Forbes, Harding, Trowbridge vs.

Chuoco Tiaco, Crossfiled

Presidential immunity from suit; president is immune from civil liability and may not be sued during his tenure.
Facts: This is an original action commenced in this court to secure a writ of prohibition against the Hon. A. S. Crossfield,
as one of the judges of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, to prohibit him from taking or continuing jurisdiction
in a certain case commenced and PENDING before him in which Chuoco Tiaco (respondent herein) is plaintiff, and W.
Cameron Forbes, J. E. Harding, and C. R. Trowbridge (petitioners herein) are defendants.
The plaintiffs are W. Cameron Forbes is the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and CHIEF OF POLICE J. E.
Harding and CHIEF OF THE SECRET SERVICE of the city of Manila C. R. Trowbridge. Defendant A. S. Crossfield is one
of the judges of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. Defendant Chuoco Tiaco is a foreigner of Chinese
nationality and a resident of the Philippine Islands for the last 35 years having a family in the country and some properties.
Chuoco Tiaco filed a case for DAMAGES (monetary) alleging that defendants forcibly deported the plaintiff to China and
forcibly prevented his return for some months in violation of the right of the said plaintiff herein to be and to remain in the
Philippine Islands as established by law.
Crossfield issued an INHIBITION against Forbes et al from spelling or deporting or threatening to expel or deport Chuoco
Tiaco. Forbes, Harding, and Trowbridge sued for writs of prohibition against the judge and the respective plaintiffs,
alleging that the expulsion was carried out in the public interest and at the request of the proper representative of the
Chinese government in the Philippines, and was immediately reported to the Secretary of War. The complaints were
demurred to, but the Supreme Court overruled the demurrers, granted the prohibition, and ordered the actions dismissed.
The judge, having declined to join in the applications for writs of error, was made a respondent, and the cases are here on
the ground that the plaintiffs have been deprived of liberty without due process of law.
Issue: WON the Governor General, as Chief Executive, can be sued in a civil action.
Ruling: The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to touch the
acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and restrained. Such a
construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the law, could walk defiantly abroad, destroying
rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference of courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either, that a
person injured by the executive authority by an act unjustifiable under the law has no remedy, but must submit in silence.
On the contrary, it means, simply, that THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL, LIKE THE JUDGES OF THE COURTS AND THE
MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE, MAY NOT BE PERSONALLY MULCTED IN CIVIL DAMAGES FOR THE
CONSEQUENCES OF AN EXECUTED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES. The judiciary has full
power to, and will, when the matter is properly presented to it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the
Governor-General illegal and void and place as nearly as possible in status quo any person who has been deprived of his
liberty or his property by such act. This remedy is assured every person, however humble or of whatever country, when
his personal or property rights have been invaded, even by the highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary
can not do is to mulct the Governor-General personally in damages which result from the performance of his official duty,
any more than it can a member of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it.
Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be personally sued at all in relation to acts
which he claims to perform as such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the discussion heretofore had,
particularly that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an analogy between such liability and that of the
Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he can
not be said to have exercised discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act. WHAT IS HELD HERE IS
THAT HE WILL BE PROTECTED FROM PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES NOT ONLY WHEN HE ACTS WITHIN
HIS AUTHORITY, BUT ALSO WHEN HE IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY, PROVIDED HE ACTUALLY USED DISCRETION
AND JUDGMENT, THAT IS, THE JUDICIAL FACULTY, IN DETERMINING WHETHER HE HAD AUTHORITY TO ACT OR
NOT. In other words, he is entitled to protection in determining the question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still
protected provided the question of his authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might
honestly differ; but he is not protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ
over its determination. In such a case, he acts, not as Governor-General, but as a private individual, and, as such, must
answer for the consequences of his act.

