Topic: Administrative decisions are entitled to great weight and respect; Property of public

dominion is not subject to any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale.

Ponente: Perata, J.
General Mariano Alvarez Services Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO) v. National Housing
Authority (NHA), G.R. No. 175417, 09 February 2015
Facts: On May 9, 1979, the Director of the Bureau of Public Works (BPW) turned over to the National
Housing Authority (NHA) a completed water works system in San Gabriel, Carmona, Cavite (now
General Mariano Alvarez, Cavite). The NHA must, thereafter, turn over the same water works system to
a cooperative water company. Accordingly, in a Memorandum of Agreement dated July 17, 1979, the
NHA turned over the water works system to San Gabriel Water Services Cooperative (SAGAWESECO),
now GEMASCO.
In 1983, GEMASCO experienced internal problems. Two (2) Boards of Directors, the Gabumpa
group and the Catangay group, were simultaneously administering its affairs. On September 18, 1986,
as the management of the water system was characterized with instability and continued conflict, the
NHA temporarily intervened and took over through its Interim Water Services Management. On March
16,1988, the Gabumpa group again took over the management.
On January 10, 1992, the NHA entered into a Deed of Transfer and Acceptance with GMAWD
and transferred to the latter the operations and management of the water system in General Mariano
Alvarez, Cavite from GEMASCO, which comprised of six (6) artesian deep wells with pumping facilities,
five (5) water tanks, pipe mainline and distribution system. On February 17, 1992, GEMASCO filed a
Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and TRO against the NHA, GMAWD, and
the Local Water Utility Administration before the Quezon City RTC, assailing the Deed of Transfer and
Acceptance executed between the NHA and GMAWD.
On June 15, 1999, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding the validity of the contested Deed of
Transfer and Acceptance. GEMASCO thus brought the case to the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 64237. Thereafter, the CA dismissed GEMASCOs appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision. A
subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, GEMASCO filed the instant petition before
the Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 175417.
In G.R. No. 175417, GEMASCO attacks the validity of the Deed of Transfer and Acceptance
entered into by the NHA and GMAWD. In G.R. No. 198923, on the other hand, GMAWD contends that
the CA erred in affirming the issuance of the LAs August 17, 2007 Writ of Execution as well as its
Notice of Sale/Levy on Execution despite the pendency of G.R. No. 175417 before the Court. It argues
that said issuances will cause it great injustice because the same are against properties the right of
ownership over which has been consistently upheld in its favor. Since the issues are substantially
interrelated, the Court shall make a joint discussion.
Issues:
1.
2.

Whether the Deed of Transfer and Acceptance entered into by the NHA and GMAWD is valid.
Whether the water works system is subject to encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale.

1.

Yes.

SC:

Well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisprudence that administrative decisions are entitled to
great weight and respect and will not be interfered with by the courts. Courts will not interfere in
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with
regulation of activities coming under its special and technical training and knowledge, for the exercise
of administrative discretion is a policy decision and a matter that is best discharged by the concerned
government agency and not by the courts.
More so where, as in the present case, the prime consideration is the interest of the public at
large on the issue of basic water need. Certainly, the Deed of Transfer and Acceptance entered into by
the NHA and GMAWD was the result of a valid exercise of the NHAs management prerogative.

2.

No.

It is interesting to note that the water works system in General Mariano Alvarez, Cavite, including the
three (3) water tanks subject of the assailed Writ of Execution in G.R. No. 198923, is devoted to public
use and thus, property of public dominion, which GMAWD has the right to operate, maintain, and
manage. Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or
disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any
property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Otherwise, essential public
services would stop if properties of public dominion would be subject to encumbrances, foreclosures
and auction sale. Since it is GEMASCO which is liable for the payment of the separation pay and
backwages to its illegally dismissed employees, any contemplated sale must be confined only to those
properties absolutely owned by it and the subject water tanks must corollarily be excluded from the
same.
Topic: Easement of Right of Way
Ponente: Leonen, Second Division
Alicia B. Reyes Vs. Spouses Francisco S. Valentin And Anatalia Ramos, G.R. No. 194488
February 11, 2015
Facts: Alicia B. Reyes, through Dolores B. Cinco, filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court for
easement of right of way against respondents, Spouses Francisco S. Valentin and Anatalia Ramos.
The petitioner alleged that she was the registered owner of a 450-square-meter parcel of land
in Barangay Malibong Bata, Pandi, Bulacan, designated as Lot No. 3-B-12 and covered by TCT No. T343642-(M). The property used to be a portion of Lot No. 3-B and was surrounded by estates
belonging to other persons. Petitioner also alleged that respondents 1,500-square-meter property
surrounded her property, and that it was the only adequate outlet from her property to the highway.
The easement sought was the vacant portion near the boundary of respondents other lot.
Respondents lot was given to Dominador Ramos (Dominador) who allegedly was respondents
predecessor-in-interest. Dominador was also her mothers brother and caretaker of properties.
Only 500 square meters were given to Dominador, but, instead of limiting the conveyance to
himself to 500 square meters of the property, he conveyed the whole 1,500 square meters, including
that which was supposed to be the access to the barangay road. Petitioners mother was unable to
recover the land because the Registry of Deeds was razed with fire.
In their Answer, respondents contended that the isolation of petitioners property was due to
her mothers own act of subdividing the property among her children without regard to the pendency
of an agrarian case between her and her tenants. The property chosen by petitioner as easement was
also the most burdensome for respondents. Respondents pointed to an open space that connected
petitioners property to another public road.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for easement of right of way.
affirmed the decision of the RTC, in toto.

On appeal, the CA

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has the compulsory easement of right of way over respondents
property
SC: An easement of right of way is a real right. When an easement of right of way is granted to
another person, the rights of the propertys owner are limited. An owner may not exercise some of his
or her property rights for the benefit of the person who was granted the easement of right of way.
Hence, the burden of proof to show the existence of the above conditions is imposed on the person
who seeks the easement of right of way.
We agree with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals findings that petitioner
failed to establish that there was no adequate outlet to the public highway and that the proposed
easement was the least prejudicial to respondents estate.
There is an adequate exit to a public highway.

Based on the Ocular Inspection Report, petitioners property had another outlet to the highway.
In between her property and the highway or road, however, is an irrigation canal, which can be
traversed by constructing a bridge, similar to what was done by the owners of the nearby properties.
There is, therefore, no need to utilize respondents property to serve petitioners needs.
Another adequate exit exists. Petitioner can use this outlet to access the public roads.
The outlet referred to in the Ocular Inspection Report may be longer and more inconvenient to
petitioner because she will have to traverse other properties and construct a bridge over the irrigation
canal before she can reach the road. However, these reasons will not justify the imposition of an
easement on respondents property because her convenience is not the gauge in determining whether
to impose an easement of right of way over anothers property. Petitioner also failed to satisfy the
requirement of "least prejudicial to the servient estate."
The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals also considered the aspect of necessity for
an easement in determining petitioners rights.
The trial court found that there is still no necessity for an easement of right of way because
petitioners property is among the lots that are presently being tenanted by Dominador and Filomena
Ramos children.74 Petitioner is yet to use her property. The Complaint for easement was found to
have been filed merely "for future purposes." Thus, according to the Court of Appeals, "admittedly,
there is no immediate and imperative need for the construction of a right of way as the dominant
estate and its surrounding properties remain as agricultural lands under tenancy."
The aspect of necessity may not be specifically included in the requisites for the grant of
compulsory easement under the Civil Code. However, this goes into the question of "least prejudice."
An easement of right of way imposes a burden on a property and limits the property owners use of
that property. The limitation imposed on a property owners rights is aggravated by an apparent lack of
necessity for which his or her property will be burdened.
The decision of the CA was affirmed.
Topics: Revocation of a donation with a resolutory condition; Recovery of property
Ponente: Bienvenido L. Reyes
Philippine Woman's Christian Temperance Union, Inc. v. Teodoro R. Yangco 2nd and 3rd
Generation Heirs Foundation, Inc.
G.R. No. 199595
02 April 2014
Facts: During his lifetime, Teodoro Yangco donated a parcel of land to the Philippine Woman's Christian
Temperance Union, Inc. (PWCTUI), which was originally registered with the SEC in 1929 under SEC
Registration No. PW-959. The property was intended as a home for needy and unfortunate women and
children. It was provided that should the property ceased to be used for its intended purpose, it will
revert back to Yangco or his predecessors-in-interest.
The property was then registered in the name of PWCTUI. In 1979, PWCTUIs corporate term
expired. Five years later, using the same corporate name, PWCTUI obtained SEC Registration No.
122088 and immediately applied for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of title over the
subject property, which was granted in LRC Case No. 20970.
In 2004, Teodoro R. Yangco (2 nd and 3rd Generation Heirs) Foundation, Inc. (TRY Foundation)
filed before the RTC, acting as a Land Registration Court, a Petition for the Issuance of New Title over
the subject property. It claimed that the expiration of PWCTUIs corporate term in 1979 effectively
rescinded the donation pursuant to the resolutory condition. Being comprised of the heirs of the
donor, TRY Foundation claimed that it is entitled to petition for the issuance of a new title in their
name, docketed as LRC Case No. Q-18126(04), pursuant to Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529.

PWCTUI opposed the same arguing, among others, that: TRY Foundation has no legal
personality to bring the action because the donation has never been revoked and any right to demand
for its revocation already prescribed; although PWCTUIs corporate term was not extended upon its
expiration in 1979, it nonetheless registered anew and continued the operations, affairs and social
work of the corporation; and it also continued to possess the property and exercised rights of
ownership over it.
Issue: Whether or not the subject property should revert to TRY Foundation.
SC: No.
The petition filed by TRY Foundation was a disguised complaint for revocation of
donation: TRY Foundation is actually seeking to recover the possession and ownership of the subject
property from PWCTUI and not merely the cancellation of PWCTUIs title over the subject property. No
judgment proclaiming TRY Foundation as the absolute owner of the property can be arrived at without
declaring the deed of donation revoked.
An action which seeks the recovery of property is outside the ambit of Section 108
of P.D. No. 1529 because of the following reasons:
(1) Whether the donation merits revocation and consequently effect reversion of the donated
property to the donor and/or his heirs cannot be settled by filing a mere petition for cancellation of title
under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529;
(2) TRY Foundations exposed action for revocation of the donation necessarily includes a claim
for the recovery of the subject property. The petition of TRY Foundation had the effect of reopening the
decree of registration in the earlier LRC Case No. 20970 which granted PWCTUIs application for the
issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of title. As such, it breached the caveat in Section 108 of P.D.
No. 1529 that this section shall not be construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or
decree of registration;
(3) The petition of TRY Foundation also violated that portion in Section 108 stating that all
petitions or motions filed under this section as well as any other provision of this decree after original
registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration was
entered. The petition of TRY Foundation in LRC Case No. Q-18126(04) was clearly not a mere
continuation of LRC Case No. 20970; and
(4) The petition filed by TRY Foundation is not within the ambit of Section 108 because the
relief thereunder can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or that there is no
adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest. On the contrary, PWCTUI
maintained that it remains and continues to be the true and sole owner in fee simple of the property
and that TRY Foundation has no right thereto;
(4) The enumerated instances for amendment or alteration of a certificate of title under
Section 108 are non-controversial in nature. They are limited to issues so patently insubstantial as not
to be genuine issues. The proceedings thereunder are summary in nature, contemplating insertions of
mistakes which are only clerical, but certainly not controversial issues. Certainly, revocation of
donation entails litigious and controversial matters especially in this case where the condition
supposedly violated by PWCTUI is not expressly stated in the deed of donation.
Court intervention is imperative in automatic reversion: As ruled in Vda. de Delgado v.
CA (G.R. No. 125728, August 28, 2001), although automatic reversion immediately happens upon a
violation of the condition and therefore no judicial action is necessary for such purpose, still judicial
intervention must be sought by the aggrieved party if only for the purpose of determining the propriety
of the rescission made. In addition, where the donee denies the rescission of the donation or
challenges the propriety thereof, only the final award of the court can conclusively settle whether the
resolution is proper or not. Here, PWCTUI unmistakably refuted the allegation that the expiration of its
corporate term in 1979 rescinded the donation.
Topic: Action for Reconveyance
Ponente: Diosdado M. Peralta

