The RTC convicted Deligero of qualified rape. The CA affirmed the conviction.
However, the CA held that the crime committed was only simple rape as the unauthenticated
photocopy of AAAs baptismal certificate was not sufficient to prove the age of AAA.
Furthermore, while it was alleged in the Information that Deligero is AAAs grandfather, what was
proven during the trial was that he was AAAs granduncle, being the brother of AAAs paternal
grandfather.
Issue:
Whether Deligero is liable for qualified rape being the granduncle of AAA
Ruling:
Petition granted.
The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the deportment and manner of testifying of
Ecatan and Deligero, on one hand, and that of AAA, on the other, concluded that it was AAA
who was telling the truth. This Court has repeatedly held that factual findings of the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are "entitled to great weight and respect, if not
conclusiveness, for we accept that the trial court was in the best position as the original trier of
the facts in whose direct presence and under whose keen observation the witnesses rendered
their respective versions of the events that made up the occurrences constituting the ingredients
of the offenses charged. The direct appreciation of testimonial demeanor during examination,
veracity, sincerity and candor was foremost the trial courts domain, not that of a reviewing court
that had no similar access to the witnesses at the time they testified." Thus, where the Deligero,
as in the case at bar, fails to show that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals overlooked a
material fact that otherwise would change the outcome, or misappreciated a circumstance of
consequence in their assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and of their respective
versions, this Court is constrained to affirm such uniform factual findings.
The Court of Appeals modified the Decision of the trial court and adjudged Deligero to be liable
only for simple rape, ruling that the unauthenticated photocopy of AAAs baptismal certificate
was not sufficient to prove the age of AAA. The Court of Appeals furthermore ruled that while it
was alleged in the Information that Deligero is AAAs grandfather, what was proven during the
trial was that he was AAAs granduncle, being the brother of AAAs paternal grandfather.

The Court agrees with the modification of the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the Court notes that
even if the correct blood relationship of being AAAs granduncle was alleged in the Information,
and the age of AAA was proven by sufficient evidence, Deligero would still be liable for simple
rape. The granduncle, or more specifically the brother of the victims grandfather, is a relative of
the victim in the fourth civil degree, and is thus not covered by Article 266-B, paragraph 5(1) of
the Revised Penal Code.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARILYN AGUILAR y MANZANILLO
G.R. No. 191396, April 17, 2013
J. Leonardo-De Castro
Despite the failure of the apprehending officers to make an inventory of and to
photograph the items seized from Aguilar, they were nevertheless able to prove that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the evidence had been preserved, the chain of custody of such items,
having been adequately established in the case at bar.
Facts:
A buy-bust operation was conducted with PO2 Medrano as the poseur-buyer. PO2 Medrano
marked the buy-bust money with the initials JG. After respondent Marilyn Aguilar received the
buy-bust money from PO2 Medrano and giving the sachet containing a white crystalline
substance to PO2 Medrano, PO2 Medrano gave the signal and his companions rushed forward.
They introduced themselves as police officers and apprised her of her rights. PO2 Medrano was
able to retrieve another sachet from Aguilars pockets when she was asked to turn out her
pockets. Aguilar was brought to the police station of Taguig City.PO2 Medrano brought the
seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame where the items were identified as
metamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Aguilar argues that the police officers failed to follow the protocol in the custody and control of
seized items due to the absence of an inventory and photographs of the confiscated drugs as
required by R.A. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations.
Issue:
Whether the chain of custody rule has been complied with
Ruling:
Despite the failure of the apprehending officers to make an inventory of and to
photograph the items seized from Aguilar, they were nevertheless able to prove that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence had been preserved, the chain of custody
of such items, having been adequately established in the case at bar.
While a testimony about a perfect and unbroken chain is ideal, such is not always the standard
as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. A perusal of the law reveals,
however, that failure to strictly comply with the procedure in Section 21 will not render the arrest
illegal or the items seized inadmissible in evidence, provided that the integrity and evidentiary
value of such items are preserved since they will be used in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.

Despite the failure of the apprehending officers to make an inventory of and to photograph the
items seized from Aguilar, they were nevertheless able to prove that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the evidence had been preserved, the chain of custody of such items, having been
adequately established in the case at bar. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals:
It was undisputed that at about 6:20 in the evening of November 30, 2004, PO2 Medrano
bought a sachet of shabu from accused-appellant which he paid with two (2) P500.00 marked
bill[s]. PO2 Medrano placed the shabu in his pocket then executed the pre-arranged signal.
After arresting accused-appellant, PO2 Medrano seized the marked money from the formers
left hand then frisked accused-appellant and found another sachet of shabu. He marked the
sachet of shabu he bought "RM-1" and the one he found in accused-appellants pocket "RM-2".
They brought accused-appellant and the seized items to the headquarters. While accusedappellant was being booked, the team prepared the request for laboratory examination. The
request and the seized drugs were personally brought by PO2 Medrano to the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Quezon City that same evening. P/Insp. Angel Timario received the request and
specimens brought by PO2 Medrano. He weighed and examined the contents of the sachets,
confirming that the items were methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. His findings are
embodied in Chemistry Report No. D-1171-04. The specimens which bore the markings "RM-1"
and "RM-2" were identified by PO2 Medrano during trial.
SPOUSES FELIX CHINGKOE and ROSITA CHINGKOE v. SPOUSES FAUSTINO CHINGKOE
and GLORIA CHINGKOE
G.R. No. 185518, April 17, 2013
CJ Sereno
In the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may
properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the
record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is
made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is
sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is
actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or with the consent
of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.
Facts:
Respondents, Spouses Faustino and Gloria Chingkoe are the registered owners of a real
property in Quezon City, where they allowed Spouses Felix and Rosita to inhabit. Due to the
insistence of his mother, Tan Po Chu, Faustino agreed to sell to Felix the property on the
condition that the title shall be delivered only after the full payment of the purchase price and
settlement of their mortgage obligations with RCBC. Faustino delivered to Felix an uncompleted
Deed of Sale to be completed upon full payment.
Faustino sent a demand letter asking Felix and Rosita to vacate the property but refused to do
so. Faustino and Gloria then filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTC of Quezon
City. Felix and Rosita, in their Answer, presented a complete Deed of Sale claiming that they
had paid the full price but Faustino and Gloria refused to give them the property. Felix and
Rosita filed an action for specific performance against Faustino and Gloria.

The MTC ruled in favor of Felix and Rosita taking into consideration the Deed of Sale. The RTC
affirmed the MTC. The CA reversed the lower courts saying that the Deed of Sale was only a
document preparatory to an actual sale.
Issues:
1. Whether the CA can admit and give weight to a testimony given in a different
proceeding (action for specific performance) pending before the Regional Trial Court
in resolving the issue herein (unlawful detainer)
2. Whether the CA can rule on the validity of a Deed of Sale in a summary ejectment
action
Ruling:
1. The reasons advanced by the CA in taking judicial notice of Civil Case No.
3156 are valid and not contrary to law.
The reasons advanced by the CA in taking judicial notice of Civil Case No. 3156 are valid and
not contrary to law. As a general rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the
adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even
when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact
that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge." The
general rule admits of exceptions as enumerated in Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, the Court,
citing U.S. v. Claveria, which the Court quotes:
In the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly
treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of
a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to
it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently
designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn
from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and
admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.
It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, in the absence of objection, with
the knowledge of the opposing party, or at the request or with the consent of the parties the
case is clearly referred to or the original or part of the records of the case are actually
withdrawn from the archives' and 'admitted as part of the record of the case then pending.
And unlike the factual situation in Tabuena v. CA, the decision in Civil Case No. 3156 formed
part of the records of the instant case (Civil Case No. 2728) with the knowledge of the parties
and in the absence of their objection.
In the case at bar, as the CA rightly points out in its Resolution dated 28 November 2008, Felix
and Rosita never objected to the introduction of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes containing
the testimony of Tan Po Chu, which were records of Civil Case No. Q-95-22865. As shown by
the records and as Felix and Rosita admitted in their Reply, the testimony was already
introduced on appeal before the RTC. In fact, it was Felix and Rosita themselves who
specifically cited Civil Case No. Q-95-22865, referring to it both by name and number,
purportedly to bolster the claim that they were constrained to sue, in order to compel delivery of
the title.

2. Although the issue in unlawful detainer cases is physical possession over

a property, trial courts may provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for
the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession.
Concerning the second issue, Felix and Rosita object to the assessment of the Deed of Sale by
the CA, claiming such a determination is improper in summary proceedings. It should be noted
that it was Felix and Rosita who introduced the Deed of Sale in evidence before the MTC and
the RTC, as evidence of their claimed right to possession over the property. They attached the
deed to their Answer as Annex "1." The CA discovered that they falsified their copy of the
document denominated as Deed of Absolute Sale in this wise:
Said draft of the deed was undated and bears the signature of one witness, as can be clearly
noticed upon its very careful perusal. Notably, respondents made it appear in the draft of the
Deed of Absolute Sale that there indeed was a valid and consummated sale when in truth and in
fact, there was none. The document accomplished by the respondents (herein petitioners) gave
them some semblance, albeit highly questionable, of ownership over the property by affixing
their signatures, affixing the signature of one Cora Hizon as witness and superimposing the
signature of Jane Chan with that of one Noralyn Collado.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 states that when the defendant raises the question of ownership in
unlawful detainer cases and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession. This Court has repeatedly ruled that although the issue in unlawful detainer cases
is physical possession over a property, trial courts may provisionally resolve the issue of
ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession. "These actions are
intended to avoid disruption of public order by those who would take the law in their hands
purportedly to enforce their claimed right of possession. In these cases, the issue is pure
physical or de facto possession, and pronouncements made on questions of ownership are
provisional in nature. The provisional determination of ownership in the ejectment case cannot
be clothed with finality."
MAY 2013
JUNE 2013
MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and the ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR
GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE
G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013
J. Carpio
Fujiki, Marinays first spouse, filed an action for recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying the second bigamous marriage of her marriage to Maekara. The recognition of the
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new
status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in the civil registry.
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without
prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of

criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code, "the term of prescription of the crime of bigamy shall not run when
the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."
FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese national, married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay in the Philippines but both lost contact with one another. Marinay met another
Japanese national, Shinichi Maekara and married in the Philippines without dissolving the first
marriage. Fujiki and Marinay reestablished their relationship and were able to obtain a judgment
from a Japanese family court declaring the marriage between Maekara and Marinay as void for
being bigamous.
Fujiki filed a petition for the recognition of the judgment of the Japanese family court with
the RTC of Quezon City. The RTC dismissed the petition because only "the husband or the
wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void,
and not Fujiki. The RTC denied Fujikis motion for reconsideration. The Solicitor General, acting
for the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of
the NSO, filed a Manifestation and Motion agreeing with Fujikis petition, arguing that Fujiki is an
injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage void and that the petition to
recognize the foreign judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
RULING:
Petition granted.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirements of
proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses
and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the
investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of
the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court
"where the corresponding civil registry is located." In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot
dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil
registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry
entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts
under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It
is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which

presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A.
No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute
their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a
party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in
Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment
is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging
party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither
inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section
48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive
evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right
becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of
entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in
the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the
effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without
prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of
criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run
when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH
DIVISION), ANTONIO P. BELICENA, ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR., RAUL C. DE VERA,
ROSANNA P. DIALA and JOSEPH A. CABOTAJE
G.R. Nos. 185729-32, June 26, 2013
J. Abad
After Mercado was granted immunity and placed under the witness protection program,
the Sandiganbayan refused to recognize his immunity by declining to discharge him from the
information as a state witness. The authority to grant immunity is not an inherent judicial
function. Indeed, Congress has vested such power in the Ombudsman as well as in the
Secretary of Justice. Besides, the decision to employ an accused as a state witness must
necessarily originate from the public prosecutors whose mission is to obtain a successful
prosecution of the several accused before the courts. Courts should generally defer to the
judgment of the prosecution and deny a motion to discharge an accused so he can be used as
a witness only in clear cases of failure to meet the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119.

FACTS:
Homero A. Mercado, was the President of JAM Liner, Inc. The other respondents,
Antonio A. Belicena, Uldarico P. Andutan Jr., Raul C. De Vera, and Rosanna P. Diala, were
Department of Finance (DOF) officials formerly assigned at its One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax
Credit and Drawback Center (DOF One-Stop Shop). Mercado showed willingness to testify
against the criminal syndicate that allegedly ran the tax credit scam at the DOF One-Stop Shop
and applied with the Department of Justice (DOJ) for immunity as state witness under its
witness protection program. The DOJ granted immunity to Mercado. The Office of the
Ombudsman charged him and Belicena, et al. before the Sandiganbayans Fourth Division with
violations of Section 3(j) of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 and two counts of falsification under Article
171, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code.
Mercado filed a motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation before the Ombudsman,
citing the DOJs grant of immunity to him. The Ombudsman executed an Immunity
Agreement with Mercado. The agreement provided that, in consideration for granting him
immunity from suit, Mercado would produce all relevant documents in his possession and testify
against the accused in all the cases, criminal or otherwise, that may be filed against them. The
Ombudsman filed a motion to discharge Mercado from the information involving him. The
Sandiganbayan denied the Ombudsmans motion ruling that the pieces of evidence adduced
during the hearing of the Ombudsmans motion failed to establish the conditions required under
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court for the discharge of an accused as a state witness.
The Sandiganbayan denied the Ombudsmans motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in refusing to recognize the immunity
from criminal prosecution that the Ombudsman granted Mercado and, as a result, in declining to
discharge him from the information as a state witness
RULING:
Petition granted.
The authority to grant immunity is not an inherent judicial function. Indeed, Congress has
vested such power in the Ombudsman as well as in the Secretary of Justice. Besides, the
decision to employ an accused as a state witness must necessarily originate from the public
prosecutors whose mission is to obtain a successful prosecution of the several accused before
the courts. The latter do not as a rule have a vision of the true strength of the prosecutions
evidence until after the trial is over. Consequently, courts should generally defer to the judgment
of the prosecution and deny a motion to discharge an accused so he can be used as a witness
only in clear cases of failure to meet the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119.
But the records, particularly Mercados consolidated affidavit, show that his testimony if
true could be indispensable in establishing the circumstances that led to the preparation and
issuance of fraudulent tax credit certificates. Indeed, nobody appears to be in a better position
to testify on this than he, as president of JAM Liner, Inc., the company to which those
certificates were issued.
Belicena, et al. further contend that Mercado should not be granted immunity because
he also benefited from the unlawful transactions. But the immunity granted to Mercado does not

blot out the fact that he committed the offense. While he is liable, the State saw a higher social
value in eliciting information from him rather than in engaging in his prosecution.
PHILIPPINE HAMMONIA SHIP AGENCY, INC. and DORCHESTER MARINE, LTD. v.
EULOGIO DUMADAG
G.R. No. 194362, June 26, 2013
J. Brion
For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented by the parties or any of them. Otherwise stated, there is a question of
law when the issue arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of
fact when the issue involves the truth or falsehood of alleged facts. In the present case, the
controversy arises not from the findings made by Hammonia and Dorchesters physicians which
contradict the fit-to-work certification of the company-designated physician; it arises from the
application of the law and jurisprudence on the conflicting assessments of the two sets of
physicians.
FACTS:
Petitioners Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc., in behalf of its principal, Dorchester
Marine Ltd., hired respondent Eulogio V. Dumadag for four months as Able Bodied Seaman for
the vessel Al Hamra after being declared fit for work. However, while on board Dumadag
complained of difficulty in sleeping but was adjudged twice to be fit for work. When his contract
ended, he was not rehired despite the findings that he was fit to work. After four consultations
finding him unfit for work at sea, Dumadag filed a claim for permanent total disability benefits,
reimbursement of medical expenses, sickness allowance and attorneys fees against Hammonia
and Dorchester. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Dumadag which was affirmed by the NLRC
and the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition should be dismissed for raising only questions of fact and not of law in
violation of the rules.
RULING:
Petition denied.
The Court finds Hammonia and Dorchesters position untenable. For a question to be
one of law, it must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
by the parties or any of them. Otherwise stated, there is a question of law when the issue arises
as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the issue
involves the truth or falsehood of alleged facts. In the present case, the controversy arises not
from the findings made by Hammonia and Dorchesters physicians which contradict the fit-towork certification of the company-designated physician; it arises from the application of the law
and jurisprudence on the conflicting assessments of the two sets of physicians. The Court thus
finds no procedural obstacle in its review of the case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DATU NOT ABDUL
G.R. No. 186137, June 26, 2013
CJ Sereno

Abdul was convicted despite the evidentiary gaps in the testimonies of the police
officers. The chain-of-custody rule is a method of authenticating evidence, by which the corpus
delicti presented in court is shown to be one and the same as that which was retrieved from the
accused or from the crime scene. Two crucial links must be complied with. First, the seized
illegal drug must be marked in the presence of the accused and immediately upon confiscation.
This marking must be supported by details on how, when, and where the marking was done, as
well as the witnesses to the marking. Second, the turnover of the seized drugs at every stage
from confiscation from the accused, transportation to the police station, conveyance to the
chemistry lab, and presentation to the court must be shown and substantiated.
It was a grave error for the CA to rule that there was an unbroken chain of custody
simply because the plastic sachet had been marked, inventoried, sent to the crime laboratory
for analysis, and found positive for shabu, despite the fact that the integrity of the confiscated
item throughout the entire process had never been established.
FACTS:
Respondent Datu Not Abdul was apprehended during a buy-bust operation conducted
by PO2 Daniel Akia of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency acting as the poseur-buyer
together with P S/Insp John Mencio, SPO4 Marquez Madlon, and PO2 Erwin Garcia. The police
officers brought him to the PDEA office, where the operation was documented and the arrest
report and the Affidavits of the arresting officers were prepared. Also, an inventory of the item
seized from Adbul was made in the presence of representatives from the Department of Justice
(DOJ), the media, and the barangay council. PO2 Akia allegedly marked the plastic sachet with
the initials "MKM, DEA, EMG" and Exhibit "A." The plastic sachet was then forwarded to the
PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office Cordillera Administrative Region for analysis. The
forensic analyst, PO2 Juliet Valentin Albon issued a chemistry report which found that the plastic
sachet contained 1.85 grams of a white crystalline substance; and that a qualitative examination
gave a positive result for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
The RTC convicted Abdul which was affirmed by the CA. In his appeal before the
Supreme Court, Abdul cited inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers and that
the buy-bust operation team failed to follow the guidelines for drug operations, as SPO4 Madlon
testified that he did not place any markings on the plastic sachet of shabu at the place where
the arrest took place, but only marked it at the office. Also, the testimonies of PO2 Akia and PO2
Garcia were silent as to when and where the marking of the shabu took place.
ISSUES:
1. Whether an issue raised for the first on appeal may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court
2. Whether the prosecution sufficiently established compliance with the chain-ofcustody rule
RULING:
Petition granted.

1. This case falls under this exception because the CA, in appreciating the
facts, erred in affirming the RTCs ruling that there was compliance with the
rule on the chain of custody.
Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments should be brought to the attention of the
trial court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. An exception to this rule arises
when there is plain error. An instance of plain error is overlooking, misapprehending, or
misapplying facts of weight and substance that, if properly appreciated, would warrant a
different conclusion. This case falls under this exception because the CA, in appreciating the
facts, erred in affirming the RTCs ruling that there was compliance with the rule on the chain of
custody.
2. It was a grave error for the CA to rule that there was an unbroken chain of
custody simply because the plastic sachet had been marked, inventoried,
sent to the crime laboratory for analysis, and found positive for shabu,
despite the fact that the integrity of the confiscated item throughout the
entire process had never been established.
The chain-of-custody rule is a method of authenticating evidence, by which the corpus
delicti presented in court is shown to be one and the same as that which was retrieved from the
accused or from the crime scene. This rule, when applied to drug cases, requires a more
stringent application, because the corpus delicti the narcotic substance is not readily
identifiable and must be subjected to scientific analysis to determine its composition and
nature.
Hence, every link in the chain of custody must not show any possibility of tampering,
alteration or substitution. However, it is accepted that a perfect chain is not the
standard. Nonetheless, two crucial links must be complied with. First, the seized illegal drug
must be marked in the presence of the accused and immediately upon confiscation. This
marking must be supported by details on how, when, and where the marking was done, as well
as the witnesses to the marking. Second, the turnover of the seized drugs at every stage from
confiscation from the accused, transportation to the police station, conveyance to the chemistry
lab, and presentation to the court must be shown and substantiated.
All the foregoing facts show that there were substantial evidentiary gaps in the chain of
custody of the plastic sachet. Hence, these facts put into question the reliability and evidentiary
value of the contents of the alleged confiscated plastic sachet from appellant if indeed it was
the same as the one brought to the laboratory for examination, found positive for shabu, and
then presented before the RTC. It was a grave error for the CA to rule that there was an
unbroken chain of custody simply because the plastic sachet had been marked, inventoried,
sent to the crime laboratory for analysis, and found positive for shabu, despite the fact that the
integrity of the confiscated item throughout the entire process had never been established. It is
of no moment either that Abdul stipulated the existence of Chemistry Report No. D-057-05, as
this report did not amount to an admission of the identity of the contents of the plastic sachet.
Instead, it merely proved the existence and authenticity of the request for a laboratory
examination, and its result had no bearing on the required chain of custody from the time of
seizure of the plastic sachet.
J PLUS ASIA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. UTILITY ASSURANCE CORPORATION
G.R. No. 199650, June 26, 2013

J. Villarama, Jr.
The CIAC rendered an arbitral award that was appealed to the CA through a Petition for
Review under Rule 43. With the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 7902 and promulgation of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the CIAC was included in the enumeration of
quasijudicial agencies whose decisions or awards may be appealed to the CA in a petition for
review under Rule 43. Such review of the CIAC award may involve either questions of fact, of
law, or of fact and law.
FACTS:
Petitioner J Plus Asia Development Corporation and Martin Mabuhay entered into a
Construction Agreement where Mabuhay would construct J Plus Asias condominium/hotel
building. After it was found that only 31.39% of the project was completed, J Plus terminated the
contract and sent letters of demand that were unheeded. J Plus filed a request for arbitration
before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) and prayed that Mabuhay and
his surety, respondent Utility Assurance, pay liquidated damages and overpayment. The CIAC
ruled in favor of J Plus. The CA reversed the CIACs ruling.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act and the Special Rules on Alternative
Dispute Resolution stripped the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction to review arbitral awards.
2. Whether the CA erred in reversing the arbitral award on an issue that was not raised in
the answer, not identified in the terms of reference, not assigned as an error, and not
argued in any of the pleadings filed before the court.
RULING:
1. The Court finds no merit in J Plus contention that with the institutionalization of
alternative dispute resolution under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9285, otherwise
known as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, the CA was divested of
jurisdiction to review the decisions or awards of the CIAC.
On the procedural issues raised, the Court finds no merit in J Plus contention that with
the institutionalization of alternative dispute resolution under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9285, otherwise known as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, the CA was divested
of jurisdiction to review the decisions or awards of the CIAC. J Plus erroneously relied on the
provision in said law allowing any party to a domestic arbitration to file in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) a petition either to confirm, correct or vacate a domestic arbitral award.
The Court holds that R.A. No. 9285 did not confer on Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction to
review awards or decisions of the CIAC in construction disputes. On the contrary, Section 40
thereof expressly declares that confirmation by the RTC is not required.
Executive Order (EO) No. 1008 vests upon the CIAC original and exclusive jurisdiction
over disputes arising from, or connected with, contracts entered into by parties involved in
construction in the Philippines, whether the dispute arises before or after the completion of the
contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof. By express provision of Section 19
thereof, the arbitral award of the CIAC is final and unappealable, except on questions of law,
which are appealable to the Supreme Court. With the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 7902

and promulgation of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the CIAC was included in
the enumeration of quasi-judicial agencies whose decisions or awards may be appealed to the
CA in a petition for review under Rule 43. Such review of the CIAC award may involve either
questions of fact, of law, or of fact and law.
J Plus misread the provisions of A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC (Special ADR Rules)
promulgated by this Court and which took effect on October 30, 2009. Since R.A. No. 9285
explicitly excluded CIAC awards from domestic arbitration awards that need to be confirmed to
be executory, said awards are therefore not covered by Rule 11 of the Special ADR Rules, as
they continue to be governed by EO No. 1008, as amended and the rules of procedure of the
CIAC. The CIAC Revised Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration provide for the
manner and mode of appeal from CIAC decisions or awards in Section 18 thereof which states
that a petition for review from a final award may be taken by any of the parties within fifteen (15)
days from receipt thereof in accordance with the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
2. As to the alleged error committed by the CA in deciding the case upon an
issue not raised or litigated before the CIAC, this assertion has no basis.
As to the alleged error committed by the CA in deciding the case upon an issue not
raised or litigated before the CIAC, this assertion has no basis. Whether or not Mabunay had
incurred delay in the performance of his obligations under the Construction Agreement was the
very first issue stipulated in the Terms of Reference (TOR), which is distinct from the issue of the
extent of Utility Assurances liability under the Performance Bond.
Indeed, resolution of the issue of delay was crucial upon which depends J Plus right to
the liquidated damages pursuant to the Construction Agreement. Contrary to the CIACs
findings, the CA opined that delay should be reckoned only after the lapse of the one-year
contract period, and consequently Mabuhays liability for liquidated damages arises only upon
the happening of such condition.
POSEIDON INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SERVICES, INC. v. TITO R. TAMALA, FELIPE S.
SAURIN, JR. ARTEMIO A. BO-OC and JOEL S. FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 186475, June 26, 2013
J. Brion
A petition was filed to assail a CA decision rendered under Rule 65 where it failed to
pass upon the intrinsic correctness of the NLRC decision. In reviewing the legal correctness of
a CA decision rendered under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Court examines the CA
decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave
abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, and not strictly on the basis of whether the
NLRC decision under review is intrinsically correct.
FACTS:
Respondents Tito Tamala, Felipe Saurin, Jr., Artemio Bo-oc, and Joel Hernandez filed a
complaint against petitioner International Maritime Services, Inc. for illegal termination of
employment with prayer for the payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their
contracts; and for non-payment of salaries, overtime pay and vacation leave pay with the Labor
Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint which was affirmed by the NLRC. The CA
reversed the NLRC.

ISSUE:
Whether in a Rule 65 Review the CA may pass upon the intrinsical correctness of the appealed
decision
RULING:
Petition denied.
The settled rule is that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is limited to the
review of questions of law, i.e., to legal errors that the CA may have committed in its decision, in
contrast with the review for jurisdictional errors that we undertake in original certiorari actions
under Rule 65. In reviewing the legal correctness of a CA decision rendered under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, the Court examines the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly
determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before
it, and not strictly on the basis of whether the NLRC decision under review is intrinsically
correct. In other words, the Court has to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65
review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it.
Viewed in this light, the Court does not re-examine the factual findings of the NLRC and
the CA, nor does the Court substitute its own judgment for theirs, as their findings of fact are
generally conclusive on this Court. The Court cannot touch on factual questions "except in the
course of determining whether the CA correctly ruled in determining whether or not the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in considering and appreciating the factual issues before
it."
WILSON T. GO v. BPI FINANCE CORPORATION
G.R. No. 199354, June 26, 2013
J. Brion
Under the requirements, it is clear that only fifteen (15) days may initially be requested, not the
thirty (30) days petitioner requested. The petitioner cannot also assume that his motion has
been granted if the CA did not immediately act.In any case, the late response cannot be used
as an excuse to delay the filing of its pleading as a party cannot make any assumption on how
his motion would be resolved. Precisely, a motion is submitted to the court for resolution and we
cannot allow any assumption that it would be granted.

FACTS:
Respondent is engaged in the business of extending credit card accommodations to its
cardholders through the use of credit cards for the purchase of goods and services from BPIs member
establishments on the condition that the charges incurred shall be reimbursed by the cardholders to BPI
upon proper billing.In this regard, the respondent filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money
with the MeTC against petitioner as one of its cardholders for the latters incurred credit charges
amounting to Php 77,970.91. The petitioner denied the respondents allegations, contending that the BPI
credit card was a company account and was issued to him because of his position as Executive VicePresident of Noahs Ark Merchandising, and being such, he cannot be held liable as he was only acting
on behalf of the company.

The petitioner, however, failed to produce evidence during the hearing which resulted in
the MeTC declaring his waiver of such right and deemed the case submitted for decision. On
April 23, 2008, the MeTC rendered its judgment holding the petitioner liable to pay respondent

the balance due plus interest and other charges. An appeal was then filed by the petitioner with
the RTC, which rendered a decision on September 4, 2009 affirming the MeTC decision. The
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner was denied by the RTC on November 16,
2009, which order was received by the petitioners counsel on November 26, 2009.
On December 10, 2009, petitioner filed before the CA a motion for extension of time for
30 days, or up to January 10, 2009, within which to appeal. However, since January 10, 2010
was a Sunday, petitioner instead filed his petition for review on January 11, 2010.On May 20,
2010, or 4 months after the motion for extension of time was filed, the CA issued the disputed
May 4, 2010 resolution, which partially granted the motion for extension and gave petitioner a
period of 15 days, or until December 25, 2009, instead of the 30 days as requested, and denied
the petition for review for being filed beyond the period of extension given. The petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA on October 12, 2011. Hence, a
this petition under Rule 45 was filed by petitioner assailing the resolutions of the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for review should be given recognition as he only became aware of the 15-day
extension granted him instead of the 30-day request four months after he filed the same.
RULING:
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring to appeal from a decision
of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified
petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the
corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and
furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition
shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed
or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after
judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful
fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of
Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for
review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no
case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
The rule is clear that an appeal to the CA must be filed within a period of fifteen (15) days. While
a further extension of fifteen (15) days may be requested, a specific request must be made with
specifically cited reason for the request. The CA may grant the request only at its discretion and, by
jurisprudence, only on the basis of reasons it finds meritorious.
Under the requirements, it is clear that only fifteen (15) days may initially be requested, not the
thirty (30) days Go requested. The petitioner cannot also assume that his motion has been granted if the
CA did not immediately act. In fact, faced with the failure to act, the conclusion is that no favorable action
had taken place and the motion had been denied. It is thus immaterial that the resolution granting the
extension of time was only issued four months later, although such late action is a response we cannot
approve of. In any case, the late response cannot be used as an excuse to delay the filing of its pleading
as a party cannot make any assumption on how his motion would be resolved. Precisely, a motion is
submitted to the court for resolution and we cannot allow any assumption that it would be granted.

We ruled in Videogram Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals where we said that the
appellant "knew or ought to have known that, pursuant to the above rule, his motion for
extension of time of thirty (30) days could be granted for only fifteen (15) days. There simply
was no basis for assuming that the requested 30-day extension would be granted." As we
heretofore stressed, an extension of time to appeal is generally allowed only for fifteen (15)
days. Go cannot simply demand for a longer period, without citing the reason therefor, for the
court's consideration and application of discretion.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMAN ZAFRA y SERRANO
G.R. No. 197363, June 26, 2013

J. Leonardo-de Castro
The Supreme Court has been regular in its declaration that "inconsistencies in
a rape victims testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the
inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the
commission of rape."Besides, the task of evaluating the credibility of the witnesses
and their testimonies is best left to the RTC, which had the opportunity to scrutinize
the witnesses directly during the trial.
FACTS:
A complaint was filed by the daughter of herein accused, hereinafter referred to as AAA,
against her father for the crime of rape to which the accused pleaded not guilty uponhis
arraignment. The evidence for the prosecution showed that the accused first started molesting
his daughter when she was around 13 or 14 years old, which developed into actual sexual
intercourse when she was about 15. AAA claimed that her mother knew about what her father
was doing to her but did nothing to stop it. AAA told no one about her ordeal except her best
friend for fear of her father, and that her mother might not side with her. As such, she moved to
her aunts house on November 2001. However, sometime thereafter, AAA was called by her
brother overto their residenceforher father apparently had some chores for her to do. Upon
AAAs arrival thereat, her father told her to fix his beddings and wash the dishes. The accused
however went inside the room and locked the door just as AAA was about to get out.
Thereupon, the accused raped his daughter and wiped his penis with a towel after he
ejaculated. Upon her return to her aunts house, AAA was asked by her mother, inulit na
naman ng tatay mo, ano? to which she replied yes. Her mother then went back to their house,
got the linen in her fathers room, then soaked it in water. AAA then filed the complaint
abovestated.
The accused on the other hand denied the charge against him and claimed that the
complaint was filed as an act of retaliation by his wife, and presented letters from AAA wherein
she admitted to fabricating the charge against her father because he and her mother fought.
The RTC found merit in the evidence of the prosecution and found the accused guilty of
qualified rape of his minor daughter and sentenced him to death. The accused then appealed
the decision of the RTC with the CA, imputing error on the part of the RTC for relying on AAAs
inconsistent testimony. The CA however denied his appeal and affirmed the decision of the
RTC.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in giving credence to the testimony of the private
complainants highly inconsistent and unrealistic testimony.
RULING:

The present appeal is devoid of merit.

As stipulated by the parties during the pre-trial, Zafra does not contest the facts that AAA
is his biological daughter and was only 17 years old on December 14, 2001, the time the last
rape occurred. What Zafra challenges is his conviction in light of the evidence the prosecution
submitted during his trial.
Zafra attacks the credibility of AAA for being inconsistent. He claims that during AAAs
testimony, she was so confused that she contradicted her own statements. Zafra also
emphasizes the fact that prior to December 14, 2001, AAA acted as if nothing had happened at
all. Zafra claims that the fact that she did not stay away from him despite the alleged incidents of
rape belie her claim of sexual abuse. In support of his argument, Zafra points out the fact that
AAA did not sustain any external physical marks, as shown by the medico-legal findings, despite
her testimony that on December 14, 2001, Zafra punched her thighs whenever she resisted him.
This Court has been regular in its declaration that "inconsistencies in a rape victims
testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that
do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape." Thus, Zafras attempt to discredit
AAAs testimony that he raped her on December 14, 2001 must ultimately fail for his failure to
show solid grounds on which to impeach it. Besides, the task of evaluating the credibility of the
witnesses and their testimonies is best left to the RTC, which had the opportunity to scrutinize
the witnesses directly during the trial, viz:
It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is
a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination.
These are important in determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing the truth,
especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the emphasis, gesture, and
inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining the witness credibility, and the trial court
has the opportunity and can take advantage of these aids. These cannot be incorporated in the
record so that all that the appellate court can see are the cold words of the witness contained in
transcript of testimonies with the risk that some of what the witness actually said may have been
lost in the process of transcribing. As correctly stated by an American court, "There is an
inherent impossibility of determining with any degree of accuracy what credit is justly due to a
witness from merely reading the words spoken by him, even if there were no doubt as to the
identity of the words. However artful a corrupt witness may be, there is generally, under the
pressure of a skillful cross-examination, something in his manner or bearing on the stand that
betrays him, and thereby destroys the force of his testimony. Many of the real tests of truth by
which the artful witness is exposed in the very nature of things cannot be transcribed upon the
record, and hence they can never be considered by the appellate court.
Zafras denial is coupled with the attribution of ill motive against AAA. He claims that AAA
filed this case because he scolded her and because of his quarrel with his wife and in-laws.
AAAs credibility cannot be diminished or tainted by such imputation of ill motives. It is highly
unthinkable for the victim to falsely accuse her father solely by reason of ill motives or grudge.

Moreover, Zafras claim that his wife wanted him in jail is contrary to AAAs testimony that her
own mother, Zafras wife, tried to dissuade her from filing this case against him. Zafras defense
of denial must necessarily fail. It is a well-settled doctrine that such defense will only prosper
upon the presentation of clear and convincing evidence substantiating it. Otherwise, it is a selfserving assertion that deserves no weight in law, and which cannot prevail over the positive,
candid, and categorical testimony of the complainant.
Courts look upon retractions with considerable disfavor because they are generally
unreliable. To explain the rationale for rejecting recantations, this Court, in People v. Alejo,
quoting Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, held:
Mere retraction by a witness or by complainant of his or her testimony does
not necessarily vitiate the original testimony or statement, if credible. The general
rule is that courts look with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously
given in court. x x x. The reason is because affidavits of retraction can easily be
secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually through intimidation or for
monetary consideration. Moreover, there is always the probability that they will
later be repudiated and there would never be an end to criminal litigation. It would
also be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before
courts of justice simply because the witnesses who had given them later on
changed their minds for one reason or another. This would make solemn trials a
mockery and place the investigation of the truth at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses.
In the case at bar, AAAs retractions were not even in an Affidavit of Desistance. They
were written on mere scraps of paper, and in different handwritings. This Court agrees with both
lower courts that if the notes were genuine, they should have been authenticated according to
the rules on evidence. If it were true that AAA wanted to withdraw the case against her father,
she should have approached the prosecutor and expressed her desire to do so. Moreover, she
should have taken the witness stand once more to attest to her alleged letters. It is worthy to
note that in her alleged recantations, AAA enumerated, as reasons for her filing this complaint,
the same exact defenses Zafra presented before the court.

VIRGINIA DE LOS SANTOS-DIO, as authorized representative of H.S. EQUITIES, LTD., and

WESTDALE ASSETS, LTD. v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE RAMON S.
CAGUIOA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 74, Regional Trial Court,
Olongapo City, and TIMOTHY J. DESMOND
G.R. No. 178947, June 26, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TIMOTHY J. DESMOND
G.R. No. 179079, June 26, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
Determination of probable cause may be either executive or judicial. The first is made by the
public prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation, where he is given broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exists for the purpose of filing a criminal information in
court.The second is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused.
FACTS:
In 2001, petitioner Virginia De Los Santos-Dio, the majority stockholder of H.S. Equities, Ltd.and
authorized representative of Westdale Assets, Ltd., was introduced to Desmond, the Chairman and CEO
of the Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc., and the authorized representative of Active Environments,
Inc. and JV China, Inc., the majority shareholder of SBMEI.
Dio, on behalf os H.S. Equities, Ltd., decided to invest in SBMEIs Ocean Adventure Marine Park.
Dio claimed that Desmond led her to believe that SBMEI had substantial capital and guaranteed returns
on investment, which led to the execution of a Subscription Agreement between the Desmond, as
representative of SBMEI and JV China, and Dio, as representative of HS Equities.In another transaction,
this time on behalf of Westdale, invested in a separate business venture, call Miracle Beach Hotel Project,
which involved the development of a resort owned by Desmond adjoining Ocean Adventure.Dio further
claimed that she found out that, contrary to Desmonds representations, SBMEI actually had no capacity
to deliver on its guarantees, and that in fact, as of 2001, it was incurring losses. She likewise claimed to
have discovered false entries in the companys books and financial statements.
Dio thus filed two criminal complaints against Desmond for estafa (a) through false pretenses
under Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC; and (b) with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence through
misappropriation or conversion under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC, both against Desmond before the
Olongapo City Prosecutors Office. In his defense, Desmond maintained that his representation of
himself as Chairman and CEO of SBMEI was not a sham and that Dio had not even proven that he did
not have the expertise and qualifications to double her investment.After the preliminary investigation, the
City Prosecutor issued a Resolution finding probable cause against Desmond for the abovementioned
crimes. In view of the foregoing, criminal informations were correspondingly filed with the RTC docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 516-2004 and 515-2004.
The RTC ruled in favor of Desmond and declared that no probable cause exists for the crimes
charged against him since not all the elements of estafa were present. The City Prosecutor then filed a
motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied. As such, it filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus before the CA on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
CA upheld the RTCs authority to dismiss a criminal case if in the process of determining probable
cause for issuing a warrant of arrest, it also finds the evidence on record insufficient to establish probable
cause. It explained that such dismissal is an exercise of judicial discretion sanctioned under Section 6(a),
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this score, the CA evaluated the evidence
presented and agreed with the RTCs conclusions that there was no sufficient basis showing that
Desmond committed estafa by means of false pretenses.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when
it dismissed the subject informations for lack of probable cause.
RULING:
Determination of probable cause may be either executive or judicial.

The first is made by the public prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation, where he is
given broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists for the purpose of filing a
criminal information in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the
public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of
probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon.
The second is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused. In this respect, the judge must satisfy himself that, on the basis of
the evidence submitted, there is a necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge, therefore, finds no probable cause, the judge cannot
be forced to issue the arrest warrant. Notably, since the judge is already duty-bound to
determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused
immediately upon the filing of the information, the filing of a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause becomes a mere superfluity, if not a deliberate attempt to cut short the process
by asking the judge to weigh in on the evidence without a full-blown trial.
In the case of Co v. Republic, the Court emphasized the settled distinction between an
executive and a judicial determination of probable cause, viz:
We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an
investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an
investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's job.
The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary
examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge.
On this score, it bears to stress that a judge is not bound by the resolution of the public
prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation and must himself ascertain from the
latters findings and supporting documents whether probable cause exists for the purpose of
issuing a warrant of arrest. This prerogative is granted by no less than the Constitution which
provides that "no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce."
While a judges determination of probable cause is generally confined to the limited
purpose of issuing arrest warrants, Section 5(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure explicitly states that a judge may immediately dismiss a case if the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause, viz:
SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within
ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate
the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the

case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable
cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused had already
been arrested, pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted preliminary
investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 7 of this Rule.
In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by
the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.
In other words, once the information is filed with the court and the judge proceeds with
his primordial task of evaluating the evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a warrant of
arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b) immediately dismiss the case, if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to submit additional
evidence, in case he doubts the existence of probable cause.
Applying these principles, the Court finds that the RTCs immediate dismissal, as
affirmed by the CA, was improper as the standard of clear lack of probable cause was not
observed. In this case, records show that certain essential facts namely, (a) whether or not
Desmond committed false representations that induced Dio to invest in Ocean Adventure; and
(b) whether or not Desmond utilized the funds invested by Dio solely for the Miracle Beach
Project for purposes different from what was agreed upon remain controverted. As such, it
cannot be said that the absence of the elements of the crime of estafa under Article 315(2)(a)
and 315(1) (b) of the RPC had already been established, thereby rendering the RTCs
immediate dismissal of the case highly improper.
Lest it be misconceived, trial judges will do well to remember that when a perceived gap
in the evidence leads to a "neither this nor that" conclusion, a purposeful resolution of the
ambiguity is preferable over a doubtful dismissal of the case. Verily, a judge's discretion to
dismiss a case immediately after the filing of the information in court is appropriate only when
the failure to establish probable cause can be clearly inferred from the evidence presented and
not when its existence is simply doubtful. After all, it cannot be expected that upon the filing of
the information in court the prosecutor would have already presented all the evidence necessary
to secure a conviction of the accused, the objective of a previously-conducted preliminary
investigation being merely to determine whether there is sufficient ground, to engender a wellfounded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. In this light, given that the lack of probable cause had not
been clearly established in this case, the CA erred, and the RTC gravely abused its discretion,
by ruling to dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 515-2004 and 516-2004. Indeed, these cases must
stand the muster of a full-blown trial where the parties could be given, as they should be given,
the opportunity to ventilate their respective claims and defenses, on the basis of which the court
a quo can properly resolve the factual disputes therein.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PETER LINDA y GEROLAGA

G.R. No. 200507, June 26, 2013
J. Perez
When the witness rendered a clear and direct narration of the details of the buy-bust operation
from the moment the team was organized, upon receipt of the information from the confidential
informant, to the time the shabu was marked and turned over to the crime laboratory for
examination, andabsent any showing of ill-motive or bad faith on the part of the arresting officers,
as in this case where accused-appellant testified that he did not know any of the members of the
team, the doctrine of presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty finds
application.
FACTS:
In an Information dated 27 February 2008 accused-appellant was charged with violation of
Section 5, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 before the RTC of Manila to which he pleaded not guilty. The
evidence for the prosecution showed that on February 22, 2008, the team of SPO1 Rodolfo Ramos
received confidential information regarding the illegal drug activity of the accused along Malate Manilaand
thereafter conducted a buy bust operation. As the operation took place, the accused handed to the
poseur-buyer one transparent cachet containing white crystalline substance with the resemblance of
shabu. The accused was then arrested by the poseur-buyer and introduced himself as a police officer,
read the accused his rights, and marked the plastic sachet accordingly. The forensic chemist examined
the substance and the same tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
The accused on the other hand averred that on that same day, he was doing nothing at home
when suddenly several persons entered the house and went looking for his parents. When the accused
told them that his parents no longer lives there, he was told to go with the police. The accused alleged
that he was only not informed of the charges until he was in court.
The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime charged, which was affirmed by the CA in toto.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:

Whether the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:

The appeal is bereft of merit.

Here, we see no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals.Corroborated by supporting documents, PO2 Bernabe rendered a
clear and direct narration of the details of the buy-bust operation from the moment
SPO1 Rodolfo Ramos organized the team, upon receipt of the information from the
confidential informant, to the time the shabu was marked and turned over to the
crime laboratory for examination. Absent any showing of ill-motive or bad faith on
the part of the arresting officers, as in this case where accused-appellant testified
that he did not know any of the members of the team, the doctrine of presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty finds application. This, we explained
in People v. Tion:

x x x Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members

of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not
properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the buy-bust operation
deserve full faith and credit. Settled is the rule that in cases involving
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution
witnesses who are police officers, for they are presumed to have performed
their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary
suggesting ill motive on the part of the police officers or deviation from the
regular performance of their duties. The records do not show any allegation
of improper motive on the part of the buy-bust team. Thus, the presumption
of regularity in the performance of duties of the police officers must be
upheld.
By upholding the credibility of the testimony of the witness for the prosecution on the
circumstances leading to the arrest of the accused-appellant, we cannot give credence to the contrary
version of the defense that the warrantless arrest was made inside the house of the accused-appellant
after the arresting officers failed to find his parents, whom he admitted were also involved in drug-related
illegal activities. The argument of the defense that the warrantless arrest was invalid and that the item
seized is inadmissible in evidence must, therefore, fail.
Proceeding from the above, we find that the essential requisites for illegal sale of shabu were all
present in the instant case. These are: "(a) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale,
and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the thing." The
prosecution has likewise complied with the following material requirements: (1) proof that the transaction
or sale actually took place and (2) presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence."
Thus, PO2 Bernabe testified that after he was introduced by the confidential informant to
accused-appellant as a friend who wanted to buy shabu, he offered to buy and accused-appellant agreed
to sell him drugs worth two hundred pesos (P200.00). When accused-appellant received the marked
money, he gave PO2 Bernabe a sachet of white crystalline substance, which, after its marking at the
crime scene and upon submission to the laboratory, tested positive for shabu. Both the item subject of the
sale and the marked money were presented in court.
The defense now argues that the prosecution failed to establish with moral certainty the identity of
the item seized because the chemist who examined the specimen did not take the witness stand. Neither
did anyone allegedly testify on how the said specimen was delivered to the court.

The contentions are likewise unmeritorious.

There is no iota of doubt that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item were
preserved. The Letter-Request for Laboratory Examination shows that it was PO2 Bernabe who
personally delivered to the crime laboratory the specimen that he earlier marked. Moreover,
specifically stated in the Pre-Trial Order issued by the trial court was the fact that Reyes herself,
the very chemist that examined the specimen, brought the same to the court. And, while the
court dispensed with her testimony, the parties already stipulated on the material points she was
supposed to testify on. Clearly, the chain of custody was not broken.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MONICA MENDOZA y TRINIDAD

G.R. No. 191267, June 26, 2013

J. Perez

The defense of the accused that she was arrested without a valid warrant,
thus making the seized items the fruit of the poisonous tree, should fail, especially
when the arrest falls under the instances when a valid warrantless arrest can be
made.
FACTS:
The accused in this case was charged under two separate informations with the violation
of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002. During the trial, the prosecution presented evidence which showed that on May 15,
2004, a confidential informant went to the police station to report the rampant illegal sale of
drugs by a certain alias Monica who happened to be the accused along PNR South Compound,
Makati City. A buy-bust operation was then conducted to effect the arrest of the accused.Upon
the consummation ofthe transaction, the pre-arranged signal was performed and then the rest of
the buy-bust team approached the area of the transaction. The arrest was then made wherein
the accused was apprised of its nature and of her constitutional rights. A search was further
conducted which resulted in the discovery of the buy-bust money and five more sachets
containing suspected shabu, and the markings were correspondingly done. The accused was
then brought to the police station where she was turned over to the investigator on duty, and the
items seized were then brought to the Crime Laboratory for examination.
For her part, the accused denied the charges against her, contending that she was not
caught selling shabu nor was she caught of possessing the same. She avers that on that same
day, she was just hanging clothes at the back of her house when a kid named Totoy told her that
police officers were looking for her. She was then invited to the police station under the belief
that she was told to do so because of another case wherein she was a star witness. However,
the accused was brought to the Drug Enforcement Unit where she was asked whether he knew
a certain Edwin Kerabu and replied that she usually sees him front of the binggohan. Kerabu
was then apprehended from the said place, and was frisked and the police officers was able to
recover from his pocket white substance suspected to be shabu. When the accused requested
to go home, he was not permitted by the police officers and charges were filed against her.
The RTC convicted the accused of the crime charged, which the CA affirmed in toto.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court gravely erred in admitting in evidence the seized dangerous drugs despite being
the products of an unlawful arrest.

RULING:
Accused-appellant alleged that the trial court erred in appreciating the evidence
presented by the prosecution as they were seized as a result of an unlawful arrest. She insists
that a valid warrant should have been secured first before they proceeded to arrest her.

This argument is totally faulty and is without even an iota of credibility. The warrantless
arrest conducted on accused-appellant was valid. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure enumerates the situations when a person may be arrested without a warrant, thus:
"SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgement or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another."
Paragraph (a) of Section 5, is commonly known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. For a
warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
In the instant case, the prosecution completely and fully established that accusedappellant was arrested in flagrante delicto.
At any rate, accused-appellant failed to raise any objection to the manner of her arrest
before arraignment. In fact, she participated in the trial. She even took the witness stand and
testified in her own behalf. She is now estopped from assailing the legality of her arrest as she
waived any irregularity, if any, that may have tainted her arrest.
Significantly, the proof of an in flagrante delicto an-est, removes whatever credibility
there may have been about the testimony of the accused-appellant of the alleged circumstances
that made her go with the police to the DEU unit. Her version that she was a frame-up victim
cannot stand against the testimony of the police, supported by evidence of corpus delicti.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAMIL MORES

G.R. No. 189846, June 26, 2013

J. Leonardo-de Castro
We have reiterated in jurisprudence that when the credibility of a witness is in
issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive
effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court, since
it is settled that when the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate
court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.

FACTS:
The accused-appellant and his co-accused Delio Famor were charged under an
information of the complex crime of murder with attempted murder to which they pleadednot
guilty. The evidence for the prosecution showed that at about 6:00 P.M. of January 24, 1994,
witness Famisaran was chatting with his friends at the Madugo Bridge, accused-appellant
stopped before them and uttered gusto nyo pasabugin ko ito, and left. At about 9:00 P.M.on
same date, he Famisaran was at Roxas Gymnasium where a ball was being held, he again saw
the accused-appellant, who was then conversing with accused Famor in hushed tones.
Famisaran then saw the accused pull out a round object, which the former knew to be the
grenade the latter earlier showed them, from his left pocket and threw it on the floor. Another
witness kicked the object and there was an explosion and commotion ensued. The police
investigated incident and medical attention were given those injured.
The accused-appellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that on
that same night, he was asleep early at his house with his wife and child, and was only woken
up by his wife when she heard an explosion from the direction of Camp Gozar. When he went
out the house, someone told him that the explosion occurred in the gymnasium. He then went
with his friend to look for the latters children who attended the ball, and after finding them at the
hospital, went back home.
At the conclusion of court proceedings, the trial court convicted appellant for the felony of Murder
with Multiple Attempted Murder. However, it acquitted co-accused Famor on the ground that there was a
paucity of evidence to establish that Famor was appellants co-conspirator in the commission of the
criminal act of which both of them were charged. The CA rendered judgment affirming with modification
the trial courts ruling. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
The court a quo erred in giving weight and credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses thus the
guilt of the accused was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:
Appellant claimed that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were fraught with
inconsistencies and should not have been given credit by the trial court.
Furthermore, appellant asserts that flight must not always be attributed to ones
consciousness of guilt. Although it is undisputed that, after his arraignment, appellant had
stopped appearing in court and up to this day remains at large, appellant points out that he
never left the vicinity of the crime scene and was, in fact, seen by one of the prosecution
witnesses, to be near that area minutes after the explosion occurred. If he was indeed the
perpetrator of the grisly crime charged, appellant argues that he could have just left town that
very evening in order to insure non-apprehension.
We are not persuaded and, thus, sustain appellants conviction.

Contrary to appellants protestation, we find no cogent reason to question the veracity of

the testimony of Famisaran as well as that of the other witnesses for the prosecution. We have
reiterated in jurisprudence that when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of
the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the
probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high

respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate
court, since it is settled that when the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate
court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court. In all, we concur with the trial court in
setting aside the inconsequential differences in the prosecutions witnesses testimonies and in
pointing out that their testimonies actually corroborated each other as to rolling of a grenade
onto the dance floor and their respective positions from the blast.
Finally, we cannot subscribe to appellants theory that his continued presence at the
vicinity of the Municipality of Roxas right after the grenade throwing incident negates his guilt of
the crime charged and that his absence in court proceedings subsequent to his arraignment
should not be taken against him. We have elucidated on this point in one recent case wherein
we held that non-flight does not necessarily connote innocence, to wit:
Flight is indicative of guilt, but its converse is not necessarily true. Culprits behave
differently and even erratically in externalizing and manifesting their guilt. Some may escape or
flee a circumstance strongly illustrative of guilt while others may remain in the same vicinity
so as to create a semblance of regularity, thereby avoiding suspicion from other members of the
community.
Moreover, our position on the effects of unexplained flight on the guilt or innocence of an
accused remains unchanged. In People v. Camat, we reiterated the jurisprudential doctrine that
flight is indicative of guilt in this manner:
Flight in criminal law is the evading of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing
oneself in order to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or continuance of criminal
proceedings. In one case, this Court had stated that it is well-established that the flight of an
accused is competent evidence to indicate his guilt; and flight, when unexplained, is a
circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. Indeed, the wicked flee when no
man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as a lion.
CARLOS L. TANENGGEE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013

J. Del Castillo
A written admission, even if given without the assistance of counsel, can be admitted in
evidence. More so in this case, as petitioners written statement was given during an
administrative inquiry conducted by his employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he
allegedly committed in the course of his employment, and not during custodial investigation.
FACTS:
Herein petitioner was charged under an information with the crime of estafa through the
falsification of commercial documents to which he pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented
evidence which showed that the petitioner, being the branch manager of Metrobank Commercio
Branch, caused to be prepared PNs and cashiers checks in the name of Romeo Tan, in
connection with the purported loans obtained by the latter from the bank. The same documents
were approved and signed by the petitioner as the branch manager of the Metrobank
Commercio Branch, and forged or caused to be signed the signature of Tan as endorser and
payee of the proceeds of the checks at the back to show that the latter indeed endorsed the
same for payment, then handed them to the cashier for encashment. The petitioner then
obtained the proceeds of the alleged loan and misappropriated the same for his use and benefit.

The bank conducted an internal audit after the discovery of the irregular loans, where petitioner
was made to sign a document in the form of questions and answers.
For his defense, the petitioner alleged that he was able to solicit Tan as client-depositor
when he was branch manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch, and was granted a credit line
for Php 40M. Allegedly, Tan was also allowed by the bank to create a fictitious account under
the name Jose Tan to hide his finances due to rampant kidnappings or from their spouses. On
one occasion, a loan availment in the amount of Php 16M was allegedly made by Tan wherein
said proceeds were ordered to be deposited by him to the Jose Tan account. During the
investigation conducted by the bank, the petitioner was made to sign a document which turned
out to be a confession to the crime, and was not even given the assistance of a counsel.
The RTC rendered a decision finding the petitioner guilty of the crime charged, which the
CA affirmed upon appeal. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner but the same
was also denied by the CA. Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs admission in evidence of the petitioners written statement of
confession when the same was taken even if he was not under police custody nor custodial investigation.

RULING:
While he admits signing a written statement, petitioner refutes the truth of the contents thereof
and alleges that he was only forced to sign the same without reading its contents. He asserts that said
written statement was taken in violation of his rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution,
particularly of his right to remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of the first two rights.
Hence, the same should not have been admitted in evidence against him.

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the OSG, maintains
that petitioners written statement is admissible in evidence since the constitutional proscription
invoked by petitioner does not apply to inquiries made in the context of private employment but
is applicable only in cases of custodial interrogation. The OSG thus prays for the affirmance of
the appealed CA Decision.
We find the Petition wanting in merit. Petitioners written statement is admissible in
evidence.
The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of
guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by
the CA and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation.
Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities
after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant manner. Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights
which attach upon the commencement thereof, viz: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other
rights above. In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled
written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are
clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an
internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of

his liberty in any significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to
be under custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative
during the taking of his written statement.
Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, we declared that the right to
counsel "applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation." Amplifying further on the matter, the Court made clear in the recent
case of Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission:
However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of
Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule
under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a
criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.
Here, petitioners written statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted
by his employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course
of his employment. No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in
evidence and in giving due consideration to petitioners written statement as there is no
constitutional impediment to its admissibility.
Petitioners written statement was given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. He
attempts to convince us that he signed, under duress and intimidation, an already prepared
typewritten statement. However, his claim lacks sustainable basis and his supposition is just an
afterthought for there is nothing in the records that would support his claim of duress and
intimidation.
Moreover, "it is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the
contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary." Petitioner failed
to overcome this presumption. On the contrary, his written statement was found to have been
executed freely and consciously. The pertinent details he narrated in his statement were of such
nature and quality that only a perpetrator of the crime could furnish. The details contained
therein attest to its voluntariness. As correctly pointed out by the CA:
As the trial court noted, the written statement (Exhibit N) of appellant is replete with
details which could only be supplied by appellant. The statement reflects spontaneity and
coherence which cannot be associated with a mind to which intimidation has been applied.
Appellants answers to questions 14 and 24 were even initialed by him to indicate his conformity
to the corrections made therein. The response to every question was fully informative, even
beyond the required answers, which only indicates the mind to be free from extraneous
restraints.
In People v. Muit, it was held that "one of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of
petitioners extrajudicial statement is that it contains many details and facts which the
investigating officers could not have known and could not have supplied without the knowledge
and information given by him."
Also, the fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper of protest and file any charges,
criminal or administrative, against the investigator and the two policemen present who allegedly
intimidated him and forced him to sign negate his bare assertions of compulsion and
intimidation. It is a settled rule that where the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion,
where he did not institute any criminal or administrative action against his supposed

intimidators, where no physical evidence of violence was presented, his extrajudicial statement
shall be considered as having been voluntarily executed.
SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING
v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY
G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013
J. Del Castillo

The allegation of petitioners that they are not the owners of the subject property, thus
making them unable to remove the installed surveillance cameras on the corporations building,
cannot be upheld especially when the corporation who is managed by the family of petitioners.
They are thus considered parties-in-interest in the present case.
FACTS:
Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for Injunction and Damages with a prayer for the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/TRO against respondents as owners of ALDO
Development and Resources, Inc., alleging that they are the registered owners of the parcel of land upon
which a building was constructed upon by the latter. It was also alleged that sometime earlier, a case was
filed by the respondents against petitioners for Injunction and Damages for the latter allegedly was
constructing a fence without a permit and which would destroy the wall of the formers building which was
however denied by the court. In order to gather evidence for such case, the respondents installed on
their building surveillance cameras facing the petitioners property, and also took pictures of the
construction without the consent of the latter. The petitioners on the main pray that the respondents be
ordered to remove the cameras and to be enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance for being violative
of the petitioners right to privacy.
In their defense, the respondents asserted that they did not install the video surveillance
cameras, and that they are but merely stockholders of ALDO and not owners thereof.
The RTC, in its decision, ruled in favor of petitioner and granted their application for TRO. The
motion for reconsideration filed by respondents was denied by the RTC, thus prompting them to file a
petition or certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. Such was granted by the CA, declaring that the
respondents are not the proper parties to the suit, since they are not the owners of the building but mere
stockholders of ALDO.

ISSUE:
Whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.
RULING:
A real party defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong
done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant's act or omission which had violated the legal
right of the former.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.

A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong
done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendants act or omission which had violated the legal
right of the former."
In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since they do
not own the building, they could not have installed the video surveillance cameras. Such
reasoning, however, is erroneous. The fact that respondents are not the registered owners of
the building does not automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video
surveillance cameras.
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video surveillance
cameras in order to fish for evidence, which could be used against petitioners in another case.
During the hearing of the application for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when
respondents installed the video surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his concerns
but they did not seem to care, and thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for mediation,
and eventually, filed a Complaint against respondents before the RTC. He also admitted that as
early as 1998 there has already been a dispute between his family and the Choachuy family
concerning the boundaries of their respective properties. With these factual circumstances in
mind, we believe that respondents are the proper parties to be impleaded.
Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its
stockholders, records show that it is a family-owned corporation managed by the Choachuy
family.
Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that they are not owners
of the building, allowed the court to enter the compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection. The
counsel for respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building and answered all her
questions regarding the set-up and installation of the video surveillance cameras. And when respondents
moved for reconsideration of the Order dated October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the arguments they
raised is that Aldo would suffer damages if the video surveillance cameras are removed and transferred.
Noticeably, in these instances, the personalities of respondents and Aldo seem to merge.

All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents are merely
using the corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect themselves from this suit. In view of the
foregoing, we find that respondents are the proper parties to this suit.
RAYMUNDO CODERIAS, as represented by his Attorney-In-Fact, MARLON M. CODERIAS
v. ESTATE OF JUAN CIDOCO, represented by its Administrator, DR. RAUL R. CARAG
G.R. No. 180476, June 26, 2013
J. Del Castillo
Respondent had no right to claim prescription because a CLT had already been issued
in favor of petitioner. The farm is considered expropriated and placed under the coverage of the
land reform law. As such, respondent had neither the right to evict petitioner nor to claim
prescription.
FACTS:
The deceased respondent Cidoco owned a 4-hectare farm in Nueva Ecija wherein
petitioner was a tiller. As such, respondent was issued a Certificate of Land Transfer. However,
petitioner and his family left the farm under threat of death by people connected with

respondent. Upon learning of respondents death, the petitioner and his family re-established
themselves on the farm, and thereafter filed a with the DARAB a petition against respondents
estate praying that his possession and cultivation of the farm be respected and that a leasehold
contract between them be executed. Respondent on the other hand moved to dismiss the
petition, contending that the petitioners cause of action has prescribed under Sec.38 of RA
3844, as amended, since the alleged dispossession took place in 1980 but the Petition was filed
only in 1995, or beyond the statutory three-year period for filing such claims. On September 10,
1996, the PARAD issued a decision dismissing the petition on the groung of prescription.
Upon petitioners appeal to the DARAB, the PARAD decision was set aside, ordering the
respondent to respect and maintain the petitioner in his peaceful possession and cultivation of
the subject landholding. The motion for reconsideration filed by the respondent was denied by
the DARAB. Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA, insisting that petitioners cause of
action has been barred by prescription and laches. The CA held that although there exists a
tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondent, the formers action has prescribed.
Petitioner then filed a manifestation with motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
CA. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners cause of action has prescribed.
RULING:
The CA has failed to recognize this vinculum juris, this juridical tie, that exists between
the petitioner and Chioco, which the latter is bound to respect.
Under Section 8 of RA 3844, the agricultural leasehold relation shall be extinguished
only under any of the following three circumstances, to wit: "(1) abandonment of the landholding
without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor; (2) voluntary surrender of the landholding by
the agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be served three months in advance; or (3)
absence of the persons under Section 9 to succeed the lessee x x x." None of these is obtaining
in this case. In particular, petitioner cannot be said to have abandoned the landholding. It will be
recalled that Chioco forcibly ejected him from the property through threats and intimidation. His
house was bulldozed and his crops were destroyed. Petitioner left the farm in 1980 and returned
only in 1993 upon learning of Chiocos death. Two years after, or in 1995, he filed the instant
Petition.
Indeed, Section 38 of RA 3844 specifically provides that "an action to enforce any cause
of action under this Code shall be barred if not commenced within three years after such cause
of action accrued." In this case, we deem it proper to reckon petitioners cause of action to have
accrued only upon his knowledge of the death of Chioco in 1993, and not at the time he was
forcibly ejected from the landholding in 1980. For as long as the intimidation and threats to
petitioners life and limb existed, petitioner had a cause of action against Chioco to enforce the
recognition of this juridical tie. Since the threats and intimidation ended with Chiocos death,
petitioners obligation to file a case to assert his rights as grantee of the farm under the agrarian
laws within the prescriptive period commenced. These rights, as enumerated above, include the
right to security of tenure, to continue in possession of the land he works despite the expiration
of the contract or the sale or transfer of the land to third persons, the pre-emptive right to buy
the land, as well as the right to redeem the land, if sold to a third person without his knowledge.

Force and intimidation restrict or hinder the exercise of the will, and so long as they
exist, petitioner is deprived of his free will. He could not occupy his farm, plant his crops, tend to
them, and harvest them. He could not file an agrarian case against Chioco, for that meant
having to return to Nueva Ecija. He could not file the case anywhere else; any other agrarian
tribunal or agency would have declined to exercise jurisdiction.
It is worth reiterating at this juncture that respondent had no right to claim prescription
because a CLT had already been issued in favor of petitioner. The farm is considered
expropriated and placed under the coverage of the land reform law. As such, respondent had
neither the right to evict petitioner nor to claim prescription. In Catorce v. Court of Appeals, this
Court succinctly held:
Petitioner had been adjudged the bona fide tenant of the landholding in question. Not
only did respondent fail to controvert this fact, but he even impliedly admitted the same in his
Answer to petitioners Complaint when he raised, as one of his defenses, the alleged voluntary
surrender of the landholding by petitioner. Respondent Court should have taken this fact into
consideration for tenants are guaranteed security of tenure, meaning, the continued enjoyment
and possession of their landholding except when their dispossession had been authorized by
virtue of a final and executory judgment, which is not so in the case at bar.
At any rate, respondent cannot legally invoke the strict application of the rules on
prescription because the failure of petitioner to immediately file the Petition was due to its own
maneuvers. This Court should not allow respondent to profit from its threats and intimidation.
Besides, if we subscribe to respondents ratiocination that petitioners cause of action had
already prescribed, it would lead to an absurd situation wherein a tenant who was unlawfully
deprived of his landholding would be barred from pursuing his rightful claim against the
transgressor.
Petitioners tenure on the farm should be deemed uninterrupted since he could not set
foot thereon. And if he could not make the required payments to Chioco or the Land Bank of the
Philippines, petitioner should not be faulted. And, since his tenure is deemed uninterrupted, any
benefit or advantage from the land should accrue to him as well.
Our law on agrarian reform is a legislated promise to emancipate poor farm families from the
bondage of the soil. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in the exact same spirit, with mechanisms which hope
to forestall a reversion to the antiquated and inequitable feudal system of land ownership. It aims to
ensure the continued possession, cultivation and enjoyment by the beneficiary of the land that he tills
which would certainly not be possible where the former owner is allowed to reacquire the land at any time
following the award in contravention of the governments objective to emancipate tenant-farmers from
the bondage of the soil.
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES
v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN
G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013
J. Perez
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of
procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
"shall be liberally construed in order x xx to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of the fact that the

proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature,
then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted by respondent COMELEC.
FACTS:
Private respondent, a registered voter and resident of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the
COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of
petitioner on the ground that it contained material misrepresentations, one of which is that she is a Filipino
citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen. In her Answer, herein petitioner notes that such
allegation is not supported by evidence. During the course of the proceedings, private respondent filed a
Manifestation with Motion to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence and Amended List of Exhibits which
include, among others, a copy of an article published on the internet with an Affidavit of Identification and
Authenticity of Document executed by its author Eliseo J. Obligacion, which provides a database record
of the Bureau of Immigration indicating that petitioner is an American citizen and a holder of a U.S.
passport; and a Certification of Travel Records of petitioner, issued by Simeon Sanchez, Acting Chief,
Verification and Certification Unit of the Bureau of Immigration which indicates that petitioner used a U.S.
Passport in her various travels abroad.
The COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution granting the Petition and cancelling the
Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner. It found that the petitioner was not a Filipino citizen for having failed
to comply with the requirements of RA 9225 and was thus ineligible to run for the position of
Representative of Marinduque. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen and that she has not lost such status by simply obtaining and using an
American passport, which was however denied by the COMELEC En Banc in a Resolution.
The petitioner was then declared the winner of the May 2013 Elections and on the same day took
her oath of office. A Certificate of Finality was thereafter issued by the COMELEC En Banc declaring the
aforesaid Resolution final and executory. Hence, petitioner filed this present Petition for Certiorari with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order
assailing the Resolution and Certificate issued by the COMELEC En Banc.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in taking cognizance of the newlydiscovered evidence without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence.
RULING:
Petitioner assails the admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy
of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation of her
right to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to question and present
controverting evidence.
Her contentions are incorrect.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of
procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
"shall be liberally construed in order x xx to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of the fact that the
proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature,
then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted by respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every
opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tans petition was filed
up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5)
months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given her.

Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given
the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC:
The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a
hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument,
through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are
not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the
chance
to
be
heard
on
his
motion
for
reconsideration.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. RETIRED JUDGE GUILLERMO ANDAYA
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2181, June 25, 2013
J. Leonen
In order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative case, the complaint must be
filed during the incumbency of the respondent. Once jurisdiction is acquired, it is not lost by reason of
respondents cessation from office.Respondents cessation from office x x x does not warrant the
dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it
render said administrative case moot and academic. The Courts jurisdiction at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent had ceased in office during the
pendency of the case.
FACTS:
When a judicial audit was conducted on RTC, Br. 53, Lucena City, Quezon, the report showed
that the respondent judge failed to decide several cases submitted for decision beyond the reglementary
period provided under the constitution, thus making him liable for several thousands of pesos in fine.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent judge can still be held liable for said penalty.
RULING:
The reports yield the finding that, indeed, 23 criminal cases and 9 civil cases are included in both
reports. However, it must be noted that the March 2009 Monthly Report of Cases only covered 45 cases,
while there were 43 criminal cases and 46 civil cases that were the subject of the judicial audit report of
the present complaint. This means that despite the overlap, there are still 20 unresolved criminal cases
and 37 unresolved civil cases for which the respondent Judge might be held accountable for. The other
complaint also does not include the unresolved motions in 29 criminal cases and 53 civil cases, which are
included in the judicial audit report in the present complaint.
The respondent Judge could no longer be made liable for these infractions.
A review of the records shows that the judicial audit was conducted on January 19, 20, and 21,
2009 during the respondent Judges incumbency. However, the administrative complaint was docketed
only on April 29, 2009 after his compulsory retirement on March 27, 2009. In the case of Re: Missing
Exhibits and Court Properties in Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Panabo City, Davao del Norte, a
Memorandum recommending that courts presiding Judge, Jesus L. Grageda, who compulsorily retired on
November 25, 2009, be held liable for not ordering a prompt investigation as to missing court exhibits and
properties and be made to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) was submitted by the OCA
to the Court on July 10, 2012, or more than two (2) years after he retired. In dismissing the complaint
against him, We ruled that:

In order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative case, the complaint
must be filed during the incumbency of the respondent. Once jurisdiction is acquired, it is not lost
by reason of respondents cessation from office. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Hamoy, the Court held that:
Respondents cessation from office x x x does not warrant the dismissal of the
administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it
render said administrative case moot and academic. The Courts jurisdiction at the time of
the filing of the administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent
had ceased in office during the pendency of the case.
In the present case, Judge Gragedas compulsory retirement divested the OCA of its right to
institute a new administrative case against him after his compulsory retirement. The Court can no longer
acquire administrative jurisdiction over Judge Grageda by filing a new administrative case against him
after he has ceased to be a public official. The remedy, if necessary, is to file the appropriate civil or
criminal case against Judge Grageda for the alleged transgression.
Similarly, in the case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Jesus L. Grageda, the Court
dismissed another pending administrative case against him, thus:
Records show that Judge Grageda compulsorily retired on November 25, 2009 while the judicial
audit was conducted at RTC, Br. 4, Panabo City from November 17 to November 26, 2009. The OCA then
submitted its report only on March 24, 2010, which was re-docketed as a regular administrative matter on
April 28, 2010, or months after Judge Grageda retired from the judiciary. Consequently, his retirement
effectively barred the Court from pursuing the instant administrative proceeding that was instituted after
his tenure in office, and divested the Court, much less the OCA, of any jurisdiction to still subject him to
the rules and regulations of the judiciary and/or to penalize him for the infractions committed while he was
still in the service. As held in the case of OCA v. Judge Celso L. Mantua [A.M. No. RTJ-11-2291, February
8, 2012]:
This Court concedes that there are no promulgated rules on the conduct of judicial audit.
However, the absence of such rules should not serve as license to recommend the imposition of penalties
to retired judges who, during their incumbency, were never given a chance to explain the circumstances
behind the results ofthe judicial audit.In light of these pronouncements, the Court has lost jurisdiction
tofind him liable for the cases and motions left unresolved prior to hisretirement.
JESUS C. GARCIA v. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor
children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA
G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of
authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal,
special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. It is settled
that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, "this authority being embraced in
the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the
criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law."
FACTS:
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a
verified petition before the RTC of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO)
against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia, pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical
abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. The RTC, in

finding reasonable ground to believe that an immediate danger of violence against the private respondent
and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a several TPOs in their favor.
During the pendency of the abovementioned petition, the petitioner filed before the CA a petition
for prohibition, questioning, among others, the constitutionality of RA 9262 for being violative of the due
process and equal protection clauses. The CA thus issued a 60-day TRO against the enforcement of the
TPO, the amended TPOs and other orderd pursuant thereto. Subsequently, however, on January 24,
2007, the appellate court dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in
his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same.
Secondly, the challenge to the validity of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the
protection orders issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Family Court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.
RULING:
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as
Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family
courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women
and children. In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of
the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities identified. To achieve
harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts
designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined
under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under
this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case
shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at
the option of the complainant.
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of
authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal,
special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. It is settled
that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, "this authority being embraced in
the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the
criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law." The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or
the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. We
said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA that, "plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts
should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate
review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue."
Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows: x x x.
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have
been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order before the RTC
of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children,
lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an
answer. Thus:

SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the
petition which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and
shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or thirdparty complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action.
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim
and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot
likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a
defending party may have against an opposing party. A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any claim by
one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of
the original action or of a counterclaim therein. Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending
party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim. As pointed out by Justice Teresita J.
Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject
of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised
in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred
petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute
is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence. Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No.
04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among others, viz:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further
hearing, it may issue an order containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form of
affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one day, to
the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the temporary protection order
issued.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition with
prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have
proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he could be granted an
injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition
for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the
60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended
TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking its
normal course in an expeditious and summary manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited.
Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement, with
more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time, should not be enjoined. The
mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to
have the same enjoined. In Younger v. Harris, Jr., the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their
separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are
unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his
alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and,

hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to
prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid.
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the
merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect
women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the
very purpose of the law against VAWC.
SIME DARBY PILIPINAS, INC. v. JESUS B.MENDOZA
G.R. No. 202247, June 19, 2013
J. Carpio
While the share was bought by Sime Darby and placed under the name of Mendoza, his title is
only limited to the usufruct, or the use and enjoyment of the clubs facilities and privileges while employed
with the company.Despite being informed by Sime Darby to stop using the facilities and privileges of the
club share, Mendoza continued to do so. Thus, in order to prevent further damage and prejudice to itself,
Sime Darby properly sought injunction in this case.
FACTS:
Respondent is the sales manager of petitioner with tasks of handling sales, marketing and
distribution of the companys tires and rubber products. A club share in Alabang Country Club (ACC) was
purchased by petitioner from Margarita de Araneta, which was however placed under the name of
respondent because ACCs by-laws provided that only natural persons may own such. From the time of
its purchase, the petitioner was the one who paid for the monthly dues and other assessments on the club
share. Respondent retired in April 2005 and obtained his separation pay in full amounting to more than
Php 3M.Sometime thereafter, the petitioner found an interested buyer of the club share. However, before
the sale could push through, the broker required the petitioner to secure an authorization to sell from
respondent as the same was still registered in the latters name. Respondent refused to sign the same
unless petitioner paid him allegedly an amount corresponding to his unpaid separation benefits, and such
refusal resulted in the sale failing to materialize.
Petitioner thus filed a complaint for damages with writ of preliminary injunction against respondent
with the RTC, claiming that it was the practice of the company to extend to its senior managers and
executives the privilege of using and enjoying the facilities of various club memberships. They further
alleged that even after his retirement, respondent continued using the facilities and privileges of ACC, to
the damage and prejudice of petitioner. In his answer, the respondent averred that he owns the club
share, being purchased by the petitioner for him as part of his employee benefits and bonus for
exemplary service.
The RTC denied the petitioners prayer for restraining order and preliminary injunction, and trial
on the merits ensued. The RTC then rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, enjoining the defendant
from making use of the stock certificate of ACC. The decision was then appealed by the respondent to
the CA, which reversed the same. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether Sime Darby is entitled to damages and injunctive relief against Mendoza, its former employee.
RULING:
The petition has merit.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, which provides for the grounds for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction, states:

SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction may be

granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained
of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening or is attempting to do, or
is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.
In Medina v. Greenfield Development Corp., we held that the purpose of a preliminary injunction
is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can
be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the
case can be heard fully. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, Sime Darby has the burden of
establishing the following requisites:
(1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;
(2) a violation of that right;
(3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
In the present case, petitioner Sime Darby has sufficiently established its right over the subject
club share. Sime Darby presented evidence that it acquired the Class "A" club share of ACC in 1987
through a Deed of Sale. Being a corporation which is expressly disallowed by ACCs By-Laws to acquire
and register the club share under its name, Sime Darby had the share registered under the name of
respondent Mendoza, Sime Darbys former sales manager, under a trust arrangement. Such fact was
clearly proved when in the application form dated 17 July 1987 of the ACC for the purchase of the club
share, Sime Darby placed its name in full as the owner of the share and Mendoza as the assignee of the
club share. Also, in connection with the application for membership, Sime Darby sent a letter dated 17
September 1987 addressed to ACC confirming that "Mendoza, as Sime Darbys Sales Manager, is
entitled to club membership benefit of the Company."
While the share was bought by Sime Darby and placed under the name of Mendoza, his title is
only limited to the usufruct, or the use and enjoyment of the clubs facilities and privileges while employed
with the company. In Thomson v. Court of Appeals, we held that a trust arises in favor of one who pays
the purchase price of a property in the name of another, because of the presumption that he who pays for
a thing intends a beneficial interest for himself. While Sime Darby paid for the purchase price of the club
share, Mendoza was given the legal title. Thus, a resulting trust is presumed as a matter of law. The
burden then shifts to the transferee to show otherwise.
It can be gathered then that Sime Darby did not intend to give up its beneficial interest and right
over the share. The company merely wanted Mendoza to hold the share in trust since Sime Darby, as a
corporation, cannot register a club share in its own name under the rules of the ACC. At the same time,
Mendoza, as a senior manager of the company, was extended the privilege of availing a club
membership, as generously practiced by Sime Darby.
However, Mendoza violated Sime Darbys beneficial interest and right over the club share after he
was informed by Atty. Ronald E. Javier of Sime Darbys plan to sell the share to an interested buyer.
Mendoza refused to give an authorization to sell the club share unless he was paid P300,000 allegedly
representing his unpaid retirement benefit. In August 2004, Mendoza tried to appropriate the club share
and demanded from ACC that he be recognized as the true owner of the share as the named member in
the stock certificate as well as in the annual report issued by ACC. Despite being informed by Sime Darby

to stop using the facilities and privileges of the club share, Mendoza continued to do so. Thus, in order to
prevent further damage and prejudice to itself, Sime Darby properly sought injunction in this case.
As correctly observed by the RTC in its Decision dated 30 April 2007:
In order for a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the following requisites must be present: (a)
invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is
clear and unmistakable, and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage. The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or
threatened violations.
All the elements are present in the instant case. Plaintiff bought the subject share in 1987. As the
purchaser of the share, it has interest and right over it. There is a presumption that the share was bought
for the use of the defendant while the latter is still connected with the plaintiff. This is because when the
share was registered under the name of defendant, the latter signed the stock certificate in blank as well
as the deed of assignment and placed the certificate under the possession of the plaintiff. Hence, plaintiff
did not intend to relinquish its interest and right over the subject, rather it intended to have the share held
in trust by defendant, until a new grantee is named. This can be inferred from plaintiffs witness testimony
that plaintiff required the defendant to sign the said documents so that the plaintiff can be assured that its
ownership of the property is properly documented. Thirdly, plaintiffs payments of monthly billings of the
subject share bolster defendant possession in trust rather than his ownership over the share. With this,
the right of plaintiff over the share is clear and unmistakable. With defendants continued use of the
subject share despite that he is not anymore connected with plaintiff, and with plaintiffs demand upon the
defendant to desist from making use of the club facilities having been ignored, clearly defendant violated
plaintiffs right over the use and enjoyment thereof. Hence, plaintiff is entitled to its prayer for injunction.
CENTURY IRON WORKS, INC. and BENITO CHUA v. ELETO B. BANAS
G.R. No. 184116, June 19, 2013
J. Brion
In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law may be put into issue
while in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, only questions of jurisdiction may be inquired into.
FACTS:
Respondent worked at petitioner corporation as an inventory comptroller from July 2000 until his
dismissal on June 2002. His dismissal arose from complaints from petitioners gas suppliers regarding
alleged massive shortage of empty gas cylinders, which petitioner failed to make a report of. Petitioner
required respondent to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for loss of trust and
confidence and for gross and habitual neglect of duty, and appeared at a hearing to air his side.
Respondent was then terminated from service on grounds of loss of trust and confidence.
A complaint for illegal dismissal was thus filed by respondent with prayer for reinstatement and
money claims. In his defense, respondent averred that he was merely an inventory clerk who is not
responsible for the lost cylinders, and that his tasks were limited to conducting periodic and yearly
inventories, nor did he have any authority to receive and/or release cylinders. As such, he cannot be
terminated on the ground of loss of confidence. On the other hand, petitioners argued that respondent
was a supervisory employee who was responsible for the lost cylinders.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondent and ruled that he was illegally dismissed. On
appeal by petitioner, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters ruling in toto. A motion for reconsideration
was then filed by the petitioner which howeverwas denied by the NLRC, prompting him to file a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65.The CA affirmed with modification the NLRC ruling.
ISSUE:

Whether or not questions of fact may be inquired into in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court
RULING:
On the first issue, the CA relied on Cebu Shipyard & Engg Works, Inc. v. William Lines, Inc. in
affirming the lower tribunals finding that Baas worked as an inventory clerk. According to the CA, this
Court has ruled in Cebu Shipyard that in petitions for certiorari, only questions of law may be put into
issue and questions of fact cannot be entertained. Not noticing such glaring error, the petitioners agree to
such disquisition.They, however, assert that there is an exception to the rule that only questions of law
may be brought in an original action for certiorari, such as when the lower courts findings of facts are not
supported by sufficient evidence or that the same was based on misapprehension or erroneous
appreciation of facts.
A revisit of Cebu Shipyard shows that the CA has inadvertently misquoted this Court. In the said
case, we held:
In petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be put into issue.
Questions of fact cannot be entertained. The finding of negligence by the Court of Appeals is a
question which this Court cannot look into as it would entail going into factual matters on which
the finding of negligence was based.
We clarify that the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
before the CA. Both the petitioners and the CA have confused Rule 45 and Rule 65. In several Supreme
Court cases, we have clearly differentiated between a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is an appeal from a
ruling of a lower tribunal on pure questions of law. It is only in exceptional circumstances that we admit
and review questions of fact.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while
there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a
question to be one of law, the question must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what
the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.
Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such
question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue
raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a
question of fact.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a special civil action, an original
petition confined solely to questions of jurisdiction because a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
CONRADA O. ALMAGRO v. SPS. MANUEL AMAYA, SR. and LUCILA MERCADO, JESUS
MERCADO, SR., and RICARDO MERCADO
G.R. No. 179685, June 19, 2013
J. Velasco, Jr.
PD 27 encompasses only rice and corn land, i.e., agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and
corn under a system of sharecrop or lease-tenancy. In the instant case, since the landholdings cultivated
by respondents are primarily devoted to vegetable production, it is definitely outside the coverage, and
necessarily cannot properly be placed under the umbrella, of PD 27. Thus, as the RARAD found, the

landholdings cultivated by respondents which are portions of the subject lot were improperly placed under
PD 27 through OLT.
FACTS:
In 1976, Conrada allowed respondent Sps. Amaya to construct a house on a 46-square meter
portion of Lot No. 13333 on the condition that no additional improvements of such nature requiring
additional lot space shall be introduced and that they shall leave the area upon a 90-day notice. A decade
later, Conrada asked the Amayas to vacate. Instead of heeding the vacation demand, the Amayas built
permanent improvements on their house, the new structures eating an additional 48 square meters of
land space. As such, Conrada filed a Complaint against the Sps. Amaya before the DARAB-Region 7 for
Ejectment, Payment of Rentals with Damages. In their answer, the Sps.Amaya contended that they had
possessory rights over the area on which their house stands and the portion which they are cultivating,
thereby placing the latter under OLT pursuant to PD 27.
Conrada discovered after making inquiries that herein emancipation patents (EPs) in favor of
respondents have been generated over portions of Lot No. 13333. Aggrieved, Conrada filed a petition
also before the DARAB-Region 7 praying for the cancellation of the EPs since the subject lot has been
primarily devoted to vegetables production and cultivation, not to corn or rice, thus, outside the ambit of
the OLT under PD 27.
The RARAD rendered a decision declaring the coverage of Lot No. 13333 under OLT improper,
and cancelled the EPs issued in the name of respondents. Respondents thus appealed the decision to
the DARAB proper. The DARAB issued a decision upholding the validity of the EPs issued to Manuel,
thus effectively recognizing their tenurial rights over portions of Lot No. 13333. The DARAB further
upheld the validity and efficacy of the EPs issued in the name of respondents and dismissed the
complaints filed by Conrada for lack of merit.
Upon appeal to the CA, the DARAB decision was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal under
Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property is covered by PD 27.
RULING:
The issue raised is essentially factual in nature. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions and errors of law, not of fact, may be raised before the Court. Not being a trier of facts, it is not
the function of the Court to re-examine, winnow and weigh anew the respective sets of evidence of the
parties. Corollary to this precept, but subject to well-defined exceptions,is the rule that findings of fact of
trial courts or the CA, when supported by substantial evidence on record, are conclusive and binding on
the Court. But for compelling reasons, such as when the factual findings of the trying court or body are in
conflict with those of the appellate court, or there was a misapprehension of facts or when the inference
drawn from the facts was manifestly mistaken, this Court shall analyze or weigh the evidence again and if
necessary reverse the factual findings of the courts a quo. This is precisely the situation obtaining in this
case. The findings, on the one hand, of RARAD Arrieta and, those of the DARAB and the CA, on the
other, relative to the appreciation of evidence adduced in hearings before RARAD Arrieta, are
incompatible with each other.
As determined by the RARAD on the basis of documentary and testimonial evidence, and the
more conclusive judicial admissions made by respondents, vegetables are the primary crop planted in the
areas respectively cultivated by respondents. But the DARAB would have none of the RARADs
premised findings, relying instead on the presumptive correctness of the agrarian reform officers
determination, supposedly reached after a tedious proceeding, as to the nature of the land subject of this
case and the identity of the farmer-beneficiaries and their entitlement to lot award. To the DARAB, the fact

that EPs have been issued to respondents is proof enough that the disputed portions are planted to corn
as primary crop under the tillage of respondents. The DARAB held, thus:
It must be stressed that the issuance of the EPs in the instant case creates a
presumption which yields only to a clear and cogent evidence that the awardee is the qualified
and lawful owner because it involves a tedious process. Moreover, the identification and
classification of lands and qualification of farmer-beneficiaries are factual determination
performed by government officials and personnel with expertise in the line of work they are doing.
Their findings, conclusions/recommendations and final actions on the matter, after thorough
investigation and evaluation, have the presumption of regularity and correctness (La Campana
Food Products, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 770). As such, the burden of proving the
ineligibility or disqualification of the awardee rests upon the person who avers it through clear and
satisfactory proof or substantial evidence as required by law. Complainant, other than her bare
allegations, failed to prove that herein respondents-appellants do not deserve the said
government grant. Under the circumstances, it is just proper to assume that the issuance of
questioned documents was regular and correct. Thus, this Board finds no cogent reason to cause
the cancellation of the subject EPs which had long been issued in favor of respondentsappellants.
Clearly, the DARAB misappreciated the evidence adduced before the office of the RARAD and
the judicial admissions made by respondents to prove certain key issues. DARAB relied upon the
presumption based on what it points to as the tedious process in the issuance of the EPs. It considered
as but "bare allegations" what were duly established by documentary and testimonial evidence and by
respondents admission no less that the primary crop planted in the subject landholdings is not corn but
vegetables, and that corn is only planted sporadically and only for the personal consumption of one of the
respondents. To be sure, the presumption of regularity or correctness of official action cannot be used as
springboard to justify the PD 27 coverage of the disputed lots because a presumption is precisely just
thata mere presumption. Once challenged by credibly convincing evidence, as here, it can no longer be
treated as binding truth.
In Mercado v. Mercado and Gabriel v. Jamias, the Court has ruled that the mere issuance of an
EP does not put the ownership of ARBs beyond attack and scrutiny. EPs issued to such beneficiaries may
be corrected and canceled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations. In fact, DAR AO No. 02,
Series of 1994, lists and defines the grounds for cancellation of registered EPs or Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA).
PD 27 pertinently provides, "This shall apply to tenant farmers of private agricultural lands
primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as
landed estate or not."
Daez v. Court of Appeals sets forth the requisite essential to place a piece of land under PD 27,
thusly:
P.D. No. 27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program, covers tenanted
rice or corn lands. The requisite for coverage under the OLT program are the following: (1) the land must
be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease tenancy obtaining
therein. If either requisite is absent, a landowner may apply for exemption. If either of these requisite is
absent, the land is not covered under OLT. x x x
It is, thus, clear that PD 27 encompasses only rice and corn land, i.e., agricultural lands primarily
devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease-tenancy. In the instant case, since the
landholdings cultivated by respondents are primarily devoted to vegetable production, it is definitely
outside the coverage, and necessarily cannot properly be placed under the umbrella, of PD 27. Thus, as
the RARAD found, the landholdings cultivated by respondents which are portions of the subject lot were
improperly placed under PD 27 through OLT.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FERDINAND CASTRO

G.R. No. 195777, June 19, 2013
J. Perez
The finding of the credibility of the testimonies of the arresting officers should prevail over the
testimonies of the accused-appellant and his friend-witnesses especially so when their respective
testimonies were inconsistent on material points. Even assuming that these were not substantial enough
to doubt the credibility of the testimonies of the defense witnesses, we cannot simply disregard the
contradicting testimonies of the accused-appellant on one hand and his witnesses on the other as to the
place where the arrest was made.
FACTS:
The accused was charged under an information with violating Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 to
which he pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment. The prosecution presented evidence which showed
that the Drug Enforcement Unit of Pasig City Police Station received a call from an confidential informant
who reported that a certain Fredie (herein accused) was selling illegal drugs at Kalamansi Street, Pasig
City. A buy-bust operation was then conducted to apprehend appellant. The team then proceeded to the
area of operation, and the poseur-buyer was later approached by the accused and was handed a sachet
containing white crystalline substance which he took from his pocket. When the pre-arranged signal was
performed, the other members of the team approached the area and arrested the accused. When they
frisked the accused, the two piecesof transparent plastic sachets and the buy-bust money were found in
his possession and were confiscated. The proper markings on the sachet were accordingly done at the
area of operation, and the accused was brought to the station for further investigation.
In his defense, the accused alleged that on that night, as he was about to enter the gate of his
house, four persons suddenly confrontedhim and grabbed him. When he asked why he was being
arrested, he did not get a reply. Thereafter, his name, age and address were taken and he was then
charged with possession and sale of illegal drugs.
The trial court convicted the accused of the both crimes as charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the decision of the trial court, and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the decision of the trial court which found him guilty of the crime of
illegal sale and possession of drugs.
RULING:
The defense posits that the equipoise rule should have been applied in his favor inasmuch as the
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution and the defense are all self-serving.
We cannot agree. The equipoise rule does not apply because the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses are, in fact, credible based on settled legal principles and doctrines applicable to the particular
factual circumstances of the case.
Thus, we have said, time and again, that "findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature
and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross misapprehension of
facts; or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings." Also,
"the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is
accorded full weight and credit as well as great respect, if not conclusive effect."
We find nothing in the records that would justify a deviation from the findings of the trial court and
the appellate court. Supported by evidence, the arresting officers rendered a straightforward narration of
the details of the operation relative to the following: (1) the receipt of an information as to the illegal drugs

activity in the area where accused-appellant was apprehended; (2) the organization of the buy-bust team;
(3) the preparations made for the purpose; (4) the entrapment itself leading to the arrest of accusedappellant; (5) the marking of the seized items; and (6) the eventual delivery of the specimens to the crime
laboratory.
Neither did the defense prove that there was ill-motive or bad faith on the part of the team to
falsely impute upon him the commission of these grave offenses. The doctrine of presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty, therefore, applies. As explained in People v. Tion:
x x x Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust
team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their
testimonies on the buy-bust operation deserve full faith and credit. Settled is the rule that in cases
involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who
are police officers, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner,
unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill motive on the part of the police officers or
deviation from the regular performance of their duties. The records do not show any allegation of
improper motive on the part of the buy-bust team. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duties of the police officers must be upheld.
Necessarily, the finding of the credibility of the testimonies of the arresting officers should prevail
over the testimonies of the accused-appellant and his friend-witnesses especially so when their
respective testimonies were inconsistent on material points. Even assuming that these were not
substantial enough to doubt the credibility of the testimonies of the defense witnesses, we cannot simply
disregard the contradicting testimonies of the accused-appellant on one hand and his witnesses on the
other as to the place where the arrest was made.
From the context of the testimony of accused-appellant on cross-examination, he was arrested
outside his house in front of his drinking buddies Millare and dela Cruz. Accused-appellants two (2)
witnesses, on the other hand, implied clearly that the arrest was made inside the house considering that
the arresting officers followed accused-appellant inside the house and there they saw, upon peeping
through the window, that their friend was already handcuffed.
In People v. Concepcion, the Court had the occasion to rule on the credibility of the witnesses
with two conflicting statements on the place of arrest. It held:
The testimony of defense witness Julieta dela Rosa does not convince us. As the wife of
appellant Alfredo and sister-in-law of appellant Henry, we find her not to be credible. Her
testimony is suspect and unsubstantiated. In her direct testimony, she said her husband,
appellant Alfredo, was outside their house with his friends. However, such statement was belied
by Alfredo himself who said he was inside his house when he was allegedly arrested by members
of the PDEA. Such inconsistency as to where appellant Alfredo was when the alleged unlawful
arrest was made, further diminishes the credibility of the defense witnesses.
Further, in Aurelio v. People, the Court discussed the weight given to the testimonies of a longtime neighbor and a sister, who rendered contradicting statements, viz:
The testimonies of the petitioners witnesses cannot be given more weight than the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses. Teresita is the sister of the petitioner while Julieta has been his neighbor for
the past 10 years. Thus, their testimonies are necessarily suspect, considering they are petitioners sibling
and friend respectively. The testimonies of Julieta and Teresita even contradict each other as Teresita
declared that five malefactors entered their home while Julieta stated that only two men went with
petitioner inside his house. This inconsistency further diminishes the credibility of petitioners witnesses.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BENEDICT HOMAKY LUCIO
G.R. No. 191391, June 19, 2013
J. Perez

The question as to what part of the body of the accused did the police officers recover the money
does not dissolve the elements of illegal sale and possession as minor inconsistencies do not negate or
dissolve the eyewitnesses positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Minor
inconsistencies in the narration of the arresting officers do not detract from their essential credibility as
long as their testimony on the whole is coherent and intrinsically believable.
FACTS:
The accused and co-accused Wilma Tomas were charged under an information with the violation
of Sec. 5 and Sec. 11 of RA 9165, to which they pleaded not guilty upon their arraignment. The evidence
for the prosecution showed that a buy-bust operation was conducted for the apprehension of a couple
identified as Wilma and Ben, who were allegedly involved in the illegal distribution or sale of dangerous
drugs, particularly marijuana in Baguio City. At the area of operation, the poseur-buyer met Ben and
offered to buy marijuana to be transported back to Manila. Upon the performance of the pre-arranged
signal, the rest of the buy-bust team approached the area and arrested the couple. The officers then
informed them of their constitutional rights in Tagalog and Ilocano, and were then brought, along with the
confiscated 36 marijuana bricks, to the policce station for proper documentation and identification. The
markings required were accordingly done by one of the members of the buy-bust team and were then
sent to the crime lab for examination. The 35 bricks tested positive for marijuana. The defense, on the
other hand, interposed frame-up.
The RTC convicted the accused of the crimes charged but acquitted co-accused Tomas. It ruled
that the elements of both illegal sale and possession of drugs were sufficiently established by the
prosecution. It also recognized the credibility of the testimonies of the police officers pertaining to the
buy-bust operation and the positive identification of the accused as the seller of the bricks of marijuana.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court in toto, holding that all the elements of illegal sale and
illegal possession of dangerous drug were proven by the prosecution. It also upheld the credibility of the
witnesses and placed highest respect on the findings of facts of the trial court. It likewise disregarded the
absence of surveillance or test buy prior to the buy-bust operation as well as the strict compliance of the
requirements to establish chain of custody under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the decision of the trial court which gave credence to the evidence
presented by the prosecution despite their inconsistencies.
RULING:
After a careful review of the evidence, we affirm the ruling of conviction of both the trial court and
CA.
In his appellants brief, Lucio questions the full credence given by the lower courts to the version
of the prosecution despite their irregularities and inconsistencies. Among the lapses asserted was the lack
of previous surveillance prior to the buy-bust operation. No test buy was conducted to confirm the
truthfulness of the statements given by the informant which prompted the operation.
It must be stressed that prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment
operation. This issue in the prosecution of illegal drugs cases, again, has long been settled by this Court.
We have been consistent in our ruling that prior surveillance is not required for a valid buy-bust operation,
especially if the buy-bust team is accompanied to the target area by their informant. In People v.
Eugenio, the Court held that there is no requirement that prior surveillance should be conducted before a
buy-bust operation can be undertaken especially when the policemen are accompanied to the scene by
their civilian informant. Prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or a buybust operation, there being no fixed or textbook method for conducting one. When time is of essence, the

police may dispense with the need for prior surveillance. The buy-bust operation conducted by PO1
Castro and the rest of them, together with their civilian informant is justified by the urgency of the
situation.
Another point argued is the inconsistency of the recollection of events by PO1 Castro, PO1
Labbutan and SPO4 Lucas with regard to the recovery of the marked money from the accused. PO1
Castro recalled that it was recovered from the hand of Lucio while PO1 Labbutan and SPO4 Lucas
testified that the same was recovered from the pocket of the accused after a body search. We cannot
sustain his argument. In order for a discrepancy or inconsistency between the testimonies of witnesses to
serve as basis for acquittal, it must refer to significant facts vital to the guilt or innocence of the accused x
x x. An inconsistency which has nothing to do with the elements of the crime cannot be a ground for the
acquittal of the accused."
In this case, the question as to what part of the body of the accused did the police officers recover
the money does not dissolve the elements of illegal sale and possession as minor inconsistencies do not
negate or dissolve the eyewitnesses positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the
crime. Minor inconsistencies in the narration of PO1 Castro, PO1 Labbutan and SPO4 Lucas do not
detract from their essential credibility as long as their testimony on the whole is coherent and intrinsically
believable.
In his final effort to evade conviction, the accused challenged the establishment of chain of
custody of illegal drugs. In People v. Kamad, the following elements are necessary in order to establish
the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation:
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to
the court.
Upon review, we are convinced that the prosecution had sufficiently proved all the elements to
establish chain of custody of illegal drugs.1wphi1 In his direct examination, PO1 Castro positively
identified the marijuana brick sold to him through the markings "GCPC GCP Castro" and date "3/31/04"
placed on the brick also identified as Exhibit A. The rest of the marijuana bricks subject of illegal
possession case were likewise marked with AAL, LPL GCPC and HPE and dated as "3/31/04" numbered
from B-1 to B-35. Upon taking custody of the marijuana bricks, the marijuana bricks were brought to the
PDEA Office for proper investigation and documentation. The same were properly inventoried and
recounted in the presence of the fiscal and the arresting team. Thereafter, a request for examination of
the marijuana bricks was sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory to determine presence of illegal drug. As per
Chemistry Report identified as Exhibit "G" made by Forensic Chemist Officer Emilia Gracio Montes,
Exhibits "A" and "B," consisting of the marijuana brick sold to PO1 Castro as well the thirty five bricks
confiscated, all resulted positive of presence of dangerous drug.
There was a question regarding the physical condition of the marijuana bricks when they were
allegedly bought and confiscated compared to when they were presented in court. It was argued that the
bricks were wrapped in newspapers when bought, but when presented in court, they were already found
with packing tape and contained in a plastic bag. This observation cannot be taken against the
prosecution. It is only natural that the bricks were no longer be wrapped in newspapers as they were
opened by the forensic chemist for testing purposes. It was explained by the prosecution that when the

bricks were brought back to the prosecutors office, a portion of the bricks was cut in order to take
representative samples.
It has been ruled time and again that failure to strictly comply with Section 21 (1), Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 does not necessarily render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from
him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. The function of the chain of custody requirement is to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the
evidence are removed. To be admissible, the prosecution must show by records or testimony, the
continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into possession of the police
officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition up to the time it was offered
in evidence.
SPOUSES MANUEL SY AND VICTORIA SY v. GENALYN D. YOUNG
G.R. No. 169214, June 19, 2013
J. Brion
The law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It means that
whatever is once irrevocably established the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in
the same case continues to be the law of the case whether correct on general principles or not, so long
as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
FACTS:
The parcel of land subject matter of this case belonged to George Young. His wife, Lilia Young
executed a Second Supplemental to the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, under which said land was
adjudicated solely in her favor. Lilia represented her daughter respondent in the execution of the
document, who was then a minor. Subsequently, Lilia obtained a loan from petitioners with the property
as security. When she defaulted on her loan, the property was foreclosed and sold to petitioners and was
thereafter registered in their name, prompting respondent to file a complaint for Nullification of Second
Supplemental Extrajudicial Settlement, Mortgage, Foreclosure Sale and Tax Declaration with the RTC.
She argued that the partition was unenforceable since she was only a minor at the time of its execution,
pointing out that the partition was contrary to the Rules of Court as it was without the courts approval.
A motion to admit a supplemental complaint was then filed by respondent on July 20,2000,
invoking her right to redeem the property as co-owner thereof. When the RTC denied said motion on
December 28, 2000, respondent filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 (CA-G.R. Sp.
No. 65629) with the CA. The petition was however denied by the CA, holding that respondents cause of
action is entirely different from her original complaint, which prompted the respondent to elevated to the
SC under Rule 65 (GR157955).
Meanwhile, trial in the RTC continued while CA-G.R. Sp. No. 65629 was pending in the CA.
Consequently, respondent moved to suspend the proceedings until the CA has decided on the propriety
of admitting the amended complaint, but the same was denied by the RTC.Respondent then filed a
motion to cancel hearing on the ground that she was indisposed, which resulted in the dismissal of the
complaint by the RTC on the ground of non-suit. The respondents motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied by the RTC on January 4, 2002.
An appeal (CA-G.R. Sp. No. 74045) was then filed by respondent questioning orders of the RTC
dismissing her complaint. On May 28, 2002, Genalyn again filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annul the same RTC Orders that comprise the subject matter of the
ordinary appeal, which was however denied by the CA. Respondent then filed a petition for review under
Rule 45 (GR 157745) which was consolidated with GR 157955.

A decision was then promulgated on the consolidated cases. The SC granted the petition in GR
157955 and ordered the RTC to admit the supplemental complaint, since Genalyns cause of action
stems directly from her rights as co-owner of the subject property. On the other hand, in GR 157745, the
SC ruled that Genalyn engaged in forum shopping in filing an appeal and a petition for certiorari
questioning the orders of the RTC and thus dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whetheror not the CA erred in setting aside the RTC Orders which dismissed the case for non-suit.
RULING:
We deny the petition. The present action is barred by the law of the case.
In denying the petition, we necessarily must reiterate our ruling in Young which constitutes as the
controlling doctrine or the law of the case in the present case.
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It means that
whatever is once irrevocably established the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in
the same case continues to be the law of the case whether correct on general principles or not, so long as
the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
We point out in this respect that the law of the case does not have the finality of res judicata. Law
of the case applies only to the same case, whereas res judicata forecloses parties or privies in one case
by what has been done in another case. In law of the case, the rule made by an appellate court cannot be
departed from in subsequent proceedings in the same case. Furthermore, law of the case relates entirely
to questions of law while res judicata is applicable to the conclusive determination of issues of fact.
Although res judicata may include questions of law, it is generally concerned with the effect of
adjudication in a wholly independent proceeding.
The rationale behind this rule is to enable an appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily
and efficiently, which would be impossible if a question, once considered and decided by it, were to be
litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent appeal. Without it, there would be
endless litigation. Litigants would be free to speculate on changes in the personnel of a court, or on the
chance of our rewriting propositions once gravely ruled on solemn argument and handed down as the law
of a given case.
In Young, we directed the RTC to admit Genalyns supplemental complaint. In so ruling, we also
vacated the RTC Orders which dismissed Genalyns complaint for failure to prosecute. Moreover,
Genalyns move to suspend the proceedings which led to the dismissal of her complaint stemmed
essentially from the RTC's erroneous refusal to admit the supplemental complaint. On the second issue,
we unequivocably also settled that Genalyn committed forum shopping when she filed an appeal and a
petition for certiorari successively. This ruling we uphold as the ruling that should apply.
REINIER PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING, INC. and NEPTUNE SHIP MANAGEMENT SVCS,
PTE., LTD. v. CAPTAIN FRANCISCO B.GUEVARRA
G.R. No. 157020, June 19, 2013
J. Abad
The clarification provided in A.M. 00-2-14-SC actually covers a situation where the due date falls
on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday. Precisely, what such clarification wanted to address is the erroneous
claim that "the period of extension" in such a case "is to be reckoned from the next working day and not
from the original expiration of the period." The correct rule, according to the clarification, is that "any
extension of time to file the required pleading should x x x be counted from the expiration of the period
regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday."

FACTS:
Petitioner Reinier, as the agent of Neptune, hired the services of respondent to work as master of
their vessel. In the courseof his work, the Reinier sent the respondent notice relieving him from work
which prompted the latter to file a case for illegal dismissal against the former and its principal.The Labor
Arbiter found that respondent was illegally dismissed for he was not given the opportunity to be heard,
and ordered Reinier and Neptune to solidarily pay the former the salaries due him for the remainder of the
contract.
Reinier appealed to the NLRC, which affirmed the decision of the LA. The due date to file a
petition for special civil action of certiorari before the CA fell on July 26, 2002, a Friday, but Reinier
succeeded in obtaining an extension of 15 days, which period counted from July 26 began to run on July
27, a Saturday, and fell due on August 10, a Saturday. Reinier filed its petition on the following Monday,
August 12, 2002.
The CA dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time, and ruled that the petitioner
violated A.M. 00-2-14-SC (Re: Computation of Time When the Last Day Falls on a Saturday, Sunday or
Legal Holiday and a Motion for Extension Filed on Next Working Day is Granted.) Since August 10,
2002, the last day of the extended period, fell on a Saturday, automatic deferment to the next working day
did not apply and Reinier should have filed its petition before August 10, a Saturday, considering that the
court is closed on Saturdays.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing its petition for having been filed out of time.
RULING:
The petition is granted. The CA ruling is reversed and set aside.
A.M. 00-2-14-SC clarifies the application of Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court when the last
day on which a pleading is due falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday and the original period is
extended. The clarification states:
Whereas, the aforecited provision applies in the matter of filing of pleadings in courts
when the due date falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, in which case, the filing of the
said pleading on the next working day is deemed on time;
Whereas, the question has been raised if the period is extended ipso jure to the next
working day immediately following where the last day of the period is a Saturday, Sunday or legal
holiday so that when a motion for extension of time is filed, the period of extension is to be
reckoned from the next working day and not from the original expiration of the period;
NOW THEREFORE, the Court Resolves, for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, to
declare that Section 1, Rule 22 speaks only of "the last day of the period" so that when a party
seeks an extension and the same is granted, the due date ceases to be the last day and hence,
the provision no longer applies. Any extension of time to file the required pleading should
therefore be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is
a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.
Reinier Shippings last day for filing its petition fell on July 26, a Friday. It asked for a 15-day
extension before the period lapsed and this was granted. As it happened, 15 days from July 26 fell on
August 10, a Saturday. The CA held that Reinier Shipping should have filed its petition before August 10
(Saturday) or at the latest on August 9 (Friday) since, in an extended period, the fact that the extended
due date (August 10) falls on a Saturday is to be "disregarded." Reinier Shipping has no right to move the
extended due date to the next working day even if such due date fell on a Saturday. Since the courts were

closed on August 10 (Saturday), Reinier Shipping should have filed its petition, according to the CA, not
later than Friday, August 9.
But this is obviously wrong since it would mean compelling Reinier Shipping to file its petition one
day short of the 15-day extension granted it. That would unjustly deprive it of the full benefit of that
extension. Since its new due date fell on a Saturday when courts are close, however, the clear language
of Section 1, Rule 21, applies. This gives Reinier Shipping up to Monday (August 12), the next working
day, within which to file its petition.
The clarification provided in A.M. 00-2-14-SC actually covers a situation where the due date falls
on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday. Precisely, what such clarification wanted to address is the erroneous
claim that "the period of extension" in such a case "is to be reckoned from the next working day and not
from the original expiration of the period." The correct rule, according to the clarification, is that "any
extension of time to file the required pleading should x x x be counted from the expiration of the period
regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday."
For example, if a pleading is due on July 10 and this happens to be a Saturday, the time for filing
it shall not run, applying Section 1 of Rule 21, on July 10 (Saturday) nor on July 11 (Sunday) but will
resume to run on the next working day, which is July 12 (Monday). The pleading will then be due on the
latter date. If the period is extended by 10 days, such 10 days will be counted, not from July 12 (Monday)
but from the original due date, July 10 (Saturday) "regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday."
Consequently, the new due date will be 10 days from July 10 or precisely on July 20. As stated above, the
situation of Reinier Shipping is different.
BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS AND LOLITA G. TOLEDO
G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013
J. Perez
The trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied the motion to dismiss filed by the respondent. Since respondents motion to
dismiss was filed after petitioner has completed the presentation of its evidence in the trial court, we can
say that the filing of the motion to dismiss was a mere ploy on the part of respondent to delay the prompt
resolution of the case against her.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the issuanceof a writ of preliminary
attachment against spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo. An answer was filed, but herein respondent filed
an amended answer which alleges that her husband Manuel has already died. As a result, petitioner filed
a motion to require the respondent to disclose the heirs of Manuel. After the receipt of the list of heirs,
petitioner filed a motion for substitution, praying that Manuel be substituted by his children as codefendants, which was granted by the trial court.
The trial of the case then proceeded. The plaintiff, herein petitioner, presented evidence and
exhibits were thereafter admitted. The reception of the evidence for the respondent was cancelled upon
agreement of the parties, and the same was given a period of fifteen days within which to file a demurrer
to evidence. However, respondent instead filed a motion to dismiss.
The motion was denied by the trial court for having been filed out of time. Aggrieved, the
respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging that the trial court erred in denying her motion
to dismiss despite discovery, during the trial, of evidence which constitutes as ground for dismissal of the
case. The CA granted the petition of the respondent and denied the motion for reconsideration of the
petitioner, hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in not holding that:

1. Respondent is already estopped from questioning the trial courts jurisdiction;
2. Petitioner never failed to implead an indispensable party as the estate of Manuel is not an
indispensable party;
3. The inclusion of Manuel as party-defendant is a mere misjoinder of party not warranting the dismissal
of the case before the lower court; and
4. Since the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party, it is not necessary that petitioner file its claim
against the estate of Manuel.
RULING:
On whether or not respondent is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court.
At the outset, it must be here stated that, as the succeeding discussions will demonstrate,
jurisdiction over the person of Manuel should not be an issue in this case. A protracted discourse on
jurisdiction is, nevertheless, demanded by the fact that jurisdiction has been raised as an issue from the
lower court, to the Court of Appeals and, finally, before this Court. For the sake of clarity, and in order to
finally settle the controversy and fully dispose of all the issues in this case, it was deemed imperative to
resolve the issue of jurisdiction.
1. Aspects of Jurisdiction
Petitioner calls attention to the fact that respondents motion to dismiss questioning the trial
courts jurisdiction was filed more than six years after her amended answer was filed. According to
petitioner, respondent had several opportunities, at various stages of the proceedings, to assail the trial
courts jurisdiction but never did so for six straight years. Citing the doctrine laid down in the case of
Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al. petitioner claimed that respondents failure to raise the question of
jurisdiction at an earlier stage bars her from later questioning it, especially since she actively participated
in the proceedings conducted by the trial court.
Petitioners argument is misplaced, in that, it failed to consider that the concept of jurisdiction has
several aspects, namely: (1) jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) jurisdiction over the parties; (3)
jurisdiction over the issues of the case; and (4) in cases involving property, jurisdiction over the res or the
thing which is the subject of the litigation.
The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as a result of estoppel by
laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter. Thus, in Tijam, the case relied upon by petitioner, the issue
involved was the authority of the then Court of First Instance to hear a case for the collection of a sum of
money in the amount of P1,908.00 which amount was, at that time, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the municipal courts.
Here, what respondent was questioning in her motion to dismiss before the trial court was that
courts jurisdiction over the person of defendant Manuel. Thus, the principle of estoppel by laches finds no
application in this case. Instead, the principles relating to jurisdiction over the person of the parties are
pertinent herein.
Based on the foregoing provisions(Rule 9,Sec. 1 and Rule 15, Sec. 8), the "objection on
jurisdictional grounds which is not waived even if not alleged in a motion to dismiss or the answer is lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter. x x x Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter can always be
raised anytime, even for the first time on appeal, since jurisdictional issues cannot be waived x x x
subject, however, to the principle of estoppel by laches."
Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party to a case is not one of those
defenses which are not deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such defense must be invoked when
an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a waiver of the defense. If the objection is not

raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the
plaintiff or the defendant is deemed waived by virtue of the first sentence of the above-quoted Section 1 of
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred when it made a sweeping pronouncement in its questioned
decision, stating that "issue on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding, even for the first
time on appeal" and that, therefore, respondent timely raised the issue in her motion to dismiss and is,
consequently, not estopped from raising the question of jurisdiction. As the question of jurisdiction
involved here is that over the person of the defendant Manuel, the same is deemed waived if not raised in
the answer or a motion to dismiss. In any case, respondent cannot claim the defense since "lack of
jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver, is a personal defense which can only be asserted by
the party who can thereby waive it by silence."
2. Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is acquired through a valid service of summons; trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel Toledo
In the first place, jurisdiction over the person of Manuel was never acquired by the trial court. A
defendant is informed of a case against him when he receives summons. "Summons is a writ by which
the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the
court acquires jurisdiction over his person."
In the case at bar, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel since there
was no valid service of summons upon him, precisely because he was already dead even before the
complaint against him and his wife was filed in the trial court. Although the factual milieu of the present
case is not exactly similar to that of Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te, one of the issues submitted for resolution in
both cases is similar: whether or not a case, where one of the named defendants was already dead at the
time of its filing, should be dismissed so that the claim may be pursued instead in the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased defendant. The petitioner in the Sarsaba Case claimed, as did
respondent herein, that since one of the defendants died before summons was served on him, the trial
court should have dismissed the complaint against all the defendants and the claim should be filed
against the estate of the deceased defendant. The petitioner in Sarsaba, therefore, prayed that the
complaint be dismissed, not only against Sereno, but as to all the defendants, considering that the RTC
did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Sereno. This is exactly the same prayer made by
respondent herein in her motion to dismiss.
The Court, in the Sarsaba Case, resolved the issue in this wise:
x x x We cannot countenance petitioners argument that the complaint against the other
defendants should have been dismissed, considering that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction
over the person of Sereno. The courts failure to acquire jurisdiction over ones person is a
defense which is personal to the person claiming it. Obviously, it is now impossible for Sereno to
invoke the same in view of his death. Neither can petitioner invoke such ground, on behalf of
Sereno, so as to reap the benefit of having the case dismissed against all of the defendants.
Failure to serve summons on Serenos person will not be a cause for the dismissal of the
complaint against the other defendants, considering that they have been served with copies of
the summons and complaints and have long submitted their respective responsive pleadings. In
fact, the other defendants in the complaint were given the chance to raise all possible defenses
and objections personal to them in their respective motions to dismiss and their subsequent
answers.
Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal by the trial court of the complaint against
Sereno only.
Based on the foregoing pronouncements, there is no basis for dismissing the complaint against
respondent herein. Thus, as already emphasized above, the trial court correctly denied her motion to
dismiss.

On whether or not the estate of Manuel Toledo is an indispensable party.

An indispensable party is one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter of a
case that a final adjudication cannot be made in his or her absence, without injuring or affecting that
interest. He or she is a party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but "an
interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting that interest or leaving the
controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and
good conscience. It has also been considered that an indispensable party is a person in whose absence
there cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court which is effective, complete
or equitable." Further, an indispensable party is one who must be included in an action before it may
properly proceed.
On the other hand, a "person is not an indispensable party if his interest in the controversy or
subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly
or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an
indispensable party if his presence would merely permit complete relief between him or her and those
already parties to the action, or if he or she has no interest in the subject matter of the action." It is not a
sufficient reason to declare a person to be an indispensable party simply because his or her presence will
avoid multiple litigations.
Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the case at bar, it is clear that the estate of Manuel is
not an indispensable party to the collection case, for the simple reason that the obligation of Manuel and
his wife, respondent herein, is solidary. In other words, the collection case can proceed and the demands
of petitioner can be satisfied by respondent only, even without impleading the estate of Manuel.
Consequently, the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to petitioners complaint for sum of
money.
However, the Court of Appeals, agreeing with the contention of respondent, held that the claim of
petitioner should have been filed against the estate of Manuel in accordance with Sections 5 and 6 of
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the said provisions. In
construing Section 6, Rule 87 of the old Rules of Court, the precursor of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which latter provision has been retained in the present Rules of Court without any
revisions, the Supreme Court, in the case of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. v. Villarama, et. al., held:
Construing Section 698 of the Code of Civil Procedure from whence [Section 6, Rule 87] was
taken, this Court held that where two persons are bound in solidum for the same debt and one of them
dies, the whole indebtedness can be proved against the estate of the latter, the decedents liability being
absolute and primary; x x x. It is evident from the foregoing that Section 6 of Rule 87 provides the
procedure should the creditor desire to go against the deceased debtor, but there is certainly nothing in
the said provision making compliance with such procedure a condition precedent before an ordinary
action against the surviving solidary debtors, should the creditor choose to demand payment from the
latter, could be entertained to the extent that failure to observe the same would deprive the court
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action against the surviving debtors. Upon the other hand, the Civil
Code expressly allows the creditor to proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of
them simultaneously. There is, therefore, nothing improper in the creditors filing of an action against the
surviving solidary debtors alone, instead of instituting a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased debtor wherein his claim could be filed.
The foregoing ruling was reiterated and expounded in the later case of Philippine National Bank v.
Asuncion where the Supreme Court pronounced:
A cursory perusal of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court reveals that
nothing therein prevents a creditor from proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors. Said
provision merely sets up the procedure in enforcing collection in case a creditor chooses to
pursue his claim against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor. The rule has been set forth

that a creditor (in a solidary obligation) has the option whether to file or not to file a claim against
the estate of the solidary debtor. x x x
xxxx
It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the applicable provision in this matter.
Said provision gives the creditor the right to "proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or
all of them simultaneously." The choice is undoubtedly left to the solidary creditor to determine against
whom he will enforce collection. In case of the death of one of the solidary debtors, he (the creditor) may,
if he so chooses, proceed against the surviving solidary debtors without necessity of filing a claim in the
estate of the deceased debtors. It is not mandatory for him to have the case dismissed as against the
surviving debtors and file its claim against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor, x x x. For to require
the creditor to proceed against the estate, making it a condition precedent for any collection action against
the surviving debtors to prosper, would deprive him of his substantive rightsprovided by Article 1216 of the
New Civil Code.
As correctly argued by petitioner, if Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court were applied
literally, Article 1216 of the New Civil Code would, in effect, be repealed since under the Rules of Court,
petitioner has no choice but to proceed against the estate of [the deceased debtor] only. Obviously, this
provision diminishes the [creditors] right under the New Civil Code to proceed against any one, some or
all of the solidary debtors. Such a construction is not sanctioned by principle, which is too well settled to
require citation, that a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. Otherwise stated,
Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court cannot be made to prevail over Article 1216 of the New
Civil Code, the former being merely procedural, while the latter, substantive.
Based on the foregoing, the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party and the case can
proceed as against respondent only. That petitioner opted to collect from respondent and not from the
estate of Manuel is evidenced by its opposition to respondents motion to dismiss asserting that the case,
as against her, should be dismissed so that petitioner can proceed against the estate of Manuel.
On whether or not the inclusion of Manuel as party defendant is a misjoinder of party.
Section 11 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states that "neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties
is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of
any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim
against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately."
Based on the last sentence of the afore-quoted provision of law, a misjoined party must have the
capacity to sue or be sued in the event that the claim by or against the misjoined party is pursued in a
separate case. In this case, therefore, the inclusion of Manuel in the complaint cannot be considered a
misjoinder, as in fact, the action would have proceeded against him had he been alive at the time the
collection case was filed by petitioner. This being the case, the remedy provided by Section 11 of Rule 3
does not obtain here. The name of Manuel as party-defendant cannot simply be dropped from the case.
Instead, the procedure taken by the Court in Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te, whose facts, as mentioned earlier,
resemble those of this case, should be followed herein. There, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial
court when it resolved the issue of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased Sereno in this wise:
As correctly pointed by defendants, the Honorable Court has not acquired jurisdiction over the
person of Patricio Sereno since there was indeed no valid service of summons insofar as Patricio Sereno
is concerned. Patricio Sereno died before the summons, together with a copy of the complaint and its
annexes, could be served upon him.
However, the failure to effect service of summons unto Patricio Sereno, one of the defendants
herein, does not render the action DISMISSIBLE, considering that the three (3) other defendants, x x x,
were validly served with summons and the case with respect to the answering defendants may still

proceed independently. Be it recalled that the three (3) answering defendants have previously filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint which was denied by the Court.
Hence, only the case against Patricio Sereno will be DISMISSED and the same may be filed as a
claim against the estate of Patricio Sereno, but the case with respect to the three (3) other accused [sic]
will proceed.
As a result, the case, as against Manuel, must be dismissed. In addition, the dismissal of the
case against Manuel is further warranted by Section 1 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which states that:
only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action." Applying
this provision of law, the Court, in the case of Ventura v. Militante, held:
Parties may be either plaintiffs or defendants. x x x. In order to maintain an action in a
court of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is, he, she or it must be a
person in law and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural or an artificial person, and no suit
can be lawfully prosecuted save in the name of such a person.
The rule is no different as regards party defendants. It is incumbent upon a plaintiff, when he
institutes a judicial proceeding, to name the proper party defendant to his cause of action. In a suit or
proceeding in personam of an adversary character, the court can acquire no jurisdiction for the purpose of
trial or judgment until a party defendant who actually or legally exists and is legally capable of being sued,
is brought before it. It has even been held that the question of the legal personality of a party defendant is
a question of substance going to the jurisdiction of the court and not one of procedure.
Indeed, where the defendant is neither a natural nor a juridical person or an entity authorized by
law, the complaint may be dismissed on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause
of action or for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court,
because a complaint cannot possibly state a cause of action against one who cannot be a party to a civil
action.
Since the proper course of action against the wrongful inclusion of Manuel as party-defendant is
the dismissal of the case as against him, thus did the trial court err when it ordered the substitution of
Manuel by his heirs. Substitution is proper only where the party to be substituted died during the
pendency of the case, as expressly provided for by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Here, since
Manuel was already dead at the time of the filing of the complaint, the court never acquired jurisdiction
over his person and, in effect, there was no party to be substituted.
CONCRETE SOLUTIONS, INC./PRIMARY STRUCTURES CORPORATION, represented by
ANASTACIO G. ARDIENTE, JR. v. ARTHUR CABUSAS
G.R. No. 177812, June 19, 2013
J. Peralta
In petitions for review under Rule 45, only questions of law must be raised.It is elementary rule
that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and this doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases.
Here, the findings of the Labor Arbiter, on one hand, and the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, on the
other, are conflicting, thus we are constrained to determine the facts of the case.
FACTS:
Respondent was hired by petitioner as a transit mixer driver with a status of a project employee.
Sometime thereafter, petitioners received reports that respondent unloaded less than a cubic meter of
concrete mix two kilometers away from the project site and sold the excess to the residents nearby. As
such, respondent was required by petitioner to explain in writing why he should not be meted with
disciplinary action for the alleged act of theft or dishonesty under the companys Code of Conduct and
Discipline. The respondent explained his side but was still meted with a three-day suspension. In
another report received by petitioner, respondent allegedly took the companys plastic drum for personal

gain. The allegation was denied by the respondent, explaining that it would be impossible to do the same
without being noticed by the guard. An investigation was then conducted within which the respondent
was placed under preventive suspension.
As the respondent did not report for work after the period of preventive suspension expired, the
petitioners terminated him on the ground of abandonment of work, nor did he report after a telegram was
sent him requiring him to return. Earlier, however, a complaint for, among others, unfair labor practice and
illegal dismissal was filed by the respondent against the petitioners. He denied that he went AWOL and
was just awaiting the result of the investigation as of the alleged theft of company property and did not
abandon his work, and prayed for reinstatement.
The LA dismissed the case for lack of merit, finding that the respondent was validly dismissed
from his employment as he abandoned his job. Upon appeal to the NLRC, the latter modified the
decision of the LA, ordering the petitioner to reinstate the respondent with full backwages, finding that no
abandonment occurred as there was no clear showing that respondent was required to return to work
after the period of preventive suspension. The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner was
denied by the NLRC, which prompted the filing of an appeal before the CA. The CA rendered the
assailed decision affirming the NLRC decision. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent deliberately abandoned his work which is a just cause for his dismissal.
RULING:
It must be stressed that in petitions for review under Rule 45, only questions of law must be
raised. Whether respondent abandoned his job or was illegally dismissed are questions of fact better left
to quasi-judicial agencies to determine. It is elementary rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts
and this doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases. In exceptional cases, however, the Court may
be urged to probe and resolve factual issues when the LA and the NLRC came up with conflicting
positions. Here, the findings of the Labor Arbiter, on one hand, and the NLRC and the Court of Appeals,
on the other, are conflicting, thus we are constrained to determine the facts of the case.
It is well settled that in termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show
that the dismissal was for a just and valid cause, and failure to discharge the same would mean that the
dismissal is not justified and, therefore, illegal. In this case, petitioners claim that respondent was validly
dismissed as he abandoned his work as shown by the following circumstances, to wit: He did not go back
to work on May 6, 2001, i.e, after his preventive suspension expired on May 5, 2001; he did not report to
work despite receipt of the telegram on May 25, 2001 stating that "he was absent without official leave
since May 5, 2001, and to notify CSI as soon as possible," but instead , through his lawyer, sent a letter
asking for a copy of the result of the investigation; despite not being given the result of the investigation,
respondent still did not bother to report back to work; and the complaint he filed with the LA did not pray
for reinstatement.
To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur, to wit: (1) the failure to report for work or
absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some
overt acts. Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be presumed from certain equivocal
acts. To be a valid cause for dismissal for abandonment, there must be clear proof of deliberate and
unjustified intent to sever the employer-employee relationship. Clearly, the operative act is still the
employee's ultimate act of putting an end to his employment.
We find that the elements of abandonment are lacking. The CA did not commit any reversible
error in affirming the NLRC's decision that respondent was illegally dismissed for petitioners' failure to
substantiate their claim that the former abandoned his work. The circumstances obtaining in this case do
not indicate abandonment.

UNIVAC DEVELOPMENT INC. v. WILLIAM M. SORIANO

G.R. No. 182072, June 19, 2013
J. Peralta
The CA can grant a petition when the factual findings complained of are not supported by the
evidence on record; when it is necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice; when
the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the LA; and when necessary to arrive at a just decision of the
case. Thus, contrary to the contention of petitioner, the CA can review the finding of facts of the NLRC
and the evidence of the parties to determine whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in finding
that there was no illegal dismissal against respondent.
FACTS:
A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed by respondent against petitioner for being
terminatedeight days prior to the completion of his six months probationary employment period.
Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that there was no illegal dismissal as the respondent did not report
for work which constitutes abandonment. After earlier declaring at a meeting that he intended to leave the
company, petitioner presumably understood respondents absence from work as such intention.
The LA dismissed the respondents complaint for lack of merit, which was later affirmed by the
NLRC. When respondent elevated the matter to the CA under Rule 65, the NLRC decision was nullified
and petitioner was ordered to pay the respondent full backwages and separation pay. The CA considered
respondents dismissal from employment illegal because he was not informed of the standards required
for regularization; petitioner failed to show proof that respondents performance was poor and
unsatisfactory constituting a just cause for termination; and that the evidence presented negates
petitioners claim that respondent abandoned his job. Hence, this appeal under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA violated the doctrine of immutability of judgment of the NLRC when the former granted
the petition for certiorari of the respondent.
RULING:
The petition is without merit.
Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, the decision of the NLRC becomes final and executory after
the lapse of ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties. However, the adverse party is not
precluded from assailing the decision via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before
the CA and then to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. Thus, contrary to the contention of
petitioner, there is no violation of the doctrine of immutability of judgment when respondent elevated the
matter to the CA which the latter consequently granted.
The power of the CA to review NLRC decisions has already been thoroughly explained and
clarified by the Court in several cases, to wit:
The power of the Court of Appeals to review NLRC decisions via Rule 65 or Petition for
Certiorari has been settled as early as in our decision in St. Martin Funeral Home v. National
Labor Relations Commission. This Court held that the proper vehicle for such review was a
Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and that this action should
be filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts.
Moreover, it is already settled that under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7902[10] (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, amending
for the purpose of Section Nine of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended, known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980), the Court of Appeals pursuant to the exercise of its original

jurisdiction over Petitions for Certiorari is specifically given the power to pass upon the
evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues.
We agree with petitioner that in a special civil action for certiorari, the issues are confined to
errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. In exercising the expanded judicial review over labor
cases, the Court of Appeals can grant the petition if it finds that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence which is material or decisive of
the controversy which necessarily includes looking into the evidence presented by the parties. In other
words, the CA is empowered to evaluate the materiality and significance of the evidence which is alleged
to have been capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarded by the NLRC in relation to all other
evidence on record. The CA can grant a petition when the factual findings complained of are not
supported by the evidence on record; when it is necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do
substantial justice; when the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the LA; and when necessary to
arrive at a just decision of the case. Thus, contrary to the contention of petitioner, the CA can review the
finding of facts of the NLRC and the evidence of the parties to determine whether the NLRC gravely
abused its discretion in finding that there was no illegal dismissal against respondent.
HOSPICIO D. ROSAROSO, ANTONIO D. ROSAROSO, MANUEL D. ROSAROSO, ALGERICA D.
ROSAROSO, and CLEOFE R. LABINDAO v. LUCILA LABORTE SORIA, SPOUSES HAM SOLUTAN
and LAILA SOLUTAN, and MERIDIAN REALTY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 194846, June 19, 2013
J. Mendoza
Thedisputable presumptions provided under Rule 131, Sec. 3 operate against an adversary who
has not introduced proof to rebut them. They create the necessity of presenting evidence to rebut the
prima facie case they created, and which, if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail.
The burden of proof remains where it is but, by the presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved
for the time being from introducing evidence in support of the averment, because the presumption stands
in the place of evidence unless rebutted.
FACTS:
Petitioners allege in their complaint that their father Luis Rosaroso, with the full knowledge and
consent of his second wife Lourdes, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale (First Sale) covering subject
properties. They further alleged that a second sale took place, when respondent Lucila made her father
sign a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to Meridian three parcels of residential land. They thus pray that
such second sale be declared null and void ab initio.
Lucila and her daughter Laila contested the first sale in favor of petitioners, contending that even
assuming it was valid, petitioners were estopped from questioning the second sale in favor of Meridian
because they failed not only to effect the necessary transfer of title, but also in annotating their interests
on the titles of the questioned properties.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners, holding that when Luis executed the second
deed of sale in favor of Meridian, he was no longer the owner of the subject lots as he already sold the
same to his children by his first marriage. In other words, Luis lost his right to dispose of the said
properties to Meridian from the time he executed the first deed of sale in favor of petitioners.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, ruling that the first deed of sale in
favor of petitioners was void because they failed to prove that they indeed tendered a consideration for
the four parcels of land. As to the second deed of sale, the CA stated that it was valid because the
documents were notarized and, as such, they enjoy the presumption of regularity. The motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the CA, prompting them to file this present appeal
under Rule 45.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in declaring the first sale null and void for failure of petitioners to prove they
paid sufficient consideration for the subject properties.
RULING:
The fact that the first deed of sale was executed, conveying the subject properties in favor of
petitioners, was never contested by the respondents. What they vehemently insist, though, is that the said
sale was simulated because the purported sale was made without a valid consideration.
Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are disputable presumptions: (1)
private transactions have been fair and regular; (2) the ordinary course of business has been followed;
and (3) there was sufficient consideration for a contract. These presumptions operate against an
adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut them. They create the necessity of presenting evidence
to rebut the prima facie case they created, and which, if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered,
will prevail. The burden of proof remains where it is but, by the presumption, the one who has that burden
is relieved for the time being from introducing evidence in support of the averment, because the
presumption stands in the place of evidence unless rebutted.
In this case, the respondents failed to trounce the said presumption. Aside from their bare
allegation that the sale was made without a consideration, they failed to supply clear and convincing
evidence to back up this claim. It is elementary in procedural law that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by
evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the Rules of Court.
The CA decision ran counter to this established rule regarding disputable presumption. It relied
heavily on the account of Lourdes who testified that the children of Luis approached him and convinced
him to sign the deed of sale, explaining that it was necessary for a loan application, but they did not pay
the purchase price for the subject properties. This testimony, however, is self-serving and would not
amount to a clear and convincing evidence required by law to dispute the said presumption. As such, the
presumption that there was sufficient consideration will not be disturbed.
IRIS KRISTINE BALOIS ALBERTO and BENJAMIN D. BALOIS v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
ATTY. RODRIGO A. REYNA, ARTURO S. CALIANGA, GIL ANTHONY M. CALIANGA, JESSEBEL
CALIANGA, and GRACE EVANGELISTA
G.R. No. 182130, June 19, 2013
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF MUNTINLUPA, THE PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MUNTINLUPA CITY, BENJAMIN D. BALOIS, and IRIS
KRISTINE BALOIS ALBERTO v. ATTY. RODRIGO A. REYNA, ARTURO S. CALIANGA, GIL
ANTHONY M. CALIANGA, JESSEBEL CALIANGA, and GRACE EVANGELISTA
G.R. No. 182132, June 19, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
Courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of public prosecutors and the DOJ on the
existence or non-existence of probable cause for the purpose of filing criminal informations, unless such
findings are tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
rationale behind the general rule rests on the principle of separation of powers. On the other hand, the
courts could intervene in the Secretary of Justices determination of probable cause only through a
special civil action for certiorari. That happens when the Secretary of Justice acts in a limited sense like a
quasi-judicial officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law. But the
requirement for such intervention was still for the petitioner to demonstrate clearly that the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
FACTS:
In view of the incidents that transpired on December 28, 2001 and April 23 to 24, 2002, Benjamin
filed a criminal complaint for Rape, Serious Illegal Detention and Child Abuse under Section 5(b), Article

III of RA 7610 against Gil, Atty. Reyna, Jessebel and Grace before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Muntinlupa, docketed as I.S. No. 02-G-03020-22, which however was laterdismissed for insufficiency of
evidence. Nonetheless, Prosec. Alejo recommended the filing of informations for Child Abuse against Gil
for having sexual intercourse with Irisby taking advantage of her minority and his moral influence as a
pastor of their church.
Subsequently, Benjamin filed a second complaint against Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo for
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, Grave Coercion and Obstruction of Justice before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Makati, docketed as I.S. No. 03-G-14072-75. Iris executed an affidavit sworn
before Makati Assistant City Prosecutor George de Joya denying she was kidnapped, detained, or raped
by Gil. She also affirmed that she loved Gil and eloped with him. Nevertheless, the information was also
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence by 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Henry M. Salazar. Similarly,
observed that there was no evidence or any particular allegation of facts in the complaint-affidavit
constituting the acts which were claimed as coercive. In the same vein, he found no evidence or any
sufficient allegation to support the charge of Obstruction of Justice.
Dissatisfied, petitioner Benjamin moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied.
On December 15, 2003, Iris, assisted by members of the groups Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption and Gabriela, proceeded to the DOJ Task Force on Women and Children Protection and filed
a third complaint against Gil for Forcible Abduction with Rape and Obstruction of Justice, punished under
Presidential Decree No. 1829, docketed as I.S. No. 2004-127. This, also, was denied by State
Prosecutor Zenaida M. Lim of the DOJ Task Force for insufficiency of evidence.
Aggrieved, Iris and Benjamin appealed the dismissal of all the foregoing charges to the DOJ. The
DOJ Secretary resolved the consolidated petitions in in I.S. No. 02-G-03020-22, I.S. No. 03-G-14027-75
and I.S. No. 2004-127, finding probable cause to chargeGil for Rape, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III
of RA 7610; Gil, Jessebel, Atty. Reyna and Grace for one count each of Serious Illegal Detention and
Rape, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610; and Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo for one (1) count
each of Forcible Abduction with Rape. Respondents then moved for the reconsideration of such
resolution.
Meanwhile, two separate criminal informations were filed for Forcible Abduction with Rape
against Gil, Arturo, and Atty. Reyna, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-122, and for Serious Illegal
Detention with Rape against Gil, Atty. Reyna, Jessebel, and Grace, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07128. Warrants of arrest were accordingly issued by the Presiding Judges of the courts hearing the case.
For alleged reasons of extreme urgency, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
while the resolution of their abovementioned motion for reconsideration was pending. The CA gave due
course to respondents petition for certiorari and rendered its decision revoking the DOJ Resolutions. Of
particular note to the CA were the inconsistent and inherently improbable testimony of Iris, the existence
of love letters and text messages of love and concern between Iris and Gil, and the hiatus of evidence
that would show that Atty. Reyna, Arturo, Jessebel and Grace conspired to rape or illegally detain Iris.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, essentially arguing that the CA erroneously
assumed the function of public prosecutor when it determined the non-existence of probable cause. The
said motion was, however, denied. Hence this petition under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in revoking the DOJ resolutions based on graveabuse of discretion.
RULING:
The petitions are party meritorious.

It is well-settled that courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of public prosecutors
and the DOJ on the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the purpose of filing criminal
informations, unless such findings are tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. The rationale behind the general rule rests on the principle of separation of powers,
dictating that the determination of probable cause for the purpose of indicting a suspect is properly an
executive function; while the exception hinges on the limiting principle of checks and balances, whereby
the judiciary, through a special civil action of certiorari, has been tasked by the present Constitution "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
In the case of Callo-Caridad v. Esteban, citing Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Tobias III, the
Court held:
In reviewing the findings of the public prosecutor on the matter of probable cause, the
Secretary of Justice performed an essentially executive function to determine whether the crime
alleged against the respondents was committed, and whether there was probable cause to
believe that the respondents were guilty thereof.
On the other hand, the courts could intervene in the Secretary of Justices determination of
probable cause only through a special civil action for certiorari. That happens when the Secretary of
Justice acts in a limited sense like a quasi-judicial officer of the executive department exercising powers
akin to those of a court of law. But the requirement for such intervention was still for the petitioner to
demonstrate clearly that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Unless such a clear demonstration is made, the intervention is disallowed in
deference to the doctrine of separation of powers. As the Court has postulated in Metropolitan Bank &
Trust Co. v. Tobias III:
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide
matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the
Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented in
this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with
the executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion. x x x x
In the context of filing criminal charges, grave abuse of discretion exists in cases where the
determination of probable cause is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and personal hostility. The abuse of discretion to be qualified as "grave" must be so patent or gross as to
constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in
contemplation of law. In this regard, case law states that not every error in the proceedings, or every
erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As held in PCGG v. Jacobi:
In fact, the prosecutor may err or may even abuse the discretion lodged in him by law.
This error or abuse alone, however, does not render his act amenable to correction and
annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. To justify judicial intrusion into what is
fundamentally the domain of the Executive, the petitioner must clearly show that the prosecutor
gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in making his
determination and in arriving at the conclusion he reached. This requires the petitioner to
establish that the prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility; and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or
to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, before judicial
relief from a discretionary prosecutorial action may be obtained.
To note, probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the facts are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof. It does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty.
Rather, it is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Accordingly, probable cause does not require

an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction; it is enough that it is believed
that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. As pronounced in Reyes v.
Pearlbank Securities, Inc.:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a
crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical
knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence
to secure a conviction.
In order to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and to determine if
the suspect is probably guilty of the same, the elements of the crime charged should, in all reasonable
likelihood, be present. This is based on the principle that every crime is defined by its elements, without
which there should be, at the most, no criminal offense.
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court therefore holds as follows:
First, the DOJ Secretary did not gravely abuse his discretion in finding that probable cause exists
for the crime of Rape against Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo as the elements of rape, more likely or than not,
appear to be present. Similarly, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion in the DOJ Secretarys
finding of probable cause for Rape against Atty. Reyna and Arturo, but only insofar as the June 23 to
November 9, 2003 incidents are concerned.
Second, the Court further holds that the DOJ Secretary gravely abused his discretion in finding
that probable cause exists for the crime of Serious Illegal Detention as records are bereft of any evidence
to support a finding that Iris was illegally detained or restrained of her movement.
Third, the DOJ Secretary also committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause for
the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape.As earlier discussed, there lies no evidence to prove that Iris
was restrained of her liberty during the period of her captivity, thus, denying the element of abduction.
BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. ROSA REYES, CENANDO, REYES and
CARLOS REYES
G.R. No. 194247, June 19, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
The test for determining whether the supposed error was one of "law" or "fact" is not the
appellation given by the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the
issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of
fact. In other words, where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the
conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed complaints before the RTC, seeking to expropriate the lands of herein
respondents. In their separate answers, the respondents alleged that although they had no objection to
petitioners right to expropriation, the amount of just compensation offered was ridiculously low
considering that the subject properties were already re-classified into residential lots. A writ of possession
was subsequently granted in petitioners favor, meanwhile, respondents filed a motion for summary
judgment, contending that there were no genuine issues left for resolution, except for the award of
damages. In opposition, petitioner argued that Rule 35 of the Rules of Court on summary judgment
applies only to ordinary civil actions for recovery of money claims and not to expropriation cases.

Moreover, it claimed that the mandatory constitution of a panel of commissioners for the purpose of
ascertaining the amount of just compensation due under Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
precludes a summary judgment.
The RTC thus granted the motion for summary judgment, brushing aside petitioners insistence
for the constitution of a panel of commissioners under Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court,
dismissing the same as a futile exercise which would only delay the proceedings. The motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioner was denied by the RTC, prompting it to file an appeal before the
CA. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss appeal, averring that an appeal from a summary judgment
raises only questions of law; hence, the proper recourse to assail its propriety should be a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 as
adopted by petitioner.
The CA dismissed the petitioners appeal for being the wrong mode to assail the RTCs summary
judgment, finding that the errors raised in the appeal essentially pertained to the propriety of the RTCs
grant of respondents motion for summary judgment and thus, involved only questions of law of which the
CA had no jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing petitioners appeal.
RULING:
Under Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, there are two (2) modes of appealing a judgment
or final order of the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction:
(a) If the issues raised involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, the proper recourse is
an ordinary appeal to the CA in accordance with Rule 41 in relation to Rule 44 of the Rules of Court; and
(b) If the issues raised involve only questions of law, the appeal shall be to the Court by petition for review
on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Corollary thereto, should a party raise only questions of law through an ordinary appeal taken
under Rule 41, Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that the said appeal shall be dismissed.
Jurisprudence dictates that there is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to
what the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a "question of fact"
when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test for
determining whether the supposed error was one of "law" or "fact" is not the appellation given by the
parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues raised without
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact. In other words,
where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions drawn from these
facts are correct is a question of law. However, if the question posed requires a re-evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relationship
to each other, the issue is factual.
Applying these principles, the Court finds that the CA did not err in dismissing petitioners appeal.
Records show that petitioner raised four (4) issues in its appeal before the CA:
First, whether or not summary judgment was properly rendered by the RTC;
Second, whether or not there is any evidence on record to support the conclusion that the subject
lots had already been re-classified from agricultural to residential; and if in the affirmative, whether or not
the same may be considered as "interior lots" which would necessarily affect its zonal valuation;

Third, whether or not the appointment of commissioners is indispensable in an expropriation

case; and
Fourth, whether or not the properties of Cenando and Rosa Reyes overlap that of the Philippine
National Bank.
At the outset, it bears to note that the second and fourth issues were not raised by petitioner in its
opposition to respondents motion for summary judgment but only in its motion for reconsideration from
the RTCs Order dated November 27, 2007. It has been consistently held that appellate courts are
precluded from entertaining matters neither alleged nor raised during the proceedings below, but
ventilated for the first time only in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal. Thus, while these issues
may be classified as questions of fact since their resolution would require an evaluation of the evidence
on record, the CA was precluded from considering the same. Consequently, only the first and third issues
were left for its determination.
Unlike the second and fourth issues, the first and third issues can be properly classified as
questions of law since their resolution would not involve an examination of the evidence but only an
application of the law on a particular set of facts.
To elucidate, the first issue regarding the propriety of the RTCs summary judgment involves only
a question of law since one need not evaluate the evidence on record to assess if the unresolved issues
in this case, i.e., the classification of the properties expropriated, its location and valuation, constitute
genuine issues. This is in line with the rule that a summary judgment is not warranted when there are
genuine issues which call for a full blown trial. Similarly, the third issue concerning the propriety of the
appointment of a panel of commissioners only requires an application of Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court, without the need of examining the evidence on record. Thus, given that the issues to be
resolved on appeal only involve questions of law, no reversible error was committed by the CA in
dismissing petitioners appeal. The proper recourse should have been to file a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BERNESTO DELA CRUZ @ BERNING
G.R. No. 183091, June 19, 2013
J. Leonardo-de Castro

As to the credibility of witnesses, the trial judge can better determine if witnesses are
telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts
of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case, its assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. Moreover, even if
there are no eyewitnesses to the commission of the crime, especially so if the crime is rape,
circumstantial evidence may be resorted to by the courts.
FACTS:
The accused was charged under an information with the crime of rape with homicide to which he
pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment. The evidence showed that the victim AAA left her home early in
the morning to gather gabi from a farm about 50 meters away. When the AAA did not return to after a few
hours, her sister BBB went looking for her. Along the way, BBB noticed the gabi gathered by the AAA and
found the accused undressed except for blood-drenched briefs. The accused was in the act of cutting
minongga tree branches and was covering something with them, and suddenly ran when he noticed BBB.
It was after the accusedhad gone that BBB found the headless body of AAA, while her head lay a few
meters away from her body.

In his defense, the accused denied the prosecutions allegations, contending that he had been
working in his farm and it wasnt until after noon that he went home.
The RTC, in deciding the case, noted thelack of eyewitnesses to the crime, but stated that the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt was established by the prosecution through circumstantial
evidence. As such, it rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged.
The CA then affirmed the decision of the RTC and found BBB to be a credible witness. It said
that the minor inconsistencies in her testimony and the testimony of the other witness presented were not
significant enough to warrant the acquittal of the appellant. In any event, it stated that appellants bare
denial of his guilt against the positive testimony and categorical assertions of the prosecutions witnesses
proved to be worthless since it was uncorroborated. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution satisfactorily proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that there
was overwhelming circumstantial evidence presented to point that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of committing the crime of rape with homicide. As we have stated before, circumstantial evidence
may be resorted to establish the complicity of the perpetrators crime when these are credible and
sufficient, and could lead to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant committed the complex crime of
rape with homicide. As the Court of Appeals stated:
The Prosecution presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused, and no other, had raped and killed [AAA]. The following are the circumstantial
evidence, to wit:
1. [BBB] went to the mountain farm to look for [AAA] and in the process saw the accused from 10 armsstretches away covering the victims body with tree branches;
2. The accused was then holding a bolo and clad only in his bloodied briefs while covering the headless
body of the victim with tree branches;
3. The victims head was found 5 meters away from her body;
4. The victims body was exposed, with her undergarments missing;
5. After medical examination, the victims vagina tested positive for the presence of spermatozoa;
6. [AAA] also suffered 3 hack wounds, one of which was found to have been inflicted before the victim
expired;
7. The accused threw the bolo he used in cutting tree branches, which, when recovered, was determined
to be the bolo brought by [AAA] from her house; and
8. He left the victims body and ran down the mountainous terrain.
To an unprejudiced mind, the above circumstances form a solid unbroken chain of events which
ties appellant to the crime beyond reasonable doubt. BBB saw appellant at the scene of the crime; he
was wearing bloodied underwear; he was wielding a bolo owned by AAA, cutting branches which he used
to cover something; on seeing BBB he threw the bolo away and ran; when BBB checked what the
appellant was trying to hide, she discovered it to be the headless body of AAA; AAAs undergarments had

been removed; upon medical examination spermatozoa was found in her genitalia; and AAA was hacked
several times before she was beheaded.
With respect to the appellants contention that the witnesses presented were not credible, we
reiterate the jurisprudential principle affording great respect and even finality to the trial courts
assessment of the credibility of witnesses especially if the factual findings are affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. The trial judge can better determine if witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position
to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected for it had the
opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were
lying.
In People v. Dion we stated that:
Due to its intimate nature, rape is usually a crime bereft of witnesses, and, more often
than not, the victim is left to testify for herself. Thus, in the resolution of rape cases, the victims
credibility becomes the primordial consideration. It is settled that when the victims testimony is
straightforward, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things,
unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility, and the
accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof. Inconsistencies in the victims testimony
do not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not
alter the essential fact of the commission of rape. The trial courts assessment of the witnesses'
credibility is given great weight and is even conclusive and binding. x x x.
Given that in the present case, the courts a quo have sufficiently addressed the question on the alleged
inconsistencies in the testimony of BBB and appellant does not present to this Court any scintilla of
evidence to prove that the testimony of the witness was not credible, the Court must uphold the identical
assessment of the RTC as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In any event, the alleged inconsistencies in
the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses did not detract from BBB's credibility as a witness.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) v. ARIEL R. MARQUEZ
G.R. No. 191877, June 18, 2013
IRENEO M. VERDILLO v. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR)
G.R. No. 192287, June 18, 2013
J. Villarama, Jr.
A finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is
supported by substantial evidence that the respondent has committed the acts stated in the complaint or
formal charge. As defined, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
FACTS:
Marquez and Verdillo were both employed as dealers in the game of Craps at PAGCOR at the
Casino Filipino Heritage. One night, they both alternately manned a Craps table where a Mr. Johnny
Cheng was playing. The Acting Pit Supervisor Eulalia Yang noticed that on several occasions Verdillo
made a good dice call even though not one of the dice from the players throw hit the tables rubber wall.
Upon checking the CCTV, the members of the Casino Management and the investigators from the
Corporate Investigation Unit were convinced that several void throws were declared as good dice while
the same was being manned by Marquez and Verdillo. As such, both were administratively charged with
conspiring with Cheng in defrauding PAGCOR of an undetermined amount of money.
Both Marquez and Verdillo were thus found liable for fraudulent transactions and were dismissed
from service due to Dishonesty, Grave violation of company rules and regulations, Conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the company, and Loss of trust and confidence" for conspiring with a co-dealer and a
customer in defrauding the house on numerous occasions. Marquez and Verdillo filed their Motions for

Reconsideration, but both were denied by PAGCOR for lack of merit. Aggrieved, they appealed their
dismissal from service to the CSC, but both appeals were dismissed for lack of merit.
Not satisfied, Marquez filed a petition for review with the CA arguing that he was not accorded his
right to due process and that there was no substantial evidence to support a finding of his guilt in the
administrative charge. The CA then reversed the resolutions of the CSC, holding that there was no
dishonesty on his part. Meanwhile, Verdillo filed with the CA a separate petition for review, arguing that
PAGCORs decision was not supported by the evidence on record.
Unsatisfied, PAGCOR filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari, contending that the
designation of the offense in an administrative case is not controlling and one may be found guilty of
another offense if it is based on the same facts subject of the original designation. Furthermore, PAGCOR
asserts that the CA erred in simply brushing aside the evidence considered by the CSC, stressing that the
factual findings of administrative bodies are controlling on the reviewing authority. On the other hand,
Marquez maintains that there was no substantial evidence to support the findings of the CSC.
For his part, Verdillo also filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari. He argues that
PAGCOR failed to present substantial evidence to justify his dismissal from service. He contends that his
sworn statement cannot be considered as substantial evidence to support the offense of violation of office
rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as there was no admission
on his part that he violated house rules. Thus, he prays for his reinstatement to his former position without
loss of seniority rights and other benefits as well as back wages.
ISSUE:
Whether Marquez and Verdillo are guilty of dishonesty, violation of office rules and regulations and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service to justify their dismissal from service.
RULING:
It is worthy to state that in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, only questions of law may be raised. It is not our function to
analyze or weigh all over again evidence already considered in the proceedings below, our jurisdiction
being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court. The
resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters are
received with respect. A question of law which we may pass upon must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants.
This rule, however, is not ironclad. We have consistently recognized several exceptional
circumstances where we disregarded the aforesaid tenet and proceeded to review the findings of facts of
the lower court such as when the findings of fact are conflicting or when the CA manifestly overlooked
certain relevant and undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
Considering the conflict in the factual findings of the CSC and of the CA, we rule on the factual issues as
an exception to the general rule.
Marquez was administratively charged for conspiring with Verdillo and Cheng to defraud
PAGCOR. The CA observed that there was a disparity between the offense charged and the offenses for
which Marquez was found guilty -- dishonesty, grave violation of company rules and regulations, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the company and loss of trust and confidence. The CA concluded that
PAGCOR failed to comply with the requirement of administrative due process since Marquez was not duly
apprised of the proper charges which led to his dismissal.We do not agree.
In Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission, the Court pronounced that the charge against the
respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal
prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what is
controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense. It must be

stressed that what the law requires is to simply inform the civil servant of the nature and cause of
accusation against him in a clear and concise manner for the purpose of giving him the right to confront
the allegations against him.
The failure to designate the offense specifically and with precision is of no moment in this
administrative case. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is that a party be afforded
a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense.
The law simply requires that the civil servant is informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
him in a clear and concise manner to give the person a chance to answer the allegations intelligently.
Evidently, PAGCOR substantially complied with the requirements of due process for administrative cases.
With regard to Verdillos contention that he would be in a better position to defend himself if
confronted with the CCTV footage, we find the same to be without merit. There is more than substantial
evidence which proves that he indeed declared void transactions as valid on at least eight occasions. We
note that the CCTV footage is not the only evidence against him. Acting Pit Supervisor Yang actually
witnessed that several clearly void transactions were declared by Verdillo as good and valid. Even
Verdillos sworn statement reveals that he did not see the dice hit the rubber wall. In fact, he mentioned in
his statement that he used his sense of hearing in determining whether or not the dice hit the rubber wall.
The CSC, as affirmed by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 106961, found sufficient evidence to support
a finding of dishonesty, grave violation of company rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the company and loss of trust and confidence. The circumstances in this case all point to the
conclusion that Verdillo conspired with Marquez and Cheng. Verdillo declared several dice throws of
Cheng as "good dice" even if they were void. Marquez then paid Cheng his winnings in huge amounts.
Whenever a customer or employee would pass the Craps table, Cheng would change his dice throws and
would even comment "may multo" (there is a ghost) when Acting Pit Supervisor Yang would approach the
craps tableThese anomalous transactions were not only witnessed by Acting Pit Supervisor Yang, but
were also confirmed by the CCTV footage.
As regards Marquez, evidence shows that on eight occasions, Marquez paid customer Cheng
despite the fact that the latters throws were void. He admitted that he knew that on several occasions the
throws made should have been declared void and that it was incumbent upon him to make sure that the
calls were in order. This duty could not have escaped him as he had been a dealer for five years. Hence,
it is our view that the conduct of Marquez amounts to serious dishonesty, and not merely negligence,
since his dishonest act was committed not just a few times but repeatedly or eight times over a very short
period of seven minutes, a statistical improbability.
Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule." A finding of guilt in an
administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that
the respondent has committed the acts stated in the complaint or formal charge. As defined, substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. We find that Marquez and Verdillo failed to present any cogent reason for the Court to deviate
from the rule that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally held to be binding and final so
long as they are supported by substantial evidence in the record of the case. All told, we find that there
was substantial evidence for the charges against Marquez and Verdillo, warranting their dismissal from
service.
ROBERTO B. REBLORA v. ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 195842, June 18, 2013
J. Perez
The distinction between an appeal under Rule 45 and a special civil action under Rule 64 in
relation to Rule 65 could not be anymore overstated in remedial law. Indeed, by restricting the review of
judgments or resolutions of the COA only thru a special civil action for certiorari before this Court, the
Constitution and the Rules of Court precisely limits the permissible scope of inquiry in such cases only to

errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Hence, unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion,
simple errors of judgment committed by the COA cannot be reviewedeven by this Court.
FACTS:
Petitioner rendered civilian government service at the DILG prior to entering military service as a
Probationary Ensign in the Philippine Navy. The AFP confirmed the incorporation of his petitioners
service in the DILG with his length of service in the military pursuant to Sec.3 of PD 1638, as amended by
PD 1650. On 2003, at the age of 59, and after a total of 34 years of active service, the petitioner was
compulsorily retired from the military by virtue of General Order No. 12, who was already ranked as a
Commander in the Philippine Navy.
After his retirement, petitioner claimed retirement benefits under Sec.17 of PD 1638 and chose to
avail of the monthly retirement pay with the option to receive in advance and in lump sum an amount
equivalent to three years worth thereof for the first three years after his retirement. The AFP granted
petitioners claim of retirement benefits and immediately paid the same, taking into account his actual
military service without including his service in the DILG.
Petitioner insisted that the computation of his retirement benefit should include his civilian
government service at the DILG immediately before he entered military service. After an unsuccessful bid
to obtain a favorable legal opinion from the AFP Judge Advocate General, the petitioner requested
assistance from the COA for the collection of his claimed additional retirement benefit.
The COA agreeing with the petitioner that his civilian service at the DILG should and ought to be
included as part of his active service in the military for purposes of computing his retirement benefits
under PD No. 1638. However, since his civilian service should be included as part of his active service in
the military, the COA opined that petitioner should also have been considered as compulsorily retired on
2000 and not on 2003. The COA explained that as of 22 May 2000, petitioner has already reached the
age of 56 with a total of 31 years in active service, inclusive of his four years in the DILG, which fulfilled
the conditions for compulsory retirement under Section 5(a) of PD No. 1638, as amended. The COA
found that petitioner was not actually underpaid but was rather overpaid his benefits. The petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether the COA erred in the computation of respondents retirement benefits.
RULING:
We deny the petition.
This Court can very well dismiss the instant petition on account of it being the wrong remedy.
Decisions and resolutions of the COA are reviewable by this Court, not via an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45, as is the present petition, but thru a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Section 2 of Rule 64, which implements the mandate of Section 7 of Article
IX-A of the Constitution, is clear on this:
Section 2. Mode of Review.A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on
certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.
The distinction between an appeal under Rule 45 and a special civil action under Rule 64 in
relation to Rule 65 could not be anymore overstated in remedial lawthe most profound of which,
arguably, is the difference of one to the other with respect to the permissible scope of inquiry in each.
Indeed, by restricting the review of judgments or resolutions of the COA only thru a special civil action for
certiorari before this Court, the Constitution and the Rules of Court precisely limits the permissible scope

of inquiry in such cases only to errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Hence, unless tainted
with grave abuse of discretion, simple errors of judgment committed by the COA cannot be reviewed
even by this Court.
That is where the present petition patently fails. It alleges neither grave abuse of jurisdiction nor
any jurisdictional error on the part of the COA. It, in fact, contented itself with imputations of errors on the
part of the COA and the AFP as to how they interpreted or applied PD No. 1638 to the petitioners case.
For all intents and purposes, the present petition is, on that account, an improper invocation of this
Courts power of review over the judgments and resolutions of the COA.
Nevertheless, even if this Court should take a liberal appreciation of the present petition as one
that is filed under Rule 65, such petition would still fail. We have taken an extra step and scoured the
established facts vis--vis the allegations of the instant petition in search of any vestiges of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the COA, but we found none. What we did find, on the other hand, is that the
assailed COA Decision and Resolution was rendered in accord with law.
DARMA MASLAG v. ELIZABETH MONZON, WILLIAM GESTON, and REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF
BENGUET
G.R. No. 174908, June 17, 2013
J. del Castillo
There are two modes of appealing an RTC decision or resolution on issues of fact and law. The
first mode is an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 in cases where the RTC exercised its original jurisdiction.
It is done by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. The second mode is a petition for review under Rule
42 in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction over MTC decisions. It is done by filing a
Petition for Review with the CA. Simply put, the distinction between these two modes of appeal lies in the
type of jurisdiction exercised by the RTC in the Order or Decision being appealed.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for reconveyance of real property with declaration of nullity of original
certificate of title against respondents before the MTC, which found that respondent Monzon is guilty of
fraud in obtaining and OCT over petitioners property and ordered the reconveyance of said property to
petitioner.
Respondents appealed to the RTC which declared,through Judge Cabato, that the MTC without
jurisdiction over the petitioners cause of action and took cognizance of the case pursuant to Sec.8, Rule
40 of the Rules of Court. Both parties acknowledged receipt of the RTC order but neither presented
additional evidence before the new Judge De Rivera.
A Resolution was issued by the RTC which reversed the MTC decision, ordering petitioner to turn
over possession of the subject land to respondent Monzon. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal
with the CA, assailing the resolution of the RTC which reversed MTCs findings. The respondents, on the
other hand, moved to dismiss petitioners ordinary appeal for being the improper remedy, and asserted
that the proper mode should have been under Rule 42 for the RTC rendered such resolution in its
appellate jurisdiction.
The CA dismissed petitioners appeal, holding that the proper remedy is Petition for Review under
Rule 42 and not an ordinary appeal. Petitioner sought reconsideration, this time arguing that RTC
rendered the said resolution in its original jurisdiction, which was also denied by the CA, enunciating its
earlier decision. Hence, this appeal under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the case, and if so, whether the CA was correct in dismissing
petitioners appeal.

RULING:
Under the present state of the law, in cases involving title to real property, original and exclusive
jurisdiction belongs to either the RTC or the MTC, depending on the assessed value of the subject
property.Pertinent provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, as amended by RA No. 7691, provides:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where x x x the assessed value of the property exceeds Fifty thousand
pesos ([P]50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxxx
SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) x x x.
In the case at bench, annexed to the Complaint is a Declaration of Real Property dated
November 12, 1991, which was later marked as petitioners Exhibit "A", showing that the disputed
property has an assessed value of P12,400 only. Such assessed value of the property is well within the
jurisdiction of the MTC. In fine, the RTC, thru Judge Cabato, erred in applying Section 19(1) of BP 129 in
determining which court has jurisdiction over the case and in pronouncing that the MTC is divested of
original and exclusive jurisdiction.
This brings to fore the next issue of whether the CA was correct in dismissing petitioners appeal.
Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides for the dismissal of an improper appeal:
SECTION 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. An appeal under
Rule 41 taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only questions of law
shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not being reviewable by said court. Similarly, an appeal
by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from the appellate judgment of a Regional
Trial Court shall be dismissed.
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the
appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.
There are two modes of appealing an RTC decision or resolution on issues of fact and law. The
first mode is an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 in cases where the RTC exercised its original jurisdiction.
It is done by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. The second mode is a petition for review under Rule
42 in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction over MTC decisions. It is done by filing a

Petition for Review with the CA. Simply put, the distinction between these two modes of appeal lies in the
type of jurisdiction exercised by the RTC in the Order or Decision being appealed.
As discussed above, the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case; hence, there is no other way the RTC could have taken cognizance of the case and review the
court a quos Judgment except in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Besides, the new RTC Judge
who penned the May 4, 2004 Resolution, Judge Diaz de Rivera, actually treated the case as an appeal
despite the October 22, 2003 Order. He started his Resolution by stating, "This is an appeal from the
Judgment rendered by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La Trinidad Benguet" and then proceeded to
discuss the merits of the "appeal." In the dispositive portion of said Resolution, he reversed the MTCs
findings and conclusions and remanded residual issues for trial with the MTC. Thus, in fact and in law, the
RTC Resolution was a continuation of the proceedings that originated from the MTC. It was a judgment
issued by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. With regard to the RTCs earlier October 22,
2003 Order, the same should be disregarded for it produces no effect (other than to confuse the parties
whether the RTC was invested with original or appellate jurisdiction). It cannot be overemphasized that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by law and it is "not within the courts, let alone the
parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside." Neither would the active participation of the
parties nor estoppel operate to confer original and exclusive jurisdiction where the court or tribunal only
wields appellate jurisdiction over the case.38 Thus, the CA is correct in holding that the proper mode of
appeal should have been a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, and not an ordinary
appeal under Rule 41.
To reiterate, only statutes can confer jurisdiction. Court issuances cannot seize or appropriate
jurisdiction. It has been repeatedly held that "any judgment, order or resolution issued without jurisdiction
is void and cannot be given any effect." By parity of reasoning, an order issued by a court declaring that it
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case when under the law it has none
cannot likewise be given effect. It amounts to usurpation of jurisdiction which cannot be countenanced.
Since BP 129 already apportioned the jurisdiction of the MTC and the RTC in cases involving title to
property, neither the courts nor the petitioner could alter or disregard the same. Besides, in determining
the proper mode of appeal from an RTC Decision or Resolution, the determinative factor is the type of
jurisdiction actually exercised by the RTC in rendering its Decision or Resolution. Was it rendered by the
RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, or in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction? In short, we
look at what type of jurisdiction was actually exercised by the RTC. We do not look into what type of
jurisdiction the RTC should have exercised. This is but logical. Inquiring into what the RTC should have
done in disposing of the case is a question which already involves the merits of the appeal, but we
obviously cannot go into that where the mode of appeal was improper to begin with.
LUCILLE DOMINGO v. MERLINDA COLINA
G.R. No. 173330, June 17, 2013
J. Peralta
Prosecution's failure to prove the second and third elements of the violation of BP 22, it can be
deduced that the prosecution was able to establish the presence of the first and fourth elements, i.e., (1)
a person draws and issues a check and (4) the check is dishonored by the bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit. Hence, the fact that petitioner was proven to have drawn and issued a check and that the same
was subsequently dishonored for inadequate funds leads to the logical conclusion that the fact from
which her civil liability might arise, indeed, exists. As such, the RTC correctly entertained the
respondents appeal of the civil aspect of the case.
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged under an information with the violation of BP 22 for the check it issued in
payment of an obligation in favor of respondent. After the prosecution rested its case, the defense filed a
Demurrer to Evidence which the MTCC granted. It held that the prosecution failed to prove elements 2
and 3 of the crime of violation of BP 22, thus acquitting the accused and dismissing the case.

The prosecution then filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the Order of Dismissal and in the
Alternative to Reopen the Civil Aspect of the Case, contending that although petitioner did not receive
valuable consideration for her bounced check, she is nonetheless liable to respondent for the face value
of the check as an accommodation party and, that petitioner's knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds
in or credit with the bank is presumed from the dishonor of her check. However, said motion was also
denied by the MTCC, declaring further that the act from which the civil liability of the accused did not
exist.
The respondent appealed the case to the RTC of Davao City, which modified the MTCC decision
and ordered the herein petitioner to pay the former the civil liability arising out of the offense charged.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner was denied by the RTC, prompting the filing of a
petition for review with the CA. The CA dismissed the petitioner for review, hence, this appeal under Rule
45.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC to entertain the appeal when
it was violative of Sec.2, Rule 111 when the MTCC already ruled that the act from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist.
RULING:
The petition lacks merit.
The last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a
final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist.
Moreover, the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 120 of the same Rules states that:
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist.
In the instant case, the Orders of the MTCC, dated October 25, 2001 and November 23, 2001,
did not contain any such finding or determination. The Court agrees with the CA that in acquitting
petitioner in its Order dated October 25, 2001, the MTCC did not rule on the civil aspect of the case.
While it subsequently held in its November 23, 2001 Order that "the act from which the civil liability of the
accused in favor of the private complainant may arise does not exist in this case," the MTCC,
nonetheless, failed to cite evidence, factual circumstances or any discussion in its October 25, 2001
Decision which would warrant such ruling. Instead, it simply concluded that since the prosecution failed to
prove all the elements of the offense charged, then the act from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist. The MTCC held that its observations and ratiocinations in its October 25, 2001 Order justified its
conclusion. However, after a careful review of the above-mentioned Orders, the Court finds nothing
therein which the MTCC could have used as a reasonable ground to arrive at its conclusion that the act or
omission from which petitioner's civil liability might arise did not exist.
On the contrary, the tenor of the Orders of the MTCC is that the dismissal of the criminal case
against petitioner was based on reasonable doubt. As may be recalled, the MTCC dismissed the criminal
case on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the second and third elements of BP 22, i.e., (2)
the check is applied on account or for value and (3) the person issuing the check knows at the time of its
issuance that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the bank for the full payment of the check
upon its presentment.

This only means, therefore, that the trial court did not convict petitioner of the offense charged,
since the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the quantum of evidence
required in criminal cases. Conversely, the lack of evidence to prove the aforesaid elements of the
offense charged does not mean that petitioner has no existing debt with respondent, a civil aspect which
is proven by another quantum of evidence, a mere preponderance of evidence. Moreover, from the above
pronouncement of the MTCC as to the prosecution's failure to prove the second and third elements of the
offense charged, it can be deduced that the prosecution was able to establish the presence of the first
and fourth elements, i.e., (1) a person draws and issues a check and (4) the check is dishonored by the
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit. Hence, the fact that petitioner was proven to have drawn and
issued a check and that the same was subsequently dishonored for inadequate funds leads to the logical
conclusion that the fact from which her civil liability might arise, indeed, exists. On the basis of the
foregoing, the RTC correctly entertained respondent's appeal of the civil aspect of the case.
SIMPLICIA O. ABRIGO and DEMETRIO ABRIGO v. JIMMY F. FLORES, EDNA F. FLORES, DANILO
FLORES, BELINDA FLORES, HECTOR. FLORES, MARITES FLORES, HEIRS OF MARIA F. FLORES,
JACINTO FAYLONA, ELISA FAYLONA MAGPANTAY, MARIETTA FAYLONA CARTACIANO, and
HEIRS of TOMASA BANZUELA VDA. DE FAYLONA
G.R. No. 160786, June 17, 2013
J. Bersamin
A supervening event is an exception to the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable
judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter already litigated and settled, or substantially changes
the rights or relations of the parties therein as to render the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable. A
supervening event consists of facts that transpire after the judgment became final and executory, or of
new circumstances that develop after the judgment attained finality, including matters that the parties
were not aware of prior to or during the trial because such matters were not yet in existence at that time.
FACTS:
Involved in the suit is a lot inherited by both Francisco (Faylona) and Gaudencia (Faylona) from
their deceased parents.It appears that after Franciscos death, his widow and Gaudencia entered into an
extrajudicial partition whereby the western half of the same lot was assigned to Franciscos heirs while the
eastern half thereof to Gaudencia. There was, however, no actual ground partition of the lot up to and
after Gaudencias death. It thus result that both the heirs of Francisco (herein respondents) and
Gaudencia (herein petitioners) owned in common the land in dispute.The heirs and successors-in-interest
of Francisco, herein private respondents, filed a complaint for judicial partition in order to terminate their
co-ownership. The trialcourt rendered judgment in favor of private respondents by ordering the partition
of the land in dispute in such a way that the western half thereof shall pertain to the heirs of Francisco
while the eastern half, to the heirs of Gaudencia. The court thus ordered the latter to remove all their
improvements which encroached on the western half.
The heirs of Gaudencia thus filed an appeal with the CA which affirmed the judgment of the RTC.
Since no further appellate proceedings were taken by the petitioners or their other co-heirs, the judgment
thus became final. Thereafter, the heirs of Francisco filed with the court a motion for execution to enforce
and implement its decision. The implementing sheriff returned the writ PARTIALLY SATISFIED, as the
petitioners failed to remove the aforesaid improvements. On account of cush return, the respondents filed
with the court a Motion for Issuance of Special Order of Demolition.
Before the court could act on respondents aforementioned Motion for Demolition, petitioners filed
a Motion to Defer Resolution on Motion for Demolition, alleging that they have become one of the coowners of the western half, purportedly because one of the successors-in-interest of Francisco Jimmy
Flores who was co-plaintiff of the private respondents in the case, sold to them his share in the western
half. The CA denied the petitioners motion to defer and directed the issuance of an alias writ of
execution, to which the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which in turn was opposed by the

respondents. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA against the repondents and the
RTC, which was, however, also denied. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale by respondent Jimmy Flores of his 1/4 share in the western portion of the 402square meter lot constituted a supervening event that rendered the execution of the final judgment
against petitioners inequitable.
RULING:
Although it is true that there are recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of right of a
final and immutable judgment, one of which is a supervening event, such circumstance did not obtain
herein. To accept their contention would be to reopen the final and immutable judgment in order to further
partition the western portion thereby adjudicated to the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco
Faylona for the purpose of segregating the portion supposedly subject of the sale by Jimmy Flores. The
reopening would be legally impermissible, considering that the November 20, 1989 decision, as modified
by the CA, could no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or
modification was meant to correct what was perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law and
regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of the land, rendered it. This is pursuant to the doctrine
of immutability of a final judgment, which may be relaxed only to serve the ends of substantial justice in
order to consider certain circumstances like: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence
of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) the cause not being entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the doctrine; (e) the lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; or (f) the other party will not be
unjustly prejudiced by the suspension.
Verily, petitioners could not import into the action for partition of the property in litis their demand
for the segregration of the 1/4 share of Jimmy Flores. Instead, their correct course of action was to initiate
in the proper court a proceeding for partition of the western portion based on the supposed sale to them
by Jimmy Flores.
We deem it highly relevant to point out that a supervening event is an exception to the execution
as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter already
litigated and settled, or substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties therein as to render the
execution unjust, impossible or inequitable. A supervening event consists of facts that transpire after the
judgment became final and executory, or of new circumstances that develop after the judgment attained
finality, including matters that the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial because such
matters were not yet in existence at that time. In that event, the interested party may properly seek the
stay of execution or the quashal of the writ of execution, or he may move the court to modify or alter the
judgment in order to harmonize it with justice and the supervening event. The party who alleges a
supervening event to stay the execution should necessarily establish the facts by competent evidence;
otherwise, it would become all too easy to frustrate the conclusive effects of a final and immutable
judgment.
Here, however, the sale by Jimmy Flores of his supposed 1/4 share in the western portion of the
property in litis, assuming it to be true, did not modify or alter the judgment regarding the partition of the
property in litis. It was also regarded with suspicion by the CA because petitioners had not adduced
evidence of the transaction in the face of respondents, including Jimmy Flores, having denied the
genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale itself.
The issuance of the special order of demolition would also not constitute an abuse of discretion,
least of all grave. Such issuance would certainly be the necessary and logical consequence of the
execution of the final and immutable decision. According to Section 10(d) of Rule 39, Rules of Court,
when the property subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the
judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except

upon special order of the court issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after
the judgment obligor or his agent has failed to remove the improvements within a reasonable time fixed
by the court. With the special order being designed to carry out the final judgment of the RTC for the
delivery of the western portion of the property in litis to their respective owners, the CA's dismissal of the
petition for certiorari could only be upheld.
ABELARDO JANDUSAY v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 185129, June 17, 2013
J. Reyes
The fact that petitioner failed to account for, upon demand, the funds of the association of the
year 2000 which were received by him in trust, already constitutes circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation or conversion of said properties to petitioners own personal use.
FACTS:
In 1999, petitioner was elected as the treasurer of a tricycle drivers association
CALAPUPATODA, which is a registered non-stock association of tricycle operators and drivers in
Valenzuela City, and was re-elected the following year. Relative to his dutiesas treasurer, he maintained
a blue book which reflected the associations income derived from membership dues, motor and drivers
fees and the butaw, an amount collected from members on a daily basis. Consequent to the election of
the new set of officers for the year 2001, a turnover meeting was held where petitioner turned over the
blue book which reflected the net remaining funds of the association for the year 2000. Despite
demands, however, petitioners failed to turn over such funds.
Petitioner was thus formally charged with estafa or violation of paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the
RPC before the RTC. Prosecution presented evidence showing that on a meeting held, petitioner signed
an undertaking to return the said amount to the association. Petitioner however denied signing the
undertaking and claimed that the same was merely inserted on top of his signature when he signed the
same. The RTC rendered judgment finding the petitioner guilty of the crime of estafa, which was affirmed
by the CA. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion for new trial, which were
denied by the CA. Hence, this appeal under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the judgment of the RTC finding him guilty of
estafa beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
The petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to sufficiently prove the first element of estafa
that he received the money or funds of the association for the year 2000.
The courts a quo were correct in convicting the petitioner of estafa. Under Article 315, paragraph
1(b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (1) that the money,
goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;
(2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on
his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (4) that there is demand by the offended party to the offender. As correctly found by the CA:
In the case at bar, the aforementioned elements have been sufficiently established by the
prosecution. It cannot be denied that accused-appellant, as Treasurer of CALAPUPATODA,
received and held money for administration and in trust for the association. He was thus under an
obligation to turnover the same upon conclusion of his term as Treasurer. Instead, however, he
misappropriated the same to the prejudice of the association and, despite demand, failed to

account for or return them. Such failure to account, upon demand, of funds or property held in
trust is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.
In addition, misappropriation or conversion may be proved by the prosecution by direct evidence
or by circumstantial evidence. The "failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation." As mentioned, the petitioner failed to account for, upon
demand, the funds of the association of the year 2000 which were received by him in trust. This already
constitutes circumstantial evidence of misappropriation or conversion of said properties to petitioners
own personal use.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARCELINO COLLADO Y CUNANAN, MYRA COLLADO Y
SENICA, MARK CIPRIANO Y ROCERO, SAMUEL SHERWIN LATARIO Y ENRIQUE, AND REYNALDO
RANADA Y ALAS
G.R. No. 185719, June 17, 2013
J. del Castillo
The arrest of the appellants was lawful. Under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, "[a]
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been
used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant." The factual milieu of
this case clearly shows that the search was made after appellants were lawfully arrested. Pursuant to the
above-mentioned rule, the subsequent search and seizure made by the police officers were likewise
valid. Hence, appellants claim of unreasonable search and seizure must fail.
FACTS:
Co-accused spouses Marcelino and Myra Collado were charged under an information with the
crime of violating Sec. 5 and Sec. 6 of RA 9165, to which they pleaded not guilty upon their arraignment.
The evidence for the prosecution showed that on information obtained from a civilian asset by the police
officers, co-accused spouses were engaged in selling shabu and that drug users were using their
residence in Pasig City for drug sessions. A buy-bust team was thereafter formed to apprehend the
suspects. Upon reaching the target area, the asset introduced the poseur-buyer to Marcelino as regular
buyer of shabu. When the transaction was consummated, the pre-arranged signal was then performed,
after which the rest of the team rushed to the scene. The poseur-buyer then introduced himself as a
police officer and arrested Marcelino, and frisked the latter, thus obtaining a metal container that
contained a sachet of white crystalline substance and marked the same accordingly. Meanwhile, inside
the house of the suspects were several other persons gathered around a table littered with drug
paraphernalia, hence they too were arrested.
On the other hand, Marcelino contends that on that evening, he was at the living room with his
nieces and children as he was fixing a VCD player. Then suddenly, four armed men rushed inside the
house and pointed their guns at him. He was then dragged outside where the other accused already in
handcuffs, and was there informed that they were arrested for selling shabu.
The RTC found Marcelino guilty of Sections 5, 11, and 14 of PD 9165. The rest of the accused
applied for probation, while the others, including Marcelino and Myra, appealed the decision to the CA.
The appellate court found the warrantless arrest of the accused to be lawful considering they were caught
in the act of committing a crime. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest of Marcelino and Myra were legally done.
RULING:

Appellants argue that the arrest, search, and seizure conducted by the police were
illegal since it was not supported by a valid warrant. They thus posit that their right to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures was
violated.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides for lawful warrantless arrests, viz:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
Section 5(a) is what is known as arrest in flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless
arrest to be valid, two requisites must concur: "(1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
a crime; and, (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer." A common example of an arrest in flagrante delicto is one made after conducting a buybust operation.
This is precisely what happened in the present case. The arrest of the appellants was an
arrest in flagrante delicto made in pursuance of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The
arrest was effected after Marcelino and Myra performed the overt act of selling to PO2 Noble
the sachet of shabu and Ranada of having in his control and custody illegal drug paraphernalia.
Thus, there is no other logical conclusion than that the arrest made by the police officers was a
valid warrantless arrest since the same was made while the appellants were actually committing
the said crimes.
Moreover, assuming that irregularities indeed attended the arrest of appellants, they can
no longer question the validity thereof as there is no showing that they objected to the same
before their arraignment. Neither did they take steps to quash the Informations on such ground.
They only raised this issue upon their appeal to the appellate court. By this omission, any
objections on the legality of their arrest are deemed to have been waived by them.Anent their
claim of unreasonable search and seizure, it is true that under the Constitution, "a search and
consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes
unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding." This proscription, however, admits of exceptions, one of which is a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest.
The arrest of the appellants was lawful. Under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court, "[a] person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search

warrant." The factual milieu of this case clearly shows that the search was made after appellants
were lawfully arrested. Pursuant to the above-mentioned rule, the subsequent search and
seizure made by the police officers were likewise valid. Hence, appellants claim of
unreasonable search and seizure must fail.
Appellants argue that the procedure laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165 was not
followed. They specifically harp on the fact that the confiscated drugs were not photographed
and inventoried. Moreover, they contend that the police officers who handled the seized
specimen were not presented in court to testify on the condition in which they received the said
specimen. For the appellants, these defects constitute a clear break in the chain of custody and,
consequently, the prosecution failed to establish corpus delicti.
The Court, however, finds this argument unmeritorious.
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of RA 9165 provides for the custody and disposition of
the confiscated drugs, to wit:
(1) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
This rule is elaborated in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 9165, viz:
a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that
the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/ team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizure;
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.
Pursuant to the above-cited provisions, this Court has consistently ruled that the failure
of the police officers to inventory and photograph the confiscated items are not fatal to the
prosecutions cause, provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized substance
were preserved, as in this case. Here, PO2 Noble, after apprehending Marcelino and
confiscating from him the sachets of shabu, immediately placed his markings on them.
Moreover, it is of no moment that Forensic Chemist Alejandro De Guzman who
conducted the laboratory examination was not presented as a witness. The non-presentation as
witnesses of other persons who had custody of the illegal drugs is not a crucial point against the
prosecution. There is no requirement for the prosecution to present as witness in a drugs case

every person who had something to do with the arrest of the accused and the seizure of the
prohibited drugs from him. To stress, the implementing rules are clear that non-compliance with
the requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
REPUBLIC GAS CORPORATION, ARNEL U. TY, MARI ANTONETTE N. TY, ORLANDO
REYES, FERRER SUAZO and ALVIN U. TY v. PETRON CORPORATION, PILIPINAS SHELL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, and SHELL INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY
LIMITED
G.R. No. 194062, June 17, 2013
J. Peralta
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a
certiorari petition may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct
any error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.
However, this rule is not absolute as jurisprudence has laid down several recognized exceptions
permitting a resort to the special civil action for certiorari without first filing a motion for
reconsideration.
FACTS:
Petitioners are the directors and officers of Republic Gas Corporation, an entity duly licensed to
engage in, conduct and carry on, the business of refilling, buying, selling, distributing, and marketing at
wholesale and retail of LPG.
Respondents Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporationare the two largest bulk suppliers and producers of LPG in the Philippines.

LPG Dealers Associations received reports that certain entities were engaged in the
unauthorized refilling, sale, and distribution of LPG cylinders bearing the registered tradenames
and trademarks of the respondents, thus prompting the filing of a complaint with the NBI
regarding such activity. The NBI thus conducted an investigation, and found that several
persons and/or establishments, including herein petitioner corporation, were suspected of
having violated provisions of BP 33. The NBI then applied for the issuance of search warrants
in the RTC, against REGASCO, which was granted by the judge.
The Assistant City Prosecutor then recommended the dismissal of the comlpaint,
contending that the respondents failed to show REGASCO was engaged in selling petitioners
products or that it imitated and reproduced the registered trademarks of the petitioners. On
appeal, the DOJ Secretary affirmed the prosecutors dismissal.
Dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, respondents sought recourse
to the CA through a petition for certiorari, which was granted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by respondents should have been denied outright.

RULING:

The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a
certiorari petition may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct
any error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.
However, this rule is not absolute as jurisprudence has laid down several recognized
exceptions permitting a resort to the special civil action for certiorari without first filing a motion
for reconsideration, viz.:
(a) Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction;
(b) Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court.
(c) Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the
subject matter of the petition is perishable;
(d) Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless;
(e) Where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency
for relief;
(f) Where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) Where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and,
(i) Where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.
In the present case, the filing of a motion for reconsideration may already be dispensed
with considering that the questions raised in this petition are the same as those that have
already been squarely argued and passed upon by the Secretary of Justice in her assailed
resolution.
HEIRS OF MARCELO SOTTO, REPRESENTED BY: LOLIBETH SOTTO NOBLE, DANILO C.
SOTTO, CRISTINA C. SOTTO, EMMANUEL C. SOTTO, and FILEMON C. SOTTO; and
SALVACION BARCELONA, AS HEIR OF DECEASED MIGUEL BARCELONA
v. MATILDE S. PALICTE
G.R. No. 159691, June 13, 2013
J. Bersamin

Res judicata exists when as between the action sought to be dismissed and the other
action these elements are present, namely; (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the former
judgment must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the
parties; (3) the former judgment must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be
between the first and subsequent actions (i) identity of parties or at least such as representing
the same interest in both actions; (ii) identity of subject matter, or of the rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and, (iii) identity of causes of action
in both actions such that any judgment that may be rendered in the other action will, regardless
of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
FACTS:
Filemon had four children, namely: Marcelo Sotto, Pascuala Sotto-Pahang, Miguel
Barcelona, and Matilde. Marcelo was the administrator of the Estate of Sotto. Marcelo and
Miguel were the predecessors-in-interest of petitioners.Pilar Teves and the other heirs of
Carmen Rallos, the deceased wife of Filemon, filed with the CFI a complaint against the Estate
of Sotto, seeing to recover certain properties that Filemon inherited from Carmen.
The CFI rendered judgment in favor of Pilar and the heirs of Carmen, and to satisfy the
monetary part of the judgment, levy on execution was effected against properties belonging to
the Estate of Sotto. The levied assets were then sold at public auction, and was later redeemed
by herein respondent. Respondent then filed a motion (Civil Case No. R-10027) to transfer to
her name the title to the four properties, which the CFI granted when the other heirs failed to
exercise the option granted them to join respondent as co-redemptioners. Thereafter, the heirs
of Miguel filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that they be included as respondents coredemptioners. This, however, was denied for lack of merit, which they then elevated to the SC
on certiorari (G.R. No. 154585). Their petition was denied.
Pascuala, who previously executed a document expressly waiving her rights in the four
properties covered by the deed of redemption, changed her mind and filed a complaint with the
RTC seeking the nullification of her waiver of her rights, and to have herself be declared as coredemptioner of such properties. However, the RTC dismissed the same on the ground that it is
already barred by laches, which was later assailed in her petition for certiorari filed with the CA.
She then appealed the dismissal of her petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 131722), but the Court
denied due course to her petition.
The heirs of Marcelo, and the heirs of Manuel, instituted an action for partition(Civil Case
No. CEB-24293) against respondent in the RTC, alleging in their complaint that despite the
redemption of the four properties having been made in the sole name of Matilde, the four
properties still rightfully belonged to the Estate of Sotto for having furnished the funds used to
redeem the properties, and prayed that the RTC declare the four properties as the assets of the
Estate of Sotto, and that the RTC direct their partition among the heirs of Filemon.Respondent
moved to dismiss the case, alleging that claim was already barred by prior judgment considering
that the decision in all the abovementioned cases had become final, and the cases involved the
same parties, the same subject matter, the same causes of action, and the same factual and
legal issues. The RTC held that it had no jurisdiction to annul the rulings of co-equal courts that
had recognized respondents exclusive rights over the properties and dismissed the case, and
the motion for reconsideration petitioners filed. Aggrieved, petitioners appealed the dismissal of
the case with the CA, but the same was affirmed, hence this appeal.

In the meantime, the Estate of Sotto, through its administrator Marcelo, moved in the
probate court to require respondent to account for and turn over the properties that allegedly
belonged to the estate. The probate court granted the motion, but subsequently reversed itself
upon respondents motion for reconsideration. Hence, the Estate of Sotto appealed (G.R. No.
158642), but the Court promulgated its decision adversely against the Estate of Sotto.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the present action for partition was already barred by prior judgment.

RULING:
Petitioners argue here that the four properties be declared as part of the Estate of Sotto to be
partitioned among the heirs of Filemon because the funds expended by Matilde for the redemption of the
properties came from the Estate of Sotto.

We still rule that res judicata was applicable to bar petitioners action for partition of the
four properties. Res judicata exists when as between the action sought to be dismissed and the
other action these elements are present, namely; (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the
former judgment must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter
and the parties; (3) the former judgment must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must
be between the first and subsequent actions (i) identity of parties or at least such as
representing the same interest in both actions; (ii) identity of subject matter, or of the rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and, (iii) identity of
causes of action in both actions such that any judgment that may be rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.
The first three elements were present. The decision of the Court in G.R. No. 55076 (the
first case), the decision of the Court in G.R. No. 131722 (the second case), the order dated
October 5, 1989 of the RTC in Civil Case No. R-10027 as upheld by the Court in G.R. No.
154585 (the third case), and the decision in G.R. No. 158642 (the fourth case) all of which
dealt with Matildes right to the four properties had upheld Matildes right to the four properties
and had all become final. Such rulings were rendered in the exercise of the respective courts
jurisdiction over the subject matter, and were adjudications on the merits of the cases.
We find that, indeed, Civil Case No. CEB-24293 was no different from the previous
cases as far as parties, subject matter, causes of action and issues were concerned. In other
words, Civil Case No. CEB-24293 was an undisguised relitigation of the same settled matter
concerning Matildes ownership of the four properties.
In all the five cases (Civil Case No. CEB-24293 included), an identity of parties existed
because the parties were the same, or there was privity among them, or some of the parties
were successors-in-interest litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity. An absolute identity of the parties was not necessary, because a shared identity
of interest sufficed for res judicata to apply. Moreover, mere substantial identity of parties, or
even community of interests between parties in the prior and subsequent cases, even if the
latter were not impleaded in the first case, would be sufficient. As such, the fact that a previous
case was filed in the name of the Estate of Sotto only was of no consequence.

Secondly, the subject matter of all the actions (Civil Case No. CEB-24293 included), was
the same, that is, Matildes right to the four properties. On the one hand, Matilde insisted that
she had the exclusive right to them, while, on the other hand, the other declared heirs of
Filemon, like petitioners predecessors-in-interest, maintained that the properties belonged to
the Estate of Sotto.
And, lastly, a judgment rendered in the other cases, regardless of which party was
successful, would amount to res judicata in relation to Civil Case No. CEB-24293.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive about the rights of the parties or their privies in all
later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit. The foundation principle
upon which the doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same
issue more than once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon
the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.
Section 47 (b) Rule 39 of the Rules of Court institutionalizes the doctrine of res judicata
in the concept of bar by prior judgment, viz:
Section 47. Effect of judgments and final orders.The effect of a judgment or
final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or final order, may be as follows:
xxxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the
same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
xxxx
The doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by
age, and founded on the broad principle that it is to the interest of the public that there should be
an end to litigation by the same parties over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated. It has
been appropriately said that the doctrine is a rule pervading every well-regulated system of
jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law:
one, public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be
an end to litigation interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium; the other, the hardship on the individual
that he should be vexed twice for one and the same cause nemo debet bis vexari pro una et
eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and
neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors
to the preservation of the public tranquillity and happiness. The doctrine is to be applied with
rigidity because:
x x x the maintenance of public order, the repose of society, and the quiet of
families require that what has been definitely determined by competent tribunals shall be
accepted as irrefragable legal truth. So deeply is this principle implanted in xxx
jurisprudence that commentators upon it have said, the res judicata renders white that

which is black and straight that which is crooked. Facit excurvo rectum, ex albo nigrum.
No other evidence can afford strength to the presumption of truth it creates, and no
argument can detract from its legal efficacy.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDWARD M. CAMACHO
G.R. No. 185604, June 13, 2013
J. Villarama, Jr.
The nature of the proceeding for reconstitution of a certificate of title under R.A. No. 26
denotes a restoration of the instrument, which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed, in its
original form and condition. The purpose of such a proceeding is merely to have the certificate
of title reproduced, after proper proceedings, in the same form it was in when its loss or
destruction occurred. The same R.A. No. 26 specifies the requisites to be met for the trial court
to acquire jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution of a certificate of title. Failure to comply
with any of these jurisdictional requirements for a petition for reconstitution renders the
proceedings null and void.
FACTS:
Respondent filed a petition seeking the reconstitution of an OCT whose number is no longer
legible due to wear and tear, alleging that he is the owner thereof by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition with Absolute Sale executed by the heirs of Sps. Lapitan in his favor. The RTC thus issued an
Order finding the respondents petition sufficient in form and substance ans set the same for hearing.

After trial, the RTC rendered its decision, granting the petition of respondent, and
directing the RD to reconstitute said original certificate of title in respondents favor. The OSG
later on filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC for lack of merit, holding
thatrespondent complied with Section 2 of R.A. No. 2642 considering that the reconstitution in
this case is based on the owners duplicate copy of the OCT.
Petitioner then appealed to the CA, but the decision of the RTC was affirmed, holding
that respondents petition is governed by Section 10 of R.A. No. 26 since the reconstitution
proceedings is based on the owners duplicate copy of the OCT itself. Aggrieved, respondent
filed this present petition under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC properly acquired and was invested with jurisdiction in the first place to hear
and decide the Land Registration Case in the light of the strict and mandatory provisions of R.A. No. 26.

