REM Barops

1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Francisco Motors Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 505 SCRA 8,
October 23, 2006 (Page 2)
2. Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 513 SCRA 69, January 26, 2007
(Page 28)
3. Dalida vs. Naguit, 526 SCRA 172, June 29, 2007 (Page 53)
4. Taguinod vs. Court of Appeals, 533 SCRA 403, September 14,
2007 (Page 60)
5. People vs. Capwa, 541 SCRA 516, December 27, 2007 (Page 89)
6. Laynesa vs. Uy, 547 SCRA 200, February 29, 2008 (Page 101)
7. Pactolin vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), 554 SCRA 136, May
20, 2008 (Page 126)
8. Bayot vs. Court of Appeals, 570 SCRA 472, November 07, 2008
(Page 139)
9. Daikoku Electronics Phils. vs. Raza, 588 SCRA 788, June 05,
2009 (Page 169)
10. Macalinao vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 600 SCRA 67,
September 17, 2009 (Page 183)
11. Tomawis vs. Balindong, 614 SCRA 354, March 05, 2010 (Page
201)
12. People vs. Ng Yik Bun, 639 SCRA 88, January 10, 2011 (Page
222)
13. Yu vs. Reyes-Carpio, 652 SCRA 341, June 15, 2011 (Page 250)
14. Bote vs. Veloso, 686 SCRA 758, December 03, 2012 (Page 269)
15. LBL Industries, Inc. vs. City of Lapu-lapu, 705 SCRA 688,
September 16, 2013. (Page 286)
CASE DIGEST (Page 301)
1. Francisco Motors Corporation vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

AND ANTONIO RAQUIZA
G.R. Nos. 117622-23
October 23, 2006
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
It is the spirit and not the form of law that keeps justice alive.
former US Chief Justice Earl Warren
The Court, at times, bends in its regimen of strictly enforcing its own
rules and issuances when technicalities would becloud the serving of
equity and fairnessespecially when protracted litigation ensues and
such prolonged dispute bars litigants from having a genuine day in
court. However, protracted litigation, which by its nature puts the
odds against a party, should not be a bar to discovering the truth
and ruling on the merits of a case.
The Case
This petition for review[1] challenges the April 28, 1994 Decision[2] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15512 and CA-G.R. SP No.
15515 entitled Antonio Raquiza v. Hon. Milagros Caguioa, Judge,
RTC of Pasig, M.M. Branch 165. The assailed Decision granted
respondent Raquizas right to the issuance of a writ of execution
against the lot which was in the name of petitioner Francisco Motors
Corporation (FMC).
The Facts
We reiterate the facts found by the Court of Appeals, in addition to

those borne by the records.
The present controversy originated in 1958 concerning the
annulment of public auction sales of parcels of land in San Jose and
Norzagaray, Bulacan; Antipolo; and Las Pias, Metro Manila owned by
spouses Epifanio Alano and Cecilia Pading-Alano. Records show that
Raquiza was the lawyer of the Alano spouses in Civil Case Nos. 2608
and 4622.[3] As payment for Raquizas legal services, the Alano
spouses agreed in a written contract to pay him attorneys fees
equivalent to 30% of the properties in litigation. Raquiza, however,
was subsequently dismissed by the Alano spouses without justifiable
cause. Hence, he was allowed to intervene in the civil cases with
respect to his claim for attorneys fees.[4]
On May 30, 1958, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI,
granted the motion of Raquiza to have his contract of legal retainer
annotated in the titles involved in Civil Case No. 4622, which
includes Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 56520 covering a
parcel of land in Las Pias (Las Pias property) then in the name of
Miguel Campos. On January 30, 1959, said annotation of attorneys
lien was cancelled.[5]
On December 11, 1970, Presiding Judge Herminio C. Mariano of the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pasig, Branch 10, rendered a Joint
Decision[6] in Civil Case Nos. 2608 and 4622. The dispositive portion
partly reads:
Regarding the claim of intervenor, Atty. Antonio V. Raquiza, the
Court declares that said intervenor is entitled to 30% of whatever
rights and interests the Alanos may have in the Natalia Realty, Inc.
as stockholder thereof considering that the Contract of Legal
Retainer is obviously on a contingent basis. The Alanos are further
ordered to reimburse Atty. Antonio V. Raquiza the sum of
P10,000.00 representing various advances made by the latter to the
former and as litigation and other expenses.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Separate appeals were filed by Raquiza and the Alanos before the
Court of Appeals (CA) which were docketed as CA-G.R. Nos. 5215960-R. Meanwhile, the Las Pias property was transferred from Miguel
Campos to CPJ Corporation as nominee of the Alano spouses, and
TCT No. 56520 was replaced with TCT No. 190712 in the name of
CPJ Corporation on May 18, 1967. The property was transferred to
the Alano spouses on October 3, 1973, but the Deed of
Reconveyance was not immediately presented to the Register of
Deeds for registration. On December 7, 1973, the Alano spouses
executed a Deed of Sale with First Mortgage in favor of petitioner
FMC.[8] Both the Deed of Reconveyance and Deed of Sale with First
Mortgage were presented to the Register of Deeds of Rizal only on
January 21, 1974. On the same date, TCT No. 190712 was cancelled
and replaced by TCT No. 432260 in the name of the Alanos, which in
turn, was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 432261[9] in the name
of petitioner FMC.
On January 17, 1980, the Special First Division of the CA rendered a
Decision in CA-G.R. Nos. 52159-60-R. The dispositive portion reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the lower Court in
Civil Cases Nos. 2608 and 4622 is MODIFIED insofar as the claim of
Atty. Raquiza for attorneys fees is concerned in the sense that he
shall be entitled to 30% pro indiviso interest in all the properties
reconveyed by Campos, Philamgen and Philamlife under the
Compromise Agreement of December 28, 1965, except the Antipolo
properties covered by the Deed of Sale of September 10, 1953 in
favor of Natalia Realty, and to 30% interest in the participation of the
Alanos as shareholder of Natalia Realty, subject to his reimbursing
the Alanos the amount of P195,000.00, representing 30% of the
consideration paid by the Alanos for said reconveyance. The Alanos
shall also reimburse Atty. Raquiza the sum of P10,000.00,
representing various advances made by him to the Alanos.
In all other respects, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto with
costs against appellant Alanos.
SO ORDERED.[10] (Emphasis supplied.)
This Decision became final and executory on July 13, 1981.[11]
On October 1, 1980, Raquiza filed with the trial court an Ex-Parte

Motion for Execution of the Decision of the CA. He also filed an ExParte Motion for Production of Title alleging that the title which
eventually replaced TCT No. 56520, TCT No. 190712, is missing in
the Register of Deeds.[12] A Writ of Execution was issued on
February 10, 1982 ordering the Sheriff of Pasig to implement the
judgment of the CA within 60 days from receipt of the writ.[13]
On April 15, 1982 and May 19, 1982, Raquiza filed with the trial
court Motions for the Issuance of a Separate Transfer Certificate of
Title[14] in his name covering the area corresponding to his
attorneys fees. This was opposed by the Alano spouses on June 14,
1982 through the filing of an Opposition.[15]
On October 8, 1982, the trial court issued an Order granting

Raquizas motion for the issuance of a separate title, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and in accordance with the

decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 17, 1980 which has
long become final and executory, as prayed for, a portion with an
area of 162,576.60 sq.m. of the real property with Transfer
Certificate of Title No. S-65162 is hereby ordered segregated from the
total area of the real property covered by said titles S-65161 and S65162 and a separate transfer certificate of title be issued in the
name of Antonio Epifanio J. Alano, Sr. and Cecilia P. Alano and
Trans-Resource Management and Development Corporation are
further ordered to surrender Transfer Certificate of Title No. 190713
(S-65161) and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 190714 (now S-65162)
to the custody of this Court within fifteen (15) days from receipt
hereof in order that the corresponding segregation and issuance of a
separate transfer certificate of title in favor of Antonio V. Raquiza can
be effected.
SO ORDERED.[16]
On May 8, 1983, Trans-Resource Management and Development

Corporation, a party in one of the original civil cases, appealed the
above Order through a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.[17] The
appeal was dismissed by the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) on
August 27, 1985.[18]
On January 31, 1986, Raquiza filed with the lower court a

Supplemental Motion for Execution[19] alleging that the October 8,
1982 Order failed to include the lot covered by TCT No. 56520, that
is, the Las Pias property which was acquired by petitioner FMC.
On February 5, 1986, the trial court, through Judge Eficio Acosta,

issued an Order of Execution directing FMC to surrender its title so
that Raquizas 30% of the property can be segregated. The Order
reads:
AS PRAYED FOR by Intervenor Antonio V. Raquiza in his

supplemental Motion for Execution and there being no objection
thereto, the Court hereby orders the segregation of the 30% of the
parcel of land previously covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
56521[20] of the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the name of CPJ
Corporation which the said company later transferred and conveyed
to Francisco Motors, Inc., and the issuance of a new Certificate of
Title over said portion in the name of the intervenor Antonio V.

Raquiza and that Francisco Motors, Inc. is hereby ordered to
surrender to this Court the title of the subject parcel of land so that
the segregation and issuance of a separate transfer of certificate of
title in favor of the intervenor over 30% can be effected.
SO ORDERED.[21]
On February 14, 1986, Raquiza filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for

correction of the above Order. He alleged that upon further inquiry,
what was conveyed to FMC was the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
190712 in the name of CPJ Corporation, not TCT No. 56521.[22]
Finding merit in the motion, the lower court, on February 18, 1986,
issued an Order correcting the February 5, 1986 Order by changing
TCT No. 56521 to TCT No. 190712.[23]
On March 10, 1986, Raquiza filed an Ex-Parte Motion praying that

FMC be ordered to explain why it had not surrendered TCT No.
190712.[24] In its March 13, 1986 Opposition, FMC alleged inter alia
that it is a buyer in good faith as the attorneys lien of Raquiza was
not annotated at the back of TCT No. 190712.[25] On June 3, 1986,
FMC filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution.[26]
On June 6, 1986, the lower court, also through Judge Eficio Acosta,
granted Raquizas motion. It held that FMCs defense of good faith
was without merit. The dispositive portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion to quash writ of

execution field by Francisco Motors Corporation is hereby denied.
The opposition to motion of intervenor Raquiza filed by Francisco
Motors Corporation is hereby denied and the Orders of this Court

dated February 5, 1986 and February 18, 1986 stand. Francisco
Motors Corporation is hereby ordered to submit to the Court the
portion of the property it prefers to hold so that the remaining
portion shall be segregated and titled in the name of the intervenor
Antonio Raquiza.
SO ORDERED.[27]
On June 19, 1986, Raquiza filed an Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance
of a Writ of Execution pursuant to the orders dated February 5 and
18, 1986.[28]
On July 8, 1986, FMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said

Order. FMC alleged that it purchased the property from the Alano
spouses as early as December 7, 1973, while Raquizas attorneys fees
were awarded by the CA much later, or only on January 17, 1980;
hence, it cannot be levied upon to answer for his attorneys fees.[29]
On September 23, 1986, the lower court, through Judge Nicolas

Galing, issued an Order quashing the writ of execution issued by
Judge Eficio Acosta on the ground that the land, having been sold by
the Alano spouses to FMC as early as December 7, 1973, long before
the Court of Appeals awarded Raquizas attorneys fees, could no
longer be reached by execution.[30] On November 4, 1986, Raquiza
filed a Motion for Reconsideration while FMC opposed.[31]
On June 10, 1987, Raquiza filed a Motion to Enforce his Motion to
Execute alleging that the decision sought to be enforced had long
become final and executory. He prayed that the writ of execution,
which was quashed in the order dated September 23, 1986, be
reinstated and enforced immediately.[32] FMC and Alano spouses
opposed the motion. Meanwhile, the entire judiciary was reorganized.

The cases were re-raffled to Branch 164. Subsequently, Branch 164
was converted into a Special Criminal Court; hence, the cases were
re-raffled to Branch 165 which was presided by Judge Milagros V.
Caguioa.[33]
On January 19, 1988, the lower court denied Raquizas Motion to

Enforce the Motion to Execute for lack of merit on the ground that
the decision sought to be enforced had become final and executory
after the lapse of five years, and the same Decision could no longer
be enforced by a mere motion.[34]
On February 11, 1988, Raquiza filed a Motion for Reconsideration

citing the delay in the implementation of the judgment which was
brought about by various causes. Again, spouses Alano and FMC
opposed the motion. On May 13, 1988, respondent court denied the
Motion for Reconsideration.[35]
On June 21, 1988, Raquiza filed a Motion for Extension of Time to

file a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. In the July 4,
1988 Resolution, this Court granted Raquiza 30 days within which to
file a petition for certiorari.[36] The petition[37] was filed on July 25,
1988 and the case was docketed as G.R. No. 83718-19. In that
petition, Raquiza prayed that the Court (1) give due course to the
petition, (2) include FMC as respondent, and (3) reverse the Decision
of Judge Caguioa and order the execution of the January 17, 1980
Decision of the CA. In the August 15, 1988 Resolution, the Court
remanded the case to the CA.[38] The case was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 15512 and 15515[39] which is now for review.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
10

The April 28, 1994 Decision of the CA set aside the January 19 and
May 13, 1988 Orders of the trial court, citing the following three (3)
reasons: (1) that Raquizas motions dated April 15 and May 19, 1982
for the segregation of titles were for the execution of the decision in
his favor; thus, the subsequent motions should be treated as mere
follow-up;[40] (2) that FMC, as a successor-in-interest in relation to
the property of the Alano spouses and transferee pendente lite, was
bound to recognize the encumbrances attached to the land,
including the attorneys liens, although not inscribed in the title;[41]
and (3) it justified Raquizas petition for certiorari after finding the
appeal was not a speedy or sufficient remedy.[42]
FMCs Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its

October 26, 1994 Resolution. [43]
Intervening Events
On January 2, 1995, FMC filed the instant petition for review. After
the submission of the parties respective Memoranda in August 1995,
counsel for private respondent filed on June 19, 2002 an Urgent
Motion for Substitution of Parties and Early Resolution.[44]
Furthermore, Antonio Raquiza reportedly passed away last December
24, 1999.[45] In the July 28, 2003 Resolution, we denied the motion
for substitution for lack of merit.[46]
The Issues
The parties submitted the following issues for our consideration:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROPER REMEDY

RESPONDENT IS CERTIORARI AND NOT APPEAL
OF
PRIVATE
11

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN

CA-G.R. NOS. 52159-60-R CAN STILL BE ENFORCED BY A SIMPLE
MOTION UNDER SEC. 6, RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT
WHETHER OR NOT THE ATTORNEYS FEES AWARDED TO PRIVATE

RESPONDENT IN CA-G.R. NOS. 52159-60-R [ON JANUARY 17,
1980] CAN BE ENFORCED/SATISFIED AS AGAINST THE PARCELS
OF LAND ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER FROM THE ALANOS ON
DECEMBER 7, 1973
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition partly meritorious.
(1) Resort to Certiorari
Petitioner contends that Raquizas resort to certiorari is erroneous

because one of the essential requisites for the issuance of a writ of
certiorari is that there must be no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioner reasoned
that since the subject of the petition for certiorari were the orders of
the trial court dated January 19 and May 13, 1988, appeal, not
certiorari, is the proper remedy. Petitioner further alleged that the
petition for certiorari was filed with the CA only in March 1989, after
the lapse of more than one year from the assailed orders.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a writ

of certiorari lies when any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
12

its or his [/her] jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal,
or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. We have consistently held that where the error sought to be
corrected neither relates to the courts jurisdiction nor involves grave
abuse of discretion, review [of the error] through certiorari will not be
allowed. This rule, however, admits exceptions such as (1) when it is
necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party, (2)
where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his
[/her] judgment, (3) where there may be danger of failure of justice,
(4) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient, (5)
where the issue raised is one purely of law, (6) where public interest
is involved, and (7) in case of urgency.[47] In Jaca v. Davao Lumber
Company, we further ruled that:
Although Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the

special civil action of certiorari may only be invoked when "there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
[ordinary] course of law," this rule is not without exception. The
availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute
sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari where the appeal is not an
adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the
inadequacy not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the
danger of failure of justice without the writ that must usually
determine the propriety of certiorari.[48]
In this case, while private respondent had other legal remedies

against the trial courts orders, these remedies would be slow,
inadequate and insufficient in light of the excessive delay in this case.
Private respondents attempts to collect his fees in 1958 was evident
when he intervened in Civil Case Nos. 2608 and 4622. He received a
favorable decision after 22 years, or on January 17, 1980, after an
13

appeal to the CA. The Decision became final on July 13, 1981. Since
then private respondent had been trying to execute the decision by
filing various motions. The trial court, however, frustrated private
respondents efforts when it issued its January 19 and May 13, 1988
Orders. Thereafter, private respondent filed the questioned petition
for certiorari and the CA issued its Decision only in 1994. The
number of years alone that the private respondent had devoted in
enforcing his claim, that is, almost half a century to date,
exceptionally calls for certiorari as a more speedy and adequate
remedy. The availability of other legal remedies cannot prevent the
recourse to certiorari when these remedies would be slow and
inadequate to effectively dispense justice in favor of the private
respondent.
We take special cognizance that when the CA issued the questioned

Decision in 1994, private respondent Raquiza was almost 90 years
old. Private respondent had once appealed the case which resulted in
a Decision in his favor after ten years of pendency in the appellate
court. Considering the private respondents age and the slow
disposition of his previous appeal, it is easy to understand why he
had resorted to certiorari instead of appeal in trying to execute the
Decision in his favor. Dismissing the instant petition on the basis of
technicality alone would be unjust to private respondent. We
reiterate that:
Technicalities should be disregarded if only to render to the

respective parties that which is their due. Thus, although We have
said that certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lapsed appeal, We
have, time and again, likewise held that where a rigid application of
that rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the
rule may be relaxed. Hence, considering the broader and primordial
interests of justice, particularly when there is grave abuse of
discretion, thus impelling occasional departure from the general rule
that the extraordinary writ of certiorari cannot substitute for a lost
14

appeal, respondent appellate court may legally entertain the special

civil action for certiorari.[49]
Petitioner FMC mistakenly pointed out that private respondent filed

the petition for certiorari before the CA in 1989, concluding that
more than one year had elapsed from the assailed orders of the trial
court dated January 19 and May 13, 1988. As previously mentioned,
private respondent initially filed a petition for certiorari on July 25,
1988 which was within the extended period of time granted to him by
this Court. [50] On August 15, 1988, the Court remanded the case to
the CA.[51] While the case was pending in the CA, Raquiza asked for
an extension of time to file his Amended Petition. The appellate court
granted his motion and on March 30, 1989, Raquiza filed the
Amended Petition for Certiorari.[52] Thus, private respondents
Petition for Certiorari was filed within the time set by the rules and
with the approval of the Supreme Court and CA. Private respondent,
therefore, cannot be said to have slept on his right to appeal for more
than a year.
(2) Enforcement of the Decision by Motion
There is no dispute that the judgment sought to be enforced by

private respondent was the January 17, 1980 Decision of the CA
which became final on July 13, 1981. Petitioner asserts, however,
that judgments can be enforced by mere motion within five years
from finality and since private respondents Motion to Enforce the
Motion to Execute was filed only on June 10, 1987, said Motion had
already prescribed.
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court states:
15

SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action A final and

executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five
(5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and
before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be
enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter
by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
In Lancita v. Magbanua, we held that:
In computing the time limited for suing out of an execution, although

there is authority to the contrary, the general rule is that there
should not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by
agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the
taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas,
by the death of a party or otherwise. Any interruption or delay
occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ
may be issued without scire facias (citation omitted).[53]
As pointed above, in computing the time limited for suing out an

execution, the time during which execution is stayed should be
excluded, and the said time will be extended by any delay occasioned
by the debtor. In Blouse Potenciano v. Mariano, we held that the
motion for examination of the judgment debtor, which is a
proceeding supplementary to execution, and the action for
mandamus amounted to a stay of execution which effectively
interrupted or suspended the five (5)-year period for enforcing the
judgment by motion.[54] In Camacho v. Court of Appeals, et. al.,
16

where after a final judgment, the petitioner (obligor) moved to defer

the execution, elevated the matter to the CA and the Supreme Court,
transferred the property to her daughter, in addition to the issues
regarding counsel and subsequent vacancies in the courts, we ruled
that:
Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case where the

delays were occasioned by petitioners own initiatives and for her
advantage as well as beyond the respondents control, we hold that
the five [5]-year period allowed for the enforcement of the judgment
by motion was deemed to have been effectively interrupted or
suspended. Once again we rely upon basic notions of equity and
justice in so ruling. (Emphasis supplied.)
The purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing

judgment or actions is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their
rights. Far from sleeping on their rights, respondents persistently
pursued their rights of action. It is revolting to the conscience to
allow petitioner to further avert the satisfaction of her obligation
because of sheer literal adherence to technicality (citation
omitted).[55]
We also subtracted from the five (5)-year period the time when the
judgment could not be enforced due to the restraining order issued
by this Court,[56] and when the records of the case were lost or
misplaced through no fault of the petitioner.[57] In Provincial
Government of Sorsogon v. Vda. de Villaroya, we likewise excluded
the delays caused by the auditors requirements which were not the
fault of the parties who sought execution, and ruled that [i]n the
eight years that elapsed from the time the judgment became final
until the filing of the restraining motion by the private respondents,
the judgment never became dormant. Section 6, Rule 39 of the
17

Revised Rules of Court does not apply.[58] In Jacinto v. Intermediate

Appellate Court, this Court further held:
Granting for the sake of argument that the motion for an alias writ of
execution was beyond the five [5]-year limitation within which a
judgment may be executed by mere motion, still under the
circumstances prevailing wherein all the delay in the execution of the
judgment lasting for more than eight [8]-years was beneficial to
private respondents, this Court[,] for reasons of equity[,] is
constrained to treat the motion for execution as having been filed
within the reglementary period required by law.[59] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Republic v. Court of Appeals summed it up as follows:
To be sure, there had been many instances where this Court allowed
execution by motion even after the lapse of five years, upon
meritorious grounds. These exceptions have one common
denominator, and that is: the delay is caused or occasioned by
actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or
advantage (emphasis supplied).[60]
In the case at bar, since the judgment of the CA became final on July
13, 1981, private respondent had filed several motions for and in
support of its execution. After the dismissal of the appeal of TransResource Management Corporation in 1985, private respondent
moved for the inclusion of the Las Pias property in the order of
execution. He reasoned that the February 10, 1982 Writ of Execution
could not be enforced against the Las Pias property because the title
number was already changed and could not be traced or found in the
Register of Deeds.[61]
18

Nevertheless, during the five (5) year period from the finality of
judgment, private respondent filed several motions for and in
support of execution. His persistence is manifest in the number of
motions, manifestations, oppositions, and memoranda he had filed
since the judgment became final on July 13, 1981. He obtained three
writs of execution (February 10, 1982; February 5, 1986 and June 6,
1986) and two orders in aid of execution (October 8, 1982 and
February 18, 1986) but the alleged loss of the title, incorrect orders,
and the subsequent refusal of petitioner FMC to surrender its title
prevented the satisfaction of judgment. While the delay was not
wholly attributable to FMC, it nevertheless worked to FMCs
advantage. FMCs motion for reconsideration of the order of execution
prevented the implementation of said order, especially considering
that it was filed on July 8, 1986. Said motion effectively suspended
the five (5) year prescriptive period which was supposed to expire on
July 13, 1986.
Subsequently, an order quashing the writ of execution was issued by

the court a quo on September 23, 1986 which private respondent
questioned in a motion for reconsideration. Before the lower court
released its Decision, on private respondents motion for
reconsideration, Raquiza filed the assailed Motion to Enforce the
Motion to Execute. In view of the foregoing circumstances and for
reasons of equity, we are constrained to treat the Motion to Enforce
the Motion to Execute as having been filed within the reglementary
period. The purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for
enforcing judgments or actions is to prevent obligors from sleeping
on their rights.[62] Private respondent, on the contrary, persistently
sought the execution of the judgment in his favor.
(3) Satisfaction of Claims Against the Petitioners Property
Private respondents claim on the property is based on the January

17, 1980 decision of the CA which awarded him 30% pro indiviso
interest in all the properties reconveyed by Campos, Philamgen and
19

Philamlife under the Compromise Agreement of December 28, 1965.