DIRECTOR OF PRISONS VS. ANG CHO KIO

power to recommend

Ang was convicted and was granted conditional pardon. He was never to return to the Philippines. In violation of his
pardon, he returned. He was recommitted by order of the Executive Secretary.
He filed a petition for habeas corpus. RTC denied. CA also denied it. But the CA made a recommendation that Ang
may be allowed to leave the country on the first available transporation abroad.
The Solgen assailed this CA decision, claiming that the recommendation by the CA should not be part of the decision,
because it gives the decision a political complextion, because courts are not empowered to make such
recommendation, nor is it inherent or incidental in the exercise of judicial powers. The Solgen contends that allowing
convicted aliens to leave the country is an act of the state exercises solely in the discretion of the Chief Executive. It is
urged that the act of sending an undesirable alien out of the country is political in character, and the courts should not
interfere with, nor attempt to influence, the political acts of the President.

ISSUE: Whether the CA decision was proper? Can it make recommendations?

SC: NO.
The case in the CA was for habeas corpus. The only issue there was whether the RTC correctely denied the petition. The
CA was not called upon the review any sentence imposed upon Ang. The sentence against him had long become final
and in fact, he was pardoned. The opinion should have been limited to the affirmance of the decision of the RTC, and no
more.
The recommendatory power of the courts are limited to those expressly provided in the law, such as Art 5 RPC. (when an
act is not punishable by law judge should report it to the executive).
The CA was simply called to determine whether Ang was illegally confined or not under the Director of Prisons (for
violating the pardon). It was improper for the CA justices to make a recommendation that would suggest a modification or
correction of the act of the President. The matter of whether an alien who violated the law may remain or be deported is a
political question that should be left entirely to the President, under the principle of separation of powers. It is not within
the province of the judiciary to express an opinion, or a suggestion that would reflect on the wisdom or propriety of an
action by the President, which are purely political in nature.
After all, courts are not concerned with the wisdom or morality of laws, but only in the interpretation and application of the
law. Judges should refrain from expressing irrelevant opinions in their decisions which may only reflect unfavorably upon
the competence and the propriety of their judicial actuations.
Summary:
1) Recommendatory powers of the SC under RPC does not include matters which are purely political in nature. (otherwise
it violates separation of powers)
2) deportation of aliens is a political question
3) opinion of judges should be relevant to the question presented for decision.

SALAZAR VS. ACHACOSO [183 SCRA 145; G.R. NO. 81510; 14 MAR 1990]
Facts: Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner with illegal recruitment.
Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the
complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency,
public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that
there will a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing
illegal recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor
and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited
under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was then tasked to implement
the said Order. The group, accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen, went to petitioners residence. They
served the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The team confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed
with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and hearing.
The said Order violated due process. She also allegedthat it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties were
confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation.
Issue: Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) can validly issue
warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code
Held: Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Mayors and
prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of
the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer
issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare
Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect The power of the President to
order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be made to
extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts. Furthermore, the
search and seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant. The court held that the warrant is null and void, because
it must identify specifically the things to be seized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of
Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.

NGO BURCA VS RP
FACTS: Zita Ngo is a Chinese national married to Florencio Burca a Filipino citizen. She claims that she possessed all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for naturalization as a Filipino citizen , she applied for cancellation of her
Alien Certificate of Registration. This was opposed by the Solicitor General, but the trial court dismissed the opposition
and declare that Zita Ngo Burca has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen and
that she being married to a Filipino citizen is hereby declared as a citizen of the Philippines.
Such judgment of the trial court was appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition of Zita Ngo Burca should be granted?
RULING : NO
The SC discussed here that an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the status of the Philippines unless there is
proof that she herself may be lawfully naturalized.
An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this country must apply therefor by filing a petition for
citizenship reciting that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2, and none of the disqualifications under
Section 4, both of the Revised Natura lization Law;
(2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner has resided at least one year immediately
preceding the filing of the petition; and
(3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise other than the judgment of a
competent court of justice certifying or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is
hereby declared null and void.
As to the merits of the case:
Section 7 of the Naturalization Law requires that a petition for naturalization should state petitioner's "present and former
places of residence.
The reason for exacting recital in the petition of present and former places of residence is that "information regarding
petitioner and objection to his application are apt to be provided by people in his actual, physical surrounding".
the State is deprived of full opportunity to make inquiries as to petitioner's fitness to become a citizen, if all the places of
residence do not appear in the petition. So it is, that failure to allege a former place of residence is fatal.
We find one other flaw in petitioner's petition. Said petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible
persons, "stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the
Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that
said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any
way disqualified under the provisions of this Act. Petitioner likewise failed to "set forth the names and post-office
addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case".
These witnesses should indeed prove in court that they are reliable insurers of the character of petitioner. Short of this,
the petition must fail.
Here, the case was submitted solely on the testimony of the petitioner. No other witnesses were presented. This does not
meet with the legal requirement. Upon the view we take of his case, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and
the petition dismissed.

