GSIS and Garcia vs. Villaviza, et. al, G. R. No.

190291, July 27, 2010

Facts:

PGM Garcia, as President and General Manager of the GSIS, filed separate formal

charges against respondents and eventually found them guilty for Grave Misconduct and/or
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and meting out the penalty of one (1) year
suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto.

The charges contained that

respondent, wearing red shirt together with some employees, marched to or appeared
simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass
demonstration/rally of protest and support for Messrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the
latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises.
On appeal, CSC found that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU office wearing red
shirts to witness a public hearing do not amount to a concerted activity or mass action proscribed
above. CSC added that their actuations can be deemed an exercise of their constitutional right to
freedom of expression. The CA found no cogent reason to deviate therefrom.

Issue: Whether or not the unruly mass gathering of twenty employees during office hours, inside
office premises to protest falls within the purview of the constitutional guarantee to freedom of
expression and peaceful assembly.

Ruling: Yes.
As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to regulate the political
rights of those in the government service, the concerted activity or mass action proscribed must
be coupled with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize
their demands of force concession. Wearing similarly colored shirts, attending a public hearing at
the GSIS-IU office, bringing with them recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some even
badmouthing the guards and PGM Garcia, are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work
stoppage or service disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force
concession.
The limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 are there to
temper and focus the application of such prohibition. Not all collective activity or mass
undertaking of government employees is prohibited. Otherwise, we would be totally depriving
our brothers and sisters in the government service of their constitutional right to freedom of expression.
Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the land to voice
out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests. Civil
Service does not deprive them of their freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold that by

joining the government service, the members thereof have renounced or waived this basic
liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.
Respondents freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and CSCs Resolution No. 021316 defining what a prohibited concerted activity or mass action has only tempered or regulated
these rights. Measured against that definition, respondents actuations did not amount to a
prohibited concerted activity or mass action.

DENNIS A. B. FUNA, VS. THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REYNALDO A. VILLAR,

FACTS: Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of the
Commission on Audit.
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner,
Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April
18,2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the
Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly
indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on
February 2, 2011. Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold on the
chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of seven (7) years which is
yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years
reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011 addressed to President
Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from office upon the appointment of his replacement. True
to his word, Villar vacated his position when President Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan
(Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This development has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein
moot and academic.
Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and the resignation of Villar, We
consider the instant case as falling within the requirements for review of a moot and academic case, since it asserts
at least four exceptions to the mootness rule discussed in David vs Macapagal Arroyo namely:
a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
b. The case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest;
c. The constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the
public;
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The procedural aspect comes down to the question of whether or not the following requisites for the exercise of
judicial review of an executive act obtain in this petition, viz:
a. There must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the court
b. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication;
c. The person challenging the act must be a proper party; and
d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the case
ISSUES:
a. WON the petitioner has Locus Standi to bring the case to court
b. WON Villars appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and after having served for four (4) years of
his seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations imposed under, and the
circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution
HELD:
Issue of Locus Standi: This case before us is of transcendental importance, since it obviously has far-reaching
implications, and there is a need to promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future
analogous cases. We, thus, assume a liberal stance and allow petitioner to institute the instant petition.
In David vs Macapagal Arroyo, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called non-traditional suitors
may be extended standing to sue, thusly:

a. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;
b. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question
c. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which
must be settled early; and
d. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their prerogatives as
legislators.
On the substantive issue:
Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the
Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for three
years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes reappointment of
any kind within the commission, the point being that a second appointment, be it for the same position (commissioner
to another position of commissioner) or upgraded position (commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited
reappointment and is a nullity ab initio.
The Court finds petitioners position bereft of merit. The flaw lies in regarding the word reappointment as, in context,
embracing any and all species of appointment. The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be appointed by the President for a term of
seven years, and if he has served the full term, then he can no longer be reappointed or extended another
appointment. In the same vein, a Commissioner who was appointed for a term of seven years who likewise served
the full term is barred from being reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner shall have served the full
term of seven years, then he can no longer be reappointed to either the position of Chairman or Commissioner. The
obvious intent of the framers is to prevent the president from dominating the Commission by allowing him to appoint
an additional or two more commissioners.
On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional appointment from commissioner to
chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the full term of seven years, further qualified by the third
sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of
the term of the predecessor. In addition, such promotional appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to
the rotational plan or the staggering of terms in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the service of
the Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be appointed to the position of Chairman must not
exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a promotional appointment from
Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under the aforestated circumstances or conditions.
The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villars proposition that his promotional appointment as COA Chairman gave
him a completely fresh 7- year termfrom February 2008 to February 2015given his four (4)-year tenure as COA
commissioner devalues all the past pronouncements made by this Court. While there had been divergence of opinion
as to the import of the word reappointment, there has been unanimity on the dictum that in no case can one be a
COA member, either as chairman or commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an aggregate term of more than 7
years. A contrary view would allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year service limitation and would be
constitutionally offensive as it would wreak havoc to the spirit of the rotational system of succession.
In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any circumstance, validly appointed Villar
as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not legally feasible in light of the
7-year aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A shorter term,
however, to comply with said rule would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively breach