One of the properties that was reconveyed to the Alano spouses is
the Las Pias property which is now in dispute.
Petitioner contends that when it acquired the property, there was

neither an attorneys lien at the back of TCT No. 56520 nor a notice
of lis pendens; thus, it was in good faith at the time of purchase.
Petitioner also asserts that it acquired the property before the CA
awarded the attorneys fees against the property in question.[63]
Nevertheless, the trial court ruled that petitioner should have been
alerted by the fact that TCT No. 190712 was in the name of CPJ as
nominee and assignee of the Alanos. The appellate court affirmed
this finding, adding that the petitioner is bound to recognize the
encumbrances including attorneys lien although not inscribed in the
title and that petitioner is bound by the judgment even though there
was no formal substitution of the parties. The appellate court ruled
that petitioner should have exercised the ordinary care expected of a
buyer in real estate. [64]
We DISAGREE.
The annotation of attorneys lien on TCT No. 56520 was cancelled on
January 30, 1959, long before petitioner FMC acquired the property
in question, on December 7, 1973. TCT No. 56520 was later
cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 190712 in the name of CPJ
Corporation. A notice of lis pendens was inscribed on TCT No.
190712 on February 6, 1958 by spouses Epifanio J. Alano and
Cecilia Alano in view of the pendency of Civil Case No. 4622 entitled
Epifanio J. Alano; et al. v. Miguel Campos, et al. On the other hand,
respondent Antonio Raquiza did not bother to have his attorneys lien
annotated at the back of TCT NO. 190712, to protect his interests in
it. This annotation was cancelled on June 19, 1967 by the Alano
spouses.[65] Private respondent did not cause the reannotation of
the attorneys lien and the notice of lis pendens despite the pendency
of the two civil cases. Thus, when petitioner bought the property in
20

question on December 7, 1973, the title was free from the attorneys
lien and notice of lis pendens.
Private respondent argued that the reannotation of his claim could

not be effected due to the alleged loss of TCT No. 190712 (formerly
TCT No. 56520) and its derivatives. This posture does not hold water.
The annotation of lis pendens is done on the original certificate of
title which is on file with the Register of Deeds. Even conceding that
the original TCT No. 190712 was missing, still respondent Raquiza
should have filed the notice of lis pendens with the Office of the
Register of Deeds so that the latter will be forewarned if a person
requests for the transfer of the title which appears to have been
misplaced or lost. Another remedy would be to file a motion for
preliminary injunction to prevent the Alano spouses from selling the
lot subject of TCT No. 190712, and to direct the Register of Deeds
not to transfer the title to any third party. Unfortunately, respondent
Raquiza failed to undertake the safeguards necessary to protect his
attorneys lien. Thus, we hold that petitioner FMC bought the
property without notice of any defect in the title. It is therefore a
purchaser in good faith and for value.
In Spouses Po Lam v. Court of Appeals, we held that the filing of a

notice of lis pendens in effect (1) keeps the subject matter of the
litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final
judgment so as to prevent the defeat of the latter by successive
alienations; and (2) binds the purchaser of the land subject of the
litigation to the judgment or decree that will be promulgated there on
whether such a purchaser is a bona fide purchaser or not; but (3)
does not create a non-existent right or lien. The cancellation of a
notice of pendency terminates the effects of such notice; thus, the
buyers of the property cannot be considered transferees pendente lite
and purchasers in bad faith.[66] This ruling holds true for petitioner
FMC. Similar to the aforementioned case, petitioner FMC bought the
property pending appeal. The title carried no notice of lis pendens
and the private respondent did not cause the reannotation of or the
21

attorneys lien. Thus, petitioner FMC could not be considered a

transferee pendente lite and buyer in bad faith.
Furthermore, private respondents right over the property is based on

the January 17, 1980 Decision of the CA in CA-GR No. 52159-60R
which modified the ruling of the lower court by granting the claim of
respondent Raquiza for attorneys fees of 30% pro indiviso interest in
all the properties reconveyed by Campos, et al. At the time of the sale
on December 7, 1973 in favor of petitioner FMC, private respondent
Raquiza did not yet have a right over 30% of the Las Pias property.
Had respondent Raquiza been vigilant, he could have impleaded
petitioner FMC as a party-litigant in the civil cases. However, it was
only in March 1986 when respondent Raquiza asked that petitioner
be ordered to surrender its title. By that time, it was already too late.
Apparently, private respondent slept on his rights, and verily such
inaction should not prejudice an innocent purchaser for value.
Having bought the property in good faith, petitioner FMC cannot be
considered a transferee pendente lite which could be bound by the
1980 judgment of the appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED IN PART and the
April 28, 1994 Decision and the October 26, 1994 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are MODIFIED, so that the attorneys fees awarded
to petitioner Raquiza in the January 17, 1980 Decision in CA-G.R.
Nos. 52159-60-R entitled Natasha Realty, Inc. v. Sheriff, Province of
Rizal, et al. can no longer be satisfied and enforced against the lot
registered under TCT No. 432261 in the name of petitioner Francisco
Motor Corporation being an innocent purchaser for value of said lot.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
22

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
23

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
24

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the

Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp 7-21.

[2] Rollo, pp. 23-35.
[3] Civil Case No. 2608 was captioned, Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Sheriff,
Province of Rizal, et. al.; Miguel Campos, et. al., Third Party Plaintiff;
Vivencio D. Antonio, et. al., Third Party Defendants; while Civil Case
No. 4622 was captioned, Epifano J. Alano, et. al, vs. Miguel Campos,
et. al.; Antonio V. Raquiza, Intervenor.
[4] Supra note 2, at 24.
[5] CFI Records, Vol. II, pp. 348-349.
[6] CFI Records, Vol. I, pp. 647-682.
[7] Id. at 682.
25

[9] Rollo, pp. 172-177.

[14] CFI Records, Vol. I, pp. 773-776 & 798-802.
[15] Supra note 11.
[20] Should read as 56520.
[21] CFI Records, Vol. II, p. 309.
[31] CFI Records, Vol. II, pp. 497-501 and 464-487.
26

[34] CFI Records Vol. III, pp. 51-52.

[35] CFI Records, Vol. III, p. 101.
[36] Rollo, p. 137.
[37] Rollo, pp. 138-142.
[38] CA rollo, p. 17.
[39] The case was captioned, Antonio Raquiza versus Hon. Milagros
Caguioa, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 165, Fernando Francisco, as
President of Francisco Motors Corp., Epifanio Alano and wife Cecilia
Pading-Alano, Judge Eutropio Migrio, Judge Nicolas Galing, Judge
Fernando Gerona, Jr., and Atty. Eleazar Ferry.
[40] Rollo, p. 32.
[41] Id. at 33-34.
[42] Id.
[43] Rollo, pp. 37-38.
[44] Rollo, pp. 223-232.
[45] Id. at 225.
[46] Rollo, p. 276.
[47] Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 113420, March 7, 1997,
269 SCRA 316, 324-325 (citations omitted).
[48] G.R. No. L-25771, March 29, 1982, 113 SCRA 107, 129.
[49] Luna v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100374-75, November 27,
1992, 216 SCRA 107, 111, citing Aranda v. CA, G.R. No. 63188, 186
SCRA 456 (1990), and other cases.
[50] Supra note 37.
[51] CA rollo, p. 17.
[52] Id. at 24-39.
27

[53] G.R. No. L-15467, January 31, 1963, 7 SCRA 42, 46.
[54] Blouse Potenciano v. Mariano, G.R. No.L-30904, March 6, 1980,
96 SCRA 463, 468-470.
[55] G.R. No. 118339, March 19, 1988, 287 SCRA 611, 617.
[56] Villaruel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78827, April 17, 1989,
172 SCRA 305, 312-313.
[57] Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 62556, August 13, 1992,
212 SCRA 595, 603.
[58] G.R. No. L-64037, August 27, 1987, 153 SCRA 291, 298.
[59] G.R. No. L-66478, August 29, 1988, 164 SCRA 739, 746-747.
[60] GR No. 91885, August 7, 1996, 260 SCRA 344, 349-350.
[61] Private respondent Raquiza submitted the affidavit (CFI Records,
Vol. III, pp. 59-60) dated July 15, 1986 of his secretary, Mr. Antonio
Calaro, who attested that upon his search sometime in 1981, TCT No.
190712 could not be found in the Registry of Deeds in Pasay, Makati,
Pasig, and Las Pias; and it was only in January 1986 when the title
and its derivatives were discovered.
[62] Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91885, August 7, 1996,
260 SCRA 344, 351-352.
[63] Rollo, pp. 191-192.
[64] Supra note 41.
[65] Rollo, p. 200.
[66] G.R. No. 116220 (Resolution), December 6, 2000, citing Somes v.
Government, 62 Phil. 432 (1935);
28

2. Santiago vs. Court of Appeals

513 SCRA 69
G.R. No. 127440, January 26, 2007
SECOND DIVISION
FERNANDO SANTIAGO, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, and
SPOUSES RUSTICO AND FE SANTOS, Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Challenged in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the June 25,

1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 32374,
entitled Fernando Santiago v. Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), et al., which affirmed with modification the July 29, 1988
Decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch XXVI in
Civil Case No. R-81-616 for specific performance and damages
against GSIS and for ejectment and damages against spouses Santos.
Likewise assailed is the December 10, 1996 CA Resolution rejecting
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
29

The Facts
On October 8, 1959, a Contract to Sell[1] was entered into by and

between petitioner Fernando Santiago, with residence at 756 Padilla
St., San Miguel, Manila and respondent GSIS over Lot 15, Block 2,
Leonila Hills Subdivision, Baguio City, for a consideration of Thirtythree Thousand Pesos (PhP 33,000.00), subject to the following
terms and conditions, viz:
1.
The PURCHASER agrees to pay the CORPORATION,
upon signing this Agreement, the sum of (15% for Member and 25%
for Non-Member) FOUR THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
ONLY (4,950.00) Pesos, and the amount of THREE HUNDRED
ELEVEN PESOS & 41/100 (311.41) Pesos, Philippine Currency,
monthly thereafter until the whole or full amount of the purchase
price hereinabove stipulated has been fully paid to the entire and full
satisfaction of the CORPORATION, with interest at the rate of Six
Percent (6%) per annum or Eight percent (8%) for Non-Member, said
interest to be payable monthly. Interest at the rate of 1% per month,
payable monthly, will be charged by the CORPORATION on all
payments delinquent for more than thirty (30) days.
xxxx
3. Possession of the building, the improvements thereon and the

parcel of land hereinby contracted to be sold will be delivered to the
PURCHASER by the CORPORATION, or its duly authorized
representative, after the approval of the application by the Board of
Trustees, the signing of this contract, and the payment of the down
30

payment of (15% for Member) (25% for Non-Member) 4,950.00 in

the office of the CORPORATION at Manila.
xxxx
7.
No promises, verbal or written agreement, contracts or
stipulations entered into by the PURCHASER with third parties,
contrary to any of the contents of this agreement, shall in any way
supersede, alter, modify or nullify this contract, nor shall they be
valid unless authorized herein.
8.
Should the PURCHASER fail to pay any of the monthly
installments herein provided within ninety (90) days of the date due,
this contract shall be deemed automatically cancelled and forfeited,
of no force and effect, and the CORPORATION shall have the
complete, absolute, and boundless power, authority, jurisdiction and
discretion, and without reservation by the PURCHASER, to dispose,
sell, transfer, convey, assign and encumber the herein mentioned
properties to any other person or persons, natural or juridical, in the
same manner as if this contract or agreement has never been made,
provided, however, that extension has been authorized expressly in
writing by the CORPORATION or its duly authorized representative,
may be allowed the PURCHASER upon proof of extra-ordinary
misfortune satisfactory to the CORPORATION.
9.
In the event of the cancellation and forfeiture
mentioned in the next preceding [sic] paragraph, all sums of money
paid by or due from the PURCHASER under paragraphs 1 and 2 of
this contract shall be considered as rental for the use of said
property and the PURCHASER waives and forfeits rights to ask or
demand the return thereof.
31

xxxx
15. Any single violation of this agreement shall be sufficient and

adequate reason to consider the contract forfeited and the
PURCHASER agrees to leave or vacate the property, leaving all
improvements made [thereon] in good and serviceable condition,
after notice in writing have been made on PURCHASER that he
violated this agreement and PURCHASER failed or refused to rectify
or correct said violation of the agreement.
xxxx
17. The PURCHASER shall not sell, cede, encumber, transfer in any
manner [nor] assign his rights under this contract without the
express consent of the CORPORATION in writing and until all the
stipulations of this contract shall have been fulfilled faithfully as of
the date of the transfer, assignment, conveyance or resale.
xxxx
19. The PURCHASER hereby agrees to respect and abide [by] all
rules that may be promulgated by the CORPORATION or its
management for the protection of the property rights of the
CORPORATION, the PURCHASERS and/or residents of the project;
and for the enforcement of said rules and regulations, the
CORPORATION shall have the right to bring court action which may
be proper in the premises.
At the time petitioner Santiago signed the Contract to Sell, he was

connected with the Law Division of the Department of Justice with
office address at 756 Padilla St., San Miguel, Manila, the address he
32

indicated in the contract. However, his home address was at 151

Cebu Avenue (now Mother Ignacia Avenue), Quezon City.
In 1963, petitioner became Chief of the Agrarian Counsel. In 1970,
he was appointed Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon,
Lucena City. He leased his Quezon City residence and he and his
family resided in Lucena City.
With regard to the Baguio City property, petitioner took possession of

it, undertook valuable improvements on the house, furnished it, and
had it repainted twice.
Sometime in 1961, petitioner requested Mrs. Lydia B. Salonga, his

first cousin and immediate neighbor in Quezon City, to take physical
custody and care of the disputed property in Baguio City. Mrs.
Salonga is married to Sen. Jovito Salonga. The property is situated
near the house and lot of Mr. Fernando Busuego, uncle of
petitioner.[2]
Likewise, petitioner asked Mrs. Salonga to lease or sell the property

in order to at least recoup his investment. In summer of 1973, Dr.
Jose De la Rosa, a resident of Baguio and a friend of the Busuegos,
offered to rent the premises, in behalf of a certain American, Mr.
Dennis Ireton. Mrs. Salonga authorized Dr. De la Rosa to sell or lease
the property to Ireton, who eventually became a tenant.[3]
Meanwhile, Dr. De la Rosa negotiated with Mrs. Salonga for the

eventual sale of the property to him. She apprised the petitioner of
the developments. Thereafter, petitioner sent Mr. Agustin Ortega to
the GSIS to verify the records.
33

However, based on the GSIS records, petitioner failed to pay the

agreed monthly amortizations of the subject property. Consequently,
the GSIS Acquired Assets Department sent a September 9, 1968
demand letter to petitioner at his given address at 756 Padilla St.,
San Miguel, Manila based on the Contract to Sell; however, he failed
to comply with the demand letter. Subsequently, the Acquired Assets
Accounts Division of GSIS sent two (2) additional demand letters
dated February 5, 1970 and December 7, 1972 to petitioner through
registered mail at the same address.
Meanwhile, the GSIS Claims Department sent two letters dated July
24, 1970 and November 16, 1970 to petitioner through mail at
Lucena City regarding the refund to him of the insurance premiums
he paid with interest. While said department was informed of the
office address of petitioner at the Court of First Instance of Quezon,
Lucena City, the Acquired Assets Department was not aware of his
new address which was why all communications relating to the
Baguio lot were sent to his Manila address.
Sometime in October 1973, petitioner thought that he had already

fully paid for the property and even exceeded his payments to GSIS.
Thus, he sent a representative to the GSIS to ask the latter to
execute a final deed of sale and to deliver the torrens title of the
subject property to him, but he was apprised by his representative
that his GSIS account was in arrears.
On October 29, 1973, Dr. Jose Dela Rosa wrote a letter to the GSIS
informing the latter that he allegedly acquired the property of
Senator Jovito Salonga at Leonila Hills, Baguio City, which the latter
purchased from petitioner. He sent Fe Santos to find out the amount
due to GSIS because of his desire to pay it in full so that he could
have the title to the property transferred to him.[4] It appeared that
Dr. De la Rosa allowed Fe Santos to rent petitioners house and he
offered to sell the lot to her.[5] Santos wanted to verify the papers
34

with GSIS but in the process, she discovered that the owner of the
subject property was petitioner Santiago and not De la Rosa. She
also found out that petitioner was in arrears for 71 installments. A
GSIS employee advised her to apply for the purchase of the property.
Thus, on November 12, 1973, she filed an application with the GSIS
to purchase the subject property.[6]
With regard to the rent of the premises, she tendered the payments
of rentals to GSIS corresponding to two (2) months pending the
processing of her application to purchase.[7] Through a November 23,
1973 letter,[8] GSIS then informed Santos to comply with its
requirements in order to process her application; and she deposited
PhP 622.82 to GSIS after complying with its requirements.[9]
On November 15, 1973, petitioner sent a letter to Mr. Cesar S. del

Rosario, Accounting Chief of the Acquired Assets Accounts Division
of the GSIS, stating that he was surprised to learn, through his
representative, that he still had arrearages amounting to PhP
22,324.28 as of September 30, 1973. He reasoned that since he had
already paid PhP 44,549.94, he concluded that the purchase price of
PhP 33,000.00 was already fully paid. He also stated that he was
informed that GSIS had sent letters or notices to his old address in
San Miguel, Manila and not to the Court of First Instance of Quezon,
Lucena City. Thus, he wanted to make arrangements with GSIS to
settle his arrearages through his representatives, Agustin Ortega and
Leopoldo Echevarria, Jr.[10]
On November 27, 1973, petitioner filed a letter of protest with Atty.
Jaime Marcelo, Manager of the GSIS Acquired Assets Department.
He vehemently objected to any plan of awarding the property to any
other person and manifested his willingness to pay whatever balance
he may owe the GSIS. He also stated that Fe Santos and her family,
who had been able to enter the premises without his knowledge or
consent, may wish to leave the premises.[11]
35

Meanwhile, on December 5, 1973, Fe Santos gave PhP 3,300.00 to

GSIS in the nature of good faith deposit and PhP 100.00 processing
fee.[12]
On December 6, 1973, petitioner sent a letter to Atty. Marcelo, which

was hand carried by petitioners representatives, Ortega and
Echevarria, enclosing the check in the amount of PhP 17,024.71 as
full payment of the alleged unpaid balance of the purchase price.[13]
The letter and check were presented to the Manager of the Acquired
Assets Department but these were transferred to his Assistant
Manager for comment and recommendation.[14]
It was only on December 7, 1973 that GSIS sent a letter to petitioner

at the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Lucena City notifying him of
the cancellation of his award of the subject property effective October
25, 1973 for non-compliance with the terms and conditions of the
Contract to Sell.[15] Specifically, he was in arrears for seventy-one
(71) monthly amortizations as of September 30, 1973. Petitioner then
sent a telegram of protest to the Manager of the Acquired Assets
Department and requested reconsideration of the revocation of the
award.
On December 12, 1973, the Assistant Manager of the Acquired

Assets Department stated that Judge Santiago, [the former owner,]
should be given preference per existing policy provided that the new
purchase price is paid in full. He likewise averred that the new
applicant, Fe Santos, had no perfected contract as her application
was not yet approved by the Board and her payment would be
subjected to refund under the GSIS November 23, 1973 letter of
proposal.[16]
On December 26, 1973, petitioner wrote a letter to GSIS to
reconsider the cancellation of his award.[17] Then, on January 2,
1974, he repeated his request for reconsideration through a
36

memorandum.[18] He argued that he failed to receive any notice of

arrears or delinquency from the GSIS, notwithstanding the fact that
it knew the address of his residence and all his changes of address
and residence as a consequence of his promotions.
On February 12, 1974, Santos paid PhP 934.24 to the GSIS

corresponding to the three (3)-month rental.[19]
On March 4, 1974, GSIS informed Santos that any improvements

introduced to the lot or building, if any, were unauthorized, and the
expenses that would be incurred were chargeable against her
account.[20]
On June 11, 1974, Atty. Manuel Lazaro, Assistant General Manager

of the GSIS Legal Affairs, recommended that the cancellation of the
award of petitioner be set aside but with conditions that he would
hold GSIS free and unharmed from any and all liability by reason of
the cancellation, and to defend GSIS in any and all suits connected
or related to the return of the money of Fe Santos.[21] On August 1,
1974, in its Board Resolution No. 21, the GSIS Board of Trustees
approved the recommendation of Atty. Lazaro, with the conditions
that were set forth in the meeting.[22]
In a letter dated August 31, 1974, Santiago accepted the terms and
conditions of Board Resolution No. 21 provided however that the full
force and effect of the said original Deed of Conditional Sale x x x is
recognized conformably with law x x x.[23] He later designated
Leopoldo Echevarria as his attorney-in-fact, through a Special Power
of Attorney,[24] to sign the Deed of Absolute Sale covering the
property located at Leonila Hills, Baguio City.
37

Through a July 2, 1974 letter, GSIS notified Santos that her

application to purchase the subject property was denied by its Board
of Trustees and that GSIS was returning to her the amount of PhP
3,300.00 deposit she previously paid.[25] Moreover, through an
August 15, 1974 letter, GSIS also informed Santos that it set aside
the cancellation of the Contract to Sell in petitioners favor.[26]
On September 16, 1974, petitioner sent a letter[27] to GSIS
indicating his readiness to pay the balance he owed the latter,
provided that he would not pay the interest charges and that the
rental fees paid by Santos to the GSIS should be deducted from the
total amount. Thereafter, he paid the amount of PhP 17,230.78 to
GSIS under protest.[28]
On December 12, 1974, petitioner, through Enrique Andres, sent a

letter[29] to Santos demanding that she pay PhP 50,000.00 for
damages for her continued illegal occupation of the premises, and
asking her to immediately vacate them.[30]
On February 5, 1975, GSIS and petitioner executed a Deed of

Absolute Sale.[31] Leopoldo Echevarria signed in favor of petitioner
as his attorney-in-fact. However, petitioner asked GSIS to reform
said deed to conform to the stipulations in the Contract to Sell
because the deed contained onerous stipulations, but the latter
rejected the demand. The new conditions stated that:
1. Within a period of five (5) years from and after the issuance of a
Certificate of Title in favor of the VENDEE, the latter agrees and
obligates not to assign, sell, lease, sublease, or otherwise encumber
the above-described property or any portion thereof in favor of any
party except in case of hereditary succession or resale in favor of the
VENDOR. In case of breach thereof, the VENDEE obligates to pay
liquidated damages in the amount of 5,000.00 or to resell the
38

property in favor of the VENDOR at the original price [at] which it

was sold to the VENDEE, less the amount of 5,000.00 by way of
liquidated damages, at the option of the VENDOR.
xxxx
6. The VENDEE agrees to finally and unconditionally abide by the

interpretation or construction of the VENDOR of any term, condition,
or stipulation contained in this deed including its implementation.
Should the VENDEE violate this provision or any provision contained
in this Deed, VENDEE agrees, warrants and obligates to pay
liquidated damages in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND (5,000.00)
PESOS.[32]
On August 25, 1975, petitioner filed a Complaint[33] before the

Manila RTC for specific performance to compel GSIS to execute a
new Deed of Absolute Sale without any onerous conditions as
petitioner alleged, to place him in peaceful possession of the
premises, to refund to him the interest charges he paid to GSIS, to
pay him the rentals paid by Fe Santos to GSIS, and for GSIS and
Spouses Rustico and Fe Santos to pay damages and attorneys fees.
On July 29, 1988, the trial court rendered its Decision in favor of
petitioner, as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby

rendered DECLARING
39

(1)
the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between the
GSIS and plaintiff Fernando A. Santiago dated February 5, 1975
valid and enforceable as of the date of execution, February 5, 1975;
and ORDERS the following:
(2)
The GSIS to refund to the plaintiff the interest it
collected from the plaintiff for the months of December 6, 1973 to
September 1974;
(3)
The GSIS to deliver to the plaintiff all rentals it has
received and paid by the defendants Rustico and Fe Santos;
(4)
The defendants Rustico Santos and Fe Santos to
immediately vacate the premises, Lot No. 15, Block No. 2 with an
area of four hundred ninety four (494) square meters, together with
the building and improvements thereon and deliver the possession to
the plaintiff;
(5)
The defendants Rustico Santos and Fe Santos to pay the
plaintiff the rentals for occupying the house and lot from November
1973 to and until they have vacated the premises, at the prevailing
rate in the vicinity;
(6)
Defendants Rustico Santos and Fe Santos to pay the
plaintiff the amount of P200,000.00 as moral damages and
P200,000.00 as exemplary damages and P50,000.00 as attorneys
fees;
40

(7)
All improvements introduced by the defendants Rustico
Santos and Fe Santos as builders in bad faith, to be forfeited in favor
of the plaintiff; and
(8)
Defendants Rustico Santos and Fe Santos to pay [the]
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[34]
Unconvinced of the Decision, both petitioner Santiago and

respondents Santos spouses appealed to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No.
32374.
On June 25, 1996, the CA rendered its assailed Decision[35]

affirming the July 29, 1988 Decision of the Manila RTC, but deleted
the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
The CA upheld the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by

and between GSIS and petitioner on February 5, 1975, and ruled
that the latter remains the absolute owner of the disputed property
at Leonila Hills, Baguio City.
With respect to Fe Santos application to buy the disputed property,

the appellate court observed that said application was received by
GSIS on November 12, 1973, when the Contract to Sell was already
deemed automatically cancelled and of no force and effect pursuant
to paragraph eight (8) of the contract; hence, GSIS acted in good
faith. Likewise, it had no participation in placing Santos in
41

possession of the disputed property, since it was Dr. dela Rosa who
authorized her to occupy the house and lot. More importantly, the
Santos application was denied by GSIS in 1974; thus, there was no
perfected contract of sale between her and the GSIS, and she had no
preferential or legal right over the property. Lastly, the CA held that
spouses Santos should pay petitioner the fair rental value or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the disputed
property from November 1973 up to the time they vacate said
property.
The CA however considered the award of moral or temperate,

exemplary damages, and attorneys fee unwarranted because the trial
court failed to state any factual basis for the award.
After petitioners plea for reconsideration was rejected in the