Board of Commissioners vs. Judge De la Rosa

Facts:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration
as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian. On June 27, 1961, Willian,
then twelve years old, arrives in Manila from Hongkong together with a daughter and a son of Santiago. They had with
them certificate of registration and identity issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing
the signature of the secretary of foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens.
On July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino citizens and issued an identification
certificate to William. The boarf of commissioners waws directed by the Secretary of Justice to Review all cases where
entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen such included the case of William. As a result of the
decision of the board of special inquiry which recommended for the reversal of the decision of the Board of
Commissioners. Acting commissioner issued an order affirming the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.
On August 15, 1990, the Commission on Immigration and Deportatiion ordered the arrest of William and was released
upon posting P 200,000 cash bond. Thus on the 29thof the same month, he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the RTC of Manila. A motion to dismiss was filed but denied.
Issue: Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a Filipino citizen
Held:
William Gatchalian is declared as a Filipino Citizen. Having declared the assailed marriage as valid, respondent William
Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father, a Filipino as legitimate child. Respondent belongs to a class of Filipinos
who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the constitution.
Board of Commissioners (CID) v dela Rosa (1991)
FACTS:

Petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the SolGen for the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of
Immigration (formerly the CID) and Board of Special Inquiry to set aside two orders issued by different judges of
RTCs and to enjoin public respondent judges from acting on the ff. civil cases:
o 1st case: filed by Gatchalian in the RTC of Manila. Judge dela Rosa issued an order that denied the
Motion to Dismiss and restrained petitioners from commencing or continuing with any proceedings that
will lead to the deportation of William Gatchalian
o 2nd case: filed by Gatchalians wife and minor children in the RTC of Valenzuela. Judge Capulong issued
an that enjoined petitioners from proceeding with the deportation charges against Gatchalian
July 12, 1960: Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a
native born Filipino Citizen. He also testified that he had 5 children with his wife Chu Gim Tee: Jose, Gloria,
Francisco (Williams father), Elena, and Benjamin.
June 27, 1961: Then 12-year old William arrived in Manila from Hongkong with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson
Gatchalian with Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on
a cablegram from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
July 12, 1961: the Board of Special Inquiry admitted William and his companions as Filipino Citizens.
July 6, 1962: Board of Commissioners, after reviewing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry reversed the
decision of the latter and ordered the exclusion of respondent Gatchalian
o The 1967 case of Arocha v Vivo sustained the validity of said order.
1973: Gatchalian and others covered by the warrant of exclusion filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of
Special Inquiry. Acting Commissioner Nituda later issued an order recalling the warrant of arrest against
Gatchalian.

1990: acting director of NBI wrote to the DOJ recommending that Gatchalian and others covered by the warrant of
exclusion be charged with violation of the Immigration act. The SOJ indorsed the recommendation and a mission
order was issued by Commissioner Domingo of the CID ordering the arrest of Gatchalian.
o Gatchalian filed the present civil cases that are being assailed in the case at bar.
Petitioners arguments:
o The judges have no jurisdiction over petitioner and the subject matter;
o That assuming the judges had jurisdiction, they acted with grave abuse of discretion by hearing the
deportation case and in effect determined Gatchalians citizenship;
o That respondent judges disregarded the cases of Arocha v Vivo and Vivo v Acra which put to finality the
order of the Board of Commissioners
o Respondent committed forum-shopping
Private respondents arguments:
o Petitioners have no jurisdiction to proceed with the deportation case until the courts have resolved the
issue of his citizenship;
o Petitioners cannot fairly and judiciously dispose of the deportation case;
o Ground for deportation has already prescribed

ISSUES + RULING:
WoN the RTCs had jurisdiction over the cases. YES.