RULING:
We resolve the sole issue in the negative.

Section 110 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, as amended by R.A. No. 6732, allows the reconstitution of lost or
destroyed original Torrens title either judicially, in accordance with the special procedure laid
down in R.A. No. 26, or administratively, in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 6732.
As the case set before this Court is one for judicial reconstitution, we limit the discussion
to the pertinent law, which is R.A. No. 26, and the applicable jurisprudence.

The nature of the proceeding for reconstitution of a certificate of title under R.A. No. 26
denotes a restoration of the instrument, which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed, in its
original form and condition. The purpose of such a proceeding is merely to have the certificate
of title reproduced, after proper proceedings, in the same form it was in when its loss or
destruction occurred. The same R.A. No. 26 specifies the requisites to be met for the trial court
to acquire jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution of a certificate of title. Failure to comply
with any of these jurisdictional requirements for a petition for reconstitution renders the
proceedings null and void. Thus, in obtaining a new title in lieu of the lost or destroyed one, R.A.
No. 26 laid down procedures which must be strictly followed in view of the danger that
reconstitution could be the source of anomalous titles or unscrupulously availed of as an easy
substitute for original registration of title proceedings.
It bears reiterating that respondents quest for judicial reconstitution in this case is
anchored on the owners duplicate copy of said OCT a source for reconstitution of title
provided under Section 2 (a) of R.A. No. 26, which provides in full as follows:
SEC. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the
sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
a. The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;
b. The co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate of the certificate of title;
c. A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or
by a legal custodian thereof;
d. An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be,
pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued;
e. A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of
which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an
authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and
f. Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis
for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
In this aspect, the CA was correct in invoking our ruling in Puzon v. Sta. Lucia Realty and
Development, Inc., that notices to owners of adjoining lots and actual occupants of the subject
property are not mandatory and jurisdictional in a petition for judicial reconstitution of destroyed
certificate of title when the source for such reconstitution is the owners duplicate copy thereof
since the publication, posting and notice requirements for such a petition are governed by
Section 10 in relation to Section 9 of R.A. No. 26. Section 10 provides:
SEC. 10. Nothing hereinbefore provided shall prevent any registered owner or person in
interest from filing the petition mentioned in section five of this Act directly with the proper Court
of First Instance, based on sources enumerated in sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a) of
this Act: Provided, however, That the court shall cause a notice of the petition, before hearing
and granting the same, to be published in the manner stated in section nine hereof: And,
provided, further, That certificates of title reconstituted pursuant to this section shall not be
subject to the encumbrance referred to in section seven of this Act.

Correlatively, the pertinent provisions of Section 9 on the publication, posting and the
contents of the notice of the Petition for Reconstitution clearly mandate:
SEC. 9. x x x Thereupon, the court shall cause a notice of the petition to be published, at
the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be
posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the
municipality or city in which the land lies, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing, and
after hearing, shall determine the petition and render such judgment as justice and equity may
require. The notice shall specify, among other things, the number of the certificate of title, the
name of the registered owner, the names of the interested parties appearing in the reconstituted
certificate of title, the location of the property, and the date on which all persons having an
interest in the property must appear and file such claim as they may have. x x x
In sum, Section 10, in relation to Section 9, requires that 30 days before the date of
hearing, (1) a notice be published in two successive issues of the Official Gazette at the
expense of the petitioner, and that (2) such notice be posted at the main entrances of the
provincial building and of the municipal hall where the property is located. The notice shall state
the following: (1) the number of the certificate of title, (2) the name of the registered owner, (3)
the names of the interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of title, (4) the
location of the property, and (5) the date on which all persons having an interest in the property,
must appear and file such claims as they may have.
Verily, while the CA invoked the appropriate provisions of R.A. No. 26, it failed, however,
to take note that Section 9 thereof mandatorily requires that the notice shall specify, among
other things, the number of the certificate of title and the names of the interested parties
appearing in the reconstituted certificate of title. In this case, the RTC failed to indicate these
jurisdictional facts in the notice.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOEL REBOTAZO y ALEJANDRA
G.R. No. 192913, June 13, 2013
CJ. Sereno
The material inconsistencies asserted by the accused-appellant which
allegedly create grave doubts are, on the contrary, too minor, trivial and
inconsequential to affect the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, the
inconsistencies having been fully and sufficiently explained during trial by the
witnesses themselves, and their explanations having been accepted by the Trial
Court. Besides, it has been held, time and again, that minor inconsistencies and
contradictions in the declarations of witnesses do not destroy the witnesses'
credibility but even enhance their truthfulness as they erase any suspicion of a
rehearsed testimony.
FACTS:
The accused was charged under two separate informations with the violation of Sections
5 and 11, RA 9165, to which the accused pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment. The evidence
for the prosecution showed that a buy-bust operation was conducted by the NBI to apprehend

the accused, after a confidential informant reported that the former intended to sell shabu to him
later that day. At the area of operation, the confidential informant, and the poseur-buyer told the
accused that they wanted to purchase shabu. When the transaction was consummated, the prearranged signal was then performed which caused the rest of the buy-bust team to approach
the area and arrest the accused and was subjected to a body search. The accused voluntarily
informed the NBI agents that he had another sachet of shabu inside one of his socks.
At the NBI office, Dungog conducted an inventory of the seized items in the presence of
accused, a media representative, and a representative from the DOJ. A laboratory examination
was likewise made, and the specimen yielded positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.
Appellant also underwent a drug test, and tested positive for the presence of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride.
The accused on the other hand contended that on that day, he was with his friend,
herein confidential informant, when they were suddenly approached by herein poseur-buyer.
The poseur-buyer then gave money to his friend, and the latter gave something lengthy to the
former. A few minutes after the poseur-buyer left, the NBI agents approached and searched
him, but found nothing. He also claimed that at the time of the arrest, he was not informed of
his constitutional rights, and that he was wearing only pants, a t-shirt and slippers, and had no
socks. The accused was then forced to sign a document known as the Inventory of Dangerous
Drugs.
The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime charged, giving more weight to the
evidence presented by the prosecution. It relied on the testimony of the poseur-buyer who
narrated how the illegal sale took place, presented in court the evidence of the corpus delicti,
and positively identified appellant as the seller of the shabu. It also gave credence to the
testimony of the two police officers, who were both "presumed to have acted regularly in the
performance of their official functions.
Upon intermediate appellate review, the CA rendered a decision affirming the factual findings of
the RTC on the premise that witness Diaz and Dungog had clearly and convincingly established his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The fact that the CA did not find any ill motive on the part of these witnesses to
falsely implicate appellant only bolstered his conviction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in finding the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses
sufficient to warrant appellants conviction for the crimes charged.

RULING:
The supposed factual discrepancies in the prosecutions evidence do not hold water.
The rule on material inconsistencies has been enunciated by this Court several times. In People
v. Arcega, we have held that "by and large, the material inconsistencies asserted by the
accused-appellant which allegedly create grave doubts are, on the contrary, too minor, trivial
and inconsequential to affect the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, the inconsistencies
having been fully and sufficiently explained during trial by the witnesses themselves, and their
explanations having been accepted by the Trial Court. Besides, it has been held, time and
again, that minor inconsistencies and contradictions in the declarations of witnesses do not
destroy the witnesses' credibility but even enhance their truthfulness as they erase any
suspicion of a rehearsed testimony."

On this score, we agree with the findings of the CA that the prosecution has sufficiently
explained the factual discrepancies.
First, on the lack of signature of an elected official and the failure to indicate the name of
the person who affixed his signature as DOJ representative in the inventory report,
jurisprudence has maintained that "non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with
Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the
items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused."It appears from the records
that the NBI tried to contact barangay officials to attend the inventory-taking, but none arrived.49
Such effort on the part of the NBI agents and the consequent failure of said elected officials to
appear should be considered sufficient justifiable ground so as to excuse the prosecution from
complying with this particular requirement.
Considering that the integrity of the seized drugs has been maintained, and that the
drugs were immediately marked for proper identification, the absence of an elected official
during the inventory-taking should not be deemed fatal to the prosecutions case.
Second, the alleged confusion in the identity of the media representatives was
thoroughly explained by witness Dungog. Third, on the discrepancy between the inventory
report and the actual incident, including the markings on Specimen "A" and Specimen "B," the
discrepancy was also explained by Dungog.
JOSELITO RAMOS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 194384, June 13, 2013
CJ. Sereno
The assertion by petitioner that parts of onw of the witness testimony were inconsistent
with that of the other witnesses cannot be given credence. It should be noted that the
witnesses saw the incident from different vantage points, the former being a passive
eyewitness, and latter being direct witnesses to the incident. As such, the latter were able to
observe events that the latter might have overlooked or failed to see.
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with the crime of homicide. The evidence for the prosecution showed that
the victim, Pedro Prestoza, was riding a tricycle with six other people, when another tricycle, this one
driven by Ramos, cut in on their path. Petitioner and a certain Danny Alvarez alighted from their tricycle
and pulled down Nelson Tagulao from the other tricycle. Alvarez then struck Nelson Tagulao with a lead
pipe. Prestoza alighted from his tricycle in order to stop the attack, but the two assailants then turned on
the victim, was hit by Alvarez with the lead pipe and by Ramos with a piece of wood. While they were
ganging up on Prestoza, Jimmy Tagulao arrived and engaged Alvarez in a fist fight. The latter and
petitioner then ran away. Prestoza was brought to a hospital for treatment, but he died of his wounds
after eight days.
In his defense, the petitioner contended that the tricycle he was driving was trailing two other
tricycles with men on board who were cursing at him. He was about to overtake the two other tricycles
when they blocked his way. The passengers of the two other tricycles alighted, and one of them thrust a

knife at him, but missed. Ramos immediately alighted from his tricycle and ran away, with four other
persons giving chase. He was about to return to his tricycle when he saw his younger brother Edwin
arrive on board another tricycle, and approached him. The latter was suddenly stabbed by Nelson
Tagulao. Ramos took his brother away from the place, as seven other persons attacked them with pieces
of wood. He then saw his elder brother Orlando being struck on the head with a stone by Hipolito Cervas.
Ramos flagged down a tricycle and brought his brothers to a hospital, then reported the incident to the
police.
Edwin and Orlando filed a complaint for frustrated murder against prosecution witnesses John
Tagulao, Gerardo Gloria, Ernesto Ydia and eight others, but the complaint was dismissed.
After trial, the RTC found Ramos guilty of the crime of homicide, giving credence to the
testimonies of John Tagulao and Gerardo Gloria. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court, finding that the identity of Ramos as one of the assailants has been sufficiently established by
creditble eyewitness testimony. Thus, petitioners denial could not have prevailed over his positive
identification. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioner thus filed this petition
under Rule 45.

ISSUE:
Whether the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should not have been given credence, because the
testimony of Ernesto Ydia contradicts the testimonies of the other witnesses, and because they were
impelled by an improper motive, as petitioners brothers had filed a complaint for frustrated murder
against them

RULING:
We deny the petition and affirm the RTCs finding of guilt.
Petitioner Ramos ascribes reversible error on the part of the CA when it affirmed his conviction,
because parts of Ernesto Ydias testimony were allegedly inconsistent with the testimonies of John
Tagulao and Gerardo Gloria. As petitioner pointed out, John Tagulao testified that petitioner, Alvarez and
a certain Jordan Baladad mauled the victim. On the other hand, Ernesto Ydia stated that petitioner, his
brothers Edwin and Orlando, and Jordan Baladad were the ones who had beat up Prestoza.

The CA and the RTC correctly refused to give credence to the testimony of Ernesto Ydia.
As explained by the appellate court:
Significantly, the points of recall and circumstances of the witnesses were
different. Ydia was a passive eyewitness, being a passenger from another tricycle.
Tagulao and Gloria, on the other hand, directly witnessed the incident as they were
riding the same tricycle ridden by Prestoza. As such, Tagulao and Gloria were able to
observe events that Ydia might have overlooked or failed to see.
Thus, the CA and the RTC relied on the testimonies of John Tagulao and Gerardo Gloria
to establish the facts that led to Prestozas death. A review of the records shows that their
testimonies clearly identified petitioner as one of the perpetrators of the mauling incident and
were consistent on material points.
Petitioner finally argues that the testimonies of John Tagulao and Gerardo Gloria should
not be given credence because the witnesses bear a grudge against him. He attributes the
supposed grudge to a complaint for frustrated murder filed against them by petitioners brothers
Edwin and Orlando.

Again, we disagree.
The rule is that "where there is no evidence to indicate that the prosecution witness was
actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and that he would
not prevaricate and cause damnation to one who brought him no harm or injury."
In this case, while petitioner's brothers did in fact file a criminal complaint for frustrated
murder against John Tagulao, Gerardo Gloria, and some other individuals, the complaint was
eventually dismissed. Nothing on record shows any other circumstance that could have
impelled the prosecution witnesses to testify falsely against petitioner. In fact, John Tagulao was
a son-in-law of the victim. Thus, the reasonable presumption is that, as a family member, he
was interested in the prosecution of the real perpetrator of the crime.
We therefore rule that, in the absence of evidence that the prosecution witnesses were
moved by an improper motive in testifying against petitioner, the presumption that they were not
so moved prevails, and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.
PRIVATIZATION and MANAGEMENT OFFICE v. STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT and/or
PHILIPPINE ESTATE CORPORATION
G.R. No. 200402, June 13, 2013
CJ. Sereno
Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion by a public officer
on whom the law imposes the right or duty to exercise judgment in reference to any matter in
which the officer is required to act. Neither can mandamus be issued unless a clear right of the
bidder is shown. Mandamus does not lie if the right is doubtful.
FACTS:
The indebtedness of PNCC to various governmental financial institutions was transferred
to the National Governmentthrough the Committee on Privatization (COP)/Asset Privatization
Trust (APT) and the Bureau of Treasury. Consequently, APT slated the privatization of PNCC in
order to generate maximum cash recovery for the government. Thus, sometime in July of 2000,
it announced the holding of a public bidding involving the package sale of stocks, receivables,
and securities owned by the National Government in the PNCC.Dong-A Consortium, which was
formed by respondent STRADEC and Dong-A Pharmaceuticals, signified its intention to bid. As
a prospective bidder, it received the accompanying bid documents given by APT.
The public bidding was then conducted, however, when they offered their bids, none of
the bidders met the indicative price of APT.APT then informed Dong-A Consortium informing the
latter that its offer had been rejected, to which the latter asked for reconsideration and
requested the award of the PNCC properties.Meanwhile, the term of APT expired and PMO
was thus organized to implement the disposition of government-acquired assets, including
PNCC shares. The decision of APT to reject the bid still stands.
STRADEC thus filed a complaint for Declaration of Right to a Notice of Award and/or
Damages on behalf of Dong-A Consortium against PMO and PNCC. In its answer, PMO argued
that STRADEC had no legal right to demand an issuance of a Notice of Award even after having
submitted the highest bid. In its decision, the RTC ruled that PMO directed the issuance of a

Notice of Award in favor of Dong-A Consortium. Upon appeal to the CA, the sale of the assets
of PNCC was awarded to Dong-A Consortium.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dong-A Consortium has the right to receive the award, as directed by the
lower courts.
RULING:
As accurately depicted by the OSG, to compel the issuance of a Notice of Award is tantamount to
a prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Mandamus, however, will not issue to control or review
the exercise of discretion by a public officer on whom the law imposes the right or duty to exercise
judgment in reference to any matter in which the officer is required to act. Respondent has no cause of
action to compel APT to award the bid to Dong-A Consortium.

Neither can mandamus be issued unless a clear right of the bidder is shown.
Mandamus does not lie if the right is doubtful. Here, as discussed, Dong-A Consortium has no
right to receive the award, since it failed to match the indicative price.
Petitioner cannot be compelled to accept the bid of Dong-A Consortium since this forced
consent treads on the governments freedom to contract. The freedom of persons to enter into
contracts is a policy of the law, and courts should move with all necessary caution and prudence
when interfering with it.
It must be remembered that in the field of competitive public bidding, the
owner of the property to be auctioned the government enjoys a wide latitude of
discretion and autonomy in choosing the terms of the agreement. This principle is
especially true in this case, since the policy decision then was for APT to liquidate
nonperforming assets of the government in order to recover losses. Therefore,
absent any abuse of discretion, injustice, unfairness or fraudulent acts, this Court
refrain from discrediting the judgment call of APT to prefatorily refuse any offer that
fell below the indicative price.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ATTY. RICARDO D. GONZALEZ

G.R. No. 185821, June 13, 2013
J. Villarama, Jr.

While the provisions of the Rules of Court apply to Special Agrarian Court
proceedings, it is clear that, unlike in expropriation proceedings under the Rules of
Court, the appointment of a commissioner or commissioners is discretionary on the
part of the court or upon the instance of one of the parties.And since neither party
objected to the appointment of commissioners, the proper fees to be paid to them
should likewise be governed by the Rules of Court.

FACTS:

Respondent is the registered owner of two contiguous parcels of land devoted

to coconut production which was tenanted by several people. Pursuant to CARP, the
respondent voluntarily offered to sell the subject property to the DAR for
Php250,000.00 per hectare. Pursuant to DAR Administrative Order, the DAR and the
LBP valued the subject property at P50,265.17 per hectare, but the same was
rejected by the respondent. The case was then referred to the RARAD, but the
valuation made by the DAR and the LBP was affirmed.

Disappointed with the low valuation, respondent filed before the RTC sitting
as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC) a petition for just compensation against the LBP,
the DAR, and the tenants of the subject property. With the conformity of the
parties, the SAC appointed Commissioners to determine the amount of just
compensation due the respondent. The Commissioners thus submitted their
valuation recommendation.

The SAC then rendered a decision, and came up with its own valuation,
considering that the asking price of the respondent was high, while the
recommendation of the committee was low. Both the DAR and LBP sought
reconsideration of the decision but the SAC denied their respective motions.
Aggrieved, the LBP appealed the decision to the CA.

The CA affirmed the findings and the ruling of the SAC, and ordered LBP being
the losing party, to bear the payment of the commissioners fees. Hence, LBP filed
this petition under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

Whether or not LBP should be held liable for the payment of the commissioners
fees

RULING:

We held in Lee v. Land Bank of the Philippines that while the provisions of the
Rules of Court apply to SAC proceedings, it is clear that, unlike in expropriation
proceedings under the Rules of Court, the appointment of a commissioner or
commissioners is discretionary on the part of the court or upon the instance of one
of the parties. Section 58 of R.A. No. 6657 provides:

SEC. 58. Appointment of Commissioners. The Special Agrarian

Courts, upon their own initiative or at the instance of any of the parties, may
appoint one or more commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain
facts relevant to the dispute, including the valuation of properties, and to file
a written report thereof with the court.

Here, both parties did not object to the appointment of commissioners. Our
ruling in Apo Fruits is instructive:

The relevant law is found in Rule 67, Section 12 of the Rules of Court:

"SEC. 12. Costs, by whom paid. The fees of the commissioners shall
be taxed as a part of the costs of the proceedings. All costs, except those of
rival claimants litigating their claims, shall be paid by the plaintiff, unless an
appeal is taken by the owner of the property and the judgment is affirmed, in
which event the costs of the appeal shall be paid by the owner."

Rule 141, Section 16 of the Rules of Court, provides that:

"SEC. 16. Fees of commissioners in eminent domain proceedings.

The commissioners appointed to appraise land sought to be condemned for
public uses in accordance with these rules shall each receive a compensation
to be fixed by the court of NOT LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED (P300.00) PESOS
per day for the time actually and necessarily employed in the performance of
their duties and in making their report to the court, which fees shall be taxed
as a part of the costs of the proceedings."

From the afore-quoted provision, the award made by the RTC is way beyond
that allowed under Rule 141, Section 16; thus, the award is excessive and without
justification. Records show that the commissioners were constituted on 26 May
2000 and they submitted their appraisal report on 21 May 2001, when the old
schedule of legal fees was in effect. The amendment in Rule 141 introduced by A.M.
No. 04-2-04-SC, which took effect on 16 August 2004, increased the commissioners
fees from P100.00 to P300.00 per day. Assuming they devoted all the 360 days from
the time they were constituted until the time they submitted the appraisal report in
the performance of their duties, and applying the old rate for commissioners fees,
they would only receive P38,000.00. Moreover, even if the new rate is applied, each
commissioner would receive only P108,000.00. The rule above-quoted is very clear
on the amount of commissioners fees. The award made by the RTC in the amount
of 2% of the total amount of just compensation, i.e., 2 1/2% of P1,383,179,000.00,
which translates to P34,579,475.00, is certainly unjustified and excessive. x x x

Accordingly, remand of the case for the determination of the proper amount
of commissioners fees is in order, pursuant to the aforecited provision of the Rules
of Court and jurisprudence. The SAC shall particularly determine the number of days
which the Board actually devoted to the performance of its duties. Since the Board
in this case was constituted on March 3, 2000, and it rendered its Report on July 28,
2000, or prior to the increase in the rate of commissioner's fees, the old rate of
P100.00 per day shall be applied.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, as represented by Fritzi C. Pantoja, in her

capacity as the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, DAR-Laguna v. PARAMOUNT
HOLDINGS EQUITIES, INC., JIMMY CHUA, ROJAS CHUA, BENJAMIN SIM, SANTOS C.
TAN, WILLIAM C. LEE and STEWART C. LIM
G.R. No. 176838, June 13, 2013
J. Reyes

The jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB is only limited to cases
involving agrarian disputes, including incidents arising from the implementation of
agrarian laws. Basic is the rule that the "jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasijudicial office or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a
petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the
character of the relief prayed for irrespective of whether the petitioner or
complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs."

FACTS:

The case stems from the petition filed with the Office of the PARAD by the
DAR through PARO Felixberto Kagahastian, seeking to nullify the sale of several
parcels of land to respondents. The PARO argued that the properties were
agricultural land yet their sale was effected without DAR Clearance as required
under Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the CARL. The respondents
opposed the petition, contending that the case is cognizable by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform and not the DARAB. The PARAD dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction. The decision was then appealed to the DARAB.

The DARAB reversed and set aside the ruling of the PARAD, finding that the
DARAB has the jurisdiction over the case. Aggrieved, the respondents then
appealed the decision with the CA, and ruled that the DARABs jurisdiction over the
dispute should be determined by the allegations made in the petition. Since the
action was essentially for the nullification of the subject properties sale, it did not
involve an agrarian suit that is within the DARABs jurisdiction.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the dispute that seeks the
nullification of the subject properties sale.

RULING:

The Court answers in the negative.

The jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited under the law, as it was created under
E.O. No. 129-A specifically to assume powers and functions with respect to the
adjudication of agrarian reform cases under E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A.
Significantly, it was organized under the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
The limitation on the authority of it to mere agrarian reform matters is only

consistent with the extent of DARs quasi-judicial powers under R.A. No. 6657 and
E.O. No. 229, which read:

SECTION 50 [of R.A. No. 6657]. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.The

DAR is hereby vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).

SECTION 17 [of E.O. No. 229]. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.The

DAR is hereby vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters, and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department of
Agriculture (DA).

Thus, Sections 1 and 2, Rule II of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure, which
was adopted and promulgated on May 30, 1994 and came into effect on June 21,
1994, identify the specific extent of the DARABs and PARADs jurisdiction, as they
read:

SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction.

The Board shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and
appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 228, 229 and 129-A,
Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential
Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but not be limited to
cases involving the following:

a) The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical,

engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all agricultural lands
covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws;

b) The valuation of land, and the preliminary determination and

payment of just compensation, fixing and collection of lease rentals,
disturbance compensation, amortization payments, and similar disputes
concerning the functions of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP);

c) The annulment or cancellation of lease contracts or deeds of sale or

their amendments involving lands under the administration and disposition of
the DAR or LBP;

d) Those cases arising from, or connected with membership or

representation in compact farms, farmers cooperatives and other registered
farmers associations or organizations, related to lands covered by the CARP
and other agrarian laws;

e) Those involving the sale, alienation, mortgage, foreclosure, preemption and redemption of agricultural lands under the coverage of the CARP
or other agrarian laws;

f) Those involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of

Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents
(EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration Authority;

g) Those cases previously falling under the original and exclusive

jurisdiction of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations under Section 12 of
Presidential Decree No. 946, except sub-paragraph (q) thereof and
Presidential Decree No. 815.

Matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of

Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the CARL of 1988 and other
agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules shall be the exclusive
prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR.

h) And such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns

referred to it by the Secretary of the DAR.

SECTION 2. Jurisdiction of the Regional and Provincial Adjudicator.The

RARAD and the PARAD shall have concurrent original jurisdiction with the
Board to hear, determine and adjudicate all agrarian cases and disputes, and
incidents in connection therewith, arising within their assigned territorial
jurisdiction.

Consistent with the aforequoted legal provisions, we emphasized in Heirs of

Candido Del Rosario v. Del Rosario that the jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB
is only limited to cases involving agrarian disputes, including incidents arising from
the implementation of agrarian laws.

Basic is the rule that the "jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial

office or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or
complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the
relief prayed for irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to
any or all such reliefs." Upon the Courts perusal of the records, it has determined
that the PAROs petition with the PARAD failed to indicate an agrarian dispute.

Specifically, the PAROs petition failed to sufficiently allege any tenurial or

agrarian relations that affect the subject parcels of land. Although it mentioned a
pending petition for coverage filed with DAR by supposed farmers-tillers, there was
neither such claim as a fact from DAR, nor a categorical statement or allegation as
to a determined tenancy relationship by the PARO or the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform. It is also undisputed, that even the petition filed with the PARAD failed to
indicate otherwise, that the subject parcels of land had not been the subject of any
notice of coverage under the CARP. Clearly, the PAROs cause of action was merely
founded on the absence of a clearance to cover the sale and registration of the
subject parcels of land, which were claimed in the petition to be agricultural. Given
the foregoing, the CA correctly ruled that the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the
PAROs petition.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PERCIVAL DELA ROSA y BAYER

G.R. No. 201723, June 13, 2013

J. Reyes

Denial is intrinsically a weak defense which must be buttressed by strong

evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. To be sure, it is negative, self-serving
evidence that cannot be given evidentiary weight greater than that of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Time-tested is the rule that between
the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of the
accused, the former indisputably deserves more credence and evidentiary weight.

FACTS:

Accused, along with his co-accused Tabasa, were charged under an

information for the crime of the murder of Magdua, to which the former pleaded not
guilty upon his arraignment while his co-accused remained at large. Based on the
evidence presented, the prosecution witness Samson was talking to the the victim
Magdua when suddenly the accused and Tabasa approached them, and the victim
was boxed by Tabasa and stabbed on the chest by the accused. The victim was
then brought to the hospital but to no avail.

The RTC convicted the accused of murder, finding that both accused
conspired with each other, and issued an alias writ of against his co-accused
Tabasa. On appellate review, the accused assailed the credibility of the eyewitness
Samson, arguing that the lighting made it impossible for the witness to positively
identify the victims assailants. Moreover, the inconsistencies in Samsons testimony
place his guilt in serious doubt and he questioned RTCs appreciation of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery. Despite such protestations, the CA gave full
weight and credibility to Samsons testimony, affirmed the decision of the trial
court, and held that the totality of the evidence presented clearly established the
elements of murder. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs judgment convicting Dela Rosa for
Murder.

RULING:

Records show that Samson, a friend of the victim who was with him at the
time of the incident, straightforwardly testified that it was Dela Rosa who pulled out
the bladed weapon during the assault and who stabbed the victim on his chest and
at the back of his neck. As aptly stated by the CA, the positive, categorical and
unequivocal declaration of Samson identifying Dela Rosa as one of the assailants
deserves more consideration than the defenses speculation on the state of
darkness of the locus crimini or the number of times the victim was stabbed. During
the trial, Samson also vividly described the manner by which Dela Rosa committed
the crime, giving the RTC a clear picture of how Dela Rosa and Tabasa ganged up on
the victim. Indeed, it is evident that the totality of the evidence for the prosecution,
coupled with the defenses failure to discredit Samsons testimony, established Dela
Rosas guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As held in People of the Philippines v. Welvin
Diu y Kotsesa and Dennis Dayaon y Tupit:

The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of

witness, which is best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better
position to decide such question, having heard the witness and observed his
demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are the
most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in
unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. Through
its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected
to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and
which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will
not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight
have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially
affect the disposition of the case. x x x.

Moreover, Dela Rosas denial of conspiracy and participation in the crime

lacks merit.

Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner in which
the offense was perpetrated; or inferred from the acts of the accused when those
acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interests. Proof of a previous agreement and decision to commit the crime is not
essential, but the fact that the malefactors acted in unison pursuant to the same
objective suffices.

In this case, the evidence on record established that Dela Rosa and Tabasa
shared a community of criminal design. Together, they approached Magdua while
the latter was busy talking to Samson; Tabasa then boxed Magdua while Dela Rosa
pulled out a knife and stabbed the latter on the chest. When Magdua managed to
run away, the two perpetrators ran after him and were able to overtake him.
Tabasa, again, threw fist blows to Magdua who still tried to retreat. From behind,
Dela Rosa then pulled his knife and stabbed Magdua at the nape. Such acts, taken
altogether, show how Dela Rosa and Tabasa jointly accomplished killing Magdua.
Consequently, Dela Rosas denial is not supported by convincing evidence and
deserves scant consideration. Such self-serving denial, therefore, cannot overthrow
the positive identification made by Samson that he was one of the perpetrators of
the crime.

In addition, denial is intrinsically a weak defense which must be buttressed by

strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. To be sure, it is negative, selfserving evidence that cannot be given evidentiary weight greater than that of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Time-tested is the rule that
between the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses and the negative
averments of the accused, the former indisputably deserves more credence and
evidentiary weight.

ST. JOSEPH ACADEMY OF VALENZUELA FACULTY ASSOCIATION (SJA VFA)-FUR

CHAPTER-TUCP v. ST. JOSEPH ACADEMY OF VALENZUELA and DAMASO D. LOPEZ
G.R. No. 182957, June 13, 2013
J. Reyes

In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA decision,

in contrast with the review for jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65.
Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised against the
assailed CA decision.

FACTS:

A notice of strike was filed by the petitioner against respondent for illegal
termination and union busting. When the SOLE assumed jurisdiction, the four
members of the union who already passed the teachers board examinations were
ordered reinstated with full backwages. However, as to those fifteen members who
have no licenses but with temporary or special permits, the reinstatement ordered
by the SOLE was only effective until their permits are valid.

The CA, however, ruled that reinstatement is no longer possible inasmuch as

it is the Department of Education, Culture and Sports that can assign para-teachers
to schools as it may determine. The award of backwages was also deleted as there
was no illegal dismissal as found by the SOLE, the non-licensees not being its
regular employees. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether Labor Cases can be reviewed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

RULING:

In Phimco Industries, Inc. v. Phimco Industries Labor Association, the Court

reiterated the basic approach in the review of CA decisions in labor cases, viz:

In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA

decision, in contrast with the review for jurisdictional error that we undertake
under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of
law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we
have to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for
certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we have to examine the CA
decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or
absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on
the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct.
In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65
review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it.
This is the approach that should be basic in a Rule 45 review of a CA ruling in
a labor case. In question form, the question to ask is: Did the CA correctly

determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on

the case?

Consequently, the Court finds that the CA did not commit an error in ruling that
reinstatement is not possible. In the same light, the Court finds that the CA,
likewise, did not commit an error in deleting the award of backwages.

DEOGENES O. RODRIGUEZ v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE CHINESE

CHARITABLE ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R. No. 184589, June 13, 2013
J. Leonardo de-Castro

Although Rule 19 is explicit on the period when a motion to intervene may be

filed, interventions have been allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the
Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of justice. Interventions have also
been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the
right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court, when
the petition for review of the judgment has already been submitted for decision
before the Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has already become
final and executory.

FACTS:

Purita Landicho filed before the CFI Rizal an Application for Registration of a
piece of land located in San Mateo, Rizal. After trial, the court found the evidence
presented by Landicho sufficient and thus confirmed her title over the property, and
ordered the LRC to register the same in her name and to comply with Section 21 of
RA 2347 on the issuance of a decree and OCT. The RD, however, issued to Landicho
a TCT rather than an OCT for the subject property. The subject property was
thereafter sold several times, finally to herein respondent Philippine Chinese
Charitable Association, Inc. (PCCAI)

Sometime thereafter, Landicho executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the

subject property in favor of herein petitioner. Several years later, petitioner filed an

Omnibus Motion before the RTC, alleging that the decision of the RTC which
confirmed Landichos title over the property had not been executed. Petitioner
particularly asserts that no decree of registration had been issued by the LRC
Commissioner (now LRA Administrator) and that no OCT had ever been issued in by
the RD in Landichos name, and thus prays that the LRA issue the decree of
registration in his name.Petitioner submitted the TCT of PCCAI to support his claim,
contending that the same was fictitious, thus making the court issue a subpoena to
PCCAI to testify at the hearing. Later, PCCAIfiled a verified Motion for Leave to
Intervene in the case filed by Rodriguez, alleging that it is an indispensable party in
the case, having substantial legal interest therein as registered owner of the subject
property. The RTC thus issued a decision on the Omnibus Motion of petitioner,
ordering the LRA to issue a decree of registration and the RD to issue an OCT in his
favor, while the motion to intervene of PCCAI was denied.

PCCAI then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA,
assailing the orders of the RTC for having been issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. PCCAI acknowledged that it is the ministerial duty of the RTC to issue a
writ of execution for a final and executory decision/order; however, PCCAI argued
that when subsequent facts and circumstances transpired which renders the
execution of the final and executory decision/order unjust or inequitable, then the
trial court should refrain from issuing a writ of execution. The CA found merit in the
petition of PCCAI, and granted its motion for intervention. Aggrieved, petitioner
thus filed the present petition under Rule 65.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PCCAI had right to intervene

RULING:

Intervention is governed by Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, pertinent provisions

of which read:

SECTION 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in

the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an

interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a

distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of
an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the
action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.

SECTION 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed

at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the
pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the
original parties.

The subject property is presently covered by TCT No. 482970 in the name of
PCCAI. As the registered owner, PCCAI clearly has a legal interest in the subject
property. The issuance of another certificate of title to Rodriguez will adversely
affect PCCAI, constituting a cloud on its TCT No. 482970.

Although Rule 19 is explicit on the period when a motion to intervene may be

filed, the Court allowed exceptions in several cases, viz:

This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed

even beyond the period prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the
higher interest of justice. Interventions have also been granted to afford
indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard
even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court, when the petition
for review of the judgment has already been submitted for decision before
the Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has already become
final and executory. In Lim v. Pacquing, the motion for intervention filed by
the Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave
injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised
by the parties.

In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the

sound discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances.
We stress again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose
object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice.

Its purpose is not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration
of justice.

The particular circumstances of this case similarly justify the relaxation of the
rules of procedure on intervention. First, the interests of both PCCAI and Rodriguez
in the subject property arose only after the CFI Decision dated November 16, 1965
in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 became final and executory. PCCAI bought the subject
property from WPFI on November 13, 1973 and was issued TCT No. 482970 for the
same on July 15, 1975; while Rodriguez bought the subject property from Landicho
on November 14, 1996. Second, as previously discussed herein, both PCCAI and
Rodriguez trace their titles back to Landicho. Hence, the intervention of PCCAI could
not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of Landicho, the original
party in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. Third, the latest proceedings in Land Reg. Case
No. N-5098 involved Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion, filed before the RTC on May 18,
2005, in which he prayed for the execution of the November 16, 1965 Decision of
the CFI. PCCAI moved to intervene in the case only to oppose Rodriguezs Omnibus
Motion on the ground that the subject property is already registered in its name
under TCT No. 482970, which originated from Landichos TCT No. 167681. And
fourth, after learning of Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098
via the November 3, 2006 subpoena issued by the RTC, PCCAI was reasonably
expected to oppose the same. Such action was the most opportune and expedient
remedy available to PCCAI to prevent the RTC from ordering the issuance of a
decree of registration and OCT in Rodriguezs name. For this reason, the RTC should
have allowed the intervention of PCCAI.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ABEL DIAZ

G.R. No. 200882, June 13, 2013
J. Leonardo-de Castro

In the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or

misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have
affected the result of the case, the trial courts findings on the matter of credibility
of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal.

FACTS:

The accused was charged under an information with the crime of rape, to
which he pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment. The evidence for the prosecution
showed that the offended party, 17-year old Mara, and the accused were neighbors
as they both resided at X Compound, Y Subdivision, Barangay Z, Tarlac City. Mara
was living alone in a studio-type unit beside the house of her elder sister, Ditse,
while the accused-appellant lived five houses or some 30 meters away. One night,
at around 3:00 in the morning, Mara was suddenly awakened when she felt
somebody on top of her. While the lights in her room were switched off, light coming
from outside illuminated her room and allowed her to recognize the then shirtless
accused as the intruder. She pushed the accused and shouted "Umalis ka sa harap
ko! Go away!" but she was not able to free herself as he held her hands and he was
straddling her. Despite her resistance, however, the accused-appellant was able to
raise her loose shirt and removed her panty. She continued to resist the advances of
the accused but to no avail. Weakened by her struggle, the accused was able to
penetrate her. The dastardly deed done, the accused-appellant stood up, wore his
pants and left. After a few minutes, she went to the house of Ditse to inform the
latter about what happened to her. They then went to the police station to report
the incident and later to the hospital for her medical examination

In his defense, the accused denied the accusation against him. He claimed
that, that evening, he attended the birthday party of a neighbor in the same X
Compound where he and Mara were both residing at that time. He drank liquor with
three other men at the party. They were drinking until around 1:00 in the morning of
the following day when and then went home drunk and slept.He woke up the next
day and drove his tricycle, and plied his ordinary route until around 5:00 in the
afternoon. When he returned home from driving, he was told that Ditse wanted to
see him. When he went to Ditses place, Ditse told him that Mara was raped and
that he was the culprit. The police soon arrived and brought the accused to the
police station where a sample of his pubic hair was taken and he was made to face
Mara.

The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape committed against Mara.The trial court found Maras testimony
meritorious as it was supported by the physical evidence, particularly the result of
her medical examination on the same day of the incident complained of. In
contrast, his alibi did not preclude the possibility of his presence at the place of the
crime at the time of its commission.

The accused then appealed to the CA alleging that the trial court gave undue
credence to the testimony of Mara, particularly, that her identification of him was

contrary to human experience as she admitted that her room was dark and she was
not wearing her eyeglasses at the time of the alleged assault. However, the CA
rejected the contentions of the accused pointing out that the prosecution clearly
established the element of force or intimidation, denied the appeal of the accusedappellant and affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Mara.

RULING:

The appeal of the accused-appellant boils down to a question of credibility of

the prosecutions primary witness, the private complainant Mara. As a rule,
however, credibility is the sole province of the trial court. It is well-settled that:

When the issues revolve on matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of

fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on
said findings, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is so because
the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and
is in the best position to discern whether they are telling the truth. x x x.

In the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or

misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have
affected the result of the case, the trial courts findings on the matter of credibility
of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal. On the one hand, this judicial
deference is a recognition of the role of trial judges in fact-finding trial judges have
the unique opportunity of having the privilege of a front-row seat to observe firsthand the details of a testimony, the demeanor and deportment of witnesses, and
the drama during the trial. On the other hand, this is an acknowledgment by this
Court of the limitations of its review in appealed cases this Court stands outside
the trial court, is far-removed from the witness stand, and relies solely on the
records of the case.

Acutely aware of the Courts position as the last resort of litigants, we have
nevertheless carefully sifted through the records of this case but found nothing that
indicates to us that the trial and the appellate courts overlooked or failed to
appreciate facts that, if considered, would change the outcome of the case. Thus,
we uphold the Court of Appeals ruling that Mara made a clear and positive
identification of the accused-appellant as her sexual assaulter. The records bear this
out.

We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the prosecution sufficiently
proved the element of force or intimidation which attended the sexual assault
against Mara. It cannot be denied that the accused-appellant forcibly held,
repeatedly punched and violently ravished Mara. The injuries which she sustained in
the neck, thigh and genital areas, documented in the medico legal-report of the
examination conducted on the very same day her person was violated, trump
accused-appellants contrary claim. Weak and in pain, the repeated threats of being
stabbed coupled with the blows already inflicted on her, certainly intimidated Mara
and created a numbing fear in her mind that her assailant was capable of hurting
her more and carrying out his threats.

We also affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals that Maras credibility was
not eroded by her testimony that the accused-appellant tarried for two hours in her
room. The Court of Appeals said it well: when one is being raped, forcibly held, weak
and in great pain, and in shock, she cannot be reasonably expected to keep a
precise track of the passage of time down to the last minute. Indeed, for a woman
undergoing the ordeal that Mara underwent in the hands of the accused-appellant,
every moment is like an eternity of hell and the transit of time is a painfully slow
crawl that she would rather forget. In addition, the precise duration of the rape is
not material to and does not negate the commission of the felony. Rape has no
regard for time and place. It has been committed in all manner of situations and in
circumstances thought to be inconceivable.

As regards his defenses, the accused-appellants denial and alibi crumble in

the face of his positive identification by Mara. In particular, his alibi is worthless as
his presence at a mere 30 meters away from the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission definitely does not constitute a physical impossibility for him to be at
Maras room at the time of the rape. On the contrary, it is in fact an implied
admission that there is facility of access for the accused-appellant to be at the place
where the crime happened when it happened.

PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC. v. LEANDRO LEGASPI

G.R. No. 202791, June 10, 2013
J. Mendoza

The CA, therefore, could grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the
NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution, committed grave abuse of discretion by
capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material to or
decisive of the controversy; and it cannot make this determination without looking
into the evidence of the parties.

FACTS:

Respondent was employed on board the vessel Azamara Journey under the
employment of petitioner. He was covered by a CBA whereinit was agreed that the
company shall pay a maximum disability compensation of up to $60,000.00 only.
While on board the vessel, the respondent suffered cardiac arrest and was treated
by the ships doctor. However, he was later repatriated to receive further medical
treatment and examination. Respondent then filed a complaint for full and
permanent disability compensation against petitioner before the LA.

The LA ruled in favor of respondent and ordered the petitioner to pay to the
former the disability compensationamounting to US$81,320.00 plus and additional
10% for charges. Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed the decision of the LA to the
NLRC, which affirmed said decision in its resolution.

When the decision became final and executory on September 5, 2010, a

hearing for the motion for execution was conducted, wherein petitioner paidto
respondent US$81,320.00 on October 22, 2010, the balance to be paid on the next
hearing. Petitioner timely filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on November 8,
2010; meanwhile, the LA issued a writ of execution on March 2, 2011.However, the
CA, unaware of the finality of the LA decision and the writ of execution issued,
granted the petition for certiorari and modified the resolutions of the NLRC,awarding
only US$60,000.00 pursuant to the CBA.

Petitioner then filed a motion to amend dispositive portion, submitting to the

CA the writ of execution issued by the LA, and contending that it was entitled to a
return of its excess payment. In its resolution, the CA denied the motion and ruled
that the petition should have been dismissed for being moot and academic not only
because the decision had becomefinal and executory but also because the
judgment had been satisfied even before the filing of the petition for certiorari.
Hence, this appeal under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the finality of the NLRC judgment rendered the petition for
certiorari moot before the CA.

RULING:

Petition for Certiorari is not moot.

Section 14, Rule VII of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure provides that
decisions, resolutions or orders of the NLRC shall become final and executory after
ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties, and entry of judgment
shall be made upon the expiration of the said period. In St. Martin Funeral Home v.
NLRC, however, it was ruled that judicial review of decisions of the NLRC may be
sought via a petition for certiorari before the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court;
and under Section 4 thereof, petitioners are allowed sixty (60) days from notice of
the assailed order or resolution within which to file the petition. Hence, in cases
where a petition for certiorari is filed after the expiration of the 10-day period under
the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure but within the 60-day period under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, the CA can grant the petition and modify, nullify and reverse a
decision or resolution of the NLRC.

Accordingly, in this case, although the petition for certiorari was not filed
within the 10-day period, petitioner timely filed it before the CA within the 60-day
reglementary period under Rule 65. It has, thus, been held that the CAs review of
the decisions or resolutions of the NLRC under Rule 65, particularly those which
have already been executed, does not affect their statutory finality, considering that
Section 4, Rule XI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, provides that a petition for

certiorari filed with the CA shall not stay the execution of the assailed decision
unless a restraining order is issued. In Leonis Navigation, it was further written:

The CA, therefore, could grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the
NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution, committed grave abuse of discretion by
capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material to or
decisive of the controversy; and it cannot make this determination without looking
into the evidence of the parties. Necessarily, the appellate court can only evaluate
the materiality or significance of the evidence, which is alleged to have been
capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarded by the NLRC, in relation to all
other evidence on record. Notably, if the CA grants the petition and nullifies the
decision or resolution of the NLRC on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the decision or resolution of the NLRC is,
in contemplation of law, null and void ab initio; hence, the decision or resolution
never became final and executory.

KAPISANANG PANGKAUNLARAN NG KABABAIHANG POTRERO, INC. and MILAGROS

H. REYES v. REMEDIOS BARRENO, LILIBETH AMETIN, DRANREV F. NONAY, FREDERICK
D. DIONISIO and MARITES CASIO
G.R. No. 175900, June 10, 2013
What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the
vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or
administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered by different fora upon the same issues.
FACTS:

Respondents, as employees of petitioner,filed a complaint before the DOLE for, among

others, underpayment of wages, and non-payment of labor standard benefits. During its
pendency, however, respondent Barreno received a memo from petitioner Reyes terminating
her from her employment, which resulted in the filing of another complaint for illegal dismissal by
the former with the NLRC. When the remainder of the respondents were also informed of their
termination, they filed a complaint with the NLRC, which was subsequently consolidated with
Barrenos complaint.
Petitioners, in their Position Paper dated November 29, 2001, alleged that respondents
committed forum shopping when they filed the NLRC CASE during the pendency of the DOLE
CASE. Such was denied by respondents in their reply dated December 19, 2001, explaining
that the DOLE CASE referred only to money claims and that it it had already been withdrawn,
while the NLRC CASE involves the complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims.Meanwhile,
respondents filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint dated December 18, 2001 with regard to the
DOLE CASE after having instituted the NLRC CASE. Records, however, show that the said
motion was left unresolved.

The LA found the respondents did not commit forum shopping, holding that the
subsequent dismissal of the respondents affected the jurisdiction of the DOLE-NCR since illegal
dismissal cases are beyond the latters jurisdiction.Necessarily therefore, the case for money
claims pending before the DOLE-NCR had to be consolidated with the illegal dismissal case
before the NLRC. Upon appeal to the NLRC, the ruling of the LA was set aside and found that
the respondents were guilty of forum shopping in filing the same complaint against petitioners in
two fora, namely the DOLE and the NLRC. On appeal, the CA agreed with the NLRC that
respondents committed forum shopping in seeing their money claims before the DOLE and
NLRC. Both parties moved for reconsideration which the CA denied, hence this appeal under
Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in finding respondents guilty of forum shopping.

RULING:
At the outset, the Court finds that contrary to the findings of both the NLRC and the CA,
respondents are not guilty of forum shopping. Thus, considering that the NLRC did not resolve
the appeal on the merits but instead dismissed the case based on a finding of forum shopping,
the Court concurs in the result arrived at by the CA in remanding the cases for illegal dismissal
to the NLRC for resolution of the appeal.
Forum shopping exists "when one party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same
essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or
already resolved adversely, by some other court." What is truly important to consider in determining
whether it exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different
courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered by different fora upon the same issues.

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, respondents did not commit forum
shopping. Clearly, there is no identity of causes of action between the cases pending with the
DOLE and the NLRC. The DOLE CASE involved violations of labor standard provisions where
an employer-employee relationship exists. On the other hand, the NLRC CASE questioned the
propriety of respondents' dismissal. No less than the Labor Code provides for these two (2)
separate remedies for distinct causes of action. More importantly, at the time the DOLE CASE
was initiated, respondents' only, cause of action was petitioners' violation of labor standard laws
which falls within the jurisdiction of the DOLE. It was only after the same was filed that
respondents were dismissed from employment, prompting the filing of the NLRC CASE, which
is within the mantle of the NLRC's jurisdiction. Under the foregoing circumstances, respondents
had no choice but to avail of different fora.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE ARMANDO CERVANTES CACHUELA and
BENJAMIN JULIAN CRUZ IBANEZ, Accused.
BENJAMIN JULIAN CRUZ IBANEZ, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 191752, June 10, 2013
Out-of-court identifications, when the same is not supported by detailed narrations,
cannot be given weight. For no way exists for the courts to evaluate the factors used in
determining the admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications, such as the level of

certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; the length of time between the crime
and the identification; and the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. The absence of
an independent in-court identification by Zaldy additionally justifies our strict treatment and
assessment of Linos testimony.
That being said, there can be conviction if the prosecution can establish the appellants
participation in the crime through credible and sufficient circumstantial evidence that leads to
the inescapable conclusion that the accused, and none other, committed the imputed crime,
and such was done in this case.
FACTS:
The accused in this case was charged with the crimof robbery with homicide under an information
to which they pleaded not guilty upon their arraignment. At the NBI Main Office, Zaldy pointed to the
appellants, during a police line-up, as the persons responsible for the robbery at WSC and for the killing
of Rex. Nabilgas also executed a handwritten confession implicating the appellants and Zaldy in the
crime.Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

After trial, the RTC found both the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide. They then filed an appeal before the CA, but
the same was denied. The CA held that pieces of circumstantial evidence showed that the
appellants robbed WSC and killed Rex during the course of this robbery, and ruled that the
totality of these circumstances point to the appellants as the perpetrators of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide. It disregarded the appellants defenses of alibi, denial and
frame-up for being self-serving. The CA likewise found unmeritorious the appellants argument
that the firearms confiscated from them were inadmissible in evidence, pointing out that the
seizures were the result of lawful entrapment operations. It further held that the appellants failed
to impute any ill or improper motive against the police officers who conducted the entrapment
operations. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court correctly convicted both the accused of the crime charged.
RULING:
Admissibility of the out-of-court identification and the extrajudicial confession
Lino testified that Zaldy identified the appellants as the persons involved in the robbery of WSC
and in the killing of Rex in a police line-up held at the NBI Main Office on Taft Avenue, Manila. We note
that Zaldy did not testify in court since he was brought to the National Center for Mental Health, and
subsequently died there during the trial. For this reason, we examine with greater scrutiny Linos
testimony regarding Zaldys alleged out-of-court identification.

People v. Algarme explains the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to
determine its admissibility, as follows:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done
thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face-to-face with the witness for
identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to
identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect
from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving the admissibility of

and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of
circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness'
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description, given by the witness; (4)
the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of
time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.
In the present case, Lino merely stated that Zaldy, during a police line-up, identified the
appellants as the persons involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex. Lino did not
state when the line-up took place; how this line-up had been conducted; who were the persons
in the line-up with the appellants (if there were indeed other persons included in the line-up);
and whether the line-up was confined to persons of the same height and built as the appellants.
Lino likewise did not indicate who accompanied Zaldy before and during the line-up, and
whether there had been the possibility of prior or contemporaneous improper insinuations on
Zaldy regarding the appearance of the appellants. To our mind, Linos failure to state relevant
details surrounding the police line-up is a glaring omission that renders unreliable Zaldys out-ofcourt identification. No way exists for the courts to evaluate the factors used in determining the
admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications, such as the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. The absence of an
independent in-court identification by Zaldy additionally justifies our strict treatment and
assessment of Linos testimony.
The records also bear out that Nabilgas executed an extrajudicial confession at the NBI
Main Office, where he implicated the appellants and Zaldy in the crime charged. During trial, he
repudiated this confession, and claimed that he had been tortured by the NBI agents, and that
he was forced to copy a previously prepared statement.
After a careful examination of the evidence on hand, we hold that Nabilgas extrajudicial
confession is inadmissible in evidence. The Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial
confession, to be admissible, must satisfy the following requirements: "(1) the confession must
be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel,
preferably of the confessant's choice; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing."
We point out that Nabilgas was already under custodial investigation by the authorities
when he executed the alleged written confession. "A custodial investigation is understood x x x
as x x x any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. x x x It begins
when there is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and the investigation has
started to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts
interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.
After a close reading of the records, we rule that Nabilgas confession was not made
with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel. The services of Atty. Melita Go,
the lawyer who acted in Nabilgas behalf, were provided by the very same agency investigating
Nabilgas the NBI itself; she was assigned the task despite Nabilgas open declaration to the
agencys investigators that he already had a lawyer in the person of Atty. Donardo Paglinawan.
Atty. Paglinawan confirmed this fact when he stated that he was already representing Nabilgas
at the time his client made the alleged confession. Nabilgas also testified that Atty. Go did not
disclose that she was a lawyer when she was called to assist him; she merely represented

herself to be a mere witness to the confession. There was also nothing in the records to show
that Atty. Go ascertained whether Nabilgas confession was made voluntarily, and whether he
fully understood the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession and its impact
on his constitutional rights.
To be sure, this is not the kind of assistance required of lawyers in a custodial
investigation. "An effective and vigilant counsel necessarily and logically requires that the
lawyer be present and be able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant
answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial
confession." In addition, the extrajudicial confession of Nabilgas was not corroborated by a
witness who was present at the time the written confession was made. We note in this regard
that the prosecution did not present Atty. Go at the witness stand despite hints made during the
early stages of the trial that she would be presented.
At any rate, Nabilgas extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against the
appellants in view of the res inter alios acta rule. This rule provides that the rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is not admissible against his or
her co-accused because it is considered as hearsay against them.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This provision states that the act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy, and during its existence, may be given in evidence
against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or
her co-conspirators, it is necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other
than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to the common object; and (c) it has been
made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
This exception, however, does not apply in the present case since there was no other
piece of evidence presented, aside from the extrajudicial confession, to prove that Nabilgas
conspired with the appellants in committing the crime charged. Conspiracy cannot be presumed
and must be shown as distinctly and conclusively as the crime itself. Nabilgas, in fact, was
acquitted by the trial court due to insufficiency of evidence to prove his participation in the crime.
Sufficiency of the proven circumstantial evidence

In view of the inadmissibility of Zaldys out-of-court identification and Nabilgas

extrajudicial confession, the prosecutions case rests purely on circumstantial evidence.
Conviction can be secured "on the basis of circumstantial evidence if the established
circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion proving
that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others." There can be
conviction if the prosecution can establish the appellants participation in the crime through
credible and sufficient circumstantial evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion that the
accused, and none other, committed the imputed crime.
"Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from
which the main fact in issue may be inferred based on reason and common experience. Under
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if the following requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the
facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; and (c) the combination of

all the circumstances unavoidably leads to a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. These
circumstances must be consistent with one another, and the only rational hypothesis that can be
drawn therefrom must be the guilt of the accused."
In our view, no doubt exists, based on the appellants' actions, that their primary objective
was to rob WSC, and that the killing of Rex was done on occasion, or by reason, of the robbery:
first, Ibaez went to WSC on July 23, 2004, and inquired from Henessy about the schedule and
the rates of the firing range, the amount of the membership fee of the companys gun club, the
days when there are many people in the firing range, and whether she was the only female
employee of the company; second, when Henessy arrived at WSC at 9:00 a.m. on July 26,
2004, Zaldy informed her that he cannot open the front door because his hands were tied; third,
Henessy called the companys operations manager and informed him that Zaldy had been tied;
fourth, the police saw Zaldy handcuffed to the vault when they opened the back gate; fifth, the
police saw the lifeless body of Rex lying on the floor with several gunshot wounds when they
entered the firing range; sixth, the operations manager discovered that 53 guns and several
ammunitions had been missing from the gun store, including a .9 mm Bernardelli with serial
number T1102-03E000151 and a .45 Glock 30 with serial number FML 245; seventh, the NBI
agents caught Cachuela trying to sell the .9 mm Bernardelli with serial number T110203E000151 in an entrapment operation in Cavite; eighth, the NBI agents caught Ibaez trying to
sell the .45 Glock 30 with serial number FML 245 and a .45 Llama with serial number 04490Z in
a follow-up entrapment operation in Cavite; ninth, Cachuela and Ibaez were unable to explain
how they came into possession of the stolen firearms; tenth, Police Inspector Armin Austria, the
PNP Forensic Firearm Examiner, found that the 98 pieces of .45 fired cartridge cases found at
the crime scene were fired from the .45 Llama with serial number 04490Z recovered from
Ibaez;27 and finally, Dr. Nulud conducted an autopsy on the body of Rex, and found that the
victim suffered several gunshot wounds on the head, thorax, and abdomen caused by a .45
pistol.
From these established circumstances, the overriding intention of the appellants cannot
but be to rob WSC; the killing of Rex was merely incidental to the robbery. "Intent to rob is an
internal act, but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of personal property." Rex
was killed to facilitate the robbery; he was also the person who would have been a witness to
the crime. In People v. De Leon, we held that "homicide is said to have been committed by
reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed (a) to facilitate the
robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c)
to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the
commission of the crime."
In this regard, we cannot overlook the fact that another WSC employee Zaldy was
not killed, but merely tied to the vault. The Court cannot second-guess on what could have been
behind the malefactors decision to spare Zaldys life, but we note that Zaldy became one of the
accused in this case after the Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict him in
the crime, as the robbery could have been the result of an "inside job." Unfortunately, Zaldy was
unable to testify during trial since the RTC ordered that he be brought to the National Center for
Mental Health for treatment. Accordingly, Nabilgas extrajudicial confession (which we ruled to
be inadmissible) was the only evidence linking Zaldy to the crime. For lack of evidence, we
cannot make any definite conclusion and can only speculate on Zaldys involvement in the crime
charged.
We find it worthy to stress that the appellants failed to overcome the disputable
presumption that "a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent

wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act." To recall, Ibaez was at WSC two days
before the robbery, asking questions to the companys secretary. Several days after the robbery,
the appellants were caught trying to sell firearms that were reported stolen from WSC in
separate entrapment operations; they could not satisfactorily explain how and why these guns
came to their respective possession. The appellants likewise did not impute ill motive on the
part of the arresting officers that would impel the latter to fabricate evidence against them.
These factors lead to no other conclusion than that the appellants, to the exclusion of others,
had robbed WSC.
To our mind, the fact that the cartridge bullet shells found at the firing range (where the
lifeless body of Rex had been discovered) matched with one of the guns recovered from Ibaez
during the entrapment operation clinches the case against the appellants insofar as establishing
the nexus between the robbery and the victims killing. Notably, the gunshot wounds suffered by
Rex also came from the same caliber of gun recovered from Ibaez. In the final analysis, the
prosecution sufficiently established the direct and intimate connection between the robbery and
the killing, and that the death of Rex had been committed by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery. When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who
took part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and
indivisible felony of robbery with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the killing,
unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same.
VALBUECO, INC. v. PROVINCE OF BATAAN, represented by its Provincial Governor
ANTONIO ROMAN; EMMANUEL M. AQUINO, in his official capacity as Registrar of the
Register of Deeds of Balanga, Bataan; and PASTOR P. VICHUACO, in his official capacity
as Provincial Treasurer of Balanga, Bataan
G.R. No. 173829, June 10, 2013
J. Peralta
The "equiponderance of evidence" rule states that when the scale shall stand upon an
equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the
court will find for the defendant. Under this principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his
evidence and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim; even if the evidence of the plaintiff
may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his side if
such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action.
FACTS:
Petitioner was the owner of eight parcels of land situated in Bagac, Bataan. However, due to his
unpaid real property taxes, the abovementioned properties were sold at public auction whereby
respondent emerged as the winning bidder. Years later, petitioner filed a complaint to nullify the sale and
the consolidation of title and ownership in favor of respondent province, and to reconvey the possession,
title and ownership of the subject properties, alleging that a distraint of personalty should have been first
made by the provincial Treasurer.
In its answer, the respondent averred that distraint of personal property is not a condition sine qua
non before real property could be distraint. And since the subject lots were placed under the coverage of
the CARP and distributed to qualified beneficiaries under RA 6657, the beneficiaries and the DAR
Secretary were impleaded as additional defendants in the amended complaint filed by petitioner. In their
answer the beneficiaries moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the ground that the petitioners
claim states no cause of action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to the filing of the case.
Likewise, the DAR Secretary sought the dismissal of the amended complaint, arguing that the RTC has

no jurisdiction over DAR, since the relief prayed for was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB.
The trial court thus dismissed the amended complaint.
Petitioner then elevated the case to the CA, but the same was dismissed, the RTC decision being
affirmed.Hence, this present petition under Rule 45.

ISSUE:
Whether or not notices of the sale were properly sent to the petitioner.
RULING:
Under Section 73 of PD 464 x x x notices of the sale at public auction may be sent to the
delinquent taxpayer, either (i) at the address as shown in the tax rolls or property tax record cards of the
municipality or city where the property is located or (ii) at his residence, if known to such treasurer or
barrio captain. Plainly, Section 73 gives the treasurer the option of where to send the notice of sale. In
giving the treasurer the option, nowhere in the wordings is there an indication of a requirement that notice
must actually be received by the intended recipient. Compliance by the treasurer is limited to strictly
following the provisions of the statute: he may send it at the address of the delinquent taxpayer as shown
in the tax rolls or tax records or to the residence if known by him or the barrio captain.
In this case, it is reasonable to deduce that respondent Provincial Treasurer actually sent the
notices at the address uniformly indicated in TCT No. 47377, 47378, 47379, 47380, 47381, 47382, 47385
and 47386, as well as in the tax declarations, which is 7th Floor, Bank of P.I. Bldg., Ayala Avenue, Makati,
Rizal. The fault herein lies with petitioner, not with respondent Provincial Treasurer. It had a number of
years to amend its address and provide a more updated and reliable one. By neglecting to do so, it
should be aware of the chances it was taking should notices be sent to it. Respondent Provincial
Treasurer cannot be faulted for presumably sending the notices to petitioners address indicated in the
land titles and tax declarations of the subject properties.
The principle We enunciated in Valencia v. Jimenez, Camo v. Riosa Boyco, and Requiron v.
Sinaban that there can be no presumption of regularity of any administrative action which results in
depriving a taxpayer of his property through a tax sale does not apply in the case at bar. By and large,
these cases cited by petitioner involved facts that are way too different from the one found in the instant
case. More importantly, in the present case, respondent Province, through its witness, Josephine Espino,
unequivocally attested that the procedural requisites mandated by PD 464 were definitely observed.
During her presentation, Espino stated that she is a Local Treasury Operation Officer IV of the Provincial
Treasurers Office since March 2000 and that she had previously served as Local Treasury Operations
Officer and Local Revenue Collection Officer III of the Provincial Treasurers Office, being in charge of
collecting taxes. Under oath, she declared to have personal knowledge of the fact that notice of tax
delinquency was sent by the Provincial Treasurers Office to petitioner. She could not, however, show any
documentary proof mainly because the exclusive folder of petitioners properties are now missing despite
exercise of all possible means to locate them in other property files. Considering the long time that
elapsed between the public sale held sometime in 1987 or 1988 and the presentation of her testimony in
2002, it is also understandable that Espino could no longer remember the minute details surrounding the
notices, publication, and posting that respondent Provincial Treasurer observed relative to the auction
sale of the subject properties.

The Court, therefore, affirms the RTCs opinion that petitioner was not able to establish
its cause of action for its failure to submit convincing evidence to establish a case and the CAs
position that it must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of
respondents claim. Indeed, in Sapu-an v. Court of Appeals, We held:

The general rule in civil cases is that the party having the burden of proof must establish
his case by a preponderance of evidence. By "preponderance of evidence" is meant that the
evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other.
In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues
involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts on
which they are testifying, the nature of such facts, the probability or improbability of their
testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility as far as the same
may legitimately appear at the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses,
although the preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number.
It is settled that matters of credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge who is in a
better position than the appellate court to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of the
testimonies of witnesses who have personally appeared before him.
What petitioner has accomplished is only to cast doubts by capitalizing on the absence
of documentary evidence on the part of respondents. While such approach would succeed if
carried out by the accused in criminal cases, plaintiffs in civil cases need to do much more to
overturn findings of fact and credibility by the trial court, especially when the same had been
affirmed by the CA. It must be stressed that overturning judgments in civil cases should be
based on preponderance of evidence, and with the further qualification that, when the scales
shall stand upon an equipoise, the court should find for the defendant. The "equiponderance of
evidence" rule states that when the scale shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in
the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant.
Under this principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the
weakness of the defendant's claim; even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than
that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is
insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action.
BENIGNO M. VIGILLA, ALFONSO M. BONGOT, ROBERTO CALLESA, LINDA C. CALLO,
NILO B. CAMARA, ADELIA T. CAMARA, ADOLFO G. PINON, JOHN A. FERNANDEZ,
FEDERICO A. CALLO, MAXIMA P. ARELLANO, JULITO B. COST ALES, SAMSON F.
BACHAR, EDWIN P. DAMO, RENA TO E. FERNANDEZ, GENARO F.CALLO, JIMMY C.
ALETA, and EUGENIO SALINAS v. PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF CRIMINOLOGY INC. and/or
GREGORY ALAN F. BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 200094, June 10, 2013
J. Mendoza
It is the swearing of a person before the Notary Public and the latters act of signing and
affixing his seal on the deed that is material and not the submission of the notarial report.
Parties who appear before a notary public to have their documents notarized should not be
expected to follow up on the submission of the notarial reports. They should not be made to
suffer the consequences of the negligence of the Notary Public in following the procedures
prescribed by the Notarial Law. Such notarization gives prima facie evidence of the due
execution of the releases, waivers, and quitclaims; and since such were not refuted nor
disputed by complainants herein, thus, we have no recourse but to uphold their due execution.
FACTS:

Petitioners were hired as employees under the Maintenance Division of PCCr, but were under the
control and supervision of MBMSI, a private corporation engaged in providing janitorial services. Atty.
Seril is an officer of both corporations, as Senior Vice President for Administration of the former, and the
President and General Manager of the latter. Their corporations relations were terminated, however, by
PCCr when it learned that the certificate of incorporation of MBMSI has been revoked. Thuis resulted in
the termination of the petitioners from their employment.

Petitioners then filed a complaint against PCCr, its President Gregory Bautista, MBMSI,
and Atty. Seril, for illegal dismissal and payment of labor standard benefits. They alleged that
PCCr is their employer and not MBMSI, as the former was the one who hired them, which was
denied by PCCr in their answer. To support its claim, PCCr submitted releases, waivers, and
quitclaims executed by petitioners in favor of MBMSI. The LA rendered a decision directing the
PCCr to reinstate the petitioners with backpay, explaining that PCCr was actually the one which
exercised control over the means and methods of the work of the petitioner, thru Atty. Seril, who
was acting, throughout the time in his capacity as Senior Vice President for Administration of
PCCr, not in any way or time as the supposed employer/general manager or president of
MBMSI.
On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the LA was affirmed, but released the
respondents from liability by virtue of the releases, waivers, and quitclaims. The decision was
later modified, reinstating some of the complainants. As to those not reinstated a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 was then filed with the CA. However, the decision of the NLRC was still
upheld. Hence, this petition under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether the releases, waivers, and quitclaims executed are valid and enforceable.

RULING:
Petitioners had several opportunities to question the authenticity of the said documents but did
not do so. The records disclose that during the proceedings before the LA, PCCr submitted several
documents, including the subject releases, waivers and quitclaims executed on September 11, 2009 in
favor of MBMSI, but petitioners never put their genuineness and due execution at issue. These were
brought up again by the respondents in their Memorandum of Appeal, but again petitioners did not bother
to dispute them.

It was only after the NLRCs declaration in its February 11, 2011 Resolution that the
claims of petitioners had been settled amicably by virtue of the releases, waivers and quitclaims,
that petitioners, in their motion for reconsideration, denied having executed any of these
instruments. This passiveness and inconsistency of petitioners will not pass the scrutiny of this
Court.
Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts and this doctrine applies with
greater force in labor cases. Questions of fact are for the labor tribunals to resolve. Only errors
of law are generally reviewed in petitions for review on certiorari criticizing decisions of the CA.
Moreover, findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, are
generally conclusive on this Court. Hence, as correctly declared by the CA, the following NLRC
factual findings are binding and conclusive on this Court:
We noted that the individual quitclaims, waivers and releases executed by the
complainants showing that they received their separation pay from MBMSI were duly notarized

by a Notary Public. Such notarization gives prima facie evidence of their due execution. Further,
said releases, waivers, and quitclaims were not refuted nor disputed by complainants herein,
thus, we have no recourse but to uphold their due execution.
Even if the Court relaxes the foregoing rule, there is still no reason to reverse the factual
findings of the NLRC and the CA. What is on record is only the self-serving allegation of
petitioners that the releases, waivers and quitclaims were mere forgeries. Petitioners failed to
substantiate this allegation. As correctly found by the CA: "petitioners have not offered concrete
proof to substantiate their claim of forgery. Allegations are not evidence."
Petitioners requested the Court to take a look at such releases, waivers and quitclaims,
particularly their contents and the handwriting, but they failed to attach to the records copies of
the said documents which they claimed to have been forged. The petition is dismissible on this
ground alone. The Rules of Court require the petition to be accompanied by such material
portions of the record as would support the petition. Failure to comply with the requirements
regarding "the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition" is a ground
for the dismissal of the appeal.
Moreover, mere unsubstantiated allegations of lack of voluntariness in executing the
documents will not suffice to overcome the presumption of authenticity and due execution of a
duly notarized document. As correctly held by the NLRC, "such notarization gives prima facie
evidence of their due execution."
Petitioners contend that the alleged notarization of the releases, waivers and quitclaims
by one Atty. Ramil Gabao did not take place, because there were no records of such documents
in the Notary Section of Manila. Thus, the prima facie evidence thereof has been disputed.
The Court is not moved. Respondents should not be penalized for the failure of the
notary public to submit his Notarial Report. In Destreza v. Rinoza-Plazo, this Court stated that
"the notarized deed of sale should be admitted as evidence despite the failure of the Notary
Public in submitting his notarial report to the notarial section of the RTC Manila." The Court
expounded:
It is the swearing of a person before the Notary Public and the latters act of
signing and affixing his seal on the deed that is material and not the submission of the
notarial report. Parties who appear before a notary public to have their documents
notarized should not be expected to follow up on the submission of the notarial reports.
They should not be made to suffer the consequences of the negligence of the Notary
Public in following the procedures prescribed by the Notarial Law.
SURIGAO DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., and/or DANNY Z. ESCALANTE v.
TEOFILO GONZAGA
G.R. No. 187722, June 10, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the
dismissal is for a valid cause. Failing in which, the law considers the matter a case of illegal
dismissal. In this relation, the quantum of proof which the employer must discharge is
substantial evidence which, as defined in case law, means that amount of relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds,
equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.

FACTS:
Respondent was hired by petitioner SURNECO as its lineman, but was later assigned as
temporary teller at the latters sub-office in Gigaquit, Surigao del Norte. Petitioner Escalante ,
as General Manager of SURNECO, sent a memorandum to respondent, seeking an explanation
regarding his remittance shortages, and in the meantime, an investigation committee was
formed to investigate such matter.The Committee then tendered its report, finding the
respondent guilty of gross and habitual neglect and of misappropriation of funds. Respondent
sought reconsideration before SURNECOs BOD but the latter denied the same after he
presented his case. Consequently, he was dismissed from service. In view of the foregoing,
the respondent filed a complaint before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch for illegal
dismissal with payment of backwages including damages and attorneys fees, claiming that he
was denied due process and dismissed without just cause.
The LA rendered a decision finding that petitioners were unable to show that
respondents dismissal was just and valid and thus, ordered that the latter be reinstated to his
former position. The LA found that the alleged shortages in respondents remittances were not
proven since the actual receipts were not presented in evidence. Aggrieved, petitioners
elevated the matter to the NLRC, attaching an Audit Report by an independent CPA as
additional evidence.The NLRC then vacated the ruling of the LA, finding respondent to have
been dismissed for a just and valid cause. With respect to the imputed cash shortages, the
NLRC did not give credence to Gonzagas position in view of his general denial. In this light, the
NLRC faulted Gonzaga for not demanding the production and examination of the collection
receipts during the investigation proceedings, noting that the said omission meant that the
collection receipts would confirm the shortage. The decision was then appealed to the CA.
The CA reversed and set aside the NLRCs ruling, and instead reinstated the LAs
decision with modifications. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however,
denied by the CA. It held that the Summaries presented by petitioners remained insufficient as
they failed to establish the voluminous character of the official receipts evidencing the amount of
Gonzagas collections and remittances as to render them admissible under Section 3(c), Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. It also observed that apart from the fact that the September 15, 2003
Audit Report was belatedly filed with the NLRC eight months after Gonzaga had filed his
Comment to the Memorandum of Appeal, the said report was hearsay since the accountant who
prepared the said report was not presented to testify on its veracity. Hence, this petition under
Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents dismissal was just and valid.
RULING:
In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the dismissal is for a
valid cause. Failing in which, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal. In this relation, the
quantum of proof which the employer must discharge is substantial evidence which, as defined in case
law, means that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.

Applying the foregoing principles to this case, the Court finds that petitioners were able
to prove, by substantial evidence, that there lies a valid cause to terminate Gonzagas
employment.
The Court concurs with the NLRCs finding that petitioners evidence which consists of
the Collection Report, the Summaries, and the September 15, 2003 Audit Report with attached
Cash Flow Summary adequately supports the conclusion that Gonzaga misappropriated the
funds of the cooperative. The data indicated therein show gaping discrepancies between
Gonzagas collections and remittances, of which he was accountable for. In this accord, the
burden of evidence shifted to Gonzaga to prove that the reflected shortage was not attributable
to him. However, despite being allowed to peruse the bills and receipts on record together with
the assistance of an accountant and a counsel during the investigation proceedings, Gonzaga
could not reconcile the amounts of his collections and remittances and, instead, merely
interposed bare and general denials.
To note, petitioners could not be faulted for not presenting each and every bill or receipt
due to their voluminous character. Corollarily, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that
documents of such nature could indeed consist of multiple pages; likewise, it is clear that
petitioners only sought to establish a general result from the whole, i.e., the total cash shortage.
In this regard, the requirement that the offeror first establish the voluminous nature of the
evidence sought to be presented, as discussed in the CAs March 30, 2009 Resolution, is
dispensed with. Besides, technical rules of evidence are not strictly followed in labor cases47
and thus, their liberal application relaxes the same.
Neither does the lack of collection receipt numbers, as Gonzaga alleges, suffice to
exculpate him from the dismissal charges. This is because the said numbers had already been
supplied by petitioners through their eventual submission of the Cash Flow Summary which was
attached to the September 15, 2003 Audit Report. On this score, the Court observes that the CA
should have considered the foregoing documents as they corroborate the evidence presented
by the petitioners before the LA. Verily, labor tribunals, such as the NLRC, are not precluded
from receiving evidence submitted on appeal as technical rules are not binding in cases
submitted before them.48 In fact, labor officials should use every and reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law
or procedure, all in the interest of due process.
Also, it cannot be said that with the admission of the said evidence, Gonzaga would be
denied due process. Records show that he was furnished a copy of the Manifestation with the
attached audit report on September 23, 2003 and the NLRC only rendered a decision on August
31, 2004. This interim period gave him ample time to rebut the same; however, he failed to do
so.
Finally, the records are bereft of any showing that SURNECOs internal auditor was illmotivated when he audited Gonzaga. Thus, there lies no reason for the Court not to afford full
faith and credit to his report.
All told, considering the totality of circumstances in this case, the Court finds the
evidence presented by the petitioners, as opposed to the bare denial of Gonzaga, sufficient to
constitute substantial evidence to prove that he committed serious misconduct and gross and
habitual neglect of duty to warrant his dismissal from employment.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GLORIA CALUMBRES y AUDITOR

G.R. No. 194382, June 10, 2013

J. Perez
The solo performance by SPO1 Dela Victoria of all the acts necessary for the
prosecution of the offense is unexplained and puts the proof of corpus delicti, which is the illegal
object itself, in serious doubt. No definite answer can be established regarding the question as
to who possessed what from the time of the alleged apprehension until the trial of the case. We
are left in doubt whether or not the sachet of shabu allegedly seized from Calumbres was the
very same object offered in court as the corpus delicti, or if a sachet of anything was in fact
seized from Calumbres.SPO1 Dela Victorias claim that the sachet of shabu presented in court
was the same one confiscated from Calumbres, cannot be taken at its face value, solely on the
presumption of regularity of ones performance of duty.
FACTS:
The prosecution presented its lone witness SPO1 Dela Victoria who testified that on April 6, 2004,
an informant came to his office and reported that someone was selling shabu at Brgy. 31. He then hired a
faux-buyer and proceeded to the area the informant described. When he saw the faux-buyer hand
something to herein accused after receiving something from the latter, he immediately approached the
accused and introduced himself as the police. He took the money from the accused and retrieved the
suspected shabu from the faux-buyer. The accused was then brought to the office of Dela Victoria for
booking, where he claimed he recorded the incident in the police blotter, prepared a request for lab report
and took his photograph.
In her defense, the accused avers that she only met Dela Victoria when she was brought to the
police station at Precinct 2 in the Cogon Market because she snatched the wallet of a man. He promised
her release onlyif she would give him three cellphones, but she had none.The RTC convicted the accused
as charged, which was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:
SPO1 Dela Victorias credibility must be thoroughly looked into, being the lone arresting officer
who allegedly took custody of the confiscated shabu and the five twenty-peso bills supposedly used by
his poseur-buyer to buy the shabu from Calumbres. It did not escape us that while there were five 20peso bills used, only one of them was presented in court. SPO1 Dela Victoria also claimed to have taken
a photograph of the confiscated items but he failed to present it in court on the lame excuse that there
was no money to have the picture developed; and, alone, he inventoried these items without the
participation of the accused and in the absence of the authorities, in blatant disregard of Section 21,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

The details of SPO1 Dela Victorias testimony reveal lapses too, which, if connected,
cast reasonable doubt on the guilt of Calumbres. His informant never identified Calumbres as
the drug pusher; what his informant told him was that drug sale was ongoing at Sto. Nino, Brgy.
31, prompting him to hire a faux-buyer. At that time, the information was still unverified and the
seller of shabu unidentified. Without the informants details of who the pusher was, it was
incomprehensible how a poseur-buyer, randomly and instantly hired, would have been able to
identify Calumbres as the pusher.

A reading of the RTC decision on this matter reveals that the conviction was arrived at
upon reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of SPO1 Dela Victorias
official duty. It is noteworthy however, that presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions cannot by its lonesome overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Nothing less than evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt can erase the postulate of
innocence. And this burden is met not by placing in distrust the innocence of the accused but by
obliterating all doubts as to his culpability.
The solo performance by SPO1 Dela Victoria of all the acts necessary for the
prosecution of the offense is unexplained and puts the proof of corpus delicti, which is the illegal
object itself, in serious doubt. No definite answer can be established regarding the question as
to who possessed what from the time of the alleged apprehension until the trial of the case. We
are left in doubt whether or not the sachet of shabu allegedly seized from Calumbres was the
very same object offered in court as the corpus delicti, or if a sachet of anything was in fact
seized from Calumbres.
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 reads:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.
9165 reads:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that
the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.
SPO1 Dela Victorias claim that the sachet of shabu presented in court was the same
one confiscated from Calumbres, cannot be taken at its face value, solely on the presumption of
regularity of ones performance of duty. SPO1 Dela Victoria blatantly broke all the rules
established by law to safeguard the identity of a corpus delicti. To allow this to happen is to
abandon everything that has been said about the necessity of proving an unbroken chain of
custody of the corpus delicti.
AMANDO P. CONTES v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), VICTORY M.
FERNANDEZ, JULIO E. SUCGANG and NILO IGTANLOC

G.R. Nos. 187896-97, June 10, 2013

J. Perez
Appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43, in line with the
regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure.Jurisprudence accords a different treatment with respect to an appeal
in a criminal case filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and that remedy is to file with this
Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
FACTS:
Petitioner charged respondents with violation of Section 3(c) of RA 3019, or the Anti Graft and
Corrup Practices Act, claiming that respondents utilized a heavy equipment in levelling a portion of his
land and destroyed . The Ombudsman (Visayas), in its Consolidated Evaluation Report, recommended
the dismissal of the cases due to the fact that two other cases involving the same parties and issues had
already been filed by petitioner. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Report but the same was
denied by the Ombudsman (Visayas).
Petitioner then filed an appeal directly to the SC, via a petition for review on certiorari, pursuant to
Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act, assailing the denial of his motion for reconsideration. He refutes the
finding of the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) that he had filed a similar administrative and criminal
complaint against respondents. In their Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General seeks the dismissal
of the petition because the petitioner availed of the wrong remedy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman erred in dismissing the petitioners complaints.

RULING:
Petitioner, in filing this petition for review, committed a procedural misstep which
warrants an outright dismissal.
Petitioner misconstrued Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and
disregarded prevailing jurisprudence. Section 27 provides, in part, that:

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten
(10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
This provision, insofar as it provided for appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 from the
decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, had been declared
unconstitutional by this Court as early as in the case of Fabian v. Desierto. We ruled in Fabian
that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases
should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43, in line with the
regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Jurisprudence accords a different treatment with respect to an appeal in a criminal case
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. We made the pronouncement in Acua v. Deputy

Ombudsman for Luzon that the remedy of an aggrieved party in criminal complaints before the
Ombudsman is to file with this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Considering that the case at bar was a consolidation of an administrative and a criminal
complaint, petitioner had the option to either file a petition for review under Rule 43 with the
Court of Appeals or directly file a certiorari petition under Rule 65 before this Court. Neither of
these two remedies was resorted to by petitioner. By availing of a wrong remedy, this petition
merits an outright dismissal.
ALBERTO PAT-OG, SR. v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 198755, June 5, 2013
J. Mendoza
Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject
matter at the same time by two or more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon a
government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be
presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise
vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over
the matter. Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes
cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.
FACTS:
Robert Bang-on, a 14-year old second year high school student, filed an affidavit-complaint
against petitioner, a third year high school teacher of the same school, before the Civil Service
Commission-CAR, because the former was punched in the stomach without warning for failure to follow
instructions. A criminal case for the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries was also filed by Bang-on with
the RTC for the same incident. In his defense, petitioner averred that he did not punch Bang-on but
merely scolded the class for failure to follow instructions.
The CSC-CAR, finding the existence of a prima facie case for misconduct, formally charged
petitioner, and after due hearing, found petitioner guilty of Simple Misconduct. While the proceedings of
the administrative case were ongoing, the RTC rendered judgment in the criminal case and found
petitioner guilty of slight physical injuries.
Upon appeal to the CSC, the decision of the CSC-CAR was affirmed and perpetually disqualified
him from employment. In his motion for reconsideration, he questioned for the first time the jurisdiction of
the CSC over the case, contending that administrative harges against a public school teacher should
have been initially heard by a committee to be constituted pursuant to the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers. However, the same was denied by the CSC, ruling that petitioner was estopped from
challenging its jurisdiction considering he actively participated in the administrative proceedings against
him.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA, which affirmed the CSC decision. The motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner was likewise denied, prompting petitioner to file this appeal under Rule
45.

ISSUE:
Whether the CSC has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

The petitioners argument that the administrative case against him can only proceed
under R.A. No. 4670 is misplaced.
In Puse v. Santos-Puse, it was held that the CSC, the Department of Education (DepEd)
and the Board of Professional Teachers-Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) have
concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers.
Under Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the CSC is the body charged with the
establishment and administration of a career civil service which embraces all branches and
agencies of the government. Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (the Administrative Code of 1987)
and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines) expressly
provide that the CSC has the power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases
instituted with it or brought to it on appeal. Thus, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of
the government, has the inherent power to supervise and discipline all members of the civil
service, including public school teachers.
Indeed, under Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670, the jurisdiction over administrative cases of
public school teachers is lodged with the investigating committee constituted therein. Also,
under Section 23 of R.A. No. 7836 (the Philippine Teachers Professionalization Act of 1994), the
Board of Professional Teachers is given the power, after due notice and hearing, to suspend or
revoke the certificate of registration of a professional teacher for causes enumerated therein.
Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject
matter at the same time by two or more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon a
government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be
presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise
vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over
the matter.
Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes
cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. In this
case, it was CSC which first acquired jurisdiction over the case because the complaint was filed
before it. Thus, it had the authority to proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the
DepEd and the Board of Professional Teachers.
In CSC v. Alfonso, it was held that special laws, such as R.A. No. 4670, do not divest the
CSC of its inherent power to supervise and discipline all members of the civil service, including
public school teachers. Pat-og, as a public school teacher, is first and foremost, a civil servant
accountable to the people and answerable to the CSC for complaints lodged against him as a
public servant. To hold that R.A. No. 4670 divests the CSC of its power to discipline public
school teachers would negate the very purpose for which the CSC was established and would
impliedly amend the Constitution itself.
To further drive home the point, it was ruled in CSC v. Macud that R.A. No. 4670, in
imposing a separate set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative
proceedings against public school teachers, should be construed to refer only to the specific
procedure to be followed in administrative investigations conducted by the DepEd. By no
means, then, did R.A. No. 4670 confer an exclusive disciplinary authority over public school
teachers on the DepEd.

At any rate, granting that the CSC was without jurisdiction, the petitioner is indeed
estopped from raising the issue. Although the rule states that a jurisdictional question may be
raised at any time, such rule admits of the exception where, as in this case, estoppel has
supervened. Here, instead of opposing the CSCs exercise of jurisdiction, the petitioner invoked
the same by actively participating in the proceedings before the CSC-CAR and by even filing his
appeal before the CSC itself; only raising the issue of jurisdiction later in his motion for
reconsideration after the CSC denied his appeal. This Court has time and again frowned upon
the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. HEIRS OF SPOUSES DIONISIO DELOY and PRAXEDES
MARTONITO, represented by POLICARPIO DELOY
G.R. No. 192893, June 5, 2013
J. Mendoza
First level courts are clothed with the power to preliminarily resolve questions on the
ownership of real property, if necessary, to arrive at the proper and complete determination of
the question on physical possession or possession de facto. Thus, as correctly ruled by the CA,
the MTCC should have taken cognizance of the complaint as it was well within its jurisdiction to
do so. Moreover, considering that B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, has distinctly defined and granted
the MTCC with jurisdiction, it is the trial courts duty and obligation to exercise the same when
properly invoked.
FACTS:
Respondents are the owners of the subject land in Trece Martires, Cavite by virtue of succession.
Their predecessor-in-interest Dionisio donated a portion thereof to the Communications and Electricity
Development Authority (CEDA) for the latter to provide cheap and affordable electric supply to the
province of Cavite.CEDA then sold to MERALCO, its electric distribution system, transformers,
accessories, poles, hardware, wires, etc. necessary for the latter to provide electrical service in Cavite.
Thereafter, MERALCO occupied the subject land.
The respondents then offered the land for sale to MERALCO, but their offer was rejected. Thus,
they demanded MERALCO to vacate the premises, but since the latter failed to heed their demand, a
complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by the former with the MTCC.
The MTCC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction
over the case. Aggrieved, the respondents then appealed the case before the RTC, which however,
affirmed the decision of the MTCC. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the RTC, the
respondents then elevated the case before the CA via a petition under Rule 42.In its decision, the CA set
aside the RTC ruling and accordingly granted the complaint for unlawful detainer against MERALCO.
Hence, this petition under Rule 45.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the MTCC has jurisdiction over the complaint for unlawful detainer.
RULING:
MERALCO contends that respondents complaint failed to make out a case for unlawful
detainer but, rather, one incapable of pecuniary estimation, properly cognizable by the RTC and

not the MTCC. It stresses the allegations in the complaint involve a prior determination on the
issue of ownership before the issue of possession can be validly resolved.
This contention fails to persuade.
When the issue of ownership is raised in an ejectment case, the first level courts are not
ipso facto divested of its jurisdiction. Section 33 (2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, provides:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer:
Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in
his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue
of possession.
xxxx
In this regard, Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court allows the first level courts, in
ejectment cases, to provisionally determine the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of
resolving the issue of physical possession.
Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership.When the defendant raises the defense of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession.
Accordingly, it is unquestionably clear that the first level courts are clothed with the
power to preliminarily resolve questions on the ownership of real property, if necessary, to arrive
at the proper and complete determination of the question on physical possession or possession
de facto. Thus, as correctly ruled by the CA, the MTCC should have taken cognizance of the
complaint as it was well within its jurisdiction to do so. Moreover, considering that B.P. Blg. 129,
as amended, has distinctly defined and granted the MTCC with jurisdiction, it is the trial courts
duty and obligation to exercise the same when properly invoked.
SPOUSES RUBIN AND PORTIA HOJAS
v. PHILIPPINE AMANAH BANK AND RAMON KUE
G.R. No. 193453, June 5, 2013
J. Mendoza
Through estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying on it. This
doctrine is based on the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith, and justice and its
purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act, representations or commitments to the
injury of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied on it. Thus, in order for this
doctrine to operate, a representation must have been made to the detriment of another who

relied on it. In other words, estoppel would not lie against one who, in the first place, did not
make any representation.
FACTS:
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they obtained a loan from respondent bank
secured by a mortgage that covered both real and personal properties. Loan payments were
made, which, however, were not properly recorded by the respondent. For the failure of the
petitioner to pay the loan, the respondent applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgaged real properties of petitioner, whereby the bank emerged as the highest bidder in the
public auction. Petitioners further alleged that the bank wrote their son regarding the extension
of the redemption period given them under the banks incentive scheme; but despite such letter,
the bank sold the properties in a public bidding.
In the said bidding, the properties were awarded to private respondent and were thus
requested to vacate the premises. This prompted petitioners to file an action for "Determination
of True Balance of Mortgage Debt, Annulment/Setting Aside of Extrajudicial Foreclosure of
Mortgage and Damages, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction" against respondent.
The RTC dismissed the petitioners complaint, which prompted the petitioners to file an
appeal with the CA. They averred that since the period for redemption has been extended
pursuant to the letter given by the bank, the latter violated the principleof estoppel when it
conducted the public sale of the land. The appeal was denied by the CA, holding that the period
of extension was never extended. It further ruled that the bank, through said letter, did not make
an unqualified representation to petitioners that it had extended the period of redemption.
Hence, this appeal under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in not holding that the bank has violated the principle of estoppel when it
conducted the public sale.

RULING:
Through estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying on it. This doctrine is based
on the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith, and justice and its purpose is to forbid one to
speak against his own act, representations or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were
directed and who reasonably relied on it. Thus, in order for this doctrine to operate, a representation must
have been made to the detriment of another who relied on it. In other words, estoppel would not lie
against one who, in the first place, did not make any representation.
In this case, a perusal of the letter, on which petitioners based their position that the redemption
period had been extended, shows otherwise. Pertinent portions of the said letter read:
xxxx
Our records show that the above account has already been foreclosed by the bank.
However, the borrowers concerned can still exercise the one (1) year right of redemption over the
foreclosed properties until April 21, 1988.
As the Bank has adopted an incentive scheme whereby payments are liberalized to give
chances to former owners to repossess their properties, we suggest that you advise your parents

to drop by at our Zamboanga Office so they can avail of this rare privilege which shall be good
only up to December 31, 1988.
As correctly held by the RTC and upheld by the CA, the date "December 31, 1988" refers to the
last day when owners of foreclosed properties, like petitioners, could submit their payment proposals to
the bank. The letter was very clear. It was about the availment of the liberalized payment scheme of the
bank. On the last day for redemption, the letter was also clear. It was April 21, 1988. It was never
extended.
In this regard, the CA was correct when it wrote:
Here, there is no estoppel to speak of. The letter does not show that the Bank had unqualifiedly
represented to the Hojases that it had extended the redemption period to December 31, 1988. Thus, the
Hojases have no basis in positing that the public sale conducted on November 4, 1988 was null and void
for having been prematurely conducted.

GREEN ACRES HOLDINGS, INC. v. VICTORIA P. CABRAL, SPS. ENRIQUE T. MORAGA

and VICTORIA SORIANO, FILCON READY MIXED, INC., DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB), and REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF BULACAN,
MEYCAUA YAN BRANCH
G.R. No. 175542, June 5, 2013
VICTORIA P. CABRAL v. PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR, JOSEPH NOEL C. LONGBOAN I
OFFICE OF THE AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATOR, GREEN ACRES HOLDINGS, INC.,
SPOUSES ENRIQUE T. MORAGA and VICTORIA SORIANO and FILCON READY MIXED,
INC.
G.R. No. 183205, June 5, 2013
J. Villarama, Jr.
An action for declaration of nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real
property, or re-conveyance, is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it
binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing.
Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.No one
shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a
case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a
writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not
have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the
judgment therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant thereto.
FACTS:
Cabral was the registered owner of the subject parcel of land which was later placed under the
coverage of PD 27, thus resulting in the issuance of three Emancipation Patents (EP) in favor of Sps.
Moraga. Cabral then filed a complaint before the PARAD seeking the cancellation of said EPs,
contending that the same were obtained through fraud. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the
PARAD for lack of merit, and such decision was then appealed by Cabral to the DARAB.While the appeal
was pending, Sps. Moraga sold the subdivided the parcel of land and sold the lots to Filcon, who then
sold the same to herein petitioner Green Acres. The DARAB then rendered a decision on the appeal of
Cabral, ordering the cancellation of the title issued in the names of Sps. Moraga and of Filcon for having
been illegally acquired.

Green Acres then filed a complaint for Quieting of Title, Damages with Application for Preliminary
Injunction and Writ of Preliminary Attachment before the RTC against Cabral, Sps. Moraga, Filcon, the
DARAB and the RD of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Cabral, in her answer, alleged that Green Acres never
acquired valid title to the subject property much less can it claim to be an innocent purchaser for value.
The RTC granted the Demurrer to Evidence filed by Cabral and ordered the case dismissed. Green
Acres motion for recondieration having been denied, it thus filed an appeal with the CA.
In the meantime, the DARAB Decision became final and executory, prompting Cabral to file with
the PARAD a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution of such. The said motion was, however, denied
by the PARAD, ruling that such decision cannot be implemented against Green Acres, as it does not
contain any order of cancellation of title issued in favor of Green Acres. From this, Cabral filed an appeal
with the PARAD.
The CA dismissed Green Acres appeal, citing that the trial court had no authority to interfere with
the proceedings of a court of equal jurisdiction. On the other hand, the PARAD issued an order denying
Cabrals appeal and held that her act of impleading Green Acres as additional defendant only in the
execution stage is highly irregular and that to enforce the decision against the same would violate the
lattersrights to due process.
Aggrieved, Cabral then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul
the orders of PARAD. The same was denied by the CA, holding that an execution can only be issued
against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court; as Green Acres was never a party
to this case not was it mentioned in the decision sought to be exeucted, he cannot be made to suffer the
consequnces of a case where it did not participate. Thus, both Green Acres and Cabral filed petitions for
review under Rule 45, seeking the reversal of the CA decisions adverse to them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the DARAB sought to be executed can be enforced against Green Acres.

RULING:
The petition of Green Acres is impressed with merit. The petition of Cabral is denied.
Cabral contends that the PARAD committed grave abuse of discretion in not issuing the
writ of execution to enforce the January 17, 2001 DARAB decision in her favor. She argues that
the issuance of a writ of execution is ministerial under Section 1, Rule XX of the 2003 DARAB
Rules of Procedure which provides that the execution of a final order or decision shall issue as a
matter of course.
Cabral also argues that contrary to the PARADs ruling, she is not seeking the
amendment of the final decision sought to be executed. She contends that the directive to the
Register of Deeds to restore TCT No. T-73737 (M) in her name means that it should be done
regardless of who holds title to the property at the time of execution. In this case, it is Green
Acres. She also points out that the transfer from the Spouses Moraga to Filcon in 1996 and
eventually to Green Acres in 1999 transpired after she filed a case with the DARAB in 1994.
Therefore, under Section 12.2, Rule XX of the DARAB Rules, Green Acres is considered a
successor in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action upon whom the
final judgment or order of the DARAB is conclusive. Cabral also insists that Green Acres cannot
be considered an innocent purchaser for value because the transfers were made to defeat the
DARAB ruling.

Green Acres, for its part, submits that the CA did not err in denying Cabrals petition for
certiorari. Green Acres contends that Cabral, through her motion for execution, sought the
amendment of the DARAB decision and did not move merely for its execution. Green Acres
points out that Cabrals motion for execution specifically sought the cancellation of Green Acres
titles even though the DARAB decision neither included Green Acres or its titles. Green Acres
points out that if the issuance of a writ of execution that conforms to the decision may be denied
on the ground that it will be inequitable, moreso should it be denied in the case where the writ of
execution prayed for goes beyond the decision. Hence, even if the issuance of a writ of
execution to enforce a final and executory decision is a ministerial duty, the PARAD may not
issue a writ of execution against Filcon and Green Acres as prayed for by Cabral.
Green Acres also argues that it cannot be bound by the DARAB decision since a writ of
execution of a decision can only be issued against a party to the case and not against one who
did not have his day in court. Moreover, if granted, the execution sought will constitute a
collateral attack against the titles of Green Acres since nowhere in the DARAB decision sought
to be executed were they mentioned. Green Acres also adds that Cabral misinterpreted Section
12.2 of the DARAB Rules to mean that a judgment issued in a case is binding upon, and can be
executed, even against those parties not impleaded in the case. Green Acres submits that
Section 12 is a mere reproduction of Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on the principle
of res judicata. Thus, the cited DARAB rule does not operate to bind Green Acres, either
presently or in the future, to the DARAB decision which does not mention Green Acres either in
the body or the dispositive portion. Green Acres likewise argues that impleading it as an
additional defendant in the execution stage aggravates the violation of its right to due process.
We find in favor of Green Acres.
The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or
proceeding in which he was not made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due
process of law. In Muoz v. Yabut, Jr., this Court ruled:
An action for declaration of nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real property, or
re-conveyance, is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual
only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding only upon
the parties properly impleaded.
Since they were not impleaded as parties and given the opportunity to participate in Civil
Case No. Q-28580, the final judgment in said case cannot bind BPI Family and the spouses
Chan. The effect of the said judgment cannot be extended to BPI Family and the spouses Chan
by simply issuing an alias writ of execution against them. No man shall be affected by any
proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment
rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a
party and not against one who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an
action are bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution issued pursuant thereto.
It is beyond dispute that Green Acres was not made a party in the DARAB case.
Consequently, the January 17, 2001 DARAB decision cannot bind Green Acres. Likewise, the
binding effect of the DARAB decision cannot be extended to Green Acres by the mere issuance
of a writ of execution against it. No one shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a
stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. In the
same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who

did not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment
therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant thereto.
In the instant case, Cabral seeks the execution of a final and executory DARAB decision
that directs the cancellation of the TCTs in the name of the Spouses Moraga and Filcon.
Nowhere in the said decision is Green Acres or its TCTs mentioned. Nonetheless, in her Motion
for Issuance of Writ of Execution, Cabral alleged that Green Acres, like Filcon, "also never
acquired valid title to the subject land" and "hence, its present TCTs thereto should likewise be
cancelled (together with the respective Emancipation Patents and TCTs of Sps. Moraga and
Filcon Ready Mixed, Inc. mentioned in the DARAB Decision) and reverted back to her TCT."
She prayed for the issuance of a writ of execution against the Spouses Moraga and "their
subsequent assigns/successors in interest Filcon Ready Mixed, Inc. and Green Acres Holdings,
Inc." Clearly, seeking the cancellation of the titles of Green Acres by a mere Motion for Issuance
of Writ of Execution of a decision rendered in a case where said titles were not in issue
constitutes a collateral attack on them which this Court cannot allow.
Furthermore, as correctly ruled by the PARAD and upheld by the appellate court, only
the decision of the DARAB as embodied in the dispositive portion of the decision can be
implemented by a writ of execution. As held in Ingles v. Cantos:
A writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to be
executed, and the execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or
award, for it is a settled general principle that a writ of execution must conform strictly with every
essential particular of the judgment promulgated. It may not vary the terms of the judgment it
seeks to enforce. Nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed.
Where the writ of execution is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life,
the writ has pro tanto no validity.
A reading of the fallo of the DARAB decision would show that nothing in it directs the
cancellation of the titles issued in favor of Green Acres. To subscribe to Cabrals prayer in her
motion is tantamount to modifying or amending a decision that has already attained finality in
violation of the doctrine of immutability of judgment.
It is also worth noting that the fact that the DARAB by final judgment ordered the
cancellation of the titles of the Spouses Moraga and Filcon does not automatically make the
titles of Green Acres null and void. It is settled that a void title may be the source of a valid title
in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. An innocent purchaser for value is one who,
relying on the certificate of title, bought the property from the registered owner, without notice
that some other person has a right to, or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price
for the same at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of
some other person in the property.
RODRIGO RONTOS y DELA TORRE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 188024, June 5, 2013
CJ. Sereno
This Court has emphasized the import of Section 21 as a matter of substantive law that
mandates strict compliance. It was laid down by Congress as a safety precaution against
potential abuses by law enforcement agents who might fail to appreciate the gravity of the
penalties faced by those suspected to be involved in the sale, use or possession of illegal

drugs. Under the principle that penal laws are strictly construed against the government,
stringent compliance therewith is fully justified.
FACTS:
Due to reports of illegal drug activity in the area, two police officers were dispatched to
conduct surveillance along Sampaloc St., Camarin, Caloocan. When they arrived at said place,
the said police officers noticed herein petitioner who was scrutinizing two plastic sachets in his
hand. When they approached the petitioner, the police officers noticed that the plastic sachets
appear to be containing a white crystalline substance similar to shabu. When one of them
confiscated the sachet, he introduced himself as a police officer and informed the petitioner of
the offense he committed. The markings were done on the sachets and the same were placed
in a makeshift envelope.
When they brought the petitioner to the station, the police investigator conducted an
investigation and prepared a request for a lab examination of the contents of the sachet. The
examination yielded a positive result for shabu. As such, a complaint for violation of Section 11
of RA 9165 was filed before the city prosecutor for the filing of the proper charges in court.
The petitioner, in his defense, stated that on said day, he was at home with his family
and their visitor Cassandra when suddenly the police officers barged in and searched the
house, claiming that they were looing for something. However, when the search proved futile,
they arrested petitioner and Cassandra and detained them in the Drug Enforcement Unit in
Camarin.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a decision, finding the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and ruled that the elements of the crime were duly
proven by the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. On appeal to the CA, petitioner
contended that since his warrantless arrest was illegal, the allegedly confiscated items were
inadmissible in evidence.
The CA however affirmed the decision of the RTC, holding that the petitioner was
arrested in flagrante delicto when he committed the crime in plain view of the police officers.
While the CA admitted that no photograph or inventory of the confiscated items was taken or
made, it entertained no doubt that the dangerous drugs presented in court were the same ones
confiscated from petitioner. Furthermore, the failure of the police officers to observe the proper
procedure for handling confiscated dangerous drugs may only result in administrative liability on
their part. That failure does not cast doubt on the identity and integrity of the illegal drugs.
Hence, this appeal under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.
RULING:
On the basis of the nonobservance of the rules of procedure for handling illegal drug
items, we resolve to acquit petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt.

In illegal drugs cases, the identity and integrity of the drugs seized must be established
with the same unwavering exactitude as that required to arrive at a finding of guilt. The case
against the accused hinges on the ability of the prosecution to prove that the illegal drug
presented in court is the same one that was recovered from the accused upon his arrest.
The procedure set forth in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 is intended precisely to ensure the
identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized. This provision requires that upon seizure of
illegal drug items, the apprehending team having initial custody of the drugs shall (a) conduct a
physical inventory of the drugs and (b) take photographs thereof (c) in the presence of the
person from whom these items were seized or confiscated and (d) a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice and any elected public official (e) who shall all be required
to sign the inventory and be given copies thereof.
This Court has emphasized the import of Section 21 as a matter of substantive law that
mandates strict compliance. It was laid down by Congress as a safety precaution against
potential abuses by law enforcement agents who might fail to appreciate the gravity of the
penalties faced by those suspected to be involved in the sale, use or possession of illegal drugs.
Under the principle that penal laws are strictly construed against the government, stringent
compliance therewith is fully justified.
Here, the procedure was not observed at all. Where it is clear that Section 21 was not
observed, as in this case, such noncompliance brings to the fore the question of whether the
illegal drug items were the same ones that were allegedly seized from petitioner.
We cannot, in good conscience, affirm the conviction of petitioner for possession of
illegal drugs if the police officer charged with the preservation of the evidence cannot even be
certain in the identification of the envelope that was presented in court. As held in Dolera v.
People, there also exists in the present case a reasonable likelihood of substitution, in that the
two plastic sachets that tested positive for shabu and were presented in court were not the
items allegedly seized from petitioner. This possibility of substitution is fatal for the prosecution,
for there is then a failure to prove the identity of the corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt.
We are not unaware of the rule that justifiable grounds may excuse noncompliance with
the requirements of Section 21 as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved. The problem in this case is that the police officers presented no
justifiable reason why they neglected to observe the proper procedure. Considering that PO1
Pacis himself expressed misgivings on the identity of the envelope shown to him in court, with
the envelope that he had placed the confiscated illegal drug items in, neither can we confirm
that the chain of custody had been sufficiently established.
Corpus delicti is the "actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged." In
illegal drug cases, it refers to the illegal drug item itself. When courts are given reason to
entertain reservations about the identity of the illegal drug item allegedly seized from the
accused, the actual commission of the crime charged is put into serious question. In those
cases, courts have no alternative but to acquit on the ground of reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ERNESTO GANI y TUPAS
G.R. No. 195523, June 5, 2013
J. Peralta

Settled is the rule that alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and
categorical testimony and identification of an accused by the complainant. Positive
identification where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill
motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over a denial
which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and selfserving evidence undeserving of weight in law. They cannot be given greater
evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters.
FACTS:
The accused was charged under an information with the crime of rape to which he pleaded not
guilty upon his arraignment. The evidence for the prosecution showed that the accused raped his niece
AAA, who was then only 5 year old, while the latter and her brother were harvesting vegetables with her
brother. After having sexual intercourse with AAA, the accused drew out his knife and slashed her vagina
causing her serious injury. When the accused left, AAA then went home and recounted her ordeal to her
grandmother. AAA was then brought to the hospital medical care. Subsequently, AAA's aunt filed, in her
behalf, a Criminal Complaint against appellant.

In his defense, the accused interposed an alibi claiming that he was in Quezon City at
the time of the rape and pointed to his brother-in-law, Ermelo Alingasa, as the one who
committed the rape.
The RTC found the version of the prosecution credible and, accordingly, rendered
judgment finding accused the accusedguilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
committed against his niece AAA. The RTC held that the victim's testimony was corroborated by
the findings of the medico-legal officer who examined and treated her.Aggrieved, appellant
appealed to the CA. The CA promulgated its decision affirming the findings of the RTC, but
modified the penalty imposed and the amount of moral damages awarded.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused despite the fact that his guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt

RULING:
The accused basically questions the credibility of the private complainant. He contends
that the latter failed to amply explain why she previously accused another person as the culprit
and who was even detained by reason of such accusation; and, that if appellant was the actual
perpetrator of the crime, why was he not immediately taken into custody and indicted.
The Court upholds the rulings of the RTC and the CA that appellant's defense of alibi
deserves scant consideration. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate
and highly unreliable. To merit approbation, the appellant must adduce clear and convincing
evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time when the crime was
committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime
when it was committed. In this case, appellant failed to prove that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the crime scene on February 21, 1997. His token defense, during his direct

examination, that he was in Quezon City when the victim was raped is hardly credible because
he failed to prove the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime when it
was committed. On the contrary, he admitted, when he was cross-examined, that he was, in
fact, in the same locality (Sitio Bayogbayog, Barangay Bulata) when AAA was raped.
At any rate, settled is the rule that alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and
categorical testimony and identification of an accused by the complainant. Positive identification
where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over a denial which, if not substantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.
They cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters.
As to appellant's defense of frame-up, this Court quotes with approval the disquisition of
the CA on the matter, to wit:
BBB, private complainant's elder sister testified on direct examination that it was
their grandmother, mother of accused-appellant, who reported the incident to the police
authorities. The grandmother pointed to one Ermelo Alingasa as the person responsible
for the crime so that her son, herein accused, could evade the crime of rape. Witness,
BBB, was not able to confront her grandmother regarding the incident because the latter
ran away and went to Guimaras as did the accused-appellant.
When BBB was presented on the witness stand, accused-appellant neither
challenged the truthfulness of the foregoing testimony nor did he question her credibility.
xxxx
Verily, WE find appellant's argument that he was being framed presumably due to
a family conflict as a flimsy excuse. It is highly improbable that AAA would accuse
appellant, her own uncle at that, of so serious a crime as rape, if it were not the truth. In
any case, revenge or feud has never swayed this Court from giving full credence to the
testimony of a complainant for rape, especially a minor, who remained steadfast in her
testimony that she was raped.
x x x x.
It is settled that the defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by this
Court with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted but is difficult to prove. In order to prosper, the
defense of frame-up must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing evidence. In the
case under consideration, appellant failed to present any clear and convincing proof that AAA
was moved by hatred or revenge, or that she was influenced by her aunt to implicate appellant.
Thus, appellants bare allegation of frame-up must fail.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by ABUSAMA M. ALID, Officer-in-Charge,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE - REGIONAL FIELD UNIT XII (DA-RFU XII) vs.
ABDULWAHAB A. BAYAO, OSMEA I. MONTAER, RAKMA B. BUISAN, HELEN M.
ALVAREZ, NEILA P. LIMBA, ELIZABETH B. PUSTA, ANNA MAE A. SIDENO, UDTOG B.
TABONG, JOHN S. KAMENZA, DELIA R. SUBALDO, DAYANG W. MACMOD, FLORENCE S.

TAYUAN, in their own behalf and in behalf of the other officials and employees of DA-RFU
XII
G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013
J. Leonen
The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the
filing of a petition for certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any
actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case.
FACTS:
Petitioner Department of AgricultureRegional Field Unit XII (DA-RFU XII) is a government office
mandated to implement the laws, policies, plans, programs, rules, and regulations of the Department of
Agriculture in its regional area, while respondents are officials and employees of DA-RFU XII. EO 304
was passed which designated Koronadal City as the regional center and seat of SOCCSKSARGEN
Region, and provided that all national government offices in the Region shall transfer their regional seat of
operations to Koronadal City.
Private respondents opposed to transfer to Cotabato City, contending that a building was
constructed in Cotabato City that can accommodate the whole staff of DA-RFU XII, and that there is not
bulding yet in Koronadal City, and rent there is very expensive. Further, the government would have to
spend over 7,200,000.00 as dislocation pay as well as other expenses for equipment hauling and
construction.

Nonetheless, respondent Alid held a meeting,ordering the transfer of the regional office
to ATI Building in Tantangan and Tupi Seed Farm in Tupi, both located in South Cotabato and
Uptown, Koronadal City. This prompted respondents to file a Complaint for Injunction with
prayer for issuance of Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO, which was granted by the RTC.
Petitioner then went to the CA via Rule 65, but the same was denied for failure to first resort to a
Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed order. Hence, this petition under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case falls under the exceptions for filing a Motion for Reconsideration priorto filing a
Petition Under Rule 65.

RULING:
For its part, petitioner argues that its Petition for Certiorari filed before the Court of
Appeals falls under the exceptions to the necessity of filing a Motion for Reconsideration. In its
Petition with the Court of Appeals, petitioners explained its reasons for no longer filing a Motion
for Reconsideration of the assailed order in that (a) the questions to be raised in the motion
have already been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court and (b) there is urgent
necessity for the resolution of the questions or issues raised. Petitioners allege that the trial
court presiding judge was not acting on the disposition of the case with dispatch and that any
further delay would unduly prejudice the interests of the government in pursuing its economic
development strategies in the region.
Concededly, the settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua
non for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to

correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and
factual circumstances of the case. The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined
exceptions, such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised
and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the
lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject
matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is
extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent
and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the
lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding were ex parte or in
which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of
law or where public interest is involved.
The second exception is present in this case.
In Siok Ping Tang v. Subic Bay Distribution, Inc., this Court found that the non-filing of a
Motion for Reconsideration in the case was not fatal since the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings have already been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, viz:
Respondent explained their omission of filing a motion for reconsideration before
resorting to a petition for certiorari based on exceptions (b), (c) and (i). The CA brushed
aside the filing of the motion for reconsideration based on the ground that the questions
raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower
court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court. We agree.
Respondent had filed its position paper in the RTC stating the reasons why the
injunction prayed for by petitioner should not be granted. However, the RTC granted the
injunction. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA and presented the same
arguments which were already passed upon by the RTC. The RTC already had the opportunity
to consider and rule on the question of the propriety or impropriety of the issuance of the
injunction. We found no reversible error committed by the CA for relaxing the rule since
respondent's case falls within the exceptions.
Similarly, the various issues raised in the Petition with the Court of Appeals have already
been raised by petitioner on several occasions through its pleadings with the trial court. The
lower court, therefore, passed upon them. Thus, the present case falls under the second
exception in that a Motion for Reconsideration need not be filed where questions raised in the
certiorari proceedings are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court.
In any case, this Court disregards the presence of procedural flaws when there is
necessity to address the issues because of the demands of public interest, including the need
for stability in the public service and the serious implications the case may cause on the
effective administration of the executive department.
ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., ISAIAS ALBANO, LILY REYES, JANET
BAY, JESUS R. GALANG, AND RANDY HAGOS vs. FRANCISCO R. CO, JR.
G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013
J. Bersamin

Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam the power of the court to
render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and
other rulings rendered in the action is an element of due process that is essential in all
actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem. Jurisdiction over the
defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not required, and the court acquires jurisdiction
over an actionas long as it acquires jurisdiction over the resthat is thesubject matter of the
action. The purpose of summons in such action is not the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
defendant but mainly to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process.
FACTS:
Respondent filed a case against Abante Tonite and herein petitioners, claiming damages because
of an allegedly libelous article petitioners published in its Abante Tonite issue. The court wherein such
case was raffled to issued the summons to be served on each defendant at their business address.
When the Sheriff went to the stated address to effect the personal service of summons on defendants, his
efforts became futile as the defendants were then out of the office and unavailable. When he returned
that afternoon, the service was still not effected as they were still out of the office. Hence, the Sheriff
decided to resort to substituted service and explained the reason therefor in his return.

Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint alleging lack of jurisdiction over their
persons because of the invalid and ineffectual substituted service of summons.The RTC denied
the petitioners motion to dismiss and directed them to filed their answers to the complaint within
the remaining period allowed by the Rules.
Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that the sheriff had
immediately resorted to substituted service of the summons upon being informed that they were
not around personally receive the summons upon being informed that they were not around to
personally receive the same. Tthe RTC however denied their motion, prompting them to file a
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with the CA assailing the order of the RTC.
The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit, ruling that certiorari will prosper only if
there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction
committed by the respondent Judge. The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners
were likewise denied by the CA, prompting the filing of this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed an error of law in holding that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
herein petitioners.

RULING:
The petition for review lacks merit.
Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam the power of the court to render
a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other
rulings rendered in the action is an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil
as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem. Jurisdiction over the defendantin an
action in rem or quasi in rem is not required, and the court acquires jurisdiction over an actionas
long as it acquires jurisdiction over the resthat is thesubject matter of the action. The purpose of

summons in such action is not the acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant but mainly to
satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process.
The distinctions that need to be perceived between an action in personam, on the one
hand, and an action inrem or quasi in rem, on the other hand, are aptly delineated in Domagas
v. Jensen, thusly:
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character.
Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is
determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a
proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is
based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the
exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose
of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in
personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability
directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a
defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on
him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against
the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the property to determine its state.
It has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or
obligations; such action is brought against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief
are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in personam. In Combs v.
Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to enforce personal rights and
obligations and in which personal judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and
obligations between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of real
property are in personam.
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to
subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi
in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with
the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on
these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain
or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only
upon the parties who joined in the action.
As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by the act of filing the initiatory pleading. As to the defendant, the court
acquires jurisdiction over his person either by the proper service of the summons, or by a
voluntary appearance in the action.Upon the filing of the complaint and the payment of the
requisite legal fees, the clerk of court forthwith issues the corresponding summons to the
defendant. The summons is directed to the defendant and signed by the clerk of court under
seal. It contains the name of the court and the names of the parties to the action; a direction that
the defendant answers within the time fixed by the Rules of Court; and a notice that unless the
defendant so answers, the plaintiff will take judgment by default and may be granted the relief
applied for. To be attached to the original copy of the summons and all copies thereof is a copy
of the complaint (and its attachments, if any) and the order, if any, for the appointment of a
guardian ad litem.
The significance of the proper service of the summons on the defendant in an action in
personam cannot be overemphasized. The service of the summons fulfills two fundamental

objectives, namely: (a) to vest in the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; and (b)
to afford to the defendant the opportunity to be heard on the claim brought against him. As to
the former, when jurisdiction in personam is not acquired in a civil action through the proper
service of the summons or upon a valid waiver of such proper service, the ensuing trial and
judgment are void. If the defendant knowingly does an act inconsistent with the right to object to
the lack of personal jurisdiction as to him, like voluntarily appearing in the action, he is deemed
to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. As to the latter, the essence of due
process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence the
defendant may have in support of his defense. With the proper service of the summons being
intended to afford to him the opportunity to be heard on the claim against him, he may also
waive the process. In other words, compliance with the rules regarding the service of the
summons is as much an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction.
Under the Rules of Court, the service of the summons should firstly be effected on the
defendant himself whenever practicable. Such personal service consists either in handing a
copy of the summons to the defendant in person, or, if the defendant refuses to receive and sign
for it, in tendering it to him. The rule on personal service is to be rigidly enforced in order to
ensure the realization of the two fundamental objectives earlier mentioned. If, for justifiable
reasons, the defendant cannot be served in person within a reasonable time, the service of the
summons may then be effected either (a) by leaving a copy of the summons at his residence
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copy
at his office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. The
latter mode of service is known as substituted service because the service of the summons on
the defendant is made through his substitute.
It is no longer debatable that the statutory requirements of substituted service must be
followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by
statute is considered ineffective. This is because substituted service, being in derogation of the
usual method of service, is extraordinary in character and may be used only as prescribed and
in the circumstances authorized by statute. Only when the defendant cannot be served
personally within a reasonable time may substituted service be resorted to. Hence, the
impossibility of prompt personal service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the
defendant himself and the fact that such efforts failed, which statement should be found in the
proof of service or sheriffs return. Nonetheless, the requisite showing of the impossibility of
prompt personal service as basis for resorting to substituted service may be waived by the
defendant either expressly or impliedly.
There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the summons upon
each of petitioners in person at their office address, the first in the morning of September 18,
2000 and the second in the afternoon of the same date. Each attempt failed because Macasaet
and Quijano were "always out and not available" and the other petitioners were "always roving
outside and gathering news." After Medina learned from those present in the office address on
his second attempt that there was no likelihood of any of petitioners going to the office during
the business hours of that or any other day, he concluded that further attempts to serve them in
person within a reasonable time would be futile. The circumstances fully warranted his
conclusion. He was not expected or required as the serving officer to effect personal service by
all means and at all times, considering that he was expressly authorized to resort to substituted
service should he be unable to effect the personal service within a reasonable time. In that
regard, what was a reasonable time was dependent on the circumstances obtaining. While we
are strict in insisting on personal service on the defendant, we do not cling to such strictness

should the circumstances already justify substituted service instead. It is the spirit of the
procedural rules, not their letter, that governs.
In reality, petitioners insistence on personal service by the serving officer was
demonstrably superfluous. They had actually received the summonses served through their
substitutes, as borne out by their filing of several pleadings in the RTC, including an answer with
compulsory counterclaim ad cautelam and a pre-trial brief ad cautelam. They had also availed
themselves of the modes of discovery available under the Rules of Court. Such acts evinced
their voluntary appearance in the action.
DR. ZENAIDA P. PIA v. HON. MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR., Overall Deputy Ombudsman,
Formerly Acting Ombudsman, Office of the Ombudsman, Dr. OFELIA M. CARAGUE,
Formerly PUP President, Dr. ROMAN R. DANNUG, Formerly Dean, College of
Economics, Finance and Politics (CEFP), now Associate Professor, CEFP Polytechnic
University of the Philippines (PUP), Sta. Mesa, Manila

G.R. No. 172334, June 5, 2013

J. Reyes
In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual
administratively liable is substantial evidence. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court defines
substantial evidence as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. The settled rule provides that factual findings of the
Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence and are
accorded due respect and weight, especially when they are affirmed by the CA. Furthermore,
only questions of law may be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; the
Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to review evidence on record and assess the
probative weight thereof.
FACTS:
Respondent Dr. Dannug, in his capacity as Dean of the College of Economics of PUP,
filed a complaint against petitioner as a professor of PUP, alleging that the latter was directly
selling to her students a book in violation of Section 3, Article X of the Code of Ethics for
Professional Teachers. He attached therewith a list of students who were allegedly forced to
buy a copy of said book.In her defense, petitioner argued that her students were not forced to
buy the book, even submitting a certification to that effect from students who had bought from
her.
The Ombudsman declared petitioner guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service, and ordered her suspension. Upon appeal to the CA, the decision of the
Ombudsman was affirmed, holding that the violation of petitioner has been sufficiently
established by substantial evidence. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the Office of the Ombudsmans decision finding Pia
guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
RULING:

In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual

administratively liable is substantial evidence. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court defines
substantial evidence as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify a conclusion.
The settled rule provides that factual findings of the Office of the Ombudsman are
conclusive when supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight,
especially when they are affirmed by the CA. Furthermore, only questions of law may be raised
in petitions filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; the Court is not a trier of facts and it is not
its function to review evidence on record and assess the probative weight thereof.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the CA have sufficiently identified Pias act that
constitutes Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Although Pia questions the weight that
should be accorded to the list of students attached to the complaint of Dannug, it is significant that she
readily admitted having directly sold copies of the book/compilation "Organization Development Research
Papers" to her students, an act that is proscribed among PUP faculty members, by the submission of a
certification from her students claiming that they were not forced to buy copies of the book.
In asking for the complaints dismissal, Pia argues that she was not covered by the Code of
Ethics of Professional Teachers which was cited by the Office of the Ombudsman to support the decision
rendered against her. She contends that the Code only applies to teachers in educational institutions at
the pre-school, primary, elementary and secondary levels, but not to professors in the tertiary level.

Our review of the CA decision indicates that such argument has already been sustained
by the appellate court. Nonetheless, the finding of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service remains justified given the standards that are required from Pia as a faculty member in
a staterun university. The appellate court correctly explained:
We sustain the petitioners contention that she is not covered under R.A. No. 7836 (The
Philippine Teachers Professionalization Act of 1994) relative to the definition of "teachers"
therein. As we have earlier stated, the culpability of the petitioner is anchored on her irregular
and unjustifiable act being complained of, in violation of an existing regulation of a state-run
university (the PUP, in this case) where she is currently employed. Additionally, the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees enunciates the State policy
of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.
Pias argument that she was not properly charged with the offense for which she was
found guilty of committing still does not warrant her exoneration from the offense. In Avenido, we
emphasized that the designation of the offense or offenses with which a person is charged in an
administrative case is not controlling, and one may be found guilty of another offense where the
substance of the allegations and evidence presented sufficiently proves ones guilt. Citing the
case of Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission, we held in Avenido that the charge against the
respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an information in
a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against
him; what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the
offense.
Considering then that the acts alleged and proved to have been committed by Pia
amounts to Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and that she has been
afforded a full opportunity to present her side and refute the act imputed against her, the Court
finds no cogent reason to nullify the ruling made by the CA on Pias guilt.

MR. ALEXANDER "LEX" ADONIS, represented by the CENTER FOR MEDIA FREEDOM
AND RESPONSIBILITY (CMFR), through its Executive Director, MRS. MELINDA QUINTOSDE JESUS; and the NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUJP),
through its Chairperson, MR. JOSE TORRES, JR. v. SUPERENTENDENT VENANCIO
TESORO, DIRECTOR, DAVAO PRISONS AND PENAL FARM, PANABO CITY, DIGOS
DAVAO DEL NORTE
G.R. No. 182855, June 5, 2013
J. Reyes
The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful
restraint. The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint and as an effective defense of personal freedom. It is issued only for the lone purpose
of obtaining relief for those illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient legal basis. It is not
issued when the person is in custody because of a judicial process or a valid judgment.
FACTS:
Adonis was convicted by the Br.17, RTC Davao for libel, filed against him by then Representative
Prospero Nograles, and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence accordingly. He began serving
such sentence at the Davao Prison on February 20, 2007. A second libel case was likewise filed against
Adonis by Jeanette Leuterio, pending before Br. 14, RTC Davao.
Sometime thereafter, the Board of Pardons and Parole issued an order for the discharge of seven
inmates, one of which is Adonis. Also, the SC issued Admin. Circ. No. 08-2008, the subject of which is
the "Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases."
In view of the abovementioned, Adonis filed with the RTC Br. 17 a Motion to Reopen Case, praying for his
immediate release from detention and modification of his sentence pursuant to said circular. He also filed
before Br. 14 a motion for his provisional release from detention, which was granted by the judge in open
court and he was allowed to post bail. On the same day, an order for the release of Adonis was sent to
the Chief of Davao Penal Colony, but such was not effected.
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus was then filed by Adonis on May 30, 2008,
alleging that his liberty was restrained by the respondent for no valid reason. On February 11, 2009, the
court received the letter from respondent, informing the court that Adonis had been released from
confinement on December 23, 2008 after accepting the conditions set forth of his parole.

ISSUE:
Whether the petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be granted.
RULING:
The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful
restraint. The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint and as an effective defense of personal freedom. It is issued only for the lone purpose
of obtaining relief for those illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient legal basis. It is not
issued when the person is in custody because of a judicial process or a valid judgment.
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court provides when a writ must not be
allowed or discharge authorized, to wit:

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and
that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or
make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is
allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the
process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In the instant case, Adonis was convicted for libel by the RTC Branch 17, in Criminal
Case No. 48679-2001. Since his detention was by virtue of a final judgment, he is not entitled to
the Writ of Habeas Corpus. He was serving his sentence when the BPP granted him parole,
along with six (6) others, on December 11, 2007. While it is true that a convict may be released
from prison on parole when he had served the minimum period of his sentence; the pendency of
another criminal case, however, is a ground for the disqualification of such convict from being
released on parole. Notably, at the time he was granted the parole, the second libel case was
pending before the RTC Branch 14. In fact, even when the instant petition was filed, Criminal
Case No. 48719-01 was still pending. The issuance of the writ under such circumstance was,
therefore, proscribed. There was basis for the respondent to deny his immediate release at that
time.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GUILLERMO LOMAQUE
G.R. No. 189297, June 5, 2013
J. del Castillo
"AAAs" momentary inaction will neither diminish nor affect her credibility. "The filing of
complaints of rape months, even years, after their commission may or may not dent the
credibility of witness and of testimony, depending on the circumstances attendant thereto." "It
does not diminish the complainants credibility or undermine the charges of rape when the delay
can be attributed to the pattern of fear instilled by the threats of bodily harm, specially by one
who exercises moral ascendancy over the victim."
FACTS:
The accused was charged under separate informations of thirteen counts of rape by
sexual intercourse allegedly committed against his stepdaughter AAA. The evidence for the
prosecution showed that the accused, on numerous occasions, had sexual intercourse with
AAA, the first of which is when she was only eight years old. Thiss eventually led to AAA
becoming pregnant which her mother discovered when they went to the hospital for a medical
check-up. When her mother inquired who the father was, AAA told her that it was the accused,
a matter which the latter admitted. However, when the mother became hysterical, the accused
retracted and concocted a story that somebody else caused the pregnancy of AAA. After giving
birth, AAA returned to their house and saw the accused kissing her younger sister, CCC. Afraid
that CCC might suffer the same fate she had, she decided to file a complaint against the
accused,and with the help of her aunt went to Bantay-Bata 163 to seek assistance.
In his defense, the accused denied that he sexually abused AAA, claiming that he could
not have committed the crimes charged because as a bio-medical technician, he was deployed
all over the country to repair hospital equipment. He offered several plane tickets in support of

this allegation. He likewise testified that his parents-in-law and sister-in-law were living with
them.
The RTC found AAA to be a credible witness and rejected the defense of denial and alibi
proffered by the appellant. Consequently, it rendered a Decision which declared appellant guilty
of seven counts of rape by sexual intercourse, one count of rape by sexual assault and one
count of Acts of Lasciviousness.
The accused elevated the case to the CA, and faulted the trial court in giving full weight
and credence to AAAs testimony and in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged. The OSG, on the other hand prayed for the affirmance of the assailed
Judgment contending that AAAs testimony is clear, candid and straightforward and contended
that appellants culpability was established beyond reasonable doubt. The CA, not impressed
with the arguments of the accused, affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellant for the crimes of rape
and acts of lasciviousness. Basically, appellant assails the credibility of AAA.

RULING:
In his attempt to discredit "AAA," appellant contends that "AAAs" silence and failure to
divulge her alleged horrifying ordeal to immediate relatives despite the claim that it happened for
several times run counter to the natural reaction of an outraged maiden despoiled of her honor.
We are not persuaded. "AAAs" momentary inaction will neither diminish nor affect her
credibility. "The filing of complaints of rape months, even years, after their commission may or
may not dent the credibility of witness and of testimony, depending on the circumstances
attendant thereto." "It does not diminish the complainants credibility or undermine the charges
of rape when the delay can be attributed to the pattern of fear instilled by the threats of bodily
harm, specially by one who exercises moral ascendancy over the victim." In this case, not long
after the initial rape, appellant threatened "AAA" that he would kill her and her mother if ever she
would tell anyone about what happened. At that time, "AAA" was only 11 years old and was
living under the same roof with the latter whom she treated as a father. Obviously, the threat
"AAA" received from appellant, coupled with his moral ascendancy, is enough to cow and
intimidate "AAA." Being young and inexperienced, it instilled tremendous fear in her mind. In
People v. Domingo, we ruled that the effect of fear and intimidation instilled in the victims mind
cannot be measured against any given hard-and-fast rule such that it is viewed in the context of
the victims perception and judgment not only at the time of the commission of the crime but
also at the time immediately thereafter. In any event, "the failure of the victim to immediately
report the rape is not necessarily an indication of a fabricated charge."
Neither the failure of "AAA" to struggle nor at least offer resistance during the rape
incidents would tarnish her credibility. "Physical resistance need not be established when
intimidation is brought to bear on the victim and the latter submits herself out of fear. As has
been held, the failure to shout or offer tenuous resistance does not make voluntary the victims
submission to the criminal acts of the accused." Rape is subjective and not everyone responds
in the same way to an attack by a sexual fiend. Although an older person may have shouted for
help under similar circumstances, a young victim such as "AAA" is easily overcome by fear and
may not be able to cry for help.

Also, the fact that "AAA" resumed her normal life after the commission of the alleged
rapes cannot be taken against her. We have consistently ruled that "no standard form of
behavior can be anticipated of a rape victim following her defilement, particularly a child who
could not be expected to fully comprehend the ways of an adult. People react differently to
emotional stress and rape victims are no different from them."
Moreover, appellant contends that it challenges human credulity that he was able to
sexually abuse "AAA" despite the many people around them. Such contention deserves scant
consideration. This is not the first time that our attention was called upon to rule on this matter.
As has been repeatedly ruled, rape can be committed even when the rapist and the victim are
not alone. "Lust is no respecter of time and place." "Rape is not impossible even if committed in
the same room while the rapists spouse is sleeping or in a small room where other family
members also sleep."
"AAA" having positively identified the assailant to be the appellant and no other, the
latters proffered defense of denial must fail. "Denial could not prevail over the victims direct,
positive and categorical assertion." As to his alibi, appellant failed to substantiate the same with
clear and convincing evidence. The plane tickets he submitted in evidence to show that he was
in other places during the incidents are irrelevant. As correctly observed by the RTC, the tickets
were all issued in 1994 while the incidents subject of the Informations charging appellant with
rape transpired from 1996 to 1999. Thus, appellants alibi being uncorroborated and
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is self-serving and deserves no weight in
law.
In fine, "AAAs" woeful tale of her harrowing experience in the hands of the appellant is
impressively clear, definite and convincing. Her detailed narration of the incidents, given in a
spontaneous and frank manner and without any fanfare, were beyond cavil well-founded. We
therefore sustain the RTCs and the CAs findings of appellants guilt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MYLENE TORRES
G.R. No. 191730, June 05, 2013
J. Perez
The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims
it to be. This rule is, however, not established solely by compliance with the prescribed physical
inventory and photographing of the seized drugs in the presence of the enumerated persons.
Though there are deviations from the required procedure, what is essential is the preservation
of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
FACTS:
On January 19, 2007, appellant Mylene Torres was charged with violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The prosecution claimed that on January 17, 2007, PO1
Rivera received information that the appellant was engaged in the sale of dangerous drugs. On
the basis thereof, the police conducted surveillance. Thereafter, a team was formed to conduct
a buy-bust operation. Upon consummation of the sale, appellant was arrested and apprised of
her violation. PO1 Rivera remained in possession of the one heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance subject of the sale. The buy bust team

subsequently brought appellant and the confiscated item to their office. At their office, PO1
Rivera placed a scotch tape and put his initials "JLR" on the one heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet subject of the sale and turned it over to the investigator. The specimen tested was
positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
On the other hand, the appellant denied such claims and averred that on that day, armed
police officers searched her house, frisked her and invited her to the police station though
nothing was found in her possession. She was incarcerated and subjected to a drug test, but
the result was not made known to her.
The trial court rendered a judgment of conviction against appellant, which was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether non-compliance with the mandatory procedure for handling dangerous drugs set forth
in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, particularly the physical inventory and the taking of
photograph of the seized item, created reasonable doubt on appellants culpability.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (the chain of custody rule)
provides for safeguards for the protection of the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized,
to wit:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims
it to be. In context, this would ideally cover the testimony about every link in the chain, from
seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that
everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, to
include, as much as possible, a description of the condition in which it was delivered to the next
link in the chain.

The chain of custody is, however, not established solely by compliance with the
prescribed physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs in the presence of the
enumerated persons. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 on the
handling and disposition of seized dangerous drugs states:
x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items.
Clearly, what is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused."
In the present case, as contrary to the claim of appellant, the totality of the evidence
presented by the prosecution leads to an unbroken chain of custody of the confiscated item
from appellant. Though there were deviations from the required procedure, i.e., making physical
inventory and taking photograph of the seized item, still, the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the dangerous drug seized from appellant were duly proven by the prosecution to have been
properly preserved; its identity, quantity and quality remained untarnished.
It must be stressed that said "justifiable ground" will remain unknown in the light of the
apparent failure of the accused-appellant to challenge the custody and safekeeping or the issue
of disposition and preservation of the subject drugs and drug paraphernalia before the RTC.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARIEL CALARA
G.R. No. 197039, June 05, 2013
J. Perez
The Court has held that although there may be inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses on minor details, they do not impair their credibility where there is consistency in
relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailant. The prosecution
witnesses positive identification prevails over the mere denial of appellant. Denial is an
intrinsically weak defense. When unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, it is
negative and self-serving and merits no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary
value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.
FACTS:
On March 6, 2004, Francisco Dulay (Francisco) was fatally stabbed while he was about
to board a tricycle. Dante Dulay (Dante) and Fernando Porquillano (Fernando) identified
accused as the perpetrator through the latters distinguishing tattoo mark on his right arm.
Francisco was immediately brought to the hospital where he died.
Accused, on the other hand, denied killing Francisco and claimed that on the day of the
incident, he was accompanied by his friends, Albert Cauian, alias "Dugong" and Guiller
Salvador, to the lugawan to court a girl. A commotion ensued and accused had a fistfight with
Dante. Appellant saw Francisco attempt to stab him but Dugong intercepted the attack and
stabbed Francisco first.

The trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty of murder, which was affirmed
by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether inconsistencies in the statements of the witnesses have caused the failure of the
prosecution to establish the guilt of appellant
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Witnesses are not expected to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect
or total recall. What is vital in their testimonies is not their knowledge of the weapon used, but
that they saw appellant stab the victim. As a matter of fact, the presentation of the murder
weapon is not even indispensable to the prosecution of an accused.
The Court has held that although there may be inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses on minor details, they do not impair their credibility where there is consistency in
relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailant.
The purported inconsistencies aside, Dante and Fernando were steadfast in pointing to
appellant as the person who stabbed Francisco. Dante was able to identify appellant by his
tattoo mark and upon hearing someone call out his name at the time of the stabbing, thus:
The prosecution witnesses positive identification prevails over the mere denial of
appellant. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense. When unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, it is negative and self-serving and merits no weight in law and cannot be
given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on
affirmative matters.
SUSAN LIM-LUA v. DANILO Y. LUA
G.R. Nos. 175279-80, June 05, 2013
J. Villarama, Jr.
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its
authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the
courts order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of
justice. To constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper
purpose. Respondent admittedly ceased or suspended the giving of monthly support pendente
lite granted by the trial court, which is immediately executory. However,respondents act was not
contumacious considering that he had not been remiss in actually providing for the needs of his
children.
FACTS:
On September 3, 2003, petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua. She prayed for support pendente lite
which was granted by the trial court. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but the trial
court stated that the Order granting support had become final and executory since respondents

motion for reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper for violation of the three-day notice
period. On certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), the said court allowed deductions to the
monthly support. Petitioner, on the other hand, asserted that none of the expenses deducted
may be chargeable as part of the monthly support. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner and
issued a writ of execution.
Upon respondents failure and refusal to pay the support in arrears pendente lite,
petitioner filed in the CA a Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages. Respondent, on the
other hand, filed a Petition for Certiorari. The CA thereafter set aside the assailed Order of the
trial court and ruled in favor of respondent.
ISSUES:
Whether respondent should be held guilty of indirect contempt.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its
authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the
courts order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of
justice. To constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper
purpose. The good faith, or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor should be considered.
Respondent admittedly ceased or suspended the giving of monthly support pendente lite
granted by the trial court, which is immediately executory. However, we agree with the CA that
respondents act was not contumacious considering that he had not been remiss in actually
providing for the needs of his children. It is a matter of record that respondent continued
shouldering the full cost of their education and even beyond their basic necessities in keeping
with the familys social status. Moreover, respondent believed in good faith that the trial and
appellate courts, upon equitable grounds, would allow him to offset the substantial amounts he
had spent or paid directly to his children.
Respondent complains that petitioner is very much capacitated to generate income on
her own because she presently maintains a boutique at the Ayala Center Mall in Cebu City and
at the same time engages in the business of lending money. He also claims that the two
children have finished their education and are now employed in the family business earning
their own salaries.
Suffice it to state that the matter of increase or reduction of support should be submitted
to the trial court in which the action for declaration for nullity of marriage was filed, as this Court
is not a trier of facts. The amount of support may be reduced or increased proportionately
according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or
means of the person obliged to support. As we held in Advincula v. Advincula:
Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such
nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a
needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in

accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It
cannot be regarded as subject to final determination.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO BUSTAMANTE
G.R. No. 189836, June 05, 2013
J. Leonardo-De Castro
In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the
testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things. Moreover, it is well-settled that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law because denial
cannot prevail over the positive, candid and categorical testimony of the complainant, and as
between the positive declaration of the complainant and the negative statement of the
appellant, the former deserves more credence.
FACTS:
At about lunch time or thereafter on February 17, 1997, AAA was alone in the second
floor in their house when her father, the appellant, arrived. The appellant laid her down on the
floor and removed her shorts and panty. He then removed his pants and went on top of her.
Thereafter, she reported the incident to her mother and the police. On the other hand, appellant
claimed that in the early morning on February 17, 1997, he went to Tuguegarao with his
daughter, AAA, because the latter told him that her cousin, Randy Torrado, molested her. When
they reached their house, policemen arrived and brought him to the Municipal Hall. Appellant
further claimed that his daughter AAA charged him of the heinous crime of rape because his
wife and brothers-inlaw harbored ill feelings against him.
At the conclusion of trial, the trial court rendered judgment against appellant of the crime
of rape. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether AAAs testimony should be given full credence so as to prove appellants guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING:
It is settled in jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted
solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things. Jurisprudence is likewise instructive that the
factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the rape victim, are accorded
great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.
In the case at bar, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found AAA to be a
credible witness and her testimony worthy of full faith and credit. After a careful review of the
records of this case, we find no reason to deviate from the findings of the lower courts.
It is well-settled that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a
self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law because denial cannot prevail over the
positive, candid and categorical testimony of the complainant, and as between the positive
declaration of the complainant and the negative statement of the appellant, the former deserves

more credence. Likewise, the testimonies of the witnesses presented by appellant failed to
buttress his defense of denial as they merely related to tangential matters which do not
seriously affect the issue of AAAs credibility.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO PIOSANG
G.R. No. 200329, June 05, 2013
J. Leonardo-De Castro
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender
age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired,
considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be
exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally
badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA could not have invented a
horrible story.
As between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere
denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. Moreover, for the defense of
alibi to prosper, the appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the offense was
committed and that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically
present at the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. In the
case at bar, accused-appellant was in the immediate vicinity of the locus criminis at the time of
commission of the crime.
FACTS:
On July 8, 1998, then eleven-and-a-half-year-old CCC called AAA, his neighbor, and
asked her to play computer with him at the house of accused-appellant, Ricardo Piosang on
instructions of the latter.On their way, however, AAA and CCC were suddenly pushed inside
accused-appellants comfort room, wherein the latter instructed CCC to hold AAA from behind.
Accused-appellant removed his short pants and inserted his private part into AAA. Thereafter,
accused-appellant ordered CCC to do the same thing the former did. CCC pretended to do what
he was told.Accused-appellant threatened to kill them if they told anyone of what happened, and
then let them go home. Months after, AAA only revealed what happened to her when her mother
warned her not to let anyone touch her private part.
On the other hand, accused-appellant completely denied the charges and claimed that
he was at home on the day in question. He further averred that it was CCC who raped AAA.
The trial court held accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged. Such conviction was
upheld by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether the guilt of accused-appellant was established beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:

AAA, who was six years old by the time she testified in court, had consistently, positively,
and categorically identified accused-appellant as her abuser. Her testimony was direct, candid,
and replete with details of the rape.
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender
age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired,
considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be
exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally
badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA could not have invented a
horrible story.
In contrast, accused-appellant averred that he was at home, letting his hair dry in the
garage, at the time of AAAs rape. We have oft pronounced that both denial and alibi are
inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the
prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime. Thus, as between a categorical
testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the
former is generally held to prevail. Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the appellant
must prove that he was somewhere else when the offense was committed and that he was so
far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the
crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. In the case at bar, AAA was
raped in the detached comfort room of accused-appellants house on July 8, 1998, at which
time, accused-appellant claimed that he was in the garage of the very same house. Obviously,
accused-appellant was in the immediate vicinity of the locus criminis at the time of commission
of the crime.
Accused-appellants theory that he was falsely charged with rape because the actual
rapist, CCC, was a minor and could not be held criminally liable, is baseless and illogical. We
stress that AAA clearly testified that it was only accused-appellant who inserted his penis into
AAAs vagina and that CCC merely pretended to have also done so. Accused-appellant failed to
impute any ill motive on the part of AAA to single him out from all other neighbors and
untruthfully charge him with the rape. As we held in People v. Agcanas:
Positive identification where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill
motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter prevails over a denial which, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence is negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law. They cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony
of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
HENRY L. SY v. LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY
G.R. No. 202690, June 5, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
A claim of excusable negligence does not loosely warrant a relaxation of the rules. Verily, the
party invoking such should be able to show that the procedural oversight or lapse is attended by a
genuine miscalculation or unforeseen fortuitousness which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against so as to justify the relief sought. The standard of care required is that which an ordinarily prudent
man bestows upon his important business. In this accord, the duty rests on every counsel to see to adopt
and strictly maintain a system that will efficiently take into account all court notices sent to him.

FACTS:
A complaint was filed by then Quezon City Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr. on November 7, 1996 with
the RTC for the expropriation of a 1,000 sq. m. parcel of land, owned and registered under the name of
petitioner. Pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the
respondent deposited the amount of Php 241,090.00 representing 15% of the fair market value of the
property based on its tax declaration with the Office of the Clerk of Court. However, because the
petitioner disputes the amount of the just compensation, the RTC appointed three commissioners to
determine the proper amount to be paid by the respondent. Two of the commissioners recommended the
payment of Php 5,500.00 per sq. m. while the other commissioner recommended the higher amount of
Php 13,500.00 per sq. m. as just compensation.
The RTC, in its Orderdated adopted the findings the two commissioners and ordered the payment
of aforesaid amount with interest. Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA, which affirmed the RTC ruling
with modifications and ordered the payment of damages. Aggrieved, petitioner then filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied in the Resolution dated July 16, 2012 for being filed out of time.
Hence, this appeal under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration for being filed out of
time.
RULING:
At the outset, the Court observes that Sys motion for reconsideration was filed out of time and
thus, was properly dismissed by the CA. Records show that, as per the Postmasters Certification, the
CAs January 20, 2012 Decision was received by Sy on January 26, 2012 and as such, any motion for
reconsideration therefrom should have been filed not later than fifteen (15) days from receipt, or on
February 10, 2012. However, Sy filed his motion for reconsideration (subject motion) a day late, or on
February 13, 2012, which thus, renders the CA decision final and executory.
In this regard, it is apt to mention that Sys counsel, Atty. Tranquilino F. Meris (Atty. Meris), claims
that his secretarys inadvertent placing of the date January 27, 2012, instead of January 26, 2012, on the
Notice of Decision constitutes excusable negligence which should therefore, justify a relaxation of the
rules.
The assertion is untenable. A claim of excusable negligence does not loosely warrant a
relaxation of the rules. Verily, the party invoking such should be able to show that the procedural oversight
or lapse is attended by a genuine miscalculation or unforeseen fortuitousness which ordinary prudence
could not have guarded against so as to justify the relief sought. The standard of carerequired is that
which an ordinarily prudent man bestows upon his important business. In this accord, the duty rests on
every counsel to see to adopt and strictly maintain a system that will efficiently take into account all court
notices sent to him.
Applying these principles, the Court cannot excuse Atty. Meris misstep based on his proffered
reasons. Evidently, the erroneous stamping of the Notice of Decision could have been averted if only he
had instituted a credible filing system in his office to account for oversights such as that committed by his
secretary. Indeed, ordinary prudence could have prevented such mistake.
Be that as it may, procedural rules may, nonetheless, be relaxed for the most persuasive of
reasons in order to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which states that the
mistakes of counsel bind the client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in the
outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires.

As applied in this case, the Court finds that the procedural consequence of the above-discussed
one-day delay in the filing of the subject motion which, as a matter of course, should render the CAs
January 20, 2012 Decision already final and executory and hence, bar the instant petition is
incommensurate to the injustice which Sy may suffer. This is in line with the Courts observation that the
amount of just compensation, the rate of legal interest, as well as the time of its accrual, were incorrectly
adjudged by both the RTC and the CA, contrary to existing jurisprudence. In this respect, the Court
deems it proper to relax the rules of procedure.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MOISES CAOILE
G.R. No. 203041, June 5, 2013
J. Leonardo - de Castro
It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter
best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand
and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. These are important in
determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting
testimonies. For, indeed, the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining
the witness credibility, and the trial court has the opportunity and can take advantage of these aids.
FACTS:
The victim in this case, hereinafter referred to as AAA, was left in the care of her grandmother
and auntie in Alipang, Rosario, La Union when her mother left for work abroad when she was still young.
One of their neighbors was the accused whose daughter, Marivic, was the playmate of AAA. The
evidence for the prosecution showed that the accused had, in multiple times and places, carnal
knowledge of AAA. Sometime in April 2005, AAA heard her friend BBB complain to the Barangay Tanod
that the accused mashed her breast, and upon hearing BBBs story, AAA blurted out that she, too, was
abused by the accused. CCC took AAA, her niece, to the police station to reportthe incident, and
thereafter AAA was subjected to various types of medical examinations. The psychological evaluation
conducted on AAA showed that she suffers from mental retardation.
The accused, in his defense, denied the accusations and alleged that the sexual intercourse
between him and AAA was consensual as they were lovers, and that he did not now that AAA was a
demented person since she acted like a normal individual.
The RTC, in its May 6, 2009 decision, found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape. On appeal, the accused alleged that the lower court was not able to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and attacked the credibility of AAA and the methods used to determine her mental
state. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape even though the credibility of AAA was questionable.
RULING:
Caoiles insistence, to escape liability, that AAA is not a mental retardate, cannot be accepted by
this Court.
The fact that AAA was able to answer in a straightforward manner during her testimony cannot be
used against her. The capacity of a mental retardate to stand as a witness in court has already been
settled by this Court. In People v. Castillo, we said:
It bears emphasis that the competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as
witnesses have been upheld by this Court where it is shown that they can communicate their ordeal

capably and consistently. Rather than undermine the gravity of the complainants accusations, it even
lends greater credence to her testimony, that, someone as feeble-minded and guileless could speak so
tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands
of the accused. Moreover, it is settled that when a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect all
that is necessary to show that she has been raped and her testimony alone is sufficient if it satisfies the
exacting standard of credibility needed to convict the accused.
More importantly, AAAs medical condition was verified not only by one expert, but three
witnesses a psychologist and two psychiatrists, one of whom was even chosen by the defense and
testified for the defense. All three experts confirmed that AAA suffered from mental retardation. Caoile
cannot, at this point, properly impeach his own witness without violating established rules of evidence.
This Court further disagrees with Caoiles claim that the experts "merely impressed that they
conducted a psychological evaluation on [AAA] in which she obtained a performance classified within the
mental retardation range." The experts findings on AAAs mental condition were based on several tests
and examinations, including the Stanford-Binet Test, which Caoile, relying on this Courts ruling in People
v. Cartuano, Jr., considered as one of the more reliable standardized tests. Besides, this Court has
already qualified the applicability of Cartuano in cases involving mentally deficient rape victims, to wit:
People v. Cartuano applies only to cases where there is a dearth of medical records to sustain a
finding of mental retardation. Indeed, the Court has clarified so in People v. Delos Santos, declaring that
the records in People v. Cartuano were wanting in clinical, laboratory, and psychometric support to sustain
a finding that the victim had been suffering from mental retardation. It is noted that in People v. Delos
Santos, the Court upheld the finding that the victim had been mentally retarded by an examining
psychiatrist who had been able to identify the tests administered to the victim and to sufficiently explain
the results of the tests to the trial court.
Borrowing our words in People v. Butiong, "in direct contrast to People v. Cartuano, this case did
not lack clinical findings on the mentality of the victim." Here, the psychiatric evaluation report of Caoiles
own expert witness is the final nail on the coffin of Caoiles argument.
In addition, this Court will not contradict the RTCs findings, which were affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, absent any valid reason. The trial courts assessment of the witnesses credibility is given great
weight and is even conclusive and binding upon this Court. In People v. Sapigao, Jr., we explained in
detail the rationale for this practice:
It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter
best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand
and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. These are important in
determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting
testimonies. For, indeed, the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining
the witness credibility, and the trial court has the opportunity and can take advantage of these aids.
These cannot be incorporated in the record so that all that the appellate court can see are the cold words
of the witness contained in transcript of testimonies with the risk that some of what the witness actually
said may have been lost in the process of transcribing. As correctly stated by an American court, "There is
an inherent impossibility of determining with any degree of accuracy what credit is justly due to a witness
from merely reading the words spoken by him, even if there were no doubt as to the identity of the words.
However artful a corrupt witness may be, there is generally, under the pressure of a skillful crossexamination, something in his manner or bearing on the stand that betrays him, and thereby destroys the
force of his testimony. Many of the real tests of truth by which the artful witness is exposed in the very
nature of things cannot be transcribed upon the record, and hence they can never be considered by the
appellate court."
JOSELITO C. BORROMEO v. JUAN T. MINA
G.R. No. 193747, June 5, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe

Settled is the rule that a party who adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and
decided by the lower courts or tribunals will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, not because
of the strict application of procedural rules, but as a matter of fairness. Basic considerations of due
process dictate that theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court would
not ordinarily be considered by a reviewing court, except when their factual bases would not require
presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable him to properly meet the
issue raised.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a Petition dated June 9, 2003 before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO)
of Isabela, seeking that: (a) his landholding over the subject be exempted from the coverage of the
governments Operation Land Transfer(OLT) program under PD No. 27; and (b) respondents
emancipation patent over the subject property be consequently revoked and cancelled. To this end,
petitioner alleged that he purchased the aforesaid property from its previous owner, one Serafin M.
Garcia, as evidenced by a deed of sale notarized on February 19, 1982. For various reasons, however,
he was not able to effect the transfer of title in his name. Subsequently, to his surprise, he learned that an
emancipation patent was issued in respondents favor without any notice to him.
In a Resolution, the PARO cancelled respondents emancipation patent and directed the
petitioner to allow the respondent to continue in peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject
property and to execute a leasehold contract over the same pursuant to the Agricultural Land Reform
Code. Aggrieved, respondent filed an administrative appeal before the DAR Regional Director, who
declared the subject property exempted from OLT coverage but did not order the cancellation of the
respondents emancipation patent and instead directed petitioner to institute proper proceedings for such
purpose before the DARAB. The DAR Secretary in turn affirmed the ruling of the Regional Director in
toto. As such, respondent filed a petition for review with the CA.
The CA reversed and set aside the DAR Secretarys Ruling. It doubted petitioners claim of
ownership based on the 1982 deed of sale due to the inconsistent allegations regarding the dates of its
notarization stated in the two PARO petitions, and found the sale to be null and void. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioner which was, however, denied. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in declaring the sale between him and Garcia as null and void.
RULING:
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in declaring the sale between him and Garcia as null and
void. In this connection, he avers that there was actually an oral sale entered into by him and Garcia
(through his son Lorenzo Garcia) in 1976. The said oral sale was consummated on the same year as
petitioner had already occupied and tilled the subject property and started paying real estate taxes
thereon. He further alleges that he allowed respondent to cultivate and possess the subject property in
1976 only out of mercy and compassion since the latter begged him for work. The existing sale
agreement had been merely formalized by virtue of the 1982 deed of sale.
In his Comment, respondent counters that petitioner cannot change his theory regarding the date
of sale between him and Garcia nor even raise the same factual issue on appeal before the Court.
Moreover, he asserts that the 1982 deed of sale was not registered and therefore, does not bind him. In
any event, he posits that the sale between petitioner and Garcia was null and void.
Settled is the rule that a party who adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and
decided by the lower courts or tribunals will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, not because

of the strict application of procedural rules, but as a matter of fairness. Basic considerations of due
process dictate that theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court would not
ordinarily be considered by a reviewing court, except when their factual bases would not require
presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable him to properly meet the
issue raised, such as when the factual bases of such novel theory, issue or argument is (a) subject of
judicial notice; or (b) had already been judicially admitted, which do not obtain in this case.
Records show that petitioner changed his theory on appeal with respect to two (2) matters:
First, the actual basis of his ownership rights over the subject property, wherein he now claims
that his ownership was actually based on a certain oral sale in 1976 which was merely formalized by the
1982 deed of sale; and
Second, the status of respondent as tenant of the subject property, which he never questioned
during the earlier stages of the proceedings before the DAR but presently disputes before the Court.
Clearly, the factual bases of the foregoing theories require the presentation of proof as neither of
them had been judicially admitted by respondent nor subject of judicial notice. Therefore, the Court
cannot entertain petitioners novel arguments raised in the instant petition. Accordingly, he must rely on
his previous positions that (a) his basis of ownership over the subject property rests on the 1982 deed of
sale; and (b) that respondents status as the tenant of the subject property remains undisputed.
METRO MANILA SHOPPING MECCA CORP., SHOEMART, INC., SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., STAR
APPLIANCES CENTER, SUPER VALUE, INC., ACE HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC., HEALTH AND
BEAUTY, INC., JOLLIMART PHILS. CORP., and SURPLUS MARKETING CORPORATION v. MS.
LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her official capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila, and THE CITY OF
MANILA
G.R. No. 190818, June 5, 2013
J. Perlas Bernabe
The Court held that the original period for filing the petition for review may be extended for a
period of fifteen (15) days, which for the most compelling reasons, may be extended for another period
not exceeding fifteen (15) days. In other words, the reglementary period provided under Section 3, Rule 8
of the RRCTA is extendible and as such, CTA Divisions grant of respondents motion for extension falls
squarely within the law.
FACTS:
Sometime in October 2001, respondent, as Treasurer of the City of Manila, assessed the
petitioners for their fourth quarter local business taxes pursuant to the Revenue Code of the City of Manila
amounting to Php 5,104,281.26, which the latter paid under protest on October 20, 2001. The protest
was denied on October 25, 2001. On October 20, 2003, petitioners filed a case with the RTC, alleging
that the City Ordinance relied upon for the assessment was null and void and sought the refund of the
taxes they previously paid to the City. Respondents then filed a Motion to Dismisson November 6, 2003
but since the RTC did not address the arguments raised in such, they filed an Answer on December 16,
2003, averring in both that petitioners failed to filed any written claim for tax refund or credit with the Office
of the City Treasurer of Manila. On July 8, 2004, petitioners sent respondents Requests for Admissions &
Interrogatories dated July 7, 2004 which inter alia requested the admission of the fact that the former fied
a written protest with the latter. However, petitioners did not respond to said request.
In its Decision, the RTC held that respondents assessment of local business tax under the
Revenue Code of Manila is null and void, thereby warranting the issuance of a tax refund or tax credit in
the amount previously paid. Aggrieved, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the RTC,
which the latter denied. Thereafter, they filed two Motions for Extension to File Petition for Review with
the CTA, effectively requesting for a period of thirty days from May 27, 2007, or until June 26, 2007, to file
their petition for review. On June 26, 2007, respondents filed their Petition for Review dated June 22,

2007 via registered mail and issued a Resolution on July 6, 2007 granting the Motion for Extension and
admitted their Petition.
In its decision, the CTA Division reversed and set aside the RTCs ruling and in effect denied the
petitioners request for tax credit/refund, and held that the petitioners failed to contest the denial of their
protest before a court of competent jurisdiction within the period provided for under the LGC, thus making
the assessment conclusive and unappealable. Petitioners then moved for reconsideration, but the same
was denied. They then elevated the matter to the CTA En Banc which upheld the CTA Divisions ruling.
Hence, this appeal under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CTA Division correctly gave due course to respondents petition for review.
RULING:
The petition is bereft of merit.
Petitioners argue that the CTA Division erred in extending the reglementary period within which
respondents may file their Petition for Review, considering that Section 3, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of
the CTA (RRCTA) is silent on such matter. Further, even if it is assumed that an extension is allowed, the
CTA Division should not have entertained respondents Petition for Review for their failure to comply with
the filing requisites set forth in Section 4, Rule 5 and Section 2, Rule 6 of the RRCTA.
Petitioners arguments fail to persuade.
Although the RRCTA does not explicitly sanction extensions to file a petition for review with the
CTA, Section 1, Rule 7 thereof reads that in the absence of any express provision in the RRCTA, Rules
42, 43, 44 and 46 of the Rules of Court may be applied in a suppletory manner. In particular, Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 9282 makes reference to the procedure under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. In this light,
Section 1 of Rule 42 states that the period for filing a petition for review may be extended upon motion of
the concerned party. Thus, in City of Manila v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., the Court held that the
original period for filing the petition for review may be extended for a period of fifteen (15) days, which for
the most compelling reasons, may be extended for another period not exceeding fifteen (15) days. In
other words, the reglementary period provided under Section 3, Rule 8 of the RRCTA is extendible and as
such, CTA Divisions grant of respondents motion for extension falls squarely within the law.
Neither did respondents failure to comply with Section 4, Rule 5 and Section 2, Rule 6 of the
RRCTA militate against giving due course to their Petition for Review. Respondents submission of only
one copy of the said petition and their failure to attach therewith a certified true copy of the RTCs
decision constitute mere formal defects which may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice. It is
well-settled that dismissal of appeals based purely on technical grounds is frowned upon as every party
litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free
from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. In this regard, the CTA Division did not overstep its
boundaries when it admitted respondents Petition for Review despite the aforementioned defects "in the
broader interest of justice."
SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON AGNER vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC.
G.R. No. 182963, June 3, 2013
J. Peralta
Prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin, since there is nothing
in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court that requires the applicant to make a demand on the
possessor of the property before an action for a writ of replevin could be filed.
FACTS:

On February 15, 2001, petitioner spouses executed a Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage in
favor of Citimotors, Inc amounting to Php 834, 768.00. On the same day, Citimotors, Inc. assigned all its
rights, titles and interests in the Promissory Note to ABN AMRO Savings Bank, Inc., whichlikewise
assigned the same to respondent on May 31, 2002. For failure of the petitioner spouses to pay four
consecutive installments, respondent through counsel, sent to petitioners a demand letter declaring the
entire obligation as due and demandable and requiring to pay Php 576,664.04, or surrender the
mortgaged vehicle immediately upon receiving the letter. As the demand left unheeded, respondent filed
on October 4, 2002 an action for Replevin and Damages before the Manila RTC.
A writ of replevin was issued but the subject vehicle was not seized. Trial on the merits then
ensued and after weighing the evidence, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent and ordered petitioners to
pay the amount due as aforesaid with interests. Upon appeal to the CA, the latter affirmed the lower
courts decision, and, subsequently, denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari was filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have defaulted in their payment even though there lacks competent proof
of their receipt of a written letter of demand, thus making the action for replevin improper.
RULING:
The contention is untenable.
Records bear that both verbal and written demands were in fact made by respondent prior to the
institution of the case against petitioners. Even assuming, for arguments sake, that no demand letter
was sent by respondent, there is really no need for it because petitioners legally waived the necessity of
notice or demand in the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage, which they voluntarily and knowingly
signed in favor of respondents predecessor-in-interest. Said contract expressly stipulates:
In case of my/our failure to pay when due and payable, any sum which I/We are obliged to pay
under this note and/or any other obligation which I/We or any of us may now or in the future owe to the
holder of this note or to any other party whether as principal or guarantor x x x then the entire sum
outstanding under this note shall, without prior notice or demand, immediately become due and payable.
Further, the Court even ruled in Navarro v. Escobido that prior demand is not a condition
precedent to an action for a writ of replevin, since there is nothing in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of
Court that requires the applicant to make a demand on the possessor of the property before an action for
a writ of replevin could be filed.
Also, petitioners representation that they have not received a demand letter is completely
inconsequential as the mere act of sending it would suffice. Again, We look into the Promissory Note with
Chattel Mortgage, which provides:
All correspondence relative to this mortgage, including demand letters, summonses, subpoenas,
or notifications of any judicial or extrajudicial action shall be sent to the MORTGAGOR at the address
indicated on this promissory note with chattel mortgage or at the address that may hereafter be given in
writing by the MORTGAGOR to the MORTGAGEE or his/its assignee. The mere act of sending any
correspondence by mail or by personal delivery to the said address shall be valid and effective notice to
the mortgagor for all legal purposes and the fact that any communication is not actually received by the
MORTGAGOR or that it has been returned unclaimed to the MORTGAGEE or that no person was found
at the address given, or that the address is fictitious or cannot be located shall not excuse or relieve the
MORTGAGOR from the effects of such notice.

The Court cannot yield to petitioners denial in receiving respondents demand letter. To note, their
postal address evidently remained unchanged from the time they executed the Promissory Note with
Chattel Mortgage up to time the case was filed against them. Thus, the presumption that "a letter duly
directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail" stands in the absence of satisfactory
proof to the contrary.
ERNESTO L. NATIVIDAD v. FERNANDO MARIANO, ANDRES MARIANO and DOROTEO GARCIA
G.R. No. 179643, June 3, 2013
J. Brion
The broader interests of justice and equity demand that we set aside procedural rules as they
are, after all, intended to promote rather than defeat substantial justice. If the rigid and pedantic
application of procedural norms would frustrate rather than promote justice, the Court always has the
power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from its operation, particularly if defects of
jurisdiction appear to be present.
FACTS:
On December 23, 1998, petitioner filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication (PARAD)
of Nueva Ecija a petition for ejectment and collection of back lease rentals against the respondents who
are the tenants of the subject property, alleging that he purchased the same in a public auction several
years ago. The PARAD granted the petition in its October 27, 1999 decision, ordering the respondents to
vacate the property and to pay the lease rentals in arrears. When the respondents failed to appeal the
decision despite due notice, the PARADs decision became final and executory, and on April 6, 2000, the
PARAD granted Ernestos motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
Respondents filed an appearance and a Petition for Relief from Judgment on the ground of
excusable negligence on May 4, 2000. They alleged that they had no knowledge of such sale, and that
they had been paying the lease rentals to the landowner, attaching thereto copies of rental payment
receipts issued by the latters representative. The petition was however denied by the PARAD on June 7,
2000, declaring that none of the grounds that grant the petition exists, and that the same was filed out of
time. The motion for reconsideration filed by respondents was also denied by the PARAD. Aggrieved,
they appealed to the DARAB.
On February 15, 2005, the DARAB granted the respondents appeal and reversed the PARADs
October 27, 1999 Decision, ordering the petitioner to maintain the respondents in peaceful possession
and cultivation of the subject property, but still ordered the latter to pay the lease rentals in arrears.
Petitioner then appealed the DARAB decision to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, which the latter denied for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the final and executory decision of the PARAD could still be reopened modified.
RULING:

We cannot blame Ernesto for insisting that the PARAD decision can no longer be
altered. The doctrine of immutability of final judgments, grounded on the fundamental principle
of public policy and sound practice, is well settled. Indeed, once a decision has attained finality,
it becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, whether
the modification is to be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
The doctrine holds true even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact
and law. The judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must, on some
definite date fixed by law, become final even at the risk of occasional errors. The only accepted
exceptions to this general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc

entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable.
This doctrine of immutability of judgments notwithstanding, we are not persuaded that
the DARAB and the CA erred in reopening, and ruling on the merits of the case. The broader
interests of justice and equity demand that we set aside procedural rules as they are, after all,
intended to promote rather than defeat substantial justice. If the rigid and pedantic application
of procedural norms would frustrate rather than promote justice, the Court always has the power
to suspend the rules or except a particular case from its operation, particularly if defects of
jurisdiction appear to be present. This is the precise situation that we presently find before this
Court.
In the present petition, the DARAB granted the respondents appeal, despite the lapse of
ten months from the respondents notice of the PARADs decision, because the PARAD denied
the respondents petition for relief from judgment simply on a sweeping declaration that none of
the grounds for the grant of the petition exists and that the petition had been filed out of time.
The records, however, sufficiently contradict the PARADs reasons for denying the respondents
petition for relief; not only do we find justifiable grounds for its grant, we also find that the
respondents filed their petition well within the prescriptive period. Thus, the PARAD effectively
and gravely abused its discretion and acted without jurisdiction in denying the petition for relief
from judgment.
A petition for relief from the judgment of the PARAD is governed by Section 4, Rule IX of
the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure (the governing DARAB rules at the time Ernesto filed his
complaint). It reads in part:
SECTION 4. Relief from Judgment. A petition for relief from judgment must be
verified and must be based on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake and excusable
neglect x x x; Provided, that the petition is filed with the Adjudicator a quo within three (3)
months from the time the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect was discovered
and six (6) months from notice of order, resolution or decision from which relief is sought.
A reading of Section 4 shows that four grounds justify the grant of the petition for relief
from judgment, namely: fraud, accident, mistake and excusable negligence. The same provision
also presents two periods that must be observed for such grant 90 days and six months.
In their first and second petitions, the respondents invoked the ground of excusable
negligence. They alleged that they failed to appear before the PARAD due to their inexperience
and ignorance of agrarian reform laws and of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, as well as
indigence. These circumstances their averred ignorance coupled with financial constraints if
not outright poverty - taken altogether sufficiently convince us that the respondents negligence
is more than excusable and constitutes a justifiable ground for the grant of their petition for
relief.
We are also convinced that the respondents complied with the twin period requirement
set by Section 4, Rule IX of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure. First, the records show that
the respondents received a copy of the PARADs October 27, 1999 decision on December 10,
1999, at the earliest; they filed their first petition on May 4, 2000 or five months after. Second,
following our above discussion that the respondents had sufficiently shown grounds for the
grant of their petition, we perforce count the 90-day period from the respondents discovery of
their excusable negligence. We construe this date as the time when the respondents discovered

the adverse consequence of their failure to answer, seek reconsideration or appeal the
PARADs decision, which was when they were evicted from the subject property on June 9,
2000 or 35 days before they filed their first petition. Clearly, the respondents filed their petition
well within 6 months from their notice of the PARADs decision and within 90 days from the
discovery of their excusable negligence.
Based on these considerations, we are convinced that the DARAB did not err in granting
the respondents appeal despite the procedural lapses. Under Section 3, Rule I of the 1994
DARAB Rules of Procedure, the DARAB and its adjudicators "shall not be bound by technical
rules of procedure and evidence as prescribed in the Rules of Court, but shall proceed to hear
and decide all agrarian cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner,
employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice
and equity." The same provision is essentially embodied in R.A. No. 3844 upon which Ernesto
heavily relied. In our view, considerations of equity, justice and jurisdiction surround this case,
justifying the relaxation of the rules and the DARABs grant of the respondents appeal.
In sum, we rule that the DARAB correctly allowed the respondents appeal despite the
lapse of the reglementary period. Accordingly, we cannot impute error on the CA in not reversing
the DARABs decision simply under the doctrine of immutability of judgments.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REGGIE BERNARDO
G.R. No. 198789, June 3, 2013
J. Reyes
It has been settled that affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially
when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Absent clear and convincing evidence, alibi and
denial are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. Further, for alibi to prosper, it
must be proved, not only that the assailant was in another place when the crime was committed, but that
it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time
of its commission altogether.
FACTS:
An information charged the accused of the crime of murder of one Efren Calumag y Antonio and
the attempted murder of one Reah Calumag, to which the accused pleaded not guilty upon his
arraignment. Reah Calumag, one of the witnesses offered by the prosecution, testified that the incident
transpired on July 27, 2006 along the National Highway in Sarrat, Ilocos Norte while she was aboard a
motorcycle driven by her father, Efren Calumag. Three men on a motorcylce going the same direction
suddenly appeared beside them and shot them several times, consequently causing Efren to die and
Reah to survive as she was treated for her wounds. Two days thereafter, Reah went to the police station
upon being informed that the police has in their custody a person who fitted the description of one of the
assailants as given by her, who is herein accused.
The accused on the other hand interposed the defense of denial and alibi, alleging that although
he was originally ordered to be released on July 21, 2006, he was still incarcerated at the time the crime
was committed as his request to stay in jail was granted by the warden for he has nowhere else to go. He
even narrated that on the day of the incident, he washed his clothes in the morning, helped in preparing
the lunch, and was later accompanied by three jail guards to the PAGIBIG office in Laoag City using the
district jail service.
The RTC rendered its judgment on April 27, 2007 and found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of murder with attempted murder, giving credence to Reahs
narration of facts over Bernardos defense of denial and alibi. On March 4, 2011, the CA affirmed the

decision of the RTC, deleting however the temperate damages awarded by the lower court. Aggrieved,
the accused filed this present appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution has proven the accuseds guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
The Court sustains the accuseds conviction.
Bernardo asserts alibi and denial as defenses. He argues that he was in jail when the crime was
committed. Such alibi, while corroborated by the testimonies of some of Batac District Jail guards, cannot
prevail over the positive identification made by Reah pinpointing Bernardo as one of the malefactors who
shot Efren to death. The identification of Bernardo as an assailant was positively and credibly established
by the prosecution in this case. It has been settled that affirmative testimony is far stronger than a
negative testimony especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Absent clear and
convincing evidence, alibi and denial are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.
Further, for alibi to prosper, it must be proved, not only that the assailant was in another place
when the crime was committed, but that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime
scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission altogether. In this case, Bernardo claims the
physical impossibility of having committed the crime for the reason that he was still in jail when it was
perpetrated. He was ordered released by the RTC of Batac on July 21, 2006; hence, he was no longer a
detention prisoner during the commission of the crime. The Batac District Jail is in the same province
where the crime was committed and could be easily reached within thirty to forty five minutes from
BarangaySan Marcos, Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. Having been discharged from jail, Bernardo was also free to
move around and was not subject to strict monitoring. This was bolstered by the finding of the RTC that
there was no record that Bernardo stayed in jail on the day the crime was perpetrated. Undisputedly,
there was no physical impossibility for Bernardo to leave his cell and be present at the shooting incident.
The alleged minor discrepancies in the testimony of Reah, the main prosecution witness,
identifying Bernardo as one of the perpetrators in the shooting incident were, indeed, negligible. As the
CA correctly emphasized, Reah was not only able to relate a detailed story of what transpired on July 27,
2006 but more importantly, her testimony was sufficient to convict Bernardo for the crime charged.

JULY 2013
WILLIAM T. GO v. ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO, substituted by his legal heirs TERESITA C.
LOOYUKO, et. al.
G.R. No. 196529, July 1, 2013
J. Mendoza
The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the
parties. When the defendant, however, raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of
ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
Prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not an indispensable requirement in an
unlawful detainer case brought by a vendee or other person against whom the possession of
any land is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of a right to hold possession.

FACTS:
Respondent Alberto T. Looyuko (Looyuko) and Jimmy Go, brother of petitioner William
Go (William) were partners in a business called Noahs Ark Group of Companies (Noahs Ark).
Their partnership was embodied in a written agreement, dated February 9, 1982.
Sometime in 1986, William was appointed Chief of Staff of Noahs Ark Sugar Refinery.
He was allowed by Looyuko to occupy the townhouse in Gilmore Townhomes, Granada Street,
Quezon City. On October 10, 1986, another agreement was entered into by Looyuko and
Jimmy in furtherance of their business partnership.
In a letter, dated October 28, 1998, Looyuko demanded that William vacate the
townhouse. Jimmy filed an adverse claim over the property, annotating his interest on the title
as co-owner. He claimed that the townhouse was bought using funds from Noahs Ark and,
hence, part of the property of the partnership. William refused to vacate the property relying on
the strength of his brothers adverse claim.
On December 2, 1998, Looyuko filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against William
before the MeTC. He adduced as evidence the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 108763
issued in his name as well as the aforementioned demand letter. He alleged that Williams
occupation was merely by tolerance, on the understanding that he should vacate the property
upon demand. On the other hand, William presented the partnership agreements, the contract
to sell of the subject property to Noahs Ark, and the cash voucher evidencing payment for the
acquisition of the property.
The MeTC rendered a decision in favor of Looyuko stating that he had the right to the
possession of the said townhouse as its registered owner. William then appealed to the QC
RTC. Meanwhile, Looyuko filed a motion for execution pending appeal on the ground that the
supersedeas bond was insufficient.
On his part, William filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the unlawful detainer case
because a complaint for specific performance against Looyuko had been filed by Jimmy before
RTC of Pasig City to establish his alleged right as a co-owner.
In March 2001, the QC RTC ruled in favor of William and deferred the proceedings in the
unlawful detainer case to await the outcome of the civil case before the Pasig RTC. The
QC RTC also denied Looyukos two motions for execution. The CA, however, reversed the QC
RTC orders and directed the immediate execution of the MTC Decision.
On March 29, 2004, the QC RTC issued a decision in the action for unlawful detainer,
reversing the findings of the MTC and ruling in favor of William. It held that the property was
purchased in the name of Noahs Ark and that Looyuko held the title for purpose of expediency
only.
Looyuko filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the CA.
The CA ruled in favor of Looyuko and held that the issue of possession could be resolved
without ruling on the claim of ownership. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:

1. Whether the issue of ownership should be ruled upon in relation to the action between
Jimmy and Looyuko involving their claimed shares in the title over the property.
2. Whether respondents prior physical possession is necessary for his action for unlawful
detainer to prosper.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
This petition involves an action for unlawful detainer, which is an action to recover
possession of real property from one who unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The
possession of the defendant in an unlawful detainer case is originally legal but becomes illegal
due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The sole issue for resolution in an
unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent
of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. When the defendant, however, raises the
defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine
the
issue
of
possession.
The Court agrees with William that the issue of ownership should be ruled upon
considering that such has been raised and it appears that it is inextricably linked to the question
of possession. Its resolution will then boil down to which of the parties respective evidence
deserves more weight. Even granting, however, that all the pieces of documentary evidence
presented by William are valid, they will fail to bolster his case.
The Court has consistently upheld the registered owners superior right to possess the
property in unlawful detainer cases. It is an age-old rule that the person who has a Torrens Title
over a land is entitled to its possession. It has repeatedly been emphasized that when the
property is registered under the Torrens system, the registered owners title to the property is
presumed legal and cannot be collaterally attacked, especially in a mere action for unlawful
detainer. It has even been held that it does not even matter if the partys title to the property is
questionable.
The TCT of respondent Looyuko is, therefore, evidence of indefeasible title over
property and, as its holder, he is entitled to its possession as a matter of right. Thus,
partnership agreements and other documentary evidence presented by petitioner William
not, by themselves, enough to offset Looyukos right as registered owner. It must
underscored, however, that this adjudication on ownership is merely provisional and would
bar or prejudice the action between Jimmy and Looyuko involving their claimed shares in
title over the property.

the
the
are
be
not
the

However, William is mistaken in his argument that respondent Looyukos prior physical
possession is necessary for his action for unlawful detainer to prosper. Section 1 of Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court lays down the requirements for filing a complaint for unlawful detainer, to wit:
Sec. 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provision of
the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or
building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold

possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal

representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person,
may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court
against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession,
or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs.
Nowhere does it appear in the above-cited rule that, in an action for unlawful detainer,
the plaintiff be in prior physical possession of the property. Thus, it has been held that prior
physical possession by the plaintiff is not an indispensable requirement in an unlawful detainer
case brought by a vendee or other person against whom the possession of any land is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of a right to hold possession.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOEMARI JALBONIAN alias BUDO

G.R. No. 180281, July 01, 2013
J. Del Castillo
When there is only one witness to the crime and that he was familiar with both the victim
and the accused, it can therefore be established that such witness is telling the truth. Finding of
guilt based on the testimony of a lone witness is not uncommon. "For although the number of
witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, preponderance is not
necessarily with the greatest number and conviction can still be had on the basis of the credible
and positive testimony of a single witness.
FACTS:
On July 30, 1991, an Information for murder was filed against appellant. Appellant then
went into hiding for more than five years and was apprehended only on July 10, 1996. During
his arraignment, he entered a plea of "not guilty.
For the evidence of the prosecution, Barangay Chairman Oscar Valenciano (Valenciano)
testified that at 9:00 a.m. of January 26, 1991, a barangay assembly meeting was held in
Balicotoc Elementary School, a public educational institution located in Brgy. Balicotoc, Ilog,
Negros Occidental. After the meeting was adjourned at noon, the participants including
Valenciano left the school premises. From a distance of about three-arms length, Valenciano
saw appellant position himself behind Fortunato Quintanilla, Jr. (Quintanilla), stab the latter on
the back with a knife, and immediately run away. Valenciano ordered Julio Gaston, a member of
the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), to chase appellant but the latter eluded
arrest. Quintanilla was brought by Valenciano to the nearest hospital but he died before
reaching there.
After the prosecution rested its case, appellant filed a Motion for Leave to File a Motion
to Dismiss by Way of Demurrer of Evidence. However, the trial court denied the motion. Despite
the denial, the defense did not present any evidence anymore.
The RTC convicted appellant of murder qualified by treachery. It gave credence to the
testimony of Valenciano who identified appellant as the perpetrator of the crime and gave a
detailed account of the stabbing incident. The trial court found that Valenciano had no reason to
falsely testify against the appellant and that his account as to how appellant stabbed the victim
was corroborated by the death certificate. In addition, the trial court considered appellants flight
for more than five years as indication of his guilt. Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal which the
RTC approved. Pursuan thereto, the records of the case were elevated to the Supreme Court.
However, in view of the ruling in People v. Mateo this case was remanded to the CA for
intermediate review.The CA affirmed appellants conviction but modified the RTCs judgment.
Hence, the present appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime
charged despite the insufficiency of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:

The appeal is dismissed.

The Court is convinced that it was appellant who killed the victim. Valenciano clearly
narrated the details of the stabbing incident and positively identified appellant as the assailant.
It has been held that when a testimony is given in a candid and straightforward manner,
there is no room for doubt that the witness is telling the truth. Moreover, Valencianos testimony
on the stabbing of the victim was corroborated by the Certificate of Death attesting that the
cause of death was a stab wound.
As to appellants argument that it was impossible for Valenciano to personally identify
him as the assailant since the victim and his attacker had their backs turned to Valenciano, the
Court finds the same unworthy of credence.
Suffice it to say that the relative position of the witness from the victim and the assailant
refers to a minor detail that does not detract from his credibility. What is important is that
Valenciano witnessed the unfolding of the crime and was able to positively identify appellant as
the culprit. In addition and as correctly pointed out by the OSG, Valenciano readily identified
appellant because the latter used to reside in the same barangay of which he was barangay
captain.
Likewise untenable is appellants contention that Valencianos testimony cannot be relied
upon since it was not corroborated by other witnesses to the crime. Finding of guilt based on the
testimony of a lone witness is not uncommon. "For although the number of witnesses may be
considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, preponderance is not necessarily with the
greatest number and conviction can still be had on the basis of the credible and positive
testimony of a single witness. Corroborative evidence is deemed necessary only when there
are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his observation
had been inaccurate." This is not obtaining in this case.
Moreover, appellant also failed to attribute any improper motive to Valenciano to falsely
testify against him. There was no evidence to establish that Valenciano harbored any ill-will
against appellant or that he had reasons to fabricate his testimony. In the absence of proof to
the contrary, the presumption is that the witness was not moved by any ill-will and was untainted
by bias, and thus worthy of belief and credence. Furthermore, appellants immediate departure
from the scene of the crime and successful effort to elude arrest until his apprehension more
than five years later are not consistent with his claim of innocence. Flight from the scene of the
crime and failure to immediately surrender militate against appellants contention of innocence
"since an innocent person will not hesitate to take prompt and necessary action to exonerate
himself of the crime imputed to him."
Under these circumstances, the rule that "where the prosecution eyewitness was familiar
with both the victim and the accused, and where the locus criminis afforded good visibility, and
where no improper motive can be attributed to the witness for testifying against the accused,
then his version of the story deserves much weight," thus applies. The Court is therefore
convinced that appellants culpability for the killing of the victim was duly established by the
testimony of the lone prosecution witness, Valenciano.

ROY D. PASOS v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION

G.R. No. 192394, July 03, 2013
J. Villarama, Jr.
When a party files an appeal bond amounting to at least 90% of the amount it was
adjudged to pay, such payment can be considered as substantial compliance. The bond
requirement on appeals may be relaxed when there is substantial compliance with the Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC or when the appellant shows willingness to post a partial bond.
FACTS:
Petitioner started working for respondent on April 26, 1996. He was designated as Clerk
II (Accounting) and was assigned to NAIA-II Project. His employment was extended until August
4, 1998 instead of the stipulated date, June 25, 1996. On February 23, 1999, petition was again
hired by PNCC as Accounting Clerk and was assigned to the SM Project. Said appointment,
however, did not specify the date when his employment will end; it only stated that it will be coterminus with the completion of the project. Despite the termination of his employment on
October 19, 2000, petitioner claims that his superior instructed him to report for work the
following day, intimating to him that he will again be employed for the succeeding SM projects.
For purposes of reemployment, he then underwent a medical examination which allegedly
revealed that he had pneumonitis. Petitioner was advised by PNCCs physician, Dr. Arthur C.
Obena, to take a 14-day sick leave.
On November 27, 2000, after serving his sick leave, petitioner claims that he was again
referred for medical examination where it was revealed that he contracted Kochs disease. He
was then required to take a 60-day leave of absence. The following day, he submitted his
application for sick leave but PNCCs Project Personnel Officer, Mr. R.S. Sanchez, told him that
he was not entitled to sick leave because he was not a regular employee. Petitioner still served
a 60-day sick leave. When he returned for work, he was informed that his services were already
terminated on October 19, 2000 and he was already replaced due to expiration of his contract.
This prompted petitioner on February 18, 2003 to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against
PNCC with a prayer for reinstatement and back wages.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner and ordered PNCC to pay
petitioner back wages amounting toP422,630.41 and separation pay of P37,662 or a total
of P460,292.41. PNCC then filed an appeal bond amounting to P422,630.41 or at least 90% of
the adjudged amount. The NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of the LA. As to the
procedural issues raised before it, NLRC ruled that there was substantial compliance as to the
appeal bond and that Mr. Erece, Jr. was the proper person to represent PNCC, despite the lack
of any board resolution authorizing him to do so. Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a
petition for certiorari but the appellate court dismissed the same for lack of merit. Hence this
petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether an appeal should be dismissed outright if the appeal bond filed is less than
the adjudged amount.
2. Whether the head of the personnel department sign the verification and certification
on behalf of the corporation sans any board resolution or secretarys certificate

authorizing such officer to do the same.

RULING:
The petition is granted.
There is substantial compliance as to the requirement of an appeal bond.
The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed
by law is jurisdictional, and noncompliance with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively
renders the judgment final and executory. As provided in Article 223 of the Labor Code, as
amended, in case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may
be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in
the judgment appealed from.
However, the Court has relaxed this requirement in a number of cases in order to bring
about the immediate and appropriate resolution of cases on the merits. In Ong v. Court of
Appeals, the Court held that the bond requirement on appeals may be relaxed when there is
substantial compliance with the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC or when the appellant shows
willingness to post a partial bond. The Court held that "while the bond requirement on appeals
involving monetary awards has been relaxed in certain cases, this can only be done where
there was substantial compliance of the Rules or where the appellants, at the very least,
exhibited willingness to pay by posting a partial bond."
In the instant case, when the PNCC filed an appeal bond amounting to P422,630.41 or
at least 90% of the amount it was ordered to pay by the LA, there is no question that this is
substantial compliance with the requirement that allows relaxation of the rules.
Validity of the verification and certification signed by a corporate officer on behalf of the
corporation without the requisite board resolution or secretarys certificate
An individual corporate officer cannot exercise any corporate power pertaining to the
corporation without authority from the board of directors pursuant to Section 23, in relation to
Section 25 of the Corporation Code which clearly enunciates that all corporate powers are
exercised, all business conducted, and all properties controlled by the board of directors.
However, in many cases the Court recognized the authority of some corporate officers to sign
the verification and certification against forum-shopping.
The following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and
certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2)
the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4)
Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.
While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the
verification and certification required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the
authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to
justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the
verification or certificate against forum shopping, being "in a position to verify the truthfulness
and correctness of the allegations in the petition."

In the present case, the Court recognizes the authority of Mr. Erece, Jr. to sign the
verification and certification on behalf of PNCC sans a board resolution or secretarys certificate
as allowed in Pfizer, Inc. v. Galan. In Pfizer, the Court ruled as valid the verification signed by an
employment specialist as she was in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the
allegations in the petition despite the fact that no board resolution authorizing her was ever
submitted by Pfizer, Inc. even belatedly.
Even assuming that the verification in the appeal filed by PNCC is defective, it is well
settled that rules of procedure in labor cases maybe relaxed. As provided in Article 221 of the
Labor Code, as amended, "rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be
controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the Commission and its members
and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each
case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the
interest of due process." Moreover, the requirement of verification is merely formal and not
jurisdictional.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. ERNESTO M. DE CHAVEZ, ROLANDO L. LONTOC, SR.

et al.
G.R. No. 172206, July 03, 2013
J. Peralta
When the Office of the Ombudsman decides on a case, the Court of Appeals has no
authority nor discretion to stay such decision as this would tantamount to an encroachment on
the rule-making powers of the Ombudsman under the Constitution, and Sections 18 and 27 of
R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Office of the Ombudsman the authority to promulgate its own
rules of procedure.
FACTS:
On August 18, 2005, the BSU-BOR received an Order from Deputy Ombudsman Victor
Fernandez directing the former to enforce the aforementioned Office of the Ombudsman's Joint
Decision and Supplemental Resolution. Pursuant to said Order, the BSU-BOR issued
Resolution No. 18, series of 2005 resolving to implement the Order of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Thus, herein respondents filed a petition for injunction with prayer for issuance of
a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas City, Branch 4 (RTC), against the BSU-BOR. The gist of the petition before the RTC is
that the BSU-BOR should be enjoined from enforcing the Ombudsman's Joint Decision and
Supplemental Resolution because the same are still on appeal and, therefore, are not yet final
and executory.
The RTC ordered the dismissal of herein respondents' petition for injunction on the
ground of lack of cause of action. The CA issued a Resolution granting respondents' prayer for a
temporary restraining order enjoining the BSU-BOR from enforcing its Resolution No. 18, series
of 2005.
Thereafter, on March 7, 2006, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Motion to Intervene
and to Admit Attached Motion to Recall Temporary Restraining Order, with the Motion to Recall
Temporary Restraining Order attached thereto. On April 7, 2006, the CA denied the
Ombudsman's Motion to Recall the TRO and granted appellants Urgent Motion for Issuance of
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The CA further conditioned that the writ be issued upon the
posting by the appellants of an Injunction Bond, enjoining the Board of Regents of BSU, and all
other persons and agents acting under its command authority, pending the complete resolution
of the appeal. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Batangas State University Board of Regents (BSU-BOR) could validly
enforce the Office of the Ombudsmans Joint Decision dated February 14, 2005 and
Supplemental Resolution dated July 12, 2005, finding respondents guilty of dishonesty and
grave misconduct and imposing the penalty of dismissal from service with its accessory
penalties, despite the fact that said Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution are pending
appeal before the CA.
RULING:

The petition is granted.

The CA should have allowed the Office of the Ombudsman to intervene in the appeal
pending with the lower court. The wisdom of this course of action has been exhaustively
explained in Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego:
"2. As a competent disciplining body, the Ombudsman has the right to seek
redress on the apparently erroneous issuance by this Honorable Court of the Writ
of Preliminary Injunction enjoining the implementation of the Ombudsman's Joint
Decision x x x."
In asserting that it was a "competent disciplining body," the Office of the Ombudsman
correctly summed up its legal interest in the matter in controversy. In support of its claim, it
invoked its role as a constitutionally mandated "protector of the people," a disciplinary authority
vested with quasi-judicial function to resolve administrative disciplinary cases against public
officials. To hold otherwise would have been tantamount to abdicating its salutary functions as
the guardian of public trust and accountability.
It is true that under the rule on intervention, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to
intervene is left to the sound discretion of the court after a consideration of the appropriate
circumstances. However, such discretion is not without limitations. One of the limits in the
exercise of such discretion is that it must not be exercised in disregard of law and the
Constitution. The CA should have considered the nature of the Ombudsman's powers as
provided in the Constitution and RA 6770.
Here, since its power to ensure enforcement of its Joint Decision and Supplemental
Resolution is in danger of being impaired, the Office of the Ombudsman had a clear legal
interest in defending its right to have its judgment carried out. The CA patently erred in denying
the Office of the Ombudsman's motion for intervention.
Note that for a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the following essential requisites
must concur, to wit: (1) that the invasion of the right is material and substantial; (2) that the right
of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and, (3) that there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the present case, the right of respondents
cannot be said to be clear and unmistakable, because the prevailing jurisprudence is that the
penalty of dismissal from the service meted on government employees or officials is
immediately executory in accordance with the valid rule of execution pending appeal uniformly
observed in administrative disciplinary cases.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as
a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly
enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to
comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or
censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against such officer.
The Ombudsman's decision imposing the penalty of suspension for one year is
immediately executory pending appeal. It cannot be stayed by the mere filing of an appeal to the
CA. This rule is similar to that provided under Section 47 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service.

The ratiocination above also clarifies the application of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court in
relation to Section 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. The CA, even
on terms it may deem just, has no discretion to stay a decision of the Ombudsman, as such
procedural matter is governed specifically by the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The CA's issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction, staying the penalty of
dismissal imposed by the Ombudsman in this administrative case, is thus an encroachment on
the rule-making powers of the Ombudsman under Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution,
and Sections 18 and 27 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Office of the Ombudsman the
authority to promulgate its own rules of procedure. The issuance of an injunctive writ renders
nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

HEIRS OF JOSE FERNANDO v. REYNALDO DE BELEN

G.R. No. 186366, July 03, 2013
J. Velasco, Jr.
When a party fails to specify the assessed value of the property subject matter of the
action, this court to which it was filed, will not acquire jurisdiction over the case. This is because
what determines the nature of the action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
FACTS:
Petitioners are the children of the late Jose and they are in the process of partitioning
their inheritance. However, they could not properly accomplish the partition due to the presence
of the respondent who intruded into a portion of their property located in Bulacan and conducted
quarrying operations in its immediate vicinity for so many years, without their knowledge and
permission. Petitioners wrote a letter to respondent, which was left unheeded and the
respondent failed to appear during the barangay conciliation. Thus, a complaint for Recovery of
Possession was filed by the petitioners against respondent.
Instead of filing an Answer, respondent Reynaldo De Belen filed a Motion to
Dismiss setting forth the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction; (2) lack of cause of action; (3)
ambiguity as to the portion of the lot De Belen occupies; and, (4) incomplete statement of
material facts, the complaint having failed to state the identity, location and area of the lot
sought to be recovered.
The motion was denied and the trial court ordered herein petitioners to amend the
complaint, which they complied with. Respondent then moved for Bill of Particulars, specifically
questioning the legal basis for the complaint since the entire property appears to be co-owned
by Jose and Antonia Fernando and it was not particularized in the complaint as to what specific
portion belongs to each of the co-owners.
In addition, the respondent, in his Answer, claimed that even the Bill of Particulars did not
clearly show the exact identity, personal circumstances and relationship of the individual heirs of
the decedent, location, area and size of the subject property. Also, prescription, estoppel and
laches had set in as against the petitioners.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. The CA set aside the decision of
the RTC for want of jurisdiction and declaring further that the Amended Complaint must be
dismissed.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction for failure to allege in the complaint the assessed value of the subject
property.
RULING:

The petition is granted.

Instant complaint for Recovery of Possession failed to specify the assessed value of the
property subject matter of the action. What determines the nature of the action as well as which
court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought. The allegations in the complaint and the relief sought by the party determine the nature
of the action if the title or designation is not clear. The complaint, in the case at bar, is bereft of
any allegation which discloses the assessed value of the property subject matter thereof. The
court a quo therefore, did not acquire jurisdiction over instant action. The Amended Complaint
does not state a valid cause of action.
Furthermore, after the entire proceedings fully participated in by the respondent, he
cannot be allowed to question the result as having been rendered without jurisdiction. This is the
teaching in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, et al. as reiterated in Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines, Inc.,
where the Court ruled:
While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, this rule presupposes that
estoppel has not supervened. In the instant case, respondent actively participated in all stages
of the proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative
relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial courts jurisdiction, especially
when an adverse judgment has been rendered.