the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first set of
commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like respondent Villar who
serves for a period less than seven (7) years cannot be appointed as chairman when such position became vacant as
a result of the expiration of the 7-year term of the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full term is not valid
and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve more than seven (7) years under the constitutional ban.
To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the uneven
terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment
for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional. The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven
(7) years in case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by
the Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only
be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired
portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full term of seven years and
who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first
appointees in the Commission under the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an
appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such
appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service
as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and
provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by
impeachment. The Court clarifies that reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and
the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment
involving a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new
appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a tempor capacity.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V. MASING

Doctrine: Intervention of the Office of the Ombudsman may be allowed where the ruling of the Court of Appeals
adversely affected the formers all-important jurisdiction, the ruling having serious consequences on its effectiveness
as the body charged by the Constitution with the prosecution of officials and employees of the government suspecting
of violating our laws on graft and corruption. Facts: In G.R Nos. 165416 and 165731, respondents Masing and
Tayactac, who were then holding the positions of principal and office clerk of the Davao City Integrated Special
School (DCISS), were administratively charged before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao for allegedly
collecting unauthorized fees, failing to remit authorized fees, and to account for public funds. The complainants were
the parents of the children studying at the DCISS. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
Office of the Ombudsman does not have jurisdiction over them. They assert that the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) has jurisdiction over them which shall exercise the same through a committee to be
constituted under Section 9 of RA No. 4670, or the Magna Carta of Public School Teachers. Respondents motion
was denied, as well as their motion for reconsideration. The Office of the Ombudsman rendered a decision finding
respondents guilty. Masing was dismissed from service, while Tayactac was suspended for 6 months. Upon denial of
respondents MR before the Office of the Ombudsman, they filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the ROC to
the CA. CA granted the petition and ordered the immediate reinstatement of the respondents. The Office of the
Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion to Intervene and for reconsideration, which the CA denied on the following
grounds: 1. Intervention is not proper because it is sought by the quasi-judicial body whose judgment is on appeal 2.
Intervention, even if possible, is belated under Section 2, Rule 19 of ROC In another case filed against respondent
Masing GR No. 165584, she was charged and found guilty of oppression, serious misconduct, discourtesy in the
conduct of official duties and physical or mental incapacity before the Office of the Ombudsman. What followed after
is similar to that in aforementioned cases. Issue: 1. WON the Office of the Ombudsman may intervene and seek
reconsideration of the adverse decisions rendered by the CA 2. WON the Office of the Ombudsman may directly

discipline public school teachers and employees Held: 1. Yes, it may intervene and seek reconsideration 2. Yes, the
Office of the Ombudsman is empowered to directly discipline public school teachers and employees Ratio: 1.
Intervention of the Office of the Ombudsman may be allowed where the ruling of the Court of Appeals adversely
affected the formers all-important jurisdiction, the ruling having serious consequences on its effectiveness as the
body charged by the Constitution with the prosecution of officials and employees of the government suspecting of
violating our laws on graft and corruption. Moreover, CA reasoned that the motions to intervene filed by the Office of
the Ombudsman were already belated since decisions have already been rendered. Section 2, Rule 19 of the ROC
provides that a motion for intervention may be filed before rendition of judgment. The SC, on the other hand, ruled
that allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court after
consideration of the appropriate circumstances. 2. The authority of the Ombudsman to act on complaints filed against
public officers and employees is explicit in Article XI, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution. Article XI, Section 12. The
Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officers and employees xxx Article XI, Rule 13 delineates the powers, functions and duties of
the Ombudsman, but the same is non-exclusive. The Ombudsman Act of 1989 (RA 6770) gives the Office such other
powers that it may need to efficiently perform the task given by the Constitution. Note: Respondents rely on the ruling
in Fabella case, but the same does not apply because the charges against them were for violations of RA 6713,
otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, collecting
unauthorized fees, failing to remit authorized fees, etc. Such acts complained of relate to respondents conduct as
public official and employee, if not outright graft and corruption. In Fabella, the public schoolteachers were charged
with violation of civil service laws, rules and regulations initiated by the DECS Secretary.