Rodolfo V. Francisco v. Emiliana M. Rojas

GR No. 167120
23 April 2014
Facts: The entire hacienda used to be owned by one Don Buenaventura Guido y Santa Ana upon
whose death left a portion thereof, consisting of the said 3,181.74 hectares, to his two sons Francisco
Guido and Hermogenes Guido. Sometime in September 1911, Decreto No. 6145, covering the same
3,181.74-hectare portion of Hacienda de Angono was issued in favor of the brothers Francisco and
Hermogenes. Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 633 over the same 3,181.74 hectares was issued in
the names of the two brothers. On May 12, 1933, OCT No. 633 was cancelled, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 23377 was issued. Nine years later, or sometime in 1942, the heirs of Francisco and
Hermogenes adjudicated among themselves the same 3,181.74 hectares and transferred the one-half
portion thereof to Jose Rojas. Allegedly, the adjudication was formalized by the heirs of Francisco and
Hermogenes only on December 17, 1973, when they purportedly executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement
of Estate With Quitclaim.
On March 29, 1976, Alfredo Guido, Sr., representing the other heirs, filed with the Registry of
Deeds of Morong a petition for reconstitution of TCT No. 23377, alleging that the original of the same
title could not be located in the files of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal when he and his co-heirs sought
the registration of their aforementioned [Extra]-Judicial Settlement of Estate With Quitclaim. The
petition was supported by the owners duplicate copy of the title sought to be reconstituted. On the
same date that Guido, Sr. filed the petition for reconstitution, the same was granted and a
reconstituted certificate of title TCT (23377) RT-M-0002 was issued.
Thereafter, the heirs who executed the aforesaid document of extra-judicial settlement,
including the now spouses Jose Rojas and Emiliana Rojas, sold the property to Pacil Management
Corporation, and new titles were issued in favor of Pacil on June 26, 1976. Three months later, or on
August 26, 1976, Pacil reconveyed all the 21 lots to the former owners. On August 25, 1978, fourteen
of the 21 lots were exchanged for shares of stock of Interport Resources Corporation. On April 25,
1980, all the named heirs in the same Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate With Quitclaim renounced
their rights over the remaining portion of the 3,181.74 hectares in favor of their co-heir Alfredo Guido,
Sr., in exchange for monetary considerations.
It appears, however, that on August 13, 1976, barely five months from the time Alfredo Guido, Sr. filed
his petition for reconstitution of TCT No. 23377 on March 29, 1976, which petition was approved on the
same date, an Application for Registration of Title over four parcels of land (lots 1, 2, 3 and 4), which
lots are presently alleged by the Rojases to be "overlapping a portion of the area covered by TCT No.
23377," x x x was filed with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 10, by Rosalina, Rodolfo,
Carmela and Carmen, all surnamed Francisco, about which petition the Rojases now claim to be
unaware of.
Issue: Whether or not an Action for Reconveyance is the appropriate proceeding.
SC: Yes.
The "appropriate proceeding" referred to in Guido is a case where the Franciscos must present
specific acts of ownership to substantiate their claim that they are bona fide occupants of Lots 1-4 of
Psu-04-001463 while, at the same time, respondents are accorded due process of law by availing of
the opportunity to oppose and refute the representations made by the Franciscos. Whatever the
"appropriate proceeding" may be, the decisive factor is that the same should be a proceeding in
personam wherein personal service of summons and copy of the complaint/petition is necessary.
Truly, one of the appropriate legal remedies that should have been availed of by the Franciscos
is an action for reconveyance. Contrary to petitioners declaration, proof of actual fraud is not required
as it may be filed even when no fraud intervened such as when there is mistake in including the land
for registration. In the action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is highly respected as
incontrovertible; what is sought instead is the transfer of the property wrongfully or erroneously
registered in anothers name to its rightful owner or to the one with a better right.
An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes four years from the discovery of the
fraud and if it is based on an implied or a constructive trust it prescribes ten (10) years from the
alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property. However,
an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust is imprescriptible if the plaintiff or
the person enforcing the trust is in possession of the property. In effect, the action for reconveyance is
an action to quiet the property title, which does not prescribe. In this case, the Franciscos claim to be
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lots. It appears

that they never lost possession of said properties, and as such, they are in a position to file the
complaint to protect their alleged rights and clear whatever doubts has been cast thereon.

Topics: Land transfer; Encumbrances - Annotations; Liens - Registration and Effect; Buyer
in good faith and for value; Contract of Sale v. Contract to Sell; Ripening of Ownership;
Laches; Builder in Good Faith
Ponente: Jose Catral Mendoza
Saberon, et al. v. Ventanilla, Jr.
G.R. No. 192669
21 April 2014
Facts: This case is an offshoot of two (2) cases involving the same property, which had been decided,
respectively, by the Supreme Court with finality.
Manila Remnant Co., Inc. (MRCI) owned several parcels of land constituting a subdivision. It
entered into a contract with A.U. Valencia & Co. Inc. (AUVC), whereby for a consideration, the latter
was to, among others, develop the aforesaid subdivision with authority to manage the sales thereof
and execute contracts to sell to lot buyers. At that time, the president of AUVC, was Artemio U.
Valencia (Valencia)*.
Subsequently, MRCI and AUVC executed two (2) contracts to sell in favor of Oscar C. Ventanilla,
Jr. and Carmen Gloria D. Ventanilla (Ventanillas).
Afterwards, Valencia, holding out himself as president of MRCI*, and without the knowledge of
the Ventanillas, resold the same property to Carlos Crisostomo (Crisostomo), without any
consideration. Valencia transmitted the fictitious contract with Crisostomo to MRCI while he kept the
contracts to sell with the Ventanillas in his private office files. All the amounts paid by the latter were
deposited in Valencias bank account and remitted to MRCI as payments of Crisostomo. The Ventanillas
continued to pay the monthly installment.
Thereafter, MRCI terminated its business relationship with AUVC on account of irregularities
discovered in its collection and remittances. Consequently, Valencia was removed as president by the
Board of Directors of MRCI*. He then stopped transmitting the Ventanillas monthly installments, which
appearing in MRCIs records as credited under the name of Crisostomo.
AUVC sued MRCI to impugn the abrogation of their agency agreement. AUVC then informed the
Ventanillas that it was still authorized by the trial court to collect the monthly amortizations and
requested them to continue remitting their payment, with the assurance that said payments would be
deposited later in court.
For AUVCs failure to forward its collections to the trial court as ordered, MRCI caused the
publication of a notice cancelling the contracts to sell of some lot buyers including those of Crisostomo
in whose name the payments of the Ventanillas had been credited.
It was only after some time when the Ventanillas discovered Valencias deception. Believing
that they had already remitted a substantial amount for the lots, the Ventanillas offered to
pay the balance to MRCI. To their shock, their names as lot buyers did not appear in MRCIs records.
Instead, MRCI showed them a copy of the contract to sell signed by Valencia, in favor of Crisostomo.
MRCI refused the Ventanillas offer to pay for the remainder of the contract price.
Aggrieved, the Ventanillas commenced an action for specific performance, annulment of deeds
and damages against MRCI, AUVC, and Crisostomo. The then CFI rendered a decision declaring the
contracts to sell in favor of the Ventanillas as valid and subsisting, and annulling the contract to sell in
favor of Crisostomo.
On separate appeals filed by AUVC and MRCI, the CA sustained the CFI Quezon Citys decision
in toto.

The 1990 Case

MRCI then filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari. The decision of the CA was
affirmed and declared the judgment of the CFI Quezon City immediately executory.
Encouraged by the seeming triumph of their cause, the Ventanillas moved for the issuance of a
writ of execution, and was duly issued. A notice of levy was annotated in the titles of MRCI on May
31, 1991.
In a manifestation and motion, however, MRCI alleged that the subject properties could no
longer be delivered to the Ventanillas because they had already been sold to Samuel Marquez
(Marquez) on February 7, 1990, while its petition was pending. Nevertheless, MRCI offered to reimburse
the amount paid by the Ventanillas, including legal interest plus damages. MRCI also prayed that its
tender of payment be accepted and that all garnishments on their accounts lifted.
The Ventanillas
accepted the amount of P210,000.00 as damages and attorneys fees but rejected the reimbursement.
MRCI then moved for reconsideration praying that it be ordered to reimburse the Ventanillas
and that the garnishment of its bank deposit be lifted. This plea was denied twice by the trial court
prompting MRCI to file another petition for certiorari with the CA, which ruled that the contract to
sell in favor of Marquez did not constitute a legal impediment to the immediate execution of the
judgment.
The 1994 Case
From the CA, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court where MRCI argued that the sale of
the properties to Marquez was valid because at the time of the sale, the issue of the validity of the sale
to the Ventanillas had not yet been resolved. Further, there was no specific injunction against it reselling the property. As a buyer in good faith, Marquez had a right to rely on the recitals in the
certificate of title. The subject matter of the controversy having been passed to an innocent purchaser
for value, the execution of the absolute deed of sale in favor of the Ventanillas could not be ordered by
the trial court.
The Ventanillas countered that the validity of the sale to them had already been established
even while the previous petition was still awaiting resolution. The petition only questioned the solidary
liability of MRCI to the Ventanillas. Hence, the portion of the decision ordering MRCI to execute an
absolute deed of sale in their favor had already become final and executory when MRCI failed to
appeal it to the Court. Thus, an order enjoining MRCI from reselling the property in litigation was
unnecessary. Besides, the unusual lack of interest, on the part of Marquez, to protect and assert his
right over the disputed property was, to the Ventanillas, a clear indication that the alleged sale to him
was merely a ploy of MRCI to evade the execution of the absolute deed of sale in their favor.
The Court settled the controversy in favor of the Ventanillas and cited circumstances that cast
suspicion on the validity, not to say the very existence, of the contract with Marquez.
Yet, Samuel Cleofe, Register of Deeds for Quezon City (ROD Cleofe) revealed to them, that on March
11, 1992, MRCI registered a deed of absolute sale to Marquez who eventually sold the same
property to the Saberons (herein petitioners), which conveyance was registered in July 1992. ROD
Cleofe opined that a judicial order for the cancellation of the titles in the name of the Saberons was
essential before he complied with the said writ of execution. Apparently, the notice of levy, through
inadvertence, was not carried over to the title issued to Marquez, the same being a junior
encumbrance which was entered after the contract to sell to Marquez had already been annotated.
Civil Case No. Q-96-26486
Once again, the Ventanillas were constrained to go to court to seek the annulment of the deed
of sale executed between MRCI and Marquez as well as the deed of sale between Marquez and the
Saberons, as the fruits of void conveyances. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
which ruled for the Ventanillas.
The defendants filed separate appeals. The Saberons relied on one central argumentthat
they were purchasers in good faith, having relied on the correctness of the certificates of title covering
the lots in question; and therefore, holders of a valid and indefeasible title.
The CA said that MRCI and the other defendants were found guilty of bad faith for selling the
lots to Marquez at a time when litigation as to the validity of the first sale to the Ventanillas was still
pending. In other words, MRCI was sufficiently aware of the Court decision confirming its failure to
supervise and control the affairs of its authorized agent, AUVC, which led to the explicit
pronouncement that the first sale to the Ventanillas was valid. This should have served as a warning to
MRCI that it could no longer deal with the property in deference to the Courts ruling and affirmation of
the trial courts order to execute the deed of sale in favor of the Ventanillas.