Under 21 of BP 129, the RTC has concurrent jurisdiction with the SC and CA to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction
While 9(3) of BP 129 vests the CA with exclusive jurisdiction over quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
board or commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph of and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, the same does not provide
that the exclusive appellate jurisdiction extends to all quasi-judicial agencies.
o The quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the Court of Appeals are those
which under the law, Republic Act No. 5434, or their enabling acts, are specifically appealable to the
Court of Appeals.
o RA 5434 does not include the Bureau of Immigration. The decisions of the Bureau of Immigration are
subject to judicial review in accordance with 25, Chapter 4, Book VII of the Administrative Code:

Sec. 25. Judicial Review.(1) Agency decisions shall be subject to judicial review in accordance
with this chapter and applicable laws.
xxx xxx xxx

(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified in the statute or, in the absence
thereof, in any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the
Rules of Court.
B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to the same level or rank of the RTC except
those specifically provided for under the law as aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank
as the RTC, its decisions may be appealable to, and may be reviewed through a special civil action
for certiorari by, the RTC (Sec. 21, (1) BP 129).
While it is true that Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases
against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine also their citizenship and that a mere claim of citizenship
cannot operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings, the Court
carved out an exception in Chua Hiong v Deportation Board:
o When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate
review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings.
Judicial intervention, however, should be granted only in cases where the claim of citizenship is so substantial that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct.
Hence, Gatchalians petitions before the RTCs contained a proper and ripe controversy for the disposition of the
courts. He also presented sufficient documents and other evidence to his petitions.

WoN Arocha v Vivo and Vivo v Arca already settled the respondents alienage (i.e., res judicata). NO.

The party to the case was Pedro Gatchalian (Williams uncle). Moreover, the cases did not categorically make
any statement that William Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen. Generally, res judicata does not apply to questions of
citizenship except in the following case (stated in Burca v Republic):
o A person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;
o The Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and
o The finding or citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Such elements are not present in the case at bar.

WoN the arrest of respondent based on the warrant of exclusion is valid. NO.

Pursuant to 37(a) of the Immigration Act, an arrest can only be effected after a determination by the Board of
Commissioner of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien.
Moreover, the mission ordered issued by petitioner only for purposes of investigation. The mission order/warrant
of arrest made no mention that the same was issued pursuant to a final order of deportation or warrant of
exclusion.
Petitioners also omitted the fact that Acting Commissioner Nituda issued a memorandum in 1973 that
recommended the reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners which
reversed the July 6, 1961 decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 and the lifting of the warrants of
arrest issued against applicants.
Such was the last official act of the government that is the basis of which respondent William Gatchalian
continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present. Consequently, the presumption of citizenship
lies in favor of respondent William Gatchalian.
Also took note that the basis for the warrant of exclusion is that the cablegram issued by the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs was forged. Even if the applicants could have entered illegally, the mere fact that they are citizens of the
Philippines entitles them to remain in the country.

WoN the ground for deportation already prescribed. YES.

The warrant of arrest came 28 years after the alleged cause of action arose in 1962. The warrant was issued by
Commissioner Domingo only in 1990.
37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in the
deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of deportation arises."
In any case, the warrant of exclusion was already recalled by Acting Commissioner Nituda in 1973.
45 of the Immigration Act imposes the penalty of a fine not more than one thousand pesos, imprisonment for
not more than two years, and deportation if he is an alien. For such correctional penalties, the prescriptive
period is 10 years.
The Court also cited 1 of Act No. 3326 that states:
o "violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: . . .c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two
years or more, but less than six years
o No prosecution and consequent deportation for violation of the offenses enumerated in the Immigration
Act can be initiated beyond the eight-year prescriptive period, it being a special law.
Deportation actions are not imprescriptible. In Lao Gi v CA, the Court stated:
o Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however,
considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and
liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the
provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to
deportation proceedings.
o Under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a final judgment may not be executed after the lapse of five
(5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory.
Since his entry into the country, Gatchalian also contributed to the economy by providing jobs and investing.