December 10, 1996 CA Resolution,[36] he interposed the instant
petition raising the following issues, viz:
THE COURT OF APPEALS RULING THAT RESPONDENT GSIS HAD

ACTED IN GOOD FAITH IS CONTRARY TO THE DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE AND THE ESTABLISHED FACTS ON RECORD.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS RULING THAT RESPONDENT SANTOS

POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IS IN THE CONCEPT OF A
LESSEE IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND THIS HONORABLE
COURTS AFFIRMATION OF THE FINDING OF THE COURT A QUO.
42

III
THE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSAL OF THE AWARD OF MORAL

AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE
RULINGS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.[37]
The Courts Ruling
Unfortunately, the petition has to fail.
Factual Matters Subject of Issues I and II Barred

The aforequoted grounds in petitioners issues I and II raise factual
issues which are precluded in this petition under the factual issue
bar rule under Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides that the petition shall raise only questions
of law.
Under the first ground, petitioner claims GSIS acted in bad faith as
shown by documentary evidence and the facts extant on the record.
The query whether GSIS acted in bad faith is a question of fact as it
will necessitate the examination of the probative value of the
evidence adduced before the Manila RTC. The Court is not
predisposed to render a review of such evidence as it is not a trier of
facts.
43

Even if we entertain the issue on whether GSIS acted in good faith in

its dealings with petitioner, we agree with the CA that the GSIS acted
aboveboard with regard to petitioners contract. We uphold the ruling
of the CA, thus:
We agree with the trial court that appellee GSIS acted in good faith
in its transaction with the appellants regarding the properties in
question.
Good faith is defined as an honest intention to abstain from taking

unconscientious advantage of another (Guzman Bocalinga v.
Bonnevie, 206 SCRA 668). On the other hand, bad faith is a state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive
of self-interest or ill-will or for ulterior purpose (Air France v.
Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155).
The undeniable fact is that appellant Santiago was in arrears for 71

monthly amortizations as of September 1973. Under the provision of
the Contract to Sell (Exhibit A) x x x, said contract was automatically
cancelled on account of the long delay of appellant Santiago in
settling those 71 amortizations. Appellant Santos filed her
application to buy said properties on November 12, 1973 at the time
when the Contract to Sell was already deemed cancelled. Additionally,
appellee GSIS had nothing to do with placing appellant Santos in
possession of the properties in question. It was a certain Dr. Jose
dela Rosa who put appellant Santos in possession of said properties
as confirmed in his letter (Exhibit 17) dated November 10, 1973.
Under these fully established facts, there is no way to label appellee
GSIS as having acted in bad faith.[38]
44

Under paragraph eight (8) of the Contract to Sell, GSIS had every
right to cancel petitioners contract for he was delinquent for five (5)
years and eleven (11) months, and still, respondent GSIS was even
generous enough to reinstate petitioners contract. GSIS act of
restoring petitioners contract is eloquent proof of its fairness to its
members like petitioner and the absence of bad faith on its part.
Moreover, GSIS entertained Santos application to purchase the

subject property only after petitioner Santiago committed the breach
of the latters contractual obligation to pay 71 monthly amortizations.
Under the Contract to Sell, GSIS had the discretion to consider the
contract automatically revoked even after a delinquency of only one
monthly installment under paragraph eight (8) of the contract, but it
did not. In this situation, GSIS had been more than liberal and
accommodating to petitioner.
In addition, GSIS neither assisted nor placed Fe Santos in

possession of the subject property. As a matter of fact, it was
petitioner who indirectly authorized Santos to take possession of his
lot by allowing Dr. Jose De la Rosa, through Mrs. Salonga, to
manage the property by permitting Santos to use the lot as
lessee.[39] This is the only plausible explanation for Santos
possession of the lot as there was no allegation that she committed
acts of forcible entry on the lot. Thus, the act of petitioner in leasing
the property through Dr. De la Rosa is a violation of paragraph 17 of
the Contract to Sell, which prohibits him from selling or
encumbering the property without GSIS consent.
Furthermore, Ortega and Echevarria, authorized representatives of

petitioner, notified the Manager of the GSIS Acquired Assets
Departments, through a December 12, 1973 letter,[40] that Fe
Santos be allowed to be a sub-tenant by Dr. Jose De la Rosa, who, in
turn, previously informed GSIS that he had purchased the subject
property awarded to petitioner.
45

GSIS was cautious in its dealings with Santos so as not to prejudice

petitioner. It apprised Santos that her application to purchase was
conditioned upon the approval of the GSIS Board of Trustees
inclusive of its other terms and conditions. Eventually, her
application was disapproved in 1974 after GSIS granted petitioners
request to reconsider its cancellation of his award.
It is hard to believe that GSIS acted in bad faith by colluding with

Santos in depriving petitioner Santiago of the disputed lot. As a
whole, we do not find the acts of GSIS dishonest or malicious to take
an unconscionable advantage of petitioner.
Similarly, the second ground to support the instant petition likewise

pertains to a factual issuewhether the possession of respondents
spouses Rustico and Fe Santos is in the nature of a lessee based on
the evidence. Again, petitioner would like the Court to evaluate and
calibrate the evidence anewa task already accomplished by the
Manila RTC and later by the CA. We deny petitioners request for it is
not the Courts duty to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the CA are final and conclusive and
cannot be reviewed on appeal by this Court.[41] More so, as in this
case, when the findings of fact of the trial court were affirmed by the
CA, the Court perforce must confirm and approve said findings.
While every rule has its exceptions, petitioner has not satisfactorily
shown that his appeal can lead to a departure from the
aforementioned rule.
Even if we consider the second issue as proper under Rule 45, still,
the Court agrees with the CA that respondent Santos be treated as
petitioners lessee. This conclusion stems from the admission of
46

petitioner himself in his RTC Complaint in Civil Case No. R-81-616,

where he alleged:
3. The [respondent] GSIS to refund the amount of interest charges

paid by the herein plaintiff to the [respondent] GSIS for the period
covering December 11, 1973 to September 30, 1974 and to deliver to
the plaintiff the amount of monthly rentals collected by the
[respondent] GSIS from the [respondent] Fe Santos;[42]
Secondly, the December 12, 1973 letter of Ortega and

Echevarria,[43] petitioners authorized representatives, reveals
without equivocation that respondent Fe Santos was allowed to be a
sub-tenant of Dr. Jose Dela Rosa. Mr. Dela Rosa previously wrote to
GSIS on October 29, 1973 that he had purchased the lot from
petitioner. Thus, an implied lease was entered into between Santos
and petitioner in view of the cancellation of Santos GSIS application
and her prolonged stay in said property.
Deletion of damages sanctioned

Anent the third issue, the Court rules that no reversible error was
committed by the CA in recalling the award of moral and exemplary
damages in petitioners favor.
In awarding damages, it is settled principle that the trial court

should state the factual bases of the award of these damages and
attorneys fees.[44] A simple perusal of the July 29, 1988 Decision of
the Manila RTC easily reveals the absence of any basis for the award
of PhP 200,000.00 as moral damages and PhP 200,000.00 as
exemplary damages in petitioners favor. Such being the case, the CA
is correct in disregarding said damages.
47

It is also a firm rule that while no proof of pecuniary loss is

necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount
of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is,
nevertheless, essential that the claimant satisfactorily prove the
existence of the factual basis of the damage and its causal relation to
defendants acts.[45]
As previously discussed, the Court has adopted the findings of fact of

the CA, more particularly, its finding that spouses Santos are
occupying the disputed lot as lessees. We agree with the CA that
petitioner can recover only the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the disputed property.
The fact that the trial court awarded petitioner the rentals from
respondents Santos spouses for the use of the house and lot from
November 1973 until the latter vacates the premises necessarily
precludes an additional award of damages. Hence, petitioner has not
demonstrated ample justification for the reinstatement of moral
damages.
In addition, Article 2234 of the Civil Code bars the award of

exemplary damages since respondent spouses were not held liable
for moral damages.
From the foregoing considerations, petitioner has not shown that the
CA deviated from applicable laws and pertinent Supreme Court
rulings and hence, the Court rules that the CA has not committed
any reversible error in its June 25, 1996 Decision and December 10,
1996 Resolution.
48

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit and AFFIRM

the assailed CA Decision and Resolution, with no costs.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
49

ATTESTATION
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION

50

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Records, pp. 599-604.

[2] Id. at 606.
[3] Contract of Lease, id. at 715; Memorandum in Support of Judge
Santiagos Request to Set Aside Notice of Cancellation, id. at 611-617,
612.
[4] Id. at 690.
[5] Id. at 621.
[6] Id. at 691.
[7] Id. at 512.
[8] Id. at 592.
[9] Id. at 692.
[10] Id. at 495.
[11] Id. at 497.
[12] Id. at 693.
[13] Id. at 10 & 498.
[14] Id. at 503.
[15] Id. at 499.
[16] Id. at 503.
[17] Id. at 550-555.
[18] Id. at 382A-388.
[19] Id. at 512.
[20] Id. at 593.
51

[21] Id. at 607-609.

[22] Id. at 510-513.
[23] Id. at 509.
[24] Id. at 622-623.
[25] Id. at 595.
[26] Id. at 598.
[27] Id. at 505-506.
[28] Id. at 516-517.
[29] Id. at 713.
[30] Id. at 716.
[31] Id. at 522-527.
[32] Id. at 523-525.
[33] Id. at 7-22.
[34] CA rollo, pp. 146-147.
[35] Rollo, pp. 41-49. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice
Hilarion L. Aquino, and concurred in by Associate Justices Jainal D.
Rasul and Conchita Carpio Morales (now a member of this Court).
[36] Id. at 51.
[37] Id. at 25-26.
[38] Id. at 47.
[39] Records, pp. 612 & 621.
[40] Id. at 620.
[41] Lanuza v. Muoz, G.R. No. 147372, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 562,
571-572.
[43] Supra note 40.
52

[44] See Saguid v. Security Finance, Inc., G.R. No. 159467,

December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA 256, 275 and Del Rosario v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 118325, January 29, 1997, 267 SCRA 158, 175.
[45] Raagas v. Traya, G.R. No. L-20081, February 27, 1968, 22 SCRA
839, 843.
53

3. Dalida vs. Naguit, 526 SCRA 172, June 29, 2007

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 170083
June 29, 2007
HERNAN C. DALIDA, petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES ELISEO NAGUIT and ALICIA NAGUIT, respondentS.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 assails the

August 10, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 88248, which set aside the May 19, 2004 Order of the Quezon
City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 90, denying respondents
Urgent Motion to Recall/Quash writ of execution over a compromise
agreement; and the November 9, 2004 Order rejecting respondents
Motion for Reconsideration on the earlier Order. The Orders were
issued in connection with Civil Case No. Q-03-048 which resulted in
a judicially approved compromise agreement and the issuance of a
writ of execution.
On April 23, 2003, plaintiffs Astra Builders Enterprises Corporation

(Astra), acting through its minority stockholder, petitioner Hernan C.
Dalida, and Hernan C. Dalida, also on his behalf, instituted Civil
Case No. Q-03-048 for Derivative Suit, for Accounting and/or
54

Receivership, with TRO/Injunction against respondents, Equitable

PCI Bank, and three of Astras clients, Leighton Contractors Asia
Limited, Nation Petroleum, and Sumicon Philippines Corporation.
The suit was anchored on respondent Eliseo Naguits unauthorized
withdrawal of PhP 38,280,703 in corporate funds while he was
president of Astra. Respondent Eliseo Naguit and Equitable PCI
Bank were impleaded to account for the withdrawal. It was likewise
alleged that there was a great danger that the assets of Astra may be
lost unless a receiver is appointed. The TRO/Injunction was based
on the compelling need to direct Astras clients to stop any payment
in favor of Astra through respondent Eliseo Naguit.
On June 9, 2003, the parties filed a Compromise Agreement with

Joint Motion to Approve Compromise subject to the terms and
conditions stated in it. The agreement, among others, asked for the
dismissal of Civil Case No. Q-03-048 and pending criminal
complaints against respondent Eliseo Naguit. It further provided that
petitioner was to transfer upon full payment his twenty-eight (28)
shares in Astra. Respondent Eliseo Naguit and Astra, in turn, were to
hold themselves jointly and severally liable to pay petitioner a total
sum of seven million pesos (PhP 7,000,000) in four (4) installments
as payment for the shares. It was approved by the Quezon City RTC
in its June 23, 2003 Order. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered approving the

Compromise Agreement quoted above, and making it as the basis of
the decision of this Court in this case. The parties are enjoined to
strictly comply with the terms and conditions thereof.
SO ORDERED.2
On December 12, 2003, the trial court granted petitioners Motion for
Execution. Respondents subsequently filed the aforesaid motions: an
55

Urgent Motion to Recall/Quash Writ of Execution which was denied

by the May 19, 2004 Order, and a Motion for Reconsideration later
filed by respondents which was likewise denied by the November 9,
2004 Order. These motions alleged that Astra did not yet have funds
and could not pay petitioner.
Respondents elevated the matter to the CA by way of a Petition for

Certiorari under Rule 65. In ruling for respondents, the CA stated
that "a writ of execution may be refused on equitable grounds."3 It
sustained the assertion of respondents that supervening events and
occurrences after the approval of the compromise agreement made it
impossible for respondents to comply with the obligation to pay PhP
7 million.4 Astras loss of revenues, as a result of the termination by
Nation Petroleum of its contract with Astra, was upheld as a
supervening event preventing full compliance with the agreement.
Premised on such justification, the CA on August 10, 2005 issued

the assailed judgment5 annulling the challenged May 19 and
November 9, 2004 Orders.
On November 2, 2005, petitioner instituted the present petition for

review raising the issue of the impropriety of the stay of the
execution. Petitioner contends that only for the most compelling
reasons may the execution of a judgment based on a compromise
agreement be stayed. These reasons, petitioner concludes, are
lacking in the instant case.
We find merit in the petition.
As held in a number of cases, the court may stay immediate

execution of a judgment where supervening events bring about a
material change in the situation of the parties which makes the
56

execution inequitable, or where there is no compelling urgency for

the execution because it is not justified by the prevailing
circumstances.6
However, the reason put forward by respondents is insufficient to

merit a stay of execution. Nowhere in the compromise agreement is it
stated that the obligation to pay is conditioned upon Astras receipt
of the payment due from its projects with other companies.
Respondent Eliseo Naguit cannot renege on his obligation under the
agreement by claiming an inability to pay. It would be an anathema
to the orderly administration of justice if such an easy excuse is
entertained to abrogate a final decision based on a compromise
agreement. Neither is there any supervening event which materially
and substantially altered the situation of the parties such that
execution would be unjust and inequitable. The compromise
agreement has the force of law between the parties unless it is void,
there is a vice of consent, or there is forgery, or if the terms are so
palpably unconscionable,7 none of which applies in this case.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE and SET

ASIDE the August 10, 2005 CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 88248.
The questioned May 19, 2004 and November 9, 2004 Orders of the
Quezon City RTC, Branch 90 in Civil Case No. Q-03-048 are
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
57

(On Official Leave)

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING *
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
58


Division Acting Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* On official leave.
1 Rollo, pp. 3-12.
2 Id. at 120.
3 Id. at 22; citing San Antonio v. Court of Appeals, 423 Phil. 8 (2001).
4 Id. at 20.
5 Id. at 23.
6 See Laurel v. Abalos, 140 Phil. 532 (1969); and Hualam

Construction and Devt Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85466,
October 16, 1992, 214 SCRA 612, 627.
59

7 De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151298, November 17,

2004, 442 SCRA 492, 504.
60


2007
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 154654
September 14, 2007
JOSEPHINE A. TAGUINOD and VIC A. AGUILA, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONINO SAMANIEGO, JOSE DELA CRUZ,
JOHN SAMANIEGO, ERNESTO SANTOS, MACARIO DELA CRUZ,
ANDRES PASTORIN, BENETRITO DELA CRUZ, JESUS BATAC, and
RODOLFO LAGUISMA, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Were the petitioners able to prove that their lots were previously
covered by homestead patents and thus outside the ambit of
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 271 known as the Tenants
Emancipation Decree? This is the core issue in this instant petition2
under Rule 45 assailing the August 31, 2001 Decision3 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 36812, which reversed and set
aside the January 1, 1995 Decision4 of the Office of the President
(OP) in O.P. Case No. 5113, granting the retention of not more than
seven (7) hectares in favor of petitioners. Likewise challenged is the
61

August 7, 2002 CA Resolution5 rejecting petitioners Motion for

Reconsideration.
The Facts
On October 21, 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos

promulgated PD 27 for the emancipation of tenant-farmers from
private agricultural lands they till that are primarily devoted to rice
and corn. Pursuant to PD 27, the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) launched Operation Land Transfer (OLT) on January 2, 1973
to implement and enforce the laws provisos of transferring
ownership to qualified tenant-farmers or farmer-beneficiaries of the
rice or corn land they are cultivating under a system of sharecrop or
lease-tenancy, with the landowner having retention of not more than
seven (7) hectares of agricultural land. In accordance with the OLT
and to prevent its circumvention, Memorandum Circular (MC) Nos. 2
and 2-A, series of 1973, and MC No. 8, series of 1974, were issued
by the DAR.
When OLT was launched, Salud Alvarez Aguila was the registered
owner of the disputed lots with Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
Nos. T-12368 and T-65348,6 with an aggregate area of 10.4496
hectares, being 7.8262 hectares and 2.6234 hectares, respectively,
both under the Registry of Deeds of Isabela, Cagayan. TCT No. T12368 emanated from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. I-3423
which was issued on January 11, 1936 based on a homestead patent
issued on December 18, 1935. On the other hand, TCT No. T-65348
was derived from TCT No. T-36200-A which cancelled OCT No. I2965. OCT No. I-2965 was issued on May 27, 1935 on the basis of a
homestead patent issued on June 27, 1935.
Subsequently, the 7.8262-hectare lot covered by TCT No. T-12368

was transferred to and registered in the name of petitioner Vic A.
62

Aguila (who was then 14 years old) under TCT No. T-908727 dated
January 19, 1976; while the other 2.6234-hectare lot under TCT No.
T-65348 was transferred to petitioner Josephine A. Taguinod.
Both disputed lots were placed under the coverage of the OLT
pursuant to PD 27, with the following tenants or farmer-beneficiaries,
to wit:
TCT No. T-90872
Lot No.
Area
1. Jose dela Cruz
1.0055 has.
2. Ernesto Santos
0.9353 ha.
63

3. Antonino Samaniego
0.8561 ha.
4. John Samaniego
0.6030 ha.
5. Macario dela Cruz
0.4702 ha.
6. Macario dela Cruz
0.9395 ha.
7. Andres Pastorin
64

0.7430 ha.
8. Ernesto Santos
0.7656 ha.
9. [Benetrito] dela Cruz
0.5806 ha.
10. Jose dela Cruz
10
0.4939 ha.
TCT No. T-65348
65

1. Rodolfo Laguisma
1.2705 has.
2. Jesus Batac
1.2288 has.8
On January 26, 1976, or shortly after the transfer of the subject lot
covered by TCT No. 90872 to petitioner Vic A. Aguila, Salud Aguila,
on behalf of then minor petitioner Aguila, filed a notarized
application for retention.9 Much later, on October 24, 1984, when he
was already of age, petitioner Aguila filed a letter-protest10 for
exclusion or exemption from the OLT of his landholding covered by
TCT No. T-90872. Similarly, after acquiring the subject lot covered by
TCT No. T-65384, petitioner Taguinod filed her June 24, 1988 letterprotest with the Team Leader of the DAR, Santiago, Isabela, seeking
exclusion or exemption from the OLT of her landholding.
Meanwhile, the two subject lots were surveyed and a subdivision

plan of the lots parceled to the farmer-beneficiaries was prepared
and approved on July 11, 1987, with respondents-farmerbeneficiaries executing their respective "undertakings" to remit
amortizations of their respective lots to the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP).
66

On June 23, 1989, the DAR Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer

(MARO) of San Fermin, Cauayan, Isabela sent a letter11 to the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO), recommending approval
of the applications of Salud A. Aguila/Vic A. Aguila and Josephine A.
Taguinod for retention of rights over the two subject lots.
The Ruling of the DAR PARO Officer in

In Re: OLT Protest Under P.D. No. 27, Vic Alvarez Aguila, Petitioner
On August 3, 1990, taking into consideration the MAROs

recommendation, the PARO issued a Resolution granting the
application for retention of petitioners. The decretal portion reads:
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that an Order

be issued:
1. Granting the petition/application for retention under P.D. 27 of

not more than seven (7) hectares.
2. Cancelling the CLTs/EPs generated if any, in favor of FarmerBeneficiary/ies concerned within the retention area.
3. Plac[ing] under OLT coverage the excess of seven (7) hectares.
4. Directing the MARO, Santiago, Isabela to cause the preparation

and execution of Agricultural Leasehold Contracts between the
petitioners and the tenant-tillers affected within the retention
area.12
67

From the above PARO Resolution, respondents-farmer-beneficiaries

filed an Opposition to and Counter-Protest over Resolution dated
August 3, 1990 of the PARO13 and a Motion for Reconsideration to
Set Aside Resolution dated August 3, 1990.14
The Ruling of the DAR Regional Director

in ADM. Case No. 02-24-90 Isa.
On August 21, 1991, the Regional Director of the DAR, Cagayan

Valley Region 02, Tuguegarao, Cagayan issued an Order, which in
effect affirmed the August 3, 1990 PARO Resolution with some
modifications, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, ORDER is hereby issued:
1. Granting the petition/application for retention under PD 27 of not

more than seven (7) hectares;
2. Placing under OLT coverage the excess area of seven hectares;
3. Directing the MARO concerned to cause the preparation and

execution of agricultural Leasehold Contracts between petitioners
and tenant-tillers affected within the retention area;
4. Authorizing the petitioners to withdraw in their favor the lease

rentals deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines by the
tenants, if any;
68

5. Directing the tenants outside the retention area to pay the LBP the
value of the land.15
The Regional Director held that the transfer of the subject lots by
landowner Salud Aguila to petitioners on January 19, 1976 was a
violation of MC Nos. 2, 2-A, and 8, and therefore null and void and of
no effect; thus, ownership of the subject lots should revert to Salud
Aguila. Nonetheless, since landowner Salud Aguila filed her
petition/application for retention on January 26, 1976 in accordance
with Administrative Order (AO) No. 4, Subsection B, paragraph 2,
which provided that landowners should file their application for
retention before August 27, 1985, the deadline set by AO No. 1,
Series of 1985, she may retain not more than seven (7) hectares of
her landholdings covered by PD 27, regardless of whether or not she
complied with Letters of Instruction (LOI) Nos. 41, 45 and 52.
From this adverse ruling, private respondents filed their motion for
reconsideration denominated as Motion to Set Aside Order dated
August 21, 1991 with the DAR Regional Director,16 where they
contended, inter alia, that landowner Salud Aguila was not entitled
to a seven (7)-hectare retention over the subject lots, as she was the
owner of several other landholdings, specifically 11 parcels of land,
at the time the subject lots were placed under the coverage of the
OLT program pursuant to PD 27. Private respondents submitted to
the DAR a Certification from the Municipal Assessor of Santiago,
Isabela, regarding Salud Aguilas ownership of a total of 13
landholdings, including the subject lots covered by TCT Nos. T90872 and T-65348, with the corresponding copies of Tax
Declarations covering the properties.
Petitioner Taguinod likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 of

the August 21, 1991 Order, asserting that Salud Aguila was not the
69

real owner of TCT No. T-65348, as such was inherited by Taguinod

from her biological mother, Patrocinia Alvarez, and was only
mortgaged in 1971 to her adoptive mother, Salud Aguila, for which
she executed a deed of sale with a right to repurchase. Petitioner
Taguinod further contended that she had already redeemed said
property which was allegedly rightly hers.
In addition, petitioner Taguinod filed her September 16, 1991 appeal

from the August 21, 1991 Order of the Regional Director with the
DAR Secretary.
The Ruling of the DAR Secretary in ADM Case No. 02-24-90 Isa.
On September 28, 1992, the DAR Secretary issued an Order18

affirming the August 21, 1991 Order of the Regional Director and
denying petitioner Taguinods appeal, with the modification that
respondent Antonino Samaniego was disqualified as a farmerbeneficiary on the ground that he was the landowner of nine (9)
agricultural properties even larger than the aggregate area of the
subject lots. The decretal portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Order is hereby issued affirming

in toto the Order dated August 21, 1991 of the Regional Director of
DAR Region II and in addition thereto disqualifying Antonio
Samaniego as tenant-beneficiary of his tillage.19
From the above order, private respondents filed a Motion for