Thus, the Saberons filed the instant petition, reiterating that they were innocent purchasers for
value and in good faith. It was only upon receipt of the summons in the case filed by the Ventanillas
with the RTC that they learned of the present controversy.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the registration of the notice of levy had produced constructive notice that
would bind third persons despite the failure of the ROD-QC to annotate the same in the
certificates of title.
2. Whether or not the rights or interests of the Ventanillas in the subject properties ripened
into ownership.
3. Whether or not laches could be attributed to the Ventanillas.
4. Whether or not the Saberons were builders in good faith.
SC: 1. Yes.
Sections 51 and 52 of P.D. No. 1529 explain the purpose and effects of registering both
voluntary and involuntary instruments, to wit:
Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. An owner of registered land may
convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He
may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in
law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or
affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a
contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make
registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third
persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office
of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.
Section 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien,
attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or
entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates
lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering.
These provisions encapsulate the rule that documents, like the certificates of title do not effect
a conveyance of or encumbrances on a parcel of land. Registration is the operative act that
conveys ownership or affects the land insofar as third persons are concerned. By virtue of
registration, a constructive notice to the whole world of such voluntary or involuntary instrument or
court writ or processes, is thereby created.
The Court is thus beckoned to rule on two conflicting rights over the subject properties: the
right of the Ventanillas to acquire the title to the registered land from the moment of inscription of the
notice of levy on the day book (or entry book), on one hand; and the right of the Saberons to rely on
what appears on the certificate of title for purposes of voluntary dealings with the same parcel of land ,
on the other.
The Saberons maintain that they had no notice of any defect, irregularity or encumbrance in
the titles of the property they purchased. In its decision, however, the RTC pointed out that their
suspicion should have been aroused by the circumstance that Marquez, who was not engaged in the
buy-and-sell business and had the property for only a few months, would offer the same for sale.
Although the RTC found that the Saberons may not be considered as innocent purchasers for value
because of this circumstance, it, nonetheless, ruled that they, who might well be unwilling victims of
the fraudulent scheme employed by MRCI and Marquez, were entitled to actual and compensatory
damages.
To this latter finding, the Court agrees. The Saberons could not be said to have
authored the entanglement they found themselves in. No fault can be attributed to them
for relying on the face of the title presented by Marquez. This is bolstered by the fact that
the RTC decision shows no categorical finding that the Saberons purchase of the lots from
Marquez was tainted with bad faith. That the Saberons should have harbored doubts against
Marquez is too high a standard to impose on a buyer of titled land. This is in consonance to the rule
that the one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system is charged with notice only

of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. All persons dealing with property covered by
Torrens certificate of title are not required to explore further than what the Torrens title upon its face
indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right
thereto. These rules remain as essential features of the Torrens system. The present case does not
entail a modification or overturning of these principles.
Be that as it may, no fault can likewise be imputed to the Ventanillas.
It has already been established in the two previous cases decided by the Court that the contracts to
sell executed in favor of the Ventanillas are valid and subsisting. Clearly, it has been acknowledged,
even by MRCI, as can be seen in the latters own choice to only question their solidary liability in the
1990 case and its failure to assign the same as an error in the 1994 case. In the same vein, the issue
on Marquezs title had already been passed upon and settled in the 1994 case. That he purchased the
lots prior to the annotation of the notice of levy in MRCIs title was of no moment. In fact, the Court
explicitly declared that MRCIs transaction with Marquez "cannot prevail over the final and executory
judgment ordering MRCI to execute an absolute deed of sale in favor of the Ventanillas."
These favorable findings prompted the Ventanillas to register the notice of levy on the
properties. The records show that on the strength of a final and executory decision by the Court, they
successfully obtained a writ of execution from the RTC and a notice of levy was then entered, albeit on
the primary entry book only. The contract to sell to Marquez was registered on May 21, 1991, while the
notice of levy was issued ten (10) days later, or on May 31, 1991. In February 1992, MRCI executed the
Deed of Sale with Marquez, under whose name the clean titles, sans the notice of levy, were issued. A
year later, or on March 11, 1992, MRCI registered the deed of sale to Marquez who later sold the same
property to the Saberons.
This complex situation could have been avoided if it were not for the failure of ROD Cleofe to
carry over the notice of levy to Marquezs title, serving as a senior encumbrance that might have
dissuaded the Saberons from purchasing the properties.
Distinctions between a contract to sell and a contract of sale are well-established in
jurisprudence. In a contract of sale, the vendor loses ownership over the property and
cannot recover it until and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded; whereas, in a
contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until full payment of the price. In the latter
contract, payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition, failure of which is not a breach but
an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming effective.
It is undeniable, therefore, that no title was transferred to Marquez upon the annotation of the
contract to sell on MRCIs title. As correctly found by the trial court, the contract to sell cannot be
substituted by the Deed of Absolute Sale as a "mere conclusion" of the previous contract since the
owners of the properties under the two instruments are different.
Considering that the deed of sale in favor of Marquez was of later registration, the
notice of levy should have been carried over to the title as a senior encumbrance.
Corollary to this is the rule that a levy of a judgment debtor creates a lien, which nothing can
subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment of the levy itself. Prior registration
of the lien creates a preference, since the act of registration is the operative act to convey and affect
the land. Jurisprudence dictates that the said lien continues until the debt is paid, or the sale is had
under an execution issued on the judgment or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment is
discharged or vacated in the same manner provided by law. Under no law, not even P.D. No. 1529, is it
stated that an attachment shall be discharged upon sale of the property other than under execution.
Additionally, Section 59 of P.D. No. 1529 undoubtedly speaks of the ministerial duty on the
part of the Register of Deeds to carry over existing encumbrances to the certificates of title.
From the foregoing, ROD Cleofes theory that a deed of sale, as a mere conclusion of a contract
to sell, turns into a senior encumbrance which may surpass a notice of levy, has no leg to stand on. It
was, in fact, properly rejected by the courts a quo. Verily, the controversy at hand arose not from the
Ventanillas fault, but from ROD Cleofes misplaced understanding of his duty under the law.

Surely, the Ventanillas had every right to presume that the Register of Deeds would carry over
the notice of levy to subsequent titles covering the subject properties. The notice was registered
precisely to bind the properties and to serve as caution to third persons who might potentially deal
with the property under the custody of the law.
While the Court is not unmindful that a buyer is charged with notice only of such burdens and
claims as are annotated on the title, the RTC and the CA are both correct in applying the rule as to the
effects of involuntary registration. In cases of voluntary registration of documents, an innocent
purchaser for value of registered land becomes the registered owner, and, in contemplation of law the
holder of a certificate of title, the moment he presents and files a duly notarized and valid deed of sale
and the same is entered in the day book and at the same time he surrenders or presents the owner's
duplicate certificate of title covering the land sold and pays the registration fees, because what
remains to be done lies not within his power to perform. The Register of Deeds is duty-bound to
perform it. In cases of involuntary registration, an entry thereof in the day book is a sufficient notice to
all persons even if the owner's duplicate certificate of title is not presented to the register of deeds.
Therefore, in the registration of an attachment, levy upon execution, notice of lis pendens,
and the like, the entry thereof in the day book is a sufficient notice to all persons of such
adverse claim.
Thus, the Court must sustain the notice of levy registered by the Ventanillas notwithstanding
the nonfeasance of ROD Cleofe. Again, the prevailing rule is that there is effective registration once
the registrant has fulfilled all that is needed of him for purposes of entry and annotation, so that what
is left to be accomplished lies solely on the Register of Deeds.
Suffice it to say, no bad faith can be ascribed to the parties alike. Nevertheless, the
equal footing of the parties necessarily tilts in favor of the superiority of the Ventanillas
notice of levy, as discussed.
2. Yes.
It bears stressing that the previous decisions discussed herein already sealed the validity
of the contract to sell issued to the Ventanillas decades ago. As found by the RTC, it was MRCIs
obstinate refusal to accept their tender of payment, not to mention the devious transfer of the
property, which caused the decade-long delay of the execution of the deed of sale in their favor. This is
a finding that the Court, which is not a trier of facts, will have to respect.
3. No.
Their failure to learn about the structures being built on the subject lands and the payment of
real property taxes by the Saberons is not sufficient justification to withhold the declaration of their
ownership over it. Against a different factual milieu, laches may be said to have set it but not so in this
case. While the Ventanillas may have been unaware that improvements were being erected over the
lots, this obliviousness can, by no means, be treated as a lack of vigilance on their part. It bears
stressing that the Ventanillas are now of advanced age and retired as university professors.
Considering the length of litigation which they had to endure in order to assert their right over the
property which they have painstakingly paid for decades ago, to hold now that they have been
remiss in the protection of their rights would be the height of impropriety, if not injustice. To exact from
them an obligation to visit the land in litigation every so often, lest they be held to have slept on their
rights, is iniquitous and unreasonable. All told, the Ventanillas remain as innocent victims of deception.
4. Yes.
No less than the court a quo observed that "no actual evidence that the Saberons connived
with the MRCI and Marquez to have the titles registered in their names to the prejudice of the
(Ventanillas)" and that what was obvious was that "the Saberons dealt with clean certificates of titles."
Consequently, Article 448 in relation to Article 546 of the Civil Code will apply. The provisions
respectively read:
Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sow or planted in good faith, shall
have the right to appropriate, as his own the works, sowing, or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in Article 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price
of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged
to buy the land and if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he

shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees
after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case disagreement,
the court shall fix the terms thereof.
Article 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good
faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefore.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention,
the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the
expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
Thus Two options available to the Ventanillas:
1) they may exercise the right to appropriate after payment of indemnity representing the value of the
improvements introduced and the necessary and useful expenses defrayed on the subject lots; or
2) they may forego payment of the said indemnity and instead, oblige the Saberons to pay the price of
the land.
Consequences:
1. Should the Ventanillas elect to appropriate the improvements, the trial court is ordered to
determine the value of the improvements and the necessary and useful expenses after
hearing and reception of evidence.
Should the Ventanillas, however, pursue the option to oblige the Saberons to pay the "price of the
land," the trial court is ordered to determine said price to be paid to the Ventanillas.
Depending on the option exercised by the Ventanillas, the Court remanded the case to the
court of origin for further proceedings as to the determination of reimbursement due to the petitioners
or of the "price" of the subject lots due the Ventanillas.
*Which is which?
Topics: Ownership and possession; Double Sale
Ponente: Diosdado Peralta
Juanito Gopiao v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.
G.R. No. 188931
28 July 2014
Facts: This case stemmed from LRC Case No. 666, a Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Possession of
real properties, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 489198-R, 489199-R, and 489200-R
of the Register of Deeds of San Fernando, Pampanga, filed by respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust
Co. In said case, the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga issued, on November 5, 2007, a writ of
possession in favor of respondent Bank when it purchased the subject properties at a public auction
and registered the same in its name on October 1, 1998. Consequently, on January 4, 2008, a Notice to
Vacate was served on Green Asia Construction and Development Corporation, represented by the
spouses Renato and Delia Legaspi.
Upon learning of the notice to vacate, petitioner filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim on
January 8, 2008 and a Very Urgent Motion for Intervention and to Recall and/or Stop the
Enforcement/Implementation of the Writ of Possession January 9, 2008. In said actions, petitioner
alleged to be in actual occupation of the subject properties and claimed ownership thereof by virtue of
a Deed of Sale dated May 20, 1995 executed by the Spouses Legaspi in his favor.
The respondent bank was a mortgagee in good faith. It has shown that prior to the approval of
the loan application of the borrowers, it checked the records of the properties offered as collaterals at
the Registry of Deeds and verified that the titles were clean. Moreover, it inspected the premises and
found no occupants. Thus, it approved the loan secured by the mortgage over the subject properties
which they caused to be registered. When the borrowers defaulted, it foreclosed the mortgage,
purchased the property at the public auction and registered the Certificate of Sale on October 1, 1998.
The real properties are now covered by TCT No. 489198-R, TCT No. 489199-R and TCT No. 489200-R
registered in its name. Thus, a writ of possession was issued in its favor
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling as to the existence of double sale instead of petitioner's
preferred right.
SC: No.