ALFREDO C. LIM, JR. v. SPOUSES TITO S. LAZARO and CARMEN T. LAZARO

G.R. No. 185734, July 03, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
When the parties executed a compromise agreement, such agreement does not
extinguish the obligation of the debtor; hence, the attachment to his property should continue to
subsist such obligation is fully complied with. While the provisions of Rule 57 are silent on the
length of time within which an attachment lien shall continue to subsist after the rendition of a
final judgment, jurisprudence dictates that the said lien continues until the debt is paid, or the
sale is had under execution issued on the judgment or until the judgment is satisfied, or the
attachment discharged or vacated in the same manner provided by law.
FACTS:
On August 22, 2005, Lim, Jr. filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment before the RTC, seeking to recover from
respondents-spouses Lazaro the sum of P2,160,000.00, which represented the amounts stated
in several dishonored checks issued by the latter to the former. The RTC granted and
subsequently issued the writ of preliminary attachment. In this accord, three (3) parcels of land
registered in the names of Sps. Lazaro were levied upon.
On September 22, 2006, the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement which was
approved by the RTC. In said compromise agreement, Sps. Lazaro agreed to pay Lim, Jr. the
amount of P2,351,064.80 on an installment basis, following a schedule of payments covering
the period from September 2006 until October 2013, under the following terms, among others:
(a) that should the financial condition of Sps. Lazaro improve, the monthly installments shall be
increased in order to hasten the full payment of the entire obligation; and (b) that Sps. Lazaros
failure to pay any installment due or the dishonor of any of the postdated checks delivered in
payment thereof shall make the whole obligation immediately due and demandable.
Subsequently, the Sps. Lazaro filed an Omnibus Motion, seeking to lift the writ of
preliminary attachment, which the RTC granted and ordered the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan
to cancel the writs annotation on the subject TCTs. It ruled that since the case had already been
considered closed and terminated, the writ of preliminary attachment should be lifted and
quashed. The CA affirmed the RTCs Decision. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the writ of preliminary attachment was properly lifted.
RULING:
The petition is granted.
By its nature, preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court (Rule 57), is
an ancillary remedy applied for not for its own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize
upon the relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action; it is a measure
auxiliary or incidental to the main action. As such, it is available during its pendency which may
be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the interim,
awaiting the ultimate effects of a final judgment in the case. In addition, attachment is also

availed of in order to acquire jurisdiction over the action by actual or constructive seizure of the
property in those instances where personal or substituted service of summons on the defendant
cannot be effected.
In this relation, while the provisions of Rule 57 are silent on the length of time within
which an attachment lien shall continue to subsist after the rendition of a final judgment,
jurisprudence dictates that the said lien continues until the debt is paid, or the sale is had under
execution issued on the judgment or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment
discharged or vacated in the same manner provided by law.
Applying these principles, the Court finds that the discharge of the writ of preliminary
attachment against the properties of Sps. Lazaro was improper.
Records indicate that while the parties have entered into a compromise agreement, the
obligations thereunder have yet to be fully complied with particularly, the payment of the total
compromise amount of P2,351,064.80. Hence, given that the foregoing debt remains unpaid,
the attachment of Sps. Lazaros properties should have continued to subsist.
In fine, the Court holds that the writ of preliminary attachment subject of this case should
be restored and its annotation revived in the subject TCTs, re-vesting unto Lim, Jr. his
preferential lien over the properties covered by the same as it were before the cancellation of
the said writ. Lest it be misunderstood, the lien or security obtained by an attachment even
before judgment, is in the nature of a vested interest which affords specific security for the
satisfaction of the debt put in suit.

LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS v. THE HEIRS OF THE LATE DR. ANDRESS NAVARRO, JR.
G.R. No. 198240, July 03, 2013
J. Villarama, Jr.
When a witness takes participation in a case, it is only mandated that he possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court. There is no
provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared in default from taking the witness stand for
non-disqualified parties. The law does not provide default as an exception. The specific
enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other than
those mentioned in the Rules.
FACTS:
Petitioner and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are claiming exclusive
ownership of the lots left behind by the deceased Spouses Navarro. Respondents based their
claim on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property dated May 19, 1954 where Andres, Sr.
donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr., the father of the respondents and brother of the petitioner.
Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters requested a handwriting examination of the
affidavit. The examination, conducted by PO2 Alvarez, resolved that the signature on the
affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not by one and the same
person. Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for annulment of the deed of donation.
After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. They
argued that the RTC did not authorize the handwriting examination of the affidavit. They added
that presenting PO2 Alvarez as a witness will violate their constitutional right to due process
since no notice was given to them before the examination was conducted.
The RTC granted respondents motion and disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness. The
RTC ruled that PO2 Alvarezs supposed testimony would be hearsay as she has no personal
knowledge of the alleged handwriting of Andres, Sr. Also, there is no need for PO2 Alvarez to be
presented, if she is to be presented as an expert witness, because her testimony is not yet
needed. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by the sisters. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in not ruling that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying PO2 Alvarez as a witness
RULING:
The petition is granted.
In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System v.
Republic of the Philippines, the Court has held that a witness must only possess all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence provides:

SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.Except as provided in the next

succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21 to 24, Rule 130
of the Rules on Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies a witness by reason of mental incapacity or
immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a witness by reason of marriage. Section 23 disqualifies a
witness by reason of death or insanity of the adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies a witness by
reason of privileged communication.
In Cavili v. Judge Florendo, the Court has held that the specific enumeration of
disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned
in the Rules. The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein.
Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications. Section 19
disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age or immaturity
renders them incapable of being witnesses. Section 20 provides for disqualification based on
conflicts of interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for disqualification based on
privileged communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of
witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against
whom he was called.
There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared in default from taking
the witness stand for non-disqualified parties. The law does not provide default as an exception.
The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability
other than those mentioned in the Rules. It is a maxim of recognized utility and merit in the
construction of statutes that an express exception, exemption, or saving clause excludes other
exceptions. x x x As a general rule, where there are express exceptions these comprise the only
limitations on the operation of a statute and no other exception will be implied. x x x The Rules
should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein.
As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make known
her perception to others. She cannot be disqualified as a witness since she possesses none of
the disqualifications specified under the Rules. Respondents motion to disqualify her should
have been denied by the RTC for it was not based on any of these grounds for disqualification.
The RTC rather confused the qualification of the witness with the credibility and weight of her
testimony.
Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the opinion of an
expert witness may be received in evidence, to wit:
SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.The opinion of a witness on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to
possess, may be received in evidence.
Thus, PO2 Alvarezs testimony should not have been considered as hearsay. Section 49,
Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, PO2 Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion. But the
RTC already ruled at the outset that PO2 Alvarezs testimony is hearsay even before her

testimony is offered and she is called to the witness stand. Under the circumstances, the CA
should have issued a corrective writ of certiorari and annulled the RTC ruling.

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY ALVARO YPON, et al. v. GAUDIOSO PONTERAS

RICAFORTE, ETC, ET.AL.
G.R. No. 198680, July 08, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
The allegation that the petitioners are the lawful heirs is not sufficient to be entitled to the
relief. There is a need to institute a separate special proceeding for heirship before the said
heirs can be considered real parties-in-interest and without such, any complaint instituted by
them shall not prosper for failure to state a cause of action.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another. It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations
in the complaint. In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if,
admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief
prayed for.
FACTS:
On July 29, 2010 petitioners filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance
with Damages against respondent. In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon died
intestate and childless, thereby leaving behind lots. Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno,
respondent executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the titles in
Magdalenos name, leading to the subsequent transfer to his name, to the prejudice of
petitioners who are Magdalenos collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by
documents and that by way of affirmative dfense, he claimed that petitioners have no cause of
action against him (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not
prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been
judicially declared as Magdalenos lawful heirs.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of
action against respondent. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their
relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding, this does not mean that they
could be considered as the decedents compulsory heirs. The plaintiffs filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the Court. Aggrieved, the petitioners sought direct
recourse to the Supreme Court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTCs dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed
to state cause of action was proper.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another. It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations

in the complaint. In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if,
admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief
prayed for.
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the lawful heirs of
Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by
Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latters
favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently
warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a
decedents lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding precludes the
RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same.
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the
determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties
in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their
evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment
thereon, or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist.
Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the
heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of the case.

HEIRS OF NUMERIANO MIRANDA, SR. v. PABLO R. MIRANDA

G.R. No. 179638, July 08, 2013
J. Mendoza
A party aggrieved by a decision of a court in an action for revival of judgment may
appeal the decision, but only insofar as the merits of the action for revival is concerned. The
original judgment, which is already final and executory, may no longer be reversed, altered, or
modified. An action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action. It is different and
distinct from the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced.
FACTS:
In 1994, petitioners filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa a Complaint for Annulment of
Titles and Specific Performance against the heirs of Pedro Miranda, the heir of Tranquilino
Miranda and the spouses respondent Pablo Miranda and Aida Lorenzo. The RTC rendered a
decision upholding the validity of the titles and ordered Pablo Miranda to indemnify all other
heirs of Numeriano Miranda the amount equivalent to 12/13 fair market value of the co-owned
residential house.
The petitioners did not file any appeal hence the decision of the RTC became final and
executor. On December 11, 2001 the RTC issued a Writ of Execution which, however, was not
implemented. On July 8, 2005, respondent filed an Ex-parte Motion praying that the RTC issue
a Break-Open and Demolition Order" in order to compel the petitioners to vacate his property.
But since more than five years have elapsed from the time the Writ of Execution should have
been enforced, the RTC denied the Motion. This prompted respondent to file with the RTC a
Petitionfor Revival of Judgment. Petitioners opposed the revival of judgment assailing, among
others, the jurisdiction of the RTC to take cognizance of the Petition for Revival of Judgment.
On June 20, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision granting the Petition. On July 13, 2006,
petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal via LBC, which was opposed by respondent on the ground
that the Decision dated August 30, 1999 has long become final and executory. Petitioners, in
turn, moved for the transmittal of the original records of the case to the CA, insisting that
respondents opposition is without merit.
The RTC denied the Notice of Appeal. Petitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus with the
CA, which was denied and the appeal is dismissed for having been filed out of time. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the appeal was perfected on time;
2. Whether the action to revive judgment is appealable;
3. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for Revival of Judgment
RULING:
The petition is denied.
The Notice of Appeal was belatedly filed

It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should be filed "within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from."
Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, pleadings may be filed in court either
personally or by registered mail. In the first case, the date of filing is the date of receipt. In the
second case, the date of mailing is the date of receipt.
In this case, however, the counsel for petitioners filed the Notice of Appeal via a private
courier, a mode of filing not provided in the Rules. Though not prohibited by the Rules, we
cannot consider the filing of petitioners Notice of Appeal via LBC timely filed. It is established
jurisprudence that "the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not
to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court;" instead, "the date of actual receipt by the
court is deemed the date of filing of that pleading." Records show that the Notice of Appeal was
mailed on the 15th day and was received by the court on the 16th day or one day beyond the
reglementary period. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time.
Only the merits of the action for revival may be appealed
An action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action. It is different and
distinct from the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced. As such, a party aggrieved
by a decision of a court in an action for revival of judgment may appeal the decision, but only
insofar as the merits of the action for revival is concerned. The original judgment, which is
already final and executory, may no longer be reversed, altered, or modified.
In this case, petitioners assail the Decision dated August 30, 1999, which is the original
judgment sought to be revived or enforced by respondent. Considering that the said Decision
had already attained finality, petitioners may no longer question its correctness. As the Court
stated, only the merits of the action for revival may be appealed, not the merits of the original
judgment sought to be revived or enforced.
RTC has jurisdiction over the Petition for Revival of Judgment
As to whether the RTC has jurisdiction, the Court rules in the affirmative. An action for
revival of judgment may be filed either "in the same court where said judgment was rendered or
in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any other place designated by the
statutes which treat of the venue of actions in general." In this case, respondent filed the Petition
for Revival of Judgment in the same court which rendered the Decision dated August 30, 1999.
Hence, the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition.

RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION v. FEDERICO A. SERRA

G.R. No. 203241, July 10, 2013
J. Carpio
When there is a delay in the execution of the decision caused by the respondent for his
own advantage, the five-year period to enforce the same shall be suspended. The Rules of
Court provide that a final and executory judgment may be executed by motion within five years
from the date of its entry or by an action after the lapse of five years and before prescription
sets in. This Court, however, allows exceptions when execution may be made by motion even
after the lapse of five years. These exceptions have one common denominator: the delay is
caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment obligor and/or is incurred for his benefit or
advantage.
FACTS:
On 20 May 1975, Serra and petitioner Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC)
entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy, wherein Serra agreed to lease his land to
RCBC for 25 years. Serra further granted RCBC the option to buy the land and improvement
within 10 years from the signing of the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy. However, when
RCBC informed Serra of its decision to exercise its option to buy the property but Serra replied
that he was no longer interested in selling the property, which then prompted RCBC to file a
Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against Serra in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati (Specific Performance case). The RTC Makati initially dismissed the complaint.
However, it subsequently reversed itself and ordered Serra to execute and deliver the proper
deed of sale in favor of RCBC. Serra then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA).
On 18 May 1989, Serra donated the property to his mother, who then sold the property
to Hermanito Liok (Liok). A new land title was issued in favor of Liok. Thus, RCBC filed a
Complaint for Nullification of Deed of Donation and Deed of Sale with Reconveyance
and Damages against Liok, Ablao and Serra (Annulment case) before the RTC of Masbate City.
Meanwhile, the CA, and later the Supreme Court, affirmed the order of the RTC Makati
in the Specific Performance case. The Supreme Court declared that the Contract of Lease with
Option to Buy was valid, effective, and enforceable. Such decision became final and executory
upon entry of judgment.
On 22 October 2001, the RTC Masbate ruled in favor of RCBC. The CA affirmed
the RTC Masbate decision. Thus, Liok filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, while Serra and
Ablao filed a Petition for Certiorari, before the Supreme Court. In separate Resolutions, the
Court found neither reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion on the CAs part.
On 25 August 2011, RCBC moved for the execution of the decision in the Specific
Performance case. RCBC alleged that it was legally impossible to ask for the execution of the
decision prior to the annulment of the fraudulent transfers made by Serra. Thus, the period to
execute by motion was suspended during the pendency of the Annulment case. The RTC
Makati denied RCBCs motion for execution. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the court a quo erred in holding that petitioner RCBC is barred from
having its 05 January 1989 Decision executed through Motion, considering that under the
circumstances obtaining in this case, RCBC was unlawfully prevented by the respondent from
enforcing the said decision.
RULING:
The petition is granted.
The Rules of Court provide that a final and executory judgment may be executed by
motion within five years from the date of its entry or by an action after the lapse of five years and
before prescription sets in. This Court, however, allows exceptions when execution may be
made by motion even after the lapse of five years. These exceptions have one common
denominator: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment obligor and/or is
incurred for his benefit or advantage.
In the present case, it is clear that the delay in the execution of the decision was caused
by Serra for his own advantage. Thus, the pendency of the Annulment case effectively
suspended the five-year period to enforce through a motion the decision in the Specific
Performance case. Since the decision in the Annulment case attained finality on 3 March 2009
and RCBCs motion for execution was filed on 25 August 2011, RCBCs motion is deemed filed
within the five-year period for enforcement of a decision through a motion.
This Court has reiterated that the purpose of prescribing time limitations for enforcing
judgments is to prevent parties from sleeping on their rights. Far from sleeping on its rights,
RCBC has pursued persistently its action against Serra in accordance with law. On the other
hand, Serra has continued to evade his obligation by raising issues of technicality. While strict
compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases
where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice.

FRANCISCO L. ROSARIO, JR. v. LELLANI DE GUZMAN, ARLEEN DE GUZMAN, et al.

G.R. No. 191247, July 10, 2013
J. Mendoza
When petitioner files a claim for attorneys fees, he may do such as an incident in the
main action or have it instituted in a separate action. While a claim for attorneys fees may be
filed before the judgment is rendered, the determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to
the amount thereof will have to be held in abeyance until the main case from which the lawyers
claim for attorneys fees may arise has become final. Otherwise, the determination to be made
by the courts will be premature.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the legal counsel of the spouses De Guzman in a 1990 case of annulment
of contract and recovery of possession. While the case was pending before the Supreme Court,
the spouses died in a vehicular accident and were substituted by their children, the respondents
herein.
On September 8, 2009, petitioner filed the Motion to Determine Attorneys Fees before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He alleged, among others, that he had a verbal agreement with
the deceased Spouses de Guzman that he would get 25% of the market value of the subject
land if the complaint filed against them by Chong would be dismissed. Despite the fact that he
had successfully represented them, respondents refused his written demand for payment of the
contracted attorneys fees.
The RTC denied petitioners motion on the ground that it was filed out of time. The RTC
stated that the said motion was filed after the judgment rendered in the subject case, as
affirmed by the SC, had long become final and executory on October 31, 2007. The RTC wrote
that considering that the motion was filed too late, it had already lost jurisdiction over the case
because a final decision could not be amended or corrected except for clerical errors or
mistakes. There would be a variance of the judgment rendered if his claim for attorneys fees
would still be included. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the
RTC for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the trial court committed a reversible error in denying the motion to
determine attorneys fees on the ground that it lost jurisdiction over the case since
the judgment in the case has become final and executory;
2. Whether the trial court seriously erred in declaring that petitioners claim for
attorneys fees would result in a variance of the judgment that has long become final
and executory;
3. Whether the trial court erred in not declaring that the finality of the decision did not
bar petitioner from filing the motion to recover his attorneys fees.
RULING:
The petition is granted.

It is well settled that a claim for attorneys fees may be asserted either in the very action
in which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate action.
With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorneys fees as an incident of the
main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client. Attorneys fees cannot
be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of the recovery is
at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorneys fees only arises when something has
been recovered from which the fee is to be paid.
While a claim for attorneys fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the
determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held in
abeyance until the main case from which the lawyers claim for attorneys fees may arise has
become final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will be premature. Of
course, a petition for attorneys fees may be filed before the judgment in favor of the client is
satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client.
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a lawyer has two options as to when to
file his claim for professional fees. Hence, private respondent was well within his rights when he
made his claim and waited for the finality of the judgment for holiday pay differential, instead of
filing it ahead of the awards complete resolution. To declare that a lawyer may file a claim for
fees in the same action only before the judgment is reviewed by a higher tribunal would deprive
him of his aforestated options and render ineffective the foregoing pronouncements of this
Court.
In this case, petitioner opted to file his claim as an incident in the main action, which is
permitted by the rules. As to the timeliness of the filing, this Court holds that the questioned
motion to determine attorneys fees was seasonably filed.
There is no dispute that petitioner filed his Motion to Determine Attorneys Fees about
one (1) year and eleven (11) months from the finality of the RTC decision. Because petitioner
claims to have had an oral contract of attorneys fees with the deceased spouses, Article 1145 of
the Civil Code allows him a period of six (6) years within which to file an action to recover
professional fees for services rendered. Respondents never asserted or provided any evidence
that Spouses de Guzman refused petitioners legal representation. For this reason, petitioners
cause of action began to run only from the time the respondents refused to pay him his
attorneys fees.

RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 161075. JULY 15, 2013
J. BERSAMIN
An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not
raise a prejudicial question to stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the
defendant for estafa through falsification. This is because the result of the independent civil
action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.
FACTS:
Rafael Consing, Jr. was charged with estafa through falsification.

Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz
various loans totaling P18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. The loans were secured by a real
estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of land under the name of de la Cruz. In accordance
with its option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of
the property for a total consideration of P21,221,500.00. Payment was effected by off-setting the
amounts due to Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz and Consing in the amount
of P18,000,000.00 and paying an additional amount of P3,145,946.50. The other half of the
property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc., a joint venture partner of Unicapital.
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that the title
to the property was in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the parties from whom
the property had been allegedly acquired by de la Cruz. The title held by De la Cruz was
spurious.
Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of P41,377,851.48 as of April 19,
1999 that had been paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the
demands.
Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of public document
against Consing and de la Cruz
Consing moved to defer his arraignment in the criminal case on the ground of existence
of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of the civil cases. The RTC issued an order
suspending the criminal proceedings on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.
The RTC order was questioned via petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for certiorari holding that the resolution of the civil case is prejudicial to the criminal
cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the existence of pending civil cases a prejudicial question with regards to
the Criminal Proceedings
RULING:
Petition granted. The Criminal Proceedings should continue
Between the civil and criminal case: (1) the parties are identical; (2) the transactions in
controversy are identical; (3) the Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCT) involved are identical; (4)
the questioned Deeds of Sale/Mortgage are identical; (5) the dates in question are identical; and
(6) the issue of private respondents culpability for the questioned transactions is identical in all
the proceedings.
In the case at bar, The Supreme Court finds no prejudicial question that would justify the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case. The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the
Pasig civil case) is for Injunctive Relief is whether or not Consing merely acted as an agent of
his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), is for
Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay
damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if
respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the

questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may
be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents.
Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive
Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa
through falsification of public document.

ROSALINDA DIMAPILIS-BALDOZ, in her capacity as then Administrator of POEA v.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT, represented by CHAIRMAN REYNALDO VILLAR and
COMMISSIONER JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR..
G.R. No. 199114, July 16, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
When the commission, having no knowledge of a prior dismissal, fixes the reckoning
point of the period of disallowance at an erroneous date, it does not tantamount to a grave
abuse of discretion. Not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or
fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The abuse of discretion to be qualified as "grave"
must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law.
FACTS:
Labrador was the former Chief of the POEAs Employment Services Regulation Division
(ESRD). On May 2, 1997, then Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Quisumbing) ordered
his dismissal from service as he was found to have bribed an overseas Filipino
worker. Labradors dismissal was affirmed on appeal by the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
Aside from the administrative proceedings, a criminal case for direct bribery was
instituted against Labrador in view of the same infraction. Consequently, on August 31, 1999,
the Sandiganbayan (SB) promulgated a Decision, convicting him of the aforementioned
crime. Labradors motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to elevate the matter to
the Court.
The Court affirmed Labradors conviction and subsequently denied his motion for
reconsideration with finality. Likewise, the Court denied Labradors motion for leave to file a
second motion for reconsideration with motion for new trial and prayer for referral to the Court
En Banc, resulting to the Resolutions entry of judgment. On October 26, 2000, the SB received
copies of the same resolution and its corresponding entry of judgment. As such, the SB
immediately set the case for this purpose.
On February 26, 2001, Labradors counsel de oficio manifested in open court that
Labrador desires to apply for probation. Eventually, upon favorable recommendation of the
Parole and Probation Office, the SB granted Labradors application for probation and likewise
cancelled the bail bond he posted for his provisional liberty.
Thereafter, at the end of Labradors probation period, it was recommended that his
probation be terminated and that he be discharged from its legal effects. The SB, however,
withheld its approval and, instead, issued a Resolution stating that Labradors application for
probation was, in fact, erroneously granted due to his previous appeal from his judgment of
conviction, in violation of Section 4 of the Probation Law.
On February 7, 2005, COA State Auditor IV Escurel, issued a COA Audit Memo which
contained her audit observations on the various expenditures of the POEA pertaining to the
payment of salaries and benefits to Labrador for the period covering August 31, 1999 to March
15, 2004. It questioned why Mr. Leonel Labrador was allowed to continue in the service and
receive his salaries and other personal benefits when pursuant to the August 31, 1999 judgment
of conviction, which had long become final and executory, Mr. Labrador is considered

terminated from the service and is no longer entitled to continue to draw his salaries thereafter
up to March 15, 2004.
Thus, COA issued a Notice of Disallowance finding Dimapilis-Baldoz, among other
POEA employees, personally liable for the salaries and other benefits unduly received by
Labrador.
Dimapilis-Baldoz sought the reconsideration of the Notice of Disallowance, asserting that
the POEA should not be held liable for the refund of the foregoing amount since Labrador's
employment was fully and promptly terminated upon receipt of the SBs Resolution. However,
on October 29, 2009, the COA issued a decision which affirmed the Notice of Disallowance. The
COA pointed out that Labrador should not have reported for work while he was under probation
since his probation did not obliterate the crime for which he was convicted, more so his penalty
of dismissal from the service.
The POEA moved for the reconsideration however, it was no longer entertained in view
of the issuance by the COA Secretary of a Notice of Finality of Decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether grave abuse of discretion attended the COAs disallowance in this case.
RULING:
The petition is partly granted.
Significant to the determination of the appropriate period of the disallowance is the
undisputed fact that, pursuant to an order issued by then Labor Secretary Quisumbing,
Labrador had already been made to suffer the administrative penalty of dismissal from service
on May 2, 1997, which was long before the SB convicted him of direct bribery on August 31,
1999. As a matter of law, a department secretarys decision confirming the removal of an officer
under his authority is immediately executory, even pending further remedy by the dismissed
public officer.
As to the immediate execution of the decision of the Secretary against petitioners, the
same is authorized by Section 47, paragraph (2), of Executive Oder No. 292, thus: "The
Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities
shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against
officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty
imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty
days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the
Commission, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case
the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned."
Hence, based on these authorities, then Labor Secretary Quisumbings order of
dismissal in this case should have also been executed immediately upon its issuance. In this
accord, Labrador should not have been allowed to report for work from such date, much less
receive any salary or benefit accruing from his previous post.
At this juncture, it is well to note that neither the grant nor subsequent revocation of
Labradors probation should hold any relevance to his disqualification from office. As correctly

argued by the COA, the grant of probation does not justify a public employees retention in the
government service. Thus, irrespective of the incidents concerning Labradors probation, the
concomitant effects of his conviction, more significantly, his disqualification to hold public office,
were already left for him to suffer at the time the SBs August 31, 1999 Decision became final
and executory.
Jurisprudence instructs that not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous
conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The abuse of discretion to be
qualified as "grave" must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, no grave abuse of discretion can be
attributed to the COA in fixing the reckoning point of the period of disallowance at May 3, 2000,
since records are bereft of any showing that it had any knowledge of Labradors prior dismissal
on May 2, 1997. To hold otherwise would be simply antithetical to the concept of grave abuse of
discretion, much less countenance a speculative endeavor.
Be that as it may, the Court cannot, nevertheless, sanction the erroneous finding that the
disallowance of the POEAs illegal disbursements to Labrador should only be reckoned from
May 3, 2000 when he was, in fact, already dismissed as early as May 2, 1997. The salaries of
government employees clearly constitute public funds which should, at all times, be properly
accounted for.
In this relation, the Constitution vests the COA with the primary responsibility to ensure
that any irregularity in the disbursement of the same is cleared, or any attendant illegality be
proscribed. Yet, when a significant fact which would impact this process is missed as in this
case, the May 2, 1997 dismissal of Labrador the public nature of the above-mentioned
interests impels the Court to judiciously mind the COA of such fact if only to aid the latter to fulfill
its constitutional mandate as well as to avert any loss on the part of the government. The COA
must correct its previous issuances in this case in order to reflect the actual date of Labradors
dismissal which would also be the proper reckoning point of the period of disallowance.
NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO ALMARIO, et. al. v. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, et. al.
G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013
J. Villarama, Jr.
When a party assails the legality of an official act, he must first establish that he has a
direct and personal interest. Not only should they show that the act is invalid but they must
sustain that they may suffer as a result of its enforcement. Standing is the determination of
whether a specific person is the proper party to bring a matter to the court for adjudication. The
gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
FACTS:
On January 30, 2007 a joint meeting of the NCCA Board of Commissioners and the CCP
Board of Trustees was held to discuss, among others, the evaluation of the 2009 Order of
National Artists and the convening of the National Artist Award Secretariat. The nomination

period was set for September 2007 to December 31, 2007, which was later extended to
February 28, 2008. The pre-screening of nominations was held from January to March 2008.
On April 3, 2009, the First Deliberation Panel met. A total of 87 nominees were
considered during the deliberation and a preliminary shortlist of 32 names was compiled. On
April 23, 2009, the Second Deliberation Panel purportedly composed of an entirely new set of
Council of Experts met and shortlisted 13 out of the 32 names in the preliminary shortlist. On
May 6, 2009, the final deliberation was conducted. From the 13 names in the second shortlist, a
final list of four names was agreed upon.22 The final list, according to rank, follows:
Name

Art Field/Category

Number of Votes

Manuel Conde (+)

Film and Broadcast Arts (Film)

26

Ramon Santos

Music

19

Lazaro Francisco (+)

Literature

15

Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz

Visual Arts

15

On May 6, 2009, a letter, signed jointly by the Chairperson of the NCCA, Undersecretary
Vilma Labrador, and the President and Artistic Director of the CCP, Mr. Nestor Jardin, was sent
to the President.23 The letter stated, thus:
According to respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of
the President to the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the
President allegedly received nominations from various sectors, cultural groups
and individuals strongly endorsing private respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez,
Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Maosa and Jose Moreno. The
Committee on Honors purportedly processed these nominations and invited
resource persons to validate the qualifications and credentials of the nominees.
The Committee on Honors thereafter submitted a memorandum to then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo recommending the conferment of the Order of National Artists on the four
recommendees of the NCCA and the CCP Boards, as well as on private respondents GuidoteAlvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno. Acting on this recommendation, Proclamation No. 1823
declaring Manuel Conde a National Artist was issued on June 30, 2009. Subsequently, on July
6, 2009, Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829 were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico
AguilarAlcuaz and private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno,
respectively, as National Artists. This was subsequently announced to the public by then
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita on July 29, 2009.
Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive province of the NCCA Board of Commissioners
and the CCP Board of Trustees to select those who will be conferred the Order of National
Artists and to set the standard for entry into that select group, petitioners instituted this petition
for prohibition, certiorari and injunction (with prayer for restraining order) praying that the Order
of National Artists be conferred on Dr. Santos and that the conferment of the Order of National
Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno be enjoined and
declared to have been rendered in grave abuse of discretion.
In a Resolution dated August 25, 2009, the Court issued a status quo order enjoining
"public respondents" "from conferring the rank and title of the Order of National Artists on private

respondents; from releasing the cash awards that accompany such conferment and recognition;
and from holding the acknowledgment ceremonies for recognition of the private respondents as
National Artists."
ISSUE:
Whether the proclamation of respondents as National Artists is valid.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Standing of the Petitioners
Standing is the determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to bring a
matter to the court for adjudication. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
The parties who assail the constitutionality or legality of a statute or an official act must
have a direct and personal interest. They must show not only that the law or any governmental
act is invalid, but also that they sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that they suffer thereby in some indefinite
way.
In this case, the Court finds that the petitioning National Artists will be denied some right
or privilege to which they are entitled as members of the Order of National Artists as a result of
the conferment of the award on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno. In
particular, they will be denied the privilege of exclusive membership in the Order of National
Artists.
Among the other petitioners, Prof. Gemino Abad presents a unique valid personal and
substantial interest. Like respondents Caparas, Maosa and Moreno, he was among the 87
nominees for the 2009 Order of National Artists. Like respondent Moreno, he made it to the
preliminary shortlist. As he did not make it to the second shortlist, he was not considered by the
Final Deliberation Panel, more so by the former President.
It should be recalled too that respondent Guidote-Alvarez was disqualified to be
nominated for being the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while respondents Maosa
and Caparas did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not
included in the second shortlist. Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered
favorably when they were exempted from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the
CCP and conferred the Order of National Artists. The Committee on Honors and the former
President effectively treated respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno as a
preferred class. The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Maosa and Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny. No real and substantial distinction between
respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that would justify deviating from the laws,
guidelines and established procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional position. The
undue classification was not germane to the purpose of the law. Instead, it contradicted the law
and well-established guidelines, rules and regulations meant to carry the law into effect. While

petitioner Abad cannot claim entitlement to the Order of National Artists, he is entitled to be
given an equal opportunity to vie for that honor. In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of
petitioner Abads right to equal protection, an interest that is substantial enough to confer him
standing in this case.
As regards the other concerned artists and academics as well as the CAP, their claim of
deep concern for the preservation of the countrys rich cultural and artistic heritage, while
laudable, falls short of the injury in fact requirement of standing. Their assertion constitutes a
generalized grievance shared in a substantially equal measure by all or a large class of
citizens. Nor can they take refuge in their status as taxpayers as the case does not involve any
illegal appropriation or taxation. A taxpayers suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the
spending or taxing power of the Congress.
Propriety of the Remedies
It has been held that the remedies of prohibition and injunction are preventive and, as
such, cannot be availed of to restrain an act that is already fait accompli. Where the act sought
to be prohibited or enjoined has already been accomplished or consummated, prohibition or
injunction becomes moot.
Nevertheless, even if the principal issue is already moot, this Court may still resolve its
merits for the future guidance of both bench and bar. Courts will decide a question otherwise
moot and academic if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." More than being a
teaching moment, this is not the first time that the Order of National Artists was conferred in the
manner that is being assailed in this case. 72 If not addressed here and now, there is great
probability that the central question involved in this case will haunt us again in the future. Every
President may invoke absolute presidential prerogative and thrust upon us National Artists after
his or her own heart, in total disregard of the advise of the CCP and the NCCA and the voice of
the community of artists, resulting to repeated episodes of indignation and uproar from the
artists and the public.
Furthermore, if not corrected, such an act would give rise to mischief and dangerous
precedent whereby those in the corridors of power could avoid judicial intervention and review
by merely speedily and stealthily completing the commission of an illegality.
JOYCE V. ARDIENTE v. SPOUSES JAVIER and MA. THERESA PASTORFIDE, CDO WATER
DISTRICT and GASPAR GONZALEZ, JR.
G.R. No. 161921, July 17, 2013
J. Peralta
Co-parties before the RTC and CA cannot be made adversary parties in a petition for
review on certiorari. There is no basis to treat the co-parties as such when it cannot be shown
that there was a cross-claim filed against said co-parties. Under Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules
of Court, a cross-claim which is not set up shall be barred. Thus, for failing to set up a crossclaim against her co-defendants before the RTC, petitioner is already barred from doing so in
the present petition.
FACTS:

Petitioner Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto S. Ardiente are owners of a
housing unit at Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement selling, transferring and conveying in favor of
respondent Ma. Theresa Pastorfide all their rights and interests in the housing unit at Emily
Homes in consideration of P70,000.00. The Memorandum of Agreement carries a stipulation
that the water and power bill of the subject property shall be for the account of the Second Party
(Ma. Theresa Pastorfide) effective June 1, 1994.
For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water connection in the name of Joyce
Ardiente was never questioned nor perturbed until on March 12, 1999, without notice, the water
connection of Ma. Theresa was cut off. Proceeding to the office of the Cagayan de Oro Water
District (COWD) to complain, she was told that she was delinquent for three (3) months and that
it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off. On March 15, 1999, Ma.
Theresa paid the delinquent bills. On the same date, through her lawyer, Ma. Theresa wrote a
letter to the COWD to explain who authorized the cutting of the water line. The COWD reiterated
that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off.
Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide filed a complaint for damages
against petitioner, COWD and its manager Gaspar Gonzalez. The RTC rendered judgment in
favor of Ma. Theresa. Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez then filed an appeal with the CA. The
appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. It ruled that petitioner has a "legal duty to
honor the possession and use of water line by Ma. Theresa Pastorfide pursuant to their
Memorandum of Agreement" and "that when petitioner applied for its disconnection, she acted
in bad faith causing prejudice and injury to Ma. Theresa. As to COWD and Gonzalez, the CA
held that they "failed to give a notice of disconnection and derelicted in reconnecting the water
line despite payment of the unpaid bills by the spouses Pastorfide.
COWD and Gonzalez filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 161802. However, based on technical grounds and on the finding that the
CA did not commit any reversible error in its assailed Decision, the petition was denied. COWD
and Gonzalez filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied with finality.
Petitioner, on the other hand, timely filed the instant petition against the Spouses Javier,
Ma. Theresa, CDO Water District and Gaspar Gonzalez, Jr.
ISSUES:
Whether the petitioners co-defendants before the RTC and her co-appellants in the CA
can be her adversary parties in the instant petition for review on certiorari
RULING:
Being her co-parties before the RTC and the CA, petitioner cannot, in the instant petition
for review on certiorari, make COWD and Gonzalez, adversary parties. It is a grave mistake on
the part of petitioner's counsel to treat COWD and Gonzalez as respondents. There is no basis
to do so, considering that, in the first place, there is no showing that petitioner filed a cross-claim
against COWD and Gonzalez. Under Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a cross-claim
which is not set up shall be barred. Thus, for failing to set up a cross-claim against COWD and
Gonzalez before the RTC, petitioner is already barred from doing so in the present petition.

More importantly, COWD and Gonzalez's petition for review on certiorari filed with this
Court was already denied with finality on June 28, 2004, making the presently assailed CA
Decision final and executory insofar as COWD and Gonzalez are concerned. Thus, COWD and
Gonzalez are already precluded from participating in the present petition. They cannot resurrect
their lost cause by filing pleadings this time as respondents but, nonetheless, reiterating the
same prayer in their previous pleadings filed with the RTC and the CA.
CAROLINA B. JOSE v. PURITA SUAREZ
G.R. No. 17611 July 17, 2013
J. Abad
When a trial court merely denied a motion for being unmeritorious without further
elaborating on the bases of its conclusion, it then fails to perform its bounden-duty to make an
independent evaluation of the merits of the case. Such failure of the RTC constitutes grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Carolina filed two Affidavit-Complaints for estafa against Purita before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Cebu, one concerning 14 Chinabank checks totalling P1.5 million 8 and the
other pertaining to 10 Chinabank checks in the aggregate amount of P2.1 million. She claimed
that on April 26, 2004, Purita went to her house because the latter needed cash for her
business. Carolina gave Purita the cash she needed provided she would pay interest at 5%
monthly. In exchange for the cash, Purita issued checks all dated April 27, 2004. However, the
checks were dishonored upon presentment. Hence, the complaint for estafa.
The City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Purita for estafa. Stressing that her
transactions with Carolina did not constitute estafa, Purita promptly filed a Petition for
Review before the Department of Justice (DOJ). The The DOJ reversed and set aside the Joint
Resolution of the City Prosecutor. Pursuant to the DOJs directive, City Prosecutor Nicolas C.
Sellon moved for the withdrawal of the Information before the RTC. However, the RTC denied
the Motion to Withdraw Information. When Purita moved for reconsideration, the RTC issued
another Order denied such motion.
The CA ruled that the RTC Judge failed to personally assess or evaluate the Resolution
of the DOJ. Upholding the DOJs ruling that there is no probable cause to indict Purita for
estafa, the CA also held that the matter is the proper subject of a civil case as the parties
engaged themselves in a contract of loan. Carolina pleaded for reconsideration and argued that
the RTCs own evaluation of a prima facie case for estafa is a matter that is within the trial
courts jurisdiction that should not be disturbed by the CA. The CA, however, rejected this claim.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed error in reversing the Orders of the RTC which adjudged to
maintain the estafa charge against Purita.
RULING:
The petition is partly granted.

When a trial court is confronted to rule on a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an

Information, it is its bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this
assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the motion.
As aptly observed by the CA, the RTCs Order denying the Motion to Withdraw
Information failed to state cogent reasons behind the said courts refusal to grant withdrawal of
the Information. The RTC simply declared that it was denying the motion for being
unmeritorious, without further elaborating on the bases of its conclusion.
Likewise, in its Order reiterating its denial of respondents Motion for Reconsideration,
the RTC merely stated that the 5% interest is a matter of defense. There was never any
discussion as to how it reached such conclusion, or how the DOJ findings impacted on its
ruling. And instead of confronting the reasons stated in the motion for the withdrawal of the
Information, the RTC digressed and focused solely on what constitutes estafa involving
bouncing checks.
Hence, it is plain from the said Orders that the RTC failed to perform its bounden-duty to
make an independent evaluation of the merits of the case. The CA did not therefore err in
declaring that such failure of the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
of jurisdiction. Thus, the Court deems it proper to remand this case to the RTC.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN
G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013
J. Peralta
When a party files a motion to quash information for bigamy based on the trial courts
declaration that his marriage is null and void ab initio, the same cannot be granted. A motion to
quash information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint
or information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which
are apparent in the face of the information." It is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in
the information. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments in
an Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted,
would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law.
FACTS:
On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina). On October 28, 1993,
respondent married Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon). Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for
annulment of his marriage with Modina. On February 23, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City granted
respondents petition and declared his marriage with Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid
marriage license. On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, in June 2003, private
complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of respondents previous marriage with Modina.
She thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging respondent with Bigamy.
On April 15, 2005, respondent was indicted in Information for Bigamy. Respondent filed
an Omnibus Motion praying that he be allowed to present evidence to support his motion; that
his motion to quash be granted; and that the case be dismissed. Respondent moved for the
quashal of the information on two grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts do not charge the offense of
bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished.

On September 4, 2008, the RTC issued an Order denying respondents Omnibus

Motion. The RTC held that the facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of bigamy.
Respondents motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Aggrieved, respondent instituted
a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA, which the
appellate court granted. The CA concluded that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
denying respondents motion to quash the information, considering that the facts alleged in the
information do not charge an offense. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed reversible error when it granted respondents petition for
certiorari, considering that the subsequent court judgment declaring respondents first marriage
void ab initio did not extinguish respondents criminal liability which already attached prior to
said judgment.
RULING:
The petition is granted.
As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused
assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency on its
face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information." It is a
hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. The fundamental test in
determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an Information is whether or not the
facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements
of the crime defined by law.
Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the information are not to be considered. To be
sure, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which is evident on its
fact. Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the court the opportunity to
correct the defect by amendment. If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that
another complaint or information be filed except when the information is quashed on the ground
of extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy.
Respondents motion to quash was founded on the trial courts declaration that his
marriage with Modina is null and void ab initio. He claims that with such declaration, one of the
elements of the crime is wanting. The Family Code has settled once and for all that a
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense. It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration
of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral. The issue on the declaration of
nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the
subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHRIS CORPUZ y BASBAS

G.R. No. 191068, July 17, 2013
J. Perez
When a witness fails to positively identify the accused as the victims assailant and that
there are inconsistencies between his affidavit and testimony, the same shall not affect his
credibility. Discrepancies referring only to minor details and collateral matters not to the
central fact of the crime do not affect the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of
witnesses declarations, as long as these are coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole.
FACTS:
On 18 January 2001, Chris Corpuz (Corpuz) was charged for the Murder of Gilbert
Cerezo with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm in an Information.
During the trial, the prosecutions evidence was primarily taken from the eyewitness
account of Romeo Aquino (Aquino). Aquino narrated that Cerezo went to talk to Naning, the
daughter of appellant when Corpuz came out of the house and shot the victim. Aquino further
stated that he, together with two companions, brought Cerezo to the hospital afterwards.
The prosecution also submitted as evidence the Police Blotter Entry as reported by
Aquino as well as the police investigation conducted by PO Maramba. On the part of the
defense, testimonies of the appellant and his daughter Cristina, also known as Naning were
offered in evidence.
After evaluating the evidence presented by the parties, the trial court found appellant
guilty of murder with the use of an unlicensed firearm. It noted the Certification issued by the
Firearms and Explosives Division of the PNP Camp Crame indicating that the accused is not a
licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and calibre. Aggrieved, the appellant assailed the
decision on appeal. The Court of Appeals (CA) sustained the trial courts finding and found the
same to be in order.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed reversible error in giving credence to the alleged eyewitness
testimony of Aquino, despite the latters failure to positively identify the appellant as the victims
assailant.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
The appellant challenges his conviction by attacking the credibility of prosecution
witness Romeo Aquino. According to appellant, the said eyewitness failed to positively identify
him as the victims assailant. This is aside from the inconsistencies between Aquinos affidavit
submitted
to
the
police
and
the
testimony
he
made
in
open
court.
Well aware that the identity of the offender is crucial in the success of the prosecution of
an offense, the Court notes important details that clearly ascertain the appellant as the person
responsible for the death of Gilbert Cerezo. For one, it must be pointed out that at the outset,
appellants identity as Chris Corpuz was already admitted and he was positively identified by

Romeo Aquino during the trial as the person who shot his friend Gilbert Cerezo in the abdomen,
while the latter was having a conversation with appellants daughter Naning. In a
straightforward manner, Aquino narrated and demonstrated how appellant shot the victim and
where they were positioned vis-a-vis his location at the time of the shooting. He also pointed to
the appellant as the person who shot Cerezo with a handgun, causing the latters death. This
was appreciated by the court a quo which observed the demeanor of Aquino while on the
witness stand. At this point, the Court sees no reason to disbelieve his testimony, especially so,
that there was no motive on his part to attribute the killing to appellant Corpuz, a neighbour
known to him for so long.
Also, it is posited that while on the stand, Aquino gave the impression that he saw the
act of shooting and not merely heard a gunshot which caused him to look at the direction where
it came from. Giving attention to the apparent inconsistency, it was observed that during crossexamination, Aquino insisted that he actually witnessed the shooting and that he was telling the
truth. In fact, he was able to demonstrate how the shooting was carried out and the position of
appellant Corpuz when he aimed his shot at Cerezo.
Furthermore, as aptly cited in People v. Cabtalan, minor inconsistencies and
discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as well as
their positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Similarly, as held in
the case of People v. Laog, where the appellant also raised the inconsistencies in the testimony
of the victim, this Court declared:
Nonetheless, this matter raised by appellant is a minor detail which had nothing
to do with the elements of the crime of rape. Discrepancies referring only to
minor details and collateral matters not to the central fact of the crime do not
affect the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of witnesses
declarations, as long as these are coherent and intrinsically believable on the
whole.
BOBBY ABEL AVELINO y BULAWAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 181444, July 17, 2013
J. Villarama, Jr.
When there are inconsistencies with the testimonies of two witnesses, this does not
exculpate the accused from criminal liability and does not ignore the fact that one witness was
able to unequivocally identify the accused as the gunman. It cannot be denied that once a
person gains familiarity of another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a
considerable distance.
FACTS:
Petitioner Bobby Abel Avelino y Bulawan, together with five co-accused, was charged
with murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila with the qualifying circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation.
The prosecution presented eight witnesses: Delia Hispano, the wife of the victim; Diana
Espinosa; Alfredo Manalangsang (Manalangsang); Mary Ann Caada (Caada); Renato Sosas;
Dr. Romeo T. Salen; P/Insp. Mario Prado; and National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent
Rizaldi Jaymalin.

On October 5, 2000, around 9:00 oclock in the evening, Alfredo Manalangsang was
riding on a tricycle going to Baseco Compound, Tondo, Manila. Since Manalangsang was the
last passenger to board the tricycle, he sat behind the driver. Upon reaching a certain point
between Muelle Del Rio and 2nd Street, Port Area, Manila, the tricycle which Manalangsang was
riding on passed at the left lane instead of the right lane of the road to give way to the ownertype jeep owned by the barangay and driven by its Chairman Generoso Hispano, herein victim.
While Chairman Hispano was entering the nearest route near the center island, a man suddenly
emerged and blocked Chairman Hispanos vehicle. Instantaneously, Manalangsang heard
bursts of gunshot which prompted him to jump from the tricycle. Manalangsang instinctively hid
behind the center island of the road. At this juncture, Manalangsang peeped at the direction of
Chairman Hispanos jeep and saw three (3) men wearing bonnets, two of whom were
strategically blocking the jeep of Chairman Hispano. The third man, who was wearing a green
jacket and positioned himself near the gutter, fired successive shots at Chairman Hispano and
thereafter approached the jeep of Chairman Hispano. He pulled down from the jeep the almost
lifeless body of Chairman Hispano. Since Manalangsang was situated near the third assailant,
he failed to identify the other two assailants. However, Manalangsang positively identified the
third assailant as appellant Bobby Abel Avelino, whom he saw stooping down at the
Chairmans body and pulling the opening of his bonnet down to his chin to ascertain if the
Chairman was still alive. Sensing that it was safe for him to leave the scene, Manalangsang
boarded a tricycle again and went home.
Denying the accusation, the defense presented as evidence the testimonies of petitioner,
PO2 Anthony P. Galang, Adonis T. Bantiling and Scene of the Crime Operative (SOCO) PSI Lito
D. Cabamongan (Cabamongan).
Petitioner advanced the defense of denial and alibi. He testified that on October 5, 2000,
he and his wife went to the Land Transportation Office in Pasay City to renew his license as
they planned to go to Baguio that day. But as he was issued a temporary license late in the
afternoon, instead of going home, he and his wife checked in at the Pharaoh Hotel in Sta. Cruz,
Manila to spend the night. He parked his car along Dasmarias Bridge and slept. Later, he woke
up to transfer his car but his car was gone. Thus, he and his wife went to the police station in
Sta. Cruz, Manila then to the Anti-Carnapping Unit along U.N. Avenue to report the incident. At
the latter location, they learned from a certain Tata Randy, an acquaintance and former police
officer, that the victim had been gunned down. Around 1:00 a.m., he and his wife returned to the
hotel. On October 23, 2000, he was arrested by agents of the NBI.
The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The
CA upheld the RTC decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in relying on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
Manalangsang and Caada and disregarding the inconsistencies between the statements of
Manalangsang and the findings of the medico-legal and SOCO PSI Cabamongan as to the
position of the gunman.
RULING:
The petition is denied.

For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that appellant was somewhere else when
the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Unless substantiated by clear
and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in
law. Denial, like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be
accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.
In this case, the defense failed to establish that it was physically impossible for the
petitioner to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Pharaoh Hotel,
where petitioner claims to have stayed with his wife at the time of the commission of the crime,
is in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The said hotel is not so far from the scene of the crime, which is in
Baseco Compound in Tondo, Manila, so as not to afford the petitioner an opportunity to easily
go to the place of the shooting at the time Hispano was killed. Indeed, for the defense of alibi to
prosper, the accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of
the crime. These, the defense failed to do.
The defense of the petitioner is based, secondly, on his allegations that prosecution
witnesses Manalangsang and Caada failed to positively identify him as the gunman who
mortally wounded Hispano, and that Manalangsangs testimony as to the locations and number
of gunshot wounds, as well as the position of the gunman, is inconsistent with the physical
evidence as provided by the medico-legal officer and the testimony of SOCO PSI Cabamongan.
However, these allegations cannot exculpate the petitioner from criminal liability.
Manalangsang unequivocally identified the petitioner as the gunman. Manalangsang was able
to identify the petitioner because the latter revealed his face when he pulled down the bonnet he
was wearing, thereby exposing his eyes, nose, mouth, and chin. Moreover, the certainty of
Manalangsang in identifying the petitioner as the one who shot Hispano is bolstered by the fact
that he and petitioner were neighbors for five years in Baseco. It cannot be denied that once a
person gains familiarity of another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a
considerable
distance.
The identification made by Manalangsang was likewise sufficiently corroborated by the
testimony of Caada, that she saw the petitioner, with whom she was familiar, drive away in
Hispanos owner-type jeep, wearing a green jacket and black bonnet rolled up to his forehead.
Further, as can be gleaned from the excerpt below, the petitioners defense that
Manalangsangs testimony contradicts with the medical findings, and should then be
disregarded, must fail. Petitioner claims that Manalangsangs statements that Hispano was shot
in a downward direction conflict with the findings of the medico-legal that the trajectory of the
bullets is in an upward direction. Clearly, the fact that the trajectory of the bullets is in an upward
direction does not negate the veracity of Manalangsangs statement that Hispano was shot by
the gunman from an elevated plane.
Thus, the positive identification of the petitioner as the gunman by Manalangsang, as
corroborated by Caada, must stand. Indeed, it has been consistently held by this Court that in
criminal cases the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial judge, whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the
judge has the direct opportunity to observe said witnesses on the stand and ascertain if they are
telling the truth or not. Absent any showing that the lower courts overlooked substantial facts

and circumstances, which if considered, would change the result of the case, this Court gives
deference to the trial courts appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses,
especially since Manalangsang and Caadas testimony meets the test of credibility.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REYNALDO ANDY SOMOZA y HANDAYA

G.R. No. 197250, July 17, 2013
J. Leonardo-De Castro
The fact that the inventory was made at the accused-appellants house and not at the
scene of the buy-bust operation did not adversely affect the chain of custody. If it is shown that
the illicit drugs seized from accused-appellant are the same illicit drugs marked and subjected
to physical inventory then the chain of custody was continuous and the identity, integrity and
evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs seized from accused-appellant were preserved.
FACTS:
Two informations were filed against accused-appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11
of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Accussed-appellant was arrested after a
buy-bust operation was conducted. During such operation, coin purse with six sachets
containing powdered crystalline substance was found in his pocket when he was searched. NBI
Agent Celon marked the items recovered from the scene immediately after accused-appellants
apprehension. The remaining sachet bought by PO1 Bautista was marked as "BB-RS-01," the
six sachets found in the coin purse as "POS-RS-01" to "POS-RS-06" and the metallic tube as
"POS-RS-21 July 05." The marking was witnessed by Kagawad Talavera and media
representative Elloren.
Accused-appellant was thereafter informed that the law enforcers have a warrant to
search his house. He was brought to his house and his place was searched in the presence of
Kagawad Talavera and media representative Elloren. However, the search yielded nothing but
plastic sachets, lighter and foils. Accused-appellant was subsequently brought to the NBI office
for booking and documentation. He was photographed with the seized items in front of him and
the incident was entered in the PDEA blotter.
The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for both cases of illegal
sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. On appeal, the CA found nothing irregular in the
buy-bust operation. The Court of Appeals held that the buy-bust was not affected by the
absence of a pre-operation report. The appellate court also rejected accused-appellants
assertion of a defect in the chain of custody of the drugs taken from him. The failure to make an
immediate inventory at the scene of the buy-bust operation was not fatal to the prosecutions
case as all of the prosecutions witnesses.
ISSUE:
Whether there is failure on the part of the prosecution to prove accused-appellants guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
The petition is denied.

In this case, the State has discharged the burden of proof required of it.
In both cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution
must show the chain of custody over the dangerous drug in order to establish the corpus delicti,
which is the dangerous drug itself. Such chain of custody should show that the dangerous drug
sold by or in the possession of the accused is the same dangerous drug seized from the said
accused and taken into custody by the apprehending officer, marked and subjected to physical
inventory by the apprehending officer, submitted to the PDEA or PNP forensic laboratory,
subjected by the forensic laboratory examiner to laboratory examination the results of which are
contained in a sworn certification, and presented to the court as evidence against the
accused This is to ensure the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items and preclude
the possibility of alteration, tampering or substitution of substance in the chain of custody of the
dangerous drug.
The Court also finds that there was no break in the chain of custody of the dangerous
drugs taken from accused-appellant. The prosecution has shown that the illicit drugs seized
from accused-appellant are the same illicit drugs marked and subjected to physical inventory.
The chain of custody was continuous and the identity, integrity and evidentiary value of the
dangerous drugs seized from accused-appellant were preserved.
The inventory made at accused-appellants house and not at the scene of the buy-bust
operation did not adversely affect the chain of custody. The fact is that, as witnessed by
Kagawad Talavera and media representative Elloren, the illicit drugs taken from accusedappellant were marked in his presence at the scene of the buy-bust operation immediately after
his arrest. This marking may be considered as the preliminary phase of the inventory. Indeed,
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 which provides for the chain of custody of dangerous drugs
seized by law enforcers is silent on the matter of marking of the seized drugs. In particular, its
paragraph (1) only speaks of conducting a physical inventory and photographing of the illicit
drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation.
"Marking" is the placing by the apprehending officer of some distinguishing signs with
his/her initials and signature on the items seized. It helps ensure that the dangerous drugs
seized upon apprehension are the same dangerous drugs subjected to inventory and
photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station or at some other
practicable venue rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule
requires that the "marking" of the seized items -- to truly ensure that they are the same items
that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence -- should be done (1) in the
presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.
As marking is the initial stage of physical inventory, in effect, the physical inventory of the
confiscated contraband commenced at the scene of the buy-bust and was completed at the
house of accused-appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARVIN CRUZ
G.R. No. 201728, July 17, 2013
J. Reyes
When the victim commits a mistake in remembering the dates when she was raped,
such does not contradict the fact that she did not consent to the sexual act. A rape victim is not
expected to make an errorless recollection of the incident, so humiliating and painful that she

might in fact be trying to obliterate it from her memory. Thus, a few inconsistent remarks in rape
cases will not necessarily impair the testimony of the offended party.
FACTS:
Accussed-appellant Marvin Cruz (Cruz) was charged in three (3) separate Informations
of Violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 and two (2) counts of Rape.
AAA is a 17-year old college student in St. Columbans College in Lingayen,
Pangasinan. She met Cruz sometime in March 2007 via text messaging through her
schoolmate and his cousin Raffy, who gave her mobile number to him. By June 2007, they
became sweethearts despite the fact that they still have not personally met. They finally met on
October 22, 2007 when Cruz and Raffy visited AAAs place.
It was the version of the incidents that occurred after the two had a relationship that the
prosecution and the defense differed. According to the prosecution, Cruz forced himself upon
AAA on the three (3) separate incidents complained of, while the defense set up the sweetheart
defense.
The first incident happened on October 23, 2007 when Cruz took advantage of AAAs
dizzy state and forcibly got her naked. He then mounted her and had sexual intercourse with
her despite her resistance. On November 1, 2007, AAA broke up with Cruz through a text
message. The second and third incidents both occurred on November 6, 2007. Cruz denied
AAAs accusations. He professed his love for AAA and claimed that she consented to the
sexual acts.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Cruz for (2) counts of Rape and aquitted him
for Violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. According to the RTC, although they were lovers,
Cruz failed to prove AAAs consent to the carnal knowledge. Despite the lapses in AAAs
testimony, the RTC found that it did not detract from her statement that she did not consent to
the sexual acts complained of. The CA denied Cruzs appeal and affirmed the decision of the
RTC. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the lapses in AAAs testimony is sufficient to acquit Cruz.
RULING:
The appeal is denied.
It is well-settled that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses is
entitled to the highest respect absent a showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case.
In the Courts assessment of the records, there is no cogent reason to reverse the findings of
the RTC, as affirmed by the CA.
The Court is convinced that the testimony of AAA positively identifying Cruz as the one
who sexually abused her is worthy of belief. The clear, consistent and spontaneous testimony
of AAA unrelentingly established how Cruz sexually molested her on November 6, 2007 with the
use of force, threat and intimidation. Indeed, a rape victim is not expected to make an errorless
recollection of the incident, so humiliating and painful that she might in fact be trying to obliterate

it from her memory. Thus, a few inconsistent remarks in rape cases will not necessarily impair
the testimony of the offended party.
Cruzs defense that AAAs testimony that she received his messages on June 2007
instead of October 2007 is flawed, is immaterial and does not in any way detract from the fact
that he raped her several times on November 6, 2007. Moreover, Cruz failed to present any
scintilla
of
evidence
to
prove
that
AAAs
testimony
was
not
credible.
As to the sweetheart defense, it is said that love is not a license for lust. A love affair
does not justify rape for a man does not have the unbridled license to subject his beloved to his
carnal desires against her will. In this case, Cruzs argument that they are lovers may be true;
however, the sexual incidents between him and AAA on November 6, 2007 have not been
proven to be consensual.
ANITA MANGILA v. JUDGE HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN, ET AL.
G.R. No. 160739, July 17, 2013
J. Bersamin
When a party is detained for legal reasons, she cannot avail of the writ of habeas corpus
as a remedy. The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the
detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee.
Equally well-settled however, is that the writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the
writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record.
FACTS:
On June 16, 2003, seven (7) criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila and
four others with syndicated estafa and with violations of Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042
(Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) were filed in the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities in Puerto Princesa City (MTCC). The complaints arose from the recruiting and promising
of employment by Mangila and the others to the private complainants as overseas contract
workers in Toronto, Canada, and from the collection of visa processing fees, membership fees
and on-line application the private complainants without lawful authority from the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
On the following day, Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan, Presiding Judge of the MTCC,
conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaints. After examining Miguel Aaron Palayon,
one of the complainants, Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her
cohorts without bail. On the next day, the entire records of the cases, including the warrant of
arrest, were transmitted to the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City for further proceedings
and appropriate action in accordance with the prevailing rules.
As a consequence, Mangila was arrested on June 18, 2003 and detained at the
headquarters of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).Claiming that Judge Pangilinan did
not have the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation; that the preliminary investigation
he conducted was not yet completed when he issued the warrant of arrest; and that the
issuance of the warrant of arrest was without sufficient justification or without a prior finding of
probable cause, Mangila filed in the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for habeas corpus to obtain
her release from detention.

The CA denied the petition for habeas corpus for its lack of merit. Hence, this appeal via
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to obtain
the release of Mangila from detention.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the
trial courts function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot
be used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure
or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of
whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is
not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in
the absence of exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in
advance of trial. The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted
before resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances are extant.
Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when
instituted for the sole purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in
order that the cause of his detention may be inquired into and his statements final. The writ of
habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds
him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority. Hence, the only parties before the court are
the petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question
to be resolved is whether the custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The
writ may be denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito
justicias.
The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and,
if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-settled
however, is that the writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out
on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge with
jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record.
There is no question that when the criminal complaints were lodged against Mangila and
her cohorts on June 16, 2003, Judge Pangilinan, as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, was
empowered to conduct preliminary investigations involving "all crimes cognizable by the proper
court in their respective territorial jurisdictions."
Under Section 6(b) of Rule 112of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
investigating judge could issue a warrant of arrest during the preliminary investigation even
without awaiting its conclusion should he find after an examination in writing and under oath of
the complainant and the witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers that a
probable cause existed, and that there was a necessity of placing the respondent under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Consequently, the CA properly
denied Mangilas petition for habeas corpus because she had been arrested and detained by

virtue of the warrant issued for her arrest by Judge Pangilinan, a judicial officer undeniably
possessing the legal authority to do so.

DR. ROGER R. POSADAS and DR. ROLANDO P. DAYCO v. SANDIGANBAYAN and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 168651 & 169000, July 17, 2013
J. Villarama, Jr.
When a party files motion for reconsideration which is not set for hearing, it renders the
motion without no legal effect. It is considered a pro forma motion which shall not toll the
reglementary period of the appeal. This requirement is mandatory Basic is the rule that every
motion must be set for hearing by the movant except for those motions which the court may act
upon without prejudice to the rights of the adverse party.
FACTS:
Petitioner Dr. Posadas is a longtime professor and former Dean of the College of
Science at the UP-Diliman Campus. He was appointed by the Board of Regents as UP Diliman
Chancellor for a three-year term starting November 1, 1993 and ending on October 31, 1996.
On July 26, 1995, Dr. Posadas submitted to the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA) an Application for Funding of his proposed project entitled "Institutionalization
of Technology Management at the University of the Philippines in Diliman" (TMC Project). The
TMC Project, to be funded by a grant from the Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA), aimed to design and develop ten new graduate courses in technology management for
the diploma, masters and doctoral programs to be offered by TMC.
On November 7, 1995, Dr. Posadas was appointed as Project Director of UP TMC
effective September 18, 1995 up to September 17, 1996.In another undated "Contract for
Consultancy Services", Dr. Posadas was hired as Consultant for the TMC Project for the same
period. As evidenced by disbursement vouchers and admitted by Dr. Posadas, the latter
received his "honoraria"(P30,000.00 per month) and consultancy fees (totaling P100,000.00) as
Project Director and Consultant of the TMC Project until May 1996 when the Commission on
Audit (COA) raised questions on the legality of the said fees.7
In August 1996, payment of the subject "honoraria" and fees was suspended by COA
Resident Auditor Romeo J. Pulido who noted that there were deficiencies.
In a Memorandum dated September 16, 1996, UPs Chief Legal Officer Marichu C.
Lambino addressed the foregoing concerns of COA Auditor Pulido.Atty. Lambino stated that (a)
the compensation received by Dr. Posadas are in the nature of consultancy fees and hence
expressly exempted by Department of Budget and Management (DBM) National Compensation
Circular (NCC) No. 75 dated March 11, 1995; (b) the TMC Project, being a training program, is
likewise exempted from the coverage of NEDA Guidelines on the Procurement of Consulting
Services for Government Projects; and (c) under Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum
Circular (MC) No. 43, series of 1993 "Streamlining and Deregulating Human Resource
Development Functions" UP is authorized, without prior approval from the CSC, to determine
the rates of honorarium for government personnel participating as resource persons,
coordinator, and facilitator, in training programs. On the issue of double compensation, Atty.

Lambino pointed out that Dr. Posadas was appointed Project Director because of managerial
expertise, and his skills in supervising personnel who are involved in an academic undertaking,
and as Consultant because of his expertise in technology management. Finding these
explanations/justifications acceptable, Auditor Pulido lifted the notices of suspension in
September 1997.
However, even before the issuance of the suspension notices, then UP President Dr.
Emil Q. Javier, ordered an investigation on the basis of an administrative complaint filed. After
the conduct of a preliminary investigation and finding a prima facie case against the petitioners,
President Javier issued the formal chargesfor Grave Misconduct and Abuse of Authority. The
ADT found petitioners guilty of serious or grave misconduct and recommended the penalty of
dismissal in accordance with CSC Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1989, as well as
Article 250 of the University Code. The Report likewise stated that the acts of petitioners for
which they were held administratively liable may warrant prosecution under Section 3(h) and (i)
of R.A. No. 3019. Under the Orderdated August 25, 1998 signed by President Javier, petitioners
were dismissed from the service.
On September 3, 1998, Atty. Carmelita Yadao-Guno in her capacity as General Counsel
of UP formally endorsed the findings and recommendations of the ADT to the Ombudsman.
Meanwhile, the BOR at its 1126th meeting resolved petitioners appeal in the ADT Case.
Satisfied with the BORs action, petitioners caused the withdrawal of their appeal before the
CSC.
On June 9, 1999, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the Office of
Ombudsman recommended the dismissal of the charges against petitioners for insufficiency of
evidence. However, said recommendation was disapproved by then Ombudsman Aniano A.
Desierto who ordered that petitioners be indicted for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
and Section 7(b) in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713. The corresponding
Informations were thus filed against the petitioners before the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case
Nos. 25465-66). The Sandiganbayan found both Dr. Posadas and Dr. Dayco guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied due course for
the reason that it has not been set for hearing as required by the rules, hence the motion is pro
forma.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
or in excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioners motion for reconsideration on the ground that it
was not set for hearing.
RULING:
The petition is dismissed.
Contrary to petitioners stance, the 2002 Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan
requires a motion for reconsideration to be set for hearing, as it provides under Rule VII:
SECTION 1. Motion Day. - Except for motions which may be acted upon ex
parte, all motions shall be scheduled for hearings on a Friday, or if that day is a
non-working holiday, on the next working day.

Motions requiring immediate action may be acted upon on shorter notice.

Under the Rules of Sandiganbayan, effective January 10, 1979, a petition for
reconsideration of a judgment or final order may be filed upon the grounds, in the form and
subject to the requirements, for motions for new trial in criminal cases under Rule 121 of the
Rules of Court. In the case of Alvarezv. Sandiganbayan, the Court upheld the Sandiganbayan in
not considering "the failure of the movant to fix the place, date and time of the hearing of his
motion a substantial defect, for instead of giving the motion a short shrift, it set the incident for
hearing, and even granted the prosecution ten days from notice within which to
oppose/comment." The Court noted what was then the practice of the Sandigabayan itself,
rather than the movant, to determine the date and time of hearings of motions. The peculiar
circumstances of said case heavily weighed in favor of relaxation of the rules, with the Courts
finding that the evidence presented against the petitioner does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and may not be deemed sufficient to support a conviction. Hence, the Court was not
prepared "to declare that petitioners omission to set his motion for hearing is so grievous an
error as to foreclose the award to him of the relief to which he is otherwise entitled."
In any event, the mandatory setting for hearing a motion for reconsideration to reverse or
modify a judgment or final order of the Sandiganbayan is already settled.
A pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary period of
appeal. Section 4, Rule 121 states:
SEC. 4. Form of motion and notice to the prosecutor. The motion for a new trial
or reconsideration shall be in writing and shall state the grounds on which it is
based. x x x. Notice of the motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be given
to the prosecutor.
As correctly stated by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Sec.2 of Rule 37 and
Sec. 4 of Rule 121 should be read in conjunction with Sec.5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Basic is the rule that every motion must be set for hearing by the movant except for those
motions which the court may act upon without prejudice to the rights of the adverse party. The
notice of hearing must be addressed to all parties and must specify the time and date of the
hearing, with proof of service.
This Court has indeed held, time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court, the requirement is mandatory. Failure to comply with the requirement
renders the motion defective. "As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro
forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite
pleading."
In this case, as Flores committed a procedural lapse in failing to include a notice of
hearing, his motion was a worthless piece of paper with no legal effect whatsoever. Thus, his
motion was properly dismissed by the Sandiganbayan.
The Court thus find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Sandiganbayan when
it denied due course to petitioners motion for reconsideration on the ground that it "has not
been set for hearing as required by the rules" and the same is "deemed pro forma."

COALITION OF ASSOCIATION OF SENIOR CITIZEN IN THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 206844-45/G.R. No. 206982, July 23, 2013
J. Leonardo-De Castro
When the COMELEC reviews the registration of party lists, it must give the latter the
opportunity to be heard and to adduce evidence as to their continuing compliance with the
requirements for the accreditation. However, a formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and
in all instances essential; Rule 17 of the COMELECs Rules of Procedure defines the
requirements for a hearing and these serve as the standards in the determination of the
presence or denial of due process.
FACTS:
The SENIOR CITIZENS party-list participated in the May 14, 2007 elections. However,
the organization failed to get the required two percent (2%) of the total votes cast. Thereafter,
SENIOR CITIZENS was granted leave to intervene in the case of Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on Elections. In accordance
with the procedure set forth in BANAT for the allocation of additional seats under the party-list
system, SENIOR CITIZENS was allocated one seat in Congress. Rep. Arquiza, then the
organizations first nominee, served as a member of the House of Representatives.
Subsequently, SENIOR CITIZENS was allowed to participate in the May 10, 2010 elections.
On May 5, 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled
Irrevocable Covenant, the relevant terms of which the Court quote:
After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked
second among all the party-list candidates and was allocated two seats in the
House of Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first nominee, Rep.
Arquiza, while the second was given to its second nominee, David L. Kho (Rep.
Kho).
The split among the ranks of SENIOR CITIZENS came about not long after. According to
the Datol Groups petition, the members of SENIOR CITIZENS held a national convention on
November 27, 2010 in order to address "the unfulfilled commitment of Rep. Arquiza to his
constituents." Further, a new set of officers and members of the Board of Trustees of the
organization were allegedly elected during the said convention. SENIOR CITIZENS third
nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., was supposedly elected as the organizations Chairman.
Thereafter, on November 30, 2010, in an opposite turn of events, Datol was expelled from
SENIOR CITIZENS by the Board of Trustees that were allied with Rep. Arquiza.
Thenceforth, the two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS had been engaged in a bitter rivalry
as both groups, with their own sets of officers, claimed leadership of the organization.
On December 14, 2011, Rep. Arquiza informed the office of COMELEC Chairman Sixto
S. Brillantes, Jr. that the second nominee of SENIOR CITIZENS, Rep. Kho, had tendered his
resignation, which was accepted by the Coalition. Thereafter, the COMELEC En Banc
conducted a hearing on SENIOR CITIZENS petition in E.M. No. 12-040. At the hearing, the
counsel for CITIZENS (Arquiza Group) admitted that Rep. Khos tender of resignation was
made pursuant to the agreement entered into by the organizations nominees. However, said
counsel also stated that the Board of Trustees of the organization reconsidered the acceptance
of Rep. Khos resignation and the latter was, instead, to complete his term. Also, from the
transcript of the hearing, it appears that the Arquiza Group previously manifested that it was

withdrawing its petition, but the same was opposed by the Datol Group and was not acted upon
by the COMELEC.
On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution in E.M. No. 12-040,
dismissing the petition of the SENIOR CITIZENS (Arquiza Group). It held that the term of office
of public officials cannot be made subject to any agreement of private parties. Public office is
not a commodity that can be shared, apportioned or be made subject of any private agreement.
Public office is vested with public interest that should not be reined by individual interest.
In fact, to formalize the policy of disallowing term sharing agreements among party list
nominees, the Commission recently promulgated Resolution No. 9366, which provides:
"SEC. 7. Term sharing of nominees. Filing of vacancy as a result of term
sharing agreement among nominees of winning party-list groups/organizations
shall not be allowed."
Considering all these, the Court finds the term sharing agreement by the nominees of
the Senior Citizens Party-List null and void.
Subsequently, on December 04, 2012, the Commission En Banc disqualified the
petitioner SENIOR CITIZENS because of the said term-sharing agreement between its
nominees. The Commission En Banc found it to be contrary to public policy. The Court then
ordered the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of the petitioner and its
Manifestations of Intent to Participate was denied. The petitioner was then removed from the
registry and was not allowed to participate as a candidate for the May 13, 2013 Elections and
subsequent elections thereafter. On May 13, 2013, the elections proceeded. Despite the earlier
declaration of its disqualification, SENIOR CITIZENS still obtained 677,642 votes.
Questioning the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS registration and its disqualification to
participate in the May 13, 2013 elections, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed the
instant petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it cancelled petitioners certificate of registration/accreditation
without due process of law.
RULING:
The petition is granted.
The Arquiza Group argues that no notice and hearing were given to SENIOR CITIZENS
for the cancellation of its registration on account of the term-sharing agreement of its nominees.
The Arquiza Group maintains that SENIOR CITIZENS was summoned only to a single hearing
date in the afternoon of August 24, 2012 and the COMELECs review therein focused on the
groups programs, accomplishments, and other related matters. The Arquiza Group asserts that
SENIOR CITIZENS was not advised, before or during the hearing, that the issue of the termsharing agreement would constitute a basis for the review of its registration and accreditation.
Likewise, the Datol Group faults the COMELEC for cancelling the registration and
accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS without giving the latter the opportunity to show that it

complied with the parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum. The Arquiza Group confirms that
after the promulgation of Atong Paglaum, the COMELEC conducted summary hearings in
executive sessions, without informing SENIOR CITIZENS.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7941 provides for the procedure relative to the review of
the registration of party-list organizations. The provision states that the COMELEC may, motu
prorprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on
any of the following grounds provided by the law.
Unquestionably, the twin requirements of due notice and hearing are indispensable
before the COMELEC may properly order the cancellation of the registration and accreditation
of a party-list organization. In connection with this, the Court lengthily discussed in Mendoza v.
Commission on Elections the concept of due process as applied to the COMELEC. We
emphasized therein that:
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as an
administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal, are those outlined in the seminal case of Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relations, quoted below:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof. x x x.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it
is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but
the evidence must be "substantial." "Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or
at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on
its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy,
and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render
its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
These are now commonly referred to as cardinal primary rights in administrative
proceedings.
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at hearing
stage of the proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due process, the Court has consistently
held, is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential; in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure defines the requirements

for a hearing and these serve as the standards in the determination of the presence or denial of
due process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are
reinforcements of the right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the
deliberative stage, as the decision-maker decides on the evidence presented during the
hearing. These standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case and
are the material and substantial components of decision-making. Briefly, the tribunal must
consider the totality of the evidence presented which must all be found in the records of the
case (i.e., those presented or submitted by the parties); the conclusion, reached by the
decision-maker himself and not by a subordinate, must be based on substantial evidence.
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the decision of a
quasi-judicial body, further complements the hearing and decision-making due process rights
and is similar in substance to the constitutional requirement that a decision of a court must state
distinctly the facts and the law upon which it is based. As a component of the rule of fairness
that underlies due process, this is the "duty to give reason" to enable the affected person to
understand how the rule of fairness has been administered in his case, to expose the reason to
public scrutiny and criticism, and to ensure that the decision will be thought through by the
decision-maker
In the instant case, the review of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS was made
pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 through a summary evidentiary hearing carried out
on August 24, 2012 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM). In this hearing, both
the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group were indeed given the opportunity to adduce evidence
as to their continuing compliance with the requirements for party-list accreditation. Nevertheless,
the due process violation was committed when they were not apprised of the fact that the termsharing agreement entered into by the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS in 2010 would be a
material consideration in the evaluation of the organizations qualifications as a party-list group
for the May 13, 2013 elections. As it were, both factions of SENIOR CITIZENS were not able to
answer this issue squarely. In other words, they were deprived of the opportunity to adequately
explain their side regarding the term-sharing agreement and/or to adduce evidence, accordingly,
in support of their position.
It is true that during the April 18, 2012 hearing, the rival groups of SENIOR CITIZENS
admitted to the existence of the term-sharing agreement. Contrary to the claim of COMELEC,
however, said hearing was conducted for purposes of discussing the petition of the Arquiza
Group in E.M. No. 12-040. To recall, said petition asked for the confirmation of the replacement
of Rep. Kho, who had tendered his resignation effective on December 31, 2011. More
specifically, the transcript of the hearing reveals that the focus thereof was on the petition filed
by the Arquiza group and its subsequent manifestation, praying that the group be allowed to
withdraw its petition. Also, during the hearing, COMELEC Chairman Brillantes did admonish the
rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS about their conflicts and warned them about the
complications brought about by their term-sharing agreement. However, E.M. No. 12-040 was
not a proceeding regarding the qualifications of SENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list group and the
issue of whether the term-sharing agreement may be a ground for disqualification was neither
raised nor resolved in that case. Chairman Brillantess remonstration was not sufficient as to
constitute a fair warning that the term-sharing agreement would be considered as a ground for
the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS registration and accreditation.

Furthermore, after the promulgation of Atong Paglaum, which remanded, among other
cases, the disqualification cases involving SENIOR CITIZENS, said organization should have
still been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the matter of the term-sharing agreement,
either through a hearing or through written memoranda. Instead, the COMELEC issued the May
10, 2013 Omnibus Resolution in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) without
conducting any further proceedings thereon after its receipt of our Decision in Atong Paglaum.
ABBOTT LABORATORIES, PHILS., et al. v. PEARLIE ANN F. ALCARAZ
G.R. No. 192571, July 23, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
A plaintiff who files a case should provide a complete statement of the present status of
any pending case if the latter involves the same issues as the one that was filed. If there is no
such similar pending case, Section 5(a) of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that the plaintiff
is obliged to declare under oath that to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim
is pending.
FACTS:
On December 7, 2004, petitioner Abbott Laboratories offered Alcaraz the position of
Medical and Regulatory Affairs Manager. In its offer sheet, it was stated that Alcaraz was to be
employed on a probationary basis for six months. However, during the course of her
employment, Alcaraz experienced difficulties in dealing with the staff. On May 16, 2005, Alcaraz
was called to a meeting where she was told that she failed to meet the regularization standards
for the position. Thereafter, she was requested to tender her resignation.
Alcaraz felt that she was unjustly terminated from her employment and thus, filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against Abbott and its officers. She contended that
while her employment contract stated that she was to be engaged on a probationary status, the
same did not indicate the standards on which her regularization would be based. She further
averred that the individual petitioners maliciously connived to illegally dismiss her.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed Alcarazs complaint for lack of merit. The National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the findings of the LA. In the First CA Petition,
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the ruling of the NLRC and held that the latter did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion in finding that Alcaraz was illegally dismissed. During the
pendency of the motion for reconsideration for the First CA Petition, the petitioners filed the
Second CA Petition which the CA likewise denied and ruled that the NLRC was correct in
upholding the execution of the NLRC Decision.
Alcaraz again moved for the issuance of a writ of execution before the LA, which the latter
granted. The petitioners then appealed said motion to the NLRC through a Memorandum of
Appeal on the ground that the implementation of the LAs order would render its motion for
reconsideration moot and academic.
Alcaraz alleges that petitioners were guilty of forum shopping when they filed the Second
CA Petition pending the resolution of their motion for reconsideration of the decision in the First
CA Petition. She contends that petitioners have not complied with the certification requirement
under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court when they failed to disclose in the instant petition
the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal filed before the NLRC.

ISSUES:
Whether petitioners are guilty of forum shopping and have violated the certification
requirement under Section 5 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Compliance with the certification against forum shopping is separate from and
independent of the avoidance of the act of forum shopping itself. There is a difference in the
treatment between failure to comply with the certification requirement and violation of the
prohibition against forum shopping not only in terms of imposable sanctions but also in the
manner of enforcing them. The former constitutes sufficient cause for the dismissal without
prejudice to the filing of the complaint or initiatory pleading upon motion and after hearing, while
the latter is a ground for summary dismissal thereof and for direct contempt.
Forum shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits involving the same
parties, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. It exists where
the elements of litis pendentia are present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the
two preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in
the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other case.
Section 5(b), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court requires that a plaintiff who files a case should
provide a complete statement of the present status of any pending case if the latter involves the
same issues as the one that was filed. If there is no such similar pending case, Section 5(a) of
the same rule provides that the plaintiff is obliged to declare under oath that to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending.
In this case, records show that, except for the element of identity of parties, the elements
of forum shopping do not exist. Evidently, the First CA Petition was instituted to question the
ruling of the NLRC that Alcaraz was illegally dismissed. On the other hand, the Second CA
Petition pertains to the propriety of the enforcement of the judgment award pending the
resolution of the First CA Petition and the finality of the decision in the labor dispute between
Alcaraz and the petitioners. Based on the foregoing, a judgment in the Second CA Petition will
not constitute res judicata insofar as the First CA Petition is concerned. Thus, considering that
the two petitions clearly cover different subject matters and causes of action, there exists no
forum shopping.
JOSIELEN LARA CHAN v. JOHNNY T. CHAN
G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013
J. Abad
When a party to a case wishes to request for subpoena duces tecum, it must be
established first that the records would have been offered as evidence for admission in court.
Otherwise, such request is premature. Furthermore, Section 36, Rule 132, states that
objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such evidence for admission in court.

FACTS:
On February 6, 2006 petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage
to respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny), the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and
the award of custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and
support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant
drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had convinced him to undergo
hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation.
Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties.
To save their marriage, he agreed to marriage counseling but when he and Josielene got to the
hospital, two men forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an injection. The
marriage relations got worse when the police temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated
crime and released her only after the case against her ended. By then, their marriage
relationship could no longer be repaired.
During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form that
Johnny attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of
a hospital. The form carried a physicians handwritten note that Johnny suffered from
methamphetamine and alcohol abuse. Following up on this point, on August 22, 2006
Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed
to Medical City, covering Johnnys medical records when he was there confined. The request
was accompanied by a motion to be allowed to submit in evidence the records sought by
subpoena duces tecum.
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by
physician-patient privilege. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) sustained the opposition and denied
Josielenes motion. It also denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a special
civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) imputing grave abuse of discretion to
the RTC. The CA denied Josielenes petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnnys hospital records on the ground that these are
covered by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Josielene requested the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital
records of Johnnys confinement, which records she wanted to present in court as evidence in
support of her action to have their marriage declared a nullity.
Respondent Johnny resisted her request for subpoena, however, invoking the privileged
character of those records. He cites Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence which
reads:

SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following

persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxxx
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a
civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or
treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in
attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the
reputation of the patient.
The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician
who gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined
without the patients consent as to any facts which would blacken the latters reputation. This
rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of
his ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis
of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in
the future to come to court and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might
prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk.
The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of
evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer could be
made part of the physicians testimony or as independent evidence that he had made entries in
those
records
that
concern
the
patients
health
problems.
Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of
such evidence for admission in court. Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielenes
request for subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before
making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnnys hospital
records. It is when those records are produced for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt
to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure. Section 24(c),
Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence quoted above is about non-disclosure of privileged matters.
It is of course possible to treat Josielenes motion for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecumcovering the hospital records as a motion for production
of documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant prior to trial. Section
1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 1. Motion for production or inspection; order. Upon motion of any party
showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a)
order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible
things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b)
order any party to permit entry upon designated land or other property in his
possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation

thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the
inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms
and conditions as are just.
But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the
documents to be disclosed are not privileged.
Also, Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition before
the RTC that he had been confined in a hospital against his will and in fact attached to his
answer a Philhealth claim form covering that confinement, he should be deemed to have waived
the privileged character of its records. Josielene invokes Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Evidence that provides:
SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the
remainder admissible. When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing
or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may
be inquired into by the other, and when a detached act, declaration,
conversation, writing or record is given in evidence, any other act, declaration,
conversation, writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given
in evidence.
But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had
already presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act contemplated above which
would justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement.
Johnny was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any
request for disclosure of his hospital records would again be premature.

PROVINCE OF CAGAYAN, represented by HON. ALVARO T. ANTONIO, et. al. v. JOSEPH

LASAM LARA
G.R. No. 188500, July 24, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
When a party fails to comply with a pre-requisite mandated by law, he does not therefore
acquire any legal right to be protected by an injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect
contingent or future rights. Where the complainants right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is
not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a
ground for an injunction.
FACTS:
On September 14, 2007, Lara obtained an Industrial Sand and Gravel Permit (ISAG
Permit) from the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), authorizing him to conduct quarrying operations in a twenty-hectare
area situated in Barangay Centro, Muncipality of Peablanca (Peablanca), Cagayan (Permit
Area) and extract and dispose of sand, gravel, and other unconsolidated materials from the
Permit Area. For the same purpose, Lara obtained an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) from the DENR Environmental Management Bureau (EMB).
On January 3, 2008, Jovy Balisi (Balisi), Laras representative, went to the Cagayan
Provincial Treasurers Office (Treasurers Office) to pay the extraction fee and other fees for

Laras quarrying operations but she was directed to first secure an Order of Payment from the
Environmental and Natural Resources Officer, petitioner Robert Adap (ENRO Adap). However,
when Balisi went to ENRO Adap, the latter refused to issue an Order of Payment. Despite
various pleas from Balisi and Atty. Victorio N. Casauay (Atty. Casauay), Laras counsel, ENRO
Adap remained adamant with his refusal. This prompted Atty. Casauay to tender and deposit the
amount of P51,500.00 with the Treasurers Office corresponding to the said extraction fee and
other related fees.
On January 11, 2008, Lara commenced his quarrying operations. Later that day,
however, a total of four trucks loaded with sand and gravel extracted from the Permit Area were
stopped and impounded by several local officials. Consequently, Lara filed an action for
injunction with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the said officials,
seeking to enjoin the stoppage of his quarrying operations. After due proceedings, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued enabling Lara to restart his business.
Nonetheless, on March 17, 2008, Lara received a Stoppage from Cagayan Governor
Alvaro T. Antonio (Gov. Antonio), directing him to stop his quarrying operations. Hence, Lara
filed the present action for injunction and damages with an urgent and ex-parte motion for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction before the RTC.
The RTC granted Laras application for a writ of preliminary injunction based on a prima
facie finding that he is authorized to extract gravel and sand from the Permit Area. The RTC
consequently made permanent the writ of preliminary injunction and thus, enjoined petitioners
from stopping or disturbing Laras quarrying operations. Aggrieved, petitioners sought direct
recourse to the Court via the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC properly issued the permanent injunction subject of this case.
RULING:
The petition is granted.
It is well-settled that a writ of injunction would issue upon the satisfaction of two (2)
requisites, namely: (a) the existence of a right to be protected; and (b) acts which are violative of
the said right. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future
rights. Where the complainants right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The
possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an
injunction.
In order for an entity to legally undertake a quarrying business, he must first comply with
all the requirements imposed not only by the national government, but also by the local
government unit where his business is situated. A governors permit is a pre-requisite before
one can engage in a quarrying business in Cagayan. Records, however, reveal that Lara
admittedly failed to secure the same; hence, he has no right to conduct his quarrying operations
within the Permit Area. Consequently, he is not entitled to any injunction.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICORDITO N. DE ASIS, JR.

G.R. No. 193874, July 24, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
When a party causes a publication short of the thirty-day period preceding the hearing,
there is a mandatory publication notice required under the Rules of Court. The law clearly
requires that (a) notice of the petition should be published in two (2) successive issues of the
Official Gazette; and (b) publication should be made at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of
hearing. Substantial compliance with this jurisdictional requirement is not enough.
FACTS:
On August 7, 2002 De Asis filed a verified amended petition for Reconstitution of TCT
No. 8240 of the Register of Deeds of QC in the name of his uncle, Lauriano De Asis covering a
lot located at Caloocan. De Asis alleged that he purchased the subject property from Lauriano
through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 5, 1978 and that the same is free from any
encumbrances. Likewise, no deed affecting it has been presented or is pending before the
Register of Deeds. Unfortunately, the original copy of TCT No. 8240 was destroyed by the fire
that gutted the Quezon City Hall on June 11, 1988, hence, the amended petition based on the
owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 8240, which was in his possession.
Finding the amended petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the RTC scheduled
the initial hearing and directed that the Land Registration Authority (LRA), inter alia, be furnished
a copy thereof. The RTC likewise ordered that notice of the amended petition be published in
the Official Gazette once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks, which was complied with.
On January 30, 2003, after compliance with the jurisdictional requirements and without
any opposition having been raised, the RTC allowed De Asis to present his evidence ex-parte.
Later, on February 7, 2003, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as counsel for herein
petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), filed a notice of appearance and deputized the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City to assist the OSG and appear in the case on its behalf, which
the RTC noted.
On February 20, 2003, upon request of the LRA and in accordance with paragraph 4(a)
of LRC Circular No. 35, De Asis was required to submit a certified true copy of the owners
duplicate certificate of title of the subject property, with which he complied. Subsequently, the
LRA Report before the RTC stating that "the technical description of Lot [No.] 804-C of the
subdivision plan Psd-2341, appearing on the reproduction of [TCT] No. T-8240, was found
correct after examination and due computation. The RTC Ruling
The RTC granted the amended petition based on the evidence presented ex parte by De
Asis. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto, ratiocinating that the thirty-day notice should be
reckoned from the date of issue of the Official Gazette, not from the date of its actual release,
citing Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26 (RA 26). While the CA conceded the stringent and
mandatory nature of the requirement of publication, it however considered the fact that the
source of the reconstitution in this case was the owners duplicate copy of title in De Asis
possession, the authenticity of which was never disputed by the Republic.
ISSUE:

Whether the CA committed reversible error in affirming the RTC when it granted the
amended petition on the basis of non-compliance with Sections 9 and 10 of RA 26 requiring
publication of the notice of hearing in two (2) successive issues of the Official Gazette at least
30 days prior to the date of hearing, a jurisdictional requisite
RULING:
The petition is granted.
At the outset, the Court notes that the present amended petition for reconstitution is
anchored on the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 8240 a source for reconstitution of title
under Section 3(a)29 of RA 26 which, in turn, is governed by the provisions of Section 10 in
relation to Section 9 of RA 26 with respect to the publication, posting, and notice
requirements. Section 10 reads:
SEC. 10. Nothing hereinbefore provided shall prevent any registered owner or
person in interest from filing the petition mentioned in section five of this Act
directly with the proper Court of First Instance, based on sources enumerated in
sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a) of this Act: Provided, however, That the
court shall cause a notice of the petition, before hearing and granting the same,
to be published in the manner stated in section nine hereof: And, provided,
further, That certificates of title reconstituted pursuant to this section shall not be
subject to the encumbrance referred to in section seven of this Act.
Corollarily, Section 9 reads in part:
SEC. 9. x x x Thereupon, the court shall cause a notice of the petition to be
published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the
Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building
and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land lies, at
least thirty days prior to the date of hearing, and after hearing, shall determine
the petition and render such judgment as justice and equity may require. x x x.
The foregoing provisions, therefore, clearly require that (a) notice of the petition should
be published in two (2) successive issues of the Official Gazette; and (b) publication should be
made at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of hearing. Substantial compliance with this
jurisdictional requirement is not enough; it bears stressing that the acquisition of jurisdiction over
a reconstitution case is hinged on a strict compliance with the requirements of the law.
The factual antecedents of this case are undisputed: De Asis caused the publication of
the notice of the amended petition in the December 23 and 30, 2002 issues of the Official
Gazette. However, the NPO certified that the December 30, 2002 issue was officially released
only on January 3, 2003, evidently short of the thirty-day period preceding the January 30, 2003
scheduled hearing. Indubitably, therefore, there was a defect in the mandatory publication of the
notice required under Section 10 in relation to Section 9 of RA 26.
The purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for reconstitution in the Official
Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a petition has been filed and that whoever is
minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the date set by the
court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as
a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.

Hence, while Section 9 merely required that the notice of the petition should be
"published x x x twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette," jurisprudence expressly
clarified that "publication" means the actual circulation or release of the issue of the Official
Gazette on which the notice of the petition is printed. The law could not have possibly
contemplated "publication" independent of its actual dissemination to the public, for whose
benefit the requisite of publication is mandated in the first place. For sure, publication without
actual circulation of the printed material is worthless.
Consequently, the thirty-day period that precedes the scheduled hearing should be
reckoned from the time of the actual circulation or release of the last issue of the Official
Gazette, and not on the date of its issue as reflected on its front cover. To interpret it otherwise,
as the CA had erroneously done in this case, would render nugatory the purposes of publication
in reconstitution proceedings, which are to safeguard against spurious and unfounded land
ownership claims, to apprise all interested parties of the existence of such action, and to give
them enough time to intervene. Otherwise, unscrupulous parties would merely invoke
compliance with the requirement of two-time publication in the Official Gazette, without regard to
the date of its actual release, as a convenient excuse for their failure to observe the mandatory
prerequisite of publication.
Moreover, while it is true that the thirty-day period in this case was short by only three (3)
days, the principle of substantial compliance cannot apply, as the law requires strict compliance,
without which the Court is devoid of authority to pass upon and resolve the petition.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NINOY ROSALES y ESTO
G.R. No. 197537, July 24, 2013
J. Perez
The victims mental retardation does not affect her credibility of her testimony. Mental
retardation per se does not affect credibility. A mentally retarded may be a credible witness. The
acceptance of her testimony depends on the quality of her perceptions and the manner she can
make them known to the court. The acceptance of her testimony depends on the quality of her
perceptions and the manner she can make them known to the court.
FACTS:
Appellant was charged with rape. The victim, AAA, then 39 years of age, testified that in
the morning of 27 June 2004, appellant forced her to go with him to his house located inside a
nearby cemetery in Caloocan City. Upon reaching appellants house, appellant raped AAA. AAA
identified appellant in court as the person who raped her.
Dr. Lorenda Gozar (Dr. Gozar), a clerical psychologist working with the National Bureau of
Investigaton, testified on AAAs mental condition. Dr. Gozar had examined AAA and concluded
in her Neuro-Psychiatric Examination and Evaluation that AAA has been found suffering from
"moderate mental retardation with a Mental Age of (6) six years and (8) eight months and an IQ
of (41) forty-one."
Appellant, testifying in his own behalf, denied that he raped AAA. He however admitted
that he was having a drinking session in his house with AAA when the alleged rape incident
occurred. Appellant stated that prior to the incident, AAA has lived in his house for 4 months. He
then denied any knowledge of AAAs mental condition.

On 19 September 2007, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty of rape and found
AAAs testimony straightforward, notwithstanding her mental condition. The Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court gravely erred in considering the evidence adduced by the
prosecution despite its apparent incredibility.
RULING:
The appeal is denied.
At any rate, it is an oft-repeated principle that not every witness to or victim of a crime
can be expected to act reasonably and conformably to the usual expectations of everyone.
People may react differently to the same situation. One person's spontaneous, or unthinking or
even instinctive, response to a horrible and repulsive stimulus may be aggression, while
another's may be cold indifference. Yet, it can never be successfully argued that the latter are
any less sexual victims than the former.
The fact of AAAs mental retardation did not impair the credibility of her testimony. Mental
retardation per se does not affect credibility. A one mentally retarded person may be a credible
witness. The acceptance of her testimony depends on the quality of her perceptions and the
manner she can make them known to the court.
The Court have thoroughly examined AAAs testimony and found no reason to depart
from the legal adage that the Court accords the trial judges assessment of the credibility of
witnesses great respect in the absence of any attendant of grave abuse of discretion on the
account that the trial court had the advantage of actually examining both real and testimonial
pieces of evidence, including the demeanor of the witnesses, and is in the best position to rule
on the matter. The rule finds an even greater application when the trial courts findings are
sustained by the Court of Appeals.
Taking into consideration the positive and categorical declaration of AAA and the medical
findings to support her claims, the SC affirms the lower courts unanimous finding that AAA, by
proof beyond reasonable doubt, was raped by the appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDWIN ALEMAN y LONGHAS
G.R. No. 181539, July 24, 2013
J. Leonardo-De Castro
A deaf-mute may not be able to hear and speak but his/her other senses, such as
his/her sense of sight, remain functional and allow him/her to make observations about his/her
environment and experiences. The inability to hear and speak may prevent a deaf-mute from
communicating orally with others but he/she may still communicate with others in writing or
through signs and symbols and, as in this case, sketches. Thus, a deaf-mute is competent to
be a witness so long as he/she has the faculty to make observations and he/she can make
those observations known to others.

FACTS:
On February 10, 2003, the accused, conspiring and confederating with another person
robbed and killed one Ramon Jaime Birosel y Villa while the latter was inside his car having a
conversation over his cellphone. The prosecutions case against accused-appellant hinges on
the eyewitness account of Mark Almodovar, a 14-year old deaf-mute.
In his testimony, Mark narrated the events that took place with particularity. He even
made a drawing representing the place where he followed the accused and his company and
while thereat, he saw one of the culprits uncover his face. On re-direct examination, when asked
how he was able to see the face of the accused, he answered that there was light in the area
which he described as near the flowing water where the accused removed his bonnet. When
Mark testified, he was assisted by Daniel Catinguil, a licensed sign language interpreter.
However, on February 13, 2003, Mark failed to identify accused-appellant in a police line-up.
The trial court (RTC) found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with homicide. On appeal, accused-appellant interposed that Mark is not
qualified as a witness because he was a deaf-mute. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
RTC decision and declared that the capacity of a deaf-mute to testify has long been
recognized. The witness may communicate his perceptions to the court through an interpreter.
According to the appellate court, Mark is competent as a witness.
ISSUE:
Whether a deaf-mute is unqualified or incompetent to be a witness.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
The mere fact that Mark is a deaf-mute does not render him unqualified to be a witness.
The rule is that all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception
to others, may be witnesses. A deaf-mute may not be able to hear and speak but his/her other
senses, such as his/her sense of sight, remain functional and allow him/her to make
observations about his/her environment and experiences. The inability to hear and speak may
prevent a deaf-mute from communicating orally with others but he/she may still communicate
with others in writing or through signs and symbols and, as in this case, sketches. Thus, a deafmute is competent to be a witness so long as he/she has the faculty to make observations and
he/she can make those observations known to others.
In this case, both the trial and the appellate courts found that Mark understood and
appreciated the sanctity of an oath and that he comprehended the facts he testified on.
Mark communicated his ideas with the help of Catinguil and the trial and the appellate
courts found Catinguil qualified to act as interpreter for Mark.
Mark communicated a credible account of the things he perceived on that fateful
February 10, 2003. In this connection, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that despite
intense and gruelling cross-examinations, the eyewitness responded with consistency upon
material details that could only come from first-hand knowledge of the shocking events which
unfolded before his eyes. The imperfections or inconsistencies cited by accused-appellant

were due to the fact that there is some difficulty in eliciting testimony where the witness is a
deaf-mute. As such, those discrepancies do not detract from the credibility of Marks testimony,
much less justify the total rejection of the same. What is material is that he positively identified
accused-appellant and personally saw what accused-appellant did to the victim on the fateful
night when the incident happened.
Moreover, the CA correctly observed that Marks testimony was corroborated by the
findings of the medico-legal officer who autopsied the victims corpse
The RTC and the CA saw no improper motive which would impel Mark to testify falsely
against accused-appellant. As the determination of bad faith, malice or ill motive is a question
of fact, this Court respects the unanimous finding of the trial and the appellate courts on the
matter. Furthermore, the CA correctly ruled that Marks failure to identify accused-appellant in a
police line-up on February 13, 2003 was of no moment. There is no law stating that a police
line-up is essential to proper identification. What matters is that the positive identification of the
accused as the perpetrator of the crime be made by the witness in open court.

DREAM VILLAGE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC. v. BASES CONVERSATION

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 192896, July 24, 2013
J. Reyes
When a land dispute or problem is lodged before COSLAP, it is not assumed that it has
jurisdiction over it. Under EO 561, the instances when the COSLAP may resolve land disputes
are limited only to those involving public lands or those covered by a specific license from the
government, such as pasture lease agreements, timber concessions, or reservation grants.
Outside said scope, COSLAP has no authority to resolve the case before it.
FACTS:
Petitioner Dream Village claims to represent more than 2,000 families who have been
occupying a 78,466-square meter lot in Western Bicutan, Taguig City since 1985 "in the concept
of owners continuously, exclusively and notoriously." The lot used to be part of the Hacienda de
Maricaban (Maricaban). Following the purchase of Maricaban by the government of the United
States of America (USA) early in the American colonial period, it was to be converted into the
military reservation known as Fort William Mckinley.
On July 12, 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423 withdrawing
from sale or settlement the tracts of land within Fort William Mckinley, now renamed Fort
Bonifacio, and reserving them for military purposes. On January 7, 1986, President Ferdinand
E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476 declaring certain portions of Fort Bonifacio alienable
and disposable, thus allowing the sale to the settlers of home lots.
On October 16, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172
amending Proclamation No. 2476 by limiting to Lots 1 and 2 of the survey Swo-13-000298 the
areas in Western Bicutan open for disposition.
On March 13, 1992, R.A. No. 7227 was passed creating the Bases Conversion and
Development Authority (BCDA) to oversee and accelerate the conversion of Clark and Subic

military reservations and their extension camps (John Hay Station, Wallace Air Station,
ODonnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval Communications Station and Capas Relay
Station) to productive civilian uses. Now charging the BCDA of wrongfully asserting title to
Dream Village and unlawfully subjecting its members to summary demolition, resulting in unrest
and tensions among the residents.Dream Village, thus, asserts that the lot is not among those
transferred to the BCDA under R.A. No. 7227, and therefore patent applications by the
occupants should be processed by the Land Management Bureau (LMB).
On August 15, 2000, Dream Village formalized its complaint in the COSLAP. The
COSLAP called a mediation conference on March 22, 2001, during which the parties agreed to
have a relocation/verification survey conducted of the subject lot. On the basis of the DENRs
verification survey report, the COSLAP resolved that Dream Village lies outside of BCDA, and
particularly, outside of Swo-00-0001302, and thus directed the LMB of the DENR to process the
applications of Dream Villages members for sales patent. The CA ruled that COSLAP has no
jurisdiction over the complaint. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the honorable CA erred in ruling that COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the
controversy between the parties herein.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
In fine, it is apparent that the COSLAP acted outside its jurisdiction in taking cognizance
of the case. It would have been more prudent if the COSLAP has just referred the controversy
to the proper forum in order to fully thresh out the ramifications of the dispute at bar. As it is, the
impugned Resolution is a patent nullity since the tribunal which rendered it lacks jurisdiction.
Thus, the pronouncements contained therein are void.
On July 31, 1970, President Marcos issued E.O. No. 251 creating the Presidential Action
Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP) to expedite and coordinate the investigation and
resolution of all kinds of land disputes between settlers, streamline and shorten administrative
procedures, adopt bold and decisive measures to solve land problems, or recommend other
solutions.67 E.O. No. 305, issued on March 19, 1971, reconstituted the PACLAP and gave it
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving public lands and other lands of the public
domain,68 as well as adjudicatory powers phrased in broad terms: "To investigate, coordinate,
and resolve expeditiously land disputes, streamline administrative proceedings, and, in general,
to adopt bold and decisive measures to solve problems involving public lands and lands of the
public domain."
The abovementioned proviso Section (3)(2) of E.O. No. 561, which vests COSLAP the
power to resolve land disputes, does not confer upon COSLAP blanket authority to assume
every matter referred to it. Its jurisdiction is confined only to disputes over lands in which the
government has proprietary or regulatory interest. Moreover, the land dispute in Baaga
involved parties with conflicting free patent applications which was within the authority of
PACLAP to resolve, unlike that of the instant case which is exclusively cognizable by the DAR.
Under these terms, the COSLAP has two different rules in acting on a land dispute or
problem lodged before it, e.g., COSLAP can assume jurisdiction only if the matter is one of

those enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law. Otherwise, it should refer the case to the
agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement or resolution. In resolving whether to
assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer it to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP
considers: (a) the nature or classification of the land involved; (b) the parties to the case; (c) the
nature of the questions raised; and (d) the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to
prevent injury to persons and damage or destruction to property. The terms of the law clearly do
not vest on the COSLAP the general power to assume jurisdiction over any land dispute or
problem. Thus, under EO 561, the instances when the COSLAP may resolve land disputes are
limited only to those involving public lands or those covered by a specific license from the
government, such as pasture lease agreements, timber concessions, or reservation grants.
Which is not the situation in the present case, hence, COSLAP had no jurisdiction.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE CLARA y BUHAIN
G.R. No. 195528, July 24, 2013
J. Perez
When there are clear inconsistencies in the testimony or presentation of the facts of the
prosecution, the accused cannot be convicted guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error,
produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. If the prosecution fails to meet the required
amount of evidence, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf, in
which case, the presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted
FACTS:
Prosecution witness P03 Leonardo R. Ramos (P03 Ramos) narrated that he acted as a
poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation conducted by their office, the District Anti-Illegal Drug
Special Task Group (DAID-SOTG) of Quezon City on 12 September 2005. He recalled that on
or about 4:00 oclock in afternoon of the said date, a male informant came to their office with the
information that a person named "Ningning" was selling drugs at 22-C Salvador Drive,
Balonbato, Quezon City. Police team leader SPO2 Dante D. Nagera (SPO2 Nagera) endorsed
the matter to their Chief of Office Col. Gerardo B. Ratuita (Col. Ratuita) for the conduct of a buybust operation.
At 8:00 oclock in the evening, the team proceeded to the area on board three vehicles:
Nissan Sentra, Toyota Corolla and owner-type jeep. Upon their arrival at 9:35 oclock in the
evening, PO3 Ramos and the informant knocked on the door of the house while the rest of the
team positioned themselves ten meters away. The informant identified "Gigi" as the accused
Joel, Ningnings uncle. Initiating a conversation, the informant introduced to Joel PO3 Ramos as
a buyer of P200.00-peso worth of illegal drug. When PO3 Ramos asked for Ningning, Joel
answered that she was upstairs. Joel asked for payment and PO3 Ramos handed theP200
marked money. Joel went upstairs and called Ningning. Ningning opened the door and handed
Joel a small plastic sachet of shabu which in turn was handed to PO3 Ramos.Thereafter, PO3
Ramos touched his head as a pre-arranged signal to prompt the back-up police officers of the
consummation of the illegal sale. Immediately, the rest of the team rushed to the place to arrest
Joel. Joel tried to close the door to prevent the police officers from entering the house but PO3
Ramos was able to grab him. SPO2 Nagera quickly went upstairs to arrest Ningning but the
latter was able to escape apprehension. PO3 Ramos immediately frisked Joel inside the house

but failed to recover anything from him; the marked money was given to Ningning when Joel
went upstairs to get the plastic sachet.
Joel was brought to the police station and was informed by PO1 Jimenez of his constitutional
rights as a consequence of his arrest. Afterwards, the small plastic sachet recovered was
marked by PO1 Jimenez inside the station and an inventory receipt was prepared. PO3 Ramos
clarified that the plastic sachet was in the possession of PO1 Jimenez from the place of arrest
until arrival at the police station. PO3 Ramos added that PO1 Jimenez was present at the time
of arrest which explained his possession of the plastic sachet containing shabu.
The trial court on 21 March 2007 found the accused guilty of the offense charged. The
CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the conviction of accused-appellant is proper despite the inconsistencies in the
prosecutions presentation of a supposed buy-bust operation, coupled with its failure to establish
with certainty the chain of custody of evidence.
RULING:
The appeal is granted.
It is basic in criminal prosecutions that an accused is presumed innocent of the charge
laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has the burden to
overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree
of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. It must rest on its own merits and
must not rely on the weakness of the defense. If the prosecution fails to meet the required
amount of evidence, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf, in
which case, the presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted.
In this case, the prosecution failed to overcome such presumption when it presented
inconsistent versions of an illegal sale. The testimony of PO3 Ramos, which apparently was
given as proof of all the elements that constitute an illegal sale of drug is however, inconsistent
on material points from the recollection of events of PO3 Ramos, SPO2 Nagera and PO1
Jimenez regarding the marking, handling and turnover of the plastic sachet containing the
dangerous drug of shabu.
The clear inconsistency in the presentation of facts is fatal. It creates doubts whether the
transaction really occurred or not. Though Joels denial as a defense is weak, such cannot
relieve the prosecution the burden of presenting proof beyond reasonable doubt that an illegal
transaction actually took place.
Inconsistencies and discrepancies referring to minor details and not upon the basic
aspect of the crime do not diminish the witnesses credibility. If the cited inconsistency has
nothing to do with the elements of a crime, it does not stand as a ground to reverse a
conviction. However, in this case, the material inconsistencies are furthered by inconsistencies
of the police officers on minor details. Referring back to the narration of circumstances of the
buy-bust operation, SPO2 Nagera was asked about the gender of the informant who went to

their office to report about the illegal activities committed by Ningning.1 He readily answered that
the informant was a female. PO3 Ramos in turn, when asked to describe what happened in the
afternoon before the buy-bust operation, testified that a male informant came to their office to
report about a person selling illegal drugs.
These conflicting statements of the prosecution effectively broke the chain of custody of
evidence of the sale of dangerous drug.
"Chain of custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court and finally for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person
who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody
were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition
To establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation, the prosecution must establish
the following links, namely: First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; Second, the turnover of the illegal drug
seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; Third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to
the court.
The "objective test" in determining the credibility of prosecution witnesses regarding the
conduct of buy-bust operation provides that it is the duty of the prosecution to present a
complete picture detailing the buy-bust operationfrom the initial contact between the poseurbuyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration, until
the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal subject of sale.
In view of these guiding principles, the Court rules that the prosecution failed to present
a clear picture on how the police officers seized and marked the illegal drug recovered by the
apprehending officer and how the specimen was turned over by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer.
SPS ARGOVAN and FLORIDA GADEITANO v. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION
G.R. No. 188767, July 24, 2013
J. Perez
When the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal
responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no
necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case
does not involve a prejudicial question. A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the
former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure
of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
FACTS:

Petitioner Spouses Argovan Gaditano (Argovan) and Florida Gadiano (Florida), who
were engaged in the business of buying and selling beer and softdrinks products, purchased
beer products from San Miguel Corporation (SMC) in the amount of P285, 504.00 on 7 April
2000. Petitioners paid through a check signed by Florida and drawn against Argovans Asia
Trust Bank Current Account. When said check was presented for payment on 13 April 2000, the
check was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Despite three (3) written
demands, petitioner failed to make good of the check. This prompted SMC to file a criminal case
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa against petitioners.
On 23 October 2000, petitioners filed an action for specific performance and damages
against AsiaTrust Bank, Guevarra, SMC and Fatima. Petitioners alleged that AsiaTrust Bank
and Guevarra unlawfully garnished and debited their bank accounts; that their obligation to SMC
had been extinguished by payment; and that Fatima issued a forged check.
Petitioners assert that the issues they have raised in the civil action constitute a bar to
the prosecution of the criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa.
On 29 January 2002, the Office of the Prosecutor recommended that the criminal
proceedings be suspended pending resolution of the case for Specific Performance and
Damages. SMC thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration before the Office of the Prosecutor
but it was denied for lack of merit on 19 September 2002.
SMC filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition for review challenging the
Resolutions of the Office of the Prosecutor. In a Resolution dated 3 June 2004, the DOJ
dismissed the petition. SMC filed a motion for reconsideration, which the DOJ Secretary denied
in a Resolution dated 15 December 2004. Undaunted, SMC went up to the Court of Appeals by
filling a petition for certiorari, which the court granted.
ISSUE:
Whether certiorari is the correct mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals.
RULING:
The petition is granted.
Court of Appeals is clothed with jurisdiction to review the resolution issued by the
Secretary of the DOJ through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court albeit
solely on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
In Alcaraz v. Gonzalez, the Court stressed that the resolution of the Investigating
Prosecutor is subject to appeal to the Justice Secretary who exercises the power of control and
supervision over said Investigating Prosecutor; and who may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify
the ruling of such prosecutor. Thus, while the Court of Appeals may review the resolution of the
Justice Secretary, it may do so only in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, solely on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his
discretion amounting to excess of lack of jurisdiction

The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the DOJ abused its discretion when it
affirmed the prosecutors suspension of the criminal investigation due to the existence of an
alleged prejudicial question.
Petitioners insist that the Court of Appeals erroneously ruled against the existence of a
prejudicial question by separately treating their joint savings account and Argovans current
account, and concluding therefrom that the civil and criminal cases could proceed independently
of each other.
Petitioners maintain that since the checking account was funded by the monies
deposited in the savings account, what mattered was the sufficiency of the funds in the savings
account. Hence, petitioners separate action against AsiaTrust Bank for unlawfully garnishing
their savings account, which eventually resulted in the dishonor of their check to SMC, poses a
prejudicial question in the instant criminal proceedings.
A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the
civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions.
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure states the two elements
necessary for a civil case to be considered a prejudicial question, to wit:
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately
related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided
that the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt
or innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine
the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if
there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case,
the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the
civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.
POLICE SENIOR SUPERINTENDENT DIMAPINTO MACAWADIB v. THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTORATE FOR PERSONNEL AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT
G.R. No. 186610, July 29, 2013
J. Peralta
When the agencies and their public records are involved and affected by any decision
rendered in a petition for correction filed by a party, it is thus required that they are made parties
to said proceeding. They are indispensable parties, without whom no final determination of the
case can be had. An indispensable party is defined as one who has such an interest in the

controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without
injuring or affecting that interest. The absence of opposition from government agencies is of no
controlling significance, because the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or
error of its officials or agents.
FACTS:
Petitioner was a police officer with the rank of Police Senior Superintendent. He was
among the commissioned officers who were subject to compulsory retirement by virtue of
Section 39 of R.A. 6975. As shown in the PNP Records Management Division, petitioner was
born on January 11, 1946 and was supposed to retire on January 11, 2002.
On September 3, 2001, petitioner filed an application for late registration of his birth with
the Registrars Office. In the said application, which was subsequently approved, he swore
under oath that he was born on January 1956. He then filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Marawi City a Petition for Correction of Entry in the Public Service Records Regarding the
Birth Date, docketed as SP No.782-01. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner and
the decision has become final and executory.
On January 8, 2008, herein respondent filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
with the Court of Appeals (CA), seeking to nullify the above-mentioned Decision of the RTC on
the ground that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the PNP, "an unimpleaded
indispensable party." The CA granted the petition and ordered the RTC Decision to be nullified
and set aside. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the appellate court denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA erred in holding that PNP-DPRM is an indispensable party in SP No.
782-01 and that the RTC have not acquired jurisdiction over the person of PNPDPRM.
2. Whether respondent is estopped from assailing the decision of the RTC for failure of
the OSG to participate in the proceedings before the RTC.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
The CA held that it is the integrity and correctness of the public records in the custody of
the PNP, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and Civil Service Commission (CSC)
which are involved and which would be affected by any decision rendered in the petition for
correction filed by herein petitioner. The aforementioned government agencies are, thus,
required to be made parties to the proceeding. They are indispensable parties, without whom no
final determination of the case can be had. An indispensable party is defined as one who has
such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in
his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, "parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be
joined as plaintiffs or defendants." If there is a failure to implead an indispensable party, any
judgment rendered would have no effectiveness.

It is "precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) an action
should be dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of
the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to
those present." The purpose of the rules on joinder of indispensable parties is a complete
determination of all issues not only between the parties themselves, but also as regards other
persons who may be affected by the judgment.
In the instant case, there is a necessity to implead the PNP, NAPOLCOM and CSC
because they stand to be adversely affected by petitioner's petition which involves substantial
and controversial alterations in petitioner's service records. Moreover, as correctly pointed out
by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), if petitioner's service is extended by ten years, the
government, through the PNP, shall be burdened by the additional salary and benefits that
would have to be given to petitioner during such extension.
As the above-mentioned agencies were not impleaded in this case much less given
notice of the proceedings, the decision of the trial court granting petitioner's prayer for the
correction of entries in his service records, is void.
On the question of whether or not respondent is estopped from assailing the decision of
the RTC for failure of the OSG, as government representative, to participate in the proceedings
before the trial court or to file an opposition to petitioner's petition for correction of entries in his
service records, the Court rules that such an apparent oversight has no bearing on the validity
of the appeal which the petitioner filed before the CA. Neither can the State, as represented by
the government, be considered in estoppel due to the petitioner's seeming acquiescence to the
judgment of the RTC when it initially made corrections to some of petitioner's records with the
PNP. The Court has reiterated time and again that the absence of opposition from government
agencies is of no controlling significance, because the State cannot be estopped by the
omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents. Nor is the Republic barred from assailing the
decision granting the petition for correction of entries if, on the basis of the law and the evidence
on record, such petition has no merit.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SARABIA MANOR HOTEL CORPORATION
G.R. No. 175844, July 29, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
When a party raises issues involving questions of facts, the petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is not proper. Such petition covers only questions
of law. In this relation, questions of fact are not reviewable and cannot be passed upon by the
Court unless exceptions are found to exist.
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is well-defined. A
question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state
of facts. A question of fact, on the other hand, exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of
the alleged facts.
FACTS:
In 1997, Sarabia obtained a P150,000,000.00 special loan package from Far East Bank
and Trust Company (FEBTC) in order to finance the construction of a five-storey hotel building

(New Building) for the purpose of expanding its hotel business. An additional P20,000,000.00
stand-by credit line was approved by FEBTC in the same year.
The foregoing debts were secured by real estate mortgages over several parcels of
land owned by Sarabia and a comprehensive surety agreement dated September 1, 1997
signed by its stockholders. By virtue of a merger, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) assumed
all of FEBTCs rights against Sarabia.
Sarabia started to pay interests on its loans as soon as the funds were released in
October 1997. However, largely because of the delayed completion of the New Building,
Sarabia incurred various cash flow problems. Thus, despite the fact that it had more assets than
liabilities at that time, it, nevertheless, filed, on July 26, 2002, a Petition for corporate
rehabilitation (rehabilitation petition) with prayer for the issuance of a stay order before the RTC
as it foresaw the impossibility to meet its maturing obligations to its creditors when they fall due.
Finding Sarabias rehabilitation petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued
a Stay Order on August 2, 2002. It also appointed Liberty B. Valderrama as Sarabias
rehabilitation receiver (Receiver). Thereafter, BPI filed its Opposition.
After several hearings, the RTC gave due course to the rehabilitation petition and referred
Sarabias proposed rehabilitation plan to the Receiver for evaluation.
In a Recommendation, the Receiver found that Sarabia may be rehabilitated. On August
7, 2004 the RTC approved Sarabias rehabilitation plan as recommended by the Receiver,
finding the same to be feasible. The RTC further noted that while it may be true that Sarabia has
been unable to comply with its existing terms with BPI, it has nonetheless complied with its
obligations to its employees and suppliers and pay its taxes to both local and national
government without disrupting the day-to-day operations of its business as an on-going
concern. The CA affirmed the RTCs ruling. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the present petition for review on certiorari is the right remedy to be availed of
by the petitioner.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
It is fundamental that a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court covers only questions of law. In this relation, questions of fact are not reviewable and
cannot be passed upon by the Court unless, the following exceptions are found to exist: (a)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) when there is a grave abuse
of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (e) when the findings
of fact are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of
both parties; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.

The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is well-defined. A question
of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts.
A question of fact, on the other hand, exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. This being so, the findings of fact of the CA are final and conclusive and the Court
will not review them on appeal.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds BPIs petition to be improper and hence,
dismissible as the issues raised therein involve questions of fact which are beyond the ambit of
a Rule 45 petition for review.
To elucidate, the determination of whether or not due regard was given to the interests of
BPI as a secured creditor in the approved rehabilitation plan partakes of a question of fact since
it will require a review of the sufficiency and weight of evidence presented by the parties
among others, the various financial documents and data showing Sarabias capacity to pay and
BPIs perceived cost of money and not merely an application of law. Therefore, given the
complexion of the issues which BPI presents, and finding none of the above-mentioned
exceptions to exist, the Court is constrained to dismiss its petition, and prudently uphold the
factual findings of the courts a quo which are entitled to great weight and respect, and even
accorded with finality. This especially obtains in corporate rehabilitation proceedings wherein
certain commercial courts have been designated on account of their expertise and specialized
knowledge on the subject matter, as in this case.
MILA CABOVERDE TANTANO and ROSELLER CABOVERDE v. DOMINILDA ESPINACABOVERDE, EVE CABOVERDA-YU, et al.
G.R. No. 203585, July 29, 2013
J. Velasco, Jr.
When courts appoint a receiver, it must not only consider the reasons given by the
owners of the properties. Before appointing a receiver, courts should consider: (1) whether or
not the injury resulting from such appointment would probably be greater than the injury ensuing
if the status quo is left undisturbed; and (2) whether or not the appointment will imperil the
interest of others whose rights deserve as much a consideration from the court as those of the
person requesting for receivership.
FACTS:
Petitioners and their siblings, Ferdinand, Jeanny and Laluna, are the registered owners
and in possession of certain parcels of land, identified as Lots 2, 3 and 4 located at Bantayan,
Sindangan and Poblacion, Sindangan in Zamboanga del Norte, having purchased them from
their parents, Maximo and Dominalda Caboverde
The present controversy started when on March 7, 2005, respondents Eve and Fe filed a
complaint before the RTC of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte where they prayed for the
annulment of the Deed of Sale purportedly transferring Lots 2, 3 and 4 from their parents
Maximo and Dominalda in favor of petitioners Mila and Roseller and their other siblings, Jeanny,
Laluna and Ferdinand.
As encouraged by the RTC, the parties executed a Partial Settlement Agreement (PSA)
where they fixed the sharing of the uncontroverted properties among themselves, in particular,
the adverted additional eight (8) parcels of land including their respective products and

improvements. Under the PSA, Dominaldas daughter, Josephine, shall be appointed as

Administrator. The PSA provided that Dominalda shall be entitled to receive a share of one-half
(1/2) of the net income derived from the uncontroverted properties. The PSA also provided that
Josephine shall have special authority, among others, to provide for the medicine of her mother.
The parties submitted the PSA to the court on or about March 10, 2008 for approval.
Before the RTC could act on the PSA, Dominalda, who, despite being impleaded in the case as
defendant, filed a Motion to Intervene separately in the case. Mainly, she claimed that the
verified Answer which she filed with her co-defendants contained several material averments
which were not representative of the true events and facts of the case. This document, she
added, was never explained to her or even read to her when it was presented to her for her
signature.
On May 12, 2008, Dominalda filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer,
attaching her Amended Answer where she contradicted the contents of the aforesaid verified
Answer by declaring that there never was a sale of the three (3) contested parcels of land in
favor of Ferdinand, Mila, Laluna, Jeanny and Roseller and that she and her husband never
received any consideration from them. The RTC would later issue a Resolution granting the
Motion to Admit Amended Answer.
On May 13, 2008, the court approved the PSA, leaving three (3) contested properties,
Lots 2, 3, and 4, for further proceedings in the main case.
Fearing that the contested properties would be squandered, Dominalda filed with the
RTC on July 15, 2008 a Verified Urgent Petition/Application to place the controverted Lots 2, 3
and 4 under receivership. Mainly, she claimed that while she had a legal interest in the
controverted properties and their produce, she could not enjoy them, since the income derived
was solely appropriated by petitioner Mila in connivance with her selected kin. She alleged that
she immediately needs her legal share in the income of these properties for her daily
sustenance and medical expenses. Also, she insisted that unless a receiver is appointed by the
court, the income or produce from these properties is in grave danger of being totally dissipated,
lost and entirely spent solely by Mila and some of her selected kin.
On August 27, 2009, the court heard the Application for Receivership and persuaded the
parties to discuss among themselves and agree on how to address the immediate needs of their
mother.
On October 9, 2009, petitioners and their siblings filed a Manifestation formally
expressing their concurrence to the proposal for receivership on the condition, inter alia, that
Mila be appointed the receiver, and that, after getting the 2/10 share of Dominalda from the
income of the three (3) parcels of land, the remainder shall be divided only by and among Mila,
Roseller, Ferdinand, Laluna and Jeanny. The court, however, expressed its aversion to a party
to the action acting as receiver and accordingly asked the parties to nominate neutral persons.
On February 8, 2010, the trial court issued a Resolution granting Dominaldas
application for receivership over Lot Nos. 2, 3 and 4. The Resolution reads:
Petitioners thereafter moved for reconsideration raising the arguments that the
concerns raised by Dominalda in her Application for Receivership are not
grounds for placing the properties in the hands of a receiver and that she failed to

prove her claim that the income she has been receiving is insufficient to support
her medication and medical needs.
The RTC denied the motion. While the CA rendered the assailed Decision denying the
petition on the ground that the court a quo failed to require Dominalda to post a bond prior to the
issuance of the order appointing a receiver, in violation of Section 2, Rule 59 of the Rules of
Court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the
appointment of a receiver despite clear showing that the reasons advanced by the
applicant are not any of those enumerated by the rules.
2. Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the
Resolution of the RTC and ruling that the receivership bond is not required prior to
appointment despite clear dictates of the rules.
RULING:
The petition is granted.
The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one and should be exercised with extreme
caution and only under circumstances requiring summary relief or where the court is satisfied
that there is imminent danger of loss, lest the injury thereby caused be far greater than the injury
sought to be averted. The court should consider the consequences to all of the parties and the
power should not be exercised when it is likely to produce irreparable injustice or injury to
private rights or the facts demonstrate that the appointment will injure the interests of others
whose rights are entitled to as much consideration from the court as those of the complainant.
To recall, the RTC approved the application for receivership on the stated rationale that
receivership was the most convenient and feasible means to preserve and administer the
disputed properties. As a corollary, the RTC, agreeing with the applicant Dominalda, held that
placing the disputed properties under receivership would ensure that she would receive her
share in the income which she supposedly needed in order to pay for her vitamins, medicines,
her regular check-ups and daily sustenance. Considering that, as the CA put it, the applicant
was already an octogenarian who may not live up to the day when the conflict will be finally
settled, the RTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it granted the application for receivership since it was justified under Sec. 1(d),
Rule 59 of the Rules of Court.
However, in granting applications for receivership on the basis of this section, courts
must remain mindful of the basic principle that receivership may be granted only when the
circumstances so demand, either because the property sought to be placed in the hands of a
receiver is in danger of being lost or because they run the risk of being impaired, and that being
a drastic and harsh remedy, receivership must be granted only when there is a clear showing of
necessity for it in order to save the plaintiff from grave and immediate loss or damage.
Before appointing a receiver, courts should consider: (1) whether or not the injury
resulting from such appointment would probably be greater than the injury ensuing if the status
quo is left undisturbed; and (2) whether or not the appointment will imperil the interest of others
whose rights deserve as much a consideration from the court as those of the person requesting
for receivership.

Moreover, this Court has consistently ruled that where the effect of the appointment of a
receiver is to take real estate out of the possession of the defendant before the final adjudication
of the rights of the parties, the appointment should be made only in extreme cases.
After carefully considering the foregoing principles and the facts and circumstances of
this case, the Court finds that the grant of Dominaldas Application for Receivership has no leg
to stand on.
First, Dominaldas alleged need for income to defray her medical expenses and support
is not a valid justification for the appointment of a receiver.
Second, there is no clear showing that the disputed properties are in danger of being lost
or materially impaired and that placing them under receivership is most convenient and feasible
means to preserve, administer or dispose of them. Based on the allegations in her application, it
appears that Dominalda sought receivership mainly because she considers this the best remedy
to ensure that she would receive her share in the income of the disputed properties. Much
emphasis has been placed on the fact that she needed this income for her medical expenses
and daily sustenance.
Third, placing the disputed properties under receivership is not necessary to save
Dominalda from grave and immediate loss or irremediable damage. Contrary to her assertions,
Dominalda is assured of receiving income under the PSA approved by the RTC providing that
she was entitled to receive a share of one-half (1/2) of the net income derived from the
uncontroverted properties.
Finally, it must be noted that the defendants in Civil Case No. S-760 are the registered
owners of the disputed properties that were in their possession. In cases such as this, it is
settled jurisprudence that the appointment should be made only in extreme cases and on a
clear showing of necessity in order to save the plaintiff from grave and irremediable loss or
damage.
This Court has held that a receiver should not be appointed to deprive a party who is in
possession of the property in litigation, just as a writ of preliminary injunction should not be
issued to transfer property in litigation from the possession of one party to another where the
legal title is in dispute and the party having possession asserts ownership in himself, except in a
very clear case of evident usurpation.
Furthermore, the Court has declared that the appointment of a receiver is not proper
when the rights of the parties, one of whom is in possession of the property, depend on the
determination of their respective claims to the title of such property unless such property is in
danger of being materially injured or lost, as by the prospective foreclosure of a mortgage on it
or its portions are being occupied by third persons claiming adverse title.
To reiterate, the RTCs approval of the application for receivership and the deprivation of
petitioners of possession over the disputed properties would be justified only if compelling
reasons exist. Unfortunately, no such reasons were alleged, much less proved in this case.
As regards the issue of whether the CA was correct in ruling that a bond was not
required prior to the appointment of the receivers in this case, the Court rules in the negative.

Sec. 2 of Rule 59 is very clear in that before issuing the order appointing a receiver the
court shall require the applicant to file a bond executed to the party against whom the
application is presented. The use of the word "shall" denotes its mandatory nature; thus, the
consent of the other party, or as in this case, the consent of petitioners, is of no moment. Hence,
the filing of an applicants bond is required at all times. On the other hand, the requirement of a
receivers bond rests upon the discretion of the court. Sec. 2 of Rule 59 clearly states that the
court may, in its discretion, at any time after the
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. SPS. SALVADOR AND NENITA CRUZ, et al.
G.R. No. 165386, July 29, 2013
J. Brion
When the PAC was appointed as commissioners for the determination of just
compensation, there was no contravention to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Although the
appointment of commissioners is mandatory, the Rules do not impose any qualifications or
restrictions on the appointment, other than that the commissioners should not number more
than three and that they should be competent and disinterested parties.
FACTS:
Civil Case No. 111-M-97 was an expropriation proceeding commenced by NAPOCOR
against respondents who are the owners of individual lots located in Del Monte Park
Subdivision, Dulong Bayan, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. The complaint, filed on February 17,
1997, primarily sought the determination of just compensation due the respondents after the
negotiations for the purchase of the lots failed.
The RTC directed the Bulacan Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) "to review and
submit an updated appraisal report on the properties to be acquired by Napocor in order to
judicially guide the Court in fixing the amount to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendants."In the
meantime, the RTC allowed Napocor to take possession of the lots, after Napocor deposited an
amount equivalent to their assessed value pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
The PAC submitted to the RTC the report that the just compensation be valued at
P2,200.00 per square meter. After considering the PACs report, the RTC issued an order fixing
the just compensation at P3,000.00 per square meter. Although the RTC found the PACs
recommended amount of P2,200.00 reasonable, it noted that an additional amount of P800.00
was necessary in view of the then prevailing economic crises and the devaluation of the peso.
Napocor appealed the RTCs March 31, 1998 order with the CA. It assailed the
appointment of the PAC, claiming that its appointment was contrary to Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court. It also alleged that the determination of the amount of just compensation was without
basis. The CA affirmed the RTCs March 31, 1998 order, subject to a modification. It upheld the
appointment of the PAC and the recommendation to set the just compensation at P2,200.00 per
square meter, but removed the additionalP800.00 that the RTC imposed. Hence, this present
petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the appointment of the PAC as commissioners was contrary to Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court.

2. Whether petitioner was denied due process in the determination of the amount of just
compensation.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
The appointment of the PAC as commissioners
The settled rule in expropriation proceedings is that the determination of just
compensation is a judicial function. To assist the courts in this task, Section 5, Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court requires the appointment of "not more than three (3) competent and
disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken." Although the appointment of commissioners
is mandatory, the Rules do not impose any qualifications or restrictions on the appointment,
other than that the commissioners should not number more than three and that they should be
competent and disinterested parties.
In this case, the Court finds that the appointment of the PAC as commissioners
substantially complies with Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. It is immaterial that the
RTC appointed a committee instead of three persons to act as commissioners, since the PAC is
composed of three members the Provincial Assessor, the Provincial Engineer, and the
Provincial Treasurer. Considering their positions, we find each member of the PAC competent to
perform the duty required of them, i.e., to appraise the valuation of the affected lots. As correctly
found by the CA, they "are government officials entrusted with the updating and time-to-time
determination of currently assessed, as well as, market value of properties within their
jurisdiction." The mere fact that they are government officials does not disqualify them as
disinterested persons, as the provincial government has no significant interest in the case.
Instead, what the Court finds material is that the PAC was tasked to perform precisely
the same duty that the commissioners, under Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, are
required to discharge. The RTC order dated September 17, 1997 directed the PAC "to review
and submit an updated appraisal report on the property to be acquired by the plaintiff
NAPOCOR from the defendants to judicially guide the court in fixing the amount to be paid by
the plaintiff to the defendants." The appointment of the PAC served the same function as an
appointment of three persons as commissioners under the Rules.
If Napocor found the appointment of the PAC to be objectionable, it should have filed its
objections early on and not belatedly raise them in its appeal with the CA. The second
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 67 states that
Copies of the order of appointment shall be served on the parties. Objections to
the appointment of any of the commissioners shall be filed with the court within
ten (10) days from service, and shall be resolved within thirty (30) days after all
the commissioners shall have received copies of the objections.
There is nothing in the records which indicates that Napocor seasonably objected to the
appointment of the PAC or to any aspect in the order of appointment. Instead, Napocor
belatedly raised its objections only in its appeal with the CA. For its failure to comply with the
Rules, it is considered Napocor to have waived its objections against any supposed irregularity
in the appointment of the PAC.

The determination of just compensation

The PAC members, upon their appointment and oath, are considered officers of the
court, and we can extend to them the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
official functions.
If Napocor had any objections on the amount of just compensation fixed in the
commissioners report, its remedy was to file its objections within ten (10) days from receipt of
the notice of the report. Section 7, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 7. Report by commissioners and judgment thereupon. x x x Except as
otherwise expressly ordered by the court, such report shall be filed within sixty
(60) days from the date the commissioners were notified of their appointment,
which time may be extended in the discretion of the court. Upon the filing of such
report, the clerk of the court shall serve copies thereof on all interested parties,
with notice that they are allowed ten (10) days within which to file objections to
the findings of the report, if they so desire.
However, as with the objections to the appointment of the PAC, Napocor failed to make
a timely objection to the report of the commissioners and raised them only before the CA.
TERESA C. AGUILAR, et al. v. MICHAEL J. OPALLICK
G.R. No. 182280, July 29, 2013
J. Del Castillo
When a person is not impleaded in a case, he cannot be bound by the decision therein
and consequently, he was not given the opportunity to present his case. The principle that a
person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was
not made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. Not being a
party to the case, he has the right to vindicate his claim in a separate action.
FACTS:
On March 20, 1995, a Contract To Sell was executed between Primetown Property
Group, Inc. (PPGI) on the one hand, and Reynaldo Poblete and Tomas Villanueva (Poblete and
Villanueva) on the other, over Unit 3301 of the Makati Prime Citadel Condominium in Makati
City (the unit), and covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 25156 (CCT No.
25156). Poblete and Villanueva in turn executed in favor of herein respondent Michael J.
OPallick (OPallick) a Deed of Assignment covering the unit. In October 1995, PPGI issued a
Deed of Sale in favor of OPallick after the latter paid the purchase price in full. Although
OPallick took possession of the unit, the Deed of Sale in his favor was never registered nor
annotated on CCT No. 25156.
Meanwhile, in a case between PPGI and herein petitioner Teresa C. Aguilar (Aguilar)
filed in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), Aguilar was able to obtain a final
and executory Decision in her favor, and as a result, Sheriff Cesar D. Raagas (Raagas) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, caused several properties of PPGI to be levied,
including the herein subject condominium unit. But before the scheduled auction sale, or on
OPallick filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim. Raagas conducted the public auction sale on

March 30, 2000, where Aguilar was declared the highest bidder for the subject unit. A certificate
of sale was issued in her favor.
Because PPGI failed to redeem the property, a final Deed of Salewas issued in favor of
Aguilar on April 20, 2001. CCT No. 25156 was cancelled, and CCT No. 74777 was issued in her
name. Aguilar moved for the issuance of a Writ of Possession, and in a December 21, 2001
Order, the HLURB granted the motion.
On April 6, 2001, OPallick instituted Civil Case No. 01-572 with the RTC Makati for
quieting of title and to set aside the levy on execution of the subject unit, to annul the certificate
of sale issued in favor of Aguilar, as well as to recover the unit. During the proceedings,
petitioners filed a Motion to Dismisson the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case; and that since the subject matter was a condominium unit, the
HLURB possessed exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute. The RTC dismissed the complaint
because had no jurisdiction to annul the levy and sale on execution ordered by the HLURB, an
agency under the Office of the President. The CA reversed the decision of the trial court and
remanded the case to the said court for trial on the merits. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in ruling there was illegal levy on the property under execution
thus the same may be threshed out in a separate action.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
The buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if
it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. The issuance
of the writ of possession had become ministerial on the part of HLURB since the respondent
Aguilar had sufficiently shown her proof of title over the subject condominium. Being the
registered owner of the condominium unit, she is entitled to its possession. The case at bar is
akin to foreclosure proceedings where the issuance of a writ of possession becomes a
ministerial act of the court after title to the property has been consolidated in the mortgage.
It must be stressed that the Register of Deeds had already cancelled CCT No. 25156
and issued CCT No. 74777 in the name of the respondent. Thus, the argument of the PPGI that
the title or ownership had been wrongfully vested with the respondent is a collateral attack on
the latters title which is more appropriate in a direct proceeding.
Thus, contrary to petitioners claim, this Courts pronouncement in G.R. No. 157801 can in no
way constitute a final determination of OPallicks claim. In his Amended Complaint, OPallick
averred that Aguilar obtained her title through unlawful means. More particularly, he prayed for
the nullification of Aguilars CCT No. 74777. Clearly, therefore, although captioned as one for
Quieting of Title, OPallicks suit is actually a suit for annulment of title.
Basic is the rule that "the cause of action in a Complaint is not determined by the
designation given to it by the parties. The allegations in the body of the Complaint define or
describe it. The designation or caption is not controlling more than the allegations in the
Complaint. It is not even an indispensable part of the Complaint."

"The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or

proceeding in which he was not made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due
process of law." Thus, the Court agrees with the CAs pronouncement that since respondent
was not impleaded in the HLURB case, he could not be bound by the decision rendered therein.
Because he was not impleaded in said case; he was not given the opportunity to present his
case therein. But, more than the fact that OPallick was not impleaded in the HLURB case, he
had the right to vindicate his claim in a separate action, as in this case. As a prior purchaser of
the very same condominium unit, he had the right to be heard on his claim.
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIZON, et al. v. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA
LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON
G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013
J. Perez
The daughter of the deceased may be entitled to the issuance of letters of administration
as she is one of the preferred persons enumerated by law to such. An "interested party," in
estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who
has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next
of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to
share in the estate as distributees.
FACTS:
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo
Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseos common-law wife and daughter.
The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo
was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer
Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992. On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes
Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition
for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City. In her
Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo
having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry
each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the
validity of Eliseos marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been
contracted during the subsistence of the latters marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To
prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of
Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her
children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death
Certificate, Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City, at the time of his
death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for settlement
of decedents estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Pias City. In
addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and
legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseos estate.
The RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the
necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las

Pias City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseos last residence
was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The CA affirmed the RTC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA gravely erred in declaring that Amelia was not legally married to
Eliseo Quiazon due to pre-existing marriage;
2. Whether the CA overlooked the fact that Elise has not shown any interest in the
petition for letters of administration.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of
the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides
at the time of his death.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence"
and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed
or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode.
The Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue
for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Pias City. It is evident from
the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar
Village, Las Pias City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in
the said city.
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals erred in
declaring Amelias marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no
marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may
attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the
lifetime of the parties to the marriage. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even
after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of
the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left
as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a
voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would
be prejudiced by her fathers marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage
even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an
action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably,
Elise, as a compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of

the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does
not extinguish such cause of action.
Neither is the Court inclined to lend credence to the petitioners contention that Elise has
not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who
are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust,
or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both,
in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or
wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or
widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to
apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some
other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted
to such other person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of
Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as
known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and
residences of the creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate
proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is
such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the
distribution of Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming
evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners pounding
on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedents estate, is just a desperate attempt
to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to

be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right
as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the
estate are satisfied. Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his
natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of
the law.
RE: LETTER DATED APRIL 18, 2011 OF CHIEF PUBLIC ATTORNEY PERSIDA RUEDAACOSTA REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM THE PAYMENT OF SHERIFFS EXPENSES
A.M. No. 11-10-03, July 30, 2013
J. Reyes
When a party files a second motion for reconsideration, it is considered as a prohibited
pleading and as such, the Court will dismiss it. This rule, however, is not absolute. A second
motion for reconsideration may be allowed if there are extraordinarily persuasive reasons
therefor, and upon express leave of court first obtained.
FACTS:
This case stemmed from the February 7, 2011 letter of Attorney Persida V. RuedaAcosta (Atty. Acosta), Chief Public Attorney of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), to the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA). In the said letter, Atty. Acosta sought a clarification as to the
exemption of PAO's clients from the payment of sheriffs expenses, alleging that PAO's clients in
its Regional Office in Region VII are being charged with the payment of sheriffs expenses in the
amount of P1,000.00 upon the filing of a civil action in court. She claimed that sheriffs expenses
should not be exacted from PAOs clients since Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9406 (R.A. No.
9406) specifically exempts them from the payment of docket and other fees incidental to
instituting an action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies.
In its report and recommendation, the OCA maintained its position that PAOs clients are
not exempted from the payment of sheriffs expenses; it stressed that the P1,000.00 sheriffs
expenses are not the same as the sheriffs fee fixed by Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court and, hence, not covered by the exemption granted to PAOs clients under R.A. No. 9406.
The OCA further alleged that the grant of exemption to PAOs clients from the payment of
sheriffs expenses amounts to disbursement of public funds for the protection of private
interests. Accordingly, the OCA recommended that Atty. Acostas request for exemption of PAOs
clients from payment of sheriffs expenses be denied.
Adopting the recommendation of the OCA, the Court en banc issued Resolutiondated
November 22, 2011 which denied Atty. Acostas request for exemption from the payment of
sheriffs expenses.
On January 2, 2012, Atty. Acosta sought a reconsideration of the Courts Resolution
dated November 22, 2011, which the Court en banc referred to the OCA for appropriate action.
The OCA averred that the exemption of PAOs clients from payment of legal fees is not an
absolute rule and that the Court is not precluded from providing limitations thereto. Thus, the
OCA recommended the denial of Atty. Acostas motion for reconsideration. Tthe Court en banc
issued a Resolution which denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Atty. Acosta.
Unperturbed, Atty. Acosta filed a motion for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration and a Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Courts Resolution dated April
24, 2012, alleging that the imposition of sheriffs expenses on PAOs clients is contrary to the

language, intent and spirit of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406 since sheriffs expenses are considered
as fees "incidental to instituting an action in court." Further, she claimed that the said imposition
on PAOs clients would hinder their access to the courts contrary to the mandate of Section 11,
Article III of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether the second motion for reconsideration is allowed by the Court.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
At the outset, it bears stressing that this is already the third attempt of Atty. Acosta to
obtain from this Court a declaration exempting PAOs clients from the payment of sheriffs fees
the initial request therefor and the subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied by
this Court.
As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. This rule,
however, is not cast in stone. A second motion for reconsideration may be allowed if there are
extraordinarily persuasive reasons therefor, and upon express leave of court first obtained.
Ordinarily, the Court would have dismissed outright Atty. Acostas second motion for
reconsideration. However, for reasons to be discussed at length later, there is a need to give
due course to the instant petition in order to reassess and clarify the Courts pronouncement in
our Resolutions dated November 22, 2011 and April 24, 2012.
In any case, it bears stressing that what is involved in this case is the Courts
administrative power to determine its policy vis--vis the exaction of legal fees from the litigants.
The Courts policy determination respecting administrative matters must not be unnecessarily
bound by procedural considerations. Surely, a rule of procedure may not debilitate the Court
and render inutile its power of administration and supervision over court procedures.
That Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406 exempts PAOs clients from the payment of "docket and
other fees incidental to instituting an action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies" is beyond
cavil. However, contrary to Atty. Acostas claim, a plain reading of the said provision clearly
shows that the exemption granted to PAOs clients cannot be extended to the payment of
sheriffs expenses; the exemption is specifically limited to the payment of fees, i.e., docket and
other fees incidental to instituting an action.
The term "fees" is defined as a charge fixed by law or by an institution for certain
privileges or services. Viewed from this context, the phrase "docket and other fees incidental to
instituting an action" refers to the totality of the legal fees imposed under Rule 141of the Rules
of Court. In particular, it includes filing or docket fees, appeal fees, fees for issuance of
provisional remedies, mediation fees, sheriffs fees, stenographers fees and commissioners
fees. These are the fees that are exacted for the services rendered by the court in connection
with the action instituted before it.
Sheriffs expenses, however, cannot be classified as a "fee" within the purview of the
exemption granted to PAOs clients under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406. Sheriffs expenses are
provided for under Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, viz:

The difference in the treatment between the sheriffs fees and the sheriffs
expenses in relation with the exemption enjoyed by cooperatives is further
demonstrated by the wording of Section 10, Rule 141, which uses "fees" in
delineating the enumeration in the first paragraph, and "expenses" in qualifying
the subsequent paragraphs of this provision. The intention to make a distinction
between the two charges is clear; otherwise, the Rules would not have used
different designations. Likewise, the difference between the two terms is
highlighted by a consideration of the phraseology in the first sentence of the
second paragraph of Section 10, Rule 141, which uses the clause "in addition to
the fees hereinabove fixed," thereby unequivocally indicating that sheriffs
expenses are separate charges on top of the sheriffs fees.
The Court, however, is not unmindful of the predicament of PAOs clients. In exempting
PAOs clients from paying docket and other legal fees, R.A. No. 9406 intended to ensure that
the indigents and the less privileged, who do not have the means to pay the said fees, would not
be denied access to courts by reason of poverty. Indeed, requiring PAOs clients to pay sheriffs
expenses, despite their exemption from the payment of docket and other legal fees, would
effectly fetter their free access to the courts thereby negating the laudable intent of Congress in
enacting R.A. No. 9406.
DONNA C. NAGTALON v. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK
G.R. No. 172504, July 31, 2013
J. Brion
When there is a pending civil case challenging the validity of a mortgage or its
foreclosure, such pendency does not bar the issuance of a writ of execution/writ of possession
after said foreclosure, sale of the mortgaged properties and the lapse of the one-year period.
As a ministerial function of the court, the judge need not look into the validity of the mortgage or
the manner of its foreclosure, as these are the questions that should be properly decided by a
court of competent jurisdiction in the pending case filed before it.
FACTS:
Roman Nagtalon and the petitioner (Spouses Nagtalon) entered into a credit
accommodation agreement (credit agreement) with respondent United Coconut Planters Bank.
In order to secure the credit agreement, Spouses Nagtalon, together with the Spouses Vicente
and Rosita Lao, executed deeds of real estate mortgage over several properties in Kalibo,
Aklan. After the Spouses Nagtalon failed to abide and comply with the terms and conditions
Officio Provincial Sheriff a verified petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage.
The mortgaged properties were consequently foreclosed and sold at public auction to
the respondent which emerged as the sole and highest bidder. After the issuance of the sheriffs
certificate of sale, the respondent caused the entry of the sale in the records of the Registry of
Deeds of Kalibo, Aklan and its annotation on the transfer certificates of titles (TCTs) on January
6, 1999. With the lapse of the one year redemption period and the petitioners failure to exercise
her right to redeem the foreclosed properties, the respondent consolidated the ownership over
the properties, resulting in the cancellation of the titles in the name of the petitioner and the
issuance of TCTs in the name of the respondent.

On April 30, 2003, the respondent filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession with the RTC. The petitioner opposed the petition, citing mainly the pendency of
Civil Case No. 6602 (for declaration of nullity of foreclosure, fixing of true indebtedness,
redemption, damages and injunction with temporary restraining order) still pending with the
RTC.
The RTC issued an order, holding in abeyance the issuance of the writ of possession of
the properties on the ground of prematurity. The RTC ruled that due to the pendency of Civil
Case No. 6602 where the issue on nullity of the credit agreement and foreclosure have yet to
be resolved the obligation of the court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser
in a foreclosure of mortgage property ceases to be ministerial. The CA reversed and set aside
the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the pendency of a civil case challenging the validity of the credit agreement, the
promissory notes and the mortgage can bar the issuance of a writ of possession after the
foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged properties and the lapse of the one-year redemption
period.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure is not a legal
ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of execution/writ of possession.
In the case of Spouses Montano T. Tolosa and Merlinda Tolosa v. United Coconut
Planters Bank, a case closely similar to the present petition, the Court explained that a pending
action for annulment of mortgage or foreclosure (where the nullity of the loan documents and
mortgage had been alleged) does not stay the issuance of a writ of possession. It reiterated the
well-established rule that as a ministerial function of the court, the judge need not look into the
validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure, as these are the questions that should
be properly decided by a court of competent jurisdiction in the pending case filed before it. It
added that questions on the regularity and the validity of the mortgage and foreclosure cannot
be invoked as justification for opposing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the new
owner.
In the cited case, the petitioner, in opposition to the respondents ex parte application for
a writ of possession, likewise pointed to the prima facie merit of the allegations in her complaint
for annulment of mortgage, foreclosure and sale. She alleged that the apparent nullity of the
mortgage obligation and the sale of the properties justify, at the very least, the deferment of the
issuance of the writ of possession.
That the issuance of a writ of possession remains a ministerial duty of the court until the
issues raised in the civil case for annulment of mortgage and/or foreclosure are decided by a
court of competent jurisdiction has long been settled.
In the Tolosa case, it would be revealed that there are exceptions to the rule that the
issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial function:

(1)Gross inadequacy of purchase price

xxx
(2)Third party claiming right adverse to debtor/mortgagor
xxx
(3) Failure to pay the surplus proceeds of the sale to mortgagor
However, in the present case is not analogous to any of the above-mentioned
exceptions. The facts are not only different from those cited above; the alleged peculiar
circumstances pertain to the validity of the mortgage, a matter that may be determined by a
competent court after the issuance of the writ of possession. In these lights, the Court held that
the CA correctly ruled that the present case does not present peculiar circumstances that would
merit an exception from the well-entrenched rule on the issuance of the writ.
FAUSTINO T. CHINGKOE and GLORIA CHINGKOE v. Republic of the Philippines,
represented by THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS
G.R. No. 183608, July 31, 2013
J. Velasco, Jr.
When a party resorts to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, it must be shown that
there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to it other than such petition. If,
however, the order partakes of a final adjudication, the proper remedy therefore should be
appeal, under Rule 41. A petition for certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal,
especially if ones own negligence or error in ones choice of remedy occasioned such loss or
lapse. When an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the basis is grave abuse
of discretion.
FACTS:
This petition stemmed from two collection cases filed by the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic), represented by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila.
In the first complaint for collection of money and damages, the Republic alleged that
Chiat Sing Cardboard Inc. (Chiat Sing) secured in 1997 fake and spurious tax credit
certifications. It claimed that Chiat Sing utilized the fraudulently-acquired tax credit certificates to
settle its
customs duties and taxes on its importations.
Meanwhile, in the second complaint, the Republic alleged that in the years 1992-1998,
defendant Filstar fraudulently secured 20 tax credit certificates. Thereafter, Filstar made various
importations, using the tax credit certificates to pay the corresponding customs duties and
taxes.
After an Order of consolidation was issued, the two cases were jointly heard before
Branch 34, Manila RTC. Pursuant to a Notice of Mediation Hearing sent to the parties, the
cases were referred to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) for mandatory mediation. The
pre-trial for the consolidated cases was initially set on January 9, 2006, but come said date, the
report of the mediation has yet to be submitted; hence, on the motion of the counsel of
defendant Chiat Sing, the pre-trial was canceled and rescheduled to February 15, 2006.

On February 15, 2006, the PMC reported that the proceedings are still continuing; thus,
the trial court, on motion of the same counsel for Chiat Sing, moved for the re-setting of the pretrial to March 17, 2006. Unfortunately, the mediation proceedings proved to be uneventful, as no
settlement or compromise was agreed upon by the parties.
During the March 17, 2006 pre-trial setting, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
representing the Republic, failed to appear. The counsel for defendant Filstar prayed for a
period of 10 days within which to submit his motion or manifestation regarding the plaintiffs pretrial brief. The trial court granted the motion, and again ordered a postponement of the pre-trial
to April 19, 2006.
Come the April 19, 2006 hearing, despite having received a copy of the March 17, 2006
Order, the OSG again failed to appear. It also failed to submit its comment. Thus, counsels for
the defendants Filstar, Chiat Sing, and Chingkoe moved that plaintiff be declared non-suited..
The trial court then warned the plaintiffs Republic and BOC that if no comment is submitted and
if they fail to appear during the pre-trial set on May 25, 2006, the court will be constrained to go
along with the motion for the dismissal of the case.
The scheduled May 25, 2006 hearing, however, did not push through, since the trial
court judge went on official leave. The pre-trial was again reset to June 30, 2006.
During the June 30, 2006 pre-trial conference, the OSG again failed to attend. A certain
Atty. Bautista Corpin, Jr. (Atty. Corpin Jr.), appearing on behalf of BOC, was present, but was
not prepared for pre-trial. Meanwhile, counsels for defendants Chiat Sing, Filstar, and third-party
defendants Faustino T. Chingkoe and Gloria C. Chingkoe, who were all present during the pretrial, moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of respondents failure to prosecute. The
trial court judge issued an Order resetting the pre-trial to July 14, 2006.
At the hearing conducted on July 14, 2006, the respective counsels of the defendants
were present/ Neither the OSG nor the BOC attended the hearing. Thus, as moved anew by the
respective counsels of the three defendants, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the case.
As recourse, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA,
alleging that the trial court judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the two
cases. The CA granted the petition and ordered the remand of the case to the Court a quo.
Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it granted
the petition for certiorari and revoked and set aside the order of dismissal of the RTC
considering that:
1. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available in the instant case as an appeal
from the order of dismissal as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the
respondent;
2. The dismissal of the complaints below for the repeated failure of the respondent to
appear during the pre-trial and for its failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length
of time despite the stern warning of the RTC is not a dismissal on mere technical
grounds; and
3. The dismissal of the cases with prejudice was not attended with grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC.

RULING:
The petition is granted.
Respondents Petition for Certiorari filed before the CA was not the proper remedy
against the assailed Order of the RTC. Pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a special civil
action for certiorari could only be availed of when a tribunal acts in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of [its] judgment as to be said to be equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction or when it acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and if there is no appeal or other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
It is settled that the Rules precludes recourse to the special civil action of certiorari if
appeal by way of a Petition for Review is available, as the remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
Here, respondent cannot plausibly claim that there is no plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy available to it to question the dismissal Order of the trial court. The RTC Order does not
fall into any of the exceptions under Section 1, Rule 41, where appeal is not available as a
remedy. It is clear from the tenor of the RTCs July 14, 2006 Order that it partakes of the nature
of a final adjudication, as it fully disposed of the cases by dismissing them. The proper remedy,
therefore, would have been the filing of a Notice of Appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Such remedy is the plain, speedy, and adequate recourse under the law, and not a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65, as respondent here filed before the CA.
A petition for certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if ones
own negligence or error in ones choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. When an
appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the basis is grave abuse of discretion. The
RTC Order subject of the petition was a final judgment which disposed of the case on the
merits; hence, an ordinary appeal was the proper remedy.
Respondent laments that the questioned RTC Order did not specify whether the
dismissal is with prejudice or not, putting it in a precarious situation of what legal actions to take
upon its receipt. This misgiving, however, stems from a misreading of the Rules. Rule 18, Sec. 5
of the Rules of Court clearly states:
Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear. The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so
required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of
the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the
court. x x x
The rule is clear enough that an order of dismissal based on failure to appear at pre-trial
is with prejudice, unless the order itself states otherwise. It should be considered as adjudication
on the merits of the case, where the proper remedy is an appeal under Rule 41. Regrettably, the
respondent chose the wrong mode of judicial review. In not dismissing the petition for certiorari
outright, and in not ruling that such remedy is the wrong mode of judicial review, the CA
committed grave and reversible error.
Dismissal due to the fault of respondent

The trial court amply gave respondent sufficient notice and opportunity to attend the pretrial conference, but despite this, it neglected its duty to prosecute its case and attend the
scheduled pre-trial hearings. Hence, the trial court cannot be faulted for dismissing the case. In
finding that the dismissal by the trial court is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the CA
committed reversible error.
It is fairly obvious that the trial court gave the Republic, through the OSG and the BOC,
every opportunity to be present during the pre-trial conference. Despite the express warning by
the trial court during the penultimate setting on June 30, 2006, the OSG and BOC still failed to
attend the next scheduled setting. Despite the leeway and opportunity given by the trial court, it
seemed that the OSG and BOC did not accord proper importance to the pre-trial conference.
Pre-trial, to stress, is way more than simple marking of evidence. Hence, it should not be
ignored or neglected, as the counsels for respondent had.
Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Hailed as
the most important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth century, pretrial seeks to achieve the following:
(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative
modes of dispute resolution;
(b) The simplification of the issues;
(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of
documents to avoid unnecessary proof;
(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;
(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner;
(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment,
or of dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist;
(h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and
(i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.
Petitioners repeated failure to appear at the pre-trial amounted to a failure to comply
with the Rules and their non-presentation of evidence before the trial court was essentially due
to their fault. In view, however, of the huge amount of tax collectibles involved. and considering
that taxes are the "lifeblood of the government:" the dismissal of the case should be without
prejudice.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALAMANDA MACABANDO

G.R. No. 188708, July 31, 2013
J. Brion
When there is absence of direct evidence to prove that the appellant caused the crime
charged of him, circumstantial evidence may be availed of. To justify a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as
to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
FACTS:
The prosecutions evidence showed that at around 4:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001, the
appellant broke bottles on the road while holding a G.I. pipe, and shouted that he wanted to get
even (manabla ko). Afterwards, he uttered that he would burn his house.
At 6:35 p.m. of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard his neighbors shout that there
was a fire. When Cornelio went out of his house to verify, he saw smoke coming from the
appellants house. He got a pail of water, and poured its contents into the fire. Eric Quilantang, a
neighbor whose house was just 10 meters from that of the appellant, ran to
the barangay headquarters to get a fire extinguisher. However, appellant, who was carrying a
traveling bag and a gun, told Eric not to interfere; the appellant then fired three (3) shots in the
air. The appellant also told the people around that whoever would put out the fire would be
killed.
Upon hearing the gunshots, Cornelio hurriedly went home to save his nephews and
nieces. Eric also returned to his house to save his belongings.
The spot investigation conducted by the Fire Officers concluded that the fire started in
the appellants house and that it has been intentional. The prosecution then charged the
appellant with the crime of destructive arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code
before the RTC. The trial court found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in toto. It gave weight to the RTCs factual
findings since these findings were based on unrebutted testimonial and documentary evidence.
The CA held that the totality of the presented circumstantial evidence led to the conclusion that
the appellant was guilty of the crime charged. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether circumstantial evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Because no one saw the appellant set fire to his house, the trial and appellate courts
resorted to circumstantial evidence since there was no direct evidence to prove his culpability to
the crime charged.
It is settled that in the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence may be
sufficient to sustain a conviction provided that: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the

facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the
one who has committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
In the present case, the following circumstances constitute an unbroken chain that leads
to an unavoidable conclusion that the appellant, to the exclusion of others, set fire to his
house: first, the appellant, while holding an iron lead pipe, acted violently and broke bottles near
his house at around 4:00 p.m. of December 21, 2001; second, while he was still in a fit of rage,
the appellant stated that he would get even, and then threatened to burn his own house; third,
Judith Quilantang saw a fire in the appellants room approximately two hours after the appellant
returned to his house; fourth, the appellant prevented Cornelio, Eric, and several other people
from putting out the fire in his house; fifth, the appellant fired shots in the air, and then
threatened to kill anyone who would try to put out the fire in his house; sixth, the appellant
carried a traveling bag during the fire; and finally, the investigation conducted by the fire
marshals of the Bureau of Fire Protection revealed that the fire started in the appellants house,
and that it had been intentional.
The combination of these circumstances, indeed, leads to no other conclusion than that
the appellant set fire to his house.
The Court finds it unnatural and highly unusual for the appellant to prevent his neighbors
from putting out the fire in his house, and threaten to kill them if they did, if he had nothing to do
with the crime. The first impulse of an individual whose house is on fire is to save his loved ones
and/or belongings; it is contrary to human nature, reason and natural order of things for a
person to thwart and prevent any effort to put out the fire in his burning property. By carrying
(and firing) a gun during the fire, the appellant showed his determination to repel any efforts to
quell the fire. Important to note, too, is the fact that the appellant carried a traveling bag during
the fire which, to our mind, showed deliberate planning and preparedness on his part to flee the
raging fire; it likewise contradicted his statement that he was asleep inside his house when the
fire broke out, and that the fire was already big when he woke up. Clearly, the appellants
indifferent attitude to his burning house and his hostility towards the people who tried to put out
the fire, coupled with his preparedness to flee his burning house, belied his claim of innocence.
Notably, the appellant failed to impute any improper motive against the prosecution witnesses to
falsely testify against him; in fact, he admitted that he had no misunderstanding with them prior
to the incident.

MARK ANTHONY ESTEBAN v. SPS. RODRIGO C. MARCELO and CARMEN T. MARCELO

G.R. No. 197725, July 31, 2013
J. Brion
When a petitioner wishes to file an action for unlawful detainer, there should first be a
demand to pay or to comply with the terms of the lease and a demand to vacate. Mere failure to
pay rents does not ipso facto make unlawful tenant's possession of the premises. It is the
owner's demand for tenant to vacate the premises, when the tenant has failed to pay the rents
on time, and tenants refusal or failure to vacate, which make unlawful withholding of
possession.

FACTS:
The late Gabriel O. Esteban, substituted by his son, petitioner Mark Anthony
Esteban, had been in possession of a piece of land located at Mandaluyong City, since the
1950s. In the 1960s, the late Esteban's sister constructed a foundry shop at the property. In the
1970s, after the foundry operations had proven unproductive, the respondents-spouses Rodrigo
and Carmen Marcelo were allowed to reside therein, for a monthly rental fee of P50.00.
Since March 2001, the respondents-spouses have stopped paying the rental fee (which
by that time amounted to P160.00). On October 31, 2005, the late Esteban, through a lawyer,
sent the respondents-spouses a demand letter requiring them to settle their arrears and to
vacate within five (5) days from receipt thereof. For failure to comply with the demand to pay
and to vacate, the late Esteban instituted an unlawful detainer case against the respondentsspouses on December 6, 2005.
The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) ruled that there was a valid ground for ejectment;
with the jurisdictional demand to vacate complied with, the respondents-spouses must vacate
the property. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) fully affirmed the MeTC ruling. The CA
reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that from the year of dispossession in 2001 when the
respondents-spouses stopped paying rent, until the filing of the complaint for ejectment in 2005,
more than a year had passed; hence, the case no longer involved an accion
interdictal cognizable by the MeTC, but an accion publiciana that should have been filed before
the RTC. Therefore, the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case so that its decision was a
nullity. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the case is cognizable by the MeTC as it has been properly been filed as an
accion interdictal.
RULING:
The petition is granted.
It has been pointed out by the petitioner that there should first be a demand to pay or to
comply with the terms of the lease and a demand to vacate before unlawful detainer arises.
"Mere failure to pay rents does not ipso facto make unlawful tenant's possession of the
premises. It is the owner's demand for tenant to vacate the premises, when the tenant has failed
to pay the rents on time, and tenants refusal or failure to vacate, which make unlawful
withholding of possession." In 2000, the Supreme Court reiterated this rule: "It is therefore clear
that before the lessor may institute such action, he must make a demand upon the lessee to pay
or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate the premises. It is the owners demand
for the tenant to vacate the premises and the tenants refusal to do so which makes unlawful the
withholding of possession. Such refusal violates the owners right of possession giving rise to an
action for unlawful detainer."
Furthermore, in cases where there were more than one demand to pay and vacate, the
reckoning point of one year for filing the unlawful detainer is from the last demand as the lessor
may choose to waive his cause of action and let the defaulting lessee remain in the premises

In the present case, the respondents-spouses stopped paying since 2001. However, the
late Esteban only sent a demand in October 31, 2005. Due to respondents-spouses failure to
comply, the unlawful detainer case was instituted on December 6, 2005, or within the one-year
prescriptive period. Based on the foregoing and as petitioner correctly posits, the case was
then properly filed because it was filed within the said one-year prescriptive period counted from
the date of the last demand and not from the date of dispossession. Thus, the case, being
accion interdictal, is cognizable by the MeTC.
ARNEL ALICANDO y BRIONES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 181119, July 31, 2013
J. Reyes
When a witness commits discrepancies relating to minor details and collateral matters,
such testimony does not affect the veracity of the witness declarations. It is an oft-repeated
doctrine that the testimony of even a single eyewitness is sufficient to support a conviction so
long as such testimony is found to be clear and straight-forward and worthy of credence by the
trial court.
FACTS:
On June 13, 1994, Leopoldo Santiago, a neighbor of the victim and the accused, was
surprised when he saw the dead body of AAA outside his house. The matter was reported to the
police at once. At this point, Luisa Rebada, who lived about 1-1 arms length away from the
house of the petitioner related to the girls parents that she saw AAA the afternoon before at the
window of petitioners house. She called out to her and offered her some yemas. The
petitioner suddenly closed the window. Later on, Luisa heard AAA cry and then squeal. Her
curiousity aroused, she crept two steps up the house of the petitioner, peeped through an
opening between the floor and the door, and saw the petitioner naked on top of AAA, his right
hand choking the girls neck. Rebada became frightened and went back to her house to gather
her children. She told her compadre, Ricardo Lagrana, who was in her house at that time, of
what she saw. Thus, with Luisa Rebadas revelation, the petitioner was arrested.
During the investigation conducted by PO3 Danilo Tan, the petitioner readily admitted to
raping and killing AAA. The police were able to recover from the house of the petitioner AAAs
green slippers, a pair of gold earrings placed on top of a bamboo post, a bloodied buri mat, a
pillow with blood stain in the middle, and a stained T-shirt owned by the petitioner.
Consequently, the petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 43663 for Rape with
Homicide before the RTC. During arraignment, the petitioner entered a plea of guilty. In
compliance with law and jurisprudence, the prosecution presented its evidence. It presented (1)
Luisa Rebada; (2) Dr. Tito Doromal, the medico-legal officer; (3) SPO1 Manuel Artuz, the exhibit
custodian of Iloilo City Police Station; (4) PO3 Danilo Tan; (5) SPO3 Rollie Luz, police
investigator; and (6) BBB, the victims father. The defense, for its part, merely presented the
autopsy report of Dr. Tito Doromal to show that the proximate cause of death was asphyxia by
strangulation.
On July 20, 1994, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting the petitioner of the
crime of rape with homicide. He was accordingly meted out the penalty of death by
electrocution.

On automatic appeal to the Supreme Court, the case was remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings. The Supreme Court found that the proceedings before the lower court were
tainted with procedural infirmities, namely: (a) an invalid arraignment; and, (b) admission of
inadmissible evidence.
Thus, on August 13, 1996, the petitioner was arraigned anew whereby he entered a plea
of not guilty. Trial on the merits was again conducted. During the hearings, counsel for the
defense refused to cross-examine the witnesses who had been presented in the first trial as he
interposed a continuing objection to their presentation again as witnesses since their
testimonies had already been ruled upon by the Supreme Court as incredible and inadmissible
in case G.R. No. 117487.
When the prosecution had finished presenting its evidence, the petitioner filed a
demurrer to evidence, which was subsequently denied. Instead of presenting evidence, the
petitioner manifested that he was submitting the case for judgment without presentation of
evidence for the defense.
On May 2, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision against the petitioner.
On appeal, the CA concurred with the RTCs factual findings, affirmed the conviction of
the petitioner, but modified the penalty and the damages imposed upon him.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA breached the Constitution and jurisprudential doctrines when it affirmed
the petitioners conviction on the basis of evidence derived from uncounselled confession.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
The petitioner poses the question of whether or not the CA erred in convicting him on the
basis of evidence obtained from an uncounselled confession. The issue is not genuinely a legal
issue even when it speciously presents itself to be one at first glance. An examination of the
assailed decision reveals that the conviction handed by the courts a quo was primarily based on
the testimony of Luisa, as corroborated by Dr. Doromals autopsy report, and not on physical
evidence, to wit, the pillow and the blood-stained shirt, which the petitioner claimed were fruits
of the poisonous tree.
Axiomatic is the rule that factual findings of trial courts are accorded the highest respect
and are generally not disturbed by the appellate court, unless they are found to be clearly
arbitrary or unfounded, or some substantial fact or circumstance that could materially affect the
disposition of the case was overlooked, misunderstood or misinterpreted. This rule is founded
on the fact that the trial judge has the unique opportunity to personally observe the witnesses
and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude on the witness stand, which are significant
factors in evaluating their honesty, sincerity and credibility.
Luisas testimonies were found by two branches of the trial court and the CA as credible,
straightforward and consistent. It is also well to note that Luisa once again testified even after
the proceedings before the RTC, which were conducted relative to the petitioners initial

indictment, were declared null. She was firm and unshaken in her identification of the
perpetrator of the crime and no ill motive can be attributed to her on why she testified against
the petitioner. It is an oft-repeated doctrine that the testimony of even a single eyewitness is
sufficient to support a conviction so long as such testimony is found to be clear and straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court.
Further, discrepancies referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect
the veracity of the witness declarations. The alleged inconsistencies in Luisas statements
regarding which hand the petitioner used to strangle AAA and when did she inform
her compadre, Lagrana, about what she had witnessed, were too inconsequential for they do
not relate to the elements of the crime charged. Those inconsistencies cannot destroy the thrust
of Luisas testimony that: (a) the petitioner was the last person seen with AAA before the girls
lifeless body was found; (b) from an opening in between the door and the floor, she saw the
petitioner naked on top of AAA, whose panty and shorts were taken off; and (c) the petitioner
choked AAAs neck with one hand. The autopsy report prepared by Dr. Doromal indicating that
AAA was raped and that she sustained injuries in her head, neck, thoraco-abdominal regions,
extremities, vagina and anus validated Luisas statements. Hence, this Court finds no
arbitrariness in the factual findings of the courtsa quo.
RHODORA PRIETO v. ALPADI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 191025, July 31, 2013
J. Leonardo-De Castro
When a party is deprived of his day in court because of her counsels failure to notify
him, such is not excusable and cannot be considered by the court. The failure of a partys
counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is
negligence, which is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client,
and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss
of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.
FACTS:
Prieto was employed as an accounting clerk and cashier of the Alpadi Group of
Companies, composed of respondent Alpadi Development Corporation (ADC), Manufacturers
Building, Incorporated (MBI), and Asian Ventures Corporation (AVC). Prieto was charged before
the RTC with the crime of estafa.
Trial ensued and the prosecution presented its evidence. After resting its case, the
prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Evidence, which was admitted by the RTC in an Order
dated December 13, 2004. Prieto, represented by the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), asked for
leave of court to file a Demurrer to Evidence. The RTC gave Prieto 20 days from December 13,
2004 within which to file her Demurrer to Evidence. The 20th day of the period was January 2,
2005, a Sunday, so Prieto could still file her Demurrer to Evidence on January 3, 2005, a
Monday. Records show that Prieto filed her Demurrer to Evidence only on January 13, 2005.
In her Demurrer to Evidence, Prieto argued that she could not be convicted for estafa
because (1) as an employee, her custody of the rental collections was precarious and for a
temporary purpose or short period only, and the juridical or constructive possession of the said
collections remained in her employer; and (2) there was no showing that demand was made
upon Prieto to deliver or return the rental collections to ADC.

In an Order dated March 8, 2005, the RTC granted Prietos Demurrer to Evidence. ADC,
as the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 97-157752, filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the aforementioned RTC Order. The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration. ADC sought
recourse from the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari. The appellate granted the
petition for certiorari finding that the elements of Estafa have been duly proven by the
prosecution. Given the findings of the Court of Appeals that the RTC Orders were in
contravention of law and settled jurisprudence and were, therefore, issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the appellate court held that its reversal of
the grant of Demurrer to Evidence did not violate Prietos right against double jeopardy.
To justify the timeliness of the filing of her Petition in G.R. No. 191025 on February 10,
2012, Prieto alleges that she received a copy of the Resolution dated November 12, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals, denying her Motion for Reconsideration, only on January 26, 2010, mailed to
her by the PAO. Prieto prays for the liberal application of the rules of procedure and posits that
the 15-day reglementary period be counted from January 26, 2010, the day she actually
received a copy of the Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration of the adverse
judgment of the Court of Appeals, sent to her through mail by the PAO.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner can be excused from not being able to file her appeal on time due to
her counsels negligence.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
In National Power Corporation v. Laohoo, the Court pronounced that:
The rules provide that if a party is appearing by counsel, service upon him shall
be made upon his counsel or one of them unless service upon the party himself
is ordered by the court. x x x.
The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the
realm of procedural technique. The exception to this rule is when the negligence of counsel is
so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court. The failure of a
partys counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom
is negligence, which is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the
client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the
loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its
face.
Prieto herein not only alleges mistake or negligence on the part of the PAO, but more
seriously, attributes to her former counsel deliberate acts which deprived her of her right to
appeal. It must be stressed that anyone seeking exemption from the application of the
reglementary period for filing an appeal has the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally
meritorious instances warranting such deviation. Parties praying for the liberal interpretation of
the rules must be able to hurdle that heavy burden of proving that they deserve an exceptional
treatment. It was never the Courts intent "to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the
rules with impunity." Unfortunately for Prieto, she was unable to discharge this burden of proof.

Procedural rules should not be so easily brushed aside with the mere averment of the "higher
interest of justice," as the Court discussed in Building Care Corp./Leopard Security &
Investigation Agency v. Macaraeg:
It should be emphasized that the resort to a liberal application, or suspension of the application
of procedural rules, must remain as the exception to the well-settled principle that rules must be
complied with for the orderly administration of justice. In Marohomsalic v. Cole, the Court stated:
While procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of justice, it is well-settled
that these are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. The
relaxation of procedural rules in the interest of justice was never intended to be a
license for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. Liberality in the
interpretation and application of the rules can be invoked only in proper cases
and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While litigation is not a game of
technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
The later case of Daikoku Electronics Phils., Inc. v. Raza, further explained that:
To be sure, the relaxation of procedural rules cannot be made without any valid
reasons proffered for or underpinning it. To merit liberality, petitioner must show
reasonable cause justifying its non-compliance with the rules and must convince
the Court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the
administration of substantial justice. x x x. The desired leniency cannot be
accorded absent valid and compelling reasons for such a procedural lapse. x x x.
We must stress that the bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" line is not
some magic want that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules.
Procedural rules are not to be belittled, let alone dismissed simply because their nonobservance may have resulted in prejudice to a partys substantial rights. Utter disregard of the
rules cannot be justly rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction.
Prieto cannot claim that she had been deprived of her day in court when her arguments
in support of her Demurrer to Evidence had been heard by the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, she does not lose her liberty at this point for she still has the opportunity to present
evidence in her defense before the RTC in the continuation of the proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 97-157752.
With the withdrawal of the appeal in G.R. No. 190282 and the belated filing of the
Petition in G.R. No. 191025, the Decision dated August 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 91714, reversing the grant by the RTC of Prietos Demurrer to Evidence and
reinstating Criminal Case No. 97-157752, had become final and executory, thus, immutable.

SPOUSES JESUS DYCOCO and JOELA E. DYCOCO v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

G.R. No. 147257, July 31, 2013
J. Leonardo-De Castro

When the court liberally allows the petitioner-spouses to file their petition five days after
the extended period, there is no ground to believe that the court gravely abused its discretion
when it subsequently dismissed the petition. Where a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court alleges grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner should establish that the
respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the
exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. This is so because "grave
abuse of discretion" is well-defined and not an amorphous concept that may easily be
manipulated to suit ones purpose.
FACTS:
On November 23, 1994, petitioner-spouses filed a complaint for ejectment, cancellation
of certificates of land transfer, damages and injunction against private respondents Nelly
Siapno-Sanchez and Inocencio Berma in the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Albay. Eusebio Siapno, Rogelio
Siapno, Felix Sepato, Sr., Leonora Talagtag and Pablo Bonde, Sr. were also named
respondents in the complaint.
In their complaint, petitioner-spouses alleged that they are the absolute and registered
owners of Lot No. 216, a 38,157 sq.m.-parcel of land situated at Bonbon, Libon, Albay, covered
by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. VH-5187 of the Register of Deeds of Albay. According
to them, the respondents named in the complaint took advantage of the liberality of petitionerspouses, entered the subject property, successfully registered themselves as tenants for
agrarian reform purposes, and occupied and cultivated the property to the prejudice of
petitioner-spouses. Said respondents deprived petitioner-spouses of the enjoyment and
possession of the property without paying petitioner-spouses or the Land Bank the rentals due
thereon. Moreover, in violation of agrarian reform laws, said respondents subleased their
respective landholdings to other persons.
All seven respondents named in the complaint were summoned but only Bonde and
Rogelio submitted their answer and position paper.7 Bonde and Rogelio showed that they
already own their portions of the property through Operation Land Transfer under Presidential
Decree No. 27.
Pursuant to the said law, petitioner-spouses executed deeds of transfer in their favor
which resulted in the issuance to them of emancipation patents and, subsequently, OCT No. E2333 and OCT No. E-2334, respectively.
Thereafter, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision dated June 27, 1995 finding
private respondents "not worthy to become beneficiaries" under Presidential Decree No. 27.
On motion of petitioner-spouses, the Provincial Adjudicator issued a writ of execution
dated November 22, 1995 ordering, among others, the ejectment of private respondents from
their respective tillage. Subsequently, petitioner-spouses filed a Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ
of Execution and to Cite Respondents in Contempt, claiming that private respondents returned
to the subject property although they have already been ordered ejected. Private respondents
filed a Motion to Quash or Suspend Implementation of the Writ of Execution. They explained
that they are already the owners of their respective portions of the property in question by virtue
of the Operation Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27.

In an order dated October 16, 1996, the Provincial Adjudicator found that the copy of the
decision dated June 27, 1995 was sent by registered mail to and, on July 10, 1995, received by
Crispina Berma Penaranda, daughter of private respondent Berma, who resided in a different
barangay. Still, the Provincial Adjudicator ruled that private respondent Berma was bound by his
daughters receipt and the decision is already final and executory as against him. Thus, with
respect to him, the notice of appeal was filed out of time. On the other hand, there was no
showing that private respondent Siapno-Sanchez has been served a copy of the decision before
she procured a copy of it from the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator on August 26, 1996.
Hence, as regards her, the notice of appeal was filed on time. Therefore, the Provincial
Adjudicator denied the Motion to Quash or Suspend Implementation of the Writ of Execution
with respect to private respondent Berma, and approved and granted the same motion with
respect to private respondent Siapno-Sanchez.
Petitioner-spouses filed the petition by registered mail on May 8, 2000. The petition was
denied due course and dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their
appeal on the ground of late filing.
RULING:
The petition is dismissed.
The Court of Appeals granted petitioner-spouses a 15-day extension, within which to file
their intended petition. The action of the Court of Appeals was in accordance with Section 4,
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Thus, as the original deadline of petitioner-spouses was April 18,
2000, they had until May 3, 2000 to file their intended petition. Petitioner-spouses, however, filed
the petition on May 8, 2000. Petitioner-spouses even admit that their petition in the Court of
Appeals was filed five days after the extended period. It is therefore clear that the Court of
Appeals simply applied the rules, while petitioner-spouses concededly failed to observe the very
same rules. As such, the Court of Appeals dismissal of the petition of petitioner-spouses was
discretion duly exercised, not misused or abused.
Where a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleges grave abuse of
discretion, the petitioner should establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. This is so because "grave abuse of discretion" is well-defined
and not an amorphous concept that may easily be manipulated to suit ones purpose. In this
connection, Yu v. Judge Reyes-Carpio is instructive:
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal
can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious
or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility."
Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases
wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the foregoing
definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act

down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show
that such act was patent and gross. x x x.
In this case, nowhere in the petition did petitioner-spouses show that the issuance of the
Resolutions dated June 2, 2000 and January 1, 2001 was patent and gross that would warrant
striking them down through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
AUGUST 2013
ROMULO L. NERI v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 202243, August 07, 2013
J. Velasco, Jr.
Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how
cases in its docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched
expeditiously while providing justice to the parties. When there are two criminal cases that are
consolidated together, it must be for the purpose of expediency and speedy disposition of
justice. If not, the same shall be denied.
FACTS:
Petitioner Romulo L. Neri (Neri) served as Director General of the National Economic
and Development Authority (NEDA) during the administration of former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo.
In connection with what had been played up as the botched Philippine-ZTE National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project, the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), the Sandiganbayan
filed two (2) criminal Informations, the first against Benjamin Abalos, for violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act and the second against Neri, also for the same violation. The
cases were raffled to the Fourth and Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan respectively. Vis--vis
the same project, the Ombudsman would also later file an information against MacapagalArroyo and another information against her and several others in the anti-graft courts 4th
Division.
In the ensuing trial in the Neri case following the arraignment and pre-trial proceedings,
six (6) individuals took the witness stand on separate dates to testify for the prosecution.
Thereafter, the prosecution twice moved for and secured continuance for the initial stated
reason that the prosecution is still verifying the exact address of its next intended witness and
then that such witness cannot be located at his given address.
In the meantime, a pre-trial conference was conducted in the Abalos case following
which the Fourth Division issued a Pre-Trial Order containing, among other things, a list of
witnesses and documents the prosecution intended to present. Neri, whose name appeared
high on the list, took the witness stand against Abalos in the Abalos case.
On January 3, 2012, in SB-10-CRM-0099, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP),
OMB, moved for its consolidation with SB-10-CRM-0098 (People v. Abalos), SB-11-CRM-0467
(People v. Arroyo, et al.) and SB-11-0468 to 469 (People v. Arroyo). Neri opposed and argued

against consolidation. The Sandiganbayan Fifth Division, agreeing with the position thus taken
by the OSP, granted the consolidation of SB-10-CRM-0099 with SB-10-CRM-0098.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent court gravely erred in ordering a consolidation of the subject criminal
cases when the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does not allow a consolidation of criminal
cases, only a consolidation of trials or joint trials in appropriate instances.
RULING:
The petition is granted.
Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how
cases in its docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched
expeditiously while providing justice to the parties. Toward this end, consolidation and a single
trial of several cases in the courts docket or consolidation of issues within those cases are
permitted by the rules.
To be sure, consolidation is allowed, as Rule 31 of the Rules of Court is entitled
"Consolidation or Severance." The counterpart, but narrowed, rule for criminal cases is found in
Sec. 22, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court stating:
Sec. 22. Consolidation of trials of related offenses. - Charges for offenses founded on
the same facts or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character may be tried jointly at
the discretion of the court.
As complemented by Rule XII, Sec. 2 of the Sandiganbayan Revised Internal Rules which
states:
Section 2. Consolidation of Cases. Cases arising from the same incident or series of
incidents, or involving common questions of fact and law, may be consolidated in the Division to
which the case bearing the lowest docket number is raffled.
While the assailed resolution is silent as to the resultant effect/s of the consolidation it
approved, there is nothing in the records to show that what the prosecution vied for and what
the Fifth Division approved went beyond consolidation for trial or joint trial. Not to be overlooked
is the fact that the prosecution anchored its motion for consolidation partly on the aforequoted
Sec. 22 of Rule 119 which indubitably speaks of a joint trial.
Jurisprudence has laid down the requisites for consolidation of trial. As held in Caos v.
Peralta, joint trial is permissible "where the actions arise from the same act, event or
transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same
evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and that a
joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of
the parties."
In the case at bar, a consolidation of the Neri case to that of Abalos, although allowed,
would nonetheless expose petitioner Neri to testimonies which have no relation whatsoever in
the case against him and the lengthening of the legal dispute thereby delaying the resolution of
his case. And as in People v. Sandiganbayan, consolidation here would force petitioner to await
the conclusion of testimonies against Abalos, however irrelevant or immaterial as to him (Neri)

before the case against the latter may be resolveda needless, hence, oppressive delay in the
resolution of the criminal case against him.
What is more, there is a significant difference in the number of witnesses to be
presented in the two cases. In fact, the number of prosecution witnesses in the Neri case is just
half of that in Abalos.
Clearly then, consolidation, assuming it to be proper owing to the existence of the
element of commonality of the lineage of the offenses charged contemplated in Sec. 22 of Rule
119, should be ordered to achieve all the objects and purposes underlying the rule on
consolidation, foremost of which, to stress, is the swift dispensation of justice with the least
expense and vexation to the parties. It should, however, be denied if it subverts any of the aims
of consolidation.
ALFEO D. VIVAS, ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE SHAREHOLDERS OR
EUROCREDIT COMMUNITY BANK v. THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE BANGKO
SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and THE PHILIPPINE EPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
G.R. No. 191424, August 07, 2013
J. Mendoza
When the acts being prevented by a party have already been accomplished, a writ of
prohibition is not proper. A prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be
rendered which would direct the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an
act perceived to be illegal. As a rule, the proper function of a writ of prohibition is to prevent the
doing of an act which is about to be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already
accomplished.
FACTS:
The Rural Bank of Faire, Incorporated (RBFI) was a duly registered rural banking
institution. Its corporate life expired on May 31, 2005. Notwithstanding, petitioner Vivas and his
principals acquired the controlling interest in RBFI sometime in January 2006. At the initiative of
Vivas and the new management team, an internal audit was conducted on RBFI and results
thereof highlighted the dismal operation of the rural bank. In view of those findings, certain
measures calculated to revitalize the bank were allegedly introduced. On December 8, 2006,
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued the Certificate of Authority extending the corporate
life of RBFI for another fifty (50) years.
Sometime in April 2008, the examiners from the Department of Loans and Credit of the
BSP arrived at the ECBI and cancelled the rediscounting line of the bank, which Vivas
appealed. Thereafter, the Monetary Board (MB) issued Resolution No. 1255 placing ECBI
under Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) framework because of serious findings and supervisory
concerns noted during the general examination. Vivas claimed that the BSP took the above
courses of action due to the joint influence exerted by a certain hostile shareholder and a former
BSP examiner.
Vivas moved for a reconsideration of Resolution No. 1255 on the grounds of nonobservance of due process and arbitrariness. The ISD II, on several instances, had invited the
BOD of ECBI to discuss matters pertaining to the placement of the bank under PCA framework
and other supervisory concerns before making the appropriate recommendations to the MB.
The proposed meeting, however, did not materialize due to postponements sought by Vivas.

In its letter, dated February 20, 2009, the BSP directed ECBI to explain why it transferred
the majority shares of RBFI without securing the prior approval of the MB in apparent violation
of Subsection X126.2 of the Manual of Regulation for Banks (MORB). Also, the scheduled
March 31, 2009 general examination of the books, records and general condition of ECBI with
the cut-off date of December 31, 2008, did not push through. According to Vivas, ECBI asked
for the deferment of the examination pending resolution of its appeal before the MB.
In view of ECBIs refusal to comply with the required examination, the MB issued
Resolution No. 726, imposing monetary penalty/fine on ECBI, and referred the matter to the
Office of the Special Investigation (OSI) for the filing of appropriate legal action. The ISD II then
reiterated its demand upon the ECBI BOD to allow the BSP examiners to conduct a general
examination, which the ECBI asked again to be deferred due to the pendency of certain
unresolved issues subject of its appeal before the MB, and because Vivas was then out of the
country. The ISD II denied ECBIs request and ordered the general examination to proceed as
previously scheduled.
Thereafter, the MB issued Resolution No. 823, approving the issuance of a cease and
desist order against ECBI, which enjoined it from pursuing certain acts and transactions that
were considered unsafe or unsound banking practices, and from doing such other acts or
transactions constituting fraud or might result in the dissipation of its assets.
On June 10, 2009, the OSI filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint for
Estafa Through Falsification of Commercial Documents against certain officials and employees
of ECBI.
On March 4, 2010, the MB issued Resolution No. 276, prohibiting the Eurocredit Bank
from doing business in the Philippines and to place its assets and affairs under receivership.
Hence, this petition for prohibition.
ISSUE:
Whether the MB committed grave abuse of discretion for prohibiting ECBI from continuing its
banking business and for placing it under receivership.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Granting that a petition for prohibition is allowed, it is already an ineffective remedy
under the circumstances obtaining. Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that process by which
a superior court prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or
exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law, and confines them to the
exercise of those powers legally conferred. Its office is to restrain subordinate courts, tribunals
or persons from exercising jurisdiction over matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its
jurisdiction in matters of which it has cognizance. In our jurisdiction, the rule on prohibition is
enshrined in Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that the judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as the law and justice require.
x x x x.
Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which
would direct the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to
be illegal. As a rule, the proper function of a writ of prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act
which is about to be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished.
Though couched in imprecise terms, this petition for prohibition apparently seeks to
prevent the acts of closing of ECBI and placing it under receivership. Resolution No. 276,
however, had already been issued by the MB and the closure of ECBI and its placement under
receivership by the PDIC were already accomplished. Apparently, the remedy of prohibition is
no longer appropriate. Settled is the rule that prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that is
already a fait accompli.
Furthermore, the Court ruled that the petition should have been filed with the CA
pursuant to the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. True, the Court, the CA and the RTC have
original concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The
concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not grant the party seeking any of the extraordinary
writs the absolute freedom to file a petition in any court of his choice. The petitioner has not
advanced any special or important reason which would allow a direct resort to this Court.
The MB Committed No Grave Abuse of Discretion
In any event, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the MB for the issuance
of the assailed Resolution No. 276. The thrust of Vivas argument is that ECBI did not commit
any financial fraud and, hence, its placement under receivership was unwarranted and
improper. Vivas argues that implementation of the questioned resolution was tainted with
arbitrariness and bad faith, stressing that ECBI was placed under receivership without due and
prior hearing, invoking Section 11 of R.A. No. 7353 which states that the BSP may take over the
management of a rural bank after due hearing.
The Court has taken this into account, but it appears from all over the records that ECBI
was given every opportunity to be heard and improve on its financial standing. The records
disclose that BSP officials and examiners met with the representatives of ECBI, including Vivas,
and discussed their findings. There were also reminders that ECBI submit its financial audit
reports for the years 2007 and 2008 with a warning that failure to submit them and a written
explanation of such omission shall result in the imposition of a monetary penalty. More
importantly, ECBI was heard on its motion for reconsideration. For failure of ECBI to comply, the
MB came out with Resolution No. 1548 denying its request for reconsideration of Resolution No.
726. Having been heard on its motion for reconsideration, ECBI cannot claim that it was
deprived of its right under the Rural Bank Act.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE v. COURT OF TAX APPEALS ET AL.
G.R. No. 168137, August 07, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe

When a court grants a motion to release founded on legal bases supporting its , it
therefore did not gravely abuse its discretion. An act of a court or tribunal can only be
considered to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In order to be qualified as
"grave," the abuse of discretion must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law.
FACTS:
On the strength of a Warrant of Seizure and Detention by the Bureau of Customs, 73
container vans loaded with 29,796 bags of imported rice (subject goods) were seized and
detained for alleged violation of the "Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines" (TCCP). The
seizure was thereafter, docketed as Batangas Seizure Identification No. 02-03.
On February 7, 2003, KCTMPC, claiming ownership over the foregoing shipment,
moved to intervene in the seizure proceedings and further sought the quashal of the seizure
warrant. The BoC granted KCTMPCs motion to intervene but denied its motion to quash
seizure warrant.
After the formal hearing of the case, the BoC rendered a Decision in favor of KCTMPC,
ordering the release of the 73 container vans loaded with the subject goods. As the BoCs ruling
was adverse to the government, the case was forwarded for automatic review to petitioner
Secretary of the Department of Finance. Petitioner then reversed the Decision of the BoC and
ordered the same to "determine the possible violations or applicable customs rules and
regulations, and institute such actions, criminal or otherwise, against the person found to be
responsible."
KCTMPC filed a Motion for Execution, contending that the Decision of the BoC had
already become final and executory but such motion was denied. Aggrieved, KCTMPC filed a
Petition for Review with Prohibition (petition for prohibition) before the CTA. Citing the Geotina
case, petitioner argued that the subject goods should be considered as prohibited under Section
102(k) of the TCCP and as such, should not be released pending final determination of
KCTMPCs petition for prohibition. The CTA issued a Resolution which granted KCTMPCs
motion to release. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CTA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted KCTMPCs motion to
release.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
The Court finds that the CTA did not gravely abuse its discretion when it granted
KCTMPCs motion to release since there lies cogent legal bases to support its conclusion that
the subject goods were merely "regulated" and not "prohibited" commodities.
Among others, the CTA correctly observed that the Geotina ruling was inapplicable due
to the classification of the goods involved therein. As cited by the CTA, CB Circular No. 1389

dated April 13, 1993 classified imports into three (3) categories, namely: (a) "freely importable
commodities" or those commodities which are neither "regulated" nor "prohibited" and the
importation of which may be effected without any prior approval of or clearance from any
government agency; (b) "regulated commodities" or those commodities the importation of which
require clearances/permits from appropriate government agencies; and (c) "prohibited
commodities" or those commodities the importation of which are not allowed by law. Under
Annex 1 of the foregoing circular, rice and corn are enumerated as "regulated" commodities,
unlike the goods in the Geotina case, which were, at that time, classified as "prohibited"
commodities. Therefore, owing to this divergence, the CTA properly pronounced that the
Geotina ruling is inapplicable.
It is a standing jurisprudential rule that not every error in the proceedings, or every
erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. An act of a court or
tribunal can only be considered to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion when such act is
done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In
order to be qualified as "grave," the abuse of discretion must be so patent or gross as to
constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in
contemplation of law. Finding that this characterization does not fit the CTAs exercise of
discretion in this case, the Court holds that no grave abuse of discretion attended its grant of
KCTMPCs motion to release.
THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ MIRANDA AND ASEOCHE, ETC.v. ATTY. JOSEJINA C. FRIA
G.R. No. 183014, August 07, 2013
J. Mendoza
A trial court judge may immediately dismiss a criminal case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause. It must, however, be observed that the judges power
to immediately dismiss a criminal case would only be warranted when the lack of probable
cause is clear. The judges dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut cases when the
evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause that is when the records readily
show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of
the elements of the crime charged.
FACTS:
The Law Firm was engaged as counsel by the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 03-110 instituted
before Branch 203. On July 29, 2005, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff (July 29,
2005 judgment), prompting the defendant in the same case to appeal. However, Branch 203
disallowed the appeal and consequently ordered that a writ of execution be issued to enforce
the foregoing judgment. The July 29, 2005 judgment became final and executory.
In its Complaint-Affidavit, The Law Firm alleged that as early as April 4, 2006, it had
been following up on the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the July 29, 2005
judgment. However, Atty. Fria vehemently refused to perform her ministerial duty of issuing said
writ.
Atty. Fria posited that the draft writ of execution (draft writ) was not addressed to her and
she maintained that she need not sign the draft writ since on April 18, 2006, the presiding judge
issued an Order stating that he himself shall sign and issue the same.