Reconsideration, pointing out that Antonio Samaniego was not the
farmer-beneficiary but his son, Antonino Samaniego, who was the
tenant-tiller of a portion of the subject lot under TCT No. T-90872.
Moreover, private respondents asserted that contrary to the findings
of the Regional Director and the DAR Secretary, they had presented
70

proof that landowner Salud Aguila was not entitled to retention for
she owned other properties aside from the subject lots.
Consequently, on January 6, 1993, the DAR Secretary issued an

Order20 granting private respondents Motion for Reconsideration,
the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, x x x the Order dated September 28, 1992 of this

Office is hereby set aside. The MARO having jurisdiction over the
subject property is hereby directed to execute the necessary
correction, placing Antonino Samaniego as the rightful farmerbeneficiary.21
The DAR Secretary found that Salud Aguila was disqualified to retain
seven (7) hectares of the subject lots as she owned several
landholdings other than the subject lots, and that Antonino
Samaniego was qualified as farmer-beneficiary as he is not Antonio
Samaniego but the son of the latter.
From the January 6, 1993 Order of the DAR Secretary, petitioners

interposed their Appeal22 before the OP, docketed as O.P. Case No.
5113 (ADM Case No. 02-24-90).
The Ruling of the Office of the President

in O.P. Case No. 5113 (ADM Case No. 02-24-90)
The OP saw it differently.
71

On January 1, 1995, the OP, through the Executive Secretary,

rendered a Decision reversing the January 6, 1993 Order of the DAR
Secretary and reinstating the latters September 28, 1992 Order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order, dated January 6,

1993, of the Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby SET ASIDE.
The earlier order of that Department, dated September 28, 1992, is
hereby CONFIRMED and REINSTATED with a modification that
subject landholdings are not covered by the OLT program of the
government pursuant to P.D. No. 27. 23
The OP primarily anchored its ruling on the fact that the subject lots
were issued OCTs pursuant to homestead patents, specifically TCT
No. T-90872 which was derived from OCT No. I-2423, and TCT No. T65348 which was derived from OCT No. I-2965. Giving credence to
petitioner Taguinods contention that she and petitioner Aguila are
the direct heirs of the original patentees or homesteaders of the
subject lots, and pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the
Public Land Act, the OP held that the subject lots are exempt from
the coverage of PD 27, citing Alita v. Court of Appeals.24
Private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration25 of the above

Decision, but this was denied through a Resolution26 issued on
February 24, 1995.
Aggrieved, private respondents assailed the above Decision and

Resolution of the OP before the CA through a Petition for Review27
under Rule 43.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
72

On August 31, 2001, the CA rendered the assailed Decision

sustaining private respondents position and granted relief, thus:
[T]he Petition is granted. The Decision of the Office of the President,

Annex "C" of the Petition, and its Resolution, Annex "E" of the
Petition, are set aside and reversed. The Order of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, Annex "B" of the Petition, is AFFIRMED.28
In reversing the findings of fact and conclusions of law by the OP,

the CA however agreed with the OP that the rights of the
homesteader and his/her heirs to own and cultivate personally their
land acquired under the "homestead laws" are superior over those of
tenants invoking the "agrarian reform laws" as now embodied in
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6657;29 however, it found that
petitioners Taguinod and Aguila failed to discharge the burden of
adducing evidence to prove the identities of the original homestead
patentees and that they are the direct compulsory heirs of the
original patentees.
The CA ratiocinated that both petitioners never claimed before the

DAR and OP that Salud Aguila was the original homestead grantee of
OCT No. I-3423 issued on January 11, 1936. It pointed out that it
was only on August 13, 1959 or after 24 years from the issuance of
the homestead patent that OCT No. I-3423 was cancelled and TCT
No. T-12368 was issued in the name of Salud Aguila. But petitioner
Aguila never adduced evidence on how and under what
circumstances landowner Salud Aguila acquired the property, and
whether she was indeed a compulsory heir of the original homestead
patentee.
73

Likewise, the CA found that petitioner Taguinod never adduced

evidence to prove that the subject lot covered by TCT No. T-65348,
which she claimed she inherited from her biological mother, was
inherited from the original homestead patentee of whom she and her
biological mother are direct compulsory heirs. Moreover, the
appellate court pointed out that while it is true that the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Isabela was burned on December 4, 1976, still,
petitioner Taguinod could have easily secured a certified true copy of
the homestead patent from the Bureau of Lands or a certified true
copy of the Owners Duplicate of said title under the name of her
biological mother or the original patentee as owner of said property.
Petitioner Taguinod did not do so. Furthermore, the CA found that
the records belie petitioner Taguinods claims as TCT No. T-65348 in
the name of Salud Aguila did not show any encumbrance or lien. In
fact, the CA found that petitioner Taguinod never showed any
evidence that she indeed redeemed or repurchased the subject lot
from Salud Aguila.
In fine, the CA concluded that the only evidence on record was that
the subject lots were covered by homestead patents, but no shred of
evidence on record showed who the patentees were and that
petitioners are the direct compulsory heirs of the original patentees
in order to preclude the subject lots from the coverage of the OLT
program pursuant to PD 27.
Unconvinced, petitioners interposed a Motion for Reconsideration

and Manifestation to Terminate Services of Counsel of Record30 of
said Decision where they terminated and changed their counsel de
officio on the ground of lack of communication and concern over the
instant case, and in seeking reconsideration, they contended, inter
alia, that the homestead patentees of the subject lots were Salud
Aguila, their adoptive mother, and Patrocinia Alvarez, the biological
mother of petitioner Taguinod.
74

Finding no merit in petitioners plea for recall of the assailed Decision,

it was rejected through the assailed August 7, 2002 CA
Resolution.31
Thus, this petition is before us.
The Issues
Petitioners present the following issues for consideration:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals acted in gross violation of the well

entrenched jurisprudential principle that factual findings of quasijudicial bodies or tribunals are binding on the appellate court if
based on substantial evidence when it reversed and set aside the
decision of the Office of the President and when it affirmed the Order
of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform dated January 6, 1993 on
ground [sic] that petitioners allegedly failed to prove by substantial
evidence that: (1) the Homestead patentees are Salud Alvarez Aguila
(the adoptive [parent] of petitioners Vic Alvarez Aguila and Josephine
Taguinod) and Patrocinia Alvarez (the biological parent/mother of
Josephine Taguinod); and (2) that petitioners Vic Alvarez Aguila and
Josephine Taguinod are the direct compulsory heirs of the original
homestead patentees, namely Salud Alvarez Aguila and Patrocinia
Alvarez; and in so doing also acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals likewise failed to properly apply

and/or that it misinterpreted the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 27 and related laws when it held that the subject parcels of land
are not exempted nor excluded from the Operation Land Transfer
program of the government under the said laws.
75

C. That, in the alternative, if the subject parcels of land are covered

by Presidential Decree No. 27 and related laws, still the ownership of
the same cannot be transferred to the private respondents
considering that petitioners who are small landowners are entitled to
[the] retention of seven (7) hectares under Presidential Decree No.
27.32
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First and Second Issues:

Petitioners failed to adduce substantial evidence
As the two issues are closely related, we will tackle both of them
together.
Power of review by the Court of Appeals on factual issues
Petitioners contend that the CA gravely abused its discretion in the

exercise of its appellate jurisdiction by disregarding OPs findings of
fact which were anchored on substantial evidence.
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides the authority of

the CA to review resolutions and decisions of quasi-judicial bodies on
questions of fact. Thus, it is the appellate court which must
determine if substantial evidence is extant on record to support the
findings of fact of the quasi-judicial bodies. Such review is however
76

guided by the long-settled doctrine that factual findings of

administrative officials and agencies who have acquired expertise in
the performance of their official duties and the exercise of their
primary jurisdiction are generally accorded not only respect but at
times, even finality if such findings are supported by substantial
evidence.33
A close review of the DARs findings of fact, starting from the August
3, 1990 PARO Order, the August 21, 1991 Order of the DAR Region
02 Regional Director, and the September 28, 1992 and January 6,
1993 Orders of the DAR Secretary vis--vis the January 1, 1995
Decision of the OP, however reveals a glaring disparity in the findings
of fact. This is a clear exception to the rule that findings of fact of the
quasi-judicial body are generally maintained. In view of the
conspicuous divergence in the findings of fact, the CA is duty bound
to review and ascertain which of said findings are duly supported by
substantial evidence.
No substantial evidence to show ownership through homestead

patent
Settled in this jurisdiction is the rule that the rights of a holder of a

homestead patent are superior over the rights of the tenants
guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform Law, as enunciated in Alita:
We agree with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the

emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and
transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping
social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the
social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such contention
cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the
Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Thus,
77

"The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection
of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he
may build a modest house for himself and family and plant what is
necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of lifes other needs.
The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things necessary
for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a
right to live with a certain degree of comfort as x x x human beings,
and the State which looks after the welfare of the peoples happiness
is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right."
(Patricio v. Bayog, 112 SCRA 45)34
It is therefore incumbent upon petitioners to identify substantial

evidence on record to support the OPs finding that their lots are
excluded from the coverage of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program.
A comparison of the findings of fact of the OP and CA in relation to

the evidence extant on record leads the Court to conclude that the
findings of the OP are not propped up by substantial evidence.
The OP held that TCT No. T-90872 in the name of petitioner Aguila
was issued cancelling TCT No. T-12368 in the name of Salud Aguila,
which came from OCT No. I-3423, being a derivative of OCT No. I2423. Such finding was not borne out by the records.
OCT No. I-2423 was issued on December 18, 1935 based on a

homestead patent. If that was the original title over the 7.8262hectare lot, then why was there a need to have another title, OCT No.
I-3423, issued on January 11, 1936? Why was OCT No. I-3423 not
indicated in the most recent TCT No. T-90872?
78

If Salud Aguila was the original homestead patentee, as now alleged

by petitioners, why was there a need to cancel OCT No. I-2423
issued on December 18, 1935 and have TCT No. T-12368 issued on
August 13, 1959, also in her name? This is incongruous to say the
least. No explanation was given. We agree with the CA that OCT No.
I-2423 was cancelled when Salud Aguila acquired the subject
property on August 13, 1959 or 24 years after the issuance of the
OCT.
In fact, as aptly put by private respondents, petitioners never averred

before the DAR and OP that Salud Aguila was the original homestead
patentee of OCT No. I-2423 and that petitioner Aguila is a direct
compulsory heir of the homestead patentee to whom OCT No. I-2423
was issued. Without any substantial evidence that would show that
petitioner Aguila or Salud Aguila was entitled to the exemption
pursuant to the homestead laws, the lot now covered by TCT No. T90872 is indubitably under the coverage of the OLT of the
government pursuant to PD 27.
Anent the 2.6234-hectare lot covered by TCT No. T-65348, the OP

held that it was issued on March 1, 1973 in the name of Salud
Aguila pursuant to a deed of absolute sale between Salud Aguila and
petitioner Taguinod, cancelling TCT No. T-36200-A in the name of
petitioner Taguinod. TCT No. T-36200-A is allegedly the derivative of
OCT No. I-2965 issued on June 27, 1935 pursuant to a homestead
patent. This finding of fact by the OP, while based on the records,
does not support the conclusion that petitioner Taguinod is entitled
to protection by the homestead laws.
Verily, the records do not show who the original homestead patentee
was and whether petitioner Taguinod is a direct compulsory heir of
the homestead patentee. Petitioners contend that the original
patentee was one Patrocinia Alvarez, the biological mother of
petitioner Taguinod. This again was not borne out by the records.
79

While petitioners presented a Certification35 issued by the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources Lands
Management Bureau on April 19, 1993, purportedly attesting that
Lot No. 655 (lot covered by TCT No. T-65348 is a portion of Lot No.
655) was covered by Homestead Application No. 112012 and issued
a patent on June 3, 1935 in the name of Patrocinia Alvarez, still, it
will not afford relief to petitioner Taguinod as there were no other
available records of said pre-World War II patent application. Her
position is untenable for the following reasons:
First, she is not the owner on record of the subject lot covered by
TCT No. T-65348, which is in the name of landowner Salud Aguila.
Second, if indeed it was mortgaged to landowner Salud Aguila

through a pacto de retro contract of sale, the mortgage encumbrance
was not reflected in TCT No. T-65348.
Third, no deed of such alleged mortgage was presented.
Fourth, her alleged ownership pursuant to a pacto de retro sale is

belied by the evidence on record that the transfer of the subject lot to
Salud Aguila was through an absolute deed of sale as borne by the
certification in Tax Declaration No. 13081 under the name of Salud
Aguila. The certification in Tax Declaration No. 13081 attests, thus:
Transferred by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale of a portion of the

whole lot executed by Josephine A. Taguinod in favor of Salud A. de
Aguila and ratified before Emilio R. Gombao-Notary Public as per Do.
No. 18 Page No. 5, Book 8; Series of 1971.
80

SGD. ANTONIO L. MIRASOL

Deputy Assessor36
Fifth, and more importantly, the records are bereft of any showing
that petitioner Taguinod had indeed repurchased or redeemed
subject property from landowner Salud Aguila. It was only the bare
allegation of petitioners that subject lot had been reacquired or
redeemed by petitioner Taguinod. Thus, absent any evidence to the
contrary, the 2.6234-hectare lot covered by TCT No. T-65348 is still
owned by the owner of record, Salud Aguila.
Salud Aguila is the owner of the subject lots
From the foregoing reasons, it is clear that petitioners are not the
owners of the subject lots. As aptly found by the Regional Director in
his August 21, 1991 Order, later cited and affirmed by the DAR
Secretary in his January 6, 1993 Order, thus:
Although evidently, the transfer of subject landholding by the

landowner Salud Aguila to her children, petitioners herein, on
January 19, 1976 is a violation of Memorandum Circular Nos. 2, 2-A
and 8, Series of 1974 and therefore null and void and of no effect,
ownership therefore of subject lot reverts back to the landowner
Salud Aguila.37 (Emphasis supplied.)
Although the Regional Director erroneously held that Salud Aguila

was entitled to retention, the DAR Secretary corrected the judgment
and affirmed the above finding which is duly supported by evidence
on record.
81

Pursuant to PD 27, "[t]he Department of Agrarian Reform through its

Secretary is x x x empowered to promulgate rules and regulations for
the implementation of this Decree."
The DAR Secretary issued MC No. 2, series of 1973, dated June 18,
1973, and MC No. 2-A, dated June 19, 1973, which amended the
former, with the explicit proscription and prohibition, among others,
as follows:
h. Transfer of ownership after October 21, 1972, except to the actual

tenant-farmer tiller. If transferred to him, the cost should be that
prescribed by Presidential Decree No. 27.
Moreover, the DAR Secretary likewise issued MC No. 8, series of

1974, dated April 1, 1974, which repealed or modified MC Nos. 2 and
2-A, and other circulars or memoranda inconsistent with it,
pertinently providing that:
4. No act shall be done to undermine or subvert the intent and

provisions of Presidential Decrees, Letters of Instructions,
Memoranda and Directives, such as the following and/or similar
acts:
xxxx
f) Transferring ownership to tenanted rice and/or corn lands after

October 21, 1972, except to the actual tenant- farmers or tillers but
in strict conformity to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 27
and the requirements of the DAR.
82

Based on the above provisos, it is indubitable that the transfer by

Salud Aguila of the subject lot covered by TCT No. T-90872 (vice TCT
No. T-12368) was clearly in violation of the above cited Memoranda.
Consequently, the transfer is null and void, and the ownership
reverts to Salud Aguila.
On the other hand, the acquisition by Salud Aguila, through an

absolute sale of the subject lot covered by TCT No. T-36200-A for
which TCT No. T-65348 was subsequently issued on March 15, 1973
in her name, was made sometime in 1971, per certification in Tax
Declaration No. 13081. Consequently, landowner Salud Aguila was
the owner of the subject lot covered by TCT No. T-65348 when PD 27
was issued. Clearly then, from the foregoing facts, Salud Aguila was
the owner of record of the subject lot covered by TCT No. T-65348
when the OLT pursuant to PD 27 was implemented. And, as
discussed above, no substantial evidence was presented except
petitioner Taguinods bare allegations that she had redeemed or
repurchased the subject lot covered by TCT No. T-65348; therefore, it
is Salud Aguila who owns the subject lot covered by TCT No. T65348.
Further, even granting arguendo that the subject lot covered by TCT
No. T-65348 had been repurchased or redeemed by petitioner
Taguinod, such transfer is likewise null and void for being similarly
violative of DAR MC Nos. 2 and 2-A, series of 1973, and MC No. 8,
series of 1974.
Thus, the DAR Regional Director and DAR Secretary correctly ruled
that the alleged and apparent transfers of the subject lots to
petitioners were null and void for violation of the pertinent DAR MCs
in order to evade, undermine, and circumvent the intent of PD 27
and pertinent statutory and administrative issuances related to it.
83

Salud Aguila not entitled to retention rights over the subject lots
The next question to answer is whether landowner Salud Aguila is

entitled to retention under PD 27. The DAR Regional Director held so,
but this was reversed by the DAR Secretary.
The DAR Secretary took cognizance of the Certification presented by

private respondents from the Municipal Assessor of Santiago, Isabela
regarding Salud Aguilas ownership of a total of 13 landholdings,
including the subject lots covered by TCT Nos. T-90872 and T-65348,
with the corresponding copies of Tax Declarations covering said
properties. This fact was never contested by petitioners, and it
unquestionably shows that Salud Aguila cannot be granted retention
over the subject lots pursuant to LOI No. 474 dated October 21,
1976.
LOI No. 474 mandates the DAR Secretary to "undertake to place

under the Land Transfer Program of the Government pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27, all tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of
seven (7) hectares or less belonging to landowners who own other
agricultural lands of more than seven (7) hectares in aggregate areas
or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban
purposes from which they derive adequate income to support
themselves and their families."38 Considering her other eleven (11)
landholdings and the application of LOI No. 474, we agree with the
DAR Secretary and CAs holding that Salud Aguila is not entitled to
retention over the subject lots.
Moreover, considering the seemingly simulated transfers made by

Salud Aguila over the subject properties, we agree with the DAR
Secretary and CA that these were done to circumvent the intent and
application of PD 27 and the OLT of the Government. We cannot give
our imprimatur to said transfers in the light of the clear intent of the
84

law to emancipate the tenants from the bondage of the land they are
cultivating, giving desirable benefits to the tenant-farmers cultivating
their own land.
Premised on said grounds, the third issue on petitioners right to

retention over the subject lots is answered in the negative as they are
not the owners, and consequently are not small landowners who are
accorded the right of retention.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit, and AFFIRM

IN TOTO the August 31, 2001 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 36812.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing,Chairperson Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Tinga, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 "Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the

Soil, Transferring to them the Ownership of the Land They Till and
Providing the Instruments and Mechanism Therefor" (1972).
2 Rollo, pp. 10-28.
3 Id. at 30-50. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Romeo

J. Callejo, Sr. (Chairperson, a retired Member of this Court) and
85

concurred in by Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Perlita J.

Tria Tirona of the Former Thirteenth Division.
4 Id. at 101-107; per Executive Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
5 Id. at 52.
6 Id. at 54.
7 Id. at 53.
8 Supra note 3, at 31.
9 Rollo, p. 55.
10 Id. at 56.
11 Id. at 59-60.
12 Id. at 62.
13 Id. at 63-66.
14 Id. at 67-71.
86

15 Id. at 74.
16 Id. at 75-80.
17 Id. at 81-86.
18 Id. at 87-92.
19 Id. at 92.
20 Id. at 93-97.
21 Id. at 96.
22 Id. at 98-100.
24 G.R. No. 78517, February 27, 1989, 170 SCRA 709.
25 Rollo, pp. 108-111.
26 Id. at 112-113; per Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A.

Quisumbing (now a Member of this Court).
87

27 Rollo, pp. 114-124.
29 "An Act Instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program to

Promote Social Justice and Industrialization Providing the
Mechanism for its Implementation, and for Other Purposes" (1988).
30 Id. at 154-167.
31 Supra note 5.
32 Supra note 2, at 16-17; original in uppercase.
32 Eastern Overseas Employment Center, Inc. v. Bea, G.R. No.

143023, November 29, 2005, 476 SCRA 384, 389; Philsa
International Placement and Services Corp. v. Hon. Secretary of
Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 103144, April 4, 2001, 356 SCRA
174, 185.
35 Rollo, p. 171.
36 Id. at 58.
37 Id. at 95.
88

38 LOI No. 474, par. 1
89

5. People vs. Capwa, 541 SCRA 516, December 27, 2007
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174058
December 27, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
CARMELITO LAURENTE CAPWA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an automatic review of the May 10, 2006 Decision1 of the

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. HC No. 00141 entitled People
of the Philippines v. Carmelito Laurente Capwa, which affirmed the
May 21, 2001 Judgment2 of the Surigao City Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 32 in Criminal Case No. 5250. The RTC found
accused-appellant Carmelito Capwa guilty of incestuous rape and
imposed upon him the death penalty.
Accused-appellant, his wife, and six children lived in a small nipa

hut in Sitio Maibay, Barangay Sapa, Claver, Surigao del Norte. On
the evening of September 4, 1998, while everyone else was sleeping,
appellant entered his childrens room and came to where his eldest
daughter, AAA,3 was sleeping. He then started to touch the different
parts of AAAs body and placed himself on top of her. He removed
AAAs underwear, opened the zipper of his shorts, placed his penis
90

inside her vagina, and repeatedly made pumping motions. AAA could
not protest because accused-appellant was carrying a bladed weapon.
AAA was only 15 years old then.4
On September 11, 1998, AAA left their house and did not return
anymore. AAA went to her auntie BBBs house and told her that she
was raped by accused-appellant. BBB then accompanied AAA to the
Department of Social Welfare and Development Office in Claver,
Surigao del Norte.5
On September 29, 1998, AAA, assisted by a social worker, lodged a

complaint against appellant before the police.6 Thereafter, she was
medically examined at the CARAGA Regional Hospital. The medical
findings revealed the following: "[AAAs hymen] not intact but has no
fresh or sign of recent lacerations; slightly contused minor lips at 4
and 8 oclock positions."7
Consequently, an Information for attempted rape was filed.8 However,

before arraignment, the prosecution filed an Amended Information
for consummated qualified rape.9
Accused-appellants defense was denial. He claimed that AAA

accused him of raping her only because he scolded and threatened to
kill her for refusing to end her relationship with her boyfriend.10
On May 21, 2001, the RTC rendered a decision, the dispositive

portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused,

Carmelito Laurente Capwa, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a
principal of the crime of incestuous rape under Article 266-A,
91

paragraph 1 (a), of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 266B thereof, and taking into consideration the aggravating/qualifying
circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) of age and the
offender is her own father, hereby imposes upon him the mandatory
penalty of death by lethal injection; and to pay the costs.
The accused is ordered to pay to the victim x x x the following sums:

[PhP] 75,000.00 as civil indemnity; [PhP] 50,000.00 as moral;
damages; and [PhP] 25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.11
Due to the penalty imposed, the case was forwarded to this Court for
automatic review and was originally docketed as G.R. No. 149709.
However, in accordance with the ruling in People v. Mateo,12 this
Court, in its September 7, 2004 Resolution, transferred this case to
the CA for intermediate review.
On May 10, 2006, the CA affirmed the May 21, 2001 RTC Decision.
The appellate court observed that accused-appellant questioned the
amendment of the information for the first time during his appeal. In
dismissing accused-appellants arguments, the CA ruled that he
failed to seasonably raise his objection to the amendment. It held
that his silence at the time the amendment was made is deemed a
consent to such amendment.
Moreover, in affirming the guilt of accused-appellant, the CA gave

credence to the victims testimony. It disregarded the discrepancy
between the victims Sinumpaang Salaysay and testimony in court,
and emphasized that statements made in court are preferred over
affidavits made ex parte. Also, it found that the victims allegation of
rape was supported by the medical evidence.
92

On October 3, 2006, this Court required the parties to submit

supplemental briefs within 30 days. On November 13, 2006,
plaintiff-appellee manifested that it would no longer file a
supplemental brief. On the other hand, accused-appellant, to this
date, has not yet filed a supplemental brief. Thus, for failure to
comply with the October 3, 2006 Resolution, the Court deems as
waived the filing of accused-appellants supplemental brief and
considers this case submitted for resolution.
Accused-appellant, in his May 26, 2003 Brief,13 raised three issues

for the appellate courts consideration. These issues are now deemed
adopted in this present appeal:
The trial court erred in allowing the amendment of the information to

charge [accused-appellant] with consummated rape.
II
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the prosecution had
proven beyond reasonable doubt [aaccused-appellants] guilt for rape,
whether attempted or consummated.
III
93