The CA aptly noted the good faith of respondent Bank in this case. In its decision, it ruled that
respondent Bank has sufficiently shown that prior to the approval of the loan application of the
Spouses Legaspi, it checked the records of the properties offered as collaterals at the Register of
Deeds and verified that the titles were clean. Moreover, it inspected the premises and found no
occupants. Thus, respondent Bank cannot be said to have acquired the subject properties in bad faith
as to negate its right of possession thereof.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the CAs discussion on double sale and good faith was
based on an assumption, for the sake of argument, that the Spouses Legaspi actually sold the subject
properties to both petitioner and respondent Bank. The same is on the supposition that the first sale to
the petitioner had indeed taken place. However, as mentioned above, there is doubt as to whether
petitioner had truly purchased the properties subject of this case. What can be derived from the CAs
discussion is that even if petitioner is able to establish his possession, he would still have to overcome
the rule on double sale wherein the good faith of respondent Bank is material.
In view of the foregoing, the Court found no compelling reason to disturb the findings of the
RTC and the CA. The RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying petitioners Affidavit of ThirdParty Claim and Very Urgent Motion for Intervention and to Recall and/or Stop the
Enforcement/Implementation of the Writ of Possession, since petitioners alleged possession of the
subject real properties has not been adequately proved. Thus, the general rule, and not the exception,
applies to the instant petition. Likewise, the CA did not err in invoking the rule on double sale and
appreciating the good faith of respondent Bank, the same being material herein.

Topic: Real Estate Mortgage Validity

Ponente: Diosdado Peralta
Leonardo Castillo v. Security Bank Corp.
G.R. No. 196118
30 July 2014
Facts: Petitioner Leonardo C. Castillo and respondent Leon C. Castillo, Jr. are siblings. Leon and
Teresita Flores-Castillo (the Spouses Castillo) were doing business under the name of JRC Poultry Farms.
Sometime in 1994, the Spouses Castillo obtained a loan from respondent SBC in the amount of P45,
000,000.00. To secure said loan, they executed a real estate mortgage on August 5, 1994 over eleven
(11) parcels of land belonging to different members of the Castillo family and which are all located in
San Pablo City. They also procured a second loan amounting to P2,500,000.00, which was covered by a
mortgage on a land in Pasay City. Subsequently, the Spouses Castillo failed to settle the loan,
prompting SBC to proceed with the foreclosure of the properties. SBC was then adjudged as the
winning bidder in the foreclosure sale held on July 29, 1999. Thereafter, they were able to redeem the
foreclosed properties, with the exception of the lots covered by Torrens Certificate of Title(TCT) Nos.
28302 and 28297.
On January 30, 2002, Leonardo filed a complaint for the partial annulment of the real estate
mortgage. He alleged that he owns the property covered by TCT No. 28297 and that the Spouses
Castillo used it as one of the collaterals for a loan without his consent. He contested his supposed
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in Leons favor, claiming that it is falsified.
In a Decision dated October 16, 2006, the RTC of San Pablo City ruled in Leonardos favor. On
November 26, 2010, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision, essentially ruling that the August
5, 1994 real estate mortgage is valid. Leonardo filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was
denied for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether or not the real estate mortgage constituted over the property under TCT No. T-28297
is valid and binding.
HELD: Yes.
The following are the legal requisites for a mortgage to be valid:
(1) It must be constituted to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation;
(2) The mortgagor must be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged;
(3) The persons constituting the mortgage must have the free disposal of their property,
and in the absence thereof, they should be legally authorized for the purpose
In view of the great ease with which CTCs are obtained these days, there is reasonable ground
to believe that, as the CA correctly observed, the CTC could have been issued with the space for the
date left blank and Leonardo merely filled it up to accommodate his assertions. Also, upon careful
examination, the handwriting appearing on the space for the date of issuance is different from that on
the computation of fees, which in turn was consistent with the rest of the writings on the document. He
did not likewise attempt to show any evidence that would back up his claim that at the time of the
execution of the SPA on May 5, 1993, he was actually in America and therefore could not have possibly
appeared and signed the document before the notary.
And even if the Court were to assume, simply for the sake of argument, that Leonardo indeed
secured his CTC only on May 17, 1993, this does not automatically render the SPA invalid. The
appellate court aptly held that defective notarization will simply strip the document of its public
character and reduce it to a private instrument, but nonetheless, binding, provided its validity is
established by preponderance of evidence
Here, the preponderance of evidence indubitably tilts in favor of the respondents, still making
the SPA binding between the parties even with the aforementioned assumed irregularity. There are
several telling circumstances that would clearly demonstrate that Leonardo was aware of the
mortgage and he indeed executed the SPA to entrust Leon with the mortgage of his property.
Topics: Property; Action for Reconveyance; Vested Right
Ponente: Diosdado Peralta
Campos v. Ortega
G.R. no. 171286, June 2, 2014

Facts: Plaintiff Campos is a lessee of a building constructed on government lands. In 1977, after a
census, they were qualified as bona fide occupants which operated to the effect that if they could buy
the building they were leased, then they would be awarded the said lot. Negotiations ensued.
In 1988 however, plaintiff learned that the property has already been awarded to herein
respondents and that a deed of absolute sale was executed between respondents and Clarita Boloy,
owner of the leased building. This happened despite the fact that during the said initial meeting for the
negotiations, plaintiff was given one month to exercise the option of buying the property. Plaintiff, thru
her representative, inquired with the National Housing Authority (NHA) and questioned the award of
the lot to defendants who are disqualified for not having been duly censused either as renters or
sharers, and also the matter regarding the alteration the lot number actually being occupied by
plaintiff. Hence, this recourse.
Issue: Whether or not plaintiff has a vested right over the property, which, in the affirmative, would
render the award to respondents void.
SC: No.
A censused owner with assigned NHA tag number acquired no vested right over the
subject property. While it is true that NHA recognizes plaintiff as the censused owner of the structure
built on the lot, the issuance of the tag number is not a guarantee for lot allocation. Plaintiff had
petitioned the NHA for the award to her of the lot she is occupying. However, the census, tagging, and
plaintiff's petition, did not vest upon her a legal title to the lot she was occupying, but a mere
expectancy that the lot will be awarded to her. The expectancy did not ripen into a legal title.
A vested right is one that is absolute, complete and unconditional and no obstacle
exists to its exercise. It is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon any contingency. To
be vested, a right must have become a title legal or equitable to the present or future enjoyment of
property.
The appropriate legal remedy that petitioner should have availed is an action for
reconveyance. Proof of actual fraud is not required as it may be filed even when no fraud intervened
such as when there is mistake in including the land for registration.
Under the principle of constructive trust, registration of property by one person in his name,
whether by mistake or fraud, the real owner being another person, impresses upon the title so
acquired the character of a constructive trust for the real owner, which would justify an action for
reconveyance. In the action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as
incontrovertible but what is sought instead is the transfer of the property wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another's name to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. If the registration of the
land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee, and the
real owner is entitled to file an action for reconveyance of the property.
Topics: Accion Publiciana; Torrens Title
Ponente: Jose Mendoza
Paul P. Gabriel, Jr., Ireneo C. Calwag, Thomas L. Tingga-an and Heirs of Juliet B. Pulkera vs.
Carmeling Crisologo
G.R No. 204626, June 9, 2014
Facts: Crisologo alleged, among others, that she was the registered owner of two parcels of land with
a total area of approximately 2,000 square meters, described in, and covered by, two (2) certificates of
title Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-13935 and T-13936; that the properties were covered by
an Assessment of Real Property; that the payments of realty taxes on the said properties were
updated; that sometime in 2006, she discovered that petitioners unlawfully entered, occupied her
properties by stealth, by force and without her prior consent and knowledge, and constructed their
houses thereon; that upon discovery of their illegal occupation, her daughter, Atty. Carmelita Crisologo
and another, personally went to the properties and verbally demanded that petitioners vacate the
premises and remove their structures thereon; that the petitioners begged and promised to buy the
said properties for P3,500.00 per square meter; that she gave petitioners time to produce the said
amount, but they reneged on their promise to buy them; that petitioners refused to vacate the subject

properties despite several demands; that the petitioners knew full well that the subject premises they
were occupying were titled properties but they insisted on unlawfully holding the same; and that she
was unlawfully dispossessed and displaced from the subject properties due to petitioners illegal
occupation.
The petitioners countered that Crisologo's certificates were void since she did not comply with
the legal requirements. They added that they had been in open, actual, exclusive, notorious,
uninterrupted, and continuous possession of the subject land, in good faith, and that Crisologo was
never in prior possession and had no valid title over the subject land.
Issues: 1. Whether the petitioners or the respondent have/has the right of ownership over the
properties.
2. Whether or not the action of petitioners in questioning respondent's title was correct.
SC: 1. The respondent.
The testimonial and documentary evidence on record prove that respondent Crisologo has a
preferred claim of possession over that of petitioners. It cannot be denied that she bought the subject
properties from the previous owner in 1967, which was why the transfer certificates of title were
subsequently issued in her name. Records further show that she has been paying the realty taxes on
the said properties since 1969. She likewise appointed her attorney-in-fact, Isican, as administrator of
the disputed lands. More importantly, there is no question that she offered to sell to petitioners the
portions of the subject properties occupied by them. Hence, she deserves to be respected and restored
to her lawful possession as provided in Article 539 of the New Civil Code.
2. No.
Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
realty independently of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the
accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not
ownership. When parties, however, raise the issue of ownership, the court may pass upon the issue to
determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication,
nonetheless, is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the
purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the
issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an
action between the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not
conclusive on the issue of ownership.
In respondent Crisologo's action, she prayed that she be declared the lawful possessor of the
land. Thus, clearly, her intention pertains to an accion publiciana. When the petitioners raised the
question on the legality of the titles, this by nature is a collateral attack on the question of
ownership. This cannot be entertained since the action is essentially only on the question of
possession.
In addition to the above reason, as a holder of a Torrens certificate of title, the law protects
Crisologo from a collateral attack on the same. Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, provides that a certificate of title cannot be the subject of a collateral
attack. Thus, under Sec. 48: Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A certificate of title shall
not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.
Registration of land under the Torrens system, aside from perfecting the title and rendering it
indefeasible after the lapse of the period allowed by law, also renders the title immune from collateral
attack. A collateral attack transpires when, in another action to obtain a different relief and as an
incident of the present action, an attack is made against the judgment granting the title.
Topic: Unlawful Detainer
Ponente: ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Bonifacio Piedad, Maria Piedad represented by Inspiracion Danao vs. Spouses Victorio
Qurieza and Emeteria M. Gurieza
G.R. No. 207525, June 18, 2014
Facts: A Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages was filed by Bonifacio against Sps.Gurieza. In
his complaint, Bonifacio alleged that he is the absolute owner of the 1/3 middle portion of a parcel of
residential land designated as Lot 1227 which he acquired through intestate succession from his late

father who inherited the same from the latters parents, Alejandro Piedad (Alejandro)and Tomasa
Villaray (Tomasa). He also claimed that his ownership of the subject lot took place even before his
fathers death and was validated through a Deed of Confirmation of an Adjudication and Partition
(Deed of Confirmation) executed by Alejandro and Tomasas legal heirs. Further, Bonifacio alleged that
before migrating to Hawaii, he built a bungalow on the subject lot and assigned numerous caretakers
to look after it, the last of which were Sps. Gurieza. Sometime in 2005, however, Sps. Gurieza allegedly
took interest of the bungalow and the subject lot after learning from an employee of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) that Lot 1227 is public land. Using such information, Sps.
Gurieza had the subject lot declared under their name for tax purposes, caused a subdivision survey of
Lot 1227, and filed an application for survey authority and titling with the Bureau of Land
Management, Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the DENR, Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya (CENRO DENR Nueva Vizcaya).
When Bonifacio learned of Sps. Guriezas acts, he authorized Ofelia Bay-ag to file a protest
before the DENR which deferred further action on their (Sps. Guriezas) application before it.
Thereafter, Bonifacio sent his daughter, Maria Inspiracion Piedad-Danao (Danao), to the country to
personally demand that Sps. Gurieza vacate the subject lot unconditionally; and for this purpose,
Danao initiated a complaint before the barangay court. However, during the mediation proceedings,
Sps. Gurieza refused to heed Danaos demand and even challenged her to go to higher courts. Thus,
Bonifacio was constrained to file the instant case as his last resort.
In their defense, Sps. Gurieza denied Bonifacios claim and maintained that in 1974, the
subject lot was a vacant and virginal public land and that the DENR allowed them to possess and
occupy the same in the concept of an owner. As such, they acquired the same through acquisitive
prescription. They likewise assailed the authenticity and validity of the Deed of Confirmation,
contending that it was only signed by a few heirs of Alejandro and Tomasa.
Issue: Whether or not Bonifacio had clearly established his cause of action for unlawful detainer.
SC: Yes.