RAMON ALBERT, PETITIONER, VS. CELSO D. GANGAN,

Facts:
This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify Commission on Audit (COA) Decision No. 2700 dated February 19, 1993,
finding petitioner, then President of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), liable for the
amount of P36,796,711.55 covering the payment of the loan proceeds for the lot acquired by the Alyansang MakaMaralitang Asosasyon at Kapatirang Organisasyon (AMAKO) which was disallowed in audit.
The Housing and Urban Development Coordination Council (HUDCC) together with the Presidential Commission for
Urban Poor (PCUP), NHMFC, and Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation (HIGC) formed an inter-agency
committee to conceptualize and prepare the guidelines and procedures for the Community Mortgage Program
(CMP),a sub-program of the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP). The CMP is an innovative scheme in mortgage
financing where an undivided tract of land may be acquired by several beneficiaries through the concept of
community ownership. It was adopted to assist residents of blighted or depressed areas to initially own the lots they
occupy, and, eventually, to build a decent house thereon to the extent of their affordability within the concept of lowcost-home financing and after due compensation to the landowner. The beneficiaries of the financing shall then form
or establish an association, or cooperative, duly registered with appropriate governmental agencies and accredited
with the PCUP. Under the financing procedure of the CMP, an application of an association for a loan is coursed
through duly accredited originators, such as the National Housing Authority (NHA), and Non-Government
Organizations (NGOs).
August 20, 1988, the NHMFC Board issued Resolution No. 419, Series of 1988, approved the CMP.
December 19, 1988, Carlos P. Doble, then Vice President of HIGC, issued an appraisal policy for the CMP which was
concurred in by the HIGC President, Federico Gonzales, herein petitioner, NHMFC OIC/EVP, and HUDC Teodoro
Katigbak. On the same date, Doble likewise issued to HIGC Technical Service Department personnel the Appraisal
Policy for the CMP.
April 12, 1989, the NHMFC board issued Resolution No. 546, Series of 1989, approving the amended/expanded
guidelines for CMP.
On April 4,1989, the Sapang Palay Community Development Foundation Inc., (Foundation) applied for accreditation
with the NHMFC as originator of land and housing project through a Purchase Commitment Line. The application
consists of sixteen (16) project sites situated in different parts of the country. Among these is the AMAKO Project
which was submitted for accreditation to the NHMFC by Nelson Concepcion, President of the Foundation. The
AMAKO project refers to seventy-three (73) hectares of land located at Sta. Catalina, Angeles City, which was offered

by Severino H. Gonzales, Jr. Construction, Co, Inc. (SHGCCI), through its shareholder, Engineer Ceres Pajaron, to
the members of AMAKO. Mr. Concepcion who was also the concurrent head of the PCUP's Housing and Settlement
Division, delivered on September 7, 1989, to the CMP Unit - then under Mortgage Takeout Department (MROD)HMFC - the project documents of AMAKO for pre-evaluation which were returned to the Foundation on September
22, 1989 by the CMP unit.
October 4, 1989, Mr. Concepcion submitted an application for Purchase Commitment Line in the amount of
P36,794,250.00, specifically for the AMAKO project together with an Information Sheet of the Foundation, the
AMAKO project profile, and the Department of Agrarian Reform certification dated December 4, 1988. On the same
day, Mr. Generozo Cruz, Foundation Vice President and PCUP Director, redelivered the documents to the CMP unit
to discuss the Foundation's proposal on the AMAKO project.
On October 5, 1989, the Officer-in-charge of the Credit and Collection Group, NHMFC, recommended to petitioner
the grant of an additional line in favor of Sapang Palay Community Development Foundation, Inc., in the total amount
of P36,8000,000.00 - approved by the NHMFC Credit Committee on October 13, 1989 - subject, however, to the
approval of the NHMFC Board.
December 14, 1989, the NHMFC, upon the recommendation of the CMP Task Force, together with the Certification of
Mortgage Examinations, issued a Letter of Guaranty in favor of SHGCCI.Thereafter, the disbursement voucher (No.
89F2-5732) was prepared by the CMP Task Force in favor of SHGCCI. Mr. Rogelio Olaguer, head of the CMP Task
Force, likewise inspected the project site and assured petitioner that the project is above board and in accordance
with the NHMFC-CMP guidelines. With this assurance, petitioner approved the payment to the SHGCCI. Thus, on
January 4, 1990, the amount of P36,796,711.55 under Philippine National Bank - Land Bank of the Philippines Check
No. 362994, was released to Engineer Severino A. Gonzales, Jr. of the SHGCCI.
Sometime in June 1990, petitioner instructed the Community Mortgage Management Office (CMMO) to conduct a
routine inspection of the AMAKO Project. Upon verification, it was discovered that the AMAKO project was three (3)
months in arrears in their amortization. As a consequence, petitioner, sometime in July 1990, tasked the Committee
on Evaluation of Originating Institutions to investigate the originators with respect to their compliance with corporate
circulars, other rules and regulations issued by NHMFC regarding its lending programs. One of the originators
investigated was the Foundation which was instrumental in the granting of the loan to the AMAKO Project.
September 3, 1990, the COA Resident Auditor of NHMFC disallowed the loan granted to the AMAKO Project for the
following reasons: (a) non-submission of documentary requirements/non-complying or defective documents as
required under NHMFC Corporate Circular No. CMP-001; and (b) irregular/excessive expenditures per COA Circular
No. 85-55A dated September 8, 1985. The Auditor determined the following officers of NHMFC, as personally liable,
viz.: petitioner as President; Fermin T. Arzaga, OIC, Finance, Corpan & Computer Services Group; Roger Olaguer,
Head, CMP Task Force; Vivien Noble, Deputy Head, CMP Task Force; Ernesto Salvador, Executive Asst. CMP Task
Force; Cynthia O. Alas, Div. Chief II, Budget and Irma Fuentes, COD, CMMO.
On October 19, 1990, petitioner requested for the lifting of the disallowance on the loan grant to AMAKO which was
denied on October 25, 1990. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration which was elevated to the COA Corporate Audit
Office pursuant to Section 65 of PD 1445.
February 19, 1993, the COA rendered Decision No. 2700, finding petitioner as among the persons liable for the
amount representing the payment of the loan proceeds obtained by AMAKO. COA disallowed the plan payment
because it found the payment irregular and an excessive expenditure, and held petitioner primarily liable pursuant to
Section 103 of P.D. 1445.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the above-mentioned decision was denied on August 29, 1996 per COA
Decision No. 96-484.