The trial court gravely erred in imposing the death penalty on

[accused-appellant] considering the prosecutions failure to prove the
minority of the complainant.14
The appeal has no merit.
Accused-appellant questions the propriety of allowing the

amendment of the Information from attempted to consummated rape.
He claims that the complainants Sinumpaang Salaysay failed to
allege facts that justified the conclusion that the act allegedly
committed by accused-appellant was consummated rape; thus, the
trial judge gravely erred in accepting the Amended Information
because no probable cause was shown. Plaintiff-appellee, on the
other hand, claims that appellant is estopped from objecting to the
amendment of the Information. It avers that objections to the
amendment cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Accused-appellant is mistaken. He confused the determination of

probable cause to hold a person for trial with the determination of
probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. The duty to determine
the existence of probable cause in order to charge a person for
committing a crime rests on the public prosecutor. It is an executive
function, the correctness of the exercise of which is a matter that the
trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.15
On the other hand, the duty to determine whether probable cause
exists to issue a warrant of arrest rests on the judgea judicial
function to decide whether there is a necessity for placing the
accused under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends
of justice.16
Courts can not interfere with the discretion of the public prosecutor
in evaluating the offense charged.17 Thus, it cannot dismiss the
information on the ground that the evidence upon which the
94

information is based is inadequate. And unless it is shown that the

finding of probable cause was made with manifest error, grave abuse
of discretion, and prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, the
trial court should respect such determination.18
Moreover, as correctly held by the CA, accused-appellant could not

raise his objections in the Amended Information for the first time on
appeal. It is settled that objections to the amendment of an
information should be raised at the time the amendment is made;19
otherwise, defects not seasonably raised are deemed waived.20 In
this case, accused-appellant never questioned the amendment either
before or during trial. It is only when he appealed his conviction that
he raised his objection. Hence, appellants objections are already
deemed waived.
We now rule on the prosecutions sufficiency of evidence. To sustain

a conviction for rape, there must be proof of the penetration of the
female organ.21 In this case, the conviction of accused-appellant was
anchored mainly on the testimony of the minor victim, AAA.
Accused-appellant, however, questions AAAs credibility, alleging that
there was significant discrepancy between her Sinumpaang Salaysay,
where she said that she was harassed; and her testimony in court,
where she said that she was raped.
We affirm the credibility of AAA. It is a settled doctrine that the trial

courts finding of credibility is conclusive on the appellate court,
unless it is shown that certain facts of substance and value have
been plainly overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied.22 In this
case, accused-appellant has not shown that the RTC and CA findings
should be reversed. As correctly observed by the CA, the inaccuracy
in AAAs Sinumpaang Salaysay may be attributed to the inadequacy
of the investigators language, and not on her alleged lack of honesty.
Moreover, AAAs testimony in court clearly proved that accusedappellant had sexually abused her. It must be stressed that affidavits
95

taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in court, the affidavits

being invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate due to partial
suggestions or want of specific inquiries.23
As regards the imposition of the proper penalty, we find that the RTC
and the CA correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of
minority. Accused-appellant failed to controvert the proofs presented
establishing AAAs minority at the time of the rape. However, in view
of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346, "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines," the death penalty
is now reduced to reclusin perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
Moreover, we note that the trial court awarded PhP 50,000 as moral
damages. The award of moral damages is automatically granted
without need of further proof because it is assumed that a rape
victim has actually suffered moral damages entitling the victim to
such award.24 However, in keeping with prevailing jurisprudence,
the award of moral damages should be increased to PhP 75,000.25
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the May 10, 2006 Decision of the CA in

CA-G.R. CR. HC No. 00141 with MODIFICATIONS, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Carmelito Laurente

Capwa, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a principal of the crime of
incestuous rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a), of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to Article 266-B thereof, and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole;
and to pay the costs.
The accused is ordered to pay to the victim the following sums: PhP
75,000 as civil indemnity; PhP 75,000 as moral damages; and PhP
25,000 as exemplary damages.
96

SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
(On Leave)
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING*
Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
97

Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby

certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution were reached
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* On leave.
1 Rollo, pp. 4-36. Penned by Associate Justice Teresita Dy-Liaco

Flores and concurred in by Associate Justices Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr.
and Ramon R. Garcia.
2 CA rollo, pp. 38-45. Penned by Judge Diomedes M. Eviota.
98

3 Pursuant to RA 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence

Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," and its
implementing rules, the real name of the victim, together with the
names of her immediate family members, is withheld, and fictitious
initials instead are used to represent her, to protect her privacy.
4 Supra note 1, at 5-6.
5 Rollo, p. 7.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 9.
8 Id. at 10.
9 Id. at 11.
10 Id. at 18.
11 CA rollo, p. 21.
12 G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
13 CA rollo, pp. 99-127.
99

14 Id. at 106-107. Original in boldface.
15 People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999,

301 SCRA 475, 483.
16 Id. at 487; citing Ho v. People, 345 Phil. 597 (1997).
17 Santos v. Go, G.R. No. 156081, October 19, 2005, 473 SCRA 350,
362.
19 People v. Degamo, G.R. No. 121211, April 30, 2003, 402 SCRA
133, 142.
20 People v. Aparejado, G.R. No. 139447, July 23, 2002, 385 SCRA
76, 84.
21 People v. Pandapatan, G.R. No. 173050, April 13, 2007.
22 People v. Dimaano, G.R. No. 168168, September 14, 2005, 469

SCRA 647, 658.
23 People v. dela Cruz, G.R. No. 131035, February 28, 2003, 398
SCRA 415, 431; citing People v. Estorco, G.R. No. 111941, April 27,
2000, 331 SCRA 38, 51.
100

24 People v. Cayabyab, G.R. No. 167147, August 3, 2005, 465 SCRA

681, 693.
25 People v. Audine, G.R. No. 168649, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA

531.
101

6. Laynesa vs. Uy, 547 SCRA 200, February 29, 2008

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 149553
February 29, 2008
NICOLAS LAYNESA and SANTOS LAYNESA, petitioners,

vs.
PAQUITO and PACITA UY, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In 1938, Robert Morley was the owner of a four (4)-hectare parcel of

land in Barrio Tagbong, Pili, Camarines Sur. Petitioner Santos
Laynesa was his tenant over two and a half (2 ) hectares of the land.
In 1947, Morley sold the 4 has. to Sixto Cuba, Sr. He maintained
Santos as the tenant over the 2 -hectare portion while instituting
petitioner Nicolas Laynesa, son of Santos, as his tenant over the
remainder of the property. On May 20, 1974, Original Certificate of
Title No. 1660 on the property was issued to Cuba, Sr.1
On October 25, 1979, Cuba, Sr. died intestate, survived by his

children, Sixto Cuba, Jr., Carmelita Cuba Sunga, and Bienvenido
Cuba. Santos and Nicolas continued as tenants, and delivered the
owner's share of the produce to Cuba, Jr. and Bienvenido.2
102

On January 13, 1993, Cuba, Jr. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of

Unregistered Land, transferring the property to respondent Pacita Uy,
married to respondent Paquito Uy, in consideration of PhP 80,000.
Cuba, Jr. was named owner of the land. Notably, the Deed was not
registered with the Register of Deeds. Later, Cuba, Jr. executed a
Deed of Assignment or Transfer of Rights of the undelivered owner's
share of the produce in favor of Pacita.
On July 13, 1993, Pacita demanded that the Laynesas vacate the
land. She claimed that she had purchased the land. The Laynesas
asked for proof of Pacita's acquisition, but she could not produce any.
Subsequently, Pacita returned and again demanded that the

Laynesas vacate the property, this time exhibiting the Deed of
Absolute Sale of Unregistrered Land signed by Cuba, Jr.
Consequently, the Laynesas filed on October 13, 1993 a petition
against Pacita with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB), docketed as DARAB Case No. 730 for Legal
Redemption entitled Santos Laynesa, et al. v. Paquito Uy. The
Laynesas primarily sought that they be allowed to redeem the land
from Pacita.3
Thereafter, on November 25, 1993, Pacita filed a complaint docketed

as DARAB Case No. 745 entitled Pacita Uy v. Santos Laynesa, et al.
for Collection of Rentals and Ejectment against the Laynesas with
the DARAB.
Cuba, Jr. died intestate on December 23, 1993.4
On February 10, 1994, the Laynesas deposited PhP 80,000 in the

form of a Cashier's Check with the Clerk of Court of the DARAB by
way of consignation of the redemption price of the property.
103

Meanwhile, the heirs of Bienvenido filed a petition with the

Camarines Sur Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the judicial declaration
of presumptive death of their father who had been missing since
1984.5
Afterwards, on June 20, 1994, the heirs of Bienvenido, with Reynoso

and Carmelita Sunga, filed a Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. P1963 for Annulment of Sale of Real Estate against the spouses Uy
with the Camarines Sur RTC. They prayed that the court declare the
Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land executed by Cuba, Jr. in
favor of the spouses Uy as null and void, and the property returned
to Cuba, Sr.'s intestate estate. The DARAB dismissed the complaint
without prejudice to the two cases filed before it by the parties.6
Subsequently, the parties in Civil Case No. P-1963 amicably settled

their dispute. In a Compromise Agreement approved by the RTC, the
parties agreed to divide the property into two portions. Two hectares
of rice lands would be transferred to the spouses Uy, and the
remaining portion to Cuba, Sr.'s heirs. Thereafter, the Register of
Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 23276 over a
portion of the property with an area of 20,000 square meters in the
names of the spouses Uy.
Meanwhile, Pacita obtained a certification from the Municipal

Agricultural Office (MAO) that the property was not prime
agricultural property, and from the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office
(MARO) that TCT No. 23276 was not covered by Operation Land
Transfer (OLT) or by Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27. The
certifications were sought so the land could be reclassified as
industrial land.
104

On May 29, 1995, the Municipal Council of Tagbong, Pili, Camarines

Sur approved Resolution No. 67, which embodied Ordinance No. 28
and reclassified the land from agricultural to industrial.
On July 17, 1995, the Laynesas filed a Complaint dated July 13,
1995, docketed as DARAB Case No. V-RC-028 and entitled Nicolas
Laynesa, et al. v. Paquito Uy, et al. for Threatened Ejectment and
Redemption with a Prayer for the issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction with the DARAB. In the Complaint, the Laynesas sought
to redeem the property covered by TCT No. 23276 for PhP 40,000.
In their Answer dated August 15, 1995, the spouses Uy alleged that
the Laynesas had no cause of action against them, and even
assuming that the Laynesas had, the action was already barred by
estoppel and laches, the complaint was already moot and academic,
and the DARAB had no jurisdiction since the land had already been
reclassified as industrial land.
On January 12, 1996, DARAB Provincial Adjudicator Isabel E. Florin

issued a Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby

rendered
1. Granting the petition for redemption by the plaintiffs herein of the

two-hectare Riceland now titled in the name of Pacita E. Uy with TCT
No. T-23276, for Nicolas Laynesa, his .5 hectare tillage and for
Santos Laynesa, his 1.5 hectares tillage in the consolidated amount
of P60,000.00;
105

2. Ordering the conveyance of subject lots to herein plaintiffs as

above-stated;
3. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs temperate damages of

P15,000.00; exemplary damages of P20,000.00; Attorney's fees of
P12,000.00; and appearance fees of P2,400.00.
4. Declaring the injunction permanent, unless the appropriate Order

allowing conversion is thereby presented.
SO ORDERED.7
Thereafter, the spouses Uy filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In an

Order dated February 27, 1996,8 the DARAB affirmed the Decision
of the adjudicator, but with the modification to set aside the award of
damages.
The spouses Uy appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA ruled DARAB without jurisdiction
On May 16, 2001, the CA issued a Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 59454,

reversing the Decision of the DARAB. The dispositive portion of the
CA Decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the DARAB,

Annex "A" of the Petition and its Resolution, Annex "B" of the Petition
are set aside and reversed. The Complaint of the Respondents and
the counterclaims of the Petitioners are DISMISSED.
106

SO ORDERED.9
According to the CA, the evidence on record shows that when the
Laynesas filed their action with the DARAB, the property was no
longer agricultural but had been reclassified. Thus, the DARAB had
no jurisdiction.
Hence, we have this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
The Issues
[T]he Honorable Court of Appeals (Fourteenth Division), seriously

erred and/or committed grave error in:
A. Holding that at the time of the filing of the Complaint (V-RC-028CS-Branch 1) the land subject matter of the case ceases to be
agricultural by virtue of the reclassification made by Municipal
Ordinance No. 28 of Pili, Camarines Sur, so that the DARAB has no
jurisdiction over the dispute involving said land and that the
Decision of the DARAB is null and void.
B. Holding that the reclassification alone of an agricultural land by a

Municipal Ordinance from agricultural to any other uses without the
necessary conversion Order from the DAR is enough to divest the
DAR of jurisdiction to hear and determine any agrarian disputes
involving the land.10
107

The pivotal issue in this case is whether the reclassification of a lot

by a municipal ordinance, without the Department of Agrarian
Reform's (DAR's) approval, suffices to oust the jurisdiction of the
DARAB over a petition for legal redemption filed by the tenants.
There are strict requirements for the
valid reclassification of land by a local government unit
The resolution of this case is not that simple.
There is no question that petitioners-Laynesas are the tenants of the

previous owner of the land. As such, disputes pertaining to the land
tenancy were within the jurisdiction of the DAR. However,
respondents-spouses Uy posit that after the issuance of Municipal
Council Resolution No. 67, reclassifying the land on May 29, 1995,
the land ceased to be agricultural and is therefore beyond the
jurisdiction of the DARAB.
Previously, under Republic Act No. (RA) 3844, all agrarian disputes
fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian
Relations. Later, the jurisdiction over such disputes went to the
RTCs.11 When RA 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law, took effect on June 15, 1988, the adjudication
of agrarian reform disputes was placed under the jurisdiction of the
DAR, thus:
Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.-The DAR is hereby

vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
108

except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the

Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR).
xxxx
Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of

the DAR shall be immediately executory.
However, Section 56 of RA 6657 vested original and exclusive

jurisdiction over controversies involving the determination of just
compensation and prosecution of all criminal offenses arising from
violations of RA 6657 to RTCs designated as Special Agrarian Courts.
From the cited legal provisions, it cannot be disputed that the DAR,
through the DARAB, shall exercise quasi-judicial functions and has
exclusive original jurisdiction over all disputes involving the
enforcement and implementation of all agrarian reform laws.
Sec. 4 of RA 6657 tells us which lands are covered by the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, thus:
Section 4. Scope.-The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988

shall cover; regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other
lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. (Emphasis
supplied.)
109

However, in 1991, RA 7160 or the Local Government Code was

passed into law, granting local government units the power to
reclassify land. Being a later law, RA 7160 shall govern in case of
conflict between it and RA 6657, as to the issue of reclassification.
Title I, Chapter 2, Sec. 20 of RA 7160 states:
SEC. 20. Reclassification of Lands.--(a) A city or municipality may,

through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting
public hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of
agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization or
disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be
economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as
determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land
shall have substantially greater economic value for residential,
commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the
sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such reclassification shall be
limited to the following percentage of the total agricultural land area
at the time of the passage of the ordinance:
(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen

percent (15%);
(2) For component cities and first to third class municipalities, ten
percent (10%); and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%):

Provided, further, That agricultural lands distributed to agrarian
reform beneficiaries pursuant to [RA 6657], otherwise known as "The
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law", shall not be affected by the
said reclassification and the conversion of such lands into other
purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said Act.
110

(b) The President may, when public interest so requires and upon
recommendation of the National Economic and Development
Authority, authorize a city or municipality to reclassify lands in
excess of the limits set in the next preceding paragraph.
(c) The local government units shall, in conformity with existing laws,
continue to prepare their respective comprehensive land use plans
enacted through zoning ordinances which shall be the primary and
dominant bases for the future use of land resources: Provided, That
the requirements for food production, human settlements, and
industrial expansion shall be taken into consideration in the
preparation of such plans.
(d) Where approval by a national agency is required for

reclassification, such approval shall not be unreasonably withheld.
Failure to act on a proper and complete application for
reclassification within three (3) months from receipt of the same shall
be deemed as approval thereof.
(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending,

or modifying in any manner the provisions of [RA] 6657.
Pursuant to RA 7160, then President Fidel Ramos issued

Memorandum Circular No. (MC) 54 on June 8, 1993, providing the
guidelines in the implementation of the above Sec. 20 of the Local
Government Code, as follows:
SECTION 1. Scope and Limitations.-(a) Cities and municipalities with

comprehensive land use plans reviewed and approved in accordance
with EO 72 (1993), may authorize the reclassification of agricultural
lands into non-agricultural uses and provide for the manner of their
111

utilization or disposition, subject to the limitations and other

conditions prescribed in this Order.
(b) Agricultural lands may be reclassified in the following cases:
(1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of
Agriculture (DA), in accordance with the standards and guidelines
prescribed for the purpose; or (2) where the land shall have
substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial, or
industrial purposes as determined by the sanggunian concerned, the
city/municipality concerned should notify the DA, HLRB, DTI, DOT
and other concerned agencies on the proposed reclassification of
agricultural lands furnishing them copies of the report of the local
development council including the draft ordinance on the matter for
their comments, proposals and recommendations within seven (7)
days upon receipt.
(c) However, such reclassification shall be limited to a maximum of

the percentage of the total agricultural land of a city or municipality
at the time of the passage of the ordinance as follows:
(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen

percent (15%);
(2) For component cities and first to third class municipalities, ten
percent (10%); and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%).
112

(d) In addition, the following types of agricultural lands shall not be

covered by the said reclassification:
(1) Agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries

subject to Section 65 of RA 6557;
(2) Agricultural lands already issued a notice of coverage or

voluntarily offered for coverage under CARP.
(3) Agricultural lands identified under AO 20, s. of 1992, as nonnegotiable for conversion as follows:
(i) All irrigated lands where water is available to support rice and
other crop production;
(ii) All irrigated lands where water is not available for rice and other
crop production but within areas programmed for irrigation facility
rehabilitation by DA and National Irrigation Administration (NIA);
and
(iii) All irrigable lands already covered by irrigation projects with form
funding commitments at the time of the application for land
conversion or reclassification.
(e) The President may, when public interest so requires and upon
recommendation of the National Economic Development Authority
(NEDA), authorize a city or municipality to reclassify lands in excess
of the limits set in paragraph (d) hereof. For this purpose, NEDA is
hereby directed to issue the implementing guidelines governing the
113

authority of cities and municipalities to reclassify lands in excess of

the limits prescribed herein.
SECTION 2. Requirements and Procedures for Reclassification.-(a)

The city or municipal development council (CDC/MDC) shall
recommend to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan,
as the case may be, the reclassification of agricultural lands within
its jurisdiction based on the requirements of local development.
(b) Prior to the enactment of an ordinance reclassifying agricultural

lands as provided under Sec. 1 hereof, the sanggunian concerned
must first secure the following certificates [from] the concerned
national government agencies (NGAs):
(1) A certification from DA indicating -
(i) the total area of existing agricultural lands in the LGU concerned;
(ii) that which lands are not classified as non-negotiable for

conversion or reclassification under AO 20 (1992); and
(iii) that the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes in the case of Sec. 1 (b-1).
(2) A certification from DAR indicating that such lands are not
distributed or not covered by a notice of coverage or not voluntarily
offered for coverage under CARP.
114

(c) The HLRB shall serve as the coordinating agency for the issuance
of the certificates as required under the preceding paragraph. All
applications for reclassification shall, therefore, be submitted by the
concerned LGUs to the HLRB, upon receipt of such application, the
HLRB shall conduct initial review to determine if:
(1) the city or municipality concerned has an existing comprehensive

land use plan reviewed and approved in accordance with EO 72
(1993); and
(2) the proposed reclassification complies with the limitations

prescribed in SECTION 1 (d) hereof.
Upon determination that the above conditions have been satisfied,

the HLRB shall then consult with the concerned agencies on the
required certifications. The HLRB shall inform the concerned
agencies, city or municipality of the result of their review and
consultation. If the land being reclassified is in excess of the limit,
the application shall be submitted to NEDA.
Failure of the HLRB and the NGAs to act on a proper and complete
application within three months from receipt of the same shall be
deemed as approved thereof.
(d) Reclassification of agricultural lands may be authorized through

an ordinance enacted by the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, after conducting public
hearings for the purpose. Such ordinance shall be enacted and
approved in accordance with Articles 107 and 108 of the IRR of the
LGC.
115

(e) Provisions of Sec. 1 (b-2) hereof to the contrary notwithstanding,

the sanggunian concerned shall seek the advice of DA prior to the
enactment of an ordinance reclassifying agricultural lands. If the DA
has failed to act on such request within thirty (30) days from receipt
thereof, the same shall be deemed to have been complied with.
Should the land subject to reclassification is found to be still

economically feasible for agriculture, the DA shall recommend to the
LGU concerned alternative areas for development purposes.
(f) Upon issuance of the certifications enumerated in Section 2 (b)

hereof, the sanggunian concerned may now enact an ordinance
authorizing the reclassification of agricultural lands and providing
for the manner of their utilization or disposition. Such ordinance
shall likewise update the comprehensive land use plans of the LGU
concerned. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is because of the authority granted to a city or municipality by Sec.