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who
unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to
hold possession under any contract, express or implied.

The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became
illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.

The only issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is the physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the
parties.

An ejectment case, based on the allegation of possession by tolerance, falls under

the category of unlawful detainer. Where the plaintiff allows the defendant to use his/her
property by tolerance without any contract, the defendant is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he/she will vacate on demand, failing which, an action for unlawful
detainer will lie.
Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the complaint must be filed "within one
(1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession" and must allege that: (a) the
defendant originally had lawful possession of the property, either by virtue of a contract or by
tolerance of the plaintiff;
(b) eventually, the defendants possession of the property became illegal or unlawful upon notice by
the plaintiff to defendant of the expiration or the termination of the defendants right of possession;
(c) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff the
enjoyment thereof; and
(d) within one (1) year from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.
Bonifacio had clearly established his cause of action for unlawful detainer. The following
established facts impel this conclusion:
First, the evidence shows that as early as the 1950s, Bonifacio already had possession of the
subject lot and even built a bungalow-type house thereon. Moreover, when he migrated to Hawaii,
Bonifacio appointed numerous caretakers to the said house and lot, the last being Sps. Gurieza. Thus,
despite his migration to Hawaii, Bonifacio never relinquished said possession over the house and lot.
Consistent with Article 524 of the Civil Code, it is well-settled that "it is not necessary that the
owner of a parcel of land should himself occupy the property as someone in his name may perform the
act. In other words, the owner of real estate has possession, either when he himself is physically in
occupation of the property, or when another person who recognizes his rights as owner is in such
occupancy." Thus, the Sps. Guriezas stay on the subject lot was only made possible through the mere
tolerance of Bonifacio.

Second, when Bonifacio learned that Sps. Gurieza declared the subject lot under their name for
tax purposes, caused a subdivision survey of Lot 1227, and filed an application for survey authority
and titling with the CENRODENR Nueva Vizcaya, he immediately took steps to terminate their
tolerated stay on the subject lot and house and demanded that they leave immediately, rendering the
Sps.Guriezas stay on the subject lot illegal.
Third, instead of vacating the subject lot, Sps. Gurieza defied Bonifacios demand and asserted
their ownership over the same. Moreover, they even challenged Danao to go to the courts to have
them removed from such lot. In effect, Sps. Gurieza was able to unlawfully withhold possession of the
subject lot from Bonifacio.
Lastly, Bonifacio, through Danao, made his final demand to Sps. Gurieza on January 14, 2008,
as evidenced by a Certificate to File Action issued by the Barangay Captain of the area where the
subject lot was located, stating that the Sangguniang Barangay had tried to settle the dispute between
the parties but failed to do so, and filed his complaint on June 24, 2008, or within the one (1) year
period from his last demand.
Topic: Property (Ownership)
Ponente: Jose Catral Mendoza
Heirs of Yabao v. Paz Lentejas Van Der Kolk
GR No. 207266, June 25, 2014
Facts: The heirs of Yabao alleged in their complaint that they are the sole surviving heirs of the late
spouses Yabao, and that they are the absolute co-owners of the parcel of land declared in the name of
the late Paciano Yabao. The Heirs of Yabao prayed that they be declared the co-owners and possessors
of the subject property occupied and possessed by Paz Lentejas Van Der Kolk (Van Der Kolk), who also
asserted claim of ownership over the same.
Van Der Kolk started possessing the land in 1996 and refused to vacate the same despite
demands from the said heirs. Also, she filed a petition for original patent regarding such land. This was
timely oppsed by the heirs, according to them.
Aside from these material averments in the complaint, nothing else was presented to prove the
heirs' right over the subject property.
Issue: Whether or not the Heirs of Yabao are the rightful owners of the subject property.
SC: No.
Ownership by the heirs cannot be established by mere lip service and bare allegations in the
complaint. As in all matters, a party must establish his/her averments in the complaint by sufficient
evidence necessary to prove such claim.
In the case at bench, the heirs of Yabao merely alleged that they are the heirs of Paciano Yabao
without presenting any proof why they are the latters heirs and in what degree or capacity.
The basis of the heirs claim of ownership was a mere tax declaration that was supposedly in
the name of their putative ancestor Paciano Yabao. However, a tax declaration is not a proof of
ownership; it is not a conclusive evidence of ownership of real property. In the absence of
actual, public, and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove
ownership. It can only be a strong indication of ownership if coupled with possession.
In the case at bench, it was Paz Lentejas who was in possession of the property and not the
heirs of Yabao. Consequently, the tax declaration, standing alone, is not an acceptable proof
of ownership.
Topics: Ownership; Damages
Ponente: Martin S. Villarama, Jr.
Charlie Lim v. Spouses Danilo Ligon
GR. No. 183589, June 25, 2014
Facts: Tomas Fernandez filed a Free Patent Application over a parcel of land. After the death of Tomas
Fernandez, his son Felicisimo pursued the application and was approved by the Bureau of Lands.
In 1985, the spouses Isaac and Concepcion Ronulo asked the assistance of the Office of the

President and requested investigation of their claim that a parcel of land containing 1,000 square
meters which they have been occupying since the 1950s was included in the approved survey plan in
the name of Tomas Fernandez.Regional Director Antonio Prinsipe of DENR Provisional Region IV-A
issued an Order cancelling the earlier plan approved. The spouses Ronulo are then advised to cause
the survey and to file the appropriate public land application over the land actually possessed and
occupied by them. The said order was appealed by Felicisimo Fernandez to the Office of the DENR
Secretary
Thereafter, widowed Concepcion Ronulo executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights over the
parcel of land in favor of defendant Lim . On the same date, the children of Concepcion Ronulo
executed an affidavit of conformity to the waiver, conveyance and transfer of the property in favor of
Charlie Lim. In the meantime, Spouses Danilo Ligon and Generosa Vitug-Ligon purchased the subject
property from Felicisimo Fernandez and introduced improvements thereon, including a beach house.
TCT was issued in the name of the spouses Ligon based on Free Patent issued and an analogous
Original Certificate of Title both in the name of Felicisimo Fernandez.
Defendant Lim then filed a complaint for forcible entry against the Spouses Ligon involving the
subject property. The trial court based its decision on the alleged finality of the Order by Regional
Director Prinsipe. As a result of the finality of the judgment in the ejectment case, the Spouses Ligon
were evicted from the subject property. They then filed a complaint against defendant Lim for Quieting
of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages with prayer for a TRO and Preliminary Injunction, to
restore them to their possession of the subject property and to enjoin defendant Lim from demolishing
their beach house. The Court denied their application for injunctive relief as a result of which their
beach house was demolished on the motion of defendants. Spouses Ligon then filed a supplemental
complaint for additional damages as a result of the demolition of their beach house worth about P7
million.
The MTC ruled in favor of defendant Lim. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC. The CA also
dismissed the appeal of the spouses. On appeal to Supreme Court, a Resolution was issued denying
the appeal with finality. Hence, petitioner Lim now contends that the finality of the ejectment case
"determining the issues of possession and prior possession serves as res judicata between the parties
in as much as the case involves the same parties, same issues and same property therein."
Issues: 1. Whether or not the finality of the judgment in the ejectment case served as res judicata
with respect to the issue of prior possession of the Spouses Ronulos (the predecessor-in-interest of the
petitioners).
2. Whether or not the Spouses are entitled to moral damages for the demolition of their beach
house.
SC:
First Issue
No.
An ejectment suit is brought before the proper court to recover physical possession or
possession de facto and not possession de jure. The use of summary procedure in ejectment cases is
intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of the
property and not to determine the actual title to an estate. If at all, inferior courts are empowered to
rule on the question of ownership raised by the defendant in such suits, only to resolve the issue of
possession. Its determination on the ownership issue is, however, not conclusive.
The following discussion in the case of Spouses Diu v. Ibajan (2000) is instructive:
Detainer, being a mere quieting process, questions raised on real property are incidentally discussed.
(Pealosa v. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303.) In fact, any evidence of ownership is expressly banned by Sec. 4 of
Rule 70 (Sec. 4, Rule 70 provides: "Evidence of title, when admissible. - Evidence of title to the land or
building may be received solely for the purpose of determining the character and extent of possession
and damages for detention.") except to resolve the question of possession. (Tiu v. CA, 37 SCRA 99;
Calupitan v. Aglahi, 65 Phil. 575; Pitargue v. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5.) Thus, all that the court may do, is to
make an initial determination of who is the owner of the property so that it can resolve who is entitled
to its possession absent other evidence to resolve the latter. But such determination of ownership is
not clothed with finality. Neither will it affect ownership of the property nor constitute a binding and
conclusive adjudication on the merits with respect to the issue of ownership.
Thus, under Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules on Civil Procedure:
SEC. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving title or
ownership. The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be
conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the

ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same
parties respecting title to the land or building.
The legal limitation, despite the finality of the ruling in the ejectment case, however, is that the
concept of possession or prior possession which was established in favor of petitioners predecessorsin-interest in the ejectment case pertained merely to possession de facto, and not possession de jure.
The favorable judgment in favor of petitioners predecessors-in-interest cannot therefore
bar an action between the same parties with respect to who has title to the land in
question. The final judgment shall not also be held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case
between the same parties upon a different cause of action not involving possession. As what took
place in the case at bar, the final judgment was not bar to this subsequent action to quiet respondents
title in order to settle ownership over the said property.
Second Issue
No.
There is no basis for the award of moral damages of P1,000,000.00. Lim caused the demolition
of the beach house of respondents pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the MTC in the ejectment
case the same judgment which was affirmed by the RTC, the CA and Supreme Court. As Lim states in
this petition, it will become an absurdity if he will be penalized and required to pay moral damages
over a property the rightful possession of which has been awarded to them in the ejectment case.
Topics: Nuisance; In pari delicto; Recovery of Property
Ponente: Estela M. Perlas- Bernabe
Linda Rana v. Teresita Lee Wong, et al./ Sps. Rosario Uy, et al. v. Sps. Reynaldo and Linda
Rana
GR No. 192861/ 192862, June 30, 2014
Facts: Teresita Lee Wong and Spouses Shirley and Ruben Ang Ong are co-owners pro-indiviso of a
residential land abutting a 10-meter wide subdivision road.
On the opposite side of the subject road, across the Wong-Ong property, are the adjacent lots
of Spouses Wilson and Rosario Uy and Spouses Reynaldo and Linda Rana. The said lots follow a rolling
terrain with the Rana property standing about two (2) meters higher than and overlooking the Uy
property, while the Wong-Ong property is at the same level with the subject road.
Sometime in 1997, Sps. Rana elevated and cemented a portion of the subject road that runs
between the Rana and Wong-Ong properties (subject portion) in order to level the said portion with
their gate. Sps. Rana likewise backfilled a portion of the perimeter fence separating the Rana and Uy
properties without erecting a retaining wall that would hold the weight of the added filling materials.
The matter was referred to the Office of the Barangay Captain well as the Office of the Building Official
of Cebu City (OBO) but to no avail. Thus, Wong, Sps. Ong, and Sps. Uy filed a Complaint for Abatement
of Nuisance with Damages against Sps. Rana.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the remedy of abatement of nuisance is proper.
2. Whether or not in pari delicto is applicable in this case.
3. Whether or not Sps. Rana are entitled for recovery of property.
SC:
First Issue
No.
Jurisprudence classifies nuisances in relation to their legal susceptibility to summary abatement (that
is, corrective action without prior judicial permission).
In this regard, a nuisance may either be:
(a) nuisance per se (or one which "affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity");
(b) nuisance per accidens (or that which "depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and
its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal
authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance.")
It is a standing jurisprudential rule that unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it may not
be summarily abated.
With respect to the elevated and cemented subject portion, the same is not a nuisance per se. By its
nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the community. It was built primarily to facilitate
the ingress and egress of Sps. Rana from their house which was admittedly located on a higher
elevation than the subject road and the adjoining Uy and Wong-Ong properties. Since the subject

portion is not a nuisance per se(but actually a nuisance per accidens) it cannot be summarily abated.
As such, Wong, et al.s demolition of Sps. Ranas subject portion, which was not sanctioned under the
RTCs Order, remains unwarranted.
Second Issue
No.
The principle of in pari delicto provides that when two parties are equally at fault, the law
leaves them as they are and denies recovery by either one of them. However, this principle
does not apply with respect to inexistent and void contracts.
Clearly, no void or inexistent contract is herein at issue, hence, the principle of in pari delicto is
inapplicable in this case.
Third Issue
Yes.
Settled is the rule that in order that an action for the recovery of property may prosper, the party
prosecuting the same need only prove the identity of the thing and his ownership thereof .
In the present cases, the Report of the court-appointed commissioner, Atty. Pintor, who conducted a
relocation survey of the Rana and Uy properties identified and delineated the boundaries of the two
properties and showed that Sps. Uys perimeter fence intruded on 2 sq. m. of the Rana property. Both
the RTC and the CA relied upon the said report; thus, absent any competent showing that the said
finding was erroneous, the Court sees no reason to deviate from the conclusions reached by the courts
a quo. Having sufficiently proven their claim, Sps. Rana are, therefore entitled to the return of the 2
sq.m. encroached portion.
Topic: Property
Ponente: BIENVENIDO REYES
ROTAIRO v. ROVIRA
G.R. No. 173632, September 29, 2014
Facts: A parcel of land is owned by Alcantara and Ignacio, who mortgaged the property to Pilipinas
Bank in 1968. Two years after, the property was parcelled out, through the firm Ignacio & Co. and
separately sold to different buyers. One of the buyers was Rotairo who bought a portion (Lot C-1) on
installment basis. After completing payments, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September 25,
1979 in his favor.
In the meantime, Alcantara and Ignacio defaulted in their loan obligations causing Pilipinas
Bank to foreclose the mortgage on the entire property. Without redemption being made by Alcantara
and Ignacio, title was consolidated in the name of Pilipinas Bank being the highest bidder during the
auction sale. Pilipinas Bank then sold the property in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 6, 1975 to
Rovira, who happens to be Alcantara's daughter.
Rovira filed for recovery of possession and damages. The RTC dismissed and ruled in favor of
defendant Rotario. On appeal, the CA set aside the RTC decision and ordered the turnover of
possession of the property to Rovira. Petitioners sought reconsideration, which was denied by the CA.
The CA held that P.D. No. 957 is not applicable since the mortgage was constituted prior to the sale to
Rotairo. Section 1811 of P.D. No. 957 protects innocent lot buyers, and where there is a prior registered
mortgage, the buyer purchases it with knowledge of the mortgage. In the case of Rotairo, P.D. No. 957
does not confer "more" rights to an unregistered buyer like him, as against a registered prior
mortgagee like Pilipinas Bank and its buyer, Rovira. Hence, the present petition.
Issue: Whether or not Rovira is a buyer in good faith.
Held: No.
The Court found that Rovira cannot claim a better right to the property because she is not a
buyer in good faith. The determination of whether one is a buyer in good faith is a factual issue, which
generally cannot be determined by the Court in a petition for review filed under Rule 45. The rule,
nonetheless, admits of exceptions, some of which are when the judgment of the CA is based on a
misapprehension of facts or when the CA overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion. A review of this case shows that the CA failed to appreciate the

relevance of certain undisputed facts, thus giving rise to its erroneous conclusion that Rovira has a
better right to the property in dispute.
General rule: As between two transactions concerning the same parcel of land, the registered
transaction prevails over the earlier unregistered right. This is in accord with Section 50 of the Land
Registration Act.
Exception: The conveyance shall not be valid against any person unless registered, except (1) the
grantor, (2) his heirs and devisees, and (3) third persons having actual notice or knowledge thereof.
Moreover, "when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the
lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the
status of the title of the property in litigation, he cannot find solace in the protection afforded by a prior
registration. Neither can such person be considered an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in
good faith.
In this case, two factors work against Rovira as a buyer in good faith. One, she cannot be
considered a third person for purposes of applying the rule. She is the daughter and an heir of
Alcantara, one of the parties to the contract of sale executed in favor of Rotairo. "The vendor's heirs
are his privies." Based on such privity, Rovira is charged with constructive knowledge of prior
dispositions or encumbrances affecting the subject property made by her father.
Further, this case show Rovira's actual knowledge of the disposition of the subject property
and Rotairo's possession thereof. Rotairo, and subsequently, his heirs, has been residing on the
property since then. Rovira, who lives only fifty 50 meters away from the subject property, in fact,
knew that there were structures built on the property. Rovira, however, claims that "she did not bother
to inquire as to the legitimacy of the rights of the occupants, because she was assured by the bank of
its title to the property." But it was incumbent upon Rovira to look beyond the title and make necessary
inquiries because the bank was not in possession of the property. "Where the vendor is not in
possession of the property, the prospective vendees are obligated to investigate the rights of one in
possession." A purchaser cannot simply close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on
guard, and thereafter claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the
title of the vendor. Hence, Rovira cannot claim a right better than that of Rotairo's as she is not a buyer
in good faith.
It is a settled rule that the Land Registration Act protects only holders of title in good faith, and
does not permit its provision to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or as a means to
enrich oneself at the expense of others.
Topics: Ejectment case; Co-ownership
Ponente: Lucas P. Bersamin
Fe U. Quijano v. Atty. Daril Almante
G.R. No. 164277, October 8, 2014
Facts: Fe (petitioner), Eliseo, Jose and Gloria inherited from their late father a parcel of land. In 1990,
prior to any partition among the heirs, Eliseo sold a portion of his share to Atty. Daryll Amante
(respondent). In 1991, Eliseo sold again a portion of his share to respondent. It was stated in the Deed
of Absolute Sale that the sale was with the approval of Eliseos siblings. In 1992, the siblings executed
a deed of extrajudicial partition to divide their fathers estate among themselves. The partition
resulted in the portions earlier sold by Eliseo to the respondent being adjudicated to the petitioner
instead of Eliseo. Petitioner then demanded that respondent should vacate the portion that he is
occupying but to no avail. Hence, petitioner filed against respondent a complaint for ejectment and
damages in the MTCC.
Petitioner alleged that she was the registered owner of the parcel of land, a portion of which
was being occupied by the respondent, through the mere tolerance of Eliseo when the inherited
property was still undivided and co-owned by them; and that the respondent's occupation had become
illegal
following
his
refusal
to
vacate
despite
repeated
demands.
Respondent denied the allegations of petitioner and he asserted that he was in fact the owner and

lawful possessor of the property, having bought it from Eliseo, which was approved by the latters
siblings.
The MTCC ruled in favor of the petitioner. On appeal, the RTC reversed the judgment of the
MTCC, and dismissed the complaint, holding that the summary proceeding for ejectment was not
proper because the serious question of ownership of the disputed property was involved. The CA
affirmed the RTC ruling and dismissed the case for ejectment, but on the ground that the respondent
was either a co-owner or an assignee holding the right of possession over the disputed property.
Issue: Whether or not the CA properly ruled on the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of
determining who between the parties had the better right to possess the disputed property.
SC: Yes, considering that the parties are both claiming ownership of the disputed property.
What is an ejectment case? It can either be for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. It is a summary
proceeding designed to provide expeditious means to protect the actual possession or the right to
possession of the property involved. The sole question for resolution in the case is the physical or
material possession (possession de facto) of the property in question, and neither a claim of juridical
possession (possession de jure) nor an averment of ownership by the defendant can outrightly deprive
the trial court from taking due cognizance of the case. Hence, even if the question of ownership is
raised in the pleadings, like here, the court may pass upon the issue but only to determine the
question of possession especially if the question of ownership is inseparably linked with the question of
possession. The adjudication of ownership in that instance is merely provisional, and will not bar or
prejudice an action between the same parties involving the title to the property.
Nature of a co-ownership: In a co-ownership, the undivided thing or right belong to different
persons, with each of them holding the property pro indiviso and exercising their rights over the whole
property. Each co-owner may use and enjoy the property with no other limitation than that he shall not
injure the interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is actually made,
the respective share of each cannot be determined, and every co-owner exercises, together with his
co-participants, joint ownership of the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of it.
Co-heirs right of ownership: Even if an heir's right in the estate of the decedent has not yet been
fully settled and partitioned and is thus merely inchoate, Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the heir the
right to exercise acts of ownership. Accordingly, when Eliseo sold the disputed property to the
respondent in 1990 and 1991, he was only a co-owner along with his siblings, and could sell only that
portion that would be allotted to him upon the termination of the co-ownership. The sale did not vest
ownership of the disputed property in the respondent but transferred only the seller's pro
indiviso share to him, consequently making him, as the buyer, a co-owner of the disputed property
until it is partitioned.
Right of successor-in-interest or assignee: As Eliseo's successor-in-interest or assignee, the
respondent was vested with the right under Article 497 of the Civil Code to take part in the partition of
the estate and to challenge the partition undertaken without his consent.
Article 497 states: The creditors or assignees of the co-owners may take part in the division of the
thing owned in common and object to its being effected without their concurrence. But they cannot
impugn any partition already executed, unless there has been fraud, or in case it was made
notwithstanding a formal opposition presented to prevent it, without prejudice to the right of the
debtor or assignor to maintain its validity.
Is respondent bound by the extrajudicial partition of the co-heirs? Yes. Notwithstanding having
knowledge of Eliseo's co-ownership with his co-heirs, and of their oral agreement of partition, the
respondent still did not exercise his right under Article 497. Having been silent despite his ample
opportunity to participate in or to object to the partition of the estate, the respondent was bound by
whatever was ultimately agreed upon by the Quijanos.
What is an unlawful detainer? It involves the defendant's withholding of the possession of the
property to which the plaintiff is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the former's right to
hold possession under the contract, whether express or implied. A requisite for a valid cause of action
of unlawful detainer is that the possession was originally lawful, but turned unlawful only upon the

expiration of the right to possess.