On July 31, 2006, the prosecutor recommended that Atty. Fria be indicted for the crime
of Open Disobedience. Atty. Fria filed a Motion for Determination of Probable Cause on the
ground that the Rules on Criminal Procedure do not empower trial courts to review the
prosecutors finding of probable cause and that such rules only give the trial court judge the duty
to determine whether or not a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused.
Pending resolution of her motion, Atty. Fria filed a Manifestation with Motion stating that
the Court had rendered a Decision in the case of Reyes v. Balde II (Reyes) an offshoot of Civil
Case No. 03-110 wherein it was held that Branch 203 had no jurisdiction over the foregoing
civil case. In response, The Law Firm filed its Comment/Opposition, contending that Atty. Fria
already committed the crime of Open Disobedience 119 days before the Reyes ruling was
rendered and hence, she remains criminally liable for the aforestated charge.
The MTC ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause. It found that
aside from the fact that Atty. Fria is a judicial officer, The Law Firm failed to prove the existence
of the other elements of the crime of Open Disobedience. The RTC affirmed the MTCs ruling.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in sustaining the MTCs dismissal of the case for Open Disobedience
against Atty. Fria for lack of probable cause.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Under Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court judge may
immediately dismiss a criminal case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause. It must, however, be observed that the judges power to immediately dismiss a criminal
case would only be warranted when the lack of probable cause is clear.
In this regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutors authority, it must be
stressed that the judges dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut cases when the
evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause that is when the records readily
show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of
the elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on record shows that, more
likely than not, the crime charged has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty of
the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to proceed to
trial. In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of action would be to order the
presentation of additional evidence.
Applying these principles to the case at bar would lead to the conclusion that the MTC
did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the case for lack of probable cause. The
dismissal ought to be sustained since the records clearly disclose the unmistakable absence of
the integral elements of the crime of Open Disobedience.
To elucidate, the second element of the crime of Open Disobedience is that there is a
judgment, decision, or order of a superior authority made within the scope of its jurisdiction and
issued with all legal formalities. In this case, it is undisputed that all the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 03-110 have been regarded as null and void due to Branch 203s lack of jurisdiction

over

the

said

case.

Hence, since it is explicitly required that the subject issuance be made within the scope
of a superior authoritys jurisdiction, it cannot therefore be doubted that the second element of
the crime of Open Disobedience does not exist. Lest it be misunderstood, a court or any of its
officers for that matter which has no jurisdiction over a particular case has no authority to act
at all therein. In this light, it cannot be argued that Atty. Fria had already committed the crime
based on the premise that the Courts pronouncement as to Branch 203s lack of jurisdiction
came only after the fact. Verily, Branch 203s lack of jurisdiction was not merely a product of the
Courts pronouncement in Reyes. The said fact is traced to the very inception of the
proceedings and as such, cannot be accorded temporal legal existence in order to indict Atty.
Fria for the crime she stands to be prosecuted.
The Court holds that no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the MTC as
correctly found by the RTC. It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be
considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
LEE PUE LIONG a.k.a. PAUL LEE v. CHUA PUE CHIN LEE
G.R. No. 181658, August 07, 2013
J. Villarama, Jr.
When a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which
he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he has violated; and (2) the
individual member of the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been
actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. Furthermore, in
Section 12, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, it is reasonable to assume that the offended party in
the commission of a crime, public or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly liable,
and therefore the private individual to whom the offender is civilly liable is the offended party.
FACTS:
Petitioner Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, is the President of Centillion Holdings, Inc.
(CHI), a company affiliated with the CKC Group of Companies (CKC Group) which includes the
pioneer company Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC). The CKC Group is the subject of intracorporate disputes between petitioner and his siblings, including herein respondent Chua Pue
Chin Lee, a majority stockholder and Treasurer of CHI.
On July 19, 1999, petitioners siblings including respondent and some unidentified
persons took over and barricaded themselves inside the premises of a factory owned by CKC.
Petitioner and other factory employees were unable to enter the factory premises. This incident
led to the filing of Criminal Case Nos. 971-V-99, 55503 to 55505 against Nixon Lee and 972-V99 against Nixon Lee, Andy Lee, Chua Kipsi a.k.a. Jensen Chua and respondent, which are
now pending in different courts in Valenzuela City.
On June 14, 1999, petitioner on behalf of CHI (as per the Secretarys Certificate issued
by Virginia Lee on even date) caused the filing of a verified Petitionfor the Issuance of an
Owners Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 232238which covers a

property owned by CHI. The RTC granted the petition and directed the Register of Deeds of
Manila to issue a new Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 232238 in lieu of the lost one.
Respondent, joined by her brother Nixon Lee, filed an Omnibus Motion praying, among others,
that the Order be set aside claiming that petitioner knew fully well that respondent was in
possession of the said Owners Duplicate Copy, the latter being the Corporate Treasurer and
custodian of vital documents of CHI. Thus, the RTC recalled and set aside its Order.
In a Complaint-Affidavit dated May 9, 2000 filed before the City Prosecutor of Manila,
respondent accused petitioner of two cases of perjury. Initially, the Investigating Prosecutor
recommended the dismissal of the case. However, in the Review Resolution by First Assistant
City Prosecutor Eufrosino A. Sulla, the recommendation to dismiss the case was set aside.
Thereafter, said City Prosecutor filed the Information against petitioner before the MeTC of
Manila, Branch 28.
In its Order dated May 7, 2003, the MeTC gave both the defense and the prosecution
the opportunity to submit their motion and comment respectively as regards the issue raised by
petitioners counsel. Complying with the MeTCs directive, petitioner filed the aforementioned
Omnibus Motion asserting that in the crime of perjury punishable under Article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, there is no mention of any private offended party. As such, a
private prosecutor cannot intervene for the prosecution in this case. The court denied the
Omnibus Motion. On petition for certiorari, the CA ruled in favor of respondent, holding that the
presence of the private prosecutor who was under the control and supervision of the public
prosecutor during the criminal proceedings of the two perjury cases is not proscribed by the
rules. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the honorable CA committed grave error when it upheld the resolution of the
MeTC that there is a private offended party in the crime of perjury, a crime against public
interest.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our
law that "[e]very person criminally liable x x x is also civilly liable." Underlying this legal principle
is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime, he offends two entities, namely (1)
the society in which he lives in or the political entity, called the State, whose law he has violated;
and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property
was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.
Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
For the recovery of civil liability in the criminal action, the appearance of a private prosecutor is
allowed under Section 16 of Rule 110:

SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.Where the civil action for
recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended
party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, defines
an offended party as "the person against whom or against whose property the offense was
committed." In Garcia v. Court of Appeals, the Court rejected petitioners theory that it is only the
State which is the offended party in public offenses like bigamy. The Court explained that from
the language of Section 12, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, it is reasonable to assume that the
offended party in the commission of a crime, public or private, is the party to whom the offender
is civilly liable, and therefore the private individual to whom the offender is civilly liable is the
offended party.
Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried
in the MeTC, this Court declared in the early case of Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco, cited by both MeTC
and CA, that whether public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to
consider the intervention of the offended party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus,
where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, that right
must be respected. The right reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening
for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding
punishment of the accused. Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the direction and
control of the public prosecutor.
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate that
every man criminally liable is also civilly liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two
entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose
law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of the society whose person, right, honor,
chastity or property has been actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act
or omission. An act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil
liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another.
Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of
everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or
omission, whether done intentionally or negligently. The indemnity which a person is sentenced
to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of the crime. The
civil action involves the civil liability arising from the offense charged which includes restitution,
reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages.
Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the
criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the
prosecution of the offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that,
"[w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action."
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute
it separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus,
the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. CORAZON B. BAELLO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 200858, August 07, 2013

J. Carpio, Jr.
When the validity of a land title has long been settled in a previous case, an action to
annul the same is already barred from being questioned in another case despite the fact that
they are in different actions. Conclusiveness of judgment does not require identity of the causes
of action for it to work. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the
judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former
judgment between the same parties will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point
or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit.
FACTS:
Pedro Baello and Nicanora Baello are the owners of a parcel of land registered with
OCT No. (804) 53839. When Pedro died intestate in December 3, 1971, he left 32 surviving
heirs including respondents herein. On October 30, 1974, President Marcos issued P.D. No. 569
creating a committee to expropriate the Dagat-Dagatan Lagoon and its adjacent areas,
including the properties of the siblings (Baello property and Rodriguez property).The National
Housing Authority (NHA) took possession of the properties after the caretaker was compelled to
leave. The Baello and Rodriguez heirs, for fear of losing their lives and those of their families,
decided to remain silent and did not complain.
On 23 February 1987, after the EDSA People Power Revolution, the heirs of Baello
executed an extrajudicial partition of Pedros estate, which included the Baello property.
Respondents were issued TCT No. 280647 over an undivided portion of the Baello property.
On 18 August 1987, the NHA filed an action for eminent domain against the heirs of
Baello and Rodriguez before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC dismissed the complaint
on the ground of res judicata and lack of cause of action. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
the Order of the RTC. The NHA filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court (SC), which
the Court denied due course to the petition on the ground that the Court of Appeals did not
commit any reversible error in affirming the order of the RTC.
On 5 November 1993, the NHA filed a complaint for nullity of OCT No. (804) 53839. The
RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of estoppel and res judicata and also because the
issue on the legal nature and ownership of the property covered by OCT No. (804) 53839 has
already been barred by a final judgment. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Again, the
NHA went to the Supreme Court to assail the decision of the CA but the Court, in the case
docketed as G.R. No. 143230 denied the NHAs petition for lack of merit.
Respondents then filed an action for Recovery of Possession and Damages against the
NHA and other respondents. The Regional Trial Court ruled that the dismissal of NHAs
complaint for expropriation and for declaration of nullity of OCT No. (804) 53839 left NHA with
no right to hold possession of respondents property which was admittedly a part of Pedros
land. The CA denied the NHAs appeal. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in adopting the facts in G.R. No.
143230 when the case was not tried on the merits.

RULING:
The petition is denied.
The rule is that when material facts or questions, which were in issue in a former action
and were admitted or judicially determined are conclusively settled by a judgment rendered
therein, such facts or questions become res judicata and may not again be litigated in a
subsequent action between the same parties or their privies regardless of the form of the latter.
Jurisprudence expounds that the concept of res judicata embraces two aspects. The
first, known as "bar by prior judgment," or "estoppel by verdict," is the effect of a judgment as a
bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. The
second, known as "conclusiveness of judgment," otherwise known as the rule of auter action
pendent, ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be
raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.
In this case, the NHAs petition is barred by conclusiveness of judgment. The SC
sustains the CA in ruling that the main issue raised by the NHA is the validity of OCT No. (804)
53839 and such issue has long been settled by the SC in G.R. No. 143230. In that case, the
Court ruled that the action to annul OCT No. (804) 53839 was barred by the decision in LRC
Case No. 520, which the Republic did not nullify until November 1993, when it was already
barred from questioning it.
Conclusiveness of judgment does not require identity of the causes of action for it to
work. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will
depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the
same parties will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in
issue and adjudicated in the first suit; but the adjudication of an issue in the first case is not
conclusive of an entirely different and distinct issue arising in the second. Hence, facts and
issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case
between the same parties, even if the latter suit may involve a different claim or cause of action.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANGELES BELLATE, ET AL.
G.R. No. 175685, August 07, 2013
J. Brion, Jr.
When the CA does not affirm the RTCs findings of facts, such as when both have ruled
differently on the identity of the lands in a case, the Supreme Court may then review the
findings of fact of the appellate court. As a general rule, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
cases brought to it from the CA is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to
it, its findings of fact being conclusive. However, the Court enumerated the exceptional
circumstances when the Supreme Court may review the findings of fact of the CA, such as
when the lower courts findings of fact are conflicting.
FACTS:
On December 28, 1975, respondent Angeles Bellate filed Free Patent Application (FPA)
over Lot No. 2624, in Barangay Matobato, Calbayog City. Pursuant to the FPA, the Register of
Deeds issued OCT No. 1546 in favour of Angeles. On February 19, 1980, Enriquita BellateQuizan filed a protest against the LMB, praying for the annulment of the FPA in favour of

Angeles, contending that it was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation because Angeles
did not state the fact that the land had other occupants aside from him.
Meanwhile, Lot No. 2624 was divided into two smaller lots, described as Lot Nos. 2624A and 2624-B. Respondent Jesus Cabanto bought the smaller lot (Lot No. 2624-B) from
Angeles which then led to the cancellation of OCT No. 1546, and the issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 770 for Lot No. 2624-A, in the name of Angeles, and TCT No. 771
for Lot No. 2624-B, in the name of Cabanto.
Acting on Enriquitas protest, the Director of Lands ordered Supervising Land Examiner
Jovencio D. Bulan to conduct a formal investigation on Lot No. 2624.On the basis of this report,
the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a case against Angeles and
spouses Cabanto and Marieta Juanerio (Juanerio) for the reversion of land to the mass of public
domain and for the annulment of the granted free patent and title with the RTC.
During the pre-trial, the counsel of the respondents informed the RTC about the
pendency of Civil Case No. 137-CC, an action for ownership and recovery of possession of Lot
No. 2624-B which respondent Cabanto instituted in the RTC of Calbayog City, Branch 31,
against Fideles Quizan, Eduardo Quizan, Preciosa Bellate, Constancio Cabaliza and Uldarico
Pania.
The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of litis pendentia. The Republic
appealed the case to the CA, which remanded it back to the RTC for trial on the merits. On
October 7, 1996, the RTC dismissed the complaint on the premise that the land which was the
subject of dispute was different from the land previously occupied by Eusebia. The Republic
appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA denied the appeal. Hence, this present petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether this court may review the case under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
RULING:
The petition is granted.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the CA is limited to
reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. In
several decisions, however, the Court enumerated the exceptional circumstances when the
Supreme Court may review the findings of fact of the CA. In the present case, the Court agrees
with the Republic that the petition falls within the exceptions because the lower courts findings
of fact are conflicting.
In the present petition, the CA did not affirm the RTCs findings of facts. The RTC
compared the tax declarations and differences in areas and boundaries of the two properties
and held that the two are distinct and separate parcels of land. On the other hand, the CA ruled
that the identity of the two properties was ever raised by the parties and that the issue raised
before the RTC was for the determination of whether Angeles made false statements in his
application for Free Patent. Furthermore, the appellate court found that the subject lot is part of
Eusebias property.

While both the RTC and the CA decisions ruled in favor of the respondents, the Republic
correctly observed, however, that the RTC and the CA arrived at contradicting findings of facts.
The RTCs findings that Lot No. 2624 was not the same parcel of land originally owned by
Eusebia cannot be reconciled with the CAs findings that Lot No. 2624 was part of the 27,930square-meter land of Eusebia. The conclusions being conflicting, the Court then has the
authority to review the case under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. MARY SHEILA ARCOBILLAS
G.R. No. 179648, August 07, 2013
J. Del Castillo
A Motion for Reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party
can resort to the special civil action for certiorari. The rationale for the rule is that the law
intends to afford the NLRC an opportunity to rectify such errors or mistakes it may have
committed before resort to courts of justice can be had.
It bears to stress that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration is not a mere technicality
of procedure. It is a jurisdictional and mandatory requirement which must be strictly complied
with.
FACTS:
On May 15, 1998, the PNB Foreign Currency Denomination-Savings Account of NomadSpoor was credited with US$138.00. However, instead of posting its peso equivalent
of P5,517.10, Arcobillas, the assigned administrative teller at PNB Bacolod-Lacson branch,
erroneously posted US$5,517.10, resulting in an overcredit of US$5,379.10. Said amount was
later withdrawn by Nomad-Spoor to the damage of PNB in the amount of P214,641.23. The
misposting was discovered only about seven months later. After investigation, Arcobillas was
administratively charged with neglect of duty.
On February 24, 2000, PNBs Administrative Adjudication Panel found Arcobillas guilty of
gross neglect of duty and meted upon her the penalty of forced resignation with benefits.Upon
denial of her plea for reconsideration, Arcobillas instituted a Complaint for illegal dismissal with
money claims against PNB, PNBs Senior Manager Reynald A. Rey and Senior Vice-President
Rosauro C. Macalagay.
The Labor Arbiter found no sufficient evidence to establish gross and habitual
negligence and that the misposting was committed without malice, bad faith or dishonest
motive. The NLRC affirmed with modification the LAs Decision.
PNB received a copy of the said Decision on October 14, 2004. Without filing a Motion
for Reconsideration, PNB filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari until
December 23, 2004. On said date, PNB filed its Petition for Certiorari before the CA.
Subsequently on May 25, 2005, the NLRC issued an Entry of Final Judgment declaring its
Decision final and executor. Despite the non-filing of a Motion for Reconsideration with the
NLRC, the CA took cognizance of PNBs Petition for Certiorari. Nevertheless, it dismissed the
same. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals can correct the evaluation of the evidence by, or the factual
findings of the NLRC in a petition for certiorari.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
The Court recognizes that the finality of the NLRCs Decision does not preclude the
filing of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. That the NLRC issues an
entry of judgment after the lapse of ten (10) days from the parties receipt of its Decision will only
give rise to the prevailing partys right to move for the execution thereof but will not prevent the
CA from taking cognizance of a Petition for Certiorari on jurisdictional and due process
considerations." However, it is a well-established rule that "a Motion for Reconsideration is an
indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for
certiorari. The rationale for the rule is that the law intends to afford the NLRC an opportunity to
rectify such errors or mistakes it may have committed before resort to courts of justice can be
had.
Of course, the rule is not absolute and jurisprudence has laid down exceptions when the
filing of a Petition for Certiorari is proper notwithstanding the failure to file a Motion for
Consideration such as "(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised
and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the
lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject
matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a Motion for
Consideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is
extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent
and the granting of such relied by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the
lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in
which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and, (i) where the issue raised is one purely of
law or where public interest is involved."
Here, PNB did not at all allege to which of the above-mentioned exceptions this case
falls. Neither did it present any plausible justification for dispensing with the requirement of a
prior Motion for Reconsideration before the NLRC.
Despite this, the CA still took cognizance of PNBs Petition for Certiorari and ignored this
significant flaw. It bears to stress that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration is not a mere
technicality of procedure. It is a jurisdictional and mandatory requirement which must be strictly
complied with. Thus, PNBs "failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration with the NLRC before
availing of the special civil action for certiorari is a fatal infirmity." In view thereof, the CA erred in
entertaining the Petition for Certiorari filed before it. It follows, therefore, that the proceedings
before it and its assailed Decision are considered null and void. Hence, the final and executory
Decision of the NLRC dated August 31, 2004 stands.
FLORD NICSON CALAWAG v. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VISAYAS, ET AL./
MICAH P. ESPIA, ET AL. v. DR. CARLOS BAYLON, ET AL.
G.R. No. 207412/207542, August 07, 2013
J. Brion

When a party wishes to compel another do a duty expected of the latter, the same
should be through a petition for certiorari and mandamus. However, to be entitled to a writ of
preliminary injunction, the party must establish the following requisites: (a) the invasion of the
right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear
and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage.
Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction presents a fourth
requirement: it is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When the
complainants right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and,
therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is improper.
FACTS:
The petitioners are students of UP Visayas under a scholarship from the Department of
Science and Technology-Philippine Council for Aquatic and Marine Research and Development.
When they were preparing their thesis in the first semester of their second year, the petitioners
sent to Dean Baylon their tentative thesis titles for approval. However, the Dean questioned the
propriety of the thesis topics and subsequently disapproved the petitioners thesis composition.
The petitioners thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), asking it to order Dean Baylon to approve and constitute the petitioners thesis
committees and approve their thesis titles. They also asked that the RTC issue a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against Dean Baylon, and order him to perform such acts while
the suit was pending.
The RTC granted a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which Dean Baylon
allegedly refused to follow. UP Visayas eventually assailed this order before the Court of
Appeals (CA) through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, with prayer for a temporary restraining
order (TRO). The CA issued a TRO against the implementation of the RTCs order, holding that
the petitioners had no clear right to compel Dean Baylon to approve the composition of their
thesis committees as a matter of course. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed an error in judgment in setting aside the preliminary mandatory
injunction that the RTC issued against Dean Baylon.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, the petitioners must establish the
following requisites: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and
substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent
and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Since a preliminary mandatory
injunction commands the performance of an act, it does not preserve the status quo and is thus
more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction. Accordingly, the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction presents a fourth requirement: it is justified only in a clear

case, free from doubt or dispute. When the complainants right is thus doubtful or disputed, he
does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is improper.
The CA did not err in ruling that the petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable
right that needs the protection of a preliminary mandatory injunction. The SC supports the CAs
conclusion that the dean has the discretion to approve or disapprove the composition of a thesis
committee, and, hence, the petitioners had no right for an automatic approval and composition
of their thesis committees.
By necessary implication, the deans power to approve includes the power to disapprove
the composition of a thesis committee. Thus, under the UP Systems faculty manual, the dean
has complete discretion in approving or disapproving the composition of a thesis committee.
Absent any finding of grave abuse of discretion, the Court cannot interfere with the exercise of
the deans prerogative without encroaching on the colleges academic freedom. The courts may
not interfere with their exercise of discretion unless there is a clear showing that they have
arbitrarily and capriciously exercised their judgment.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY
G.R. No. 198010, August 12, 2013
J. Peralta
When a person wishes to correct or change the entries in the Civil Registrar regarding
her name and status, it is required that the indispensable parties must be impleaded in the
proceedings. The Rules of Court mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors:
one given to the persons named in the petition and another given to other persons who are not
named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties.
Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction
but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned
the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.
FACTS:
On March 8, 2004 respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of
Live Birth. Her Certificate of Live Birth shows that her full name is Anita Sy when in fact she is
allegedly known to her family and friends as Norma S. Lugsanay. She further claimed that her
school records, PRC Board of Medicine Certificate and passport bear the name Norma S.
Lugsanay. She also alleged that she is an illegitimate child considering that her parents were
never married, so she had to follow the surname of her mother. She also contended that she is
a Filipino citizen and not Chinese.
Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the corrections on her name and citizenship which
was supposedly granted. However, the National Statistics Office (NSO) records did not bear
such changes.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued an Order finding the petition to be sufficient in
form and substance and set the case for hearing, with the directive that the said Order be
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Gingoog and the Province of
Misamis Oriental at least once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of
respondent, and that the order and petition be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG) and the City Prosecutors Office for their information and guidance. Pursuant to the RTC
Order, respondent complied with the publication requirement.
On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent and directed the City
Civil Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the correction or change of the entries. The Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed in toto the order of the RTC, finding that the respondents failure to
implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the publication of the Order. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition is dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties.
RULING:
The petition is granted.
In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded as
respondent in the petition. This, notwithstanding, the RTC granted her petition and allowed the
correction sought by respondent, which decision was affirmed in toto by the CA.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation
and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings
taken. Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets
of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and
another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be
considered interested or affected parties. Summons must, therefore, be served not for the
purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play
and due process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so
chooses.
Respondents birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese
citizen and a legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the petition, however, she
seeks the correction of her first name and surname, her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate"
and her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus, respondent should have impleaded and
notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who
have interest and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.
Furthermore, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or
changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all
parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other
mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching.

CITY GOVERNMENT OF MAKATI, AS REPRESENTED BY HON. MAYOR JEJOMAR C.

BINAY v. EMERITA B. ODENA

G.R. No. 191661, August 13, 2013

CJ. Sereno
When a party wishes to appeal a decision rendered by the CSC, the CA has jurisdiction
over the case and the proper recourse is a petition for review under Rule 43. The jurisdiction of
the CA over petitions for review under Rule 43 is not limited to judgments and final orders of the
CSC, but can extend to appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions issued by
the latter.
FACTS:
In a case decided by the Supreme Court in 2007 (2007 Decision), the Court ruled that
respondent, a teacher employed by petitioner, had been illegally dismissed and was thus
ordered to be reinstated and paid her backwages, computed from the date of dismissal up to the
date of reinstatement, but in no case to exceed five (5) years. The 2007 Decision, being final
and executor, the CSC then directed the incumbent Mayor of Makati to immediately reinstate
respondent t her former position and cause the payment of all her salaries and other benefits,
as adjudged by the SC
The CSC, upon motion of respondent, directed the incumbent Mayor of Makati to
immediately reinstate respondent to her former position and cause the payment of all her
salaries and other benefits from the date of her removal from service up to her reinstatement
However, this directive was never complied with, which then compelled respondent to instead
opt for an early retirement instead, effective February 13, 2008. Petitioner thereafter paid her
supposed back salaries and other benefits. In line with this, respondent signed in favour of
petitioner a Release, Quitclaim and Waiver.
Respondent alleges that after realizing that she had been shortchanged by petitioner,
she complained to the CSC. She claimed in her Letter-Complaint that the payment made to her,
the amount of which corresponded to five years of service, was insufficient to cover her almost
eight years of suffering. The CSC ruled in favour of respondent
The CSC ruled in favor of respondent, and directed petitioner to pay her backwages and
other benefits from the period of her illegal dismissal until her early retirement, or for a period of
seven (7) years, eight (8) months and twenty-eight (28) days.
The CSC, in its Resolution No. 082264, stated that the 5-year limit was inequitable and
ordered the incumbent City Mayor of Makati to recomputed the full back salaries and other
benefits of respondent. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the CSC denied and the motion
and affirmed the earlier Resolution. In a subsequent Resolution, Resulotion No. 090622, the
CSC stated that res judicata invoked by petitioner must give way to the higher interest of justice.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Rule 43 Petition with the CA, which the appellate court dismissed.
Petitioner then filed before the Supreme Court a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Review on Certiorari (Motion for Extension), praying for an additional period of thirty (30) days
within which to file a petition for review on certiorari, which the Court denied for failure to state
material dates.
In the meantime, on 7 May 2010, petitioner filed the instant Petition.
ISSUE:

Whether petitioner undertook an improper remedy when it filed a Rule 43 Petition with the CA to
question the Resolutions issued by the CSC.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Although the Court ruled that a Rule 43 Petition with the CA is the proper remedy to
assail the CSC resolutions, it however, found that the reasons advanced by petitioner are
correct.
First, the jurisdiction of the CA over petitions for review under Rule 43 is not limited to
judgments and final orders of the CSC, but can extend to appeals from awards, judgments, final
orders or resolutions issued by the latter.
Second, although the general rule is that an order of execution is not appealable, the CA
failed to consider that there are exceptions to this rule, as illustrated in this case.
A writ of execution is a direct command of the court to the sheriff to carry out the mandate of the
writ, which is normally the enforcement of a judgment. By analogy, the CSC Resolutions were
orders of execution and were issued in connection with the implementation of this Courts 2007
Decision. It is obvious from both the body and the dispositive portions of the CSC Resolutions
that they carried instructions to enforce this Courts 2007 Decision, albeit erroneously made.
The directive addressed to petitioner to recompute the amount of full back salaries and
other benefits is derived from the enforcement of this Courts 2007 Decision.
In a similar vein, the dispositive portion of CSC Resolution No. 090622,64 which
dismissed petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the above Resolution, states as follows:
Based on the foregoing, the CA was correct in treating the CSC Resolutions as orders of
execution that were issued in connection with the implementation of this Courts 2007 Decision.
The CA, however erred in dismissing petitioners Rule 43 Petition for being improper.
To recall, the CA ruled that an order of execution is not appealable under Section 1(f), Rule 41of
the Rules of Court. It reasoned that the correct remedy should have been a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65.
Section 1(f), Rule 41provides, in pertinent part:
SECTION 1. Subject of Appeal. An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final
order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by
these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxxx
f) An order of execution;
xxxx

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Indeed, the general rule is that an order of execution is not appealable; otherwise, a
case would never end. The CA, however, failed to consider that there are exceptions to this rule.
This Court in Banaga v. Majaducon enumerated the exceptions as follows:
1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;
2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or
unjust;
xxxx
6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in
substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or
otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority;
In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be
some mode available to the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court. That
mode of elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error or certiorari), or by a special civil action
of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.
MASAYUKI HASEGAWA v. LEILA F. GIRON
G.R. No. 184536, August 14, 2013
J. Perez
A party who files a complaint against another need not show proof that the acts alleged
of happened. It is sufficient that there is probable cause to file such case. The prosecutors
findings on the existence of probable cause are not subject to review by the courts, unless
these are patently shown to have been made with grave abuse of discretion.A finding of
probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged.
FACTS:
On 16 September 2006, respondent filed a Complaint Affidavit for Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention against petitioner and several John Does. Respondent alleged that
sometime on December 2005, she and her officemate, Leonarda Marcos (Marcos) filed a
complaint against their employer Pacific Consultants International, J.F. Cancio & Associates,
Jaime F. Cancio, Tesa Tagalo and petitioner for illegal salary deductions, non-payment of 13th
month pay, and non-remittance of SSS contributions. Respondent averred that since the filing of
said complaint, they have been subjected to threats and verbal abuse by petitioner to pressure
them to withdraw the complaint. Respondent had also filed separate complaints for grave
threats, grave coercion, slander and unjust vexation against petitioner. Said cases are pending
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City.
Petitioner denied the accusation and he stated that he had nothing to do with the
kidnapping; that he was neither the "brains" nor a "participant" in the alleged crimes; that he did
not know the alleged kidnappers; and, that he was not present inside one of the vehicles talking
with one of the abductors at the place alleged by Marcos. Petitioner asserted that respondent

and Marcos are extorting money from him because the instant case was filed right after the
negotiations to settle the civil aspect of the three cases they filed with the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID), National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and MeTC Pasay failed.
In a Resolution dated 5 January 2007, Senior State Prosecutor Emilie Fe M. De Los
Santos dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause.
Respondent filed an appeal from the Resolution of the prosecutor dismissing her
complaint. In her Petition for Review before the DOJ, respondent claimed that the Investigating
Prosecutor gravely erred when she recommended the dismissal of the case against petitioner
despite overwhelming evidence showing the existence of probable cause.
Finding no basis to overturn the findings of the Investigating Prosecutor, then Secretary
of Justice Raul M. Gonzales dismissed the petition. On petition for certiorari before the CA, the
appellate court reversed and set aside the Resolutions of the DOJ and ordered the filing of
Information for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention against petitioner. The Court of
Appeals found that the prosecutor usurped the duties belonging to the court when she
"overstretched her duties and applied the standards, not of ordinary prudence and
cautiousness, nor of mere reasonable belief and probability, but of a full-blown trial on the
merits, where rules on admissibility of testimonies and other evidence strictly apply." Hence, the
instant petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA committed grievous error in reversing the finding of the Secretary of
justice that no probable cause exists in the instant case.
2. Whether the CA committed grievous error in granting respondents petition for certiorari
despite raising questions of fact and being unmeritorious.
3. Whether the CA committed grievous error in ruling that respondents petition for
certiorari is the proper mode of appeal from judgments of the Secretary of Justice.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
The elementary rule is that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the resolution
issued by the DOJ through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the
ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction. The grant by the Court of Appeals of the certiorari petition is a
determination that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal complaint for kidnapping and serious illegal detention for
lack of probable cause.
The decision of whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint against the accused
depends on the sound discretion of the prosecutor. Hence, the courts will not interfere with the
conduct of preliminary investigations, or reinvestigations, or in the determination of what
constitutes sufficient probable cause for the filing of the corresponding information against an
offender. The prosecutors findings on the existence of probable cause are not subject to review
by the courts, unless these are patently shown to have been made with grave abuse of

discretion. In this present case, there is a need for judicial review and the Court sustains the
CAs reversal of the ruling of the Secretary of the DOJ.
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is a
reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded on such a state of
facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to
believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean
"actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether
there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
It must be mentioned, though, that in order to arrive at probable cause, the elements of
the crime charged should be present. In this case, all elements were sufficiently averred in the
complaint-affidavit were sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime may have been
committed and petitioner may have committed it. Respondent, an office worker, claimed that
she and her friend were taken at gunpoint by two men and forcibly boarded into a vehicle. They
were detained for more than 24-hours. Whether or not the accusations would result in a
conviction is another matter. It is enough, for purposes of the preliminary investigation that the
acts complained of constitute the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
The Investigating Prosecutor has set the parameters of probable cause too high. Her
findings dealt mostly with what respondent had done or failed to do after the alleged crime was
committed. She delved into evidentiary matters that could only be passed upon in a full-blown
trial where testimonies and documents could be fairly evaluated in according with the rules of
evidence. Thus, the CA correctly held that when the DOJ ruled that there is no probable cause
to indict petitioner, it already amounted to grave abuse of discretion on the latters part. Hence,
resort by respondent to the extraordinary writ of certiorari and the grant thereof by the CA is
correct.
PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 155943, August 19, 2013
CJ. Sereno
When there is a similarity of parties, subject matter and cause of action and that
judgments were issued on the merits, a subsequent filing of an action involving the same
elements are barred by the prior judgment. However, the identity of causes of action does not
mean absolute identity. The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to
ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in
the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would
sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar
to the subsequent action.
FACTS:
Spouses Lopez and Spouses Ng acquired a 185,317 sq.m. property located in Almanza,
Las Pias City, from a certain Philip Dumbrique on 7 February 1977. Thereafter, the latters
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-50432 was cancelled. On 6 January 1978, TCT No.
61176 was issued in the name of Sps. Lopez, and TCT No. 61177 in the name of Sps. Ng.

May 1978after the property had been transferred to and registered in the names of
Sps. Ng and Sps. Lopeza claim adverse to theirs and Dumbriques cropped up. Lilia MayugaFusilero filed a Complaint against them with the Court of First Instance (Fusilero Case). The CFI
ruled in favor of the Lopezes and the Ngs. The CA affirmed the CFIs Decision. She appealed to
the Supreme Court, but her appeal was also denied.
Eventually, Sps. Lopez sold their property to respondent Sps. Martel, resulting in the
cancellation of the formers title and the issuance of TCT No. T-57471 in the latters names.
While the Fusilero case was pending, Enrique, Narciso, Reuben, Mario, Teodorica,
Beatriz, Ricardo, and Rolando all surnamed Factor executed a Deed of Sale of
Unregistered Lands dated 21 January 1975 in favor of petitioner. After the purchase of the
property, petitioner enclosed it with a fence made of cement hollow blocks. It subdivided and
developed the property into what is now known as "Pilar Village."
On 9 December 1975, the Factors filed an Application for Registration and Confirmation
of Title to Parcels of Land with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal (Case 1). The CFI in
Case 1 rendered its Decision declaring the Factors as the rightful owners of the subject
property. Consequently, it ordered the issuance of the decrees of registration and the
corresponding certificates of title. In compliance with the Order, TCTs in the names of the
Factors were issued on 13 December 1994.
After the issuance of their TCTs, respondents filed a Petition to Reopen, Review, and Set
Aside the Decision of the CFI in Case 1. The RTC issued its Decision granting respondents
Petition to Reopen. It set aside its earlier Decision awarding the property to the Factors and
ordered the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificates of title in
respondents favour. Neither of the parties appealed the RTC Decision.
Instead of appealing the Decision of the RTC, the Factors filed anew a Complaint for
Annulment of Title (Case 2), alleging that TCT Nos. 61176 and 61177 were spurious and could
not be used as basis for any claim of title. The Sps. Lopez and Sps. Ng filed a Motion to Dismiss
Case 2, alleging that the cause of action of the Factors was barred by prior judgment and res
judicata.
The RTC in Case 2 issued an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss. The CA affirmed the
RTC Decision and dismissed the appeal of the Factors.
The Factors then filed a Petition for Review with the Court, where the case was
docketed as G.R. No. 132334. At the same time, petitioner filed with the RTC of Las Pias City,
on 15 July 1997, a Complaint for Quieting of Title and Declaration of Nullity of respondents title
(Case 3).
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Quieting of Title which the RTC
granted.
As to the Petition for Review filed by the Factors in Case 2, it was denied.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA erred in holding that the equitable principle of laches cannot be applied
against respondents, who are holders of a Certificate of Title.

2. Whether the CA erroneously applied the principle of stare decisis and the rule on res
judicata.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
The facts of this case clearly show that petitioners cause of action is already barred by
the prior judgments of the RTC in its Decision dated 8 December 1994 in Case 1 and of this
Court in Case 2.
If an action has been dismissed and the order of dismissal has become final, a prior
judgment bars the institution of another action involving the same parties, subject matter, and
cause of action as in the earlier case. The fundamental principle behind the doctrine of res
judicata is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once. That
is, when a right or a fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the courtso long
as it remains unreversed should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them
in law or estate.
In order that there may be res judicata, it is requisite (a) that the former judgment is final;
(b) that it has been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) that it is a judgment on the
merits; and (d) that, between the first and the second actions, there is identity of parties,
subject-matter, and cause of action.
The Decisions of the RTC in Case 1 and of this Court in Case 2 both of which ruled
that respondents are the rightful owners of the property in questionhave all become final and
unappealable. In Case 2, this Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties;
the judgments were issued on the merits; and there was a similarity of parties, subject matter,
and cause of action. The question of who has a better right to the property was already resolved
by the RTC when it granted respondents Petition to set aside the CFIs Decision granting the
Factors Application for Registration and Confirmation of Title. Since neither of the parties
appealed from this RTC Decision, it became final and unappealable. Hence, this Court ruled in
Case 2 that the CA correctly affirmed the trial courts Decision to grant respondents Motion to
Dismiss. The cause of action of the Factors in their Complaint for Annulment of Title was, even
then, already barred by the prior judgment in Case 1.
Concomitantly, the issue of whether or not TCT Nos. 61176 and 61177 are valid titles
has already been resolved in Case 1 and subsequently in Case 2. Both cases already involved
the Factors and the predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioner and respondents. The subject
matter in the foregoing cases is the same property that is the subject of the instant Petition.
Lastly, the prayers in both cases are the same. It must be kept in mind that the principle of res
judicata does not require absolute but only substantial identity of parties, subject matter, and
issues.
We rule that there is identity of causes of action, the test for which is to look into the
facts or evidence necessary to maintain the two actions, to wit:

Hornbook is the rule that identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity.
Otherwise, a party could easily escape the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the
action or the relief sought. The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to
ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in
the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would
sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar
to the subsequent action.
HADJI PANGSAYAN T. ABDULRAHMAN v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FOR
MINDANAO AND GUIAMALUDIN A. SENDAD
G.R. No. 175977, August 19, 2013
CJ. Sereno
When there is a failure on the party to comply with Section 5, Rule 65, which is to
implead other persons in the case, it is not a ground to have the case dismissed. It is stated in
Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, states that neither the misjoinder nor the non-joinder of
parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action.
FACTS:
Petitioner was a Land Management Inspector of the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Kalamansig, Sultan Kudarat. In a letter dated 29 August
1990 addressed to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), private respondent reported the
alleged illegal activities of petitioner and Guialil Sayutin (Sayutin), a CENRO employee also.
Petitioner solicited from him the total amount of PP5,450 as consideration for the titling
in private respondents name of lands located in South Upi, Maguindanao, and covered by the
homestead applications of Unos Pacutin and Ting Midtimbang. On the other hand, Sayutin
received documents belonging to private respondent from Ellen Alcoriza (Alcoriza), records
officer of CENRO Salimbao, Sultan Kudarat, without authority therefor. Sayutin later lost the
aforesaid documents.
The letter-complaint found its way to the Ombudsman. Instead of submitting a counteraffidavit in compliance, petitioner filed a Manifestation stating that the private respondent had
already executed an Affidavit of Desistance. In that affidavit, private respondent indicated that
he had forgiven petitioner after the latter produced the missing documents and returned the
money solicited together with incidental expenses. Thus, petitioner prayed that he be dropped
as respondent in the complaint.
However, the Ombudsman still recommended the dismissal of petitioner, Sayutin, and
Alcoriza from service. It found Sayutin and Alcoriza guilty of gross neglect of duty and petitioner
of grave misconduct. As regards the Manifestation and the attached Affidavit of Desistance filed
by petitioner, the Ombudsman ruled that these documents failed to controvert and, in fact,
admitted the material allegations of the complaint.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Ombudsman denied. Petitioner
then filed a Motion for New Trial or Second Motion for Reconsideration which the Ombudsman
also denied for being a second motion for reconsideration.
Under the mistaken notion that petitioners Motion for New Trial or Second Motion for
Reconsideration had yet to be resolved by the Ombudsman, the new DENR Region XII RED

ordered the retention of petitioner in the latters position pending the resolution of the second
motion for reconsideration.
CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit and the Decision attained finality. The
Ombudsman then directed DENR XII RED officer-in-charge to implement the dismissal from the
service of petitioner and to show proof of compliance within 10 days from receipt.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a Status Quo
Order before the CA, alleging that the Ombudsman had issued the Order of Implementation with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner also questioned the Order
of Implementation for being a direct order to dismiss. On 21 July 2005, the CA issued the first
assailed Resolution dismissing the petition for the following reasons: (1) failure to implead
private respondent; and (2) failure to attach copies of the pleadings and documents relevant to
the petition. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 17 August 2005. The CA issued
the second assailed Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
The CA also found additional grounds to dismiss the appeal. Petitioner did not file a
motion for reconsideration of the Order of Implementation. Thus, his petition was rendered
dismissible for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The CA likewise ruled that there are three essential dates that must be indicated in a
petition for certiorari: (1) when judgment or final order was received; (2) when the motion for
reconsideration was filed; and (3) when notice of denial thereof was received.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Rules of Court should be given liberal construction, especially when there
are substantial issues to be resolved.
2. Whether the CA misapprehended facts by concluding that petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
The acceptance of a petition for certiorari, and necessarily the grant of due course
thereto, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Thus, the court may reject and
dismiss a petition for certiorari (1) when there is no showing of grave abuse of discretion by any
court, agency, or branch of the government; or (2) when there are procedural errors, such as
violations of the Rules of Court or Supreme Court circulars.
In this case, the CA dismissed petitioners special civil action for certiorari because of procedural
errors, namely: (1) failure to implead private respondent; (2) failure to attach copies of the
pleadings and documents relevant to the petition; (3) failure to file a motion for reconsideration
of the Order of Implementation; and, consequently, (4) failure to allege material dates in the
petition.
Petitioner argues that the rules of procedure should be liberally construed when
substantial issues need to be resolved. Indeed, the rules of procedure need not always be
applied in a strict, technical sense, since they were adopted to help secure and not override
substantial justice. "In clearly meritorious cases, the higher demands of substantial justice must

transcend rigid observance of procedural rules." As in this case, the petition is meritorious even
though the CA was correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari in the light of the failure of
petitioner to submit material documents.
Failure to implead private respondent
In this case, it was an error for the CA to dismiss the petition for failure to comply with
Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Section 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. When the petition filed relates to
the acts or omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person, the petitioner shall join, as private respondent or respondents with such public
respondent or respondents, the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in
the court; and it shall be the duty of such private respondents to appear and defend, both in his
or their own behalf and in behalf of the public respondent or respondents affected by the
proceedings, and the costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be
against the private respondents only, and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency,
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as public respondent or respondents.
Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, states that neither the misjoinder nor the nonjoinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. If it was truly necessary to implead
Guiamaludin Sendad, what the CA should have done was to order petitioner to add him as
private respondent to the case.
Failure to file a motion for reconsideration
The CA stood ready to excuse the failure of petitioner to attach copies of the pleadings
and documents relevant to the petition, since his omission could be remedied by requiring him
to submit additional requirements necessary for the resolution of the petition. However, the CA
could not excuse his failure to move for reconsideration of the issuance of the Order of
Implementation prior to the filing of the petition for certiorari before it. On the other hand,
petitioner insists that he has filed a motion for reconsideration not once, but twice.
The CA is correct on this point. It is clear that upon receipt of a copy of the Order of
Implementation dated 31 March 2004, petitioner immediately filed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the CA three days later. The motions for reconsideration that petitioner
referred to were filed by him in connection with the Resolution dated 14 March 1995
recommending his dismissal from service. There are well-settled exceptions to the general rule
that a motion for reconsideration is a condition precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. However, none of them finds application in this case.
ROSENDO R. CORALES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MUNICPAL MAYOR OF NAGCARLAN,
LAGUNA AND DR. RODOLFO R. ANGELES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MUNICIPAL
ADMINISTRATOR OF NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 186613, August 27, 2013
J. Perez
Settled is the rule that for the courts to exercise the power of judicial review, the
following must be extant: (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and (3) the person challenging must have
the "standing." Hence, when a case is still ripe or premature, a party cannot pre-empt by
prematurely seeking judicial intervention, like filing an action for prohibition.

FACTS:
Petitioner Corales was the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Nagcarlan, Laguna for three
(3) consecutive terms, i.e., the 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections. In his first term as local chief
executive, petitioner Corales appointed petitioner Dr. Angeles to the position of Municipal
Administrator, whose appointment was unanimously approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sangguniang Bayan) per Resolution No. 98-64 dated 22 July 1998. During
his second and third terms as municipal mayor, petitioner Corales renewed the appointment of
petitioner Dr. Angeles.
Following an audit on various local disbursements, Maximo Andal (Andal), the Provincial
State Auditor of Laguna, issued an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2006-007100 dated 6 October 2006 addressed to petitioner Corales who was asked to comment/reply.
The aforesaid AOM, in sum, states that: 1) petitioner Dr. Angeles appointment as Municipal
Administrator (during the second and third terms of petitioner Corales) was without legal basis
for having been repeatedly denied confirmation by the Sangguniang Bayan; 2) petitioner Dr.
Angeles can be considered, however, as a de facto officer entitled to the emoluments of the
office for the actual services rendered; 3) nonetheless, it is not the Municipality of Nagcarlan
that should be made liable to pay for petitioner Dr. Angeles salary.
Instead of submitting his comment/reply thereon, petitioner Corales, together with
petitioner Dr. Angeles, opted to file a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus against Andal and
the then members of the Sangguniang Bayan before the RTC of San Pablo City, Laguna.
In its turn, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on Andals behalf, who was
impleaded in his official capacity, filed a Motion to Dismiss petitioners Petition for Prohibition
and Mandamus grounded on lack of cause of action, prematurity and non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies. In its Order dated 17 May 2007, the trial court denied the said Motion
to Dismiss on the ground that Andal was merely a nominal party. Respondent Republic, as
represented by COA, as represented by Andal, consequently filed a Petition for Certiorari with
the Court of Appeals ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the Orders dated 17 May 2007 and 5
September 2007, as it unjustly denied respondents right to actively prosecute the case through
a mere declaration that it was a nominal party despite a clear showing that the Petition for
Prohibition referred to the respondent as a real party in interest.
On 15 September 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision
granting respondents Petition for Certiorari, thereby annulling and setting aside the RTC Orders
dated 17 May 2007 and 5 September 2007 and, accordingly, dismissing petitioners Petition for
Prohibition with the court a quo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a palpably erroneous resolution of a substantial
question of law when it ordered the dismissal of petitioners suit for prohibition.
RULING:
The petition is dismissed.

It is beyond doubt that the issuance of an AOM is, indeed, an initial step in the conduct
of an investigative audit considering that after its issuance there are still several steps to be
conducted before a final conclusion can be made or before the proper action can be had against
the Auditee. There is, therefore, no basis for petitioner Corales claim that his comment thereon
would be a mere formality. Further, even though the AOM issued to petitioner Corales already
contained a recommendation for the issuance of a Notice of Disallowance, still, it cannot be
argued that his comment/reply to the AOM would be a futile act since no Notice of Disallowance
was yet issued. Again, the records are bereft of any evidence showing that Andal has already
taken any affirmative action against petitioner Corales after the issuance of the AOM.
The Supreme Court can hardly see any actual case or controversy to warrant the
exercise of its power of judicial review. Settled is the rule that for the courts to exercise the
power of judicial review, the following must be extant: (1) there must be an actual case calling
for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and (3) the
person challenging must have the "standing." An actual case or controversy involves a conflict
of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a mere hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a
contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence. Closely related thereto is that the question must be ripe for adjudication. A
question is considered ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. The third requisite is legal standing or locus
standi, which has been defined as a personal or substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance. The gist of the question of standing is
whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Unless a person is injuriously
affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no
standing.
The requisites of actual case and ripeness are absent in the present case. Hence, it is
beyond question that in relation to his audit investigation function, Andal can validly and legally
require petitioners to submit comment/reply to the AOM, which the latter cannot pre-empt by
prematurely seeking judicial intervention, like filing an action for prohibition.
Moreover, prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek a judgment ordering the
defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal, may
only be resorted to when there is "no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law."
In this case, petitioners insist that it is no longer necessary to exhaust administrative
remedies considering that there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and appropriate
remedial measure to assail the imposition under the AOM aside from an action for prohibition.
This Court finds the said contention plain self-deception.
As previously stated, petitioners action for prohibition was premature. The audit
investigative process was still in its initial phase. There was yet no Notice of Disallowance
issued. And, even granting that the AOM issued to petitioner Corales is already equivalent to an
order, decision or resolution of the Auditor or that such AOM is already tantamount to a directive
for petitioner Corales to reimburse the salaries paid to petitioner Dr. Angeles, still, the action for
prohibition is premature since there are still many administrative remedies available to

petitioners to contest the said AOM. Section 1, Rule V of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure
of the COA, provides: "[a]n aggrieved party may appeal from an order or decision or ruling
rendered by the Auditor embodied in a report, memorandum, letter, notice of disallowances and
charges, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, to the Director who has jurisdiction over the
agency under audit." From the final order or decision of the Director, an aggrieved party may
appeal to the Commission proper. It is the decision or resolution of the Commission proper
which can be appealed to this Court.
MARICRIS D. DOLOT, CHAIRMAN OF THE BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYANSORSOGON v. HON. RAMON PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, ET AL.
G.R. No. 199199, August 27, 2013
J. Reyes
A party who, after complying with the requirements laid down by law, files a petition for
continuing mandamus may institute the same with the RTC having jurisdiction of the place in
controversy. Jurisdiction, which is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a
case, is conferred by law. It may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter,
over the person of the defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings. A special civil
action for continuing mandamus shall be filed with the RTC exercising jurisdiction over the
territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred.
FACTS:
On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the parish
priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog
(petitioners), filed a petition for continuing mandamus, damages and attorneys fees with the
RTC of Sorsogon.
The petition contained the following pertinent allegations: (1) sometime in 2009, they
protested the iron ore mining operations being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global
Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco,
located in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail; (2) Matnog is located in the southern tip of
Luzon and there is a need to protect, preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the
municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides, and confronted with the
environmental dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground settlement, ground subsidence and
landslide hazard; (4) after investigation, they learned that the mining operators did not have the
required permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee
issued to the operators a small-scale mining permit, which they did not have authority to issue;
(6) the representatives of the Presidential Management Staff and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not do anything to protect
the interest of the people of Matnog; and (7) the respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7076 or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act
of 1995, and the Local Government Code. Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs: (1) the
issuance of a writ commanding the respondents to immediately stop the mining operations in
the Municipality of Matnog; (2) the issuance of a temporary environment protection order or
TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-agency group to undertake the rehabilitation of the mining
site; (4) award of damages; and (5) return of the iron ore, among others.
The case was summarily dismissed by the RTC Branch 53 (designated environmental
court) for lack of jurisdiction.

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Aside from sustaining
the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, the RTCfurther ruled that: (1) there was no final
court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a
condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely
filed as the petitioners therein failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; and (3) they also
failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or
appropriate agency, as required by the rules.
Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve the case.
2. Whether the petition is dismissible on the grounds that:
a. there is no final court decree, order or decision that the public officials allegedly
failed to act on;
b. the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies;
c. petitioners failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to
the government or appropriate agency.
RULING:
The petition is granted.
The RTC has the jurisdiction to resolve the environmental case.
When the RTC dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, it replied on SC A.O. No. 7
which defined the territorial areas of RTC in Regions 1 to 12 and Admin. Ciruclar No. 23-208
which designated environmental courts to try and decide violations of environmental laws
committin within their respective territorial jurisdictions. The Court ruled that its territorial
jurisdiction was limited within the boundaries of Sorsogon City and the neighboring
municipalities of Donsol, Pilar, Castilla, Casiguran and Juban and that it was "bereft of
jurisdiction to entertain, hear and decide [the] case, as such authority rests before another coequal court." This reasoning was found by the Court to be erroneous.
The RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and
confine itself within its four corners in determining whether it had jurisdiction over the action filed
by the petitioners. None is more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the power
and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred by law. It may either be
over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over
the issues framed in the pleadings.
By virtue of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in the
RTC while A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 merely provide for the venue where an
action may be filed.
The RTC need not be reminded that venue relates only to the place of trial or the
geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be brought and does not equate
to the jurisdiction of the court. It is intended to accord convenience to the parties, as it relates to

the place of trial, and does not restrict their access to the courts. Consequently, the RTCs motu
proprio dismissal of Civil Case No. 2011-8338 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is patently
incorrect. At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the RTC of
Sorsogon was that of improper venue. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (Rules) specifically states that a special civil action for continuing
mandamus shall be filed with the "[RTC] exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the
actionable neglect or omission occurred x x x."
The petition is not dismissible on the ground that there is no final court decree, order or
decision.
The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to
compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law." The petition should mainly
involve an environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or a right therein. The RTCs
mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is apparently based on the
definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:
(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing
any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of
acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied.
The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually
pertains to the judgment or decree that a court would eventually render in an environmental
case for continuing mandamus and which judgment or decree shall subsequently become final.
Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8, Section 7
and such judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the case to
ensure that the government agency concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law and
to monitor the effective performance of said tasks. It is only upon full satisfaction of the final
judgment, order or decision that a final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the
court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be
entered in the court docket. A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of
continuing compliance with a final judgment as it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after
judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the
courts decision."
The petition is not dismissible on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
The Court, likewise, cannot sustain the argument that the petitioners should have first
filed a case with the Panel of Arbitrators (Panel), which has jurisdiction over mining disputes
under R.A. No. 7942. The petition filed below does not involve a mining dispute. What was
being protested are the alleged negative environmental impact of the small-scale mining
operation; the authority of the Governor of Sorsogon to issue mining permits in favor of these
entities; and the perceived indifference of the DENR and local government officials over the
issue. Resolution of these matters does not entail the technical knowledge and expertise of the
members of the Panel but requires an exercise of judicial function. Consequently, resort to the
Panel would be completely useless and unnecessary.
The petition is not dismissible for failure to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of
the complaint to the government or appropriate agency.

The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to
attach judicial affidavits. Rule 8 only requires that the petition should be verified, contain
supporting evidence and must be accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.
There is nothing in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of judicial affidavits, albeit not prohibited. It
is only if the evidence of the petitioner would consist of testimony of witnesses that it would be
the time that judicial affidavits (affidavits of witnesses in the question and answer form) must be
attached to the petition/complaint. Finally, failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the
respondents is not a fatal defect such that the case should be dismissed.

ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. SUMITOMO

CORPORATION / SUMITOMO CORPORATION v. ASIA CONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 196723/G.R. No. 196728, August 28, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
When a party files another petition while one that is identical to it is pending before
another tribunal, there constitutes a ground for forum shopping since the relief sought is the
same. Forum shopping is treated as an act of malpractice and, in this accord, constitutes a
ground for the summary dismissal of the actions involved. To be sure, the rule against forum
shopping seeks to prevent the vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party who
asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and grant the same or substantially
the same reliefs and in the process creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered by the different fora upon the same issues.
FACTS:
On March 15, 1996, Asian Construction entered into a Civil Work Agreement
(Agreement) with Sumitomo for the construction of a portion of the Light Rail Transit System
along the Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue, specifically, from Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong City
to Taft Avenue, Pasay City for a total cost of US$19,982,000.00 (Project). The said Agreement
provides that the "validity, interpretation, enforceability, and performance of the same shall be
governed by and construed in accordance with the law of the State of New York, U.S.A. (New
York State Law), without regard to, or legal effect of, the conflicts of law provisions thereof" and
that any dispute, controversy or claim arising therefrom "shall be solely and finally settled by
arbitration."
In May 1996, Sumitomo paid Asian Construction the amount of US$2,997,300.00 as
advance payment to be recovered in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. Later, an
additional advance payment of US$1,998,200.00 was made in October 1997. In all, Asian
Construction received from Sumitomo the amount of US$9,731,606.62, inclusive of the advance
payments (before withholding tax of US$97,308.44).
On September 1, 1998, Sumitomo informed Asian Construction that it was terminating
the Agreement effective September 5, 1998. Sumitomo then requested Asian Construction to
"make the necessary arrangements for the proper turnover of the Project. Asian Construction,
however, claimed that some claims were still left unpaid, hence, it sent Sumitomo a letter

demanding payment of the total amount of US$6,371,530.89. This was followed by several
correspondences between the parties through 1999 to 2007 but no settlement was achieved.
Asian Construction filed a complaint with the CIAC seeking payment for its alleged
losses and reimbursements. Sumitomo filed a Motion to Dismiss, questioning the CIACs
jurisdiction over the dispute on the ground that the arbitration should proceed in accordance
with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of Japan. The motion was denied. The Arbitral Tribunal
rendered the Partial Award which affirmed its jurisdiction over the dispute but held that the
parties were bound by their Agreement that the substantive New York State Law shall apply in
the resolution of the issues. It proceeded to dismiss both the claims and counterclaims of the
parties on the ground that these had already prescribed under New York State Laws six-year
statute of limitations and ruled that, in any case, were it to resolve the same on the merits, "it
would not produce an affirmative recovery for the claimant."
Aggrieved, Asian Construction filed before the CA, a Rule 43 Petition for Review (First
CA Petition), seeking the reversal of the Partial Award.
Meanwhile, notwithstanding its dismissal of the claims and counterclaims, the Arbitral
Tribunal further directed the parties to itemize their respective claims for costs and attorneys
fees and to submit factual proof and legal bases for their entitlement thereto.
On March 17, 2010, the Arbitral Tribunal rendered the Final Award which granted
Sumitomos claim for attorneys fees in the amount of US$200,000.00.
Dissatisfied with the Arbitral Tribunals ruling, Asian Construction filed another Rule 43
Petition for Review before the CA. The CA rendered a Resolution (July 23, 2010 Resolution),
dismissing Asian Constructions First CA Petition against the Partial Award on the ground of
forum-shopping. Meanwhile, the CA gave due course to Asian Constructions Second CA
Petition assailing the Final Award and rendered a Decision on January 26, 2011, upholding the
Arbitral Tribunals ruling except the award of attorneys fees in favor of Sumitomo.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing Asian Constructions First CA Petition on the ground of
forum shopping.
RULING:
The petitions are denied.
Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the
same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially
the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court, to
increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. More
particularly, forum shopping can be committed in three ways, namely: (a) by filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having
been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (b) by filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case having been
finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (c) by filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action,
where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).

Forum shopping is treated as an act of malpractice and, in this accord, constitutes a

ground for the summary dismissal of the actions involved. To be sure, the rule against forum
shopping seeks to prevent the vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party who
asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and grant the same or substantially
the same reliefs and in the process creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered by the different fora upon the same issues.
In this case, the Court finds that the CA committed no reversible error in dismissing
Asian Constructions First CA Petition on the ground of forum shopping since the relief sought
(i.e., the reconsideration of the Partial Award) and the allegations stated therein are identical to
its opposition to Sumitomos claim for costs filed before the Arbitral Tribunal while CIAC Case
No. 28-2008 was still pending. These circumstances clearly square with the first kind of forum
shopping which thereby impels the dismissal of the First CA Petition on the ground of litis
pendentia.
MARIA LOURDES D. CASTELLS AND SHALIMAR CENTI-MANDANAS v. SAUDI ARABIAN
AIRLINES
G.R. No. 188514, August 28, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
When a party files a motion for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari, the court
should not admit the same due to non-compliance with the reglementary period prescribed by
the court. It is well-settled that procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due
regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening
problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. From time
to time, however, the Court has recognized exceptions to the strict application of such rules,
but only for the most compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules would defeat
rather than serve the ends of justice. However, despite the rigid wording of Section 4, Rule
65 of the Rules, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, which now disallows an extension
of the 60-day reglementary period to file a petition for certiorari, courts may nevertheless
extend the same, subject to its sound discretion.
FACTS:
Petitioners were two of the 10 flight attendants of the respondent Saudi Arabian Airlines
(SAUDIA) who were transferred from Manila to Jeddah due to operational requirements
(transfer order). However, after complying with the transfer order, both petitioners were told that
their contract would no longer be renewed and that they were asked to resign. Petitioners, along
with a co-flight attendant, Maria Joy Teresa O. Bilbao, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against SAUDIA. They alleged that they were dismissed because of their old age, being 39 to
40 years old at the time.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) held SAUDIA guilty of illegal dismissal. It further held that the
subject undertaking, which was akin to a quitclaim, did not bar petitioners and Bilbao from filing
a case against SAUDIA. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed and set
aside the LAs ruling and thereby dismissed the illegal dismissal complaint.
The petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Motion for Extension to File a
Petition for Certiorari, praying that they be given a period of 15 days from January 18, 2008,
or until February 2, 2008, within which to file the subject petition. The said motion was

granted. Since February 2, 2008 was a Saturday, petitioners filed the subject petition on the
next working day, or on February 4, 2008, and the CA admitted the same.
SAUDIA then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, primarily contending that A.M. No.
07-7-12-SC, which took effect on December 27, 2007, no longer allowed the filing of an
extension of time to file a petition for certiorari, thus, the CA should not have admitted the
subject petition. The CA then reconsidered its earlier resolution and granted SAUDIAs
motion. It deemed the subject petition not admitted due to petitioners non-compliance with the
reglementary period prescribed by Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules), as
amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly refused admission of the subject petition.
RULING:
The petition is granted.
It is well-settled that procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due
regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening
problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. From time
to time, however, the Court has recognized exceptions to the strict application of such rules,
but only for the most compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules would defeat
rather than serve the ends of justice. These exceptions, as enumerated in the case of Labao
v. Flores, are as follows:
x x x (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a
litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by
immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default;
(4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of
the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of
the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing
that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence without appellants fault; (10) peculiar legal and
equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of
substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved;
and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the
attendant circumstances. x x x
In view of the foregoing, despite the rigid wording of Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules,
as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC - which now disallows an extension of the 60-day
reglementary period to file a petition for certiorari - courts may nevertheless extend the same,
subject to its sound discretion.
In this case, the CA had already exercised its sound discretion in granting the extension
to file the subject petition thru its Resolution. Consequently, it could not renege on such grant by
rendering another issuance almost seven months later which resulted in the refusal to admit the

same petition. Such course of action is clearly antithetical to the tenets of fair play, not to
mention the undue prejudice to petitioners' rights. Verily, the more appropriate course of action
would have been to admit the subject petition and resolve the case on the merits. Thus, in order
to rectify this lapse, the Court deems it prudent to have the case remanded to the CA for its
proper resolution.
VIRGINIA M. VENZON v. RURAL BANK OF BUENAVISTA, INC., represented by Lourdesita
E. Parajes
G.R. No. 178031, August 28, 2013
J. Del Castillo
When a trial court dismissed a case involving a rural bank, the same must be treated as
a dismissal with the character of finality. That being a final decision, the proper recourse that
petitioner should have availed of is the remedy under Rule 41, which is appeal, and not Rule
65.
FACTS:
On January 28, 2005, petitioner Virginia M. Venzon filed before the RTC of Butuan City a
Petition to nullify foreclosure proceedings and Tax Declaration Nos. 96-GR-06-003-7002-R and
96-GR-06-7003-R issued in the name of respondent Rural Bank of Buenavista (Agusan del
Norte), Inc.
Petitioner alleged that in 1983, she and her late souse obtained a P5,000.00 loan from
respondent against a mortgage on their house and lot, covered by Tax Declarations Nos. 28289
and 42710 issued in their names, which were later on replaced with Tax Declaration Nos. 96
GR-06-003-2884-R and 96 GR-06-003-2885-R; that she was able to payP2,300.00, thus leaving
an outstanding balance of only P2,370.00; that sometime in March 1987, she offered to pay the
said balance in full, but the latter refused to accept payment, and instead shoved petitioner
away from the bank premises; that in March 1987, respondent foreclosed on the mortgage, and
the property was sold at auction for P6,472.76 to respondent, being the highest bidder; that the
foreclosure proceedings are null and void for lack of notice and publication of the sale, lack of
sheriffs final deed of sale and notice of redemption period; and that she paid
respondent P6,000.00 on October 9, 1995, as evidenced by respondents Official Receipt No.
4108486 issued on October 9, 1995.
The RTC dismissed the case, finding that the petitioner failed to consider that the other party is
a Rural Bank and therefore, it is exempt from the requirement of publication. Hence, the
foreclosure is proper without publication. The CA also dismissed the petition for certiorari,
finding that the petitioners remedy should have been an appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court since the assailed Resolution is a final order of dismissal. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA reversibly erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari thereby preventing the
court from finding out that actually no extrajudicial foreclosure was conducted by the office of
the provincial sheriff on petitioners property at the instance of the private respondent.
RULING:
The petition is denied.

The Court finds no error in the CAs treatment of the Petition for Certiorari. The trial
courts July 13, 2006 Resolution dismissing the case was indeed to be treated as a final order,
disposing of the issue of publication and notice of the foreclosure sale which is the very core
of petitioners cause of action in Civil Case No. 5535 and declaring the same to be
unnecessary pursuant to the Rural Banks Act, as petitioners outstanding obligation did not
exceed P10,000.00, and thus leaving petitioner without basis to maintain her case. This
constitutes a dismissal with the character of finality. As such, petitioner should have availed of
the remedy under Rule 41, and not Rule 65.
The Court is not prepared to be lenient in petitioners case, either. Civil Case No. 5535
was instituted only in 2005, while the questioned foreclosure proceedings took place way back
in 1987. Petitioners long inaction and commission of a procedural faux pas certainly cannot
earn the sympathy of the Court.
Nor can the Court grant the Petition on the mere allegation that no foreclosure
proceedings ever took place. The February 2, 2005 Certification issued by the Office of the
Clerk of Court of Butuan City to the effect that the record of the foreclosure proceedings could
not be found is not sufficient ground to invalidate the proceedings taken. Petitioner herself
attached the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale as Annex "A" of her Petition in Civil Case No. 5535; this
should belie the claim that no record exists covering the foreclosure proceedings. Besides, if
petitioner insists that no foreclosure proceedings took place, then she should not have filed an
action to annul the same since there was no foreclosure to begin with. She should have filed a
different action.
However, petitioner is entitled to a return of the P6,000.00 she paid to respondent in 1995.
While this may not be validly considered as a redemption of her property as the payment was
made long after the redemption period expired, respondent had no right to receive the amount.
Interestingly, respondent did not deny being the issuer of Official Receipt No. 410848.
Instead, it averred that petitioners payment to it of P6,000.00 was false and self-serving, but in
the same breath argued that, without necessarily admitting that payment of P6,000.00 was
made, the same cannot be considered as redemption price. By making such an ambiguous
allegation in its Answer with Counterclaims, respondent is deemed to have admitted receiving
the amount of P6,000.00 from petitioner as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 410848, which
amount under the circumstances it had no right to receive. "If an allegation is not specifically
denied or the denial is a negative pregnant, the allegation is deemed admitted." "Where a fact is
alleged with some qualifying or modifying language, and the denial is conjunctive, a negative
pregnant exists, and only the qualification or modification is denied, while the fact itself is
admitted." "A denial in the form of a negative pregnant is an ambiguous pleading, since it cannot
be ascertained whether it is the fact or only the qualification that is intended to be denied."
"Profession of ignorance about a fact which is patently and necessarily within the pleader's
knowledge, or means of knowing as ineffectual, is no denial at all."
ARACELI J. CABRERA v. ANGELO G. FRANCISCO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 172293, August 28, 2013
J. Del Castillo
When the petitioners allege that the main purpose of their complaint is for collection of
Agents Compensation, Commission and Damages, it is nonetheless principally for the
collection of a sum of money representing the same and is thus not capable of pecuniary
estimation. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of

pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim
is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts or in the Courts of First Instance would depend on the amount of the claim.
FACTS:
On October 25, 1976, respondents father, Atty. Gella executed a private document
confirming that he has appointed Severino Cabrera (Severino), husband of Araceli and father of
Arnel as administrator of all his real properties. When Severino died in 1991, Araceli and Arnel,
with the consent of respondents, took over the administration of the properties. Respondents
likewise instructed them to look for buyers of the properties, allegedly promising them "a
commission of five percent of the total purchase price of the said properties as compensation for
their long and continued administration" thereof.
Accordingly, petitioners introduced real estate broker and President of ESV Marketing
and Development Corporation, Erlinda Veegas (Erlinda), to the respondents who agreed to
have the said properties developed by Erlindas company. However, a conflict arose when
respondents appointed Erlinda as the new administratrix of the properties and terminated
Aracelis and Arnels services.
Petitioners, through counsel, wrote respondents and demanded for their five percent
commission and compensation to no avail. Hence, on September 3, 2001, they filed a
Complaint for Collection of Agents Compensation, Commission and Damages against
respondents before the RTC. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss based on the following
grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) failure to state a cause of action, and (3) lack of legal
capacity of Araceli and Arnel to sue in behalf of the other heirs of Severino.
The RTC granted the respondents Motion to Dismiss. On appeal, the CA ruled the
Complaint did not state a cause of action since it failed to show the existence of petitioners right
that was allegedly violated by respondents. Moreover, it found no evidence of Aracelis and
Arnels authority to file the Complaint for and in behalf of Severinos other heirs. In sum, the CA
found no error on the part of the RTC in granting respondents Motion to Dismiss. Hence, the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUES:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs findings:
1. that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case;
2. that the Complaint states no cause of action;
3. and that petitioners Araceli and Arnel have no legal capacity to sue in behalf of the other
heirs of Severino.
RULING:
The Petition is denied.
The RTC made an independent assessment of the merits of respondents Motion to Dismiss.
In this case, the RTC complied with this duty by making its own independent
assessment of the merits of respondents Motion to Dismiss. A reading of the RTCs Order will

show that in resolving said motion, it judiciously examined the Complaint and the documents
attached thereto as well as the other pleadings filed in connection with the said motion. Clearly,
petitioners claim that the RTC merely adopted the arguments of respondents in their Motion to
Dismiss when it resolved the same is belied by the above-quoted disquisition of the RTC on the
matter and therefore deserves no credence.
Petitioners Complaint is neither one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation nor involves
interest in a real property.
Section 19(1) and (2) of BP 129 as amended by RA 7691 read:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxxx
To ascertain the correctness of petitioners contention that the RTC has jurisdiction over
their Complaint because the same is one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation or involves
interest in a real property the assessed value of which exceedsP200,000.00, the averments in
the Complaint and the character of the relief sought in the said Complaint must be consulted.
This is because the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the Complaint.
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim
is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts
or in the Courts of First Instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the
basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim
is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and are cognizable exclusively by Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
It can be readily seen from the allegations in the Complaint that petitioners main
purpose in filing the same is to collect the commission allegedly promised them by respondents,
as well as the compensation for the services rendered by Severino, Araceli and Arnel for the
administration of respondents properties. Captioned as a Complaint for Collection of Agents
Compensation, Commission and Damages, it is principally for the collection of a sum of money
representing such compensation and commission. Indeed, the payment of such money claim is
the principal relief sought and not merely incidental to, or a consequence of another action
where the subject of litigation may not be estimated in terms of money. Therefore, the CA did
not err when it ruled that petitioners Complaint is not incapable of pecuniary estimation.

The Court cannot also give credence to petitioners contention that their action involves
interest in a real property. It is apparent that their only interest is to be compensated for their
long-term administration of the properties. They do not claim an interest in the properties
themselves but merely payment for their services, such payment they compute to be equivalent
to five (5%) percent of the value of the properties. Under Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court,
a real action is an action affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein.
These include partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property.
Plaintiffs-appellants interest is obviously not the one contemplated under the rules on
jurisdiction.
Petitioners demand is below the jurisdictional amount required for RTCs outside of Metro
Manila, hence, the RTC concerned in this case has no jurisdiction over petitioners Complaint.
To determine whether the RTC in this case has jurisdiction over petitioners Complaint,
respondents correctly argued that the same be considered vis--vis Section 19(8) of BP 129,
which provides:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
xxxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interests, damages of whatever
kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property exceeds One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the
demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00).
This jurisdictional amount of exceeding P100,000.00 for RTCs outside of Metro Manila
was adjusted toP200,000.00 effective March 20, 1999 in pursuance to Section 5 of RA 7691.
Hence, when petitioners filed their Complaint on September 3, 2001, the said increased
jurisdictional amount was already effective. The demand in their Complaint must therefore
exceed P200,000.00 in order for it to fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
There is no merit to petitioners averment that their demand for moral damages should
be included in the computation of their total claims. Paragraph 8, Section 19 of BP 129
expressly speaks of demand which is exclusive of damages of whatever kind. The said claim for
moral damages cannot be included in determining the jurisdictional amount.
The CAs affirmance of the RTCs findings that the Complaint states no cause of action
and that Araceli and Arnel have no authority to sue in behalf of Severinos other heirs cannot be
raised in this Petition.
As pointed out by respondents, petitioners tailed to question in their Motion for
Reconsideration before the CA its affirmance of the RTC's findings that the Complaint states no
cause of action and that Araceli and Arnel have no authority to sue in behalf of the other heirs of
Severino. Suffice it to say that ''prior to raising these arguments before this Court, they should
have raised the matter in their Motion for Reconsideration in order to give the appellate court an
opportunity to correct its ruling. For them to raise these issues be tore this Court now would be
improper, since they failed to do so be tore the CA."

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION

ON GOOD GOVERNMENT v. LUZ REYES BAKUNAWA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 180418, August 28, 2013
J. Bersamin
In a case of reconveyance or recovery of ill-gotten wealth, it is sufficient that the
Republic prove their demand through a preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of
evidence refers to the comparative weight of the evidence presented by the opposing parties.
As such, it has been defined as "the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on
either side," and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight of the
evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. It is proof that is more convincing to the
court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
FACTS:
Civil Case No. 0023 is an action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages brought by the Republic against respondents Luz Reyes-Bakunawa, Manuel
Bakunawa, Jr., Manuel Bakunawa III, President Marcos and First Lady Imelda R. Marcos for
having allegedly acquired and accumulated ill-gotten wealth consisting of funds and other
property "in unlawful concert with one another" and "in flagrant breach of trust and of their
fiduciary obligations as public officers, with grave abuse of right and power and in brazen
violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines, thus resulting in their
unjust enrichment."
The complaint alleged that respondent Luz Reyes-Bakunawa (Luz Bakunawa) had
served as Imelda Marcos Social Secretary during the Marcos administration; that it was during
that period of her incumbency in that position that Luz Bakunawa and her husband Manuel
Bakunawa had acquired assets, funds and other property grossly and manifestly
disproportionate to her salaries and their other lawful income; and that Luz Bakunawa, "by
herself and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos,
taking undue advantage of her position, influence and connection with the latter Defendant
spouses, for their benefit and unjust enrichment and in order to prevent disclosure and recovery
of assets illegally obtained, engaged in devices, schemes and stratagems."
The Republic prayed for: (a) the reconveyance to itself of all funds and other property
impressed with constructive trust, as well as funds and other property acquired by respondents
abuse of right and power and through unjust enrichment, plus interests; (b) accounting of all
beneficial interests in funds, properties and assets in excess of their unlawful earnings; and (c)
payment of actual damages to be proved during the trial, moral damages
of P50,000,000,000.00, temperate, nominal and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses and treble judicial costs.
In their amended answer, the Bakunawas alleged that Luz Bakunawa was never the
Social Secretary of Imelda Marcos, but only an employee in the office of the Social Secretary;
that the properties acquired while Luz Bakunawa was employed in the Government were
purchased with honestly earned money and their acquisition was well within their legitimate
income.
During the pre-trial on August 26, 1999, the Bakunawas admitted that: (a) the properties
enumerated in Annex A of the complaint belonged to or were connected to them, except three

corporations, namely:7-R International Trading, 7-R Enterprise, Inc., and 7-R Group of
Companies; and (b) two parcels of land that belonged to one of their children.
After the Republic rested its case, respondents filed their motion to dismiss, insisting that
the Republic "has failed to establish even prima facie, its case and/or charges against them."
The Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in favor of respondents, finding that neither
the presence of the link with the Marcoses, nor the irrefutability of the evidence against the
Bakunawas for their misuse of that connection exists to justify the instant action by the PCGG.
The Republic sought the reconsideration of the decision, arguing that the
Sandiganbayan erred in holding that it did not show the Bakunawas link with the Marcoses, and
in ruling that it did not prove that the Bakunawas had abused their connections or close
association with the Marcoses. The Sandiganbayan denied the Republics motion for
reconsideration, reiterating its ruling that the Republic did not discharge its burden of proving the
close links between the Bakunawas and the Marcoses, and of proving how the Bakunawas had
abused said links, assuming that the links existed. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the Republic preponderantly showed that the Bakunawas had acquired ill-gotten
wealth during Luz Bakunawas employment during the Marcos administration.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
As correctly pointed out by the Republic, only a preponderance of evidence was needed
to prove its demand for reconveyance or recovery of ill-gotten wealth. That is quite clear from
Section 1 of E.O. No. 14-A, which provides:
Section 1. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 14 dated May 7, 1986 is hereby amended to
read as follows:
Sec. 3. The civil suits to recover unlawfully acquired property under Republic Act No.
1379 or for restitution, reparation of damages, or indemnification for consequential and other
damages or any other civil actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws filed with the
Sandiganbayan against Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, members of their immediate
family, close relatives, subordinates, close and/or business associates, dummies, agents and
nominees, may proceed independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.(Emphasis supplied.)
By preponderance of evidence is meant that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a
whole, superior to that of the other side. Essentially, preponderance of evidence refers to the
comparative weight of the evidence presented by the opposing parties. As such, it has been
defined as "the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side," and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence or greater
weight of the credible evidence. It is proof that is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
Here, the Bakunawas filed a motion to dismiss, by which they specifically demurred to
the evidence adduced against them. A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the

parties in an action to the effect that the evidence that his adversary produced, whether true or
not, is insufficient in point of law to make out a case or to sustain the issue. The demurring party
thereby challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a judgment. The court, in
passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence, is required merely to ascertain whether there is
competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or claim, or to support a verdict of
guilt or liability.
Under the rule on preponderance of evidence, the court is instructed to find for and to
dismiss the case against the defendant should the scales hang in equipoise and there is nothing
in the evidence that tilts the scales to one or the other side. The plaintiff who had the burden of
proof has failed to establish its case, and the parties are no better off than before they
proceeded upon their litigation. In that situation, the court should leave the parties as they are.
Moreover, although the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the
defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on the plaintiffs side if its evidence alone is
insufficient to establish its cause of action. Similarly, when only one side is able to present its
evidence, and the other side demurs to the evidence, a preponderance of evidence can result
only if the plaintiffs evidence is sufficient to establish the cause of action. For this purpose, the
sheer volume of the evidence presented by one party cannot tip the scales in its favor. Quality,
not quantity, is the primordial consideration in evaluating evidence.
The evidence of the Republic did not preponderantly establish the ill-gotten nature of the
Bakunawas wealth. The decisive query is whether the Republic preponderantly showed that the
Bakunawas had acquired ill-gotten wealth during Luz Bakunawas employment during the
Marcos administration.
The Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the evidence of the Republic was able to
establish, at best, that Luz Bakunawa had been an employee in Malacaang Palace during the
Marcos administration, and did not establish her having a close relationship with the Marcoses,
or her having abused her position or employment in order to amass the assets subject of this
case.
The determination by the Sandiganbayan of the equiponderance or insufficiency of
evidence involved its appreciation of the evidence. The Republics evidence could not sustain
the belief that the Bakunawas had used their influence, or the Marcoses influence in acquiring
their properties. Nor did it prove that the ties or relationship between the Bakunawas and the
Marcoses had been "similar to that of an immediate member of the family or a dummy."
The Court upholds the Sandiganbayan. It was basic enough that the Sandiganbayan
could not consider any evidence that was not formally offered; and could consider evidence only
for the purposes it was specifically offered. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly
states:
Section 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
The need to formally offer evidence by specifying the purpose of the offer cannot be
overemphasized. This need is designed to meet the demand for due process by apprising the
adverse party as well as the trial court on what evidence the court would soon be called upon to
decide the litigation. The offer and purpose will also put the trial court in the position to

determine which rules of evidence it shall apply in admitting or denying admission to the
evidence being offered.
At any rate, the Court must point out that negotiated contracts, offered as evidence in
the case, are not per se illegal. A negotiated contract is one that is awarded on the basis of a
direct agreement between the Government and the contractor, without going through the normal
procurement process, like obtaining the prior approval from another authority, or a competitive
bidding process. It is generally resorted to for convenience, or "when time is of the essence, or
where there is a lack of qualified bidders or contractors, or where there is conclusive evidence
that greater economy and efficiency would be achieved." Absent evidence proving that the
negotiated construction contracts had been irregularly entered into by the Bakunawas, or that
the public had been thereby prejudiced, it is pointless for the Court to declare their invalidity. On
the contrary, the Sandiganbayan correctly observed that the presumption of the validity of the
contracts prevailed.
It is true that the recovery of ill-gotten wealth should be relentlessly pursued. But the
pursuit should not be mindless as to be oppressive towards anyone. Due process requires that
there be sufficient competent evidence of the asset being ill-gotten wealth, and of the person or
persons charged with the illegal acquisition of ill-gotten wealth being a close associate or
subordinate of the Marcoses who took advantage of such ties with the Marcoses to enrich
themselves. In that effort, the Republic carries the heavy burden of proof, and must discharge
such burden fully; otherwise, the effort would fail and fall.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANASTACIO AMISTOSO
G.R. No. 201447, August 28, 2013
J. Leonardo-De Castro
When an accused dies pending appeal of his conviction, such death
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. Since
the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as
the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is
ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Amistoso was charged before the RTC of Masbate City for the rape
of his daughter, AAA, alleged to be 12 years old at the time of the incident. The Regional Trial
Court (RTC) found Amistoso guilty of qualified rape. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
Amistosos conviction. Insisting upon his innocence, Amistoso appealed to the Supreme Court
(SC). The SC affirmed the CAs Decision with modification.
In a letter dated February 7, 2013 Ramoncito Roque, Officer-in-Charge, Inmate
Documents and Processing Division of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that
Amistoso had died on December 11, 2012 at the New Bilibid Prison. Attached to the letter is a
photocopy of the Death Report. Yet, on February 22, 2013, the Public Attorneys Office (PAO),
which represented Amistoso and which was apparently also unaware of its clients demise,
still filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Courts Decision.
In a Resolution dated March 20, 2013, the Court required Roque to submit a certified
true copy of Amistosos Death Certificate within 10 days from notice and deferred action on

the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the PAO pending compliance with the Courts former
directive.
In a letter dated June 20, 2013, and received by the Court on June 25, 2013, PIS
Lansangan finally provided the Court with a certified true copy of Amistosos Death
Certificate.
ISSUE:
Whether the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability.
RULING:
The petition is granted.
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment.
In People v. Bayotas, the Court laid down the rules in case the accused dies prior to
final judgment:
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in
this regard, the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed,
i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.
It is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil
action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal case.
Undeniably, Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 preceded the promulgation by
the Court of its Decision on January 9, 2013. When Amistoso died, his appeal before the
Court was still pending and unresolved and that the Court ruled upon Amistosos appeal
only because it was not immediately informed of his death. Moreover, since said Decision
has not yet become final, hence, the Court still has the jurisdiction to set it aside.
MALAYANG MANGGAGAWA NG STAYFAST PHILS., INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.
G.R. No. 155306, August 28, 2013
J. Leonardo-De Castro
When the NLRC promulgates a decision, the proper recourse from such is not to file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 but instead, to file a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petitions from Rule 45 and Rule 65 are not the same. A

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that may be
resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite for the
availment of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The filing of a motion for reconsideration
before resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford the public respondent an opportunity to
correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and
factual aspects of the case.
FACTS:
Petitioner and Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Stayfast (NLMS-Olalia) sought
to be the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees of respondent company, Stayfast
Philippines, Inc. A certification election was conducted on December 29, 1995 and out of the
223 valid votes cast, petitioner garnered 109 votes while NLMS-Olalia received 112 votes and 2
votes were for "No Union." Thus, the Med-Arbiter who supervised the certification election
issued an Order certifying NLMS-Olalia as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank
and file employees of respondent company.
Petitioner appealed the Order of the Med-Arbiter to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. The Secretary of Labor and Employment initially set aside the Order of the MedArbiter and called for run-off election between petitioner and NLMS-Olalia. On motion of NLMSOlalia, however, the Secretary of Labor and Employment reconsidered his earlier decision and
restored the Med-Arbiters Order dated January 9, 1996. Petitioner elevated the matter via
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court but was subsequently dismissed.
Meanwhile, NLMS-Olalia demanded to collectively bargain with respondent company.
The latter rejected petitioners demand, insisting that it would negotiate a collective bargaining
agreement only with whichever union is finally certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the workers. Nevertheless, NLMS-Olalia went on strike.
Subsequently, on June 5, 1997, petitioner filed its own notice of strike in the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). Respondent company opposed petitioners move
and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner was not the certified bargaining agent
and therefore lacked personality to file a notice of strike. Thereafter, the parties were able to
make concessions during the conciliation-mediation stage in the NCMB which led petitioner to
withdraw its notice of strike.
On July 21, 1997, however, petitioners members staged a "sit-down strike" to dramatize
their demand for a fair and equal treatment as respondent company allegedly continued to
discriminate against them. Respondent company issued a memorandum requiring the alleged
participants in the "sit-down strike" to explain within 24 hours why they should not be terminated
or suspended from work for infraction of company rules and regulations pertaining to
unauthorized work stoppage, acts inimical to company interest, and disregard of instruction of
immediate supervisor to perform assigned task. As no one complied with the memorandum
within the 24-hour deadline, respondent company promptly terminated the service of the
participants in the "sit-down strike" on July 22, 1997. Consequently, on July 23, 1997, petitioner
staged a strike and filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, union busting and illegal lockout
against respondent company and its General Manager, Maria Almeida, in the NLRC.
On April 27, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision which ruled that, while
petitioner may file a notice of strike on behalf of its members, petitioner failed to cite any

instance of discrimination or harassment when it filed its notice of strike on June 5, 1997 and the
incidents mentioned as discriminatory occurred after the filing of the said notice. Moreover,
assuming the strike was legal at the beginning, it became illegal when petitioner committed acts
prohibited under Article 264(e) of the Labor Code. The NLRC upheld the Labor Arbiters
Decision. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari. Hence, this petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
Whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
First, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action
that may be resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Contrary to petitioners claim in its petition that there was
no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other
than this petition for certiorari, the right recourse was to appeal to this Court in the form of a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
For purposes of appeal, the Decision dated July 1, 2002 of the Court of Appeals was a
final judgment as it denied due course to, and dismissed, the petition. Thus, petitioner should
have filed an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65, in this Court. The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits,
final order or resolution is appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to the court
rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power
in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the
decision, order or resolution. The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the
resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for the latter remedy is that there should be
no appeal.
Moreover, certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the
latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence. In this case, petitioner
received the Decision dated July 1, 2002 on August 2, 2002 and, under the rules, had until
August 19, 2002 to file an appeal by way of a petition for review in this Court. Petitioner let this
period lapse without filing an appeal and, instead, filed this petition for certiorari on October 1,
2002.
Second, even assuming that a petition for certiorari is the correct remedy in this case,
petitioner failed to comply with the requirement of a prior motion for reconsideration.
As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite for the availment of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The filing of a motion for reconsideration before resort to
certiorari will lie is intended to afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any actual
or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the
case. In the present case, the Court of Appeals was not given any opportunity either to rectify
whatever error it may have made or to address the ascription and aspersion of grave abuse of
discretion thrown at it by petitioner. Nor did petitioner offer any compelling reason to warrant a
deviation from the rule. The instant petition for certiorari is therefore fatally defective.

Third, petitioner was not able to establish its allegation of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Court of Appeals.
Where a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleges grave abuse of
discretion, the petitioner should establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. This is so because "grave abuse of discretion" is well-defined
and not an amorphous concept that may easily be manipulated to suit ones purpose.
In this case, nowhere in the petition did petitioner show that the issuance of the Decision
of the Court of Appeals was patent and gross that would warrant striking it down through a
petition for certiorari. No argument was advanced to show that the Court of Appeals exercised
its judgment capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion and
hostility. Thus, petitioner failed in its duty to demonstrate with definiteness the grave abuse of
discretion that would justify the proper availment of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
Fourth, petitioner essentially questioned the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC. Petitioner cannot properly do that in a petition for certiorari.
For petitioner to question the identical findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC is to
raise a question of fact. However, it is settled that questions of fact cannot be raised in an
original action for certiorari. Only established or admitted facts can be considered. Romys
Freight Service v. Castro explains the rationale of this rule:
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the
extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor of law are entertained, but only
questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The sole object of the
writ is to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The phrase grave abuse of
discretion has a precise meaning in law, denoting abuse of discretion "too patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act
in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and personal hostility." It does not encompass an error of law. Nor does it
include a mistake in the appreciation of the contending parties respective evidence or the
evaluation of their relative weight. (Citations omitted.)
Fifth, considering that petitioner basically presented an issue of fact, its petition for
certiorari crumbles in view of the identical findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which
were further upheld by the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that findings of fact made by Labor Arbiters and
affirmed by the NLRC are not only entitled to great respect, but even finality, and are considered
binding if the same are supported by substantial evidence. Furthermore, in arriving at the said
ruling, the Court of Appeals even reviewed the rationale of the Labor Arbiters decision and was
convinced that there was justifiable reason for the NLRC to uphold the same.

LUCENA B. RALLOS v. CITY OF CEBU

G.R. No. 202651, August 28, 2013
J. Reyes
When the petitioner filed other pending actions involving the same people, same reliefs
prayed for and essentially the same issue, there exists forum shopping because the elements of
litis pendentia are present. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites:
(1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both
actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the
same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such
that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
FACTS:
At the root of the controversy are Lots 485-D and 485-E of the Banilad Estate, Sambag I,
Cebu City, which were expropriated to be used as a public road in 1963. The Heirs of Fr. Rallos
alleged that the City of Cebu occupied the lots in bad faith sans the authority of the former's
predecessors-in-interest, who were the registered owners of the subject parcels of land.
On June 11, 1997, the Heirs of Fr. Rallos filed before the RTC a Complaint for Forfeiture
of Improvements or Payment of Fair Market Value with Moral and Exemplary Damages against
the City of Cebu. In its Answer filed on October 6, 1997, the City of Cebu contended that the
subject parcels of land are road lots and are not residential in character. They have been
withdrawn from the commerce of men and were occupied by the City of Cebu without
expropriation proceedings pursuant to Ordinance No. 416 which was enacted in 1963 or more
than 35 years before the Heirs of Fr. Rallos instituted their complaint.
On January 14, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision, which found the City of Cebu liable
to pay the Heirs of Fr. Rallos just compensation in the amount still to be determined by a board
of three commissioners, one each to be designated by the contending parties and the court.
On March 21, 2002, the RTC issued a Consolidated Order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the City of Cebu, but modifying the Decision rendered on July 24,
2001. Through the said order, the RTC increased the amount of just compensation payable to
the Heirs of Fr. Rallos. The CA opined that the RTC erred in holding that the reckoning point for
the determination of the amount of just compensation should be from 1997, the time the
complaint for just compensation was filed by the Heirs of Fr. Rallos. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, the CA still dismissed on procedural grounds the appeal filed by the City of Cebu.
The Heirs of Fr. Rallos thereafter filed before the RTC a Motion for Execution which the
trial court granted. The City of Cebu sought the reiteration of the directives stated in the Writ of
Execution issued on December 4, 2008 and the setting aside of the amended demand letter
served upon it by Sheriff Bellones.
On March 16, 2009, the RTC issued an Order denying the City of Cebu's motion for the
reiteration of the writ of execution. The RTC, however, set aside the demand letter served upon
the City of Cebu by Sheriff Bellones and interpreted the directives of the writ of execution.
The Heirs of Fr. Rallos assailed the abovementioned order on the ground that it
effectively modified the final and executory Decision rendered on July 24, 2001. The RTC did

not consider their claims, thus they filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus before the CA.
The appellate court granted the petition after finding that the two assailed orders effectively
modified the final and executory disposition made by the RTC. However, on April 13, 2012, the
CA granted the City of Cebu's application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO). Subsequently, a writ of preliminary injunction was likewise issued.
Lucena then filed numerous petitions for indirect contempt.
ISSUE:
Whether the present petition is proper.
RULING:
The petition is dismissed. Lucena engaged in forum shopping.
In the Verification and Non-Forum Shopping Certification attached to the instant petition
and executed by Lucena, she admitted that there are five other pending actions for indirect
contempt which she filed relative to Civil Case No. CEB-20388. She, however, claims that the
issues in the other five petitions are different from that raised before this Court now. Lucena's
claim cannot be sustained.
"Forum shopping is the act of litigants who repetitively avail themselves of multiple
judicial remedies in different fora, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on
the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances; and raising
substantially similar issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court;
or for the purpose of increasing their chances of obtaining a favorable decision, if not in one
court, then in another."
"Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those
representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two
preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other
case."
Since the elements of litis pendentia concur in the instant petition and SCA No. CEB38292, this Court so holds Lucena guilty of forum shopping.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. APOLIARIO MANALILI

G.R. No. 191253, August 28, 2013
J. Perez
The testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to produce a conviction, if the same
appears to be trustworthy and reliable. If credible and convincing, that alone would be sufficient
to convict the accused. Testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full
credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of

defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being
subject to public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the
wrong committed against her.
FACTS:
Apolinario Manalili was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila with
statutory rape. Upon arraignment, Manalili entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged
against him.
AAA, the victim who was then barely eleven (11) years old narrated with particularity the
events that took place on the date of the crime. Also, when she executed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated 18 March 1998, she stated that she was molested more than three (3) times by
Manalili.
On cross-examination, AAA described the place of the incident in detail. Although it was
dark, AAA narrated that she was certain it was Manalili who followed her inside the house.
Familiar with Manalilis voice, AAA positively identified Manalili when he instructed her to remove
her underwear. She recalled that while drinking, Manalili was only wearing pants without a t-shirt
on. She claims that the man who mounted her only had pants on, without a t-shirt.
The RTC rendered a decision convicting Manalili of statutory rape. The Court finds that
the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Manalili
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) but the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision
with modification. The CA ruled that the prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the
essential elements of statutory rape beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
Whether AAAs testimony is not sufficient to convict Manalili.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
As held by the CA, rape is essentially an offense of secrecy, not generally attempted
except in dark or deserted and secluded places away from the prying eyes, and the crime
usually commences solely upon the word of the offended woman herself and conviction
invariably turns upon her credibility, as the prosecutions single witness of the actual occurrence.
As a corollary, a conviction for rape may be made even on the testimony of the victim herself, as
long as such testimony is credible. In fact, the victims testimony is the most important factor to
prove that the felony has been committed.
Manalili contends that AAAs testimony is not sufficient to convict him because the
identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime was not positively established. However,
jurisprudence is instructive that identification of an accused by his voice has been accepted
particularly in cases where, such as in this case, the witness has known the malefactor
personally for so long and so intimately. The Court has opined that once a person has gained
familiarity with another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable
distance.

Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to
produce a conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy and reliable. If credible and
convincing, that alone would be sufficient to convict the accused. No law or rule requires the
corroboration of the testimony of a single witness in a rape case.
The trial court noted that during AAAs cross-examination, her testimony bore the
hallmarks of truth, as she remained consistent on material points. There is no reason to disturb
the trial courts appreciation of the credibility of AAAs testimony. The trial courts assessment
deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The assessment of the
credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique
opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point
denied appellate courtsand when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.
Moreover, the Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are
young and immature deserve full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of
tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and
thereafter pervert herself by being subject to public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the
desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her.
FELY Y. YALONG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 187174, August 28, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
When a party inappropriately files a petition for review instead of a required notice of
appeal, the same shall be dismissed. Appeals to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the latter court.
FACTS:
Respondent Lucila C. Ylagan filed a complaint against Fely C. Yalong (Yalong) for the
crime of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22). During trial, Ylagan testified that
Yalong borrowed from her the amount ofP450,000.00 with a verbal agreement that the same
would be paid back to her in cash and, as payment thereof, issued to her, inter alia, a postdated
check in the similar amount of P450,000.00. However, the check was dishonored and returned
to her for the reason "Account Closed." As verbal and written demands made on Yalong to pay
her loan proved futile, Ylagan was constrained to file the instant criminal case.
In her defense, Yalong averred that she already paid her loan but did not require Ylagan
to issue a receipt or acknowledge the same. Likewise, she claimed that the subject check
belonged to her husband and that while she knew that the said check was not covered by
sufficient funds, it was already signed by her husband when she handed it to Ylagan.
The MTCC found Yalong guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of BP
22. Consequently, Yalong filed a Notice of Appeal which was denied, considering that the
judgment against her was promulgated in absentia on account of her unjustified absence.
Aggrieved, Yalong filed a Petition for Certiorari with Petition for Bail (certiorari petition), before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC denied Yalongs certiorari petition, finding the
promulgation of the MTCC Decision in absentia to be valid as Yalong was duly notified of the
scheduled date of promulgation on October 6, 2006 and yet failed to appear thereat. Yalong

then filed the subject petition for review before the CA which was dismissed on the ground that
the "Order of the RTC was issued in the exercise of its original jurisdiction where appeal by
filing a notice of appeal with the RTC and not a petition for review is the proper remedy."
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA properly dismissed the subject petition for review on the ground of
improper appeal.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
While the Rules of Court (Rules) do not specifically state that the inappropriate filing of a
petition for review instead of a required notice of appeal is dismissible, Section 2(a), Rule 41 of
the Rules nonetheless provides that appeals to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the latter court.
A notice of appeal is filed with the regional trial court that rendered the assailed decision,
judgment or final order, while a petition for review is filed with the CA. Also, a notice of appeal is
required when the RTC issues a decision, judgment or final order in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, while a petition for review is required when such issuance was in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. Thus, owing to these differences, Yalongs filing of the subject petition for
review cannot be simply accorded the same effect as the filing of a notice of appeal.
In the present case, Yalong should have filed a notice of appeal with the RTC instead of
a petition for review with the CA. As a consequence of Yalongs failure to file a notice of appeal
with the RTC within the proper reglementary period, the RTC Decision had attained finality
which thereby bars Yalong from further contesting the same.
Verily, jurisprudence dictates that the perfection of an appeal within the period and in the
manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such requirements is
considered fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. To be sure,
the rules on appeal must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable to forestall or
avoid unreasonable delays in the administration of justice, to ensure an orderly discharge of
judicial business, and to put an end to controversies. As it stands, the subject petition for review
was the wrong remedy and perforce was properly dismissed by the CA.
B. STA. RITA & CO., INC. AND ARLENE STA. RITA KANAPI v. ANGELINE M. GUECO
G.R. No.193078, August 28, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
Persons who are not parties to a case, either as petitioners, defendants or intervenors,
they cannot participate in the proceedings of the same. Consequently, they also cannot be
adversely affected by the outcome of such proceeding. A complaint-in-intervention cannot be
treated as an independent action as it is merely an ancillary to and a supplement of the principal
action. The complaint-in-intervention essentially latches on the complaint for its legal efficacy so
much so that the dismissal of the complaint leads to its concomitant dismissal.
FACTS:

On April 11, 2000, Gueco purchased four (4) parcels of land from B. Sta. Rita through its
president. The transaction was evidenced by a deed of sale. In October 2001, Gueco filed a
petition for the surrender of the subject titles against B. Sta. Rita, its corporate secretary and the
Tarlac RD. However, B. Sta Rita and its corporate secretary pray that the transaction be
construed as a conditional sale and that it be rescinded and that they be restored in the
possession of the subject properties.
On July 30, 2003, while the surrender of titles case was pending, the Sta. Ritas, as
alleged heirs of the late Ben Sta. Rita and as shareholders of B. Sta. Rita, for themselves, their
co-heirs and on behalf of B. Sta. Rita, and by way of a derivative suit filed a complaint for
reformation and rescission of contract and quieting of title against Gueco. The Sta. Ritas also
moved to intervene in the surrender of titles case, claiming similarity of the subject matter and
parties, which the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted. On the other hand, Gueco, as defendant
in the reformation case, moved to dismiss the complaint. The motion was denied, thus Gueco
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA).
On March 5, 2004, herein petitioner Arlene Sta. Rita Kanapi, wife of Edgardo, together
with the Heirs of Edgardo, moved for leave to file their complaint-in-intervention in the
reformation case, alleging that she is also a stockholder and director of B. Sta. Rita. The RTC
admitted the complaint-in-intervention and proceeded to hear the cases jointly.
On July 30, 2004, the CA rendered its Decision in the certiorari case, dismissing the
reformation case due to the Sta. Ritas lack of legal personality to bring a derivative suit.
Aggrieved, the Sta. Ritas filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the
CA. As such, they filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Court.
On December 8, 2005, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision rescinding the sale. The CA
reversed and set aside the Joint Decision. It held that the final dismissal of the reformation case
left only the surrender of titles case for RTC to resolve. As rescission was one of the main
issues raised in the dismissed reformation case, it was reversible error on the part of the RTC
Branch 63 to have rescinded the sale transaction in favor of the Sta. Ritas. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the dismissal of the reformation case on the ground of lack of personality on the part of
the Sta. Ritas should not have affected Arlenes complaint-in-intervention.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Arlenes and the Heirs of Edgardos complaint-in-intervention in the dismissed
reformation case had been effectively discharged since the principal complaint therein had
already been terminated with finality. Clearly, their complaint-in-intervention cannot be treated as
an independent action as it is merely an ancillary to and a supplement of the principal action. In
other words, the complaint-in-intervention essentially latches on the complaint for its legal
efficacy so much so that the dismissal of the complaint leads to its concomitant dismissal.
Applying these principles to this case therefore lead to the conclusion that the dismissal of the
main complaint in the reformation case necessarily resulted in the dismissal of Arlenes and the
Heirs of Edgardos complaint-in-intervention lodged in the same case.

Arlene or the Heirs of Edgardo were not parties either as defendants or intervenors
in the surrender of titles case nor did they, in any manner, participate in the proceedings of the
same. It is a standing rule that no person shall be adversely affected by the outcome of a civil
action or proceeding in which he is not a party. In this light, it cannot be gainsaid that Arlene and
the Heirs of Edgardo cannot be adversely affected by the outcome of the surrender of titles case
and, as such, cannot therefore interpose an appeal therefrom.
Neither can Arlene file the instant appeal on behalf of B. Sta. Rita since there lies no
evidence on record to show that she had been properly authorized by the said corporation to file
the same. It is fundamental that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any court is
lodged with the board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents, which Arlene
clearly is not. Consequently, for her lack of authority, the appeal of Arlene on behalf of B. Sta.
Rita must necessarily fail.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BIENVENIDO CASTRO
G.R. No. 189125, August 28, 2013
J. Perez
When the court ignored the fact that an objection was raised in the motion for
reconsideration, it then proceeded to say that the defense was not pleaded during trial so that it
cannot be considered on appeal. This is not correct. As principle that since the statement in the
pleading is conclusive on the pleader, it is unaffected by any contrary proof submitted by the
pleader, whether or not objection is interposed by any party.
FACTS:
Respondent Bienvenido Castro (Castro) is the owner of an unregistered property located
at Surigao Del Sur. On 20 June 1994, Castro voluntarily offered to sell the property to the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law. Castros offered price isP60,000.00 per hectare or a total of P560,340.00
for the entire 9.3390 hectare lot.
The DAR, through the LBP, assessed the property at P15,441.25 per hectare or a total
price of P144,205.90. Castro rejected it. Consequently, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB),
in DARAB Case No. LVC-XIII-232, conducted a summary administrative proceeding to fix just
compensation for the subject property. At the preliminary conference, Castro alleged that LBPs
valuation did not constitute fair and just compensation.
On 9 March 2000, the DARAB issued an Order directing LBP to conduct another
inspection and to reassess Castros property. LBP complied, but still reached the same
valuation at P144,205.90.
Two years later, in 2002, Castro insisted on a higher valuation through a petition to fix
just compensation before the RTC. LBPs opposed and its main defense was that the case
should be dismissed since the DARAB Decision on the amount of just compensation for the
subject property was not timely elevated to the SAC within the 15-day reglementary period.
Thus, the DARAB Decision had attained finality and constituted a bar to the filing of the case.
Nevertheless, the SAC set the case for pre-trial. Since LBP and Castro had declared in
their respective pre-trial briefs that they were willing to enter into a settlement. After numerous

delays, on 13 August 2004, the Commissioners submitted its report. Relying heavily on the
Commissioners and Supplemental Reports, the SAC rendered a Consolidated Decisionfixing
the just compensation of Castros property at P43,327.16 per hectare or a total of P404,632.35
for the entire 9.3390 hectares.
Aggrieved, LBP filed a motion for reconsideration of the SACs decision, asserting that
Castro had already accepted LBPs valuation of the subject property at P144,205.90 as shown
in three documents Castro had signed: two Reply to Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition
dated 18 September 1997 and 13 March 2001, respectively; and the Deed of Confirmation of
Transfer Executed by the Landowner dated 5 March 2001. LBP likewise assailed the
Commissioners Report, contending that at the time LBP initially inspected the subject property
in 1994, only two hectares were unirrigated riceland while the remaining 7.3390 hectares were
forest land, in contrast to the Commissioners findings based on the Ocular Inspection
conducted a decade thereafter in 2004.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals completely agreed with the SAC that LBP was already
estopped from raising the defense that Castro has accepted the assessed amount of
144,205.90 for the subject property.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA failed to sustain the national governments substantive right to avail of the
defense that the respondent is already estopped from questioning the valuation of the property
with his agreement.
RULING:
The petition is dismissed.
The trial court ruled in its denial of LBPs motion that the defense or objection is not one
of the recognized exceptions to the rule on waiver of defenses not pleaded in the answer of
motion to dismiss. On appeal, LBP repleaded the fact of payment and argued that Castro is
already estopped from questioning the land valuation of the DAR. The Court of Appeals,
iterating the trial court, ruled that the failure to raise the defense of consummated sale is a
"procedural infirmity which cannot be cured on appeal."
The Court of Appeals ignored the fact that the objection was raised in the motion for
reconsideration which was duly litigated below and proceeded to say that the defense was not
pleaded during trial so that it cannot be considered on appeal. It ignored Castros acceptance of
the valuation by the DAR in the amount of P144,205.90, the payment by LBP to Castro of the
determined price of P144,205.90, and the receipt of the payment which Castro confirmed.
These facts were all documented and, more importantly, all unrebutted by respondent.
Most significantly, the court below did not pay attention to the fact that the documented
and accepted LBP payment for the property squares with the pertinent averment in the
complaint that:
7. x x x upon acquisition of the land and tax declaration over which was transferred to
the Republic of the Philippines, the Fair Market Value raised to P245,615.00, per TDN 99-16012-00567 x x x

The Tax Declaration evidencing "transfer to the Republic of the Philippines" attached to
the petitions as Annex "C," declares that the owner is the Republic of the Philippines and that
the administrator is Land Bank of the Philippines.
The averments in the petition for payment, Paragraph 7, and the evidence made part of
the petition which is the tax declaration in the name of the Republic amount to an admission that
the claim or demand set forth in Castros petition has been paid or otherwise extinguished. Such
admission is conclusive on respondent. All contrary or inconsistent proof submitted by the party
who made the admission should be ignored. And they should be ignored whether the objection
is interposed by the other party or not.
Santiago is a case where, like the case at hand, the dismissal of the action was based
on the judicial admission embodied in the very allegations in the complaint. Santiago is a land
registration case involving a property claimed as publicly and uninterruptedly possessed since
26 July 1894. However, the pleadings alleged that the parcel of land subject of registration was
part of public forest released by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources by an Order
dated 10 August 1961.
The Court clearly pronounced in Santiago that what was so categorically set forth in the
pleading which is that the land is part of a public forest is conclusive and binding on the pleader.
Therefrom we declared as principle that since the statement in the pleading is conclusive on the
pleader, it is unaffected by any contrary proof submitted by the pleader, whether or not objection
is interposed by any party.
The principles in Santiago, derived from repeated prior rulings and forwarded to later
cases, cover and apply to the present case. The solemn declaration in Castro's pleading is that
the Republic is the owner of the land the compensation for which he seeks. The ownership is
proved by the tax declaration made part of the pleading naming the Republic as such owner.
The judicial admission that Castro no longer owns the property cannot be controverted by
Castro as it is conclusive as to him. The proceedings, including the appointment of
commissioners who inspected and priced the property for the purpose of compensating Castro,
which is inconsistent with ownership by the Republic, should be ignored. The full hearing in the
case cannot overcome the fact of government ownership as admitted in the complaint.
The payment by LBP for the property and its transfer to the Republic was fully discussed
and submitted before the trial court through LBP's motion for reconsideration. The trial and
appellate courts, however, incorrectly viewed the motion as a belated and procedurally
unacceptable defense rather than, as it should be, a reminder to the Court about the fact,
conclusive on Castro as pleader, of transfer of ownership to the Republic.
SEPTEMBER 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOJIE SUANSING
G.R. No. 189822, September 02, 2013
J. Del Castillo
When there is a single eyewitness, her testimony is sufficient to support a conviction so
long as such testimony is found to be clear and straight-forward and worthy of credence by the
trial court. Discrepancies referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the
veracity of the witness declarations.

FACTS:
On June 13, 1994 the dead body of AAA, four (4) years old at the time, was found
outside the house of her neighbor. When the matter was reported to the police, Luisa Rebada, a
neighbor of the petitioner, related to the AAAs parents what she knew. Rebada recounted that
at about 5:30 of the afternoon before, she saw AAA at the window of petitioners house. She
called out to her and offered her some yemas. The petitioner suddenly closed the window.
Later on, Rebada heard AAA cry and then squeal. Thereafter, she saw the petitioner naked on
top of AAA, his right hand choking the girls neck. Rebada became frightened and went back to
her house to gather her children. She told her compadre, Ricardo Lagrana, who was in her
house at that time, of what she saw. The latter got nervous and left. That evening,when she
heard that AAAs parents were looking for the child, she called out from her window and asked
what time AAA left their house. Thus, with Luisa Rebadas revelation, the petitioner was
arrested.
During the investigation, the petitioner readily admitted to raping and killing AAA. The
police were able to recover from the house of the petitioner AAAs green slippers, a pair of gold
earrings, a bloodied buri mat, a pillow with blood stain in the middle, and a stained T-shirt owned
by petitioner. Consequently, the petitioner was charged for Rape with Homicide whereby he
entered a plea of guilty. The RTC found him guilty of the crime. On automatic appeal to the
Supreme Court, the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The Supreme
Court found that the proceedings before the lower court were tainted with procedural infirmities,
namely: (a) an invalid arraignment; and, (b) admission of inadmissible evidence.
Thus, the petitioner was arraigned anew whereby he entered a plea of not guilty. During
the hearings, counsel for the defense refused to cross-examine the witnesses who had been
presented in the first trial as he interposed a continuing objection to their presentation again as
witnesses since their testimonies had already been ruled upon by the Supreme Court as
incredible and inadmissible. When the prosecution had finished presenting its evidence, the
petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence, which was subsequently denied. Instead of presenting
evidence, the petitioner manifested that he was submitting the case for judgment without
presentation of evidence for the defense. The RTC rendered a decision against the petitioner.
On appeal, the CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA breached the Constitution and jurisprudential doctrines when it affirmed the
petitioners conviction on the basis of evidence derived from uncounselled confession
RULING:
The petition is denied.
An examination of the assailed decision reveals that the conviction handed by the courts
a quo was primarily based on the testimony of Luisa, as corroborated by Dr. Doromals autopsy
report, and not on physical evidence, to wit, the pillow and the blood-stained shirt, which the
petitioner claimed were fruits of the poisonous tree.
Luisas testimonies were found by two branches of the trial court and the CA as credible,
straightforward and consistent. It is also well to note that Luisa once again testified even after
the proceedings before the RTC, which were conducted relative to the petitioners initial

indictment, were declared null. She was firm and unshaken in her identification of the
perpetrator of the crime and no ill motive can be attributed to her on why she testified against
the petitioner. It is an oft-repeated doctrine that the testimony of even a single eyewitness is
sufficient to support a conviction so long as such testimony is found to be clear and straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court.
Further, discrepancies referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect
the veracity of the witness declarations. The alleged inconsistencies in Luisas statements
regarding which hand the petitioner used to strangle AAA and when did she inform
her compadre, Lagrana, about what she had witnessed, were too inconsequential for they do
not relate to the elements of the crime charged. Those inconsistencies cannot destroy the thrust
of Luisas testimony that: (a) the petitioner was the last person seen with AAA before the girls
lifeless body was found; (b) from an opening in between the door and the floor, she saw the
petitioner naked on top of AAA, whose panty and shorts were taken off; and (c) the petitioner
choked AAAs neck with one hand.
SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF PANGASUGAN, BAYBAY, LEYTE v. EXPLORATION
PERMIT APPLICATION OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY
G.R. No. 162226, September 02, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
When a party fails to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal, the decision shall
become final and executory. Under the doctrine of immutability of judgment, a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and
whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land.
FACTS:
On July 3, 1996, PNOC-EDC applied for an exploration permit with the Mines and
Geosciences Bureau covering a total area of 16,144 hectares in the Province of Leyte and
located within the Leyte Geothermal Reservation. On November 19, 1996, petitioner passed
Resolution No. 58, Series of 1996, expressing its deep concern for the possible environmental
damages that may be brought about by PNOC-EDCs activities. Thereafter, it filed a Complaint
praying for the denial of the subject application with the MGB Panel of Arbitrators (PA).
The PA dismissed petitioners complaint for lack of jurisdiction, but remanded the same
to the Mining Environment and Safety Division of the Office of the Regional Director of MGB for
appropriate action. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the MAB. The MAB affirmed the dismissal
of petitioners complaint, albeit on a different ground. While it ruled that the PA has jurisdiction
over the complaint, the same is nevertheless dismissible for being premature. The MAB opined
that since the complaint is primarily anchored on perceived environmental damages which are
still abstract, anticipatory, and not ripe for determination, petitioner lacks a cause of action
against PNOC-EDC. Nonetheless, the MAB declared that such dismissal is without prejudice to
any protest or opposition to PNOC-EDCs non-compliance with its Environmental Work Program
under any exploration permit that may be issued to it.
On January 21, 2004, the MAB declared its Decision final and executory. It cited Section
11, Rule V of the Rules which provides that motions for reconsideration should be filed within 10
days from receipt of the decision, resolution or order sought to be reconsidered. Moreover, it

noted that petitioner actually failed to file a motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, the subject
application was given due course, subject to pertinent laws, rules, and regulations. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the MAB is correct in giving due course to the subject application
RULING:
The petition is denied.
At the outset, it should be made clear that petitioner itself admits that it is assailing the
MABs Order dated January 21, 2004. However, it is well to emphasize that such Order merely
declared the MABs earlier Decision as final and executory for failure of petitioner to either move
for reconsideration or appeal the same.
It is well-settled that under the doctrine of immutability of judgment, a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and
whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act
which violates this principle must immediately be struck down.
This doctrine has a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of
justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put
an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts
exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must
not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. The doctrine is not a mere technicality to
be easily brushed aside, but a matter of public policy as well as a time-honored principle of
procedural law.
FIRST GAS POWER CORPORATION v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED
BY THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
G.R. No. 169461, September 02, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
When a court has already ruled on a matter binding over an issue, another court cannot
set aside the ruling of said court which is of co-equal and coordinate standing.The doctrine of
judicial stability states that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be
interfered with by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. The rationale for the same is founded on
the concept of jurisdiction verily, a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders
judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate
courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the
conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.
FACTS:
In a land registration case, petitioner sought for the original registration of two (2) parcels
of land. During its initial hearing, no oppositor appeared except Prosecutor Amelia Panganiban
who appeared in behalf of the Office of the Solicitor General. Consequently, the RTC issued the

corresponding Order of Special Default and the reception of evidence was delegated to the
Branch Clerk of Court.
The subject lots were both investigated and inspected separately and based on the
findings, the subject lots are within the alienable and disposable zone. Also, in a letter from the
Chief of the Surveys Division of the DENR Region IV Land Management Sector, it is stated
that the subject lots are not portion of/nor identical to any approved isolated survey. During the
reception of evidence, the government, through respondent, was given the opportunity to
examine the authenticity of the documents presented by petitioner. Without any object, all
exhibits were admitted by the RTC. Meanwhile, respondent did not present any evidence to
contradict petitioners application.
The RTC granted petitioners application for the registration of the subject lots, despite
the fact that there subsists a decision in a previous cadastral case which covers the same lots,
as manifested by the petitioner. The trial court found that petitioner was able to substantiate its
bona fide claim of ownership over the subject lots. Subsequently, the RTC issued an Amended
Order setting aside any decision affecting the subject lots and reiterated the issuance of the
corresponding decree of registration in favor of petitioner due to the finality of the RTC Decision.
Claiming that the RTCs Amended Order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion,
respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which was initially denied. Upon
reconsideration, the CA admitted the petition. In its Decision, the CA granted respondents
petition and thereby annulled and set aside the RTC Decision and Amended Order. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in annulling and setting aside the RTC Decision and Amended Order as
well as the final decree of registration issued in favor of petitioner over the subject lots
RULING:
The petition is denied.
As amply addressed by the CA, the RTCs Amended Order was issued in violation of the
doctrine of judicial stability. This doctrine states that the judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction may not be interfered with by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. The rationale for
the same is founded on the concept of jurisdiction verily, a court that acquires jurisdiction over
the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all
other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance
of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment. Therefore,
as the RTCs Amended Order was issued in stark contravention of this rule, the CA correctly
ordered its nullification.
While petitioner points out to the fact that respondent belatedly filed its certiorari petition
before the CA, it must be observed that the CA had already exercised its discretion in giving due
course to the same. Jurisprudence dictates that the strict application of the rules on filing a
petition for certiorari may be relaxed, among others, in the exercise of the sound discretion by
the judge (or the CA) as guided by all the attendant circumstances, as in this case.

Indeed, the Court can only commiserate with petitioner as it has already gone through
the rigors of proving its cause before the RTC only to fall short of its ultimate objective. Yet, the
Courts duty to uphold the principles of law and jurisprudential pronouncements as herein
discussed remains staunch and unyielding. Definitively, the Court cannot sanction the
registration of the subject lots when there stands an existing decision binding over the same.
Neither can the Court allow the RTC to set aside the ruling of a co-equal and coordinate court.
Based on these reasons, the Court is therefore constrained to sustain the nullification of
the RTC Decision and Amended Order as well as the final decree of registration issued in favor
of petitioner.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FREDDY SALONGA Y AFIADO
G.R. No. 194948, September 02, 2013
CJ. Sereno
When the drugs confiscated from the accused were properly accounted for and
forthrightly submitted to the Crime Laboratory, there will be no suspicion as to the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized articles. The chain of custody rule is a method of authenticating
evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would
include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the
time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in
the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it
was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and
no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
FACTS:
On October 7 2003, a buy-bust operation was conducted whereupon the accused was
arrested for selling methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. After the arrest, the accused was
frisked and three (3) more sachets of shabu were seized from him. Thereafter, they proceeded
to the police station where the sachets of shabu were marked and later brought to the PNP
Crime Laboaratory. He was then charged for violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article 11 of R.A.
No. 9165 (illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs).
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC after it
found that the drugs confiscated from the accused were properly accounted for and forthrightly
submitted to the Crime Laboratory, that nothing invited the suspicion that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized articles were jeopardized.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in finding that the evidence of the prosecution was sufficient
to convict the accused of the alleged sale and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride,
in violation of Sections 5 and 11, respectively of R.A. 9165
RULING:

The petition is granted.

The accused argues that the prosecution failed to prove that the subject items allegedly
confiscated from him were the ones submitted to the forensic chemist for examination; thus,
they were not able to establish the unbroken chain of custody of the illegal drugs.
It has been consistently ruled that the elements needed to be proven to successfully
prosecute a case of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
The Court has adopted the chain of custody rule, a method of authenticating evidence
which requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it
is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in
the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it
was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and
no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
The Court finds unreasonable doubt on the evidence presented to prove an unbroken
chain of custody. First, it is not clear from the evidence that the marking, which was done in the
police station, was made in the presence of the accused or his representative, as mandated by
Section 21 of R.A. 9165. Thus, there is already a gap in determining whether the specimens
that entered into the chain were actually the ones examined and offered in evidence.
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs and other related
items immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting
point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contrabands are immediately marked
because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The
marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other
similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are
disposed at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, planting or contamination of
evidence.
Second, the prosecution failed to duly accomplish the Certificate of Inventory and to take
photos of the seized items. Third, the Court finds conflicting testimony and glaring
inconsistencies that would cast doubt on the integrity of the handling of the seized drugs. The
material inconsistency of who actually received the specimens in the Crime Laboratory
creates a cloud of doubt as to whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items were preserved. Thus, the identity of the corpus delicti was not proven.
The gaps in the chain of custody creates a reasonable doubt as to whether the specimens
seized from the accused were the same specimes brought to the laboratory and eventually
offered in court as evidence. Without adequate proof of the corpus delicti, the conviction cannot
stand.
As held by the Court in People v. De Guzman:

Accordingly, the failure to establish, through convincing proof, that the integrity of the
seized items has been adequately preserved through an unbroken chain of custody is enough
to engender reasonable doubt on the guilt of an accused. Reasonable doubt is that doubt
engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such investigation to let
the mind rest upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to
convict a person charged with a crime, but moral certainty is required as to every proposition of
proof requisite to constitute the offense. A conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent
doubt on the identity of the drug.
The inconsistency in the evidence and the weak presentation of the prosecution leaves a
gaping hole in the chain of custody, which creates a reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused.
HEIRS OF MARGARITA PRODON v. HEIRS OF MAXIMO S. ALVAREZ AND VALENTINA
CLAVE
G.R. No. 170604, September 2, 2013
J. Bersamin
The Heirs of Maximo Alvarez and Valentina Clave filed a complaint for quieting of title
and damages against Margarita Prodon. They alleged that Prodon maliciously made an entry in
the TCT of the property of the respondents, the entry states that the property had been sold to
them with a right of repurchase. The deed of sale with the right of repurchase had been lost.
The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written document are the
subject of the inquiry. In an action for quieting of title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale
with right to repurchase that purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a property, therefore, the
Best Evidence Rule does not apply, and the defendant is not precluded from presenting
evidence other than the original document.
FACTS:
The Heirs of Maximo Alvarez and Valentina Clave (Respondents) filed a complaint for
quieting of title and damages against Margarita Prodon, the respondents averred that their
parents, were the registered owners of that parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 84797 and their parents had been in possession of the property during their lifetime.
Respondents are in possession of the property and have been paying the real property taxes
due thereon.
The owners duplicate copy cannot be located but the original copy of TCT No. 84797 on
file with the Register of Deeds of Manila was intact. The original copy contained an entry stating
that the property had been sold to Prodon subject to the right of repurchase and that the entry
had been maliciously done by Prodon because the deed of sale with right to repurchase
covering the property did not exist. Respondents prayed that the entry be cancelled, and that
Prodon be adjudged liable for damages.
During trial, the custodian of the records of the property attested that the copy of the
deed of sale with right to repurchase could not be found in the files of the Register of Deeds of
Manila. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the Petitioners. The RTC concluded that the
original copy of the deed of sale with right to repurchase had been lost, and that earnest efforts

had been exerted to produce it before the court. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the best evidence rule is applicable in the instant case
RULING:
The petition is denied.
The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written document the
original of the document must be produced in court. The rule excludes any evidence other than
the original writing to prove the contents thereof, unless the offeror proves: (a) the existence or
due execution of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its
non-production in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the
unavailability of the original can be attributed.
The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the exact contents of a
writing are brought before the court, considering that (a) the precision in presenting to the court
the exact words of the writing is of more than average importance, particularly as respects
operative or dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, because a slight
variation in words may mean a great difference in rights; (b) there is a substantial hazard of
inaccuracy in the human process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting; and (c) as
respects oral testimony purporting to give from memory the terms of a writing, there is a special
risk of error, greater than in the case of attempts at describing other situations generally.
The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of writing are in issue. When the
evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution or
delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked.
In such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the original.
This case involves an action for quieting of title, a common-law remedy for the removal
of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property by reason of any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth
and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title.
The action is for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt
over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired
improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the property.
The action for quieting of title may be based on the fact that a deed is invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable. The terms of the writing may or may not be material to an action for
quieting of title, depending on the ground alleged by the plaintiff. For instance, when an action
for quieting of title is based on the unenforceability of a contract for not complying with the
Statute of Frauds, Article 1403 of the Civil Code specifically provides that evidence of the
agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents.
There is then no doubt that the Best Evidence Rule will come into play.
Prodon did not preponderantly establish the existence and due execution of the deed of
sale with right to repurchase. This was because the deed, although a collateral document, was
the foundation of her defense in this action for quieting of title. Her inability to produce the

original logically gave rise to the need for her to prove its existence and due execution by other
means that could only be secondary under the rules on evidence. Towards that end, however, it
was not required to subject the proof of the loss of the original to the same strict standard to
which it would be subjected had the loss or unavailability been a precondition for presenting
secondary evidence to prove the terms of writing.

ROSALINDA PUNZALAN, RANDALL PUNZALAN AND RAINIER PUNZALAN

v. MICHAEL GAMALIEL J. PLATA AND RUBEN PLATA
G.R. No. 160316, September 2, 2013,
J. Mendoza
The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed the complaints filed against the petitioners
for lack of sufficient basis both in fact and in law. The respondents filed their separate petitions
before the DOJ. The DOJ ordered the filing of separate informations against the respondents.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The DOJ reconsidered its findings and ruled that
there was no probable cause. The respondents elevated the matter to the CA. The CA annulled
and set aside the recent Resolutions of the DOJ.
It a sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the conduct of preliminary
investigations and to leave the DOJ a wide latitude of discretion in the determination of what
constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of the supposed
offenders. The rule is based not only upon the respect for the investigatory and prosecutory
powers granted by the Constitution to the executive department but upon practicality as well.
FACTS:
On August 13, 1997, Dencio dela Pea was in front of a store near their house when the
group of Rainier Punzalan, Randall Punzalan, Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio, Alex "Toto" Ofrin,
and several others arrived. Ricky Eugenio mocked Dela Pea to which the latter responded;
irked by the response, Jose Gregorio slapped Dela Pea while Rainier punched him in the
mouth. The group then ganged up on him. Alex "Toto" Ofrin kicked Dela Pea and tried to stab
him with a balisong but missed because he was able to run. The group chased him. The latter
was seen by Plata and Cagara while Dencio was being mauled by Rainier, et al., thereby
compelling Plata and Cagara to go out of Platas house and defend Dencio. Dencio run towards
Plata and Cagara and took the gun out of Cagaras hand and aimed the gun at Rainier, et al.
which, in turn, forced Plata to grapple with Cagara to prevent Cagara from hurting anyone but
unfortunately, the gun accidentally fired and hit Rainier in the thigh.
Rainier filed a criminal complaint for Attempted Homicide against Michael Gamaliel Plata
(Michael) and one for Illegal Possession of Firearms against Robert Cagara (Cagara). On the
other hand, Michael, Ruben Plata (Ruben) and several others filed several complaints against
petitioners Rosalinda, Randall, Rainier, and several individual. The Office of the City Prosecutor
dismissed the complaints filed against the petitioners for lack of sufficient basis both in fact and
in law. The respondents filed their separate petitions before the DOJ. The DOJ modified the
Joint Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor and ordered the filing of separate
informations for Slight Oral Defamation, Light Threats, Attempted Homicide, Malicious Mischief,

and Theft against Rosalinda, Rainier, Randall and the other respondents in the above cases.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The DOJ reconsidered its findings and ruled that
there was no probable cause. In its Resolution, dated June 6, 2000, the DOJ set aside its
directed the Office of the City Prosecutor to withdraw the informations. The respondents moved
for a reconsideration of the June 6, 2000 Resolution but the DOJ denied the motion.
The respondents elevated the matter to the CA by way of certiorari ascribing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Secretary which ordered the withdrawal of the
separate informations. The CA annulled and set aside the recent Resolutions of the DOJ and
reinstated its March 23, 2000 Resolution. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court can interfere with the discretion of the prosecutor
RULING:
The petition is granted.
The well-established rule is that the conduct of preliminary investigation for the purpose
of determining the existence of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public
prosecutor. Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provided that all criminal actions either
commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control
of a public prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule of the public prosecutor or in the event of
lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of
the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the
approval of the court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private
prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to end of the trial even in the absence of a
public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by a complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a
criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the
complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party, according to
whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court considers it a sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the conduct of
preliminary investigations and to leave the DOJ wide latitude of discretion in the determination
of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of the
supposed offenders. The rule is based not only upon the respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the executive department but upon
practicality as well.
In this special action, this Court is being asked to assume the function of a public
prosecutor. It is being asked to determine whether probable cause exists as regards petitioners.
More concretely, the Court is being asked to examine and assess such evidence as has thus far
been submitted by the parties and, on the basis thereof, make a conclusion as to whether or not
it suffices to engender a well founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It is a function that this Court
should not be called upon to perform. It is a function that properly pertains to the public

prosecutor, one that, as far as crimes cognizable by a Regional Trial Court are concerned, and
notwithstanding that it involves adjudication process of a sort, exclusively pertains, by law, to
said executive officer, the public prosecutor. It is moreover a function that in the established
scheme of things, is supposed to be performed at the very genesis of, indeed, prefatorily to, the
formal commencement of a criminal action. The proceedings before a public prosecutor, it may
well be stressed, are essentially preliminary, prefatory, and cannot lead to a final, definite and
authoritative adjudgment of the guilt or innocence of the persons charged with a felony or crime.
The rule is that this Court will not interfere in the findings of the DOJ Secretary on the
insufficiency of the evidence presented to establish probable cause unless it is shown that the
questioned acts were done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment evidencing a
clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse
of discretion, thus "means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction." The party seeking the writ of certiorari must establish that the DOJ
Secretary exercised his executive power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as would
amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law.
In the present case, there was no clear evidence of grave abuse of discretion committed
by the DOJ when it set aside its March 23, 2000 Resolution and reinstated the July 28, 1998
Resolution of the public prosecutor. The conclusions arrived at by the DOJ were neither
whimsical nor capricious as to be corrected by certiorari. Even on the assumption that the DOJ
Secretary made erroneous conclusions, such error alone would not subject his act to correction
or annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. After all, not "every erroneous conclusion
of law or fact is an abuse of discretion."
LIGAYA ESGUERRA, ET AL. v. HOLCIM PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 182571, September 2, 2013
J. Reyes
The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned orders
without giving HOLCIM the chance to be heard. Since HOLCIM was not given an opportunity to
rebut the petitioners evidence, considering that the formers Manifestation and Motion for
Ocular Inspection was denied, justice will be better served if the trial court determines first the
existence of documents relative to HOLCIMs payments made to de Guzman, and if the same is
not done, to receive further evidence, this time, from both parties. In the examination of a
person, corporation, or other juridical entity who has the property of such judgment obligor or is
indebted to him, and such person, corporation, or juridical entity denies an indebtedness, the
court may only authorize the judgment obligee to institute an action against such person or
corporation for the recovery of such interest or debt. Nothing in the Rules gives the court the
authority to order such person or corporation to pay the judgment obligee and the court exceeds
its jurisdiction if it orders the person who denies the indebtedness to pay the same. The Court
held that an "execution of a judgment can only be issued against one who is a party to the
action, and not against one who, not being a party thereto, did not have his day in court. Due
process dictates that a court decision can only bind a party to the litigation and not against
innocent third parties.
FACTS:

Esguerra filed an action to annul the Free Patent in the name of de Guzman. Esguerra
claimed that he was the owner of Lot 3308-B covered by TCT No. T-1685-P (M). Esguerra
learned that the said parcel of land was being offered for sale by de Guzman to Hi-Cement
Corporation (now HOLCIM Philippines, Inc.).The former possessor of the land, Felisa Maningas,
was issued Free Patent No. 575674 which was subsequently issued in the name of de Guzman
over said parcel of land and described in Psu-216349, covered by OCT No. P-3876. Esguerra
also demanded that the portion of his property, which has been encroached upon and included
in de Guzmans Free Patent, be excluded. He later amended his complaint to implead HiCement as a co-defendant since the latter was hauling marble from the subject land. He also
prayed that Hi-Cement be ordered to desist from hauling marble, to account for the marble
already hauled and to pay him.
The RTC dismissed Esguerras complaint but on appeal, the CA reversed it. The
Supreme Court affirmed the CAs decision. After attaining finality, the case was remanded to the
RTC for execution. Accordingly, the RTC made a finding that the total volume of limestone which
HOLCIM allegedly quarried from the subject land amounted to P91,872,576.72. It also ordered
the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for the royalties which were purportedly due to the
petitioners. HOLCIM filed a motion for reconsideration and motion for ocular inspection. The
RTC denied their motions. It stated that to grant the motions for reconsideration and ocular
inspection is to reopen the case despite the fact that the trial court has no more power to do so
since the execution of this Courts decision is now a matter of right on the petitioners part.
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals .The CA reversed the
decision of the RTC. The motion for reconsideration of the Petitioner was denied. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether HOLCIM is estopped to question the jurisdiction of the trial court to conduct a hearing
and to accept evidence on the exact amount of royalty
RULING:
The petition is granted.
The petitioners argue that HOLCIM is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
RTC in conducting a hearing on the exact amount of royalty that HOLCIM must pay the
petitioners. They allege that: (a) HOLCIM expressed willingness to pay the royalty to whoever
would be adjudged the rightful owner of the subject land; (b) HOLCIM and de Guzman did not
appear in the hearing nor oppose the Omnibus Motion dated September 28, 2004; (c) HOLCIM
did not file any opposition or comment on the petitioners Formal Offer of Evidence, Supplement
to the Motion for Execution and Motion for Alias Writ of Execution; and (d) HOLCIM is now the
new owner of de Guzmans property. As such, it has acquired the rights, interests and liabilities
of de Guzman. The petitioners insist that HOLCIM must not only account for the royalty it paid
de Guzman, but it must also turnover said payments to the petitioners
What is clear is that the present case emanates from the petitioners desire to implement
the CA decision which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the Decision .At the execution
stage, the only thing left for the trial court to do is to implement the final and executory
judgment; and the dispositive portion of the decision controls the execution of judgment. The
final judgment of this Court cannot be altered or modified, except for clerical errors, misprisions
or omissions.

The final judgment does not direct HOLCIM nor its predecessor Hi-Cement to pay a
certain amount to Esguerra and his heirs. What was required from HOLCIM to do was merely to
account for the payments it made to de Guzman. Apparently, this was not enforced. It may be
deduced from the records that when the petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion, they asked for the
examination of de Guzman and Hi-Cement (HOLCIM) under Sections 36 and 37 of Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court. This motion was subsequently granted by the trial court. Sections 36 and 37
of Rule 39 are resorted to only when the judgment remains unsatisfied, and there is a need for
the judgment obligor to appear and be examined concerning his property and income for their
application to the unsatisfied amount in the judgment. In the instant case, the decision in CAG.R. CV No. 40140 as affirmed by the Court calls on HOLCIM to simply make an accounting of
the royalty paid to de Guzman. Unfortunately, the trial court, instead of facilitating the accounting
of payments made by HOLCIM to de Guzman, proceeded to adduce evidence on the amount of
limestone extracted from the disputed area and imposed the monetary liability on HOLCIM.
It cannot be denied that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
questioned orders without giving HOLCIM the chance to be heard. Since HOLCIM was not
given an opportunity to rebut the petitioners evidence, considering that the formers
Manifestation and Motion for Ocular Inspection was denied, justice will be better served if the
trial court determines first the existence of documents relative to HOLCIMs payments made to
de Guzman, and if the same is not done, to receive further evidence, this time, from both
parties.
It must be emphasized, however, that the evidence to be adduced here is in relation to
the amount of royalty paid to de Guzman by HOLCIM for marbles extracted from the disputed
area of 38,451 sq m beginning March 23, 1990 up to the time HOLCIM ceased to operate in the
subject area. In the event that the petitioners claim is beyond the subject area and period, and
HOLCIM denies such indebtedness, the governing rule should be Section 43, Rule 39 .
Pursuant to this Rule, in the examination of a person, corporation, or other juridical entity
who has the property of such judgment obligor or is indebted to him (Rule 39, Section 37), and
such person, corporation, or juridical entity denies an indebtedness, the court may only
authorize the judgment obligee to institute an action against such person or corporation for the
recovery of such interest or debt. Nothing in the Rules gives the court the authority to order such
person or corporation to pay the judgment obligee and the court exceeds its jurisdiction if it
orders the person who denies the indebtedness to pay the same. In Atilano II v. Asaali, the
Court held that an "[e]xecution of a judgment can only be issued against one who is a party to
the action, and not against one who, not being a party thereto, did not have his day in court.
Due process dictates that a court decision can only bind a party to the litigation and not against
innocent third parties."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHRISTOPHER RIVERA Y ROYO
G.R. No. 200508, September 4, 2013,
J. Mendoza
Rivera claimed that AAA was his girlfriend and that sexual intercourse was consensual.
AAA went to the motel voluntarily. The sweetheart defense is an affirmative defense that must
be supported by convincing proof. Such defense is "effectively an admission of carnal
knowledge of the victim and consequently places on accused-appellant the burden of proving
the alleged relationship by substantial evidence." Independent proof is required. It cannot be

argued that because AAA voluntarily went with Rivera to the Ilang-Ilang Lodge, she consented
to have sex with him. To presume otherwise would be non sequitur. It must be noted that AAA,
who was not in good terms with a co-worker, wanted a change in employer. She easily believed
Rivera who convinced her that he could help her look for a new job. Thus, she trusted Rivera
and went along with him because of his assurance that he could help her find a new
employment.
FACTS:
AAA had a misunderstanding with a co-worker and wanted to change her employer.
Rivera offered to help her look for another job. On September 29, 2004, AAA went with Rivera
believing that the latter will bring her to his parent's house in Quiapo. Rivera brought her to Ilang
Ilang Motel located along Quezon Boulevard. When they entered a room, Rivera had sexual
intercourse with AAA against her will and without her consent. AAA did not complain to the
nearest police station because she was ashamed and thought of bringing Rivera to her cousin's
house.
For the defense, Rivera claimed that AAA was his girlfriend and she voluntarily went with
him to the Ilang Ilang lodging house in Quiapo. The other defense witness, Dueo, the cashier
at the lodging house, supported the version of Rivera. She observed that both were happy when
they checked in at the lodge and added that it was even AAA who paid for the room.
The RTC rendered its judgment finding Rivera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether there is rape in the instant case
RULING:
Inasmuch as the crime of rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or even
secrecy, it is usually the victim alone who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual
intercourse. Therefore, in a prosecution for rape, the credibility of the victim is almost always the
single and most important point to consider. Thus, if the victims testimony meets the test of
credibility, the accused can justifiably be convicted on the basis of this testimony; otherwise, the
accused should be acquitted of the crime.
The rule in this regard, applicable to this case, is: "The assessment of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its
unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and
attitude under grilling examination. These are the utmost significant factors in evaluating the
sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting
testimonies. Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be
expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which
witness to disbelieve. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on
appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended
or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case."
The Court, in its own assessment of the case, casts no doubt on AAAs credibility and to
the truthfulness of her testimony, as opposed to Riveras weak reliance on the "sweetheart
theory." Not even an iota of ill motive to file such a malicious case for rape on the part of AAA

was shown by Rivera to at least discredit her claim that the act was not consensual. As held in
People v. Cabanilla, the sweetheart defense is an affirmative defense that must be supported by
convincing proof. As correctly ruled by the CA, such defense is "effectively an admission of
carnal knowledge of the victim and consequently places on accused-appellant the burden of
proving the alleged relationship by substantial evidence." Independent proof is required.
It cannot be argued that because AAA voluntarily went with Rivera to the Ilang-Ilang
Lodge, she consented to have sex with him. To presume otherwise would be non sequitur. It
must be noted that AAA, who was not in good terms with a co-worker, wanted a change in
employer. She easily believed Rivera who convinced her that he could help her look for a new
job. Thus, she trusted Rivera and went along with him because of his assurance that he could
help her find a new employment.
AAAs failure to shout or to tenaciously resist appellant should not be taken against her
since such negative assertion would not ipso facto make voluntary her submission to appellants
criminal act. In rape, the force and intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victims
perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime. As already settled in our
jurisprudence, not all victims react the same way. Some people may cry out, some may faint,
some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may appear to yield to the intrusion. Some
may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all.
Moreover, resistance is not an element of rape. A rape victim has no burden to prove that she
did all within her power to resist the force or intimidation employed upon her. As long as the
force or intimidation is present, whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point.
In his last ditch effort to secure his exoneration, Rivera pointed out that the records were
bereft of evidence to prove that AAA suffered vaginal lacerations. The lack of lacerated wounds
in the vagina, however, does not negate sexual intercourse. Laceration of the hymen, even if
considered the most telling and irrefutable physical evidence of sexual assault, is not always
essential to establish the consummation of the crime of rape. In the context used in the RPC,
"carnal knowledge," unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily
require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. Accordingly, granting
arguendo that AAA did not suffer any laceration, Rivera would still be guilty of rape after it was
clearly established that he did succeed in having carnal knowledge of her. At any rate, it has
been repeatedly held that the medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a
prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely corroborative in character and not essential to
a conviction.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GILBERT REYES WAGAS
G.R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013
J. Bersamin
Alberto Lagaray filed a complaint for estafa against Gilbert Reyes for allegedly placing
orders over the phone and issuing a check with insufficient fund as payment. Alberto Ligaray
expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with whom he was transacting
over the telephone.
The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved. In order to overcome the presumption of innocence, the Prosecution is
required to adduce against him nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. Such proof is
not only in relation to the elements of the offense, but also in relation to the identity of the

offender. If the Prosecution fails to discharge its heavy burden, then it is not only the right of the
accused to be freed, it becomes the Courts constitutional duty to acquit him.
FACTS:
Alberto Ligaray filed a complaint for estafa against Wagas, who allegedly placed an
order for 200 bags of rice over the telephone. Ligaray released the goods to Caada the
brother-in-law of Wagas who had given him a postdated check, which was dishonored when
presented for payment because of insufficiency of funds. Ligaray admitted that he did not
personally meet Wagas because they transacted through telephone only; that he released the
200 bags of rice directly to Robert Caada, the brother-in-law of Wagas, who signed the delivery
receipt upon receiving the rice.
In his defense, Wagas admitted having issued the said check to Caada, his brother-inlaw, not to Ligaray. He denied having any telephone conversation or any dealings with Ligaray.
He explained that the check was intended as payment for a portion of Caadas property that he
wanted to buy, but when the sale did not push through, he did not anymore fund the check.
Wagas admitted the letter signed and addressed to Ligarays counsel, wherein he admitted
owing Ligaray P200, 000.00 for goods received, but insisted that it was Caada who had
transacted with Ligaray, and that he had signed the letter only because his sister and her
husband (Caada) had begged him to assume the responsibility.
The RTC convicted Wagas of estafa .Wagas filed a motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, opining that
the evidence Wagas desired to present at a new trial did not qualify as newly discovered, and
that there was no compelling ground to reverse its decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the Prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the existence of all the elements
of the crime of estafa as charged, as well as the identity of the perpetrator of the crime
RULING:
In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself,
must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, the Prosecution did not
establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the
check.
Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with whom
he was transacting over the telephone. Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made
payable to cash. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, this type of check was payable to the
bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery without the need of an indorsement. This
rendered it highly probable that Wagas had issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody
else like Caada, his brother-in-law, who then negotiated it to Ligaray. Thirdly, Ligaray admitted
that it was Caada who received the rice from him and who delivered the check to him.
Considering that the records are bereft of any showing that Caada was then acting on behalf of
Wagas, the RTC had no factual and legal bases to conclude and find that Caada had been
acting for Wagas. This lack of factual and legal bases for the RTC to infer so obtained despite
Wagas being Caadas brother-in-law.

Finally, Ligarays declaration that it was Wagas who had transacted with him over the
telephone was not reliable because he did not explain how he determined that the person with
whom he had the telephone conversation was really Wagas whom he had not yet met or known
before then. We deem it essential for purposes of reliability and trustworthiness that a telephone
conversation like that one Ligaray supposedly had with the buyer of rice to be first authenticated
before it could be received in evidence. Among others, the person with whom the witness
conversed by telephone should be first satisfactorily identified by voice recognition or any other
means. Without the authentication, incriminating another person just by adverting to the
telephone conversation with him would be all too easy. In this respect, an identification based on
familiarity with the voice of the caller, or because of clearly recognizable peculiarities of the
caller would have sufficed. The identity of the caller could also be established by the callers
self-identification, coupled with additional evidence, like the context and timing of the telephone
call, the contents of the statement challenged, internal patterns, and other distinctive
characteristics, and disclosure of knowledge of facts known peculiarly to the caller. It is only fair
that the caller be reliably identified first before a telephone communication is accorded probative
weight. The identity of the caller may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. The
Prosecution did not tender any plausible explanation or offer any proof to definitely establish
that it had been Wagas whom Ligaray had conversed with on the telephone.
It is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the onus probandi in
establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as a consequence of the tenet
ei incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui negat, which means that he who asserts, not he who
denies, must prove, and as a means of respecting the presumption of innocence in favor of the
man or woman on the dock for a crime. Accordingly, the State has the burden of proof to show:
(1) the correct identification of the author of a crime, and (2) the actuality of the commission of
the offense with the participation of the accused. All these facts must be proved by the State
beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence and without solace from the weakness
of the defense. That the defense the accused puts up may be weak is inconsequential if, in the
first place, the State has failed to discharge the onus of his identity and culpability. The
presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the Prosecution to demonstrate the guilt and not
for the accused to establish innocence. Indeed, the accused, being presumed innocent, carries
no burden of proof on his or her shoulders. For this reason, the first duty of the Prosecution is
not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal. For even if the commission of the
crime can be established, without competent proof of the identity of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, there can be no conviction.
. SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC. v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL
G.R. No. 166836, September 4, 2013
J. Bersamin
The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the buyer
of residential subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to
compel the seller to deliver the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is properly
considered a ground to suspend a criminal prosecution for violation of Section 25 of Presidential
Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question. The administrative determination is a
logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges based on non-delivery of the TCTs.
FACTS:

San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties) purchased in 1992, 1993 and April
1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes), then represented by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain
(Orendain) as its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver appointed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). The transactions were embodied in three separate deeds of
sale. The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first and second deeds were fully delivered to
San Miguel Properties, but 20 parcels of land under the third deed of sale, executed in April
1993 and for which San Miguel Properties paid the full price were not delivered to San Miguel
Properties.
BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, San Miguel
Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor charging respondent
directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in violation of Section 25, in
relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957. At the same time, San Miguel
Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB praying to compel BF Homes
to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.
The OCP Las Pias dismissed San Miguel Properties criminal complaint for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground that no action could be filed by or against a receiver
without leave from the SEC that had appointed him; that the implementation of the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 957 exclusively pertained under the jurisdiction of the HLURB; that
there existed a prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the criminal action until after
the issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first determined by the SEC en banc or
by the HLURB; and that no prior resort to administrative jurisdiction had been made; that there
appeared to be no probable cause to indict respondents for not being the actual signatories in
the three deeds of sale. The OCP Las Pias denied San Miguel Properties motion for
reconsideration. San Miguel Properties appealed the resolutions of the OCP Las Pias to the
Department of Justice (DOJ), which were eventually denied. The CA dismissed San Miguel
Properties petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the HLURB administrative case could be a reason to suspend the proceedings on the
criminal complaint for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground
of a prejudicial question
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative
agency, raises a prejudicial question BF Homes posture that the administrative case for specific
performance in the HLURB posed a prejudicial question that must first be determined before the
criminal case for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 could be resolved is
correct.
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct
and separate from the crime but is so intimately connected with the crime that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to

avoid conflicting decisions. The essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in
Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet,
contrary to San Miguel Properties submission that there could be no prejudicial question to
speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action
for specific performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the
proceedings determining the charge for the criminal violation of Section 25 of Presidential
Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific performance was an action
civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction
over the action was exclusive and original.
The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a
prejudicial question rested on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the
specific performance case were so related with the issues raised in the criminal complaint for
the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957, such that the resolution of the issues in the former
would be determinative of the question of guilt in the criminal case.
An examination of the nature of the two cases involved is thus necessary. An action for
specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact performance of a contract in the
specific form in which it was made, or according to the precise terms agreed upon by a party
bound to fulfill it. Evidently, before the remedy of specific performance is availed of, there must
first be a breach of the contract. The remedy has its roots in Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which
provided that the power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the
obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him. The injured party may choose
between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in
either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter
should become impossible.
Accordingly, the injured party may choose between specific performance or rescission
with damages. As presently worded, Article 1191 speaks of the remedy of rescission in
reciprocal obligations within the context of Article 1124 of the former Civil Code which used the
term resolution. The remedy of resolution applied only to reciprocal obligations, such that a
partys breach of the contract equated to a tacit resolutory condition that entitled the injured
party to rescission. The present article, as in the former one, contemplates alternative remedies
for the injured party who is granted the option to pursue, as principal actions, either the
rescission or the specific performance of the obligation, with payment of damages in either
case.
On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 957 is a law that regulates the sale of
subdivision lots and condominiums in view of the increasing number of incidents wherein "real
estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their
representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly" the basic requirements and
amenities, as well as of reports of alarming magnitude of swindling and fraudulent manipulations
perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as
failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances. Presidential
Decree No. 957 authorizes the suspension and revocation of the registration and license of the
real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers in certain instances, as

well as provides the procedure to be observed in such instances; it prescribes administrative

fines and other penalties in case of violation of, or non-compliance with its provisions.
Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific performance in the HLURB would
determine whether or not San Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of
the remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes
directors and officers were criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the
former must obviously precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel
Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have
the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership having been terminated
by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential
Decree No. 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.
Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve
the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is enough for the prejudicial question to simply test the
sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the
criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically
admitted that all the essential elements of the crime have been adequately alleged in the
information, considering that the Prosecution has not yet presented a single piece of evidence
on the indictment or may not have rested its case. A challenge to the allegations in the
information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the
criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.
RODULFO VALCURZA AND BEATRIZ LASAGA, ET AL. v. ATTY. CASIMIRO N.
TAMPARONG, JR.
G.R. No. 189874, September 4, 2013
CJ. Sereno
The DARAB has jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of registered CLOAs
relating to an agrarian dispute between landowners and tenants. However, in cases concerning
the cancellation of CLOAs that involve parties who are not agricultural tenants or lessees
cases related to the administrative implementation of agrarian reform laws, rules and
regulations - the jurisdiction is with the DAR, and not the DARAB. It is the DAR and not the
DARAB that has jurisdiction. First, the issue of whether the CLOA issued to petitioners over
respondents land should be cancelled hinges on that of whether the subject landholding is
exempt from CARP coverage by virtue of two zoning ordinances. This question involves the
DARs determination of whether the subject land is indeed exempt from CARP coverage a
matter involving the administrative implementation of the CARP Law. Second, respondents
complaint does not allege that the prayer for the cancellation of the CLOA was in connection
with an agrarian dispute. The complaint is centered on the fraudulent acts of the MARO, PARO,
and the regional director that led to the issuance of the CLOA.
FACTS:
Casimiro N. Tamparong, Jr. (respondent) is the registered owner of a land pursuant to a
judicial decree. The Sangguniang Bayan of Villanueva, Misamis Oriental allegedly passed a
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance classifying respondents land from agricultural to industrial.
The DAR Secretary eventually issued Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) over the
land in favor of Petitioners.

Respondent filed a protest against the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program

(CARP) coverage on the ground that his land was industrial, being found within the industrial
estate of PHIVIDEC per Zoning Ordinance No. 123. Regional Director Benjamin R. de Vera
denied respondents protest. Aggrieved, Respondent filed a Complaint for Annulment of CLOA
and Cancellation of OCT No. E-4640 with the Provincial Adjudication Reform and Adjudication
Board (PARAB). He questioned the issuance of the CLOA on the ground that his land had long
been classified by the municipality as industrial. It was also covered by Presidential
Proclamation No. 1962, being adjacent to the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate, and was thus
exempted from CARP coverage.
The PARAB declared that Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance had reclassified Lot No.
2252 from agricultural to industrial land prior to the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law. It held that the complaint was not a protest or an application for exemption, but
also for annulment and cancellation of title over which DARAB had jurisdiction. As the PARAB
exercised delegated authority from the DARAB, it was but proper for the former to rule on the
complaint. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, the PARAB found the CARP coverage irregular
and anomalous because the issuance of the CLOA, as well as its registration with the Register
of Deeds, happened before the survey plan was approved by the DENR.
On appeal, CA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Respondent filed a Petition for
Review with the CA, which ruled that the annulment of duly registered CLOAs with the Land
Registration Authority falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB and not of the regional
director and the subject landholding was considered industrial because of a zoning
classification. The case was elevated to the SC. Petitioner alleged that it is the DAR and not the
DARAB that has jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether the DARAB has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
RULING:
The jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the nature and subject matter of an action is
conferred by law. The court or tribunal must look at the material allegations in the complaint, the
issues or questions that are the subject of the controversy, and the character of the relief prayed
for in order to determine whether the nature and subject matter of the complaint is within its
jurisdiction. If the issues between the parties are intertwined with the resolution of an issue
within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court or tribunal, the dispute must be addressed and
resolved by the said court or tribunal.
Section 50 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 229 vests the DAR with quasi-judicial powers
to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, as well as with exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. The jurisdiction of
the DAR over the adjudication of agrarian reform cases was later on delegated to the DARAB,
while the formers jurisdiction over agrarian reform implementation was assigned to its regional
offices.
The DARAB has jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of registered CLOAs
relating to an agrarian dispute between landowners and tenants. However, in cases concerning
the cancellation of CLOAs that involve parties who are not agricultural tenants or lessees

cases related to the administrative implementation of agrarian reform laws, rules and
regulations - the jurisdiction is with the DAR, and not the DARAB.
It is the DAR and not the DARAB that has jurisdiction. First, the issue of whether the CLOA
issued to petitioners over respondents land should be cancelled hinges on that of whether the
subject landholding is exempt from CARP coverage by virtue of two zoning ordinances. This
question involves the DARs determination of whether the subject land is indeed exempt from
CARP coverage a matter involving the administrative implementation of the CARP Law.
Second, respondents complaint does not allege that the prayer for the cancellation of the CLOA
was in connection with an agrarian dispute. The complaint is centered on the fraudulent acts of
the MARO, PARO, and the regional director that led to the issuance of the CLOA.
HEIRS OF MELENCIO YU, ET AL. v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL
G.R. No. 182371, September 4, 2013
J. Peralta
The CA issued a TRO in order to stop the demolition order. It is settled that a writ of
preliminary injunction should be issued only to prevent grave and irreparable injury, that is,
injury that is actual, substantial, and demonstrable. Here, there is no "irreparable injury" as
understood in law. Rather, the damages alleged by the petitioner, namely," immense loss in
profit and possible damage claims from clients" and the cost of the billboard which is "a
considerable amount of money" is easily quantifiable, and certainly does not fall within the
concept of irreparable damage or injury.
Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule relative to the issuance of
injunction where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable
accuracy. "An irreparable injury which a court of equity will enjoin includes that degree of wrong
of a repeated and continuing kind which produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be
estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard of measurement." An
irreparable injury to authorize an injunction consists of a serious charge of, or is destructive to,
the property it affects, either physically or in the character in which it has been held and
enjoined, or when the property has some peculiar quality or use, so that its pecuniary value will
not fairly recompense the owner of the loss thereof. Here, any damage petitioner may suffer is
easily subject to mathematical computation and, if proven, is fully compensable by damages.
Thus, a preliminary injunction is not warranted.
FACTS:
Spouses Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga filed a civil case against John Z. Sycip.
The Trial court declared that Melencio Yu is the rightful owner of the said real property. The
judgment later attained finality. During the pendency of the said case, squatters entered the
subject lot. Consequently, when a writ of execution and an order of demolition were issued by
the trial court, a group of squatters known as Yard Urban Homeowners Association, Inc.
(YUHAI) filed a complaint for injunction with damages and prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction (WPI)or temporary restraining order (TRO).
RTC Br. 23 granted petitioners motion to implement the writ of demolition. A Special
Order of Demolition was issued. Thereafter, a notice to vacate was issued. YUHAI filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA issued a TRO but it later revoked it. Petitioners filed
a Motion to Resume and Complete Demolition pursuant to the Special Order, which was
granted.

Private respondents filed a Special Appearance with Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion
again arguing that they should not be included in the demolition as they are not parties to both
cases. Upon, denial, a petition for certiorari with prayer for TRO and/or WPI seeking to set aside
the October 9, 2007 Order was filed before the CA.
The CA issued a TRO but was later vacated for being moot and academic because the
writ of demolition was already executed and completed. Arguing in main that there was no
complete demolition and no proper turn-over of the contested lot on December 13, 2007, private
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration with very urgent prayer for immediate issuance of
WPI and WPMI. The CA resolved to grant the prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. On
the same day, the writ was issued by respondent Rosemarie D. Anacan-Dizon. Aggrieved,
petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and, later, an Urgent Motion for
Dissolution of the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and without waiting for the CA
resolution on the two motions, petitioner filed the present case before the SC.
ISSUES:
Whether the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction by Dizon is proper
RULING:
The petition is granted.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior
to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which
case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. To justify the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, it must be shown that: (1) the complainant has a clear legal
right; (2) such right has been violated and the invasion by the other party is material and
substantial; and (3) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely
contingent and may never arise since, to be protected by injunction, the alleged right must be
clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.
In this case, there is doubt on private respondents entitlement to a preliminary
mandatory injunction since the evidence presented before the respondent CA in support thereof
appears to be weak and inconclusive, and the alleged right sought to be protected is
vehemently disputed. The documentary evidence presented by private respondents does not
suffice to prove their ownership and possession of the contested lot. Notably, both the Quitclaim
Deed allegedly executed on April 16, 1957 by the spouses Melencio Yu and Talinanap
Matualaga in favor of Alfonso Aguinaldo Non and the Transfer of Free Patent Rights allegedly
executed on May 28, 1957 by Melencio Yu in favor of Concepcion Non Andres were among
those documents already declared null and void by the trial court in Civil Case No.1291 on the
grounds that: (a) the spouses never received any consideration for said conveyances; (b) the
documents were falsified; (c) the instruments were not approved by the Provincial Governor or
his duly-authorized representative pursuant to Sections 145 and 146 of the Revised
Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu; (d) all transactions were restricted by the law
governing free patent; and (e) Lot No. 2, Psu-135740-Amd is a paraphernal property of
Talinanap Matualaga and was sold without her consent.

It is settled that a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued only to prevent grave
and irreparable injury, that is, injury that is actual, substantial, and demonstrable. Here, there is
no "irreparable injury" as understood in law. Rather, the damages alleged by the petitioner,
namely," immense loss in profit and possible damage claims from clients" and the cost of the
billboard which is "a considerable amount of money" is easily quantifiable, and certainly does
not fall within the concept of irreparable damage or injury. As described in Social Security
Commission v. Bayona, damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule relative to the
issuance of injunction where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with
reasonable accuracy. "An irreparable injury which a court of equity will enjoin includes that
degree of wrong of a repeated and continuing kind which produce hurt, inconvenience, or
damage that can be estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard of
measurement." An irreparable injury to authorize an injunction consists of a serious charge of,
or is destructive to, the property it affects, either physically or in the character in which it has
been held and enjoined, or when the property has some peculiar quality or use, so that its
pecuniary value will not fairly recompense the owner of the loss thereof.
Here, any damage petitioner may suffer is easily subject to mathematical computation
and, if proven, is fully compensable by damages. Thus, a preliminary injunction is not
warranted. As previously held in Golding v. Balatbat, the writ of injunction should never issue
when an action for damages would adequately compensate the injuries caused. The very
foundation of the jurisdiction to issue the writ rests in the probability of irreparable injury, the
inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of the multiplicity of suits, and where
facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of injunction should be
refused.
KOPPEL, INC. v. MAKATI ROTARY CLUB FOUNDATION, INC.
G.R. No. 198075, September 4, 201
J. Perez
Petitioner may still invoke the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract
notwithstanding the fact that it assails the validity of such contract. This is due to the doctrine of
separability. Under the doctrine of separability, an arbitration agreement is considered as
independent of the main contract. Being a separate contract in itself, the arbitration agreement
may thus be invoked regardless of the possible nullity or invalidity of the main contract.
FACTS:
In 1975, Fedders Koppel Inc.(FKI) bequeathed a parcel of land in favor of respondent
Makati Rotary Club Foundation, Inc. by way of a conditional donation. One of the conditions of
the donation required the respondent to lease the subject land back to FKI under terms
specified in their Deed of Donation. The Deed of Donation also stipulated that the lease over the
subject property is renewable for another period of twenty-five (25) years subject to their mutual
agreement. Two (2) days before the lease was set to expire, a new contact of lease (2000
Lease Contract) was entered into by the parties which contained an arbitration clause
enforceable in the event the parties come to disagreement about the" interpretation, application
and execution" of the lease.
The 2000 Lease Contract was renewed for another five (5) years. This new lease (2005
Lease Contract) required FKI to pay a fixed annual rent. In addition to paying the fixed rent,
however, the 2005 Lease Contract obligated FKI to make a yearly donation of money to the

respondent. Notably, the 2005 Lease Contract contained an arbitration clause similar to that in
the 2000 Lease Contract.
FKI sold all its rights and properties relative to its business in favor of herein petitioner
Koppel, Inc. Petitioner assumed all the rights and obligations of FKI under the Lease Contract.
However, petitioner did not comply with the terms and conditions of the 2005 Lease Contract
despite repeated demands by the respondent. Instead, petitioner filed with the RTC a complaint
for the rescission or cancellation of the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed of Donation
against the respondent. Thus, the Respondent filed an unlawful detainer case with the MeTC.
Petitioner averred that pursuant to the 2005 Lease Contract the disagreement between the
parties should first be referred to arbitration. MeTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. The RTC
reversed the MeTC, which was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner can invoke the arbitration clause and yet impugn the validity of the 2005
Lease Contract
RULING:
The arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract stipulates that "any disagreement" as
to the interpretation, application or execution " of the 2005 Lease Contract ought to be
submitted to arbitration. To the mind of this Court, such stipulation is clear and is comprehensive
enough so as to include virtually any kind of conflict or dispute that may arise from the 2005
Lease Contract including the one that presently besets petitioner and respondent.
First, the disagreement between the petitioner and respondent falls within the allencompassing terms of the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract. While it may be
conceded that in the arbitration of such disagreement, the validity of the 2005 Lease Contract,
or at least, of such contracts rental stipulations would have to be determined, the same would
not render such disagreement non-arbitrable.)
Second, petitioner may still invoke the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract
notwithstanding the fact that it assails the validity of such contract. This is due to the doctrine of
separability.
Under the doctrine of separability, an arbitration agreement is considered as
independent of the main contract. Being a separate contract in itself, the arbitration agreement
may thus be invoked regardless of the possible nullity or invalidity of the main contract.
Once again instructive is Cargill, wherein this Court held that, as a further consequence
of the doctrine of separability, even the very party who repudiates the main contract may invoke
its arbitration clause.
Third, the operation of the arbitration clause in this case is not at all defeated by the
failure of the petitioner to file a formal "request" or application therefor with the MeTC. We find
that the filing of a "request" pursuant to Section 24 of R.A. No. 9285 is not the sole means by
which an arbitration clause may be validly invoked in a pending suit.
JOVITO C. PLAMERAS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013

J. Perez
Plameras was found guilty of violation of RA 3019 by the Ombudsman. He appealed via
petition for review under Rule 45. Petitioner insists that his transaction is related to the mother
contract between the DECS and CKL Enterprises, which culminated in a case filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman, where the Ombudsman absolved the DECS officials.
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of
law. Questions of fact are not reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt is on what
the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt is on the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts. The Court reiterates the well-settled rule that, absent any clear
showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its findings of
facts, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive upon this
Court.
FACTS:
The Province of Antique was among the beneficiaries of the DECS Purchase of School
Desks Program. Petitioner during his incumbency as Provincial Governor of the Province of
Antique received two (2) checks from the DECS- Poverty Alleviation Fund drawn against the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), for the purchase of school desks and armchairs. Petitioner
signed a Purchaser-Seller Agreement for the Supply and Delivery of Monoblock Graders Desks
with CKL as represented by Jesusa T. Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz). Petitioner applied with the LBP
Head Office for the opening of an Irrevocable Domestic Letter of Credit. Such application was
approved by the LBP. Thus, Letter of Credit was issued in favor of Dela Cruz of CKL.
The petitioner signed Sales Invoice and accepted LBP Draft. The sales invoice stated
that the petitioner received and accepted 1,354 graders desks and 5,246 table armchairs in
good order and condition. Cruz of CKL Enterprises submitted the said sales invoice and draft to
the LBP Head Office. Thereupon, the said bank fully negotiated the letter of credit for the full
amount and remitted its proceeds to Land Bank Pasig City Branch for credit to the account of
CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz, charging the full payment to the Provincial School Board/Governor
Jovito Plameras, Jr. Province of Antique.
Upon inquiry by the petitioner, he learned that CKL had delivered only 1,294 pieces of
graders desks and 1,838 pieces of tablet armchairs. The petitioner demanded from CKL
Enterprises/Dela Cruz, the complete delivery of the purchased items. For failure to settle the
matter, a case was filed by the Province of Antique, represented by its new Governor, Exequiel
B. Javier against CKL Enterprises to refund the amount paid. While the civil case was pending,
Governor Javier likewise instituted a criminal complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman
against petitioner for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Office of the Ombudsman
found probable cause to indict petitioner for the offense charge. A case was filed against the
petitioner for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Sandiganbayan rendered a
decision finding the petitioner guilty of the crime charged.
ISSUE:
Whether there is a misappreciation of facts and evidence
RULING:

The petition is denied.

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for review on certiorari
"shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth." In Pagsibigan v. People, the
Court held that:
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of
law. Questions of fact are not reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on
what the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
The Court reiterates the well-settled rule that, absent any clear showing of abuse,
arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its findings of facts, especially
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive upon this Court. As held in
the case of Navallo v. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that "xxx Findings of fact made by a trial
court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate tribunal and, absent a clear
disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the results of the case, those
findings should not be ignored xxx."
Indeed, even if the foregoing rules were, to be relaxed in the interest of substantial
justice, this Court, nevertheless finds no reason to disagree with the comparative analysis of the
Sandiganbayan between the 1996DECS contract and the contract subject matter of this case,
which resulted in the conclusion that the two contracts are different, separate and distinct from
one another. Otherwise, there would have been no need for a separate check issued to the
petitioner and for the opening of a letter of credit in favor of CKL Enterprise, in the same way,
that it becomes unnecessary to draft another Purchaser-Seller Agreement the same being
already covered by the prior contract where CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz was fully paid in the
amount of P81,788,170.70 under Check No. 247768 dated 24 December 1996.
In all, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan committed reversible
errors in finding him guilty of the offense charged.
HERNANDO BORRA, JOHN PACHEO, ET AL. v. CA, 2ND AND 19TH DIVISIONS AND
HAWAIIAN PHILIPPINE COMPANY
G.R. No. 167484, September 9, 2013
J. Peralta
There can be no forum shopping in the instant case because the grounds cited by
private respondent in its motions to dismiss filed in 1998 and in the present case are different.
In 1998, the motion to dismiss is based on the argument that the final and executory decision in
the Perez case serves as res judicata and, thus, bars the re-litigation of the issue of employeremployee relations between private respondent and petitioners. In the instant case, private
respondent again cites res judicata as a ground for its motion to dismiss. This time, however,
the basis for such ground is not Perez but the final and executory decision in RAB Case No. 0609-10699-97. Thus, the relief prayed for in private respondent's motion to dismiss subject of the
instant case is founded on totally different facts and issues.
FACTS:

In 1997, Petitioners filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) two (2)
separate complaints. RAB Case No.06-09-10698-97 was filed against herein private respondent
alone, while RAB Case No. 06-09-10699-97 impleaded herein private respondent and a certain
Fela Contractor as respondents. In RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97, herein petitioners asked
that they be recognized and confirmed as regular employees of herein private respondent and
further prayed that they be awarded various benefits received by regular employees for three (3)
years prior to the filing of the complaint, while in RAB Case No. 06-09-10699-97, herein
petitioners sought for payment of unpaid wages, holiday pay, allowances, 13th month pay,
service incentive leave pay, moral and exemplary damages also during the three (3) years
preceding the filing of the complaint.
In 1998, Private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss RAB Case No. 06-09-0698-97 on
the ground of res judicata. Private respondent cited an earlier decided case entitled "Humphrey
Perez, et al. v. Hawaiian Philippine Co. et al." (Perez case), which was an action for recovery of
13th month pay and service incentive leave pay. It includes herein petitioners among the
complainants and herein private respondent and one Jose Castillon (Castillon) as respondents.
Private respondent contended that the Perez case, which has already become final and
executory serves as a bar to the litigation of RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97, because it was
ruled therein that petitioners are not employees of private respondent but of Castillon.
The Labor Arbiter granted the Motion to Dismiss. On appeal, NLRC set aside the Order
of the Labor Arbiter and reinstated the complaint in RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97. The CA
affirmed the decision of NLRC. The Supreme Court affirmed the Decision of the CA. In the
meantime, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in RAB Case No. 06-09-10699-97 holding that
there is no employer-employee relations between private respondent and petitioners. The
decision became final and executory.
Private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97 on the
ground of among others, of res judicata. Private respondent contended that the final and
executory Decision of the Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 06-09-10699-97 serves as a bar to the
further litigation of RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97. The Labor Arbiter denied the Motion to
Dismiss. Private respondent then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA. The
CA granted the petition.
ISSUES:
1) Whether there is res judicata in the instant case
2) Whether private respondent is guilty of forum shopping
RULING:
The principle of res judicata is applicable by way of (1) "bar by prior judgment" and (2)
"conclusiveness of judgment." This Court had occasion to explain the difference between these
two aspects of res judicata as follows: there is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the
first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred,
there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in
the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or
decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the
parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same
cause of action before the same or other tribunal. But where there is identity of parties in the
first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only

as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters
merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of
judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily
involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be
litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or
subject matter of the two actions is the same.
Forum-shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) by filing multiple cases based on
the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved
yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) by filing multiple cases based on the
same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved
(where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) by filing multiple cases based on the
same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground
for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). More particularly, the elements of
forum-shopping are: (a) identity of parties or at least such parties that represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; (c) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata
in the action under consideration.
In the instant case, there can be no forum shopping, because the grounds cited by
private respondent in its motions to dismiss filed in 1998 and in the present case are different. In
1998, the motion to dismiss is based on the argument that the final and executory decision in
the Perez case serves as res judicata and, thus, bars the re-litigation of the issue of employeremployee relations between private respondent and petitioners. In the instant case, private
respondent again cites res judicata as a ground for its motion to dismiss because of the final
and executory decision in RAB Case No. 06-09-10699-97. Thus, the relief prayed for in private
respondent's motion to dismiss subject of the instant case is founded on totally different facts
and issues.
. CORAZON S. CRUZ UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE, VILLA CORAZON CONDO
DORMITORY v. MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 184732, September 9, 2013

J. Perlas-Bernabe
Jurisprudence dictates that the appellees role in the appeal process is confined only to
the task of refuting the assigned errors interposed by the appellant. Since the appellee is not
the party who instituted the appeal and accordingly has not complied with the procedure
prescribed therefor, he merely assumes a defensive stance and his interest solely relegated to
the affirmance of the judgment appealed from. Keeping in mind that the right to appeal is
essentially statutory in character, it is highly erroneous for the appellee to either assign any
error or seek any affirmative relief or modification of the lower courts judgment without
interposing its own appeal.
The CA committed a reversible error in sustaining the dismissal of the Pasig case on the
ground of improper venue because the same was not an error raised by Cruz who was the
appellant before it. The CA cannot take cognizance of MIAAs position that the venue was
improperly laid since, being the appellee, MIAAs participation was confined to the refutation of
the appellants assignment of errors.
FACTS:

Cruz filed before the RTC-Pasig City a complaint for breach of contract, consignation,
and damages against respondent Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA). In her complaint,
Cruz alleged that she executed a Contract of Lease with MIAA and the latter failed to inform her
that part of the leased premises is subject to an easement of public use since the same was
adjacent to the Paraaque River. As a result, she was not able to obtain a building permit as
well as a certificate of electrical inspection from the MERALCO, leading to her consequent
failure to secure an electrical connection.
MIAA filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of forum shopping and improper venue.
The RTC-Pasig City issued an Order dismissing Cruzs complaint. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was, however, denied. Thus, Cruz filed a notice of appeal. On the other
hand, MIAA filed its Defendant-Appellees Brief refuting Cruzs arguments. In addition, MIAA
raised its argument on improper venue which had been previously denied by the RTC. The CA
affirmed with modification the RTC decision. Cruz moved for reconsideration but was denied by
the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals can resolve the issue raised by the appellee
RULING:
Jurisprudence dictates that the appellees role in the appeal process is confined only to
the task of refuting the assigned errors interposed by the appellant. Since the appellee is not the
party who instituted the appeal and accordingly has not complied with the procedure prescribed
therefor, he merely assumes a defensive stance and his interest solely relegated to the
affirmance of the judgment appealed from. Keeping in mind that the right to appeal is essentially
statutory in character, it is highly erroneous for the appellee to either assign any error or seek
any affirmative relief or modification of the lower courts judgment without interposing its own
appeal. As held in the case of Medida v. CA:
An appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any
affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the court below. He cannot
impugn the correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him. He cannot assign such errors
as are designed to have the judgment modified. All that said appellee can do is to make a
counter-assignment of errors or to argue on issues raised at the trial only for the purpose of
sustaining the judgment in his favor, even on grounds not included in the decision of the court a
quo nor raised in the appellant's assignment of errors or arguments.
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the CA committed a reversible error in sustaining
the dismissal of the Pasig case on the ground of improper venue because the same was not an
error raised by Cruz who was the appellant before it. Pursuant to the above-mentioned
principles, the CA cannot take cognizance of MIAAs position that the venue was improperly laid
since, being the appellee, MIAAs participation was confined to the refutation of the appellants
assignment of errors. As MIAAs interest was limited to sustaining the RTC-Pasig Citys
judgment, it cannot, without pursuing its own appeal, deviate from the pronouncements made
therein. In particular, records bear out that the RTC-Pasig City, while granting MIAAs motion to
dismiss, found the latters argument on improper venue to be erroneous. Hence, given that the
said conclusion was not properly contested by MIAA on appeal, the RTC-Pasig Citys ruling on
the matter should now be deemed as conclusive. Corollary, the CA should not have taken this

ground into consideration when it appreciated the case before it. By acting otherwise, it
therefore committed a reversible error, which thereby warrants the reversal of its Decision.
ENGINEER MANOLITO P. MENDOZA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 195395, September 10, 2013
J. Leonen
In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not
lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party was
given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process. As
long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not
denied due process. Mendoza was afforded due process despite his claim that he had never
personally received a copy of the Notice of Disallowance/s. He was able to file the Motion for
Reconsideration. The Commission gave due course to the Motion and ruled on the merits.
Petitioner Mendoza, therefore, has been duly afforded an opportunity to explain his side and
seek a reconsideration of the ruling he assails, which is the "essence of administrative due
process."
FACTS:
Mendoza is the general manager of Talisay Water District. The Commission on Audit
(COA) disallowed a total amount of P380,208.00 which Mendoza received as part of his salary
as the Water District's general manager from 2005 to 2006. COA found that petitioner
Mendoza's salary as general manager was not in consonance with the rate prescribed under
Salary Standardization Law and the approved Plantilla of Position of the district. COA also found
that Mendoza's claim of salary was not supported with an Appointment duly attested by the Civil
Service Commission. Payment to petitioner Mendoza was, therefore, illegal.
COA issued the "Notice of Finality of COA Decision" informing petitioner Mendoza of the
finality of the Notice of Disallowance/s. Mendoza filed his Motion for Reconsideration of the
"Notice of Finality of COA Decision." He assailed the finality of the Notice of Disallowance/s,
arguing that he had not personally received a copy of this, which deprived him of the opportunity
to answer the Notice immediately. The Commission on Audit denied petitioner Mendoza's
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. It found that the Notice of Disallowance/s had been
received by petitioner Mendoza's employee and ruled that petitioner Mendoza is deemed to
have received, the Notice of Disallowance/s constructively. It likened the service of the Notice of
Disallowance/s to the service of summons. The Commission also noted that technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings; therefore,
petitioner Mendoza cannot invoke the defense of technicality.
ISSUE:
Whether the Notice of Disallowance/s became final and executory despite lack of personal
service on petitioner Mendoza
RULING:
The Commission on Audit issued the Notice of Disallowance/s on May 28, 2007. The 1997
Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit governed pleading and practice in the
Commission during this period. Section 5 of Rule IV stated that the report, Certificate of

Settlement and Balances, notice of disallowances and charges, and order or decision of the
Auditor shall be prepared in such number of copies as may be necessary for distribution to the
following: (1) original to the head of agency being audited; (2) one copy to the Auditor for his
record; (3) one copy to the Director who has jurisdiction over the agency of the government
under audit; (4) other copies to the agency officials directly affected by the audit findings.
Section 6 of the said Rules provided that unless a request for reconsideration in filed or an
appeal is taken, the report, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, order or decision of the
Auditor shall become final upon the expiration of six (6) months after notice thereof to the
parties concerned.
In this case, copies of the Notice of Disallowance/s were received on May 29, 2007 by "the
Agency Head," "Accountant," and "Persons Liable" with their signatures appearing beside the
three designations. Petitioner Mendoza never disputed this fact. After his receipt of the Notice of
Finality of COA Decision on August 27, 2009, petitioner Mendoza filed the Motion for
Reconsideration dated September 10, 2009. The Commission on Audit gave due course to the
Motion for Reconsideration and issued the assailed Decision two (2) years after the issuance of
the Notice of Disallowance/s. It ruled that petitioner Mendoza's salary is covered by the Salary
Standardization Law. These circumstances show that the Notice of Disallowance/s was served
on the necessary officers in accordance with the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the
Commission on Audit.
Moreover, this Court En Banc in Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission ruled that:
Time and again, we have held that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity
to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or
an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the application
of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice
but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party was given the opportunity to
defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process. Mendoza was afforded due
process despite his claim that he had never personally received a copy of the Notice of
Disallowance/s. He was able to file the Motion for Reconsideration. The Commission gave due
course to the Motion and ruled on the merits. Petitioner Mendoza, therefore, has been duly
afforded an opportunity to explain his side and seek a reconsideration of the ruling he assails,
which is the "essence of administrative due process."
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. ARSENIO ALDECOA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 166330, September 11, 2013
J. Leonardo-De Castro
Under the 1996 HLURB Rules of Procedure, as amended, an opposition to an
application for a locational clearance for a cellular base station or a complaint for the revocation
of a locational clearance for a cellular base station already issued, is within the original
jurisdiction of the HLURB Executive Committee. There is no showing that respondents availed
themselves of administrative remedies prior to instituting Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000 before
the RTC.
Ordinarily, failure to comply with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction will result in the dismissal of the case for lack of cause of
action. However, the Court herein will not go to the extent of entirely dismissing Civil Case No.
Br. 23-632-2000. The Court does not lose sight of the fact that respondents Complaint is

primarily for abatement of nuisance; and respondents alleged the lack of HLURB requirements
for the cellular base station, not to seek nullification of petitioners locational clearance, but to
support their chief argument that said cellular base station is a nuisance which needs to be
abated.
FACTS:
Petitioner Smart Communications Inc. (Smart) entered into a contract of lease with
Florentino Sebastian in which the latter agreed to lease to the former a piece of vacant lot.
Smart immediately constructed and installed a cellular base station on the leased property.
Around and close to the cellular base station are houses, hospitals, clinics, and establishments,
including the properties of respondents. Respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint against
petitioner for abatement of nuisance and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order
and writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, declaring the cellular base station of
petitioner a nuisance that endangered the health and safety of the residents of the place. The
CA based its ruling on the following grounds: (1) the locational clearance granted to petitioner
was a nullity due to the lack of approval by majority of the actual residents of the barangay and
a barangay resolution endorsing the construction of the cellular base station; and (2) the sound
emission of the generator at the cellular base station exceeded the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) standards.
ISSUE:
Whether it was proper for the Court of Appeals to take cognizance and rule upon the validity of
nullity of locational clearance of the cellular base station
RULING:
The petition is partly meritorious.
Based on the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and its corollary doctrine
of primary jurisdiction, it was premature for the Court of Appeals to take cognizance of and rule
upon the issue of the validity or nullity of petitioners locational clearance for its cellular base
station. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. The general rule is that before a party may seek the
intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative
processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be
summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first giving such administrative
agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of
that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

Correlatively, the HLURB provides administrative remedies for non-compliance with its
requirements. In 2000, when factual precedents to the instant case began to take place, HLURB
Resolution No. R-586, series of 1996, otherwise known as the 1996 HLURB Rules of
Procedure, as amended, was in effect. The original 1996 HLURB Rules of Procedure was
precisely amended by HLURB Resolution No. R-655, series of 1999, "so as to afford oppositors
with the proper channel and expeditious means to ventilate their objections and oppositions to
applications for permits, clearances and licenses, as well as to protect the rights of applicants
against frivolous oppositions that may cause undue delay to their projects. "Under the 1996
HLURB Rules of Procedure, as amended, an opposition to an application for a locational
clearance for a cellular base station or a complaint for the revocation of a locational clearance
for a cellular base station already issued, is within the original jurisdiction of the HLURB
Executive Committee.
There is no showing that respondents availed themselves of administrative remedies
prior to instituting Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000 before the RTC. While there are accepted
exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, respondents never asserted nor argued any of them.
Ordinarily, failure to comply with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction will result in the dismissal of the case for lack of cause of
action. However, the Court herein will not go to the extent of entirely dismissing Civil Case No.
Br. 23-632-2000. The Court does not lose sight of the fact that respondents Complaint in Civil
Case No. Br. 23-632-2000 is primarily for abatement of nuisance; and respondents alleged the
lack of HLURB requirements for the cellular base station, not to seek nullification of petitioners
locational clearance, but to support their chief argument that said cellular base station is a
nuisance which needs to be abated. The issue of whether or not the locational clearance for
said cellular base station is valid is actually separate and distinct from the issue of whether or
not the cellular base station is a nuisance; one is not necessarily determinative of the other.
While the first is within the primary jurisdiction of the HLURB and, therefore, premature for the
courts to rule upon in the present case, the latter is within the jurisdiction of the courts to
determine but only after trial proper.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. FORTUNE TOBACCO
CORPORATION/FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
G.R. Nos. 167274-75& G.R. No. 192576, September 11, 2013

J. Velasco, Jr.
It is an established rule that when the dispositive portion of a judgment, which has
meanwhile become final and executory, contains a clerical error or an ambiguity arising from an
inadvertent omission, such error or ambiguity may be clarified by reference to the body of the
decision itself. The very contents of the body of the Decision dated July 21, 2008 rendered by
this Court in G.R. Nos. 167274-75 undoubtedly reveal that both CA G.R. SP No. 80675 and CA
G.R. SP No. 83165 were the subject matter of the petition therein.
FACTS:
FTC filed before the CTA three (3) separate petitions for refund covering three different
periods docketed as CTA Case No. 6365, CTA Case No. 6383 and CTA Case No. 6612. In three
(3) separate decisions/resolutions, the CTA found the claims for refund valid and thus ordered

the payment thereof. Aggrieved, BIR Commissioner went to the CA on a petition for review
assailing in CA-G.R.SP No. 80675 the CTA decision/resolution pertaining to consolidated CTA
Case Nos. 6365 & 6383. A similar petition, docketed as CA G.R. SP No.83165, was
subsequently filed assailing the CTA decision/resolution on CTA Case No. 6612.
The CA, by Decision dated September 4, 2004, denied the Commissioners consolidated
petition for review. Upon finality, petitioner filed a motion for execution praying for the issuance
of a writ of execution of the Decision of the Honorable Court in G.R. Nos. 167274-75 dated July
21, 2008. The CTA issued a Writ of Execution and ordered refund to FTC. Thereafter, petitioner
filed a motion for the issuance of an additional writ of execution praying that the CTA order the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to pay representing the amount of tax to be refunded in
C.T.A. Case No. 6612. The CTA denied petitioners motion. FTC posits that the CTA should
have issued the desired additional writ of execution in CTA Case No. 6612 since the body of the
Decision of this Court in G.R. Nos. 167274-75 encompasses both CA G.R. Case No. 80675
which covers CTA Case Nos. 6365 and 6383 and CA G.R. Case No. 83165 which embraces
CTA Case No. 6612.
ISSUE:
Whether the additional writ of execution should be issued
RULING:
The petition is granted.
It is an established rule that when the dispositive portion of a judgment, which has
meanwhile become final and executory, contains a clerical error or an ambiguity arising from a
inadvertent omission, such error or ambiguity may be clarified by reference to the body of the
decision itself.
After a scrutiny of the body of the aforesaid July 21, 2008 Decision, the Court finds it
necessary to render a judgment nunc pro tunc and address an error in the fallo of said
decision.The office of a judgment nunc pro tunc is to record some act of the court done at a
former time which was not then carried into the record, and the power of a court to make such
entries is restricted to placing upon the record evidence of judicial action which has actually
been taken.The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment and
the ascertainment and determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper form on the
record, that has been previously rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to make it show
what the judicial action really was, not to correct judicial errors, such as to render a judgment
which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did erroneously render, not to
supply non-action by the court, however erroneous the judgment may have been.The Court
would thus have the record reflect the deliberations and discussions had on the issue. In this
particular case it is a correction of a clerical, not a judicial error. The body of the decision in
question is clear proof that the fallo must be corrected, to properly convey the ruling of this
Court.
The very contents of the body of the Decision dated July 21,2008 rendered by this Court in G.R.
Nos. 167274-75 undoubtedly reveal that both CA G.R. SP No. 80675 and CA G.R. SP No.
83165 were the subject matter of the petition therein. And as FTC would point out at every turn,
the Courts Decision passed upon and decided the merits of the September 28,2004 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases of CA G.R.SP Case Nos. 80675 and 83165 and
necessarily CA G.R. SP No. 83165 was included in our disposition of G.R. Nos. 167274-75.

In the case of Ong Ching Kian Chung v. China National Cereals Oil and Foodstuffs
Import and Export Corporation, the Court noted two (2) exceptions to the rule that the fallo
prevails over the body of the opinion, viz: (a) where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of
the opinion may be referred to for purposes of construing the judgment because the dispositive
part of a decision must find support from the decisions ratio decidendi; (b) where extensive and
explicit discussion and settlement of the issue is found in the body of the decision.
Both exceptions obtain in the present case. We find that there is an ambiguity in the fallo
of Our July 21, 2008 Decision in G.R. Nos. 167274-75 considering that the propriety of the CA
holding in CA-G.R. SP No.83165 formed part of the core issues raised in G.R. Case Nos.
167274-75, but unfortunately was left out in the all-important decretal portion of the judgment.
The fallo of Our July 21, 2008 Decision should, therefore, be correspondingly corrected.

LETICIA I. KUMMER v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013
J. Brion
The discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those made
by him on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex parte affidavits are
generally incomplete. As between the joint affidavit and the testimony given in open court, the
latter prevails because affidavits taken ex-parte are generally considered to be inferior to the
testimony given in court.
The chemistry report showing a positive result of the paraffin test is a public document.
As a public document, the rule on authentication does not apply. It is admissible in evidence
without further proof of its due execution and genuineness; the person who made the report
need not be presented in court to identify, describe and testify how the report was conducted.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a complaint
even after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. It is clear that consistent with the rule on
amendments and the jurisprudence, the change in the date of the commission of the crime of
homicide is a formal amendment - it does not change the nature of the crime, does not affect
the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new
averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused.
FACTS:
Petitioner and her son Johan were charged with homicide for allegedly shooting Jesus
Mallo, Jr (Mallo) on July 19, 1998. Both accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. The complaint was later amended changing the date of commission from July
19, 1998 to June 19, 1998. After trial, the RTC found both the petitioner and Johan guilty of
homicide based on testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses Ramon Cuntapay and Amiel
Malana who both testified that the petitioner shot Mallo which was coupled by the positive
findings of gunpowder nitrates on the left hand of Johan and on the petitioners right hand, as
well as the corroborative testimony of the other prosecution witnesses.

The petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction with the CA. She averred that the
RTC erred, among others: (1) in giving credence to the testimonial evidence of Cuntapay and of
Malana despite the discrepancies between their sworn statements and direct testimonies; (2) in
considering the paraffin test results finding the petitioner positive for gunpowder residue. The
petitioner also claimed that she was not arraigned on the amended complaint for which she was
convicted. The CA affirmed the RTC judgment. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1)
Whether the discrepancies between the affidavit and testimonies of the prosecution
eyewitnesses affect their credibility
2)
Whether paraffin test results is admissible as evidence
3)
Whether there is a need for the petitioner to be arraigned in the amended complaint
RULING:
Variance between the eyewitnesses testimonies in open court and their affidavits does
not affect their credibility
We have ruled that the discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in his
affidavit and those made by him on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex
parte affidavits are generally incomplete. As between the joint affidavit and the testimony given
in open court, the latter prevails because affidavits taken ex-parte are generally considered to
be inferior to the testimony given in court.
In the present case, we find it undeniable that Malana and Cuntapay positively identified
the petitioner as one of the assailants. This is the critical point, not the inconsistencies that the
petitioner repeatedly refers to, which carry no direct bearing on the crucial issue of the identity of
the perpetrator of the crime. Indeed, the inconsistencies refer only to minor details that are not
critical to the main outcome of the case. Moreover, the basic rule is that the Supreme Court
accords great respect and even finality to the findings of credibility of the trial court, more so if
the same were affirmed by the CA, as in this case.
Public documents are admissible in court without further proof of their due execution
and authenticity
The chemistry report showing a positive result of the paraffin test is a public document.
As a public document, the rule on authentication does not apply. It is admissible in evidence
without further proof of its due execution and genuineness; the person who made the report
need not be presented in court to identify, describe and testify how the report was conducted.
Moreover, documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty
by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that it was Captain Benjamin Rubio who
was presented in court to identify the chemistry report and not the forensic chemist who actually
conducted the paraffin test on the petitioner, the report may still be admitted because the
requirement for authentication does not apply to public documents. In other words, the forensic
chemist does not need to be presented as witness to identify and authenticate the chemistry
report. Furthermore, the entries in the chemistry report are prima facie evidence of the facts
they state, that is, of the presence of gunpowder residue on the left hand of Johan and on the
right hand of the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the petitioner herself admitted the presence of

gunpowder nitrates on her fingers, albeit ascribing their presence from a match she allegedly
lighted.
Change in the date of the commission of the crime, where the disparity is not great, is
merely a formal amendment, thus, no arraignment is required
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a complaint
even after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. The test as to when the rights of an
accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense
under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the
amendment is made, when any evidence the accused might have would no longer be available
after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have would be
inapplicable to the complaint or information, as amended.
It is not even necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which
the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense. The act
may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near as to the actual date at which date
the offense was committed, as the information will permit. Under the circumstances, the precise
time is not an essential ingredient of the crime of homicide.
Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the case
evidently show that the amendment in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988,
or a difference of only one month. It is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments and
the jurisprudence cited above, the change in the date of the commission of the crime of
homicide is a formal amendment - it does not change the nature of the crime, does not affect
the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment,
and is not prejudicial to the accused. Further, the defense under the complaint is still available
after the amendment, as this was, in fact, the same line of defenses used by the petitioner. This
is also true with respect to the pieces of evidence presented by the petitioner. The effected
amendment was of this nature and did not need a second plea.
UNICAPITAL INC., ET AL. v. RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., ET AL./RAFAEL CONSING, JR.
v. HON. MARISSA MACARAIG-GUILLEN, ETC., ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285, September 11, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint
alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. The inquiry is into the sufficiency,
not the veracity of the material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient
basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that
may be presented by the defendants. In this case, the Court finds that Consing, Jr.s complaint
properly states a cause of action since the allegations there insufficiently bear out a case for
damages under Articles 19 and 26 of the Civil Code.
FACTS:
Rafael Consing, Jr., an investment banker, and his mother, Cecilia Dela Cruz (Dela
Cruz), obtained a loan from Unicapital secured by Promissory Notes and a Real Estate
Mortgage over parcel of land (subject property) registered in the name of Dela Cruz. Prior to

these transactions, Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI), a real estate company, was already interested to
develop the subject property into a residential subdivision. PBI entered into a joint venture
agreement with Unicapital, through its real estate development arm, URI. After further
negotiations, Dela Cruz decided to sell the same to Unicapital and PBI. For this purpose, Dela
Cruz appointed Consing, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact.
After purchasing the subject property, Juanito Tan Teng (Teng) and Po Willie Yu (Yu)
informed Unicapital that they are the lawful owners of the subject property. Upon further
investigation PBI learned that Dela Cruz's title was actually of dubious origin. Thus, PBI and
Unicapital sent separate demand letters to Dela Cruz and Consing, Jr., seeking the return of the
purchase price they had paid for the subject property.
Consing Jr. filed a complaint against Unicapital, et. al., claiming, among others, that
Unicapital and PBI have used abusive manner in enforcing their claims against Consing, Jr.
which has severely affected his personal and professional life. Unicapital, et al. filed separate
Motions to Dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. RTC denied the motions
to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the complaint of Consing Jr. properly stated the cause of action
RULING:
A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another. It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations
in the complaint.
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges
facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise, may the court render a
valid judgment upon the facts alleged therein? The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity
of the material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it
can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented
by the defendants.
Stated otherwise, the resolution on this matter should stem from an analysis on whether
or not the complaint is able to convey a cause of action; and not that the complainant has no
cause of action. Lest it be misunderstood, failure to state a cause of action is properly a ground
for a motion to dismiss under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court while the latter is not a
ground for dismissal under the same rule.
In this case, the Court finds that Consing, Jr.s complaint properly states a cause of
action since the allegations there insufficiently bear out a case for damages under Articles 19
and 26 of the Civil Code.
Records disclose that Consing, Jr.s complaint contains allegations which aim to
demonstrate the abusive manner in which Unicapital and PBI, et al. enforced their demands
against him. Among others, the complaint states that Consing, Jr. "has constantly been
harassed and bothered by Unicapital and PBI, et al.; x x x besieged by phone calls from them; x
x x has had constant meetings with them variously, and on a continuing basis, such that he is
unable to attend to his work as an investment banker." In the same pleading, he also alleged

that Unicapital and PBI, et al.s act of "demanding a postdated check knowing fully well that he
does not have the necessary funds to cover the same, nor is he expecting to have them is
equivalent to asking him to commit a crime under unlawful coercive force." Accordingly, these
specific allegations, if hypothetically admitted, may result into the recovery of damages pursuant
to Article 19 of the Civil Code which states that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith."
Records reveal that Consing, Jr., in his complaint, alleged that "he has come to discover
that Unicapital and PBI, et al. are speaking of him in a manner that is inappropriate and libelous;
and that they have spread their virulent version of events in the business and financial
community such that he has suffered and continues to suffer injury upon his good name and
reputation which, after all, is the most sacred and valuable wealth he possesses - especially
considering that he is an investment banker."In similar regard, the hypothetical admission of
these allegations may result into the recovery of damages pursuant to Article 26, and even
Article2219(10), of the Civil Code.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS v. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
G.R. No. 20303, September 11, 2013
J. Carpio
DPWH wanted to expropriate portions of the properties of BPI. BPI claimed for the
inclusion of the value of its building in determining the just compensation although it was never
taken by the government. The general rule is that the just compensation to which the owner of
the condemned property is entitled to is the market value. The general rule, however, is
modified where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. In such a case, the owner is not
restricted to compensation for the portion actually taken; he is also entitled to recover the
consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the property. No actual taking of the
building is necessary to grant consequential damages. Consequential damages are awarded if
as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of the owner suffers from impairment or
decrease in value.
FACTS:
The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) filed with the Regional Trial
Court a case for expropriation against portions of the properties of Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI) and of Bayani Villanueva (Villanueva). DPWH needed BPIs lot for the construction of the
Zapote-Alabang Fly-Over. Neither BPI nor Villanueva objected to the propriety of the
expropriation; hence, the trial court constituted a Board of Commissioners to determine the just
compensation.
The trial court thereafter required petitioner and BPI to submit their respective nominees
and their oaths of office. Petitioner, instead of submitting its nominee, filed a Manifestation and
Motion objecting to the propriety of paying just compensation for BPIs building and praying that
BPIs claim for additional just compensation be denied, claiming that the building was never
taken by the government. The trial court denied the motion and ruled that the demolition of the
old building of BPI can be construed as a consequential damage suffered by BPI as a result of
the expropriation. Petitioner was thus ordered to submit its nominee to the Board of
Commissioners.