WoN there is proof that Santiagos children were born out of wedlock. NO.

Following the principle of lex loci celebrationis: a marriage formally valid where it is celebrated is valid
everywhere.
Santiagos attestation that the marriage was valid is competent evidence as statements or declarations regarding
family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree (34, Rule 130 of the RoC).
Since the marriage is valid, it follows that Williams father Francisco (Santiagos son) follows the Filipino
citizenship of his father. And since William is also a legitimate child of Francisco, he is a Filipino citizen.

DISPOSITION: Petitions dismissed.

Feliciano, J. Dissenting Opinion:

The warrant of exclusion remains valid. Respondent and his co-applicants failed to substantiate and prove their
claim to Filipino citizenship.
Respondent William Gatchalian does not claim Philippine citizenship by any mode of entitlement subsequent to
his application for entry as a citizen of the Philippines in 1961, i.e., by any act or circumstance subsequent to his
birth and supposed filiation as a legitimate son of Francisco Gatchalian, also a supposed citizen of the Philippines.
The validity of Pedro Gatchalians citizenship, which was the controversy in Arocha v Vivo, included that of his
other co-applicants (William et al).
The Court in that decision upheld that validity of the July 6, 1962 order. Since respondent William Gatchalian does
not claim to have been naturalized as a Philippine citizen after rendition of the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision, he must
accordingly be held to be not a Philippine citizen.
The prescriptive period does not apply. Deportation may be effected at any time after entry. The NBI
recommended the filing of charges in 1990.
Aliens seeking entry into the Philippines do not acquire the right to be admitted into the country by the simple
passage of time. Exclusion of persons found not to be entitled to admission as Philippine citizens, must be
distinguished from the deportation of aliens, who, after having been initially lawfully admitted into the Philippines,
committed acts which rendered them liable to deportation.
Reliance on Act. No. 3266 is also misplaced. The Act refers to criminal prosecutions under special laws.
The recall of arrests in the memorandum issued by Nituda has no effect. The Commissioner is not higher than the
BOC itself, hence the appellate proceedings vested in the BSI.
Respondents petition for rehearing was filed more than 10 years after the 1962 order.
In Arocha, the Court held that individual actions of members of the BOC are legally ineffective:
o Individual action by members of a board plainly renders nugatory the purpose of its constitution as a
Board. The Legislature organized the Board of Commissioners precisely in order that they should
deliberate collectively and in order that their views and Ideas should be exchanged and examined before
reaching a conclusion.

Davide, J. Dissenting Opinion:

The questioned acts of the Boards were done absolutely within their quasi-judicial functions, hence 9(3) of BP
129 is applicable.
Gatchalian committed forum shopping. Since he is a resident of Valenzuela, there is no reason for him to file the
petition with the RTC of Manila.
Chua Hiong v Deportation Board is not applicable. The word courts should not now be interpreted to mean or to
include the regional trial courts because, as stated above, said courts do not have any appellate jurisdiction over
the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, the Board of Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry.
This case was decided in 1955 yet, or twenty-six years before the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The condition sine qua non then to an authorized judicial intervention is that the evidence submitted by a
respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, which is not the case in the present petition.
The action taken by and the recommendation of the Board of Special Inquiry of 14 March 1973 to the then Acting
Commissioner Victor Nituda for the reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners were not
only highly anomalous, irregular and improper, it was done without any semblance of authority.

o
o

The Board of Special Inquiry did not have the power to review, modify or reverse a Decision of the Board
of Commissioners rendered about eleven years earlier.
Then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda, acting alone, did not likewise have the power or authority to
approve the recommendation of said Board, to revive and/or reaffirm the July 6, 1961 decision of the
Board of Special Inquiry, to reverse, and nullify, the Decision of 6 July 1962 of the Board of
Commissioners, and to order the admission of William Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen. His order is void
ab initio.