Is there an unlawful detainer or forcible entry in this case? None. Considering that the
allegation of the petitioner's tolerance of the respondent's possession of the disputed property was not
established since she failed to adduce supporting evidence, the possession could very well be deemed
illegal from the beginning. In that case, her action for unlawful detainer has to fail. Even so, the Court
would not be justified to treat this ejectment suit as one for forcible entry because the complaint
contained no allegation that his entry in the property had been by force, intimidation, threats, strategy
or stealth.
NOTE: Where the plaintiff does not prove her alleged tolerance of the defendant's occupation, the
possession is deemed illegal from the beginning. Hence, the action for unlawful detainer is an improper
remedy. But the action cannot be considered as one for forcible entry without any allegation in the
complaint that the entry of the defendant was by means of force, intimidation, threats, strategy or
stealth.
Topics: Annulment of Contract of Sale and Tax Declaration; Reconveyance of Possession
with Damages; Ownership over a property
Ponente: JOSE PEREZ
Extraordinary Development Corporation vs. Herminia F. Samson-Bico and Ely B. Flestado
G.R. No. 191090, October 13, 2014
FACTS: Apolonio Ballesteros and Maria Membrebe were married, and they begot two children Juan
Ballesteros married to Leonarda Tambongco; and Irenea Ballesteros married to Santiago Samson. Juan
and Leonarda begot six children, namely, Leonardo T. Ballesteros, Marcelina T. Ballesteros-Abad, Lydia
T. Ballesteros-De Lara, Cresencia T. Ballesteros-Lirio, Lourdes T. Ballesteros-Tan, and Juan T. Ballesteros,
Jr. Irenea and Santiago begot two children, namely, Herminia B. Samson-Bico and Merlita Samson
Flestado, who married Ely D. Flestado.
Apolonio during his lifetime owned a parcel of land (29, 748 square meters), covered by Tax
Declaration. Said land was inherited by Juan and Irenea when their parents died. The Heirs of Juan and
Irenea inherited and become co-owners of the property when Juan and Irenea died.
The Heirs of Juan, without the consent of Heirs of Irenea sold the property to Extraordinary
Development Corporation (EDC); thus the Heirs of Irenea informed EDC of the existence of coownership over the property. EDC replied that they should establish their claim.EDC was able to
register the Deed of sale and transfer the tax declaration over the property in its name.
Heirs of Irenea then filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Tax Declarationveya, and
Reconveyance of Possession with Damages with the RTC. EDC alleged that it was a buyer in good faith
and for value; Heirs of Juan, on the other hand, alleged that Heirs of Irenea knew about the sale, that
they even received their share of the downpayment.
RTC ruled in favor of the Heirs of Irenea, pronouncing (1) that the Deed of Absolute Sale and
he Tax Declaration is null and void to the extent of one-half of the property sold; (2) the tax declaration
in the name of EDC is declared null and void, and the tax declaration be reinstated in the name of the
Heirs of Apolonio and Maria; (3) EDC ordered to vacate or reconvey ownership and possession of the
subject land or reinstate the lawful ownership of one-half of the same; (4) Heirs of Juan was ordered to
pay moral, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees to Heirs of Irenea. It reasoned that both the Heirs
of Juan and Irenea are co-owners of the land, and that the Heirs of Juan did not have the right to sell
one-half of the share of Heirs od Irenea. EDC appealed to the CA which affirmed the decision with
modifications; it affirmed RTCs decision but it ordered that the tax declaration in the name of EDC be
cancelled and to issue new one in the names of co-owners EDC (one-half) and heirs of Irenea (onehalf);and to delete the award of damages.EDCs invocation of it being a buyer in good faith was not
considered by the appellate court because the subject property is an unregistered land and the
defense of having purchased the property in good faith may be availed of only where registered land
is involved and the buyer had relied in good faith on the clear title of the registered owner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Heirs of Irenea has the right to recover the disputed parcel of land.
SC: Yes.
Article 1458 of the Civil Code provides that the principal obligation of a seller is to transfer
the ownership of the thing sold. Also, Article 1459 of the Civil Code, further provides that the thing
must be licit and the vendor must have a right to transfer the ownership thereof at the time it is
delivered.
The Deed of Sale executed by Ballesteros in favor of EDC over the parcel of landwhich they do
not exclusively own but is admittedly co-owned by them together with the Heirs of Irenea, was valid

only to the extent of the formers undivided one-half share thereof, as they had no title or interest to
transfer the other one-half portion which pertains to the latter without the their consent. It is an
established principle that no one can give what one does not have nemo dat quod non
habet. Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer
can acquire no more than what the seller can transfer legally. Thus, since appellant EDCs
rights over the subject property originated from sellers-appellants Ballesteros, said
corporation merely stepped into the shoes of its sellers and cannot have a better right
than what its sellers have.
Heirs of Irenea was able to establish co-ownership rights over the subject property.
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership; thus the provision recognizes the
absolute right of a co-owner to freely dispose of his pro indiviso share as well as the fruits and other
benefits arising from that share, independently of the other co-owners.
Jurisprudence provides that the purported transfer of a definite portion of a co-owned lot by
metes and bounds does not per se render the sale a nullity provided that the object of said sale did not
even exceed the ideal shares held by the seller in the co-ownership, since one has the absolute right to
sell part of her undivided interest in the co-owned propertyin accordance with the well-settled doctrine
that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and substitute another person in its enjoyment. Stated otherwise, a co-owner cannot
rightfully dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition among all the coowners.However, this should not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything at all in case a
physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the co-owner/vendors
undivided interest could properly be the object of the contract of sale between the parties, what the
vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal
share equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction. In other words, the vendee steps
into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property
held in common.
Topic: Property Relations
Ponente: DIOSDADO PERALTA
Barrido vs. Nonato
G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014.
FACTS: Leonardo V. Nonato and Marietta N. Barrido were married. They were able to acquire a property
consisting of a house and lot. On March 15, 1996, their marriage was declared void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Nonato then asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused.
On January 29, 2003, Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities. Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had already been sold
to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She also moved for the dismissal of the complaint
because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction since the case for partition is an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
MTCC applied Article 129 of the Family Code. It ordered that the conjugal property of the
former Spouses, a house and lot, which was their conjugal dwelling, be adjudicated to defendant
Marietta the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Leonardo
appealed before the RTC, which reversed the ruling of the MTCC, and ordered (1) to equitably partition
the house and lot; (2) to reimburse Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato of the amount advanced
by them in payment of the debts and obligation of the Property; and (3) to deliver the presumptive
legitimes of Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato pursuant to Article 51 of the Family Code. Upon
appeal, CA affirmed the RTC Decision. CA held that since the propertys assessed value was only
P8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCCs jurisdiction. Also, although the RTC erred in relying on
Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 147, the dispositive portion of its decision still
correctly ordered the equitable partition of the property.
ISSUE: Whether or not conjugal partnership regime governed the property relations of the former
Spouses.
SC: Yes.
Nonato and Barridos marriage had been declared void for psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. Conjugal partnership regime governed their property relations
during their marriage. Although Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the
conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages on

the spouses property relations. Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on coownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or
waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to
the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
This kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to
marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the
benefit of marriage.
For Article 147 to operate the man and the woman:

must be capacitated to marry each other;

live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and

their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void.

In this case, all these elements are present. The term "capacitated" provision pertains to the
legal capacity of a party to contract marriage. Any impediment to marry has not been shown to have
existed on the part of either Nonato or Barrido. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and
wife. However, their marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and
industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party
who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed to
the same jointly if said party's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.
Efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the
acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. Here, the
former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during the subsistence of their
marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares.
The claim that the ownership over the property in question is already vested on children, by
virtue of a Deed of Sale could not be given credence. The title to the property was still being
registered in the names of the former spouses. It must be noted that without the notarial seal, a
document remains to be private and cannot be converted into a public document, making it
inadmissible in evidence unless properly authenticated. Unfortunately, Barrido failed to prove its due
execution and authenticity. Thus, the subject property remains to be owned in common by Nonato
and Barrido, which should be divided in accordance with the rules on co-ownership.
Topic: Ejectment Suit
Ponente: Jose Mendoza
Mangaser, v. Ugay
G.R. No. 204926, December 03, 2014
Facts: Petitioner was the registered owner and possessor of a parcel of land situated in Santiago Sur,
Caba, La Union, with an area of 10,632 square meters and covered by OCT No. RP-174 (FP-13787) and
Tax Declaration No. 014-00707. On October 31, 2006, petitioner, discovered that respondent stealthy
intruded and occupied a portion of his property by constructing a residential house. He referred the
matter to the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa for conciliation, but no settlement was reached, hence,
a certification to file action was issued by the Lupon. Demand letters were sent to respondent but he
still refused to vacate the premises, thus, he was constrained to seek judicial remedy. Petitioner filed a

complaint for Forcible Entry with Damages.

Issue: Whether the action for forcible entry shall prosper.
SC: Yes.
For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove: (a) that they have prior
physical possession of the property; (b) that they were deprived of possession either by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and, (c) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the
time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of the
property.
General Rule: The word "possession" in forcible entry suits indeed refers to nothing more than prior
physical possession or possession de facto, not possession de jure or legal possession in the sense
contemplated in civil law. Title is not the issue, and the absence of it "is not a ground for the courts to
withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case."
Exception: The Court, however, has consistently ruled in a number of cases that while prior physical
possession is an indispensable requirement in forcible entry cases, the dearth of merit in respondent's
position is evident from the principle that possession can be acquired not only by material occupation,
but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal
formalities established for acquiring such right.
Jurisprudence also stresses this doctrine. Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These
are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of these are donations,
succession, execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information
titles and the like. The reason for this exceptional rule is that possession in the eyes of the law
does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it
can be said that he is in possession. It is sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the property
to the action of his will. Here, respondent failed to show that he falls under any of these circumstances.
He could not even say that the subject property was leased to him except that he promised that he
would vacate it if petitioner would be able to show the boundaries of the titled lot.
In the case at bench, the Court finds that petitioner acquired possession of the subject
property by juridical act, specifically, through the issuance of a free patent under Commonwealth Act
No. 141 and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds on March 18, 1987.
First, the juridical act from which the right of ownership of petitioner arise would be the
registration of the free patent and the issuance of OCT No. RP-174(13789). Apparently, the Torrens
title suggests ownership over the land. Second, respondent also asserts ownership over the land
based on his prior, actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession in the
concept of an owner of the property in dispute. Because there are conflicting claims of ownership, then
it is proper to provisionally determine the issue of ownership to settle the issue of possession de facto.
The Court cannot agree with the CA that petitioner's OCT No. RP-174(13789) and his tax
declarations should absolutely be disregarded. The issuance of an original certificate of title to the
petitioner evidences ownership and from it, a right to the possession of the property flows. Wellentrenched is the rule that a person who has a Torrens title over the property is entitled to the
possession thereof.
Moreover, his claim of possession is coupled with tax declarations. While tax declarations
are not conclusive proof of possession of a parcel of land, they are good indicia of
possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes
for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession. Together with the Torrens
title, the tax declarations dated 1995 onwards presented by petitioner strengthens his claim of
possession over the land before his dispossession on October 31, 2006 by respondent.
Topic: Forcible entry
Ponente: Estela Perlas-Bernabe
JAVIER v. LUMONTAD
G.R. No. 203760, December 3, 2014
Facts: Petitioner Homer Javier alleged that he is one of the sons of the late Vicente T. Javier (Vicente),
who was the owner of the subject property. Since his birth, petitioners family has lived in the
residential house erected thereon. Upon Vicentes death, petitioner, together with his mother,
continued their possession over the same.
Subsequently, respondent Susan Lumontad gained
entry into the subject land and started to build a two (2)-storey building on a certain portion thereof,
despite petitioners vigorous objections and protests.
Barangay conciliation failed, so a case for forcible entry was filed.
Respondent admitted that during Vicentes lifetime, he indeed was the owner and in physical