Savellano recommended the amount of P2,633,000.00, which was based on the

appraisal conducted by an independent professional business and property consultant. On the
other hand, Gervacio recommended the amount of P1,905,600.00, which was the market value
indicated on the tax declaration of said building. Eventually, the RTC issued an order adopting
the recommendation of Gervacio. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the trial
court.
ISSUE:
Whether the award of additional just compensation for BPIs building in the amount fixed
therefor is unfounded and without legal basis
RULING:
The general rule is that the just compensation to which the owner of the condemned
property is entitled to is the market value. Market value is that sum of money which a person
desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree
on as a price to be paid by the buyer and received by the seller. The general rule, however, is
modified where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. In such a case, the owner is not
restricted to compensation for the portion actually taken; he is also entitled to recover the
consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the property.
No actual taking of the building is necessary to grant consequential damages.
Consequential damages are awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property
of the owner suffers from impairment or decrease in value. The rules on expropriation clearly
provide a legal basis for the award of consequential damages. Section 6 of Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court provided that the commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the
property not taken and deduct from such consequential damages the consequential benefits to
be derived by the owner from the public use or public purpose of the property taken, the
operation of its franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the business of the corporation
or person taking the property. But in no case shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed
the consequential damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the actual value of his
property so taken.
No actual taking of the remaining portion of the real property is necessary to grant
consequential damages. If as a result of the expropriation made by petitioner, the remaining lot
of private respondent suffers from impairment or decrease in value, consequential damages
may be awarded to private respondent.
MANUEL UY & SONS, INC. v. VALBUECO, INCORPORATED
G.R. No. 179594, September 11, 2013
J. Peralta
Actions based upon a written contract must be brought within ten years from the time
the right of action accrues. Non-fulfillment of the obligation to pay on the due date, that is, on
November 15, 1974, would give rise to an action by the vendor, which date of reckoning may
also apply to any action by the vendee to determine his right under R.A. No. 6552. The vendee,
respondent herein, filed this case on March 16, 2001, which is clearly beyond the 10-year
prescriptive period; hence, the action has prescribed.

Even though the ground of prescription was raised only for the first time before the
Supreme Court, the respondents right to due process was not violated as it was given the
opportunity to oppose such defense. It is well within the authority and discretion of the Court to
resolve such issue of prescription as provided under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of
Court.
FACTS:
Petitioner Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. is the registered owner of parcels of land located in
Teresa, Rizal. On November 29, 1973, two Conditional Deeds of Sale were executed by
petitioner, as vendor, in favor of respondent Valbueco, Incorporated. Respondent made partial
payments. However, respondent suspended further payment as it was not satisfied with the
manner petitioner complied with its obligations under the conditional deeds of sale.
Consequently, on March 17, 1978, petitioner sent respondent a letter informing respondent of its
intention to rescind the conditional deeds of sale and attaching therewith the original copy of the
respective notarial rescission.
On November 28, 1994, respondent filed a Complaint for specific performance and
damages against petitioner with the RTC of Antipolo City. However, it was dismissed without
prejudice as respondent's counsel failed to attend the pre-trial conference. On March 16, 2001,
respondent again filed with the RTC of Manila a Complaint for specific performance and
damages, seeking to compel petitioner to accept the balance of the purchase price for the two
conditional deeds of sale and to execute the corresponding deeds of absolute sale. The RTC
dismissed the complaint as petitioner had exercised its right to rescind the contracts. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court.
In its petition to the Supreme Court, petitioner argued that it is evident on the face of the
complaint and the two contracts of conditional sale that the cause of action accrued in 1974; yet,
the complaint for specific performance was filed after 27 years, hence the action has prescribed.
ISSUE:
Whether the cause of action has already prescribed
RULING:
Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provided that defenses and
objections not pleaded whether in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
However, when it appears from the pleadings that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or
that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss
the claim.
In Gicano v. Gegato, the Court held that trial courts have authority and discretion to
dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on
record show it to be indeed time-barred; and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss
(Sec. 1,f, Rule 16, Rules of Court); or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative
defense (Sec. 5, Rule16); or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a
motion for reconsideration; or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no
statement thereof is found in the pleadings; or where a defendant has been declared in default.

What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive
period, be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the
averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence.
Moreover, it was held in Dino v. Court of Appeals that even if the defense of prescription
was raised for the first time on appeal in respondent's Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
of the appellate court's decision, this does not militate against the due process right of the
petitioners. On appeal, there was no new issue of fact that arose in connection with the question
of prescription, thus it cannot be said that petitioners were not given the opportunity to present
evidence in the trial court to meet a factual issue. Equally important, petitioners had the
opportunity to oppose the defense of prescription in their Opposition to the Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration filed in the appellate court and in their Petition for Review in this Court.
In this case, petitioner raised the defense of prescription for the first time before this
Court, and respondent had the opportunity to oppose the defense of prescription in its Comment
to the petition. Hence, the Court can resolve the issue of prescription as both parties were
afforded the opportunity to ventilate their respective positions on the matter. The Complaint
shows that the Conditional Deeds of Sale were executed on November 29, 1973, and payments
were due on both Conditional Deeds of Sale on November 15, 1974. Article 1144 of the Civil
Code provides that actions based upon a written contract must be brought within ten years from
the time the right of action accrues. Non-fulfillment of the obligation to pay on the last due date,
that is, on November 15, 1974, would give rise to an action by the vendor, which date of
reckoning may also apply to any action by the vendee to determine his right under R.A. No.
6552. The vendee, respondent herein, filed this case on March 16, 2001, which is clearly
beyond the 10-year prescriptive period; hence, the action has prescribed.
S.C. MEGAWORLD CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. ENGR. LUIS
U. PARADA, REPRESENTED BY ENGR. LEONARDO A. PARADA OF GENLITE
INDUSTRIES
G.R. No. 183804, September 11, 2013
J. Reyes
The verification and certification of non-forum shopping in the complaint is not a
jurisdictional but a formal requirement, and any objection as to non-compliance therewith should
be raised in the proceedings below and not for the first time on appeal.
Genlite Industries is merely the DTI-registered trade name or style of the respondent by
which he conducted his business. As such, it does not exist as a separate entity apart from its
owner, and therefore it has no separate juridical personality to sue or be sued. As the sole
proprietor of Genlite Industries, there is no question that the respondent is the real party in
interest who stood to be directly benefited or injured by the judgment in the complaint below.
FACTS:
S.C. Megaworld Construction and Development Corporation (petitioner) bought for its
Read-Rite project electrical lighting materials from Genlite Industries, a sole proprietorship
owned by Engineer Luis U. Parada (respondent). The petitioner was unable to pay on due date
and blamed it on its failure to collect under its sub-contract with the Enviro Kleen Technologies,
Inc. (Enviro Kleen). It was however able to persuade Enviro Kleen to agree to settle, but after
paying the respondent, Enviro Kleen stopped making further payments, leaving an outstanding

balance. Petitioner denied the repeated demands of the respondent prompting the respondent
to file a suit.
The petitioner denied liability and averred that novation took place when the latter
accepted the partial payment of Enviro Kleen in its behalf, and thereby acquiesced to the
substitution of Enviro Kleen as the new debtor in the petitioners place. After trial, the RTC
rendered judgment in favor of the respondent.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the petitioner raised for the first time that the trial
court should have dismissed the complaint for failure of the respondent to implead Genlite
Industries as "a proper party in interest", as provided in Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. The CA found that respondent is the sole proprietor of Genlite Industries, and
therefore the real party-plaintiff. On motion for reconsideration, the petitioner, for the first time,
questioned the validity of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the
complaint because the SPA executed by the respondent did not specifically include an authority
for Engr. Leonardo Parada (Leonardo) to sign the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping. The CA denied the said motion for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the complaint is
valid
2) Whether there is a need to implead Gentile Industries as a party-plaintiff in a civil case
RULING:
The verification and certification of non-forum shopping in the complaint is not a
jurisdictional but a formal requirement, and any objection as to non-compliance therewith should
be raised in the proceedings below and not for the first time on appeal.
We have emphasized, time and again, that verification is a formal, not a jurisdictional
requisite, as it is mainly intended to secure an assurance that the allegations therein made are
done in good faith or are true and correct and not mere speculation. The Court may order the
correction of the pleading, if not verified, or act on the unverified pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that a strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order
that the ends of justice may be served.
Moreover, granting that Leonardo has no personal knowledge of the transaction subject
of the complaint below, Section 4 of Rule 7 provides that the verification need not be based on
the verifiers personal knowledge but even only on authentic records. Sales invoices, statements
of accounts, receipts and collection letters for the balance of the amount still due to the
respondent from the petitioner are such records. There is clearly substantial compliance by the
respondents attorney-in-fact with the requirement of verification.
Lastly, it is well-settled that a strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in
order that the ends of substantial justice may be served. It is clear that the present controversy
must be resolved on its merits, lest for a technical oversight the respondent should be deprived
of what is justly due him.
A sole proprietorship has no juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its
owner, and need not be impleaded as a party-plaintiff in a civil case.

On the question of whether Genlite Industries should have been impleaded as a partyplaintiff, Section 1 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that only natural or juridical persons
or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil case. Article 44 of the New Civil Code
provided that the following are juridical persons: (1) the State and its political subdivisions; (2)
other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their
personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law; (3) corporations,
partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical
personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.
Genlite Industries is merely the DTI-registered trade name or style of the respondent by
which he conducted his business. As such, it does not exist as a separate entity apart from its
owner, and therefore it has no separate juridical personality to sue or be sued. As the sole
proprietor of Genlite Industries, there is no question that the respondent is the real party in
interest who stood to be directly benefited or injured by the judgment in the complaint below.
There is then no necessity for Genlite Industries to be impleaded as a party-plaintiff, since the
complaint was already filed in the name of its proprietor, Engr. Luis U. Parada. To heed the
petitioners sophistic reasoning is to permit a dubious technicality to frustrate the ends of
substantial justice.
HERMINIO T. DISINI v. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL./HERMINIO T. DISINI v.
SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 169823-24, September 11, 2013
J. Bersamin
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to
constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground that
the complaint or information charges no offense may be properly sustained. The test does not
require absolute certainty as to the presence of the elements of the offense; otherwise, there
would no longer be any need for the Prosecution to proceed to trial. The informations in
Criminal Case No. 28001 (corruption of public officials) and Criminal Case No. 28002 (violation
of Section 4(a) of RA No.3019) have sufficiently complied with the requirements of Section 6,
Rule110 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman filed two (2) informations charging Disini in the
Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials, penalized under Article 212 in relation to
Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case No. 02-0575) and with a violation of
Section 4(a) of Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act(Criminal Case No. 28002).
Disini filed a motion to quash, alleging that the criminal actions had been extinguished by
prescription, and that the informations did not conform to the prescribed form. The Prosecution
opposed the motion to quash. Disini voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment to obtain the
Sandiganbayans favorable action on his motion for permission to travel abroad. He then
entered a plea of not guilty to both informations. The Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the
motion to quash and his subsequent motion for reconsideration. In his petition for certiorari to
the Supreme Court, Disini alleged, among others, that the two (2) informations charging him
were not in compliance with the form and substance prescribed by the law.

ISSUE:
Whether the two (2) informations are sufficient in form
RULING:
The petition is denied.
The informations were sufficient in form and substance. It is axiomatic that a complaint or
information must state every single fact necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise,
a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground that the complaint or information charges no
offense may be properly sustained. The fundamental test in determining whether a motion to
quash may be sustained based on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically
admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law. Extrinsic
matters or evidence aliunde are not considered.
The test does not require absolute certainty as to the presence of the elements of the
offense; otherwise, there would no longer be any need for the Prosecution to proceed to trial.
The informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 (corruption of public officials) and Criminal
Case No. 28002 (violation of Section 4(a) of RA No.3019) have sufficiently complied with the
requirements of Section 6, Rule110 of the Rules of Court.
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleging corruption of public officers
specifically put forth that Disini, in the period from 1974 to February 1986 in Manila, Philippines,
conspiring and confederating with then President Marcos, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
offered, promised and gave gifts and presents to President Marcos, who, by taking undue
advantage of his position as President, committed the offense in relation to his office, and in
consideration of the gifts and presents offered, promised and given by Disini, President Marcos
caused to be awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse the respective contracts to do the
engineering and architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP. The felonious act consisted
of causing the contracts for the PNPPP to be awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by
reason of the gifts and promises offered by Disini to President Marcos.
The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the Revised Penal
Code are: 1) that the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to a public
officer; and 2) that the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a public
officer under circumstances that will make the public officer liable for direct bribery or indirect
bribery.
The allegations in the information for corruption of public officials, if hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime. The information stated that: (1)
Disini made an offer and promise, and gave gifts to President Marcos, a public officer; and (2) in
consideration of the offers, promises and gifts, President Marcos, in causing the award of the
contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by taking advantage of his position and in
committing said act in relation to his office, was placed under circumstances that would make
him liable for direct bribery.
The second element of corruption of public officers simply required the public officer to
be placed under circumstances, not absolute certainty, that would make him liable for direct or

indirect bribery. Thus, even without alleging that President Marcos received or accepted Disinis
offers, promises and gifts an essential element in direct bribery the allegation that President
Marcos caused the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse sufficed to place
him under circumstances of being liable for direct bribery.
The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a)
of R.A. No. 3019 is similarly upheld. The elements of the offense under Section 4(a) of R.A. No.
3019 are: 1) that the offender has family or close personal relation with a public official; 2) that
he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly
or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary advantage from any
person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government;
3) that the public official with whom the offender has family or close personal relation has to
intervene in the business transaction, application, request, or contract with the government.
The allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019,
if hypothetically admitted, would establish the elements of the offense, considering that: (1)
Disini, being the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini, the first cousin of First Lady Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos, and at the same time the family physician of the Marcoses, had close
personal relations and intimacy with and free access to President Marcos, a public official; (2)
Disini, taking advantage of such family and close personal relations, requested and received
$1,000,000.00 from Burns & Roe and $17,000,000.00 from Westinghouse, the entities then
having business, transaction, and application with the Government in connection with the
PNPPP; (3) President Marcos, the public officer with whom Disini had family or close personal
relations, intervened to secure and obtain for Burns & Roe the engineering and architectural
contract, and for Westinghouse the construction of the PNPPP.
ELISEO AGUILAR v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ET AL.
G.R. No. 197522, September 11, 2013
Per Curiam
The Court observes that grave abuse of discretion taints a public prosecutors resolution
if he arbitrarily disregards the jurisprudential parameters of probable cause. In particular, case
law states that probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the
facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
the respondent is probably guilty thereof. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed by the suspects. It
need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge.
FACTS:
Petitioner Eliseo Aguilar, father of Francisco M. Aguilar, alias Tetet, filed a criminal
complaint for murder against the members of Occidental Mindoro Police Force, identified as
respondents SPO3 Gregardro Villar (Villar), SPO1 Ramon Lara (Lara), SPO1 Alex Acaylar
(Acaylar), PO1 Leo Dangupon (Dangupon), and PO1 Jovannie Balicol (Balicol), and members
of the Philippine Army, namely, respondents 1st Lt. Philip Fortuno (Fortuno) and Cpl. Edilberto
Abordo (Abordo). He averred that Tetet was arrested by respondents for alleged acts of
extortion. Despite his peaceful surrender, he was maltreated by respondents. He was then

boarded on a military jeep and brought to the Viga River where he was gunned down by
respondents.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dismissed petitioners complaint against all
respondents for lack of probable cause. The Provincial Prosecutor held that the evidence on
record shows that the shooting of Tetet by Dangupon was done either in an act of self-defense,
defense of a stranger, and in the performance of a lawful duty or exercise of a right of office.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the DOJ, which affirmed the Provincial Prosecutors ruling.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether there is probable cause to charge the respondents of the crime of murder
RULING:
It is well-settled that courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of public
prosecutors and the DOJ on the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the purpose
of filing criminal informations, unless such findings are tainted with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In the foregoing context, the Court observes that grave abuse of discretion taints a public
prosecutors resolution if he arbitrarily disregards the jurisprudential parameters of probable
cause. In particular, case law states that probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal
information, exists when the facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. It does not mean "actual
and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. Rather, it is merely based on opinion
and reasonable belief and, as such, does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction; it is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. As pronounced in Reyes v. Pearl bank
Securities, Inc.:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a
crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not
on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average
man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of
evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is
determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.
At this juncture, it must be noted that Dangupons theories of self-defense/defense of a
stranger and performance of an official duty are not clear and convincing enough to exculpate
him at this stage of the proceedings. To add, neither can the dismissal of the murder charge
against Dangupon be sustained in view of his presumption of innocence. Jurisprudence holds
that when the accused admits killing the victim, but invokes a justifying circumstance, the
constitutional presumption of innocence is effectively waived and the burden of proving the
existence of such circumstance shifts to the accused. The rule regarding an accuseds
admission of the victims killing has been articulated in Ortega v. Sandiganbayan, to wit:

Well settled is the rule that where the accused had admitted that he is the author of the
death of the victim and his defense anchored on self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove
this justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court. To do so, he must rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for the accused himself had
admitted the killing. The burden is upon the accused to prove clearly and sufficiently the
elements of self-defense, being an affirmative allegation, otherwise the conviction of the
accused is inescapable. Therefore, due to the ostensible presence of the crime charged and
considering that Dangupons theories of self-defense/defense of a stranger and lawful
performance of ones duty and the argument on presumption of innocence are, under the
circumstances, not compelling enough to overcome a finding of probable cause, the Court finds
that the DOJ gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the case against Dangupon.
Consequently, the reversal of the CA ruling with respect to the latter is in order.
The Court, however, maintains a contrary view with respect to the determination of lack
of probable cause on the part of Villar, Lara, Acaylar and Balicol. Records are bereft of any
showing that the aforementioned respondents as opposed to Dangupon, Fortuno, and Abordo
directly participated in the killing of Tetet at the Viga River. As observed by the DOJ, Villar,
Lara, Acaylar, and Balicol were not with Tetet at the time he was shot; thus, they could not have
been responsible for his killing. Neither could they be said to have acted in conspiracy with the
other respondents since it was not demonstrated how they concurred in or, in any way,
participated towards the unified purpose of consummating the same act. It is well-settled that
conspiracy exists when one concurs with the criminal design of another, indicated by the
performance of an overt act leading to the crime committed. Therefore, finding no direct
participation or conspiracy on the part of Villar, Lara, Acaylar, and Balicol, the Court holds that
the DOJ did not gravely abuse its discretion in affirming the Provincial Prosecutors dismissal of
the charges against them. In this respect, the CAs Decision must stand.
ERNESTO DY v. HON. GINA M. BIBAT-PALAMOS
G.R. No. 196200, September 11, 2013
J. Mendoza
When a supervening event renders the execution of a judgment impossible or unjust,
the interested party can petition the court to modify the judgment to harmonize it with justice
and the facts. A supervening event is a fact which transpires or a new circumstance which
develops after a judgment has become final and executory. This includes matters which the
parties were unaware of prior to or during trial because they were not yet in existence at that
time.
In this case, the sinking of M/V Pilar-I can be considered a supervening event. Petitioner,
who did not have possession of the ship, was only informed of its destruction when Colorado
filed its Manifestation, dated July 29, 2010, long after the September 11, 2009 Decision of this
Court in Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation v. M/V "Pilar-I" and Spouses Ernesto Dy
and Lourdes Dy attained finality on January 19, 2010. During the course of the proceedings in
the RTC, the CA and this Court, petitioner could not have known of the worsened condition of
the vessel because it was in the possession of Colorado.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Dy (petitioner) and his wife, Lourdes Dy (Lourdes), were the
proprietors of Limchia Enterprises which was engaged in the shipping business. Limchia

Enterprises, with Lourdes as co-maker, obtained a loan from Orix Metro Leasing and Finance
Corporation (respondent) to fund its acquisition of M/V Pilar-I, a cargo vessel. As additional
security for the loan, Limchia Enterprises executed the Deed of Chattel Mortgage over M/V
Pilar-I. Spouses Dy suffered losses when M/V Pilar-I was attacked by pirates because of this
they failed to make the scheduled payments. After repeated demands of the respondent,
Spouses Dy applied for the restructuring of their loan.
Respondent filed the Complaint and Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Preferred
Ship Mortgage with Urgent Prayer for Attachment with the RTC. The RTC ordered the seizure of
M/V Pilar-I and turned over its possession to respondent. Respondent transferred all of its
rights, title to and interests, as mortgagee, in M/V Pilar-I to Colorado Shipyard Corporation
(Colorado). This was affirmed by the CA with the modification that Spouses Dy be ordered to
reimburse the respondent for repair and dry docking expenses while the vessel was in the
latters possession.
Upon finality of judgment, petitioner filed a motion for execution of judgment. In the
intervening period, Colorado filed its Manifestation/Motion informing the RTC that M/V Pilar-I,
which was in its possession, had sunk in its shipyard because of its exposure to the elements.
For this reason, it sought permission from the court to cut the sunken vessel into pieces, sell its
parts and deposit the proceeds in escrow. The RTC granted the motion for execution but denied
petitioners prayer for the return of M/V Pilar-I in the same state in which it was taken by
respondent. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether petitioner is estopped from asking for the return of the vessel in the condition it had at
the time it was seized
RULING:
This Court is not unaware of the doctrine of immutability of judgments. When a judgment
becomes final and executory, it is made immutable and unalterable, meaning it can no longer be
modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even by this Court. Its purpose is
to avoid delay in the orderly administration of justice and to put an end to judicial controversies.
Even at the risk of occasional errors, public policy and sound practice dictate that judgments
must become final at some point.
As with every rule, however, this admits of certain exceptions. When a supervening
event renders the execution of a judgment impossible or unjust, the interested party can petition
the court to modify the judgment to harmonize it with justice and the facts. A supervening event
is a fact which transpires or a new circumstance which develops after a judgment has become
final and executory. This includes matters which the parties were unaware of prior to or during
trial because they were not yet in existence at that time.
In this case, the sinking of M/V Pilar-I can be considered a supervening event. Petitioner,
who did not have possession of the ship, was only informed of its destruction when Colorado
filed its Manifestation, dated July 29, 2010, long after the September 11, 2009 Decision of this
Court in Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation v. M/V "Pilar-I" and Spouses Ernesto Dy
and Lourdes Dy attained finality on January 19, 2010. During the course of the proceedings in

the RTC, the CA and this Court, petitioner could not have known of the worsened condition of
the vessel because it was in the possession of Colorado.
It could be argued that petitioner and his lawyer should have had the foresight to ask for
the return of the vessel in its former condition at the time respondent took possession of the
same during the proceedings in the earlier case. Nonetheless, the modification of the Courts
decision is warranted by the superseding circumstances, that is, the severe damage to the
vessel subject of the case and the belated delivery of this information to the courts by the party
in possession of the same.
Having declared that a modification of our earlier judgment is permissible in light of the
exceptional incident present in this case, the Court further rules that petitioner is entitled to the
return of M/V Pilar-I in the same condition in which respondent took possession of it.
Considering, however, that this is no longer possible, then respondent should pay petitioner the
value of the ship at such time.
NARCISO SALAS v. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM
G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013
J. Villarama, Jr.
A high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for
recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family
or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by
clear and convincing evidence. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father
had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth
certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is
incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can such birth certificate be taken as recognition in a
public instrument. It has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father. As to the
Baptismal Certificate of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as the father, we have
ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve
as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not
necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the childs
paternity.
FACTS:
Annabelle Mausoleum (respondent) filed a complaint for Support/Damages against
Narciso Salas (petitioner); praying for, among others, support pendente lite and monthly
support. She claimed that petitioner is the father of her son Christian Paulo. She alleged that
petitioner enticed her by making her believe that he was a widower and promising that he will
take care of her and marry her. She believed him and yielded to his advances, with the thought
that she and her child will have a better life. When she became pregnant, petitioner rented an
apartment where respondent stayed. After she gave birth, she filled out the form for the childs
birth certificate and wrote all the information supplied by petitioner himself. It was also petitioner
who shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child and drove her baby home. However,
when respondent refused the offer of petitioners family to take the child from her, petitioner
abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the mercy of relatives and friends.
Salas denied paternity of Christian Paulo and claimed that he was motivated by genuine
altruism when he agreed to shoulder the expenses for the delivery of said child.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondent, which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents evidence sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the
illegitimate child of petitioner
RULING:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines stated that the filiation of legitimate
children is established by any of the following: (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or
a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the
foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.
We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is
not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a
hand in the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate,
the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence
of paternity. Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public
instrument and it has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father.
As to the Baptismal Certificate of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as the
father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents,
they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so
specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with
respect to the childs paternity.
The rest of respondents documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and
letters, hospital bill and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented
apartment unit. Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are
inconclusive evidence to prove paternity. The Statement of Account from the Good Samaritan
General Hospital where respondent herself was indicated as the payee is likewise incompetent
to prove that petitioner is the father of her child notwithstanding petitioners admission in his
answer that he shouldered the expenses in the delivery of respondents child as an act of
charity
As to the handwritten notes of petitioner and respondent showing their exchange of
affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish Christian
Paulos filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no statement of
admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were
authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-- vis Article 175 of the Family Code
which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private

handwritten

instrument

signed

by

the

parent

concerned.

An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, like his baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting
his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Reviewing the records, we find the totality of
respondents evidence insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish
paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome
situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued
only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPO1 ALFREDO ALAWIG

G.R. No. 187731, September 18, 2013
J. Del Castillo
There is no eyewitness to the shooting of the victim. Prosecutions key witness testified
that he saw the respondents went to the house of the victim and he received a call from the
victim asking for help. Likewise, the respondents tested positive for gunpowder nitrates.
Nonetheless, jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from
which a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules on evidence allow a
trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. It is sufficient to
sustain a conviction if (i) there is more than one circumstance; (ii) the facts from which the
inference is derived are proven; and (iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to
produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
FACTS:
In the early morning of November 30, 1996, PO3 Miel de Ocampo Caf (victim) and
MacGregor Reyes (Reyes) went to a nearby market. Upon their return, Reyes left the victim at
the latters residence and came back at noon. He did not immediately enter the house as he
noticed several policemen strategically positioned on the premises. He saw appellant and PO3
Romeo Ventinilla (PO3 Ventinilla), SPO2 Dabu, PO2 Armando de Vera (PO2 De Vera) and PO2
Vivencio Corpuz (PO2Corpuz). To avoid being noticed, Reyes used the alternative road and
went inside the house through the back gate. From his position, he heard the conversation
among appellant, PO3 Ventinilla and the victim. They informed the latter to bring his firearm
because they have an operation regarding illegal drugs as instructed by SPO4 Ponciano
Miraples (SPO4 Miraples). After the group left the victims residence, Reyes entered the house.
While inside, he received a telephone call from the victim asking for help. Not long after, Reyes
learned that the victim died from gunshot wounds in different parts of his body.
Appellant, along with PO3 Ventinilla, SPO4 Miraples, PO2 De Vera, SPO2 Dabu and
PO2 Corpuz were charged with murder for the killing of the victim. The RTC convicted appellant
and SPO2 Dabu of murder qualified by treachery. On appeal, Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
Decision but reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:

Whether there is enough circumstantial evidence to warrant conviction of the appellant

RULING:
Appellant claims that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was not
sufficient to convict him. He argues that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of
events that showed his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, he is entitled to enjoy the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
Indeed, no prosecution witness has actually seen the commission of the crime. But
jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial
court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules on evidence allow a trial court to
rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that
evidence "which indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder
draws from the evidence established."
In this case, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly synthesized the
circumstances constituting circumstantial evidence as culled from the entire testimony of Reyes,
the prosecutions key witness, to wit:
1. Around x x x noon of November 30, 1996, Reyes saw appellant and the late PO3 x x x
Ventinilla enter the house of the victim after the latters friend Tomas Beroy, opened the door
upon the instruction of the victim;
2. Reyes saw appellant and [PO3] Ventinilla carrying an armalite rifle and [a] .38 caliber
pistol;
3. Reyes heard appellant and [PO3] Ventinilla tell the victim that he was being instructed
by SPO4 x x x Miraples, the Chief of Police of Police Kababayan Center I, Doa Ata Subdivision
Station, Marulas, Valenzuela, to join a team of police which will apprehend a big person x x x
involved in illegal drugs in Malanday, Valenzuela;
4. Because of the alleged instruction of the victims superior, Reyes saw the victim leave
his house together with appellant and PO3 Ventinilla around 1:00 p.m. of November 30, 1996;
5. A few minutes thereafter, Reyes received a telephone call from the victim who
nervously told him, "Pare wala pala kaming tatrabahuhin, ako palaang tatrabahuhin. Tulungan
mo ako sumundo ka ng tao na tutulong sa akin."But before Reyes could respond, the line at the
other end of the telephone wassuddenly cut x x x; and
6. Later in the afternoon, Reyes learned from his friend that the victim was already dead.
The prosecution likewise presented corroborating evidence which constitute an
unbroken chain leading to the inevitable conclusion that appellant is guilty of killing the victim.
For instance, the presence of gunpowder nitrates on appellant after a paraffin test; the firearm
used in the killing which could either be a .38 caliber or 9 mm pistol dovetails with the testimony
of Reyes that he saw appellant carrying a .38 caliber short firearm which was later found to
have been recently fired; and the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of the victim after
a paraffin test which belies appellants claim that he was shot by the victim or that the latter
exchanged fire with PO3 Ventinilla.
"Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if (i) there is more than one
circumstance; (ii) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and (iii) the
combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt." All
the foregoing elements were sufficiently established in this case.

JUANITO VICTOR C. REMULLA v. ERINEO S. MALIKSI, ETC., ET AL.

G.R. No. 171633, September 18, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
Remulla is not a party to the compromise but he has the legal standing to file the petition
before the Court either in his personal capacity as taxpayer or as then Vice-Governor and,
hence, Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite. As a
taxpayer, he may be allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds
are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law or ordinance. As then
Vice-Governor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Cavite, he represents the interests of the province itself which is, undoubtedly, a real party in
interest since it stands to be either benefited or injured by the execution of the compromise
judgment.
FACTS:
Marietta OHara de Villa (de Villa) donated a portion of her property (subject property) in
favor of the Province of Cavite, on which now stands various government offices and facilities.
The Province of Cavite wanted to expropriate the remaining portion of subject property which
the former intends to develop as the Provincial Capitol Site. While the case is pending the
remaining portion of the subject property was sold to Goldenrod, Inc., a joint venture company
owned by Sonya G. Mathay (Mathay) and Eleuterio M. Pascual, Jr. (Pascual).Subsequently,
Mathay and Pascual intervened in the expropriation case.
Respondent then Cavite Governor Erineo S. Maliksi (Maliksi) issued an Executive Order
authorizing the creation of a committee which recommended the terms and conditions for the
proper settlement of the expropriation case. The recommendations of the committee were then
adopted in a Compromise Agreement. Thereafter, the subject compromise was approved by the
RTC in a decision and an Amended Decision (compromise judgment), both of which were
ratified by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite and the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Trece Martires City.
Remulla, in his personal capacity as taxpayer and as then Vice-Governor and, hence,
Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite, filed a petition for
annulment of judgment before the CA. He argued that the subject compromise is grossly
disadvantageous to the government and Maliksi entered into the subject compromise without
authority from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and sans any certification on the availability of
funds as required by law. The CA dismissed the petition of Remulla based on the following
grounds: (a) there was yet no disbursement of public funds at the time of its filing; thus, it cannot
be considered as a taxpayer's suit; and (b) Remulla was not a real party in interest to question
the propriety of the subject compromise as he was not a signatory thereto. Aggrieved, Remulla
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether Remulla is a real party in interest
RULING:

The petition is granted.

Remulla filed his petition for annulment of judgment in two capacities: first, in his
personal capacity as a taxpayer; and, second , in his official capacity as then presiding officer of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite.
With respect to the first, jurisprudence dictates that a taxpayer may be allowed to sue
where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of
an invalid or unconstitutional law or ordinance. In this case, public funds of the Province of
Cavite stand to be expended to enforce the compromise judgment. As such, Remulla being a
resident-taxpayer of the Province of Cavite has the legal standing to file the petition for
annulment of judgment and, therefore, the same should not have been dismissed on said
ground. Notably, the fact that there lies no proof that public funds have already been disbursed
should not preclude Remulla from assailing the validity of the compromise judgment. Lest it be
misunderstood, the concept of legal standing is ultimately a procedural technicality which may
be relaxed by the Court if the circumstances so warrant.
Anent the second, Remulla equally lodged the petition for annulment of judgment in his
official capacity as then Vice-Governor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of the Province of Cavite. As such, he represents the interests of the province itself which is,
undoubtedly, a real party in interest since it stands to be either benefited or injured by the
execution of the compromise judgment.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOEY BACATAN
G.R. No. 203315, September 18, 2013
J. Reyes
In rape cases, the law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance
because it is not an element of rape. Hence, the absence of abrasions or contusions in AAAs
body is inconsequential. What is necessary is that the force employed against her was sufficient
to consummate the purpose which he has in mind. Sufficient force does not mean great or is of
such character that is irresistible; as long as it brings about the desired result, all considerations
of whether it was more or less irresistible are beside the point.
FACTS:
On the night of the incident, Joey Bacatan and Danilo Mabano were having a drinking
spree outside the house of 18-year old private complainant, AAA. When they ran out of beer,
Bacatan and Mabano decided to look for a store to buy some more. Mabano invited AAA to join
them in buying beer. She declined at first but the two men prodded that store owners will surely
sell to her than to them. AAA eventually obliged and they boarded a motorcycle. Upon arriving at
Litmon Beach, Bacatan talked to an old man as Mabano held AAA. Thereafter, Batacan had
sexual intercourse with AAA through the use of force. Mabano also wanted to have sexual
intercourse with AAA but he decided not to do it upon the latters plea. Instead of doing the
same thing, Mabano tried to exculpate himself by saying that he was just a witness in the
incident.

On the part of the defense, Bacatan claimed that he and AAA were sweethearts and that
she voluntarily went with them. AAAs parents saw her board the vehicle but they expressed no
objections. The RTC found Bacatan guilty, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether there is rape in the instant case
RULING:
The following elements of rape were proved beyond reasonable doubt, viz: (1) Bacatan
had carnal knowledge of AAA; and (2) it was accomplished through the use of force. The first
element is undisputed as it is an admission inherent in the sweetheart defense advanced by
Bacatan, which in turn, was correctly, rejected by the courts a quo for lack of substantial
corroboration. With the presence of the first element being settled, the prosecution only had to
prove the employment of force upon AAA.
Bacatan points out that the absence of abrasions in AAAs body negates the employment
of force upon her. She also did not put up tenacious resistance neither did she cry for help
during and after the alleged rape incident despite the presence of other people in nearby areas.
Neither was she or her family members threatened for her to succumb to the sexual congress.
In rape cases, the law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance
because it is not an element of rape. Hence, the absence of abrasions or contusions in AAAs
body is inconsequential. Also, not all victims react the same way. Some people may cry out,
some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may appear to yield to the
intrusion. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any
resistance at all. The failure of a rape victim to offer tenacious resistance does not make her
submission to accuseds criminal acts voluntary. What is necessary is that the force employed
against her was sufficient to consummate the purpose which he has in mind.
Sufficient force does not mean great or is of such character that is irresistible; as long as
it brings about the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible
are beside the point.
In any event, AAA put up resistance by kicking and wiggling out of Bacatan whose entire
weight was on top of her, but he proved too strong. He even mocked her defiance by telling her
shes like a horse.
Moreover, there is no doubt that Bacatan employed that amount of force sufficient to
consummate rape. At the time the crime was committed, AAA was only 18 years old, while
Bacatan was a full-grown 32-year old man who stands six feet tall with stout bearing. There is
thus a clear disparity of physical strength between them thus any resistance exerted by AAA
proved in vain. More importantly, Mabano reduced her to helplessness when he held her hands
as Bacatan inserted his sexual organ in hers. The combined might of two adult male constitutes
more than sufficient force as it inescapably subdues the frailty of female strength rendering her
vulnerable to their felonious appetite to fornicate.
Bacatans submission that the contents of the medical certificate cannot be considered
as corroborative of the claim of rape as the signatory himself did not testify cannot prosper. As
held in People v. Alverio, medical evidence is dispensable evidence; it is not necessary to prove

rape in as much the time of its commission does not constitute a material ingredient of the
crime. These circumstances do not pertain to the details and elements that produce the grava
men of the offense that is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her
consent.
SPOUSES CARMELITO AND ANTONIA ALDOVER v. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. No. 167174, September 23, 2013
J. Del Castillo
The CA set for hearing on January 4, 2005, the propriety of issuing a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. This hearing did not push through. Although the scheduled January 4, 2005 hearing
on the propriety of issuing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction did not push through, the parties were
nonetheless amply heard thru their pleadings. There is no grave abuse of discretion in the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction where a party was not deprived of its day in court,
as it was heard and had exhaustively presented all its arguments and defenses.
FACTS:
Siblings Tomas and Sidra and their father Alfredo Reyes (the Reyeses) obtained a loan
from Antonia Aldover (Aldover) secured by a Real Estate Mortgage (REM). Upon default of the
Reyeses, Aldover foreclosed the property. At the foreclosure sale, Aldover emerged as the
winning bidder. Thereafter, Aldover filed with the RTC of Pasig City a verified Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Possession which was later on granted.
In the meantime, Aldover also caused the consolidation of title over the foreclosed
property in her name. Aldover filed for writ of possessison with the RTC. The RTC granted her
petition and issued a Writ of Possession. Thereafter, the sheriff issued a Notice to Vacate.
However, the writ was not fully implemented because there are occupants on the lot that
claimed ownership over the said property. Respondents filed a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Documents and Title, Reconveyance and Damages with Prayer for TRO and/or
Preliminary Injunction. Respondents alleged that the Reyeses sold to them portions of the lot
they respectively occupy and that the REM is a fictitious transaction. Hence, the mortgage as
well as the subsequent foreclosure sale is null and void.
Meanwhile, in view of the Sheriffs Partial Report, Aldover filed a Motion for Special
Order of Demolition which was granted by the Court. Respondents filed before the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, which was dismissed by the CA. On reconsideration, the CA granted respondents
prayer for the issuance of TRO. Petitioner contended that respondents ancillary prayer for
injunctive relief lacked basis as they have no clear and unmistakable right that must be
protected because Only 15 out of the 315 respondents are armed with proof of ownership. The
CA denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction
RULING:

A Writ of Preliminary Injunction is issued at any stage of an action prior to judgment or

final order to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before
their claims can be thoroughly studied or adjudicated. To justify its issuance, the applicants must
prove the following requisites: (1) that they have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected,
that is a right in esse; (2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (3) there is
an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicants; and, (4) there is no
other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.
In fine, the CA cannot be said to have acted capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily or
despotically in issuing its January 3, 2005 Resolution and February 10, 2005 Writ of Preliminary
Injunction to prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury. There is preliminary
showing that respondents have clear and unmistakable right over the disputed portions of the
property which must be protected during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 86363. Indeed, the
precipitate demolition of their houses would constitute material and substantial invasion of their
right which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. Hence, the need for a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction.
Besides, it has been held that the trial court (or the CA in this case) has a wide latitude in
determining the propriety of issuing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The assessment and
evaluation of evidence in the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction involve findings of facts
ordinarily left to it for its determination. Hence, absent a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion, the trial courts disposition in injunctive matters is not generally interfered with by the
appellate courts.
Furthermore, we note that although the scheduled January 4, 2005 hearing on the
propriety of issuing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction did not push through, the parties were
nonetheless amply heard thru their pleadings. At the time the CA issued its challenged January
3, 2005 Resolution, petitioners had already filed their Comment and Rejoinder where they
argued at length why no injunctive relief should be granted in favor of the respondents.
We have consistently held that there is no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction where a party was not deprived of its day in court, as it was heard
and had exhaustively presented all its arguments and defenses. Hence, when contending
parties were both given ample time and opportunity to present their respective evidence and
arguments in support of their opposing contentions, no grave abuse of discretion can be
attributed to the x x x court which issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, as it is given a
generous latitude in this regard, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.
HEIRS OF THE LATE SPS. FLAVIANO MAGLASANG AND SALUD ADAZA-MAGLASANG,
NAMELY, OSCAR A. MAGLASANG, ET AL. v. MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, NOW
SUBSTITUTED BY FIRST SOVEREIGN ASSET MANAGEMENT (SPV-AMC)
G.R. No. 171206, September 23, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed
alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the
other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or
upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the
provision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In this case, respondent sought to

extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage of the properties previously belonging to Sps. Maglasang
(and now, their estates) and, therefore, availed of the third option. Lest it be misunderstood, it
did not exercise the first option of directly filing a claim against the estate, as petitioners assert,
since it merely notified, the probate court of the outstanding amount of its claim against the
estate of Flaviano and that it was currently restructuring the account. Thus, having
unequivocally opted to exercise the third option of extra-judicial foreclosure under Section 7,
Rule 86, respondent is now precluded from filing a suit to recover any deficiency amount as
earlier discussed.
FACTS:
Spouses Flaviano and Salud Maglasang (Sps. Maglasang) obtained a credit line from
respondent which was secured by a real estate mortgage. Subsequently, Flaviano Flaviano
died intestate. The probate court issued an Order granting the petition for administration of
Edgar Maglasang and appointed him as the administrator of Flavianos estate. The probate
court issued a Notice to the Creditors. Thus, the respondent notified the probate court of the
outstanding amount of its claim against the estate of Flaviano.
When the probate proceedings terminated, loan obligations owed by the estate to
respondent remained unsatisfied. Nonetheless, the probate court expressly recognized the
rights of respondent under the mortgage and promissory notes executed by the Sps.
Maglasang, specifically, its right to foreclose the same within the statutory period.
In this light, respondent proceeded to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage covering
the Sps. Maglasangs properties and emerged as the highest bidder at the public
auction. There, however, remained a deficiency on Sps. Maglasangs obligation to respondent.
Thus, respondent filed a suit to recover the deficiency amount against the estate of Flaviano, his
widow Salud and petitioners.
The RTC ordered petitioners to pay the deficiency. On appeal, petitioners averred that
the remedies available to respondent under Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court are
alternative such that the election of one operates as a waiver or abandonment of the others.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent is entitled to recovery of deficiency
RULING:
The petition is partly granted.
Jurisprudence breaks down the rule under Section 7, Rule 86 and explains that the
secured creditor has three remedies/options that he may alternatively adopt for the satisfaction
of his indebtedness. In particular, he may choose to: (a) waive the mortgage and claim the
entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (b) foreclose the mortgage
judicially and prove the deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (c) rely on the mortgage
exclusively, or other security and foreclose the same before it is barred by prescription, without
the right to file a claim for any deficiency. It must, however, be emphasized that these remedies
are distinct, independent and mutually exclusive from each other; thus, the election of one

effectively bars the exercise of the others. With respect to real properties, the Court in Bank of
America v. American Realty Corporation pronounced:
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed
alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the
other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or
upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the
provision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such
remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court
of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made, in
accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.4118.
Anent the third remedy, it must be mentioned that the same includes the option of extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgage under Act No. 3135, as availed of by respondent in this case.
However, the plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the creditor waives his
right to recover any deficiency from the estate.
Case law now holds that this rule grants to the mortgagee three distinct, independent and
mutually exclusive remedies that can be alternatively pursued by the mortgage creditor for the
satisfaction of his credit in case the mortgagor dies, among them: (1) To waive the mortgage
and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (2) To foreclose
the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (3) To rely on the
mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at anytime before it is barred by prescription without
right to file a claim for any deficiency.
In this case, respondent sought to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage of the
properties previously belonging to Sps. Maglasang (and now, their estates) and, therefore,
availed of the third option. Lest it be misunderstood, it did not exercise the first option of directly
filing a claim against the estate, as petitioners assert, since it merely notified the probate court
of the outstanding amount of its claim against the estate of Flaviano and that it was currently
restructuring the account. Thus, having unequivocally opted to exercise the third option of extrajudicial foreclosure under Section 7, Rule 86, respondent is now precluded from filing a suit to
recover any deficiency amount as earlier discussed.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HERMINIO HARRY ROQUE ET. AL
G.R. No. 204603, September 24, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
Respondents filed a petition for declaratory relief, assailing the constitutionality of certain
sections of RA 9372. Private respondents only assert general interests as citizens, and
taxpayers and infractions which the government could prospectively commit if the enforcement
of the said law would remain untrammeled.
Private respondents petition for declaratory relief failed to demonstrate how they are left
to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Without any justiciable controversy, the
petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where both
the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public
official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.
FACTS:

Private respondents filed a Petition for declaratory relief before the RTC, assailing the
constitutionality of the certain sections of RA 9372. Petitioners moved to suspend the
proceedings, averring that certain petitions (SC petitions) questioning the constitutionality of RA
9372 have been lodged before the Supreme Court. The said motion was granted. The Supreme
Court promulgated its Decision in the Southern Hemisphere cases and thereby dismissed the
SC petitions.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, contending that private respondents failed to satisfy
the requisites for declaratory relief. Likewise, they averred that the constitutionality of RA 9372
had already been upheld by the Supreme Court in the Southern Hemisphere cases. The RTC
denied the motion to dismiss, finding that the Supreme Court did not pass upon the
constitutionality of RA 9372 and that private respondents petition for declaratory relief was
properly filed. Petitioners moved for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition has met all the requisites for declaratory relief
RULING:
The petition is granted.
The following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief: first , the subject
matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second , the terms of said documents and the
validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; third , there must have been no
breach of the documents in question; fourth , there must be an actual justiciable controversy or
the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; fifth , the issue must
be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth , adequate relief is not available through other
means or other forms of action or proceeding.
The Court observes that while the first, second, and third requirements appear to exist in
this case, the fourth, fifth, and sixth requirements, however, remain wanting. As to the fourth
requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of
one exists in this case. The concept describes a state of facts indicating imminent and inevitable
litigation provided that the issue is not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing declaration.
A perusal of private respondents petition for declaratory relief would show that they have
failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some
direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far
removed from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private respondents only
assert general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which the government could
prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law would remain untrammeled. As their
petition would disclose, private respondents fear of prosecution was solely based on remarks of
certain government officials which were addressed to the general public. They, however, failed
to show how these remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action geared
towards the implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other words, there was no particular,
real or imminent threat to any of them. As held in Southern Hemisphere: without any justiciable
controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no
original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency,"

where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a
public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the
present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not
peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused. Allegations
of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. Thus, in the same
light that the Court dismissed the SC petitions in the Southern Hemisphere cases on the basis
of, among others, lack of actual justiciable controversy (or the ripening seeds of one), the RTC
should have dismissed private respondents petition for declaratory relief all the same.
As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that
the controversy at hand is ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on the
above-discussed allegations in private respondents petition, remain highly-speculative and
merely theorized. It is well-settled that a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. This private
respondents failed to demonstrate in the case at bar.
Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a
discussion on the availability of adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the
private respondents exists in the first place.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARTURO ENRIQUEZ Y DE LOS REYES
G.R. No. 197550, September 25, 2013
J. Leonardo-De Castro
While non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not automatically
render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, this is true only when "(i) there is a
justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and (ii) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved." Thus, any divergence from the prescribed procedure
must be justified and should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
contraband. Absent any of the said conditions, the non-compliance is an irregularity, a red flag
that casts reasonable doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti. In the case at bar, not only was
there no justifiable ground offered for the non-compliance with the chain of custody
requirement, there was an apparent failure to properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items to ensure the identity of the corpus delicti from the time of seizure to
the time of presentation in court.
FACTS:
Sometime in May 2003, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Edilberto David, SPO2 Ernesto
Divina, and SPO1 Saturnino Garung received reports from the barangay office and other
concerned citizens of drug-dealing activities in the locality of Porac, Pampanga. After confirming
the reports, a test-buy was conducted. Thereafter, a team was organized to conduct a buy-bust
operation. Upon completion of the transaction, the accused was apprehended and the plastic
sachets were confiscated.
On the other hand, the defense claimed that he was eating when three men, all in
civilian clothes, approached him. One of the men asked Enriquez if he knew a certain truck

driver who is suspected of selling shabu. When he denied knowledge thereof, he was
immediately handcuffed and detained. He was later told that he is being suspected of selling
shabu. The RTC convicted Enriquez. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether there was an unbroken chain of custody
RULING:
As the dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of both offenses, its
identity and integrity must definitely be shown to have been preserved. "This means that on top
of the elements of possession or illegal sale, the fact that the substance [possessed or illegally
sold], in the first instance, the very substance adduced in court must likewise be established
with the same exacting degree of certitude as that required sustaining a conviction."
Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which
implements the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, defines "chain of custody as the
duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or
plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court
for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity
and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time
when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as
evidence, and the final disposition.
Describing the mechanics of the custodial chain requirement, this Court, in People v.
Cervantes, said:
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. In context, this would ideally include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered
into evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness
possession, the condition in which it was received, and the condition in which it was delivered to
the next link in the chain.
While non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not automatically
render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, this is true only when "(i) there is a
justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and (ii) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved." Thus, any divergence from the prescribed procedure must
be justified and should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
contraband. Absent any of the said conditions, the non-compliance is an irregularity, a red flag
that casts reasonable doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti.
In the case at bar, not only
compliance with the chain of custody
preserve the integrity and evidentiary
corpus delicti from the time of seizure

was there no justifiable ground offered for the nonrequirement, there was an apparent failure to properly
value of the seized items to ensure the identity of the
to the time of presentation in court. In other words, the

prosecutions evidence failed to establish the chain that would have shown that the sachets of
shabu presented in court were the very same items seized from Enriquez.
Overall, the prosecution failed to observe the requirement that the testimonies of all
persons who handled the specimen are important to establish the chain of custody. Of all the
individuals who came into direct contact with or had physical possession of the shabu allegedly
seized from Enriquez, only SPO2 David testified for the specific purpose of identifying the
evidence.
However, his testimony miserably failed to demonstrate an unbroken chain as it ended
with his identification of the money and seized items he marked and documents he signed. In
effect, the custodial link ended with SPO2 David when he testified that he brought the seized
items, together with Enriquez, to the police station.
Under the above premises, it is clear that there was a break in the chain of custody of
the seized substances. The failure of the prosecution to establish the evidence's chain of
custody is fatal to its case as we can no longer consider or even safely assume that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the confiscated dangerous drug were properly preserved.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GIOVANNI OCFEMIA Y CHAVEZ
G.R. No. 185383, September 25, 2013
J. Leonardo-De Castro
P02 Aldea marked the seized items not at the crime scene but at the police station in the
presence of Ocfemia. The "chain of custody" requires that the "marking" of the seized items to
truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones
offered in evidence should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2)
immediately upon confiscation.". "Immediate confiscation" has no exact definition. To be able to
create a first link in the chain of custody, then, what is required is that the marking be made in
the presence of the accused and upon immediate confiscation. "Immediate confiscation" has no
exact definition. In one case, the marking of the seized items at the police station and in the
presence of the accused was sufficient in showing compliance with the rules on chain of
custody. Marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police
station or office of the apprehending team.
FACTS:
Based on a tip from a confidential informant, a team, headed by PS/INSP Vargas,
composed of other agents/officers from PDEA and the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG), conducted a buy-bust operation against Giovanni Ocfemia (Ocfemia). Upon
completion of the transaction, the police officers apprehended Ocfemia. A body search was
conducted and the police officers were able to retrieve only two of the five marked P100.00 bills
from his possession. Afterwards, Ocfemia was brought to the police station.
At the police station, PO2 Aldea marked with his initials the sachet of shabu sold to him
by Ocfemia. PO2 Aldea then submitted the said sachet of shabu to their crime laboratory,
together with PS/INSP Vargass letter-request for chemical analysis of the same. The submitted
specimen yielded positive results.

Ocfemia was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The
RTC rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged. On appeal,
Ocfemia claimed the prosecution was not able to prove with moral certainty the identity of the
corpus delicti for failure of the police officers to comply with Section 21(1) of Republic Act No.
9165. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the identity of the corpus delicti in the instant case was duly proved with moral certainty
RULING:
Jurisprudence tells us that the failure to immediately mark seized drugs will not
automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody. The failure to strictly comply with Sec.
21(1), Art. II of RA 9165 does not necessarily render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items
seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
As we held in People v. Cortez, testimony about a perfect chain is not always the
standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. People v.
Sanchez, however, explains that RA 9165 does not specify a time frame for "immediate
marking," or where said marking should be done:
"What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is
the matter of "marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence
seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and photography when
these activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest.
Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items to
truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones
offered in evidence should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2)
immediately upon confiscation."
To be able to create a first link in the chain of custody, then, what is required is that the
marking be made in the presence of the accused and upon immediate confiscation. "Immediate
confiscation" has no exact definition. Thus, in People v. Gum-Oyen, testimony that included the
marking of the seized items at the police station and in the presence of the accused was
sufficient in showing compliance with the rules on chain of custody. Marking upon immediate
confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team.
In this case, the chain of custody of the sachet of shabu sold by accused-appellant could
be continuously traced from its receipt by PO2Aldea, the poseur-buyer, during the buy-bust
operation; its transfer to the police laboratory for examination; it being kept in police custody
while awaiting trial; and its presentation as evidence before the RTC. PO2 Aldea himself marked
the said sachet of shabu with his initials upon arriving at the police station with the arrested
accused-appellant. He also personally submitted the same sachet of shabu to the PNP crime
laboratory for forensic examination. When he testified before the RTC, PO2 Aldea identified the
sachet of Shabu and confirmed his initials thereon. P/SUPT Arroyo was the forensic officer who
conducted the chemical examination of the contents of the sachet bearing PO2 Aldeas initials
and she confirmed on the wit stand that the said contents tested positive for methamphetamine

hydrochloride. Thus, the integrity and evidentiary value of the sachet of shabu presented in
evidence against accused-appellant was properly preserved in substantial compliance with
Section 21(1) of Republic Act No.9165.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDWIN IBANEZ Y ALBANTE, ET AL.
G.R. No. 197813, September 25, 2013
J. Perez
The Rule on Examination of a Child Witness specifies that every child is presumed
qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party
challenging the child's competence. Petitioners flimsy objections on Rachels lack of education
and inability to read and tell time carry no weight and cannot overcome the clear and convincing
testimony of Rachel as to who killed her father.
On the other hand, Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court explicitly provided that a
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which
are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. Anicetas
testimony is mainly hearsay, especially on the purported fight between Wilfredo and Jesus that
ended in Wilfredos death. Anicetas testimony as such carries no probative weight. At best,
Anicetas testimony is an independent relevant statement: offered only as to the fact of its
declaration and the substance of what had been relayed to Aniceta by Marilou, not as to the
truth thereof.
FACTS:
Appellants Edwin and Alfredo, with Jesus Monsillo y Taniares, were all charged in an
Information for Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. On that day, Wilfredo
Atendido y Dohenog (Wilfredo) was invited by Alfredo to a drinking session with Jesus and
Edwin. Rachel saw her father step away from the group to urinate. While Wilfredo relieved
himself, Edwin snatched a t-shirt from a nearby clothesline, and hooded the t-shirt over the head
and face of Wilfredo. Robbed of vision as his head was fully covered, Wilfredo was wrestled and
pinned down by Edwin, while Alfredo boxed the left side of Wilfredos chest. Jesus, armed with a
long iron bar, swung at and hit Wilfredo in the head.
In defense, the two accused-appellants pointed to Jesus as the sole culprit and
professed that they were only at the scene of the crime because of their curiosity for what had
occurred. To corroborate their claim of innocence, the defense presented Aniceta Dosil
(Aniceta), who testified that Rachel could not have witnessed the murder of Wilfredo because
they were out on that day selling doormats and only returned at 6:00 p.m. Thus, they only
witnessed the aftermath of the purported fight between Jesus and Wilfredo. Marilou, Jesus
sister, recounted to Aniceta that Jesus had hit Wilfredo because Wilfredo was about to stab
Jesus.
The RTC convicted Edwin and Alfredo of Murder. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the RTC. The appellants averred that the CA erred in: 1) giving
credence to Rachel as a witness despite her lack of education and inability to read and tell time
and; 2) not giving credence to testimony of Aniceta.
ISSUES:

1. Whether the testimony of Rachel should be given credence

2. Whether the testimony of Aniceta should be given credence
RULING:
We cannot take Rachels testimony lightly simply because she was a mere child when
she witnessed the incident and when she gave her testimony in court. There is no showing that
her mental maturity rendered her incapable of testifying and of relating the incident truthfully.
With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court, all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. That is even
buttressed by the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness which specifies that every child is
presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the
party challenging the child's competence. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the
ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or
appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party,
conduct a competency examination of a child. Thus, petitioners flimsy objections on Rachels
lack of education and inability to read and tell time carry no weight and cannot overcome the
clear and convincing testimony of Rachel as to who killed her father.
As regards Anicetas version of the events that Jesus was the sole perpetrator of the
crime who attacked Wilfredo only in self-defense, we easily see the fatal flaw: Aniceta arrived
after the supposed fight between Wilfredo and Jesus, and what transpired was merely relayed
to her by Jesus sister, Marilou.
Quite apparent from Anicetas narration of events is that she has no personal knowledge
of Wilfredos killing. Anicetas testimony is mainly hearsay, specially on the purported fight
between Wilfredo and Jesus that ended in Wilfredos death. Anicetas testimony as such carries
no probative weight. At best, Anicetas testimony is an independent relevant statement: offered
only as to the fact of its declaration and the substance of what had been relayed to Aniceta by
Marilou, not as to the truth thereof.
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court explicitly provided that a witness can testify
only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from
his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
CRISANTA GUIDO-ENRIQUEZ v. ALICIA I. VICTORINO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 180427, September 30, 2013
J. Peralta
Petitioner did not receive a notice of the August 15, 1988 Decision of the RTC in LRC
Case No. 10371. A land registration case is a proceeding in rem. In land registration
proceedings, being in rem, there is no necessity to give personal notice to the owners or
claimants of the land sought to be registered in order to vest the courts with power and authority
over the res. Moreover, since no issue was raised as to Antonia Victorino's compliance with the
prerequisites of notice and publication, she is deemed to have followed such requirements. As a
consequence, petitioner is deemed sufficiently notified of the hearing of Antonia's application.
Hence, petitioner cannot claim that she is denied due process.
FACTS:

Antonia Vda. De Victorino (Antonia) filed for an Application for Registration of Title over a
lot. The Republic, thru the Director of Lands, opposed said application alleging that it belongs to
the Republic of the Philippines. It appeared that the subject lot is a portion of a large parcel of
land covered by TCT No. M-2102, registered under the name of Antonia Guido, et al., and, at
the same time, overlapped with another lot which was also a subject of an application for
registration. There is a pending case filed by the republic for annulment of TCT No. 23377, the
mother title of TCT No. M-2102, against Guido, et. al. (Guido case).
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Guido, et. al. On August 15, 1988, the RTC-Pasig
granted the application of Antonia Victorino and issued an Order for the Issuance of the Decree
directing the Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission to implement the said
Decision, considering the same has become final. However, the Land Registration Authority
held in abeyance the issuance of the decree in favor of Antonia Victorino. On November 21,
1991, the Supreme Court issued a Decision in the Guido Case in favor of (Antonia Guido, et.al.)
and declared TCT 23377 issued under the name of Guido, et. al. true and authentic.
Private Respondent Alicia Victorino filed a Manifestation and Motion for an Alias Order
for Issuance of a Decree in the Name of the New Owner-Transferee. Private Respondent
alleged that Antonia Victorino sold the subject lot in her favor. Private Respondent prayed for the
issuance of an order annotating these decisions of the Supreme Court and the RTC-Pasig in
TCT M-2102 to segregate Antonia's portion. On November 19, 2002, the RTC-Pasig issued an
order granting Private Respondent's Motion and directing the Land Registration Authority to
issue the corresponding decree "in accordance with the adjudication of (the Trial Court's)
Decision dated August 15, 1988 after payment of all taxes due on the land." The RTC-Pasig
likewise ordered the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Morong Branch, to make an annotation on TCT
M-2102.
On December 4, 2002, Petitioner Crisanta Guido-Enriquez filed a Motion for
Clarification, to clarify whether the August 15, 1988 decision ordered the segregation of the
subject lot and whether the Land Registration Authority has the authority to move for said
segregation. Petitioners motion was denied for being moot. The RTC ordered the issuance of
the decree in the name of Antonia Vda. De Victorino. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
thereof was denied by the RTC. .Aggrieved, herein petitioner filed a special civil action for
certiorari with the CA, claiming that the August 15, 1988 Decision of the RTC in LRC Case No.
10371 is null and void for lack of jurisdiction as well as for denial of petitioner's right to due
process because she did not receive a copy of such decision. The CA denied the petition and
affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the August 15, 1988 Decision of the RTC in LRC Case No. 10371 is null and void for
lack of jurisdiction as well as for denial of petitioner's right to due process
RULING:
As to the alleged denial of petitioner's right to due process due to Antonia Victorino's
failure to identify petitioner as indispensable party in her application for registration, as well as to
serve her with actual and personal notice, Section 15 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 simply
requires that the application for registration shall "state the full names and addresses of all
occupants of the land and those of the adjoining owners, if known, and, if not known, it shall

state the extent of the search made to find them." A perusal of Antonia Victorino's Application
shows that she enumerated the adjoining owners. She also indicated therein that, to the best of
her knowledge, no person has any interest or is in possession of the subject land. The fact that
she did not identify petitioner as an occupant or an adjoining owner is not tantamount to denial
of petitioner's right to due process and does not nullify the RTC Decision granting such
application.
Besides, the CA was correct in holding that a land registration case, like the one at bar,
is a proceeding in rem. This Court has already ruled that in land registration proceedings, being
in rem, there is no necessity to give personal notice to the owners or claimants of the land
sought to be registered in order to vest the courts with power and authority over the res.
Moreover, since no issue was raised as to Antonia Victorino's compliance with the
prerequisites of notice and publication, she is deemed to have followed such requirements. As a
consequence, petitioner is deemed sufficiently notified of the hearing of Antonia's application.
Hence, she cannot claim that she is denied due process.
GREGORIO SINGIAN, JR., v. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION)
G.R. Nos. 195011-19, September 30, 2013
J. Del Castillo
The grant or denial of a Demurrer to Evidence is left to the sound discretion of the court,
and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such
discretion.
FACTS:
Atty. Orlando L. Salvador was PCGG Consultant on detail with the Presidential Ad Hoc
Committee on Behest Loans (Committee). He was also coordinator of a Technical Working
Group tasked to examine and study the reports and recommendations of the Asset Privatization
Trust relating to loan accounts in all government financing institutions. Among the accounts
acted upon by the Committee were the loans granted to Integrated Shoe, Inc. (ISI) by the
Philippine National Bank (PNB). It would appear that on ISI applied for a five-year confirmed
irrevocable deferred letter of credit to finance its purchase of a complete line of machinery and
equipment. PNB approved the loan, subject to certain stipulations. The said letter of credit was
to be secured by collaterals. PNB further extended loan accommodations in various amounts
and on different dates to ISI without sufficient collaterals.
The Committee found that the loans extended to ISI bore characteristics of behest loans
specifically for not having been secured with sufficient collaterals and obtained with undue
haste. As a result, Atty. Orlando Salvador filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a sworn
complaint for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019. Thus, herein petitioner
was charged with nine (9) counts of violation of Section 3(e), and another nine (9) counts of
violation of Section 3(g), of RA 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The trial for the case ensued. After prosecution rested its case and submitted their
Formal Offer of Evidence, petitioner with prior leave, filed a Demurrer to Evidence anchored on
the following grounds: (1) lack of proof of conspiracy with any PNB official; (2) the contracts with
PNB contained provisions that are beneficial, and not manifestly and grossly disadvantageous,
to the government; (3) the loans could not be characterized as behest loans because they were
secured by sufficient collaterals and ISI increased its capitalization; and (4) assuming the loans

are behest loans, petitioner could not be held liable for lack of any participation. The
Sandiganbayan denied the Demurrer to Evidence and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether Demurrer to Evidence should be granted
Ruling:
A demurrer to the evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect
that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or
not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of
the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the
evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or
sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.
Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in
character, weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded
according to the circumstances. To be considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove:
(a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by the
accused.
At the outset, we emphasize that "the resolution of a demurrer to evidence should be left
to the exercise of sound judicial discretion. A lower courts order of denial shall not be disturbed,
that is, the appellate courts will not review the prosecutions evidence and precipitately decide
whether such evidence has established the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt,
unless accused has established that such judicial discretion has been gravely abused, there by
amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. Mere allegations of such abuse will not suffice."
In this case, petitioner miserably failed to present an iota of evidence to show that the
Sandiganbayan abused, much more, gravely abused, its discretion in denying petitioners
Demurrer to Evidence. A closer scrutiny of the assailed Resolutions would indeed show that the
Sandiganbayan meticulously discussed both testimonial and documentary evidence presented
by the prosecution. It was only after a careful analysis of the facts and evidence presented did
the respondent court lay down its findings and conclusions.
Based on the evidence presented, the Sandiganbayan was convinced that all three
elements of Section 3(g), RA 3019 were satisfactorily established. It found that PNB and ISI
entered into several contracts or loan transactions. The Sandiganbayan also assessed that
petitioner conspired with his co-accused in defrauding the government considering "(1) the
frequency of the loans or closeness of the dates at which they were granted; (2) the quantity of
the loans granted; (3) the failure of the bank to verify and to take any action on the failure of ISI
to put up additional capitalization and additional collaterals; and (4) the eventual absence of any
action by the Bank to collect full payment from ISI."
OCTOBER 2013

CAMP JOHN HAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. CENTRAL BOARD ASSESSMENT

APPEALS, ETC., ET AL.
G.R. No. 169234, October 2, 2013
J. Perez
Section 252 emphatically directs that the taxpayer/real property owner questioning the
assessment should first pay the tax due before his protest can be entertained. As a matter of
fact, the words paid under protest shall be annotated on the tax receipts. Consequently, only
after such payment has been made by the taxpayer may he file a protest in writing (within thirty
[30] days from said payment of tax) to the provincial, city, or municipal treasurer, who shall
decide the protest within sixty (60) days from its receipt. In no case is the local treasurer
obliged to entertain the protest unless the tax due has been paid.
A claim for exemption from payment of real property taxes does not actually question
the assessors authority to assess and collect such taxes, but pertains to the reasonableness or
correctness of the assessment by the local assessor, a question of fact which should be
resolved, at the very first instance, by the LBAA. By providing that real property not declared
and proved as tax-exempt shall be included in the assessment roll, Section 206 of RA No. 7160
implies that the local assessor has the authority to assess the property for realty taxes, and any
subsequent claim for exemption shall be allowed only when sufficient proof has been adduced
supporting the claim.
FACTS:
Respondent City Assessor of Baguio City assessed petitioner, Camp John Hay Development
Corporation, for the real property taxes on its properties. The petitioner protested the
assessment and filed an appeal with the the Board of Tax Assessment Appeals (BTAA). BTAA
enjoined petitioner to first comply as to the payment under protest of the subject real property
taxes before the hearing of its appeal.
The CBAA denied petitioners appeal and remanded the case to the LBAA for further
proceedings subject to a full and up-to-date payment of the realty taxes on subject properties.
The CTA En Banc dismissed the petition finding that petitioner failed to comply with Section 252
of RA No. 7160. It adopted the CBAAs position, ruling that it could not resolve the issue on
whether petitioner is liable to pay real property tax or whether it is indeed a tax-exempt entity
considering that the LBAA has not decided the case on the merits.
ISSUES:
1) Whether petitioner may protest the assessment without payment
2) Whether the local assessor may include in the assessment realty claimed to be tax
exempt pending proof of its tax exempt status
RULING:
1) The taxpayer/real property owner questioning the assessment should first pay the
tax due before his protest can be entertained.
To begin with, Section 252 emphatically directs that the taxpayer/real property owner
questioning the assessment should first pay the tax due before his protest can be entertained.
As a matter of fact, the words paid under protest shall be annotated on the tax receipts.

Consequently, only after such payment has been made by the taxpayer may he file a protest in
writing (within thirty [30] days from said payment of tax) to the provincial, city, or municipal
treasurer, who shall decide the protest within sixty (60) days from its receipt. In no case is the
local treasurer obliged to entertain the protest unless the tax due has been paid.
Secondly, within the period prescribed by law, any owner or person having legal interest in the
property not satisfied with the action of the provincial, city, or municipal assessor in the
assessment of his property may file an appeal with the LBAA of the province or city concerned,
as provided in Section 226 of RA No. 7160. Thereafter, within thirty (30) days from receipt, he
may elevate, by filing a notice of appeal, the adverse decision of the LBAA with the CBAA,
which exercises exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all appeals from the decisions, orders,
and resolutions of the Local Boards involving contested assessments of real properties, claims
for tax refund and/or tax credits, or overpayments of taxes.
In the present case, the authority of the assessor is not being questioned. Despite petitioners
protestations, the petition filed before the court a quo primarily involves the correctness of the
assessments, which are questions of fact, that are not allowed in a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus. The court a quo is therefore precluded from entertaining the
petition, and it appropriately dismissed the petition.
2) The local assessor has the authority to assess the property for realty taxes, and
any subsequent claim for exemption shall be allowed only when sufficient proof
has been adduced supporting the claim.
Moreover, a claim for exemption from payment of real property taxes does not actually question
the assessors authority to assess and collect such taxes, but pertains to the reasonableness or
correctness of the assessment by the local assessor, a question of fact which should be
resolved, at the very first instance, by the LBAA.
In other words, by providing that real property not declared and proved as tax-exempt shall be
included in the assessment roll, Section 206 of RA No. 7160 implies that the local assessor has
the authority to assess the property for realty taxes, and any subsequent claim for exemption
shall be allowed only when sufficient proof has been adduced supporting the claim.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. SAN ROQUE POWER CORPORATION/
TAGANITO MINING CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE/ PHILEX
MINING CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 187485/G.R. No. 196113/G.R. No. 197156, October 8, 2013
J. Carpio
A claim for tax refund or credit, like a claim for tax exemption, is construed strictly
against the taxpayer. One of the conditions for a judicial claim of refund or credit under the
VAT System is compliance with the 120+30 day mandatory and jurisdictional periods.
Thus, strict compliance with the 120+30 day periods is necessary for such a claim to prosper,
whether before, during, or after the effectivity of the Atlas doctrine, except for the period
from the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on 10 December 2003 to 6 October 2010
when the Aichi doctrine was adopted, which again reinstated the 120+30 day periods as
mandatory and jurisdictional.
Section 4 of the 1997 Tax Code provides that the "power to interpret the provisions of
this Code and other tax laws shall be under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Commissioner, subject to review by the Secretary of Finance," Section 7 of the same Code

does not prohibit the delegation of such power. Thus, "the Commissioner may delegate the
powers vested in him under the pertinent provisions of this Code to any or such subordinate
officials with the rank equivalent to a division chief or higher, subject to such limitations and
restrictions as may be imposed under rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary
of Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner."
FACTS:
This is a Resolution resolving the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration filed by San Roque Power Corporation (San Roque) and the Comment to the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR).
San Roque prays that the rule established in the 12 February 2013 Decision be given only a
prospective effect, arguing that the manner by which the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) actually treated the 120 + 30 day periods constitutes an
operative fact the effects and consequences of which cannot be erased or undone.
The CIR, on the other hand, asserts that Taganito Mining Corporation's judicial claim for tax
credit or refund was prematurely filed before the CTA and should be disallowed because BIR
Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued by a Deputy Commissioner, not by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the doctrine of operative fact applies to tax regulations
2) Whether the BIR Ruling issued by a Deputy Commissioner can be relied on
RULING:
1) Since the law has already prescribed in Section 246 of the Tax Code how the
doctrine of operative fact should be applied, there can be no invocation of the
doctrine of operative fact other than what the law has specifically provided in
Section 246.
Clearly, for the operative fact doctrine to apply, there must be a "legislative or executive
measure," meaning a law or executive issuance, that is invalidated by the court. From the
passage of such law or promulgation of such executive issuance until its invalidation by the
court, the effects of the law or executive issuance, when relied upon by the public in good faith,
may have to be recognized as valid. In the present case, however, there is no such law or
executive issuance that has been invalidated by the Court except BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03.
To justify the application of the doctrine of operative fact as an exemption, San Roque asserts
that "the BIR and the CTA in actual practice did not observe and did not require refund seekers
to comply with the120+30 day periods." This is glaring error because an administrative practice
is neither a law nor an executive issuance. Moreover, in the present case, there is even no such
administrative practice by the BIR as claimed by San Roque.
At the time San Roque filed its petition for review with the CTA, the 120+30 day mandatory
periods were already in the law. Section112 (C) expressly grants the Commissioner 120 days
within which to decide the taxpayers claim. The law is clear, plain, and unequivocal: "x x x the
Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes

within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents."
Following the verbalegis doctrine, this law must be applied exactly as worded since it is clear,
plain, and unequivocal. The taxpayer cannot simply file a petition with the CTA without waiting
for the Commissioners decision within the 120-daymandatory and jurisdictional period. The CTA
will have no jurisdiction because there will be no "decision" or "deemed a denial" decision of the
Commissioner for the CTA to review. In San Roques case, it filed its petition with the CTA a
mere 13 days after it filed its administrative claim with the Commissioner. Indisputably, San
Roque knowingly violated the mandatory 120-day period, and it cannot blame anyone but itself.
Section 112(C) also expressly grants the taxpayer a 30-day period to appeal to the CTA the
decision or inaction of the Commissioner
To repeat, a claim for tax refund or credit, like a claim for tax exemption, is construed strictly
against the taxpayer. One of the conditions for a judicial claim of refund or credit under the VAT
System is compliance with the 120+30 day mandatory and jurisdictional periods. Thus, strict
compliance with the 120+30 day periods is necessary for such a claim to prosper, whether
before, during, or after the effectivity of the Atlas doctrine, except for the period from the
issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on 10 December 2003 to 6 October 2010 when the Aichi
doctrine was adopted, which again reinstated the 120+30 day periods as mandatory and
jurisdictional.
Under Section 246, taxpayers may rely upon a rule or ruling issued by the Commissioner from
the time the rule or ruling is issued up to its reversal by the Commissioner or this Court. The
reversal is not given retroactive effect. This, in essence, is the doctrine of operative fact. There
must, however, be a rule or ruling issued by the Commissioner that is relied upon by the
taxpayer in good faith. A mere administrative practice, not formalized into a rule or ruling, will not
suffice because such a mere administrative practice may not be uniformly and consistently
applied. An administrative practice, if not formalized as a rule or ruling, will not be known to the
general public and can be availed of only by those within formal contacts with the government
agency.
Since the law has already prescribed in Section 246 of the Tax Code how the doctrine of
operative fact should be applied, there can be no invocation of the doctrine of operative fact
other than what the law has specifically provided in Section 246. In the present case, the rule or
ruling subject of the operative fact doctrine is BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 dated 10 December
2003. Prior to this date, there is no such rule or ruling calling for the application of the operative
fact doctrine in Section 246. Section 246, being an exemption to statutory taxation, must be
applied strictly against the taxpayer claiming such exemption.
2) Thus, "the Commissioner may delegate the powers vested in him under the
pertinent provisions of this Code to any or such subordinate officials with the
rank equivalent to a division chief or higher, subject to such limitations and
restrictions as may be imposed under rules and regulations to be promulgated by
the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner."
In asking this Court to disallow Taganitos claim for tax refund or credit, the CIR
repudiates the validity of the issuance of its own BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03. "Taganito cannot
rely on the pronouncements in BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, being a mere issuance of a Deputy
Commissioner."

Although Section 4 of the 1997 Tax Code provides that the "power to interpret the provisions of
this Code and other tax laws shall be under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Commissioner, subject to review by the Secretary of Finance," Section 7 of the same Code
does not prohibit the delegation of such power. Thus, "the Commissioner may delegate the
powers vested in him under the pertinent provisions of this Code to any or such subordinate
officials with the rank equivalent to a division chief or higher, subject to such limitations and
restrictions as may be imposed under rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary
of Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner."
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. TEAM (PHILIPPINES) OPERATIONS
CORPORATION [FORMERLY MIRANT (PHILIPPINES) OPERATIONS CORPORATION)
G.R. No. 185728, October 16, 2013
J. Villarama, Jr.
For a taxpayer to be entitled to a tax credit or refund of creditable withholding tax, the
following requisites must be complied with: First, The claim must be filed with the CIR within the
two-year period from the date of payment of the tax; Second, It must be shown on the return of
the recipient that the income received was declared as part of the gross income; and Third, The
fact of withholding is established by a copy of the statement duly issued by the payor to the
payee showing the amount paid and the amount of tax withheld.
FACTS:
Respondent Team (Philippines) Operations Corporation entered into an Operating and
Management Agreements with Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (MPagC) AND Mirant Sual
Corporation (MSC). Payments received by the respondent for the services rendered were
subjected to creditable withholding tax. Respondent filed an administrative claim for refund or
issuance of tax credit certificate with the BIR for the alleged overpaid income tax or excess
creditable withholding tax in the amount of P23,108,689 for the calendar year ended December
31, 2002. As the two-year prescriptive period for the filing of a judicial claim under Section 229
of the NIRC was about to lapse without action on the part of CIR, respondent elevated its case
before the CTA Division by way of Petition for Review.
Subsequently, CTA Division rendered a decision partially granting the respondents petition and
ordered CIR to refund or issue a tax credit certificate in a reduced amount of P23, 053,919.22
representing the excess/unutilized creditable withholding tax for the taxable year 2002. It further
found that the respondent complied with the substantiation requirements to be entitled to its
claim. CIR filed a motion for partial reconsideration, but the same was denied. On appeal to the
CTA En Banc, CIRs petition was denied for lack of merit and the decision of the CTA Division
was affirmed.
Petitioner claims that the respondent is not entitled to the refund of excess or unutilized
creditable withholding taxes for the taxable year 2002 for failure to comply with the requirements
for refund of creditable withholding tax.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent complied with the requirements for refund of creditable withholding tax
RULING:

A taxpayer claiming for a tax credit or refund of creditable withholding tax must comply with the
following requisites:
1. The claim must be filed with the CIR within the two-year period from the date of payment
of the tax;
2. It must be shown on the return of the recipient that the income received was declared as
part of the gross income; and
3. The fact of withholding is established by a copy of the statement duly issued by the
payor to the payee showing the amount paid and the amount of tax withheld.
There is no dispute that respondent has complied with the first requirement when it filed its
administrative claim for tax refund on March 17, 2004 and thereafter filed a petition for review
with the CTA on April 27, 2004 or within two years from April 15, 2003, the date of filing of its
Annual Income Tax Return. Respondent was also able to prove the second requirement by
showing in tis ITR that the income upon which the creditable withholding taxes were paid was
declared as part of its gross income for the taxable year 2002.
As to the third condition, both the CTA First Division and the CTA En Banc ruled that respondent
has sufficiently establish the fact of withholding by presenting the Certificates of Creditable Tax
Withheld at Source issued by MPagC and MSC for the year 2002. We find no cogent reason to
deviate from these findings. Oft-repeat is the rule that the court will not lightly set aside the
conclusions reached by the CTA which, by the very nature of its function of being dedicated
exclusively to the resolution of tax problems, has accordingly developed an expertise on the
subject, unless there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of authority.
Thus, we are in accord with the findings of the CTA First Division and the CTA En Banc that
respondent complied with the substantiation requirements for refund of creditable withholding
tax. Here, respondent was able to establish the fact of withholding by submitting a copy of the
withholding tax certificates duly issued by MPagC and MSC, as the withholding agent, indicating
the name of the payor and showing the income payment basis of the tax withheld and the
amount of tax withheld. Contrary to the petitioners assertion, it is not necessary for the person
who executed and prepared the Certificates of Creditable Tax Withheld at Source to be
presented and to testify personally as to the authenticity of the certificates. The copies of the
said certificates when found by the duly commissioned ICPA to be faithful reproductions of the
original copies would suffice to establish the fact of withholding.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GST PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 190872, October 17, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
The two-year prescriptive period applies only to administrative claims and not to judicial
claims. The 120-day and 30-day periods are not merely directory but mandatory. The taxpayer
will always have 30 days to file the judicial claim even if the Commissioner acts only on the
120th day, or does not act at all during the 120-day period. With the 30-day period always
available to the taxpayer, the taxpayer can no longer file a judicial claim for refund or tax credit
of unutilized excess input VAT without waiting for the Commissioner to decide until the
expiration of the 120-day period. Failure to comply with the 120-day waiting period violates the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and renders the petition premature and thus
without a cause of action, with the effect that the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction over the
taxpayers petition.

However, the San Roque case provides exception to the strict compliance with the 120day period. Although the 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional, the BIR Ruling No. DA489-03 dated December 10, 2003 provided a valid claim for equitable estoppel under Section
246 of the Tax Code. BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 expressly states that the "taxpayer-claimant
need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA
by way of Petition for Review. Thus, the BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 will shield the filing of a tax
payers judicial claim from the vice of prematurity when such claim is filed during its effectivity.
FACTS:
GST is a duly registered VAT Enterprise and filed Quarterly VAT Returns showing its zero-rated
sales for the taxable years 2004 and 2005. Claiming unutilized excess input VAT attributable to
the zero-rated sales, GST filed before the BIR separate claims for refund on the following
periods: June 9, 2004 for the 1st Quarter of 2004, August 12, 2004 for the 2nd Quarter of 2004,
February 18, 2005 for the 3rd and 4th Quarter of 2004, May 11, 2005 for the 1st Quarter of 2005,
November 18, 2005 for the 2nd and 3rd Quarter of 2005.
For failure of the CIR to act on its administrative claims, GST filed a petition for review before
the CTA on March 17, 2006. After due proceedings, the CTA First Division rendered a
Decision on January 27, 2009 granting GSTs claims for refund but at the reduced amount. The
CIR moved for reconsideration, which was denied prompting the elevation of the case to the
CTA En Banc via petition for review. CTA En Banc affirmed the Decision of the CTA Division and
denied CIRs motion for reconsideration.
The CIR argued that the judicial appeal to the CTA was filed beyond the reglementary periods
prescribes in Section 112 of the Tax Code.
ISSUES:
1) Whether GSTs judicial claim was premature for being filed simultaneously with the
administrative claim
2) Whether the 120+30 day rule is mandatory and jurisdictional
3) Whether GSTs judicial claim for the second and third quarters of 2005 are valid
pursuant to BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03
4) Whether GSTs judicial claims for the other quarters must be denied
RULING:
1) The judicial claim, which was simultaneously filed with its administrative claim,
was found to be premature.
The filing of the Petition for Review before the First Division has already prescribed with respect
to the administrative claim filed on June 9, 2004; August 12, 2004; February 18, 2005; and May
11, 2005 for being filed beyond the 30th day provided under the second paragraph of Section
112 (D) of the NIRC of 1997. The petition is therefore dismissible for being out of time.
Anent the administrative claim filed on November 18, 2005, the filing of the petition before the
First Division is premature for failure of respondent to wait for the 120-day period to expire. It
failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies. Hence, the instant petition is likewise
dismissible for lack of cause of action.

2) The 120+30 day periods are mandatory and jurisdictional.

The Court had already clarified in the case of CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.
(Aichi), promulgated on October 6, 2010, that the two-year prescriptive period applies only to
administrative claims and not to judicial claims. Moreover, it was ruled that the 120-day and 30day periods are not merely directory but mandatory. Accordingly, the judicial claim of Aichi,
which was simultaneously filed with its administrative claim, was found to be premature.
The taxpayer will always have 30 days to file the judicial claim even if the Commissioner acts
only on the 120th day, or does not act at all during the 120-day period. With the 30-day period
always available to the taxpayer, the taxpayer can no longer file a judicial claim for refund or tax
credit of unutilized excess input VAT without waiting for the Commissioner to decide until the
expiration of the 120-day period. Failure to comply with the 120-day waiting period violates the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and renders the petition premature and thus
without a cause of action, with the effect that the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction over the
taxpayers petition.
3) BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 effectively shielded the filing of GST's judicial claim
from the vice of prematurity.
BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was classified in San Roque as a general interpretative rule having
been made in response to a query by a government agency tasked with processing tax refunds
and credits the One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Drawback Center of the
Department of Finance. As such, all taxpayers can rely on said ruling from the time of its
issuance on December 10, 2003 up to its reversal by this Court in Aichi on October 6, 2010,
where it was held that the 120+30 day periods are mandatory and jurisdictional.
Therefore, GST can benefit from BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 with respect to its claims for refund
of unutilized excess input VAT for the second and third quarters of taxable year 2005 which
were filed before the CIR on November 18, 2005 but elevated to the CTA on March 17, 2006
before the expiration of the 120-day period (March 18, 2006 being the 120th day). BIR Ruling
No. DA-489-03 effectively shielded the filing of GST's judicial claim from the vice of prematurity.
4) GST's claims, however, for the four quarters of taxable year 2004 and the first
quarter of taxable year 2005 should be denied for late filing of the petition for
review before the CTA.
GST's claims, however, for the four quarters of taxable year 2004 and the first quarter of taxable
year 2005 should be denied for late filing of the petition for review before the CTA. GST filed its
VAT Return for the first quarter of 2004 on April 16, 2004. Reckoned from the close of the first
taxable quarter of 2004 on March 31, 2004, the administrative claim filed on June 9, 2004 was
well within the required two-year prescriptive period from the close of the taxable quarter, the
last day of filing being March 31, 2006. The CIR then had 120 days from June 9, 2004, or until
October 7, 2004, to decide the claim. Since the Commissioner did not act on the claim within the
said period, GST had 30 days from October 7, 2004, or until November 6, 2004, to file its
judicial claim. However, GST filed its petition for review before the CTA only on March 17, 2006,
or 496 days after the last day of filing. In short, GST was late by one year and 131 days in filing
its judicial claim.
For the second quarter of taxable year 2004, GST filed its administrative claim on August 12,
2004. The 120-day period from the filing of such claim ended on December 10, 2004, and the

30th day within which to file a judicial claim fell on January 9, 2005. However, GST filed its
petition for review before the CTA only on March 17, 2006, or 432 days after the last day of
filing.
GST was late by one year and 67 days in filing its judicial claim. For the third and fourth quarters
of taxable year 2004, GST filed its administrative claims on February 18, 2005. The 120th day,
or June 18, 2005, lapsed without any action from the CIR. Thus, GST had 30 days therefrom, or
until July 18, 2005, to file its judicial claim, but it did so only on March 17, 2006, or 242 days
after the last day of filing. GST was late by 242 days in filing its judicial claim.
Finally, for the first quarter of taxable year 2005, GST filed its administrative claim on May 11,
2005. The 120-day period ended on September 8, 2005, again with no action from the CIR.
Nonetheless, GST failed to elevate its claim to the CTA within 30 days, or until October 8, 2005.
The petition for review filed by GST on March 17, 2006, or 160 days after the last day of filing
was, therefore, late.
As may be observed from the Court's application of the 120+30 day periods to GST's claims,
the 120-day period is uniformly reckoned from the date of the filing of the administrative claims.
The CIR insists, however, that the filing of the administrative claim was not necessarily the same
time when the complete supporting documents were submitted to the Commissioner.
NOVEMBER 2013
NUCCIO SAVERIO AND NS INTERNATIONAL INC. v. ALFONSO G. PUYAT,
G.R. No. 186433, November 27, 2013
J. Brion
Petitioners filed review on certiorari under Rule 45 to the SC. Petitioners argue that the
Breakdown of Account which the RTC used as a basis in awarding the claim, as affirmed by the
CA , is hearsay since the person who prepared it was not presented in court to authenticate it.
It is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the Court
is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence
presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of
facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized
several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in
making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of
fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
The entries in the Breakdown of Account and their corresponding amounts are not
supported by the respondents presented evidence. The itemized expenses, as repeatedly
pointed out by the petitioners, were not proven, and the remaining indebtedness, after the
partial payment of P600,000.00, was merely derived by the RTC from the Breakdown of

Account. It is unacceptable for the RTC to simply come up with a conclusion that the payment
of P600,000.00 did not extinguish the debt, or, assuming it really did not, that the remaining
amount of indebtedness amounts exactly to P460,505.86, without any showing of how this
balance was arrived at. To our mind, the RTCs ruling, in so far as the determination of the
actual indebtedness is concerned, is incomplete.
FACTS:
Respondent granted a loan to NSI. The loan was made pursuant to the Memorandum of
Agreement and Promissory Note between the respondent and NSI, represented by Nuccio. The
petitioners received a total amount of P300,000.00 and certain machineries intended for their
fertilizer processing plant business. The proposed business, however, failed to materialize.
On several occasions, Nuccio made personal payments amounting to P600,000.00.
When the petitioners defaulted in the payment of the loan, the respondent filed a collection suit
with the RTC. The petitioners insisted that they have already paid the loan as evidenced by the
respondents receipt for the amount of P600,000.00. They submitted that their remaining
obligation to pay the machineries value, if any, had long been extinguished by their business
failure to materialize.
The RTC ruled that the payment of P600,000.00 did not completely extinguish the
petitioners obligation. The RTC also applied the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction
and ordered the petitioners, jointly and severally, to pay the balance of P460, 505.86.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA likewise held that since the
petitioners neither questioned the delivery of the machineries nor their valuation, their obligation
to pay the amount of P460, 505.86 under the Breakdown of Account remained unrefuted.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed review on certiorari under Rule 45 to the SC. The petitioners
averred that the CA gravely erred in ruling that a proper accounting was not necessary. They
argue that the Breakdown of Account which the RTC used as a basis in awarding the claim, as
affirmed by the CA is hearsay since the person who prepared it was not presented in court to
authenticate it. They averred further that Nuccios mere ownership of forty percent (40%) does
not justify the piercing of the separate and distinct personality of NSI. The respondent, on the
other hand, claimed that the issues raised by the petitioners are questions of fact, thus beyond
the ambit of a Rule 45 petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the questions of facts raised by the petitioner should be entertained.
RULING:
Petition granted
After a review of the parties contentions, we hold that a remand of the case to the court
of origin for a complete accounting and determination of the actual amount of the petitioners
indebtedness is called for.
The respondent questions the present petitions propriety, and contends that in a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be

raised. He argues that the petitioners are raising factual issues that are not permissible under
the present petition and these issues have already been extensively passed upon by the RTC
and the CA. The petitioners, on the other hand, assert that the exact amount of their
indebtedness has not been determined with certainty. They insist that the amount
of P460,505.86 awarded in favor of the respondent has no basis because the latter failed to
substantiate his claim. They also maintain that the Breakdown of Account used by the lower
courts in arriving at the collectible amount is unreliable for the respondents failure to adduce
supporting documents for the alleged additional expenses charged against them. With no
independent determination of the actual amount of their indebtedness, the petitioners submit
that an order for a proper accounting is imperative.
We agree with the petitioners. While we find the fact of indebtedness to be undisputed,
the determination of the extent of the adjudged money award is not, because of the lack of any
supporting documentary and testimonial evidence. These evidentiary issues, of course, are
necessarily factual, but as we held in The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of
Appeals, this Court may take cognizance even of factual issues under exceptional
circumstances. In this cited case, we held:
It is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the
Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the
evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering
that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. However, the
Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.
We note in this regard that the RTC, in awarding the amount of P460,505.86 in favor of
the respondent, principally relied on the Breakdown of Account. Under this document, numerous
entries, including the cash loan, were enumerated and identified with their corresponding
amounts. It included the items of expenses allegedly chargeable to the petitioners, the value of
the machineries, the amount credited as paid, and the interest and penalty allegedly incurred.
A careful perusal of the records, however, reveals that the entries in the Breakdown of
Account and their corresponding amounts are not supported by the respondents presented
evidence. The itemized expenses, as repeatedly pointed out by the petitioners, were not proven,
and the remaining indebtedness, after the partial payment of P600,000.00, was merely derived
by the RTC from the Breakdown of Account.
Significantly, the RTC ruling neither showed how the award was computed nor how the
interest and penalty were calculated. In fact, it merely declared the petitioners liable for the

amount claimed by the respondent and adopted the breakdown of liability in the Breakdown of
Account. This irregularity is even aggravated by the RTCs explicit refusal to explain why the
payment of P600,000.00 did not extinguish the debt. While it may be true that the petitioners
indebtedness, aside from the cash loan of P300,000.00, undoubtedly covered the value of the
machineries, the RTC decision was far from clear and instructive on the actual remaining
indebtedness (inclusive of the machineries value, penalties and interests) after the partial
payment was made and how these were all computed.
It is unacceptable for the RTC to simply come up with a conclusion that the payment
of P600,000.00 did not extinguish the debt, or, assuming it really did not, that the remaining
amount of indebtedness amounts exactly to P460,505.86, without any showing of how this
balance was arrived at. To our mind, the RTCs ruling, in so far as the determination of the
actual indebtedness is concerned, is incomplete.
What happened at the RTC likewise transpired at the CA when the latter affirmed the
appealed decision; the CA merely glossed over the contention of the petitioners, and adopted
the RTCs findings without giving any enlightenment. To reiterate, nowhere in the decisions of
the RTC and the CA did they specify how the award, including the penalty and interest, was
determined. The petitioners were left in the dark as to how their indebtedness of P300,000.00,
after making a payment of P600,000.00, ballooned to P460,505.86. Worse, unsubstantiated
expenses, appearing in the Breakdown of Account, were charged to them.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ASIR GANI Y ALIH AND NORMINA GANI Y GALOS
G.R. No. 198318, November 27, 2013
J. Leonardo-De Castro
The buy-bust team failed to take pictures of the seized drugs immediately upon seizure
and at the site of accused-appellants apprehension, and to mark and make an inventory of the
same in the presence of all the persons named in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.
Jurisprudence has decreed that, in dangerous drugs cases, the failure of the police
officers to make a physical inventory and to photograph the sachets of shabu, as well as to
mark the sachets at the place of arrest, do not render the seized drugs inadmissible in evidence
or automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody of the said drugs. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as
these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
FACTS:
Special Investigator Elson Saul (SI Saul) received information from a confidential
informant that accused-appellant Normina Gani (Normina), alias Rohaima, was looking for a
buyer of shabu. SI Saul agreed to meet the informant and accused-appellant Normina for
negotiation .After the meeting, SI Saul reported back to the NBI Headquarters and they then set
up a buy bust operation.
Normina arrived at the target place on a motorcycle with a man, later on identified as
accused-appellant Asir Gani (Asir).After the exchange of money and shabu the accusedappellants were arrested and duly advised of their constitutional rights. Incidental to accusedappellants arrest, the buy-bust team seized from accused-appellants possession two other
sachets of shabu, the marked money, accused-appellant Asirs .45 caliber pistol, and the

motorcycle. The buy- bust team and accused-appellants then proceeded to the FTI Barangay
Hall.
At the FTI Barangay Hall, SI Saul conducted an inventory of the items recovered from
accused-appellants, including the two plastic sachets of shabu subject of the sale, which SI Saul
marked with his initials and the date of the buy-bust. All these were done in the presence of
accused-appellants and two barangay officials. SI Sauls inventory report, however, did not
include the two other sachets of shabu seized from accused-appellants possession. Thereafter,
the buy-bust team brought accused-appellants to the NBI Headquarters in Manila.
At the NBI Headquarters, accused-appellants were booked and further investigated. The
following day, several members of the buy- bust team executed the Joint Affidavit of Arrest of
accused-appellants. SI Saul also executed an incident report, requested for laboratory
examination of the contents of the marked plastic sachets and submitted the said specimens to
the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division where they were received by NBI Forensic Chemist II
Patingo. The two plastic sachets submitted for laboratory examination had a combined weight of
98.7249 grams. Based on the forensic analysis by NBI Forensic Chemist II Patingo and
Forensic Chemist III Viloria-Magsipoc, the contents of said sachets tested positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.
The RTC found accused-appellants guilty of the crime charged. The accused-appellants
appealed to the CA the decision of the RTC. The accused-appellants pointed out the noncompliance of the buy-bust team with Sec. 21 of RA 9165, The CA affirmed the decision of RTC.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the guilt of the accused-appellants have been proven beyond reasonable doubt
RULING:
Petition denied
The combined testimonial, documentary, and object evidence of the prosecution
produced a detailed account of the buy-bust operation against accused-appellants and proved
all the essential elements of the crime charged against them.
In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the following elements
must concur: (1) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof. What is material to the prosecution for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually occurred, coupled with
the presentation in court of the substance seized as evidence.
It has been clearly established herein that a buy-bust operation took place on May 6,
2004 conducted by a team of NBI agents. SI Saul, as the poseur-buyer, and accusedappellants, as the sellers, agreed on the price of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P150,000.00) for One Hundred (100) grams of shabu. After SI Saul handed over the buy-bust
money to accused-appellants, the latter gave him, in exchange, two plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance. Thereafter, accused-appellants were immediately arrested by the
buy-bust team. During the search incidental to accused-appellants arrest, a .45 caliber
handgun, the buy-bust money, and two more sachets of suspected shabu were recovered from

their possession. Chemical examination confirmed that the contents of the two plastic sachets
sold to SI Saul were indeed shabu. These two sachets of shabu, marked "ES-1 05-06-04" and
"ES-2 05-06-04" and with a total weight of 98.7249 grams, together with two other sachets,
were duly presented as evidence by the prosecution before the RTC.
Contrary to accused-appellants averment, prosecution witness, SI Saul, was able to
explain why there were a total of four sachets of shabu presented during trial, when SI Saul only
bought two sachets during the buy- bust operation. SI Saul testified that in addition to the two
plastic sachets of shabu sold to him by accused-appellants, there were two more sachets of
shabu recovered from accused-appellants possession by the buy-bust team during the body
search conducted incidental to accused-appellants lawful arrest.
The Court further finds that the arresting officers had substantially complied with the rule
on the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs as provided under Section 21 of Republic Act
No. 9165. Jurisprudence has decreed that, in dangerous drugs cases, the failure of the police
officers to make a physical inventory and to photograph the sachets of shabu, as well as to
mark the sachets at the place of arrest, do not render the seized drugs inadmissible in evidence
or automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody of the said drugs. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as
these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
In this case, testimonial and documentary evidence for the prosecution proved that
immediately after accused-appellants arrest, they were brought to the FTI Barangay Hall. It was
there, in the presence of two barangay officials, that SI Saul conducted an inventory of the two
plastic sachets of shabu subject of the buy-bust operation, plus the other items seized from
accused-appellants possession during the search conducted incidental to accused-appellants
arrest. It was also at the barangay hall where SI Saul marked the two plastic sachets of shabu
sold to him by accused-appellants as "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-06-04," representing SI
Sauls initials and the date of the buy-bust operation. Thereafter, the buy-bust team, with
accused-appellants, proceeded to the NBI Headquarters. At the NBI Headquarters, SI Saul
made a request for examination of the two plastic sachets of shabu, marked "ES-1 05-06-04"
and "ES-2 05-06-04," and personally handed the same to NBI Forensic Chemist II Patingo. NBI
Forensic Chemist II Patingo, together with NBI Forensic Chemist III Viloria-Magsipoc, conducted
the laboratory examination of the contents of the two sachets marked "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES2 05-06-04" and kept said sachets in his custody until the same were submitted to the RTC as
evidence during trial.
Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in its observation that the failure of the buy-bust
team to take pictures of the seized drugs immediately upon seizure and at the site of accusedappellants apprehension, and to mark and make an inventory of the same in the presence of all
the persons named in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, are not fatal and did not render the
seized drugs inadmissible in evidence given that the prosecution was able to trace and establish
each and every link in the chain of custody of the seized drugs and, hence, the identity and
integrity of the said drugs had been duly preserved. For the same reasons, it was not imperative
for the prosecution to present as witnesses before the RTC the two barangay officials who
witnessed the conduct of the inventory. At best, the testimonies of these two barangay officials
will only be corroborative, and would have no significant impact on the identity and integrity of
the seized drugs.
THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN v. JODY KING CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013

J. Villarama, Jr.
Jody King Construction filed a money claim against the Province of Aklan with the RTC
of Marikina. Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential
Decree No. 1445, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against
government agencies and instrumentalities. Respondents collection suit being directed against
a local government unit, such money claim should have been first brought to the COA. Hence,
the RTC should have suspended the proceedings and refer the filing of the claim before the
COA. Moreover, petitioner is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction even after the
denial of its notice of appeal and before the CA
FACTS:
The Province of Aklan (petitioner) and Jody King Construction and Development Corp.
(respondent) entered into a contract for the design and construction of the Caticlan Jetty Port
and Terminal.Likewise, Petitioner entered into a negotiated contract with respondent for the
construction of Passenger Terminal Building, Respondent made a demand for payment of the
unpaid balance, but the petitioner failed to pay.
Respondent sued petitioner in the RTC of Marikina to collect payment. The trial court
issued a writ of preliminary attachment. RTC rendered a decision in favor of Jody King
Construction And Development Corporation. Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration but
the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. The trial court issued a writ of execution
ordering Sheriff IV Antonio E. Gamboa, Jr. to demand from petitioner the immediate payment to
the respondent.
Petitioner filed in the CA a petition for certiorari with application for temporary restraining
order (TRO) and preliminary injunction assailing the Writ of Execution docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 111754.
The trial court denied petitioners notice of appeal. Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied. Petitioner filed another petition for certiorari in the CA questioning the
aforesaid orders denying due course to its notice of appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
114073.
The CAs First Division dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 111754 as it found no
grave abuse of discretion in the lower courts issuance of the writ of execution. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration .Petitioner argued that it is the COA and not the RTC which has
original jurisdiction over money claim against government agencies and subdivision. CA denied
the petitioners motion for reconsideration. On the matter of execution of the trial courts
decision, the appellate court said that it was rendered moot by respondents filing of a petition
before the Commission on Audit (COA).
CAs Sixteenth Division dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 114073. The CA also
held that petitioner is estopped from invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as it only raised
the issue of COAs primary jurisdiction after its notice of appeal was denied and a writ of
execution was issued against it.
ISSUES:
1. Whether COA has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case

2. Whether the writ of execution issued by the RTC is valid

RULING:
The petition granted
1. COA has primary jurisdiction over private respondents money claims Petitioner is not
estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction
As can be gleaned, respondent seeks to enforce a claim for sums of money allegedly
owed by petitioner, a local government unit.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree
No. 1445, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government
agencies and instrumentalities.
Section 26. General jurisdiction. The authority and powers of the Commission shall
extend to and comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures, systems and controls, the
keeping of the general accounts of the Government, the preservation of vouchers pertaining
thereto for a period of ten years, the examination and inspection of the books, records, and
papers relating to those accounts; and the audit and settlement of the accounts of all persons
respecting funds or property received or held by them in an accountable capacity, as well as the
examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction
extends to all government-owned or controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, and
other self-governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, and as herein
prescribed, including non-governmental entities subsidized by the government, those funded by
donations through the government, those required to pay levies or government share, and those
for which the government has put up a counterpart fund or those partly funded by the
government.
Pursuant to its rule-making authority conferred by the 1987 Constitution and existing
laws, the COA promulgated the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit.
Rule II, Section 1 specifically enumerated those matters falling under COAs exclusive
jurisdiction, which include "money claims due from or owing to any government agency." Rule
VIII, Section 1 further provides:
Section 1. Original Jurisdiction - The Commission Proper shall have original
jurisdiction over:
a) money claim against the Government; b) request for concurrence in the hiring
of legal retainers by government agency; c) write off of unliquidated cash advances and
dormant accounts receivable in amounts exceeding one million pesos (P1,000,000.00);
d) request for relief from accountability for loses due to acts of man, i.e. theft, robbery,
arson, etc, in amounts in excess of Five Million pesos (P5,000,000.00).
Petitioner argues, however, that respondent could no longer question the RTCs
jurisdiction over the matter after it had filed its answer and participated in the subsequent
proceedings. To this, we need only state that the court may raise the issue of primary jurisdiction
sua sponte and its invocation cannot be waived by the failure of the parties to argue it as the

doctrine exists for the proper distribution of power between judicial and administrative bodies
and not for the convenience of the parties.
Respondents collection suit being directed against a local government unit, such money
claim should have been first brought to the COA. Hence, the RTC should have suspended the
proceedings and refer the filing of the claim before the COA. Moreover, petitioner is not
estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction even after the denial of its notice of appeal and
before the CA.
There are established exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, such as: (a)
where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged
administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where
the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e)
where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts
of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and
irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo
warranto proceedings. However, none of the foregoing circumstances is applicable in the
present case.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. All the proceedings of the court in violation of the
doctrine and all orders and decisions rendered thereby are null and void.
2) Writ of Execution issued in violation of COAs primary jurisdiction is void
Since a judgment rendered by a body or tribunal that has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case is no judgment at all, it cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any
obligation. All acts pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect and the
void judgment can never be final and any writ of execution based on it is likewise void.
SPOUSES DAVID AND MARISA WILLIAMS v. ATTY. RUDY T. ENRIQUEZ,
A.C. No. 7329, November 27, 2013
J. Carpio
Atty. Enriquez filed with the SC a petition for review dated 19 August 2011 challenging
the IBP Board of Governors 5 June 2008 and 26 June 2011 Resolutions. The Spouses Williams
filed opposed the petition for review because it was filed out of time.
The IBP Board of Governors Resolutions did not become final. Resolutions of the IBP
Board of Governors are only recommendatory and always subject to the Courts review. The
Supreme Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. It exercises such
disciplinary functions through the IBP, but it does not relinquish its duty to form its own
judgment. Disbarment proceedings are exercised under the sole jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, and the IBPs recommendations imposing the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law or disbarment are always subject to this Courts review and approval.
FACTS:

The Spouses Williams bought a portion of the property owned by Josephine L. Verar
(Verar) covered by TCT No. T-19723, said sale was annotated on TCT No. T-19723.
Atty. Enriquez, representing his clients filed with the MCTC a complaint against the
Spouses Williams for forcible entry. The Court ordered the Spouses Williams to restore
possession of the lot to the clients of Atty. Enriquez. As a result of the forcible entry suit filed
against them, the Spouses Williams filed the present complaint against Atty. Enriquez, charging
him of committing falsehood and of misleading the MCTC.
The Court referred the matter to the IBP. Commissioner Concepcion found that Atty.
Enriquez knowingly made untruthful statements in the complaint he filed against the Spouses
Williams and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
In its 5 June 2008 Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
findings and recommendation of Commissioner Concepcion and, in its 26 June 2011
Resolution, denied Atty. Enriquezs motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Enriquez filed with the SC a petition for review dated 19 August 2011 challenging
the IBP Board of Governors 5 June 2008 and 26 June 2011 Resolutions. The Spouses Williams
filed opposed the petition for review because it was filed out of time.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the IBP Board of Governors 5 June 2008 and 26 June 2011 Resolutions are
already final.
2. Whether Atty. Enriquez is guilty of dishonesty warranting his suspension from the practice of
law.
RULING:
Petition granted.
1. The IBP Board of Governors 5 June 2008 and 26 June 2011 Resolutions did not become
final. Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors are only recommendatory and always
subject to the Courts review. In Ylaya v. Gacott, the Court held that:
We remind all parties that resolutions from the IBP Board of Governors are merely
recommendatory and do not attain finality without a final action from this Court. Section 12,
Rule 139-B is clear on this point that:
Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole
record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
The Supreme Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. It
exercises such disciplinary functions through the IBP, but it does not relinquish its duty to form
its own judgment. Disbarment proceedings are exercised under the sole jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court, and the IBPs recommendations imposing the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law or disbarment are always subject to this Courts review and approval.
2. In administrative cases, the only issue within the ambit of the Courts disciplinary authority is
whether a lawyer is fit to remain a member of the Bar. Other issues are proper subjects of
judicial action. In Anacta v. Resurreccion, the Court held that:
x x x Thus, it is imperative to first determine whether the matter falls within the
disciplinary authority of the Court or whether the matter is a proper subject of judicial action
against lawyers. If the matter involves violations of the lawyers oath and code of conduct,
then it falls within the Courts disciplinary authority. However, if the matter arose from acts
which carry civil or criminal liability, and which do not directly require an inquiry into the
moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter would be a proper subject of a judicial action
which is understandably outside the purview of the Courts disciplinary authority.
On its face, the 12 September 2006 complaint filed by the Spouses Williams against
Atty. Enriquez does not merit an administrative case. In order for the Court to determine whether
Atty. Enriquez is guilty of dishonesty, the issue of ownership must first be settled. The Spouses
Williams alleged that Verar was the owner of the property and that she sold a portion of it to
them. On the other hand, Atty. Enriquez alleged that Desiderio, Francisco, Ramon, Umbac and
Briones were the real owners of the property and that Verar was only a trustee. This was
precisely the issue in Civil Case No. 390. Unfortunately, the MCTC was not able to make a
definite ruling because the Spouses Williams failed to file their answer within the prescribed
period.
The issue of ownership of real property must be settled in a judicial, not administrative,
case. In Virgo v. Amorin, the Court dismissed without prejudice a complaint against a lawyer
because it could not determine his fitness to remain a member of the Bar without delving into
issues which are proper subjects of judicial action. The Court held that:
While it is true that disbarment proceedings look into the worthiness of a respondent to
remain as a member of the bar, and need not delve into the merits of a related case, the Court,
in this instance, however, cannot ascertain whether Atty. Amorin indeed committed acts in
violation of his oath as a lawyer concerning the sale and conveyance of the Virgo Mansion
without going through the factual matters that are subject of the aforementioned civil cases,
particularly Civil Case No. 01-45798.
The allegations that Atty. Enriquez wrote "OCT" instead of "TCT" but with the same
number T-19723, and "Veran" instead of "Verar," are too trivial to give rise to administrative
sanction. Besides, these mistakes could have been made inadvertently. Atty. Enriquez's failure
to attach the pages of TCT No. T-19723 bearing the annotation of the sale to the Spouses
Williams did not prejudice the Spouses Williams because in forcible entry the issue is the fact of
prior possession, not ownership.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARISSA CASTILLO Y ALIGNAY
G.R. No. 190180, November 27, 2013
J. Leonardo-De Castro
The appellant argues that the police officers who apprehended her failed to strictly
comply with the procedural requirements of Section 21(1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
specifically, the failure to take photographs and to make an inventory of the seized evidence,

and the lack of participation of the representatives from the media, the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official in the operation.
Despite the seemingly mandatory language used in the procedural rule at issue, a
perusal of Section 21, Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.
9165 reveals the existence of a clause which may render non-compliance with said procedural
rule non-prejudicial to the prosecution of drug offenses. Notwithstanding the procedural error,
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the illegal drugs used in this case were duly preserved
and the chain of custody of said evidence was shown to be unbroken.
FACTS:
PO2 Santos and his colleagues at the said office was informed by their confidential
informant (CI) about the illegal activity of the accused Marissa Castillo and one alias "Ompong"
who were reported to be selling shabu .
They set up a buy bust operation. During the buy bust operation PO2 Santos was able to
recover the Php200.00 buy bust money from the left hand of Marissa and the two other plastic
sachets containing suspected shabu. Marissas companion, however, was able to run away.
After PO2 Santos had arrested accused Castillo, he informed her of her rights and then
put markings on the plastic sachets confiscated from the accused. Thereafter, the accused was
brought to the office of the SDEU while the plastic sachets confiscated from the accused were
brought to crime laboratory for examination. The examination shows that the contents of the
plastic sachets tested positive for shabu.
Two (2) informations were filed charging the appellant of violation of Sec 5 and 11 of RA
9165. During the trial, appellant denied the charges against her and claimed that she was
framed by the police officers who arrested her. Marinel Castillo, the daughter of the accused,
corroborated in some details the testimony of her mother.
The RTC rendered a decision finding the accused guilty of the crimes charged.
Aggrieved, the appellant appealed to the CA. The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
decision of the RTC.
The case was elevated to the SC. The appellant argues that the police officers who
apprehended her failed to strictly comply with the procedural requirements of Section 21(1),
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, specifically, the failure to take photographs and to make an
inventory of the seized evidence, and the lack of participation of the representatives from the
media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official in the operation. Hence,
she should be acquitted of all charges against her as the chain of custody of the seized illegal
drugs was not properly established.
ISSUE:

1. Whether the failure to comply with Section 21(1), Art II of RA 9165 would warrant acquittal of
the accused
2. Whether the testimony of the accused as corroborated by her daughter would warrant the
accuseds acquittal
RULING:

Petition denied
1. Despite the seemingly mandatory language used in the procedural rule at issue, a perusal of
Section 21, Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165
reveals the existence of a clause which may render non-compliance with said procedural
rule non-prejudicial to the prosecution of drug offense.
In the case at bar, we concur with appellants assertion that the arresting officers
involved were not able to strictly comply with the procedural guidelines stated in Section 21(1),
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. However, our affinity with appellants argument does not
sway us towards granting her absolution because, notwithstanding the procedural error, the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the illegal drugs used in this case were duly preserved and
the chain of custody of said evidence was shown to be unbroken.
With regard to the first link in the chain of custody, the testimony of PO2 Santos confirms
the fact that three heat-sealed plastic sachets each containing 0.04 gram of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu were seized from appellant during a buy-bust
operation conducted by PO2 Santos, PO1 Chavez and an unnamed confidential informant. The
seized drugs were immediately marked at the place where appellant was apprehended.
The illegal drugs seized from appellant were then turned over to Police Senior Inspector
Hoover SM Pascual (PSI Pascual), the team leader and investigator of the buy-bust operation,
who prepared and signed a Memorandum requesting the laboratory examination of the three
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance previously marked by PO2 Santos as
"MCA-1," "MCA-2" and "MCA-3," respectively. This document together with the marked
specimens was then transmitted to the Eastern Police District (EPD) Crime Laboratory Office to
determine if they contained dangerous drugs. As per Physical Sciences Report No. D-48606E, signed by Police Senior Inspector Isidro L. Carino (PSI Carino), the qualitative examination
of the contents of the three plastic sachets yielded a positive result for the presence of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The same marked specimens were later identified
by PO2 Santos in open court as the same items that he seized from appellant when confronted
with them by Prosecutor Conrado Tolentino (Tolentino). After PO2 Santos positively identified
them, Prosecutor Tolentino then requested the trial court that the three plastic sachets
containing shabu be marked as Exhibits "G," "G-1," and "G-2," respectively. From the foregoing
narrative, it is readily apparent that the other links in the chain of custody of the seized illegal
drugs have been sufficiently established.
2. With respect to her defense, appellant raised the claim that she was innocent of the charges
and was merely framed by the police officers who arrested her. Nevertheless, in one case,
we thoroughly explained why this Court is usually wary of a defense of denial in drug cases,
thus:
Further, the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust are
generally accorded full faith and credit, in view of the presumption of regularity in the
performance of public duties. Hence, when lined against an unsubstantiated denial or claim
of frame-up, the testimony of the officers who caught the accused red-handed is given more
weight and usually prevails. In order to overcome the presumption of regularity,
jurisprudence teaches us that there must be clear and convincing evidence that the police
officers did not properly perform their duties or that they were prompted with ill-motive.

Appellant may argue that her denial is not entirely unsubstantiated because the same is
corroborated by the testimony of her daughter, Marinell Castillo. However, contrasted with the
credible and positive testimony of P02 Santos and POI Chavez, the corroborating testimony
made by appellant s daughter is given lesser probative value than that of the prosecution s
witnesses since this Court has consistently held that the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi,
has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a
common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.
Furthermore, we have recently reiterated that we give less probative weight to a defense
of alibi when it is corroborated by friends and relatives. We apply the same principle in the case
at bar and declare that for the defense of denial to prosper, like alibi, it is necessary that the
corroboration is credible, the same having been offered preferably by disinterested witnesses. In
so doing, we regard the testimony of appellants daughter, which in no way can be considered
as disinterested and unbiased, as invalid corroboration unworthy of belief.
Lacking unprejudiced testimony to support her denial and without her making any
allegation as to any ill motive on the part of the police officers who arrested her during a
legitimate buy-bust operation, this Court is not inclined to overturn appellant s conviction for the
sale and possession of illegal drugs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROBERTO VELASCO
G.R. NO. 190318, November 27, 2013
J. Leonardo-De Castro
Accused denied the charges against him and pointed out that during the times and
dates the alleged criminal acts took place, he was working at the construction site with his
nephew. Roderick Palconet, nephew of the accused, was presented in court in order to
corroborate his alibi.
It is established by jurisprudence that in order for a corroboration of an alibi to be
considered credible, it must necessarily come from disinterested witnesses. The testimony of
appellants nephew, which is undoubtedly coming from a close relative, cannot, in any way, be
described as disinterested and unbiased.
FACTS:
On the 27th, 28th and 29th of December 2001, Lisa was raped for the third consecutive
time by Roberto Velasco (appellant) , the live-in partner of her mother AAA ,while they were
alone in the house.
A year thereafter, appellant attempted to insert his penis into Lisas vagina while the
latter was sleeping on her folding bed. Although appellant succeeded in touching and kissing
Lisas private parts, he did not push through with his intention of raping her for fear of getting
caught. The medico legal report submitted by public physician Richard Ivan Viray states that
Lisa is in a non-virgin state; that she had shallow healed hymenal lacerations at 2 and 3 oclock
positions and deep healed lacerations at 6 and 7 oclock positions
Informations were filed charging the accused of three counts of rape under Article 266-A
of the Revised and acts of lasciviousness.

During the trial, Appellant denied the charges and claimed that he was at work on the
27th, 28th and 29th of December 2001 with his nephew Roderick Palconet while he was at
home on the 21st of December 2002. Roderick Palconet, nephew of the accused, testified as
the corroborating witness of the accused.
The trial court convicted appellant of three counts of rape and one count of acts of
lasciviousness. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court but with modification.
Appellant elevated the case to the SC. He averred that the medico-legal reports
conclusion that the "subject is in a non-virgin state physically" did not prove that the victim was
indeed raped. Likewise, he pointed out the lack of resistance; delay in reporting the rape
incidents; and continued residence in appellants place of dwelling even after she was raped
numerous times militates against a finding that the allegations of rape are true. He also pointed
out that during the times and dates the alleged criminal acts took place, he was somewhere
else.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the guilt of the accused had been proven beyond reasonable doubt
2. Whether the defense of alibi of the accused would warrant his acquittal
RULING:
The petition denied.
1. It is settled in jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted
solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent
with human nature and the normal course of things. Furthermore, it is axiomatic that when it
comes to evaluating the credibility of the testimonies of the witnesses, great respect is
accorded to the findings of the trial judge who is in a better position to observe the
demeanor, facial expression, and manner of testifying of witnesses, and to decide who
among them is telling the truth. Lastly, in order for a discrepancy or inconsistency in the
testimony of a witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the
innocence of the appellant for the crime charged since the credibility of a rape victim is not
diminished, let alone impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her testimony.
With regard to appellants argument that the findings of the medico-legal report do not
support the allegation that the victim was indeed raped, we cannot give any credit to such claim
in light of established jurisprudence holding that a medical certificate is not necessary to prove
the commission of rape, as even a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a
prosecution for rape.
We have also recently reiterated that the failure of the victim to shout for help does not
negate rape and the victims lack of resistance especially when intimidated by the offender into
submission does not signify voluntariness or consent. Furthermore, it is doctrinally settled that
"delay in reporting rape incidents, in the face of threats of physical violence, cannot be taken
against the victim" because "delay in reporting an incident of rape is not an indication of a
fabricated charge and does not necessarily cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant." It is
likewise settled in jurisprudence that human reactions vary and are unpredictable when facing a
shocking and horrifying experience such as sexual assault, thus, not all rape victims can be
expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone.

2. As his principal defense against all these criminal charges, appellant provided an alibi. He
maintains that, at the time of the three rape incidents as well as the one instance of acts of
lasciviousness, he was working at a construction site in Barangay Caingin, Malolos City,
Bulacan with his nephew Roderick Palconet who was the only witness he presented in court
in order to corroborate his alibi.
Time and again, we have repeated the legal doctrine that for alibi to prosper, it must be
proved that during the commission of the crime, the accused was in another place and that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene. Furthermore, we have also
established in jurisprudence that, in order for a corroboration of an alibi to be considered
credible, it must necessarily come from disinterested witnesses.
In the case at bar, the testimony of appellants sole corroborating witness reveals that
the distance between the construction site and the appellants house where the instances of
rape and acts of lasciviousness occurred is relatively short and can be covered by a mere fiveminute travel by motor vehicle.
The testimony of appellants nephew, which is undoubtedly coming from a close relative,
cannot, in any way, be described as disinterested and unbiased. Therefore, considering these
factual circumstances, appellants defense of alibi certainly cannot prosper.
SPOUSES TEODORO and ROSATIO SARAZA and FERNANDO SARAZA
v. WILLIAM FRANCISCO
G.R. No. 198718, November 27, 2013
J. Reyes
William Francisco filed a complaint for specific performance with RTC of Imus, Cavite to
compel the petitioners to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the a lot situated in Makati
covered by TCT No. 220530 Fernandos name. Petitioner Fernando claimed that RTC Imus
lacked jurisdiction over the case as it involved an adjudication of ownership of a property
situated in Makati City.
Although the end result of the respondents claim was the transfer of the subject
property to his name, the suit was still essentially for specific performance, a personal action,
because it sought Fernandos execution of a deed of absolute sale based on a contract which
he had previously made. Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs the venue for the
respondents action. It provides that personal actions "may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff." Considering the respondents statement in his complaint that he resides
in Imus, Cavite, the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was proper.
FACTS:
William Francisco (respondent) and Fernando Saraza (FErnando) executed an
Agreement that provided for the latters sale of his 100-square meter share in a lot situated in
Makati City, which at that time was still registered in the name of one Emilia Serafico and
covered by TCT No. 40376 (later covered by TCT No. 220530), for a total consideration 3.2
Million. He made an initial payment while the balance was to be paid on installments to the

PNB, to cover a loan of Spouses Saraza, Fernandos parents, with the bank. A final deed of sale
conveying the property was to be executed by Fernando upon full payment of the PNB loan.
It was also agreed upon that should the parties fail to transfer the subject property to the
respondents name, the property covered by TCT No. 156126 and encumbered to PNB to
secure the loan shall be considered collateral in favor of the respondent. The respondent was
also allowed to take immediate possession of the property covered by TCT No. 156126 through
a contract of lease. The petitioners likewise furnished PNB with an Authority, allowing the
respondent to pay their obligations to the PNB, to negotiate for a loan restructuring, to receive
the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 156126 upon full payment of the loan secured by its
mortgage.
When the remaining balance of the PNB loan reached P226,582.13, the respondent
asked for the petitioners issuance of a Special Power of Attorney that would authorize him to
receive from PNB the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 156126 upon full payment of the loan.
The petitioners denied the request. Upon inquiry from PNB, the respondent found out that the
petitioners had instead executed an Amended Authority, which provided that the owners copy of
TCT No. 156126 should be returned to the mortgagors upon full payment of the loan. Spouses
Saraza also caused the eviction of the respondent from the property. These prompted to file a
case for specific performance, sum of money and damages with the RTC of Imus, Cavite
against the petitioners.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. The RTC, however, declared
that only Fernando should be held liable for the respondents claims, since the main action was
for specific performance, specifically to compel him to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the
subject property already covered by TCT No. 220530 under Fernandos name.
On appeal, Fernando argued that the RTC of Imus lacked jurisdiction over the case as it
involved an adjudication of ownership of a property situated in Makati City. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Petitioner Fernando filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by
the CA. Hence, this petition
ISSUE:
Whether Imus is the proper venue for the action for specific performance
RULING:
Petition denied
As to the issue of venue, the petitioners argument that the action should have been
instituted with the RTC of Makati City, and not the RTC of Imus, Cavite, is misplaced. Although
the end result of the respondents claim was the transfer of the subject property to his name, the
suit was still essentially for specific performance, a personal action, because it sought
Fernandos execution of a deed of absolute sale based on a contract which he had previously
made.
Our ruling in Cabutihan v. Landcenter Construction & Development Corporationis
instructive. In the said case, a complaint for specific performance that involved property situated
in Paraaque City was instituted before the RTC of Pasig City. When the cases venue was

raised as an issue, the Court sided with therein petitioner who argued that "the fact that she
ultimately sought the conveyance of real property not located in the territorial jurisdiction of the
RTC of Pasig is x x x an anticipated consequence and beyond the cause for which the action
[for specific performance with damages] was instituted." The Court explained:
In La Tondea Distillers, Inc. v. Ponferrada, private respondents filed an action for
specific performance with damages before the RTC of Bacolod City. The defendants
allegedly reneged on their contract to sell to them a parcel of land located in Bago City
a piece of property which the latter sold to petitioner while the case was pending before
the said RTC. Private respondent did not claim ownership but, by annotating a notice of
lis pendens on the title, recognized defendants ownership thereof. This Court ruled that
the venue had properly been laid in the RTC of Bacolod, even if the property was
situated in Bago.
In Siasoco v. Court of Appeals, private respondent filed a case for specific performance
with damages before the RTC of Quezon City. It alleged that after it accepted the offer of
petitioners, they sold to a third person several parcels of land located in Montalban, Rizal. The
Supreme Court sustained the trial courts order allowing an amendment of the original
Complaint for specific performance with damages. Contrary to petitioners position that the RTC
of Quezon City had no jurisdiction over the case, as the subject lots were located in Montalban,
Rizal, the said RTC had jurisdiction over the original Complaint. The Court reiterated the rule
that a case for specific performance with damages is a personal action which may be filed in a
court where any of the parties reside.
The Court compared these two cases with the case of National Steel Corporation v.
Court of Appeals where the Court held that an action that seeks the execution of a deed of sale
over a parcel of land is for recovery of real property, and not for specific performance, because
the primary objective is to regain ownership and possession of the property. It was explained
that the prayer in National Steel was not in any way connected to a contract that was previously
executed by the party against whom the complaint was filed, unlike in Cabutihan where the
parties had earlier executed an Undertaking for the propertys transfer, correctly giving rise to a
cause of action either for specific performance or for rescission, as in this case.
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs the venue for the respondents
action. It provides that personal actions "may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any
of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of
the plaintiff." Considering the respondents statement in his complaint that he resides in Imus,
Cavite, the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was proper.
GENEROSO ENESIO v. LILIA TULOP
G.R. No. 183923, November 27, 2013
J. Brion
Lilia Tulop filed an ejectment case against the Generoso Enesio with the MTC. MTC
proceeded with the pre-trial conference and required the parties to submit position papers.
Generoso posited that the MTC should have conducted a preliminary hearing and received
evidence to determine the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties.
As expressly provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, ejectment cases
merely require the submission by the parties of affidavits and position papers. The rule directs

courts to conduct hearings only when necessary to clarify factual matters. "This procedure is in
keeping with the objective of the Rule of promoting the expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases."
FACTS:
Lilia Tulop (respondent) substituted by her heirs sued Generoso Enesio (petitioner) for
"Ejectment, and Other Relief" before the MTC. Lilia alleged in her complaint that she was the
owner of the lot in possession of the petitioner whose possession was by Lilias mere tolerance.
She sent the respondent a demand letter asking him to vacate the premises but he refused.
The petitioner in his answer, claimed that he had been an agricultural tenant of the land;
that the case was an agrarian dispute cognizable by the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board; and hence, the MTC must dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The the
pretrial conference the parties entered into stipulations.
The MTC exercised jurisdiction over the case and held that the petitioner was not Lilias
agricultural tenant. The RTC fully affirmed the MTCs decision. The case was elevated to the
CA. The petitioner pointed out that the MTC merely proceeded with the pre-trial conference and
required the parties to submit position papers. He posited that the MTC should have conducted
a preliminary hearing and received evidence to determine the existence of a tenancy
relationship between the parties. The petitioner cited in this regard the procedures laid down by
the Court in Bayog v. Hon. Natino.
The CA affirmed the RTCs ruling and ruled that the MTC does not lose jurisdiction over
ejectment cases simply because tenancy relationship has been raised as a defense. It is only
upon determination, after hearing that tenancy relationship exists that the MTC must dismiss the
case for want of jurisdiction. The MTC concluded, after hearing, that tenancy did not exist
between the parties. In fact, the petitioner himself admitted that he had never shared any of his
harvests with Lilia. Thus, sharing of harvest, an important element of tenancy relationship, was
missing. The CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the MTC should have conducted a preliminary hearing and received evidence to
determine the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties
RULING:
Petition denied.
As the CA correctly held, the petitioners reference to Bayog is misplaced as the factual
situation in that case does not obtain in the present case.
In Bayog, the Court faulted the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) for not receiving the
defendants belated Answer. As ruled by the Court, had the MCTC not refrained from receiving
the defendants Answer, the MCTC would have found that the defendant raised tenancy as an
issue. While tenancy as a defense in ejectment cases does not automatically divest the MCTC
of its jurisdiction over ejectment cases, the MCTC should have heard and received evidence to
determine whether the MCTC had jurisdiction over the case. If tenancy had indeed been an
issue, the MCTC had no option but to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

In the present case, the MTC correctly observed the proper procedure in ejectment
cases. As expressly provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, ejectment cases
merely require the submission by the parties of affidavits and position papers. The rule directs
courts to conduct hearings only when necessary to clarify factual matters. "This procedure is in
keeping with the objective of the Rule of promoting the expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases."
Therefore, the petitioners assertion that the MTC did not receive testimonial or
documentary evidence in resolving the case is not correct. In fact, it is from the evidence
furnished by the parties that the MTC concluded that the petitioner never shared his produce
with Lilia. Expectedly, the MTC ruled that the petitioner was not Lilias tenant and in this light, it
had jurisdiction over the case.
SPOUSES PIO DATO AND SONIA Y. SIA
v. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
G.R. No. 181873, November 27, 2013
J. Reyes
The petitioner mortgaged the subject property to respondent bank. Upon maturity of the
loan, petitioner failed to pay the loan despite demand. The property was foreclosed and sold in
a public auction where respondent bank was the highest bidder. Spouses Sia filed suit
questioning the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. Petitioner, however, failed to
redeem the property within the one-year redemption period. Respondent bank consolidated its
ownership over the property and a new title was issued in its favor. Hence, it became the
ministerial duty of the court to issue the writ of possession applied for by respondent bank.
Despite the pending suit for annulment of the mortgage and Notice of Sheriffs Sale, respondent
bank is entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice to the eventual outcome of the said
case.
FACTS:
Spouses Pio Dato (Pio) and Sonia Y. Sia (Spouses Sia) applied for a P240,000.00 loan
which was granted by BPI which was secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land
owned by Spouses Sia, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 102434.
Subsequently, Spouses Sia availed of a P4 Million Revolving Promissory Note Line with a term
of one year, secured by the same real estate mortgage over TCT No. 102434.
Before their two (2) previous loans matured, Spouses Sia obtained a Credit Facility
of P5.7 Million using the same collaterals offered in their previous loans and four additional
parcels of land. Spouses Sia obtained P800,000.00 from their Credit Facility of P5.7 Million
which was credited to their current account with BPI after executing a Promissory Note for the
same amount. While Spouses Sia paid some of the interest on their loans, the amount was
insufficient to cover the principal amount of said loans.
Spouses Sia filed a complaint with the RTC of Cebu City praying for the issuance TRO
to maintain status quo, award of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation
costs. In the said complaint, Spouses Sia alleged that BPI "deliberately refused to comply with
the condition/undertaking of the loan for IGLF endorsement and approval" until the maturity date
of the loan lapsed to their great prejudice and irreparable damage.

Despite repeated demands Spouses Sia failed to pay their loans. Hence, WBPI
Extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage covered by TCT No. 102434 which secured
Spouses Sias loans The lot was sold at a public auction with BPI as the sole bidder in the
amount of P10,060,080.20. The certificate of sale was issued on August 10, 1993 upon payment
of all the required registration fees.
Spouses Sia amended their complaint claiming that the bank inserted and annotated a
falsified/illegal Real Estate Mortgage of P5.7 Million, purportedly availed of by Spouses Sia.
During the pendency of the instant case, the one-year redemption period had lapsed without
Spouses Sia exercising their right to redeem the subject property. BPI prayed for the issuance
writ of possession over foreclosed property and the occupancy of Spouses Sia on the
foreclosed property entitles BPI to a reasonable compensation.
The RTC rendered its judgment in favor of BPI. Spouses Sia filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC.On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC but with modification. After the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration .Spouses Sia
raised the matter before SC via the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Pending the resolution of this case, Spouses Sia filed on September 20, 2013 an Urgent
Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
alleging that in an Order Branch ordered the issuance of a Writ of Possession over TCT No.
130468 (Formerly TCT No. 102434) after BPI filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
Possession.
Pursuant to the said Order, a writ of possession was issued directing Sheriff Generoso
Regalado to issue a Notice to Vacate. Spouses Sia filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was
denied. Spouses Sia then filed a Motion to Recall and to Quash Writ of Possession which was
also denied. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
An Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction was filed by Spouses Sia on September 20, 2013 before the Court as
they have received a Second Notice to Vacate on Writ of Possession.
On October 17, 2013, Spouses Sia filed before the Court an Extremely Urgent
Reiterative Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction to Enjoin Enforcement of Third Notice to Vacate dated October 8, 2013, giving
Spouses Sia ten (10) days from receipt thereof within which to vacate the premises.
ISSUE:
Whether the situation warrants the issuance of temporary restraining order
RULING:
Petition denied.
In their Extremely Urgent Reiterative Motion For Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed on October 17, 2013, Spouses Sia referred to
the ruling of this Court in Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate Court where it was held that an issue
in a separate case wherein the validity of levy and sale of properties is questioned, is one that
requires pre-emptive resolution.

A scrutiny of the above-cited case reveals that it is not applicable to this case. In
Cometa, the property which was the subject of dispute was sold after levy and execution when
the judgment award was not satisfied in another case for damages. Therein petitioner Herco
Realty, assailed the validity of the execution sale and contended that the ownership of the lots
had been transferred to it by Cometa before such execution sale. The ownership of the property
sold in the execution sale was put into the very issue.
Whereas in this case, the property owned by Spouses Sia covered by TCT No. 102434
was mortgaged to BPI as security for their loans. The same property was sold after it was
extrajudicially foreclosed. Hence, the facts in Cometa and this case cannot be any more
different. Spouses Sia cannot invoke the application of the Courts ruling in Cometa to a case
which is poles apart to it.
The pending suit questioning the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage
does not entitle Spouses Sia to a suspension of the issuance of writ of possession. The Court
calls to mind its ruling in Baldueza v. CA:
The Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals as respondent bank is
entitled to possession of the subject property. In several cases, this Court has held:
"It is settled [that] the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the
property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of
the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the property and can demand it at any time
following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer
certificate of title. The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the
redemption period except that he has to post a bond in accordance with Section 7 of Act 3135
as amended.
No such bond is required after the redemption period if the property is not redeemed.
Possession of the land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner.
Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a
ministerial duty of the court."
The facts show that petitioner mortgaged the subject property to respondent bank. Upon
maturity of the loan, petitioner failed to pay the loan despite demand. The property was
foreclosed and sold in a public auction where respondent bank was the highest bidder.Petitioner
failed to redeem the property within the one-year redemption period. Respondent bank
consolidated its ownership over the property and a new title was issued in its favor. Hence, it
became the ministerial duty of the court to issue the writ of possession applied for by
respondent bank.
Despite the pending suit for annulment of the mortgage and Notice of Sheriffs Sale,
respondent bank is entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice to the eventual outcome of
the said case.
Based on the reasons discussed above, the Court holds that there is no basis for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction..
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FAISAL LOKS Y PELONYO,
G.R. NO. 203433, NOVEMBER 27, 2013

J. REYES
The buy-bust team failed to make an inventory and to take photographs of the subject
drug. The non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 which identifies the said
requirements does not necessarily render the arrest illegal or the items seized
inadmissible. What is essential is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
which would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused are
preserved. In this case, the defense failed to substantiate its claim that such integrity and
evidentiary value of the subject drug was adversely affected by the police officers handling
thereof. As the Court explained in People v. Mendoza:
This Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody should ideally be
perfect, in reality it is not, "as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain." The
most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Hence, the
prosecutions failure to submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the seized
drugs as required under Article 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, will not render [the accused]s
arrest illegal or the items seized from her inadmissible.
FACTS:
SPO1 Jerry Velasco (SPO1 Velasco) and SPO1 Rodolfo Ramos (SPO1 Ramos) testified
for the prosecution. They testified that their confidential informant told them about the delivery
of shabu to be made by a certain "Faisal which was later identified as herein appellant. Hence,
they organized a buy-bust operation.
When Loks arrived at the target area, he approached the polices confidential informant,
who was then with SPO1 Velasco. SPO1 Velasco was introduced by the confidential informant
to Loks as the buyer of shabu. The sale ensued between SPO1 Velasco and Loks. Loks handed
to SPO1 Velasco 1.25 grams of shabu, while SPO1 Velasco paid the amount of P3,000.00 to
Loks. When SPO1 Velasco executed the teams pre-arranged signal, the other members of the
buy-bust team approached to arrest Loks. SPO1 Ramos recovered the marked money from
Loks, while SPO1 Velasco kept with him the purchased drug.
Loks was then brought to the police station, where SPO1 Velasco marked the seized
item. The specimen was turned over to one SPO1 Pama who brought it to the police crime
laboratory examination. The examination conducted by Police Senior Inspector Marites F.
Mariano confirmed that the seized specimen contained shabu.
Faisal Loks (appellant) was accused of violating R.A. No. 9165 for the sale of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, weighing 1.300 grams. The
RTC rendered a decision finding Loks guilty of the crime charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC .Hence, this appeal. Apellant pointed buy-bust teams failure to comply
with Sec 21 of the IRR of RA 9165.
ISSUE:
Whether proven the guilt of the appellant had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:

Petition denied
In the prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the two essential elements of the
offense must concur, namely: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
In the case under consideration, all these elements have been established. The
witnesses for the prosecution clearly showed that the sale of the drugs actually happened and
that the shabu subject of the sale was brought and identified in court. The poseur buyer (SPO1
Velasco) positively identified accused as the seller of the shabu. He categorically testified about
the buy-bust operation from the time he was introduced by the informant to accused as the
buyer of the shabu; to the time when accused agreed to the sale; to the actual exchange of the
marked money and the heat-sealed sachet containing a white crystalline substance; and until
the apprehension of accused. His testimony was corroborated by SPO1 Ramos.
Moreover, the prosecution was able to establish that the substance recovered from
accused was indeed shabu Per Chemistry Report No D-D-911-06 of Police Senior Inspector
Marites F. Mariano, the substance, weighing ONE POINT THREE ZERO ZERO (1.300) grams,
which was brought by SPO2 Pama was examined and found to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu).
The RTCs appreciation of the prosecution witnesses testimonies vis--vis the defense
offered by Loks and the other evidence presented during the proceedings before it deserves
respect. It is a well-entrenched principle that "the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is conclusive on this Court as it is the trial court which had the
opportunity to closely observe the demeanor of the witnesses." Further, we explained in People
v. Naelga:
It should be pointed out that prosecutions involving illegal drugs largely depend on the
credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy- bust operation. Considering that this
Court has access only to the cold and impersonal records of the proceedings, it generally relies
upon the assessment of the trial court. This Court will not interfere with the trial courts
assessment of the credibility of witnesses except when there appears on record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, or
misinterpreted.
"It is equally settled that in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 9165, credence is given
to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their
duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary." In this case, the RTC gave
greater weight to the testimonies of the police officers who testified against Loks, a ruling which
even the CA affirmed on appeal. Upon review, the Court has determined that the testimony of
SPO1 Velasco, who was the poseur-buyer in the sale and thus armed with sufficient personal
knowledge on the transaction, indeed established Loks sale of the illegal drug and the validity
of his arrest.
"[A] buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law,
for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors." Since Loks was caught by the buy-bust team
in flagrante delicto, his immediate arrest was also validly made. The accused was caught in the
act and had to be apprehended on the spot. From the very nature of a buy-bust operation, the
absence of a warrant did not make the arrest illegal. Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
authorizes a warrantless arrest by a peace officer and even a private person "when, in his

presence, the person to be arrested has committed or is attempting to commit an offense." The
legitimate warrantless arrest also cloaks the arresting police officer with the authority to validly
search and seize from the offender those that may be used to prove the commission of the
offense.
The drug seized during the buy-bust operation, which is considered the crimes corpus
delicti, was sufficiently established as containing shabu, a dangerous drug. SPO1 Velascos
marking of the seized drug immediately upon his arrival at the police station qualified as a
compliance with the marking requirement. Contrary to the argument of the defense, even the
buy-bust teams failure to make an inventory and to take photographs of the subject drug did not
adversely affect the prosecutions case. Time and again, the Court has recognized that noncompliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 which identifies the said requirements does not
necessarily render the arrest illegal or the items seized inadmissible. What is essential is that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items which would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused are preserved. In this case, the defense
failed to substantiate its claim that such integrity and evidentiary value of the subject drug was
adversely affected by the police officers handling thereof. As the Court explained in People v.
Mendoza:
This Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody should ideally
be perfect, in reality it is not, "as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken
chain." The most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. Hence, the prosecutions failure to submit in evidence the physical inventory
and photograph of the seized drugs as required under Article 21 of Republic Act No.
9165, will not render [the accused]s arrest illegal or the items seized from her
inadmissible.
SKM ART CRAFT CORPORATION v. EFREN BAUCA ET AL.
G.R. NO. 171282, November 27, 2013
J. Villarama, Jr.
The 23 respondents filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals but only nine of
the respondents had signed the verification and certification against forum shopping attached to
the petition.
The general rule that the certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the
plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to
the case. However, that under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, as when all the plaintiffs
or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, as in
this case, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping
substantially complies with the certification requirement. The verification signed by nine of the
respondents substantially complied with the verification requirement since respondents share a
common interest and cause of action in the case. The 23 respondents in G.R. No. 171282 were
employed by petitioner SKM Art Craft Corporation which is engaged in the handicraft business.
FACTS:
The 23 respondents in G.R. No. 171282 were employed by petitioner SKM Art Craft
Corporation which is engaged in the handicraft business. Unfortunately , a fire burned
petitioners premises and caused millions in damages. Petitioner then informed respondents that

it will suspend its operations for six months. Only eight days after receiving notice of the
suspension of petitioners operations, the 23 respondents (and other co-workers) filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal, docketed as NLRC NCR (South) Case No. 30-05-03012-00, 3005-03028-00 and 30-05-03045-00.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondents were illegally dismissed and ordered petitioner
to reinstate them and pay them back wages of P59,918.41. On appeal, NLRC set aside the
Labor Arbiters Decision and ruled that there was no illegal dismissal.
The case was elevated to the CA. the CA set aside the NLRC Decision and Resolution
and reinstated the Labor Arbiters Decision. The CA considered the merits of the petition for
certiorari filed by respondents and the conflicting findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC as
justification for its decision to decide the case on the merits even if only nine of the respondents
had signed the verification and certification against forum shopping attached to the petition. The
CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA gravely erred in not summarily dismissing the petition insofar to those who did
not sign the verification and certification against forum shopping are concerned.
RULING:
Petition denied
We hold that the verification signed by nine of the respondents substantially complied
with the verification requirement since respondents share a common interest and cause of
action in the case. The apparent merit of respondents CA petition and the conflicting findings of
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC also justified the CAs decision to rule on the merits of the case.
The CA aptly noted that in Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development
Corporation, only two of the 25 petitioners therein signed the verification and certification
against forum shopping. We said that the problem is not the lack of a verification, but the
adequacy of one executed by only two of the 25 petitioners. These two signatories, we added,
are unquestionably real parties in interest, who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and
belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition. This verification is enough
assurance that the matters alleged therein have been made in good faith or are true and
correct, not merely speculative. Hence, we ruled that the requirement of verification was
substantially complied with. In Altres v. Empleo, we also ruled that the verification requirement is
deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth
of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in
the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, as in this case.
In Altres, we likewise stated the general rule that the certification against forum shopping
must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will
be dropped as parties to the case. We also said, however, that under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or defense, as in this case, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the certification requirement. In
Torres, we also considered the apparent merits of the case as a special circumstance or
compelling reason for allowing the petition. We noted the conflicting findings of the NLRC and

the Labor Arbiter and held this as ample justification for the CAs review of the merits. We
stressed that rules of procedure are established to secure substantial justice. Being instruments
of the speedy and efficient administration of justice, they must be used to achieve such end, not
to derail it. Technical requirements may thus be dispensed with in meritorious appeals.
MORETO MIRALLOSA v. CARMEL DEVELOPMENT INC.
G.R. No. 194538, November 27, 2013
CJ. Sereno
Sometime in 1995, petitioner took over Lot No. 32. . A written demand letter was sent
sometime in April 2002 .On January 14 2003, respondent filed a Complaint for Unlawful
Detainer before the MeTC.
The one-year prescriptive period for filing a case for unlawful detainer is tacked from the
date of the last demand, the reason being that the other party has the right to waive the right of
action based on previous demands and to let the possessor remain on the premises for the
meantime. When respondent sent petitioner a demand letter in April 2002 and subsequently
filed the Complaint in January 2003, it did so still within the one-year prescriptive period
imposed by the rules.
FACTS:
Respondent Carmel Development, Inc. was the registered owner of a Caloocan property
known as the Pangarap Village. The property has a total land area of 156 hectares and consists
of three parcels of land registered in the name of Carmel Farms, Inc. The lot that petitioner
presently occupies is Lot No. 32, Block No. 73 covered by the titles registered in the name of
the Carmel Farms, Inc.
On 14 September 1973, President Marcos issued PD 293 which invalidated the titles of
respondent and declared them open for disposition to the members of the Malacaang
Homeowners Association, Inc. (MHAI). On the basis of P.D. 293, petitioners predecessor-ininterest, Pelagio M. Juan, a member of the MHAI, occupied Lot No. 32 and subsequently built
houses there. On the other hand, respondent was constrained to allow the members of MHAI to
also occupy the rest of Pangarap Village.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court promulgated Roman Tuason v. The Register of Deeds,
Caloocan City (Tuason Case), which declared P.D. 293 as unconstitutional and void ab initio in
all its parts. By virtue of the decision, the Register of Deeds restored respondents ownership of
the entire property.
Sometime in 1995, petitioner took over Lot No. 32 by virtue of an Affidavit executed by
Pelagio M. Juan in his favor. As a consequence of Tuason case, respondent made several oral
demands on petitioner to vacate the premises, but to no avail. A written demand letter which
was sent sometime in April 2002 also went unheeded.
On 14 January 2003, respondent filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer before the
MeTC. MeTC rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and ordered the defendant to vacate
the subject property.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the RTC. The RTC reversed the findings of the MeTC
and ruled that respondents Complaint did not make out a case for unlawful detainer. The
respondent appealed to the CA. The CA granted the appeal of the respondents and reinstated

the ruling of the MTC. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence,
the instant Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the MeTC had jurisdiction over the case
RULING:
Petition denied
The MeTC rightly exercised jurisdiction, this case being one of unlawful detainer.
An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully withholds possession of any
land or building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other persons, after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. Here,
possession by a party was originally legal, as it was permitted by the other party on account of
an express or implied contract between them. However, the possession became illegal when
the other party demanded that the possessor vacate the subject property because of the
expiration or termination of the right to possess under the contract, and the possessor refused
to heed the demand.
The importance of making a demand cannot be overemphasized, as it is jurisdictional in
nature. The one-year prescriptive period for filing a case for unlawful detainer is tacked from the
date of the last demand, the reason being that the other party has the right to waive the right of
action based on previous demands and to let the possessor remain on the premises for the
meantime.
In this case, it is clear from the facts that what was once a legal possession of petitioner,
emanating from P.D. 293, later became illegal by the pronouncement in Tuason that the law was
unconstitutional. While it is established that tolerance must be present at the start of the
possession, it must have been properly tacked after P.D. 293 was invalidated. At the time the
decree was promulgated, respondent had no option but to allow petitioner and his predecessorin-interest to enter the property. This is not the "tolerance" envisioned by the law. As explained in
Tuason, the decree "was not as claimed a licit instance of the application of social justice
principles or the exercise of police power. It was in truth a disguised, vile stratagem deliberately
resorted to favor a few individuals, in callous and disdainful disregard of the rights of others. It
was in reality a taking of private property without due process and without compensation
whatever, from persons relying on the indefeasibility of their titles in accordance with and as
explicitly guaranteed by law."
When respondent sent petitioner a demand letter in April 2002 and subsequently filed
the Complaint in January 2003, it did so still within the one-year prescriptive period imposed by
the rules. It matters not whether there is an ownership issue that needs to be resolved, for as
we have previously held, a determination of the matter would only be provisional. In Heirs of
Ampil v. Manahan, we said:
In an unlawful detainer case, the physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties, is the sole issue
for resolution. But where the issue of ownership is raised, the courts may pass upon said
issue in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. This adjudication,
however, is only an initial determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue

of possession, the issue of ownership being inseparably linked thereto. As such, the
lower courts adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is merely provisional and
would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
property.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WELMO LINSIE Y BINEVIDEZ
G.R. No. 199494, November 27, 2013
J. Leonardo-De Castro
Appellant claimed that he was at work at the time of the AAA was raped. This was
corroborated by another defense witness Allan Talinghale. For the defense of alibi to prosper,
the appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the offense was committed and
that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the
place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
In the case at bar, we find that appellants alibi did not sufficiently establish that he was
working at a construction site when AAA was raped and that it was physically impossible for him
to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Likewise, the corroborating testimony of
defense witness Talinghale does not discount the possibility that appellant may have left the
construction site to commit the dastardly act he was charged with and came back afterwards.
FACTS:
On December 14, 2005, at around 11 in the morning, while resting AAA heard someone
knocking on the door. Thinking it was her husband, she opened the door, but, instead, she saw
Welmo Linsie (appellant). Appellant asked her if Edna was there to which she answered no.
Knowing that she was alone, [appellant] pushed and closed the door, drew a knife which is
about 6 to 8 inches long with a wood handle and pointed it to the center of her neck. The
appellant asked AAA to remove her clothes, fearing for her life she followed his instruction.
Thereafter, Appellant successfully had carnal knowledge with AAA despite her resistance.
In defense, Appellant denied that he AAA and claimed that never left his place of work
and it is physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene. This was corroborated by
another defense witness Allan Talinghale, who owns a store infront of the house being
constructed by the appellant. Talinghale testified that on December 14, 2005, Between 11 and
11:30 in the morning, appellant, went to his store and bought ice and 2 sticks of Hope
cigarettes. Thereafter, appellant went back to work at around 11:20 in the morning.
RTC rendered a decision finding the appellant guilty of simple rape . Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty based solely
on the incredible and uncorroborated testimony of the private complainant.
2. Whether it is physically impossible for appellant to be at the crime scene
RULING:
Petition denied

1. It is settled in jurisprudence that in reviewing rape convictions, we are guided by three

principles, namely (a) that an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult for
the complainant to prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b)
that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape as involving two persons, the rapist
and the victim, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution;
and (c) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Unsurprisingly, the credibility of the rape victims testimony is a recurring crucial factor in
the resolution of a case of rape. In fact, we have held that, in rape cases, the accused may be
convicted based solely on the testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible,
natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
The trial court concluded that AAAs version of events is more credible than what
appellant narrated after having had the opportunity to observe the deportment and manner of
testifying of both parties. The same conclusion was likewise firmly upheld by the Court of
Appeals.
In People v. Deligero, we ruled that:
[F]actual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are "entitled to great weight and respect, if not conclusiveness, for we accept
that the trial court was in the best position as the original trier of the facts in whose direct
presence and under whose keen observation the witnesses rendered their respective
versions of the events that made up the occurrences constituting the ingredients of the
offenses charged. The direct appreciation of testimonial demeanor during examination,
veracity, sincerity and candor was foremost the trial courts domain, not that of a
reviewing court that had no similar access to the witnesses at the time they testified."
We have repeatedly held that what is decisive in a rape charge is that the commission of
the rape by the accused against the complainant has been sufficiently proven; and that
inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters which are irrelevant to the elements of
the crime cannot be considered grounds for acquittal. Furthermore, we have recently reiterated
that rape victims are not expected to make an errorless recollection of the incident, so
humiliating and painful that they might be trying to obliterate it from their memory, thus, a few
inconsistent remarks in rape cases will not necessarily impair the testimony of the offended
party.
2. For his ultimate defense, appellant puts forward denial and alibi. His alibi was corroborated
by defense witness Talinghale who appears to be not related to appellant as borne by the
records. However, we are not persuaded by appellants alibi despite corroboration from a
disinterested witness.
In People v. Piosang, we reiterated our frequent pronouncements regarding denial and
alibi in this manner:
Both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail over the
positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed
the crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one
hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.
Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the appellant must prove that he was

somewhere else when the offense was committed and that he was so far away that it
was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or at
its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
In the case at bar, we find that appellants alibi did not sufficiently establish that he was
working at a construction site when AAA was raped and that it was physically impossible for him
to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Likewise, the corroborating testimony of
defense witness Talinghale does not discount the possibility that appellant may have left the
construction site to commit the dastardly act he was charged with and came back afterwards.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JONAS GUILLEN Y ATIENZA
G.R. No. 191756, November 25, 2013
J. Del Castillo
The RTC rendered a decision finding the appellant guilty of the rape. RTC took
appellants silence and passiveness when he was confronted by "AAA" with the rape charge at
the police station as an implied admission of guilt.
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. Clearly, when appellant remained silent when confronted by the
accusation of "AAA" at the police station, he was exercising his basic and fundamental right to
remain silent. At that stage, his silence should not be taken against him. Thus, it was error on
the part of the trial court to state that appellants silence should be deemed as implied
admission of guilt. In fact, this right cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel and any admission obtained in violation of this rule shall be inadmissible in evidence.
FACTS:
On May 20, 2002, Jonas Guillen (appellant) knocked at the door of AAA and when AAA
opened the door appellant the entered the house of "AAA". Appellant poked a balisong at her
neck, forcing her to lie down on the floor, pressing her with his thighs and removing her duster
and panty and thereafter pulling down his brief and shorts, did then and inserted his penis into
her vagina and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of "AAA" against the latters will and
consent.
"AAA" asked assistance from her sister-in-law. AAAs" sister-in-law contacted the police.
When the responding police officers arrived, appellant, who was readily identified by "AAA"
since he was her neighbor, was immediately arrested. AAA underwent medical examination and
the Medico-Legal Report Number MG-02-366 issued by Dra. Soliman shows that private
complainants hymen had "deep healed laceration at 7 oclock position;" positive for
spermatozoa; and that there was "evident sign of extragenital physical injury noted on the body
of the subject at the time of the examination
Information was filed charging appellant with the crime of rape. The RTC rendered a
decision finding the appellant guilty of the rape. RTC took appellants silence and passiveness
when he was confronted by "AAA" with the rape charge at the police station as an implied
admission of guilt. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:

1. Whether trial court gravely erred when it deemed his silence as an implied admission of
guilt.
2. Whether AAAs" healed hymenal laceration does not prove rape
RULING:
Petition denied.
1. It should be borne in mind that when appellant was brought to the police station, he was
already a suspect to the crime of rape. As such, he was already under custodial
investigation. Section 12, Article III of the Constitution explicitly provides, viz:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
Clearly, when appellant remained silent when confronted by the accusation of "AAA" at
the police station, he was exercising his basic and fundamental right to remain silent. At that
stage, his silence should not be taken against him. Thus, it was error on the part of the trial
court to state that appellants silence should be deemed as implied admission of guilt. In fact,
this right cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel and any admission
obtained in violation of this rule shall be inadmissible in evidence.
In any case, we agree with the Decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, finding
appellant guilty of the crime of rape. The trial courts Decision convicting appellant of rape was
anchored not solely on his silence and so-called implied admission. More importantly, it was
based on the testimony of "AAA" which, standing alone, is sufficient to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
2. Anent appellants contention that "AAAs" healed hymenal laceration does not prove rape,
we find the same irrelevant and immaterial. Hymenal laceration, whether fresh or healed, is
not an element of the crime of rape. Even a medical examination is not necessary as it is
merely corroborative. As we mentioned before, the fact of rape in this case was satisfactorily
established by the testimony of "AAA" alone.
All the elements of rape having been established beyond reasonable doubt, both the trial
court and the CA properly found appellant guilty as charged and correctly imposed on him the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
DIGITAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC. v. JESSIE E. CANTOS
G.R. No. 180200, November 25, 2013
J. Del Castillo
Pursuant to a courts order respondent issued Warrants of Levy against several
delinquent properties of the petitioner. These properties were advertised and sold at public
auction. Digital Telecommunications made a request to the respondent to lift the warrant
invoking the final Decision in Civil Case No. 3514 decreeing petitioners exemption from the
payment of real property tax is binding upon respondent. Since the warrants remained unlifted,
petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Indirect Contempt.

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its

authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the
courts order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of
justice. It is a defiance of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court which tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice partylitigants or their witnesses during litigation. The acts of respondent in issuing the Warrants of
Levy and in effecting the public auction sale of petitioners real properties, were neither intended
to undermine the authority of the court nor resulted to disobedience to the lawful orders of
Branch IX. He merely performed a ministerial function which he is bound to perform under
Sections 176 and 177 of RA 7160.
FACTS:
Petitioner wanted to renew its Mayors Permit but was informed that if petitioner failed to
pay real property taxes, its operation would be restrained. Petitioner failed to pay the real
property taxes, hence a cease and desist order was issued against the petitioner. Petitioner filed
a case for Annulment of the Cease and Desist Order against the Mayor and Chief of the Permit
and License Division. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3514 and raffled to Branch IX.
RTC declared that the issuance of the Cease and Desist Order was without legal basis and that
petitioner is only liable to pay real property taxes on properties not used in connection with the
operation of its franchise. The then Mayor filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. The CA
dismissed his petition.
The respondent issued seven (7) Warrants of Levy against several delinquent properties
of the petitioner. Hence, the properties would be advertised and sold at public auction. Petitioner
wrote respondent to request the lifting of the Warrants of Levy and to refrain from proceeding
with the public sale of its property located in Balayan. It invoked the final Decision in Civil Case
No. 3514 decreeing petitioners exemption from the payment of real property tax is binding upon
respondent. But since the warrants remained unlifted, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for
Indirect Contempt and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a TRO docketed as Civil Case
No. 4051.
The RTC granted petitioners prayer for TRO. Respondent, however, manifested that
when said TRO was served upon him, he had already effected the public auction of petitioners
real properties. Thus, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Manifestation and Motion to recall and nullify
the auction sale and to order respondent and his counsel to explain why they should not be held
in contempt for their blatant defiance of the TRO.
The RTC denied petitioners prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injuction.
Petitioner filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Declare Null and Void the Sale
Conducted which was however denied by the RTC. When petitioner elevated the denial to the
CA but was dismissed.
Meanwhile, the RTC dismissed petitioners Petition for Indirect Contempt and Prohibition
against respondent (Civil Case No. 4051). The RTC ruled that since respondent was not a party
in Civil Case No. 3514, he had no duty to render obedience to the Decision therein.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied it. The CA denied
the appeal and subsequent motion for reconsideration of the petitioner. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent is guilty of indirect contempt
2. Whether the final Decision in Civil Case No. 3514 is binding upon the respondent
RULING:
Petition denied.
1. Respondent is not guilty of indirect contempt. "Contempt of court is defined as a
disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It
signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts order, but such conduct
which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or,
in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. It is a defiance of the authority,
justice, or dignity of the court which tends to bring the authority and administration of the law
into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice party-litigants or their witnesses during
litigation."
In this case, the acts of respondent in issuing the Warrants of Levy and in effecting the
public auction sale of petitioners real properties, were neither intended to undermine the
authority of the court nor resulted to disobedience to the lawful orders of Branch IX. He merely
performed a ministerial function which he is bound to perform under Sections 176 and 177 of
RA 7160, viz:
Section 176. Levy on Real Property. - After the expiration of the time required to
pay the delinquent tax, fee, or charge, real property may be levied on before,
simultaneously, or after the distraint of personal property belonging to the delinquent
taxpayer. To this end, the provincial, city or municipal treasurer, as the case may be,
shall prepare a duly authenticated certificate showing the name of the taxpayer and the
amount of the tax, fee, or charge, and penalty due from him. Said certificate shall
operate with the force of a legal execution throughout the Philippines. Levy shall be
effected by writing upon said certificate the description of the property upon which levy is
made. At the same time, written notice of the levy shall be mailed to or served upon the
assessor and the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the property is located
who shall annotate the levy on the tax declaration and certificate of title of the property,
respectively, and the delinquent taxpayer or, if he be absent from the Philippines, to his
agent or the manager of the business in respect to which the liability arose, or if there be
none, to the occupant of the property in question.
In case the levy on real property is not issued before or simultaneously with the warrant
of distraint on personal property, and the personal property of the taxpayer is not sufficient to
satisfy his delinquency, the provincial, city or municipal treasurer, as the case may be, shall
within thirty (30) days after execution of the distraint, proceed with the levy on the taxpayer's
real property. .
A report on any levy shall, within ten (10) days after receipt of the warrant, be submitted
by the levying officer to the sanggunian concerned.
Section 177. Penalty for Failure to Issue and Execute Warrant. - Without prejudice to
criminal prosecution under the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, any local

treasurer who fails to issue or execute the warrant of distraint or levy after the expiration of the
time prescribed, or who is found guilty of abusing the exercise thereof by competent authority
shall be automatically dismissed from the service after due notice and hearing.
Noteworthy at this point is that there is nothing in the records which would show that
petitioner availed of the tax exemption or submitted the requirements to establish that it is
exempted from paying real property taxes. Section 206 of RA 7160 outlines the requirements for
real property tax exemption, viz.:
Sec. 206. Proof of Exemption of Real Property from Taxation. - Every person by
or for whom real property is declared, who shall claim tax exemption for such property
under this Title shall file with the provincial, city or municipal assessor within thirty (30)
days from the date of the declaration of real property sufficient documentary evidence in
support of such claim including corporate charters, title of ownership, articles of
incorporation, by-laws, contracts, affidavits, certifications and mortgage deeds, and
similar documents.
If the required evidence is not submitted within the period herein prescribed, the property
shall be listed as taxable in the assessment roll. However, if the property shall be proven to be
tax exempt, the same shall be dropped from the assessment roll.
Neither did petitioner avail of the remedy of paying the assessed real property tax under
protest as prescribed in Section 252 of RA 7160. Suffice it to say that the availment of these
remedies could have prevented respondents issuance of the Warrants of Levy and the conduct
of the subsequent public auction sale of petitioners properties. Due to petitioners nonavailment of these remedies, respondent therefore remained duty bound to perform such acts,
otherwise, he may be subjected to the penalties prescribed for non-performance of his
ministerial duties as provincial treasurer.

2.

Respondent is not bound by the Decision in Civil Case No. 3514. Petitioner avers that
respondent blatantly defied a final and binding Decision rendered in Civil Case No. 3514
declaring it exempt from paying taxes on its real properties. It argues that there is a shared
identity of interest between the defendants in Civil Case No. 3514 and respondent.
Therefore, respondent is barred by the Decision in the said case under the principle of res
judicata.

The contention is specious. "Res judicata means a matter adjudged; a thing judicially
acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment."For res judicata to apply there
must among others be, between the first and the second actions, identity of the parties, identity
of subject matter, and identity of causes of action. Here, there is no identity of parties between
Civil Case No. 3514 and the instant case. "Identity of parties exists where the parties in both
actions are the same, or there is privity between them, or they are successors-in-interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action, litigating for the same thing and under the
same title and in the same capacity." In Civil Case No. 3514, the action was directed against
Benjamin E. Martinez, Jr. and Francisco P. Martinez in their capacities as Mayor and Chief of
the Permit and License Division of the Municipality of Balayan, Batangas, respectively. On the
other hand, respondent, in the instant case, is being sued in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer
of the Province of Batangas. While the defendants in both cases similarly sought to enforce the
tax obligation of petitioner, they were sued under different capacities. Moreover, there is no
identity in the causes of action between the two cases. In Civil Case No. 3514, the propriety of
the municipal officials closure/stoppage of petitioners business operation in Balayan, Batangas

was the one in question while what is involved in this case is respondents act of issuing
Warrants of Levy and proceeding with the auction sale of the real properties of petitioner.
Clearly, the principle of res judicata does not apply. The RTC and the CA are therefore correct in
ruling that respondent, not being a party thereto, is not bound by the Decision rendered in Civil
Case No. 3514.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NATALIO HILARION Y LALIAG
G.R. No. 201105, November 25, 2013
J. Brion
Natalio Hilarion was charged with statutory rape for raping AAA, a six (6) years old girl.
AAA and her mother testified that AAA was six (6) years old at the time she was rape but no
documentary evidence was presented to prove the same.
In the present case, the records are completely devoid of evidence that the certificates
recognized by law have been lost or destroyed or were otherwise unavailable. The mother
simply testified without prior proof of the unavailability of the recognized primary evidence.
Thus, proof of the victims age cannot be recognized, following the rule that all doubts should be
interpreted in favor of the accused. We stress that age is an essential element of statutory rape;
hence the victim's age must be proved with equal certainty and clarity as the crime itself.
FACTS:
The RTC found the Natalio Hilarion (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape under Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended (RPC). It gave credence to the testimony of AAA that the appellant inserted his penis
into her vagina. It further held that AAAs testimony was corroborated by the medical findings of
the Philippine National Police medico-legal officer.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in toto. The CA held that the victim's age
had been sufficiently proven by the written and oral testimonies of AAA's mother, BBB. Hence,
this petition. Appellant claimed that the victim's age had not been proven with certainty.
ISSUE:
Whether the age of AAA had been proven with certainty
RULING:
Petition denied
In People v. Buado Jr., the Court reiterated the guidelines in appreciating the victim's
age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, thus:
In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing
cases, we hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element
of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as

baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would
suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost
or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to
be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to
be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought
to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the
testimony of the victim s mother or relatives concerning the victim s age, the complainant
s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended
party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall
not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the
victim.
In the present case, the records are completely devoid of evidence that the certificates
recognized by law have been lost or destroyed or were otherwise unavailable. The mother
simply testified without prior proof of the unavailability of the recognized primary evidence. Thus,
proof of the victims age cannot be recognized, following the rule that all doubts should be
interpreted in favor of the accused.
To reiterate, while AAAs mother, BBB, testified that her daughter was six (6) years old at
the time of the rape, it had not been previously established that the certificate of live birth or
other similar authentic document such as the baptismal certificate or school records have been
lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable. Even AAAs own testimony on cross examination that
she was six (6) years old at the time of the incident would not suffice to prove her minority since
her age was not expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. We stress that age is an
essential element of statutory rape; hence the victim's age must be proved with equal certainty
and clarity as the crime itself.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROBERTO GARCIA Y PADIERNOS
G.R. No. 206095, November 25, 2013
J. MENDOZA
Roberto Garcia was charged with rape for raping AAA, a three (3) year old girl.
In People v. Arpon, the Court established the guidelines in appreciating age, either as an
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, as follows:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified
true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim
would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is
qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of
birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony
will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party.
The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not
be taken against him.
In this case, there is nothing on record to prove the qualifying circumstance that "the
victim is a child below 7 years old." The testimony of AAA anent her age and the absence of
denial on the part of Garcia are not sufficient evidence of her age. On the other hand, the
information regarding the age of AAA as indicated in Medico Legal Report No. M-4356-04 is not
reliable because there was no showing who supplied the same. Lamentably, her age was not
one of the subjects of stipulation during the pre-trial conference.
FACTS:
AAA was three (3) years old when Roberto Garcia (Garcia) inserted his index finger into
her vagina . AAA told her mother about the incident and when AAA urinated, blood oozed out of
her vagina her mother brought her to the hospital.
Information was filed against Garcia charging him with rape. The RTC rendered its
judgment convicting Garcia of simple rape. Garcia appealed the RTC judgment of conviction
before the CA. The CA found Garcia guilty of qualified rape .CA held that the RTC erred in not
appreciating the qualifying circumstance of minority. It was of the view that since the minority of
AAA was alleged in the Information and proven during trial, through her testimony and Medico
Legal Report No. M-4356-04, the imposition of the death penalty was warranted. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of minority
RULING:
Petition denied.
In the case at bench, the CA held that the qualifying circumstance of minority was
proven beyond reasonable doubt. According to the CA, the unrefuted testimony of AAA that she

was 3 years old when the incident happened, and Medico-Legal Report No. M-4356-04, which
stated that AAA was 3 years old when she was examined for any evidence of sexual abuse, had
established the qualifying circumstance that "the victim is a child below 7 years old." It further
declared that since AAA was under 7 years old at the time of the commission of the object rape,
Garcia should be convicted of qualified rape and meted the death penalty.
The Court has to disagree.
Well-settled is the rule that qualifying circumstances must be specifically alleged in the
Information and duly proven with equal certainty as the crime itself. The victims minority must
be proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself.
In People v. Arpon, the Court established the guidelines in appreciating age, either as an
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, as follows:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy
of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove
age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of
the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40,
Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice
provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party.
The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not
be taken against him.
In this case, there is nothing on record to prove the qualifying circumstance that "the
victim is a child below 7 years old." The testimony of AAA anent her age and the absence of
denial on the part of Garcia are not sufficient evidence of her age. On the other hand, the
information regarding the age of AAA as indicated in Medico Legal Report No. M-4356-04 is not
reliable because there was no showing who supplied the same. Lamentably, her age was not
one of the subjects of stipulation during the pre-trial conference.
It bears stressing that the prosecution did not adduce any independent and competent
documentary evidence such as AAAs original or duly certified birth certificate, baptismal
certificate, school records or any authentic documents indicating her date of birth, to show that
the commission of the crime was attended by the subject qualifying circumstance of minority.
The prosecution also failed to establish that the documents referred to above were lost,

destroyed, unavailable, or otherwise totally absent. Her mother or any member of her family, by
affinity or consanguinity, never testified on her age or date of birth. Further, there is no showing
that the testimony of AAA as to her age at the time of the commission of the crime was
expressly and clearly admitted by Garcia. In the light of the foregoing, the subject qualifying
circumstance cannot be appreciated against Garcia.
HEIRS OF THE LATE FELIX M. BUCTON v. SPOUSES GONZALO and TRINIDAD GO,
G.R. No. 188395, November 20, 2013
J. Perez
a. While it is true that a notarized document, like an SPA, carries the evidentiary weight
conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and has in its favor the presumption of
regularity, this presumption, however, is not absolute. It may be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. In brushing aside the expert witness testimony, it was
observed that in order to bring about an accurate comparison and analysis, the standard of
comparison must be as close as possible in point of time to the suspected signature. However,
when the dissimilarity between the genuine and false specimens of writing is visible to the
naked eye and would not ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer,
resort to technical rules is no longer necessary and the instrument may be stricken off for being
spurious. When so established and is conspicuously evident from its appearance, the opinion of
handwriting experts on the forged document is no longer necessary.
b. Ownership and real rights over real property are acquired by ordinary prescription
through possession of ten years, provided that the occupant is in good faith and with just title. A
prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of
ownership for a period of ten years unless such possession was acquired with color of title and
good faith. However, it must be stressed that possession by virtue of a spurious title, as the
Spouses Go believed it to be, cannot be considered constructive possession for the purpose of
reckoning the ten-year prescriptive period. The conclusion of the appellate court that
prescription has already set in is erroneously premised on the absence of forgery and the
consequent validity of the deed of sale.
FACTS:
The suit concerns a parcel of land originally registered in the name of Felix M. Bucton,
married to Nicanora Gabar and covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT). Sometime in March
1981, Felix received a phone call from Gonzalo Go informing him that he has bought the
property thru Benjamin Belisario who represented himself as the attorney-in-fact of Felix. Felix
then learned that the owners duplicate certificate of title of the property was lost while in the
possession of his daughter. The certificate of title then fell into the hands of Belisario thus
depriving Felix of his ownership of the property. It was also annotated at the back of the title that
the Spouses Bucton purportedly authorized Belisario to sell the property to third persons, as
evidenced by a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) allegedly signed by the Spouses Bucton.
On the strength of the SPA, Belisario executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the
Spouses Go. With this, the Registry of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City cancelled TCT in the
name of Felix and issued a new one in the names of the Spouses Go. In the meantime, Felix
died leaving his heirs to claim against Spouses Go that there was forgery in the signature of
Spouses Bucton on the SPA, alleging further that since the SPA was spurious, no valid title was
conveyed to the Spouses Go. The Spouses Go refuted the allegations asserting that they are

buyers in good faith and for value, and that they are in actual possession of the property from
the time it was purchased in 1981.
The RTC ruled that the complaint filed by the Heirs of Felix is already barred by laches
and prescription since from the time the alleged fraudulent transaction was discovered in 1981
up to 1996 the complainants failed to take any legal step to assail the title of the Spouses Go.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint further explaining that the
evidence adduced by the Heirs of Felix failed to preponderantly establish that the questioned
SPA was a forgery.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the signatures were forged.
2. Whether or not the action of the heirs of Felix are already barred by laches and prescription.
RULING:
1. As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing
evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The best evidence of a
forged signature in the instrument is the instrument itself reflecting the alleged forged
signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by comparison between the alleged
forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is
theorized upon to have been forged.
While it is true that a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it
with respect to its due execution, and has in its favor the presumption of regularity, this
presumption, however, is not absolute. It may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary.
In upholding the validity of the SPA, the Court of Appeals brushed aside the testimonial
evidence of the expert witness and made an independent examination of the questioned
signatures, and based thereon, ruled that there is no forgery. We are not unmindful of the
principle that in order to bring about an accurate comparison and analysis, the standard of
comparison must be as close as possible in point of time to the suspected signature. However,
when the dissimilarity between the genuine and false specimens of writing is visible to the
naked eye and would not ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer,
resort to technical rules is no longer necessary and the instrument may be stricken off for being
spurious. More so when, as in this case, the forgery was testified to and thus established by
evidence other than the writing itself. When so established and is conspicuously evident from its
appearance, the opinion of handwriting experts on the forged document is no longer necessary.
2. Ownership and real rights over real property are acquired by ordinary prescription through
possession of ten years, provided that the occupant is in good faith and with just title. A
prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of
ownership for a period of ten years unless such possession was acquired with color of title
and good faith. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the
person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his
ownership. For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came
into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights but the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right.

The Spouses Go miserably failed to meet the requirements of good faith and just title
thus the ten-year prescriptive period is a defense unavailable to them. It must be stressed that
possession by virtue of a spurious title cannot be considered constructive possession for the
purpose of reckoning the ten-year prescriptive period. The conclusion of the appellate court that
prescription has already set in is erroneously premised on the absence of forgery and the
consequent validity of the deed of sale. And extraordinary acquisitive prescription cannot
similarly vest ownership over the property upon the Spouses Go since the law requires 30 years
of uninterrupted adverse possession without need of title or of good faith before real rights over
immovable prescribes.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE AND
ASSURANCE, INC., DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and LAND BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 165585, November 20, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
In this relation, jurisprudence dictates that an answer fails to tender an issue if it does
not comply with the requirements of a specific denial as set out in Sections 8 and 10, Rule 8 of
the Rules, resulting in the admission of the material allegations of the adverse partys pleadings.
As such, it is a form of judgment that is exclusively based on the submitted pleadings
without the introduction of evidence as the factual issues remain uncontroverted. In this case,
records disclose that in its Answer, GSIS admitted the material allegations of PGAIs complaint
warranting the grant of the relief prayed for. In particular, GSIS admitted that: (a) it made a
request for reinsurance cover which PGAI accepted in a reinsurance binder effective for one
year; (b) it remitted only the first three reinsurance premium payments to PGAI; (c) it failed to
pay PGAI the fourth and final reinsurance premium installment; and (d) it received demand
letters from PGAI. It also did not refute the allegation of PGAI that it settled reinsurance claims
during the reinsured period. On the basis of these admissions, the Court finds that the CA did
not err in affirming the propriety of a judgment on the pleadings.
FACTS:
The National Electrification Administration (NEA) entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) with Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) insuring all real and
personal properties mortgaged to it by electrical cooperatives under an Industrial All Risks
Policy (IAR policy). Out of which, 95% was reinsured by GSIS with PGAI for a period of one
year or from March 5, 1999 to March 5, 2000. GSIS agreed to pay PGAI reinsurance premiums
in an amount per quarter. While GSIS remitted to PGAI the reinsurance premiums for the first
three quarters, it, however, failed to pay the fourth and last reinsurance premium due on
December 5, 1999 despite demands. This prompted PGAI to file, on November 15, 2001, a
Complaint for sum of money (complaint) against GSIS before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case
No. 01-1634.
On December 18, 2001, PGAI filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings averring that
GSIS essentially admitted the material allegations of the complaint, such as: (a) the existence of
the MOA between NEA and GSIS; (b) the existence of the reinsurance binder between GSIS
and PGAI; (c) the remittance by GSIS to PGAI of the first three quarterly reinsurance premiums;
and (d) the failure/refusal of GSIS to remit the fourth and last reinsurance premium. Hence,
PGAI prayed that the RTC render a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Section 1, Rule 34 of

the Rules of Court (Rules). GSIS opposed the foregoing motion by reiterating the allegations
and defenses in its Answer.
On January 11, 2002, the RTC issued an Order (January 11, 2002 Order) granting
PGAIs Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. It observed that the admissions of GSIS that it
paid the first three quarterly reinsurance premiums to PGAI affirmed the validity of the contract
of reinsurance between them. As such, GSIS cannot now renege on its obligation to remit the
last and remaining quarterly reinsurance premium. It further pointed out that while it is true that
the payment of the premium is a requisite for the validity of an insurance contract as provided
under Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 612, otherwise known as "The Insurance
Code," it was held in Makati Tuscany Condominium Corp. v. CA (Makati Tuscany) that
insurance policies are valid even if the premiums were paid in installments, as in this
case. Thus, in view of the foregoing, the RTC ordered GSIS to pay PGAI the last quarter
reinsurance premium in the sum of P32,885,894.52, including interests amounting
toP6,519,515.91 as of July 31, 2000 until full payment, attorneys fees, and costs of
suit. Dissatisfied, GSIS filed a notice of appeal.
Meanwhile, PGAI filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal based on the following
reasons: (a) GSIS appeal was patently dilatory since it already acknowledged the validity of
PGAIs claim; (b) GSIS posted no valid defense as its Answer raised no genuine issues; and (c)
PGAI would suffer serious and irreparable injury as it may be blacklisted as a consequence of
the non-payment of premiums due. PGAI also manifested its willingness to post a sufficient
surety bond to answer for any resulting damage to GSIS. The latter opposed the motion
asserting that there lies no sufficient ground or urgency to justify execution pending appeal. It
also claimed that all its funds and properties are exempted from execution citing Section 39 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 8291, otherwise known as "The Government Service Insurance System
Act of 1997."
On February 14, 2002, the RTC issued an Order (February 14, 2002 Order) granting
PGAIs Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, conditioned on the posting of a bond. It further
held that only the GSIS Social Insurance Fund is exempt from execution. Accordingly, PGAI
duly posted a surety bond which the RTC approved through an Order dated February 19, 2002,
resulting to the issuance of a writ of execution 54 and notices of garnishment (February 19, 2002
issuances), all of even date, against GSIS.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in sustaining the RTCs January 11, 2002 Order rendering judgment on
the pleadings.
RULING:
Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading. The rule is stated in
Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules which reads as follows:
Sec. 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue,
or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the court
may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. x x x.

In this relation, jurisprudence dictates that an answer fails to tender an issue if it does
not comply with the requirements of a specific denial as set out in Sections 8 and 10, Rule 8 of
the Rules, resulting in the admission of the material allegations of the adverse partys pleadings.
As such, it is a form of judgment that is exclusively based on the submitted pleadings
without the introduction of evidence as the factual issues remain uncontroverted.
In this case, records disclose that in its Answer, GSIS admitted the material allegations
of PGAIs complaint warranting the grant of the relief prayed for. In particular, GSIS admitted
that: (a) it made a request for reinsurance cover which PGAI accepted in a reinsurance binder
effective for one year; (b) it remitted only the first three reinsurance premium payments to
PGAI; (c) it failed to pay PGAI the fourth and final reinsurance premium installment; and (d) it
received demand letters from PGAI. It also did not refute the allegation of PGAI that it settled
reinsurance claims during the reinsured period. On the basis of these admissions, the Court
finds that the CA did not err in affirming the propriety of a judgment on the pleadings.
GSIS affirmative defense that the non-payment of the last reinsurance premium merely
rendered the contract ineffective pursuant to Section 77 of PD 612 no longer involves any
factual issue, but stands solely as a mere question of law in the light of the foregoing
admissions hence allowing for a judgment on the pleadings. Besides, in the case of Makati
Tuscany, the Court already ruled that the non-payment of subsequent installment premiums
would not prevent the insurance contract from taking effect; that the parties intended to make
the insurance contract valid and binding is evinced from the fact that the insured paid and the
insurer received several reinsurance premiums due thereon, although the former refused to
pay the remaining balance, viz:
We hold that the subject policies are valid even if the premiums were paid on
installments. The records clearly show that petitioner and private respondent intended subject
insurance policies to be binding and effective notwithstanding the staggered payment of the
premiums. The initial insurance contract entered into in 1982 was renewed in 1983, then in
1984. In those three (3) years, the insurer accepted all the installment payments. Such
acceptance of payments speaks loudly of the insurers intention to honor the policies it issued to
petitioner. Certainly, basic principles of equity and fairness would not allow the insurer to
continue collecting and accepting the premiums, although paid on installments, and later deny
liability on the lame excuse that the premiums were not prepaid in full.
GENESIS INVESTMENT, INC. v. HEIRS of CEFERINO EBARASABAL
G.R. No. 181622, November 20, 2013
J. Peralta
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation, the Supreme Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of
money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in
the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought,
this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable by Regional Trial Courts.

Although the causes of action of respondents pertains to the title, possession and
interest of each of the contending parties over the contested property, the assessed value of
which falls within the jurisdiction of the MTC, the complaint, however suggests that the nature of
the suit, the allegations therein, and the reliefs prayed for, is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
FACTS:
The heirs of Ebarasabal filed against Genesis Inevstment, Inc. a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Shares, Partition, Damages and Attorney's
Fees before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Barili, Cebu. Genesis then filed a Motion to
Dismiss contending that the RTC has no jurisdiction to try the case on the ground that the case
involves title to or possession of real property or any interest therein and since the assessed
value of the subject property does not exceed P20,000.00, the action falls within the jurisdiction
of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC).
In its initial order the RTC granted Genesis' Motion to Dismiss since the assessed value
of the real property involved is determinative of which court has jurisdiction over the case. Heirs
of Ebarasabal filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, arguing that the complaint consists of
several causes of action, including one for annulment of documents, which is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and, as such, falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC. The RTC granted the
Motion reversing its earlier order, from which Genesis filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the
RTC denied it.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which the CA dismissed
holding that the subject matter of respondents' complaint is incapable of pecuniary estimation
therefore, within the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that the main purpose in filing the action
is to declare null and void the documents assailed therein.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action.
RULING:
It is true that one of the causes of action of respondents pertains to the title, possession
and interest of each of the contending parties over the contested property, the assessed value
of which falls within the jurisdiction of the MTC. However, a complete reading of the complaint
would readily show that, based on the nature of the suit, the allegations therein, and the reliefs
prayed for, the action is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
In filing their Complaint with the RTC, respondents sought to recover ownership and
possession of their shares in the disputed parcel of land by questioning the due execution and
validity of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale as well as the Memorandum of
Agreement entered into by and between some of their co-heirs and herein petitioners. Clearly,
this is a case of joinder of causes of action which comprehends more than the issue of partition
of or recovery of shares or interest over the real property in question but includes an action for
declaration of nullity of contracts and documents which is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim

is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts
or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the
basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim
is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and are cognizable by Regional Trial Courts. Well entrenched is the rule that jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the party is entitled to all
or some of the claims asserted.
Moreover, it is provided under Section 5 (c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court that where the
causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions,
the joinder may be allowed in the RTC provided one of the causes of action falls within the
jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein.
FAR EASTERN SURETY AND INSURANCE CO. INC. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 170618, November 20, 2013
J. Brion
Under Rule 41 of the Rules, an appeal from the RTCs decision may be undertaken in
three (3) ways, depending on the nature of the attendant circumstances of the case, namely: (1)
an ordinary appeal to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction; (2) a petition for review to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction; and (3) a petition for review on certiorari directly filed with the Court where
only questions of law are raised or involved.
The first mode of appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules is available on questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and of law. The second mode of appeal, governed by Rule 42 of the
Rules, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and of law.
The third mode of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is filed with the Court only on
questions of law. It is only where pure questions of law are raised or involved can an appeal be
brought to the Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The rule in this
jurisdiction is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court. "The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from
the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its
findings of fact being conclusive." However, when the petitioner questioned the RTCs ruling, it
was, in fact, raising the issues of falsity and of forgery of the signatures in the bail bond, which
questions are purely of fact and must be resolved before the CA and not proper under Rule 45
certiorari petition.
FACTS:
A personal bail bond for the provisional release of accused Tuazon was filed before the
RTC in a criminal case, which was approved by the RTC. The personal bail bond was under the
signatures of Paul Malvar and Teodorico Evangelista as the petitioners authorized signatories.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court required all bonding companies to accredit all their authorized
agents with the courts, causing the petitioner to apply for its Certification of Accreditation and
Authority to transact surety business with the courts designating Samuel Baui as its authorized
representative. However, the accused failed to appear in the scheduled hearing for the criminal
case prompting the RTC to issue an order requiring the petitioner to produce the body of the
accused.

Samuel, who was then the petitioners designated representative, filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to comply with the RTCs order seeking the petitioners assistance for the use
of its resources and agents outside Tarlac City. Thereafter, the petitioner allegedly verified from
its register that it did not authorize the issuance of a bail bond allowing it to file with the RTC a
Very Urgent Motion to Cancel Fake/Falsified Bail Bond. The petitioner alleged that the signature
of Teodorico in the bail bond was forged; that Paul was not an authorized signatory. In support
of the motion, petitioner attached copies of the Personal Bail Bond, Corporate Secretarys
Certificate, and Special Power of Attorney in favor of Patricio, and prayed to be relieved from
any liability under the bail bond, from which the RTC denied on the ground that the petitioner
had indirectly acknowledged the bonds validity when it filed a motion for extension of time with
the trial court. The petitioner sought reconsideration of the judgment, but the RTC denied the
motion.
Further, the RTC issued another order directing the issuance of a writ of execution. The
petitioner responded by filing an omnibus motion to hold in abeyance or quash the writ, but the
RTC denied this motion, prompting the petitioner to file a petition to assail the RTC orders under
Rule 45. Respondent then contended that the petitioner used the wrong mode of review as the
proper remedy is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy.
RULING:
Under Rule 41 of the Rules, an appeal from the RTCs decision may be undertaken in
three (3) ways, depending on the nature of the attendant circumstances of the case, namely: (1)
an ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction; (2) a petition for review to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) a petition for review on certiorari directly filed with
the Court where only questions of law are raised or involved.
The first mode of appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules is available on questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and of law. The second mode of appeal, governed by Rule 42 of the
Rules, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and of law.
The third mode of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is filed with the Court only on
questions of law. It is only where pure questions of law are raised or involved can an appeal be
brought to the Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
The issues of the authenticity and of the validity of the bail bonds signatures and the
authority of its signatories had never been resolved. When the petitioner questioned the RTCs
ruling, it was, in fact, raising the issues of falsity and of forgery of the signatures in the bail bond,
which questions are purely of fact. Nothing in the order resolved the question of whether
Teodoricos signature had been forged. Neither was there any finding on the validity of the bail
bond, nor any definitive ruling on the effects of the unauthorized signature of Paul. Missing as
well was any mention of the circumstances that led to the RTCs approval of the bond. We need
all these factual bases to make a ruling on what and how the law should be applied. Thus, even
if we are inclined to take equitable considerations into account in light of the alleged previous
court approval of the bail bond, we cannot do so for lack of sufficient factual and evidentiary

basis. To be fair, we must know what we must be fair about and cannot simply rely on general
allegations of overall unfairness.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. "The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of
law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive." This Court has emphatically declared that
"it is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its
jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the lower
court." Moreover, this Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily
perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. Thus, a
petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision involving both questions of fact and law
must first be brought before the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, while we note the irregular procedure adopted by the RTC when it
rendered a decision based on implications, we nevertheless hold that the proper remedy to
question this irregularity is not through a Rule 45 petition.
PRIMO C. MIRO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas
v. MARILYN MENDOZA VDA. DE EREDEROS
G.R. Nos. 172532 172544-45, November 20, 2013
J. Brion
The rule on conclusiveness of factual findings is not an absolute one. Despite the
respect given to administrative findings of fact, the CA may resolve factual issues, review and
re-evaluate the evidence on record and reverse the administrative agencys findings if not
supported by substantial evidence. Since, the CA found no substantial evidence to support the
conclusion that the respondents are guilty of the administrative charges against them, the
Ombudsmans findings can be reversed, as mere allegation and speculation is not evidence,
and is not equivalent to proof.
The theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of
the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and,
therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand,
subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as
an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter
asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply.
The records show that not one of the complainants actually witnessed the transfer of
money from Alingasa to Erederos and Mendoza. Nowhere in their affidavits did they specifically
allege that they saw Alingasa remit the collections to Erederos. However, their testimonies are
still "evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others."
FACTS:
Mendoza, Erederos, Alingasa, and Peque were administratively charged by private
complainants with Grave Misconduct before the Deputy Ombudsman and criminal complaints
for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The administrative and
criminal charges arose from the alleged anomalies in the distribution at the LTO Cebu of
confirmation certificates, an indispensable requirement in the processing of documents for the
registration of motor vehicle with the LTO. It was alleged that Alingasa was selling the

confirmation certificates which are supposedly issued by the LTO free of charge, being a
scheme that existed upon Mendoza's assumption in office as Regional Director of LTO Cebu.
During preliminary conference, the respondents thru their counsels manifested their
intention to submit the case for decision on the basis of the evidence on record after the
submission of their memoranda/position papers. In the meantime, additional administrative and
criminal complaints were filed by new complainants against the respondents, which
subsequently are consolidated with the original pending complaints.
The new complainants alleged that they had to pay P2,500.00 per pad to Alingasa before they
could be issued confirmation certificates by the LTO Cebu, that Alingasa would give her
collections to Erederos and to Mendoza, pointing Mendoza as the source of instructions. Further
they were told that the previous administrations issued confirmation certificates would no longer
be honored under Mendoza s administration; hence, they had to buy new sets of confirmation
certificates to process the registration of their motor vehicles with the LTO. With this, Mendoza
denied the accusations against him and submitted the affidavits of desistance of some of the
private complainants as there were no evidence to support the allegations against him.
Nonetheless, this affidavit of desistance was retracted to because of the alleged threat made by
Peque to the private complainants to sign the affidavit of desistance. On the other hand,
Erederos and Alingasa also denied liability for the charges against them.
The Deputy Ombudsman rendered a joint decision on the administrative aspect of the
cases and a joint resolution on the criminal cases, finding Mendoza, Erederos and Alingasa
guilty of grave misconduct relying mainly on the affidavits and NBI/Progress report in support of
the respondents guilt. On appeal, the CA reversed the Deputy Ombudsmans joint decision in
the administrative case ruling that the Deputy Ombudsmans finding of grave misconduct was
not supported by substantial evidence because the affidavits were not corroborated by any
other documentary evidence and that the statements in the affidavits were hearsay, thus should
not be given any evidentiary weight. The Deputy Ombudsman moved for the reconsideration of
the decision, but the CA denied the motion.
In his stand, the Deputy Ombudsman argues that the evidence adduced by the
complainants satisfied the requisite quantum of proof because the complainants personal
knowledge can be gleaned from the preface of their narration; hence, their affidavits could not
have been hearsay.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals may resolve factual issues already settled by the
administrative agency.
2. Whether or not the statements in the affidavits are hearsay.
RULING:
1. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the findings and conclusions of the
Deputy Ombudsman on the ground that they were not supported by substantial evidence.
It is well settled that findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive
when supported by substantial evidence. Their factual findings are generally accorded with
great weight and respect, if not finality by the courts, by reason of their special knowledge and
expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction.