20 of RA 7160 coupled with the implementing guidelines laid down
in MC 54 dated June 8, 1993 that the CA was convinced to rule that
the disputed lot is no longer agricultural but industrial land and,
hence, the DARAB does not have or has lost jurisdiction over the
subject matter of DARAB Case No. V-RC-028.
This position is incorrect.
Despite the reclassification of an agricultural land to nonagricultural land by a local government unit under Sec. 20 of RA
7160, the DARAB still retains jurisdiction over a complaint filed by a
tenant of the land in question for threatened ejectment and
redemption for the following reasons:
116

(1) Jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of

the commencement of the action.12 Likewise settled is the rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations
of the complaint.13 DARAB Case No. V-RC-028 was filed by the
tenants of an agricultural land for threatened ejectment and its
redemption from respondents. It cannot be questioned that the
averments of the DARAB case clearly pertain to an agrarian reform
matter and involve the implementation of the agrarian reform laws.
Such being the case, the complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the
DARAB under Sec. 50 of RA 6657 on the quasi-judicial powers of the
DAR. It bears stressing that the DAR has primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of the agrarian reform except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Primary
jurisdiction means in case of seeming conflict between the
jurisdictions of the DAR and regular courts, preference is vested with
the DAR because of its expertise and experience in agrarian reform
matters. Sec. 50 is also explicit that except for the DA and DENR, all
agrarian reform matters are within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the DAR.
(2) Sec. 20(e) of RA 7160 is unequivocal that nothing in said section

shall be construed "as repealing, amending or modifying in any
manner the provisions of [RA] 6657." As such, Sec. 50 of RA 6657 on
quasi-judicial powers of the DAR has not been repealed by RA 7160.
In view of the foregoing reasons, we rule that the DARAB retains

jurisdiction over disputes arising from agrarian reform matters even
though the landowner or respondent interposes the defense of
reclassification of the subject lot from agricultural to nonagricultural use.
117

On the issue of whether there has been a valid reclassification of the

subject lot to industrial land, we rule that respondents failed to
adduce substantial evidence to buttress their assertion that all the
conditions and requirements set by RA 7160 and MC 54 have been
satisfied.
Respondent Pacita only procured a MAO certification that the

property was not prime agricultural property. The MARO certified
that the land was not covered by the OLT under PD 27. These two
certifications will not suffice for the following reasons:
(1) Sec. 20 of RA 7160 requires submission of the recommendation

or certification from the DA that the land ceases to be economically
feasible or sound for agricultural purposes. In this case, the MAO
certification attests only that the lot is no longer "prime agricultural
property."
(2) Sec. 20 requires a certification from the DAR that the land has
not yet been distributed to beneficiaries under RA 6657 which took
effect on June 15, 1988 nor covered by a notice of coverage. In the
case at bar, the MARO certification which pertains only to PD 27
does not suffice.
(3) Respondents have not shown any compliance with Sec. 2 of MC

54 on the additional requirements and procedures for reclassification
such as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board's report and
recommendation, the requisite public hearings, and the DA's report
and recommendation.
118

Based on the foregoing reasons, respondents have failed to satisfy

the requirements prescribed in Sec. 20 of RA 7160 and MC 54 and,
hence, relief must be granted to petitioners.
Landowners must understand that while RA 7160, the Local

Government Code, granted local government units the power to
reclassify agricultural land, the stringent requirements set forth in
Sec. 30 of said Code must be strictly complied with. Such adherence
to the legal prescriptions is found wanting in the case at bar.
Be that as it may, the DARAB erred in awarding damages to

petitioners.
In Saba v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the exercise of one's rights

does not make him liable for damages, thus: "One who exercises his
rights does no injury. Qui jure suo utitur nullum damnum facit. If
damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is
damnum absque injuria."14
This principle was further explained by this Court in the case of

Custodio v. Court of Appeals, to wit:
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give
rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of
damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong
inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff
therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does
not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of
the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.
119

There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is

the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm
which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm
was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are
often called damnum absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff may
maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must
establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the
defendant owed to the plaintiff - a concurrence of injury to the
plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The
underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an
individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must
first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for
that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to
state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff
suffered some pain and suffering.
Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or

omissions which cause damage or loss to another but which violate
no legal duty to such other person, and consequently create no
cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences must
be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no remedy for
damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal
injury or wrong.
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act
causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful.
There must be damnum et injuria. If, as may happen in many cases,
a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person
or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or
omission which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is
regarded as damnum absque injuria.15
120

Thus, in Government Service Insurance System v. Labung-Deang16

and Premiere Development Bank v. Court of Appeals,17 this Court
ruled that temperate damages will only be awarded by virtue of the
wrongful act of a party.
Whereas in Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Vasquez, we ruled that

exemplary damages may only be awarded if the act of the offender is
attended by bad faith or done in wanton, fraudulent, or malevolent
manner.18
In the instant case, the RTC awarded damages to petitioners on the

ground that respondents dumped earthfill materials during the
pendency of the case. It must be pointed out that the RTC did not
issue a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order (TRO)
against respondents.
Contrary to this finding of the trial court, respondents did not act in
bad faith or in a wanton, fraudulent, or malevolent manner;
consequently, petitioners are not entitled to an award for damages.
Respondents' dumping of earth filling materials on the subject land
was but a lawful exercise of their rights as owners of the land. It
must be remembered that respondents attempted to have the land
reclassified through the Municipal Government of San Juan, Pili,
Camarines Sur by virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No. 67
which embodied Ordinance No. 28. Given the disputable
presumption that official duty was regularly performed,19
respondents were justified to presume that the reclassification of the
land was lawful. It was also natural for respondents to conclude that
such reclassification resulted in the dispossession of petitioners as
tenants, there being no tenants of industrial land. Thus, respondents,
at the time, could lawfully exercise their proprietary rights over the
land, including the dumping of earth filling materials thereon.
Moreover, the pendency of the case before the RTC, absent a
preliminary injunction or TRO against respondents, would not
121

preclude respondents from exercising their rights. Although this

reclassification has now been declared to be ineffectual, for failing to
comply with the provisions of RA 7160, respondents cannot be made
liable for damages. Respondents' exercise of acts of ownership over
the land, at a time that the reclassification had not yet been declared
as invalid and ineffectual, is a lawful exercise of their rights. And
even though this may have prejudiced or injured petitioners,
respondents cannot be made liable for it. As stated, respondents
cannot be penalized for a lawful act.
Similarly, the instant case does not fall under any of the grounds set
forth in Article 2208 of the Civil Code to justify the award for
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. Thus, there are also no
grounds for the DARAB's grant of attorney's fees and appearance
fees in favor of petitioners.
Therefore, the RTC's award for exemplary and temperate damages,

as well as attorney's and appearance fees, must be deleted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 16, 2001 CA

Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 59454 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The February 27, 1996 DARAB Order and January 12, 1996
Decision of DARAB Provincial Adjudicator Florin in DARAB Case No.
V-RC-028 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award
for temperate and exemplary damages and attorney's and
appearance fees is DELETED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
122


Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
*LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
**ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
123

opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION

Division Acting Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO<
Chief Justice
Footnotes
124

** Additional member as per Special Order No. 485 dated February

14, 2008.
1 Rollo, p. 87.
2 Id. at 88.
3 Id. at 88-89.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 90.
6 Id. at 90-91.
7 Id. at 65-66.
8 Id. at 67-69.
9 Id. at 87-103. Penned by Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.

(Chairperson, now a retired member of this Court) and concurred in
by Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Perlita Tria-Tirona.
10 Id. at 9.
11 R.P. Barte, Law on Agrarian Reform 24.
125

12 Lee v. Presiding Judge, MTC of Legaspi City, Br. I, No. L-68789,

November 10, 1986, 145 SCRA 408, 415.
13 Ganadin v. Ramos, No. L-23547, September 11, 1980, 99 SCRA

613, 621.
14 G.R. No. 77950, August 24, 1990, 189 SCRA 50, 55; citations
omitted.
15 G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 483, 489-491.
16 G.R. No. 135644, September 17, 2001, 365 SCRA 341, 350.
17 G.R. No. 159352, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 686, 700.
18 G.R. No. 150843, March 14, 2003, 399 SCRA 207, 223.
19 RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Sec. 3(m).
126

7. Pactolin vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), 554 SCRA 136,

May 20, 2008
EN BANC
G.R. No. 161455
May 20, 2008
ATTY. RODOLFO D. PACTOLIN, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE FOURTH DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
THE HON. and SIMEON V. MARCELO, in his official capacity as the
Ombudsman, and MARIO R. FERRAREN, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Petitioner Atty. Rodolfo P. Pactolin was a former member of the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental. During Pactolins
term, sometime in May 1996, the mayor of Ozamis City, Benjamin A.
Fuentes, received a letter dated May 3, 1996 from Elmer Abastillas,
the playing coach and team captain of the Ozamis City volleyball
team, requesting financial assistance for the citys volleyball team.
Mayor Fuentes immediately approved the request and then
forwarded Abastillas letter to the City Treasurers Office for
processing. Mayor Fuentes at that time designated Mario R. Ferraren,
a member of the city council, as OIC (Officer-in-Charge)-Mayor for
the duration of his trip to Cagayan de Oro City starting May 5, 1996.
Abastillas received the check for PhP 10,000 on behalf of the
volleyball team on May 8, 1996.
127

While Ferraren was OIC-Mayor, Pactolin went to the Ozamis City

Treasurers Office and asked to photocopy Abastillas letter. Assistant
City Treasurer Alma Y. Toledo lent the letter to Pactolin, having
known him as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Besides,
he was accompanied by Solomon Villaueran, a city employee.
Pactolin returned the letter to the City Treasurers Office immediately
after photocopying it.
Thereafter, on June 24, 1996, Pactolin filed a complaint, docketed as

OMB-MIN-96-0416, against Mario with the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman-Mindanao, alleging that Mario illegally disbursed public
funds worth PhP 10,000 in connivance with then City Accountant
Cynthia Ferraren. Attached as Annex "A" to the complaint was the
alleged falsified version of the Abastillas letter. The purported
falsified letter showed that it was Mario and not Mayor Fuentes who
approved the request for financial assistance. Aggrieved, Mario
instituted a criminal complaint against Pactolin. Pactolin was
charged with falsification of a public document under Article 171(2)1
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in an Amended Information filed on
January 31, 2000, as follows:
That on or about June 24, 1996, or some time prior or subsequent

thereto, in Ozamis City, Misamis Occidental, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused RODOLFO D.
PACTOLIN, a high ranking public officer, being a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental, committing the
felony herein charged in relation to his office, and taking advantage
of his official position as Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member and
head of the athletic delegation of Misamis Occidental, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, falsify a document dated
May 3, 1998 requesting from the city mayor of Ozamis City financial
assistance, by intercalating thereon the printed name of Mario R.
Ferraren, and the latters position as OIC Mayor, and by imitating
the latters signature on top of the intercalated name "Mario R.
Ferraren", thereby making it appear that OIC Mayor Mario R.
128

Ferraren approved the request for financial assistance, when in truth

and in fact, Mario R. Ferraren neither signed the subject letter nor
approved the said request for financial assistance.
After arraignment in which Pactolin appeared on his own behalf and

pleaded not guilty, and after trial on the merits in which Pactolin
repeatedly failed to appear, the Sandiganbayan issued a Decision2
on November 12, 2003, disposing, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

finding accused Rodolfo D. Pactolin, guilty of Falsification under
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, and in the absence of any
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, he is sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 2 years and 4 months
of prision correccional as minimum to 4 years, 9 months and 10
days of prision correccional as maximum, to suffer all the accessory
penalties of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the fine.
SO ORDERED.
On the stated premise that the falsified document was not in the
official custody of Pactolin, nor was there evidence presented
showing that the falsification was committed by him while in the
performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan found him liable for
falsification under the first paragraph of Art. 172, penalizing "any
private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications
enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official
document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial
document."
129

Pactolins motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, he filed this

petition, raising the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT FALSIFICATION UNDER THE REVISED PENAL

CODE IS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN? [sic]
II. WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO ACTING WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN CONVICTING PETITIONER WHEN BY ITS OWN
FINDINGS OF FACTS THE FALSIFIED DOCUMENT WAS NOT IN
THE OFFICIAL CUSTODY OF THE ACCUSED NOR WAS THERE ANY
EVIDENCE PRESENTED THAT THE FALSIFICATION WAS
COMMITTED BY ACCUSED WHILE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS
OFFICIAL DUTIES? [sic]
Simply, the issues are: Did the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over
the case? If so, did it gravely abuse its discretion when by its own
findings the falsified document was not in the custody of Pactolin,
and he falsified the document while in the performance of his duties?
Pactolin claims that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the

crime of falsification. First, according to Pactolin, even as Republic
Act No. (RA) 8249, known as An Act Further Defining the
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, amending for the Purpose P.D.
1606, as Amended, Providing Funds therefor and for Other Purposes,
vests the Sandiganbayan with exclusive jurisdictional authority over
certain offenses, the following requisites must concur before that
court can exercise such jurisdiction: (1) the offense is committed in
violation of (a) RA 3019, as amended, known as The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, (b) RA 1379 or The Law on Ill-gotten Wealth,
(c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the RPC, (d) Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, or (e) other offenses or felonies
130

whether simple or complex with other crimes; (2) the offender

committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c), and (e) is a public official
or employee holding any of the positions enumerated in Section 4,
par. (a) of RA 8249; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the
office.3 Pactolin argues that these requisites show that the crime of
falsification as defined under Arts. 171 and 172 of the RPC is not
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. He also points out that
nowhere under Sec. 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, RA 3019, RA
1379, or in Title VII, Book II of the RPC is "falsification of official
document" mentioned. He relies on Bartolome v. People4 as a case in
point.
Our Ruling: The Sandiganbayan Has Jurisdiction
Falsification of public document under the RPC is within the

jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This conclusion finds support
from Sec. 4 of RA 8249, which enumerates the cases in which the
Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction, as follows:
Section 4. x x x
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known

as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of

regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and
131

higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989

(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and
other provincial department heads;
xxxx
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other

crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a. of this section in relation to their office. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Going to another point, Pactolin, in his Memorandum, contends that

the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it convicted
him as a private individual under an information charging him as a
public official, thus violating his right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him and his right to due process
of law. He claims that the information filed against him charged him
with violation of Art. 171 of the RPC in his capacity as Board
Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, but the Sandiganbayan
convicted him of violation of Art. 172 as a private individual. Thus,
he avers, he had not been given a chance to defend himself from a
criminal charge of which he had been convicted.
132

Again, Pactolin errs. It is true that the Amended Information did not
at all mention any statutory designation of the crime he is charged
with. But, it is all too evident that the body of the information
against him contains averments that unmistakably constitute
falsification under Art. 171 and also Art. 172 of the RPC, which, for
reference, are quoted below:
Art.171. Falsification by public officer, employee; or notary or

ecclesiastical minister.x x x
xxxx
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or

proceeding when they did not in fact so participate [as testified to by
witnesses].
xxxx
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified

documents.The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 shall be
imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsification

enumerated in the next preceeding article in any public or official
document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial
document;
xxxx
133

Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial

proceedings or to the damage of another or who, with the intent to
cause such damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced
in the next preceeding article or in any of the foregoing subdivisions
of this article shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Note that the last paragraph of Art. 172 does not specify that the
offending person is a public or private individual as does its par. 1.
Note also that the last paragraph of Art. 172 alludes to the use of the
false document embraced in par. 2 of Art. 171 where it was made to
appear that "persons have participated in any act or proceeding
when they did not in fact participate." Patently, even a public officer
may be convicted under Art. 172. The crime in Art. 171 is absorbed
by the last paragraph of Art. 172. Thus, Pactolins argument about
being deprived of his right to be informed of the charges against him
when the Sandiganbayan convicted him as a private person under
Art. 172, is baseless. The headings in italics of the two articles are
not controlling. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint,
or the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part
thereof allegedly violated, but the description of the crime charged
and the particular facts therein recited.5 The character of the crime
is not determined by the caption or the preamble of the information
or by the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in
the complaint or information.6 In this case, the Amended
Information encompasses the acts of Pactolin constitutive of a
violation of Art. 172 in relation to par. 2 of Art. 171 of the RPC.
Pactolin also misapplied Bartolome.7 In Bartolome, there was no

showing that the accused committed acts of falsification while they
were discharging official functions, and the information in Bartolome
did not allege there was an intimate connection between the
134

discharge of official duties and the commission of the offense. In this

case, the State, in no uncertain words, alleged in the Amended
Information and proved that Pactolin was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and took advantage of his position when
he committed the falsification.
The Sandiganbayan Is Correct in Convicting Petitioner
As to the second issue, Pactolin avers that the Sandiganbayan

gravely abused its discretion when it convicted him despite its own
findings that the falsified document was not in his official custody
and that there was no evidence he committed the falsification in the
performance of his official duties.
Pactolin distorts the statement of the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayans conviction of Pactolin was based on its factual

findings after the prosecution presented both documentary and
testimonial pieces of evidence. We are not a trier of facts so we defer
to the factual findings of the lower court that had more opportunities
and facilities to examine the evidence presented.
The Sandiganbayan had established the following undisputed facts:

(1) the request for financial assistance of the volleyball players,
represented by Abastillas, was approved by Mayor Fuentes and not
by OIC-Mayor Mario; (2) the original Abastillas letter was in the
custody of Toledo in her official capacity and she testified that the
approving authority was Mayor Fuentes and no other; (3) Pactolin
borrowed the Abastillas letter for photocopying upon oral request,
and Toledo granted the said request because she knew him as a
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of their province; and (4)
Pactolin filed a complaint against Mario with the Ombudsman for
135

illegal disbursement of public funds, and the principal document he

attached to show the alleged illegal disbursement was the Abastillas
letter on which was superimposed Marios signature, thus making it
appear that Mario approved the financial assistance to the volleyball
players, and not Mayor Fuentes. In short, the Sandiganbayan clearly
established that the copy of the Abastillas letter that Pactolin
attached to his complaint was spurious. Given the clear absence of a
satisfactory explanation regarding Pactolins possession and use of
the falsified Abastillas letter, the Sandiganbayan did not err in
concluding that it was Pactolin who falsified the letter. The settled
rule is that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in
possession of and who used a forged document is the forger and
therefore guilty of falsification.8
Neither do we agree with Pactolin that the Sandiganbayan gravely

abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse
of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.9 The rule in this jurisdiction is
that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition
of the case, be it dismissal, conviction, or acquittal of the accused,
rests on the sound discretion of the court.10 The only qualification to
this exercise of judicial prerogative is that the substantial rights of
the accused must not be impaired nor the People be deprived of the
right to due process. As we have discoursed, no substantial right of
Pactolin has been impaired nor has there been any violation of his
right to due process. He had been adequately informed by the
detailed litany of the charges leveled against him in the information.
He had the occasion to confront witnesses against him and the
opportunity to question documents presented by the prosecution.
Under no circumstance in this case has his right to due process been
violated.
Lastly, Pactolin is a member of the Philippine bar. As a lawyer, he is

bound by the professions strict code of ethics. His conviction means
136

he has not met the high ethical standard demanded by his

profession. He must be dealt with accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Sandiganbayans

Decision dated November 12, 2003 in Criminal Case No. 25665 and
its Resolution dated January 7, 2004 are AFFIRMED in their entirety.
This Decision shall be treated as an administrative complaint against
petitioner Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin under Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court and is referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
appropriate action.
The Clerk of Court is directed to furnish private complainant Mario R.

Ferraren with a copy of this Decision.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,

Corona*, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Nachura,
Reyes, Leonardo-de-Castro, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* On leave.
137

1 ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee; or notary or

ecclesiastical minister. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not
to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer,
employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position,
shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or

proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.
2 Rollo, pp. 28-38. Penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao

and concurred in by Associate Justices Gregory S. Ong (Chairperson)
and Norberto Y. Geraldez.
3 Id. at 230-231.
4 Nos. L-64548 & L-64559, July 7, 1986, 142 SCRA 459.
5 People v. Malngan, G.R. No. 170470, September 26, 2006, 503

SCRA 294, 330-331.
6 Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163866, July 29, 2005, 465
SCRA 465, 482.
7 Supra note 4.
8 Maliwat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107041, May 15, 1996, 256
SCRA 718, 734.
138

9 Pontejos v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 158613-14,

February 22, 2006, 483 SCRA 83, 94.
10 Fuentes v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164664, July 20, 2006, 495

SCRA 784, 800; citing Crespo v. Mogul, No. L-53373, June 30, 1987,
151 SCRA 462, 467-468.
139

8. Bayot vs. Court of Appeals, 570 SCRA 472, November 07,

2008
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 155635
November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL
BAYOT, respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 163979
November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
140

Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria

Rebecca Makapugay Bayot impugning certain issuances handed out
by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.
In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and docketed as

G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to nullify the April 30,
2002 Resolution2 of the CA, as reiterated in another Resolution of
September 2, 2002,3 granting a writ of preliminary injunction in
favor of private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the
trial court's grant of support pendente lite to Rebecca.
The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,4 docketed G.R. No.
163979, assails the March 25, 2004 Decision5 of the CA, (1)
dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage with application for support commenced by
Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders and a
resolution issued by the RTC in the said case.
Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the
consolidation of both cases.
The Facts
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario

de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage
Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American
citizen7 born in Agaa, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay,
American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.
141

On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave

birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente
and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the
latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the
Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First Instance of the
Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared,
while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On February 22,
1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,8
ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them
to remarry after completing the legal requirements," but giving them
joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same
court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the couple's
property relations pursuant to an Agreement10 they executed on
December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the
"conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage
consist[s] only of the real property and all the improvements and
personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang,
Muntinlupa."11
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the

issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati
City RTC a petition12 dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for
declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378.
Rebecca, however, later moved13 and secured approval14 of the
motion to withdraw the petition.
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of

Acknowledgment15 stating under oath that she is an American
citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living
separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.
On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before
the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological
142

incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria

Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition
was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it, Rebecca also
sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with
application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also
prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support
for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss17 on, inter alia,

the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred
by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca
filed and moved for the allowance of her application for support
pendente lite.
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting

on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another

marriage, and Rebecca commenced several criminal complaints
against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury
complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged
Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.
Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss

and Motion for Support Pendente Lite
On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying Vicente's

motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting Rebecca's
application for support pendente lite, disposing as follows:
143

Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the

respondent is DENIED. Petitioner's Application in Support of the
Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED. Respondent is
hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner
as support for the duration of the proceedings relative to the instant
Petition.
SO ORDERED.19
The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment
invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during actual
trial. As to the grant of support pendente lite, the trial court held
that a mere allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate
to preclude her from receiving legal support.
Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the above

August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on a petition for
certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.21 His petition was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.
Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA
On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.22 On April 30,

2002, the appellate court granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the

petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in
144

this case, enjoining the respondent court from implementing the

assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated
November 20, 2001, and from conducting further proceedings in
Civil Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of an injunction bond in the
amount of P250,000.00.
SO ORDERED.23
Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the

aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the meantime, on May
20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ25 was issued. Rebecca also
moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution
dated September 2, 2002, denied her motion.
The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2,

2002 are presently being assailed in Rebecca's petition for certiorari,
docketed under G.R. No. 155635.
Ruling of the CA
Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated

March 25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set
aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the case. The
fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The

Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November
20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered
DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a cause of
action. No pronouncement as to costs.
145

SO ORDERED.26
To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to

dismiss on the basis of the following premises:
(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals,

the hypothetical-admission rule applies in determining whether a
complaint or petition states a cause of action.27 Applying said rule
in the light of the essential elements of a cause of action,28 Rebecca
had no cause of action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her
marriage with Vicente declared void, the union having previously
been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign divorce decree
she personally secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce
restored Vicente's capacity to contract another marriage.
(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a

Filipino citizen at the time the foreign divorce decree was rendered,
was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship was
also doubtful as it was not shown that her father, at the time of her
birth, was still a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca
issued by the Government of Guam also did not indicate the
nationality of her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship,

having professed to have that nationality status and having made
representations to that effect during momentous events of her life,
146

such as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce;
and (c) when she applied for and eventually secured an American
passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she
initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her
marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a

purportedly Filipino father in Guam, USA which follows the jus soli
principle, Rebecca's representation and assertion about being an
American citizen when she secured her foreign divorce precluded her
from denying her citizenship and impugning the validity of the
divorce.
Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above

Decision, but this recourse was denied in the equally assailed June 4,
2004 Resolution.29 Hence, Rebecca's Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as

grounds for the allowance of her petition, all of which converged on
the proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the implementation of
the RTC's orders which would have entitled her to support pending
final resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.
In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA

decision submitting as follows:
147

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING

AND NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF
THE FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONER'S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS
CATEGORICALLY STATED AND ALLEGED IN HER PETITION
BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON

ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS
BROUGHT BEFORE IT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO

CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING
THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN
DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT
ACTS.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT

THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL
COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.30
148

We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome
being determinative of the success or failure of the petition in G.R.
No. 155635.
Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a

divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce
is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.31 Second, the
reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth
or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured
by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in this
jurisdiction.32
Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in

G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the propriety of the granting of the motion to
dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the questions of:
first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the
divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on
February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment of divorce is
valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case
There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she

applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American
149

citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective

repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling
circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was
born in Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in
this American territory granting American citizenship to those who
are born there; and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an
American passport.33
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed,

asserted, and represented herself as an American citizen,
particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage
certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she
secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention may be
made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment34 in which she stated being
an American citizen.
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration

(Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a
Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would
tend to show that she has indeed been recognized as a Filipino
citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that such recognition
was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the
Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order
of Recognition issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L.
Mendoza.
For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC

9778:
To Whom It May Concern:
150

This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT*

whose photograph and thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially
covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other particulars are as
follows:
Place of Birth:
Sex:
Hair:
Guam, USA
female
brown
Color of Eyes:
none
Date of Birth:
Civil Status:
brown
March 5, 1953
married
Color of
Distinguishing marks on face:
was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per

pursuant to Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935
Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by
Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and
duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st
Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.
Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel

purposes.
Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995
(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA

ASSO. COMMISSIONER
151

Official Receipt No. 5939988

issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000
From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material

facts and dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner
Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995;
(2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero
affirming Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on
June 8, 2000 or almost five years from the date of the order of
recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly
issued on October 11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee
on October 10, 1995 per OR No. 5939988.
What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could
have been issued by the Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the
Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation only on June 8,
2000. No explanation was given for this patent aberration. There
seems to be no error with the date of the issuance of the 1st
Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes
judicial notice that he was the Secretary of Justice from February 16,
2000 to January 22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to
conclude that the certificate in question must be spurious.
Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of

Filipino citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of
Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292,
also known as the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title
III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to "provide
immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement
the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens."
Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for
Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required.
152

Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on

Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly provides:
The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall

automatically furnish the Department of Justice an official copy of its
Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of approval by the
way of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of
Justice pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification
Certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the
Secretary of Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by the
Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently
indicate thereon the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice.
(Emphasis ours.)
Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine

passport only on June 13, 2000, or five days after then Secretary of
Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement confirming the order of
recognition. It may be too much to attribute to coincidence this
unusual sequence of close events which, to us, clearly suggests that
prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet
recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply
that ID Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995,
as Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that no
identification certificate shall be issued before the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore, the
affirmation or confirmation of Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino
citizen through the 1st Indorsement issued only on June 8, 2000 by
Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of
Rebecca's passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.
When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a

Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One
153

The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino

citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that
Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet
recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22,
1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.
The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that
Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her original petition for declaration of
nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously
because she could not show proof of her alleged Filipino citizenship
then. In fact, a perusal of that petition shows that, while bearing the
date January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC on March 14,
1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22,
1996, the foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there
was no mention about said divorce in the petition. Significantly, the
only documents appended as annexes to said original petition were:
the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Birth
Certificate of Alix (Annex "B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778
from the Bureau was truly issued on October 11, 1995, is it not but
logical to expect that this piece of document be appended to form
part of the petition, the question of her citizenship being crucial to
her case?
As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of

marriage under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the withdrawn first
petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as
attachment. What were attached consisted of the following material
documents: Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It
was only through her Opposition (To Respondent's Motion to Dismiss
dated 31 May 2001)36 did Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID
Certificate No. RC 9778.
154

At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had
sufficient basis to dismiss the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together with Vicente's
motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to motion, with their
respective attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of cause of
action, which we will expound later.
Validity of Divorce Decree
Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and
406/97 valid.
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was

still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact
later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in
public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she
chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American
citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured
personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the
text of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently declared:
IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly

submit to the jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the existing
incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA REBECCA
M. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 years of age, married,
domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin
Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who personally appeared before this court,
accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of
age, married and domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala
Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court
represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x,
revalidated by special power of attorney given the 19th of February of
155

1996, signed before the Notary Public Enrico L. Espanol of the City of
Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him to subscribe all the acts
concerning this case.37 (Emphasis ours.)
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national

laws of the United States of America, a country which allows divorce.
Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly
adjudicated through their Agreement38 executed on December 14,
1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22,
1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March
4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v.

Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the
divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law
of the alien spouse.39 Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was
clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that
divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the
Union,40 the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here,
sufficient.
It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not
been denied, but in fact admitted by both parties. And neither did
they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the
validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity
to do so. The same holds true with respect to the decree of partition
of their conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v.
Rodriguez:
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign
judgment [of divorce] x x x, it must be shown that the parties
156

opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so

on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court
(now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of a

tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is

conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is

presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the

foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to
properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of
Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as
distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment |merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a
party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.41
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally

secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his
counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As
things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the
Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both
Rebecca and Vicente.
157

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a
Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary
of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of
Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the
foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on
February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining
whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale
of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point
is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is
obtained.42
Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the

same shall be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an
obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum
between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both
freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and
Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. As the
divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between
MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is
hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry after completing
the legal requirements."43
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no

longer be subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He
cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.44
The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second
paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing as follows:
158

Art. 26. x x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As
amended by E.O. 227)
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the
applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2

of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a

Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating

him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.45
Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor

further the fact of marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship
159

when they wed, and their professed citizenship during the valid
divorce proceedings.
Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No.

406/97 and the Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 bind
both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property relations. The
Agreement provided that the ex-couple's conjugal property consisted
only their family home, thus:
9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they
acquired during their marriage consists only of the real property and
all the improvements and personal properties therein contained at
502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No.
168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati,
Metro Manila registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot, married to
Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.46 (Emphasis ours.)
This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by

the divorce court which, per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree
No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that, "THIRD: That the
agreement entered into between the parties dated 14th day of
December 1996 in Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this
Judgment of divorce by reference but not merged and that the
parties are hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and
every provision of said agreement."47
Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the

Agreement. She is thus estopped by her representation before the
divorce court from asserting that her and Vicente's conjugal property
was not limited to their family home in Ayala Alabang.48
No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage
160

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court

that Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause of action. Philippine
Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and elements
of a cause of action, thus:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the

legal right of the other. A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of
action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the
complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute
a cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting
the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the
same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists
if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of
the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or
is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the
part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages.49
One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition

before the RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition
thereof, with the documentary evidence attached therein: The
petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of
marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a marriage.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the

movant must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than
that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite,
or uncertain.50 With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca,
161

there is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no

more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.
The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of
Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of their daughter, Alix.
The records do not clearly show how he had discharged his duty,
albeit Rebecca alleged that the support given had been insufficient.
At any rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November 27,
1982, reached the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four
months before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of
nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back
support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is
best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In this
way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved as well as
the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can
thus determine what Vicente owes, if any, considering that support
includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her
education.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve

into the issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebecca's right
to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind of
support hinges on the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No.
01-094 for declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil
Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for,
and effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby

DISMISSED on the ground of mootness, while the petition for review
in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly,
the March 25, 2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA
in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
162

SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson

Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
163

Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION

Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 3-34.
164

2 Id. at 36-38. Penned by Associate, now Presiding, Justice Conrado

M. Vasquez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B.
Reyes, Jr. and Mario L. Guaria III.
3 Id. at 40-41.
4 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 10-43.
5 Id. at 575-583.
6 Id. at 145.
7 See Certification of Birth from the Government of Guam issued on

June 1, 2000; rollo (G.R. No. 155635), p. 213.
8 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 146-150.
9 Id. at 214-217.
10 Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 151-158.
11 Id. at 154.
12 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 206-212.
13 Id. at 305-306. Per a motion to withdraw dated November 8, 1996.
165

14 Id. at 213. Per Order of Judge Josefina Guevara Salonga dated

November 14, 1996.
15 Id. at 236-237.
16 Id. at 126-144.
17 Id. at 156-204.
18 Id. at 123-124. Penned by Presiding Judge Alberto L. Lerma.
19 Id. at 338.
20 Id. at 125. Per Order dated November 20, 2001.
21 Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 512-590.
22 Id. at 592-593.
23 Id. at 38.
24 Id. at 852-869.
25 Id. at 850-851.
166

27 G.R. No. 137898, December 15, 2000, 348 SCRA 401, 409.
28 Enumerated in San Lorenzo Village Association, Inc. v. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. 116825 March 26, 1998, 288 SCRA 115, 125: (1)
the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the
defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right.
29 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), p. 597.
30 Id. at 22-23.
31 Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA

437, 447.
32 Llorente v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124371, November 23,

2000, 345 SCRA 592, 600.
33 Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 388-389, issued on January 18,

1995 with expiration date on January 17, 2005.
34 Supra note 15.
35 Adopted on April 15, 1999.
167

36 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 268-292.
37 Id. at 147, 214-215.
38 Supra note 10.
39 Supra note 31.
40 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139

SCRA 139, 143.
41 G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003, 404 SCRA 495, 502-503.
42 Id. at 501-502.
43 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 148, 216.
44 Van Dorn, supra note 40, at 144.
45 G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114, 122.
46 Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), p. 154.
47 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), p. 215.
168

48 Van Dorn, supra note 44.
49 G.R. No. 165500, August 30, 2006, 500 SCRA 242, 251-252;
citations omitted.
50 Azur v. Provincial Board, No. L-22333, February 27, 1969, 27

SCRA 50, 57-58.
169

2009
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 181688
June 5, 2009
DAIKOKU ELECTRONICS PHILS., INC., Petitioner,

vs.
ALBERTO J. RAZA, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45, Daikoku Electronics Phils.,
Inc. (Daikoku) assails and seeks to set aside the Decision1 dated
September 26, 2007 and Resolution2 dated February 7, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 96282, effectively dismissing
Daikokus appeal from the resolutions dated May 31, 20063 and July
31, 2006,4 respectively, of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) in NLRC CA No. 044001-05.
The Facts
In January 1999, Daikoku hired respondent Alberto J. Raza as

company driver, eventually assigning him to serve as personal driver
to its president, Mamuro Ono (Ono, hereafter). By arrangement,
Alberto, at the end of each working day which usually starts early
170

morning and ends late at night, parks the car at an assigned slot
outside of Onos place of residence at Pacific Plaza Condominium in
Makati City.
On July 21, 2003, at around 8:00 p.m., Alberto, after being let off by
Ono, took the company vehicle to his own place also in Makati City.
This incident did not go unnoticed, as Ono asked Alberto the
following morning where he parked the car the night before. In
response, Alberto said that he parked the car in the usual
condominium parking area but at the wrong slot.
On July 24, 2003, Alberto received a show-cause notice why he

should not be disciplined for dishonesty. A day after, Alberto
submitted his written explanation of the incident, owning up to the
lie he told Ono and apologizing and expressing his regret for his
mistake.
Following an investigation, the investigation committee

recommended that Alberto be suspended for 12 days without pay for
the infraction of parking the company vehicle at his residence and
for deliberately lying about it. The committee considered Albertos
voluntary admission of guilt and apology as mitigating circumstances.
Daikokus general affairs manager, however, was unmoved and
ordered Alberto dismissed from the service effective August 14, 2003.
"Dishonesty" and "other work related performance offenses" appeared
in the corresponding notice of termination as grounds for the
dismissal action.
Alberto sought reconsideration but to no avail, prompting him to file

a case for illegal dismissal.
The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
171

On January 15, 2005, the labor arbiter, on the finding that Albertos
dismissal was predicated, among others, on offenses he was neither
apprised of nor charged with, rendered judgment for Alberto,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the complainants dismissal unlawful,

respondents are hereby directed to reinstate complainant to his
former position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits
and further ordered solidarily to pay complainant backwages from
the time of his dismissal up to actual reinstatement minus the salary
corresponding to the suspension period of twelve days, plus 10% of
the total award for attorneys fees, computed as follows:
FULL BACKWAGES
A. Basic Pay
From 8/14/03 to 1/14/05
P12,000 x 17.03 =
P 204,360.00
B. 13th month pay

P 204,360/12
17,030.00
C. Service Incentive Leave Pay

P12,000/30 x 5 days x 17.03/12 =
2,838.33
---------------P 224,228.33
Less: P12,000/30 x 12 days =
---------------TOTAL
P 219,428.33
4,800.00
172

Attorneys fee of P219,428.33 x 10%
===========
P 21,942.83
===========
SO ORDERED.
The labor arbiter also determined that while some form of sanction
against Alberto was indicated, the ultimate penalty of dismissal was
not commensurate to the offense actually committed and charged.
From the labor arbiters ruling, Daikoku appealed to the NLRC, its
recourse docketed as NLRC CA No. 044001-05.
For his part, Alberto, thru counsel, wrote Daikoku demanding

reinstatement, either actual or payroll, as decreed in the labor
arbiters appealed decision. Daikoku then asked Alberto to report
back to work on May 10, 2005 which the company later moved to
June 6, 2005.
On July 11, 2005, pending resolution of Daikokus appeal, Alberto

filed before the NLRC a Motion to Cite Respondents in Contempt and
to Compel Them to Pay Complainant for the companys alleged
refusal to reinstate him. In his accompanying affidavit, Alberto
alleged, among other things, that he reported back to work on June
24, 2005. But instead of being given back his old job or an
equivalent position, he was asked to attend an orientation seminar
and undergo medical examination, at his expense. To compound
matters, the company deferred payment of his backwages and some
other benefits. These impositions, according to Alberto, impelled him
to stop reporting for work.
173

The Ruling of the NLRC
Initially, the NLRC, by resolution of August 31, 2005, dismissed

Daikokus appeal for failure to perfect it in the manner and
formalities prescribed by law. Acting on Daikokus motion for
reconsideration, however, the NLRC issued a Resolution dated May
31, 2006, reinstating Daikokus appeal, setting aside the arbiters
January 15, 2005 appealed decision, and denying Albertos motion to
cite the company for contempt. But for Daikokus failure to reinstate
Alberto pending appeal, the NLRC ordered the payment of Albertos
backwages, at the basic rate of PhP 8,790 a month, corresponding
the period indicated in the resolution of May 31, 2006 which
dispositively reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, [Daikokus] Motion for

Reconsideration is GRANTED. [Albertos] Motion to Cite Respondents
in Contempt is DENIED for lack of merit.
The assailed Decision dated January 15, 2005 of the Labor Arbiter is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is hereby entered
declaring that complainant was validly dismissed from his
employment. Nevertheless, for failure to reinstate complainant
Alberto J. Raza pursuant to the Labor Arbiters Decision, respondent
DAIKOKU ELECTRONICS PHILS., INC. is hereby ordered to pay him
his wages from 11 March 2005 up to the promulgation of this
Resolution, provisionally computed as follows:
[Basic] pay: (3/11/05 5/11/06)
(P8,790.00 x 14 months)
13th month pay:
P 123,060.00
174

(P123,060.00 / 12 mos.)
10,255.55
Service Incentive Leave Pay:

(P8,790 / 30 x 5 days x 14 mos./12)
TOTAL
1,709.17
P 135,024.72
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis added.)
Alberto sought reconsideration of the above ruling. Daikoku also

moved for reconsideration on the backwages aspect of the NLRC
resolution. On July 31, 2006, the NLRC issued a resolution explicitly
denying only Albertos motion.
Obviously on the belief that the NLRCs July 31, 2006 resolution also
constituted a denial of its own motion for reconsideration, Daikoku
went to the CA via a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 96282, to assail the NLRC Resolutions dated May 31, 2006 and
July 31, 2006. The same NLRC resolutions were also assailed in
Albertos similar petition to the appellate court, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 100714. Both petitions, while involving the same parties and
practically the same subject and issues, were not consolidated in the
CA.
Meanwhile, on October 30, 2006, Alberto filed before the CA a Motion

for Summary Dismissal and to Cite Petitioner in Direct Contempt,
alleging that the assailed NLRC resolutions of May 31 and July 31,
2006 have become final as against Daikoku which filed out of time a
prohibited second motion for reconsideration.
The Ruling of the CA
175

On September 26, 2007, the appellate court rendered the assailed

decision dismissing Daikokus appeal as well as denying Albertos
contempt motion. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and is,

accordingly, DISMISSED. The motion to cite petitioner in contempt is,
likewise, DENIED for lack of merit.lavvphi1
SO ORDERED.
The CA anchored its denial of Daikokus petition on the interplay of

the following stated grounds or premises: (1) prematurity of the
petition for certiorari, the NLRC not having yet resolved Daikokus
motion for reconsideration of the NLRCs May 31, 2006 resolution;
(2) even if the matter of prematurity is to be disregarded, the NLRC
May 31, 2006 resolution has become final and executory as to
Daikoku as its motion for reconsideration was filed out of time; and
(3) there is no compelling reason for the relaxation of procedural
rules.
Following the CAs denial on February 7, 2008 of its motion for

reconsideration, Daikoku interposed this petition.
The Issues
I. THE [CA] GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO

LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT STATED THAT THE
DECISION OF THE NLRC AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS ALREADY
ATTAINED ITS FINALITY.
176

II. UPHOLDING THE GRANT OF BACKWAGES TO THE

RESPONDENT IS UNJUST, BASELESS AND INEQUITABLE.5
The Courts Ruling
The key issue, as the appellate court aptly put it, boils down to the
question of timeliness of Daikokus motion for reconsideration of the
May 31, 2006 NLRC Resolution.
Motion for Reconsideration Belatedly Filed
As the records show, Daikoku admitted receiving a copy of the May

31, 2006 NLRC resolution on June 16, 2006. It only filed its motion
for reconsideration on July 3, 2006, or 17 days after the receipt of
the May 31, 2006 resolution. Section 15, Rule VII of the NLRC 2005
Rules of Procedure pertinently provides:
SECTION 15. MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION.Motions for

reconsideration of any decision, resolution or order of the
Commission shall not be entertained except when based on palpable
or patent errors; provided that the motion is x x x filed within ten
(10) calendar days from receipt of decision, resolution or order, with
proof of service that a copy of the same has been furnished, within
the reglementary period, the adverse party; and provided further,
that only one such motion from the same party shall be entertained.
(Emphasis ours.)
Applying the above provision to the case at bench, Daikoku had 10

days from June 16, 2006 when it received the May 31, 2006 NLRC
resolution, or until June 26, 2006, to be precise, within which to file
a motion for reconsideration. As it were, Daikoku filed its motion for
177

reconsideration of the May 31, 2006 NLRC resolution on the 17th

day from its receipt of the said resolution. The motion for
reconsideration was doubtless filed out of time, as the CA
determined.
To be sure, the relaxation of procedural rules cannot be made

without any valid reasons proffered for or underpinning it. To merit
liberality, petitioner must show reasonable cause justifying its noncompliance with the rules and must convince the Court that the
outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of
substantive justice.6 Daikoku urges a less rigid application of
procedural rules to give way for the resolution of the case on its
merits. The desired leniency cannot be accorded absent valid and
compelling reasons for such a procedural lapse. The appellate court
saw no compelling need meriting the relaxation of the rules. Neither
does the Court.
We must stress that the bare invocation of "the interest of

substantial justice" line is not some magic wand that will
automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules.
Procedural rules are not to be belittled, let alone dismissed simply
because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a
partys substantial rights.7 Utter disregard of the rules cannot be
justly rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction.8
Daikokus substantial rights, if any, may still be amply addressed in

the appellate proceedings Alberto instituted and pending before the
CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 100714.9 As to Alberto, his appeal
opens de novo his action for illegal dismissal vis--vis the decision of
the NLRC. At the very least, Daikoku still had the opportunity to be
heard in opposition to Albertos appeal. Be that as it may, it
behooves the Court to refrain from taking any dispositive action that
will likely preempt the CA in its disposition of Albertos appeal.10
Indeed, the issue as to whether or not there was a valid ground for
178

the dismissal of workers is factual in nature,11 best threshed out

before the appellate court which has jurisdiction to rule over
controversies traversing both issues or questions of fact and law.
While not determinative of the final outcome of this case, we are

inclined to agree with Daikokus treatment of the July 31, 2006
NLRC Resolution as an action denying its motion for reconsideration
of the May 31, 2006 NLRC Resolution. Two factors point to such
conclusion: (1) Daikoku filed its motion for reconsideration on July 3,
2006, way before the issuance of the July 31, 2006 NLRC Resolution;
and (2) while the NLRC only mentioned Albertos motion in the July
31, 2006 Resolution, the tenor of this issuance conveys the
impression that it was the final ruling of the entire controversy, one
that puts to a final rest the clashing interests of the parties. Consider
the following NLRC lines:
For want of grave abuse of discretion and serious error, this

Commission now write finis to this labor controversy.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolution of 31 May 2006 STAND

undisturbed.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)
Given the foregoing consideration, it may validly be concluded that

Daikokus motion for reconsideration of the May 31, 2006 NLRC
Resolution had, in effect, been denied, on the ground of belated filing.
In a very real sense, therefore, the CA was correct in its holding that
the May 31, 2006 NLRC Resolution is final and executory as to
Daikoku.
179

To obviate any misunderstanding, however, we wish to stress that

this disposition does not purport to pass upon the correctness of,
much more sustain, the NLRCs May 31, 2006 Resolution. Neither
should this Decision be taken as affirming or negating the propriety
of Albertos dismissal from the service and the consequent money
award granted by the NLRC. That kind of adjudication could very
well come later should Alberto opt to pursue his cause further with
the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 100714. For the moment, we are mainly
concerned, as we should be, with what Daikoku has raised before us:
the propriety of the assailed September 26, 2007 CA Decision, as
reiterated in its resolution of February 7, 2008.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of

merit. Accordingly, the CA Decision dated September 26, 2007 and
Resolution dated February 7, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 96282 are
hereby AFFIRMED.Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO*
180

Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO**
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
181

Footnotes
* Additional member as per Special Order No. 645 dated May 15,
2009.
** Additional member as per Special Order No. 635 dated May 7,

2009.
1 Rollo, pp. 27-36. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De GuiaSalvador and concurred in by Associate Justices Magdangal M. De
Leon and Ricardo R. Rosario.
2 Id. at 38.
3 Id. at 54-65. Penned by Commissioner Gregorio O. Bilog III and

concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier and
Commissioner Tito F. Genilo.
4 Id. at 66-67.
5 Id. at 14 & 18.
6 United Paragon Mining Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

150959, August 4, 2006, 497 SCRA 638, 648; citing Philippine Valve
Mfg. Company v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
152304, November 12, 2004, 442 SCRA 383.
182

7 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Ascot Holdings and Equities, Inc.,

G.R. No. 175163, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 396, 406.
8 Torres v. Abundo, G.R. No. 174263, January 24, 2007, 512 SCRA
556, 565; citing Castillo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159971, March
25, 2004, 426 SCRA 369, 375.
9 CA Ninth Division.
10 Per verification, on December 22, 2008, CA-G.R. SP No. 100714

was dismissed by the Ninth Division, with Associate Justice
Arcangelita R. Lontok III as ponente. The case is pending resolution
of the motion for reconsideration filed by Alberto.
11 Espina v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164582, March 28, 2007,

519 SCRA 327, 355; citing Anvil Ensembles Garment v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 155037, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 675, 681.
183

September 17, 2009
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 175490
September 17, 2009
ILEANA DR. MACALINAO, Petitioner,

vs.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the June 30, 2006
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its November 21, 2006
Resolution2 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioner Ileana Macalinao was an approved cardholder of BPI

Mastercard, one of the credit card facilities of respondent Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI).3 Petitioner Macalinao made some purchases
through the use of the said credit card and defaulted in paying for
184

said purchases. She subsequently received a letter dated January 5,

2004 from respondent BPI, demanding payment of the amount of
one hundred forty-one thousand five hundred eighteen pesos and
thirty-four centavos (PhP 141,518.34), as follows:
Statement Date Previous Balance

Purchases (Payments)
Penalty Interest Finance Charges Balance Due
10/27/2002
94,843.70
559.72
11/27/2002
98,465.41 (15,000)
3,061.99
98,456.41
2,885.61
86,351.02
12/31/2002
86,351.02 30,308.80 259.05
119,752.28
2,806.41
1/27/2003
119,752.28
124,234.58
618.23
3,891.07
2/27/2003
124,234.58
129,263.13
990.93
4,037.62
3/27/2003
3,616.05
129,263.13
115,177.90
4/27/2003
115,177.90
119,565.44
(18,000.00)
644.26
298.72
3,743.28
5/27/2003
3,571.71
119,565.44
113,540.10
(10,000.00)
402.95
6/29/2003
3,607.32
113,540.10
118,833.49
8,362.50 (7,000.00)
323.57
7/27/2003
118,833.49
123,375.65
608.07
3,862.09
8/27/2003
123,375.65
128,435.56
1,050.20
4,009.71
9/28/2003
128,435.56
134,045.23
1,435.51
4,174.16
185

10/28/2003
11/28/2003
12/28/2003
1/27/2004
141,518.34
154,608.78
8,491.10
4,599.34
Under the Terms and Conditions Governing the Issuance and Use of
the BPI Credit and BPI Mastercard, the charges or balance thereof
remaining unpaid after the payment due date indicated on the
monthly Statement of Accounts shall bear interest at the rate of 3%
per month and an additional penalty fee equivalent to another 3%
per month. Particularly:
8. PAYMENT OF CHARGES BCC shall furnish the Cardholder a

monthly Statement of Account (SOA) and the Cardholder agrees that
all charges made through the use of the CARD shall be paid by the
Cardholder as stated in the SOA on or before the last day for
payment, which is twenty (20) days from the date of the said SOA,
and such payment due date may be changed to an earlier date if the
Cardholders account is considered overdue and/or with balances in
excess of the approved credit limit, or to such other date as may be
deemed proper by the CARD issuer with notice to the Cardholder on
the same monthly SOA. If the last day fall on a Saturday, Sunday or
a holiday, the last day for the payment automatically becomes the
last working day prior to said payment date. However,
notwithstanding the absence or lack of proof of service of the SOA of
the Cardholder, the latter shall pay any and all charges made
through the use of the CARD within thirty (30) days from date or
dates thereof. Failure of the Cardholder to pay the charges made
through the CARD within the payment period as stated in the SOA or
within thirty (30) days from actual date or dates of purchase
whichever occur earlier, shall render him in default without the
necessity of demand from BCC, which the Cardholder expressly
waives. The charges or balance thereof remaining unpaid after the
payment due date indicated on the monthly Statement of Accounts
186

shall bear interest at the rate of 3% per month for BPI Express Credit,
BPI Gold Mastercard and an additional penalty fee equivalent to
another 3% of the amount due for every month or a fraction of a
months delay. PROVIDED that if there occurs any change on the
prevailing market rates, BCC shall have the option to adjust the rate
of interest and/or penalty fee due on the outstanding obligation with
prior notice to the cardholder. The Cardholder hereby authorizes
BCC to correspondingly increase the rate of such interest [in] the
event of changes in the prevailing market rates, and to charge
additional service fees as may be deemed necessary in order to
maintain its service to the Cardholder. A CARD with outstanding
balance unpaid after thirty (30) days from original billing statement
date shall automatically be suspended, and those with accounts
unpaid after ninety (90) days from said original billing/statement
date shall automatically be cancel (sic), without prejudice to BCCs
right to suspend or cancel any card anytime and for whatever reason.
In case of default in his obligation as provided herein, Cardholder
shall surrender his/her card to BCC and in addition to the interest
and penalty charges aforementioned , pay the following liquidated
damages and/or fees (a) a collection fee of 25% of the amount due if
the account is referred to a collection agency or attorney; (b) service
fee for every dishonored check issued by the cardholder in payment
of his account without prejudice, however, to BCCs right of
considering Cardholders account, and (c) a final fee equivalent to
25% of the unpaid balance, exclusive of litigation expenses and
judicial cost, if the payment of the account is enforced though court
action. Venue of all civil suits to enforce this Agreement or any other
suit directly or indirectly arising from the relationship between the
parties as established herein, whether arising from crimes,
negligence or breach thereof, shall be in the process of courts of the
City of Makati or in other courts at the option of BCC.4 (Emphasis
supplied.)1avvphi1
For failure of petitioner Macalinao to settle her obligations,

respondent BPI filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Makati City a complaint for a sum of money against her and her
187

husband, Danilo SJ. Macalinao. This was raffled to Branch 66 of the

MeTC and was docketed as Civil Case No. 84462 entitled Bank of the
Philippine Islands vs. Spouses Ileana Dr. Macalinao and Danilo SJ.
Macalinao.5
In said complaint, respondent BPI prayed for the payment of the

amount of one hundred fifty-four thousand six hundred eight pesos
and seventy-eight centavos (PhP 154,608.78) plus 3.25% finance
charges and late payment charges equivalent to 6% of the amount
due from February 29, 2004 and an amount equivalent to 25% of the
total amount due as attorneys fees, and of the cost of suit.6
After the summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon
petitioner Macalinao and her husband, they failed to file their
Answer.7 Thus, respondent BPI moved that judgment be rendered in
accordance with Section 6 of the Rule on Summary Procedure.8 This
was granted in an Order dated June 16, 2004.9 Thereafter,
respondent BPI submitted its documentary evidence.101avvphi1
In its Decision dated August 2, 2004, the MeTC ruled in favor of

respondent BPI and ordered petitioner Macalinao and her husband
to pay the amount of PhP 141,518.34 plus interest and penalty
charges of 2% per month, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the allegations of the complaint

supported by documentary evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff, Bank of the Philippine Islands and against
defendant-spouses Ileana DR Macalinao and Danilo SJ Macalinao by
ordering the latter to pay the former jointly and severally the
following:
188