possession of the subject land. Nevertheless, she claimed to be the owner of the portion where the
subject building was being constructed, as evidenced by a tax declaration in her name. Hence, she
took possession of the said portion not as an illegal entrant but as its owner.
Issue: Whether or not there was forcible entry.
SC: There was none.
Petitioner failed to justify his right to the de facto possession (physical or material
possession) of the disputed premises.
The tax declaration, or the supposed document from which petitioner hinges his right to the de
facto possession of the subject land, that petitioner presented, only covers his house and not the entire
land itself. Nothing appears on record to show that he has the right to the de facto
possession of the portion which, on the contrary, appears to be consistent with the claim of
ownership of respondent in view of her tax declaration covering the same property as registered in her
name.
Thus, with no evidence in support of petitioners stance, and the counter-evidence showing
respondents right to the de facto possession of the portion in question as its ostensible owner, the
forcible complaint must necessarily fail.
Topic: Commercial Law: Sales- Redemption and Period of Redemption
Civil Law: Property- Recovery of Ownership (Redemption v. Repurchase)
GE Money Bank, Inc. (formerly Keppel Philippines, Inc.) vs.SpousesVictorino M. Dizon and
Rosalina L. Dizon, G.R. No. 184301, March 23,2015
Ponente: Justice Diosdado Peralta
Facts:
On September 18, 1991, the spouses Victorino M. Dizon and Rosalina L. Dizon (Spouses Dizon)
obtained a loan in the amount of P100,000.00 from Monte de Piedad and Savings Bank, the
predecessor-in-interest of Keppel Monte Bank, Inc., which is now known as GE Money Bank, Inc. (Bank).
By way of security for the loan, they executed a real estate mortgage over their two (2) lots located at
856 Sisa Street, Sampaloc, Manila. The Spouses Dizon defaulted in the payment of their loan
obligation. As of March 26, 1993, the Statement of Foreclosure issued by the Bank showed that their
outstanding liability was P143,049.54. On July 19, 1993 and August 4, 1993, they paid the Bank
P12,000.00 and P10,000.00, respectively. In a letter dated August 10, 1993, they also requested for
the postponement of the foreclosure sale for at least 60 days. On September 13, 1993, the mortgaged
properties were extra-judicially foreclosed. The Bank was the highest bidder in the amount of
P181,956.72, which was the total obligation of the Spouses Dizon at the time of the public auction. The
Certificate of Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds for Manila on October 18, 1993. Hence,
the Spouses Dizon had one (1) year therefrom, or until October 18, 1994, within which to redeem the
subject properties. Within the redemption period, the Spouses Dizon were only able to pay the sum of
P90,000.00,which, despite acceptance by the Bank, was less than the total redemption price. The Bank
then consolidated its title over the subject property.
The Spouses Dizon manifested their desire to re-acquire the subject property, but the Bank
declined to entertain the same as they still failed to tender the full amount of the redemption price.
Later, on April 3, 1998, they filed a case for Redemption and Recovery of Ownership, Title and
Possession of Real Properties.
Issues:
1. Can the respondents redeem the property even after the redemption period?
2. Assuming that an extension would be granted to the respondents, would the reacquisition of
the property constitute of a redemption or a repurchase?
Ruling:
1.
No more. The right of redemption should be exercised within the period required by
law, which should be counted not from the date of foreclosure sale but from the time the
certificate of sale is registered with the Register of Deeds. Fixing a definite term within which a
property should be redeemed is meant to avoid prolonged economic uncertainty over the
ownership of the thing sold. Redemption within the period allowed by law is not a matter of
intent but a question of payment or valid tender of the full redemption price. It is irrelevant
whether the mortgagor is diligent in asserting his or her willingness to pay. What counts is that
the full amount of the redemption price must be actually paid; otherwise, the offer to redeem
will be ineffectual and the purchaser may justly refuse acceptance of any sum that is less than
the entire amount.

To be valid and effective, the offer to redeem must be accompanied by an actual

tender of the redemption price. Redemption price should either be fully offered in legal tender
or validly consigned in court. Only by such means can the auction winner be assured that the
offer to redeem is being made in good faith.
2.

Repurchase. The Spouses Dizon claimed that they negotiated with the Bank for the
extension of the period to redeem and that the latter granted the same. Aside from the Banks
vehement denial of the allegation, the Court cannot give credence to their assertions as they
failed to present any documentary evidence to prove the conferment of the purported
extension. Assuming, but without admitting, that an additional period was granted to them, the
extension would constitute a mere offer on the part of the Bank to re-sell the subject property;
it does not constitute a binding contract. The right to redeem of the Spouses Dizon already
expired on October 18, 1994. Thereafter, their offer should aptly be termed as a repurchase,
not redemption. The Bank is not bound by the bid price, at the very least, and has the
discretion to even set a higher price.
The right to redeem becomes functus officio on the date of its expiry, and its exercise
after the period is not really one of redemption but a repurchase. Distinction must be made
because redemption is by force of law; the purchaser at public auction is bound to accept
redemption. Repurchase, however, of foreclosed property, after redemption period, imposes no
such obligation. After expiry, the purchaser may or may not re-sell the property but no law will
compel him to do so. And, he is not bound by the bid price; it is entirely within his discretion to
set a higher price, for after all, the property already belongs to him as owner.

Co-ownership; Article 493 of the Civil Code; rights of a co-owner of a certain property; each one of the
co-owners with full ownership of their parts can sell their fully owned part. Article 493 of the Code
defines the ownership of the co-owner, clearly establishing that each co-owner shall have full
ownership of his part and of its fruits and benefits. Pertinent to this case, Article 493 dictates that each
one of the parties herein as co-owners with full ownership of their parts can sell their fully owned part.
The sale by the petitioners of their parts shall not affect the full ownership by the respondents of the
part that belongs to them. Their part which petitioners will sell shall be that which may be apportioned
to them in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. With the full ownership of the
respondents remaining unaffected by petitioners sale of their parts, the nature of the property, as coowned, likewise stays. In lieu of the petitioners, their vendees shall be co-owners with the respondents.
The text of Article 493 says so. Raul V. Arambulo and Teresita Dela Cruz v. Genaro Nolasco and Jeremy
Spencer Nolasco, G.R. No. 189420, March 26, 2014.
Co-ownership; Article 494 of the Civil Code; partition. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no coowner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any
time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Raul V. Arambulo and
Teresita Dela Cruz v. Genaro Nolasco and Jeremy Spencer Nolasco, G.R. No. 189420, March 26, 2014.
Co-ownership; Article 498 of the Civil Code; when this may be resorted to. Article 498 of the Civil Code
states that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be
allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly
distributed. This is resorted to (a) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the coowners but because of the nature of the property, it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision
would prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who
among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the coowners. Raul V. Arambulo and Teresita Dela Cruz v. Genaro Nolasco and Jeremy Spencer Nolasco, G.R.
No. 189420, March 26, 2014.
Property; Recovery of possession of real property; three kinds of actions available. In Sps. Bonifacio R.
Valdez, Jr. et al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al. (523 Phil. 39 (2006)), the Court is instructive anent the
three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property, viz: (a) accion interdictal;
(b)accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and
unlawful detainer (desahuico) [sic]. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real
property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one
illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under
any contract, express or implied. The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry,
the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has

prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but
became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial
court or metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual
entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful
detainer. The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in
the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary
civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other
words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had
turned plaintiff out of possession or defendants possession had become illegal, the action will be, not
one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion
reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an
ordinary civil proceeding. Carmencita Suarez v. Mr. and Mrs. Felix E. Emboy, Jr. and Marilou P. EmboyDelantar, G.R. No. 187944, March 12, 2014.
FRANSISCO V. IAC
177 SCRA 527
FACTS:
The Malinta estate was co-owned by two sisters who later donated 1/3 of the property to their niece,
1/3 to the heirs of their deceased sister, and 1/3 was solely conveyed to Cornelia. Adjoining this estate
was property of Fransisco, fronting the Paradas road. The new co-owners then partitioned the lot. All
the frontage went to the niece. Cornelia subsequently sold her property to Eugenio sisters who then
sold it to Ramos. Ramos wanted a right of way through Fransiscos property.
HELD:
If the enclosure or isolation was due to the proprietors own acts, then there couldnt be any
compulsory right of way.
TANEDO V. BERNAD
165 SCRA 86
FACTS:
Cardenas was the owner of two lots. One lot was sold to Tanedo and the other was mortgaged. The
mortgaged lot had an four-storey apartment and house constructed thereon with a septic tank. The
other lot had on it a house. Thereafter, the second lot was sold to spouses Sim who blocked the
sewage pipe.
HELD:
Absent any statement abolishing the easement of drainage the use of the septic tank is continued by
operation of law. The new owners of the servient estate cannot impair the use of the easement.
SOLID MANILA V. BIO HONG TRADING
195 SCRA 748
FACTS:
Defendant purchased property which had an alleyway for the passage of people living in the same
vicinity. It closed the alleyway.
HELD:
The vendee of real property in which a servitude or easement exists didnt acquire the right to close
that servitude or put up obstructions thereon, to prevent the public from using it.
BALURAN V. NAVARRO

79 SCRA 309
FACTS:
Spouses Paraiso entered into a barter agreement with the spouses Baluran. The former transferred use
of their residential house in favor of the latter in exchange for the latters riceland.
HELD:
No barter agreement for purposes of transferring ownership can be inferred when it is clear that the
parties merely intended to transfer material possession thereof.

LIM KICH TONG V. CA

195 SCRA 398
FACTS:
Lim and his family originally occupied a room for residential purposes. After they transferred residence,
they utilized the room for the storage of some important belongings. The building had a common main
door through which the occupants of the various rooms therein can get in and out therefrom. Each
occupant was given a duplicate key to such doorlock. On a relevant date, when Lim needed to get his
law books, his key couldn't open the door. He then needed to incur expenses in buying new law books
because of the incident. When he was able to contact the officer-incharge, the latter refused to issue to
him a new key.
HELD:
Any person deprived of possession of any land or building or part thereof, may file an action for
forcible entry and detainer in the proper inferior courts against the person unlawfully depriving or
withholding possession from him. This relief is also available to lessees and tenants.

WILMON AUTO SUPPLY V. CA

208 SCRA 108
FACTS:
Wilmon was the lessee of a commercial building and bodegas standing on a registered land owned in
common by the Lacsons, Solinap, and Jarantilla. The leases were embodied in deeds wherein one of
the clauses provided for a reservation of rightsthe seller has the right to encumber or sell the
property provided that the transferee would respect the lease of Wilmon. On a relevant date, after the
expiration of the lease period, the premises were sold to Star Group Resources and Development. The
latter instituted an action for unlawful detainer against Wilmon. Wilmon impugned Stars right to eject
them. It alleges that its right of preemption has been violated, as well as their leasehold rights, and
that it was denied the option to extend the lease. These same propositions were also raised in the case
it filed with the RTC. In the unlawful detainer cases, it was decided by the MTC that the case should
proceed against some of the lessees but not with the others. The lessees filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied. They filed a petition for certiorari and the RTC held in the end that
the pendency of the case in the RTC didn't warrant suspension of the unlawful detainer case with the
MTC.

HELD:
An ejectment suit cannot be suspended by an action filed with the RTC based on a tenants claim of his
right of preemption was violated. The actions in the RTC didn't involve physical possession and on not
a few occasions, that the case in the RTC was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment
proceeding.