This rule on conclusiveness of factual findings, however, is not an absolute one. Despite
the respect given to administrative findings of fact, the CA may resolve factual issues, review
and re-evaluate the evidence on record and reverse the administrative agencys findings if not
supported by substantial evidence. Thus, when the findings of fact by the administrative or
quasi-judicial agencies (like the Office of the Ombudsman/Deputy Ombudsman) are not
adequately supported by substantial evidence, they shall not be binding upon the courts.
In the present case, the CA found no substantial evidence to support the conclusion that
the respondents are guilty of the administrative charges against them. Mere allegation and
speculation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to proof. Since the Deputy Ombudsmans
findings were found wanting by the CA of substantial evidence, the same shall not bind this
Court.
2. Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on
the personal knowledge of the witness.
It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that he knows of
his own personal knowledge, i.e. those which are derived from his own perception. A witness
may not testify on what he merely learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read
or heard. Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the witness knows himself but, of what he
has heard from others; it is not only limited to oral testimony or statements but likewise applies
to written statements, such as affidavits.
The records show that not one of the complainants actually witnessed the transfer of
money from Alingasa to Erederos and Mendoza. Nowhere in their affidavits did they specifically
allege that they saw Alingasa remit the collections to Erederos. In fact, there is no specific
allegation that they saw or witnessed Erederos or Mendoza receive money. That the
complainants alleged in the preface of their affidavits that they "noticed and witnessed" the
anomalous act complained of does not take their statements out of the coverage of the hearsay
evidence rule. Their testimonies are still "evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of
what he has heard from others." Based on these considerations, we cannot conclude that the
complainants have personal knowledge of Erederos' and Mendoza's participation in the
anomalous act. At most, their personal knowledge only extends to the acts of Alingasa who is
the recipient of all payments for the processing of confirmation certificates.
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as
evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of
inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the
witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is
offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the
matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a
prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief,
this testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to
show that the accused uttered those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but is
not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was
made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the
statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTONIO BACAS
G.R. No. 182913, November 20, 2013

J. Mendoza
a. When the application is set by the court for initial hearing, it is then that notice (of the
hearing), addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the lot being registered and
the adjoining owners, and indicating the location, boundaries and technical description of the
land being registered, shall be published in the Official Gazette for two consecutive times. It is
this publication of the notice of hearing that is considered one of the essential bases of the
jurisdiction of the court in land registration cases, for the proceedings being in rem, it is only
when there is constructive seizure of the land, effected by the publication and notice, that
jurisdiction over the res is vested on the court. Here, the Chabons did not make any mention of
the ownership or occupancy by the Philippine Army and did not indicate any efforts or searches
they had exerted in determining other occupants of the land. Such omission constituted
extrinsic fraud.
b. Granting that the persons representing the government was negligent, the doctrine of
estoppel cannot be taken against the Republic. It is a well-settled rule that the Republic or its
government is not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents. In any case,
even granting that the said official was negligent, the doctrine of estoppel cannot operate
against the State. As in the case, the subject lands, being part of a military reservation, are
inalienable and cannot be the subjects of land registration proceedings.
FACTS:
In 1938, President Quezon issued Presidential Proclamation No. 265 reserving for the
use of the Philippine Army three parcels of the public domain. The parcels of land were
withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for military purposes, "subject to private rights,
if any there be."
The Bacases and the Chabons filed their Application for Registration covering a parcel of
land, alleging ownership in fee simple of the property and indicating the names and addresses
of the adjoining owners. However, only the Bacases made a statement that the Philippine Army
occupied a portion of the land by their mere tolerance. Based on the evidence presented, the
Land Registration Court (LRC) held that the applicants had conclusively established their
ownership in fee simple over the land. There being no appeal interposed by the Republic from
the decision of the LRC, the decision became final and executory, resulting in the issuance of a
decree and the certificate of title over the property.
As a consequence of the LRC decisions in both applications for registration, the
Republic filed a complaint for annulment of titles against the Bacases and the Chabons. The
Republic claimed that the certificates of title issued to the Bacases and the Chabons were null
and void because they fraudulently omitted to name the military camp as the actual occupant in
their application for registration, and to state that the lot was part of Camp Evangelista. Further,
the Republic argued that the property had long been reserved in 1938 for military purposes at
the time it was applied for hence, it was no longer disposable and subject to registration.
The RTC dismissed the complaints and ruled that the respondents did not commit fraud
in their application for registration. It explained that the stated fact of occupancy by Camp
Evangelista over certain portions of the subject lands in the applications for registration by the
respondents was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law; that the Republic
was given all the opportunity to be heard thus, it is already estopped from contesting the
proceedings. Further, the RTC reasoned that assuming arguendo that respondents were guilty

of fraud, the Republic lost its right to a relief for its failure to file a petition for review on the
ground of fraud within one year after the date of entry of the decree of registration. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the decisions of the LRC over the subject lands can still be questioned
2. Whether or not prescription or estoppel can lie against the government
RULING:
1. Under Section 21 of the Land Registration Act an application for registration of land is
required to contain, among others, a description of the land subject of the proceeding, the
name, status and address of the applicant, as well as the names and addresses of all
occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known, or if unknown, of the steps taken
to locate them. When the application is set by the court for initial hearing, it is then that
notice (of the hearing), addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the lot
being registered and the adjoining owners, and indicating the location, boundaries and
technical description of the land being registered, shall be published in the Official Gazette
for two consecutive times. It is this publication of the notice of hearing that is considered one
of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court in land registration cases, for the
proceedings being in rem, it is only when there is constructive seizure of the land, effected
by the publication and notice, that jurisdiction over the res is vested on the court.
Furthermore, it is such notice and publication of the hearing that would enable all persons
concerned, who may have any rights or interests in the property, to come forward and show
to the court why the application for registration thereof is not to be granted.
Here, the Chabons did not make any mention of the ownership or occupancy by the
Philippine Army. They also did not indicate any efforts or searches they had exerted in
determining other occupants of the land. Such omission constituted fraud and deprived the
Republic of its day in court. Not being notified, the Republic was not able to file its opposition to
the application and, naturally, it was not able to file an appeal either.
With respect to the Bacases, although the lower courts might have been correct in ruling
that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of law when they alleged that
Camp Evangelista was an occupant, the Republic is not precluded and estopped from
questioning the validity of the title.
2. The success of the annulment of title does not solely depend on the existence of actual and
extrinsic fraud, but also on the fact that a judgment decreeing registration is null and void.
Any title to an inalienable public land is void ab initio. Any procedural infirmities attending the
filing of the petition for annulment of judgment are immaterial since the LRC never acquired
jurisdiction over the property. All proceedings of the LRC involving the property are null and
void and, hence, did not create any legal effect. A judgment by a court without jurisdiction
can never attain finality.
Granting that the persons representing the government was negligent, the doctrine of
estoppel cannot be taken against the Republic. It is a well-settled rule that the Republic or its
government is not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents. In any case,
even granting that the said official was negligent, the doctrine of estoppel cannot operate
against the State. Consequently, the State may still seek the cancellation of the title because

such title has not become indefeasible, for prescription cannot be invoked against the State.
The subject lands, being part of a military reservation, are inalienable and cannot be the
subjects of land registration proceedings.
BIRKENSTOCK ORTHOPAEDIE GMBH AND CO. KG v. PHILIPPINE SHOE EXPO
MARKETING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 194307, November 20, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
The primordial policy is a faithful observance of procedural rules, and their relaxation or
suspension should only be for persuasive reasons and only in meritorious cases, to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed. This is especially true with quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies, such as the IPO, which are not bound by technical rules of procedure.
While petitioner submitted mere photocopies as documentary evidence, it should be noted that
the IPO had already obtained the originals in the related Cancellation Case earlier filed before
it; hence, the IPO Director Generals relaxation of procedure was a valid exercise of his
discretion in the interest of substantial justice.
FACTS:
Petitioner, which is a German corporation, applied for various trademark registrations
before the IPO. However, registration proceedings of the applications were suspended due to
an existing registration of the mark "BIRKENSTOCK AND DEVICE" in the name the
predecessor-in-interest of respondent Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corporation. With this,
petitioner filed a petition for cancellation of registration alleging that it is the lawful and rightful
owner of the Birkenstock marks. Meanwhile, respondent and/or its predecessor-in-interest failed
to file the required 10th Year Declaration of Actual Use for registration resulting in the
cancellation of such mark. As a result, the applications of the petitioner were published in the
IPO e-Gazette. In effect, respondent filed verified notices of oppositions to the subject
applications claiming that it has been using Birkenstock marks in the Philippines for more than
16, that while it failed to file the 10th Year DAU, it continued the use of "BIRKENSTOCK AND
DEVICE" in lawful commerce, and has filed a "re-application" of its old registration.
The Bureau of Legal Affairs sustained respondents opposition ruling that the various
certificates of registration submitted by petitioners were all photocopies and, therefore, not
admissible as evidence. The IPO Director General reversed and set aside the ruling of the BLA.
The CA reinstated the decision of the BLA, as it agreed with respondent that petitioners
documentary evidence, being mere photocopies, were in violation of the Rules on Inter Partes
Proceedings. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the photocopies are admissible as documentary evidence
RULING:
It is well-settled that the rules of procedure are mere tools aimed at facilitating the
attainment of justice, rather than its frustration. A strict and rigid application of the rules must
always be eschewed when it would subvert the primary objective of the rules, that is, to

enhance fair trials and expedite justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the
substantive rights of the other party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Indeed, the primordial policy is a faithful observance of procedural rules, and their
relaxation or suspension should only be for persuasive reasons and only in meritorious cases,
to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in
not complying with the procedure prescribed. This is especially true with quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies, such as the IPO, which are not bound by technical rules of procedure.
In the case at bar, while petitioner submitted mere photocopies as documentary
evidence in the Consolidated Opposition Cases, it should be noted that the IPO had already
obtained the originals of such documentary evidence in the related Cancellation Case earlier
filed before it. Under this circumstance and the merits of the instant case, the Court holds that
the IPO Director Generals relaxation of procedure was a valid exercise of his discretion in the
interest of substantial justice.
WILLIAM C. DAGAN v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 184083, November 19, 2013
J. Perez
Decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared by law
final and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon
proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When such administrative or quasijudicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary
conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings. Thus, the decision of the
Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified or reversed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, on a finding that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Since, the Office of the Ombudsmans
Decision exonerating respondents from the administrative charges had resolved all issues
raised by petitioner, it is in a proper exercise of discretion when it found the evidence adduced
by petitioner as wanting to support the administrative charges brought against respondents.
Further, considering that a special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such petition should be
initially filed with the Court of Appeals in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
FACTS:
Dagan filed a complaint-affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman against
respondents, alleging that under Philracom-sponsored races, Philracom undertakes the
payment of all prizes for the race to the winning horses or owners thereof, less the allotted
horse owner's prize of the day with the understanding that either Philracom or Manila Jockey
shall advance the same. He further accused Philracom of overpaying when it failed to deduct
the allotted horse owner's prize of the day; that respondent Dilag caused the disbursement of
funds of Philracom as reimbursement for promotional expenses without specifying the nature of
promotion and without the necessary public bidding and prior approval of Philracom. The Office
of the Ombudsman absolved the respondents of charges of grave misconduct, oppression,
dishonesty, serious irregularities and violation of laws. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation but the Office of the Ombudsman denied the motion for lack of
merit.

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
wherein CA dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to avail of the correct mode of appeal.
It explained that the assailed issuances of the Ombudsman are administrative in nature; hence
the proper remedy is through a petition for review under Rule 43.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing his petition for certiorari,
as the remedy under Rule 43 applies only to a situation where the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman is that of conviction, and since the decision of the Ombudsman is final and
executory in case of exoneration, petitioner asserts his only recourse to reverse and nullify
decision is through special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper recourse
RULING:
There are two instances where a decision, resolution or order of the Ombudsman arising
from an administrative case becomes final and unappealable: (1) where the respondent is
absolved of the charge; and (2) in case of conviction, where the penalty imposed is public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one
month salary.
In the instant case, the respondents were absolved of the charges against them by the
Office of the Ombudsman. Such decision is final and unappealable. However, petitioner is not
left without any remedy. Decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are
declared by law final and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of
arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When such
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to
compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings. Thus,
the decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified or reversed via petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
Considering that a special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such petition should be initially filed
with the Court of Appeals in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The concurrence
of jurisdiction should not to be taken to mean as granting parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which an application will be
directed. It is an established policy that a direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special, important and
compelling reasons, clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition.
In the same vein, while petitioner employed the correct mode of review in this case, i.e.,
a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, petitioner failed to show grave
abuse of discretion committed by the Office of the Ombudsman. Hence, the petition must fail.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsmans exercise of power must have been done in
an arbitrary or despotic manner -which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion

of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law -in order to exceptionally warrant judicial intervention.
There is no showing that the assailed Decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The Office of the Ombudsmans Decision exonerating respondents from the administrative
charges discussed at length and resolved all issues raised by petitioner. Essentially, then, the
Office of the Ombudsman, in a proper exercise of discretion, found the evidence adduced by
petitioner as wanting to support the administrative charges brought against respondents.
ROLANDO P. DE LA CUESTA v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 164068-69, November 19, 2013
J. Abad
But while it is true that the prosecution has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court, once the case is filed, any disposition the
prosecutor may afterwards deem proper should be addressed to the court for its consideration
and approval. It is the courts bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the same.
The rule is that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not by the caption of
the information or the citation of the law allegedly violated but by the actual recital of facts in
that information. Here the issue is whether the facts alleged in the informations in the subject
criminal cases make out a case for the crime of technical malversation. However, the
informations show that there is no allegation in the informations that the P2 million and P6
million grants to COCOFED had been earmarked for some specific expenditures.
FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman filed two separate informations against former members
of the Governing Board of the Philippine Coconut Administration, including its chairman,
accused Rolando P. De La Cuesta, and a member, Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., before the
Sandiganbayan, having charged with granting financial assistance of P2 million to the
COCOFED. Claiming that the informations were prematurely filed, the Sandiganbayan granted
the accused leave to seek reconsideration of the resolution from the Office of the Special
Prosecutor of the OMB. Subsequently, the OMB submitted to the Sandiganbayan the
Memorandum of Special Prosecution Officer III bearing the approval of the Ombudsman
recommending the dismissal of the cases, which prompted the accused to file motion to
dismiss.
The OSG then told the court that the documents needed to show probable cause had
been submitted to the OMB at the preliminary investigation but were simply not adequately
explained hence, not fully appreciated. Later, the OSP informed the Sandiganbayan that, even
with the provided documents, it still found no new evidence sufficient to overturn its earlier
findings that no probable cause existed against the accused. However, the Sandiganbayan
ruled that probable cause existed to warrant the prosecution of the accused.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is bound by the findings and recommendations of the
Ombudsman concerning the existence of probable cause
2. Whether or not the accused may be held for trial, using the same criminal informations, for

the crime of technical malversation under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.
RULING:
1. But while it is true that the prosecution has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether
or not a criminal case should be filed in court, once the case is filed, any disposition the
prosecutor may afterwards deem proper should be addressed to the court for its
consideration and approval. It is the courts bounden duty to assess independently the
merits of the same. The only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the
substantial right of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
There is probable cause when the evidence at hand will persuade a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that the accused committed the offense of which he is charged.
Only common sense, not the technical rules for weighing evidence, is required. But, although
less than the evidence that would justify conviction is needed, probable cause demands more
than bare suspicion.
The corrupt practice committed by a public officer under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019
consists in his "causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence."
2. Apparently conscious that its charge of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 against the
accused had not been strong, the prosecution claims that the latter may alternatively be
prosecuted and tried under the same informations for two counts of technical malversation
under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.
The rule of course is that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not by the
caption of the information or the citation of the law allegedly violated but by the actual recital of
facts in that information. Consequently, the issue is whether the facts alleged in the informations
in the subject criminal cases make out a case for the crime of technical malversation.
The element in the crime of technical malversation that public fund be appropriated for a
public use requires an earmarking of the fund or property for a specific project. Here, there is no
allegation in the informations that the P2 million and P6 million grants to COCOFED had been
earmarked for some specific expenditures.
SYCAMORE VENTURES CORPORATION v. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY
G.R. No. 173183, November 18, 2013
J. Brion
Act No. 3135 has no requirement for the determination of the mortgaged properties
appraisal value. Nothing in the law likewise indicates that the mortgagee-creditors appraisal
value shall be the basis for the bid price. Neither is there any rule nor any guideline prescribing
the minimum amount of bid, nor that the bid should be at least equal to the properties current
appraised value. Under the circumstances, no necessity of determining the mortgaged
properties current appraised value or any showing of the existence of any prejudicial question
warrants the suspension of the foreclosure proceedings. It must be noted that a prejudicial

question is a prior issue whose resolution rests with another tribunal, but at the same time is
necessary in the resolution of another issue in the same case.
FACTS:
Sycamore and spouses Paz obtained from Metrobank a credit line secured by 10 real
estate
mortgages over
Sycamores
11
parcels
of
land, together
with
their
improvements. Sycamore and the spouses Paz withdrew from the credit line the total amount
of P65,694,914.26, evidenced by 13 promissory notes. The petitioners failed to pay their loan
obligations and for violations of the terms and conditions of their promissory notes, Metrobank
instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings over six real estate mortgages. The public
auction sale was then set for various dates but the sale did not take place as Sycamore and
spouses Paz asked for postponements.
Later, Metrobank restructured Sycamore and spouses Pazs loan, resulting in the
issuance of one promissory note in lieu of the previously issued promissory notes and the
execution of a single real estate mortgage covering the parcels of land. Despite reminders,
petitioners still failed to settle their obligations, compelling Metrobank to file a second petition for
auction sale. Then Sycamore and spouses Paz again asked for the postponement, to which
Metrobank refused. With this, petitioners filed a complaint for the annulment of the contract and
of the real estate mortgage, disputing Metrobanks alleged unilateral and arbitrary reduction of
the mortgaged properties appraisal value, further requesting that Metrobank be enjoined and
prevented from proceeding with the extrajudicial foreclosure. A TRO was subsequently issued
which order was extended, until a writ of preliminary injunction was issued, to which Metrobank
unsuccessfully resisted through a motion for reconsideration that was denied. Petition for
certiorari was recourse to the CA questioning the RTC orders for grave abuse of discretion.
However, the CA dismissed Metrobanks petition for lack of merit and upheld the RTCs issued
injunction.
Meanwhile, the proceedings in the main case continued, and the pettioners moved for
the appointment of independent commissioners to determine the properties appraisal value.
The RTC granted the petitioners motion, which the CA on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
granted Metrobanks petition for certiorari and set aside the RTCs orders.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the determination of the mortgaged properties appraisal value constitutes a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the foreclosure proceedings
RULING:
Act No. 3135 has no requirement for the determination of the mortgaged properties
appraisal value. Nothing in the law likewise indicates that the mortgagee-creditors appraisal
value shall be the basis for the bid price. Neither is there any rule nor any guideline prescribing
the minimum amount of bid, nor that the bid should be at least equal to the properties current
appraised value. What the law only provides are the requirements, procedure, venue and the
mortgagors right to redeem the property. When the law does not provide for the determination
of the propertys valuation, neither should the courts so require, for our duty limits us to the
interpretation of the law, not to its augmentation.

Under the circumstances, we fail to see the necessity of determining the mortgaged
properties current appraised value. We likewise do not discern the existence of any prejudicial
question, anchored on the mortgaged properties appraised value, that would warrant the
suspension of the foreclosure proceedings.
A prejudicial question is a prior issue whose resolution rests with another tribunal, but at
the same time is necessary in the resolution of another issue in the same case. As so defined,
we do not see how the motion for the appointment of independent commissioners can serve as
a prejudicial question. It is not a main action but a mere incident of the main proceedings; it
does not involve an issue that is intimately related to the foreclosure proceedings; and lastly, the
motions resolution is not determinative of the foreclosures outcome.
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA v. CRESENCIASTA.TERESA RAMOS
G.R. No. 179181, November 18, 2013
J. Brion
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application
of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of the facts
being admitted. Nevertheless, as an exception, when the lower courts grossly misunderstood
the facts and circumstances that, when correctly appreciated, would warrant a different
conclusion, a review of the lower courts' findings may be made. Nonetheless, an examination of
the issues shows that the claimed errors primarily question the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the lower courts' conclusion that is proper for a question of fact.
FACTS:
At the core of the controversy are two parcels of land, in which the RCAM filed an
application for registration of title of property, pursuant to Commonwealth Act C.A No. 141 or the
Public Land Act. However, RCAM amended its application, wherein it claimed that it owned the
property, having acquired the property during the Spanish time in open, public, continuous and
peaceful possession in the concept of an owner. Later, the Republic, through the Director of
Lands, filed an opposition to the application, claiming that the property is part of the public
domain and cannot be subject to private appropriation.
Respondent Cresencia, through her husband Francisco, filed her opposition to RCAM's
application, whereby she alleged that the property formed part of the entire property that her
family owns and has continuously possessed and occupied from the time of her grandparents,
during the Spanish time, up to the present. The RTC then denied RCAM's application holding
that RCAM failed to prove actual possession and ownership of the property applied for. The CA
affirmed with modification the RTC's ruling.
In its argument, RMAC posits that the CA erred and gravely abused its discretion. As
such, Cresencia countered that the petition essentially questions the CAs appreciation of the
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses who attested to her actual, public and notorious
possession of the property, arguing further that these are questions of fact that are not proper
for a Rule 45 petition.
ISSUE:
Whether Rule 45 petition applies as remedy

RULING:
The settled rule is that the jurisdiction of this Court over petitions for review on certiorari
is limited to the review of questions of law and not of fact. A question of law exists when the
doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of
facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when a
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and
the probability of the situation. An examination of the RCAM's issues shows that the claimed
errors indeed primarily question the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the lower courts'
conclusion that Cresencia, and not the RCAM, had been in possession of the property in the
manner and for the period required by law. When the presented question centers on the
sufficiency of the evidence, it is a question of fact and is barred in a Rule 45 petition.
Nevertheless, jurisprudence recognizes certain exceptions to the settled rule. When the
lower courts grossly misunderstood the facts and circumstances that, when correctly
appreciated, would warrant a different conclusion, a review of the lower courts' findings may be
made. This, in our view, is the exact situation in the case.
Moreover, the RCAM also questions the propriety of the CAs confirmation of Cresencia's
title over the property although she was not the applicant and was merely the oppositor in the
present confirmation and registration proceedings. Stated in question form -was the CA justified
under the law and jurisprudence in its confirmation of the oppositor's title over the property?
This, in part, is a question of law as it concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to
recognized facts.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BASILIO VILLARMEA Y ECHAVEZ
G.R. No. 200029, November 13, 2013
J. Villarama, Jr.
In criminal cases, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial judge whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect
because the judge had the direct opportunity to observe them on the stand and ascertain if they
were telling the truth or not. This deference to the trial courts appreciation of the facts and of
the credibility of witnesses is consistent with the principle that when the testimony of a witness
meets the test of credibility, that alone is sufficient to convict the accused. Since the eyewitness
positively identified the accused as the perpetrator of the crime, no further defense could negate
the lower courts appreciation and finding of guilt.
FACTS:
Accused Villarmea was charged with murder for the killing of Arnaldo Diez. However, the
original information was later amended to include other co-accused. It was further admitted that
the Death Certificate and the fact and cause of death of the victim, is Hemorrhage due to
multiple stab wounds on the trunk and lower extremities. Subsequently, the prosecution
presented the testimonies of several witnesses including the wife of the victim. The wife testified
that her husband died from stab wounds and that her husband was stabbed because the latter
allegedly mauled someone from appellants group. Further, one Jaime Candelada, the victims
companion during the incident also testified, wherein he claimed that on the night of the killing,

he and the victim were buying something from a store. But, when they walked out of the store,
seven persons followed them.
On the other hand the defense presented as witness Basilio Villarmea, who denied that
he participated in the assault. He testified that on the night of the incident, he went out of the
premises of the construction site where he was a live-in construction worker where he saw coaccused Labora and Obatay who are still at-large, and also his fellow live-in construction
workers at J. King Construction, playing computer games at a store near the well. He claimed
that it was Candelada who allegedly kicked Labora. A fight immediately ensued without any
heated argument or discussion.
The trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimony of Candelada who positively
identified appellant as one of the assailants who attacked and stabbed the victim. Appellant
sought to reverse his the RTC decision before the CA, to which CA found no reversible error in
the lower courts finding that appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the
murder of the victim, but ordered that the amount of moral and exemplary damages awarded to
his heirs be increased
ISSUE:
Whether or not full credence may be given to an eyewitness testimony.
RULING:
The defense of denial interposed by appellant cannot overcome the positive
identification made by Candelada, an eyewitness in the case at bar, that he and his co-accused
conspired in mauling and stabbing the victim. The attempt of appellant to impute an ulterior
motive on the part of Candelada to testify against him was not supported by any concrete
evidence. Lastly, the fact that appellant did not escape from the scene of the crime does not
negate his guilt. As correctly observed by the appellate court, it does not lessen the evidence on
record that sufficiently proves appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In sum, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the decision of the CA when it
affirmed the factual findings of the trial court. We have consistently held that in criminal cases,
the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
judge whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge had the
direct opportunity to observe them on the stand and ascertain if they were telling the truth or not.
This deference to the trial courts appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses is
consistent with the principle that when the testimony of a witness meets the test of credibility,
that alone is sufficient to convict the accused. This is especially true when the factual findings of
the trial court were affirmed by the appellate court. Thus, absent any showing that the trial court
in this case had overlooked substantial facts and circumstances, which if considered would
change the result of the case, this Court gives deference to the trial courts appreciation of the
facts and of the credibility of witnesses.
CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRIAL GASES, INC. v. ALABANG MEDICAL CENTER
G.R. No. 181983, November 13, 2013
J. Reyes
It is a settled rule that the Court examines only questions of law on appeal and not
questions of facts. However, jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions in which factual

issues may be resolved by the Court, such as when the factual findings of the courts a quo are
conflicting. As there has been conflicting finding between RTC and CA, a review of facts
necessitates question of fact.
Settled is the rule that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge, which means those facts which are derived from his own perception. A
witness may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either because he was told or
read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as
proof of the truth of what he has learned. When CIGIs installation manager, testified a request
in writing was made but no evidence was submitted, the testimony is a self-serving allegation,
which is not equivalent to proof. However, it may be considered as an independently relevant
statement and may be admitted to show that utterances were made.
FACTS:
CIGI entered into a Phase 1 installation project with AMC, whereby CIGI bound itself to
provide labor and materials for the installation of a medical gas pipeline system for the first,
second and third floors of the AMCs hospital. Nonetheless, controversy arose after the parties
entered into Phase 2 installation project, for the continuation of the centralized medical oxygen
and vacuum pipeline system in the hospitals fourth & fifth floors, having the same terms and
conditions as that of the Phase 1 project. CIGI commenced works for Phase 2 while AMC made
partial payment with the balance be paid through progress billing within 15 days from the date of
receipt of the original invoice sent by CIGI. Later, CIGI sent the sales invoice for the unpaid
balance for the Phase 2, which however was not paid, prompting CIGI to send a demand letter
to AMC. Despite such, AMC still failed to pay, thus CIGI filed a collection suit claiming that
AMCs obligation to pay is already due and demandable. With this, AMC argued that its
obligation to pay the balance has not yet accrued because CIGI still has not turned over a
complete and functional pipeline system.
During trial, CIGI presented the testimonies of its witnesses to confirm the unpaid
balance of AMC. One of them is Tolentino who declared that CIGI failed to test the installed
system because AMC did not supply the necessary electrical power. He claimed that CIGI
verbally notified Dr. Ty, AMCs Medical Director, on the need for electrical power for the test run
but she did not respond, further stating that contrary to what was agreed in the contract, CIGI
has not conducted commissioning and lecture on the proper operation and preventive
maintenance of the system and that the seminar does not require the use of electricity.
Nonetheless, the seminar can only be conducted once they have already fully turned over the
system which is possible after performing a test run. On the other hand, AMC presented Dr. Ty
and testified that the payment of the unpaid balance is not yet due because the project is
incomplete and that the balance shall only be paid after CIGI finishes its work.
AMC then filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Amended Answer with
Counterclaims seeking the rescission of the contracts and for the return of its payment for an
unfinished project. However, the RTC denied the motion as it will compel CIGI to substantially
alter the presentation of its evidence thus, delaying the resolution of the case. After trial, the
RTC adjudged AMC to have breached the contract for failure to perform its obligation of paying
the remaining balance of the contract price. The CA found that CIGI reneged on its obligation
and took into consideration AMCs willingness to pay the balance on the condition that CIGI will
turn over a fully functional centralized medical oxygen and vacuum pipeline system.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the appeal involves question of fact

2. Whether or not the testimony of Tolentino is hearsay
RULING:
1. Primarily, the arguments proffered by CIGI involve questions of fact which are beyond the
scope of the Courts judicial review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is a settled rule
that the Court examines only questions of law on appeal and not questions of facts.
However, jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions in which factual issues may be
resolved by the Court, such as when the factual findings of the courts a quo are conflicting,
as in this case.
The incongruity in the findings of the RTC and CA is conspicuous. On one hand, the
RTC granted CIGIs complaint for sum of money and adjudged AMC as the defaulting party. On
the other hand, the CA, while sustaining AMCs liability for CIGIs monetary claim, held the latter
as the party who breached the installation contracts. A review of the contradicting findings of the
courts a quo is thus in order so as to finally settle the conflicting claims of the parties.
2. CIGI failed to amply support its allegation that it requested for electrical facilities from AMC.
Tolentino, CIGIs installation manager, testified that they requested in writing for the electrical
facilities but no evidence of such document was submitted. It is but a self-serving allegation,
which by law is not equivalent to proof.
Settled is the rule that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge, which means those facts which are derived from his own perception. A
witness may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either because he was told or
read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as
proof of the truth of what he has learned.
While Tolentinos testimony may be considered as independently relevant statement and
may be admitted as to the fact that Pineda made utterances to him about the request for
electricity, it is still inadequate to support the claim that AMC reneged on its obligation to provide
electrical facilities. Admissibility of testimony should not be equated with its weight and
sufficiency. Admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the
weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and
persuade.
VIRGINIA Y. GOCHAN v. CHARLES MANCAO
G.R. No. 182314, November 13, 2013
J. Peralta
Although Section 2 of Rule 47 provides that a petition for annulment may be based only
on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence has recognized denial of
due process as an additional ground.
An action to annul a final judgment is an extraordinary remedy, which is not to be
granted indiscriminately. It is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional
cases as where there is no adequate or appropriate remedy available (such as new trial,
appeal, petition for relief) through no fault of petitioner. The reason for the restriction is to
prevent this extraordinary action from being used by a losing party to make a complete farce of

a duly promulgated decision that has long become final and executory. A review of the evidence
presented reveals that respondent failed to show any artifice or extrinsic fraud being committed
against the Spouses Paray, hence CAs decision of setting aside the compromise agreement is
grounded on surmises or conjectures. Further, the approved compromise agreement serves as
the final judgment that settles the controversy.
FACTS:
Felix Gochan, Amparo Alo, and Jose A. Cabellon were co-owners of the property in
controversy, whereas the petitioners are the successors-in-interest of Gochan and respondent
are the buyers of the subdivided lots thereof. The respondents bought the lots from the children
of Velez, who acquired the same from Alo. Later, petitioners filed a case against spouses Paray
as purchasers of the lots from the heirs of Alo, for legal redemption of the other subdivided lots.
The matter ended on a compromise agreement, whereby the spouses Paray conveyed to
petitioners all their shares, interests, and participation over the properties. However, the
respondents claimed that the redemption prejudiced their portion of the property, hence filed a
suit before the CA for Declaration of Nullity of Final Decision and Compromise Agreement as the
lots in controversy are road lots which could not be owned by any individual or entity as it is
beyond the commerce of men. The respondents alleged that the petitioners are using the
compromise agreement as tools to deny the respondents and other lot owners from free access
to and from the subdivision lots, by placing barriers therein.
Petitioners countered that the petition states no cause of action as the respondents are
not real party-in-interest and that there was no extrinsic fraud nor lack of jurisdiction, hence the
respondents filing of the petition is in violation of the rule on forum shopping and litis pendentia.
Despite such CA ruled in favor of respondent thereby setting aside the compromise agreement
and the registration of the decision with the Register of Deeds is declared null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the compromise agreement can be modified.
RULING:
The general rule is that, except to correct clerical errors or to make nunc pro tunc
entries, a final and executory judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified in any
respect, and that nothing further can be done but to execute it. A final and executory decision
can, however, be invalidated via a petition to annul the same or a petition for relief under Rules
47 and 38 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47 provide for
the coverage and grounds for annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions of the
RTCs in civil action.
Although Section 2 of Rule 47 provides that a petition for annulment may be based only
on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence has recognized denial of
due process as an additional ground. In this case, extrinsic fraud was the basis of the CA in
annulling the trial courts judgment; thus, there is a need to examine the concept, as established
by a plethora of jurisprudence and, thereafter, to determine whether the CA, in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction, correctly applied the same.
We begin by restating that an action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will
lie only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. Intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party at

a trial which prevented a fair and just determination of the case, and which could have been
litigated and determined at the trial or adjudication of the case. In contrast, extrinsic or collateral
fraud is a trickery practiced by the prevailing party upon the unsuccessful party, which prevents
the latter from fully proving his case; it affects not the judgment itself but the manner in which
said judgment is obtained. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic "where it prevents a party from having
a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters
pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding
consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing
litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.
We reverse the CA findings as it is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures. Upon examination of the records, the evidence presented by respondent are plainly
wanting to show any specific trick, artifice, or device employed by petitioners that caused them
to prevail over the Spouses Paray. In fact, when petitioners contended that extrinsic fraud must
be present in an action to annul judgment, respondent erroneously countered that it is
"immaterial" and even admitted that "the present case is based on the illegality of the acts of the
petitioners arising from the nature of the lots dealt with and the resultant violation by the
petitioners of the law declaring the act to be so."
The Court has repeatedly stressed that an action to annul a final judgment is an
extraordinary remedy, which is not to be granted indiscriminately. It is a recourse equitable in
character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no adequate or appropriate
remedy available (such as new trial, appeal, petition for relief) through no fault of petitioner. It is
an equitable principle as it enables one to be discharged from the burden of being bound to a
judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with. Yet, more importantly, the relief it affords is
equitable in character because it strikes at the core of a final and executory judgment, order or
resolution, allowing a party-litigant another opportunity to reopen a judgment that has long
elapsed into finality. The reason for the restriction is to prevent this extraordinary action from
being used by a losing party to make a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has
long become final and executory.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. P/SUPT. ARTEMIO E. LAMSEN
G.R. No. 198338, November 13, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
The Court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court. It
is settled that an affidavit of desistance made by a witness after conviction of the accused is not
reliable, and deserves only scant attention. The rationale for the rule is obvious: affidavits of
retraction can easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary
consideration. Only when there exist special circumstances in the case which when coupled
with the retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony or statement given, can
retractions be considered and upheld.
The unreliable character of the affidavit of recantation executed by a complaining
witness is also shown by the incredulity of the fact that after going through the burdensome
process of reporting to and/or having the accused arrested by the law enforcers, executing a
criminal complaint-affidavit against the accused, attending trial and testifying against the
accused, the said complaining witness would later on declare that all the foregoing is actually a
farce and the truth is now what he says it to be in his affidavit of recantation.
FACTS:

Accused-appellants SPO1 Ramoz and PO2 Abulencia filed a motion for reconsideration
and motion for new trial due to newly discovered evidence and P/Supt. Lamsen for
reconsideration of the February 20, 2013 Resolution, which convicted the accused-appellants of
the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. In their motions, the accused appellants stated that they obtained affidavits from
prosecution witnesses Reyes and Domingo whose testimonies implicated accused-appellants of
the crime of robbery with homicide. Further, it is provided in the affidavit that the witnesses
made their testimonies under duress as they were forced by elements of the Philippine National
Police, the National Bureau of Investigation, and the former mayor of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan to point at accused-appellants as perpetrators of the aforesaid crime; that they did
not actually see who committed the crime having testified out of fear of their own lives.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the recantation made by the prosecution witnesses after rendering of resolution
affects their previous testimony.
RULING:
Verily, recantations are viewed with suspicion and reservation. The Court looks with
disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court. It is settled that an affidavit of
desistance made by a witness after conviction of the accused is not reliable, and deserves only
scant attention. The rationale for the rule is obvious: affidavits of retraction can easily be
secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary consideration. Recanted
testimony is exceedingly unreliable. There is always the probability that it will later be
repudiated. Only when there exist special circumstances in the case which when coupled with
the retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony or statement given, can retractions be
considered and upheld. Indeed, it is a dangerous rule to set aside a testimony which has been
solemnly taken before a court of justice in an open and free trial and under conditions precisely
sought to discourage and forestall falsehood simply because one of the witnesses who had
given the testimony later on changed his mind. Such a rule will make solemn trials a mockery
and place the investigation of the truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.
Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original
testimony if credible. The rule is settled that in cases where previous testimony is retracted and
a subsequent different, if not contrary, testimony is made by the same witness, the test to
decide which testimony to believe is one of comparison coupled with the application of the
general rules of evidence. A testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside and
disregarded lightly, and before this can be done, both the previous testimony and the
subsequent one should be carefully compared and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which
each was made, carefully and keenly scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change,
discriminatingly analyzed. The unreliable character of the affidavit of recantation executed by a
complaining witness is also shown by the incredulity of the fact that after going through the
burdensome process of reporting to and/or having the accused arrested by the law enforcers,
executing a criminal complaint-affidavit against the accused, attending trial and testifying
against the accused, the said complaining witness would later on declare that all the foregoing
is actually a farce and the truth is now what he says it to be in his affidavit of recantation. And in
situations, like the instant case, where testimony is recanted by an affidavit subsequently
executed by the recanting witness, we are properly guided by the well-settled rules that an

affidavit is hearsay unless the affiant is presented on the witness stand and that affidavits taken
ex-parte are generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARILYN SANTOS and ARLENE VALERA
G.R. No. 193190, November 13, 2013
J. Leonardo-De Castro
The issue of whether or not there was indeed a buy-bust operation primarily boils down
to one of credibility. In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, a case becomes
a contest of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies. When it comes to credibility, the
trial courts assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The
inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses testimony does not negate positive finding of guilt
specially, as in this case, where the inconsistencies pertains to minor details. Settled is the rule
that discrepancies on minor matters do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecutions
evidence as a whole or reflect on the witnesses honesty. These inconsistencies, which may be
caused by the natural fickleness of memory, even tend to strengthen rather than weaken the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses because they erase any suspicion of rehearsed
testimony.
FACTS:
Appellants Marilyn Santos and Arlene Valera were convicted of the crime of illegal sale
of shabu under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. During trial, the prosecution
presented several witnesses who took part in the buy-bust operation. With this, PO2 Aninias
testified that they received an information prompting their team leader to form a buy-bust team,
where PO2 Aninias was designated as the poseur-buyer, while SPO2 Male was to act as the
back-up arresting officer the buy-bust team proceeded to the area where their team leader gave
PO2 Aninias four pieces of five hundred peso bills, to which PO2 Aninias placed his initials as a
form of authentication. The informant returned together with two women and invited them to go
inside the vehicle where PO2 Aninias as the buyer of drugs, was introduced. The meeting
ended with the sale of shabu, to which SPO2 Male gave a "missed call" to their team leader.
PO2 Aninias marked the box containing the shabu by placing the wording Exhibit "B," his initials,
his signature, and the date April 20, 2006. He also marked the six pieces of plastic sachets as
Exhibits "A-1" to "A-6" and he wrote his signature and the date on each of the sachets.
After marking the items, the team went back to their office where the appellants were
investigated upon and the team accomplished a Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, an inventory
of the items recovered and prepared requests for the physical and medical examination of the
appellants. PO2 Aninias stated that he and SPO2 Male brought the confiscated drug specimens
to the crime laboratory and it was received by the forensic chemist.
SPO2 Male also testified on the conduct of the buy-bust operation stating that after
receiving information SPO2 Male and his team proceeded to the place to conduct surveillance
finding the place suitable for a buy-bust operation. Later, a buy-bust operation was planned and
he was the designated driver and the back-up arresting officer while PO2 Aninias was the
poseur-buyer. In the operation, it was agreed that PO2 Aninias will remove his bull cap as a
signal for the consummated transaction, which signal was executed thus, SPO2 Male
immediately dialed the number of their team leader. SPO2 Male further testified that he was
present when the inventory was conducted.

On the other hand, the defense denied that a buy-bust operation was conducted by the
police contending that they did not know the contents of the bag, further alleging that armed
men in civilian clothing entered her house without search warrant, to which a search was
conducted that resulted to the armed men finding a box that contained a white substance that
looked like tawas. Nonetheless, the RTC convicted appellants of the crime of selling of illegal
drugs, which the Court of Appeals affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the incompatible statements of the prosecution witness affected the conviction of
the accused.
RULING:
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential elements must be
established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof." What is material
to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.
The issue of whether or not there was indeed a buy-bust operation primarily boils down
to one of credibility. In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, a case becomes
a contest of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies. When it comes to credibility, the
trial courts assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The
reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses deportment and
manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate
testimonial evidence properly. The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said
findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.
To our mind, the incompatible statements of PO2 Aninias and SPO2 Male did not
destroy their credibility. Nor are these statements utterly irreconcilable as appellants would like
this Court to believe. As to the sale transaction itself, the testimony of PO2 Aninias is of greater
relevance considering that he was the poseur-buyer who dealt directly, i.e., face to face, with
appellants. On the other hand, SPO2 Male, who was sitting in the drivers seat, merely listened
to the conversation between PO2 Aninias and the appellants. SPO2 Male had no actual
participation in the exchange of illegal drugs and boodle money. His recollection of events might
not be as precise as that of PO2 Aninias.
With respect to the other inconsistencies enumerated by appellants, the Court agrees
with the rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the same pertain to insignificant and
minor details that had nothing to do with the essential elements of the crime charged.
Settled is the rule that discrepancies on minor matters do not impair the essential
integrity of the prosecutions evidence as a whole or reflect on the witnesses honesty. These
inconsistencies, which may be caused by the natural fickleness of memory, even tend to
strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of the prosecution witnesses because they erase
any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. What is important is that the testimonies agree on the
essential facts and that the respective versions corroborate and substantially coincide with each
other to make a consistent and coherent whole.

Brushing aside the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution

witnesses, the Court finds that the testimonial evidence of the prosecution duly established the
fact that appellants sold to PO2 Aninias, the poseur-buyer, six heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachets that contained white crystalline substance that later tested positive for shabu. Thus, the
elements of the crime charged had been sufficiently established.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. MARCELINO A. DECHAVEZ
G.R. No. 176702, November 13, 2013
J. Brion
The rule that the Court will not disturb the CA' s findings of fact is not an absolute rule
that admits of no exceptions. A notable exception is the presence of conflict of findings of fact
between or among the tribunals' rulings on questions of fact.
This Court cannot be any clearer in laying down the rule on the quantum of evidence to
support an administrative ruling: In administrative cases, substantial evidence is required to
support any findings. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The requirement is satisfied where there is
reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner is guilty of the act or omission complained of,
even if the evidence might not be overwhelming. An examination of the records shows that the
Ombudsman's appreciation of the evidence is in accord with reason and common experience
so that it successfully proved, Dechavez's dishonesty.
FACTS:
Dechavez was the president of the Negros State College of Agriculture. One Sunday,
Dechavez and his wife used the college service Suzuki Vitara to go Negros Occidental.
However, on their way back to the NSCA, they figured in a vehicular accident resulting in minor
injuries and damage to the vehicle. To support his claim for insurance, Dechavez executed an
affidavit before the GSIS, which granted Dechavez's claims and NSCA shouldered the other
portion share in the vehicle's depreciation expense. Also, GSIS released an amount for Mrs.
Dechavez's third-party liability claim.
Later, some 20 faculty and staff members of the NSCA complained and asked the
Commission on Audit to conduct an audit investigation of NSCAs expenditures in the vehicular
accident, with which the COA dismissed for lack of merit. The complainants then sought
recourse with the Ombudsman and file a verified complaint charging Dechavez with Dishonesty
under Section 46(b)(l), Chapter 6, Tile I of the Administrative Code, wherein the Ombudsman
found Dechavez guilty of all accessory penalty and dismissed him from the service. The motion
for reconsideration having been denied, the case was elevated to the CA where it reversed the
findings of the Ombudsman. The CA found that the complainants failed to sufficiently show that
Dechavez had deliberately lied in his affidavit, further explaining that Dechavez sufficiently
proved that he went on an official trip, and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the
Ombudsman.
In its petition, the Ombudsman argues that the guilt of Dechavez has been proven by
substantial evidence invoking that its findings, being supported by substantial evidence, deserve
great weight and must be accorded full respect and credit. However, Dechavez counters that
the present petition raises factual issues that are improper for a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.

ISSUE:
Whether the findings in the administrative ruling must be accorded respect and credit.
RULING:
The rule that the Court will not disturb the CA' s findings of fact is not an absolute rule
that admits of no exceptions. A notable exception is the presence of conflict of findings of fact
between or among the tribunals' rulings on questions of fact. The case before us squarely falls
under this exception as the tribunals below made two critical conflicting factual findings. We are
thus compelled to undertake our own factual examination of the evidence presented.
This Court cannot be any clearer in laying down the rule on the quantum of evidence to
support an administrative ruling: In administrative cases, substantial evidence is required to
support any findings. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The requirement is satisfied where there is
reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner is guilty of the act or omission complained of,
even if the evidence might not be overwhelming.
Our own examination of the records tells us that the Ombudsman's findings and
appreciation of the presented evidence are more in accord with reason and common experience
so that it successfully proved, by the required quantum of evidence, Dechavez's dishonesty, at
the same time that we find the respondent's reading of the evidence to be stretched to the point
of breaking, as our analysis shows.
We start with our agreement with the CA's view that the Ombudsman's finding by itself,
is not sufficient basis for the conclusion that Dechavez's business on that day was not official.
We, nevertheless, examined the other surrounding facts and are convinced that the spouses
Dechavez's trip was a personal one; thus, Dechavez had been dishonest when he made the
claim that he went on official business.
BANI RURAL BANK INC. v. TERESA DE GUZMAN
G.R. No.170904, November 13, 2013
J. Brion
As a rule, a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the
alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of the land,
rendered it. An exception to this rule is the existence of supervening events which refer to facts
transpiring after judgment has become final and executory or to new circumstances that
developed after the judgment acquired finality, including matters that the parties were not aware
of prior to or during the trial as they were not yet in existence at that time. The presence of
strained relations between petitioner and respondent, consisted the supervening event that
justified the NLRC in modifying its final resolution.
Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA
decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same context
that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we have to examine the CA
decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave
abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC
decision on the merits of the case was correct.

FACTS:
Respondents as employees of the petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,
which however was initially dismissed by Labor Arbiter. On appeal, the NLRC reversed labor
arbiters findings, and ruled that the respondents had been illegally dismissed, thus ordering the
reinstatement of the two complainants to their former positions, without loss of seniority rights
and other benefits and privileges. Nonetheless, the parties did not file any motion for
reconsideration or appeal and as a result the resolution of the NLRC became final and
executory and the computation of the awards was then remanded to the labor arbiter for
execution purposes. Subsequently, the respondents appealed the labor arbiters computation
with the NLRC, to which the NLRC modified the terms the resolution insofar as it clarified the
phrase less earnings elsewhere. The NLRC additionally awarded the payment of separation
pay, in lieu of reinstatement. Motion for reconsideration was filed but was dismissed for being
filed out of time. The latter decision of the NLRC lapsed to finality and became executory,
resulting to the second computation of monetary awards. NLRC explained that the computation
of backwages has already been settled and should no longer be disturbed.
Appeal was made before the CA, which found the petition to be without merit as it held that
certiorari was not the proper remedy since no error of jurisdiction was raised or no grave abuse
of discretion was committed by the NLRC. As a result, the CA echoed the NLRCs conclusions.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the rule on immutability of judgment applies
2. Whether petition for certiorari under Rule 45 may be availed of in a labor case
RULING:
1. As a rule, a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the
alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of
the land, rendered it. Any attempt on the part of the entities charged with the execution of a
final judgment to insert, change or add matters not clearly contemplated in the dispositive
portion violates the rule on immutability of judgments. An exception to this rule is the
existence of supervening events which refer to facts transpiring after judgment has become
final and executory or to new circumstances that developed after the judgment acquired
finality, including matters that the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial as they
were not yet in existence at that time.
Under the circumstances of this case, the existence of the strained relations between the
petitioners and the respondents was a supervening event that justified the NLRCs modification
of its final March 17, 1995 resolution. The NLRC, in its July 31, 1998 decision, based its
conclusion that strained relations existed on the conduct of the parties during the first execution
proceedings before Labor Arbiter Gambito. The NLRC considered the delay in the respondents
reinstatement and the parties conflicting claims on whether the respondents wanted to be
reinstated. The NLRC also observed that during the intervening period from the first
computation to the appeal and resolution of the correctness of the first computation, neither
party actually did anything to implement the respondents reinstatement. The NLRC considered
these, actions as indicative of the strained relations between the parties so that neither of them
actually wanted to implement the reinstatement decree in the March 17, 1995 resolution. Unless

exceptional reasons are presented, these above findings and conclusion can no longer be
disturbed after they lapsed to finality.
2. In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA decision, in contrast
with the review for jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule
45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In
ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same context that the
petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision
from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of
discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on
the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA
undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged
before it. This is the approach that should be basic in a Rule 45 review of a CA ruling in a
labor case.
Grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, has been defined
as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to or equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. There is grave abuse of discretion when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law.
With this standard in mind, we find no reversible error committed by the CA when it found no
grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC's ruling. We find the computation of backwages and
separation pay in the September 28, 2001 decision of the NLRC consistent with the provisions
of law and jurisprudence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DANIEL ALCOBER
G.R. No. 192941, November 13, 2013
J. Leonardo-De Castro
The sweetheart theory as a defense, however, necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the
first element of rape. Effectively, it leaves the prosecution the burden to prove only force or
intimidation, the coupling element of rape. When the accused raised the affirmative defense that
sexual relations exist between him and the victim, it necessarily entails that evidence must be
adduced to support the claim.
Pursuant to number 4 of the guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the
crime or as a qualifying circumstance, however, in the absence of the foregoing documents
(certificate of live birth or authentic document), the complainants testimony will suffice provided
that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. In the case at bar, AAA testified that she
was 13 years old on July 20, 1999 and that her birthday was in February. Further, when accusedappellant, insisted that the incident occurred on October 20, 1999, he admitted that AAA was
still 13 years old when the rape was committed.
FACTS:
In an information, Alcober was charged for the rape of his common-law spouses minor
daughter, wherein Alcober pleaded not guilty. During pre-trial Alcober admitted that he is the
common-law spouse of the victims mother. The prosecution also proposed to have the
accused-appellant admit that the victim was a minor at the time of the incident, but the court

insisted that it be proven with a Birth Certificate. As a result, the victim testified that she was
around 10 years old and was in Grade 5 when Alcober and her mother started living together as
husband and wife. Further, the victim stated that she was in second year high school and was
thirteen years old, when Alcober raped her. In his defense, Alcober argued that the sexual
intercourse between him and the victim was consensual.
Further, the mother of the victim also testified stating that the victim was six years old
when she and started living together and that the victim was 13 years old when the incident
happened. The RTC found Alcober guilty of the crime of rape and was sentenced to suffer the
maximum penalty of death, which decision the CA affirmed with modification, thus sentencing
Alcober to reclusion perpetua.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the sweet heart doctrine must be appreciated
2. Whether or not the age of the victim was proven
RULING:
1. We must emphasize that when the accused in a rape case claims, as in the case at bar, that
the sexual intercourse between him and the complainant was consensual, the burden of
evidence shifts to him, such that he is now enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to prove
the relationship. Being an affirmative defense, it must be established with convincing
evidence, such as by some documentary and/or other evidence like mementos, love letters,
notes, pictures and the like.
The sweetheart theory as a defense, however, necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the
first element of rape. Effectively, it leaves the prosecution the burden to prove only force or
intimidation, the coupling element of rape. This admission makes the sweetheart theory more
difficult to defend, for it is not only an affirmative defense that needs convincing proof; after the
prosecution has successfully established a prima facie case, the burden of evidence is shifted to
the accused, who has to adduce evidence that the intercourse was consensual.
Other than his self-serving testimony, however, accused-appellant failed to adduce
evidence of his supposed relationship with AAA. On the other hand, we are convinced that the
sordid version of facts presented by accused-appellant is nothing but a depraved concoction by
a very twisted and obnoxious imagination. Accused-appellants tale of being seduced by his 13year old stepdaughter who calls him "Tatay" or "Papa," and having sexual intercourse with her
while her mother was watching and crying is not only nauseatingly repulsive but is likewise
utterly incredible.
2. In People v. Pruna, the Court established the guidelines in appreciating age, either as an
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, as follows:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would
suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost
or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims

mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to

testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the
testimony of the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the
complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by
the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended
party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall
not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the
victim.
In the case at bar, no birth or baptismal certificate or school record showing the date of
birth of AAA was presented.
Pursuant to number 4 of the guidelines, however, in the absence of the foregoing
documents (certificate of live birth or authentic document), the complainants testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. In the case at bar, AAA
testified that she was 13 years old on July 20, 1999 and that her birthday was in
February. Accused-appellant, who insists that the incident occurred on October 20, 1999,
expressly and clearly admitted that AAA was still 13 years old on that date. Further, several
more questions were propounded to accused-appellant to ascertain that he was aware of AAAs
minority at the time of the sexual intercourse, and accused-appellants answers plainly showed
that he was fully cognizant of this fact.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. KENNETH MONCEDA
G.R. No. 176269, November 13, 2013
J. Brion
The rule is that inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, when referring only to
minor details and collateral matters, do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their
veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Such minor inconsistencies even enhance their
veracity as the variances erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. Though inconsistent,
the testimony of the prosecution witness was straightforward, hence minor inconsistencies that
attended their testimony did not negate finding of guilt.
The defense of alibi, frame-up is an allegation that can easily be concocted. For this
claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the
presumption of regularity of official acts of government officials.
FACTS:

The accused were charged for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, due to selling and
delivering to a poseur-buyer methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. They pleaded not
guilty, trial ensued wherein the prosecution stated that a female informant told P/Inspector
Arsenal that a "contact" was looking for a buyer of huge quantities of shabu, further disclosing
that the "contact" preferred to be paid in casino chips and not in cold cash. With this,
P/Inspector Arsenal immediately formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation, which team
was composed of PO3 Pastrana, who was designated as the poseur-buyer, P/Inspector
Arsenal, and SPO3 Anasta. The operation was consummated at the parking lot of Sofitel Hotel
wherein Monceda and Lai were arrested.
Moceda and Lai were initially brought to Diamond Hotel where the high-ranking officers
of the Narcotics Group had stationed themselves. PO3 Pastrana surrendered three plastic bags
of shabu, to Col. Castillo. The bags and their contents were then forwarded to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for chemical analysis and the appellants were brought to the PNP Headquarters in
Camp Crame where they were subjected to physical examination.
On the other hand, the defense had a different version of events, denying the selling of
shabu and claimed that they were framed-up. Lai and five other witnesses, took the witness
stand for the defense, but Monceda declined. Lai asserted that Monceda was her nephew and
that she has been engaged in various businesses, further asserting that she is a member of an
association engaged in lending money to casino players and that she arrived from China the
night before her arrest. Lai further testified that on the day of the incident, she was at Hotel
Sofitel carrying with her the income of the association amounting to P2,000,000.00 and
US$30,000.00 in cash as she was to convert the money to chip checks when she received a
call from Monceda, who told her that the police were arresting him at Diamond Hotel, causing
her to leave a borrower to settle Moncedas problem, and claimed that her son and a driver
were waiting for her at Sofitels lobby that day. Further, Lai asserted that upon arriving at
Diamond Hotel, some policemen searched her vehicle for shabu but found a paper bag of
money instead; that the policemen thereafter brought her to Camp Crame. Nonetheless, Lai
admitted of having knowledge of Monceda as a drug user.
During the pendency of appeal to the CA, Monceda commited suicide. The CA
nevertheless affirmed the RTC decision finding the prosecution witnesses were corroborated by
physical evidence and that Lais defense was weak.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses affects the
conviction of the accused
2. Whether or not the alibi of the accused would prosper
RULING:
1. In a charge of illegal sale of shabu, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt:
(a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, (b) the identity of the object and the consideration
of the sale; and (c) the delivery of the thing sold and of the payment made. What assumes
primary importance is the proof clearly showing that an illegal transaction actually took
place, and the presentation in court of what was sold as evidence of the corpus delicti.
Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers
who conducted the buy-bust operations. We generally defer to the trial courts assessment of

the evidence as it had the opportunity to directly observe the witnesses, their demeanor, and
their credibility on the witness stand. In this case, we find from the records sufficient evidence of
the illegal sale with the accused as the sellers and see no compelling need to re-evaluate the
trial courts assessments.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were positive and straightforward. While
there existed some inconsistencies in their individual testimonies compared with one another,
these testimonies considered in their totality leave no doubt in our minds that an illegal sale
of shabu had actually taken place with the accused as the sellers.
We are not persuaded that this inconsistency is sufficient to taint the prosecutions case
to the point that it should fail. The rule is that inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses,
when referring only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect either the substance of
their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Such minor inconsistencies even
enhance their veracity as the variances erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.
2. In People v. Zheng Bai Hui, we held that like the defense of alibi, frame-up is an allegation
that can easily be concocted. For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and
convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity of official acts of government
officials.
Lai, unfortunately for her, failed to corroborate her statements regarding the alleged
arrest which occurred at Diamond Hotel. Her presented witnesses all testified on the events
before or after her arrest. Lais lone testimony regarding the circumstances of arrest at Diamond
Hotel, on the other hand, failed to overcome the positive and credible testimony showing the
existence of the buy-bust operation at Sofitel Hotel. Worse, the two persons, her son and her
driver, who accompanied her during the alleged arrest at Diamond Hotel, and who could have
possibly shed light to her version of the events both refused to testify. We find this
development perplexing and is a matter which greatly weakened Lais frame-up allegations.
MEDICAL PLAZA MAKATI CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION v. ROBERT H. CULLEN
G.R. No. 181416, November 11, 2013
J. Peralta
The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein.
Though denominated as an action for damages, an examination of the allegations made
by respondent in his complaint shows that the case principally dwells on the propriety of the
assessment made by petitioner against respondent as well as the validity of petitioners act in
preventing respondent from participating in the election of the corporations Board of Directors.
Being corporate in nature, the issues should be threshed out before the RTC sitting as a special
commercial court. The issues on damages can still be resolved in the same special commercial
court just like a regular RTC which is still competent to tackle civil law issues incidental to intracorporate disputes filed before it.

FACTS:
Robert Cullen purchased from MLHI condominium Unit of the Medical Plaza Makati, to
which petitioner, demanded from respondent payment of unpaid association dues and
assessments. Cullen averred that he had been religiously paying his dues as he was previously
elected president and director of the condominium corporation. However, petitioner claimed that
respondents obligation was a carry-over of that of MLHI, as such respondent was prevented
from exercising his right to vote and be voted for during the 2002 election of petitioners Board.
This incident made respondent clarify from MLHI the petitioners claim, but MLHI stated all
obligations had been settled, which prompted respondent to demand from petitioner an
explanation why he was considered a delinquent payer. However, petitioner failed to make the
explanation, resulting to the filing of Complaint for Damages by Cullen against petitioner and
MLHI.
Petitioner and MLHI filed their separate motions to dismiss the complaint due to lack of
jurisdiction, wherein MLHI claimed that it is the HLURB which is vested with the exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Petitioner, on the other hand, averred lack of
jurisdiction as the case involves an intra-corporate controversy. The RTC granted petitioners
and MLHIs motions to dismiss explaining that the action is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the HLURB. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial courts decision and remanded the case to the
RTC for further proceedings, explaining that the controversy is an ordinary civil action for
damages which falls within the jurisdiction of regular courts.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action
RULING:
It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations in the complaint. It is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the
defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent
almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant.
Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. The nature of an
action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the
allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by
the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
Though denominated as an action for damages, an examination of the allegations made
by respondent in his complaint shows that the case principally dwells on the propriety of the
assessment made by petitioner against respondent as well as the validity of petitioners act in
preventing respondent from participating in the election of the corporations Board of Directors.
These issues are clearly corporate and the demand for damages is just incidental. Being
corporate in nature, the issues should be threshed out before the RTC sitting as a special
commercial court. The issues on damages can still be resolved in the same special commercial

court just like a regular RTC which is still competent to tackle civil law issues incidental to intracorporate disputes filed before it.
To be sure, RA 4726 or the Condominium Act was enacted to specifically govern a
condominium. Said law sanctions the creation of the condominium corporation which is
especially formed for the purpose of holding title to the common area, in which the holders of
separate interests shall automatically be members or shareholders, to the exclusion of others, in
proportion to the appurtenant interest of their respective units.
Clearly, condominium corporations are not covered by the amendment. Thus, the intracorporate dispute between petitioner and respondent is still within the jurisdiction of the RTC
sitting as a special commercial court and not the HLURB.
ALEJANDRO V. TANKEH
v. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 171428, November 11, 2013
J. Leonen
Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment. Further, when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged
does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed.
Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction
is not correctable through the original civil action of certiorari. What petitioner seeks to rectify
pertain to the appellate courts failure to uphold the findings of facts of the lower court. As such,
the petition is simply a continuation of the appellate process proper for a petition under Rule 45.
In any case, even if the Petition is one for the special civil action of certiorari, this Court
has the discretion to treat a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari as a Rule 45 Petition for Review on
Certiorari. This is allowed if (1) the Petition is filed within the reglementary period for filing a
Petition for review; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient
reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.
FACTS:
Respondent Ruperto Tankeh as the president of Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc, applied for
a $3.5 million loan from Development Bank of the Philippines for the partial financing of an
ocean-going vessel named the M/V Golden Lilac. To authorize the loan, DBP required that
certain conditions be met, which was complied with by Tankeh. According to petitioner, Tankeh
approached him to inform that he was operating a new shipping line business and that petitioner
would be given 1,000 shares to be a director of the business. As such petitioner signed the
Assignment of Shares of Stock with Voting Rights and subsequently signed the promissory note
needed for loan approval. After which, the loan was approved by the DBP and the vessel was
acquired. Later, Sterling Shipping through Tankeh executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of
DBP, wherein it is stated that Sterling Shipping transfers and assigns in favor of DBP, its
successors and assigns, future earnings of the mortgaged M/V "Sterling Ace," including
proceeds of charter and shipping contracts, and shall continue to subsist for as long as the
obligation remains unpaid.
However, petitioner soon wrote a letter to Tankeh severing all ties and terminating his
involvement with Sterling Shipping Lines and required that its board of directors pass a

resolution releasing him from all liabilities, particularly the loan contract with DBP, and to further
notify DBP of such severance. Subsequently, the accounts of respondent corporation in DBP
were transferred to public respondent Asset Privatization Trust. Nevertheless, at the time when
petitioner was still bound as a debtor, DBP sold M/V Sterling Ace in Singapore for an amount
which the petitioner found to be inadequate. As a result, petitioner filed complaints against
respondents, alleging that Tankeh exercised deceit and fraud in order for petitioner to bind
himself to pay DBP, thus praying that the promissory note be declared null and void and that he
be absolved from any liability from the mortgage and the note in question. Tankeh countered
that petitioner voluntarily signed the promissory note in favor of DBP with full knowledge of the
consequences, further claiming that he did not employ any fraud or deceit to secure petitioners
involvement in the company.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner ordering the annulment of the Promissory Note
as it relates to plaintiff himself, which however, the CA reversed. Hence, this petition where
respondents argue that the Petition is actually one of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court and not a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for review under Rule 45 is the proper remedy.
RULING:
Contrary to respondents imputation, the remedy contemplated by petitioner is clearly
that of a Rule 45 Petition for Review. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors
of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Further, when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the
error is committed. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctable through the original civil action of certiorari.
Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case,
such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of
jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact a mistake of judgment, appeal is the remedy.
In this case, what petitioner seeks to rectify may be construed as errors of judgment of
the Court of Appeals. These errors pertain to the petitioners allegation that the appellate court
failed to uphold the findings of facts of the lower court. He does not impute any error with
respect to the Court of Appeals exercise of jurisdiction. As such, this Petition is simply a
continuation of the appellate process where a case is elevated from the trial court of origin, to
the Court of Appeals, and to this Court via Rule 45.
Contrary to respondents arguments, the allegations of petitioner that the Court of
Appeals "committed grave abuse of discretion" did not ipso facto render the intended remedy
that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any case, even if the Petition is one for the special civil action of certiorari, this Court
has the discretion to treat a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari as a Rule 45 Petition for Review on
Certiorari. This is allowed if (1) the Petition is filed within the reglementary period for filing a
Petition for review; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient
reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. When this Court exercises this discretion, there is no
need to comply with the requirements provided for in Rule 65.

CENTURY CHINESE MEDICINE CO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LING NA LAU

G.R. No. 188526, November 11, 2013
J. Peralta
A core requisite before a warrant shall validly issue is the existence of a probable cause,
meaning the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place to be searched. And when the law speaks of facts,
the reference is to facts, data or information personally known to the applicant and the
witnesses he may present. Absent the element of personal knowledge by the applicant or his
witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified, the warrant
is deemed not based on probable cause and is a nullity, its issuance being, in legal
contemplation, arbitrary. The application and the issuance of the search warrant is was coupled
with the required probable cause as shown by the complainants trademark certificate.
FACTS:
Respondent Ling Na Lau, doing business under the name and style Worldwide
Pharmacy, is the sole distributor and registered trademark owner of TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE
OF A LEAF papaya whitening soap. Her representative, Ping wrote a letter to the NBI Director
requesting assistance for an investigation on several drugstores which were selling counterfeit
whitening papaya soaps bearing the general appearance of their products. As such, Agent
Furing was assigned to the case and he executed an affidavit stating that he conducted an
investigation thus, drawing a list of drugstores selling counterfeit papaya soaps, which included
petitioner drugstores. Later, Agent Furing applied for the issuance of search warrants before the
RTC Makati, against petitioners and other establishments for violations of the Intellectual
Property Code for unfair competition and trademark infringement. The RTC granted the
applications and issued several search warrants for trademark infringement against petitioners.
Soon, Agent Furing filed his Consolidated Return of Search Warrants but, petitioners
filed Motion to Quash the Search Warrants. During the pendency of the case, respondent filed a
Submission in relation to the Motion to Quash attaching an Order of the IPO, whereby it
approved the parties' Joint Motion To Approve Compromise Agreement. The compromise
agreement was approved and later the RTC sustained the Motion to Quash the Search
Warrants, applying the Rules on Search and Seizure for Civil Action in Infringement of
Intellectual Property Rights. On appeals, the CA set aside the RTCs decision on quashal of
search warrants, finding that Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure was applicable.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the search warrants can be applied for.
RULING:
Thus, we agree with the CA that A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC, which provides for the Rules on
the Issuance of the Search and Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual Property
Rights, is not applicable in this case as the search warrants were not applied based thereon, but
in anticipation of criminal actions for violation of intellectual property rights under RA 8293. It
was established that respondent had asked the NBI for assistance to conduct investigation and

search warrant implementation for possible apprehension of several drugstore owners selling
imitation or counterfeit TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF papaya whitening soap. Also, in his
affidavit to support his application for the issuance of the search warrants, NBI Agent Furing
stated that "the items to be seized will be used as relevant evidence in the criminal actions that
are likely to be instituted." Hence, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure applies.
A core requisite before a warrant shall validly issue is the existence of a probable cause,
meaning the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place to be searched. And when the law speaks of facts,
the reference is to facts, data or information personally known to the applicant and the
witnesses he may present. Absent the element of personal knowledge by the applicant or his
witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified, the warrant
is deemed not based on probable cause and is a nullity, its issuance being, in legal
contemplation, arbitrary. The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of
rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As
implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or
even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting
calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.
It is clear that the requisites for the issuance of the search warrants had been complied
with and that there is probable cause to believe that an offense had been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense were in the places to be searched. The
offense pertains to the alleged violations committed by respondents-appellees upon the
intellectual property rights of herein private complainant-appellant, as holder of the trademark
TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF under Certificate of Registration No. 4-2000-009881,
issued on August 24, 2003 by the Intellectual Property Office.
NISSAN GALLERY-ORTIGAS v. PURIFICACION F. FELIPE
G.R. No. 199067, November 11, 2013
J. Mendoza
As can be gleaned, with respect to criminal actions for violation of BP 22, it is explicitly
clear that the corresponding civil action is deemed included and that a reservation to file such
separately is not allowed. The rule is that every act or omission punishable by law has its
accompanying civil liability. If the accused, however, is not found to be criminally liable, it does
not necessarily mean that he will not likewise be held civilly liable because extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. This rule more specifically
applies when (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence
is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil
liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused
was acquitted.
A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because
the quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is
greater than that required for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In order to be
completely free from civil liability, a persons acquittal must be based on the fact he did not
commit the offense. If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still
be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained of. Though
the accused has been acquitted from the criminal charge, the acquittal was just based on

reasonable doubt and it did not change the fact that she issued the subject check which was
subsequently dishonored upon its presentment.
FACTS:
Purificacions son purchased a Nissan Terrano 4x4 SUV from Nissan Gallery-Ortigas,
however the vehicle was not paid upon delivery. Despite non-payment, the son took possession
of the SUV, used and enjoyed it for more than 4 months, causing Nissan to send demand letters
but to no avail. A final demand letter was sent to Purificacions son with which the son requested
a grace period within which to pay the obligation, but still no payment was made. With this, the
son asked Purificacion to issue post-dated check for payment, to which Purificacion agreed.
However, the checks were dishonoured upon presentment due to stop payment. Later, Nissan
sent a demand letter to Purificacion, through her son, informing her of the dishonour and gave
her 5 days to replace it with cash or managers check. Purificacion refused to replace the check
and argued that she did not purchase a vehicle with Nissan, which caused Nissan to file a
complaint for violation of BP 22 against Purificacion for issuing a post-dated check which was
dishonoured due to STOP PAYMENT. This lead the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
to find probable cause resulting to the filing of an information.
During the preliminary investigation before the Assistant City Prosecutor, Purificacion
gave P200,000.00 partial payment to amicably settle the civil aspect of the case. After trial, the
MeTC acquitted Purificacion of the charge, but held her civilly liable to Nissan. On appeal, the
RTC affirmed the MeTC decision ruling that Purificacion was estopped from denying that she
issued the check as a "show check" to boost the credit standing of Frederick and that Nissan
agreed not to deposit the same, further explaining that Purificacion is an accommodation party.
Motion for reconsideration was denied, and the CA ruled that no privity of contract existed
between Nissan and Purification and that no civil liability could be adjudged against Purificacion
since she was acquitted from the criminal charge. Nissan filed a motion for reconsideration, but
was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the acquittal from the criminal charge for violation of BP 22 negates civil liability.
RULING:
Well-settled is the rule that a civil action is deemed instituted upon the filing of a criminal
action, subject to certain exceptions. Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that the
criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed. As
can be gleaned, with respect to criminal actions for violation of BP 22, it is explicitly clear that
the corresponding civil action is deemed included and that a reservation to file such separately
is not allowed.
The rule is that every act or omission punishable by law has its accompanying civil
liability. The civil aspect of every criminal case is based on the principle that every person
criminally liable is also civilly liable. If the accused, however, is not found to be criminally liable,
it does not necessarily mean that he will not likewise be held civilly liable because extinction of
the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. This rule more specifically
applies when (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence
is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil

liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused
was acquitted. The civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did
not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
It can, therefore, be concluded that if the judgment is conviction of the accused, then the
necessary penalties and civil liabilities arising from the offense or crime shall be imposed. On
the contrary, if the judgment is of acquittal, then the imposition of the civil liability will depend on
whether or not the act or omission from which it might arise exists.
A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because
the quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is
greater than that required for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In order to be
completely free from civil liability, a persons acquittal must be based on the fact he did not
commit the offense. If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still
be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained of. It may
only be that the facts proved did not constitute the offense charged.
The Court is also one with the CA when it stated that the liability of Purificacion was
limited to her act of issuing a worthless check. The Court, however, does not agree with the CA
when it went to state further that by her acquittal in the criminal charge, there was no more basis
for her to be held civilly liable to Nissan. The acquittal was just based on reasonable doubt and
it did not change the fact that she issued the subject check which was subsequently dishonored
upon its presentment.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANDY ZULIETA a.k.a. "Bogarts,"
G.R. No. 192183, November 11, 2013
J. Del Castillo
Appellants alibi, being inherently weak, deserves no credence at all especially when
measured up against the positive identification by the prosecution witness pointing to appellant
as the perpetrator of the crime. Moreover, appellant failed to prove that it was physically
impossible for him to be present at the crime scene at the time of its commission.
Settled is the rule that factual findings of the trial court and its assessment on the
credibility of witnesses deserve utmost respect by this Court. In this case, we find no reason to
deviate from the findings or assessment of the trial court there being no showing that it has
overlooked or mis-appreciated some facts which if considered would materially impact on or
change the outcome of the case.
FACTS:
An information was filed charging appellant for the Murder of Armando Labando, through
the use of a Batangas knife. Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty, thus trial ensued.
The prosecution presented several witnesses, one of them is Bryan Pascua, who testified that
he saw the appellant stab the victim on the chest, as well as the Death Certificate and Autopsy
Report, before resting its case. On the other hand, the appellant denied the accusations against
him and set up an alibi stating that, he was asleep with his wife and in-laws when the incident
occurred. Further, the appellant claimed that he does not know the deceased nor Bryan Pascua
and that his nickname is Andy not Bogarts. He, however, admitted that he was born in Sto. Nio,
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, where he lived and stayed with his parents, until he got married

and transferred residence with his own family to Gingoog. Further, appellants wife testified in
his favour, corroborating his earlier testimony.
The RTC found appellant guilty of killing the victim Labando with the attendant qualifying
circumstance of treachery. Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal and the CA affirmed with
modification the RTC decision. Hence, this present appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution proved the accuseds guilt
RULING:
Appellants alibi, being inherently weak, deserves no credence at all especially when
measured up against the positive identification by the prosecution witness, Bryan Pascua,
pointing to appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Besides, nobody corroborated appellants
alibi other than his wife who is obviously biased in his favor thus making her testimony selfserving. Moreover, appellant failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be
present at the crime scene at the time of its commission. As observed by the CA, Cagayan de
Oro City could be traversed from Gingoog City within two hours; hence, it is not physically
impossible for appellant to commit the crime in Cagayan de Oro City and still go home to
Gingoog City after its commission.
Aside from having been positively identified by prosecution witness Pascua, appellant
failed to impute any ill motive to Pascua.
Settled is the rule that factual findings of the trial court and its assessment on the
credibility of witnesses deserve utmost respect by this Court. In this case, we find no reason to
deviate from the findings or assessment of the trial court there being no showing that it has
overlooked or mis-appreciated some facts which if considered would materially impact on or
change the outcome of the case. On the contrary, we find that the trial court meticulously
studied the case and properly weighed the evidence presented by the parties. Thus, we stand
by its pronouncement thatAfter a careful review and analysis of the evidence for the prosecution and the
defense and recalling the mien and manner of testimony by the witnesses, especially the
positive testimony and identification by eyewitness Bryan Pascua of the accused, the
Court is convinced that it is accused Andy Zulieta a.k.a. "Bogarts" who suddenly stabbed
the deceased, resulting in his instantaneous death.
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA v. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR.
G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other words, "there must
be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law
and jurisprudence." Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the

requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are
already ripe for adjudication.
The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon
the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution
itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along
constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering
precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power.
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the
operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing.
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on
the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a
subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of
subject matter, and of causes of action. On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the
doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under Article 8 of the Civil Code, evokes the general
rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally
applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may
be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike.
FACTS:
The case involves the legality of Pork Barrel in the Philippine government setting. The
concept of Pork Barrel is a political parlance of American-English origin. Adopted in the
Philippines, Pork Barrel has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of
Members of the Legislature, although its usage evolved in reference to certain funds of the
Executive.
Historically, Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines was crafted during the premartial law era, for public work purposes. Through the years, the Pork Barrel evolved to cover
various projects and scope, and has expanded to include certain funds of the President such as
the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund. Further, pork funds in the Philippines
have increased tremendously, owing in no small part to previous Presidents who reportedly
used the Pork Barrel in order to gain congressional support.
With the Napoles controversy and the findings in the CoA Report, petitioner Samson
Alcantara, President of the Social Justice Society, as well as petitioners Belgica, et al. and
Villegas filed their respective petitions seeking that the Pork Barrel System be declared
unconstitutional. Subsequently, the Court issued a Resolution issuing a TRO enjoining the DBM,
National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any of the persons acting under their authority
from releasing the remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013,
and Malampaya Funds under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed
by the President. With this, the OSG filed a Comment seeking the lifting or the partial lifting with
respect to educational and medical assistance purposes, of the Courts September 10, 2013
TRO, and that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.

The case was set for Oral Arguments, which was later on conducted. The Court then
directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within 7 days, which the parties
subsequently did.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and
justiciable controversy
2. Whether or not the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not
subject to judicial review
3. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to sue
4. Whether or not the Courts Decision dated August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174,
113766, and 113888, entitled "Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez" and Decision
dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v.
Secretary of Budget and Management" bar the re-litigation of the issue of constitutionality of
the "Pork Barrel System" under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis
RULING:
1. By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or
controversy. This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which
pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x."
Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict
of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other words, "there
must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence." Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy
is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny
are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite
that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court
may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action." "Withal, courts will decline to
pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to
resolve hypothetical or moot questions."
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic
positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions
in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the
provisions allowing for their utilization such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the
Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund
are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to
petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had
been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes
moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be
served in passing upon the merits. Differing from this description, the Court observes that
respondents proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor
diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014

budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally
effective and existing. Neither will the Presidents declaration that he had already "abolished the
PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government
has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the
annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a
repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality.
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities,
especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the
doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are
entrusted to enforce. Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and
justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be
sufficient.
2. The Court must deny respondents submission.
Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal
questions which are within its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive
branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,
of a particular measure." The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an
issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one
which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of
the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are
incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly,
the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but
essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law. It includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
It must also be borne in mind that when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; does
not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or the executive, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution." To a great extent, the Court is
laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is
by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Courts
avowed intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the
endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are
erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that each
great branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a
holistic and genuine solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot
heed respondents plea for judicial restraint.
3. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the
operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing.

Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizentaxpayers and accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National
Treasury." Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of
the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be
utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the
unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been
allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.
4. The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the
merits in a previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a
subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties,
of subject matter, and of causes of action. This required identity is not, however, attendant
hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved constitutional challenges against
the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar call for a broader
constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is
essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality and, thus, hardly a judgment on
the merits in that petitioners therein failed to present any "convincing proof showing that,
indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend
them according to their sole discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to demonstrate the
illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks and has become a common exercise of
unscrupulous Members of Congress." As such, the Court up held, in view of the presumption
of constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to
review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the foregoing
reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar as the Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned,
cannot apply.
On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle,
entrenched under Article 8 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of
certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if
the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from
the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases
ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have
been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by
a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issue.
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel
provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF Article, was resolved by the Court. To properly understand its
context, petitioners posturing was that "the power given to the Members of Congress to
propose and identify projects and activities to be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the
legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act is in implementation of
the law" and that "the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of
laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the
Constitution." In deference to the foregoing submissions, the Court reached the following main
conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of appropriation, or the "power of the
purse," belongs to Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify
the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law and it can be detailed and as
broad as Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and identifications made by
Members of Congress are merely recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the Philconsa

resolution was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the

propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On the
contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between
the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire "Pork Barrel
System" as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a
particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area of project
identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the issues
and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful
countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.
As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural
technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to
the substantive issues in these cases. In fine, stare decisis would not apply.

DECEMBER 2013
HADJI HASHIM ABDUL v. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 184496, DECEMBER 2, 2013
J. DEL CASTILLO
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication there must be an actual case or
controversy. Thus, where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable
controversy, and an adjudication thereof would be of no practical use or value as courts do not
sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest however intellectually
challenging. The acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge operated as a supervening
event that mooted the petition and a resolution on validity of the order or suspension could no
longer affect his rights as a ranking public officer.
FACTS:
Abdul was elected as mayor of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur in the May 1998 election and
was re-elected for his secord term in succeeding election. While serving his second term, the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao filed an information charging Abdul of falsification of public
documents, by making it appear that the Municipal Engineer, Engr. Murad prepared and signed
some Local Budget Preparation Form. On arraignment, Abdul pleaded not guilty, however
before trial ensued, the Office of Special Prosecutor moved for the suspension pendent lite of
the petitioner citing the suspension as mandatory under RA 3019 or Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
On the contrary, petitioner argued that he cannot be suspended pendent lite as the crime
charged is not among those enumerated under RA 3019 or Title Seven, Book II of the RPC,
further contending that fraud upon government or public funds does not cover falsification of
documents. Later, the Sandiganbayan found that the charge is within the ambit of Sec. 13, RA
3019 thereby suspending the petitioner from public office pendent lite. Motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the petitioner then filed with the Supreme Court a petition
for Certiorari with prayer for TRO, alleging that the order was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. However, the petition was dismissed and such
attained finality, but the suspension was not implemented due to petitioners terms expiration.
This notwithstanding, in the May 2007 election, petitioner again won for mayoralty, but this time
the OSP moved for his suspension pendent lite to implement the earlier suspension order.

Opposing such, petitioner argued that his defeat in the May 2004 election rendered the
suspension order moot and academic, to which the Sandiganbayan ordered a new suspension
of petitioner. Again, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for TRO citing his earlier
argument, with which the Court issued a TRO thus, enjoining the implementation of the new
suspension order. Pending petition, the Sandiganbayan acquitted petitioner from the criminal
charge.
ISSUE:
Whether the acquittal in the criminal charge affected the status of the pending petition.
RULING:
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication there must be an actual case or
controversy. Thus, where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable
controversy, and an adjudication thereof would be of no practical use or value as courts do not
sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest however intellectually
challenging. In the present case, the acquittal of the petitioner operates as a supervening event
that mooted the present Petition. Any resolution on the validity or invalidity of the issuance of the
order or suspension could no longer affect his rights as a ranking public officer, for legally
speaking hi did not commit the offense charged.
Notwithstanding the mootness of the present Petition, petitioner nevertheless implores
us to make a clear and categorical resolution on whether the offense of falsification of public
document under Article 171 of the RPC is included in the term fraud as contemplated under
Section 13 of RA 3019.

REBECCA PACAA-CONTRERAS and ROSALIE PACAA

v. ROVILA WATER SUPPLY, INC.
G.R. NO. 168979, DECEMBER 2, 2013
J. BRION
Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a proper remedy for a denial of a motion to dismiss
attended by grave abuse of discretion. While an order denying a motion to dismiss is
interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to address an
order of denial made without or in excess of jurisdiction.
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides for the period
within which to file a motion to dismiss under the grounds enumerated. Specifically, the motion
should be filed within the time for, but before the filing of, the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim. Equally important to this provision is Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules
of Court which states that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or
in the answer are deemed waived, except for the following grounds: 1) the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter; 2) litis pendencia; 3) res judicata; and 4) prescription.
Therefore, the grounds not falling under these four exceptions may be considered as waived in
the event that they are not timely invoked. Where the respondents motion to dismiss was filed
after the filing of an answer, the ground relied upon in the motion should have been raised as an
affirmative defense, otherwise it is deemed waived.
FACTS:
Petitioners Rebecca and Rosalie, chidren of Lourder and Luciano Pacaa, filed the a
complaint in their own names against Rovila Inc., Earl, Lilia, Dalla and Marisa for accounting
and damages, alleging that Lilia was a former employee in the Rovila Water Supply, a family
business, who hid business records and burned and ransacked the family files. In filing the
complaint, Lourdes authorized Rosalie to represent her via SPA. The petitioners claimed that
the corporation was surreptitiously formed having respondents as majority stockholders, who
conspired with one another to usurp the family business registered name. Moreover, the
petitioners contended that the respondents used the name of Lourdes as one of incorporators
making it appear in the SEC documents that the family business was operated in a place other
than the Pacaa residence; that the respondents used the Pacaa familys receipts and
deliveries and sales were made to appear as those of the respondent corporation. With this, the
respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over an
intra-corporate controversy, which the RTC denied.
Subsequently Lourdes died causing the petitioners to amend their complaint.
Nonetheless, they still attached the sworn declaration with SPA of Lourdes to Rosalie, but the
caption of the amended complaint remained the same. Not too long, Luciano also died. During
pre-trial, the respondents manifested that a substitution of the parties was necessary in light of
the deaths of Lourdes and Luciano, stating further that dismissal is in place as the petitioners
are not the real parties in interest to prosecute the case. Thereafter, the respondents filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the petitioners are not the real parties in interest to institute
and prosecute the case; as such they have no valid cause of action against the respondents.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss explaining that the motion should have been filed within the
time, but before, the filing of answer to the amended complaint. The motion for reconsideration
having been denies, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA,

which granted the petition by ruling that the petitioners are not the real parties in interest to the
case.
ISSUES:
a. Whether petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy.
b. Whether the motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, was timely
filed.
RULING:
a. Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a proper remedy for a denial of a motion to
dismiss attended by grave abuse of discretion. While an order denying a motion to
dismiss is interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari and prohibition are proper
remedies to address an order of denial made without or in excess of jurisdiction. The writ
of certiorari is granted to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to
prevent it from committing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
The history and development of the ground "fails to state a cause of action" in the 1940,
1964 and the present 1997 Rules of Court Preliminarily, a suit that is not brought in the name of
the real party in interest is dismissible on the ground that the complaint "fails to state a cause of
action."
Pursuant to jurisprudence, this is also the ground invoked when the respondents alleged
that the petitioners are not the real parties in interest because: 1) the petitioners should not have
filed the case in their own names, being merely attorneys-in-fact of their mother; and 2) the
petitioners should first be declared as heirs. A review of the 1940, 1964 and the present 1997
Rules of Court shows that the fundamentals of the ground for dismissal based on "failure to
state a cause of action" have drastically changed over time. A historical background of this
particular ground is in order to preclude any confusion or misapplication of jurisprudence
decided prior to the effectivity of the present Rules of Court.
All these considerations point to the legal reality that the new Rules effectively restricted
the dismissal of complaints in general, especially when what is being invoked is the ground of
"failure to state a cause of action." Thus, jurisprudence governed by the 1940 and 1964 Rules of
Court to the effect that the ground for dismissal based on failure to state a cause of action may
be raised anytime during the proceedings, is already inapplicable to cases already governed by
the present Rules of Court which took effect on July 1, 1997. As the rule now stands, the failure
to invoke this ground in a motion to dismiss or in the answer would result in its waiver.
b. Applying Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which provides for the grounds for the dismissal
of a civil case, the respondents grounds for dismissal fall under Section 1(g) and (j),
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, particularly, failure to state a cause of action and failure to
comply with a condition precedent (substitution of parties), respectively. The first
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides for the period within
which to file a motion to dismiss under the grounds enumerated. Specifically, the motion
should be filed within the time for, but before the filing of, the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim. Equally important to this provision is Section 1, Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court which states that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion
to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except for the following grounds: 1) the

court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; 2) litis pendencia; 3) res judicata; and 4)
prescription. Therefore, the grounds not falling under these four exceptions may be
considered as waived in the event that they are not timely invoked. As the respondents
motion to dismiss was based on the grounds which should be timely invoked, material to
the resolution of this case is the period within which they were raised. Both the RTC and
the CA found that the motion to dismiss was only filed after the filing of the answer and
after the pre-trial had been concluded. Because there was no motion to dismiss before
the filing of the answer, the respondents should then have at least raised these grounds
as affirmative defenses in their answer. The RTCs assailed orders did not touch on this
particular issue but the CA ruled that the respondents did, while the petitioners insist that
the respondents did not. In the present petition, the petitioners reiterate that there was a
blatant non-observance of the rules when the respondents did not amend their answer to
invoke the grounds for dismissal which were raised only during the pre-trial and,
subsequently, in the subject motion to dismiss.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a motion to dismiss based on the
grounds invoked by the respondents may be waived if not raised in a motion to dismiss or
alleged in their answer. On the other hand, "the pre-trial is primarily intended to make certain
that all issues necessary to the disposition of a case are properly raised. The purpose is to
obviate the element of surprise, hence, the parties are expected to disclose at the pre-trial
conference all issues of law and fact which they intend to raise at the trial, except such as may
involve privileged or impeaching matter."
The issues submitted during the pre-trial are thus the issues that would govern the trial proper.
The dismissal of the case based on the grounds invoked by the respondents are specifically
covered by Rule 16 and Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which set a period when they should be
raised; otherwise, they are deemed waived.

MODESTO SANCHEZ v. ANDREW SANCHEZ

G.R. NO. 187661, DECEMBER 4, 2013
J. PEREZ
Furthermore, well settled is the rule that the elements of laches must be proven
positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature, a fact that cannot be established by mere allegations
in the pleadings and cannot be resolved in a motion to dismiss.
The affirmative defense of prescription does not automatically warrant the dismissal of a
complaint under Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. An allegation of prescription can
effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only when the complaint on its face shows that indeed
the action has already prescribed. If the issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary
matters requiring a full-blown trial on the merits, it cannot be determined in a motion to dismiss.
Those issues must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits wherein both parties will be
given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses. However, Contrary to
petitioners contention, it is not apparent from the complaint that the action had already
prescribed. Upon closer inspection of the complaint, it would seem that there are several
possible scenarios that may have occurred given the limited set of facts. It is also apparent from
the pleadings that both parties denied each others allegations. Hence, the outright dismissal of
the action is not proper where there are factual matters in dispute, which require presentation
and appreciation of evidence.
FACTS:
A Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of land covered by transfer certificate of title,
originally registered in the name of respondent, was conveyed to petitioner via sale. This
conveyance, however, was assailed by the respondent for being a sham and replete with
falsehood and fraudulent misrepresentation. Nonetheless, the respondent admitted that he sent
the pre-signed but undated and not notarized deed of sale to petitioner, in response to the
latters offer to buy the property, but countering that the transaction did not materialize because
during that time, the petitioner did not have the funds to purchase the property. Further, the
respondent claimed that he tried to retrieve the deed but petitioner failed do so notwithstanding
several demands; that despite refusal, respondent tolerated petitioner to occupy the property
since their ancestral home was built thereon, which tolerance further extended to petitioners
live-in partner Yap. Soon, petitioner and Yap offered to buy the property but respondent refused.
Thereafter, respondent found that his certificate of title was missing, prompting him to file an
affidavit of loss with the Registry of Deeds. Later, respondent learned that a Petition for
Reconstitution of title was filed by petitioner on the basis of the deed of sale, which already
appeared to have been notarized. This led respondent to file a complaint against petitioner,
seeking for the annulment of the document. However, during the pendency of the case,
petitioners title was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of petitioner, which made
respondent amend his complain to further seek cancellation of new title and reconveyance.
Petitioner countered in his answer, stating lack of cause of action, prescription and laches.
The RTC dismissed the case on the grounds of prescription and laches, as it considered
the lapse of time between the date of the assailed document and the filing of the case. RTC
concluded that respondent was time-barred because he has only 10 years to file an action
based on written contract. On appeal, the CA held that the trial court erred in dismissing the
complaint of Andrew without the benefit of a trial.

ISSUE:
Whether prescription and laches must be determined in a trial.
RULING:
The Court has consistently held that the affirmative defense of prescription does not
automatically warrant the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. An allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only
when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed. If the issue
of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full-blown trial on the merits, it
cannot be determined in a motion to dismiss. Those issues must be resolved at the trial of the
case on the merits wherein both parties will be given ample opportunity to prove their respective
claims and defenses.
Contrary to Modestos contention, it is not apparent from the complaint that the action
had already prescribed. Furthermore, it should be noted that it is the relief based on the facts
alleged, and not the relief demanded, which is taken into consideration in determining the cause
of action. Therefore, in terms of classifying the deed, whether it is valid, void or voidable, it is of
no significance that the relief prayed for was Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale. The issue of
prescription hinges on the determination of whether the sale was valid, void or voidable. We
agree with the Court of Appeals that the issue of prescription in this case is best ventilated in a
full-blown proceeding before the trial court where both parties can substantiate their claims. The
trial court is in the best position to ascertain the credibility of both parties.
Upon closer inspection of the complaint, it would seem that there are several possible
scenarios that may have occurred given the limited set of facts. The statement "transaction did
not push through since defendant did not have the financial herewithal to purchase the subject
property" creates confusion and allows for several different interpretations.
It is also apparent from the pleadings that both parties denied each others allegations. It
is then but logical to review more evidence on disputed matters. On this score alone, it is
apparent that the complaint on its face does not readily show that the action has already
prescribed. We emphasize once more that a summary or outright dismissal of an action is not
proper where there are factual matters in dispute, which require presentation and appreciation
of evidence.
Furthermore, well settled is the rule that the elements of laches must be proven
positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature, a fact that cannot be established by mere allegations
in the pleadings and cannot be resolved in a motion to dismiss. At this stage therefore, the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of laches is premature. Those issues must be resolved
at the trial of the case on the merits, wherein both parties will be given ample opportunity to
prove their respective claims and defenses.

PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND CRISANTO G. DE

GUZMAN
G.R. NO. 173590, DECEMBER 9, 2013
J. PERLAS-BERNABE
The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. It is presumed that an administrative agency,
if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any
previous error committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience
prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies.
When DeGuzmans filed his petition for certiorari and mandamus before the CA, there resulted
a premature fling of the petition as the proper recourse is to seek relief before the CSC. Hence,
premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner.
Forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.
There is forum shopping where there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars
is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful
would amount to res judicata. Since De Guzman pursued the remedies of petition
for certiorari and appeal, that have long been held to be mutually exclusive, and not alternative
or cumulative remedies, forum shopping was committed. It must be noted that the ultimate relief
sought by De Guzman was the reversal of the resolution on his dismissal.
In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites
must concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the
merits; and (d) there must be between the first and the second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii)
identity of subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action. In this case, there was no
judgment on the merits as the dismissal of the complaint against De Guzman was a result of a
fact-finding investigation only for purposes of determining whether a prima facie case exists.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1988, De Guzman, then a Postal Inspector at the Postal Services
Office, was investigated by Regional Postal Inspector Atty. Buensalida due to an anonymous
complaint charging him of dishonesty and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. Later, Atty. Buensalida made report that De Guzman must formally be charged with and
relieved from his post to protect the employees and witnesses from harassment. The report was
then forwarded to the DOTCISLES for further evaluation and approval, which however,
recommended for the exoneration of De Guzman from charges against him for lack of merit.
This recommendation was approved by DOTC via May 15, 1990 memorandum.
Later, RA 7354 or the Postal Service Act was passed, which abolished the Postal
Services Office under the DOTC, transferring all its powers, duties and rights, and absorbing all
its officials and employees to PPC. Thereafter, De Guzman was charged by PPC for same acts
recommended to be charged by Atty. Buensalida, to which a decision was made finding De

Guzman guilty and was dismissed from the service, to be implemented immediately. However
the decision was not implemented until after 5 years when the Regional Direction issued a
memorandum. Motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied, leading to the filing of a
second motion for reconsideration, which was resolved in De Guzmans favor, as it was clarified
that when De Guzman was formally charged on July 16, 1993, the complainant was the PPC,
which had its own charter and was no longer under the DOTC making the ISLES Memorandum
recommendatory; that res judicata was unavailing as the decision exonerating De Guzman was
only a dismissal after an investigative body and not a dismissal on the merits.
Meanwhile, De Guzman elevated the matter to the CA via special civil action
for certiorari and mandamus. Subsequently he appealed the latter resolution before the PPC
Board, which however denied the appeal, causing De Guzman to appeal before the CSC, but
denied. CA also rendered a decision reversing the 2 former PPC resolutions, citing that the
revival of the case constituted grave abuse of discretion considering the clear and unequivocal
content of the May 15, 1990 Memorandum that dismissed the complaint against De Guzman.
ISSUES:
a. Whether administrative remedies have been fully exhausted.
b. Whether there is forum shopping.
c. Whether there is res judicata.
RULING:
a. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must
allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. It is
presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a
matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its
forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from
entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. Hence,
premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the
petitioner. PPC claims that De Guzman failed to subscribe to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies since he opted to file a premature certiorari case before the CA
instead of filing an appeal with the PPC Board, or of an appeal to the CSC, which are
adequate remedies under the law.
It is well-established that the CSC has jurisdiction over all employees of government
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters, and, as such, is the sole arbiter of controversies
relating to the civil service. The PPC, created under RA7354, is a government-owned and
controlled corporation with an original charter. Thus, being an employee of the PPC, De
Guzman should have, after availing of the remedy of appeal before the PPC Board, sought
further recourse before the CSC. That the subject of De Guzmans appeal to the Board was not
the Resolution dated November 23, 2004 but the Resolution dated May 10, 2005 denying the
motion for reconsideration of the first - mentioned resolution is of no moment. An appeal from an
order denying a motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively an appeal
from the final order or judgment itself. Thus, finding no cogent explanation on DeGuzmans end
or any justifiable reason for his premature resort to a petition for certiorari and mandamus
before the CA, the Court holds that he failed to adhere to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies which should have warranted the dismissal of said petition.

b. Aside from violating the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, De Guzman was
also guilty of forum-shopping by pursuing two separate remedies petition
for certiorari and appeal that have long been held to be mutually exclusive, and not
alternative or cumulative remedies. Evidently, the ultimate relief sought by said remedies
which De Guzman filed only within a few months from each other is one and the same
the setting aside of the resolution dismissing him from the service.
Forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment. There is forum shopping where there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful would amount to res judicata.
Similar thereto, the very evil that the prohibition on forum-shopping was seeking to
prevent conflicting decisions rendered by two (2) different tribunalsresulted from De
Guzmans abuse of the processes. Since De Guzmans appeal before the PPC Board was
denied in its Resolutions dated May 25, 2006 and June 29, 2006, De Guzman sought the review
of said resolutions before the CSC where he raised yet again the defense of res judicata.
Nonetheless, the CSC, in its Resolution No. 08081550 dated May 6, 2008, affirmed De
Guzmans dismissal, affirming "the Resolutions of the PPC Board of Directors dismissing De
Guzman from the service for Dishonesty, Gross Violation of Regulations, and Conduct Grossly
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
c. The investigation conducted by the ISLES, which "provides, performs, and coordinates
security, intelligence, fact-finding, and investigatory functions for the Secretary, the
Department, and Department-wide official undertakings," was intended precisely for the
purpose of determining whether or not a prima facie case against De Guzman existed.
Due to insufficiency of evidence, however, no formal charge was filed against De
Guzman and the complaint against him was dismissed by Asst. Secretary Jardiniano.
In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following
requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by
a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on
the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and the second actions (i) identity of parties,
(ii) identity of subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action.
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits when it determines the
rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical
or dilatory objections; or when the judgment is rendered after a determination of which party is
right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely
technical point.
In this case, there was no "judgment on the merits" in contemplation of the above-stated
definition. The dismissal of the complaint against De Guzman in the Memorandum dated May
15, 1990 of Asec. Jardiniano was a result of a fact-finding investigation only for purposes of
determining whether a prima facie case exists and a formal charge for administrative offenses
should be filed. This being the case, no rights and liabilities of the parties were determined
therein with finality.

RE: LETTERS OF LUCENA B. RALLOS, FOR ALLEGED ACTS/INCIDENTS/OCCURENCES

RELATIVE TO THE RESOLUTION(S) ISSUED IN CA-G.R. SP No. 06676 BY COUIRT OF
APPEALS EXECUTIVE JUSTICE PAMPIO ABARINTOS and ASSOCIATE JUSTICES
RAMON PAUL HERNANDO and VICTORIA ISABEL PAREDES.
IPI No. 12-203-CA-J, DECEMBER 10, 2013
J. BERSAMIN
We have consistently held that an administrative or disciplinary complaint is not the proper
remedy to assail the judicial acts of magistrates of the law, particularly those related to their
adjudicative functions. Indeed, any errors should be corrected through appropriate judicial
remedies, like appeal in due course or, in the proper cases, the extraordinary writs of certiorari
and prohibition if the errors were jurisdictional. Having the administrative or disciplinary
complaint be an alternative to available appropriate judicial remedies would be entirely unprocedural.
The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the
part of the judge. This discretion is an acknowledgement of the fact that judges are in a better
position to determine the issue of inhibition, as they are the ones who directly deal with the
parties-litigants in their courtrooms. The decision on whether he should inhibit himself, however,
must be based on his rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the
case brought before him. The rule does not give the judge the unfettered discretion to decide
whether he should desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes.
The mere imputation of bias, partiality and prejudgment will not suffice in the absence of clear
and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble
role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. The
disqualification of a judge cannot be based on mere speculations and surmises or be predicated
on the adverse nature of the judges rulings towards the movant for inhibition.
FACTS:
The case stemmed from a decision of the RTC involving the Heirs of Vicente Rallos,
where they sought just compensation from the government of Cebu City, over parcels of land
that had been maintained as public roads without Heirs consent. In this decision, the RTC held
Cebu City liable to pay just compensation to the Heirs of Rallos, to which a motion for
reconsideration was filed by Cebu City but was denied. Later, the Heirs of Rallos filed a motion
for the execution pending of the earlier RTC decision, which was granted by the RTC by issuing
3 separate orders. Nonetheless, both parties moved for reconsideration of the orders, thus the
RTC issued a consolidated order resolving the said motions. Both parties appealed the RTC
decision to the CA-Visayas, wherein Cebu Citys appeal sas dismissed for failure to file record
on appeal. Cebu moved for reconsideration but was denied, prompting Cebu to file petition for
review which was also denied.
Thereafter, Heirs of Rallos moved for the execution of the July 24, 2001 decision and the
March 21, 2002 consolidated order, with which the RTC granted. However, it was found out that
the RTC erred in executing the decision and the consolidated order, resulting to the Heirs of
Rallos in filing an appeal with the CA to compel RTC to strictly comply with the tenor of the
decision, which appeal was granted by the CA. Subsequently, Cebu City presented an omnibus
motion to quash the writ of execution and to lift the notice of garnishment, but the RTC denied it.
Thus, Cebu City filed a petition for the annulment of the RTCs decisions of January 14, 2000
and July 24, 2001, and the consolidated order dated March 21, 2002 alleging that Vicente

Rallos and his heirs had been obliged under a compromise agreement called convenio, to
donate, cede, and transfer the parcels of land to Cebu City; that Cebu City should not be made
to pay just compensation for the parcels of land in question despite final and executory decision
because the land were donated to Cebu City. Further, Cebu City sought the nullification of the
RTC decisions and consolidated order as well as the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to prevent release of government funds. As such, the case was raffled to
the 18th Division of CA Visayas, which directed Cebu City to rectify defects prior to ruling on
TRO application pending compliance with the order. Thereafter, Cebu City informed CA of its
receipt of the Notice to Parties of Sale on Execution, alleging that the sale on execution could
render the pending proceedings moot and academic, hence a TRO was issued. Soon, several
CA Visayas Justices inhibited from participating in the case.
Cebu City moved for preliminary injunction before the CA, which the CA granted. The
Heirs of Rallos sought for reconsideration. Subsequently, On August 10, 2012, the Court
received a letter-complaint from Rallos requesting an investigation of the allegedly unlawful and
unethical conduct of several CA Visyas Justices in dealing with the controversial case between
the Rolloses and Cebu City. Further, the Court received an affidavit-complaint from Rallos,
charging several CA Visayas Justices that dealt on the case, with administrative and criminal
offenses.
ISSUES:
a. Whether administrative complaints may be filed to assail the erroneous resolution of
stice.
b. Whether the decision was tainted with bias and negligence.
RULING:
Considering that the assailed conduct under both complaints referred to the performance
of their judicial functions by the respondent Justices, we feel compelled to dismiss the
complaints for being improper remedies. We have consistently held that an administrative or
disciplinary complaint is not the proper remedy to assail the judicial acts of magistrates of the
law, particularly those related to their adjudicative functions. Indeed, any errors should be
corrected through appropriate judicial remedies, like appeal in due course or, in the proper
cases, the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition if the errors were jurisdictional. Having
the administrative or disciplinary complaint be an alternative to available appropriate judicial
remedies would be entirely un-procedural. In Pitney v. Abrogar, the Court has forthrightly
expressed the view that extending the immunity from disciplinary action is a matter of policy, for
"to hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment."
In addition, the Court reminds that the disregard of the policy by Rallos would result in
the premature filing of the administrative complaintsa form of abuse of court processes.
In A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA, although Rallos had moved for the reconsideration of the June
26, 2012 resolution, she did not anymore wait for the resolution of the motion for
reconsideration. Instead, she filed the complaint-affidavit. That, too, was impermissible, because
her appropriate recourse was to await the resolution of the motion for reconsideration and then
to appeal should the CA deny the motion. It is to be mentioned, too, that the CA had not yet
resolved Cebu Citys main suit for the annulment of judgment on the merits; hence, it was
premature and unprocedural for her to insist that the respondent Justices could have already

ruled on the grounds for annulment. That resolution should be awaited because the issue on the
validity and effectiveness of the convenio would precisely still require the CAs appreciation of
the convenio as evidence. Nor were the principle of immutability of judgment and the
applicability of any law or jurisprudence to bar Cebu Citys action for annulment of judgment
already in effect, considering that the CA still had to discharge its adjudicatory function
respecting the matter of the validity and effectiveness of the convenio.
Anent the voluntary inhibitions of the respondent Justices concerned, it serves well to
note that Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court set standing guidelines for that purpose. The
guidelines have required just and valid causes to justify voluntary inhibitions. Thereby, the
discretion to decide whether to voluntarily inhibit or not could not be unfettered, for, as fittingly
said in Abrajano v. Heirs of Augusto F. Salas, Jr.:
x x x. The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is laid down in Sec. 1,
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1.Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any
case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided
in ny inferior court when his rulingor decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Thus stated, the rule contemplates two kinds of inhibition: compulsory
disqualification assumes that a judge cannot actively or impartially sit on a case for the reasons
stated in the first paragraph, while voluntary inhibition under the second paragraph leaves to the
judges discretion whether he should desist from sitting in a case for other just and valid reasons
with only his conscience to guide him.
The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion
on the part of the judge. This discretion is an acknowledgement of the fact that judges are in a
better position to determine the issue of inhibition, as they are the ones who directly deal with
the parties-litigants in their courtrooms. The decision on whether he should inhibit himself,
however, must be based on his rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing
in the case brought before him.
The rule does not give the judge the unfettered discretion to decide whether he should
desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The mere
imputation of bias, partiality and prejudgment will not suffice in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to
dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. The disqualification of
a judge cannot be based on mere speculations and surmises or be predicated on the adverse
nature of the judges rulings towards the movant for inhibition.
We do not subscribe to Rallos suggestion that the series of inhibitions in CA-G.R. SP
No. 06676 constituted a scheme to favor Cebu City. She presented no proof to validate her
suggestion. In fact, she herself conceded that she was thereby only voicing out her suspicion of

an irregularity. To stress, their good faith and regularity in the performance of official duties,
which are strong presumptions under our laws, should prevail unless overcome by contrary
proof. Worth noting in that regard is that there was even no valid reason that could have
prohibited the Justices charged in A.M. No. 12-9-08-CAfrom participating in CA-G.R. SP No.
06676. It serves well to consider, too, that none of the respondent Justices charged in IPI No.
12-203-CA-J is anymore participating in CA-G.R. SP No. 06676; and that the respondent
Justices charged in A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA were chosen by raffle as required under pre-existing
rules and regulations to replace the Justices who had meanwhile voluntarily inhibited
themselves from further participation for valid reasons.

WELLER JOPSON v. FABIAN O. MENDEZ, JR. AND DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 191538 , DECEMBER 11, 2013
J. PERALTA
The jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB is only limited to cases involving agrarian
disputes, including incidents arising from the implementation of agrarian laws. For the DARAB
to have jurisdiction over a case, there must be a tenancy relationship between the parties.
Since the dispute between the petitioner and respondent involved a non-agricultural property
and no tenancy relation exists between them, the decisions made by DARAB were without force
and effect.
FACTS:
Spouses Laura and Jose owned a parcel land covered by transfer certificate of title,
which was later or subdivided into 63 lots through a judicially approved subdivision and became
part of Laura Subdivision. As such, the former certificates of title were cancelled and new ones
were issued. Subsequently the spouses conveyed the some 31 parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 986 to respondent DBP via dacion en pago, as evidenced by a Deed of Conveyance of
Real Estate Property Payment Debt and a new certificate of title was issued in its favor. DBP
then published an invitation to bid for the conveyance of the land, which was then sold to
Mendez as the highest bidder causing a new certificate of title to be issued in his name. Later, a
complaint was filed by petitioner Jopson with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) against the respondents for the annulment of sale, preemption/redemption and
reinstatement, alleging that he is the bona fide tenant-farmer of the land sold to Mendez being
the successor of his father Melchor Jopson, who was the original tenant thereof; that upon the
instructions of Mendez, he was unlawfully ejected from the property; and that the sale of the
landholding by DBP to petitioner is void. These allegations were denied by Mendez stating that
Jopson has no cause of action against him, explaining further that PARAD had no jurisdiction
over the case because the land sold was no longer classified as agricultural.
PARAD declared the sale a nullity ordering DBP to execute the necessary transfer in
favour of the Republic, further holding that while the subject landholding is situated within a
district classified as secondary commercial zone and its subdivision was judicially approved, the
same was not duly converted to non-agricultural use as prescribed by law. Respondents moved
for reconsideration which the PARAD granted, thus petitioner appealed with the DARAB which
reversed the PARADs ruling by declaring that there is a tenancy relationship between DBP and
petitioner as evidenced by the sharing of harvest between them. Mendez filed a motion for
reconsideration, while petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CA arguing that the PARAD
and the DARAB gravely abused their discretion in denying his right of redemption. CA denied
petitioners petition and DARAB denied respondents motion for reconsideration. Soon, Mendez
appealed with the CA, which however nullified and set aside DARABs decision. Motion for
reconsideration of the petitioner was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the PARAD and DARAB have jurisdiction over the present case.
RULING:

Anent the second issue, we rule that the PARAD and the DARAB have no jurisdiction
over petitioners claim.
Specifically, the PARAD and the DARAB have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both
original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the
implementation of the CARL under R.A. No. 6657. Thus, the jurisdiction of the PARAD and the
DARAB is only limited to cases involving agrarian disputes, including incidents arising from the
implementation of agrarian laws. Section 3 (d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an agrarian dispute in
this wise:
(d) Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking
to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any
controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under R.A. 6657 and
other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
From the foregoing, it is clear that no agrarian dispute exists in the instant case, since
what is involved is not an agricultural land and no tenancy relationship exists between petitioner
and respondent DBP.
As aptly held by the CA, for the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must be a
tenancy relationship between the parties. Perforce, the ruling of the PARAD, as well as the
decision and resolution of the DARAB which were rendered without jurisdiction, are without
force and effect.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FERDINAND BAUTISTA Y SINAON
G.R. NO. 198113, DECEMBER 11, 2013
J. ABAD
When prosecuting the sale or possession of dangerous drugs like shabu, the State must
prove not only the elements of each of the offenses. It must prove as well the corpus delicti,
failing in which the State will be unable to discharge its basic duty of proving the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.
To prove the corpus delicti, the prosecution must show that the dangerous drugs seized
from the accused and subsequently examined in the laboratory are the same dangerous drugs
presented in court as evidence to prove his guilt. To ensure that this is done right and that the
integrity of the evidence of the dangerous drugs is safeguarded, Congress outlined in Sec. 21 of
R.A. 9165 the mandatory procedure that law enforcers must observe following the seizure of
such substance.
The Court has of course held that non-compliance with the procedural safeguards
provided in Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 and its IRR would not necessarily void the seizure and custody
of the dangerous drugs for as long as there is a justifiable ground for it and the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. As the buy-bust team did not show

the that there was justifiable reason to deviate from the procedure, despite the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty, it must be stressed that the step-by-step procedure
under R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, which cannot be simply brushed aside as a
simple procedural technicality.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Bautista was charged for violation of RA 9165 or the Dangerous
Drugs Acts for selling and possessing illegal drugs. Prosecutions evidence showed that the
Chief of PNP Meycauayan received an information regarding the sale of illegal drugs, led by
Bautista. As such, Bautista was put through surveillance and upon confirmation of the
information, police officers Tadeo, Viesca, Santos, and Mendoza were ordered to conduct a buybust operation against Bautista. In the operation, Tadeo approached Bautistas house while the
others positioned themselves nearby. Tadeo was successful in buying shabu from Bautista
leading to the arrest of the latter. During the arrest, Bautista had a lady-companion named
Rocel, from whom Viesca recovered plastics of shabu. Bautista was also asked to take out the
contents of his pocket, which revealed the marked money and plastics of shabu. Viesca marked
the shabu recovered from Rocel while Tadeo marked the plastics of shabu from the buy-bust
operation and the other plastics recovered from Bautista. Thereafter, it was sent for forensic
examination, which proved positive.
On the contrary, Bautista and Rocel denied the charges setting up the defense that
armed men trespassed their house demanding for Bautista, asking Bautista whether he was
Jerry and immediately handcuffed him. They countered that they were false accused of the
criminal charge because Bautista was accused of stealing coins from Tadeos videokarera.
The RTC found Bautista guilty of the crime charged but acquitted Rocel for lack of
required proof to sustain conviction. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arresting officers preserved the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items despite their failure to observe the mandatory procedural requirements of Sec.
21 of R.A. 9165 and its IRR.
RULING:
When prosecuting the sale or possession of dangerous drugs like shabu, the State must
prove not only the elements of each of the offenses. It must prove as well the corpus delicti,
failing in which the State will be unable to discharge its basic duty of proving the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.
To prove the corpus delicti, the prosecution must show that the dangerous drugs seized
from the accused and subsequently examined in the laboratory are the same dangerous drugs
presented in court as evidence to prove his guilt. To ensure that this is done right and that the
integrity of the evidence of the dangerous drugs is safeguarded, Congress outlined in Sec. 21 of
R.A. 9165 the mandatory procedure that law enforcers must observe following the seizure of
such substance.
Clearly, the Congress and the Executive Department demand strict compliance of the
procedure. It is only by such strict compliance that the grave mischiefs of planting evidence or

substituting it may be eradicated. Such strict compliance is also consistent with the doctrine that
penal laws shall be construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the
accused.
The first stage after seizure is the taking of inventory of the dangerous drugs seized from
the suspect. It begins with the marking of the seized objects to fix its identity. Such marking
should be made as far as practicable in the presence of the suspect immediately upon his
arrest. Of course, the failure to mark the seized items at the place of arrest does not of itself
impair the integrity of the chain of custody and render the confiscated items inadmissible in
evidence. Marking upon "immediate" confiscation can reasonably cover marking done at the
nearest police station or office of the apprehending team, especially when the place of seizure is
volatile and could draw unpredictable reactions from its surroundings.
The law requires the apprehending officer or team to conduct a physical inventory of the
seized items and take photograph of the same in the presence of the accused, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given copies of the same.
PO1 Tadeo categorically admitted that no elected official was present when the police
made the arrest and when they conducted their investigation. PO1 Viesca admitted that no
representative from the media or the DOJ were present during the inventory of the seized items.
Further, although the prosecution witnesses averred that the physical inventory of the
seized items was recorded in the police blotter, it did not bother to present a copy of the same
with the required signatures or submit some valid justification for the omission.
What is more, both PO1 Tadeo and PO1 Viesca were uncertain regarding whether they
photographed the seized items. In fact, they failed to produce any such photograph. This is
either sloppy police work or utter refusal to comply with what is required of them. The
prosecution should not have filed the case absent proof of compliance with what the law
requires.
The Court has of course held that non-compliance with the procedural safeguards
provided in Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 and its IRR would not necessarily void the seizure and custody
of the dangerous drugs for as long as there is a justifiable ground for it and the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. Here, however, the buy-bust team
did not bother to show that they "intended to comply with the procedure but where thwarted by
some justifiable reason or consideration." Accordingly, despite the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty, this Court stresses that the step-by-step procedure outlined
under R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, which cannot be simply brushed aside as a
simple procedural technicality.

ADVANCE PAPER CORPORATION AND GEORGE HAW v. ARMA TRADERS

CORPORATION
G.R. NO.176897, DECEMBER 11, 2013
J. BRION
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC dated February 19, 2008 which refer to the amendment of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice. It deleted the Community Tax Certificate among the accepted proof of
identity of the affiant because of its inherent unreliability. Nevertheless, the defective jurat in the
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping is not a fatal defect because it is only a formal,
not a jurisdictional, requirement that the Court may waive. Furthermore, we cannot simply
ignore the millions of pesos at stake in this case. To do so might cause grave injustice to a
party, a situation that this Court intends to avoid.
The rule is that failure to object to the offered evidence renders it admissible, and the court
cannot, on its own, disregard such evidence. When a party desires the court to reject the
evidence offered, it must so state in the form of a timely objection and it cannot raise the
objection to the evidence for the first time on appeal. However, hearsay evidence whether
objected to or not cannot be given credence for having no probative value. This principle,
however, has been relaxed in cases where, in addition to the failure to object to the admissibility
of the subject evidence, there were other pieces of evidence presented or there were other
circumstances prevailing to support the fact in issue. However, since the testimony of Haw was
based not on his personal knowledge as he was not present during the documents preparation,
his testimony was hearsay. Further, the documents does not fall under the exception to the
hearsay rule, but for failure to timely object on the matter, the sales invoice formed part of the
records of the case.
The issue of credibility of witnesses is to be resolved primarily by the trial court because it is in
the better position to assess the credibility of witnesses as it heard the testimonies and
observed the deportment and manner of testifying of the witnesses. Accordingly, its findings are
entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that
the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
and substance which would have affected the result of the case.
FACTS:
On various dates, Arma Traders, upon the representation of Tan and Uy, purchased on
credit paper products from Advance Paper. Having good business relations, Arma Traders was
able to obtain 3 loans from Advance Paper for the settlement of its obligations to its other
suppliers, and as payment for the transactions, Arma Traders issued some 82 post-dated check,
bearing the signatures of Tan and Uy, payable to cash or to Advance Paper. Later, Advance
Paper presented the checks to the drawee bank but were dishonored either for "insufficiency of
funds" or "account closed." Despite repeated demands, Arma Traders failed to settle its account
with Advance Paper, prompting Advance Paper to file a complaint for collection of sum of money
against respondents Arma Traders, Tan, Uy, Ting, Gui, and Ng.
The petitioners claimed that the respondents fraudulently issued the postdated checks
as payment for the purchases and loan transactions knowing that they did not have sufficient
funds with the drawee banks., to which the respondents argued that the purchases on
credit were spurious, simulated and fraudulent since there was no delivery of the paper

products. The respondents also claimed that the loan transactions were ultra vires because the
board of directors of Arma Traders did not issue a board resolution authorizing Tan and Uy to
obtain the loans from Advance Paper. The respondents accused Tan and Uy for conspiring with
the petitioners to defraud Arma Traders through a series of transactions known as rediscounting
of postdated checks.
The RTC ruled that the purchases on credit and loans were sufficiently proven by the
petitioners, which decision was appealed to the CA. The CA held that the petitioners failed to
prove by preponderance of evidence the existence of the purchases on credit and loans, hence
this petition. The petitioners argue that Haws testimony is not hearsay, emphasizing that Haw
has personal knowledge of the purchases and loan transactions, and stressing that the
respondents never objected to the admissibility of the sales invoices on the ground that they
were hearsay. On the contrary, respondents argue that the Petition for Review should be
dismissed summarily for failure to comply with A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
ISSUES:
a. Whether the petition for review should be dismissed.
b. Whether failure to object to evidence presented would render hearsay evidence
admissible.
c. Whether there was preponderance of evidence.
RULING:
a. First, the respondents correctly cited A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC dated February 19, 2008
which refer to the amendment of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. It deleted the
Community Tax Certificate among the accepted proof of identity of the affiant because of
its inherent unreliability. The petitioners violated this when they used Community Tax
Certificate No. 05730869 in their Petition for Review. Nevertheless, the defective jurat in
the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping is not a fatal defect because it is
only a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement that the Court may waive. Furthermore,
we cannot simply ignore the millions of pesos at stake in this case. To do so might cause
grave injustice to a party, a situation that this Court intends to avoid.
Second, no less than the CA itself waived the rules on the period to file the motion for
reconsideration. A review of the CA Resolution dated March 7, 2007, reveals that the petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration was denied because the allegations were a mere rehash of what the
petitioners earlier argued not because the motion for reconsideration was filed out of time.
b. The rule is that failure to object to the offered evidence renders it admissible, and the
court cannot, on its own, disregard such evidence. When a party desires the court to
reject the evidence offered, it must so state in the form of a timely objection and it cannot
raise the objection to the evidence for the first time on appeal. Because of a partys
failure to timely object, the evidence becomes part of the evidence in the case.
Thereafter, all the parties are considered bound by any outcome arising from the offer of
evidence properly presented.
Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for having no
probative value. This principle, however, has been relaxed in cases where, in addition to the
failure to object to the admissibility of the subject evidence, there were other pieces of evidence
presented or there were other circumstances prevailing to support the fact in issue.

We agree with the respondents that with respect to the identification of the sales
invoices, Haws testimony was hearsay because he was not present during its preparation and
the secretaries who prepared them were not presented to identify them in court. Further, these
sales invoices do not fall within the exceptions to the hearsay rule even under the "entries in the
course of business" because the petitioners failed to show that the entrant was deceased or
was unable to testify.
But even though the sales invoices are hearsay, nonetheless, they form part of the
records of the case for the respondents failure to object as to the admissibility of the sales
invoices on the ground that they are hearsay. Based on the records, the respondents through
Ng objected to the offer "for the purpose to which they are being offered" only not on the
ground that they were hearsay.
c. Additionally, the issue of credibility of witnesses is to be resolved primarily by the trial
court because it is in the better position to assess the credibility of witnesses as it heard
the testimonies and observed the deportment and manner of testifying of the witnesses.
Accordingly, its findings are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal
in the absence of any showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which would have
affected the result of the case.
In the present case, the RTC judge took into consideration the substance and the
manner by which Haw answered each propounded questions to him in the witness stand.
Hence, the minor inconsistencies in Haws testimony notwithstanding, the RTC held that the
respondents claim that the purchase and loan transactions were spurious is "not worthy of
serious consideration." Besides, the respondents failed to convince us that the RTC judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
which would have affected the result of the case.
On the other hand, we agree with the petitioners that the discrepancies in the photocopy
of the sales invoices and its duplicate copy have been sufficiently explained. Besides, this is
already a non-issue since the duplicate copies were surrendered in the RTC. Furthermore, the
fact that the value of Arma Traders' checks does not tally with the total amount of their obligation
with Advance Paper is not inconsistent with the existence of the purchases and loan
transactions.
As against the case and the evidence Advance Paper presented, the respondents relied
on the core theory of an alleged conspiracy between Tan, Uy and Haw to defraud Arma Traders.
However, the records are bereft of supporting evidence to prove the alleged conspiracy. Instead,
the respondents simply dwelled on the minor inconsistencies from the petitioners' evidence that
the respondents appear to have magnified. From these perspectives, the preponderance of
evidence thus lies heavily in the petitioners' favor as the RTC found. For this reason, we find the
petition meritorious.

MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG v. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING

CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 190566, DECEMBER 11, 2013
J. VILLARAMA, JR.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to
seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the
means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy
should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought.
However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it
admits of the following exceptions: (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the
issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent
is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would
be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject
matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12)
where no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political
agency applies and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has
been rendered moot.
FACTS:
Petitioner was a teller at Casino Filipino, which was operated by PAGCOR. Petitioner
alleged that while he was performing his functions as a teller, one customer named Cecilia
approached him and handed to him some money in bills, and following the casino procedure, he
laid the bills but made an error in declaring that the amount totalled to P40,000.00. With this,
Cecilia asked petitioner to check the bills, to which petitioner complied and soon apologized for
the mistake. However, petitioner claimed that Cecilia accused him of shortchanging and
continuously berated him as a person. As a result, the casinos security invited them to settle the
issue and petitioner was required to file an incident report, to which petitioner did on the same
day.
Petitioner received a Memorandum from the casino Manager, informing petitioner that he
was being charged with Discourtesy towards a casino customer and directing him to explain
within 72 hours upon receipt of the memorandum. To comply, petitioner submitted his letterexplanation but still received another Memorandum, stating that the respondents Board have
found him guilty, imposing on petitioner a 30-day suspension. Motion for reconsideration was
filed praying that if he is indeed guilty, the penalty should only be a reprimand, but such was
denied. Later, PAGCOR issued another Memorandum which reiterated the contents of its earlier
Memorandum. With this, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA,
wherein he averred that there is no evidence, much less factual and legal basis to support the
finding of guilt against him, and that the decision of PAGCOR was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion as it failed to observe the proper procedure in the rendition of its decision and in

imposing the harsh penalty. The CA dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust administrative
remedy.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA was correct in outrightly dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before
it on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
RULING:
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to
seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the
means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy
should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought. The premature
invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of action. The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will
shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and
complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its
error and dispose of the case.
However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it
admits of the following exceptions:
(1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal
question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5)
when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts
as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when
to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would
amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and
unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no administrative
review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies and (14)
where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.
The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se
provides no administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner
is covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not
more than 30 days.
In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law in view of petitioner's allegation that PAGCOR has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the CA's outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing and should therefore be set
aside.

UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK v. CHRISTOPHER LUMBO AND MILAGROS LUMBO

G.R. NO. 162757, DECEMBER 11, 2013
J. BERSAMIN
If the redemption period expires without the mortgagor or his successor-in-interest
redeeming the foreclosed property within one year from the registration of the sale with the
Register of Deeds, the title over the property consolidates in the purchaser. The consolidation
confirms the purchaser as the owner entitled to the possession of the property without any need
for him to file the bond required under Section 7 of Act No. 3135. The issuance of a writ of
possession to the purchaser becomes a matter of right upon the consolidation of title in his
name, while the mortgagor, by failing to redeem, loses all interest in the property.
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a party
who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be protected. It
is proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint,
which must aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right, or whose averments
must in the minimum constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief sought.
Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be
protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and
(c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. An
injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and
may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent
the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction,
means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.
FACTS:
Respondents loaned from UCPB secured by a real estate mortgage on a beach resort
they own. However, the respondents failed to settle the obligation necessitating UCPB to extrajudicially foreclose the property and thereby emerged as the highest bidder at the foreclosure
sale, to which certificate of sale was issued. For failure of the respondents to redeem the
property within the redemetion perion, title thereto was consolidated in the name of UCPB. As
such, respondents brought an action for annulment of the foreclosure sale and injunction
against UCPB. Pending resolution thereof, UCPB filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession to recover the property, which the RTC granted. Writ of possession was
served to the respondents with a demand to vacate peacefully. Possession was then turned
over to UCPB, though the respondents were temporarily allowed to remain on the property.
Subsequently, the respondents filed a petition to cancel writ of possession and to set aside the
foreclosure sale with a prayer for temporary restraining order to prevent the implementation of
the writ of possession, which petition the RTC denied. Respondents then brought the matter to
the CA via certiorari and/or mandamus petition, which the CA granted. UCPB sought for
reconsideration but was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly granted the injunctive writ to enjoin the implementation of the
writ of possession the RTC had issued to place UCPB in the possession of the mortgaged
property.

RULING:
With particular reference to an extra-judicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under
Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale may apply ex
parte with the RTC of the province or place where the property or any part of it is situated, to
give the purchaser possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an
amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the
debtor should it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without
complying with the requirements of Act No. 3135; and the RTC, upon approval of the bond,
order that a writ of possession be issued, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the
property is situated, who shall then execute said order immediately. We underscore that the
application for a writ of possession by the purchaser in a foreclosure sale conducted under Act
No. 3135 is ex parte and summary in nature, brought for the benefit of one party only and
without notice being sent by the court to any person adverse in interest. The relief is granted
even without giving an opportunity to be heard to the person against whom the relief is
sought. Its nature as an ex parte petition under Act No. 3135, as amended, renders the
application for the issuance of a writ of possession a non-litigious proceeding. Indeed, the grant
of the writ of possession is but a ministerial act on the part of the issuing court, because its
issuance is a matter of right on the part of the purchaser. The judge issuing the order for the
granting of the writ of possession pursuant to the express provisions of Act No. 3135 cannot be
charged with having acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
The reckoning of the period of redemption by the mortgagor or his successor-in-interest
starts from the registration of the sale in the Register of Deeds. Although Section 6 of Act No.
3135, as amended, specifies that the period of redemption starts from and after the date of the
sale, jurisprudence has since settled that such period is more appropriately reckoned from the
date of registration.
If the redemption period expires without the mortgagor or his successor-in-interest
redeeming the foreclosed property within one year from the registration of the sale with the
Register of Deeds, the title over the property consolidates in the purchaser. The consolidation
confirms the purchaser as the owner entitled to the possession of the property without any need
for him to file the bond required under Section 7 of Act No. 3135. The issuance of a writ of
possession to the purchaser becomes a matter of right upon the consolidation of title in his
name, while the mortgagor, by failing to redeem, loses all interest in the property.
The property was sold at the public auction on January 12, 1999, with UCPB as the
highest bidder. The sheriff issued the certificate of sale to UCPB on the same day of the sale.
Considering that UCPB registered the certificate of sale in its name on February 18, 1999, the
period of redemption was one year from said date. By virtue of the non-redemption by the
respondents within said period, UCPB consolidated the title over the property in its name.
It is clear enough, therefore, that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion but
acted in accordance with the law and jurisprudence in denying the respondents application for
the injunctive writ filed on February 14, 2002 in Special Proceedings No. 5884 to prevent the
implementation of the writ of possession issued on December 4, 2001.
Further, a preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a
person to refrain from a particular a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of
a particular act or acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, a

prohibitory injunction is one that commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act, while a
mandatory injunction commands the performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in the
past.
Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction may be justified under circumstances. A right is in esse if it exists in fact. In the case
of injunction, the right sought to be protected should at least be shown to exist prima facie.
Unless such a showing is made, the applicant is not entitled to an injunctive relief. In City
Government of Butuan v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), Inc., the Court has
stressed the essential significance of the applicant for injunction holding a right in esse to be
protected, stating:
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a party
who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be protected. It
is proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint,
which must aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right, or whose averments
must in the minimum constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief sought.
Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be
protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and
(c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. An
injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and
may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent
the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction,
means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.
However, the respondents made no such showing of their holding a right in esse. They
could not do so simply because their non-redemption within the period of redemption had lost
for them any right in the property, including its possession. The absence of a right in esse on
their part furnishes a compelling reason to undo the CA's reversal of the RTC's denial of their
application for injunction as well as to strike down the injunctive relief the CA afforded to the
respondents. It cannot be otherwise, for they had no "right clearly founded on or granted by law
or is enforceable as a matter of law".
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), AND
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC),
G.R. NO. 201715, DECEMBER 11, 2013
J. BERSAMIN
Consistently with the mandatory character of the pre-trial, the Rules oblige not only the
lawyers but the parties as well to appear for this purpose before the Court, and when a party
"fails to appear at a pre-trial conference be may be non-suited or considered as in default. The
obligation in appear denotes not simply the personal appearance, or the mere physical
presentation by a party of ones self, but connotes as importantly, preparedness to go into the
different subject assigned by law to a pre-trial.
Petitioners State Solicitors initial attendance during the pre-trial conference could not
be equated to the personal appearance mandated by Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.
The duty to appear during the pre-trial conference is not by mere initial attendance, but taking
an active role during the said proceedings.
FACTS:

MERALCO and NAPOCOR had entered into a contract for the sale of electricity (CSE)
effective for 10 years starting from January 1, 1995, wherein NAPOCOR was obliged to supply
and MERALCO was obliged to purchase a minimum volume of electric power and energy at
rates approved by the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC). Included in the CSE is a
provision requiring MERALCO to pay minimum monthly charges even if the actual volume of the
power and energy drawn from NAPOCOR fell below the stated minimum quantities. However,
on 2002, 2003 and 2004, due to circumstances MERALCO drew from NAPOCOR electric
power and energy less than the minimum quantities stipulated in the CSE, hence MERALCO
only paid the charges for the electric power and energy actually taken. With this, NAPOCOR
claimed from MERALCO the contracted but undrawn electric power and energy, to which
MERALCO objected and served notice of CSE termination.
Subsequently, the parties submitted their dispute to mediation, wherein a settlement
agreement was reached, covering the charges imposed by NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, and
also the payment agreed to by MERALCO. The settlement agreement was then filed via petition
with the ERC, seeking the approval of the settlement agreement. Nonetheless, almost two years
after the case was submitted for resolution, the OSG, representing the petitioner, filed in the
ERC a motion for leave to intervene with motion to admit its attached opposition to the validity of
the Settlement Agreement. As such ERC suspended the proceedings and deferred approval of
the application, prompting MERALCO in filing an action for declaratory relief before the RTC, to
which NAPOCOR prayed for resort to arbitration. Also, OSG moved to suspend the RTC
proceedings but was denied, hence a motion to dismiss or to stay proceedings and to refer
parties to arbitration was filed, which however, was also denied. Later, pre-trial was held but the
presiding Judge of the RTC reset the proceedings due to non-appearance of the OSG
representative. With this, the OSG filed a motion to cancel pre-trial and a motion for the
inhibition of the RTC Judge, further bringing petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in
the CA alleging that respondent RTC Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion, but was
denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
The RTCs proceeding with the pre-trial set on November 24, 2010 was entirely in
accord with the Rules of Court. While it is true that the OSG had filed on November 22, 2010 the
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, the CA did not restrain the RTC from thus
proceeding. Absent any TRO or WPI stopping the RTC from proceeding, the mere filing or
pendency of the special civil actions for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition did not interrupt
the due course of the proceedings in the main case. This is quite clear from the revised Section
7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which mandated that the petition shall not interrupt the course
of the principal case.
As the foregoing rule also indicates, for the RTC not to proceed with the pre-trial on its
scheduled date of November 24, 2010 despite the absence of any TRO or WPI enjoining it from
doing so could have subjected its Presiding Judge to an administrative charge.
We further concur with the holding of the CA that the RTC did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in deeming the petitioners right to

participate in the pre-trial and its right to present evidence as waived through the third assailed
pre-trial order dated November 24, 2010. The waiver appears to have been caused by the
deliberate refusal of the petitioners counsel to participate in the proceedings.
The TSN belies petitioners claim that despite its State Solicitors appearance and
objection to the holding of the said hearing of 24 November 2010, public respondent proceeded
to declare petitioner in default. A quo, public respondent did not categorically declare petitioner
in default, but instead, decreed petitioner to have waived its right to participate in the pre-trial
and present evidence in its behalf which is in accordance with Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court for the apparent reason that State Solicitor Lazo himself asked to be excused from
participating in the pre-trial conference. The case of Development Bank of the Philippines vs.
Court of Appeals, et al. is enlightening on this point where the Supreme Court had the occasion
to state therein that:
"Consistently with the mandatory character of the pre-trial, the Rules oblige not only the
lawyers but the parties as well to appear for this purpose before the Court, and when a party
"fails to appear at a pre-trial conference be may be non-suited or considered as in default. The
obligation in appear denotes not simply the personal appearance, or the mere physical
presentation by a party of ones self, but connotes as importantly, preparedness to go into the
different subject assigned by law to a pre-trial.
Petitioners State Solicitors initial attendance during the pre-trial conference could not be
equated to the personal appearance mandated by Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The
duty to appear during the pre-trial conference is not by mere initial attendance, but taking an
active role during the said proceedings. Petitioner has no valid reason to complain for its
predicament now as it chose to withhold its participation during the pre-trial conference.
From an objective view of the proceedings, the RTCs deeming of the petitioners right to
participate in the pre-trial and its right to present evidence as waived was reasonable under the
circumstances. Thus, it did not act arbitrarily, whimsically, or capriciously. The dismissal of the
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was correct and justified, for grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC was not persuasively demonstrated by the petitioner. Grave
abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent
judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined
or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE HON. JUANITO CASTANEDA, JR., ET AL.

G.R. NO. 208290; DECEMBER 11, 2013
Per Curiam
In the absence of any convincing justification, a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 filed
a month late from the lapse of the period to file the same will not warrant the relaxation of the
Rules. Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit in stating that certiorari
should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution
sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that
would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case. While

there are recognized exceptions to such strict observance, there should be an effort on the part
of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her
failure to comply with the rules
FACTS:
Garcia and Custodio Vestidas were charged before the CTA for the violation of Sections
2503 and 2530 (f) (i) and 1, (3) (4) and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines.
According to the Information, Garcia and Vestidas as owner/proprietress and broker of Plinth
Enterprise respectively, fraudulently imported into the Port of Manila 17,160 pieces of Anti-Virus
Software Kaspersky Internet Security which were inside a container van falsely declared to
contain 40 pallets of CD kit cleaner and plastic CD case. It was alleged therein that the imported
items have customs duties amounting to P3,341,245, of which only the amount of P100,362
was paid.
During the trial, The prosecution presented a number of witnesses who essentially
observed the physical examination of container van conducted by the Bureau of Customs
(BOC) and explained the process of electronic filing under the Electronic to Mobile (E2M)
Customs Systems of the BOC and the alleged misdeclared goods therein. Garcia and Vestidas
filed their Omnibus Motion to File Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court, which was granted
by the CA. Thereafter they filed the Demurrer to Evidence claiming that the prosecution failed to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the reason that the pieces of documentary
evidence submitted by the prosecution were inadmissible in court, the object evidence
consisting of the allegedly misdeclared goods were not presented as evidence and none of the
witnesses made a positive identification of the two accused as the ones responsible for the
supposed misdeclaration.
Subsequently, the CTA dismissed the case against Garcia and Vestidas for failure of the
prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution filed its motion for
reconsideration, but was denied. On July 24, 2013, the Run After the Smugglers (RATS) Group,
Revenue Collection Monitoring Group (RCMG), as counsel for the BOC, received a copy of the
July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of judgment in the case. Subsequently, a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition was filed within the reglementary period.
RULING:
The petition was filed beyond the reglementary period for the filing thereof under Rule
65. The petition itself stated that a copy of the May 15, 2013 Resolution was received by the
BOC two (2) days after its promulgation, or on May 17, 2013. Nonetheless, the RATS was only
alerted by the developments in the case on July 24, 2013, when Atty. Danilo M. Campos Jr.
(Atty. Campos) received the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of judgment
in the case, considering that no appeal was taken by any of the parties.
Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit in stating that certiorari
should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution
sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that
would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case. While there

are recognized exceptions to such strict observance, there should be an effort on the part of the
party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to
comply with the rules.
In the case at bench, no convincing justification for the belated filing of the petition was
advanced to warrant the relaxation of the Rules. Notably, the records show that the petition was
filed only on August 12, 2013, or almost a month late from the due date which fell on July 16,
2013. To excuse this grave procedural lapse will not only be unfair to the other party, but it will
also sanction a seeming rudimentary attempt to circumvent standing rules of procedure. Suffice
it to say, the reasons proffered by the petitioner do not carry even a tinge of merit that would
deserve leniency.
The late filing of the petition was borne out of the petitioners failure to monitor incoming
court processes that needed to be addressed by the office. Clearly, this is an admission of
inefficiency, if not lack of zeal, on the part of an office tasked to effectively curb smuggling
activities which rob the government of millions of revenue every year.
The display of patent violations of even the elementary rules leads the Court to suspect
that the case against Garcia and Vestidas Jr. was doomed by design from the start. The failure
to present the certified true copies of documentary evidence; the failure to competently and
properly identify the misdeclared goods; the failure to identify the accused in court; and, worse,
the failure to file this petition on time challenging a judgment of acquittal, are tell-tale signs of a
reluctant and subdued attitude in pursuing the case. This stance taken by the lawyers in
government service rouses the Courts vigilance against inefficiency in the administration of
justice. Verily, the lawyers representing the offices under the executive branch should be
reminded that they still remain as officers of the court from whom a high sense of competence
and fervor is expected. The Court will not close its eyes to this sense of apathy in RATS
lawyers, lest the governments goal of revenue enhancement continues to suffer the blows of
smuggling and similar activities.
JANUARY 2014
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR SHANG KO
VINGSON YU SHIRLY VINGSON SHIRLY VINGSON DEMAISIP v. JOVY CABCABAN
UDK no. 14817, January 13, 2014
J. Abad
Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available,
not only in cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, but also in cases involving the rightful custody over a minor. The general rule is that
parents should have custody over their minor children. But the State has the right to intervene
where the parents, rather than care for such children, treat them cruelly and abusively, impairing
their growth and well-being and leaving them emotional scars that they carry throughout their
lives unless they are liberated from such parents and properly counselled.
FACTS:
Shirly alleged that Shang Ko, her 14-year-old daughter, ran away from home causing
Shirly to go to the police station in Bacolod City, upon receipt of information that Shang Ko was
in the custody of respondent Cabcaban, a police officer in that station. Since Cabcaban refused
to release Shang Ko to her, Shirly sought the help of the NBI to rescue her child. Later, Agent

Pura informed Shirly that Shang Ko was no longer with Cabcaban but was staying with a private
organization called Calvary Kids. Pura told her, however, that the child was fine and had been
attending school. With this Shirly filed a petition for habeas corpus against Cabcaban and the
unnamed officers of Calvary Kids before the CA rather than the RTC citing as reason several
threats against her life in that city. The CA denied the petition for its failure to clearly allege who
has custody of Shang Ko, further explaining that habeas corpus may not be used as a means of
obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person or who has specifically abducted or caused
the disappearance of such person. Motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus is available in custody cases.
RULING:
Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available,
not only in cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, but also in cases involving the rightful custody over a minor. The general rule is that
parents should have custody over their minor children. But the State has the right to intervene
where the parents, rather than care for such children, treat them cruelly and abusively, impairing
their growth and well-being and leaving them emotional scars that they carry throughout their
lives unless they are liberated from such parents and properly counselled.
Since this case presents factual issues and since the parties are all residents of Bacolod
City, it would be best that such issues be resolved by a Family Court in that city. Meantime,
considering the presumption that the police authorities acted regularly in placing Shang Ko in
the custody of Calvary Kids the Court believes that she should remain there pending hearing
and adjudication of this custody case. Besides she herself has expressed preference to stay in
that place.
WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION AND CHERRYLL L. YU v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY
G.R. NO. 161106, January 13, 2014
CJ. Sereno
A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A
search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special
and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.
Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action, hence, the conformity
of the public prosecutor is not necessary before an aggrieved party moves for reconsideration
of an order granting a motion to quash search warrants.
When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial
judge, the finding is accorded respect by reviewing courts. It is presumed that a judicial function
has been regularly performed, absent a showing to the contrary. However, a trial judges finding
of probable cause may be set aside and the search warrant issued by him based on his finding
may be quashed if the person against whom the warrant is issued presents clear and
convincing evidence that when the police officers and witnesses testified, they committed a
deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth on matters that are essential or
necessary to a showing of probable cause. On the other hand, innocent and negligent
omissions or misrepresentation of witnesses will not cause the quashal of a search warrant.

The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of description is
not required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the
identity of the property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere
roving commission. A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of
the things to be seized when the things described are limited to those that bear a direct relation
to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.
FACTS:
Police Chief Inspector Villegas of PNP-RISOO filed applications for warrants before the
RTC of Quezon City to search the office premises of petitioner WWC located at the 11th floor,
IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Libis, Quezon City, as well as the office premises of
petitioner Planet Internet located at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue,
Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City. The applications alleged that petitioners were conducting
illegal toll bypass operations amounting to theft and violation of PD 401 (Penalizing the
Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered
Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the damage and prejudice of respondent PLDT.
Subsequently, the trial court conducted a hearing on the applications for search warrants,
wherein the applicant, Rivera, and Gali of PLDT testified as witnesses.
According to the witnesses, before an international call can be considered legitimate, the
international call should first pass through the local exchange or public switch telephone
network (PSTN) on to the toll center or one of the international gateway facilities (IGFs) in the
Philippines. After which it is then transmitted to the other country through voice circuits before it
passes the toll center of one of the IGFs in the detination country, and the toll center would
meter the call passing through the PSTN of the dialled number as completion. This process
however, was allegedly bypassed by petitioner by rerouting the calls but using PLDTs
telephone line.
During the hearing, the trial court required the identification of the office premises/units
to be searched, as well as their floor plans showing the location of particular computers and
servers that would be taken. Later, the RTC granted the search warrant application, which
warrants were implemented by the RISOO operatives on the same day of warrant issuance.
Upon the warrants implementation, hundreds of items were seized, to which petitioners filed a
motion to quash the search warrants citing that the warrants were issued without probable
cause; the act complained of was not a crime; and the warrants were general warrants thus, the
objects seized pursuant thereto were fruits of the poisonous tree. With this, PLDT filed its
opposition, but the RTC granted the petitioners motion to quash. Motion for reconsideration was
denied prompting PLDT to appeal to the CA, which reversed the RTC Resolution. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration but was denied, thus petition for certiorari under Rule 45 was filed to
assail CA decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether conformity of the public prosecutor is necessary, to gain personality to question
the quashal of search warrant.
2. Whether an appeal lies in case of an order quashing the search warrant.
3. Whether there is probable cause on the issuance of the search warrants where the acts
complained of do not constitute theft.

4. Whether the search warrants are general warrants.

RULING:
Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states the general rule that the public
prosecutor has direction and control of the prosecution of "all criminal actions commenced by a
complaint or information." However, a search warrant is obtained, not by the filing of a complaint
or an information, but by the filing of an application therefor.
An application for a search warrant is a "special criminal process," rather than a criminal
action. The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the
obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial
court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue which
is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in
specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and
purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the
institution of a criminal action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely
constitutes process. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made
necessary because of a public necessity. Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not
a criminal action.
An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as an incident in a
main criminal case already filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to be filed. Whether the
criminal case (of which the search warrant is an incident) has already been filed before the trial
court is significant for the purpose of determining the proper remedy from a grant or denial of a
motion to quash a search warrant.
Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case, as it was
in Marcelo, the quashal of a search warrant is merely interlocutory. There is still "something
more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused
therein."
Thus, the CA correctly ruled that Marcelo does not apply to this case. Here, the
applications for search warrants were instituted as principal proceedings and not as incidents to
pending criminal actions. When the search warrants issued were subsequently quashed by the
RTC, there was nothing left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the search
warrants were final orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly taken therefrom.
There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause in the issuance of search
warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial judges in the process of
exercising their judicial function. They determine probable cause based on "evidence showing
that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed" by the
offender.
On the other hand, innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of witnesses
will not cause the quashal of a search warrant. In this case, the testimonies of Rivera and Gali
that the test calls they conducted did not pass through PLDTs IGF are true. They neglected,
however, to look into the possibility that the test calls may have passed through other IGFs in

the Philippines, which was exactly what happened. Nevertheless, the witnesses did not commit
a deliberate falsehood. On this score, the quashal of the search warrants is not in order.
A general warrant is defined as "(a) search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the
person to be arrested or the property to be seized." It is one that allows the "seizure of one thing
under a warrant describing another" and gives the officer executing the warrant the discretion
over which items to take.
Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is
issued, vulnerable to abuses. Our Constitution guarantees our right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and safeguards have been put in place to ensure that people and their
properties are searched only for the most compelling and lawful reasons.
The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of
description is not required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and
certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant
shall not be a mere roving commission.
In this case, considering that items that looked like "innocuous goods" were being used
to pursue an illegal operation that amounts to theft, law enforcement officers would be hard put
to secure a search warrant if they were required to pinpoint items with one hundred percent
precision.
To our mind, PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to be searched as
identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of its telephone services and business. Prior to
the application for the search warrants, Rivera conducted ocular inspection of the premises of
petitioners a d was then able to confirm that they had utilized various telecommunications
equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers,
PABX or switching equipment, a d support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes,
manuals and other documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass operations."

DENNIS T. VILLAREAL v. CONSUELO C. ALIGA

G.R. NO 166995, JANUARY 13, 2014
J. Peralta
A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However, in such case,
the People is burdened to establish that the court a quo, acted without jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. No grave abuse of discretion
may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged misapplication of facts and evidence,
and erroneous conclusions based on said evidence. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of
jurisdiction, and not errors or mistakes in the findings and conclusions of the trial court.
However, the rule against double jeopardy is not without exceptions, which are: (1) Where there
has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where
there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances. In the case, there
is no deprivation of due process or a mistrial committed against petitioner, and that no grave
abuse of discretion could be attributed to the CA, hence the rule against double jeopardy
operates making the judgment of acquittal final and no longer appealable.

FACTS:
In an information for the crime of Qualified Theft thru Falsification of Commercial
Document filed against Aliga, it was alleged that Aliga, then acoountant of Dentrade Inc., stole a
UCPB check and thereafter falsified the amount indicated therein to be encashed and further
misappropriating the amount for personal use and benefit. Upon arraignment, Aliga pleaded not
guilty hence trial ensued. The prosecution presented its witnesses and documentary evidence
to support the charge against Aliga. The RTC found Aliga guilty of the crime charged but
absolved her from civil liability. As such, Aliga appealed to the CA, which reversed the RTC
decision, explaining that Aligas admission or confession before the NBI, having been a
custodial investigation, is inadmissible in evidence because Aliga was not informed of her rights
to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of her own choice.
Further, the CA declared that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is
insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence of the Aliga. Motion for reconsideration
was denied, thus petition for certiorari under Rule 45 was filed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petition for certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper remedy in assailing judgment
of acquittal.
2. Whether double jeopardy arises when judgment of acquittal is assailed.
RULING:
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules should have been filed instead of herein
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The People may assail a judgment of acquittal
only via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. If the petition, regardless of its
nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the
constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy would be violated.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are two and separate remedies. A petition under
Rule 45 brings up for review errors of judgment, while a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
covers errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground under Rule 45. A petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal. Under Section 1 of the said
Rule, a party aggrieved by the decision or final order of the Sandiganbayan may file a petition
for review on certiorari with this Court. However, the provision must be read in relation to
Section 1, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that any party may appeal
from a judgment or final order "unless the accused will thereby be placed in double jeopardy."
The judgment that may be appealed by the aggrieved party envisaged in the Rule is a judgment
convicting the accused, and not a judgment of acquittal. The State is barred from appealing
such judgment of acquittal by a petition for review.
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides that "no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." The rule is that a judgment acquitting the
accused is final and immediately executory upon its promulgation, and that accordingly, the
State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy. Such acquittal is

final and un-appealable on the ground of double jeopardy whether it happens at the trial court or
on appeal at the CA. Thus, the State is proscribed from appealing the judgment of acquittal of
the accused to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However, in such
case, the People is burdened to establish that the court a quo, in this case, the Sandiganbayan,
acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed
by law, or to act in contemplation of law or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. No grave abuse of discretion may be
attributed to a court simply because of its alleged misapplication of facts and evidence, and
erroneous conclusions based on said evidence. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of
jurisdiction, and not errors or mistakes in the findings and conclusions of the trial court.
Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is
final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation. The fundamental
philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the humanity
of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal
contest with the State. Thus, Green expressed the concern that "the underlying idea, one that is
deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with
all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal
and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."
Related to his right of repose is the defendants interest in his right to have his trial
completed by a particular tribunal. This interest encompasses his right to have his guilt or
innocence determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to try him, for
societys awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the
individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a single criminal
proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal
is prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of the initial
proceeding. Because the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the
Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair.
However, the rule against double jeopardy is not without exceptions, which are: (1)
Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or
(2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional
circumstances. Unfortunately for petitioner, We find that these exceptions do not exist in this
case.
First, there is no deprivation of due process or a mistrial. In fact, petitioner did not make
any allegation to that effect. What the records show is that during the trial, both parties had
more than sufficient occasions to be heard and to present their evidence. The same is true
during the appeal before the CA. The State, represented by the OSG, was not deprived of a fair
opportunity to prove its case.

And second, no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the CA. It could not be
said that its judgment was issued without jurisdiction, and, for this reason, void. Any error
committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied
by certiorari. An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack
or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of
certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the
evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of
law. Since no error of jurisdiction can be attributed to public respondent in her assessment of
the evidence, certiorari will not lie.
Upon perusal of the records, it is Our considered view that the conclusions arrived at by
the CA cannot, by any measure, be characterized as capricious, whimsical or arbitrary. While it
may be argued that there have been instances where the appreciation of facts might have
resulted from possible lapses in the evaluation of the evidence, nothing herein detracts from the
fact that relevant and material evidence was scrutinized, considered and evaluated as proven
by the CAs lengthy discussion of its opinion. We note that the petition basically raises issues
pertaining to alleged errors of judgment not errors of jurisdiction which is tantamount to an
appeal contrary to the express injunction of the Constitution the Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence. Conformably then we need not embark upon review of the factual and evidentiary
issues raised by petitioner as these are obviously not within the realm of Our jurisdiction.
RIVELISA REALTY, INC. v. FIRST STA. CLARA BUILDERS CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 189618, JANUARY 15, 2014
J. PERLAS-BERNABE
While a motion for additional time is expressly permitted in the filing of a petition for
review before the Court under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a similar motion seeking
to extend the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is prohibited in all other courts. The
15-day period for filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration is non-extendible. Hence, the
filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration did not toll the 15-day
period before a judgment becomes final and executory.
FACTS:
Rivelisa Realty entered into an agreement with First Sta. Clara for the construction and
development of a residential subdivision. During the course of the project respondent hired a
subcontractor to perform a part of the work, however respondent ran out of funds after only two
months of construction, forcing petitioner to shoulder a part of the payment due to the
subcontractor. Further, respondent manifested an intention to back out from the agreement and
discontinue the operations when petitioner refused to advance additional funds until 60% of the
project had been completed. With this, petitioner agreed to release respondent from the
agreement and made an estimate of the actual accomplishment that included the payment
made to the subcontractor. Nonetheless, respondent insisted on a different valuation of the
accomplished works, to which petitioner agreed but emphasized that the amount is over its
obligation in the agreement. Despite such and several demands made, the agreed amount
remained unpaid, prompting respondent to file a complaint for rescission of the agreement with
damages. As such, petitioner claimed that it was obliged to pay respondent any amount as the
respondent failed to comply with its obligation.

The RTC dismissed the complaint and an appeal was made before the CA. The CA,
however, found petitioner still liable for respondents actual accomplishments in the project, and
explained that respondent is no longer obligated to comply with the terms and conditions of the
agreement, after petitioner agreed on its dissolution. Later, petitioner received a copy of the CA
decision, but moved for a 15-day extension within which to file its motion for reconsideration.
Thereafter, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration. Nonetheless, the CA denied
petitioners motion for extension as the 15-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration
cannot be extended, and merely noted without action the subsequently filed motion for
reconsideration, but eventually the CA denied the motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether a 15-day reglementary period for the filing of a motion for reconsideration can be
extended.
RULING:
While a motion for additional time is expressly permitted in the filing of a petition for
review before the Court under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a similar motion seeking
to extend the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is prohibited in all other courts. This
rule was first laid down in the case of Habaluyas Enterprises v. Japzon 25 wherein it was held
that:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly
enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may
be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the
Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny
the extension requested.
Restating the rule in Rolloque v. CA, the Court emphasized that the 15-day period for
filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration is non-extendible. Hence, the filing of a motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration did not toll the 15-day period before a
judgment becomes final and executory.
In this case, Rivelisa Realty only had until March 18, 2009 within which to file either a
motion for reconsideration before the CA or a petition for review of the CA Decision to the Court.
But it committed the fatal error of filing instead a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion
for Reconsideration before the CA which as expressed in Rolloque did not toll the running of
the period for the finality of the latters decision. Verily, a party who fails to question an adverse
decision by not filing the proper remedy within the period prescribed by law loses the right to do
so as the decision, as to him, becomes final and binding. Since the CA Decision had already
become final and executory due to the lapse of the reglementary period, not only did the CA
properly deny Rivelisa Realtys belatedly-filed motion for reconsideration but also the remedy of
review before the Court had already been lost. The Court has repeatedly held that the failure to
perfect an appeal in the manner and within the period fixed by law renders the decision sought
to be appealed final, with the result that no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the
decision. Considering that the CA Decision had long become final and unalterable by the time
Rivelisa Realty elevated the same, the Court must hereby deny the instant petition.

DR. ENCARNACION C. LUMANTAS, M.D. v. HANZ CALAPIZ

G.R. NO. 163753, JANUARY 15, 2014
J. BERSAMIN
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has
been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable
for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and
the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second
instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case,
even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from
civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
The acquittal of an accused does not prevent a judgment from still being rendered
against him on the civil aspect of the criminal case unless the court finds and declares that the
fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
FACTS:
Spouses Calapiz brought their son, Hanz, to the Misamis Occidental Provincial Hospital
for an emergency appendectomy, which was attended to by the petitioner, and who suggested
that Hanz also undergo circumcision at no added cost. With the parents consent, the petitioner
performed the circumcision after the appendectomy. The following day, Hanz complained of pain
in his penis, which exhibited blisters and his testicles were swollen. Also, the parents noticed
that Hanz urinated abnormally after the petitioner forcibly removed the catheter, but the
petitioner declared such was normal. Later, Hanz was discharged from the hospital over his
parents protestations, and was directed to continue taking antibiotics. Nevertheless, Hanz was
confined in a hospital because of a formation in his penis, to which the petitioner presumed to
be ulceration brought about by appendicitis. As such, the petitioner referred Hanz to an
urologist, who diagnosed the boy to have a damaged urethra. Thus, Hanz underwent
cystostomy, and thereafter was operated on three times to repair his damaged urethra.
When his damaged urethra could not be fully repaired and reconstructed, Hanzs
parents brought a criminal charge against the petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting to
serious physical injuries. At the trial, the Prosecution presented several witnesses, including an
expert witness, who testified on the injury sustained by Hanz and explaining that the injury to the
urethra had been caused by trauma, without however, determining the kind of trauma that had
caused the injury. With this, petitioner denied the charges.
The RTC acquitted petitioner of the crime charged for insufficiency of the evidence, but
declared that petitioner was liable for moral damages because there was a preponderance of
evidence showing that Hanz had received the injurious trauma from his circumcision by the
petitioner. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC, sustaining the award of moral damages. Motion
for reconsideration was denied, hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether civil liability attaches despite acquittal from criminal charge.
RULING:

It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. Nevertheless, the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged does not necessarily
extinguish his civil liability. In Manantan v. Court of Appeals, the Court elucidates on the two
kinds of acquittal recognized by our law as well as on the different effects of acquittal on the civil
liability of the accused, viz:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has
been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable
for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and
the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second
instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case,
even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from
civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal, the judgment shall state
"whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or
merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist."
Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, the acquittal of an accused does not prevent
a judgment from still being rendered against him on the civil aspect of the criminal case unless
the court finds and declares that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Although it found the Prosecutions evidence insufficient to sustain a judgment of
conviction against the petitioner for the crime charged, the RTC did not err in determining and
adjudging his civil liability for the same act complained of based on mere preponderance of
evidence. In this connection, the Court reminds that the acquittal for insufficiency of the
evidence did not require that the complainants recovery of civil liability should be through the
institution of a separate civil action for that purpose.
The failure of the Prosecution to prove his criminal negligence with moral certainty did
not forbid a finding against him that there was preponderant evidence of his negligence to hold
him civilly liable. With the RTC and the CA both finding that Hanz had sustained the injurious
trauma from the hands of the petitioner on the occasion of or incidental to the circumcision, and
that the trauma could have been avoided, the Court must concur with their uniform findings.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GUARIA AGRICULTURAL AND REALTY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 160758, January 15, 2014
J. Bersamin
The general rule, nakedly and boldly put, is that legal conclusions announced on a first
appeal, whether on the general law or the law as applied to the concrete facts, not only
prescribe the duty and limit the power of the trial court to strict obedience and conformity
thereto, but they become and remain the law of the case in all other steps below or above on
subsequent appeal. Without the rule there would be no end to criticism, reagitation,
reexamination, and reformulation. In short, there would be endless litigation.

The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that when an appellate court
has once declared the law in a case, its declaration continues to be the law of that case even on
a subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule thus laid down may have been reversed in
other cases. But the law of the case, as the name implies, concerns only legal questions or
issues thereby adjudicated in the former appeal.
FACTS:
Respondent applied for a loan from DBP to finance the development of its resort
complex, to which respondent executed a promissory note, real estate mortgage, and chattel
mortgage as security for the repayment of the loan. Also, prior to the release of the loan, DBP
required respondents to put up a cash equity for the construction of the buildings and other
improvements on the resort complex. Thereafter, the loan was released in several instalments
from which DBP withheld the interest. Respondent demanded the release of the balance of the
loan, but DBP refused and directly paid some suppliers of respondent over its objection. Upon
inspection, DBP found that the construction of the resort project had not been completed,
prompting DBP to demand from respondent the completion thereof and warned respondent of
foreclosing the property if the project could not be completed. Nonetheless, respondent
objected, causing DBP to initiate an extra-judicial foreclosure over the property. Notice of
foreclosure sale was sent to respondent, which was soon published, leading to the clients of
respondent to think that its business operation had slowed down, and that its resort had closed.
Respondent sued DBP in the RTC to demand specific performance and to stop the
foreclosure of the mortgages, to which DBP moved for dismissal stating that the mortgaged
properties had been sold at a public auction to satisfy respondents obligation. As such,
respondent amended the complaint to seek nullification of the foreclosure proceedings and
cancellation of the certificate of sale, and thereafter trial ensued. Meantime, DBP applied for the
issuance of a writ of possession by the RTC, which the RTC initially denied but later granted
upon reconsideration. Feeling aggrieved, respondent assailed the decision via certiorari before
the CA, which CA dismissed causing DBP to seek the issuance of writ of possession.
The RTC nullified the extra-judicial sales of the mortgaged properties, which the CA
sustained. Motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether law of the case doctrine is applicable.
RULING:
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal, and
means, more specifically, that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal
rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case,
whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
The concept of law of the case is well explained in Mangold v. Bacon, 41 an American
case, thusly:

The general rule, nakedly and boldly put, is that legal conclusions announced on a first
appeal, whether on the general law or the law as applied to the concrete facts, not only
prescribe the duty and limit the power of the trial court to strict obedience and conformity
thereto, but they become and remain the law of the case in all other steps below or above on
subsequent appeal. The rule is grounded on convenience, experience, and reason. Without the
rule there would be no end to criticism, re-agitation, re-examination, and reformulation. In short,
there would be endless litigation. It would be intolerable if parties litigants were allowed to
speculate on changes in the personnel of a court, or on the chance of our rewriting propositions
once gravely ruled on solemn argument and handed down as the law of a given case. An itch to
reopen questions foreclosed on a first appeal would result in the foolishness of the inquisitive
youth who pulled up his corn to see how it grew. Courts are allowed, if they so choose, to act
like ordinary sensible persons. The administration of justice is a practical affair. The rule is a
practical and a good one of frequent and beneficial use.
The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that when an appellate court
has once declared the law in a case, its declaration continues to be the law of that case even on
a subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule thus laid down may have been reversed in
other cases. For practical considerations, indeed, once the appellate court has issued a
pronouncement on a point that was presented to it with full opportunity to be heard having been
accorded to the parties, the pronouncement should be regarded as the law of the case and
should not be reopened on remand of the case to determine other issues of the case, like
damages. But the law of the case, as the name implies, concerns only legal questions or issues
thereby adjudicated in the former appeal.
The foregoing understanding of the concept of the law of the case exposes DBP's
insistence to be unwarranted.
To start with, the ex parte proceeding on DBP's application for the issuance of the writ of
possession was entirely independent from the judicial demand for specific performance herein.
In fact, C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP, being the interlocutory appeal concerning the issuance of the
writ of possession while the main case was pending, was not at all intertwined with any legal
issue properly raised and litigated in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491, which was the appeal to
determine whether or not DBP's foreclosure was valid and effectual. And, secondly, the ruling in
C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP did not settle any question of law involved herein because this case for
specific performance was not a continuation of C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP (which was limited to
the propriety of the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of DBP), and vice versa.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BERNABE PAREJA
G.R. NO. 202122, JANUARY 15, 2014
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the "assessment of the credibility of
witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to
observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate
courts-and when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally
binding and conclusive upon this Court." Besides, inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape
victims testimony are generally expected. Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not
remembered in detail. Since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions,
accuracy in a testimonial account has never been used as a standard in testing the credibility of
a witness.

Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to
produce a conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy and reliable. If credible and
convincing, that alone would be sufficient to convict the accused. No law or rule requires the
corroboration of the testimony of a single witness in a rape case.
A medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a
medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert
testimony is merely corroborative in character and not essential to conviction.
FACTS:
Pareja was charged with two counts of Rape and one Attempted Rape. Upon
arraignment, Pereja pleaded not guilty, and after pre-trial conference, trial ensued. During the
trial, the victim narrated on how Pereja committed the crime charged. Further, the prosecution
also presented the Medico-Legal Report to corroborate the testimony of the victim, which
indicated that there is clear evidence of blunt force or penetrating trauma, confirming that the
victim was raped. Pereja denied the charges, averring that it was impossible for the incident to
happen, by describing the layout of their house, but admitted that he knew the victim for being
the daughter of his live-in partner. The RTC acquitted Pareja from the charge of attempted rape
but convicted him of the crime of rape. The CA affirmed the RTC judgment.
ISSUE:
1. Whether testimony of the victim is credible, despite inconsistencies.
2. Whether medical certificate is necessary to prove rape.
RULING:
When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before this Court, we follow certain
guidelines that have overtime been established in jurisprudence. In People v. Sanchez, we
enumerated them as follows:
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTCs evaluation of the testimony of the
witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the
stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness
of witnesses.
Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTCs
assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower courts
findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the
case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded.
And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC.
The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the "assessment of the credibility of
witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to
observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate
courts-and when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally
binding and conclusive upon this Court." While there are recognized exceptions to the rule, this

Court has found no substantial reason to overturn the identical conclusions of the trial and
appellate courts on the matter of AAAs credibility.
Besides, inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victims testimony are generally
expected. Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. For such
an offense is not analogous to a persons achievement or accomplishment as to be worth
recalling or reliving; rather, it is something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts
a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche for life and which her conscious and
subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a rape victim cannot be expected to mechanically
keep and then give an accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying experience she had
undergone.
Since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions, accuracy in a
testimonial account has never been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a
witness. The inconsistencies mentioned by Pareja are trivial and non-consequential matters that
merely caused AAA confusion when she was being questioned. The inconsistency regarding the
year of the December incident is not even a matter pertaining to AAAs ordeal. The date and
time of the commission of the crime of rape becomes important only when it creates serious
doubt as to the commission of the rape itself or the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of
conviction. In other words, the "date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only when
the accuracy and truthfulness of the complainants narration practically hinge on the date of the
commission of the crime." Moreover, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential
element of the crime.
Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to
produce a conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy and reliable. If credible and
convincing, that alone would be sufficient to convict the accused. No law or rule requires the
corroboration of the testimony of a single witness in a rape case.
A medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a medical
examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is
merely corroborative in character and not essential to conviction.
Therefore, the absence of testimony or medical certificate on the state of AAAs anus at the
time she was examined is of no consequence. On the contrary, the medical examination
actually bolsters AAAs claim of being raped by Pareja on more than one occasion, and not just
by anal penetration. However, as the prosecution failed to capitalize on such evidence and
prove the incidence of carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot be convicted of rape under paragraph 1
of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG v. ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA
A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014
PER CURIAM
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is
rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Hence, an administrative
proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer the
charges against him despite numerous notices. In administrative proceedings, the complainant
has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint.

The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody
thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith
and credence given to public documents.
FACTS:
Bansig filed a Petition for Disbarment against respondent Atty. Celera for Gross Immoral
Conduct, alleging that respondent and Bansigs sister, Gracemarie, entered into a contract of
marriage on May 8, 1997 as evidence by a certified Xerox copy of the certificate of marriage
issued by Civil Registry of Manila; that despite the validity of the prior marriage, respondent
contracted another marriage with Alba on January 8, 1998, as evidenced by a certified xerox
copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila.
In a Resolution, the Court resolved to require respondent to file a comment on the
instant complaint. However, respondent failed to submit his comment, despite receipt of the
copy of the Court's Resolution, as evidenced by Registry Return Receipt. Thus, the Court, in
another Resolution, resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment on the complaint
against him. Subsequently, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion praying that respondent's
failure to file his comment be deemed a waiver to file the same, and that the case be submitted
for disposition. Nonetheless, respondent though a Motion, claimed that he did not know of the
nature or cause of the administrative case as he received no pleading or any processes thereof,
save that of Bansigs Omnibus Motion. He then prayed that he be furnished a copy of the
complaint and be given time to file his answer to the complaint.
Later, the Court required Bansig to furnish respondent with a copy of the complaint and to
submit proof of such service, further requiring respondent to comment on the complaint. With
this, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof of service which is evidenced by
Registry Receipt, however, respondent failed anew to file his comment. This prompted the Court
to require respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for such failure, to which respondent, in his Explanation, reiterated that he has yet to
receive a copy of the complaint and asked for Bansig to furnish him with the complaint; this the
Court again granted.
Later, Bansig via Manifestation, lamented the dilatory tactics undertaken by respondent,
asserting that the Court should sanction respondent for his deliberate and willful act to frustrate
the actions of the Court. She further attached a copy of the complaint and submitted an Affidavit
of Mailing with Registry Receipt thereof. Later, the Court issued a Show Cause Order to
respondent as to why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to
comply despite service of copy of the complaint by registered mail. Further, the Court noted the
returned and unserved copy of the Show Cause Order sent to respondent, and required Bansig
to submit the correct and present address of respondent. With this, Bansig manifested that
respondent had consistently indicated in his correspondence with the Court the submitted
address as his residential address. However, all notices served upon him on said address were
returned with a note "moved" by the mail server. Bansig also averred that in a civil case pending
before the RTC of Tuguegarao City, respondent used the mailing address to be at "Unit 8, Halili
Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City." Thus the Court resolved to resend a copy of
the Show Cause Order to respondents new address.

Due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order, for failure to file his
comment on this administrative complaint the Court resolved imposed upon respondent a fine
and required respondent to comply with the Resolution filing the required comment. Further, it
appearing that respondent failed to comply with the Court's latter Resolutions, the Court ordered
that the filing of respondents comment be dispensed with and that respondent be arrested, and
further referred the complaint to the IBP. The return of warrant, however, showed that
respondent cannot be located in the new address as the new address used by respondent was
a vacant lot. Meanwhile, the IBP reported that as per their records, the address of respondent is
at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley View Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal.
Respondent also failed to appear before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, despite
several notices, causing respondent to be declared in default and the case was submitted for
report and recommendation. The Order of Default was received by respondent, however,
respondent failed to take any action on the matter.
ISSUE:
Whether there is quantum of evidence required in an administrative proceeding.
RULING:
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is
rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Hence, an administrative
proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer the
charges against him despite numerous notices.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial
evidence, the allegations in the complaint. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the
case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.
Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar,
this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty.
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a
second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by
the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil
Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera
contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint
Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified
xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of
San Juan, Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on
January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church, Madison St.,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that
respondent entered into a second marriage while the latters first marriage was still subsisting.
We note that the second marriage apparently took place barely a year from his first marriage to
Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the first marriage was still subsisting at the time
respondent contracted the second marriage with Alba.

The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody
thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being
admissible in evidence, also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second marriage
while the first marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage
certificates would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of two marriages
entered into by respondent. The certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these
Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence
to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member
of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly
immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
RODOLFO LABORTE and PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY v. PAGSANJAN TOURISM
CONSUMERS COOPERATIVE and LELIZA S. FABRICIO
G.R. NO. 183860, January 15, 2014
J. Reyes
Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, it is clear that the court
considers the evidence only when it is formally offered. The offer of evidence is necessary
because it is the duty of the trial court to base its findings of fact and its judgment only and
strictly on the evidence offered by the parties. A piece of document will remain a scrap of paper
without probative value unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or
purposes for which it is offered. The formal offer of evidence allows the parties the chance to
object to the presentation of an evidence which may not be admissible for the purpose it is
being offered. However, there are instances when the Court relaxed the foregoing rule and
allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted, provided, the same must have been duly
identified by testimony duly recorded and the same must have been incorporated in the records
of the case.
The records of the case show that the petitioners were able to present evidence that
have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded, and these were also on the records of the
RTC. The respondents had the chance to object to the documents that were identified and
marked, but no objections were raised causing the documents to be admitted by the court.
FACTS:
PTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation that used to operate the
Philippine Gorge Tourist Zone (PGTZ) Administration Complex (PTA Complex), a declared
tourist zone in Pagsanjan, Laguna. Respondent PTCC is a cooperative organized since 1988
under RA 6938.
In order to help the PTCC as a cooperative, PTA allowed it to operate a restaurant
business located at the main building of the PTA Complex and the boat ride services to ferry
guests and tourists to and from the Pagsanjan Falls, paying a certain percentage of its earnings
to the PTA. Soon PTA implemented a re-organization and reshuffling in its top level

management, wherein petitioner Laborte was designated as Area Manager, CALABARZON

area with direct supervision over the PTA Complex and other entities at the Southern Luzon.
Subsequently, Laborte notified respondents to cease the operations of the restaurant
and boat ride services because of the rehabilitation project of the PTA Complex. Consequently,
the PTCC filed with the RTC, a Complaint for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages praying for
the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction to prohibit Laborte from causing the
PTCC to cease the operations of the restaurant and boat ride services and from evicting the
PTCCs restaurant from the main building of the PTA Complex. The RTC issued the TRO but
Laborte opposed to such, averring that PTCC does not own the restaurant facility because it
was merely tolerated by PTA as a form of assistance. Later, PTCC filed a Petition for Contempt
with Motion for early resolution alleging that Laborte defied the TRO, which however, Laborte
denied.
Subsequently, the individual respondents who are employees and boatmen of the
PTCC, filed a Complaint-in-Intervention against defied the TRO. With this, PTCC filed an
Amended Complaint to include PTA as defendant, but PTA alleged that PTCC has no cause of
action against PTA as PTA is the owner of the complex and no contract binds it and PTCC. RTC
decided in favour of PTCC and intervenors, prompting Laborte and PTA to appeal to CA, which
however, affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the evidence not formally offered may be considered.
RULING:
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides the general rule, to wit:
Sec. 34. Offer of Evidence. The Court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
From the above provision, it is clear that the court considers the evidence only when it is
formally offered. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the trial court to
base its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly on the evidence offered by the parties.
A piece of document will remain a scrap of paper without probative value unless and until
admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which it is offered. The formal
offer of evidence allows the parties the chance to object to the presentation of an evidence
which may not be admissible for the purpose it is being offered.
However, there are instances when the Court relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed
evidence not formally offered to be admitted. Citing People v. Napat-a and People. v. Mate, the
Court in Heirs of Romana Saves, et al., v. Heirs of Escolastico Saves, et al., enumerated the
requirements for the evidence to be considered despite failure to formally offer it, namely: "first,
the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same
must have been incorporated in the records of the case." In People v. Vivencio De Roxas et
al., the Court also considered exhibits which were not formally offered by the prosecution but
were repeatedly referred to in the course of the trial by the counsel of the accused.
In the instant case, the Court finds that the above requisites are attendant to warrant the
relaxation of the rule and admit the evidence of the petitioners not formally offered. As can be
seen in the records of the case, the petitioners were able to present evidence that have been
duly identified by testimony duly recorded. To identify is to prove the identity of a person or a

thing. Identification means proof of identity; the proving that a person, subject or article before
the court is the very same that he or it is alleged, charged or reputed to be.
Undeniably, these pertinent evidence that Laborte identified, were also found in the
records of the RTC, i.e. : (a) the letter informing the Chairman of PTCC about the decision of
PTA main office regarding the repair works to be conducted; (b) Office Order No. 1018-93 from
a person named Mr. Anota, relative to the suspension of the boat ride services at the
Complex; (c) the letter to PTCC informing it of the repair at the Complex; (d) the certificates of
availability of funds for the guesthouse of the PTC Complex and for the repainting, repair works
at the Pagsanjan Administration Complex respectively; (e) the program of works dated July 22,
1993 for the renovation of the Pagsanjan Complex and of the swimming pool at the guesthouse
respectively; (f) the program of works referring to the repainting and repair works at the
Complex dated August 6, 1993; and (g) a memorandum from Mr. Oscar Anota, Deputy General
Manager for Operation of the PTA, dated December 8, 1993 addressed to the security office of
the Pagsanjan Administration Complex, instructing the same not to allow the entry of anything
without clearance from the main office in Manila into the Pagsanjan Complex. In all these, the
respondents had all the chance to object to the documents which Laborte properly identified and
marked and which are found in the records of the trial court. Considering that no objections
were made by the respondents to the foregoing documents, the Court sees no reason why
these documents should not be admitted.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TETRO ENTERPRISES, INCORPORATED
G.R. NO. 183015, January 15, 2014
J. Peralta
Clearly, the only thing the RTC was asked to do when the case was remanded to it by
the CA was to determine the damages respondent is entitled to for the loss of the use and
enjoyment of the property when the property was taken from it in 1974. Thus, when the case
was remanded to the RTC for the purpose of computing the damages, the case was not
considered a new case where an amendment of the complaint may still be allowed. Rather, it is
merely a continuation of the trial of the original complaint filed in 1992 only for the purpose of
receiving the evidence of the damages which respondent allegedly suffered as alleged in the
original complaint, since no evidence proving damages was received and passed upon when
the RTC issued its Order dated March 29, 1996. Therefore, the Section 2 and 3, Rule 10, Rules
of Civil Procedure on amendments of pleading find no applicability in this case.
FACTS:
On February 10, 1992, respondent Tetro Enterprises filed a Complaint for recovery of
possession and damages against petitioner Republic represented by DPWH, wherein it is
alleged that Tetro is the registered owner of a piece of land that has been expropriated for
construction of road by petitioner without undergoing the legal process. Also, respondent
alleged that despite repeated demands, petitioner refused to return the lot and pay rent thereto,
thus respondent prayed for the lots return in its original state and payment of damages thereto.
On the other hand, petitioner contended that respondent has no cause of action as the State
has not given its consent to be sued, and that petitioner was was willing to pay the fair market
value of the lot at the time of taking, plus interest.
As the return of the subject lot was no longer feasible, the RTC, with the parties'
conformity, converted the action for recovery of possession to eminent domain and
expropriation. Upon agreement of the parties, the RTC issued an order creating a Board of
Commissioners to determine the actual value of the lot which shall be the basis for an amicable

settlement or the decision to be rendered. Later, the Board submitted its report recommending
the just and reasonable price to be paid to respondent. The RTC took into consideration the
report submitted by the Board and rendered a decision fixing the price of the lot. Motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioner, but was denied, prompting petitioner to appeal, which the
RTC denied since the decision had become final and executory. With this, petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA but was dismissed. Motion for reconsideration was denied,
hence petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC, which reversed the CA
decision and ordered RTC to approve petitioner's notice of appeal. Consequently, petitioner's
appeal was taken up in the CA, which modified the earlier appealed decision and ordered for
the case to be remanded to the RTC.
Respondent filed a petition for review with SC, which was denied. The case was then
remanded to the RTC for computation of damages, and was scheduled for mediation
proceedings, which failed, thus, the case was set for a pre-trial conference. At the pre-trial,
when petitioner presented the proposed issue, respondent moved for the amendment of its
original complaint, which the presiding Judge granted. As such, petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but was denied for being premature. Later, respondent filed a Motion to Admit
Amended Complaint, attaching the amended complaint; this the RTC admitted. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was denied, thus, petition for certiorari was filed with the CA, which
affirmed the RTC order.
The main issue for resolution is whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC committed
no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in admitting the amended
complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting the amended complaint.
RULING:
The CA found that the amendment of the original complaint filed in 1992 is sanctioned by
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 10 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, which provide:
Section 2. Amendments as a matter of right. A party may amend his pleading once as
a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at
any time within ten (10) days after it is served.
Section 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the next preceding
section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be
refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the
court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and
after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
We are not persuaded.
To begin with, the original case which respondent filed in 1992 was for recovery of
possession, which the RTC, with the parties' conformity, converted into an expropriation case as
recovery of the subject lot was no longer possible. Thus, the pre-trial of the case had long taken
place in 1994. The expropriation case was then decided by the RTC on March 29, 1996, fixing
the value of the subject lot in the total amount of P75,858,000.00 as just compensation. Such

decision was modified by the CA's Former Third Division in a Decision dated May 24, 2001,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 60492, reducing the amount of just compensation to P252,869.00
plus 6% interest from 1974 until full payment thereof and ordered the remand of the case to the
RTC for further determination of other damages respondent suffered for the loss of use and
enjoyment of its property. The CA decision was brought to us in a petition for review on certiorari
which, in a Resolution dated October 2, 2002, denied the same and affirmed the CA decision.
Clearly, the only thing the RTC was asked to do when the case was remanded to it by
the CA was to determine the damages respondent is entitled to for the loss of the use and
enjoyment of the property when the property was taken from it in 1974. Thus, when the case
was remanded to the RTC for the purpose of computing the damages, the case was not
considered a new case where an amendment of the complaint may still be allowed. Rather, it is
merely a continuation of the trial of the original complaint filed in 1992 only for the purpose of
receiving the evidence of the damages which respondent allegedly suffered as alleged in the
original complaint, since no evidence proving damages was received and passed upon when
the RTC issued its Order dated March 29, 1996. Therefore, the above-quoted provisions
(Section 2 and 3, Rule 10, Rules of Civil Procedure) on amendments of pleading find no
applicability in this case.
While we find that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the
amendment of the complaint filed in 1992, such finding does not necessarily establish that
Presiding Judge Simbulan had exhibited bias or partiality in favor of respondent, as petitioner
claims, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence.
MAGDALENA T. VILLASI v. FILOMENO GARCIA
G.R. NO. 190106, January 15, 2014
J. Perez
It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only against the
property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if the property belonging to any
third person is mistakenly levied upon to answer for another mans indebtedness, such person
has all the right to challenge the levy through any of the remedies provided for under the Rules
of Court. Section 16, Rule 39 specifically provides that a third person may avail himself of the
remedies of either terceria, to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of
the property not belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor, or an independent "separate
action" to vindicate his claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property.
Indeed, the power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued only
against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. The right of a third-party
claimant to file a terceria is founded on his title or right of possession. Corollary thereto, before
the court can exercise its supervisory power to direct the release of the property mistakenly
levied and the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant must first unmistakably
establish his ownership or right of possession thereon. However, the Spouses Garcia failed to
prove that they have a bona fide title to the building as they were unable to present credible
evidence to prove their ownership. All that the Spouses raised were their postulation as title
holders of the land and the presumption of ownership over improvements built thereon;
whereas Villasi, on the other hand, was able to show documentary proof of ownership.
FACTS:

Petitioner Villasi engaged the services of respondent Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc.

(FGCI) to construct a seven-storey condominium building. However, Villasi failed to fully pay the
contract price despite several demands, thus, FGCI initiated a suit for collection of sum of
money before the RTC, wherein FGCI prayed, for the payment of the unpaid accomplishment
billings. With this, Villasi denied the allegations, contending that FGCI has no cause of action
against her, further averring that she delivered the total amount to FGCI but the latter
accomplished only 28% of the project. Pre-trial conference termninated without amicable
settlement being reached, thus trial ensued.
The RTC decided in favour of FGCO brushing aside Villasis allegations of excess
payment. The CA reversed the RTC decision, ruling that an overpayment was made by Villasi
and thus FGCI was ordered to return the excess payment. Thereafter, FGCI filed a petition for
review on certiorari with the SC, which however, was denied for being filed out of time. The
resolution became final and executory, to which Villasi filed a motion for execution that was
favourably acted upon by the RTC and a writ of execution was issued. Later, the sheriff levied
on a building covered by a tax declaration in the name of FGCI and built in the lots registered
under the names of Spouses Garcia. Mandatory posting and publication of notice of sale was
made, and a public auction was scheduled.
On the other hand, to forestall the sale on execution, the Spouses Garcia filed an
Affidavit of Third Party Claim and a Motion to Set Aside Notice of Sale on Execution, claiming
that they are the lawful owners of the property which was erroneously levied upon by the sheriff.
Moreover, the Spouses Garcia argued that the building covered by the levy was mistakenly
assessed by the City Assessor in the name of FGCI. Nonetheless, Villasi opposed the motion
and insisted that its ownership belongs to FGCI and not to Spouses Garcia as shown by the tax
declaration. Thus, the RTC issued an Order directing the Sheriff to hold in abeyance the
conduct of the sale on execution. Villasis motion for reconsideration was denied, hence Villasi
filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which was dismissed and reconsideration thereof
refused, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the remedy of terceria is applicable.
RULING:
It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only against the
property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if the property belonging to any
third person is mistakenly levied upon to answer for another mans indebtedness, such person
has all the right to challenge the levy through any of the remedies provided for under the Rules
of Court. Section 16, Rule 39 specifically provides that a third person may avail himself of the
remedies of either terceria, to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of
the property not belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor, or an independent "separate
action" to vindicate his claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property.
However, the person other than the judgment debtor who claims ownership or right over levied
properties is not precluded from taking other legal remedies to prosecute his claim.
Indeed, the power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued only
against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. The duty of the sheriff is

to levy the property of the judgment debtor not that of a third person. For, as the saying goes,
one man's goods shall not be sold for another man's debts.
The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria is founded on his title or right of possession.
Corollary thereto, before the court can exercise its supervisory power to direct the release of the
property mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant must first
unmistakably establish his ownership or right of possession thereon. In Spouses Sy v. Hon.
Discaya, we declared that for a third-party claim or a terceria to prosper, the claimant must first
sufficiently establish his right on the property:
A third person whose property was seized by a sheriff to answer for the obligation of the
judgment debtor may invoke the supervisory power of the court which authorized such
execution. Upon due application by the third person and after summary hearing, the court may
command that the property be released from the mistaken levy and restored to the rightful
owner or possessor. What said court can do in these instances, however, is limited to a
determination of whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties
in the execution of judgment, more specifically, if he has indeed taken hold of property not
belonging to the judgment debtor. The court does not and cannot pass upon the question of title
to the property, with any character of finality. It can treat of the matter only insofar as may be
necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted correctly or not. It can require the sheriff to restore
the property to the claimant's possession if warranted by the evidence. However, if the
claimant's proofs do not persuade the court of the validity of his title or right of possession
thereto, the claim will be denied.
Our perusal of the record shows that, as the party asserting their title, the Spouses
Garcia failed to prove that they have a bona fide title to the building in question. Aside from their
postulation that as title holders of the land, the law presumes them to be owners of the
improvements built thereon, the Spouses Garcia were unable to adduce credible evidence to
prove their ownership of the property. In contrast, Villasi was able to satisfactorily establish the
ownership of FGCI thru the pieces of evidence she appended to her opposition. Worthy to note
is the fact that the building in litigation was declared for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI
and not in the Spouses Garcias. While it is true that tax receipts and tax declarations are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute credible proof of claim of title over the
property.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. YATCO AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES
G.R. NO.172551, JANUARY 15, 2014
J. BRION
As a general rule, the Courts jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to the review of
pure questions of law. The test in determining whether a question is one of law or of fact is
"whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the
evidence, in which case, it is a question of law." Any question that invites calibration of the
whole evidence, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, is a question of fact
and thus proscribed in a Rule 45 petition.
The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the
purpose that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to
proof. Generally, courts are not authorized to "take judicial notice of the contents of the records
of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or
before the same judge." They may, however, take judicial notice of a decision or the facts
prevailing in another case sitting in the same court if: (1) the parties present them in evidence,

absent any opposition from the other party; or (2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do
so. In either case, the courts must observe the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129
of the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
Respondent Yatco was the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land covered by
transfer certificate of title, which property the government placed under the coverage of CARP.
Pursuant to EO 405, the LBP valued the property, but Yatco did not find the valuation
acceptable and thus elevated the matter to the DAR- PARAD, which then conducted summary
administrative proceedings for the determination of just compensation. The PARAD computed
the value of the property at P16,543,800.00 by using the propertys current market value as
shown by the tax declaration Yatco submitted, and applied the formula "MV x 2." Further,
PARAD noted that the LBP did not present any verified or authentic document to back up its
computation; hence, it brushed aside the LBPs valuation. On the other hand, LBP did not move
to reconsider PARADs ruling, and instead filed with the RTC-SAC a petition for the judicial
determination of just compensation.
The RTC-SAC fixed the just compensation for the property at P200.00 per square meter,
thus arriving at a valuation by adopting the valuation set by the RTC Calamba City, Branch 35 in
a civil case, which in turn, adopted the valuation that the RTC Calamba City, Branch 36 arrived
at in a civil case. Also, the RTC-SAC did not give weight to the LBPs evidence in justifying its
valuation, pointing out that the LBP failed to prove that it complied with the prescribed procedure
and likewise failed to consider the valuation factors provided in Section 17 of the CARL. Motion
for reconsideration was denied, hence LBP appealed to the CA, which dismissed LBPs appeal
and reconsideration thereto.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the factual-issue-bar rule applies.
2. Whether the court may take judicial notice of certain facts prevailing in another case.
RULING:
As a general rule, the Courts jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to the review of pure
questions of law. A question of law arises when the doubt or difference exists as to what the law
is on a certain state of facts. Negatively put, Rule 45 does not allow the review of questions of
fact. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts.
The test in determining whether a question is one of law or of fact is "whether the
appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in
which case, it is a question of law." Any question that invites calibration of the whole evidence,
as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, is a question of fact and thus proscribed
in a Rule 45 petition.
We find the presented issue clearly one of law. Resolution of this question can be made
by mere inquiry into the law and jurisprudence on the matter, and does not require a review of
the parties evidence. We, therefore, disagree with Yatco on this point as we find the present
petition compliant with the Rule 45 requirement.

The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the
purpose that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to
proof. Generally, courts are not authorized to "take judicial notice of the contents of the records
of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before
the same judge." They may, however, take judicial notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in
another case sitting in the same court if: (1) the parties present them in evidence, absent any
opposition from the other party; or (2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do so. In either
case, the courts must observe the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules
of Court.
We note that Yatco offered in evidence copies of the decisions in the civil cases, which
offer the LBP opposed. These were duly noted by the court. Even assuming, however, that the
April 21, 2004 order of the RTC-SAC (that noted Yatcos offer in evidence and the LBPs
opposition to it) constitutes sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section 3, Rule 129 of
the Rules of Court, still we find the RTC-SACs valuation based on Branch 36s previous ruling
to be legally erroneous.
After considering these factors and formula, we are convinced that the RTC-SAC
completely disregarded them and simply relied on Branch 36s valuation. For one, the RTC-SAC
did not point to any specific evidence or cite the values and amounts it used in arriving at
the P200.00 per square meter valuation. It did not even consider the propertys market value
based on the current tax declaration that Yatco insists the RTC-SAC considered in addition to
Branch 36s valuation. Assuming that the RTC-SAC considered the propertys market value
(which, again, we find that it did not), this alone will not suffice as basis, unless justified under
Item II.A.3 of DAR AO 5-98 (as provided above). Then too, it did not indicate the formula that it
used in arriving at its valuation or which led it to believe that Branch 36s valuation was
applicable to this case. Lastly, the RTC-SAC did not conduct an independent assessment and
computation using the considerations required by the law and the rules.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EMMANUEL OATE
G.R. NO. 192371, JANUARY 15, 2014
J. Del Castillo
For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Thus, the
test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question
by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue
raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law;
otherwise, it is a question of fact.
Before entries made in the course of business may qualify under the exception to the
hearsay rule and given weight, the party offering them must establish that: (1) the person who
made those entries is dead, outside the country, or unable to testify; (2) the entries were made
at, or near the time of the transaction to which they refer; (3) the entrant was in a position to
know the facts stated therein; (4) the entries were made in the professional capacity or in the
course of duty of the entrant; and, (5) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty. In the case, Land Bank neither identified the persons who made the entries in
the passbooks nor established that they are already dead or unable to testify. While the deposit
entries in the banks passbook enjoy a certain degree of presumption of regularity, they are
mere prima facie proof of what are stated therein

FACTS:
From 1978 to 1980, Oate opened and maintained seven trust accounts with Land
Bank, with each trust account being covered by an Investment Management Account (IMA) with
full discretion and corresponding passbook. It is indicated in the IMA that petitioner was
appointed as respondents agent to hold, invest and reinvest respondents fund and keep the
same invested, in the sole discretion of petitioner. However, in a letter, petitioner demanded
from respondent the return ofP4 million it claimed to have been inadvertently deposited to
respondents trust account, to which respondent refused. With the parties failure to settle the
miscrediting matter, petitioner soon unilaterally applied the outstanding balance in all of
resondents trust accounts against his resulting indebtedness by reason of the "miscrediting" of
funds, thereby exhausting all of respondents accounts, without however, satisfying the
obligation. Hence, to recoup the remaining balance of Oates indebtedness, Land Bank filed a
Complaint for Sum of Money against respondent, to which respondent denied knowledge or
involvement between petitioner and its clients, and asserted that petitioner made a setoff
without legal and factual bases. Respondent further claimed that the funds in his accounts came
from legitimate sources and was unaware with the alleged miscrediting. Upon respondents
motion, the RTC issued an Order creating a Board of Commissioners to examine the records of
respondents seven trust accounts, as well as to determine the total amount of deposits,
withdrawals, funds invested, earnings, and expenses incurred.
Reports were submitted by the board, and as summarized by the RTC it found that the
reports revealed that there were undocumented and over withdrawals and drawings from
respondents trust accounts. Respondent asserted that the undocumented withdrawals should
not be considered as cash outflows, but instead it should be treated as unauthorized
transactions which must be credited back to his accounts. Thereafter, the RTC dismissed
petitioners complaint but explained that under IMA, petitioner had the authority to withdraw
funds from respondents account even without a letter of instruction or withdrawal slip from
respondent. Further, RTC denied petitioners claim for negative balances as it was never sought
in the complaint. The CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the RTC decision. Motion for
Reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition.
Petitioner argued that under Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the entries in
the passbooks must be accepted as proof of the regularity of the transactions reflected in the
trust accounts for they were made in the regular course of business. On the contrary,
respondent argued that the argument of petitioner raises question of fact which is not proper
under a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the petition raises question of fact.
2. Whether the entries in the passbook are sufficient to meet the rule on presumption of
regularity of entries in the course of business, under Section 43, Rule 130.
RULING:
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts.