Issue:
1.Whether or not aggrieved petitioner can be held personally liable for the amount of P36,796,11.55 representing the
loan proceeds to AMAKO.
2.Whether or not respondent COA committed a grave abuse of its discretion when it held petitioner personally liable
for the payment of the loan proceeds.

Decision:
(We find the petition meritorious.)
Court finds the assailed decision failed to mention petitioner's direct participation in the fraudulent scheme. It merely
held that petitioner be immediately and primarily held responsible for the disallowance, for the simple reason that, as
the approving officer, any transaction presented to him for approval is subject to his discretion. His reliance on the
supposed review and evaluation done by his subordinates is also discretionary on his part.
The actions taken by petitioner involved the very functions he had to discharge in the performance of official duties.
He cannot, therefore, be held civilly liable for such acts unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross
negligence. In as much as no evidence was presented to show that petitioner acted in bad faith and with gross
negligence in the performance of his official duty, he is presumed to have acted in the regular performance of his
official duty. Similarly, it is a basic tenet of due process that the decision of a government agency must state the facts
and the law on which the decision is based. The COA decision merely stated conclusions of law. Facts and
circumstances, as well as the why's, the what's and the how's of the disallowance, were patently missing, inaccurate
or incomplete. The COA cannot just perform its constitutional function of disallowing expenditures of government
funds at sheer discretion. There has to be factual basis why the expenditure is alleged to be fraudulent or why was
there a misrepresentation. Liability depends upon the wrong committed and not solely by reason of being the head of
a government agency. The COA even mentioned the anti-graft law which imputes liability for a grossly
disadvantageous contract entered into by a government functionary. But as to why and how the disbursement of
funds in this case was considered disadvantageous must be duly supported by findings of facts.
Consequently, respondent COA committed a grave abuse of its discretion when it held petitioner personally liable for
the subject disallowance.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the respondent Commission on Audit are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, insofar as they refer to petitioner.

Disini v. Sandiganbayan [G.R. 169823-24/174764-65. September 11, 2013.]

FACTS:
Disini, and company were charged with corruption of public officials by the Sandiganbayan, penalized under Art. 212,
in relation to Art. 210 of the RPC and violation of Sec. 4(a) of RA 3019, for having allegedly conspired with the former
President Ferdinand Marcos, in appropriating public funds for their personal use amounting to billions of pesos. Disini
filed a motion to quash, arguing among others, that the criminal Informations filed against him failed to comply with
the required substance and form of information, thereby violating his right to be informed as the accused.
ISSUE/S:
Did the Information comply with the required substance and form?
HELD:
Yes. the Informations filed complied with the required substance and form.
An Information must state every single fact or circumstance that constitutes an element of the offense charged;
otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash may be properly sustained. Included in the things that must be in the
Information are: (1) the name of the accused, (2) the designation of the offense given by the statute, (3) the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, (4) the name of the offended party, (5) the approximate date of the commission of
the crime, and (5) the place where the crime was committed. Note that, when the offense has been committed by
more than one person, all of them must be included in the Information.
After factual examination, the SC held that the Informations filed against him and his companions were able to
comply with the prescribed forms and substance of an Information. Hence, his motion to quash could not be properly
sustained.
Withat, the Informations filed against Disini and company complied with the required substance and form.