For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is
clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.
Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such
question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine
the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of
law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.
While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, none exists in this case.
Anent Land Banks contention that the determination of whether the CA erred in
retroactively applying the 2008 MORB poses a legal question, the same deserves scant
consideration. True, the CA included in its ratio decidendi a discussion on the 2008 MORB to
give emphasis to the duties of banks to keep an accurate record and regularly apprise their
clients of the status of their accounts. But the issue of whether Land Bank failed to comply with
those duties can be resolved even without the MORB as the same duties are also imposed on
Land Bank by the IMAs, the contract that primarily governs the parties in this case. "As a
general rule, a contract is the law between the parties. Thus, from the moment the contract is
perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfilment of what has been expressly stipulated
but also to all consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith,
usage and law. Also, the stipulations of the contract being the law between the parties, courts
have no alternative but to enforce them as they were agreed [upon] and written."
Based on the factual milieu of this case even without touching on the MORB, we found
that Land Bank still failed to perform its bounden duties to keep accurate records and render
regular accounting. We also found no cogent reason to disturb the other factual findings of the
CA.
But before entries made in the course of business may qualify under the exception to the
hearsay rule and given weight, the party offering them must establish that: (1) the person who
made those entries is dead, outside the country, or unable to testify; (2) the entries were made
at, or near the time of the transaction to which they refer; (3) the entrant was in a position to
know the facts stated therein; (4) the entries were made in the professional capacity or in the
course of duty of the entrant; and, (5) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty.
Here, Land Bank has neither identified the persons who made the entries in the
passbooks nor established that they are already dead or unable to testify as required by Section
43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Also, and as correctly opined by the CA, "while the deposit
entries in the banks passbook enjoy a certain degree of presumption of regularity," the same do
"not indicate or explain the source of the funds being deposited or withdrawn from an individual
account." They are mere prima facie proof of what are stated therein the dates of the
transactions, the amounts deposited or withdrawn, and the outstanding balances. They do not
establish that the total amount of P4,086,888.89 deposited in Oates Trust Account No. 01-125
in November 1980 came from the proceeds of the pre-terminated loans of Land Banks
corporate borrowers. It would be too presumptuous to immediately conclude that said amount
came from the checks paid to Land Bank by its corporate borrowers just because the maturity
dates of the loans coincided with the dates said total amount was deposited. There must be
proof showing an unbroken link between the proceeds of the pre-terminated loans and the

amount allegedly "miscredited" to Oates Trust Account No. 01-125. As a bank and custodian
of records, Land Bank could have easily produced documents showing that its borrowers preterminated their loans, the checks they issued as payment for such loans, and the deposit slips
used in depositing those checks. But it did not.

HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS SR v. JUANA GONZALES

G.R. NO. 185922, JANUARY 15, 2014
J. Perez
Rule 16 treats of the grounds for a motion to dismiss the complaint. It must be
distinguished from the grounds provided under Section 1, Rule 9 which specifically deals with
dismissal of the claim by the court motu proprio. Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four
instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia ; (c) res judicata ; and (d) prescription of action.
It is so inferable from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense
and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts at a compromise has been made but had
failed is not one of the exceptions. Upon such failure, the defense is deemed waived.
FACTS:
Dr. Favis was married to Capitolina with whom he had seven children. When Capitolina
died Dr. Favis took Juana as his common-law wife with whom he sired one child, Mariano. Later,
Dr. Favis and Juana got married and Dr. Favis executed an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as
one of his legitimate children. Mariano is married to Larcelita, with whom he has four children.
Soon, Dr. Favis died intestate leaving residential lands, commercial building, house, and an
orchard. However, it is alleged that Dr. Favis executed a Deed of Donation transferring and
conveying the residential land and the building erected therein in favor of his grandchildren with
Juana. With this, petitioners being Dr. Favis children with Capitolina, claimed that the donation
prejudiced their legitime and filed for annulment if the Deed of Donation before the RTC against
respondents. Respondents, however, asserted that the properties donated do not form part of
the estate of the late Dr. Favis because the donation was made inter vivos.
The RTC, limited the issues to the validity of the deed of donation and whether
respondent Juana and Mariano are compulsory heirs of Dr. Favis. Thus, in its decision, RTC
nullified the Deed of Donantion finding Dr. Favis at age 92 and plagued with illnesses, could not
have jad full control of his metal capacities to execute a valid Deed of Donation, and further
declared Juan and Mariano as legitimate heirs. As such, respondents appealed to the CA
challenging the RTC decision on ground of vitiated consent. The CA dismissed the same not on
the grounds invoked by respondents but for failure of petitioners to make an averment that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, as mandated by Article 151 of the
Family Code. Subsequently, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the
case is not subject to compromise as it involves future legitime, which the CA rejected,
observing that while the action is between members of the same family it does not involve a
testator and a compulsory heir. Moreover, the appellate court pointed out that the subject

properties cannot be considered as "future legitime" but are in fact, legitime, as the instant
complaint was filed after the death of the decedent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court may dismiss the order of dismissal of the complaint for failure
to allege therein that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made.
RULING:
The appellate court committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint. The
appellate courts decision hinged on Article 151 of the Family Code, which it correlated with
Section 1, par (j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
The appellate courts reliance on this provision is misplaced. Rule 16 treats of the
grounds for a motion to dismiss the complaint. It must be distinguished from the grounds
provided under Section 1, Rule 9 which specifically deals with dismissal of the claim by the court
motu proprio.
Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio
dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia ; (c)
res judicata ; and (d) prescription of action. Specifically in Gumabon v. Larin, cited in Katon v.
Palanca, Jr., the Court held:
The motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial,
failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the
rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu proprio dismissal
would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and
expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the
amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under the new
rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence
on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of
action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a
prior judgment or by statute of limitations.
The error of the Court of Appeals is evident even if the consideration of the issue is kept
within the confines of the language of Section 1(j) of Rule 16 and Section 1 of Rule 9. That a
condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with, a ground for a motion to
dismiss emanating from the law that no suit between members from the same family shall
prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made but had failed, is, as the Rule so words, a ground for a motion to
dismiss. Significantly, the Rule requires that such a motion should be filed "within the time for
but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim." The time frame
indicates that thereafter, the motion to dismiss based on the absence of the condition precedent
is barred. It is so inferable from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense
and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
There are, as just noted, only four exceptions to this Rule, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter; litis pendentia; res judicata; and prescription of action. Failure to allege in the
complaint that earnest efforts at a compromise has been made but had failed is not one of the
exceptions. Upon such failure, the defense is deemed waived.

Thus was it made clear that a failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise
in a complaint among members of the same family, is not a jurisdictional defect but merely a
defect in the statement of a cause of action.
In the case at hand, the proceedings before the trial court ran the full course. The
complaint of petitioners was answered by respondents without a prior motion to dismiss having
been filed. The decision in favor of the petitioners was appealed by respondents on the basis of
the alleged error in the ruling on the merits, no mention having been made about any defect in
the statement of a cause of action. In other words, no motion to dismiss the complaint based on
the failure to comply with a condition precedent was filed in the trial court; neither was such
failure assigned as error in the appeal that respondent brought before the Court of Appeals.
Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is
wholly applicable to respondent. If the respondents as parties-defendants could not, and did not,
after filing their answer to petitioners complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required
allegation on earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not have
any authority or basis to motu propio order the dismissal of petitioners complaint.
Indeed, even if we go by the reason behind Article 151 of the Family Code, which
provision as then Article 222 of the New Civil Code was described as "having been given more
teeth"21 by Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rule of Court, it is safe to say that the purpose of making
sure that there is no longer any possibility of a compromise, has been served.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DONALD VASQUEZ
G.R. NO. 200304, JANUARY 15, 2014
J. Leonardo-De Castro
Any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must
accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for
information against them before their arraignment, appellants are
questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured
submission to the trial courts jurisdiction.

be made before the

the quashing of the
now estopped from
upon their voluntary

This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute
and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3)
customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless arrest, for,
while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the
Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2)
arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.
Credence shall be given to the narration of the incident by prosecution witnesses
especially so when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in
a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary.
FACTS:
In an information, Vasquez was charged for violation of dangerous drugs for selling
shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride. Upon arraignment, Vasquez pleaded not guilty and

trial on the merits ensued. During the trial, prosecution presented the testimonies of P/Insp.
Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo, who both took part in the buy-bust operation conducted by the
police to capture Vasquez.
P/Insp. Fajardo testified that they received a confidential information about Vasquez
being engaged in illegal drug activity and claimed about being an employee of the NBI. This
information was relayed to their commanding officer, and thus a team was formed to conduct a
buy-bust operation. The informant and the team went to the location with P/Insp. Fajardo acting
as the potential buyer. The deal to buy shabu was closed, with an agreement to meet the
following day for the delivery of the drugs. As such, the buy-bust team went to the agreed
meeting place, but Vasquez told P/Insp. Fajardo to have the sale take place in a more secured
place, to which Fajardo agreed and the exchange of money and shabu took place in the new
agreed place with Vasquez and companion being captured therein. With this, Fajardo took
custody of the shabu and placed her initials therein, further Vasquez and companion were
brought to the police station where their rights were read to them. Thereafter, P/Insp. Fajardo
marked the drug specimen and brought the same to the Crime Laboratory. Further, P/Insp.
Fajardo testified that she noticed that there were markings on the envelope that read "DD-931303 re Antonio Roxas y Sunga" but she did not bother to check out what they were for or who
made them, however, upon interrogation it was revealed that the same was submitted as
evidence to the NBI Crime Laboratory and that Vasquez was working as a Laboratory Aide at
the NBI Crime Laboratory. PO2 Trambulo also testified and corroborated that of Fajardo. The
defense denied the prosecutions allegation of events, contending Vasquez was framed up.
The RTC convicted Vasquez giving more credence to the prosecutions evidence given
that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty on the part of the police
officers was not overcome. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the search and arrest done by the police officers were valid.
2. Whether testimony of prosecution witness supports conviction.
RULING:
At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest.
We reiterated in People v. Tampis that "any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest
must be made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the
quashing of the information against them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped
from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary
submission to the trial courts jurisdiction." Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the
appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in
a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful.
Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in this case, the Court holds that the
warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid.
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute
and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3)
customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless arrest, for,

while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the
Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2)
arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.
Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly the invalidity of his
arrest and the subsequent search upon his person.
In People v. Ting Uy, the Court explains that "credence shall be given to the narration of the
incident by prosecution witnesses especially so when they are police officers who are presumed
to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary." In
the instant case, the appellant failed to ascribe, much less satisfactorily prove, any improper
motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to why they would falsely incriminate him.
The appellant himself even testified that, not only did he not have any misunderstanding with
P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo prior to his arrest, he in fact did not know them at all. In the
absence of evidence of such ill motive, none is presumed to exist.
It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no showing that the trial court
overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion, the
Court will not disturb the trial courts assessment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses
since the RTC was in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during trial.
Settled too is the rule that the factual findings of the appellate court sustaining those of the trial
court are binding on this Court, unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted
with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the prosecution was able to
establish the guilt of the appellant of the crimes charged.
HERMINIA ACBANG v. HON. JIMMY H.F. LUCZON
G.R. No. 164246, JANUARY 15, 2014
J. Bersamin
A judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, but the
defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an appeal; (2) file a supersede s
bond; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of the appeal.
Since the Acbangs perfected an appeal but failed to file the required superseadeas bond, the
immediate execution of the judgment in an ejectment suit cannot be stayed. The filing of the
notice of appeal alone perfected the appeal but did not suffice to stay the immediate execution
without the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit of the accruing rentals.
Facts:
Respondent Spouses Lopez commenced an ejectment suit against the petitioner, her
son Benjamin and his wife Jean in the MTC of Alcala, Cagayan. The defendants did not file their
answer. Thus, the MTC rendered a decision in favor of the Spouses Lopez. The petitioner
appealed to the RTC.
In the meantime, the Spouses Lopez moved for the execution of the decision pending
appeal in the RTC, alleging that the defendants had not filed a supersedeas bond to stay the
execution. The Acbangs opposed the motion, insisting that the failure of the Spouses Lopez to
move for the execution in the MTC constituted a waiver of their right to the immediate execution;
and that, therefore, there was nothing to stay, rendering the filing of the supersedeas bond

unnecessary. The motion for execution pending appeal was granted there being no Motion to
Fix Supersedeas bond filed by the Acbangs as of the date of the filing of the Motion.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was denied. Later, petitioner brought the
petition for prohibition directly in the Supreme Court submitting that Judge Luczon committed
grave error in granting the motion for immediate execution of the Spouses Lopez without first
fixing the supersedeas bond. Later, the RTC rendered decision on the appealed case, finding
that the petitioner had not received the summons, and that the sheriffs return did not show the
steps taken by the server to insure the petitioners receipt of the summons, hence, the nonservice of the summons resulted in the MTC not acquiring jurisdiction over petitioner; and that
the MTCs decision was void as far as petitioner was concerned.
In the petition, the petitioner insists that Spouses Lopezs motion for execution pending
appeal should be filed before she posted a supersedeas bond. She argues that even if the
MTCs decision was immediately executory, it did not mean that a motion for execution was
dispensable; and that the Spouses Lopez waived their right to the immediate execution when
they did not file a motion for execution in the MTC.
ISSUE:
Whether immediate execution of judgment can be stayed.
RULING:
The ruling in Chua v. Court of Appeals is instructive on the means of staying the
immediate execution of a judgment in an ejectment case, to wit:
As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory,
in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of the property in question.
To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the appeal is pending the foregoing provision
(Section 19, Rule 70) requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the defendant perfects his
appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits the rentals which become due
during the pendency of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is
a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being "ministerial
and imperative." Hence, if the defendant-appellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas
bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a
supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily
then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal.

In short, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory,

but the defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an appeal; (2) file a
supersede s bond; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of
the appeal. Although the petitioner correctly states that the Spouses Lopez should file a motion
for execution pending appeal before the court may issue an order for the immediate execution
of the judgment, the spouses Lopez are equally correct in pointing out that they were entitled to
the immediate execution of the judgment in view of the Acbangs failure to comply with all of the
three abovementioned requisites for staying the immediate execution. The filing of the notice of
appeal alone perfected the appeal but did not suffice to stay the immediate execution without
the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit of the accruing rentals.
THELMA M. ARANAS v. TERESITA V. MERCADO

G.R. NO. 156407, JANUARY 15, 2014

J. Bersamin
The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether the
assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. An interlocutory order deals with
preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered.
The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of
appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits
of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily
delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the
adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many
appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders
rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal,
but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being
included in the appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed
to be resorted to.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the
decedent is to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the
executor or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the
estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate. Hence, the RTC that presides
over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what
properties should be included in the inventory.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and
limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but
are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not
by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding
said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of
properties to be administered by the administrator.
FACTS:
Emigdio Mercado died intestate and was survived by his second wife, Teresita and their
five children, and his two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin and
petitioner
Thelma.
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime, owned corporate
shares in Mervir Realty and Cebu Emerson. Later, he assigned his real properties in exchange
for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Cebu to Mervir Realty.
Subsequently, Thelma filed before the RTC a petition for appointment of Teresista as the
administrator of Emigdios estate, to which the RTC granted and letters of administration was
issued in favour og Teresita.
Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio for the approval by the RTC,
indicating therein that at the time of Emigdios death, he had left only personal properties.
However, Thelma claimed that Emigdio owned other properties which were excluded from the

inventory, thus, Thelma moved that RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory. The RTC
granted Thelmas motion and Teresita filed a compliance thereto. Again, Thelma moved to
require Teresita to be examined under oath on the inventory; that Thelma be allowed file a
formal opposition or comment on the inventory. With this, the RTC the issued an order
expressing the need for parties to present evidence to enable it to resolve the motion for the
approval of the inventory, but Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory.
After series of hearings, the RTC found that the inventory submitted by Teresita had
excluded properties that should be included. Thereafter, Teresita and the other heirs of Emigdio
sought for reconsideration claiming that one of the real properties affected had already been
sold to Mervir Realty and that the land covered by deed of assignment had been registered and
in the possession of Mervir Realty. The RTC, however, denied the motion for reconsideration
stating that there was no cogent reason for the reconsideration, and that the movants
agreement as heirs to submit to the RTC the issue of what properties should be included or
excluded from the inventory already estopped them from questioning its jurisdiction to pass
upon the issue. The CA partly granted the petition for certiorari filed by Teresita, reversing the
inclusion of lands but affirmed all other respects, further explaining that because the order of the
RTC directing new inventory was interlocutory, petition for certiorari was the proper remedy.
Also, the CA ruled that RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it directed the inclusion
of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that the properties had been transferred by
sale or exchange of corporate shares by decedent during his lifetime.
ISSUES:
1. Whether special civil action for certiorari is the proper remedy.
2. Whether probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for
purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the
administrator.
RULING:
The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether the
assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. In PahilaGarrido v. Tortogo, the
Court distinguished between final and interlocutory orders as follows:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first
disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action,
leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined,
but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided
upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to
be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment
is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial
court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory;
otherwise, it is final.
The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the writ of preliminary
injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the subject of an appeal.
The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of
appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of
the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay

the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse
party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as
there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or
issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after
a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the
appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be
resorted to.
The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresitas motion for the approval of the inventory
and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory.
This is because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a final determination
of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the concomitant determination of
the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and
subject to revision at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.
Indeed, in the cited case of Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, the Court pointed out:
All that the said court could do as regards the said properties is determine whether they should
or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the
administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to take
against the assailed orders. The final judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section
1, Rule 41, Rules of Court, which also governs appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that
only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law that completely disposes of
the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable may
be the subject of an appeal in due course. The same rule states that an interlocutory order or
resolution (interlocutory because it deals with preliminary matters, or that the trial on the merits
is yet to be held and the judgment rendered) is expressly made nonappealable.
Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of the possibility
that material issues may be finally determined at various stages of the special proceedings.
Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the specific instances in which multiple
appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings.
Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not come under any of the
instances in which multiple appeals are permitted.
Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be
granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to
serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving
spouse, the RTC becomes dutybound to direct the preparation and submission of the inventory
of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and
responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of
administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court.

The usage of the word all in Section 1, demands the inclusion of all the real and
personal properties of the decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified by the
phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties
must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the
administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no
properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless
of their being in the possession of another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the
decedent is to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the
executor or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the
estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate. Hence, the RTC that presides
over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what
properties should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta, the CA cannot
impose its judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties are to
be included or excluded from the inventory in the absence of positive abuse of discretion, for in
the administration of the estates of deceased persons, the judges enjoy ample discretionary
powers and the appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken
by them, unless it be shown that there has been a positive abuse of discretion. As long as the
RTC commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the
regular performance of its judicial duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special
and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate
but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate,
not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do
regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory
of properties to be administered by the administrator. Such determination is provisional and may
be still revised. As the Court said inAgtarap v. Agtarap:
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an intestate
court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the
estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership
that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely
exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or one in
charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title
to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of
the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is,
then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action
before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of
title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice
to final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all
heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to

the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its
jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the
estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the
inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE, ROXAS BOULEY ARD, INC. v. FAR EAST BANK &
TRUST COMPANY
G.R. NO. 159926 , JANUARY 20, 2014
J. Bersamin
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it
may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or
final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through
extrinsic fraud.
The objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set
aside the judgment or final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute
his cause or to ventilate his defense. If the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire
proceedings are set aside without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper
court. If the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the
CA may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been
granted therein.
Given the extraordinary nature and the objective of the remedy of annulment of
judgment or final order, Pinausukan must be mindful of and should closely comply with the
following statutory requirements for the remedy as set forth in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
The first requirement prescribes that the remedy is available only when the petitioner
can no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies through no fault of the petitioner.
The second requirement limits the ground for the action of annulment of judgment to
either extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction.
The third requirement sets the time for the filing of the action. The action, if based on
extrinsic fraud, must be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if
based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
The fourth requirement demands that the petition should be verified, and should allege
with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting
the petitioners good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
FACTS:
Bonier, then President of Pinausukan executed four real estate mortgages involving the
petitioners parcel of land situated in Pasay City in favor of Far East Bank and Trust Company
(now Bank of Philippine Islands). When the unpaid obligation had ballooned the Bank
commenced proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages. Thereafter, the
sheriff issued the notice of sheriffs sale and public auction was set. Upon learning of the
impending sale, Pinausukan brought against the Bank and the sheriff an action for the

annulment of real estate mortgages in the RTC, averring that Bonier had obtained the loans
only in his personal capacity and had constituted the mortgages on the corporate asset without
Pinausukans consent.
The RTC dismissed the case for failure to prosecute, thereafter the order attained
finality. Later, the sheriff issued a notice of extrajudicial sale, which was received by Pinausukan
a week later. Pinausukan claimed surprise over the turn of events, thus, it inquired from the RTC
and learned that its cousel had not informed it about the order of dismissal.
Pinausukan brought a petition for annulment in the CA seeking the nullification of the
dismissal order, stating that its counsel had been guilty of gross and palpable negligence in
failing to keep track of the case he was handling, and in failing to apprise Pinausukan of the
developments on the case. However, the CA dismissed the petition citing the failure to attach
the affidavits of witnesses attesting to and describing the alleged extrinsic fraud supporting the
cause of action as required by Section 4, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether judgment may be annulled.
RULING:
The Court has expounded on the nature of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final
order in Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals, viz:
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it
may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or
final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through
extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily
and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions. The Court
has thus instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction
and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the
petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for
annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper.
The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final order or
final resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of
immutability and unalterability of final judgments, a solid corner stone in the dispensation of
justice by the courts. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose,
namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly
the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of
occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts exist.
The objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set
aside the judgment or final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute
his cause or to ventilate his defense. If the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire
proceedings are set aside without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper
court. If the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the
CA may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been
granted therein. The remedy is by no means an appeal whereby the correctness of the assailed

judgment or final order is in issue; hence, the CA is not called upon to address each error
allegedly committed by the trial court.
Given the extraordinary nature and the objective of the remedy of annulment of
judgment or final order, Pinausukan must be mindful of and should closely comply with the
following statutory requirements for the remedy as set forth in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
The first requirement prescribes that the remedy is available only when the petitioner
can no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies through no fault of the petitioner. This means that the remedy, although
seen as "a last remedy," is not an alternative to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal and
petition for relief. The petition must aver, therefore, that the petitioner failed to move for a new
trial, or to appeal, or to file a petition for relief without fault on his part. But this requirement to
aver is not imposed when the ground for the petition is lack of jurisdiction (whether alleged
singly or in combination with extrinsic fraud), simply because the judgment or final order, being
void, may be assailed at any time either collaterally or by direct action or by resisting such
judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless the ground of
lack of jurisdiction is meanwhile barred by laches.
The second requirement limits the ground for the action of annulment of judgment to
either extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction.
Not every kind of fraud justifies the action of annulment of judgment. Only extrinsic fraud
does. Fraud is extrinsic, where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully
his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from
court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the
suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or
without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has
never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit
may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and
fair hearing.
The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent
scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented the petitioner from having his day in
court. Nonetheless, extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have
been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
The third requirement sets the time for the filing of the action. The action, if based on
extrinsic fraud, must be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if
based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
The fourth requirement demands that the petition should be verified, and should allege
with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the
petitioners good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. The need for
particularity cannot be dispensed with because averring the circumstances constituting either
fraud or mistake with particularity is a universal requirement in the rules of pleading.
The petition is to be filed in seven clearly legible copies, together with sufficient copies
corresponding to the number of respondents, and shall contain essential submissions,
specifically: (a) the certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution, to be attached
to the original copy of the petition intended for the court and indicated as such by the
petitioner; (b) the affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the cause of action or

defense; and (c) the sworn certification that the petitioner has not theretofore commenced any
other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the CA or the different divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must
state the status of the same, and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding
has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the CA, or different divisions thereof, or
any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the said courts and other tribunal
or agency thereof within five days therefrom.
The purpose of these requirements of the sworn verification and the particularization of
the allegations of the extrinsic fraud in the petition, of the submission of the certified true copy of
the judgment or final order or resolution, and of the attachment of the affidavits of witnesses and
documents supporting the cause of action or defense is to forthwith bring all the relevant facts to
the CAs cognizance in order to enable the CA to determine whether or not the petition has
substantial merit. Should it find prima facie merit in the petition, the CA shall give the petition
due course and direct the service of summons on the respondent; otherwise, the CA has the
discretion to outrightly dismiss the petition for annulment.

LZK HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT

BANK
G.R. NO. 187973, January 20, 2014
J. Reyes
The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that "when a right
or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them." In the case,
the judgment rendered in G.R. No. 167998 was rendered by the CA under its jurisdiction and
was a judgment on the merits. Further, the parties involved in the previous case and the case at
bar were the same parties raising the same relief.
The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature.
It is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the
court to any person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without
giving the person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard.
By its very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a nonlitigious proceeding. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one's right of possession
as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party
sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong.
FACTS:
LZK Holdings obtained a loan from Planters Bank secured with a Real Estate Mortgage
over its lot located in La Union. Subsequently, the lot was sold at a public auction after Planters
Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage due to failure of LZK Holdings to pay its loan,
wherein Planters Bank emerged as the highest bidder. As such, LZK Holdings filed before a

complaint for annulment of extra judicial foreclosure, mortgage contract, promissory note and
damages, further praying for the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
consolidation of title over the lot by Planters Bank. Later, Planters Bank filed an ex-parte motion
for the issuance of a writ of possession in the RTC-San Fernando. 3 days before the expiration
of LZK Holdings' redemption period, the RTC-Makati issued a TRO enjoining Planters Bank
from consolidating its title over the property.
In the meantime, Planters Bank succeeded in consolidating its ownership over the
property. However, the proceedings for its ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession was suspended by the RTC-San Fernando in view of the TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the RTC-Makati. This prompted Planters Bank to move for
reconsideration, which however, was denied. Then upon motion of LZK Holdings, the RTCMakati declared as null and void the consolidated title of Planters Bank, which ruling was
affirmed by the CA. When the matter reached the Supreme Court via G.R. No. 164563, the SC
sustained the CA's judgment.
Further, Planters Bank appealed the order of the RTC-San Fernando which held in
abeyance the resolution of its ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, which
appeal was ruled in favour of Planters Bank. Aggrieved, LZK Holdings sought recourse with the
SC in a petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 167998, wherein the SC affirmed the CA's
ruling and decreed that Planters Bank may apply for and is entitled to a writ of possession as
the purchaser of the property in the foreclosure sale. Soon, Planters Bank filed a motion to set
ex-parte hearing for the issuance of a writ of possession, which the RTC-San Fernando granted
and the CA affirmed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether doctrine of res judicata by conclusive of judgment is present.
2. Whether hearing is required prior to the issuance of a writ of possession.
RULING:
The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that "when a right
or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them."
All the elements of the doctrine are present in this case. The final judgment in G.R. No.
167998 was rendered by the Court pursuant to its jurisdiction over the review of decisions and
rulings of the CA. It was a judgment on the merits of Planters Banks's right to apply for and be
issued a writ of possession. Lastly, the parties in G.R. No. 167998 are the same parties involved
in the present case.
Hence, LZK Holdings can no longer question Planter Bank's right to a writ of possession
over the subject property because the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment bars the
relitigation of such particular issue.
No hearing is required prior to the issuance of a writ of possession. This is clear from the
following disquisitions in Espinoza v. United Overseas Bank Phils. which reiterates the settled
rules on writs of possession, to wit:

The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature.
It is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court
to any person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the
person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard.
By its very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a nonlitigious proceeding. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one's right of possession
as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party
sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress
of a wrong.
Given the ex-parte nature of the proceedings for a writ of possession, the RTC did not
err in cancelling the previously scheduled hearing and in granting Planters Bank's motion
without affording notice to LZK Holdings or allowing it to participate.
SPOUSES NICASIO C. MARQUEZ AND ANITA J. MARQUEZ v. SPOUSES ALINDOG
G.R. NO. 184045, January 22, 2014
J. Perlas-Bernabe
It is an established rule that the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled
to the possession of the property and can demand that he be placed in possession of the same
either during (with bond) or after the expiration (without bond) of the redemption period therefor.
It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the
property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of
the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the said property and can demand it at any
time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new
transfer certificate of title. The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the
redemption period except that he has to post a bond in accordance with Section 7 of Act No.
3135, as amended.
The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial
act. After the consolidation of title in the buyers name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the
property, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale is merely a ministerial function. The trial court has no discretion on
this matter. Hence, any talk of discretion in connection with such issuance is misplaced.
The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, however, admits of an exception. Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court pertinently provides that the possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a
purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the property by
adverse title or right. The issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Sps. Marquez, who had
already consolidated their title over the extra-judicially foreclosed property, is merely ministerial
in nature.
FACTS:
Petitioner Anita extended a loan to Gutierrez secured by a real estate mortgage over a
land registered under the name of Sps. Gutierrez. The mortgage was annotated at the back of
the certificate of title and was verified by Sps. Marquez as clean prior to the mortgage. Sps.
Gutierrez defaulted, hence, Anita sought for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the property, upon

which a public auction was held wherein Anita emerged as the highest bidder. Gutierrez failed to
redeem the property, leading to the consolidation of title in the name of Anita Marquez, married
to Nicasio Marquez. However, it bore an annotation of adverse claim in the names of
respondents, as the annotation was copied from an earlier annotation made after the property
was mortgaged to Sps. Marquez.
Subsequently, respondents filed a civil case for the annulment of the real estate
mortgage and certificate of sale, alleging that the respondents purchased the property from
Gutierrez prior to the propertys being mortaged to Sps. Marquez, but respondents were unable
to secure a certificate of title in their names as Gonzales to whom they have entrusted said
task had deceived them. Separately, respondents averred that when the mortgage was
executed in favor of Sps. Marquez, Gutierrez was already dead. In their defense, Sps. Marquez
disputed respindents ownership over the property, arguing that the purported sale in the latters
favor was never registered and therefore, not binding upon them. Further, they insisted that their
certificate of title was already indefeasible, and cannot be attacked collaterally.
Meanwhile, Anita filed an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession before
the RTC, claiming that it is ministerial on the courts part following the consolidation of her and
her husbands title over the property. Impleaded in petition are Sps. Gutierrez, including all
persons claiming rights under them. With this, the RTC granted the ex-parte petition, to which
the respondents sought a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction that was granted in their
favour. However, under the Sheriffs return, the writ of possession was implemented.
After further proceedings on the injunction case, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the property until after the
controversy has been fully resolved on the merits. Sps. Marquez moved for reconsideration and
respondents filed a Motion for Approval of Cash Bond and to Regain Possession of the property.
RTC denied the motion for reconsideration but granted respondents motion. The CA denied
Sps. Marquezs petition.
ISSUE:
Whether writ of possession may be issued.
RULING:
It is an established rule that the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled
to the possession of the property and can demand that he be placed in possession of the same
either during (with bond) or after the expiration (without bond) of the redemption period therefor.
Strictly, Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, refers to a situation wherein the
purchaser seeks possession of the foreclosed property during the 12-month period for
redemption. Upon the purchasers filing of the ex parte petition and posting of the appropriate
bond, the RTC shall, as a matter of course, order the issuance of the writ of possession in the
purchasers favour.
It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the
property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of
the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the said property and can demand it at any
time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new
transfer certificate of title. The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the

redemption period except that he has to post a bond in accordance with Section 7 of Act No.
3135, as amended. No such bond is required after the redemption period if the property is not
redeemed. Possession of the land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as
confirmed owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of
possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial
act. After the consolidation of title in the buyers name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the
property, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale is merely a ministerial function. The trial court has no discretion on
this matter. Hence, any talk of discretion in connection with such issuance is misplaced.
The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, however, admits of an exception. Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court pertinently provides that the possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a
purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the property by
adverse title or right. In the recent case of Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara (Iloilo), Inc. v.
Centeno, citing the case of China Banking Corp., the Court illumined that "the phrase a third
party who is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor contemplates a
situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that of a coowner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner, agricultural tenant, and usufructuary possess the
property in their own right, and they are not merely the successor or transferee of the right of
possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property. Notably, the property should not
only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the third party adversely to the judgment
obligor."
In this case, it is clear that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Sps. Marquez,
who had already consolidated their title over the extra-judicially foreclosed property, is merely
ministerial in nature. The general rule as herein stated and not the exception found under
Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules should apply since Sps. Alindog hinged their claim over the
subject property on their purported purchase of the same from its previous owner, i.e., Sps.
Gutierrez (with Gutierrez being the original mortgagor). Accordingly, it cannot be seriously
doubted that Sps. Alindog are only the latters (Sps. Gutierrez) successors-in-interest who do
not have a right superior to them.
A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC. v. EMMA MONDEJAR
G.R. NO. 200804, JANUARY 22, 2014
J. Perlas-Bernabe
Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision, the remedy of appeal is not
allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its execution. Nevertheless,
the proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is
not an available remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is
an original action designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of judgment. Owing to its
nature, it is therefore incumbent upon petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors tainted the
MTCC Decision. The RTC, in turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition based on an
evaluation of whether or not the MTCC gravely abused its discretion by capriciously,
whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material to the controversy.
FACTS:

Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money under Rule of Procedure for Small Claims
Cases before the MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent an amount representing unpaid
water bills. Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to and collect payment
therefor from the homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision; that respondent and her family were
unable to pay their water consumption despite repeated demands. In defense, respondent
claimed that she religiously paid petitioner the agreed monthly flat rate; that notwithstanding
their agreement that the rate would be adjusted only upon prior notice to the homeowners,
petitioner unilaterally charged her unreasonable and excessive adjustments far above the
average daily water consumption. In the interim, petitioner disconnected respondents water line
for not paying the adjusted water charges. The MTCC ruled in favour of respondent and
disregarded the petitioners reliance on the HLURB decision as the source of petitioners
authority to impose new rates.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
before the RTC, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC, to which the RTC
dismissed finding that the said petition was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of
small claims cases as provided under Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure on Small Claims
Cases. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy on small claim cases.
RULING:
Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that:
SEC. 23. Decision. After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the same
day, based on the facts established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision shall
immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy
thereof forthwith served on the parties.
The decision shall be final and unappealable. Considering the final nature of a small
claims case decision under the above-stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the
prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on
appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an available
remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. In Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co., the Court ruled:
Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special civil action of
certiorari may only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the course of law," this rule is not without exception. The availability of the ordinary
course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial,
speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy not the mere absence of all other legal remedies
and the danger of failure of justice without the writ that usually determines the propriety of
certiorari.
In this relation, it may not be amiss to placate the RTCs apprehension that respondents
recourse before it (was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims

cases, because it asks the court to supplant the decision of the lower court with another
decision directing the private respondent to pay the petitioner a bigger sum than what has been
awarded." Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original action designed to
correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of judgment. Owing to its nature, it is therefore
incumbent upon petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors tainted the MTCC Decision. The
RTC, in turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition based on an evaluation of whether or not
the MTCC gravely abused its discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding
evidence that is material to the controversy.
In view of the foregoing, the Court thus finds that petitioner correctly availed of the
remedy of certiorari to assail the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims
case, contrary to the RTCs ruling.
Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed before their
corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with when it instituted its petition
for certiorari before the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. In
fine, the RTC erred in dismissing the said petition on the ground that it was an improper remedy,
and, as such, RTC Case No. 11-13833 must be reinstated and remanded thereto for its proper
disposition.
AIDA R. CAMPOS, ALISTAIR R. CAMPOS AND CHARMAINE R. CAMPOS v. ATTY. ELISEO
M. CAMPOS
A.C. NO. 8644, January 22, 2014
J. Reyes
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers
are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the
Bar for violation of the Lawyers Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons
of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been
traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a
disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member
of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.
FACTS:
Eliseo and Aida were married and 2 children Alistair and Charmaine were born
therefrom. Eliseo soon purchased a lot and thereafter applied for the issuance of a title in his
sons name, to which an Original Certificate of Title covering the property was issued in the
sons name. Subsequently, Eliseo filed a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
Thereafter he executed an Affidavit of Loss wherein he represented himself as the owner of the
property covered by the OCT and further declared that he unknowingly lost the owners
certificate of title. Later, he caused the annotation of the said affidavit in the copy of OCT. As
such, Alistair filed a complaint for perjury against Eliseo, stating that the owners copy of OCT
was in his possession and Eliseo was aware of such fact. Eliseo, however, insisted that he is
the owner of the property covered by OCT as he never intended to give it to Alistair.

Subsequently, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dismissed for lack of probable cause
Alistairs complaint for perjury against Eliseo.
Aida, Alistair and Charmaine filed before the OCA an administrative complaint for serious
misconduct, immorality and dishonesty against Eliseo, and a formal investigation was thereafter
conducted. Pending the resolution of the administrative complaint, Eliseo resigned from his
judicial post. Subsequently, after the conclusion of a hearing on the Annulment case, Judge
Casalas called the parties for a conference in his chambers, however, a scuffle ensued inside
the chamber. As such, a police blotter was filed indicating that Eliseo choked his daughter and
attempted to box his son.
Petitioners then filed a complaint for disbarment against Eliseo, alleging that Eliseo
committed acts of dishonesty, immorality and serious misconduct in causing the issuance of
OCT in Alistairs name; misrepresenting himself as the real owner of the lot; falsely declaring
under oath in the Affidavit of Loss that the owners copy of OCT is missing despite his
knowledge that the said title is with Alistair; stating in his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage that he is a homosexual albeit admitting to his children that he has an intimate relation
with another woman; and choking and boxing his children. This, the Court referred to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation.
During the hearing, Eliseo insisted that the allegations against him of immorality and
psychological incapacity in having extra-marital affairs; and serious misconduct in the execution
of the Affidavit of Loss need not be resolved anymore in the instant disbarment complaint since
they are already the subjects of other pending cases. CBD recommended to the IBP Board of
Governors the dismissal of the disbarment complaint against Eliseo for lack of evidence. The
IBP Board of Governors, however, reversed the findings of CBD.
ISSUE:
Whether there is automatic conversion of administrative cases against judges to disciplinary
proceedings against them as lawyers.
RULING:
In Samson v. Caballero, the Court emphasized what "automatic conversion of
administrative cases against justices and judges to disciplinary proceedings against them as
lawyers" means, viz:
This administrative case against respondent shall also be considered as a disciplinary
proceeding against him as a member of the Bar, in accordance with AM. No. 02-9-02-SC. This
resolution, entitled "Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of
the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court
Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and
as Members of the Philippine Bar," provides:
"Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan;
judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on
grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for
violation of the Lawyers Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of
Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally
recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary
action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar.
x x x. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution." x x x x
Under the same rule, a respondent "may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and
show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary
sanctioned as member of the Bar." xxx In other words, an order to comment on the complaint is
an order to give an explanation on why he should not be held administratively liable not only as
a member of the bench but also as a member of the bar. This is the fair and reasonable
meaning of "automatic conversion" of administrative cases against justices and judges to
disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of A.M. No.
02-9-02-SC to avoid the duplication or unnecessary replication of actions by treating an
administrative complaint filed against a member of the bench also as a disciplinary proceeding
against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the rule. Thus, a disciplinary proceeding as a
member of the bar is impliedly instituted with the filing of an administrative case against a justice
of the Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals or a judge of a first- or
second-level court.
The above-cited case suggests the superfluity of instituting a disbarment complaint
against a lawyer when an administrative case had been previously filed against him or her as a
magistrate. Ideally therefore, the instant disbarment complaint should have been consolidated
with A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761. However, it is well to note that Samson v. Caballero was
promulgated by the Court on August 5, 2009 subsequent to the filing of the instant disbarment
complaint on April 6, 2009. Further, while all the allegations in A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761 are
replicated in the instant disbarment complaint, the last issue of engagement in the scuffle is an
addition to the latter. Hence, this Court shall now resolve the said issue to write finis to the
parties bickerings.
CARLITO VALENCIA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 198804, January 22, 2014
J. Reyes
The rule on chain of custody under the foregoing enactments expressly demands the
identification of the persons who handle the confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring
the authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they are
seized from the accused until the time they are presented in court. Moreover, as a method of
authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every
person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it
was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change
in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession
of the same.
Although the Court has ruled that non-compliance with the directives of Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions case, the prosecution
must still prove that (a) there is a justifiable ground for the non-compliance, and (b) the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved. Further, the non-compliance

with the procedures must be justified by the States agents themselves. The arresting officers
are under obligation, should they be unable to comply with the procedures laid down under
Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, to explain why the procedure was not followed and prove
that the reason provided a justifiable ground. Otherwise, the requisites under the law would
merely be fancy ornaments that may or may not be disregarded by the arresting officers at their
own convenience.
FACTS:
Valencia was charged in an Information with illegal possession of dangerous drugs
under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Upon arraignment, Valencia pleaded not guilty,
thus, trial ensued. According to the prosecution, P/Supt. Cuaton, received a call from a
concerned citizen regarding the rampant sale of illegal drugs in Caloocan, causing for the
organization a team to conduct surveillance and a possible buy-bust operation in the said area.
The team immediately proceeded to the target area, wherein PO3 Modina and PO2 Rosales
approached a group of 6 persons playing cara y cruz, and PO3 Modina posed as a bettor. While
watching the game, PO3 Modina saw Valencia, place a plastic sachet containing a white
crystalline substance as a bet. Thereupon, PO3 Modina introduced himself as a police officer,
confiscated the plastic sachet, and arrested Valencia. When asked to empty his pockets,
Valencia brought out another transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
from his right pocket. PO3 Modina then apprised Valencia of his constitutional rights and
Valencia was brought to the police station, together with the confiscated transparent plastic
sachets.
At the police station, the two plastic sachets that were confiscated were turned over to
PO2 Hipolito for investigation and were then marked by PO2 Hipolito, thereafter were sent to
the crime laboratory for investigation. Upon examination, it yielded a positive result for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.
Valencia denied the allegations against him. The RTC convicted Valencia, which the CA
affirmed by ruling that the prosecution was able to show an unbroken chain of custody of the
seized drugs.
ISSUE:
Whether the rule on chain of custody was complied with.
RULING:
In the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug itself
constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and, in sustaining a conviction therefor, the
identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must definitely be shown to have been preserved. This
requirement necessarily arises from the illegal drugs unique characteristic that renders it
indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either
by accident or otherwise. Thus, to remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity
of the seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the
same illegal drug actually recovered from the accused-appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs under R.A. No. 9165 fails.

There must be strict compliance with the prescribed measures to be observed during
and after the seizure of dangerous drugs and related paraphernalia, during the custody and
transfer thereof for examination, and at all times up to their presentation in court.
The rule on chain of custody under the foregoing enactments expressly demands the
identification of the persons who handle the confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring
the authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they are
seized from the accused until the time they are presented in court. Moreover, as a method of
authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every
person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it
was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change
in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession
of the same.
Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related
items immediately after they are seized from the accused. In People v. Gonzales, the Court
explained that:
The first stage in the chain of custody rule is the marking of the dangerous drugs or related
items. Marking, which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items by the
apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his initials or signature or other identifying signs,
should be made in the presence of the apprehended violator immediately upon arrest. The
importance of the prompt marking cannot be denied, because succeeding handlers of
dangerous drugs or related items will use the marking as reference. Also, the marking operates
to set apart as evidence the dangerous drugs or related items from other material from the
moment they are confiscated until they are disposed of at the close of the criminal proceedings,
thereby forestalling switching, planting or contamination of evidence. In short, the marking
immediately upon confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drugs or related items is
indispensable in the preservation of their integrity and evidentiary value.
A perusal of the foregoing testimonies of PO3 Modina and PO2 Rosales shows that
there are significant lapses in the chain of custody of the plastic sachets that were confiscated
from Valencia. Indeed, while the prosecution was able to prove that the two plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance that were confiscated from Valencia were marked as
"CVC-1" and "CVC-2" by PO2 Hipolito, after the same were turned over to him at the police
station for investigation, there was no showing that the marking had been done in the presence
of Valencia or his representatives.
Although the Court has ruled that non-compliance with the directives of Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions case, the prosecution
must still prove that (a) there is a justifiable ground for the non-compliance, and (b) the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved. Further, the non-compliance
with the procedures must be justified by the States agents themselves. The arresting officers
are under obligation, should they be unable to comply with the procedures laid down under
Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, to explain why the procedure was not followed and prove
that the reason provided a justifiable ground. Otherwise, the requisites under the law would

merely be fancy ornaments that may or may not be disregarded by the arresting officers at their
own convenience.
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO v. TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO
G.R. NO. 173540, January 22, 2014
J. Perez
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is
not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the
fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence,
even a persons birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage
between his parents.
The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is the
contents, which may not be proven by secondary evidence when the instrument itself is
accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the
document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the
loss, has to be shown as foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents.
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or
primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is
actually produced, its authenticity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital
of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when
available, to establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the
admissibility of such evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the
swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by
those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also
held that the loss may be shown by any person who knows the fact of its loss, or by anyone
who has made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places
where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose
custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument has indeed been lost.
FACTS:
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly
married to the same man, now deceased. Respondent Tecla instituted a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina on the ground that Tecla, is the lawful wife
of the deceased Eustaquio. In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was
solemnized on 30 September 1942 in rites officiated by the Parish Priest. According to her, the
fact of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar, which however, were destroyed due to the war. Thus, only a Certification was
issued by the LCR. Further, Tecla claimed that during the existence of Tecla and Eustaquios
union, they begot four children. Howver, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not
known. Later, Tecla and her children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao living with
another woman by the name of Buenaventura who later died without any issue.
Subsequently, Tecla learned that Eustaquio got married to Peregrina, which marriage
she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous. On the contrary, Peregrina
averred that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died in Davao City, as their

marriage was celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City, further contending
that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an
heir of Eustaquio.
Trial ensued and Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence. On the other
hand, Peregrina testified and likewise presented documentary evidence, among which is the
Marriage Contract between her and the Eustaquio showing the date of marriage on 3 March
1979. The RTC denied Teclas petition, which decision was reversed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of, without
proof of the execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability of the best evidence, the
original document.
RULING:
Quite recently, in Aonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, we said, citing
precedents, that:
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is
not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the
fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence,
even a persons birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage
between his parents.
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact
can be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals. Thus:
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,
were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the
evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez
v. Mcgrath, the Court clarified this misconception thus:
x x x The court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of
the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the
document. It is the contents, which may not be proven by secondary evidence when the
instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or
non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due
execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the introduction of secondary
evidence of the contents. x x x x
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or
primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is
actually produced, its authenticity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital
of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when
available, to establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the
admissibility of such evidence.

The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by
relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that "marriage may be proven by
other competent evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the
swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by
those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also
held that "the loss may be shown by any person who knows the fact of its loss, or by anyone
who has made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places
where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose
custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument has indeed been lost."
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil,
who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event.
The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest,
Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution
and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary
evidencetestimonial and documentarymay be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARCELINO DADAO
G.R. NO. 201860, January 22, 2014
J. Leonardo-De Castro
The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of the witness, which is
best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such question, having
heard the witness and observed his demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling
examination. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal
unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case.
Where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the prosecution were actuated by ill
motive, it is presumed that they were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith
and credit.
Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its capacity to assimilate all material
details of a given incident, slight inconsistencies and variances in the declarations of a witness
hardly weaken their probative value. It is well-settled that immaterial and insignificant details do
not discredit a testimony on the very material and significant point bearing on the very act of
accused-appellants. As long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one another on
material points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility.
FACTS:
In an information, accused-appellants were charged of murder for the death of Yacapin. Upon
arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty and trial thereafter ensued. The prosecution
presented several witnesses, including Ronie and Edgar the stepsons of the victim and Nenita
the widow of the victim, as eyewitnesses. In his testimony, Ronie stated that he saw the
appellants helping each other with the use of firearms and bolos, shot to death the victim in their
house. This statement was corroborated by Edgar and Nenita. In all, the witnesses presented
by prosecution all point to the appellants as the perpetrator of the crime. On the contrary, the

defense also presented witnesses to negate the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Amongst the defenses witnesses are P/Insp. Armada, who testified that the paraffin test on the
appellants yielded negative result; Eddie one of the accused who provided for an alibi, which
was corroborated by his co-accused.
The RTC found the accused-appellants guilty of the crime charged, which decision was
affirmed by the CA. On petition to the SC, the appellants reiterate that their guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt because the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution were
afflicted with inconsistencies and improbabilities, thus, making them of doubtful veracity.
ISSUE:
Whether the eyewitness testimonies are credible to sustain conviction despite inconsistencies.
RULING:
We have consistently held in jurisprudence that the resolution of such a factual question
is best left to the sound judgment of the trial court and that, absent any misapprehension of
facts or grave abuse of discretion, the findings of the trial court shall not be disturbed. In People
v. De la Rosa,11 we yet again expounded on this principle in this wise:
The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of the witness, which is
best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such question, having
heard the witness and observed his demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling
examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and
in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. Through its observations
during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable
discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial
court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of
weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the
disposition of the case.
Jurisprudence also tells us that where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the
prosecution were actuated by ill motive, it is presumed that they were not so actuated and their
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. In the case at bar, no imputation of improper motive
on the part of the prosecution witnesses was ever made by appellants.
Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its capacity to assimilate all material details of
a given incident, slight inconsistencies and variances in the declarations of a witness hardly
weaken their probative value. It is well-settled that immaterial and insignificant details do not
discredit a testimony on the very material and significant point bearing on the very act of
accused-appellants. As long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one another on
material points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility. Inconsistencies on
minor details do not undermine the integrity of a prosecution witness.
Notwithstanding their conflicting statements on minor details, Ronie, Edgar and Nenita
positively identified appellants as the perpetrators of the dastardly crime of murder committed
on the victim which they categorically and consistently claimed to have personally witnessed.
In order to counter the serious accusation made against them, appellants put forward the
defense of alibi which necessarily fails in the face of positive identification. It is a time-honored
principle in jurisprudence that positive identification prevails over alibi since the latter can easily

be fabricated and is inherently unreliable. Hence, it must be supported by credible corroboration

from disinterested witnesses, and if not, is fatal to the accused. An examination of the record
would indicate that Eddie and Alfemio Malogsi were unable to present a corroborating witness to
support their alibi that they were working at a farm owned by a certain Boyle on the date and
time of Pionio Yacapins murder. While the witnesses presented by the defense to corroborate
the respective alibis of Marcelino Dadao and Antonio Sulindao consisted of friends and relatives
who are hardly the disinterested witnesses that is required by jurisprudence.
PEBLIA ALFARO AND THE HEIRS OF PROSPEROUS ALFARO v. SPOUSES EDITHO AND
HERA DUMALAGAN
G.R. NO. 186622, January 22, 2014
J. Perez
Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on
all points and matters determined in the former suit. The elements of res judicata are as follows:
(1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;
(3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of
subject matter and cause of action. The Bagano case has been settled by the court having
jurisdiction and was based on the merits. Nonetheless, the Bagano case and the present
controversy does not point to similarity of the parties or to the cause of action presented, hence
res judicata cannot be raised to bar determination of the issue.
An independent controversy cannot be injected into a suit by intervention, hence, such
intervention will not be allowed where it would enlarge the issues in the action and expand the
scope of the remedies. It is not proper where there are certain facts giving the intervenors case
an aspect peculiar to himself and differentiating it clearly from that of the original parties; the
proper course is for the wouldbe intervenor to litigate his claim in a separate suit. Intervention
is not intended to change the nature and character of the action itself, or to stop or delay the
placid operation of the machinery of the trial. The remedy of intervention is not proper where it
will have the effect of retarding the principal suit or delaying the trial of the action. Hence, the
issue of double sale as alleged cannot be injected into the Bagano case, which is based on
facts peculiar to the transaction between Bagano and petitioners.
FACTS:
Bagano sold a lot, which is registered in his name, to petitioner Spouses Alfaro.
Thereafter, petitioners caused the immediate transfer of title in their name and at the same time
paid the real property tax thereon, and constructed a perimeter fence around it. However,
respondents filed their claim thereto, alleging that they are the real owners of a portion of the
property as evidenced by a Certificate of Completion and a Certificate of Occupancy as well as
electric bills. It was further alleged that right after the respondents bought the same from
Bagano, they immediately took possession of the property and constructed a nipa hut therein,
which was later on leased to Quiineza, who then occupied the subject property until end of
1997. Since then, several tenants have occupied the subject property, paying monthly rentals to
respondent. Since then, several tenants have occupied the subject property, paying monthly
rentals to respondent.
Meanwhile, Spouses Bagano filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Sale with
Damages and Preliminary Injunction against petitioners, wherein the SC sustained the validity of

the Deed of Absolute Sale executed between petitioners and Spouses Bagano. However, in the
present case, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, which decision
the CA reversed explaining that the petitioners cannot claim good faith as there were
annotations written at the back of Baganos title. Motion for reconsider was denied, hence, this
petition wherein, Spouses Alfaro claimed that the SC decision in the Bagano case constituted
res judicata.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the decision made by the SC in the Bagano case constituted res judicata.
2. Whether non-intervention by respondents in the Bagano case bound him by the
judgment for bad faith and/or laches.
RULING:
Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on
all points and matters determined in the former suit. The elements of res judicata are as follows:
(1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;
(3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of
subject
matter
and
cause
of
action.
Our decision in the Bagano case on the merits has long been final. Also, the court a quo has
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. However, on the issue on identity of parties
and cause of action, We rule in the negative.
In the Bagano case, the parties are herein petitioner Spouses Alfaro and the Spouses Bagano,
as privies to the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 14 June 1995. In the case at bar, the parties are
petitioner Spouses Alfaro and respondent Spouses Dumalagan basing their rights on the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated 3 December 1993. There is, thus, no identity of parties.
In the Bagano case, the cause of action is the alleged forgery of the Deed of Absolute Sale by
petitioners; the crux of the case being the validity of the sale between Bagano and petitioners. In
the case at bar, the cause of action is the violation of right of ownership of respondent Spouses
Dumalagan. Clearly, there is no identity of cause of action. Therefore, the doctrine of res
judicata is inapplicable in the case at bar. The appellate court did not reverse a Supreme Court
decision.
Petitioners claim must fail. In MactanCebu International Airport Authority v. Heirs of
Estanislao Mioza, et. al., this Court clarified that:
xxx an independent controversy cannot be injected into a suit by intervention, hence, such
intervention will not be allowed where it would enlarge the issues in the action and expand the
scope of the remedies. It is not proper where there are certain facts giving the intervenors case
an aspect peculiar to himself and differentiating it clearly from that of the original parties; the
proper course is for the wouldbe intervenor to litigate his claim in a separate suit. Intervention
is not intended to change the nature and character of the action itself, or to stop or delay the
placid operation of the machinery of the trial. The remedy of intervention is not proper where it
will have the effect of retarding the principal suit or delaying the trial of the action.

In line with this ruling, the issue on double sale, which concerns the present case cannot be
injected into the Bagano case, which is based on facts peculiar to the transaction between
Bagano and petitioners. For one, herein respondents claim ownership of only a portion of the
property litigated in the Bagano case, and the basis of respondents claim is a prior sale to them
by Bagano, whose authority as a seller was an unquestioned fact. Neither of the parties in the
second Bagano sale made any mention of the first sale of a part of the property to respondents.

DIONES BELZA v. DANILO T. CANONERO

G.R. NO. 192479, January 27, 2014
J. Abad
A client has of course the right to dismiss and replace his counsel of record as provided
in the second paragraph of Section 26 above. But this assumes that such client has given
counsel a notice of dismissal so the latter could immediately cease to represent him. Indeed, it
would have been more prudent for newly hired counsel to refrain from entering his appearance
in the case until he has ascertained that the previous counsel has been dismissed from it.
Section 4, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC specifically
requires that a) The appeal shall be: 1) filed within the reglementary period provided in Section
1 of this Rule; 2) verified by the appellant himself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court, as amended; 3) in the form of a memorandum of appeal which shall state the
grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof, the relief prayed for, and with a
statement of the date the appellant received the appealed decision, resolution or order; 4) in
three (3) legibly typewritten or printed copies; and 5) accompanied by i) proof of payment of the
required appeal fee; ii) posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; iii)
a certificate of non-forum shopping; and iv) proof of service upon the other parties. b) A mere
notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the
running of the period of perfecting an appeal.
Insisting on such requirement even on appeal is a prerogative of the NLRC under its rule
making power considering the great volume of appeals filed with it from all over the country.
FACTS:
Petitioner DNB hired respondents as technicians assigned to repair and maintain its
clients' electronic and communications equipment. Respondent technicians were particularly
assigned at the Makati Medical Center, one of its clients. However, DNB lost in the bidding for
the services it was rendering to the medical center. As a consequence, DNB terminated
respondent technicians from employment without giving them new assignments or paying
separation pays. Subsequently, respondent technicians filed a complaint against DNB for
constructive illegal dismissal and non-payment of separation pay.
Following DNBs failure to file its position paper despite notice, the Labor Arbiter
rendered a Decision holding it liable for illegal dismissal and ordering it to pay respondent
technicians "backwages from the time they were dismissed up to the filing of the complaint" plus
separation pay of one month salary for every year of service. DNB appealed but the NLRC
dismissed the same as a non-perfected appeal given that DNB did not accompany its
memorandum of appeal with the required certification of non-forum shopping. Later, DNB filed,

through new counsel, Atty. Carpio, a motion for reconsideration of the NLRCs dismissal order
with a belated certification of non-forum shopping. A few days later the original counsel of
record, Atty. Claveria, filed for DNB a separate motion for reconsideration of the same order.
The NLRC issued a Resolution ignoring the motion for reconsideration that Atty. Carpio
filed for DNB considering that Atty. Claveria, the counsel of record, had not yet withdrawn from
the case; and denying the motion for reconsideration that the latter counsel filed for lack of
merit. This prompted DNB to appeal to the CA, which dismissed the petition and affirmed that of
the NLRC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether a client may dismiss counsel of record any time.

2.

Whether an appeal to the NLRC requires accompaniment of certification of non-forum

shopping.

RULING:
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Section 26. Change of Attorneys. An attorney may retire at any time from any action or
special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any
time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on
notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire.
In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket
of the court place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the
adverse party.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place x x x.
A client has of course the right to dismiss and replace his counsel of record as provided
in the second paragraph of Section 26 above. But this assumes that such client has given
counsel a notice of dismissal so the latter could immediately cease to represent him. Indeed, it
would have been more prudent for newly hired counsel to refrain from entering his appearance
in the case until he has ascertained that the previous counsel has been dismissed from it. As it
happened, apparently unaware that Atty. Carpio had already filed a motion for reconsideration of
the NLRC Order dismissing DNBs appeal, Atty. Claveria filed still another motion for
reconsideration on its behalf. He had no inkling that his client had decided to replace him.
Clearly, the fault in this case did not lie with the NLRC but with DNB which failed in its
duty to inform Atty. Claveria of his dismissal. And, since DNB had no right to file two motions for
reconsideration, the NLRC would have been well within its right to altogether disregard both
motions. Instead, however, it chose the more lenient option of acting on the one filed by the
original counsel of record who had not withdrawn from the case or been properly substituted.
This action cannot be regarded as constituting grave abuse of discretion.
b. Section 4, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC specifically requires
the submission of such certification of non-forum shopping in appeals to the NLRC. Thus:

Section 4. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. a) The appeal shall be: 1) filed within the
reglementary period provided in Section 1 of this Rule; 2) verified by the appellant himself in
accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended; 3) in the form of a
memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support
thereof, the relief prayed for, and with a statement of the date the appellant received the
appealed decision, resolution or order; 4) in three (3) legibly typewritten or printed copies; and
5) accompanied by i) proof of payment of the required appeal fee; ii) posting of a cash or surety
bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; iii) a certificate of non-forum shopping; and iv) proof
of service upon the other parties.
b) A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall
not stop the running of the period of perfecting an appeal.
The fact that DNB had not actually engaged in forum shopping is not an excuse for its
failure to comply with the requirement, an omission that allowed the period for perfecting the
appeal to run inexorably. The NLRC was, therefore, justified in dismissing DNBs appeal.
DNB points out that the requirement of certification of non-forum shopping has no
meaning in relation to its appeal from the Decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC since such
a certification is required under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court only in initiatory
pleadings and since it was respondent technicians, not DNB, who initiated the labor case with
their complaint. But insisting on such requirement even on appeal is a prerogative of the NLRC
under its rule making power considering the great volume of appeals filed with it from all over
the country. In Maricalum Mining Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court held
that substantial compliance with the requirement may be allowed when justified under the
circumstances but the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on NLRC's part when it found no
such justification in this case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FLORO MANIGO

G.R. NO. 194612, January 27, 2014
J. Del Castillo
Factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and
its assessment of their probative weight are given great respect if not conclusive effect, unless it
ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of
substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case.
Courts usually give greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual
assault, especially a minor, as in this case, because no woman would be willing to undergo a
public trial and put up with the shame, humiliation and dishonor of exposing her own
degradation were it not to condemn an injustice and have the offender apprehended and
punished.
In ascertaining whether an out-of-court identification is positive or derivative, the Court
has adopted the totality of circumstances test wherein the following factors are taken into
consideration: (1) the witnesss opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the

witnesss degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the
witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length
of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure.
FACTS:
Appellant was charged for the rape of AAA, a 13-year old minor, to which appellant
pleaded not guilty. In the trial, the prosecution present AAA to testify as to the events that took
place resulting to the crime charged. However, it appears that AAAs testimony during trial and
statement in her affidavit are somehow inconsistent. Further, the prosecution also presented the
medical findings of the doctor that examined AAA, revealing swelling on the posterior portion of
AAAs private part. In his defense, appellant raised denial and alibi, claiming that there could
have been no rape as appellant was at their home on the day of the alleged rape and that
appellant does not know the victim.
The RTC accorded full faith and credence to the testimony of "AAA" on how the incident
happened and her positive identification of the appellant, thereby rejecting appellants defense
of denial. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, sustaining the credibility of AAA and her
out-of-court identification of appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether the testimony of the victim deserves full faith and credence, despite inconsistencies.
RULING:
"AAAs" testimony deserves full faith and credence.
Appellants contentions basically relate to the trial courts appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the prosecution and its factual findings based thereon.
"The legal aphorism is that factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of their probative weight are given great
respect if not conclusive effect, unless it ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood, or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter
the outcome of the case." A careful scrutiny of the records reveals that the case at bench is not
an exception.
Like the lower courts, we find the narration of "AAA" to be candid, frank and
straightforward. There is nothing therein that appears to be unnatural or illogical. Moreover,
"AAAs" claim of rape is supported by the medical findings of Dr. Perez, another prosecution
witness. "Where a victims testimony is corroborated by the physical findings of penetration,
there is sufficient basis for concluding that sexual intercourse did take place. A rape victims
account is sufficient to support a conviction for rape if it is straightforward, candid and
corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician, as in the present case."
Also, "courts usually give greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of
sexual assault, especially a minor, as in this case, because no woman would be willing to
undergo a public trial and put up with the shame, humiliation and dishonor of exposing her own
degradation were it not to condemn an injustice and have the offender apprehended and
punished."

Insofar as the alleged inconsistency between "AAAs" statements in her affidavit and
testimony in open court is concerned, it has often been noted by this Court that if there is an
inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness, the latter should be given
more weight since affidavits being taken ex-parte are usually incomplete and
inaccurate. Besides, the inconsistency respecting the physical appearance of appellant has no
bearing on the principal question of whether appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim.
Neither the failure of "AAA" to describe the tricycle will dent her credibility. Suffice it to say that
these matters are not so material in the prosecution of the crime.
In Vidar v. People, the Court laid down the following:
In ascertaining whether an out-of-court identification is positive or derivative, the Court
has adopted the totality of circumstances test wherein the following factors are taken into
consideration: (1) the witnesss opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the
witnesss degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the
witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length
of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure.
Guided by the above, we find "AAAs" out-of-court identification of appellant not tainted
with any irregularity.
THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO, and GLORIA, ALL SURNAMED
DIMAGUILA v. JOSE AND SONIA A. MONTEIRO
G.R. NO. 201011, January 27, 2014
J. Mendoza
Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a party
in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake. In relation thereto,
Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel, an admission is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person
relying thereon.
Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides
that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody
of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that
when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or the record. The cadastral maps and
the list of claimants, as certified true copies of original public records, fall under the exception to
the best evidence rule.
As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides
that entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in
official records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. The document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of

performance of official duty. Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is
the department tasked to execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. As
such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein.
FACTS:
The respondent Spouses Monteiro filed their Complaint for Partition and Damages
before the RTC, against the petitioners, wherein it was alleged that all the parties were coowners and prayed for the partition of a residential house and lot. Spouses Monteiro anchored
their claim on a deed of sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila. The
Dimaguilas and the other defendants countered that there was no co-ownership, alleging that
the property, then owned by Buenaseda, had long been partitioned equally between her two
sons, Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, with its
southern-half portion assigned to Perfecto and the northern-half portion to Vitaliano. They
further claimed that they were the heirs of Vitaliano and that Spouses Monteiro had nothing to
do with the property as they were not heirs of either Perfecto or Vitaliano.
During the course of the proceedings, several motions and notices were initiated. Upon
resumption of the proceedings, Spouses Monteiro filed their Motion for Leave to Amend and/or
Admit Amended Complaint, which the RTC granted. The amended complaint abandoned the
original claim for partition and instead sought the recovery of possession of a portion of the
subject property occupied by the Dimaguilas and other defendants. In amending their complaint,
Spouses Montiero adopted the Dimaguilas' admission in their original answer that the subject
property had been partitioned between Perfecto and Vitaliano, through a Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition. In contrary, the Dimaguilas admitted that the subject property was inherited by, and
divided equally between Perfecto and Vitaliano, but denied the admission in their original
answer that it had been actually divided into southern and northern portions. Instead, they
argued that the Extrajudicial Partition mentioned only the division of the subject property "into
two and share and share alike."
Further, Arves, an employee from the Office of the Municipal Assessor, presented a
certified true copy of the cadastral map of Liliw and a list of claimants/owners and Tolentino, a
record officer of the DENR, testified that as part of her duties, she certifies and safekeeps the
records of surveyed land, including cadastral maps from the region. Asuncion Dimaguilas also
testified that their first counsel made a mistake when he alleged in their original answer that the
property had already been partitioned into northern and southern portions between the two
brothers, as the original answer had been rushed and they were never given a copy of it.
The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro and the CA affirmed such decision
declaring that Spouses Monteiro had established their case by a preponderance of evidence
thru their presentation of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, the cadastral map and the municipal
assessor's records. It likewise ruled that the petitioners were estopped from denying their
admission of partition after the respondent spouses had relied on their judicial admission.
ISSUES:
1. Whether admission made in the course of proceeding in the same case was made
through palpable mistake.
2. Whether there was a violation of the hearsay rule and best evidence rule.

RULING:
Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a party
in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake. The petitioners argue
that such admission was the palpable mistake of their former counsel in his rush to file the
answer, a copy of which was not provided to them.
This contention is unacceptable. It is a purely self-serving claim unsupported by any iota
of evidence. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
proof. Furthermore, the Court notes that this position was adopted by the petitioners only almost
eight (8) years after their original answer was filed, in response to the amended complaint of the
respondent spouses. In their original answer to the complaint for partition, their claim that there
was already a partition into northern-half and southern-half portions, was the very essence of
their defense. It was precisely this admission which moved the respondent spouses to amend
their complaint. The petitioners cannot now insist that the very foundation of their original
defense was a palpable mistake.
Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel, an admission is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person
relying thereon. The respondent spouses had clearly relied on the petitioners' admission and so
amended their original complaint for partition to one for recovery of possession of a portion of
the subject property. Thus, the petitioners are now estopped from denying or attempting to
prove that there was no partition of the property.
Considering that an admission does not require proof, the admission of the petitioners
would actually be sufficient to prove the partition even without the documents presented by the
respondent spouses. If anything, the additional evidence they presented only served to
corroborate the petitioners' admission.
Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides
that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody
of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that
when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or the record.
Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of claimants
of the area covered by the map were presented by two public officers. The first was Crisostomo
Arves, Clerk III of the Municipal Assessor's Office, a repository of such documents. The second
was Dominga Tolentino, a DENR employee, who, as a record officer, certifies and safekeeps
records of surveyed land involving cadastral maps. The cadastral maps and the list of claimants,
as certified true copies of original public records, fall under the exception to the best evidence
rule.
As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that
entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official
records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person

in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring
the official's attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of
his duty. The document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty.
Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to
execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear that the
cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as
they were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the
hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
Even granting that the petitioners had not admitted the partition, they presented no
evidence to contradict the evidence of the respondent spouses. Thus, even without the
admission of the petitioners, the respondent spouses proved by a preponderance of evidence
that there had indeed been a partition of the subject property.
GRAND ASIAN SHIPPING LINES, INC., EDUARDO P. FRANCISCO AND WILLIAM HOW v.
WILFREDO GALVEZ
G.R. NO. 178184, January 29, 2014
J. Del castillo
In order to perfect an appeal from the Decision of the Labor Arbiter granting monetary
award, the Labor Code requires the posting of a bond, either in cash or surety bond, in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award. Nonetheless, we have consistently held that rules
should not be applied in a very rigid and strict sense. This is especially true in labor cases
wherein the substantial merits of the case must accordingly be decided upon to serve the
interest of justice. When there has been substantial compliance, relaxation of the Rules is
warranted.
In termination disputes, the burden of proving that the dismissal is for a just or valid
cause rests on the employers. Failure on their part to discharge such burden will render the
dismissal illegal. The quantum of proof which the employer must discharge is substantial
evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might
conceivably opine otherwise. Here, the mere filing of a formal charge, to our mind, does not
automatically make the dismissal valid. Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and
conclusions of employers do not provide for legal justification for dismissing employees.
However, the rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases
finds no application when the employer denies having dismissed the employee. The employee
must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal before shifting to the employer
the burden of proving the validity of such dismissal.
FACTS:
Petitioner GASLI is a domestic corporation engaged in transporting LPG from Petron
Corporations refinery to Petrons Plant and Petrons Depot, while respondents are
crewmembers of one of GASLIs vessels, M/T Dorothy Uno. Sometime in January 2000, one of
the vessels Oilers, Abis reported to GASLIs Office and Crewing Manager Montegrico, an
alleged illegal activity being committed by respondents aboard the vessel. Abis revealed that a
substantial volume of fuel oil is unconsumed and stored in the vessels fuel tanks. However,

Gruta would misdeclare it as consumed fuel in the Engineers Voyage Reports, with the saved
fuel oil being siphoned and sold to other vessels out at sea. The proceeds thereof were then
divide by respondents among themselves. Hence, an investigation on the alleged pilferage was
conducted, which revealed for the period June 30, 1999 to February 15, 2000 fuel oil
consumption was overstated.
Subsequently, a formal complaint for qualified theft was filed against respondents, which
respondents denied the charge by alleging that the complaint was based on conflicting and
erroneous computation/estimates of fuel consumption. CIDG referred the case to the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Manila, which filed the corresponding Information for Qualified Theft with
the RTC.
Meanwhile, GASLI placed respondents under preventive suspension and after
administrative hearings, decided to terminate respondents from employment. Respondents
except Sales, were thus served with notices informing them of their termination for serious
misconduct, willful breach of trust, and commission of a crime or offense against their employer.
Respondents then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, to which the Labor Arbiter found that
the dismissal of the respondents were illegal as the filing of a criminal case for qualified theft
against them did not justify their termination from employment. Petitioners filed a Notice of
Appeal With A Very Urgent Motion to Reduce Bond before the NLRC and posted a cash bond.
The NLRC denied petitioners motion to reduce bond and directing them to post an additional
bond otherwise the appeal would be dismissed. Petitioners failed to comply with the Order,
prompting respondents to move for the dismissal of the appeal. The NLRC later on reduced the
amount of appeal bond and gave due course to petitioners appeal. Respondents filed their
motion for reconsideration and petitioner their motion for partial reconsideration. The NLRC
denied the motion of the respondents and granted that of the petitioners. On appeal to CA, the
CA set aside the NLRC decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether strict implementation of the rules may be relaxed to avoid miscarriage of justice.
2. Whether the employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal is for just and valid cause.
RULING:
In order to perfect an appeal from the Decision of the Labor Arbiter granting monetary
award, the Labor Code requires the posting of a bond, either in cash or surety bond, in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award. Article 223 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar
days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders.
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in
the judgment appealed from.
Nonetheless, we have consistently held that rules should not be applied in a very rigid
and strict sense. This is especially true in labor cases wherein the substantial merits of the case

must accordingly be decided upon to serve the interest of justice. When there has been
substantial compliance, relaxation of the Rules is warranted.
In the case at bench, petitioners appealed from the Decision of the Labor Arbiter
awarding to crewmembers the amount of P7,104,483.84 by filing a Notice of Appeal with a Very
Urgent Motion to Reduce Bond and posting a cash bond in the amount of P500,000.00 and a
supersedeas bond in the amount of P1.5 million. We find this to be in substantial compliance
with Article 223 of the Labor Code. It is true that the NLRC initially denied the request for
reduction of the appeal bond. However, it eventually allowed its reduction and entertained
petitioners appeal. We disagree with the CA in holding that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of
discretion as the granting of a motion to reduce appeal bond lies within the sound discretion of
the NLRC upon showing of the reasonableness of the bond tendered and the merits of the
grounds relied upon. Hence, the NLRC did not err or commit grave abuse of discretion in taking
cognizance of petitioners appeal before it.
In termination disputes, the burden of proving that the dismissal is for a just or valid
cause rests on the employers. Failure on their part to discharge such burden will render the
dismissal illegal.
After examination of the evidence presented, however, we find that petitioners failed to
substantiate adequately the charges of pilferage against respondents. "[T]he quantum of proof
which the employer must discharge is substantial evidence. x x x Substantial evidence is that
amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise."
Here, the mere filing of a formal charge, to our mind, does not automatically make the
dismissal valid. Evidence submitted to support the charge should be evaluated to see if the
degree of proof is met to justify respondents termination. The affidavit executed by Montegrico
simply contained the accusations of Abis that respondents committed pilferage, which
allegations remain uncorroborated. "Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and conclusions
of employers do not provide for legal justification for dismissing employees." 54 The other bits of
evidence were also inadequate to support the charge of pilferage. The findings made by
GASLIs port captain and internal auditor and the resulting certification executed by De la Rama
merely showed an overstatement of fuel consumption as revealed in the Engineers Voyage
Reports. The report of Jade Sea Land Inspection Services only declares the actual usage and
amount of fuel consumed for a particular voyage. There are no other sufficient evidence to show
that respondents participated in the commission of a serious misconduct or an offense against
their employer.
However, the rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases
finds no application when the employer denies having dismissed the employee. The employee
must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal before shifting to the employer
the burden of proving the validity of such dismissal.
We give credence to petitioners claim that Sales was not dismissed from employment.
Unlike the other respondents, we find no evidence in the records to show that Sales was
preventively suspended, that he was summoned and subjected to any administrative hearing
and that he was given termination notice. From the records, it appears Sales was not among
those preventively suspended on February 26, 2000. To bolster this fact, petitioners presented
the Payroll Journal Register for the period March 1-15, 2000 showing that Sales was still
included in the payroll and was not among those who were charged with an offense to warrant

suspension. In fact, Sales signature in the Semi-Monthly Attendance Report for February 26,
2000 to March 10, 2000proves that he continued to work as Chief Mate for the vessel M/T
Dorothy Uno along with a new set of crewmembers. It is likewise worth noting that in the
Supplemental Complaint Affidavit of Montegrico, Sales was not included in the list of those
employees who were accused of having knowledge of the alleged pilferage. This only shows
that he was never subjected to any accusation or investigation as a prelude to termination.
Hence, it would be pointless to determine the legality or illegality of his dismissal because, in the
first place, he was not dismissed from employment.
UNILEVER PHILIPPINES, INC. v. MICHAEL TAN a.k.a. PAUL D. TAN
G.R. NO. 179367, January 29, 2014
J. Brion
The determination of probable cause for purposes of filing of information in court is
essentially an executive function that is lodged, at the first instance, with the public prosecutor
and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice. The prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice have
wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigation; and their findings with
respect to the existence or non-existence of probable cause are generally not subject to review
by the Court.
Consistent with this rule, the settled policy of non-interference in the prosecutors
exercise of discretion requires the courts to leave to the prosecutor and to the DOJ the
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. Nevertheless,
this policy of non-interference is not without exception. To justify judicial intervention, the abuse
of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
The determination of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was
committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,
neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. What is merely required is
"probability of guilt."
FACTS:
Agent of the NBI applied for issuance of search warrants for the search of a warehouse
allegedly owned by respondent, wherein it is alleged that the respondent had in his possession
counterfeit shampoo products which were being sold or intended to be disposed of, in violation
of Section 168, in relation with Section 170, of RA 8293 or Intellectual Property Code of the
Philippines. On the same day, Judge Eugenio, Jr. granted the application and issued Search
Warrants. Armed with the search warrants, the NBI searched the premises and seized the
alleged counterfeit shampoo products. The NBI thereafter filed with the DOJ a complaint against
the respondent for violation of R.A. No. 8293.
Respondent claimed that he is "Paul D. Tan," and not "Michael Tan" as alluded in the
complaint; he is engaged in the business of selling leather goods and raw materials for making
leather products, and he conducts his business under the name "Probest International Trading,"
registered with DTI; he is not engaged in the sale of counterfeit Unilever shampoo products; the

sachets of Unilever shampoos seized from his are genuine shampoo products which they use
for personal consumption; he does not own and does not operate the searched warehouse.
State Prosecutor Abad of the DOJ dismissed the complaint due to insufficiency of
evidence. The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence petitioner filed a petition for review
with the DOJ, which the Acting Secretary of Justice, Merceditas N. Gutierrez, dismissed.
Petitioner thereafter sought, but failed, to secure a reconsideration. As such, petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 was filed before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground
that the petitioner failed to establish facts and circumstances that would constitute acts of unfair
competition.
Under the present petition, petitioner argues that while it may be possible that the
respondent is not the owner of the warehouse, the overwhelming pieces of evidence
nonetheless prove that he is the owner of the counterfeit shampoo products found therein. The
petitioner also maintains that the voluminous counterfeit shampoo products seized from the
respondent are more than sufficient evidence to indict him for unfair competition.
ISSUE:
Whether the determination of probable cause lies within the competence of the public
prosecutor.
RULING:
The determination of probable cause for purposes of filing of information in court is
essentially an executive function that is lodged, at the first instance, with the public prosecutor
and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice. The prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice have
wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigation; and their findings with
respect to the existence or non-existence of probable cause are generally not subject to review
by the Court.
Consistent with this rule, the settled policy of non-interference in the prosecutors
exercise of discretion requires the courts to leave to the prosecutor and to the DOJ the
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. Courts can
neither override their determination nor substitute their own judgment for that of the latter. They
cannot likewise order the prosecution of the accused when the prosecutor has not found a
prima facie case.
Nevertheless, this policy of non-interference is not without exception. The Constitution
itself allows (and even directs) court action where executive discretion has been gravely
abused. In other words, the court may intervene in the executive determination of probable
cause, review the findings and conclusions, and ultimately resolve the existence or nonexistence of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation when
necessary for the orderly administration of justice.
To justify judicial intervention, the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act
at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility.
An examination of the decisions of the State Prosecutor and of the DOJ shows that the
complaints dismissal was anchored on the insufficiency of evidence to establish the

respondents direct, personal or actual participation in the offense charged. As the State
Prosecutor found (and affirmed by the DOJ), the petitioner failed to prove the ownership of the
warehouse where counterfeit shampoo products were found. This finding led to the conclusion
that there was insufficient basis for an indictment for unfair competition as the petitioner failed to
sufficiently prove that the respondent was the owner or manufacturer of the counterfeit shampoo
products found in the warehouse.
The determination of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was
committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,
neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. What is merely required is
"probability of guilt." Its determination, too, does not call for the application of rules or standards
of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. Thus, in concluding that
there is probable cause, it suffices that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the very offense charged.
It is also important to stress that the determination of probable cause does not depend on the
validity or merits of a partys accusation or defense or on the admissibility or veracity of
testimonies presented. As previously discussed, these matters are better ventilated during the
trial proper of the case.
FEBRUARY 2014
THE NAMARIS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 191215, February 3, 2014
J. Del Castillo
A petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from
the order denying a motion for reconsideration. This is in accordance with the amendment
introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC where no provision for the filing of a motion for extension to
file a petition for certiorari exists, unlike in the original Section 4 of Rule 65 which allowed the
filing of such a motion but only for compelling reason and in no case exceeding 15 days.
However, there are exceptions to the strict application of the 60-day period rule, such as (1)
most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the
defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4)
the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules;
(7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence without appellants fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant
to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues
involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant
circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to
advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.
However, the counting 60 days from private respondents counsels receipt of the June 29,
2009 NLRC Resolution on July 8, 2009, private respondent had until September 7, 2009 to file
her petition or a motion for extension, as September 6, 2009, the last day for filing such
pleading, fell on a Sunday. However, the motion was filed only on September 8, 2009, which
date is beyond the expiration of the period sought to be extended.

FACTS:
Private respondent filed a complaint for death benefits unpaid salaries, sickness allowance,
refund of medical expenses against petitioner, alleging that she is the widow of Guillermo
Mendigorin who was employed by petitioner and died of colon cancer during term of
employment contract. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favour of private respondent,
which the NLRC reversed. Private respondent moved for reconsideration which was denied for
lack of merit. Later, she received NLRCs resolution and 62 days thereafter, filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari before the CA alleging that her counsel was
saddled and occupied with equally important cases, thus it would be impossible for him to file
the petition on time. Later, private respondent filed her Petition for Certiorari before the CA, but
the CA noted that private respondents Petition for Certiorari was filed 15 days late and suffers
from procedural infirmities. Nonetheless, in the interest of substantial justice, the CA entertained
the petition and directed private respondent to cure the technical flaws in her petition.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to Dismiss private respondents
Motion for Extension to File Petition for Certiorari for being an absolutely prohibited pleading.
Petitioners also contended that even assuming that an extension is still allowable, private
respondents motion for extension is nevertheless a useless piece of paper as it was filed
beyond the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari. The CA denied petitioners motion and
gave private respondent one last opportunity to fully comply with its Resolution by submitting
clear and legible copies of the still lacking pleadings within five days from notice thereof. Thus,
the present Petition for Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the period for filing a petition for certiorari may be extended.
RULING:
In Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc. we had the occasion to settle the seeming
conflict on various jurisprudence touching upon the issue of whether the period for filing a
petition for certiorari may be extended. In said case we stated that the general rule, as laid down
in Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, is that a petition for certiorari must be filed
strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for
reconsideration. This is in accordance with the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC
where no provision for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari exists,
unlike in the original Section 4 of Rule 65 which allowed the filing of such a motion but only for
compelling reason and in no case exceeding 15 days. Under exceptional cases, however, and
as held in Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, the 60-day period may be
extended subject to the courts sound discretion. In Domdom, we stated that the deletion of the
provisions in Rule 65 pertaining to extension of time did not make the filing of such pleading
absolutely prohibited. "If such were the intention, the deleted portion could just have simply
been reworded to state that no extension of time to file the petition shall be granted. Absent
such a prohibition, motions for extension are allowed, subject to the courts sound discretion."
Then in Labao v. Flores, we laid down some of the exceptions to the strict application of the
60-day period rule, thus: [T]here are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as:
(1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the
defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4)

the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules;
(7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence without appellants fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to
each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues
involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant
circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to
advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.
In this case, counting 60 days from her counsels receipt of the June 29, 2009 NLRC
Resolution on July 8, 2009, private respondent had until September 7, 2009 to file her petition or
a motion for extension, as September 6, 2009, the last day for filing such pleading, fell on a
Sunday. However, the motion was filed only on September 8, 2009. It is a fundamental rule of
remedial law that a motion for extension of time must be filed before the expiration of the period
sought to be extended; otherwise, the same is of no effect since there would no longer be any
period to extend, and the assailed judgment or order will have become final and executory.
Additionally, as cited earlier in Labao, there should be an effort on the part of the litigant
invoking liberality to satisfactorily explain why he or she was unable to abide by the rules. Here,
the reason offered for availing of the motion for extension is the heavy workload of private
respondents counsel, which is hardly a compelling or meritorious reason as enunciated in
Labao. Time and again, we have held that the excuse of "heavy workload is relative and often
self-serving. Standing alone, it is not a sufficient reason to deviate from the 60-day rule."
Thus, private respondents motion for extension should have been denied outright. We do
not approve of the CAs ruling on the matter because, as the motion for extension should have
been denied outright, it necessarily follows that the Petition for Certiorari is, in the words of
petitioners, a "mere scrap of paper with no remedial value whatsoever." In Negros Slashers, Inc.
v. Teng, which likewise dealt with the late filing of a petition for certiorari, we recognized that
although procedural rules ought to be strictly enforced by courts in order to impart stability in the
legal system, we have, nonetheless, relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure in
several cases to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits.
This is because the ends of justice would be better served if the parties were given the chance
to argue their causes and defenses. We are likewise constantly reminded that the general
objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the opposing claims of the
competing parties and always be guided by the principle that procedure must not hinder but,
rather, promote the administration of justice. Concomitant thereto:
Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory
character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and
the parties right to due process. In numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal construction
of the rules when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and equity.
THE CITY OF MANILA vs. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO
G.R. NO. 175723 , February 4, 2014
J. Peralta
There is no dispute that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the nature of a final order
as they disposed of the petition completely. It is settled that in cases where an assailed
judgment or order is considered final, the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in the

instant case, petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which
is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. A perusal of RA 9282
amending RA 1125 would show that, while it is clearly stated that the CTA has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases
originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction,
there is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as the amendatory RA 9282, which
provides that the CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders
issued by the RTC in local tax cases filed before it.
The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise
of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and
cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction. On the strength of the
constitutional provisions under Article VIII, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA
includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases
falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by
constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
FACTS:
Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, assessed taxes against private respondents
SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace
Hardware Philippines, Inc., Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc., Jollimart Philippines
Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines. In addition to the taxes purportedly due
from private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of
Manila, said assessment covered the local business taxes petitioners were authorized to collect
under Section 21 of the same Code. Because payment of the taxes assessed was a
precondition for the issuance of their business permits, private respondents were constrained to
pay assessment under protest. However, private respondents filed a complaint denominated for
Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition
with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. They further averred that petitioner
city's Ordinance No. 8011 which amended pertinent portions of the RRCM had already been
declared to be illegal and unconstitutional by the Department of Justice.
RTC granted private respondents' application for a writ of preliminary injunction causing
petitioners to file a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied. Thereafter, petitioners
filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing the RTC orders, but the CA
dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said
petition, since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund, which
was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Rule 65 petition for certiorari is the proper remedy.
2. Whether the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
RULING:
1. Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in assailing the Resolutions of the CA which
dismissed their petition filed with the said court and their motion for reconsideration of such

dismissal. There is no dispute that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the nature of a final
order as they disposed of the petition completely. It is settled that in cases where an assailed
judgment or order is considered final, the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in the
instant case, petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which
is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.
Petitioners should be reminded of the equally-settled rule that a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent action based on grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and it will lie only if there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As such, it cannot be a
substitute for a lost appeal.
Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the
interest of substantial justice, this Court has, before, treated a petition for certiorari as a petition
for review on certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the
reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) when errors of
judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the
rules. Considering that the present petition was filed within the 15-day reglementary period for
filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, that an error of judgment is averred, and
because of the significance of the issue on jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper and justified to
relax the rules and, thus, treat the instant petition for certiorari as a petition for review on
certiorari.
2. A perusal of the above provisions (RA 9282 amending RA 1125) would show that, while it
is clearly stated that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders or
resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise
of their original or appellate jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as well
as the amendatory RA 9282, which provides that the CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local tax cases filed before it.
The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise
of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and
cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction. Thus, in the cases of
Pimentel v. COMELEC, Garcia v. De Jesus, Veloria v. COMELEC, Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, and Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, this Court has ruled
against the jurisdiction of courts or tribunals over petitions for certiorari on the ground that there
is no law which expressly gives these tribunals such power. It must be observed, however, that
with the exception of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, these rulings pertain not to regular courts but to
tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers. With respect to the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No.
8249 now provides that the special criminal court has exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power to the
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus. With respect to the Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of BP 129 gives the
appellate court, also in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power to issue, among others,
a writ of certiorari, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As to Regional Trial Courts,
the power to issue a writ of certiorari, in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, is provided
under Section 21 of BP 129.

The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect
to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the
power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an
interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It,
thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari in these cases.
Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it
must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive
jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law
intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of
such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be
considered as partial, not total.
Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides that when by law,
jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer.
In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the same level as the CA
and shall possess all the inherent powers of a court of justice.
UNITED TOURIST PROMOTIONS vs. HARLAND B. KEMPLIN
G.R. No. 205453, February 5, 2014
J. Reyes
It is settled that Rule 45 limits us merely to the review of questions of law raised against the
assailed CA decision. The Court is generally bound by the CAs factual findings, except only in
some instances, among which is, when the said findings are contrary to those of the trial court
or administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions from which the action originated.
The steps on how to comply with procedural due process in terminating an employee:
(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or
grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the
opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period.
(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or
conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their
defenses to the charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses; and (3)
rebut the evidence presented against them by the management. During the hearing or
(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the
employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the
charge against the employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have been established
to justify the severance of their employment.

Although letters were sent to Kemplin, such letters were lame attempt to comply with the
notice requirement, for the charges against Kemplin were not specified. Further, it merely made
a declaration on the expiration of the employment, without however, specifying the criminal suits
filed against Kemplin.
FACTS:
In 1995, Jersey, with the help of two American expatriates, Kemplin and the late Mike
Dunne, formed UTP. UTP employed Kemplin to be its President for a period of five years
"renewable for the same period, subject to new terms and conditions". Howeverm Kemplin
continued to render his services to UTP even after his fixed term contract of employment
expired. Further, Kemplin, signing as President of UTP, entered into advertisement agreements
with Pizza Hut and M. Lhuillier. Thus, UTPs legal counsel sent Kemplin a letter, informing
Kemplin that his Employment Contract had been expired. As such, Kemplin filed before the
NLRC a Complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries, 13 th month and separation pay
against UTP and its officers. Kemplin claimed that even after the expiration of his employment
contract he rendered his services as President and General Manager of UTP. UTP, on its part,
argued that the termination letter sent to Kemplin was based on the expiration of the fixed term
employment contract and an employers prerogative to terminate an employee, who commits
criminal and illegal acts prejudicial to business.
The Labor Arbiter found that Kemplin was illegally dismissed. The NLRC affirmed the LAs
decision explaining that after the expiration of Kemplins term of employment, his employment
until separation is classified as regular. The CA affirmed the LA and NLRC decision, ruling that
the the validity of an employers dismissal from service hinges on the satisfaction of the two
substantive requirements for a lawful termination.
In support of their petition, UTP and Jersey reiterate their averments that Kemplin is a fugitive
from justice since warrants of arrest for grave oral defamation and grave coercion had been
issued against him by the MTC of Pasay City, and for qualified theft by the RTC of Angeles City.
ISSUE:
Whether there is substantial evidence to the decision.
RULING:
It is settled that Rule 45 limits us merely to the review of questions of law raised against the
assailed CA decision. The Court is generally bound by the CAs factual findings, except only in
some instances, among which is, when the said findings are contrary to those of the trial court
or administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions from which the action originated.
In the case before us now, the LA, NLRC and CA uniformly ruled that Kemplin was
dismissed sans substantive and procedural due process. While we need not belabor the first
two factual issues presented herein, it bears stressing that we find the rulings of the appellate
court and the labor tribunals as amply supported by substantial evidence.
Specifically, we note the advertisement agreements with Pizza Hut and M. Lhuillier entered into
by Kemplin, who signed the documents as President of UTP on May 12, 2009, or more than two
years after the supposed expiration of his employment contract. They validate Kemplins claim
that he, indeed, continued to render his services as President of UTP well beyond March 2,
2007. Moreover, in the letter dated July 30, 2009, Kemplin was ordered to cease and desist
from entering the premises of UTP.

In Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Maria Ruby M. Rivera, the Court laid down in detail the steps
on how to comply with procedural due process in terminating an employee, viz: (1) The first
written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds for
termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit
their written explanation within a reasonable period. "Reasonable opportunity" under the
Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that management must accord to the
employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense. This should be construed as
a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the employees an
opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data
and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise against the complaint. Moreover, in
order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and defenses, the notice
should contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the
charge against the employees. A general description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the
notice should specifically mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among
the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees.
(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or
conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their
defenses to the charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses; and (3)
rebut the evidence presented against them by the management. During the hearing or
conference, the employees are given the chance to defend themselves personally, with the
assistance of a representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing
could be used by the parties as an opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.
(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve
the employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the
charge against the employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have been established to
justify the severance of their employment.
Prescinding from the above, UTPs letter sent to Kemplin on July 30, 2009 is a lame attempt
to comply with the twin notice requirement provided for in Section 2, Rule XXIII, Book V of the
Rules Implementing the Labor Code. The charges against Kemplin were not clearly specified.
While the letter stated that Kemplins employment contract had expired, it likewise made general
references to alleged criminal suits filed against him. Corollarily, in the absence of a hearing and
investigation, the existence of just cause to terminate Kemplin could not have been sufficiently
established.
SPOUSES VICENTE AFULUGENCIA and LETICIA AFULUGENCIA
vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO
G.R. NO. 185145, February 5, 2014
J. Del Castillo
As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is
not allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied in
Section 6, Rule 25.
One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless
delays; it is there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a
party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will most likely
be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness

stand as its witness. Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories,
the court may limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from
straying or harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand. Thus, the rule not
only protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or harassment; it likewise prevents
the calling party from conducting a fishing expedition or bungling its own case. In the case,
Metrobanks officers were sought to be presented by the petitioner as its initial witness and to
present documents in the possession of Metrobank, which move cannot be allowed in the
petitioners presentation of its evidence-in-chief.
FACTS:
Petitioners, spouses Afulugencia, filed a Complaint for nullification of mortgage, foreclosure,
auction sale, certificate of sale and other documents, with damages, against respondents
Metrobank and Ortega. Upon the conclusion of pre-trial, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance
of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum to require Metrobanks officers to appear and
testify as the petitioners initial witnesses during the August 31, 2006 hearing for the
presentation of their evidence-in-chief, and to bring the documents relative to their loan with
Metrobank, as well as those covering the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of petitioners land.
With this, Metrobank filed an Opposition arguing that the Motion must be denied for lack of
proper notice of hearing as it is a litigated motion. Petitioners replied by stating that the lack of
proper notice was cured by Metrobanks filing of Opposition, hence the defect may be ignored.
The RTC denied petitioner Motion. Motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied.
Subsequently, petition for certiorari was raised to the CA, which it later on dismissed holding
that petitioners Motion is a litigated motion that requires a proper notice of hearing to the parties
specifying the date and time of hearing, as contained under Section 4 and 5 of Rule 15.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied. Hence, the present
Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the request by a party for the issuance of subpoenas do not require notice to other
parties to the action.
RULING:
As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is
not allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied in
Section 6, Rule 25.
One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless
delays; it is there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a
party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will most likely
be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness
stand as its witness. Instead, the process could be treated as a fishing expedition or an attempt
at delaying the proceedings; it produces no significant result that a prior written interrogatories
might bring.
Besides, since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse partys
testimony, compelling the adverse party to take the witness stand may result in the calling party
damaging its own case. Otherwise stated, if a party cannot elicit facts or information useful to its

case through the facility of written interrogatories or other mode of discovery, then the calling of
the adverse party to the witness stand could only serve to weaken its own case as a result of
the calling partys being bound by the adverse partys testimony, which may only be worthless
and instead detrimental to the calling partys cause.
Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court may
limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from straying or harassing
the adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand.
Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or
harassment; it likewise prevents the calling party from conducting a fishing expedition or
bungling its own case. Using its own judgment and discretion, the court can hold its own in
resolving a dispute, and need not bear witness to the parties perpetrating unfair court practices
such as fishing for evidence, badgering, or altogether ruining their own cases. Ultimately, such
unnecessary processes can only constitute a waste of the courts precious time, if not pointless
entertainment.
In the present case, petitioners seek to call Metrobanks officers to the witness stand as
their initial and main witnesses, and to present documents in Metrobanks possession as part of
their principal documentary evidence. This is improper. Petitioners may not be allowed, at the
incipient phase of the presentation of their evidence-in-chief at that, to present Metrobanks
officers who are considered adverse parties as well, based on the principle that corporations
act only through their officers and duly authorized agents as their main witnesses; nor may
they be allowed to gain access to Metrobanks documentary evidence for the purpose of making
it their own. This is tantamount to building their whole case from the evidence of their opponent.
The burden of proof and evidence falls on petitioners, not on Metrobank; if petitioners cannot
prove their claim using their own evidence, then the adverse party Metrobank may not be
pressured to hang itself from its own defense.
It is true that under the Rules, a party may, for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of
justice, be compelled to give testimony in court by the adverse party who has not served written
interrogatories. But what petitioners seek goes against the very principles of justice and fair
play; they would want that Metrobank provide the very evidence with which to prosecute and
build their case from the start. This they may not be allowed to do.
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES vs. GLENN SALVADOR and DORY ANN PARCON
G.R. NO. 190621, February 10, 2014
J. Del Castillo
In a buy-bust operation, the failure to conduct a physical inventory and to photograph the
items seized from the accused will not render his arrest illegal or the items confiscated from him
inadmissible in evidence as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the said items have
been preserved.
FACTS:
An Information for violation of Section 5 (illegal sale), Article II of RA 9165 otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was filed against appellant and Parcon,
while an Information for violation of Section 11(illegal possession) of Article II, RA 9165 was filed
against Parcon. Upon motion of the prosecution, the cases were consolidated.

The prosecution presented PO2 Sofjan Soriano (PO2 Soriano) to testify on the entrapment
operation that resulted in the arrest of appellant and Parcon. Trial ensued. Parcon failed to
attend the scheduled hearings, hence, she was tried in absentia. To claim innocence, Salvador
used denial and frame up as a defense.
The RTC rendered a decision finding Salvador and Parcon guilty of the offenses charged.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this appeal filed by Salvador.
ISSUE:
Whether Salvador is guilty of the offense charged
RULING:
All the elements for the prosecution of illegal sale of shabu were sufficiently established in
this case. Prosecutions for illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers
who conducted the buy-bust operation. Their narration of the incident, "buttressed by the
presumption that they have regularly performed their duties in the absence of convincing proof
to the contrary, must be given weight." Here, the CA affirmed the RTCs ruling that the
testimonies and facts stipulated upon were consistent with each other as well as with the
physical evidence. Thus, there is no justification to disturb the findings of the RTC, as sustained
by the CA, on the matter.
The defenses of denial and frame-up are unavailing. Denial cannot prevail against the
positive testimony of a prosecution witness. "A defense of denial which is unsupported and
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence becomes negative and self-serving,
deserving no weight in law, and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over convincing,
straightforward and probable testimony on affirmative matters." Appellant cannot likewise avail
of the defense of frame-up which "is viewed with disfavor since, like alibi, it can easily be
concocted and is a common ploy in most prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Law." To substantiate this defense, the evidence must be clear and convincing and should show
that the buy-bust team was inspired by improper motive or was not properly performing its duty.
Non-compliance with Section 21(Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.), Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal. The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers
conducted the required physical inventory and photographed the objects confiscated does not
ipso facto result in the unlawful arrest of the accused or render inadmissible in evidence the
items seized. This is due to the proviso added in the implementing rules stating that it must still
be shown that there exists justifiable grounds and proof that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the evidence have not been preserved. "What is crucial is that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are preserved for they will be used in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused."
"The integrity and evidentiary value of seized items are properly preserved for as long as
the chain of custody of the same are duly established." "Chain of Custody means the duly
recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant
sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court.
Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of

the person who had temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer
of custody was made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition."
There are links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation,
namely: "first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of
the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and, fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court." In this
case, the prosecution established clearly the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
shabu.
Lastly, appellants argument that the entrapment operation is fatally flawed for failure of the
buy-bust team to coordinate with the PDEA deserves scant consideration. "Coordination with
PDEA, while perhaps ideal, is not an indispensable element of a proper buy-bust operation;" it is
not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR
G.R. NO. 189538, February 10, 2014
J. Peralta
While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage,
we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the
opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the
evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought,
not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the
record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in
allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion
thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage
to speak of.
FACTS:
Respondent requested from the NSO a Certificate of No Marriage as one of the
requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she
discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June
24, 2002, at the Office of the MTCC, Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said
marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the
solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. She,
thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in
the wife portion thereof. Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as
her alleged husband, as parties to the case. Finding that the signature appearing in the subject
marriage contract was not that of Olaybar, the RTC granted the petition for cancellation of
entries in Olaybars marriage contract. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the
marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding

RULING:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the
correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the
civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be
adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia in 1986, the Court has
repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a
petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the
error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding." An appropriate adversary
suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant
facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly
weighed and considered.
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed
with, and the remedy is granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special
proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary
proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of
all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it
also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it
states that although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing
that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long
as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary
proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly
the personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was
forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. With the
testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court made a categorical conclusion that
respondents signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged.
Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.
A petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for
an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, and other related
laws. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to
prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts, as a petition for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the
corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his
marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage,
we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the
opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the
evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought,
not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the
record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in
allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion
thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to
speak of.

TRINIDAD VALLEY REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, et al.

vs. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO.183191, February 11, 2014
J. Villarama
The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein.
All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), even though
they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional in nature.
FACTS:
Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, Frannie Greenmeadows Pastures,
Inc., Isabel Greenland Agri-based Resources, Inc., Isabel Evergreen Plantations, Inc., Michelle
Farms, Inc., Isabel Greenmeadows Quality Products, Inc., Ernesto Baricuatro, Claudio Villo, and
Efren Nuevo (hereinafter, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al.) are the
registered owners of a parcel of land in Vallehermoso, Negros Oriental. The landholding
consists of a total area of 641. 7895 hectares - about 200 hectares thereof are devoted to the
cultivation of sugar cane. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed 479.8905 hectares
of the said landholding under the coverage of RA 6657 between March 1995 and July 2000.
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were
subsequently issued in favor of the agrarian reform beneficiaries.
On June 10, 2004, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 64, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental, a Petition for
Declaration of Unconstitutionality Through Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for
Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction and Restraining Order against the Land Registration Authority
(LRA), the DAR, and the beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP), docketed as Special Civil Action No. 04-02-V.
The DAR filed its Answer. Subsequently, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development
Corporation, et al. filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Petition and for Admission of the Amended
Petition in order to change the nature of the action from a special civil action of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus to an ordinary action of annulment of land titles. The DAR, et al.
opposed the motion. On October 26, 2004 RTC it issued the Order admitting the amended
petition and ruling that it had jurisdiction over the case. The Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the Order of the RTC directing it to dismiss the civil action for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the original and amended petitions filed by Trinidad
Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al

RULING:
In the case at bar, the CA has correctly and succinctly synthesized that both the original
petition for the "Declaration of Unconstitutionality Through Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
with Prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction and Restraining Order" and the amended
petition for "Judicial Review Through an Action to Annul Titles, and Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunctions with Prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction and Restraining Order" contain the
same allegations.
The case at bar deals with acts of the DAR and the application, implementation,
enforcement, or interpretation of RA 6657 - issues which do not involve the "special jurisdiction"
of the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court. Hence, when the court a quo heard and decided
the instant case, it did so without jurisdiction.
All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), even though
they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional in nature." In said case, it was noted
that the main thrust of the allegations in the Complaint was the propriety of the Notice of
Coverage and "not x x x the 'pure question of law' spawned by the alleged unconstitutionality of
EO 405 - but x x x the annulment of the DAR' s Notice of Coverage."
In this case, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. cloaked the issue
as a constitutional question - assailing the constitutionality of administrative issuances
promulgated to implement the agrarian reform law - in order to annul the titles issued therein. It
is, however, evident that the constitutional angle was an attempt to exclude the case from the
ambit of the jurisdictional prescriptions under RA 6657.
In case of doubt, the jurisprudential trend is for courts to refrain from resolving a controversy
involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies, 'even if the
question[s] involved [are] also judicial in character. In the instant case, however, there is hardly
any doubt that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Consequently, it
did not have authority to perform any of the following: order the admission of the amended
petition of Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al., decide the amended
petition on the merits, or issue a permanent prohibitory injunction. In any case, such injunction
issued by the RTC is a nullity in view of the express prohibitory provisions of the CARP and this
Court's Administrative Circular Nos. 29-2002 and 38-2002 enjoining all trial judges to strictly
observe Section 68 of RA 6657, viz.: SECTION 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from
Undue Interference. - No injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued
by the lower courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of
Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the program.
SATURNINO C. OCAMPO vs. HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, et al.
G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014
Sereno, CJ.
Issues involving the finding of probable cause for an indictment and issuance of a
warrant of arrest, as petitioners are doubtless aware, are primarily questions of fact that are
normally not within the purview of a petition for certiorari, such as the petitions filed in the
instant consolidated cases.

FACTS:
P C/Insp. Almaden of the PNP sent 12 undated letters to the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte.
The letters requested appropriate legal action on 12 complaint-affidavits attached therewith
accusing 71 named members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples
Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder, including
petitioners herein along with several other unnamed members.
The letters narrated that on 26 August 2006, elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the
Philippine Army discovered a mass grave site of the CPP/NPA/NDFP. Recovered from the grave
site were 67 severely deteriorated skeletal remains believed to be victims of Operation VD.
Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of an Information for 15 counts of multiple
murder against 54 named members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP. Judge Abando issued an Order
finding probable cause "in the commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged." He
ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against them with no recommended bail for their
temporary liberty.
On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the Order of Judge
Abando and the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero. Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for
rebellion against him and 44 others was then pending before the RTC Makati. Putting forward
the political offense doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues that common crimes, such as murder in
this case, are already absorbed by the crime of rebellion when committed as a necessary
means, in connection with and in furtherance of rebellion.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the preliminary investigation was validly conducted
2. Whether Ocampo was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal the
Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero
3. Whether petitioner availed of the proper remedy in this case
4. Whether there is double jeopardy
RULING:
On the validity of the preliminary investigation
A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair." It is conducted to protect the innocent
from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial. While the right to have a
preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive right
and a component of due process in the administration of criminal justice.
In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the
opportunity to be heard. It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the
respondents side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide
whether the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a crime has been
committed, and that it was the respondent who committed it. Otherwise, the investigating officer
is bound to dismiss the complaint.

The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in
support of one's defense. What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard. Thus, one who
has been afforded a chance to present ones own side of the story cannot claim denial of due
process.
Pursuant to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the respondents were issued and
served with Subpoena at their last known address for them to submit their counter-affidavits and
that of their witnesses. Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits
because they could no longer be found in their last known address, per return of the subpoenas.
On the other hand, Ocampo, Lim, Palejaro and Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits.
However, Ladlad and Jerusalem failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of
appearance by their respective counsels.
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the
complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long
as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to present
countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid. The rule was put in place in
order to foil underhanded attempts of a respondent to delay the prosecution of offenses.
In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on the
named respondents at their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due process. It was only
because a majority of them could no longer be found at their last known addresses that they
were not served copies of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence.
On Ocampos right to appeal the resolution of Prosecutor Vivero
As to Ocampos claim that he was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to
appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero due to the 19-day delay in the service of the
Resolution, it must be pointed out that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal to the Secretary of Justice is reckoned from the date of receipt of the resolution of the
prosecutor, not from the date of the resolution. This is clear from Section 3 of the 2000 National
Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal:
Sec. 3. Period to appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
resolution, or of the denial of the motion for reconsideration/ reinvestigation if one has been filed
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the assailed resolution. Only one motion for
reconsideration shall be allowed. (Emphasis supplied)
On whether petitioner availed of the proper remedy in this case
At bottom, issues involving the finding of probable cause for an indictment and issuance of
a warrant of arrest, as petitioners are doubtless aware, are primarily questions of fact that are
normally not within the purview of a petition for certiorari, such as the petitions filed in the instant
consolidated cases.
On whether there is double jeopardy
The political offense doctrine is not a ground to dismiss the charge against petitioners prior
to a determination by the trial court that the murders were committed in furtherance of rebellion.
We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be discharged
by the defense, since motive is a state of mind which only the accused knows. The proof

showing political motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity
to present evidence supporting his defense. It is not for this Court to determine this factual
matter in the instant petitions.
As held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA, if
during trial, petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were indeed committed in
furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy, to wit:
SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended,
in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.
After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court
and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense
charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon
motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court
shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all
parties, especially the offended party. (n)
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a
new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the
accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail
for their appearance at the trial.
Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have been simple
rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the Information for
simple rebellion, as long as petitioners would not be placed in double jeopardy.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, states: SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal;
double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
Based on the above provision, double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy
attached; (2) it has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense
as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted,
or the case has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a
competent court in a valid indictment for which the accused has entered a valid plea during
arraignment. To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the crime of rebellion, as defined and
penalized under Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 06-944 was filed before the RTC Makati against petitioners and several
others.
However, petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06-944. Even before the
indictment for rebellion was filed before the RTC Makati, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and

Ladlad had already filed a petition before this Court to seek the nullification of the Orders of the
DOJ denying their motion for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel due to lack
of impartiality and independence. When the indictment was filed, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis
and Ladlad filed supplemental petitions to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944.
We eventually ordered the dismissal of the rebellion case. It is clear then that a first jeopardy
never had a chance to attach.
P/SUPT. HANSEL M. MARANTAN
vs. ATTY. JOSE MANUEL DIOKNO and MONIQUE CU-UNJIENG LA'O
G.R. NO. 205956, February 12, 2014
J. Mendoza
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial
proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the
administration of justice. A violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt
under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
However, A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection
of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still pending
in the courts, upon the theory that in such a case, it must necessarily tend to obstruct the
orderly and fair administration of justice.
FACTS:
Petitioner P/Supt. Marantan is the respondent in G.R. No. 199462, a petition filed on
December 6, 2011, but already dismissed although the disposition is not yet final. Respondent
La O is one of the petitioners in the said case, while respondent Atty. Diokno is her counsel
therein. G.R. No. 199462 relates to criminal cases pending before the RTC Branch 256 of Pasig
City, where Marantan and his co-accused are charged with homicide.
In the meantime, on January 6, 2013, a shooting incident occurred in the Province of
Quezon, where Marantan was the ground commander in a police-military team, which resulted
in the death of thirteen men (Atimonan incident). This encounter, according to Marantan, elicited
much negative publicity for him. Marantan alleges that, riding on the unpopularity of the
Atimonan incident, LaO and her counsel, Atty. Diokno, and one Ernesto Manzano, organized
and conducted a televised/radio broadcasted press conference. During the press conference,
they maliciously made intemperate and unreasonable comments on the conduct of the Court in
handling G.R. No. 199462, as well as contumacious comments on the merits of the criminal
cases before the RTC, branding Marantan and his co-accused guilty of murder in the Ortigas
incident.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents violated the sub judice rule, making them liable for indirect contempt
under Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
RULING:
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial
proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the

administration of justice. A violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under
Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. x x x a person guilty
of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: x x x
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice[.]
The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature. This form of
contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge
acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the
court into disrepute or disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and no
one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he
intended to commit it.
For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really appear" that such does
impede, interfere with and embarrass the administration of justice. What is, thus, sought to be
protected is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending
case. The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that courts, in the decision of issues of fact
and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon
evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by
bias, prejudice or sympathies.
The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to conduct their
business unhampered by publications and comments which tend to impair the impartiality of
their decisions or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice. As important as the
maintenance of freedom of speech, is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary.
The "clear and present danger" rule may serve as an aid in determining the proper constitutional
boundary between these two rights.
The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence of the comment must
be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before an utterance can be
punished. The contemptuous statements made by the respondents allegedly relate to the merits
of the case, particularly the guilt of petitioner, and the conduct of the Court as to its failure to
decide G.R. No. 199462. As to the merits, the comments seem to be what the respondents
claim to be an expression of their opinion that their loved ones were murdered by Marantan.
This is merely a reiteration of their position in G.R. No. 199462, which precisely calls the Court
to upgrade the charges from homicide to murder. The Court detects no malice on the face of the
said statements. The mere restatement of their argument in their petition cannot actually, or
does not even tend to, influence the Court. As to the conduct of the Court, a review of the
respondents' comments reveals that they were simply stating that it had not yet resolved their
petition. There was no complaint, express or implied, that an inordinate amount of time had
passed since the petition was filed without any action from the Court. There appears no attack
or insult on the dignity of the Court either.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERLITA PALOMARES y COSTUNA
G.R. No. 200915, February 12, 2014
J. Abad
In the case at bar, the evidence is unclear as to where the responsible police officer marked
the seized substance and whether it was done in Merlitas presence. In fact, it is also not clear

from the evidence which police officer did the marking. This uncertainty concerning a vital
element of the crime warrants overturning the judgment of conviction.
Though Merlita's denial and alibi as a defense are weak, such cannot relieve the
prosecution the burden of presenting proof beyond reasonable doubt that an illegal transaction
actually took place.
FACTS:
On March 21, 2007 the City Public Prosecutor charged Merlita with selling prohibited drugs
in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) 9165 before the Regional Trial Court (R
TC) of Manila in Criminal Case 07-251767. On March 18, 2008, the trial court found Merlita
guilty as charged and sentenced her to life imprisonment with a fine of P500,000.00 and liability
for the cost of suit. Upon review, the CA rendered judgment, affirming in full the RTC Decision,
hence, the present appeal to this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in finding, like the RTC before it, that the prosecution succeeded in
proving beyond reasonable doubt that accused Merlita sold dangerous drugs in violation of
Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165
RULING:
To secure conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the identity of the prohibited drug
seized from the accused must be proved with moral certainty. The prosecution must establish
with such measure of certitude that the substance bought or seized during the buy-bust
operation is the same substance offered as evidence in court. Proof of the chain of custody from
the time of seizure to the time such evidence is presented in court ensures the absence of doubt
concerning the integrity of such vital evidence. This requires as a minimum that the police mark
the seized item (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator and (2) immediately upon
confiscation.
Of course, the Court has ruled that immediate marking could be made at the nearest police
station or office of the apprehending team. Here, however, the evidence is unclear as to where
the responsible police officer marked the seized substance and whether it was done in Merlitas
presence.
In fact, it is also not clear from the evidence which police officer did the marking since P02
Mallari and P02 Flores gave conflicting testimonies on this point. This uncertainty concerning a
vital element of the crime warrants overturning the judgment of conviction.
Besides, neither P02 Mallari nor P02 Flores testified that they conducted a physical inventory
and took photos of the article that was seized from Merlita. In fact, their joint affidavit of arrest
made no mention of any inventory taking or photographing of the same.
And they did not bother at all to offer some justification for the omission. Parenthetically,
barangay kagawad Lizano, an elected public official, testified that he saw the police officers
enter Merlita's shanty and arrest her on the date in question. This testimony from a neutral party
strikes at the heart of the prosecution's theory that they arrested Merlita at Unit 52, Building 8, of
Paradise Heights in Balut, Tondo. Though Merlita's denial and alibi as a defense are weak, such

cannot relieve the prosecution the burden of presenting proof beyond reasonable doubt that an
illegal transaction actually took place.
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BIGNAY EX-IM PHILIPPINES, INC
G.R. NO. 171590, February 12, 2014
J. Del Castillo
Non-payment of docket fees is a jurisdictional defect. Anent the counterclaims interposed
by defendant for the collection of certain sum of money adverted earlier hereof, this Court could
not exercise jurisdiction over the same as defendant did not pay the docket fees therefor.
Although the counterclaims were denominated as compulsory in the answer, the matters therein
alleged were not connected with the plaintiffs complaint. The counterclaims could stand
independently from the plaintiffs complaint hence they are a sic permissive counterclaims.
FACTS:
On March 21, 1994, Bignay filed Civil Case No. 94-1129 for breach of warranty against
eviction under Articles 1547 and 1548 of the Civil Code, with damages, against Union Bank and
Robles. Union Bank interposed a Motion to Dismiss grounded on lack of or failure to state a
cause of action, claiming that it made no warranties in favor of Bignay when it sold the property
to the latter. The RTC deferred the resolution of the motion on finding that the ground relied
upon did not appear to be indubitable.
Union Bank thus filed its Answer Ad Cautelam, where it alleged that Bignay was not an
innocent purchaser for value. It interposed a counterclaim as well, grounded on two promissory
notes signed by Siy in favor of the bank 1) Promissory Note No. 90-1446 dated December 20,
1990 for the amount of P1.5 million payable on demand with annual interest of 33%, and 2)
Promissory Note No. 91-0286 dated February 26, 1991 for the amount of P2 million payable on
demand with annual interest of 30% which resulted in outstanding liabilities, inclusive of
interest and penalties, in the total amount of more than P10.4 million as of December 20, 1996.
Evidence for the main action and for the counterclaim were received by the trial court. The
RTC held that Bignay was entitled to the return of the value of the, as well as the cost of the
building erected thereon, since Union Bank acted in bad faith. At the same time, the trial court
held that the banks counterclaim was not at all connected with Bignays Complaint, which
makes it a permissive counterclaim for which the docket fees should accordingly be paid. Since
the bank did not pay the docket fees, the trial court held that it did not acquire jurisdiction over
its counterclaim; thus, it dismissed the same.
The Court of Appeals rendered a judgment ordering Bignay to pay Union Bank the principal
amounts due under the promissory notes plus the stipulated interests and stipulated penalty
charges from date of maturity of the loans until full payment thereof. The CA held that Union
Bank timely paid the docket fees at the time it filed its Answer Ad Cautelam as shown by official
receipts to such effect and the rubberstamped mark on the face of the answer itself. It added
that since the trial court received the banks evidence on the counterclaim during trial, it should
have made a ruling thereon. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the court can dismiss permissive counterclaims in the event of non-payment of
docket fees for the said counterclaims

RULING:
Bignay correctly observes that if the bank indeed paid the docket fees therefor, the trial
court would have so held in its March 21, 2000 Decision; yet in its judgment, the trial court
specifically declared that the docket fees remained unpaid at the time of its writing. Anent the
counterclaims interposed by defendant for the collection of certain sum of money adverted
earlier hereof [sic], this Court could not exercise jurisdiction over the same as defendant did not
pay the docket fees therefor. Although the counterclaims were denominated as compulsory in
the answer, the matters therein alleged were not connected with the plaintiffs complaint. The
counterclaims could stand independently from the plaintiffs complaint hence they are a [sic]
permissive counterclaims. During the pre-trial, this Court had already ruled that the
counterclaims were permissive yet the records showed that defendant had not paid the docket
fees. This Court therefore has not acquired jurisdiction over said case.
And if it is true that the bank paid the docket fees on its counterclaim as early as in 1994, it
would have vigorously insisted on such fact after being apprised of the trial courts March 21,
2000 Decision. It is indeed surprising that the supposed payment was never raised by the bank
in a timely motion for reconsideration, considering that the trial court dismissed its counterclaim;
if there is any opportune time to direct the courts attention to such payment and cause the
counterclaim to be reinstated, it was at that point and no other. All it had to do was prove
payment by presenting to the court the official receipts or any other acceptable documentary
evidence, and thus secure the proper reversal of the ruling on its counterclaim. Still, nothing was
heard from the bank on the issue, until it filed its brief with the CA on appeal. Indeed, "whatever
is repugnant to the standards of human knowledge, observation and experience becomes
incredible and must lie outside judicial cognizance."
More than the above, this Court finds true and credible the trial court's express declaration
that no docket fees have been paid on the bank's counterclaim; the trial court's pronouncement
enjoys the presumption of regularity. Indeed, the sudden appearance of the receipts supposedly
evidencing payment of the "docket fees is highly questionable and irregular, and deserves to be
thoroughly investigated; the actuations of the bank relative thereto go against the common
experience of mankind, if they are not entirely anomalous.
ATTY. EMMANUEL D. AGUSTIN, et al. vs. ALEJANDRO CRUZ-HERRERA
G.R. NO. 174564, February 12, 2014
J. Reyes
It has been repeatedly emphasized that in the case of natural persons, the certification
against forum shopping must be signed by the principal parties themselves and not by the
attorney. The certification against forum shopping must be signed by the plaintiff or any of the
principal parties and not by the attorney. For such certification is a peculiar personal
representation on the part of the principal party, an assurance given to the court or other
tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and
causes of action. Hence, the petition is dismissible outright for being accompanied by a
defective certification of non-forum shopping having been signed by Atty. Agustin instead of the
complainants as the principal parties.
FACTS:

Respondent Herrera was the President of Podden while complainants were assemblers
and/or line leader assigned at the production department. In 1993, the complainants were
terminated from employment due to financial reverses. Upon verification, however, with the
Department of Labor and Employment, no such report of financial reverses or even
retrenchment was filed. This prompted the complainants to file a complaint for illegal dismissal,
monetary claims and damages against Podden and Herrera. They engaged the services of Atty.
Agustin to handle the case.
The Labor Arbiter issued an order to immediately reinstate the complainants to their former
positions without loss of seniority rights and other privileges with full backwages from date of
dismissal up to actual date of reinstatement. Podden and Herrera were further ordered to pay
complainants their money claims representing their underpayment of wages, 13th month pay,
premium pay for holidays and rest days and service incentive leave pay to be computed by the
Fiscal Examiner of the Research, Information and Computation Unit of the Commission in due
time. Podden and Herrera were furthermore ordered to pay each complainant moral and
exemplary damages, as well as ten (10%) of the total awards as attorneys fee.
No appeal was taken from the foregoing judgment hence, a motion for execution was filed.
Herrera filed a Manifestation and Motion to deny issuance of the writ stating, among others, that
Podden ceased operations on almost four years before judgment was rendered by the LA on
the illegal dismissal complaint and that nine of the eleven employees have executed Waivers
and Quitclaims rendering any execution of the judgment inequitable.
Atty. Agustin opposed Herreras motion and argued that the issuance of a writ of execution
is ministerial because the LA decision has long been final and executory there being no appeal
taken therefrom. He further claimed that the alleged Waivers and Quitclaims were part of a
scheme adopted by Podden to evade its liability and defraud the complainants.
The LA denied the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. The LA sustained as valid
the Waivers and Quitclaims signed by all and not just nine of the complainants. The NLRC
reversed the LA Order for the reason that it unlawfully amended, altered and modified the final
and executory LA Decision. The quitclaims were also held invalid based on the unconscionably
low amount received by each of the complainants as against the judgment award for each
individual complainant.
Herrera filed a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the issuances of the NLRC.
During the pendency of the petition, a joint compromise agreement was submitted to the CA.
The CA approved the joint compromise agreement and entered judgment in accordance
therewith. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition filed by Atty. Agustin is meritorious
RULING:
The petition is dismissible outright for being accompanied by a defective certification of nonforum shopping having been signed by Atty. Agustin instead of the complainants as the principal
parties. Obviously it is the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose professional services
have been retained for a particular case, who is in the best position to know whether he or it

actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in that case. Hence, a certification against forum
shopping by counsel is a defective certification.
The Court has espoused leniency and overlooked such procedural misstep in cases
bearing substantial merit complemented by the written authority or general power of attorney
granted by the parties to the actual signatory. However, no analogous justifiable reasons exist in
the case at bar neither do the claims of Atty. Agustin merit substantial consideration to justify a
relaxation of the rule.
It cannot be said that Herrera negotiated for the compromise agreement in bad faith. It
remains undisputed that Podden has ceased operations almost four years before the LA
Decision was rendered. In view thereof, the implementation of the award became unfeasible
and a compromise settlement was more beneficial to the complainants as it assured them of
reparation, albeit at a reduced amount. This was the same situation prevailing at the time when
Herrera manifested and reiterated before the CA that a concession has been reached by the
parties. Thus, the motivating force behind the settlement was not to deprive or prejudice Atty.
Agustin of his fees, but rather the inability of a dissolved corporation to fully abide by its
adjudged liabilities and the certainty of payment on the part of the complainants.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIMON PATENTES Y ZAMORA
G.R. NO. 190178, February 12, 2014
J. Perez
The testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be received with
precipitate credulity for the charge can easily be concocted. Courts should be wary of giving
undue credibility to a claim of rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an alleged
victim whose charge is not corroborated and whose conduct during and after the rape is open to
conflicting interpretations. While judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation
that a rape victim undergoes as she seeks justice, they should equally bear in mind that their
responsibility is to render justice based on the law.
The numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of private complainant have created
reasonable doubt in Our mind. In view of the foregoing considerations, the presumption of
innocence in favor of appellant must be upheld considering that the evidence brought forth in
trial falls short of the quantum of proof to support a conviction.
FACTS:
AAA alleged that Patentes forcibly took her to his house on December 5, 1998 and raped
her for more than a week. To free herself from her predicament, AAA promised to marry
Patentes and convinced him to accompany her to her mother to tell the latter about their marital
plans.
Patentes on the other hand, argues that their December 5 meeting was pursuant to their
previous agreement. AAA stayed in appellants house together with the latters relatives. AAA
slept in the same room with appellant and had consented sexual intercourse. Throughout AAAs
stay, she was free to roam around the house and even helped in the household chores.
Pursuant to their marital plans, AAAs grandfather went to appellants house on 7 December
1998. As a result, they agreed to set the wedding date on 27 May 1999. Appellants mother also
went to AAAs house to discuss the marital plans on 14 December 1998. However, AAAs
mother rejected the marriage proposal because of appellants social standing.

Eight sets of Information for Forcible Abduction with Rape were filed by AAA against
Patentes where RTC rendered a decision finding the latter guilty of the crime charged. The CA
affirmed the ruling of the RTC with modification. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether Patentes is guilty of the crime charged
RULING:
Behavioral psychology teaches us that people react to similar situations dissimilarly. There
is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident as the workings
of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable. Nevertheless, the
Court must be guided by established principles. In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by
the following principles: (1) to accuse a man of rape is easy, but to disprove the accusation is
difficult, though the accused may be innocent; (2) inasmuch as only two persons are usually
involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great
caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit and should
not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. So long as
the private complainants testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted
on the basis thereof.
The numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of private complainant have created
reasonable doubt in Our mind. In view of the foregoing considerations, the presumption of
innocence in favor of appellant must be upheld considering that the evidence brought forth in
trial falls short of the quantum of proof to support a conviction.
We are mindful that appellants bare invocation of the sweetheart theory cannot alone
stand. It must be corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. Usually, these
are letters, notes, photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the lovers.
There is such corroboration in this case. To support its sweetheart theory, the defense
presented appellant and AAAs common friend, Enriquez, who attested to the veracity of
appellants claim.
A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which
means a moral certainty that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the
prosecution. In the case at bar, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of establishing
with moral certainty the truthfulness of the charge that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA
against her will using threats, force or intimidation.
The testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be received with
precipitate credulity for the charge can easily be concocted. Courts should be wary of giving
undue credibility to a claim of rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an alleged
victim whose charge is not corroborated and whose conduct during and after the rape is open to
conflicting interpretations. While judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation
that a rape victim undergoes as she seeks justice, they should equally bear in mind that their
responsibility is to render justice based on the law.
RICARDO L. ATIENZA AND ALFREDO A. CASTRO
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 188694, February 12, 2014

J. Perslas-Bernabe
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law and
cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by
the acquiescence of the court. The rule is well-settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Hence, questions of jurisdiction may be
cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal.
FACTS:
On March 24, 1995, Dario requested Atibula to insert a Decision dated September 26, 1968
in one of the volumes of the CA Original Decisions, but Atibula refused. Atienza later offered
Atibula the amount of P50,000.00 in exchange for Volume 260, which the latter turned down.
Atibula reported the incident to Atty. Macapagal, the Assistant Chief of the CA Reporters
Division, who then instructed him to hide Volumes 260, 265 and 267 in a safe place.
On May 9, 1995, Atibula discovered that Volume 266 was missing. He immediately reported
the same to Atty. Macapagal. On May 18, 1995, a certain Nelson de Castro, Clerk IV detailed at
the CA Reporters Division, handed to Atibula a bag containing the missing Volume 266. He
claimed that it was Castro who asked him to deliver the said package to Atibula.
Atibula compared the contents of Volume 266 with the index of the decisions and noticed
that there were two new documents inserted therein. Consequently, Atibula reported his findings
to Atty. Macapagal who, in turn, informed Atty. Tablate, then Chief of the CA Reporters Division,
of the same. They tried to verify the genuineness, authenticity and existence of the subject
resolution and decision, and found that the compilation of the duplicate original
decisions/resolutions of Justice Enriquez did not bear the said promulgations. Atty. Tablate
reported the incident to then CA Presiding Justice Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr. who immediately
requested the NBI to conduct an investigation on the matter.
The NBI investigation found that: (a) Volume 266 had indeed been altered; and (b) the
signatures of the CA Justices in the subject resolution and and their standard/sample signatures
"were not written by one and the same person," leading to the conclusion that the questioned
signatures were forgeries. Meanwhile, sometime in the second week of July 1995, an inspection
of the air-conditioning units at the office of the CA Reporters Division was conducted. Said
investigation yielded the following findings: (a) there were no signs of forcible entry; (b) the
perpetrators gained entry to the office of the CA Reporters Division "by passing through the
hole on the concrete wall after removing the air conditioning unit" located on the right most [sic]
end from the main door; (c) there was conspiracy to commit the crime of Falsification of Public
Document between Atienza and Dario in view of their "concerted efforts through previous or
simultaneous acts and deeds;" and (d) Castro assisted Atienza and Dario "to profit from the
effects of the crime by returning safely the missing volume.
A criminal complaint was filed by the NBI and the Ombudsman against Atienza, Castro, and
Dario before the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the OMB, charging them
Falsification of Public Document. After investigation, it was determined that there existed
probable cause to charge Atienza, Castro, and Dario for the crimes of Robbery, and of
Falsification of Public Document.The RTC found Atienza and Castro guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public Document. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners conviction for the crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public
Document should be upheld on account of the circumstantial evidence in this case proving their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt
RULING:
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which
the main fact in issue may be inferred based on reason and common experience. It is sufficient
for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence,
it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain
which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of
the others, as the guilty person. Stated differently, the test to determine whether or not the
circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of
circumstances duly proven must be consistent with each other and that each and every
circumstance must be consistent with the accuseds guilt and inconsistent with his innocence.
Applying these principles to the facts that appear on record, the Court finds that no
sufficient circumstantial evidence was presented in this case to establish the elements of
Robbery under Article 299(a)(1) of the RPC and Falsification of Public Documents under Article
172(1) in relation to Article 171(6) of the same code, or of petitioners supposed conspiracy
therefor. Also, it bears mentioning that the RTC did not have jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the falsification case since Falsification of Public Document under Article 172(1) of the RPC,
which is punishable by prision correccional falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MeTC,
MTC and MCTC. While petitioners raised this jurisdictional defect for the first time in the present
petition, they are not precluded from questioning the same.
HEIRS OF MARCELO SOTTO vs. MATILDE S. PALICTE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 159691, February 17, 2014
J. Bersamin
The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis
pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in the
other. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are present, namely: (a)
identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amounts to res judicata in the action under
consideration.
There is no question that the ultimate objective of each of the actions was the return of the
properties to the Estate in order that such properties would be partitioned among the heirs. In
the other cases, the petitioners failed to attain the objective because Palictes right in the
properties had been declared exclusivse. There was between Civil Case No. CEB-24293 and
the other cases a clear identity of the parties, of subject matter, of evidence, and of the factual
and legal issues raised. The Court saw through the petitioners "ploy to countermand the
previous decisions sustaining Palictes rights over the properties."

FACTS:
The instant case is the fifth suit to reach the Court dividing the several heirs of the late Don
Filemon Y. Sotto respecting four real properties that had belonged to Filemons estate. The first
case held that Matilde. one of four declared heirs of Filemon, had validly redeemed the four
properties pursuant to the assailed deed of redemption, and was entitled to have the title over
the four properties transferred to her name, subject to the right of the three other declared heirs
to join her in the redemption of the four properties within a period of six months.
The second was the civil case filed by Pascuala against Matilde (to annul the formers
waiver of rights, and to restore her as a co-redemptioner of Matilde with respect to the four
properties.
The third was an incident in a suit brought by the heirs of Carmen Rallos against the Estate
of Sotto wherein the heirs of Miguel prayed for their inclusion as Matildes co-redemptioners.
The fourth was a case whereby the Court expressly affirmed the ruling rendered by the
probate court in Cebu City denying the administrators motion to require Matilde to turn over the
four real properties to the Estate of Sotto.
The fifth is this case. It seems that the disposition by the Court of the previous cases did not
yet satisfy herein petitioners despite their being the successors-in-interest of two of the declared
heirs of Filemon who had been parties in the previous cases either directly or in privity. They
now pray that the Court undo the decision declaring their action for the partition of the four
properties as already barred by the judgments previously rendered.
In its June 13, 2013 decision, the Court has given Atty. Mahinay the chance to explain why he
should not be sanctioned for violating the rule against forum shopping.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Mahinay is guilty of forum shopping when he filed this action for partition
notwithstanding the earlier rulings favoring Matildes exclusive right over the four properties
RULING:
There is forum shopping "when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court." Forum
shopping is an act of malpractice that is prohibited and condemned because it trifles with the
courts and abuses their processes. It degrades the administration of justice and adds to the
already congested court dockets.
An important factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to the courts and the
parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs. The test to
determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia are
present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in the other. Thus,
there is forum shopping when the following elements are present, namely: (a) identity of parties,
or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of

the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amounts to res judicata in the action under
consideration.
There is no question that the ultimate objective of each of the actions was the return of the
properties to the Estate in order that such properties would be partitioned among the heirs. In
the other cases, the petitioners failed to attain the objective because Palictes right in the
properties had been declared exclusivse. There was between Civil Case No. CEB-24293 and
the other cases a clear identity of the parties, of subject matter, of evidence, and of the factual
and legal issues raised. The Court saw through the petitioners "ploy to countermand the
previous decisions sustaining Palictes rights over the properties."
Atty. Mahinays disclosure of the pendency of Civil Case No. CEB-24293 in filing the Motion
to Require Matilde Palicte To Turn Over And/or Account Properties Owned by the Estate in Her
Possession is not enough compliance with the rule against forum shopping. The disclosure
alone of the pendency of a similar case does not negate actual forum shopping.
The acts of a party or his counsel clearly constituting willful and deliberate forum shopping
shall be ground for the summary dismissal of the case with prejudice, and shall constitute direct
contempt, as well as be a cause for administrative sanctions against the lawyer. Forum
shopping can be committed in either of three ways, namely: (1) filing multiple cases based on
the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved
yet (litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same
prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (res judicata); or (3) filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action,
where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). If the forum
shopping is not willful and deliberate, the subsequent cases shall be dismissed without
prejudice on one of the two grounds mentioned above. But if the forum shopping is willful and
deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions shall be dismissed with prejudice.
In view of the foregoing, Atty. Mahinay was guilty of forum shopping. Under Revised
Circular No. 28-91, any willful and deliberate forum shopping by any party and his counsel
through the filing of multiple petitions or complaints to ensure favorable action shall constitute
direct contempt of court. Direct contempt of court is meted the summary penalty of fine not
exceeding P2,000.00.
EMILIO RAGA y CASIKAT vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 200597, February 19, 2014
J. Villarama, Jr.
When the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies,
the trial courts observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded
finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower
court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly
considered, would alter the result of the case.
The straightforward, candid and intrepid revelation in coming forward to avenge the
immoral defilement upon her person is more convincing and plausible compared to the weak
and uncorroborated defense of petitioner. Despite the minor inconsistencies in her testimony,
her general statements remained consistent throughout the trial as she recounted the sordid
details of her tormenting experience in the hands of her own father.

FACTS:
Complainant AAA is the daughter of petitioner and BBB. One night, sometime in the year
2000, while AAAs mother, BBB, was out of the house and while AAA and her other siblings were
sleeping, AAA, who was then five years old, was suddenly awakened when petitioner removed
her clothes and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. When petitioner was unsuccessful in
inserting his penis into AAAs vagina, he inserted his finger instead. He did that several times
while holding his penis. A white substance later came out of his penis. AAA told BBB what
petitioner did to her, but BBB did nothing.
One night in May 2004, AAA, who was then already nine years old, was sleeping in the
room while her siblings were sleeping with their father in the living room. AAA was suddenly
awakened when her father carried her from the room to the living room. Petitioner then let AAA
watch bold movies but AAA turned away. Petitioner, who was half-naked waist down, thereafter
removed AAAs clothes. He then laid on top of AAA and tried to insert his penis into her vagina.
As he was unsuccessful in inserting his penis into her vagina, he inserted his finger instead.
Because AAA was afraid of petitioner who used to whip her, she did not do anything.
According to AAA, petitioner raped her several times but she could only remember two
dates: one during the year 2000 and the other in May 2004. On September 2, 2004, two
Informations for the crime of rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 5 of the
Revised Penal Code were filed against petitioner. On May 24, 2010, the RTC rendered a
decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The Court of
Appeals sustained the conviction of petitioner and affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the accused should be acquitted on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the petitioners guilt for the crimes charged
RULING:
Time and again, we have held that when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses
and their respective testimonies, the trial courts observations and conclusions deserve great
respect and are often accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or
misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. The trial
judge enjoys the advantage of observing the witnesss deportment and manner of testifying, her
"furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh,
or the scant or full realization of an oath" -- all of which are useful aids for an accurate
determination of a witnesss honesty and sincerity. The trial judge, therefore, can better
determine if such witnesses were telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting
testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered,
might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity
to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were
lying. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the
Court of Appeals.

From our own careful examination of the records, we are convinced that there is no reason
to disturb the assessment and determination of AAAs credibility by the trial court as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. The straightforward, candid and intrepid revelation in coming forward to
avenge the immoral defilement upon her person is more convincing and plausible compared to
the weak and uncorroborated defense of petitioner. Despite the minor inconsistencies in her
testimony, her general statements remained consistent throughout the trial as she recounted the
sordid details of her tormenting experience in the hands of her own father. Nonetheless, while
this Court also upholds petitioners conviction, we modify the penalty imposed on petitioner.
DESIGN SOURCES INTERNATIONAL INC., et al. vs. LOURDES L. ERISTINGCOL
G.R. No. 193966, February 19, 2014
C. J. Sereno
Without any prior order or at least a motion for exclusion from any of the parties, a court
cannot simply allow or disallow the presentation of a witness solely on the ground that the latter
heard the testimony of another witness. It is the responsibility of respondent's counsel to protect
the interest of his client during the presentation of other witnesses. If respondent actually
believed that the testimony of Kenneth would greatly affect that of Stephen's, then respondent's
counsel was clearly remiss in his duty to protect the interest of his client when he did not raise
the issue of the exclusion of the witness in a timely manner.
FACTS:
Eristingcol bought Pergo flooring from Design Sources. The flooring was installed in her
house, but the same later turned out to be defective. Eristingcol insisted on the repair or
replacement of the flooring at the expense of the latter but Design Sources did not comply with
the demand. A complaint for damages was thus filed by the Private Respondent before the
RTC.
During the hearing, the RTC issued an order refusing to allow Stephen Sy to testify as to
material matters in the case. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the Order, but their
motion was denied by the RTC on the ground that "the Court deems it no longer necessary to
allow Stephen Sy from testifying when a different witness could testify on matters similar to the
intended testimony of the former." The Order also stated that "to allow Stephen Sy from
testifying would work to the disadvantage of the plaintiff as he already heard the testimony of
witness Kenneth Sy."
Petitioners filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration but the same was likewise denied by
the RTC. The CA sustained the orders of the RTC. Hence, this petition for review on Certiorari
under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders
disallowing petitioners from presenting Stephen as their witness
RULING:
The controversy arose from the objection of respondents counsel to the presentation of
Stephen as petitioners witness. However, as aptly found by the CA, respondent failed to
substantiate her claim that there was a prior request for the exclusion of other witnesses during

the presentation of Kenneth. Respondent did not even allege in her Comment that there was
any such request.
Section 15, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: SEC. 15.Exclusion and
separation of witnesses. On any trial or hearing, the judge may exclude from the court any
witness not at the time under examination, so that he may not hear the testimony of other
witnesses. The judge may also cause witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented from
conversing with one another until all shall have been examined.
Excluding future witnesses from the courtroom at the time another witness is testifying, or
ordering that these witnesses be kept separate from one another, is primarily to prevent them
from conversing with one another. The purpose is to ensure that the witnesses testify to the
truth by preventing them from being influenced by the testimonies of the others. In other words,
this measure is meant to prevent connivance or collusion among witnesses. The efficacy of
excluding or separating witnesses has long been recognized as a means of discouraging
fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion. However, without any motion from the opposing party or
order from the court, there is nothing in the rules that prohibits a witness from hearing the
testimonies of other witnesses.
There is nothing in the records of this case that would show that there was an order of
exclusion from the RTC, or that there was any motion from respondents counsel to exclude
other witnesses from the courtroom prior to or even during the presentation of the testimony of
Kenneth. We are one with the CA in finding that under such circumstances, there was nothing to
prevent Stephen from hearing the testimony of Kenneth. Therefore, the RTC should have
allowed Stephen to testify for petitioners.
The RTC and the CA, however, moved on to determine the materiality of the testimony of
Stephen, which became their basis for not allowing the latter to testify. Applying Sandal, the CA
ruled that the absence of a showing of how his testimony would bolster the position of
petitioners saved the judgment of the RTC in issuing the order of exclusion.
We agree with petitioners that the application of Sandal is misplaced. Contrary to the
present case, in Sandal there was a court order for exclusion which was disregarded by the
witness. The defiance of the order led to the exercise by the court of its discretion to admit or
reject the testimony of the witness who had defied its order. Again, in this case, there was no
order or motion for exclusion that was defied by petitioners and their witnesses. Thus, the
determination of the materiality of Stephen's testimony in relation to the strengthening of
petitioners' defense was uncalled for.
Respondent is bound by the acts of her counsel, including mistakes in the realm of
procedural techniques. The exception to the said rule does not apply herein, considering that
there is no showing that she was thereby deprived of due process. At any rate, respondent is
not without recourse even if the court allows the presentation of the testimony of Stephen,
considering the availability of remedies during or after the presentation of witnesses, including
but not limited to the impeachment of testimonies.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO, et al. vs. ATTY. BRAIN S. MASWENG
G.R. No. 188913, February 19, 2014
J. Villarama

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its

authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts
orders, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of
law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice. Respondents
willful disregard and defiance of this Courts ruling on a matter submitted for the second time
before his office cannot be countenanced. By acting in opposition to this Courts authority and
disregarding its final determination of the legal issue pending before him, respondent failed in
his duty not to impede the due administration of justice and consistently adhere to existing laws
and principles as interpreted in the decisions of the Court.
FACTS:
The City Government of Baguio issued an order for the demolition of illegal structures that
had been constructed on a portion of the Busol Watershed Reservation. A petition for injunction
with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction was filed, and Atty.
Brain Masweng, the Regional Hearing Officer of the NCIP-CAR, issued two temporary
restraining orders directing petitioner and all persons acting in its behalf from enforcing the
demolition orders and demolition advices for a total period of 20 days. Subsequently, the NCIPCAR, through respondent, granted the application for preliminary injunction. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the injunctive writ issued by the NCIP-CAR against the demolition orders. The SC
reversed and set aside the ruling of the CA and dismissed NCIP Case No. 31-CAR-06.
Thereafter, petitioner, through the Office of the Mayor, issued Demolition Advices against
owners of structures built on the Busol Watershed. The latter, however, filed a petition for the
identification, delineation and recognition of their ancestral land and enforcement of their rights
as indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO
and writ of preliminary injunction. A petition for injunction with urgent prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction before the NCIP against petitioner
and the City Building and Architecture Office was further filed. On the same day, respondent
issued two separate 72-hour temporary restraining orders. Subsequently, respondent issued
two separate extending the 72-hour temporary restraining orders for another 17 days. The
respondent also issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction followed by a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent should be cited in contempt of court for issuing the subject
temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction
RULING:
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice. Only in cases of
clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be exercised, however, such power,
being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the
interest of justice. The court must exercise the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly, with
utmost self-restraint, with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of
the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication. In this case, respondent was charged
with indirect contempt for issuing the subject orders enjoining the implementation of demolition

orders against illegal structures constructed on a portion of the Busol Watershed Reservation
located at Aurora Hill, Baguio City.
In the Decision dated February 4, 2009 rendered in G.R. No. 180206, the Court indeed
upheld the authority of the NCIP to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction to
preserve the rights of parties to a dispute who are members of indigenous cultural communities
or indigenous peoples. However, the Court categorically ruled that Elvin Gumangan, et al.,
whose houses and structures are the subject of demolition orders issued by petitioner, are not
entitled to the injunctive relief granted by herein respondent.
The crucial question to be asked then is whether private respondents ancestral land claim was
indeed recognized by Proclamation No. 15, in which case, their right thereto may be protected
by an injunctive writ. After all, before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, petitioners
must show that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which injunction is
directed are violative of said right.
In the case at bar, petitioners and private respondents present the very same arguments
and counter-arguments with respect to the writ of injunction against the fencing of the Busol
Watershed Reservation. The same legal issues are thus being litigated in G.R. No. 180206 and
in the case at bar, except that different writs of injunction are being assailed. While res judicata
does not apply on account of the different subject matters of the case at bar and G.R. No.
180206 (they assail different writs of injunction, albeit issued by the same hearing officer), we
are constrained by the principle of stare decisis to grant the instant petition.
Respondents willful disregard and defiance of this Courts ruling on a matter submitted for
the second time before his office cannot be countenanced. By acting in opposition to this
Courts authority and disregarding its final determination of the legal issue pending before him,
respondent failed in his duty not to impede the due administration of justice and consistently
adhere to existing laws and principles as interpreted in the decisions of the Court.
LUCENA D. DEMAALA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 173523, February 19, 2014
J. Del Castillo
Where a party was afforded the opportunity to participate in the proceedings, yet he failed
to do so, he cannot be allowed later on to claim that he was deprived of his day in court. Notice
and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the
primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.
FACTS:
Petitioner Lucena D. Demaala is the Municipal Mayor of Narra, Palawan, and is the
accused in criminal cases for violations of Section 3(h) of RA 3019, which cases are pending
before the Sandiganbayan. On January 9, 2006, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed
before the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Suspend the Accused Pursuant to Section 13, RA
3019arguing that under Section 13 of RA 3019, petitioners suspension from office was
mandatory. The Sandiganbayan held that preventive suspension was proper to prevent
Demaala from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office.

On March 23, 2006, Demaala filed her Motion for Reconsideration. Her Motion for
Reconsideration, which was originally set for hearing on April 26, 2006, was reset to August 2
and 3, 2006 via the Sandiganbayans April 21, 2006 Order. Nonetheless, before the said date
could arrive, the anti-graft court supposedly precipitately issued the assailed May 23, 2006
Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration, thus depriving her of the opportunity to be
heard. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan issued its May 23,
2006 Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration without conducting a hearing thereon
RULING:
A reading and understanding of the April 21, 2006 Order of the Sandiganbayan indicates
that what it referred to were the two hearing dates of April 26 and 27, 2006 covering the
continuation of the trial proper the ongoing presentation of the prosecutions evidence and
not the single hearing date of April 26, 2006 for the determination of petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. The prosecutions manifestation and motion to reset trial itself unmistakably
specified that what was being reset was the trial proper which was scheduled on April 26 and
27, 2006 pursuant to the courts previous January 19, 2006 Order; it had nothing at all to do with
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
If petitioner truly believed that the prosecutions manifestation and motion to reset trial
referred to the April 26, 2006 hearing of her Motion for Reconsideration, then she should have
attended the scheduled April 21, 2006 hearing thereof to reiterate her motion or object to a
resetting. Her failure to attend said hearing is a strong indication that she did not consider the
manifestation and motion to reset trial as covering or pertaining to her Motion for
Reconsideration which she set for hearing on April 26, 2006.
On the other hand, petitioners failure to attend the scheduled April 26, 2006 hearing of her
own Motion for Reconsideration is fatal to her cause. Her excuse that she no longer bothered
to go to court on April 26, 2006 since "she had no business to be there" is unavailing. By being
absent at the April 21, 2006 hearing, petitioner did not consider the prosecutions manifestation
and motion to reset trial as related to her pending Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, it was
incumbent upon her to have attended the hearing of her own motion on April 26, 2006. Her
absence at said hearing was inexcusable, and the Sandiganbayan was therefore justified in
considering the matter submitted for resolution based on the pleadings submitted.
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do
so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. Notice and hearing is the bulwark of
administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be
respected even in administrative proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain
one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. So
long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due
course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due process.
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process
it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision

can be based. "To be heard" does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court one may also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through
pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICENTE ROM
G.R. No. 198452, February 19, 2014
J. Perez
Settled is the rule that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a
satisfactory explanation of such possession. As such, the burden of evidence is shifted to the
accused to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.
Evidently, the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt the appellants guilt for
the offense of illegal sale of shabu in violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended.
FACTS:
In three separate Informations all dated 1 September 2000, the appellant was charged with
violation of Sections 15, (illegal sale of shabu) 15-A(maintenance of a drug den and 16(illegal
possession of shabu), Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, also known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The RTC rendered a decision finding herein
Rom guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged. On appeal is the Decision dated
9 August 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00579 affirming with
modification the Decision dated 24 June 2002 of the The Court of Appeals, however, modified
and reduced the penalty in Criminal Case Nos. CBU-55062 and CBU-55063 to an imprisonment
of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in convicting the appellant in spite of the failure of the prosecution
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
HELD:
After a careful perusal of the records, this Court finds no cogent or compelling reason to
overturn the findings of both lower courts, which were adequately supported by the evidence on
record. Evidently, the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt the appellants guilt
for the offense of illegal sale of shabu in violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended. On the occasion of the appellants arrest for having been caught in flagrante
delicto selling shabu, PO3 Yanson conducted a body search on the former resulting to the
recovery of four more heat-sealed plastic packets containing white crystalline substance inside
his wallet that was tucked in his pocket. Definitely, the records do not show that the appellant
has the legal authority to possess the four heat-sealed plastic packets of shabu. Settled is the
rule that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or
animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation
of such possession. As such, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the
absence of knowledge or animus possidendi, which the appellant in this case miserably failed to
do.

There is also no truth on the appellants claim that the entry in the house was illegal making
the search and the seizure in connection thereto invalid, rendering the pieces of evidence
obtained by the police officers inadmissible for being the "fruit of a poisonous tree." The
appellant, in this case, was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu, thus, he was lawfully
arrested. Following Dimacuha, the subsequent seizure of four heat-sealed plastic packets of
shabu in the appellants wallet that was tucked in his pocket was justified and admissible in
evidence for being the fruit of the crime.
With the foregoing, this Court is fully convinced that the prosecution had likewise proved
beyond a shadow of reasonable doubt that the appellant is guilty of the offense of illegal
possession of shabu in violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
Going to the charge of maintaining a drug den in violation of Section 15-A, Article III of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, the prosecution had also established appellants guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
In his attempt to exonerate himself, the appellant vehemently asserts that he was no longer
the owner of the house in Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu City, and he was no longer residing therein.
The defense also presented Teresita Bitos to corroborate this claim of the appellant, but the
testimony of Teresita Bitos corroborating the appellants testimony was not credible. She herself
admitted that the appellant requested her to testify in his favor. Also, considering the
seriousness of the charges against the appellant, he did not bother to present his daughter, who
is the alleged owner of the house in Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu City, to bolster his claim.
Time and again, this Court held that denial is an inherently weak defense and has always
been viewed upon with disfavor by the courts due to the ease with which it can be concocted.
Inherently weak, denial as a defense crumbles in the light of positive identification of the
appellant, as in this case. The defense of denial assumes significance only when the
prosecutions evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which is
not the case here. Verily, mere denial, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is
negative self-serving evidence which cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the
testimony of the prosecution witness who testified on affirmative matters. Moreover, there is a
presumption that public officers, including the arresting officers, regularly perform their official
duties. In this case, the defense failed to overcome this presumption by presenting clear and
convincing evidence. Furthermore, this Court finds no ill motive that could be attributed to the
police officers who had conducted the buy-bust operation. Even the allegation of the appellant
that PO2 Martinez got angry with him when he failed to pinpoint the big time pusher cannot be
considered as the ill motive in implicating the appellant on all the three charges against him for
this is self-serving and uncorroborated.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERVIN GAHI
G.R. No. 202976, February 19, 2014
J. Leonardo-De Castro
It is a fundamental principle in jurisprudence involving rape that the accused may be
convicted based solely on the testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible,
natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. In this
regard, we defer to the trial courts assessment of the credibility of AAAs testimony, most
especially, when it is affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:

On October 9, 2002, two criminal Informations, each charging appellant with one count of
rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code were filed by a 16-year old girl, who
happened to be the appellants niece by affinity. The trial court convicted appellant Mervin Gahi
of two counts of rape defined under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. The CA affirmed
the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the failure of the prosecution
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
RULING:
According to the prosecution, appellant used force or intimidation in order to successfully
have unlawful carnal knowledge of AAA. To be exact, appellant is alleged to have utilized, on
two occasions, a knife and the threat of bodily harm to coerce AAA into submitting to his evil
sexual desires. A careful perusal of AAAs testimony in open court reveals that she was clear
and straightforward in her assertion that appellant raped her twice in the manner described by
the prosecution. We sustain as proper the appellate courts findings regarding the first instance
of rape.
Appellant questions the weighty trust placed by the trial court on the singular and
uncorroborated testimony of AAA as the basis for his conviction. On this point, we would like to
remind appellant that it is a fundamental principle in jurisprudence involving rape that the
accused may be convicted based solely on the testimony of the victim, provided that such
testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal
course of things. In this regard, we defer to the trial courts assessment of the credibility of AAAs
testimony, most especially, when it is affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Anent the inconsistent statements made by AAA in her testimony which were pointed out by
appellant, we agree with the assessment made by the Court of Appeals that these are but minor
discrepancies that do little to affect the central issue of rape which is involved in this case.
Instead of diminishing AAAs credibility, such variance on minor details has the net effect of
bolstering the truthfulness of AAAs accusations. We have constantly declared that a few
discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details and
not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair the credibility of the
witnesses because they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed testimony.
Notable is the fact that no ill motive on the part of AAA to falsely accuse appellant was ever
brought up by the defense during trial. This only serves to further strengthen AAAs case since
we have consistently held that a rape victims testimony as to who abused her is credible where
she has absolutely no motive to incriminate and testify against the accused. It is also equally
important to highlight AAAs young age when she decided to accuse her kin of rape and go
through the ordeal of trial.
In a bid to exculpate himself, appellant argues that he could not have possibly been guilty of
rape because the time period between the rape incidents and the birth of the alleged fruit of his
crime is more than the normal period of pregnancy. He also points out that defense witness
Jackie Gucelas admission that he was AAAs lover and the father of her child should suffice to
negate any notion that he raped AAA twice. Lastly, he puts forward the defense of alibi.

We are not convinced by appellants line of reasoning which appears ostensibly compelling,
at the outset, but is ultimately rendered inutile by jurisprudence and the evidence at hand. It is
well-entrenched in our case law that the rape victims pregnancy and resultant childbirth are
irrelevant in determining whether or not she was raped. Pregnancy is not an essential element
of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the rape victim bore was fathered by the accused,
or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is important and decisive is that the
accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latters will or without her consent, and
such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner. Likewise, we assign no significance
to the testimony of defense witness Jackie Gucela.
For the ["sweetheart"] theory to prosper, the existence of the supposed relationship must be
proven by convincing substantial evidence. Failure to adduce such evidence renders his claim
to be self-serving and of no probative value. For the satisfaction of the Court, there should be a
corroboration by their common friends or, if none, a substantiation by tokens of such a
relationship such as love letters, gifts, pictures and the like. In any event, even assuming for the
sake of argument that AAA had a romantic attachment with a person other than the accused at
the time of the rape incidents or thereafter, this circumstance would not necessarily negate the
truth of AAAs statement that the appellant, her aunts husband, twice had carnal knowledge of
her through force and intimidation and without her consent.
We are similarly unconvinced with appellants defense of alibi. We have consistently held
that alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable.
Moreover, we have required that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the appellant must prove
that he was somewhere else when the offense was committed and that he was so far away that
it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or at its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
CAPITOL HILLS GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., et al. vs. MANUEL O. SANCHEZ
G.R. No. 182738, February 24, 2014
J. Peralta
In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt have not been initiated. To the Courts
mind, the September 3, 2007 Resolution could be treated as a mere reiteration of the
September 10, 2002 Order. It is not yet a "judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect
contempt" as contemplated under the Rules. The recourse provided for in the Rule 71 is clear
enough: the person adjudged in indirect contempt must file an appeal under Rule 41 (Appeal
from the Regional Trial Courts) and post a bond for its suspension pendente lite. Obviously,
these were not done in this case. Instead, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules and did not post the required bond, effectively making the September 3, 2007
Resolution final and executory.
FACTS:
On July 1, 2002, Sanchez, a stockholder of petitioner Capitol Hills Golf & Country Club, Inc.
filed a petition for the nullification of the annual meeting of stockholders of May 21, 2002 and the
special meeting of stockholders of April 23, 2002. Petitioners, along with their co-defendants,
filed an Answer with Counterclaims and, thereafter, a Motion for Preliminary Hearing of
Defendants Affirmative Defenses, which was denied by the RTC.
On August 12, 2002, Sanchez filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents, which
the court granted in an Order dated September 10, 2002. Capitol Hills Inc. filed a motion for

reconsideration of the Order which denied their motion for preliminary hearing. Subsequently,
they filed a Supplement to Defendants Motion for Reconsideration, and a Motion for Deferment
of Implementation of the production and Inspection Order. The RTC denied the petitioners MR
of the Order denying the motion for preliminary hearing and ordered the immediate
implementation of the Production and Inspection Order.
Capitol Hills Inc. elevated the case to the CA but the same was denied. A petition for review
was filed before the SC, but the same was likewise denied. Respondent sought to enforce the
Production and Inspection Order but Capitol Hills Inc. failed to show willingness to comply. In
order to give both the plaintiff and defendants one last chance to comply with the order dated
September 10, 2002, the RTC reiterated the said order with a warning that failure of the
defendants to comply with all the requirements of the said will result in this court citing all the
defendants in contempt of court. Petitioners questioned the said resolution via Petition for
Certiorari. The CA ruled that there is no indication that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the threatened citation for contempt is proper
RULING:
A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court or commits any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice may be punished for indirect contempt. In particular, Section 4, Rule 3
of the Interim Rules states that, in addition to a possible treatment of a party as non-suited or as
in default, the sanctions prescribed in the Rules for failure to avail of, or refusal to comply with,
the modes of discovery shall apply. Under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules, if a party or an officer
or managing agent of a party refuses to obey an order to produce any document or other things
for inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it to be done, the court may make such
orders as are just. The enumeration of options given to the court under Section 3, Rule 29 of the
Rules is not exclusive, as shown by the phrase "among others."
To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and
efficacious, the law imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery,
such as dismissing the action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default
against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party;
payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel
discovery; taking the matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of the
party seeking discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party support or oppose designated
claims or defenses; striking out pleadings or parts thereof; staying further proceedings.
Under the Rules of Court, there are two ways of initiating indirect contempt proceedings: (1)
motu proprio by the court; or (2) by a verified petition. In contempt proceedings, the prescribed
procedure must be followed. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provide the
procedure to be followed in case of indirect contempt. First, there must be an order requiring the
respondent to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt. Second, the respondent
must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge against him. Third, there must be a
hearing and the court must investigate the charge and consider respondents answer. Finally,
only if found guilty will respondent be punished accordingly.

The second mode of initiating indirect contempt proceedings is through a verified petition. In
cases where the court did not initiate the contempt charge, the Rules prescribe that charges for
indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and
certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the
requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt
charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for
contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately,
unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the
principal action for joint hearing and decision.
Thus, where there is a verified petition to cite someone in contempt of court, courts have
the duty to ensure that all the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings have been complied
with. It behooves them too to docket the petition, and to hear and decide it separately from the
main case, unless the presiding judge orders the consolidation of the contempt proceedings and
the main action.
But in indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by the court, the above rules, as
clarified in Regalado, do not necessarily apply. First, since the court itself motu proprio initiates
the proceedings, there can be no verified petition to speak of. Instead, the court has the duty to
inform the respondent in writing, in accordance with his or her right to due process. This formal
charge is done by the court in the form of an Order requiring the respondent to explain why he
or she should not be cited in contempt of court.
In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt have not been initiated. To the Courts
mind, the September 3, 2007 Resolution could be treated as a mere reiteration of the
September 10, 2002 Order. It is not yet a "judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect
contempt" as contemplated under the Rules. The penalty mentioned therein only serves as a
reminder to caution petitioners of the consequence of possible non-observance of the longoverdue order to produce and make available for inspection and photocopying of the requested
records/documents. In case of another failure or refusal to comply with the directive, the court or
respondent could formally initiate the indirect contempt proceedings pursuant to the mandatory
requirements of the Rules and existing jurisprudence.
Even if We are to treat the September 3, 2007 Resolution as a "judgment or final order of a
court in a case of indirect contempt," this would still not work to petitioners advantage. Section
11, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court lays down the proper remedy from a judgment in indirect
contempt proceedings. It states: Sec. 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond for stay.The
judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt may be appealed to the proper
court as in criminal cases. But execution of the judgment or final order shall not be suspended
until a bond is filed by the person adjudged in contempt, in an amount fixed by the court from
which the appeal is taken, conditioned that if the appeal be decided against him he will abide by
and perform the judgment or final order.
The recourse provided for in the above-mentioned provision is clear enough: the person
adjudged in indirect contempt must file an appeal under Rule 41 (Appeal from the Regional Trial
Courts) and post a bond for its suspension pendente lite. Obviously, these were not done in this
case. Instead, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules and did not
post the required bond, effectively making the September 3, 2007 Resolution final and
executory.

LETICIA P. LIGON
vs. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 56 AT MAKATI CITY, et al.
G.R. No. 190028, February 26, 2014
J. Perlas-Bernabe
Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an adverse party is
taken into legal custody, either at the commencement of an action or at any time thereafter, as a
security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper
party. Case law instructs that an attachment is a proceeding in rem, and, hence, is against the
particular property, enforceable against the whole world. Accordingly, the attaching creditor
acquires a specific lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently destroy except
the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself.
Applying these principles to this case, the Court finds that the CA erred in holding that the
RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the Assailed Orders as these issuances
essentially disregarded, inter alia, Ligons prior attachment lien over the subject property
patently anathema to the nature of attachment proceedings which is well-established in law and
jurisprudence.
FACTS:
On November 20, 2002, Ligon filed an amended complaint before the Quezon City RTC for
collection of sum of money and damages, rescission of contract, and nullification of title with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, against Sps. Baladjay, Marasigan,
Polished Arrow, and its incorporators, as well as the latters spouses. On February 18, 2003, a
similar complaint for collection of sum of money, damages, and cancellation of title with prayer
for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment was lodged before the Makati City RTC by Sps.
Vicente against Sps. Baladjay, Polished Arrow, and other corporations. During the proceedings
therein, a writ of preliminary attachment also against the subject property was issued and
annotated on the title. Thereafter, but before the Quezon City Case was concluded, the Makati
City RTC rendered a decision rescinding the transfer of the subject property from Sps. Baladjay
to Polished Arrow upon a finding that the same was made in fraud of creditors.
Meanwhile, the Quezon City RTC rendered a decision directing Sps. Baladjay to pay Ligon.
When Ligon sought its execution, she discovered that the December 3, 2002 attachment
annotation had been deleted from TCT No. 9273 when the subject property was sold by way of
public auction. In this regard, Ligon learned that the Makati City RTC had issued an order
directing the registration of the Officers Final Deed of Sale; and the cancellation of the title in
the name of Sps. Baladjay and issue a new title in the name of Ting, free from any liens and
encumbrances.On June 7, 2007, Atty. Garing issued a title in the name of Ting, free from any
liens and encumbrances. Later, Ting sold the subject property to respondent Techico.
Ligon filed, a certiorari petition alleging, among others, that the Makati City RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Assailed Orders. Consolidated with Ligons certiorari
petition is a complaint for indirect contempt against respondents, whereby it was alleged that the
latter unlawfully interfered with the court processes of the Quezon City RTC, particularly by
deleting the December 3, 2002 attachment annotation. The CA dismissed Ligons certiorari
petition. Likewise, it dismissed the indirect contempt charge for lack of sufficient basis. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUES:

1. Whether the CA erred in ruling that the Makati City RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
issuing the Assailed Orders
2. Whether Judge Laigo should be cited in contempt and penalized administratively
RULING:
Issuance of the Assailed Orders vis--vis Grave Abuse of Discretion
Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an adverse party is
taken into legal custody, either at the commencement of an action or at any time thereafter, as a
security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper
party. Case law instructs that an attachment is a proceeding in rem, and, hence, is against the
particular property, enforceable against the whole world. Accordingly, the attaching creditor
acquires a specific lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently destroy except
the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself. Such a proceeding, in effect, means that the
property attached is an indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the owners debt.
The lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued on the judgment,
or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner
provided by law. Thus, a prior registration of an attachment lien creates a preference, such that
when an attachment has been duly levied upon a property, a purchaser thereof subsequent to
the attachment takes the property subject to the said attachment. As provided under PD 1529,
said registration operates as a form of constructive notice to all persons.
Applying these principles to this case, the Court finds that the CA erred in holding that the
RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the Assailed Orders as these issuances
essentially disregarded, inter alia, Ligons prior attachment lien over the subject property
patently anathema to the nature of attachment proceedings which is well-established in law and
jurisprudence. The grave abuse of discretion of the Makati City RTC lies with its directive to
issue a new certificate of title in the name of Ting free from any liens and encumbrances. This
course of action clearly negates the efficacy of Ligons attachment lien and, also, defies the
legal characterization of attachment proceedings. It bears noting that Ligons claim, secured by
the aforesaid attachment, is against Sps. Baladjay whose ownership over the subject property
had been effectively restored in view of the RTCs rescission of the propertys previous sale to
Polished Arrow Thus, Sps. Ligons attachment lien against Sps. Baladjay as well as their
successors-in-interest should have been preserved, and the annotation thereof carried over to
any subsequent certificate of title, the most recent of which as it appears on record is TCT No.
31001 in the name of Techico, without prejudice to the latters right to protect his own ownership
interest over the subject property.
Indirect Contempt Charges
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public
authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders
of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or
insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the
respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a
despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. Contempt of court is of two (2) kinds,
namely: direct and indirect contempt. Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is
committed out of the presence of the court. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly,
to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice would constitute indirect contempt.

The indirect contempt charges in this case involve an invocation of paragraphs b, c, and d,
Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which read as follows: Section 3. Indirect contempt to
be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by
the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may
be punished for indirect contempt: x x x x
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, x x x;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;
Examining the petition, the Court finds that Ligon failed to sufficiently show how the acts of each
of the respondents, or more specifically, Judge Laigo, constituted any of the acts punishable
under the foregoing section tending towards a wilful disregard or disobedience of a public
authority. In issuing the Assailed Orders, Judge Laigo merely performed his judicial functions
pursuant to the December 9, 2004 Decision in the Makati City Case which had already attained
finality.
PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC.
vs. PHILTRANCO WORKERS UNION-ASSOCIATION OF GENUINE LABOR
ORGANIZATIONS (PWU-AGLO)
G.R. No. 180962, February 26, 2014
J. Del Castillo
While a government office may prohibit altogether the filing of a motion for reconsideration
with respect to its decisions or orders, the fact remains that certiorari inherently requires the
filing of a motion for reconsideration, which is the tangible representation of the opportunity
given to the office to correct itself. Unless it is filed, there could be no occasion to rectify. Worse,
the remedy of certiorari would be unavailing. Simply put, regardless of the proscription against
the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the same may be filed on the assumption that
rectification of the decision or order must be obtained, and before a petition for certiorari may be
instituted.
FACTS:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks a review and setting aside of the September 20,
2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100324, as well as its
December 14, 2007 Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. On the ground
that it was suffering business losses, petitioner Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc., a local land
transportation company engaged in the business of carrying passengers and freight, retrenched
21 of its employees. Consequently, the company union, PWU-AGLU, filed a Notice of Strike with
the Department of Labor and Employment, claiming that petitioner engaged in unfair labor
practices.
Unable to settle their differences at the scheduled preliminary conference, the case was
thereafter referred to the Secretary of Labor. Acting DOLE Cruz issued a ordering Philtranco to
reinstate to their former positions, without loss of seniority rights, the illegally terminated 17
"union officers", x x x, and pay them backwages from the time of termination until their actual or
payroll reinstatement, provided in the computation of backwages among the seventeen (17)

who had received their separation pay should deduct the payments made to them from the
backwages due them.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent, on the other hand,
submitted a "Partial Appeal." The Secretary of Labor declined to rule on petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration and private respondents "Partial Appeal", citing a DOLE Regulation which
provided that voluntary arbitrators decisions, orders, resolutions or awards shall not be the
subject of motions for reconsideration.
The CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Philtranco, holding that,
in assailing the Decision of the DOLE voluntary arbitrator, petitioner erred in filing a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules, when it should have filed a petition for review under
Rule 43 thereof, which properly covers decisions of voluntary labor arbitrators. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Philtranco availed of the proper remedy in this case
2. Whether the petition was filed on time
RULING:
On whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 5 is proper
It cannot be said that in taking cognizance of NCMB-NCR CASE No. NS-02-028-07, the
Secretary of Labor did so in a limited capacity, i.e., as a voluntary arbitrator. The fact is
undeniable that by referring the case to the Secretary of Labor, Conciliator-Mediator Aglibut
conceded that the case fell within the coverage of Article 263 of the Labor Code; the impending
strike in Philtranco, a public transportation company whose business is imbued with public
interest, required that the Secretary of Labor assume jurisdiction over the case, which he in fact
did. By assuming jurisdiction over the case, the provisions of Article 263 became applicable, any
representation to the contrary or that he is deciding the case in his capacity as a voluntary
arbitrator notwithstanding.
It has long been settled that the remedy of an aggrieved party in a decision or resolution of
the Secretary of Labor is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any
further or subsequent remedy, and then seasonably file a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. There is no distinction: when the Secretary of
Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor case in an industry indispensable to national interest,
"he exercises great breadth of discretion" in finding a solution to the parties dispute. "The
authority of the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely
to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest includes and
extends to all questions and controversies arising therefrom. The power is plenary and
discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary
dispute." This wide latitude of discretion given to the Secretary of Labor may not be the subject
of appeal.
Accordingly, the Secretary of Labors Decision in Case No. OS-VA-2007-008 is a proper
subject of certiorari. It is procedurally feasible as well as practicable that petitions for certiorari
under Rule 65 against the decisions of the Secretary of Labor rendered under the Labor Code
and its implementing and related rules be filed initially in the Court of Appeals. Paramount

consideration is strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of the courts, emphasized in
St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, on "the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for
the exercise of our primary jurisdiction."
On the question of whether the Petition for Certiorari was timely filed
The Court agrees with petitioners submission. Rule 65 states that where a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition
shall be filed not later than 60 days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion. This can
only mean that even though a motion for reconsideration is not required or even prohibited by
the concerned government office, and the petitioner files the motion just the same, the 60-day
period shall nonetheless be counted from notice of the denial of the motion. The very nature of
certiorari which is an extraordinary remedy resorted to only in the absence of plain, available,
speedy and adequate remedies in the course of law requires that the office issuing the
decision or order be given the opportunity to correct itself. Quite evidently, this opportunity for
rectification does not arise if no motion for reconsideration has been filed. This is precisely what
the Court said in the ABS-CBN Union Members case, whose essence continues to this day.
Thus: Section 8, Rule VIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code,
provides: "The Secretary shall have fifteen (15) calendar days within which to decide the appeal
from receipt of the records of the case. The decision of the Secretary shall be final and
inappealable." x x x
The aforecited provision cannot be construed to mean that the Decision of the public
respondent cannot be reconsidered since the same is reviewable by writ of certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. As a rule, the law requires a motion for reconsideration to enable the
public respondent to correct his mistakes, if any. In Pearl S. Buck Foundation, Inc., vs. NLRC,
this Court held: "Hence, the only way by which a labor case may reach the Supreme Court is
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Such petition may be filed within a reasonable time
from receipt of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision." x x
x
Clearly, before a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be availed
of, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to afford an opportunity
for the correction of the error or mistake complained of.
So also, considering that a decision of the Secretary of Labor is subject to judicial review only
through a special civil action of certiorari and, as a rule, cannot be resorted to without the
aggrieved party having exhausted administrative remedies through a motion for reconsideration,
the aggrieved party, must be allowed to move for a reconsideration of the same so that he can
bring a special civil action for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Petitioner received a copy of the Acting Secretary of Labors Decision on June 14, 2007. It
timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration on June 25, which was a Monday, or the first working
day following the last day (Sunday, June 24) for filing the motion. But for lack of procedural
basis, the same was effectively denied by the Secretary of Labor via his August 15, 2007 Order
which petitioner received on August 17. It then filed the Petition for Certiorari on August 29, or
well within the fresh 60-day period allowed by the Rules from August 17. Given these facts, the
Court finds that the Petition was timely filed.
CORAZON MACAPAGAL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 193217, February 26, 2014

J. Peralta
The disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the disallowance of the appeal itself. A
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal of a lower courts
decision or final order direct to the Supreme Court. However, the questioned Order denying her
notice of appeal is not a decision or final order from which an appeal may be taken. The Rules
of Court specifically provides that no appeal shall be taken from an order disallowing or
dismissing an appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party can elevate the matter through a special civil
action under Rule 65. Thus, in availing of the wrong mode of appeal in this petition under Rule
45 instead of the appropriate remedy of Rule 65, the petition merits an outright dismissal.
FACTS:
On November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of
Estafa for misappropriating, for her own benefit, the total amount of P800,000.00, which is the
value of the unreturned and unsold pieces of jewelry. Petitioner received the decision on
January 13, 2009 then she timely moved for reconsideration, but was likewise denied in an
Order dated May 20, 2009 which the petitioner allegedly received on July 31, 2009. She
supposedly filed a Notice of Appeal on August 3, 2009, but the same was denied on June 29,
2010 for having been filed out of time. This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assailing RTC Decision convicting Macapagal of the crime of Estafa; the
Order denying her Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial; and the Order dated denying
her Notice of Appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in issuing the assailed orders
RULING:
Petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial courts denial of her notice of
appeal. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lay down the
rules on where, how and when appeal is taken, to wit:
SEC. 2. Where to appeal. The appeal may be taken as follows:
xxxx
(b) To the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the proper cases provided by law, in
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court; and
xxxx
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court or to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal filed with the court which rendered the judgment or
final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen days from
promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from x x x.
Consequently, the disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the disallowance of the
appeal itself. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal of a

lower courts decision or final order direct to the Supreme Court. However, the questioned Order
denying her notice of appeal is not a decision or final order from which an appeal may be taken.
The Rules of Court specifically provides that no appeal shall be taken from an order disallowing
or dismissing an appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party can elevate the matter through a special
civil action under Rule 65. Thus, in availing of the wrong mode of appeal in this petition under
Rule 45 instead of the appropriate remedy of Rule 65, the petition merits an outright dismissal.
Even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still dismissible for
violation of the hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with
the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this should not be taken as granting parties the
absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which an application will be
directed. Direct resort to this Court is allowed only if there are special, important and compelling
reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition, which are not present in this case.
Even if we ignore the above non-compliance and consider the petition as an appeal of the
trial courts decision convicting her of estafa, again, we cannot do so for yet another fatal
procedural shortcoming committed by petitioner. As stated earlier, petitioner elevated to this
Court not only the Order denying her notice of appeal but also the Decision convicting her of
estafa and the Order denying her motion for reconsideration. In utter disregard of the rules of
procedure, petitioner attached to the petition only the June 29, 2010 RTC Order denying her
notice of appeal but she failed to attach a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy
of the assailed decision convicting her of estafa and the order denying her motion for
reconsideration. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must
contain a certified true copy or duplicate original of the assailed decision, final order or
judgment. Failure to comply with such requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of
the petition.
The main reason for the prescribed attachments is to facilitate the review and evaluation of
the petition by making readily available to the Court all the orders, resolutions, decisions,
pleadings, transcripts, documents, and pieces of evidence that are material and relevant to the
issues presented in the petition without relying on the case records of the lower court.
Lastly, this petition is bound to fail because of petitioners repeated disregard of the Rules
and the Courts lawful orders. Indeed, cases should be determined on the merits after full
opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality
or some procedural imperfections in order to serve better the ends of justice. It is the duty of the
counsel to make sure of the nature of the errors he proposes to assign, to determine which
court has appellate jurisdiction, and to follow the requisites for appeal. Any error in compliance
may be fatal to the client's cause. It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a
natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin and
may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its
exercise. The requirements of the rules on appeal cannot be considered as merely harmless
and trivial technicalities that can be discarded at whim. In these times when court dockets are
clogged with numerous litigations, parties have to abide by these rules with greater fidelity in
order to facilitate the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.
FLOR GUPILAN-AGUILAR and HONORE R. HERNANDEZ
vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al.
G.R. NO. 197307, February 26, 2014
J. Velasco

The Ombudsman-imposed penalties in administrative disciplinary cases are immediately

executory notwithstanding an appeal timely filed. An appeal shall not stop the decision from
being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such
appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid
the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or
removal. Thus, no error can be attributed to the CA when it ruled that the penalties imposed by
the Ombudsman against petitioners are immediately executory. Immediate execution argues
against the outlandish notion that the Ombudsman can only recommend disciplinary sanctions.
FACTS:
In June 2003, PNP-CIDG conducted an investigation on the lavish lifestyle and alleged
nefarious activities of certain personnel of the Bureau of Customs, among them Aguilar, then
Chief of the Miscellaneous Division, and Hernandez. Aguilars SALNs do not reflect any income
source other than her employment. The spaces for her spouses name and business interest
were left in blank. Following weeks of surveillance and lifestyle probe, the PNP-CIDG
investigating team executed a Joint-Affidavit depicting as owning properties not declared or
properly identified in her SALNs. It was also discovered that Aguilar took 13 unofficial trips
abroad, accompanied most of the time by daughter Josephine. During the same period, her two
other daughters also collectively made nine travels abroad.
In view of what it deemed to be a wide variance between Aguilars acquired assets and
what she spent for her four-year overseas travels, on one hand, and her income, on the other,
the PNP-CIDG, on a finding that she has violated R.A. 1379 in relation to R.A. 3019 and 6713
charged her with grave misconduct and dishonesty. Hernandez was charged too with the same
offenses. Upon evaluation of the complaint and of the evidence presented, the Ombudsman
created an investigating panel which then conducted administrative proceedings on the
complaint. The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding petitioners guilty of grave misconduct
and dishonesty and dismissed them from the service. The CA affirmed the ruling of the
Ombudsman. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether a Rule 43 petition to assail the findings or decisions of the Ombudsman in an
administrative case is proper
RULING:
Petitioners properly appealed to the CA. The Ombudsman has defined prosecutorial
powers and possesses adjudicative competence over administrative disciplinary cases filed
against public officers. What presently concerns the Court relates to the grievance mechanism
available to challenge the OMBs decisions in the exercise of that disciplinary jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of his administrative disciplinary
jurisdiction had, after due investigation, adjudged petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and
dishonesty and meted the corresponding penalty. Recourse to the CA via a Rule 43 petition is
the proper mode of appeal. Rule 43 governs appeals to the CA from decisions or final orders of
quasi-judicial agencies.
This brings us to the issue on the nature of the Ombudsmans decisions in administrative
disciplinary suits. Administrative disciplinary authority of the OMB does not end with a

recommendation to punish. This court held in Ombudsman v. De Leon that, as early as 2000,
rules were already enforced by the OMB that provide for the immediate execution of judgments
pending appeal. As pointed out in De Leon, Sec. 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 prescribes
the rules on the effectivity and finality of the OMBs decisions:
SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. (1) All provisionary orders at the Office of the
Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory. x x x x
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten
(10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The then Sec. 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (AO 07) or the Rules of Procedure
of the OMB, in turn, stated:
Sec. 7. Finality of decision. Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more
than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and
unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10)
days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for
certiorari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of RA 6770. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The Court, in Lapid v. Court of Appeals, has interpreted the above-quoted provision to mean
that the sanctions imposed by the Ombudsman other than public censure, reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month or a fine equivalent to one month salary are not
immediately executory and can be stayed by an appeal timely filed. The pertinent ruling in Lapid
has, however, been superseded. On August 17, 2000, AO 14-A was issued amending Sec. 7,
Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the OMB. The rule, as thus amended, pertinently reads:
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. Where x x x the penalty imposed is public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one
month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may
be appealed x x x.
Then came AO 17 dated September 15, 2003 further amending Sec. 7 of Rule III. Thus, the
section now provides: Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. Where the respondent is
absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure
or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary,
the decision shall be final, executory, and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be
appealed to the Court of Appeals x x x.
Clearly then, as early as August 17, 2000, when AO 14-A was issued, the OMB-imposed
penalties in administrative disciplinary cases were already immediately executory
notwithstanding an appeal timely filed. In this case, it must be noted that the complaint dated
July 28, 2003 was filed on August 20, 2003 or after the AO 14-A has come into effect. Thus, no
error can be attributed to the CA when it ruled that the penalties imposed by the Ombudsman
against petitioners are immediately executory. Immediate execution argues against the
outlandish notion that the Ombudsman can only recommend disciplinary sanctions.

RUFA A. RUBIO, ET AL. vs. LOURDES ALABATA

G.R. NO. 203947, February 26, 2014
J. Mendoza
Although strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is
warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice; and
that it is a better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly
by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice
would result.
Petitioners could not afford to engage the services of a private counsel and so were
represented by the PAO. As has been repeatedly stated all over the records, PAO, SAC-PAO in
particular, failed them, Hence, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, relaxed the
rules and decides to allowed the action for the revival of judgment filed by petitioners.
FACTS:
Petitioners and respondent were protagonists in an earlier case for annulment of
declaration of heirship and sale, reconveyance and damages before RTC of dumaguete. The
case was decided in favor of petitioner. The decision was appealed the decision to the CA, but
the same was withdrawn. The decision, thereafter became final and executory, but the
petitioners, never knew of this because when they followed up the case, they were informed that
the appeal was still pending. It appears from the records that a copy of the Entry of Judgment
was sent to the SAC-PAO lawyer in charge of their case, who had resigned. Unfortunately, she
failed to inform petitioners of the said entry of judgment before her resignation. She also failed
to inform PAO-Dumaguete of such development. It was only in November 2007, when
petitioners actually discovered that their victory was already final after their nephew secured a
copy of the entry of judgment from RTC-43.
On December 5, 2007, petitioners, through PAO-Dumaguete, filed an action for revival of
judgment. After respondent filed her Answer with Affirmative Defenses, the RTC granted her
Motion to Dismiss and ordered petitioners case for revival of judgment dismissed on the ground
of prescription. The CA affirmed the dismissal of their case for revival of judgment. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the court a quo erred in strictly applying the procedural rules on prescription and
dismissing the case based on the said ground, in spite of the fact that petitioners will suffer
manifest injustice and deprivation of their property due to a fault not attributable to them
RULING:
Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: SEC.6. Execution by motion
or by independent action. A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred
by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may
also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by
action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
Indeed, both the RTC-42 and the CA were acting in accordance with the rules and jurisprudence
when they dismissed the action for revival of judgment.

An action for revival of judgment is governed by Article 1144 (3), Article 1152 of the Civil
Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of
action accrues: xxx
Article 1152 of the Civil Code states that the period for prescription of actions to demand
the fulfillment of obligations declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment
became final.
To allow a strict application of the rules, however, would result in an injustice to petitioners
considering (1) that respondent decided not to contest the RTC-43 decision and withdrew her
appeal and (2) that no fault could be attributed to petitioners.
Petitioners could not afford to engage the services of a private counsel and so were
represented by the PAO. As has been repeatedly stated all over the records, PAO, SAC-PAO in
particular, failed them. SAC-PAO never informed them of the abandonment by respondent of
her appeal or of the entry of judgment. Under the circumstances, they could not be faulted for
their subsequent actions. They went to PAO-Dumaguete and they were told that the case was
still pending on appeal. Due to their penury and unfamiliarity or downright ignorance of the rules,
they could not be expected to bypass PAO-Dumaguete and directly verify the status of the case
with the SAC-PAO. They had to trust their lawyer and wait.
No prejudice is caused to respondent because she withdrew her appeal.1wphi1
Withdrawing her appeal means that she respected the RTC-43 Decision, which voided the
"Declaration of Heirship and Sale," dismissed respondents counterclaim, and ordered her to
reconvey the entire subject property to petitioners and to pay moral and exemplary damages
plus the cost of suit. Since the decision became final and executory, she has been in
possession of the property which rightfully belongs to petitioners. She will continue to hold on to
the property just because of a technicality.
Due to the peculiarities of this case, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, relaxes
the rules and decides to allow the action for the revival of judgment filed by petitioners. The
Court believes that it is its bounden duty to exact justice in every way possible and exercise its
soundest discretion to prevent a wrong.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANOLITO LUCENA y VELASQUEZ
G.R. NO. 190632, February 26, 2014
J. Perez
The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or
irresistible when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation be so
great or be of such character as could not be resisted it is only necessary that the force or
intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.
In the case at bench, AAAs categorical, straightforward and positive testimony revealed
that the appellant was armed with a gun and the same was pointed at her while she was
ordered to lie down and to take off her clothes, to which she acceded because of fear for her life
and personal safety.
FACTS:

On June 24, 2003, three informations for the crime of rape under paragraph 1(a), Article
266-A, in relation to paragraph 2, Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended were
filed against Lucena. The information alleged that Lucena, a Barangay Tanod Volunteer, who
took advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of the crime, by means of force,
threat or intimidation and with the use of a gun did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant AAA, a minor, 17 years of age, against
her will and consent. The appellant, for his part, could only muster the defenses of denial and
alibi. He, thus, offered a different version of the story. The RTC rendered a decision finding
Lucena guilty of three counts of rape. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether Lucena is guilty of the crime charged
RULING:
Primarily, in reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided with three settled principles: (1) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is
even more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) considering the
intrinsic nature of the crime, only two persons being usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness
of the evidence for the defense.
The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or
irresistible when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation be so
great or be of such character as could not be resisted it is only necessary that the force or
intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. Further, it
should be viewed from the perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the commission
of the crime. What is vital is that the force or intimidation be of such degree as to cow the
unprotected and vulnerable victim into submission. Force is sufficient if it produces fear in the
victim, such as when the latter is threatened with death.
In the case at bench, AAAs categorical, straightforward and positive testimony revealed
that the appellant was armed with a gun and the same was pointed at her while she was
ordered to lie down and to take off her clothes, to which she acceded because of fear for her life
and personal safety. The appellant then put the gun down on the ground and successfully
inserted his penis into AAAs vagina, not only once but thrice. This happened despite AAAs plea
not to rape her. And, after satisfying his lust, the appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her
should she tell anyone about the incident. This same threat of killing AAA was first made by the
appellant while the former was still inside the tricycle on their way to Kabuboy Bridge. It cannot
be denied, therefore, that force and intimidation were employed by the appellant upon AAA in
order to achieve his depraved desires.
While it is true that the appellant had already put the gun down on the ground the moment
he inserted his penis into AAAs vagina and was actually unarmed on those three (3) episodes
of sexual intercourse, the same does not necessarily take away the fear of being killed that had
already been instilled in the mind of AAA. Emphasis must be given to the fact that the gun was
still within appellants reach, therefore, he could still make good of his threat on AAA at anytime
the latter would show any resistance to his evil desires. AAAs lack of physical resistance,
therefore, is understandable and would not in any way discredit her testimony.

In his attempt to ruin AAAs credibility, the appellant puts stress on the portion of the result
of AAAs medical examination disclosing that even her anal orifice was also penetrated by a
hard object, which she never mentioned in her testimony. To the mind of this Court, such
argument is flimsy and totally misplaced. It would not even work to appellants advantage and
would not in any way cast doubt on the veracity of AAAs testimony. As this Court has previously
stated, a medical examination and a medical certificate, albeit corroborative of the commission
of rape, are not indispensable to a successful prosecution for rape. Moreover, even though AAA
made no mention of any anal penetration, such omission would not change the fact that she
was, indeed, raped by the appellant.
For his ultimate defense, the appellant puts forward denial and alibi. Notably, these
defenses are totally inconsistent with his line of argument that the rape was committed without
force or intimidation thereby implying that the sexual intercourse between him and AAA was
consensual.This Court also notes that the appellant failed to show any ill-motive on the part of
AAA to testify falsely against him.
As to the number of rapes committed. The appellant, citing People v. Aaron, insists that he
cannot be convicted of three (3) counts of rape despite the three (3) penetrations because he
was motivated by a single criminal intent. This Court finds this contention fallacious.
In the Aaron Case, the accused inserted his penis into the victims vagina; he then withdrew
it and ordered the latter to lie down on the floor and, for the second time, he inserted again his
penis into the victims vagina; the accused, thereafter, stood up and commanded the victim to lie
near the headboard of the makeshift bed and, for the third time, he inserted again his penis into
the victims vagina and continued making pumping motions. From these sets of facts, this Court
convicted the accused therein for only one count of rape despite the three successful
penetrations because there is no indication in the records from which it can be inferred that the
accused decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other than his
lustful desire to change positions inside the room where the crime was committed. This Court,
thus, viewed that the three penetrations occurred during one continuing act of rape in which the
accused was obviously motivated by a single criminal intent.
We agree with the trial court that the [herein appellant] should be convicted of three (3)
counts of rape. It appears from the facts that the [appellant] thrice succeeded in inserting his
penis into the private part of [AAA]. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the other at an
interval of five (5) minutes wherein the [appellant] would rest after satiating his lust upon his
victim and, after he has regained his strength, he would again rape [AAA]. Hence, it can be
clearly inferred from the foregoing that when the [appellant] decided to commit those separate
and distinct acts of sexual assault upon [AAA], he was not motivated by a single impulse[,] but
rather by several criminal intent. Hence, his conviction for three (3) counts of rape is indubitable.
MARCH 2014
JESUS G. CRISOLOGO and NANETTE B. CRISOLOGO v. JEWM AGRO-INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 196894, MARCH 3, 2014
J. MENDOZA

The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null
and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present.
Consequently, the proceedings before RTC-Br. 14 were null and void.
To turn a blind eye to the said nullity and, in turn, rule as improper the recourse to Rule
65 by the lack of legal standing is to prolong the denial of due process to the persons whose
interests are indispensible to the final disposition of the case. It will only result in a protracted
litigation as Spouses Crisologo will be forced to rely on a petition for the annulment of judgment
before the CA (as the last remaining remedy), which may again reach this Court. To prevent
multiplicity of suits and to expedite the swift administration of justice, the CA should have
applied liberality by striking down the assailed orders despite the lack of legal standing on the
part of Spouses Crisologo to file the Rule 65 petition before it. Besides, this lacking
requirement, of which Spouses Crisologo were not even at fault, is precisely the reason why
this controversy arose.
FACTS:
Petitioners were the plaintiffs in two collection cases against Robert Limso, So Keng
Koc, et al. Respondent JEWM was the successor-in-interest of one Sy Sen Ben, the plaintiff in
another collection case against the same defendants.
Based on a compromise agreement, ownership over the subject property was vested in
Sy Sen Ben. The title over the subject property was later transferred to JEWM. A year thereafter,
Spouses Crisologo prevailed in the separate collection. When this decision attained finality, a
writ of execution was eventually issued. A public auction was scheduled and a notice of sale
was posted including, among others, the subject properties now, in the name of JEWM.
In the same proceedings, JEWM immediately filed its Affidavit of Third Party Claim and
the Urgent Motion Ad Cautelam. It prayed for the exclusion of the subject properties from the
notice of sale. Upon the denial of the petition, Spouses Crisologo posted a bond in order to
proceed with the execution.
JEWM filed a separate action for cancellation of lien with prayer for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction to prevent the public sale of the subject properties and the issuance of a
permanent injunction order after trial on the merits. Spouses Crisologo filed an Omnibus Motion
praying for the denial of the application for writ or preliminary injuction filed by JEWM and asking
for their recognition as parties. No motion to intervene was, however, filed as the Spouses
Crisologo. The RTC denied the said motion and granted JEWMs application for a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Spouses prayed for reconsideration and the setting aside of its September 27, 2010
Order. This was denied in the for lack of legal standing in court considering that their counsel
failed to make the written formal notice of appearance. However, on October 27, 2010, they
received another order, likewise dated October 7, 2010, giving JEWM time to comment on their
Very Urgent Omnibus Motion filed on October 1, 2010.
On November 9, 2010, however, RTC denied the said motion.
On November 12, 2010, JEWM moved to declare the "defendants" in default which was
granted in an order given in open court on November 19, 2010. Spouses Crisologo then filed
their Very Urgent Manifestation, dated November 30, 2010, arguing that they could not be

deemed as defaulting parties because they were not referred to in the pertinent motion and
order of default.
Spouses Crisologo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the
RTC orders denying their motion to be recognized as parties. They also prayed for the issuance
of a TRO and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The CA denied the application for a TRO, but
directed Spouses Crisologo to amend their petition. Pending disposition of the Amended Petition
by the CA, JEWM filed a motion on asking for the resolution of the case on the merits. The RTC
ruled in favor of JEWM. The CA affirmed the order of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly ruled that RTC-Br. 14 acted without grave abuse of discretion
in failing to recognize Spouses Crisologo as indispensable parties in the case for cancellation of
lien.
RULING:
The petition is granted.
In an action for the cancellation of memorandum annotated at the back of a certificate of
title, the persons considered as indispensable include those whose liens appear as annotations
pursuant to Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529, to wit:
Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. -No erasure, alteration or
amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a
certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by
the Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A
registered owner or other person having an interest in registered property, or, in
proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of
Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that the
registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant
inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new
interest not appearing upon the certificates have arisen or been created; or that
an omission or error was made in entering a certificate or memorandum thereon,
or on any duplicate certificate; x x x or upon any other reasonable ground; and
the court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest,
and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or
cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon
such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may
consider proper.
In Southwestern University v. Laurente, the Court held that the cancellation of the
annotation of an encumbrance cannot be ordered without giving notice to the parties annotated
in the certificate of title itself. It would, thus, be an error for a judge to contend that no notice is
required to be given to all the persons whose liens were annotated at the back of a certificate of
title.
Here, undisputed is the fact that Spouses Crisologos liens were indeed annotated at the
back of TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676. As indispensable parties, Spouses Crisologo should

have been joined as defendants in the case pursuant to Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
to wit:
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants.
The reason behind this compulsory joinder of indispensable parties is the complete
determination of all possible issues, not only between the parties themselves but also as
regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment.
In this case, RTC-Br. 14, despite repeated pleas by Spouses Crisologo to be recognized
as indispensable parties, failed to implement the mandatory import of the aforecited rule. This
manifest disregard of the basic rules and procedures constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.
Despite the clear existence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC-Br. 14,
JEWM asserts technical grounds on why the CA did not err in dismissing the petition via Rule
65. At any rate, the remedy against an interlocutory order, not subject of an appeal, is an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Only then is certiorari under
Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
Based on the above, recourse to the CA via Rule 65 would have already been proper,
except for one last issue, that is, Spouses Crisologos legal standing to file the same. JEWM
cites DBP v. COA where the Court RULING: The petition for certiorari under Rule 65, however,
is not available to any person who feels injured by the decision of a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions. The person aggrieved under Section 1 of Rule 65
who can avail of the special civil action of certiorari pertains only to one who was a party in the
proceedings before the court a quo, or in this case before the COA. To hold otherwise would
open the courts to numerous and endless litigations.
Under normal circumstances, JEWM would be correct in their averment that the lack of
legal standing on the part of Spouses Crisologo in the case before RTC-Br. 14 prevents the
latters recourse via Rule 65. This case, however, is an exception. In many instances, the Court
has ruled that technical rules of procedures should be used to promote, not frustrate the cause
of justice.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ORTIGAS AND COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

G.R. NO. 171496, MARCH 3, 2014
J. LEONEN
Orders denying motions for reconsideration are not always interlocutory orders. A motion
for reconsideration may be considered a final decision, subject to an appeal, if it puts an end to
a particular matter, leaving the court with nothing else to do but to execute the decision. An
appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a
complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal itself. It is an appeal from a final
decision or order.
FACTS:
Ortigas is the owner of a parcel of land in Pasig City. Upon the request of the
Department of Public Works and Highways, respondent Ortigas caused the segregation of its
property into five lots and reserved one portion for road widening for the C-5 flyover project. The
title was then inscribed with an encumbrance that it was for road widening and subject to
Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree.
The C-5-Ortigas Avenue flyover was completed in 1999, utilizing only 396 square meters
of the 1,445-square-meter allotment for the project. Consequently, respondent Ortigas further
subdivided the portion actually used for road widening and the unutilized portion.
On February 14, 2001, respondent Ortigas filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a
petition for authority to sell to the government the unutilized portion. Respondent Ortigas alleged
that the Department of Public Works and Highways requested the conveyance of the property
for road widening purposes. Despite due notice, no one appeared to oppose respondent
Ortigas petition. The RTC issued an order, authorizing the sale of to petitioner Republic of the
Philippines.
On June 27, 2001, petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed an opposition, alleging that
respondent Ortigas' property can only be conveyed by way of donation to the government, citing
Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. On June 29, 2001, petitioner Republic of the
Philippines filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC order. The same was denied; this
prompted the Republic to file a notice of appeal with the CA. The CA dismissed the appeal.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in denying petitioner Republic of the
Philippines appeal based on technicalities
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Appeals from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals under Rule 41 must raise
both questions of fact and law Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals
taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only pure questions of law

are not reviewable by the Court of Appeals. In which case, the appeal shall not be transferred to
the appropriate court. Instead, it shall be dismissed outright.
Appeals from the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, raising purely questions of law
must, in all cases, be taken to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45. An appeal by notice of appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals is proper if the appellant
raises questions of fact or both questions of fact and questions of law.
There is a question of law when the appellant raises an issue as to what law shall be
applied on a given set of facts. Questions of law do not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented. Its resolution rests solely on the application of a law given the
circumstances. There is a question of fact when the court is required to examine the truth or
falsity of the facts presented. A question of fact invites a review of the evidence.
The sole issue raised by petitioner Republic of the Philippines to the Court of Appeals is
whether respondent Ortigas property should be conveyed to it only by donation, in accordance
with Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. This question involves the interpretation and
application of the provision. It does not require the Court of Appeals to examine the truth or
falsity of the facts presented. Neither does it invite a review of the evidence. The issue raised
before the Court of Appeals was, therefore, a question purely of law. The proper mode of appeal
is through a petition for review under Rule 45. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in
dismissing the appeal on this ground.
Nevertheless, we take time to emphasize that Rule 41, Section 1, paragraph (a) of the
Rules of Court, which provides that [n]o appeal may be taken from [a]n order denying a x x x
motion for reconsideration, is based on the implied premise in the same section that the
judgment or order does not completely dispose of the case. In other words, what Section 1 of
Rule 41 prohibits is an appeal taken from an interlocutory order.
Orders denying motions for reconsideration are not always interlocutory orders. A motion
for reconsideration may be considered a final decision, subject to an appeal, if it puts an end to
a particular matter, leaving the court with nothing else to do but to execute the decision. The
trial courts order denying petitioner Republic of the Philippines motion for reconsideration of the
decision granting respondent Ortigas the authority to sell its property to the government was not
an interlocutory order because it completely disposed of a particular matter. An appeal from it
would not cause delay in the administration of justice. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines
appeal to the Court of Appeals, however, was properly dismissed because the former used the
wrong mode of appeal.

CO SAY COCO PRODUCTS PHILS, INC., et al. v. BENJAMIN BALTASAR, ET AL.

G.R. NO.188828, MARCH 5, 2014
J. PEREZ
It is entrenched in our jurisprudence that perfection of an appeal in a manner and within
the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an
appeal has the effect of making judgment final and executory. While dismissal of an appeal on
technical grounds is frowned upon, Article 223 of the Labor Code which prescribes the appeal
bond requirement, however, is a rule of jurisdiction and not of procedure. Hence, there is a little
leeway for condoning a liberal interpretation thereof, and certainly none premised on the ground
that its requirements are mere technicalities.
The finding of the Labor Arbiter holding the petitioners liable for illegal dismissal is
binding on them. Not having been timely appealed, this issue is already beyond our jurisdiction
to resolve, and the finding of the Labor Arbiter can no longer be disturbed.
FACTS:
Co Say, thru its President, entered into a Contract for Cargo Handling Services with
petitioner. To jumpstart the operation of its cargo handling services, Tanawan Port employed
respondents as Crane Operators, as Crane Helper, and as Fork Lift Operator. Due to lack of
clientele, the business venture of Tanawan Port failed to gain momentum causing serious alarm
to the company. Not long after respondents were hired, Tanawan Port decided to cease
operation. As a result, respondents were terminated from employment but were accordingly
given their corresponding separation pay and 13th month pay.
Barely a month after they received their separation pay, respondents filed complaints for
illegal dismissal and non-payment of labor standard benefits against petitioners. The LA held
that petitioners are liable for illegal dismissal for failure to comply with the procedural and
substantive requirements of terminating employment due to closure of business operations. The
NLRC reversed the decision of the LA. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC Decision.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in reversing the NLRC decision on the ground that petitioners
failed to perfect their appeal
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Time and again we reiterate the established rule that in the exercise of the Supreme
Courts power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not routinely undertake the reexamination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case
considering that the findings of facts of labor officials who are deemed to have acquired
expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction are generally accorded not only respect,
but even finality, and are binding upon this Court, when supported by substantial evidence.

The NLRC ruled that petitioners were able to post the surety bond and timely perfect
their appeal before the expiration of the 10-day reglementary period, while the Court of Appeals
oppositely ruled although both findings are based on the same pieces of evidence available on
record. The crucial issue in the resolution of the instant petition concerns the timely posting of
the appeal bond. The pertinent rule on the matter is Article 223 of the Labor Code. The Labor
Code and its IRR explicitly provide that an appeal from the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC must be
perfected within ten calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards or orders of the Labor
Arbiter. In a judgment involving a monetary award, the appeal shall be perfected only upon; (1)
proof of payment of the required appeal fee; (2) posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company; and (3) filing of a memorandum of appeal.
The conclusion that the First Certification necessarily leads to is the lateness of the
perfection of the appeal to the NLRC. Ostensibly, the Second Certification puts the appeal within
the required perfection period of ten days from receipt of the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
However, the fact behind what seems to be is that both certifications state, directly by the first
while distortedly by the second, that the appeal by petitioners to the NLRC was perfected
beyond the provided period. In a seeming attempt to avoid the direct fact of untimeliness in the
First Certificate, the Second Certificate mentions two dates, one which is within the 10-day
period and the other, the late date of 28 October 2003 which is even beyond the 2 October 2003
issuance of the First Certificate. The first date, 24 September 2003 was depicted in the Second
Certificate as the date of posting while the date 28 October 2003 was described as the date of
receipt by the DOLE-RAB. Apart from saying that the appeal bond was timely posted on 24
September 2003, the Second Certification would also justify why on the date of the First
Certification, 2 October 2003, there was yet no posted appeal bond on record, the reason,
although unstated being that the posted bond was received only on 28 October 2003.
The Second Certificate is not a document of timeliness of petitioners appeal bond. It is
even confirmatory of the fact of tardiness that the First Certification stated doubtlessly. The
NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it considered as correct the statement in the Second
Certificate that x x x respondent in re: RAB-V Case No. 10-004860-02 x x x posted Surety
Bond x x x dated on September 24, 2003.
Without a straight statement, the Second Certification seems to consider posting as
mailing such that the date 24 September 2003 should be the reckoning date that determines
timeliness and not the date 28 October 2003 which was the date of receipt of the surety bond.
Even such insinuation, strained and all, is unacceptable considering the absence of proof of
mailing, it being the fact that there was no mention at all in any of the pleadings below that the
surety bond was mailed.
The Court of Appeals therefore, correctly ruled that petitioners failed to perfect their
appeal on time. In holding so, the appellate court only applied the appeal bond requirement as
already well explained in our previous pronouncements that there is legislative and
administrative intent to strictly apply the appeal bond requirement, and the Court should give
utmost regard to this intention. The clear intent of both statutory and procedural law is to require
the employer to post a cash or surety bond securing the full amount of the monetary award
within the ten 10-day reglementary period.
Rules on perfection of an appeal, particularly in labor cases, must be strictly construed
because to extend the period of the appeal is to delay the case, a circumstance which would
give the employer a chance to wear out the efforts and meager resources of the worker to the
point that the latter is constrained to give up for less than what is due him. This is to assure the

workers that if they finally prevail in the case the monetary award will be given to them both
upon dismissal of the employers appeal. It is further meant to discourage employers from using
the appeal to delay or evade payment of their obligations to the employees. The appeal bond
requirement precisely aims to prevent empty or inconsequential victories secured by laborers in
consonance with the protection of labor clause ensconced and zealously guarded by our
Constitution.
All considered then, the finding of the Labor Arbiter holding the petitioners liable for
illegal dismissal is binding on them. Not having been timely appealed, this issue is already
beyond our jurisdiction to resolve, and the finding of the Labor Arbiter can no longer be
disturbed without violating the fundamental principle that final judgment is immutable and
unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusion of fact and law.

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (NOW BDO UNIBANK, INC.) v.

ARTURO P. FRANCO, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS, NAMELY: MAURICIA P. FRANCO, ET
AL. G.R. NO. 180069, MARCH 5, 2014
J. PERALTA
When the creditor is in possession of the document of credit, he need not prove
nonpayment for it is presumed. The creditor's possession of the evidence of debt is proof that
the debt has not been discharged by payment.
In this case, respondent's possession of the original copies of the subject Trust
Indenture Certificates strongly supports his claim that petitioner Bank's obligation to return the
principal plus interest of the money placement has not been extinguished. The TICs in the
hands of respondent is a proof of indebtedness and a prima facie evidence that they have not
been paid.
FACTS:
Arturo P. Franco decided to save up for his retirement and to invest his hard earned
money with PCIB which later on merged with defendant Equitable Banking Corp. and is now
known as Equitable PCIBank. He chose defendant PCIB for the latters representation that by
making such investment, he was actually providing for his future since his investment would be
commingled, pooled and automatically rolled-over for better investment return and which will
provide for his needs upon retirement, without need for him to take any further action. He
secured from defendant Trust Indenture Certificates, and that despite demands, defendants
refused and still refuses to return to plaintiff the trust amounts, plus the stipulated interest.
Respondent Arturo P. Franco died on July 23, 2008. However, his son, Alexander P.
Franco, also passed away on September 5, 2012.
PCIB alleged that the four TICs were already paid or cancelled, or that respondents
participation therein was already withdrawn. This prompted Arturo P. Franco to file an action for
damages against PCIB where the RTC rendered a decision ordering defendant PCIB, to pay
plaintiff. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the claim of respondent is already barred by prescription
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Jurisprudence abounds that, in civil cases, one who pleads payment has the burden of
proving it. Even where the plaintiff must allege nonpayment, the general rule is that the burden
rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment.
When the creditor is in possession of the document of credit, he need not prove nonpayment for
it is presumed. The creditor's possession of the evidence of debt is proof that the debt has not
been discharged by payment.

In this case, respondent's possession of the original copies of the subject TICs strongly
supports his claim that petitioner Bank's obligation to return the principal plus interest of the
money placement has not been extinguished. The TICs in the hands of respondent is a proof of
indebtedness and a prima facie evidence that they have not been paid.
Petitioner Bank could have easily presented documentary evidence to dispute the claim,
but it did not. In its omission, it may be reasonably deduced that no evidence to that effect really
exist. Worse, the testimonies of petitioner Bank's own witnesses, reinforce, rather than belie,
respondent's allegations of non-payment.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JERRY CARANTO Y PROPETA

G.R. 193768, MARCH 5, 2014
J. PEREZ
The lower courts erred in giving weight to the presumption of regularity in the
performance that a police officer enjoys in the absence of any taint of irregularity and of ill
motive that would induce him to falsify his testimony. The presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. It should be noted that the presumption is precisely
just that a presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, it cannot be regarded
as binding truth.
FACTS:
Jerry was arrested in a buy bust operation organized by the Taguig PNP Drug
Enforcement Unit. He was, thereafter, charged in a criminal information for a violation of Section
5, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. It was
alleged that he sold one (1) heat sealed transparent sachet containing 0.39 gram of shabu, a
dangerous drug for Php 500. The RTC found Jerry guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged and imposed upon him the penalty of life imprisonment. The CA affirmed the
ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged
RULING:
The petition is granted.
A buy-bust operation resulting from the tip of an anonymous confidential informant,
although an effective means of eliminating illegal drug related activities, is susceptible to police
abuse. Worse, it is usually used as a means for extortion. It is for this reason, that the Court
must ensure that the enactment of R.A. No. 9165 providing specific procedures to counter these
abuses is not put to naught.
Non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21, par. 1 of Article II of R.A. No. 9165
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21,
paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states: (1) The apprehending team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
This is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, which reads: (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a

representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: x x
x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items.
This Court recognizes that the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible under field conditions, many of them far from ideal.
For this reason, the Implementing Rules provide that non-compliance with the strict directive of
Section 21 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions case because courts recognize the
possible occurrence of procedural lapses. However, we emphasize that these lapses must be
recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds and the integrity and evidentiary
value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved. In the present case, the
prosecution did not bother to present any explanation to justify the non-observance of the
prescribed procedures. Therefore, the non-observance by the police of the required procedure
cannot be excused. It likewise failed to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items
adduced were not tainted.
The chain of custody rule requires that the marking of the seized items to truly
ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in
evidence should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately
upon confiscation. This step initiates the process of protecting innocent persons from dubious
and concocted searches. Marking means the placing by the apprehending officer or the
poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the item/s seized.
A perusal of the records will show that the procedure of preserving the chain of custody
as laid down by jurisprudence was not observed. Ultimately, when the prosecution evidence is
wanting, deficient to the point of doubt that the dangerous drug recovered from the accused is
the same drug presented to the forensic chemist for review and examination, or the same drug
presented to the court, an essential element in cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, the corpus delicti, is absent.
The lower courts erred in giving weight to the presumption of regularity in the performance that
a police officer enjoys in the absence of any taint of irregularity and of ill motive that would
induce him to falsify his testimony.
SPOUSES MARIO AND JULIA CAMPOS v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 184371. MARCH 5, 2014
J. BRION
The general rule that an assignment of error is essential to appellate review and only
those errors assigned will be considered applies in the absence of certain exceptional
circumstances. As exceptions to the rule, the Court has considered grounds not raised or
assigned as errors in instances where: (1) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are
evidently plain or clerical errors within the contemplation of the law; (3) matters not assigned as
errors on appeal, whose consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete
resolution of the case or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;
(4) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are
matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise

or which the lower court ignored; (5) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are closely
related to the assigned error/s; and (6) matters not assigned as errors on appeal, whose
determination is necessary to rule on the question/s properly assigned as errors.
The present case falls into the exceptions. We find no error by the CA in resolving the
issues on the nature and duration of the petitioners possession and on the alienable character
of the subject land. These issues were apparently not raised by the Republic in its appeal
before the CA, but are crucial in determining whether the petitioners have registrable title over
the subject land.
FACTS:
On November 17, 2003, the petitioners applied for the registration of a 6,904 square
meter-parcel of land situated in Baccuit, Bauang, La Union.
The MTC approved the application of registration of title of Lot No. 3876, Cad-474-D,
Case 17, Bauang Cadastre, filed by the spouses Mario and Julia Campos (petitioners). The CA
reversed and set aside the RTC ruling. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in ruling on non-issues and on established and undisputed facts
that were not raised by the Republic as errors in its appeal
RULING:
The petition is denied.
First, we address the procedural issue raised by the petitioners. Section 8, Rule 51 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provides:
SEC. 8. Questions that may be decided. No error which does not affect the
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from
or the proceedings therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment of
errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly
argued in the brief, save as the court pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.
The general rule that an assignment of error is essential to appellate review and only
those errors assigned will be considered applies in the absence of certain exceptional
circumstances. The Court has, however, considered grounds not raised or assigned as errors in
excepted instances. The present case falls into the exceptions.
We find no error by the CA in resolving the issues on the nature and duration of the
petitioners possession and on the alienable character of the subject land. These issues were
apparently not raised by the Republic in its appeal before the CA, but are crucial in determining
whether the petitioners have registrable title over the subject land. In Mendoza v. Bautista, the
Court held that the appellate court reserves the right, resting on its public duty, to take
cognizance of palpable error on the face of the record and proceedings, and to notice errors that
are obvious upon inspection and are of a controlling character, in order to prevent a miscarriage
of justice due to oversight.
In deciding on the merits of the present petition, we affirm the CA in dismissing the petitioners'
application for registration of title.

Persons applying for registration of title under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No.
152911 must prove: (1) that the land sought to be registered forms part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
As the CA did, we find that the petitioners failed to prove that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945,
or earlier. The oldest documentary evidence presented by the petitioners was a 1948 tax
declaration over the subject land in the name of Margarita Laigo. The petitioners failed to
present evidence of their possession prior to 1948. In fact, the petitioners, in their application for
registration, base their possession of the subject land only from 1948, and not "since June 12,
1945, or earlier" as required by law.
We emphasize that since the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 13 on January 25, 1977, it must
be shown that possession and occupation of the land sought to be registered by the applicant
himself or through his predecessors in-interest, started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, which totally
conforms to the requirement under Section 14(1) of P.D. No 1529. A mere showing of
possession and occupation for thirty (30) years or more is no longer sufficient.
SPOUSES SILVESTRE O. PLAZA AND ELENA Y. PLAZA v. GUILLERMO LUSTIVA,
ELEODORA VDA. DE MARTINEZ AND VICKY SAYSON GOLOSENO
G.R. NO. 172909, MARCH 5, 2014
J. BRION
A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy; it is auxiliary, an adjunct of, and
subject to the determination of the main action. It is deemed lifted upon the dismissal of the
main case, any appeal therefrom notwithstanding. Upon the dismissal of the main case by the
RTC, the question of issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction has become moot and
academic. Upon the dismissal of the main action, the question of the non-issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction automatically died with it.
FACTS:
On August 28, 1997, the CA ruled that among the Plaza siblings, Barbara was the owner
of the subject agricultural land. The decision became final and executory and Barbara's
successors, have continued occupying the property.
On September 14, 1999, the petitioners filed a Complaint for Injunction, Damages,
Attorneys Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order against the respondents and the City Government of Butuan.
In their answer, the respondents pointed out that they were never delinquent in paying
the land taxes and were in fact not aware that their property had been offered for public auction.
Moreover, the auction sale was tainted with irregularity as the bidder was a government
employee disqualified in accordance with Section 89 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The petitioners are not buyers in good faith either. On the contrary, they were in bad faith for
having falsified the tax declaration they redeemed the property with. For these irregularities, the

petitioners had no right to the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
prayed for against them.
The RTC reconsidered its earlier order, denied the prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, and ordered that the possession and occupation of the land be returned to the
respondents. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence this petition. Meanwhile, on August 8,
2013, the RTC dismissed the main.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
RULING:
The petition is denied.
The petitioners maintain that they did not falsify the tax declaration they reimbursed the
property with. These factual contests are not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. The Court is not a trier of facts. The Court will not revisit, re-examine, and reevaluate the evidence and the factual conclusions arrived at by the lower courts. In the absence
of compelling reasons, the Court will not disturb the rule that factual findings of the lower
tribunals are final and binding on this Court.
Moreover, the petitioners may not invoke Section 18118 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 to validate their alleged title. The law authorizes the local government unit to purchase
the auctioned property only in instances where there is no bidder or the highest bid is xxx
insufficient. A disqualified bidder is not among the authorized grounds. The local government
also never undertook steps to purchase the property under Section 181 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, presumably because it knew the invoked provision does not apply.
Neither can the Court agree with the petitioners stance that the respondents defense
the petitioners defective title must fail for want of deposit to the court the amount required by
Section 267 of the Local Government Code. Clearly, the deposit precondition is an ingenious
legal device to guarantee the satisfaction of the tax delinquency, with the local government unit
keeping the payment on the bid price no matter the final outcome of the suit to nullify the tax
sale. This renders inapplicable the petitioners insistence that the respondents should have
made a deposit to the court. The suit filed by the petitioners was an action for injunction and
damages; the issue of nullity of the auction was raised by the respondents themselves merely
as a defense and in no way converted the action to an action for annulment of a tax sale.
The petitioners failed to show clear and unmistakable rights to be protected by the writ. Tuazon
had no ownership to confer to the petitioners despite the latters reimbursement of Tuazons
purchase expenses. To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the
violation against that right must be shown. A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only
upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency of the
principal action. When the complainants right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a
clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper.
Likewise, upon the dismissal of the main case by the RTC, the question of issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction has become moot and academic. A case becomes moot and
academic when there is no more issue between the parties or object that can be served in

deciding the merits of the case. Upon the dismissal of the main action, the question of the nonissuance of a writ of preliminary injunction automatically died with it.
Also, the petitioners are guilty of forum shopping based on litis pendentia. Not only were
the parties in both cases the same insofar as the City Government of Butuan is concerned,
there was also identity of rights asserted and identity of facts alleged. The cause of action in the
specific performance case had already been ruled upon in the present case, although it was still
pending appeal before the CA. Likewise, the prayer sought in the specific performance case-for
the City Government of Butuan to execute a deed of sale in favor of the petitioners -had been
indirectly ruled upon in the present case when the R TC declared that no certificate of sale could
be issued because there had been no valid sale.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOEL ENOJAS Y HINGIPIT, ET AL.

G.R. NO. 204894. MARCH 10, 2014
J. ABAD
The defense points out that the prosecution failed to present direct evidence that the
accused Enojas, Gomez, Santos, or Jalandoni took part in shooting PO2 Pangilinan dead. This
may be true but the prosecution could prove their liability by circumstantial evidence that meets
the evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Here the totality of the circumstantial
evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides basis for the conviction of all the
accused.
FACTS:
Enojas, driver of a taxi which was suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass
shop, was spotted by POs2 Gregorio and Pangilinan. Enojas was invited to the police station for
further questioning and he voluntarily went with the police officers. On their way to the police
station, the police officers stopped the car infront of the 7-11 store because PO2 Pangilinan
needed a restroom break. As he approached the stores door, he saw two suspected robbers
and a shootout ensued. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and hit the other who still
managed to escape before he himself was shot dead. PO2 Gregorio left the mobile car and
exchanged shots with the running suspects, but the latter were able to board a taxi and escape.
Upon returning to his mobile car, PO2 realized that Enojas had fled.
Suspecting that Enojas, was involved in the attempted robbery, the police officers who
came to PO2 Gregorios backup searched the abandoned taxi and found Enojas mobile phone.
They monitored the messages in the said phone and concluded that Enojas is in connivance
with the robbers. The police then conducted an entrapment operation that resulted in the arrest
of accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently,the police were also able to capture accused
Enojas and Gomez. The prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile phone text
messages between Enojas and some of his co-accused.
On September 4, 2006 the City Prosecutor of Las Pias charged Enojas, Arnold Gomez,
Santos, and Jalandoni with murder. The RTC rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty
of murder qualified by evident premeditation and use of armed men with the special aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms. The CA affirmed in toto the conviction of the
accused. The CA, however, found the absence of evident premeditation since the prosecution
failed to prove that the several accused planned the crime before committing it. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the appellants cannot be convicted despite the prosecutions failure to produce
direct evidence
RULING:
The petition is denied.

It has been held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is
more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently
provides basis for the conviction of all the accused.
1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojasas the driver of the taxicab
suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop x x x Subsequent
inspection of the taxicab yielded Enojas mobile phone that contained
messages which led to the entrapment and capture of the other accused who
were also taxicab drivers;
2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than remain in the cab to go to the
police station x x x He certainly did not go to the police afterwards to clear up
the matter and claim his taxi;
3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Gomez as one of the men he saw
running away from the scene of the shooting;
4. The text messages identified Kua Justin as one of those who engaged PO2
Pangilinan in the shootout; the messages also referred to Kua Justin as the
one who was hit in such shootout and later died in a hospital in Bacoor,
Cavite. These messages linked the other accused;
5. During the follow-up operations, the police investigators succeeded in
entrapping accused Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas, and Gomez, who were all
named in the text messages;
6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi driven by
Enojas clearly made references to the7-11 shootout and to the wounding of
Kua Justin, one of the gunmen, and his subsequent death;
7. The context of the messages showed that the accused were members of an
organized group of taxicab drivers engaged in illegal activities;
8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in possession of mobile
phones with call numbers that corresponded to the senders of the messages
received on the mobile phone that accused Enojas left in his taxicab.
The Court must, however, disagree with the CAs ruling that the aggravating
circumstances of a) aid of armed men and b) use of unlicensed firearms qualified the killing of
PO2 Pangilinan to murder. In aid of armed men, the men act as accomplices only. They must
not be acting in the commission of the crime under the same purpose as the principal accused,
otherwise they are to be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators. The use of unlicensed
firearm, on the other hand, is a special aggravating circumstance that is not among the
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as qualifying a homicide to
murder. Consequently, the accused in this case may be held liable only for homicide,
aggravated by the use of unlicensed firearms, a circumstance alleged in the information.

As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with
the Courts earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text
messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text
messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those
messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal
knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them.
The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest. But,
assuming that this was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged but for
rejecting any evidence that may have been taken from them after an unauthorized search as an
incident of an unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue here. At any rate, a crime had been
committedthe killing of PO2 Pangilinanand the investigating police officers had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the persons they were to arrest had committed it. The text
messages to and from the mobile phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided strong
leads on the participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught them in an
entrapment using this knowledge.

PEDRO LUKANG v. PAGBILAO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND EDUARDO T.

RODRIGUEZ
G.R. NO. 195374. MARCH 10, 2014
J. MENDOZA
A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued upon the concurrence of the following
essential requisites, to wit: (a) the invasion of right sought to be protected is material and
substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent
and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. While a clear showing of the
right is necessary, its existence need not be conclusively established. Hence, to be entitled to
the writ, it is sufficient that the complainant shows that he has an ostensible right to the final
relief prayed for in his complaint.
In the present case, the Court finds the RTC grant of injunction to be in order. There is
no question that when the Pagbilao Development Corporation bought the properties from the
vendors, it had full knowledge that there were questions involving ownership of the parcels of
land it bought. Likewise there is no question that Pagbilao Development Corporation did not
take any step to have the annotation or encumbrance in each title cancelled. Inevitably, PDC is
deemed to have obtained the properties subject to the outcome of the litigation among the heirs
of Arsenio.
FACTS:
Arsenio, and Mercedes lived as husband and wife in Calamba, Laguna, from 1922 to
1934 and begot three (3) children, namely, Domingo, Rosalina and Olympia. In 1935, he started
cohabiting with Leoncia, with whom he had ten (10) children, namely, Elpidio, Socorro, Manuel,
Pedro, Teresita, Simeon, Eugenio, Hilaria, Concepcion, and Carlos. During their cohabitation in
Lucena, Quezon, they acquired 4 real properties located in Pagbilao, Quezon (Pagbilao
properties). The said properties were then registered in the name of ARSENIO LUKANG,
married to Mercedes Dee, share and Leoncia Martinez, single, share. Arsenio and
Leoncia later acquired four (4) more parcels of land (later acquired poperties). It was allegedly
agreed that the said properties should be registered in the name of Simeon, one of their
children, in trust for the other heirs and should be owned in common by their family.
When Arsenio died in 1976, his 13 children and Mercedes, executed the Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate, in which they agreed to adjudicate and transfer among themselves the
rights, interest and ownership of the Pagbilao properties. There was, however, no agreement to
partition the properties. Years after, Mercedes, together with her three (3) children, Rosalina,
Domingo, and Olympia, executed another document wherein the parties declared that they were
the only heirs of Arsenio and partitioned the half portion of the Pagbilao properties among
themselves, with Mercedes waiving her supposed share in favor of her three (3) children.
In 1988, Simeon, alleging that the certificates of title of the later acquired properties were
lost, filed a petition for the issuance of the owners duplicate copy. As a result, new owners
duplicate copies of the allegedly lost titles were issued in his favor. Thereafter, Simeon, in a
deed of donation, transferred the said properties in favor of his children, Benedict, Heile and
Madeleine. Consequently, TCT Nos. T-103094, T125348 and T-125349 were cancelled, and
TCT No. T-241034 was issued in the name of Benedict; TCT No. 241035 in the name of Heile;

and TCT No. 241036 in the name of Madeleine. Furthermore, Simeon purportedly sold the land
covered by TCT No. 101425 in favor of Mercedes, Rosalina, Leoncia, and Elpidio.
In the meantime, on February 15, 1989, Mercedes, through Rosalinda, filed the Petition
for the Issuance of the Owners Duplicate of TCTs covering the Pagbilao properties. The RTC
granted the petition and new titles were issued in favor of Mercedes. Unknown to Leoncia,
Rosalina caused the segregation of the one-half portion of the said properties in her (Leoncias)
favor and the division of the remaining half among her and her siblings, Domingo and Olympia.
On September 26, 1990, Leoncia and her children, claiming that the titles of the
Pagbilao property were not lost but in her (Leoncias) possession, filed a complaint for
annulment of extrajudicial partition, affidavit of segregation and annulment of the new
certificates of title. The said case was consolidated with a case for recovery of four (4) owners
duplicate copy of TCTs filed by Simeon against his brother Pedro. Subsequently, Leoncia,
through Pedro, registered her adverse claim on February 3, 1989 on TCTs covering the later
acquired properties. He further caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCTs coverin
the subject properties.
During the pendency of the cases, respondent PDC purchased from Simeon, Mercedes
and Rosalina the six (6) properties which were the subject of the two cases. Thus, TCTs were
issued in favor of PDC. Accordingly, the annotations were carried over to PDCs titles.
When Pedro and the other heirs learned of the sale of the subject properties to PDC,
they filed a motion to require Simeon and Rosalina to explain why they sold the properties
without permission from the RTC. On April 23, 2008, they also filed an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction with ex-parte prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO). The RTC
granted the issuance of the TRO effective for a period of twenty (20) days. On May 13, 2008,
the RTC likewise granted the petitioner's application for a writ of preliminary injunction. The CA
nullified and set aside the order of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the writ of preliminary
injunction
RULING:
The petition is granted.
A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy which is adjunct to a main suit, as
well as a preservative remedy issued to maintain the status quo of the things subject of the
action or the relations between the parties during the pendency of the suit. The purpose of
injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to the parties before their
claims can be thoroughly studied and educated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until
the merits of the case are fully heard. Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction may be granted if the following grounds are
established: (a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of
such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained
of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; (b)
That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during
the would probably work injustice to the applicant; or (c) That a party, court, agency or a person
is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or

acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the or
proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
The well-entrenched rule is that the grant or denial of the writ of preliminary injunction
rests upon the sound discretion of the court. The trial court is given a wide latitude in this regard.
Thus, in the absence of a manifest abuse, such discretion must not be interfered with. Grave
abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal
aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law.
In the present case, the Court finds the RTC grant of injunction to be in order. There is
no question that when the Pagbilao Development Corporation bought the properties from the
vendors, it had full knowledge that there were questions involving ownership of the parcels of
land it bought. Likewise there is no question that Pagbilao Development Corporation did not
take any step to have the annotation or encumbrance in each title cancelled. Inevitably, PDC is
deemed to have obtained the properties subject to the outcome of the litigation among the heirs
of Arsenio.
With regard to the issue of the injunctive bond, the Court has time and again ruled that
the posting of the bond is a condition sine qua non before a writ of preliminary injunction may
issue. Its purpose is to secure the person enjoined against any damage that he may sustain in
case the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. The rule, does
not mean, however, that the injunction maybe disregarded since it becomes effective only after
the bond is actually filed in court.
In fine, it is erroneous for the CA to rule that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion simply because it failed to fix the amount of the bond. This error caused "no
substantial prejudice" that would warrant the quashal of the writ of injunction. (As a matter of
fact, Pedro posted a bond in the amount of One Million Pesos, the sufficiency or insufficiency of
which was never questioned by PDC before the RTC. Hence, the Court will not discuss the
sufficiency of the bond not only because the issue was not raised before the RTC but also it
involves a question of fact.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SHERWON BIS Y AVELLANEDA

G.R. NO. 191360, MARCH 10, 2014
J. DEL CASTILLO
The integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of
bad faith, ill will or proof that the evidence has been tampered with and in such case, the burden
of proof rests on the appellant. Here, appellant miserably failed to discharge this burden.
Moreover, and as aptly observed by the CA, appellant did not seasonably question these
procedural gaps before the trial court. Suffice it to say that objection to evidence cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal.
FACTS:
Bis was arrested in a buy bust operation organized by the San Fernando City Police. He
was, thereafter, charged in a criminal information for a violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic
Act No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. It was alleged that he sold
three (3) heat sealed transparent sachet containing a total of 0.068 gram of shabu, a
dangerous drug for Php 1000. The RTC found Bis guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged and imposed upon him the penalty of life imprisonment. The CA affirmed the ruling of
the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the appellants guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Appellant points out that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses,
render them incredible witnesses. The Court is not convinced. While there are indeed minor
contradictions in Espejo and Arces testimonies, the same are nevertheless inconsequential and
do not detract from the proven elements of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
It is now too well-settled to require extensive documentation that inconsistencies in the
testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect
the veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is consistency in relating the principal
occurrence and the positive identification of the accused.16 Significantly, in the case at bench,
the testimonies of the said witnesses for the prosecution were in harmony with respect to their
positive identification of appellant as the one who sold the illegal drugs to Espejo, the poseurbuyer, in a planned buy-bust operation, as well as to the other surrounding circumstances that
transpired during the said operation.
Appellant posits that the prosecution did not strictly comply with the procedures laid
down in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations regarding
the physical inventory and photograph of the seized items. Non-compliance therewith, he
argues, casts doubt on the validity of his arrest and the identity of the suspected shabu allegedly
bought and confiscated from him.

On the matter of handling the confiscated illegal drugs after a buy-bust operation,
Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165 provides: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody
and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Accordingly, Section
21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 which implements the aforequoted provision reads: (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of
the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served;
or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items; Case law has it that noncompliance with the abovequoted provision of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations is not fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
In the present case, the totality of the prosecutions evidence shows the integrity of the
drugs seized to be intact. Besides, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved
unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will or proof that the evidence has been tampered with
and in such case, the burden of proof rests on the appellant. Here, appellant miserably failed to
discharge this burden. Moreover, and as aptly observed by the CA, appellant did not seasonably
question these procedural gaps before the trial court. Suffice it to say that objection to evidence
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Appellants defense hinges principally on denial. But such a defense is unavailing
considering that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto in a legitimate buy-bust operation.
The defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts with
disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in
most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA v. FRANCISCO LINDO AND WELHILMINIA

LINDO, et al.
G.R. NO. 208232. MARCH 10, 2014
J. VELASCO, JR.
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim
is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim. But where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money,
and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation. These cases are cognizable exclusively by
RTCs.
The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil
action incapable of pecuniary estimation. It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
FACTS:
Bautista, petitioners predecessor, sold a free-patent land located in Davao Oriental to
herein respondents via a notarized deed of absolute sale. Two months later, TCTs were issued
in favor of the vendees.
Three years after the sale, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against
respondents, anchoring his cause of action on Section 119 of the Public Land Act.
Respondents, in their Answer, raised lack of cause of action, estoppel, prescription, and laches,
as defenses. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, Bautista died and was substituted by
petitioner Epifania. Respondents Francisco and Welhilmina Lindo later entered into a
compromise agreement with petitioners, whereby they agreed to cede to Epifania a 3,230
sq.m.-portion of the property as well as to waive all claims and counterclaims against each
other. The compromise was approved by the RTC. Other respondents, however, filed a Motion
to Dismiss, alleging that the complaint failed to state the value of the property sought to be
recovered and that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint question since the property
which Bautista seeks to repurchase is below the jurisdictional ceiling. The RTC issued an order
dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
RULING:
The petition is granted.

Jurisdiction of RTCs, as may be relevant to the instant petition, is provided in Sec. 19 of

BP 129, which reads:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases..Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction: 1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation; 2) In all civil actions which involve the title to,
or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value
of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands
or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. On the
other hand, jurisdiction of first level courts is prescribed in Sec. 33 of BP 129,
which provides: Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases..Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: x x x x 3)
Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not
declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by
the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil
action incapable of pecuniary estimation. It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. In this
regard, the Court, in Russell v. Vestil, wrote that in determining whether an action is one the
subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the
criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily
for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation,
and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount
of the claim. But where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may
not be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation. These
cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs.
Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of pecuniary estimation,
1. Actions for specific performance; 2. Actions for support which will require the determination of
the civil status; 3. The right to support of the plaintiff; 4. Those for the annulment of decisions of
lower courts; 5. Those for the rescission or reformation of contracts; 6. Interpretation of a
contractual stipulation. The Court finds that the instant cause of action to redeem the land is one
for specific performance.
The facts are clear that Bautista sold to respondents his lots which were covered by a
free patent. While the deeds of sale do not explicitly contain the stipulation that the sale is
subject to repurchase by the applicant within a period of five (5) years from the date of
conveyance pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA 141, still, such legal provision is deemed integrated and
made part of the deed of sale as prescribed by law. It is basic that the law is deemed written into
every contract. Although a contract is the law between the parties, the provisions of positive law

which regulate contracts are deemed written therein and shall limit and govern the relations
between the parties. Thus, it is a binding prestation in favor of Bautista which he may seek to
enforce. That is precisely what he did. He filed a complaint to enforce his right granted by law to
recover the lot subject of free patent. Ergo, it is clear that his action is for specific performance,
or if not strictly such action, then it is akin or analogous to one of specific performance. Such
being the case, his action for specific performance is incapable of pecuniary estimation and
cognizable by the RTC.
Even if we treat the present action as one involving title to real property or an interest
therein which falls under the jurisdiction of the first level court under Sec. 33 of BP 129, as the
total selling price is only PhP 16,000 way below the PhP 20,000 ceiling, still, the postulation of
respondents that MTC has jurisdiction will not hold water. This is because respondents have
actually participated in the proceedings before the RTC and aggressively defended their
position, and by virtue of which they are already barred to question the jurisdiction of the RTC
following the principle of jurisdiction by estoppel.
In Heirs of Jose Fernando v. De Belen, it was held that the party raising defenses to the
complaint, actively participating in the proceedings by filing pleadings, presenting his evidence,
and invoking its authority by asking for an affirmative relief is deemed estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the court. Here, we note that aside from the belated filing of the
motion to dismissit having been filed nine (9) years from the filing of the complaint
respondents actively participated in the proceedings through the following acts: 1. By filing their
Answer and Opposition to the Prayer for Injunction19 dated September 29, 1994 whereby they
even interposed counterclaims, specifically: PhP 501,000 for unpaid survey accounts, PhP
100,000 each as litigation expenses, PhP 200,000 and PhP 3,000 per daily appearance by way
of attorneys fees, PhP 500,000 as moral damages, PhP 100,000 by way of exemplary
damages, and costs of suit; 2. By participating in Pre-trial; 3. By moving for the postponement of
their presentation of evidence; 4. By presenting their witness; and 5. By submitting the
compromise agreement for approval. Having fully participated in all stages of the case, and
even invoking the RTCs authority by asking for affirmative reliefs, respondents can no longer
assail the jurisdiction of the said trial court. Simply put, considering the extent of their
participation in the case, they are, as they should be, considered estopped from raising lack of
jurisdiction as a ground for the dismissal of the action.

DR. FERNANDO SOLIDUM v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 192123, MARCH 10, 2014
J. BERSAMIN
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Reckless imprudence, on the other hand,
consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage
results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or
failing to perform such act.
Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right
to be heard was not respected from the outset. The RTC and the CA should have been alert to
this fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or
proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a rule would enforce the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law.
FACTS:
Gerald was born an imperforate anus. Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent
colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large intestine out through the
abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his
body.
On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila
for a pull-through operation. Dr. Solidum is part of the team of anesthesiologists assigned to
Gerald. During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma
lasted for two weeks, but he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer
see, hear or move.
Agitated by her sons helpless and unexpected condition, Luz lodged a complaint for
reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutors Office of
Manila against the attending physicians.
Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutors Office filed an information solely
against Dr. Solidum. The RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the conviction of Dr.
Solidum. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable herein
2. Whether Dr. Solidum was negligent
3. Whether Ospital ng Maynila should be held jointly and severally liable with Dr.
Solidum
RULING:
The appeal is meritorious.

1. Applicability of res ipsa loquitur

Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove
that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical
procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert
medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence.
The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such
matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are within the
common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts.
Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are competent to testify as to
whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care.
However, testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians and surgeons, external
appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one may be given by nonexpert witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is
permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid
of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the
proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury
would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of
negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without
medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why
it occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus
between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the
custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to
establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other
way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury
suffered by him.
In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following essential requisites must
first be satisfied, to wit: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.
The Court considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
inappropriate. Although it should be conceded without difficulty that the second and third
elements were present, considering that the anesthetic agent and the instruments were
exclusively within the control of Dr. Solidum, and that the patient, being then unconscious during
the operation, could not have been guilty of contributory negligence, the first element was
undeniably wanting. Luz delivered Gerald to the care, custody and control of his physicians for a
pull-through operation. Except for the imperforate anus, Gerald was then of sound body and
mind at the time of his submission to the physicians. Yet, he experienced bradycardia during the
operation, causing loss of his senses and rendering him immobile. Hypoxia, or the insufficiency
of oxygen supply to the brain that caused the slowing of the heart rate, scientifically termed as
bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-through operation, or during the
administration of anesthesia to the patient, but such fact alone did not prove that the negligence
of any of his attending physicians, including the anesthesiologists, had caused the injury. In fact,
the anesthesiologists attending to him had sensed in the course of the operation that the lack of
oxygen could have been triggered by the vago-vagal reflex, prompting them to administer
atropine to the patient.

2. Negligence of Dr. Solidum

Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
Reckless imprudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do,
without malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act.
Dr. Solidums conviction by the RTC was primarily based on his failure to monitor and
properly regulate the level of anesthetic agent administered on Gerald by overdosing at 100%
halothane.
In affirming the conviction the Prosecution did not prove the elements of reckless
imprudence beyond reasonable doubt because the circumstances cited by the CA were
insufficient to establish that Dr. Solidum had been guilty of inexcusable lack of precaution in
monitoring the administration of the anesthetic agent to Gerald.
In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing
appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of
breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such breach and the
resulting death of his patient. In Chan Lugay v. St Luke's Hospital, Inc., where the
attendingphysician was absolved of liability for the death of the complainants wife and newborn
baby, this Court held that: In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must
be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the
wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence
must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot
create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. And the
proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.
In view of the actuations of the anaesthesiologists and the administration of anaesthesia,
the committee find that the same were all in accordance with the universally accepted standards
of medical care and there is no evidence of any fault or negligence on the part of the
anaesthesiologists.
3. Liability of Ospital ng Maynila
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed
instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged.48 It is
puzzling, therefore, how the RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly
and severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng
Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts
thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their judgment against Ospital ng
Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Not surprisingly, the flawed decree raises other material concerns that the RTC and the
CA overlooked. We deem it important, then, to express the following observations for the
instruction of the Bench and Bar.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its
fundamental right to be heard was not respected from the outset. The RTC and the CA should
have been alert to this fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling
rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a rule would
enforce the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability
would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the
subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to
Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with.

ENRIQUE ALMERO Y ALCANTARA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.

G.R. NO. 188191. MARCH 12, 2014
C.J. SERENO
In the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the
judgment, or apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to appeal.
While he did not file an appeal before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the
conviction in the guise of a petition supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he
attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make appeal
and probation mutually exclusive remedies.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the accused in Criminal Case No. 96-6531 for reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide and multiple physical injuries. After private respondents reserved the right to
institute a separate action for damages, trial ensued. On 8 January 2007, the MTC found
petitioner guilty and sentenced him to suffer prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods.
Petitioner filed an Application for Probation. On 22 February 2007, the MTC denied his
application, prompting petitioner to file a special civil action with the RTC.
While his first Petition raised the sole issue of the denial of his application for probation, he filed
a Supplemental Petition, which a) assailed the validity of the promulgation of the 8 January
2007 judgment; and b) impleaded private complainants Mirasol Bartolome, Clarita P. Matias,
Rosendo P. Matias and Antonio P. Matias. The RTC found that the MTC committed grave abuse
of discretion in rendering judgment without first ruling on his Formal Offer of Exhibits since,
technically, petitioner had not yet rested his case. It also ruled that the promulgation of judgment
was similarly tainted with grave abuse of discretion, because petitioner was not present at the
time, in violation of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.
The CA ruled that the RTC should have confined itself to determining whether the MTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners application for probation, and that
inasmuch as the grant of probation rests solely on the discretion of the court, the denial thereof
cannot be considered grave abuse.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the CA erred in ruling that private complainants have personality to appeal
the 28 January 2008 Decision of the RTC
2. Whether the CA erred in ruling that the RTC reversibly erred in nullifying petitioners
judgment of conviction.
3. Whether the CA committed an error of law in ruling that petitioner is not entitled to
probation
RULING:
The petition is denied.
1. On private complainants personality to appeal

Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, sec. 6, par. 3 and 4 states: The proper clerk of court
shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel,
requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in
absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at
his last known address.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment
despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket
and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or through his counsel.
While the present petition originated from a criminal proceeding, what petitioner filed with
the RTC was a special civil action, in which he himself impleaded private respondents. He
cannot now belatedly change his stance to the prejudice of private respondents, who would
otherwise be deprived of recourse in a civil action they did not initiate. In any case, this Court
has consistently ruled that private parties may be clothed with sufficient personality if the facts
show that the ends of substantial justice would be better served, and if the issues in the action
could be determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner.
In Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz,12 citing People v. Calo, Jr.,13 the Supreme Court
ruled: While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the Solicitor General may bring or
defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or the State
in criminal proceeding pending in this Court and the Court of Appeals, the ends of substantial
justice would be better served, and the issues in this action could be determined in a more just,
speedy and inexpensive manner, by entertaining the petition at bar. As an offended party in a
criminal case, private petitioner has sufficient personality and a valid grievance against Judge
Adaos order granting bail to the alleged murderers of his (private petitioners) father.
2. and. 3. On the petitioners conviction and the denial of his petition for probation
Probation is not a right but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency conferred by
the State, and may be granted by the court to a deserving defendant. Accordingly, the grant of
probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court. It is to be exercised primarily for the
benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Aside from the
goals of according expediency and liberality to the accused, the rationale for the treatment of
appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies is that they rest on diametrically opposed
legal positions.
An accused applying for probation is deemed to have accepted the judgment. The
application for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an accused for the crime which
led to the judgment of conviction. This was the reason why the Probation Law was amended:
precisely to put a stop to the practice of appealing from judgments of conviction even if the
sentence is probationable for the purpose of securing an acquittal and applying for the
probation only if the accused fails in his bid.
Similarly, in the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question
the judgment, or apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to
appeal. While he did not file an appeal before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of
the conviction in the guise of a petition supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing,
he attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make
appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.

The assignment of errors in the Petition before us reflects the diametrically opposed
positions taken by accused petitioner. On the one hand, he bewails the defects committed by
the trial court during the promulgation of the judgment, thus casting doubt on the judgment itself.
Yet in the same breath, he persists in his application for probation, despite the waiver and
admission of guilt implicit in any procedure for probation precisely the unhealthy wager the law
seeks to prevent.

RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF AMA LAND INC. AGAINST COURT OF
APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES HON. DANTON Q. BUESER, HON. SESINANBO E.
VILLON AND HON. RICARDO R. ROSARI
A.M. OCA IPI NO. 12-204-CA-J. MARCH 11, 2014
J. BERSAMIN
Unfounded administrative charges against sitting judges truly degrade their judicial
office, and interfere with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary. The complainant
may be held liable for indirect contempt of court as a means of vindicating the integrity and
reputation of the judges and the Judiciary. In the instant case, AMALI fell short of the
requirements for establishing its charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment against
respondent Justices. Hence, we now demand that AMALIs authorized representative to show
cause in writing why they should not be held in indirect contempt of court for bringing the
unfounded and baseless charges against respondent Justices not only once but twice.
FACTS:
AMALI brought this administrative complaint against Associate Justice Danton Q.
Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, all
members of the Court of Appeals (CA), charging them with knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, gross misconduct, and violation of their oaths on account of their promulgation of the
decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 118994 entitled Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc. v. The
Honorable Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 264, Assigned in San Juan, and AMA
Land, Inc.
AMALI brought this administrative complaint alleging that respondent Justices had
conspired with the counsels of WWRAI in rendering an unjust judgment. AMALI stated that the
decision of the CA had been rendered in bad faith and with conscious and deliberate intent to
favor WWRAI, and to cause grave injustice to AMALI. In thereby knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, respondent Justices were guilty of gross misconduct, and violated Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Canon 1, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent Justices liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
RULING:
The administrative complaint is bereft of merit.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations
of the complaint by substantial evidence. Failure to do so will lead to the dismissal of the
complaint for its lack of merit. This is because an administrative charge against any official of
the Judiciary must be supported by at least substantial evidence. But when the charge equates
to a criminal offense, such that the judicial officer may suffer the heavy sanctions of dismissal

from the service, the showing of culpability on the part of the judicial officer should be nothing
short of proof beyond reasonable doubt, especially because the charge is penal in character.
AMALI fell short of the requirements for establishing its charge of knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment against respondent Justices.
Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment constitutes a serious criminal offense. Article
204, Revised Penal Code, provides that any judge who knowingly render[s] an unjust judgment
in any case submitted to him for decision is punished with prision mayor and perpetual absolute
disqualification. To commit the offense, the offender must be a judge who is adequately shown
to have rendered an unjust judgment, not one who merely committed an error of judgment or
taken the unpopular side of a controversial point of law. The complainant must not only prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is patently contrary to law or not supported by the
evidence but that it was also made with deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice. Good faith
and the absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient defenses
that will shield a judge from the charge of rendering an unjust decision. The failure of the judge
to correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not
necessarily render him administratively liable. Only a superior court acting by virtue of either its
appellate or supervisory jurisdiction over the judicial actions involved may make determine and
declare that the judgment or final order that the judicial officer knowingly rendered or issued was
unjust.
Moreover, AMALIs allegations directly attacked the validity of the proceedings in the CA
through an administrative complaint. The attack in this manner reflected the pernicious practice
by disgruntled litigants and their lawyers of resorting to administrative charges against sitting
judges instead of exhausting all their available remedies.
We seize this occasion, therefore, to stress once again that disciplinary proceedings and
criminal actions brought against any judge in relation to the performance of his official functions
are neither complementary to nor suppletory of appropriate judicial remedies, nor a substitute
for such remedies. Any party who may feel aggrieved should resort to these remedies, and
exhaust them, instead of resorting to disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions.
Finally, resort to administrative disciplinary action prior to the final resolution of the
judicial issues involved constitutes an abuse of court processes that serves to disrupt rather
than promote the orderly administration of justice and further clog the courts dockets. Those
who seek relief from the courts must not be allowed to ignore basic legal rules and abuse of
court processes in their efforts to vindicate their rights.
Accordingly, we now demand that AMALIs authorized representative, Joseph B. Usita,
its Senior Assistant Vice President, and the Members of the Board of Directors of AMALI who
had authorized Usita to file the present complaint, to show cause in writing why they should not
be held in indirect contempt of court for bringing the unfounded and baseless charges against
respondent Justices not only once but twice. To be clear, the filing of unfounded and baseless
administrative charges against sitting judicial officers may constitute indirect contempt under
Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a
charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to
comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be

heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be
punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or
in his official transactions; (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after
being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process
of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to
enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of
ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the
person adjudged to be entitled thereto; (c) Any abuse of or any unlawful
interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt under section 1 of this Rule; (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly
or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; (e)
Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without
authority; (f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served; (g) The rescue, or
attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of
an order or process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing
process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such
proceedings. (3a)

FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES/

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 189505 & G.R. NO. 189434, MARCH 12, 2014
C.J. SERENO
Forfeiture proceedings, as we have already discussed exhaustively in our Decision, are
actions considered to be in the nature of proceedings in rem or quasi in rem, such that:
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal
process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution
of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. In the
latter condition, the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may not
be in the actual custody of said court. There is potential custody when, from the nature of the
action brought, the power of the court over the property is impliedly recognized by law. While
the subject properties are in the US, the the Republics interest over the Arelma assets has
already been recognized in an earlier decision rendered by the Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court.
FACTS:
On 25 April 2012, this Court rendered a Decision affirming the 2 April 2009 Decision of
the Sandiganbayan and declaring all the assets of Arelma, S.A., an entity created by the late
Ferdinand E. Marcos, forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. The anti-graft court
found that the totality of assets and properties acquired by the Marcos spouses was manifestly
and grossly disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials, and that petitioners
were unable to overturn the prima facie presumption of ill gotten wealth, pursuant to Section 2 of
RA 1379.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment because a) the Republic had earlier stated that it will file a separate
forfeiture action regarding the assets of Arelma and b) Civil Case No. 0141 had
already terminated; and
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan does not possess territorial jurisdiction over the res or
the Arelma proceeds, which are held by Merrill Lynch in the United States.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
1. On the granting of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
It is clear from our 25 April 2012 Decision that the said Petition for Forfeiture described
among others, a corporate entity by the name Arelma, Inc., which maintained an account and
portfolio in Merrill Lynch, New York, and which was purportedly organized for the purpose of
hiding ill-gotten wealth. The Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 152154 affirmed the partial
summary judgment only over the Swiss deposits which the Sandiganbayan declared as forfeited
in favor of the State.

This cannot be construed as a bar to a subsequent judgment over numerous other

assets and properties expressly sought to be forfeited in Civil Case No. 0141. Respondent
Republics success in obtaining summary judgment over the Swiss accounts does not mean its
preclusion from seeking partial summary judgment over a different subject matter covered by
the same petition for forfeiture.
The Swiss Deposits Decision, G.R. No. 152154, dealt only with the summary judgment
as to the five Swiss accounts, because the 2000 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated 7
March 2000 specifically identified the five Swiss accounts. It did not include the Arelma account.
To subscribe to the view of petitioners is to forever bar the State from recovering the assets
listed above, including the properties involved in Civil Case No. 0141, including the properties it
had specifically identified in its petition for forfeiture. As we have discussed in our Decision, the
ruling of the Sandiganbayan is rightly characterized as a separate judgment, and allowed by the
Rules of Court under Section 5 of Rule 36:
Separate judgments.When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, the court, at any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a
particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence
which is the subject matter of the claim, may render a separate judgment
disposing of such claim. The judgment shall terminate the action with respect to
the claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed as to the remaining claims.
In case a separate judgment is rendered, the court by order may stay its
enforcement until the rendition of subsequent judgment or judgments and may
prescribe such conditions as may be necessary to secure the benefit thereof to
the party in whose favor the judgment is rendered.
Petitioners further insist that Civil Case No. 0141 does not involve the Arelma account
because the respondent unequivocally reserved its right to file a separate forfeiture petition
concerning it. However, petitioners failed to prove that such a reservation was made, and never
even substantiated how such reservation could operate to deprive the State of its right to file for
separate judgment. There is nothing in Republic Act 13793 or in the Rules which prohibits the
graft court from taking cognizance of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment only because of
statements allegedly made by one party. This Court cannot countenance the view advanced by
petitioners defeating the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over violations of R.A. Nos. 3019 and
1379,4 where the laws themselves do not provide for such limitations.
2. On Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over over the Arelma account
It is basic that the execution of a Courts judgment is merely a ministerial phase of
adjudication. The authority of the Sandiganbayan to rule on the character of these assets as illgotten cannot be conflated with petitioners concerns as to how the ruling may be effectively
enforced. More importantly, petitioner should be reminded of his earlier insistence that R.A.
1379 is penal, therefore petitions for forfeiture filed under this law are actions in personam, not
in rem.
Forfeiture proceedings, as we have already discussed exhaustively in our Decision, are
actions considered to be in the nature of proceedings in rem or quasi in rem, such that:
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal
proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. In the latter

condition, the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may not be in
the actual custody of said court.
The concept of potential jurisdiction over the res, advanced by respondent, is not at all
new. As early as Perkins v. Dizon, deciding a suit against a non-resident, the Court RULING: In
order that the court may exercise power over the res, it is not necessary that the court should
take actual custody of the property, potential custody thereof being sufficient. There is potential
custody when, from the nature of the action brought, the power of the court over the property is
impliedly recognized by law.
Finally, we take note of the Decision rendered by the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court on 26 June 2012. In Swezey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., the
foreign court agreed with the dismissal of the turnover proceeding against the Arelma assets
initiated by alleged victims of human rights abuses during the Marcos regime. It reasoned that
the Republic was a necessary party, but could not be subject to joinder in light of its assertion of
sovereign immunity: (The Republic's) national interests would be severely prejudiced by a
turnover proceeding because it has asserted a claim of ownership regarding the Arelma assets
that rests on several bases: the Philippine forfeiture law that predated the tenure of President
Marcos; evidence demonstrating that Marcos looted public coffers to amass a personal fortune
worth billions of dollars; findings by the Philippine Supreme Court and Swiss Federal Supreme
Court that Marcos stole related assets from the Republic; and, perhaps most critically, the
recent determination by the Philippine Supreme Court that Marcos pilfered the money that was
deposited in the Arelma brokerage account. Consequently, allowing the federal court judgment
against the estate of Marcos to be executed on property that may rightfully belong to the citizens
of the Philippines could irreparably undermine the Republic's claim to the Arelma assets. xx xx
The Republic's declaration of sovereign immunity in this case is entitled to recognition because
it has a significant interest in allowing its courts to adjudicate the dispute over property that may
have been stolen from its public treasury and transferred to New York through no fault of the
Republic.
The high courts of the United States, the Philippines and Switzerland have clearly
explained in decisions related to this case that wresting control over these matters from the
Philippine judicial system would disrupt international comity and reciprocal diplomatic selfinterests.
These statements made by the foreign court; based on principles of comity and
reciprocity, are highlighted if only to assuage petitioner's concerns on the effective enforcement
of the Decision and this Resolution.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ERWIN TAMAYO Y BAUTISTA

G.R. NO. 196960, MARCH 12, 2014
J. ABAD
Assuming that the prosecution witnesses failed to identify exactly who inflicted the fatal
wounds on Joey during the commotion, Erwins liability is not diminished since he and the
others with him acted with concert in beating up and ultimately killing Joey. Conspiracy makes
all the assailants equally liable as co-principals by direct participation.
FACTS:
While the group of Joeywas having a drinking session beside the Iglesia Ni Cristo
chapel, someone from the group of the accused who was also having a drinking session hurled
empty bottles of gin at them. Joeys group, in turn, threw stones and empty gin bottles at
accused Erwin and his companions. Enraged, the latter group gave chased after Joey and his
companions. Unfortunately, Joey tripped and fell to the ground. He was in this position when
Erwin and his companions attacked and mauled him. Some, including Erwin, stabbed Joey with
their knives. The assailants scampered away afterwards.
Joey was rushed to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital but died shortly after arrival.
Erwin and John were originally charged homicide and theft of a necklace, but the prosecution
amended the charge to murder, qualified by taking advantage of superior strength and
employing means to weaken the defense and afford impunity. It also claimed the attendance of
the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. Trial took place only as
to Erwin since John jumped bail and remained at-large.
On November 21, 2008 the RTC found accused Erwin guilty of murder but innocent of
the separate charge of theft. Although it did not find sufficient evidence of treachery, evident
premeditation, or employment of means to weaken the defense and afford impunity, the RTC
elevated the crime that Erwin committed from homicide to murder based on its finding that
abuse of superior strength attended the killing. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecutions failure to identify the who among Erwins group inflicted the
fatal wounds that caused Joeys death is a ground for Erwins acquittal
RULING:
The petition is denied.
The Court has always been inclined, with few exceptions, to defer to the findings of fact
of the trial court since it had the opportunity to observe how each witness expressed himself and
whether his eyes agreed with his lips. The Court finds nothing from the transcripts that would
indicate that the trial court and the CA misapprehended the facts.
The Court also finds no error in the RTC and the CAs rejection of his alibi. The site of
the murder was not far from where he lived. Besides, he presented no corroborating testimony

that he was then at his house. As to his lament that the RTC and the CA should not have given
credit to Normans testimony for he had a grudge against him, Erwin presented no proof apart
from his word that this was so. At any rate, the accounts of the remaining eyewitnesses were
just as positive, straightforward, consistent, and clear. They all testified that Erwin stabbed Joey
with a knife.
Assuming that the prosecution witnesses failed to identify exactly who inflicted the fatal
wounds on Joey during the commotion, Erwins liability is not diminished since he and the
others with him acted with concert in beating up and ultimately killing Joey. Conspiracy makes
all the assailants equally liable as co-principals by direct participation.
Since about 15 men, including accused Erwin, pounced on their one helpless victim,
relentlessly bludgeoned him on the head, and stabbed him on the stomach until he was dead,
there is no question that the accused took advantage of their superior strength.

SPOUSES FERNANDO AND MA. ELENA SANTOS v. LOLITA ALCAZAR, REPRESENTED

BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT DELFIN CHUA
G.R. NO. 183034, MARCH 12, 2014
J. DEL CASTILLO
While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy prevails over a mere photocopy,
there is no harm if in a case, both the original and a photocopy thereof are authenticated,
identified and formally offered in evidence by the party proponent. Hence, Respondents failure
to present the original copy of the Acknowledgment during the taking of her testimony for the
second time, and the presentation of a mere photocopy thereof at said hearing, does not
materially affect the outcome of the case.
Moreover, the rule that the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be
deemed admitted, unless the adverse party specifically denies them under oath, applies only to
parties to such instrument. Hence only Fernando may be held liable for the judgment amount of
P1,456,000.00, since Ma. Elena was not a signatory to the Acknowledgment.
FACTS:
Alcazar, proprietor of LCC, instituted through her attorney-in-fact Delfin Chua a
Complaint for sum of money against the spouses Santos, to collect the value of paint and
construction materials obtained by the latter from LCC amounting to P1,456,000.00, which
remained unpaid despite written demand. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 9954 and
assigned to Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City. Respondents cause of action
is based on a document entitled Acknowledgment apparently executed by hand by petitioner
Fernando
Respondent presented her evidence and testified in court as the lone witness.
Petitioners filed a Demurrer to Evidence, which respondent opposed. Petitioners argued that the
Acknowledgment respondents Exhibit A which was presented in court was not an original
copy and thus inadmissible; petitioners receipt of the written demand was not proved; the
alleged deliveries of paint and construction materials were not covered by delivery receipts; and
respondents testimony was merely hearsay and uncorroborated.
The RTC denied petitioners demurrer for lack of merit.
On March 20, 2006, or the day of the scheduled hearing, petitioners counsel failed to
appear, prompting the trial court to issue an Order 1) denying petitioners March 15, 2006
motion to reset for lack of merit and for violating Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure; 2) declaring that petitioners have waived their right to present evidence; and 3)
declaring that Civil Case No. 9954 is deemed submitted for decision.
Petitioners went up to the CA on certiorari. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 93889, the
Petition questioned the denial of petitioners demurrer. Meanwhile, they filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the March 20, 2006 Order denying their motion to reset, but the trial court
denied the same in an Order dated April 24, 2006. The RTC rendered judgment ordering the
defendants to pay the plaintiff.

In two separate dates, the CA issued decisions sustaining both the RTCs denial of their
demurrer and the RTC judgment ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in denying the petitioners demurrer to evidence
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Respondents failure to present the original copy of the Acknowledgment during the
taking of her testimony for the second time, and the presentation of a mere photocopy thereof at
said hearing, does not materially affect the outcome of the case. It was a mere procedural
inadvertence that could have been cured and did not affect petitioners cause in any manner. As
conceded by them and as held by the CA, the original exists and was made part of the records
of the case when respondents evidence was first taken. Though respondent now claims that
she had lost the original, the CA proclaimed that the document resides in the record. This would
explain then why respondent cannot find it in her possession; it is with the court as an exhibit.
Besides, it evidently appears that there is no question raised on the authenticity and contents of
the photocopy that was presented and identified in court; petitioners merely insist that the
photocopy is inadmissible as a result of respondents failure to present the original, which they
nevertheless admit to exist and is found and included in the record of the case.
While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy prevails over a mere photocopy,
there is no harm if in a case, both the original and a photocopy thereof are authenticated,
identified and formally offered in evidence by the party proponent.
More to the point is the fact that petitioners failed to deny specifically under oath the
genuineness and due execution of the Acknowledgment in their Answer. The effect of this is that
the genuineness and due execution of the Acknowledgment is deemed admitted. By the
admission of the genuineness and due execution [of such document] is meant that the party
whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his
authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the
pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formal
requisites required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it
lacks, are waived by him. Hence, such defenses as that the signature is a forgery x x x; or that it
was unauthorized x x x; or that the party charged signed the instrument in some other capacity
than that alleged in the pleading setting it out x x x; or that it was never delivered x x x, are cut
off by the admission of its genuineness and due execution.
There is no need for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to documents the
genuineness and due execution of which are admitted by the adverse party. With the
consequent admission engendered by petitioners failure to properly deny the Acknowledgment
in their Answer, coupled with its proper authentication, identification and offer by the respondent,
not to mention petitioners admissions in paragraphs 4 to 6 of their Answer that they are indeed
indebted to respondent, the Court believes that judgment may be had solely on the document,
and there is no need to present receipts and other documents to prove the claimed
indebtedness. The Acknowledgment, just as an ordinary acknowledgment receipt, is valid and
binding between the parties who executed it, as a document evidencing the loan agreement
they had entered into. The absence of rebutting evidence occasioned by petitioners waiver of

their right to present evidence renders the Acknowledgment as the best evidence of the
transactions between the parties and the consequential indebtedness incurred.
Indeed, the effect of the admission is such that a prima facie case is made for the
plaintiff which dispenses with the necessity of evidence on his part and entitles him to a
judgment on the pleadings unless a special defense of new matter, such as payment, is
interposed by the defendant.
However, as correctly argued by petitioners, only Fernando may be held liable for the
judgment amount of P1,456,000.00, since Ma. Elena was not a signatory to the
Acknowledgment. She may be held liable only to the extent of P600,000.00, as admitted by her
and Fernando in paragraph 5 of their Answer; no case against her may be proved over and
beyond such amount, in the absence of her signature and an acknowledgment of liability in the
Acknowledgment. The rule that the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be
deemed admitted, unless the adverse party specifically denies them under oath, applies only to
parties to the document.
DIAMOND TAXI AND/OR BRYAN ONG v. FELIPE LLAMAS, JR.
G.R. NO. 190724, MACRH 12, 2014
J. BRION
In this jurisdiction, courts generally accord great respect and finality to factual findings of
administrative agencies. These findings, however, are not infallible. This doctrine espousing
comity to administrative findings of facts cannot preclude the courts from reviewing and, when
proper, disregarding these findings of facts when shown that the administrative body committed
grave abuse of discretion by capriciously, whimsically or arbitrarily disregarding evidence or
circumstances of considerable importance that are crucial or decisive of the controversy.
FACTS:
Llamas worked as a taxi driver for petitioner. On July 18, 2005, Llamas filed before the
Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioners. In its position paper,
Petitioners argued that Llamas acts traffic violations, insubordination and refusal to heed
management instructions constitute grounds for the termination of Llamas employment.
Llamas failed to seasonably file his position paper. The LA rendered a decision dismissing
Llamas complaint for lack of merit.
Llamas received a copy of this LA decision on January 5, 2006. Meanwhile, he filed his
position paper on December 20, 2005. In his position paper, Llamas claimed that he failed to
seasonably file his position paper because his previous counsel, despite his repeated pleas,
had continuously deferred compliance with the LAs orders for its submission. Hence, he was
forced to secure the services of another counsel on December 19, 2005 in order to comply with
the LAs directive.
On January 16, 2006, Llamas filed before the LA a motion for reconsideration of its
decision dismissing Llama complaint. The LA treated Llamas motion as an appeal per Section
15, Rule V of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (2005 NLRC Rules) (the
governing NLRC Rules of Procedure at the time Llamas filed his complaint before the LA). The
NLRC dismissed respondent Llamas appeal for nonperfection. This CA decision reversed and
set aside the resolution of the NLRC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred when it reviewed the merits of the NLRC resolution
RULING:
The petition is denied.
As presented by the petitioners, the petition before us involves mixed questions of fact
and law, with the core issue being one of fact. Whether the CA, in ruling on the labor case
before it under an original certiorari action, can make its own factual determination requires the
consideration and application of law and jurisprudence; it is essentially a question of law that a
Rule 45 petition properly addresses.
In the context of this case, however, this legal issue is inextricably linked with and cannot
be resolved without the definitive resolution of the core factual issue whether Llamas
abandoned his work or had been constructively dismissed. As a proscribed question of fact, we
generally cannot address this issue, except to the extent necessary to determine whether the
CA correctly found that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Llamas
appeal on purely technical grounds.
For raising mixed questions of fact and law, we deny the petition outright. Even if this
error were to be disregarded, however, we would still deny the petition as we find the CA legally
correct in reversing the NLRCs resolution on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
We agree that remanding the case to the NLRC for factual determination and decision of
the case on the merits would have been, ordinarily, a prudent approach. Nevertheless, the CAs
action on this case was not procedurally wrong and was not without legal and jurisprudential
basis.
In this jurisdiction, courts generally accord great respect and finality to factual findings of
administrative agencies. These findings, however, are not infallible. This doctrine espousing
comity to administrative findings of facts cannot preclude the courts from reviewing and, when
proper, disregarding these findings of facts when shown that the administrative body committed
grave abuse of discretion by capriciously, whimsically or arbitrarily disregarding evidence or
circumstances of considerable importance that are crucial or decisive of the controversy.
Hence, in labor cases elevated to it via petition for certiorari, the CA can grant this
prerogative writ when it finds that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at its
factual conclusions. To make this finding, the CA necessarily has to view the evidence if only to
determine if the NLRC ruling had basis in evidence. It is in the sense and manner that the CA, in
a Rule 65 certiorari petition before it, had to determine whether grave abuse of discretion on
factual issues attended the NLRCs dismissal of Llamas appeal. Accordingly, we do not find
erroneous the course that the CA took in resolving Llamas certiorari petition. The CA may
resolve factual issues by express legal mandate and pursuant to its equity jurisdiction.
In sum, the CA correctly found equitable grounds to warrant relaxation of the rule on
perfection of appeal (filing of the certificate of nonforum shopping) as there was patently absent
sufficient proof for the charge of abandonment. Accordingly, we find the CA legally correct in
reversing and setting aside the NLRC's resolution rendered in grave abuse of discretion.

SOUTH EAST INTERNATIONAL RATTAN, INC. AND/OR ESTANISLAO AGBAY

v. JESUS J. COMING
G.R. NO. 186621, MARCH 12, 2014
J. VILLARAMA
Petitioners admission that the five affiants were their former employees is binding upon
them. While they claim that respondent was the employee of their suppliers Mayol and Apondar,
they did not submit proof that the latter were indeed independent contractors; clearly, petitioners
failed to discharge their burden of proving their own affirmative allegation.
FACTS:
Estanislao Agbay is the President and General Manager of SEIRI, a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and exporting furniture to various
countries with principal place of business at Paknaan, Mandaue City.
On November 3, 2003, respondent Jesus J. Coming filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay and service
incentive leave pay, with prayer for reinstatement, back wages, damages and attorneys fees.
The LA ruled that respondent is a regular employee of SEIRI and that the termination of his
employment was illegal. The NLRC set aside and vacated the LA decision and dismissed the
complaint. The CA reversed the NLRC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly appreciated the evidence presented by both parties
RULING:
The petition is denied.
The issue of whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists in a given case is
essentially a question of fact. As a rule, this Court is not a trier of facts and this applies with
greater force in labor cases. Only errors of law are generally reviewed by this Court. This rule is
not absolute, however, and admits of exceptions. For one, the Court may look into factual issues
in labor cases when the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA are
conflicting. Here, the findings of the NLRC differed from those of the Labor Arbiter and the CA,
which compels the Courts exercise of its authority to review and pass upon the evidence
presented and to draw its own conclusions therefrom.
The CA gave more credence to the declarations of the five former employees of
petitioners that respondent was their co-worker in SEIRI. One of said affiants is Vicente
Comings own son, Gil Coming. Vicente averred in his second affidavit that when he confronted
his son, the latter explained that he was merely told by their Pastor to sign the affidavit as it will
put an end to the controversy. Vicente insisted that his son did not know the contents and
implications of the document he signed. As to the absence of respondents name in the payroll
and SSS employment report, the CA observed that the payrolls submitted were only from
January 1, 1999 to December 29, 2000 and not the entire period of eighteen years when

respondent claimed he worked for SEIRI. It further noted that the names of the five affiants,
whom petitioners admitted to be their former employees, likewise do not appear in the aforesaid
documents. According to the CA, it is apparent that petitioners maintained a separate payroll for
certain employees or willfully retained a portion of the payroll. x x x As to the control test, the
following facts indubitably reveal that respondents wielded control over the work performance of
petitioner, to wit: (1) they required him to work within the company premises; (2) they obliged
petitioner to report every day of the week and tasked him to usually perform the same job; (3)
they enforced the observance of definite hours of work from 8 oclock in the morning to 5 oclock
in the afternoon; (4) the mode of payment of petitioners salary was under their discretion, at
first paying him on pakiao basis and thereafter, on daily basis; (5) they implemented company
rules and regulations; (6) [Estanislao] Agbay directly paid petitioners salaries and controlled all
aspects of his employment and (7) petitioner rendered work necessary and desirable in the
business of the respondent company.
We affirm the CA.
In their comment to the petition filed by respondent in the CA, petitioners emphasized
that in the certifications issued by Mayol and Apondar, it was shown that respondent was
employed and working for them in those years he claimed to be working for SEIRI. However, a
reading of the certification by Mayol would show that while the latter claims to have respondent
under his employ in 1997, 1998 and 1999, respondents services were not regular and that he
works only if he wants to. Apondars certification likewise stated that respondent worked for him
since 1999 through his brother Vicente as sideline but only after regular working hours and off
and on basis. Even assuming the truth of the foregoing statements, these do not foreclose
respondents regular or full-time employment with SEIRI. In effect, petitioners suggest that
respondent was employed by SEIRIs suppliers, Mayol and Apondar but no competent proof
was presented as to the latters status as independent contractors.
Petitioners admission that the five affiants were their former employees is binding upon
them. While they claim that respondent was the employee of their suppliers Mayol and Apondar,
they did not submit proof that the latter were indeed independent contractors; clearly, petitioners
failed to discharge their burden of proving their own affirmative allegation. There is thus no
showing that the five former employees of SEIRI were motivated by malice, bad faith or any illmotive in executing their affidavit supporting the claims of respondent. In any controversy
between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence are resolved in
favor of the laborer.
As a regular employee, respondent enjoys the right to security of tenure under Article
279 of the Labor Code and may only be dismissed for a just or authorized cause, otherwise the
dismissal becomes illegal.
NESTOR B. FIGUERAS AND BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR. v. ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ
A.C. NO. 9116, MARCH 12, 2014
J. VILLARAMA
The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real
party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. The right to institute
disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person
complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters
of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the

charges. The Court found no merit in respondents contention that complainants have no
personality to file a disbarment case against him as they were not his clients and that the
present suit was merely instituted to harass him.
FACTS:
Congressional Village Homeowners Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of the affairs
of the homeowners of Congressional Village in Quezon City. On January 7, 1993, the Spouses
Santander filed a civil suit for damages against the Association before the RTC of Quezon City
for building a concrete wall which abutted their property and denied them of their right of way.
The Law Firm of Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and Associates was the legal counsel for
the Association, with respondent as the counsel of record and handling lawyer. After trial and
hearing, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Spouses Santander. The Association,
represented by said law firm, appealed to the CA. On February 5, 1999, the CA dismissed the
appeal on the ground that the original period to file the appellants brief had expired 95 days
even before the first motion for extension of time to file said brief was filed. The CA also stated
that the grounds adduced for the said motion as well as the six subsequent motions for
extension of time to file brief were not meritorious. The CA resolution became final.
Eight years later, complainants as members of the Association, filed a Complaint for
Disbarment against respondent before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline for violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule
18.03, Canon 18 thereof for his negligence in handling the appeal and willful violation of his
duties as an officer of the court.
On October 3, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD found respondent
liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three to six months, with
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. On
February 19, 2009, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a resolution suspending Atty.
Jimenez from the practice of law for a period of six months for breach of Rule 12.03, Canon 12,
Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 186 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE:
Whether the IBP correctly found him administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.03,
Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
RULING:
The petition is denied.
The Court finds no merit in respondents contention that complainants have no
personality to file a disbarment case against him as they were not his clients and that the
present suit was merely instituted to harass him.
The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real
party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the person
who called the attention of the court to a lawyers misconduct is in no sense a party, and
generally has no interest in the outcome. The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not

confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the
alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis
for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges.
The Court agrees with the IBP that respondent had been remiss in the performance of
his duties as counsel for Congressional Village Homeowners Association, Inc. Records show
that respondent filed the first motion for extension of time to file appellants brief 95 days after
the expiration of the reglementary period to file said brief, thus causing the dismissal of the
appeal of the homeowners association. To justify his inexcusable negligence, respondent
alleges that he was merely the supervising lawyer and that the fault lies with the handling
lawyer. His contention, however, is belied by the records for we note that respondent had filed
with the CA an Urgent Motion for Extension, which he himself signed on behalf of the law firm,
stating that a previous motion had been filed but due to the health condition of the undersigned
counselhe was not able to finish said Appellants Brief within the fifteen (15) day period earlier
requested by him. Thus, it is clear that respondent was personally in charge of the case.
A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the
latters interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellants brief on behalf of his client,
respondent had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04,20 Canon 12
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly
delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.
An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of his ability and with
utmost diligence. A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence
on his part. The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to
his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of
justice.

DREAMLAND HOTEL RESORT AND WESTLEY J. PRENTICE v. STEPHEN B. JOHNSON

G.R. NO. 191455, MARCH 12, 2014
J. REYES
In an appeal to the SC of a CA decision dismissing a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction under
Rule 47 for lack of proof of authority and affidavit of service of filing as required by Section 13 of
the 1997 Rules of Procedure, the court held that While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be
faithfully observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really
impair the proper administration of justice. If the rules are intended to ensure the proper and
orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher objective they seek which are the
attainment of justice and the protection of substantive rights of the parties. Thus, the relaxation
of procedural rules, or saving a particular case from the operation of technicalities when
substantial justice requires it, as in the instant case, should no longer be subject to cavil.
FACTS:
Dreamland is a corporation engaged in the hotel, restaurant and allied businesses.
Prentice is its current President and Chief Executive Officer, while Respondent is an Australian

citizen who came to the Philippines as a businessman/investor without the authority to be

employed as the employee/officer of any business.
According to Johnson, he contacted petitioners to inquire on the terms for employment
offered in response to the petitioners advertisements for a resort manager for Dreamland Hotel.
It was Prentice who offered employment and convinced Johnson to give out a loan, purportedly
so the resort can be completed and operational by August 2007. Believing the representations
of petitioner, respondent accepted the employment as Resort Manager and loaned money to
petitioners to finish construction of the resort.
From the start of August 2007, as stipulated in the Employment Agreement, respondent
Johnson already reported for work. It was then that he found out that the resort was far from
finished. However, he was instructed to supervise construction and speak with potential guests.
Johnson remained unpaid since August 2007. He was also denied the benefits promised him as
part of his compensation. Johnson was also not given the authority due to him as resort
manager. Worse, he would even be berated and embarrassed in front of the staff.
Thus, on November 3, 2007, respondent Johnson was forced to submit his resignation.
In deference to the Employment Agreement signed, Johnson stated that he was willing to
continue work for the three month period stipulated therein. However, in a text message sent by
Prentice to Johnson on the same day, he was informed that I consider [yo]ur resignation as
immediate. Despite demand, petitioners refused to pay the salaries and benefits due to
Johnson.
On January 31, 2008, Johnson filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of
salaries, among others, against the petitioners, where the LA rendered a Decision dismissing
Johnsons complaint for lack of merit with the finding that he voluntarily resigned from his
employment and was not illegally dismissed. The NLRC reversed the decision of the LA.
Consequently, the petitioners elevated the NLRC decision to the CA by way of Petition for
Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction under Rule 47, but the CA dismissed the petition for lack of proof of
authority and affidavit of service of filing as required by Section 13 of the 1997 Rules of
Procedure. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition without giving due consideration to its
merits
RULING:
The petition is partially granted.
While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully observed, courts should not be
so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If
the rules are intended to ensure the proper and orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the
higher objective they seek which are the attainment of justice and the protection of substantive
rights of the parties. Thus, the relaxation of procedural rules, or saving a particular case from
the operation of technicalities when substantial justice requires it, as in the instant case, should
no longer be subject to cavil.

Time and again, this Court has emphasized that procedural rules should be treated with
utmost respect and due regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to
remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration
of justice. From time to time, however, we have recognized exceptions to the Rules but only for
the most compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules would defeat rather than
serve the ends of justice. It is true that procedural rules may be waived or dispensed with in
the interest of substantial justice.
Brushing aside technicalities, in the utmost interest of substantial justice and taking into
consideration the varying and conflicting factual deliberations by the LA and the NLRC, the
Court shall now delve into the merits of the case.
As it could not be determined with absolute certainty whether or not Johnson rendered
the services he mentioned during the material time, doubt must be construed in his favor for the
reason that the consistent rule is that if doubt exists between the evidence presented by the
employer and that by the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.
What is clear upon the records is that Johnson had already taken his place in the hotel since
July 2007.
The petitioners also maintain that they have paid the amount of P7,200.00 to Johnson
for his three weeks of service. Even so, the amount the petitioners paid to Johnson as his threeweek salary is significantly deficient as Johnsons monthly salary as stipulated in their contract
is P60,000.00. In light of this deficiency, there is more reason to believe that the petitioners
withheld the salary of Johnson without a valid reason.
Another argument posited by the petitioners is that the employment contract executed by
the parties is inefficacious because the employment contract is subject to the presentation of
Johnson of his AEP and TIN.
Again, this statement is wanting of merit.
Johnson has adduced proof that as a permanent resident, he is exempted from the
requirement of securing an AEP. Anent the requirement of securing a TIN to make the contract
of employment efficacious, records show that Johnson secured his TIN only after his resignation
as operations manager. Nevertheless, this does not negate the fact that the contract of
employment had already become effective even prior to such date.
In addition to the foregoing, there is no stipulation in the employment contract itself that the
same shall only be effective upon the submission of AEP and TIN. The petitioners did not
present any proof to support this agreement prior to the execution of the employment contract.
As regards the NLRC findings that Johnson was constructively dismissed and did not
abandon his work, the Court is in consonance with this conclusion with the following basis: Even
the most reasonable employee would consider quitting his job after working for three months
and receiving only an insignificant fraction of his salaries. There was, therefore, not an
abandonment of employment nor a resignation in the real sense, but a constructive dismissal,
which is defined as an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment is
rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely x x x.
Since Johnson was constructively dismissed, he was illegally dismissed. An illegally
dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: backwages and reinstatement. The two reliefs
provided are separate and distinct. In instances where reinstatement is no longer feasible

because of strained relations between the employee and the employer, separation pay is
granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or
separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and backwages.

MINDA S. GAERLAN v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 192717., MARCH 12, 2014
J. VILLARAMA
In an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, only questions of law may be raised. When there is no dispute as to the facts, the
question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or not, is a question of law. In the
present case, there seems to be no dispute as to the facts, and the question presented before
us calls for a review of the CAs conclusion that the documents and evidence presented by
petitioner are insufficient to support her application for registration of title. Hence, the petition is
properly filed.
FACTS:
On April 10, 1992, petitioner filed an Application for original registration of title over a
parcel of land known as Lot 18793, Cad-237 of Cagayan Cadastre, with an area of 1,061
square meters.
On August 25, 1992, the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an
Opposition to petitioners application for registration. On November 20, 2001, the trial court
rendered Judgment granting petitioners application for registration of title. The CA reversed and
set aside the Judgment of the RTC and dismissed the application for registration of title filed by
petitioner. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in denying her application for registration of title
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Prefatorily, we address the issue raised by respondent that only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari. Indeed, the principle is well established that this
Court is not a trier of facts. Therefore, in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, only questions of law may be raised. The distinction between a
question of law and a question of fact is settled. There is a question of law when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and the question does not call
for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On
the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth
or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to the facts, the question
of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or not, is a question of law. In Republic v.
Vega, the Court held that when petitioner asks for a review of the decision made by a lower
court based on the evidence presented, without delving into their probative value but simply on
their sufficiency to support the legal conclusions made, then a question of law is raised.

In the present case, there seems to be no dispute as to the facts, and the question
presented before us calls for a review of the CAs conclusion that the documents and evidence
presented by petitioner are insufficient to support her application for registration of title. Hence,
the petition is properly filed.
Now, on the merits. Petitioner asserts that the land subject of her application has been
declared alienable and disposable in 1925 and that her possession through her predecessorsin-interest started in 1929. However, after a careful examination of the evidence adduced by
petitioner, we find no error on the part of the CA in dismissing petitioners application for
registration of title for the failure of petitioner to prove satisfactorily the requirements for
registration provided under the law.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The
burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable and disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable and
disposable.
To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may secure a certification
from the government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable, but the certification
must show that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land
of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. The applicant must also present a copy of the original classification of the land into
alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the
President.
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence as follows: (a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
foreign country; (b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and (c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law
to be entered therein. Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred
to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by
his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of
the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should
have attached an official publication of the DENR Secretarys issuance declaring the land
alienable and disposable.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: Sec. 23. Public
documents as evidence.Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All
other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to
their execution and of the date of the latter.

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall
within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule
132. The certifications do not reflect entries in public records made in the performance of a duty
by a public officer, x x x. The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated
reproductions of original records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications
are not even records of public documents. x x x
Moreover, the CENRO certification attached by petitioner to her petition deserves scant
consideration since it was not presented during the proceedings before the trial court or while
the case was pending before the appellate court. Petitioner only presented the said certification
for the first time before this Court. The genuineness and due execution of the said document
had not been duly proven in the manner required by law. Also, generally, additional evidence is
allowed when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or
mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered. In the
present case, petitioner did not offer any explanation why the CENRO certification was not
presented and submitted during the proceedings before the trial court to justify its belated
submission to this Court.
As to the second and third requisites, we agree with the appellate court that petitioner
failed to establish that she and her predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land on or before June 12,
1945.
In fine, since petitioner failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as part
of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2) she and her predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, her application for
registration of title of the subject property under P.D. No. 1529 should be denied.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ASIA PACIFIC INTEGRATED STEEL CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 192100. MARCH 12, 2014
J. VILLARAMA
As a rule, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only questions
of law. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. In this case,
the only legal issue raised by petitioner is whether the trial court based its determination of just
compensation on the factors provided under existing laws and jurisprudence.
In this case, we find that the trial court did not judiciously determine the fair market value
of the subject property as it failed to consider other relevant factors such as the zonal valuation,
tax declarations and current selling price supported by documentary evidence. Indeed, just
compensation must not be arrived at arbitrarily, but determined after an evaluation of different
factors.
FACTS:
On March 1, 2002, petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings against the respondent
over a portion of their property. The affected area, shall be traversed by the expansion of the
San Simon Interchange, an integral component of the construction, rehabilitation and expansion

of the NLEX Project. Subsequently, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for issuance of writ
of possession, stating that it deposited with the Land Bank the amount of P607,200.00 (100% of
the value of the property based on current zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
[BIR]) in accordance with Section 4(a) of R.A. 8794, and hence the court has the ministerial duty
to place petitioner in possession pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed on TRBs authority to expropriate the subject
property but disagreed as to the amount of just compensation. The parties eventually agreed to
submit the issue of just compensation to three Commissioners.
The RTC rendered a decision ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant in the amount of
Php2,024,000.00 representing the net amount of just compensation after deducting the partial
payment of P607,200.00 based on the valuation of Php1,300.00 per square meter on the
expropriated portion of the subject property plus legal interest of 12% per annum from the time
of taking (March 21, 2002) until fully paid less taxes due on the land. The CA partially affirmed
RTC decision and reduced the annual legal interest awarded from 12% to 6% per annum.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the main issue of just compensation and the findings thereon by the trial court
as affirmed by the CA is a question of fact which can not be disturbed by this Court
RULING:
We grant the petition.
As a rule, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only questions
of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable and cannot be passed upon by this Court in the
exercise of its power to review. The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is
established. A question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on
a certain state of facts. A question of fact, on the other hand, exists if the doubt centers on the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
This being so, the findings of fact of the CA are final and conclusive and this Court will not
review them on appeal.
For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. In this case,
the only legal issue raised by petitioner is whether the trial court based its determination of just
compensation on the factors provided under existing laws and jurisprudence.
Section 5 of R.A. 8974 enumerates the standards for assessing the value of
expropriated land taken for national government infrastructure projects, thus:
SECTION 5. Standards for the Assessment of the Value of the Land Subject of
Expropriation Proceedings or Negotiated Sale. In order to facilitate the
determination of just compensation, the court may consider, among other wellestablished factors, the following relevant standards: (a) The classification and
use for which the property is suited; (b) The developmental costs for improving
the land; (c) The value declared by the owners; (d) The current selling price of
similar lands in the vicinity; (e) The reasonable disturbance compensation for the

removal and/or demolition of certain improvements on the land and for the value
of the improvements thereon; (f) The size, shape or location, tax declaration and
zonal valuation of the land; (g) The price of the land as manifested in the ocular
findings, oral as well as documentary evidence presented; and (h) Such facts
and events as to enable the affected property owners to have sufficient funds to
acquire similarly-situated lands of approximate areas as those required from
them by the government, and thereby rehabilitate themselves as early as
possible.
In this case, the trial court considered only (a) and (d): (1) the classification of the subject
property which is located in an area with mixed land use (commercial, residential and industrial)
and the propertys conversion from agricultural to industrial land, and (2) the current selling price
of similar lands in the vicinity the only factors which the commissioners included in their
Report. It also found the commissioners recommended valuation of P1,000.00 to P1,500.00 per
square to be fair and just despite the absence of documentary substantiation as said prices
were based merely on the opinions of bankers and realtors.
We find that the trial court did not judiciously determine the fair market value of the
subject property as it failed to consider other relevant factors such as the zonal valuation, tax
declarations and current selling price supported by documentary evidence. Indeed, just
compensation must not be arrived at arbitrarily, but determined after an evaluation of different
factors.
We agree with the trial court that it was not bound by the assessment report of the
commissioners and that it had the discretion to reject the same and substitute its own judgment
on its value as gathered from the record, or it may accept the report/recommendation of the
commissioners in toto and base its judgment thereon. However, the decision of the court must
be based on all established rules, upon correct legal principles and competent evidence. The
court is proscribed from basing its judgment on speculations and surmises.
Nonetheless, we cannot subscribe to petitioners argument that just compensation for
the subject property should not exceed the zonal valuation (P300.00 per square meter).
Zonal valuation is just one of the indices of the fair market value of real estate. By itself,
this index cannot be the sole basis of just compensation in expropriation cases.
Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market value of the property are the
cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the
particular case of lands, their size, shape, location, and the tax declarations thereon. The
measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss.30 To be just, the compensation must be
fair not only to the owner but also to the taker.31
It is settled that the final conclusions on the proper amount of just compensation can only be
made after due ascertainment of the requirements set forth under R.A. 8974 and not merely
based on the declarations of the parties. Since these requirements were not satisfactorily
complied with, and in the absence of reliable and actual data as bases in fixing the value of the
condemned property, remand of this case to the trial court is in order.
This case is remanded to the trial court for the proper determination of just
compensation, in conformity with this Decision.

MARYLOU CABRERA v. FELIX NG

G.R. NO. 201601, MARCH 12, 2014
J. REYES
A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive
and which the court has no authority to act upon. Nevertheless, the three-day notice
requirement is not a hard and fast rule. When the adverse party had been afforded the
opportunity to be heard, and has been indeed heard through the pleadings filed in opposition to
the motion, the purpose behind the three-day notice requirement is deemed realized. In such
case, the requirements of procedural due process are substantially complied with.
FACTS:
On February 14, 2004, Ng filed a complaint for sum of money with the RTC against the
Cabrera nspouses alleging that the latter issued to him 3 Metrobank checks that were
dishonored upon presentment. However, they claimed that they paid the respondent the amount
represented by the said checks through the latters son Richard Ng. Further, they deny having
issued Metrobank Check No. 0244745 to the respondent, alleging that the said check was
forcibly taken from them by Richard Ng.
On August 7, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, which ordered the spouses Cabrera
to pay the respondent the total face value of the three checks plus interest and damages. On
August 8, 2007, the spouses Cabrera received a copy of the RTC Decision. On August 14,
2007, the spouses Cabrera filed with the RTC a motion for reconsideration, which they set for
hearing on August 17, 2007. On even date, the spouses Cabrera sent a copy of their motion for
reconsideration to the respondent thru registered mail; it was actually received by the
respondent on August 21, 2007. The said motion for reconsideration, however, was not heard
on August 17, 2007 as the new acting presiding judge of the said court had just assumed office.
On December 19, 2007, the RTC issued an Order which denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera. The CA affirmed the RTC order. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Order dated December 19, 2007, which
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera.
RULING:
The petition is granted.
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provide that:
Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon
without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be
set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof
shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at

least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause
sets the hearing on shorter notice.
Sec. 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all
parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must
not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion
The general rule is that the three-day notice requirement in motions under Sections 4
and 5 of the Rules of Court is mandatory. It is an integral component of procedural due process.
The purpose of the three-day notice requirement, which was established not for the benefit of
the movant but rather for the adverse party, is to avoid surprises upon the latter and to grant it
sufficient time to study the motion and to enable it to meet the arguments interposed therein.
A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive
and which the court has no authority to act upon. Being a fatal defect, in cases of motions to
reconsider a decision, the running of the period to appeal is not tolled by their filing or
pendency.
Nevertheless, the three-day notice requirement is not a hard and fast rule. When the
adverse party had been afforded the opportunity to be heard, and has been indeed heard
through the pleadings filed in opposition to the motion, the purpose behind the three-day notice
requirement is deemed realized. In such case, the requirements of procedural due process are
substantially complied with.
It is undisputed that the hearing on the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses
Cabrera was reset by the R TC twice with due notice to the parties; it was only on October 26,
2007 that the motion was actually heard by the RTC. At that time, more than two months had
passed since the respondent received a copy of the said motion for reconsideration on August
21, 2007. The respondent was thus given sufficient time to study the motion and to enable him
to meet the arguments interposed therein. Indeed, the respondent was able to file his opposition
thereto on September 20, 2007.
Notwithstanding that the respondent received a copy of the said motion for
reconsideration four days after the date set by the spouses Cabrera for the hearing thereof, his
right to due process was not impinged as he was afforded the chance to argue his position.
Thus, the R TC erred in denying the spouses Cabrera's motion for reconsideration based
merely on their failure to comply with the three day notice requirement.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. JOSE T. CAPULONG
G.R. NO. 201643, MARCH 12, 2014
J. REYES
The preventive suspension order is interlocutory in character and not a final order on the
merits of the case. The aggrieved party may then seek redress from the courts through a
petition for certiorari under Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court. While it is true that
the primary relief prayed for by Capulong in his petition has already been voluntarily corrected
by the Ombudsman by the issuance of the order lifting his preventive suspension, we must not
lose sight of the fact that Capulong likewise prayed for other remedies. There being a finding of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly imperative for the CA
to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65.

FACTS:
The case arose from the Complaint-Affidavit for violation of Section 85 of R.A. No.
67136, Perjury under Article 183 of the RPC, and serious dishonesty and grave misconduct
under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, filed on July 27, 2009,
before the Ombudsman by Joselito P. Fangon, Acting Director of the General Investigation
Bureau of the Ombudsman, against Capulong, Customs Operation Officer V of the Bureau of
Customs.
On March 30, 2011, Capulong received an undated Order issued by the Ombudsman
placing him under preventive suspension without pay which shall continue until the case is
terminated but shall not exceed six months effective from receipt of the Order. Capulong filed an
Urgent Motion to Lift/Reconsider Order of Preventive Suspension with Motion to Resolve.
Questioning the preventive suspension and wary of the threatening and coercive nature
of the Ombudsmans order, Capulong, on April 19, 2011, filed with the CA a petition for certiorari
with urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction. The CA
granted the petition and issued a TRO enjoining and prohibiting the Ombudsman and any
person representing them or acting under their authority from implementing the preventive
suspension order.
Meanwhile, the Ombudsman issued an order lifting Capulongs preventive suspension.
On the same date, in the scheduled hearing, the Ombudsmans representative manifested in
open court that the assailed order of preventive suspension had already been lifted, thus the CA
held in abeyance the application for preliminary injunction.
On July 29, 2011, the CA granted Capulongs petition and dismissed the criminal charge.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA has jurisdiction over the subject matter and can grant reliefs, whether
primary or incidental, after the Ombudsman has lifted the subject order of preventive
suspension
RULING:
The petition is denied.
As a rule, it is the consistent and general policy of the Court not to interfere with the
Ombudsmans exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers. The rule is based not only
upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. It is within the context of this well-entrenched policy
that the Court proceeds to pass upon the validity of the preventive suspension order issued by
the Ombudsman.
While it is an established rule in administrative law that the courts of justice should
respect the findings of fact of said administrative agencies, the courts may not be bound by
such findings of fact when there is absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such evidence is
clearly, manifestly and patently insubstantial; and when there is a clear showing that the

administrative agency acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or in a capricious and
whimsical manner, such that its action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. These
exceptions exist in this case and compel the appellate court to review the findings of fact of the
Ombudsman.
In the instant case, the subsequent lifting of the preventive suspension order against
Capulong does not render the petition moot and academic. It does not preclude the courts from
passing upon the validity of a preventive suspension order, it being a manifestation of its
constitutionally mandated power and authority to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
The preventive suspension order is interlocutory in character and not a final order on the
merits of the case. The aggrieved party may then seek redress from the courts through a
petition for certiorari under Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court. While it is true that the
primary relief prayed for by Capulong in his petition has already been voluntarily corrected by
the Ombudsman by the issuance of the order lifting his preventive suspension, we must not lose
sight of the fact that Capulong likewise prayed for other remedies. There being a finding of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly imperative for the CA
to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65.
The decision of the appellate court to proceed with the merits of the case is included in
Capulongs prayer for such other reliefs as may be just and equitable under the premises.
Such a prayer in the petition justifies the grant of a relief not otherwise specifically prayed for.
More importantly, we have ruled that it is the allegations in the pleading which determine the
nature of the action and the Court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and proof even
if no such relief is prayed for.
Significantly, the power of adjudication, vested in the CA is not restricted to the specific
relief claimed by the parties to the dispute, but may include in the order or decision any matter
or determination which may be deemed necessary and expedient for the purpose of settling the
dispute or preventing further disputes, provided said matter for determination has been
established by competent evidence during the hearing. The CA is not bound by technical rules
of procedure and evidence, to the end that all disputes and other issues will be adjudicated in a
just, expeditious and inexpensive proceeding.
The requisites for the Ombudsman to issue a preventive suspension order are clearly
contained in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770. The Court, however, can substitute its own judgment
for that of the Ombudsman on this matter, with a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Ombudsman.
Undoubtedly, in this case, the CA aptly ruled that the Ombudsman abused its discretion
because it failed to sufficiently establish any basis to issue the order of preventive suspension.
Capulongs non-disclosure of his wifes business interest does not constitute serious dishonesty
or grave misconduct. Nothing in the records reveals that Capulong deliberately placed N/A in
his SALN despite knowledge about his wifes business interest. As explained by Capulong, the
SEC already revoked the registration of the corporations where his wife was an incorporator;
hence, he deemed it not necessary to indicate it in his SALN.
Ineluctably, the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of
a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts, which were the subject of the administrative

complaint. The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from this rule. However, the crime of
perjury for which Capulong was charged, requires a willful and deliberate assertion of a
falsehood in a statement under oath or in an affidavit, and the statement or affidavit in question
here is Capulong's SALNs. It then becomes necessary to consider the administrative charge
against Capulong to determine whether or not he has committed perjury. Therefore, with the
dismissal of Capulong's administrative case, the CA correctly dismissed its criminal counterpart
since the crime of perjury which stemmed from misrepresentations in his SALNs will no longer
have a leg to stand on.

LUI ENTERPRISES, INC. v. ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION AND THE PHILIPPINE

BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS
G.R. NO. 193494, MARCH 12, 2014

J. LEONEN
There should be no inexplicable delay in the filing of a motion to set aside order of
default. Even when a motion is filed within the required period, excusable negligence must be
properly alleged and proven.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati declared Lui Enterprises in default when it failed to
answer the complaint within the required period. Lui Enterprises filed a motion to set aside order
of default without an acceptable excuse why its counsel failed to answer the complaint. It failed
to prove the excusable negligence. Thus, the Makati trial court did not err in refusing to set
aside the order of default.
FACTS:
Lui Enterprises and Zuellig Pharma entered into a 10-year contract of lease over a
parcel of land located in Davao City. On January 10, 2003, Zuellig Pharma received a letter from
the Philippine Bank of Communications. Claiming to be the new owner of the leased property,
the bank asked Zuellig Pharma to pay rent directly to it.
Due to the conflicting claims of Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of
Communications over the rental payments, Zuellig Pharma filed a complaint for interpleader. Lui
Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Zuellig Pharmas alleged representative
did not have authority to file the complaint for interpleader on behalf of the corporation.
According to Lui Enterprises, an earlier filed nullification of deed of dation in payment case
pending with the RTC Davao barred the filing of the interpleader case.
Zuellig Pharma filed its opposition to the motion to dismiss. It argued that the motion to
dismiss should be denied for having been filed late, they likewise moved that Lui Enterprises be
declared in default. The RTC denied Lui Enterprises motion to dismiss and declared it in
default.
Lui manifested that the RTC Davao allegedly issued an order directing all of Lui
Enterprises lessees to observe status quo with regard to the rental payments and continue
remitting their rental payments to Lui Enterprises while the nullification of deed of dation in
payment case was being resolved. The Regional Trial Court of Makati only noted the
manifestation. It was only one year after the issuance of the order of default, that Lui Enterprises

filed a motion to set aside order of default in the Makati trial court on the ground of excusable
negligence.
While the motion to set aside order of default was still pending for resolution, Lui
Enterprises filed the manifestation and motion to dismiss. It manifested that the Davao court
issued another order directing the Philippine Bank of Communications to inform Zuellig Pharma
to pay rent to Lui Enterprises while the Davao trial courts order dated April 1, 2004 was
subsisting.
Without resolving the motion to set aside order of default, the Makati trial court denied
the manifestation with motion to dismiss on the ground that Lui Enterprises already lost its
standing in court. Lui Enterprises did not file any motion for reconsideration. The RTC ruled that
Lui Enterprises was barred from any claim in respect of the rental payments since it was
declared in default. The CA sustained the RTC ruling. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
3.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Lui Enterprises appeal for lack of
subject index, page references to the record, table of cases, textbooks and statutes
cited, and the statement of issues in Lui Enterprises appellants brief;
Whether the Regional Trial Court of Makati erred in denying Lui Enterprises motion
to set aside order of default;
Whether the annulment of deed of dation in payment pending in the Regional Trial
Court of Davao barred the subsequent filing of the interpleader case in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati; and

RULING:
The petition is denied.
1. On Lui Enterprises failure to comply with the rules on the contents of the appellants brief
Under Rule 50, Section 1, paragraph (f) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court
of Appeals may, on its own motion or that of the appellee, dismiss an appeal should the
appellants brief lack specific requirements under Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d),
and (f). These requirements are the subject index of the matter in brief, page references to the
record, and a table of cases alphabetically arranged and with textbooks and statutes cited.
Lui Enterprises appellants brief lacked a subject index, page references to the record,
and table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited. Under Rule 50, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed Lui Enterprises appeal.
There are exceptions to this rule. In Philippine Coconut Authority and Go, the appellants
substantially complied with the rules on the contents of the appellants brief. Thus, this court
excused the appellants procedural lapses.
In this case, Lui Enterprises did not substantially comply with the rules on the contents of
the appellants brief. It admitted that its appellants brief lacked the required subject index, page
references to the record, and table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited. However, it did not
even correct its admitted technical omissions by filing an amended appellants brief with the

required contents. Thus, this case does not allow a relaxation of the rules. The Court of Appeals
did not err in dismissing Lui Enterprises appeal.
2. On Lui Enterprises failure to show that its failure to answer the complaint within the required
period was due to excusable negligence
When a defendant is served with summons and a copy of the complaint, he or she is
required to answer within 15 days from the day he or she was served with summons. The
defendant may also move to dismiss the complaint within the time for but before filing the
answer.
Thus, a defendant who fails to answer within 15 days from service of summons either
presents no defenses against the plaintiffs allegations in the complaint or was prevented from
filing his or her answer within the required period due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence. In either case, the court may declare the defendant in default on plaintiffs motion
and notice to defendant. The court shall then try the case until judgment without defendants
participation and grant the plaintiff such relief as his or her complaint may warrant.
A defendant declared in default loses his or her standing in court. However, the
defendant declared in default does not waive all of his or her rights. He or she still has the right
to receive notice of subsequent proceedings. Also, the plaintiff must still present evidence
supporting his or her allegations despite the default of the defendant.
After notice of the declaration of default but before the court renders the default judgment, the
defendant may file, under oath, a motion to set aside order of default. The defendant must
properly show that his or her failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence. The defendant must also have a meritorious defense. Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph
(b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 3. Default; declaration of. x x x x (b) Relief from order of default. A party declared in
default may at any time after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set
aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case,
the order of default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in
the interest of justice. If the defendant discovers his or her default after judgment but prior to the
judgment becoming final and executory, he or she may file a motion for new trial under Rule 37,
Section 1, paragraph (a) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. If he or she discovers his or her
default after the judgment has become final and executory, a petition for relief from judgment
under Rule 38, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure may be filed. Appeal is also
available to the defendant declared in default. He or she may appeal the judgment for being
contrary to the evidence or to the law under Rule 41, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. He or she may do so even if he or she did not file a petition to set aside order of
default.
The remedies of the motion to set aside order of default, motion for new trial, and
petition for relief from judgment are mutually exclusive, not alternative or cumulative. This is to
compel defendants to remedy their default at the earliest possible opportunity. Depending on
when the default was discovered and whether a default judgment was already rendered, a
defendant declared in default may avail of only one of the three remedies.
In this case, Lui Enterprises had discovered its default before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati rendered judgment. Thus, it timely filed a motion to set aside order of default, raising the
ground of excusable negligence.

Excusable negligence is one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have
guarded against. The circumstances should be properly alleged and proved. In this case, we
find that Lui Enterprises failure to answer within the required period is inexcusable.
Lui Enterprises counsel filed its motion to dismiss four days late. It did not immediately
take steps to remedy its default and took one year from discovery of default to file a motion to
set aside order of default. In its motion to set aside order of default, Lui Enterprises only
conveniently blamed its x x x counsel for the late filing of the answer without offering any
excuse for the late filing. This is not excusable negligence under Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph
(b)127 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Makati did not err
in refusing to set aside the order of default.
Lui Enterprises argued that the Regional Trial Court of Makati should have been liberal in setting
aside its order of default. However, the basic requirements of Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph (b) of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure must first be complied with131 The defendants motion to set
aside order of default must satisfy three conditions. First is the time element. The defendant
must challenge the default order before judgment. Second, the defendant must have been
prevented from filing his answer due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Third,
he must have a meritorious defense.
As discussed, Lui Enterprises never explained why its counsel failed to file the motion to
dismiss on time. It just argued that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default.
Even assuming that it had a meritorious defense and that its representative and counsel had to
fly in from Davao to Makati to personally appear and manifest in court its meritorious defense,
Lui Enterprises must first show that its failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence. This Lui Enterprises did not do.
Lui Enterprises argued that Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case to compel Lui
Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications to litigate their claims. Thus, declaring
the other claimant in default would ironically defeat the very purpose of the suit. The Regional
Trial Court of Makati should not have declared Lui Enterprises in default.
Under Rule 62, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a person may file a
special civil action for interpleader if conflicting claims are made against him or her over a
subject matter in which he or she has no interest. The action is brought against the claimants to
compel them to litigate their conflicting claims among themselves.
An interpleader complaint may be filed by a lessee against those who have conflicting
claims over the rent due for the property leased. This remedy is for the lessee to protect him or
her from double vexation in respect of one liability. He or she may file the interpleader case to
extinguish his or her obligation to pay rent, remove him or her from the adverse claimants
dispute, and compel the parties with conflicting claims to litigate among themselves.
In this case, Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case to extinguish its obligation to pay
rent. Its purpose in filing the interpleader case was not defeated when the Makati trial court
declared Lui Enterprises in default.
At any rate, an adverse claimant in an interpleader case may be declared in default.
Under Rule 62, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a claimant who fails to answer
within the required period may, on motion, be declared in default. The consequence of the

default is that the court may render judgment barring the defaulted claimant from any claim in
respect to the subject matter.
3. On whether the nullification of deed in dation in payment case bar the filing of the
interpleader case
Under Rule 16, Section 1, paragraph (e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion
to dismiss may be filed on the ground of litis pendentia:
Section 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on
any of the following grounds: x x x x (e) That there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause; x x x x Litis pendentia is Latin for
a pending suit. It exists when another action is pending between the same
parties for the same cause of action x x x. The subsequent action is
unnecessary and vexatious and is instituted to harass the respondent [in the
subsequent action].
The requisites of litis pendentia are: (1) Identity of parties or at least such as represent
the same interest in both actions; (2) Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs
being founded on the same facts; and (3) The identity in the two cases should be such that the
judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to
res judicata in the other. All of the requisites must be present. Absent one requisite, there is no
litis pendentia.
In this case, there is no litis pendentia since there is no identity of parties in the
nullification of deed of dation in payment case and the interpleader case. Zuellig. There is also
no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. Thus, the pending nullification case did not
bar the filing of the interpleader case. All told, the trial court did not err in proceeding with the
interpleader case. The nullification of deed of dation in payment case pending with the Regional
Trial Court of Davao did not bar the filing of the interpleader case with the Regional Trial Court
of Makati.
HEIRS OF AMADA A. ZAULDA v. ISAAC Z. ZAULDA
G.R. NO. 201234, MARCH 17, 2014

J. Mendoza
The almost four months that lapsed before the records reached the ponentes office was
caused by the gross incompetence and inefficiency of the division personnel at the CA. It was
the height of injustice for the CA to dismiss a petition just because the motion for extension
reached the ponentes office beyond the last date prayed for.
The petitioners could not also be faulted that the motion for extension of time was
received by the CA on September 13, 2010. The rules allow parties to file a pleading by
registered mail. They are not required to ensure that it would be received by the court on or
before the last day of the extended period prayed for. Though no party can assume that its
motion for extension would be granted, any denial thereof should be reasonable.
FACTS:
Petitioners, as heirs of Amada Zaula, were co-owners of a parcel of land in Aklan.
Sometime in March 2000, respondent, through force and intimidation, forcibly entered the

subject property and, there and then, cut and took with him bamboos and other
forest/agricultural products. On March 29, 2000, respondent, together with two other unidentified
persons, forcibly entered the subject property and, with threat and intimidation, constructed and
built a house made of light material, and that petitioners demanded respondent to vacate and
turn over the subject property to them but the latter refused to do so.
The heirs of Zaulda then filed a complaint for recovery of possession and declaration of
ownership against respondent, before the MCTC, where the Court rendered judgment declaring
plaintiffs the lawful owners entitled to possession of the Lots 1, 3 and 6, and declaring Lots A
and B as co-owned by plaintiffs, defendant, and intervenors. The RTC, partly modified the
decision of the MCTC and declared respondent as the owner and possessor of lots 1 and 3
Petitioner Eleseo Zaulda, the lone surviving heir of Amada Aguila-Zaulda, after his coheir Rodolfo Zaulda passed away, filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for being filed out of time and for
lack of competent evidence on affiants identity on the attached verification and certification
against forum shopping. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time despite
the motion for extension of time having been timely filed
RULING:
The petition is granted.
Petition for review from the RTC to the CA is governed by Rule 42 of the Rules of Court,
which provides: Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring to appeal from a
decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file
a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of
said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, x x x. The petition shall be filed and
served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial
of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration x x x. Upon proper motion x x x, the Court
of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the
petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason
and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
In this case, the petitioners complied with the requirements laid down in the above
quoted provision. Records show that on March 10, 2010, petitioners timely filed a motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial of the RTC decision (dated January 20, 2010, received by
petitioners on February 25, 2010), but the same was denied in the RTC Order, dated August 4,
2010, copy of which was received by petitioners on August 10, 2010. Thus, they had until
August 25, 2010 within which to file a petition for review pursuant to said Section 1, Rule 42.
On August 24, 2010, petitioners filed their Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition
for Review before the CA, paying the docket and other lawful fees and deposit for costs and
prayed for an additional period of fifteen (15) days from August 25, 2010 or until September 9,
2010, within which to file the said petition.
On September 9, 2010, they filed the Petition for Review.

As earlier stated, the Motion For Extension Of Time To File Petition For Review, which
was filed through registered mail on August 24, 2010, was filed on time. It was physically in the
appellate courts possession long before the CA issued its Resolution on February 11, 2011,
dismissing the petition for review for being filed out of time. The record shows that the CA
received the motion for extension of time to file petition for review on September 13, 2010 but
the CA Division received the motion on September 14, 2010, and the ponentes office received it
on January 5, 2011.
Indeed, there was a delay, but it was a delay that cannot be attributed at all to the
petitioners. The almost four (4) months that lapsed before the records reached the ponentes
office was caused by the gross incompetence and inefficiency of the division personnel at the
CA. It was the height of injustice for the CA to dismiss a petition just because the motion for
extension reached the ponentes office beyond the last date prayed for. Clearly, the petitioners
were unreasonably deprived of their right to be heard on the merits because of the CAs
unreasonable obsession to reduce its load. In allowing the petitioners to be fatally prejudiced by
the delay in the transmittal attributable to its inept or irresponsible personnel, the CA committed
an unfortunate injustice.
The petitioners could not also be faulted that the motion for extension of time was
received by the CA on September 13, 2010. The rules allow parties to file a pleading by
registered mail. They are not required to ensure that it would be received by the court on or
before the last day of the extended period prayed for. Though no party can assume that its
motion for extension would be granted, any denial thereof should be reasonable.
Granting that the petition was filed late, substantial justice begs that it be allowed and be
given due course. Indeed, the merits of petitioners cause deserve to be passed upon
considering that the findings of the RTC were in complete contrast to the findings of the MCTC
which declared petitioners as the lawful owners entitled to possession of the lots in question.
As regards the competent identity of the affiant in the Verification and Certification,
records show that he proved his identity before the notary public through the presentation of his
senior citizen card.
The Rules on Notarial Practice provide that a senior citizen card is one of the competent
identification cards recognized in the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. For said reason, there
was compliance with the requirement. Contrary to the perception of the CA, attachment of a
photocopy of the identification card in the document is not required by the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice. Even A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, amending Section 12 thereof, is silent on it. Thus,
the CAs dismissal of the petition for lack of competent evidence on the affiants identity on the
attached verification and certification against forum shopping was without clear basis.
Even assuming that a photocopy of competent evidence of identity was indeed required,
non-attachment thereof would not render the petition fatally defective. It has been consistently
held that verification is merely a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement, affecting merely the form
of the pleading such that non-compliance therewith does not render the pleading fatally
defective.

SPOUSES EDMUNDO DELA CRUZ AND AMELIA CONCIO-DELA CRUZ

v. SPOUSES RUFINO R. CAPCO AND MARTY C. CAPCO
G.R. NO. 176055, MARCH 17, 2014

J. DEL CASTILLO
The requirement that the complaint should aver, as jurisdictional facts, when and how
entry into the property was made by the defendants applies only when the issue is the
timeliness of the filing of the complaint before the MTC. However, the timeliness of the filing of
the Complaint for unlawful detainer is not an issue in this case. Hence, the failure of the
Complaint to allege when and how the spouses Capco came into possession of the property
does not mean that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
The only issue in an ejectment case is the physical possession of real property,
possession de facto and not possession de jure. But where the parties to an ejectment case
raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between
the parties has the better right to possess the property. Here, both parties anchor their right to
possess based on ownership, i.e., the spouses Dela Cruz by their own ownership while the
spouses Capco by the ownership of Rufino as one of the heirs of the alleged true owner of the
property. Thus, the MeTC and the RTC correctly passed upon the issue of ownership in this
case to determine the issue of possession. However, it must be emphasized that the
adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between
the same parties involving title to the property.
FACTS:
On October 6, 2003, the spouses Dela Cruz filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer
against the spouses Capco before the MeTC of Pateros. They alleged that Teodora, mother of
petitioner Amelia, acquired ownership over a piece of land by virtue of a Decision rendered by
the RTC of Pasig in Land Registration Case No. 9511. The said property was eventually
registered in her name under TCT No. 31873. Teodora, out of neighborliness and blood
relationship, tolerated the spouses Capcos occupation thereof. Subsequently, the subject
property was conveyed to the spouses Dela Cruz. Intending to construct a house thereon and
utilize the space for their balut and salted eggs business, the spouses Dela Cruz thus
demanded that the spouses Capco vacate the property. As the spouses Capco refused, the
matter was brought before the Barangay Lupon for conciliation wherein several meetings were
held but to no avail.
In their Answer, the spouses Capco pointed out that the Complaint is defective for failing
to allege the exact metes and bounds of the property. Neither is a title attached thereto to show
that the spouses Dela Cruz are the owners of the disputed property. The MeTC concluded that
since the spouses Capcos possession of the subject property was by mere tolerance of the
spouses Dela Cruz, the latter have the better right to possess and thus may recover the same
upon demand. The RTC affirmed the MetC Ruling. The CA set aside the RTC decision. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in setting aside the rulings of the MeTC and then RTC
RULING:
The petition is granted.

It must be stated at the outset that this Court is not a trier of facts. However, the
conflicting findings of facts of the MeTC and the RTC on one hand, and the CA on the other,
compel us to revisit the records of this case for proper dispensation of justice.
Contrary to the CAs pronouncement, the Complaint sufficiently makes out a case for
unlawful detainer. The CA intimated in its assailed Decision that the MeTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the spouses Dela Cruz Complaint for ejectment since the same failed to
describe how the spouses Capcos entry to the property was effected or how and when the
dispossession started, as held in Go and Melchor. Such a requirement, however, does not apply
in this case.
The Court has already clarified in Delos Reyes v. Odones that: The requirement that the
complaint should aver, as jurisdictional facts, when and how entry into the property was made
by the defendants applies only when the issue is the timeliness of the filing of the complaint
before the MTC x x x.
This is because, in forcible entry cases, the prescriptive period is counted from the date
of defendants actual entry into the property; whereas, in unlawful detainer cases, it is counted
from date of the last demand to vacate. Hence, to determine whether the case was filed on time,
there is a necessity to ascertain whether the complaint is one for forcible entry or for unlawful
detainer; and since the main distinction between the two actions is when and how defendant
entered the property, the determinative facts should be alleged in the complaint.
The timeliness of the filing of the Complaint for unlawful detainer is not an issue in this
case. Hence, the failure of the Complaint to allege when and how the spouses Capco came into
possession of the property does not mean that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it. To
give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is
necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party
clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings
are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court
jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.
A complaint, to sufficiently make out a case for unlawful detainer and fall under the
jurisdiction of the MeTC, must allege that: 1. initially, possession of property by the defendant
was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; 2. eventually, such possession became
illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latters right of possession;
3. thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of
the enjoyment thereof; and; 4. within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
Here, the Complaint alleged that the spouses Dela Cruz predecessor-ininterest,
Teodora, is the registered owner of the property per TCT No. 31873 and that she tolerated the
spouses Capcos occupation of the lot. The spouses Dela Cruz subsequently acquired the
property through conveyance and they extended the same tolerance to the spouses Capco. The
spouses Dela Cruz demanded for the spouses Capco to vacate the property but to no avail;
hence, they sent the latter a formal demand letter which, per the attached copy to the
Complaint, is dated September 1, 2003.39 The Complaint was filed on October 6, 2003 or within
one year from the time the formal demand to vacate was made. Clearly, the Complaint
sufficiently established a case for unlawful detainer as to vest the MeTC jurisdiction over it.

The only issue in an ejectment case is the physical possession of real property,
possession de facto and not possession de jure. But where the parties to an ejectment case
raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between
the parties has the better right to possess the property. Here, both parties anchor their right to
possess based on ownership, i.e., the spouses Dela Cruz by their own ownership while the
spouses Capco by the ownership of Rufino as one of the heirs of the alleged true owner of the
property. Thus, the MeTC and the RTC correctly passed upon the issue of ownership in this
case to determine the issue of possession. However, it must be emphasized that [t]he
adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the
same parties involving title to the property.
The spouses Dela Cruz were able to prove by preponderance of evidence that they are
the owners of the lot. Their allegation that the subject property was adjudicated to Teodora by
virtue of a decision in a land registration case and was later conveyed in their favor, is supported
by (1) a copy of the Decision in the said land registration case; (2) the title of the land issued to
Teodora (TCT No. 31873), and, (3) the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of
Teodora wherein the latters heirs agreed to convey the said property to Amelia.
All told, the Court agrees with the MeTC's conclusion, as affirmed by the RTC, that the
spouses Dela Cruz are better entitled to the material possession of the subject property. As its
present owners, they have a right to the possession of the property which is one of the attributes
of ownership.

METROPOLITAN FABRICS, INC., et al. v. PROSPERITY CREDIT RESOURCES, INC. et al.

G.R. NO. 154390, MARCH 17, 2014

J. BERSAMIN
The contested deed of real estate mortgage was a public document by virtue of its being
acknowledged before notary public. As a notarized document, the deed carried the evidentiary
weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and had in its favor the presumption
of regularity. Hence, it was admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity, and
was entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. To rebut its authenticity and genuineness, the
contrary evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant; otherwise, the
deed should be upheld.
Petitioners undeniably failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence against the
genuineness and authenticity of the deed. Instead, their actuations even demonstrated that their
transaction with respondents had been regular and at arms-length, thereby belying the
intervention of fraud.
FACTS:
In July 1984, MFI sought from PCRI a loan in the amount of P3.5 million with 24%
interest per annum and a term of ten years. MFI allegedly entrusted to PCRI 7 titles, with an
aggregate area of 3.3 hectares and left it to defendants to choose from among the 7 titles those
which would be sufficient to secure the loan.
On September 4, 1986, MFI received a Notice of Sheriffs Sale announcing the auction
of the seven lots due to unpaid indebtedness of P10.5 million. MFI protested the foreclosure,

and the auction was reset to October 27, 1986. At the auction sale, PCRI was the sole bidder for
P6.5 million.
On January 16, 1990 and again on March 5, 1990, PCRI sent the plaintiffs a letter
demanding that they vacate the four remaining lots. On March 19, 1990, PCRI executed an
affidavit of non-redemption of TCT Nos. 317699, 317702, 317703 and 317704. On June 7,
1990, S.G. del Rosario, PCRIs vice-president, wrote MFI reiterating their demand to vacate the
premises and remove pieces of machinery, equipment and persons therein, which MFI
eventually heeded.
On October 9, 1991, MFI filed a case for nullification of the mortgage contract and of the
foreclosure with damages on the ground of fraud. The RTC rendered a decision declaring the
real estate mortgage and the foreclosure by respondents null and void, and ordering the
reconveyance of the foreclosed properties to petitioners. The CA reversed and set aside the
RTC ruling. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the mortgage and foreclosure of the subject four (4) parcels of land should be
declared null and void
RULING:
The petition is denied.
It is settled that the appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court
unless there is a showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact
or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case.
Indeed, the trial courts findings are always presumed correct.
Nonetheless, the CA is not precluded from making its own determination and
appreciation of facts if it considers the conclusions arrived at by the trial court not borne out by
the evidence, or if substantial facts bearing upon the result of the case were overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied. As an appellate court, the CA is not necessarily bound by the
conclusions of the trial court, but holds the exclusive authority to review the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses and the weighing of conflicting evidence.
In view of the conflicting findings and appreciation of facts by the RTC and the CA, we
have to revisit the evidence of the parties.
Petitioners insist that respondents committed fraud when the officers of MFIwere made
to sign the deed of real estate mortgage in blank.
According to Article 1338 of the Civil Code, there is fraud when one of the contracting
parties, through insidious words or machinations, induces the other to enter into the contract
that, without the inducement, he would not have agreed to. Yet, fraud, to vitiate consent, must
be the causal (dolo causante), not merely the incidental (dolo incidente), inducement to the
making of the contract. Causal fraud is defined as a deception employed by one party prior to
or simultaneous to the contract in order to secure the consent of the other. Fraud cannot be
presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Whoever alleges fraud
affecting a transaction must substantiate his allegation, because a person is always presumed

to take ordinary care of his concerns, and private transactions are similarly presumed to have
been fair and regular. To be remembered is that mere allegation is definitely not evidence;
hence, it must be proved by sufficient evidence.
The contested deed of real estate mortgage was a public document by virtue of its being
acknowledged before notary public. As a notarized document, the deed carried the evidentiary
weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and had in its favor the presumption
of regularity. Hence, it was admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity, and
was entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. To rebut its authenticity and genuineness, the
contrary evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant; otherwise, the
deed should be upheld.
Petitioners undeniably failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence against the
genuineness and authenticity of the deed. Instead, their actuations even demonstrated that their
transaction with respondents had been regular and at arms-length, thereby belying the
intervention of fraud.
The totality of the evidence presented tended to indicate that fraud was not attendant
during the transactions between the parties. Verily, as between the duly executed real estate
mortgage and the unsubstantiated allegations of fraud, the Court affords greater weight to the
former.
Moreover, the Action to assail the mortgage already prescribed.
It appears that the original stance of petitioners was that the deed of real estate
mortgage was voidable. In their complaint, they averred that the deed, albeit in printed form,
was incomplete in essential details, and that MFI, through its president, signed it in good faith
and in absolute confidence. Yet, petitioners now claim that the CA committed a reversible error
in not holding that the absence of consent made the deed of real estate mortgage void, not
merely voidable. In effect, they are now advancing that their consent was not merely vitiated by
means of fraud, but that there was complete absence of consent. Although they should be
estopped from raising this issue for the first time on appeal, the Court nonetheless opts to
consider it because its resolution is necessary to arrive at a just and complete resolution of the
case.
As the records show, petitioners really agreed to mortgage their properties as security
for their loan, and signed the deed of mortgage for the purpose. Thereafter, they delivered the
TCTs of the properties subject of the mortgage to respondents.
Consequently, petitioners' contention of absence of consent had no firm moorings. It
remained unproved. With the contract being voidable, petitioners' action to annul the real estate
mortgage already prescribed. Article 1390, in relation to Article 1391 of the Civil Code, provides
that if the consent of the contracting parties was obtained through fraud, the contract is
considered voidable and may be annulled within four years from the time of the discovery of the
fraud. The discovery of fraud is reckoned from the time the document was registered in the
Register of Deeds in view of the rule that registration was notice to the whole world. Thus,
because the mortgage involving the seven lots was registered on September 5, 1984, they had
until September 5, 1988 within which to assail the validity of the mortgage. But their complaint
was instituted in the RTC only on October 10, 1991. Hence, the action, being by then already
prescribed, should be dismissed.

HEIRS OF TERESITA MONTOYA, et al. v. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, et al

G.R. NO. 181055, MARCH 19, 2014

J. BRION
The petitioners essentially assail in this petition the validity of the NHAs acquisition of
the property, in view of the prohibition on sale or disposition of agricultural lands under E.O. No.
228, in relation to P.D. No. 27 and Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Resolution of this petitions core
issue requires the proper interpretation and application of the laws and the rules governing the
governments agrarian reform program, as well as the laws governing the powers and functions
of the NHA as the propertys acquiring entity. As presented, therefore, this petitions core issue
is a question of law that a Rule 45 petition properly addresses.
This notwithstanding, the resolution of this petitions core issue necessitates the prior
determination of two essentially factual issues, i.e., the validity of the propertys conversion and
the petitioners claimed ownership of the property. As questions of fact, they are proscribed in a
Rule 45 petitionThe settled rule is that the Courts jurisdiction in a petition for review on
certiorari is limited to resolving only questions of law.
FACTS:
In 1992, the Gonzaleses donated a portion of their landholding in Pampanga as a
resettlement site for the displaced victims of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption. The Gonzaleses gave
the landholdings tenants one-half share of their respective tillage with the corresponding title at
no cost to the latter. The Gonzaleses retained the property (pursuant to their retention rights)
and registered it in Dorita Gonzales-Villars name.
Still needing additional resettlement sites, the NHA purchased the property on February 20,
1996. An application filed by the NHA to convert the property to residential form was later
approved by the DAR.
In their complaint filed before the PARAD, the petitioners claimed that the sale between
the NHA and the Gonzaleses were intended to circumvent the provisions of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
The PARAD denied the Complaint for Injunction and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of
Absolute Sale filed by the Heirs of Teresita Montoya, et al. The PARAD decision was affirmed by
both the DARAB and the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether a Rule 45 petition is proper in this case
RULING:
The petition is denied.
The petitions arguments present proscribed factual issues. The petitioners essentially
assail in this petition the validity of the NHAs acquisition of the property, in view of the
prohibition on sale or disposition of agricultural lands under E.O. No. 228, in relation to P.D. No.
27 and Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Resolution of this petitions core issue requires the proper
interpretation and application of the laws and the rules governing the governments agrarian
reform program, as well as the laws governing the powers and functions of the NHA as the

propertys acquiring entity. As presented, therefore, this petitions core issue is a question of law
that a Rule 45 petition properly addresses.
This notwithstanding, the resolution of this petitions core issue necessitates the prior
determination of two essentially factual issues, i.e., the validity of the propertys conversion and
the petitioners claimed ownership of the property. As questions of fact, they are proscribed in a
Rule 45 petition.
The settled rule is that the Courts jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari is
limited to resolving only questions of law. A question of law arises when the doubt exists as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises
as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Under these significations, we clearly cannot
resolve this petitions issues without conducting a re-examination and reevaluation of the lower
tribunals unanimous findings on the factual matters (of the propertys conversion and of the
petitioners ownership of the property), including the presented evidence, which the Courts
limited Rule 45 jurisdiction does not allow.
Moreover, this Court generally accords respect, even finality to the factual findings of
quasi-judicial agencies, i.e., the PARAD and the DARAB, when these findings are supported by
substantial evidence. The PARAD and the DARAB, by reason of their official position have
acquired expertise in specific matters within their jurisdiction, and their findings deserve full
respect; without justifiable reason, these factual findings ought not to be altered, modified, or
reversed.
To be sure, this Rule 45 proscription is not iron-clad and jurisprudence may admit of
exceptions. A careful review of this cases records, however, justifies the application of the
general proscriptive rule rather than the exception. Viewed in this light, we are constrained to
deny the petition for raising proscribed factual issues and because we find no reason to depart
from the assailed rulings.
Even if we were to disregard this procedural lapse and decide the case on its merits, we
are inclined to deny the petition and affirm as valid the NHAs acquisition of the property on
three main points, which we will discuss in detail below.
The property was validly converted to residential from agricultural uses
In declaring the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale valid, all three tribunals found that the
property has already been removed from the agrarian reforms coverage as a result of its valid
conversion from agricultural to residential uses.
We find no reason to disturb their findings and conclusion on this matter.
BARRY LANIER AND PERLITA LANIER v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 189176, MARCH 19, 2014

J. PEREZ
While the determination of probable cause is primarily an executive function, the Court
would not hesitate to interfere if there is a clear showing that Secretary of Justice gravely
abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in making his determination
and in arriving at the conclusion he reached.

When the Secretary of Justice concluded that there was planting of evidence based on
the lone fact that the raiding team arrived ahead of the search team, he, in effect went into the
merits of the defense. When he made a determination based on his own appreciation of the
pieces of evidence for and against the accused, he effectively assumed the function of a trial
judge in the evaluation of the pieces of evidence and, thereby, acted outside his jurisdiction.
FACTS:
In their Joint Affidavit of Arrest, SPO1 Gorion and PO2 Remaneses attested that Task
Force Roulette of the Aklan Police and the PDEA received information from an asset that
petitioners Barry and Perlita were engaged in selling illegal drugs in Boracay Island. The police
operatives conducted a test-buy at petitioners residence where they were able to purchase
P5,000.00 worth of shabu and P1,000.00 worth of marijuana from petitioners. On the basis of
the test-buy operation, they were able to secure a search warrant from the RTC of Aklan.
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Kalibo filed an Information charging petitioners of
violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. A Motion to Quash the Information
was filed before the RTC. The RTC denied the Motion to Quash and remanded the case to the
provincial prosecutor for preliminary investigation.
In a Resolution dated 8 March 2004, the provincial prosecutor upheld the Information
and directed the return of the records to the trial court for disposition. Petitioners, however, filed
a petition for review before the DOJ assailing the Resolution of the provincial prosecutor. The
Secretary of Justice acted on the petition favorably and directed the withdrawal of the
Information which directive the provincial prosecutor heeded by filing a Motion to Withdraw
Information before the trial court. The trial court granted the Motion to Withdraw Information. On
appeal, the CA nullified and set aside the DOJ Resolutions and the RTC Order and reinstated
the Information against petitioners. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reinstating the Information against petitioners
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Petitioners defend the Secretary of Justice in ordering the withdrawal of the Information
on the ground that the pieces of evidence obtained through an illegal search becomes
inadmissible in evidence. Petitioners explain that the search was illegal because it violated
Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure when the search was not made in the
presence of the lawful occupants of the house.
It is well-settled that courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of public
prosecutors and the DOJ on the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the purpose
of filing criminal informations, unless such findings are tainted with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The rationale behind the general rule rests on the
principle of separation of powers, dictating that the determination of probable cause for the
purpose of indicting a suspect is properly an executive function; while the exception hinges on
the limiting principle of checks and balances, whereby the judiciary, through a special civil action
of certiorari, has been tasked by the present Constitution to determine whether or not there has

been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Judicial review of the resolution of the Secretary of Justice is limited to a determination
of whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction considering that full discretionary authority has been delegated to the executive
branch in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation. Courts are not
empowered to substitute their judgment for that of the executive branch; it may, however, look
into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion.
As a requisite to the filing of a criminal complaint, probable cause pertains to facts and
circumstances sufficient to incite a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
accused is probably guilty thereof.
Only such facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondent are
required, not absolute certainty. Probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding
based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction. What
is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held
for trial.
The elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
drug.
The presence of these elements was attested to by evidence such as the Joint Affidavit
of Arrest and the Receipt of the Properties seized. The police officers averred that they
recovered 3 sachets of shabu weighing 10.4 grams inside a jewelry box on petitioners living
room. They also seized one (1) big gift pack containing dried marijuana leaves weighing more or
less 950 grams and two (2) gift packs containing nine (9) bricks of dried marijuana leaves
weighing 800 grams on top of the head board of petitioners bed. Moreover, the finding of a
dangerous drug in the house or within the premises of the house of the accused is prima facie
evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi.
When the Secretary of Justice concluded that there was planting of evidence based on
the lone fact that the raiding team arrived ahead of the search team, he, in effect went into the
merits of the defense. When he made a determination based on his own appreciation of the
pieces of evidence for and against the accused, he effectively assumed the function of a trial
judge in the evaluation of the pieces of evidence and, thereby, acted outside his jurisdiction.
Regarding the submission of petitioners that the remedy from the RTCs Order to
withdraw the filing of the Information should have been an ordinary appeal, we rule that on a
finding of grave abuse of discretion, the RTC Order may be elevated to the Court of Appeals on
certiorari.
There is, here, a basis for such finding. When confronted with a motion to withdraw an
Information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the Secretary of
Justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits
of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such
resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding farther with the trial. While the

Secretary's ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. When the trial courts Order rests
entirely on the assessment of the DOJ without doing its own independent evaluation, the trial
court effectively abdicates its judicial power and refuses to perform a positive duty enjoined by
law.
The RTC erroneously held that it has not yet effectively acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the accused as no commitment order has yet been issued against them. At the risk of
sounding repetitive, we must emphasize that the trial court, having acquired jurisdiction over the
case, is not bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further
with the trial. While the Secretary's ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.
All told, the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error when it nullified and set
aside the Resolutions and Order, rendered by the Secretary of Justice and the RTC,
respectively.
HEIRS OF CORNELIO MIGUEL v. HEIRS OF ANGEL MIGUEL
G.R. NO. 158916, MARCH 19, 2014

J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or question which was in
issue in a former suit, and was there judicially passed on and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein, as far as concerns the
parties to that action and persons in privity with them, and cannot be again litigated in any future
action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent
jurisdiction on either the same or a different cause of action, while the judgment remains
unreversed or unvacated by proper authority. The. For res judicata in the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment to apply, identity of cause of action is not required but merely
identity of parties and identity of issues.
As the issues of whether Lot J of Psd. 146880 is one of the properties donated by the
spouses Cornelio and Nieves to Angel and whether such donation was valid have been
necessarily settled in Civil Case No. 1185, they can no longer be relitigated in Civil Case No.
2735.
FACTS:
Cornelio was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Puerto Princesa City. He had the
property subdivided into ten smaller lots which were designated as Lots A to J of Psd-146880.
Cornelio sold nine of the lots to his children, with Lot G going to his son Angel, predecessor-ininterest of the respondents in this case. The remaining lot, Lot J, Cornelio kept for himself and
his wife, Nieves. In a deed of donation inter vivos, the spouses Cornelio and Nieves donated
two lots to Angel. Angel accepted the donation in the same instrument.
Subsequently, however, Cornelio filed a complaint for the annulment of the deed of
donation on the alleged ground that one of the properties subject of the donation, Lot 2-J of
Psd-146879, was given the technical description of Lot J of Psd-146880. On Angels motion, it
was dismissed for lack of cause of action.
Angel, thereafter, filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Registrar of Deeds to
issue a certificate of title in his favor. The petition was granted and TCT No. 11349 was issued in

the name of Angel over Lot J of Psd-146880. Angel later on caused the subdivision of Lot J of
Psd-146880 into four smaller lots which he correspondingly donated to each of his four sons.
On July 7, 1994, petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Angels TCT No.
11349 and its derivative titles, as well as of the respective deeds of donation Angel executed in
favor of his sons. The RTC dismissed the petitioners complaint for the nullification of deeds of
donation and reconveyance of property. The CA affirmed the Order of the RTC. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA misapplied the doctrine of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness
of judgment
RULING:
The petition is denied.
The following are the elements of res judicata: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new
action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on
the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action.
Under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by
prior judgment as enunciated in Section 47(b) of the said Rule and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment as explained in Section 47(c) of the same Rule. Should identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a bar
by prior judgment would apply. If as between the two cases, only identity of parties can be
shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as conclusiveness of judgment
applies.
Nabus v. Court of Appeals clarifies the concept of conclusiveness of judgment further:
The doctrine states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit, and was there
judicially passed on and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled
by the judgment therein, as far as concerns the parties to that action and persons in privity with
them, and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in
the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or a different
cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed or unvacated by proper authority. The
only identities thus required for the operation of the judgment as an estoppel x x x are identity of
parties and identity of issues.
In this case, the Court of Appeals held the following as regards the issue of identity of
parties: As further held, conclusiveness of judgment calls for identity of parties, not causes of
action, and there is identity of parties not only when the parties are the same but also those on
privity with them, as between their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action, litigation for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity, or when there is substantial identity of parties. In the present case, appellants
were the successors in interest of petitioner Cornelio in Civil Case No. 1185 against respondent
Angel, whereas in Civil Case No. 2735, appellees were the successors in interest of Angel.
Undeniably, there is substantial identity of parties in the said two cases. And since the matter

directly controverted and determined in Civil Case No. 1185 is the lot which is also the bone of
contention in Civil Case No. 2735, the judgment rendered in the first case is conclusive in the
second case.
The petitioners do not question the ruling of the Court of Appeals that there is identity of
parties in Civil Case No. 1185 and Civil Case No. 2735. What the petitioners principally contend
is that the judgment in Civil Case No. 1185 cannot bar Civil Case No. 2735 as the two cases
involve different causes of action and different subject matters.
However, for res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment to apply, identity
of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue.
The claim of the petitioners that Civil Case No. 1185 was dismissed not because they
have no cause of action but because they failed to state such a cause of action is wrong. The
Order dated January 31, 1986 in Civil Case No. 1185 ruled that Cornelio and the petitioners had
no cause of action in connection with the reformation of the deed of donation executed by the
spouses Cornelio and Nieves in favor of Angel because the said deed of donation is a simple
donation and therefore not a proper subject of an action for reformation.
For purposes of conclusiveness of judgment, identity of issues means that the right, fact,
or matter in issue has previously been either directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action by a competent court. In this case, the issue of the transfer pursuant
to the deed of donation to Angel of Lot J of Psd. 146880 and, corollarily, his right over the said
property has been necessarily involved in Civil Case No. 1185.
The petitioners argued that none of the issues involved in Civil Case No. 1185 is also
involved in Civil Case No. 2735. The primary issue in Civil Case No. 1185 is whether the true
intention of the spouses Cornelio and Nieves as donors was to donate to Angel the property
described in the deed of donation, that is, Lot J of Psd. 146880. The issue in Civil Case No.
1185 is therefore the identity of one of the properties donated by the spouses Cornelio and
Nieves for which Cornelio and the petitioners sought reformation of the deed of donation. On the
other hand, the subject matter of Civil Case No. 2735 is the recovery of Lot J of Psd. 146880 on
the petitioners claim that a clerical error prevented the deed of donation from conforming to the
true intention of the spouses Cornelio and Nieves as to the identity of the property they intended
to donate to Angel.
As the issues of whether Lot J of Psd. 146880 is one of the properties donated by the
spouses Cornelio and Nieves to Angel and whether such donation was valid have been
necessarily settled in Civil Case No. 1185, they can no longer be relitigated again in Civil Case
No. 2735. The Order dated January 31, 1986 effectively held that the said property had been
donated to Angel. It follows that he had properly sought its registration in his name under TCT
No. 11349 and he had validly partitioned and donated it to his four children who acquired TCT
Nos. 20094, 20095, 20096, and 20097 in their respective names.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JERRY OBOGNE

G.R. NO. 199740, MARCH 24, 2014

J. Del Castillo

In a rape case filed by a mental retardate, the Court held that mental retardation per se
does not affect a witness credibility. A mental retardate may be a credible witness. Only those
whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are
incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others are disqualified.
FACTS:
Appellant Jeny Obogne was charged with the crime of rape of a 12-year old mental
retardate. The RTC rendered a Judgment finding Obogne guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of simple rape committed against AAA. The trial court did not consider AAAs mental
retardation as a qualifying circumstance considering that the Information failed to allege that
appellant knew of AAAs mental disability. The CA affirmed the trial courts ruling. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the court erred in giving credence to the testimony of AAA despite her mental
disability
RULING:
The petition is denied.
Sections 20 and 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provide:
Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. -Except as provided in the next
succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses. x x x x
Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. - The
following persons cannot be witnesses: (a) Those whose mental condition, at the
time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of
intelligently making known their perception to others; (b) Children whose mental
maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting
which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
In this case, AAA is totally qualified to take the witness stand notwithstanding her
mental condition. As correctly observed by the trial court: This Court finds AAA a very
credible witness, even in her mental condition. Contrary to defense counsels objection that
AAA was not capable of intelligently making known her perception to others, AAA managed
to recount the ordeal she had gone through in the hands of the accused, though in a soft voice
and halting manner x x x. AAAs simple account of her ordeal clearly reflects sincerity and
truthfulness. While it is true that, on cross-examination, AAA faltered in the sequence of events
x x x this is understandable because even one with normal mental condition would not be able
to recall, with a hundred percent accuracy, events that transpired in the past. But AAA was
certain that it was a long time x x x after the incident when it was reported to the police.
Likewise, she was very certain that the accused inserted his penis into her vagina x x x.
In the same vein, the appellate court found AAA qualified to take the witness stand, viz:
Our own evaluation of the records reveals that AAA was shown to be able to perceive, to
make known her perception to others and to remember traumatic incidents.

We stress that, contrary to accused-appellants assertions, mental retardation per se

does not affect a witness credibility. A mental retardate may be a credible witness.
Finally, the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found appellant guilty of simple
rape and properly imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 266B, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court correctly ruled that AAAs mental disability
could not be considered as a qualifying circumstance because the Information failed to allege
that appellant knew of such mental condition at the time of the commission of the crime.
By itself, the fact that the offended party in a rape case is a mental retardate does not
call for the imposition of the death penalty, unless knowledge by the offender of such mental
disability is specifically alleged and adequately proved by the prosecution.
Under Article 266-B(10) of the Revised Penal Code, knowledge by the offender of the
mental disability, emotional disorder, or physical handicap at the time of the commission of the
rape is the qualifying circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death penalty. As such
this circumstance must be formally alleged in the information and duly proved by the
prosecution.
Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure requires both qualifying and
aggravating circumstances to be alleged with specificity in the information. x x x But in the
absence of a specific or particular allegation in the information that the appellant knew of her
mental disability or retardation, as well as lack of adequate proof that appellant knew of this fact,
Article 266-B (10), RPC, could not be properly applied x x x

BJDC CONSTRUCTION v. NENA E. LANUZO, ET AL.

G.R. NO. 161151, MARCH 24, 2014

J. Bersamin
The party alleging the negligence of the other as the cause of injury has the burden to
establish the allegation with competent evidence. If the action based on negligence is civil in
nature, the proof required is preponderance of evidence.
Hence, the Lanuzo heirs, the parties carrying the burden of proof, who failed to establish
by preponderance of evidence that the negligence on the part of the company was the
proximate cause of the fatal accident of Balbino could not recover damages.
FACTS:
This case involves a claim for damages arising from the death of a motorcycle rider in a
nighttime accident due to the supposed negligence of a construction company then undertaking
re-blocking work on a national highway. The plaintiffs insisted that the accident happened
because the construction company did not provide adequate lighting on the site, but the latter
countered that the fatal accident was caused by the negligence of the motorcycle rider himself.
The trial court decided in favor of the construction company, but the Court of Appeals (CA)
reversed the decision and ruled for the plaintiffs. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur despite and contrary to
the finding by the trial court that the proximate cause of the accident is the victims own
negligence
RULING:
The petition is granted.
Inasmuch as the RTC and the CA arrived at conflicting findings of fact on who was the
negligent party, the Court holds that an examination of the evidence of the parties needs to be
undertaken to properly determine the issue. The Court must ascertain whose evidence was
preponderant, for Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court mandates that in civil cases, like this
one, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence.
Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary
to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. It is basic that
whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it because a mere allegation is not evidence.
Generally, the party who denies has no burden to prove. In civil cases, the burden of proof is on
the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given on either side. The burden of proof is
on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the complaint in the manner
required by the Rules of Court, but it may rest on the defendant if he admits expressly or
impliedly the essential allegations but raises affirmative defense or defenses, which if proved,
will exculpate him from liability.
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is
superior to that of the other. It refers to the weight, credit and value of the aggregate evidence
on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight of
evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. It is evidence which is more convincing to
the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. The plaintiff must
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants.
Upon a review of the records, the Court affirms the findings of the RTC, and rules that
the Lanuzo heirs, the parties carrying the burden of proof, did not establish by preponderance of
evidence that the negligence on the part of the company was the proximate cause of the fatal
accident of Balbino.
In our view, the RTC properly gave more weight to the testimonies of Zamora and SPO1
Corporal than to those of the witnesses for the Lanuzo heirs. There was justification for doing
so, because the greater probability pertained to the former. Moreover, the trial courts
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and of their testimonies is preferred to that of the
appellate courts because of the trial courts unique first-hand opportunity to observe the
witnesses and their demeanor as such.
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase that literally means the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself. For the doctrine to apply, the following requirements must be shown to exist,
namely: (a) the accident is of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones
negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or
defendants; and (c) the possibility of contributing conduct that would make the plaintiff

responsible is eliminated. This rule is grounded on the superior logic of ordinary human
experience, and it is on the basis of such experience or common knowledge that negligence
may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, the rule is applied in
conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.
Based on the evidence adduced by the Lanuzo heirs, negligence cannot be fairly
ascribed to the company considering that it has shown its installation of the necessary warning
signs and lights in the project site. In that context, the fatal accident was not caused by any
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the company. In contrast, Balbino had the
exclusive control of how he operated and managed his motorcycle. The records disclose that he
himself did not take the necessary precautions. As Zamora declared, Balbino overtook another
motorcycle rider at a fast speed, and in the process could not avoid hitting a barricade at the
site, causing him to be thrown off his motorcycle onto the newly cemented road. SPO1
Corporals investigation report corroborated Zamoras declaration. This causation of the fatal
injury went uncontroverted by the Lanuzo heirs. Hence, the Lanuzo heirs could not recover
damages.

SUTHERLAND GLOBAL SERIVES (PHILIPPINES), INC. AND JANETTE G. LAGAZO

v. LARRY S. LABRADOR
G.R. NO. 193107. MARCH 24, 2014

J. Brion
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, confines this Court to a review of the case solely on pure
questions of law. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same
context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented; we have to examine the CA
decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave
abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC
decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that
the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the challenged NLRC decision.
The CA gravely misappreciated the import of the evidence on record and can even be said to
have disregarded it. The NLRC glossed over Labradors repeated violations that led the latter to
request that he be allowed to resign to preserve his reputation for future employment, rather
than be dismissed from the service.
FACTS:
Sutherland hired Labrador as one of its call center agents with the main responsibility of
answering various queries and complaints through phoned-in calls. In his two years of working
at Sutherland, Labrador committed several infractions. But it was only on June 17, 2008 that
Labrador was finally charged with violation for transgressing the Non-Compliance Sale
Attribute policy clause stated in the Employee Handbook. Under Sutherlands Employee
Handbook, Labradors action is classified as an act of dishonesty or fraud. On May 24, 2008,
Sutherland sent Labrador a Notice to Explain in writing why he should not be held
administratively liable.
On May 28, 2008, an administrative hearing was conducted that took into consideration
Labradors past infractions. After investigation, a recommendation was issued finding Labrador
guilty of violating the Employee Handbook due to gross or habitual neglect of duty. The
recommendation further stated: With the request of Mr. Larry Labrador for resignation instead

of termination, SGS Management allows his request of resigning from the company, ergo: he
shall resign from the company effective immediately.
On June 17, 2008, Labrador submitted his resignation letter. On October 27, 2008,
Labrador filed a complaint for constructive/illegal dismissal before the NLRC. On February 27,
2009, LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Notwithstanding the defects in Labradors
appeal memorandum, the NLRC reversed the LAs ruling. The CA affirmed the decision of the
NLRC.
ISSUES:
Whether the CA correctly determined if the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
ruling on the case
RULING:
The petition is granted.
At the time this case was appealed to the NLRC, the then governing rule was the 2005
NLRC Rules whose Section 4, Rule VI provided: Section 4. Requisites For Perfection Of
Appeal. a) The appeal shall be: 1) filed within the reglementary period provided in Section 1 of
this Rule; 2) verified by the appellant himself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules
of Court, as amended; 3) in the form of a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds
relied upon and the arguments in support thereof, the relief prayed for, and with a statement of
the date the appellant received the appealed decision, resolution or order; 4) in three (3) legibly
typewritten or printed copies; and 5) accompanied by i) proof of payment of the required appeal
fee; ii) posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; iii) a certificate of
non-forum shopping; and iv) proof of service upon the other parties.
Sutherland insists that the failure to state the material dates is fatal to Salvadors appeal
to the NLRC and to his present position in this case.
We do not find Sutherlands argument meritorious as technical rules are not necessarily
fatal in labor cases; they can be liberally applied if all things being equal any doubt or
ambiguity would be resolved in favor of labor. These technicalities and limitations can only be
given their fullest effect if the case is substantively unmeritorious; otherwise, and if the defect
case), we have the discretion not to consider them fatal.
The same reasoning applies to the failure to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping.
We can likewise relax our treatment of the defect. Additionally, while the 2005 NLRC Rules
specifically stated that a certificate of non-forum shopping should be attached, the 2011 NLRC
Rules of Procedure21 no longer requires it. Jurisprudence, too, is replete with instances when
the Court relaxed the rules involving the attachment of the certificate of non-forum shopping.22
Under these circumstances, we see no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in
admitting the petition.
We, however, do not agree with the findings of the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, that
Labrador was illegally dismissed.
In this jurisdiction, the findings of the NLRC are generally binding and should be treated
with finality. The CA only looks at the facts to determine if a tribunal, board or officer exercising

judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in appreciating the facts.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on the other hand, confines this Court to a review of the
case solely on pure questions of law. In Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation, we said that
in ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same context that the
petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented; we have to examine the CA decision from the
prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in
the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the
case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65
review, not a review on appeal, of the challenged NLRC decision. The CA gravely
misappreciated the import of the evidence on record and can even be said to have disregarded
it. The NLRC glossed over Labradors repeated violations that led the latter to request that he
be allowed to resign to preserve his reputation for future employment, rather than be dismissed
from the service.
Thus, it was within Sutherlands prerogative to terminate Labradors employment when
he committed a serious infraction and, despite a previous warning, repeated it. To reiterate, he
opened another client account without the latters consent, with far-reaching and costly effects
on the company. For one, the repeated past infractions would have resulted in negative
feedbacks on Sutherlands performance and reputation. It would likewise entail additional
administrative expense since Sutherland would have to address the complaints an effort that
would entail investigation costs and the return of the doubly-delivered merchandise. As a rule,
an employer cannot be compelled to continue with the employment of workers when continued
employment will prove inimical to the employer's interests. To Sutherlands credit, it duly
complied with the procedural requirement in dismissing an employee; it clearly observed both
substantive and procedural due process.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HENRY T. GO
G.R. NO. 168539, MARCH 25, 2014

J. Peralta
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting bail
and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over his
person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions
seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the
court.
FACTS:
The SC in in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO)
nullified the various contracts awarded by the Government, through the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to PIATCO for the construction, operation and
maintenance of the Ninoy NAIA IPT III. Subsequent to the above Decision, Pesayco filed a
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of
R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Among those charged was herein respondent,
who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with
then DOTC Secretary Enrile in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict, among
others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a
finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died
prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause. An information charging Go of the
said offense was filed before the Sandiganbayan.
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash the Information filed against him. On
June 2, 2005, the SB quashed the Information filed against herein respondent for alleged
violation of Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the SB erred in dismissing the case on the ground that it had no jurisdiction
over respondent Go
RULING:
The petition is granted.
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in
conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent
offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft
law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or
corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto. This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by
this Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving herein private respondent.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer
with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however,
that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged
conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is
his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the
charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of
Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3
(g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause
to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it not
for his death, he should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in
conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all
instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public
officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has
already died, the private person may be indicted alone.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as coprincipals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the
commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in
contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in
the commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by
reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual

degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of course,
as to any conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn within
the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral ascendancy over
the rest of the conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.
Respondent claims that in a different case, he was likewise indicted before the SB for
conspiracy with Secretary Enrile for allegedly entering into another agreement which is separate
from the Concession Agreement subject of the present case. The SB granted respondent's
motion to quash the Information on the ground that the SB has no jurisdiction over the person of
respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution before this Court. In a minute
resolution, this Court affirmed the SB ruling. Respondent now argues that this Court's resolution
in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied in the instant case.
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's
ruling in G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed
a Motion for Consolidation in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's
contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation
vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused
in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his
person to the jurisdiction of the court.
Thus, it has been held that: When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a
competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of
his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the courts jurisdiction over
his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any
dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. x x x
x
Verily, petitioners participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not
confined to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters
which called for respondent courts exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now
to deny said courts jurisdiction over him. x x x.
In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the
jurisdiction of the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for
Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only
came after the SB issued an Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case
should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a
contract entered into by public officers representing the government. More importantly, the SB is
a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations
of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by
R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the
law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by
the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be done.
Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already divested of
its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise

would mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the law
defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
BABY NELLIE M. OLAIREZ, et al. vs. SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC., et al.
G.R. NO. 174758, MARCH 26, 2014

J. Mendoza
The supposed inaction of the SLU and its officials when the Olairez group visited the
school to demand their compliance with the decision was not borne out of a contumacious
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to hinder the implementation of a judgment. A conduct, to
be contumacious, implies willfulness, bad faith or with deliberate intent to cause injustice, which
is clearly not the case here. On the contrary, SLU was well within its rights to appeal the
decision and not immediately heed the demand of the Olairez group.
Records reveal that the Olairez group violated the three-day notice rule on hearing of
motions as provided in Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court when they scheduled the
hearing on their Very Urgent Motion to Cite Defendants In Contempt just one day after they
filed the said pleading. As a rule, any motion that does not comply with the requirements of Rule
15 should not be received for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance, subject only
to some exceptions, such as where a rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest failure
or miscarriage of justice or if there was substantial compliance.
FACTS:
SLU is an educational institution based in Baguio City. While the members of the Olairez
group were fourth-year graduating students of SLUs College of Medicine who filed a Complaint
for Mandatory Injunction against Dean Dacanay and other individuals challenging the
implementation of the revised version of the Comprehensive Oral and Written Examination, a
prerequisite for graduation from SLUs medicine course. The RTC granted the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.
In their Fourth Amended Complaint, the Olairez group disclosed that while they were
allowed to march and attend the commencement exercises, Dean Dacanay refused to issue
certifications of graduation in their favor.
Thus, the Olairez group prayed that Dean Dacanay and SLU be ordered to forward their
final grades to the Registrars Office for recording; to issue their clearances, certificate of
graduation, diploma and include them in the SLU Registry of Graduates; to cease and desist
from exerting pressure on the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges to recall their
certifications granting their internship and on Baguio General Hospital to pull them out from their
internship; to declare the Revised COWE as moot and academic insofar as they were
concerned; and to pay them damages. On July 16, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision
declaring the Olairez group as graduates of the College of Medicine, SLU.
However, SLU did not comply with the order of the RTC. Hence, the Olairez group filed a
Very Urgent Motion to Cite Defendants in Contempt, which was granted by the RTC. The RTC
ordered the issuance of a writ of execution and likewise found SLU guilty of indirect contempt.

Meanwhile, SLU appealed the order of the RTC finding it guilty of indirect contempt
before the CA. The CA reversed the order of the RTC. Thus, the Olairez group filed a petition
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari; and
2. Whether the CA erred in finding that the three-day notice rule was violated
RULING:
The petition is denied.
1. On CAs dismissal of the petition
The Olairez group argues that the CA erred in ruling that SLU and its officials were
denied of due process as they were not given the opportunity to comment and be heard on the
contempt charges against them.
Indirect contempt is defined by and punished under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a
charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to
comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be
heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be
punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or
in his official transactions; (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after
being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or
process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces
another to enter into or upon such real property, or in any manner disturbs the
possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto; (c) Any abuse of
or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule; (d) Any improper
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice; (e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court,
and acting as such without authority; (f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an
officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from
issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in
custody pending such proceedings. (3a)
In contempt, the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense. Thus, the good faith or lack
of it, of the alleged contemnor is considered. Where the act complained of is ambiguous or does
not clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting in good
faith, is within his rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in some
instances, held to be determinative of its character. A person should not be condemned for
contempt where he contends for what he believes to be right and in good faith institutes

proceedings for the purpose, however erroneous may be his conclusion as to his rights. To
constitute contempt, the act must be done wilfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.
The supposed inaction of the SLU and its officials when the Olairez group visited the
school on July 17, 2003 to demand their compliance with the decision was not borne out of a
contumacious conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to hinder the implementation of a judgment.
A conduct, to be contumacious, implies willfulness, bad faith or with deliberate intent to cause
injustice, which is clearly not the case here. On the contrary, SLU was well within its rights to
appeal the decision and not immediately heed the demand of the Olairez group.
2. On the petitioners violation of the three-day notice rule
Records reveal that the Olairez group violated the three-day notice rule on hearing of
motions as provided in Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court when they scheduled the
hearing on their Very Urgent Motion to Cite Defendants In Contempt on July 18, 2003 or just
one day after they filed the said pleading on July 17, 2003. As a rule, any motion that does not
comply with the requirements of Rule 15 should not be received for filing and, if filed, is not
entitled to judicial cognizance, subject only to some exceptions, such as where a rigid
application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice or if there was
substantial compliance.
Under the attendant circumstances, there was no substantial compliance with procedural
due process because although the hearing on the said motion was reset to July 22, 2003, the
disputed writ of execution was actually issued on July 18, 2003 and served on SLU and its
officials on July 19, 2003 before the rescheduled hearing date. while their counsels on record
received their copies on July 21, 2003. In due process, the parameter required is the presence
of an opportunity to be heard, as well as the time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose
or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. This was not properly afforded to SLU.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. JOHNI GLENN D. RUNES
A.M. NO. P-12-3055, MARCH 26, 2014

C.J. Sereno
Loafing is defined under the Civil Service rules as frequent unauthorized absences from
duty during office hours. The word frequent connotes that the employees absent themselves
from duty more than once. Respondents two absences from his post, being without authority,
can already be characterized as frequent. It constitutes inefficiency and dereliction of duty,
which adversely affect the prompt delivery of justice.
Substantial evidence shows that respondent is guilty of loafing. The investigation
conducted by the investigating lawyers of the OCA revealed at least two (2) instances when he
was out of his assigned post/station during regular office hours. He failed to sufficiently refute
these findings.
FACTS:
In a letter dated 20 February 2009, the Office of the Ombudsman, endorsed a Complaint
received through ephemeral electronic communication (text message) to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA). On 22 May 2009, then Executive Judge Manalastas submitted a
Confidential Report finding the complaint against subjects Mr. Glen Runez and Mr. Conrado

Gonzales being fixers in the San Courts is factual. The impression that these two (2)
employees give is that their actions are condoned and tolerated by the Court since the motions
for reduction of bail are usually granted. They have been at this illegal activity for a long time
since no one has dared to openly prevent them from doing so for fear that their employment or
their cases be jeopardized.
On 31 July 2009, the matter was referred to the NBI for entrapment operations. Failing to
get a response from the NBI, the OCA organized sometime in January 2010, an investigating
team composed of lawyers. The team was asked to conduct a discreet investigation to
determine the veracity of an anonymous Complaint on alleged case fixing in the MeTC of San
Juan City. Thus, in a Memorandum addressed to Court Administrator Jose Midas Marquez
dated 9 September 2010, Wilhelmina Geronga, Chief, OCA Legal Office, recommended that the
alleged case fixing be denied due course for insufficiency of evidence.
In the course of the investigation, however, the investigating team found that respondent
had the habit of loafing during office hours. He was found loafing in two (2) instances: (1) on 26
January 2010 when he was nowhere to be found in his station; and (2) on 26 April 2010 wherein
he left his post at 1:45 p.m. and was caught leaving the parking area in a Toyota Corolla sedan
bearing plate number JLL 933. In both instances, he declared in his Daily Time Records (DTRs)
complete working hours of 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. In a Memorandum dated 21 February 2012,
the OCA recommended that respondent be found guilty of the offense of loafing with the penalty
of suspension for three (3) months without pay.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent is guilty of the offense of loafing
RULING:
Respondent is guilty of loafing
Loafing is defined under the Civil Service rules as frequent unauthorized absences from
duty during office hours. The word frequent connotes that the employees absent themselves
from duty more than once. Respondents two absences from his post, being without authority,
can already be characterized as frequent. It constitutes inefficiency and dereliction of duty,
which adversely affect the prompt delivery of justice.
Substantial evidence shows that respondent is guilty of loafing. The investigation
conducted by the investigating lawyers of the OCA revealed at least two (2) instances when he
was out of his assigned post/station during regular office hours. He failed to sufficiently refute
these findings.
It is imperative that as Clerk III, respondent should always be at his station during office
hours; hence, if his absence were indeed because of some errand, he has yet again failed to
provide sufficient proof that those errands were official in nature. As previously mentioned, he
had not filed any application for leave, nor did he possess any written authority to travel to justify
his absence. Absent such proof, his absence remains indubitably unauthorized.
He maintains that his DTRs, which were signed by him and certified as true and correct
by the Clerk of Court, support his claim that he never left his station. He cannot rely on the
certification made by the Clerk of Court in his DTR because, as clearly shown therein, the

latters verification pertains to the prescribed office hours, and not to the correctness of the
entries therein.
In Lopena v. Saloma, this Court ruled: Respondent is reminded that all judicial
employees must devote their official time to government service. Public officials and employees
must see to it that they follow the Civil Service Law and Rules. Consequently, they must
observe the prescribed office hours and the efficient use of every moment thereof for public
service if only to recompense the government and ultimately the people who shoulder the cost
of maintaining the judiciary. To inspire public respect for the justice system, court officials and
employees are at all times behooved to strictly observe official time. This is because the image
of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and
women who work thereat, from the judge to the last and lowest of its employees. Thus, court
employees must exercise at all times a high degree of professionalism and responsibility, as
service in the judiciary is not only a duty; it is a mission.
Respondent is found guilty of loafing. Accordingly, he is hereby suspended for six (6) months
and one (1) day, with a very stern warning that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will
be dealt with more severely.

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION v. THUNDERBIRD PILIPINAS

HOTELS AND RESORTS, INC., et al.
G.R. NO. 197942-43/G.R. NO. 199528, MARCH 26, 2014

J. REYES
Subject to Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 58 the, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the
applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala
court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining
order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance, but he shall immediately comply
with the provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents
to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before
whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the
temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can
be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order
exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two (72) hours provided herein.
The Court does not now find that Judge Jurado acted in bad faith or with ill will or
malicious motive when he granted the TRO extension and later the preliminary injunction. It
would have been irregular and unreasonable for him to act on the extension of the 72-hour TRO
on June 6, 2011 when the cases were first raffled to him, and besides, under Rule 58 he had 24
hours to act thereon.
Moreover, PAGCOR is not justified in failing to file a requisite motion for reconsideration,
and to observe the hierarchy of courts. While the question of whether to give due course to the
petitions is addressed to the discretion of the Court, it behooves PAGCOR to observe the
applicable rules and keep in mind that the Court will not take lightly any non-observance of our
settled rules as if they are mere technicalities. A motion for reconsideration is a condition sine
qua non for the special civil action of certiorari.
FACTS:

Respondents entered into a MOA with PAGCOR whereby Thunderbird committed to

invest in their gaming and leisure operations in Fiesta Hotel and Casino (FHC) in Eastbay Arts
Recreational and Tourism Zone, Binangonan, Rizal. With the passage of R.A. No. 9487, which
extended PAGCORs franchise to for another 25 years, respondents sought the formal
extension of their authority to operate (ATOs) to be made co-terminus with PAGCORs new
franchise, as well as extension of their development and investment schedules.
On May 30, 2011, insisting that the respondents ATOs had expired without a renewal,
PAGCOR served notice upon the respondents to cease their casino operations, as well as gave
them until June 3, 2011 to signify their unconditional acceptance of its new terms of reference
for their new licenses, or PAGCOR will have no choice but to initiate cessation proceedings.
Believing that they are entitled to a new franchise co-terminus with that of PAGCOR,
Thunderbird Pilipinas and ERI each filed separate complaints against PAGCOR with the RTC
for specific performance and damages, with application for TRO and writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction. RTC Executive Judge Reyes issued an ex-parte 72-hour TRO, later
extended to 20 days by Presiding Jurado, who later on also issued a Writ of Preliminary
Prohibitory Injunction. Without seeking a reconsideration of the said order, PAGCOR filed
directly with this Court two certiorari petitions, G.R. Nos. 197942 and 197943.
Meanwhile, respondents filed a Supplemental Complaint for actual damages of P35
Million with application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, where the RTC ordered the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in favor of Thunderbird Pilipinas.
PAGCOR filed its third petition, G.R. No. 199528, to set aside the aforesaid order.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed orders
RULING:
The petitions are denied.
With the parties agreeing to end their differences before trial proper, the instant petitions
have ceased to present a justiciable controversy for us to resolve. However, as PAGCOR itself
has importuned, there are procedural as well as substantive issues of such importance which it
hopes this Court would help clarify for the guidance of future litigants. So shall We proceed.
On one particular point of controversy, PAGCOR has been insistent that the court a quo
has no power to extend an already expired 72-hour ex-parte TRO. But the facts will clarify the
matter. Civil Case Nos. 11-125832-33 were filed on June 3, 2011, a Friday, and at 4:30 that
same afternoon, Judge Reyes issued an ex-parte 72-hour TRO to hold off any cessation
proceedings threatened by PAGCOR against the respondents. The next two days being a
weekend, it was only on June 6, 2011, Monday, that the cases were raffled to Judge Jurado.
On June 7, 2011, Tuesday, Judge Jurado conducted a summary hearing on the
respondents TRO application, and when he granted the same, PAGCOR verbally moved for
reconsideration on the ground that Judge Reyes 72-hour TRO had already expired and could
no longer be extended. Judge Jurado denied the motion, saying that his TRO was based on his
summary hearing wherein testimonies and documents were presented by the parties, whereas

the 72-hour TRO issued by Judge Reyes was based merely on the respondents initiatory
pleadings.
On June 13 and 16, 2011, the trial court heard the respondents applications for writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction against PAGCORs cessation order. On June 23, 2011, the
20th and last day of the TRO, Judge Jurado issued the writ. As already noted, without moving
for reconsideration, PAGCOR went up directly to this Court on certiorari.
Concerning the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction or a TRO, the pertinent provisions
of the Rules of Court are found in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 58, viz:
SEC. 4. x x x (c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a
temporary restraining order is included in a complaint or any initiatory pleading,
the case, if filed in a multiple-sala court, shall be raffled only after notice to and in
the presence of the adverse party or the person to be enjoined. In any event,
such notice shall be preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied by service of
summons, together with a copy of the complaint or initiatory pleading and the
applicants affidavit and bond, upon the adverse party in the Philippines.
However, where the summons could not be served personally or by substituted
service despite diligent efforts, or the adverse party is a resident of the
Philippines temporarily absent therefrom or is a non-resident thereof, the
requirement of prior or contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply. (d)
The application for a temporary restraining order shall thereafter be acted upon
only after all parties are heard in a summary hearing which shall be conducted
within twenty-four (24) hours after the sheriffs return of service and/or the
records are received by the branch selected by raffle and to which the records
shall be transmitted immediately.
SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. No
preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the
party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by
affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result
to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the
application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary
restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service
on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within
the twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause,
at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted. The
Court shall also determine, within the same period, whether or not the preliminary
injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
However, subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme
urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of
a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte a
temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance, but he shall
immediately comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons
and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72)
hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to
determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for
preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the

temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two (72)
hours provided herein.
The Court does not now find that Judge Jurado acted in bad faith or with ill will or
malicious motive when he granted the TRO extension and later the preliminary injunction. It
would have been irregular and unreasonable for him to act on the extension of the 72-hour TRO
on June 6, 2011 when the cases were first raffled to him, and besides, under Rule 58 he had 24
hours to act thereon. On the other hand, PAGCOR should have refrained, but deliberately did
not, from serving its closure orders on the respondents on June 7, 2011, knowing very well that
a summary hearing was to be held that same morning on their TRO application. Indeed, seen in
light of the preceding acts of PAGCOR, it can hardly be said that it acted with fairness toward
the respondents so as to be permitted now to blithely take issue with the extension of the 72hour TRO. For truly, what is of compelling consideration here is that PAGCOR was accorded
notice and a chance to be heard, and when the trial court later resolved to grant the writ of
preliminary injunction, it did so after hearing it out, within the 20-day TRO.
Moreover, PAGCOR is not justified in failing to file a requisite motion for reconsideration,
and to observe the hierarchy of courts. While the question of whether to give due course to the
petitions is addressed to the discretion of the Court, it behooves PAGCOR to observe the
applicable rules and keep in mind that the Court will not take lightly any non-observance of our
settled rules as if they are mere technicalities. A motion for reconsideration is a condition sine
qua non for the special civil action of certiorari. The settled rule is that a Motion for
Reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a Petition for Certiorari. Its purpose
is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by
re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.
The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as (a) where the
order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions
raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court,
or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an
urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where
petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial
court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process; (h) where the proceeding were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to
object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
As will become more evident in our latter discussion, there is no justification for
PAGCOR dispensing with a motion for reconsideration, since an earlier case, PAGCOR v.
Fontana Development Corporation, has delved into the same points it raised here.
At their roots, these petitions deal with the manner PAGCOR has exercised its licensing
and regulatory powers over the respondent casino operators. The Court sees no novel issues of
transcendental importance to justify its action of skipping the hierarchy of the courts and coming
directly to us via certiorari petition. As explained in Emmanuel A. De Castro v. Emerson S.
Carlos, although Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is not exclusive but

concurrent with that of the CA and RTC. The petitioner has no unrestricted freedom of choice of
forum, but must strictly observe the hierarchy of the courts.
Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if
it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and
immemorial tradition. A disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the
outright dismissal of a petition.
A direct invocation of this Courts jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and
important reasons that are clearly and specifically set forth in a petition. The rationale behind
this policy arises from the necessity of preventing (1) inordinate demands upon the time and
attention of the Court, which is better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction;
and (2) further overcrowding of the Courts docket.
In this case, petitioner justified his act of directly filing with this Court only when he filed
his Reply and after respondent had already raised the procedural infirmity that may cause the
outright dismissal of the present Petition. Petitioner likewise cites stability in the civil service and
protection of the rights of civil servants as rationale for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.
Petitioners excuses are not special and important circumstances that would allow a
direct recourse to this Court. More so, mere speculation and doubt to the exercise of judicial
discretion of the lower courts are not and cannot be valid justifications to hurdle the hierarchy of
courts. Thus, the Petition must be dismissed.

Anonymous Complaint Against Otelia Lyn G. Maceda, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial
Court, Palapag, Northern Samar
A.M. No. P-12-3093, March 26, 2014

J. Leonado-De Castro
A court employee who was charged with dishonesty cannot claim that the admission of
documentary evidence which were mere photocopies and were obtained without her consent
constitute a violation of her right to due process. Proceedings in administrative investigation are
not strictly governed by the technical rules of evidence. They are summary in nature. Thus,
administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. It
is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.
Otherwise stated, in the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be
safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.
FACTS:
An anonymous complainant filed a letter-complaint before the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) charging Maceda, Court Interpreter, MTC, Palapag, Northern Samar, of
falsifying her attendance in court so she could attend her law classes at UEP in Catarman,
Norther Samar.
The OCA referred the aforementioned letter-complaint to Executive Judge Falcotelo,
who later submitted a report finding recommending the dismissal of the letter-complaint against
Maceda, considering that Maceda pursued her law studies for self-improvement and that
Maceda merely relied on Judge Lagrimas permission for her to attend her classes at UEP.

Upon receipt of Judge Falcotelos Report, the OCA directed Maceda to file her comment
on the letter-complaint against her. Maceda made a general denial of any wrongdoing in the
performance of her job and reporting of her official time, and that her only intention was to
enrich her knowledge in relation to her work in the judiciary by pursuing her law studies, for
which she was granted permission by the presiding judge of her court.
The OCA submitted its Report recommending that the instant administrative matter be
RE-DOCKETED as a regular complaint for Dishonesty against Maceda, Court; and that
respondent be found GUILTY of Dishonesty and be SUSPENDED for six (6) months without
pay, effective immediately, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall
be dealt with more severely. On October 15, 2012, the Court issued a Resolution re-docketing
the case as a regular administrative matter.
ISSUE:
Whether Maceda is guilty of dishonesty
RULING:
Maceda questions the anonymity of the complainant and suspects that the complainant.
At the outset, we stress that an anonymous complaint is always received with great
caution, originating as it does from an unknown author. However, a complaint of such sort does
not always justify its outright dismissal for being baseless or unfounded for such complaint may
be easily verified and may, without much difficulty, be substantiated and established by other
competent evidence. As this Court ruled in Anonymous Complaint Against Gibson A. Araula10:
Although the Court does not as a rule act on anonymous complaints, cases are accepted in
which the charge could be fully borne by public records of indubitable integrity, thus needing no
corroboration by evidence to be offered by complainant, whose identity and integrity could
hardly be material where the matter involved is of public interest. x x x. Indeed, any conduct, act
or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate
the norm of public accountability and would diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the
people in the Judiciary cannot be countenanced. Hence, anonymous complaints of this nature
should be acted upon by this Court.
Second, Maceda contests the admissibility of the documentary evidence attached to the
letter-complaint, particularly, the photocopies of her certificate of registration at UEP; her grades
for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd year law subjects; and her Daily Time Records (DTRs) filed with the
court, for said documents were obtained without her authorization/consent or that of the officers
who are in custody of the documents. Maceda even insinuates the possibility of a conspiracy
between the complainant and the custodian of the said documents.
Macedas opposition to the documentary evidence against her was grounded on how the
documents were obtained, but not on the falsity of the said documents or their contents.
Maceda argues that her consent was necessary for the release of copies of the documents
attached to the letter-complaint but she did not specifically cite the relevant court and school
rules to this effect. In so far as Macedas DTRs are concerned, these formed part of her
employee records, which the OCA and the Court can freely access even without her consent.

Moreover, proceedings in administrative investigation are not strictly governed by the

technical rules of evidence. They are summary in nature. As we have declared in Office of the
Court Administrator v. Indar13: It is settled that technical rules of procedure and evidence are
not strictly applied to administrative proceedings. Thus, administrative due process cannot be
fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. It is enough that the party is given the
chance to be heard before the case against him is decided. Otherwise stated, in the application
of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice
but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.
Maceda cannot claim that the admission and consideration of the documentary evidence
attached to the letter-complaint violated her right to due process. She undeniably had the
opportunity to contest the truth of the documents and/or submit controverting evidence to the
same, but she failed to do so.
Lastly, Maceda prays for additional time before resolution of this administrative matter so
she can engage the services of a lawyer to represent her. She points out that she was not
assisted by counsel in the earlier proceedings.
Maceda has knowingly and voluntarily participated in the administrative investigation
conducted by Judge Falcotelo, by the OCA, and finally, by this Court. The administrative
investigation began as early as November 10, 2010, but it was only in Macedas Manifestation
dated February 5, 2012 before this Court that she insisted on engaging the services of a legal
counsel. We can no longer accommodate Macedas request this far along into the proceedings.
Being a court employee and law student, Maceda is capable of understanding the charges
against her and adducing her defenses herself.
We already clarified in Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission the extent of the right to
counsel, thus: However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the
Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary
rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a
criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a
criminal proceeding, the fact remains that, under existing laws, a party in an administrative
inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of
petitioners capacity to represent herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person
being investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative
investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are
facts that merit the imposition of disciplinary measures against erring public officers and
employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.
Maceda was accorded her right to due process during the administrative investigation
conducted in the instant case. She was given an opportunity to answer and be heard on the
charges against her, and that, it has often been said, is the essence of procedural due process.
Now, we proceed to determining Macedas liability for falsification of her DTRs.
We see no reason to disturb the finding of the OCA that Maceda did indeed falsify her DTRs
and is, therefore, guilty of dishonesty.
Considering that Maceda has not been previously charged with an administrative
offense in her eleven (11) years in government service and that there is no proof of her being

remiss in the performance of her duties as court interpreter or causing specific damage or
prejudice to the court for her dishonest act, we find Maceda to be guilty of Less Serious
Dishonesty, for which the penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day is proper.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JESUS BURCE

G.R. NO. 201732, MARCH 26, 2014

J. Leonardo-de Castro
After a careful review, this Court is convinced that AAAs unwavering narration of how
she was raped, together with her positive identification of her own father as the one who raped
her, are worthy of belief.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some
other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not
only to the geographical distance between the place where the accused was and the place
where the crime was committed when the crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility of
access between the two places.
FACTS:
Upon the sworn complaint of AAA's mother, the Assistant Prosecutor of Naga City filed
with the RTC five Informations, all dated May 7, 2007, charging Burce with raping his 14-yearold daughter AAA on five separate occasions.
To claim innocence, the accused used denial and alibi as his defenses.
The RTC rendered its decision convicting Burce of rape only in Criminal Case No.
RTC08-0169 and acquitting him of the four other charges. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the court a quo erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of one count of qualified rape
RULING:
The petition is denied.
We stress, at the outset, that each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct
crime so that each of them should be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution is
required to establish, by the necessary quantum of proof, the elements of rape for each charge.
Therefore, Burces acquittal in RTC08-0170 to RTC08-0173 does not necessarily result in his
acquittal in RTC08-0169. While the prosecution presented the same witnesses for all the cases,
the content, credibility, and weight of their testimonies differ for each charge.
It is also important to note that only Burces conviction in RTC080169, i.e., for the rape
that occurred on December 10, 2005, that is the subject of the appeal before us. We can no

longer touch upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the RTC in its final and
executory decision in RTC08-0170 to RTC08-0173 acquitting Burce.
Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly holds that findings of fact of the trial court, particularly
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon us. As a general rule, on the question
of whether to believe the version of the prosecution or that of the defense, the trial courts
choice is generally viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more
competent to conclude so, having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses demeanor and
deportment on the witness stand as they gave their testimonies. The trial court is, thus, in the
best position to weigh conflicting testimonies and to discern if the witnesses were telling the
truth. Without any clear showing that the trial court and the appellate court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance, the rule
should not be disturbed.
After a careful review, this Court is convinced that AAAs unwavering narration of how
she was raped on December 10, 2005, together with her positive identification of her own father
as the one who raped her, are worthy of belief.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some
other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not
only to the geographical distance between the place where the accused was and the place
where the crime was committed when the crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility of
access between the two places.
Burce failed to demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been home
on the night of December 10, 2005. Not only was Burces alibi uncorroborated, Burces work as
tricycle driver would have allowed him to go home with ease anytime he wanted. In fact, BBB,
his own wife, testified that Burce would go home late at night to sleep and just leave early in the
morning to work again:
Equally baseless is Burces contention that AAA is only charging him with rape because
she is interested in getting monetary compensation. Once more, other than Burces bare
allegations, there is no evidence that his minor daughter, AAA, could be so induced by malice
and materialism as to concoct a rape charge against her own father, that would destroy her own
and her fathers honor, as well as tear her family apart, all for P10,000.00.
In this case, Burces carnal knowledge of AAA was established by AAAs testimony,
corroborated by Dr. Alcantaras finding of blunt force injuries to AAAs hymen, probably caused
by penetration by an erect male organ. Also based on AAAs testimony, Burce used force
against her by holding both her hands and pinning her legs beneath his so he could successfully
have carnal knowledge of her. Moreover, Burce is AAAs father and his moral ascendancy over
his minor daughter is sufficient to take the place of actual force, threat, or intimidation.
LEONORA A. PASCUAL v. JOSEFINO L. DAQUIOAG, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 162063, MARCH 31, 2014

J. Bersamin
As a general rule, a writ of execution should strictly conform to every particular of the
judgment to be executed, and not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it
go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed; the execution is void if it is in

excess of and beyond the original judgment or award. However, a writ of execution issued upon
a final judgment adjudicating the ownership of land to a party may authorize putting her in
possession although the judgment does not specifically direct such act.
FACTS:
On January 24, 1984, petitioner filed a Free Patent Application over Lot No. 13194, Lot
No. 13212 and Lot No. 13214. Respondent Catalina Almazan-Villamor presented a protest,
claiming that Pascual had no right to apply for title over the properties. The Regional Executive
Director of the DENR gave due course to the protest of Almazan-Villamor, and rejected the free
patent application of Pascual. The same decision was affirmed by The Secretary of DENR, the
Office of the President and the CA.
On July 3, 2000, the Regional Executive Director of the DENR issued the writ of
execution directing the CENRO to execute the decision of the OP. Accordingly, CENRO
Daquioag issued a memorandum directing respondents to execute the Decision of the OP by
placing the winning party, Catalina Almazan-Villamor in the premises of the land in question.
Assailing the issuance of the memorandum and the execution proceedings, Pascual brought a
special civil action for certiorari with prayer for issuance of writ of injunction in the RTC. The
same petition was dismissed by the RTC. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in sustaining the decision of the RTC to dismiss the petition for
certiorari
RULING:
The petition is denied.
As a general rule, a writ of execution should strictly conform to every particular of the
judgment to be executed, and not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it
go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed; the execution is void if it is in
excess of and beyond the original judgment or award.
Admittedly, the phrase placing the winning party, Catalina Almazan Villamor in the
premises of the land in question was not expressly stated in the dispositive portion of the
decision of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR. But the absence of that phrase did not
render the directive to enforce invalid because the directive was in full consonance with the
decision sought to be executed. A judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the
decision, for it embraces whatever is necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
The denial of Pascuals free patent application was based on the recognition of Almazan
Villamors ownership of the subject properties. The consequence of the denial was the directive
for Pascual to refrain from entering the property, and from possessing the subject property
declared to be owned by Almazan Villamor. Upon the final finding of the ownership in the
judgment in favor of Almazan Villamor, the delivery of the possession of the property was
deemed included in the decision, considering that the claim itself of Pascual to the possession
had been based also on ownership.

Possession is an essential attribute of ownership. Whoever owns the property has the
right to possess it. Adjudication of ownership includes the delivery of possession if the defeated
party has not shown any right to possess the land independently of her rejected claim of
ownership. In Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, the Court affirmed the writ of execution awarding
possession of land, notwithstanding that the decision sought to be executed did not direct the
delivery of the possession of the land to the winning parties.
Accordingly, Daquioags memorandum placing Almazan-Villamor in possession of the
properties was not inconsistent with the decision of the Regional Executive Director of the
DENR, as affirmed by the OP. With the clear recognition of Almazan-Villamors ownership, and
in default of any credible showing by Pascual of any valid justification for her to continue in
possession of the properties despite the denial of her free patent application, possession must
be restored to Almazan-Villamor as the rightful owner and possessor of the properties.
Finally, we also conclude that the CA rightly sustained the RTCs dismissal of Pascuals
petition for certiorari because of the impropriety of her chosen remedy. A special civil action for
certiorari is the proper action to bring when a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial function has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The exercise of judicial
function consists in the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the
parties are, and then to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. The term quasi-judicial function
applies to the action and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies that are required to
investigate facts or to ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from
them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. However,
the issuance by Daquioag of the assailed memorandum implementing the writ of execution did
not derive from the performance of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. He was not thereby
called upon to adjudicate the rights of the contending parties or to exercise any discretion of a
judicial nature, but only performing an administrative duty of enforcing and implementing the
writ.
REVELINA LIMSON v. EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ
G.R. NO. 162205, MARCH 31, 2014

J. Bersamin
The petition for review of Limson projects issues of fact. It urges the Court to undo the
findings of fact of the OCP, the Secretary of Justice and the CA on the basis of the documents
submitted with her petition. But the Court is not a trier of facts, and cannot analyze and weigh
evidence. Indeed, Section 1 of Rule 45, Rules of Court explicitly requires the petition for review
on certiorari to raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. Accordingly, the
petition for review of Limson is outrightly rejected for this reason.
FACTS:
Limson filed a criminal charge against Gonzalez for falsification. The charge is based on
Limsons assertion that EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ pretends to be the architect EUGENIO
GONZALEZ registered with the PRC.

The Prosecutor dismissed the criminal charge against Gonzalez, finding that indeed
EUGENIO JUAN R. GONZALES is the architect registered in the PRC. The Secretary of Justice
affirmed the findings of the Prosecutor.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Limson filed a new letter complaint against Gonzalez,
with the Secretary of Justice. She alleged the same basic facts, evidence, and charges, but
adding the accusation that because Gonzalez used various combinations of his name, in
different signature, on different occasions, Gonzalez had also violated Republic Act No. 6085
(the Anti-Alias Law). The Prosecutor dismissed the new complaint. The Secretary affirmed the
findings of the Prosecutor. Limson assailed on certiorari the adverse resolutions of the Secretary
of Justice in the CA. On July 31, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed decision dismissing the
petition for certiorari. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in finding that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Secretary of Justice
RULING:
The petition is denied.
To start with, the petition for review of Limson projects issues of fact. It urges the Court
to undo the findings of fact of the OCP, the Secretary of Justice and the CA on the basis of the
documents submitted with her petition. But the Court is not a trier of facts, and cannot analyze
and weigh evidence. Indeed, Section 1 of Rule 45, Rules of Court explicitly requires the petition
for review on certiorari to raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.
Accordingly, the petition for review of Limson is outrightly rejected for this reason.
Secondly, Limson appears to stress that the CA erred in concluding that the Secretary of
Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the evidence submitted
to the OCP. She would now have us reverse the CA.
We cannot reverse the CA. We find that the conclusion of the CA about the Secretary of
Justice not committing grave abuse of discretion was fully warranted. Based on the antecedents
earlier rendered here, Limson did not persuasively demonstrate to the CA how the Secretary of
Justice had been gravely wrong in upholding the dismissal by the OCP of her charges against
respondent. In contrast, the assailed resolutions of the Secretary of Justice were quite
exhaustive in their exposition of the reasons for the dismissal of the charges. And, even
assuming that the Secretary of Justice thereby erred, she should have shown to the CA that
either arbitrariness or capriciousness or whimsicality had tainted the error. Yet, she tendered no
such showing. She should be reminded, indeed, that grave abuse of discretion meant either that
the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised by the Secretary of Justice in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the Secretary of Justice
evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when the Secretary of Justice, while exercising judicial or quasijudicial powers, acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.
Thirdly, the discrepancy between photographs supposedly taken in 1941 and in 1996 of
respondent did not support Limsons allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the

Secretary of Justice. It is really absurd to expect respondent, the individual depicted on the
photographs, to look the same after 55 long years.
And, fourthly, on the issue of the alleged use of illegal aliases, the Court observes that
respondents aliases involved the names Eugenio Gonzalez, Eugenio Gonzales, Eugenio
Juan Gonzalez, Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado, Eugenio C.R. Gonzalez, Eugenio J.
Gonzalez, and per Limson Eugenio Juan Robles Gonzalez. But these names contained
his true names, albeit at times joined with an erroneous middle or second name, or a misspelled
family name in one instance. The records disclose that the erroneous middle or second names,
or the misspelling of the family name resulted from error or inadvertence left unchecked and
unrectified over time. What is significant, however, is that such names were not fictitious names
within the purview of the Anti-Alias Law; and that such names were not different from each
other. Considering that he was not also shown to have used the names for unscrupulous
purposes, or to deceive or confuse the public, the dismissal of the charge against him was
justified in fact and in law.

EMMANUEL M. OLORES v. MANILA DOCTORS COLLEGE AND/OR TERESITA O. TURLA

G.R. NO. 201663, MARCH 31, 2014

J. PERALTA
The rationale for the requirement of first filing a motion for reconsideration before the
filing of a petition for certiorari is that the law intends to afford the tribunal, board or office an
opportunity to rectify the errors and mistakes it may have lapsed into before resort to the courts
of justice can be had. In the instant case, the NLRC had all the opportunity to review its ruling
and correct itself. Hence, the CA erred in dismissing the Rule 65 petition filed by Olores.
FACTS:
Respondent is a private higher educational institution. Petitioner was hired as a part-time
faculty of respondent on 07 November 2005. From 03 November 2008, petitioner signed fixed
term employment contracts, this time as a full- time instructor.
Petitioner submitted the final grades of his students to Bernardo, the chair of the
Humanities Area. On 13 April 2010, Bernardo charged petitioner with gross misconduct and
gross inefficiency in the performance of duty. Petitioner was accused of employing a grading
system not in accordance with the system.
Meanwhile, summer classes started on 15 April 2010 without [petitioner] having signed
an employment contract.
Acting on the report of Bernardo, respondent created the Manila Doctors Tribunal (MDT)
which was tasked to ascertain the truth. The MDT sent notices of hearing to petitioner. On 31
May 2010, the MDT submitted its recommendation to the president of respondent. The
culpability of [petitioner] was established, hence, dismissal was recommended. On 07 June
2010, respondent terminated the services of [petitioner] for grave misconduct and gross
inefficiency and incompetence.
Aggrieved by the decision of respondent, [petitioner] filed a case for: a) illegal dismissal.
In a Decision4 dated December 8, 2010, the Labor Arbiter found merit in petitioners charge for

illegal dismissal. However, it dismissed petitioners claim for regularization. The NLRC reversed
the LAs ruling. The CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioners Rule 65 petition.
RULING:
The petition is granted.
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon the posting of a cash bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment
appealed from. In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or
separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be
executory, even pending appeal.
The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving
monetary awards from the decisions of the Labor Arbiter. The lawmakers clearly intended to
make the bond a mandatory requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer as inferred
from the provision that an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a
employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing
prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the
payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement
provided herein.
Here, it is undisputed that respondents appeal was not accompanied by any appeal
bond despite the clear monetary obligation to pay petitioner his separation pay in the amount of
P100,000.00. Since the posting of a bond for the perfection of an appeal is both mandatory and
jurisdictional, the decision of the Labor Arbiter sought to be appealed before the NLRC had
already become final and executory. Therefore, the NLRC had no authority to entertain the
appeal, much less to reverse the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Nevertheless, assuming that the NLRC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the instant
case, this Court would still be inclined to favor petitioner because the instant case falls under
one of the recognized exceptions to the rule that a motion for reconsideration is necessary prior
to the filing of a certiorari petition.
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is indispensable before resort to the
special civil action for certiorari to afford the court or tribunal the opportunity to correct its error, if
any. The rule is well settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable
condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari.
However, said rule is subject to several recognized exceptions: (a) Where the order is a
patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) Where the questions raised in the
certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the
same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) Where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of
the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) Where,
under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) Where petitioner

was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) Where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable; (g) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) Where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object;
and (i) Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
In the instant case, the NLRC had all the opportunity to review its ruling and correct itself.
The NLRC issued a ruling on February 10, 2011 in favor of petitioner dismissing
respondents appeal on the ground that the latter failed to file an appeal bond. However, upon a
motion for reconsideration filed by respondent, the NLRC completely reversed itself and set
aside its earlier resolution dismissing the appeal. The NLRC had more than enough opportunity
to pass upon the issues raised by both parties on appeal of the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and
the subsequent motion for reconsideration of its resolution disposing the appeal. Thus, another
motion for reconsideration would have been useless under the circumstances since the
questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have already been duly raised and passed upon
by the NLRC.
All told, the petition is meritorious. However, since this Court is not a trier of facts, we
cannot rule on the substantive issue of the case, i.e., whether petitioner has attained regular
status, inasmuch as the CA has not yet passed upon the factual issues raised by the parties.