1. The amount of PESOS: ONE HUNDRED FORTY ONE THOUSAND

FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN AND 34/100 (P141,518.34) plus
interest and penalty charges of 2% per month from January 05,
2004 until fully paid;
2. P10,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees; and
3. Cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.11
Only petitioner Macalinao and her husband appealed to the Regional

Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, their recourse docketed as Civil
Case No. 04-1153. In its Decision dated October 14, 2004, the RTC
affirmed in toto the decision of the MeTC and held:
In any event, the sum of P141,518.34 adjudged by the trial court

appeared to be the result of a recomputation at the reduced rate of
2% per month. Note that the total amount sought by the plaintiffappellee was P154,608.75 exclusive of finance charge of 3.25% per
month and late payment charge of 6% per month.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed in toto.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.12
189

Unconvinced, petitioner Macalinao filed a petition for review with the

CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 92031. The CA affirmed
with modification the Decision of the RTC:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED

with respect to the total amount due and interest rate. Accordingly,
petitioners are jointly and severally ordered to pay respondent Bank
of the Philippine Islands the following:
1. The amount of One Hundred Twenty Six Thousand Seven

Hundred Six Pesos and Seventy Centavos plus interest and penalty
charges of 3% per month from January 5, 2004 until fully paid;
2. P10,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees; and
3. Cost of Suit.
SO ORDERED.13
Although sued jointly with her husband, petitioner Macalinao was

the only one who filed the petition before the CA since her husband
already passed away on October 18, 2005.14
In its assailed decision, the CA held that the amount of PhP

141,518.34 (the amount sought to be satisfied in the demand letter
of respondent BPI) is clearly not the result of the re-computation at
the reduced interest rate as previous higher interest rates were
already incorporated in the said amount. Thus, the said amount
should not be made as basis in computing the total obligation of
petitioner Macalinao. Further, the CA also emphasized that
190

respondent BPI should not compound the interest in the instant case
absent a stipulation to that effect. The CA also held, however, that
the MeTC erred in modifying the amount of interest rate from 3%
monthly to only 2% considering that petitioner Macalinao freely
availed herself of the credit card facility offered by respondent BPI to
the general public. It explained that contracts of adhesion are not
invalid per se and are not entirely prohibited.
Petitioner Macalinaos motion for reconsideration was denied by the

CA in its Resolution dated November 21, 2006. Hence, petitioner
Macalinao is now before this Court with the following assigned
errors:
I.
THE REDUCTION OF INTEREST RATE, FROM 9.25% TO 2%,

SHOULD BE UPHELD SINCE THE STIPULATED RATE OF INTEREST
WAS UNCONSCIONABLE AND INIQUITOUS, AND THUS ILLEGAL.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ARBITRARILY MODIFIED THE REDUCED

RATE OF INTEREST FROM 2% TO 3%, CONTRARY TO THE TENOR
OF ITS OWN DECISION.
III.
THE COURT A QUO, INSTEAD OF PROCEEDING WITH A

RECOMPUTATION, SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE CASE FOR
FAILURE OF RESPONDENT BPI TO PROVE THE CORRECT
191

AMOUNT OF PETITIONERS OBLIGATION, OR IN THE

ALTERNATIVE, REMANDED THE CASE TO THE LOWER COURT
FOR RESPONDENT BPI TO PRESENT PROOF OF THE CORRECT
AMOUNT THEREOF.
Our Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The Interest Rate and Penalty Charge of 3% Per Month or 36% Per
Annum Should Be Reduced to 2% Per Month or 24% Per Annum
In its Complaint, respondent BPI originally imposed the interest and

penalty charges at the rate of 9.25% per month or 111% per annum.
This was declared as unconscionable by the lower courts for being
clearly excessive, and was thus reduced to 2% per month or 24% per
annum. On appeal, the CA modified the rate of interest and penalty
charge and increased them to 3% per month or 36% per annum
based on the Terms and Conditions Governing the Issuance and Use
of the BPI Credit Card, which governs the transaction between
petitioner Macalinao and respondent BPI.
In the instant petition, Macalinao claims that the interest rate and
penalty charge of 3% per month imposed by the CA is iniquitous as
the same translates to 36% per annum or thrice the legal rate of
interest.15 On the other hand, respondent BPI asserts that said
interest rate and penalty charge are reasonable as the same are
based on the Terms and Conditions Governing the Issuance and Use
of the BPI Credit Card.16
192

We find for petitioner. We are of the opinion that the interest rate
and penalty charge of 3% per month should be equitably reduced to
2% per month or 24% per annum.
Indeed, in the Terms and Conditions Governing the Issuance and

Use of the BPI Credit Card, there was a stipulation on the 3%
interest rate. Nevertheless, it should be noted that this is not the first
time that this Court has considered the interest rate of 36% per
annum as excessive and unconscionable. We held in Chua vs.
Timan:17
The stipulated interest rates of 7% and 5% per month imposed on

respondents loans must be equitably reduced to 1% per month or
12% per annum. We need not unsettle the principle we had affirmed
in a plethora of cases that stipulated interest rates of 3% per month
and higher are excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant.
Such stipulations are void for being contrary to morals, if not against
the law. While C.B. Circular No. 905-82, which took effect on
January 1, 1983, effectively removed the ceiling on interest rates for
both secured and unsecured loans, regardless of maturity, nothing
in the said circular could possibly be read as granting carte blanche
authority to lenders to raise interest rates to levels which would
either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their
assets. (Emphasis supplied.)
Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void, it is as if there was

no express contract thereon. Hence, courts may reduce the interest
rate as reason and equity demand.18
The same is true with respect to the penalty charge. Notably, under
the Terms and Conditions Governing the Issuance and Use of the
BPI Credit Card, it was also stated therein that respondent BPI shall
193

impose an additional penalty charge of 3% per month. Pertinently,

Article 1229 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the
principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by
the debtor. Even if there has been no performance, the penalty may
also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable.
In exercising this power to determine what is iniquitous and

unconscionable, courts must consider the circumstances of each
case since what may be iniquitous and unconscionable in one may
be totally just and equitable in another.19
In the instant case, the records would reveal that petitioner

Macalinao made partial payments to respondent BPI, as indicated in
her Billing Statements.20 Further, the stipulated penalty charge of
3% per month or 36% per annum, in addition to regular interests, is
indeed iniquitous and unconscionable.
Thus, under the circumstances, the Court finds it equitable to

reduce the interest rate pegged by the CA at 1.5% monthly to 1%
monthly and penalty charge fixed by the CA at 1.5% monthly to 1%
monthly or a total of 2% per month or 24% per annum in line with
the prevailing jurisprudence and in accordance with Art. 1229 of the
Civil Code.
There Is No Basis for the Dismissal of the Case,
Much Less a Remand of the Same for Further Reception of Evidence
194

Petitioner Macalinao claims that the basis of the re-computation of

the CA, that is, the amount of PhP 94,843.70 stated on the October
27, 2002 Statement of Account, was not the amount of the principal
obligation. Thus, this allegedly necessitates a re-examination of the
evidence presented by the parties. For this reason, petitioner
Macalinao further contends that the dismissal of the case or its
remand to the lower court would be a more appropriate disposition of
the case.
Such contention is untenable. Based on the records, the summons

and a copy of the complaint were served upon petitioner Macalinao
and her husband on May 4, 2004. Nevertheless, they failed to file
their Answer despite such service. Thus, respondent BPI moved that
judgment be rendered accordingly.21 Consequently, a decision was
rendered by the MeTC on the basis of the evidence submitted by
respondent BPI. This is in consonance with Sec. 6 of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure, which states:
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. Should the defendant fail to

answer the complaint within the period above provided, the court,
motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as
may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited
to what is prayed for therein: Provided, however, that the court may
in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorneys fees
claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is
without prejudice to the applicability of Section 3(c), Rule 10 of the
Rules of Court, if there are two or more defendants. (As amended by
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; emphasis supplied.)
Considering the foregoing rule, respondent BPI should not be made

to suffer for petitioner Macalinaos failure to file an answer and
concomitantly, to allow the latter to submit additional evidence by
dismissing or remanding the case for further reception of evidence.
Significantly, petitioner Macalinao herself admitted the existence of
195

her obligation to respondent BPI, albeit with reservation as to the

principal amount. Thus, a dismissal of the case would cause great
injustice to respondent BPI. Similarly, a remand of the case for
further reception of evidence would unduly prolong the proceedings
of the instant case and render inutile the proceedings conducted
before the lower courts.
Significantly, the CA correctly used the beginning balance of PhP

94,843.70 as basis for the re-computation of the interest considering
that this was the first amount which appeared on the Statement of
Account of petitioner Macalinao. There is no other amount on which
the re-computation could be based, as can be gathered from the
evidence on record. Furthermore, barring a showing that the factual
findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or
that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion, such findings must stand, for this Court is not expected
or required to examine or contrast the evidence submitted by the
parties.22
In view of the ruling that only 1% monthly interest and 1% penalty

charge can be applied to the beginning balance of PhP 94,843.70,
this Court finds the following computation more appropriate:
Statement Date Previous Balance

Purchases (Payments)
Balance
Interest (1%)
Penalty
Charge
(1%) Total Amount Due for the Month
10/27/2002
94,843.70
96,740.58
94,843.70 948.44
11/27/2002
94,843.70 (15,000)
81,440.58
948.44
79,843.70 798.44
798.44
196

12/31/2002
1,101.53
79,843.70 30,308.80 110,152.50

112,355.56
1,101.53
1/27/2003
1,101.53
110,152.50
112,355.56
110,152.50
1,101.53
2/27/2003
1,101.53
110,152.50
112,355.56
110,152.50
1,101.53
3/27/2003
921.53
110,152.50
93,995.56
4/27/2003
92,152.50
93,995.56
(18,000.00)
92,152.50 921.53
92,152.50 921.53
5/27/2003
821.53
92,152.50 (10,000.00)
83,795.56
6/29/2003
835.15
82,152.50 8,362.50 (7,000.00)

85,185.30
921.53
82,152.50 821.53
83,515.00 835.15
7/27/2003
83,515.00
85,185.30
83,515.00 835.15
835.15
8/27/2003
83,515.00
85,185.30
83,515.00 835.15
835.15
9/28/2003
83,515.00
85,185.30
83,515.00 835.15
835.15
10/28/2003
83,515.00
85,185.30
83,515.00 835.15
835.15
11/28/2003
83,515.00
85,185.30
83,515.00 835.15
835.15
12/28/2003
83,515.00
85,185.30
83,515.00 835.15
835.15
1/27/2004
83,515.00
85,185.30
83,515.00 835.15
835.15
TOTAL
83,515.00 14,397.26 14,397.26 112,309.52
197

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The CA Decision

dated June 30, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 92031 is hereby MODIFIED
with respect to the total amount due, interest rate, and penalty
charge. Accordingly, petitioner Macalinao is ordered to pay
respondent BPI the following:
(1) The amount of one hundred twelve thousand three hundred nine
pesos and fifty-two centavos (PhP 112,309.52) plus interest and
penalty charges of 2% per month from January 5, 2004 until fully
paid;
(2) PhP 10,000 as and by way of attorneys fees; and
(3) Cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
198

Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
199

Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 29-38. Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De

Leon and concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and
Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente.
2 Id. at 40-41.
3 Id. at 30.
4 Id. at 30-31.
5 Id. at 184.
6 Id. at 2-3.
7 Id. at 141.
8 Id. at 165.
9 Id. at 228.
10 Id. at 192-223. The documentary evidence was presented

pursuant to the Order dated June 16, 2004 of the MeTC.
11 Id. at 166. Penned by Judge Perpetua Atal-Pao.
200

12 Id. at 142-143. Penned by Hon. Manuel D. Victorio.
13 Id. at 37.
14 Id. at 146.
15 Id. at 17.
16 Id. at 323.
17 G.R. No. 170452, August 13, 2008, 562 SCRA 146, 149-150.
18 Imperial v. Jaucian, G.R. No. 149004, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA
517; citing Tongoy v. Court of Appeals, No. L-45645, June 28, 1983,
123 SCRA 99.
19 Imperial, id.
20 Rollo, pp. 56-81.
21 Id. at 165.
22 Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. Nos. 114841-43, August 23, 1995, 247 SCRA 606.
201

11. Tomawis vs. Balindong, 614 SCRA 354, March 05, 2010
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182434
March 5, 2010
SULTAN YAHYA "JERRY" M. TOMAWIS, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. RASAD G. BALINDONG, AMNA A. PUMBAYA, JALILAH A.
MANGOMPIA, and RAMLA A. MUSOR, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule

65 seeks to nullify the Orders dated July 13, 2005, September 6,
2005, and February 6, 2008 issued by respondent Judge Rasad G.
Balindong of the Sharia District Court (SDC), Fourth Judicial
District in Marawi City, in Civil Case No. 102-97 entitled Amna A.
Pumbaya, et al. v. Jerry Tomawis, et al.
The Facts
Private respondents Amna A. Pumbaya, Jalilah A. Mangompia, and

Ramla A. Musor are the daughters of the late Acraman Radia. On
February 21, 1997, private respondents filed with the SDC an action
for quieting of title of a parcel of land located in Banggolo, Marawi
City, against petitioner Sultan Jerry Tomawis and one Mangoda
202

Radia. In their complaint, styled as Petition1 and docketed as Civil

Case No. 102-97, private respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, alleged the
following:
(1) They were the absolute owners of the lot subject of the complaint,
being the legal heirs of Acraman Radia, who had always been in
peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession of the property; (2)
Tomawis assumed ownership of the said property on the claim that
he bought the same from Mangoda Radia, who, in turn, claimed that
he inherited it from his late father; (3) in 1996, they "were informed
that their land [was] leveled and the small houses [built] thereon
with their permission were removed" upon the orders of Tomawis;
and (4) they had been unlawfully deprived of their possession of the
land, and Tomawis actions had cast a cloud of doubt on their title.
In his answer, Tomawis debunked the sisters claim of ownership

and raised, as one of his affirmative defenses treated by the court as
a motion to dismiss, SDCs lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case.2 As argued, the regular civil court, not SDC, had
such jurisdiction pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129 or the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.3
Following the hearing on the affirmative defenses, respondent Judge

Rasad Balindong, by Order of April 1, 2003, denied the motion.
Apropos the jurisdiction aspect of the motion, respondent judge
asserted the SDCs original jurisdiction over the case, concurrently
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), by force of Article 143,
paragraph 2(b) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1083 or the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
On June 16, 2005, Tomawis filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss with

Prayer to Correct the Name of Defendants to Read Sultan Yahya
"Jerry" M. Tomawis & Mangoda M. Radia.4 In it, he alleged that title
203

to or possession of real property or interest in it was clearly the

subject matter of the complaint which, thus, brought it within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts in consonance
with existing law. 5 On July 13, 2005, the SDC denied this motion to
dismiss.
Unsatisfied, Tomawis later interposed an Urgent Motion for

Reconsideration with Prayer to Cancel and Reset the Continuation of
Trial Until After the Resolution of the Pending Incident.6 Per Order7
dated September 6, 2005, the SDC denied Tomawis urgent motion
for reconsideration and ordered the continuation of trial.
Forthwith, Tomawis repaired to the Court of Appeals (CA), Mindanao

Station, on a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition
under Rule 65 to nullify, on jurisdictional grounds, the aforesaid
SDC July 13, 2005 and September 6, 2005 Orders.
By Resolution8 of February 8, 2006, the appellate court dismissed

the petition on the ground that the CA was "not empowered to
resolve decisions, orders or final judgments of the [SDCs]." Justifying
its disposition, the CA held that, pursuant to Art. 1459 of PD 1083,
in relation to Art. VIII, Section 910 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9054,11
the new organic law of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
final decisions of the SDC are reviewable by the yet to be established
Sharia Appellate Court. Pending the reorganization of the Sharia
Appellate Court, the CA ruled that such intermediate appellate
jurisdiction rests with the Supreme Court.
Undeterred by the foregoing setback before the CA, Tomawis

interposed, on January 29, 2008, before the SDC another motion to
dismiss on the same grounds as his previous motions to dismiss.
The motion was rejected by respondent Judge Balindong per his
order of February 6, 2008, denying the motion with finality.
204

Hence, this recourse on the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONERS
MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF
JURISDICTION AND IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION SEEKING
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER DENYING HIS MOTION TO
DISMISS.
Simply put, the issue is whether or not the SDC can validly take
cognizance of Civil Case No. 102-97.
The Courts Ruling
Prefatorily, the Court acknowledges the fact that decades after the
enactment in 1989 of the law12 creating the Sharia Appellate Court
and after the Court, per Resolution of June 8, 1999,13 authorized its
creation, the Sharia Appellate Court has yet to be organized with the
appointment of a Presiding Justice and two Associate Justices. Until
such time that the Sharia Appellate Court shall have been organized,
however, appeals or petitions from final orders or decisions of the
SDC filed with the CA shall be referred to a Special Division to be
organized in any of the CA stations preferably composed of Muslim
CA Justices.
For cases where only errors or questions of law are raised or involved,
the appeal shall be to this Court by a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court pursuant to Art. VIII, Sec. 5 of
the Constitution and Sec. 2 of Rule 41 of the Rules.
205

To be sure, the Court has, on several occasions, passed upon and

resolved petitions and cases emanating from Sharia courts. Among
these was one involving the issue of whether or not grave abuse of
discretion attended the denial of a motion to implement a writ of
execution.14 Still another involved the Sharia courts jurisdiction in
custody and guardianship proceedings,15 nullity of marriage and
divorce when the parties were both married in civil and Muslim
rites,16 and settlement of estate proceedings where the deceased was
alleged to be not a Muslim,17 or where the estate covered properties
situated in different provinces.18
The instant petition, involving only a question of law on the

jurisdiction of the SDC over a complaint for quieting of title, was
properly instituted before the Court.
Petitioner asserts that Sec. 19(2), in relation to Sec. 33(3) of BP 129,

as amendedby vesting original exclusive jurisdiction to the RTCs or
Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), as the case may be, over civil actions
that involve the title to, or possession of, real propertyeffectively
removed the concurrent jurisdiction once pertaining to the SDC
under Art. 143(2)(b) of PD 1083. In fine, petitioner contends that Art.
143 of PD 1083, insofar as it granted the SDC concurrent
jurisdiction over certain real actions, was repealed by the BP 129
provisions adverted to.
Disagreeing as to be expected, private respondents balk at the notion

of the implied repeal petitioner espouses, arguing that PD 1083,
being a special, albeit a prior, law, has not been repealed by BP 129.
Putting private respondents contention in a narrower perspective,
Art. 143(2)(b) of PD 1083 is of specific applicability and, hence,
cannot, under the rules of legal hermeneutics, be superseded by laws
of general application, absent an express repeal.
206

Petitioners claim has no basis.
The allegations, as well as the relief sought by private respondents,

the elimination of the "cloud of doubts on the title of ownership"19
on the subject land, are within the SDCs jurisdiction to grant.
A brief background. The Judiciary Act of 1948 (RA 296) was enacted
on June 17, 1948. It vested the Courts of First Instance with original
jurisdiction:
(b) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real
property, or any interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impost or
assessment, except actions of forcible entry into and detainer on
lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is conferred by this
Act upon city and municipal courts.20 x x x
Subsequently, PD 1083, dated February 4, 1977, created the Sharia

courts, i.e., the SDC and the Sharia Circuit Court, both of limited
jurisdiction. In Republic v. Asuncion,21 the Court, citing the
Administrative Code of 1987,22 classified Sharia courts as "regular
courts," meaning they are part of the judicial department.
Art. 143 of PD 1083 vests SDCs, in certain cases, with exclusive

original jurisdiction and with concurrent original jurisdiction over
certain causes of action. As far as relevant, Art. 143 reads as follows:
ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. (1) The Sharia District Court

shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
xxxx
207

d) All actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties

are Muslims, if they have not specified which law shall govern their
relations; and
xxxx
(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Sharia District Court
shall have original jurisdiction over:
xxxx
(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1
(d) wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court. (Emphasis
added.)
On August 14, 1981, BP 129 took effect. Sec. 19 of BP 129, as later

amended by RA 7691,23 defining the jurisdiction of the RTCs,
provides:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known

as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.Regional Trial Courts shall

exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
208

xxxx
"(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000,00) or,
for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into
and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over
which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts." (Emphasis
supplied.)
As things stood prior to the effectivity date of BP 129, the SDC had,
by virtue of PD 1083, original jurisdiction, concurrently with the
RTCs and MTCs, over all personal and real actions outside the
purview of Art. 143(1)(d) of PD 1083, in which the parties involved
were Muslims, except those for ejectment. Personal action is one that
is founded on privity of contracts between the parties;24 and in
which the plaintiff usually seeks the recovery of personal property,
the enforcement of a contract, or recovery of damages.25 Real action,
on the other hand, is one anchored on the privity of real estate,26
where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of ownership or possession of
real property or interest in it.27
On the other hand, BP 129, as amended, vests the RTC or the

municipal trial court with exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil
actions that involve the title to or possession of real property, or any
interest in it, and the value of the property subject of the case or the
jurisdictional amount, determining whether the case comes within
the jurisdictional competence of the RTC or the MTC. Orbeta v.
Orbeta28 differentiated personal action from real action in the
following wise:
209

A real action, under Sec. 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, is one that
affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein.
Such actions should be commenced and tried in the proper court
which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. All other actions are
personal and may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any
of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of
the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Civil Case No. 102-97, judging from the averments in the underlying
complaint, is basically a suit for recovery of possession and eventual
reconveyance of real property which, under BP 129, as amended,
falls within the original jurisdiction of either the RTC or MTC. In an
action for reconveyance, all that must be alleged in the complaint are
two facts that, admitting them to be true, would entitle the plaintiff
to recover title to the disputed land, namely: (1) that the plaintiff is
the owner of the land or has possessed the land in the concept of
owner; and (2) that the defendant has illegally dispossessed the
plaintiff of the land.29 A cursory perusal of private respondents
complaint readily shows that that these requisites have been met:
they alleged absolute ownership of the subject parcel of land, and
they were illegally dispossessed of their land by petitioner. The
allegations in the complaint, thus, make a case for an action for
reconveyance.
Given the above perspective, the question that comes to the fore is
whether the jurisdiction of the RTC or MTC is to the exclusion of the
SDC.
Petitioners version of the law would effectively remove the

concurrent original jurisdiction granted by Art. 143, par. 2(b) of PD
1083 to civil courts and Sharia courts over, among others:
210

All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d)
wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court. x x x
Petitioners interpretation of the law cannot be given serious thought.

One must bear in mind that even if Sharia courts are considered
regular courts, these are courts of limited jurisdiction. As we have
observed in Rulona-Al Awadhi v. Astih,30 the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws creating said courts was promulgated to fulfill "the
aspiration of the Filipino Muslims to have their system of laws
enforced in their communities." It is a special law intended for
Filipino Muslims, as clearly stated in the purpose of PD 1083:
ARTICLE 2. Purpose of Code. Pursuant to Section 11 of Article XV

of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides that "The State
shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs and interests of
national cultural communities in the formulation and
implementation of state policies," this Code:
(a) Recognizes the legal system of the Muslims in the Philippines as

part of the law of the land and seeks to make Islamic institutions
more effective;
(b) Codifies Muslim personal laws; and
(c) Provides for an effective administration and enforcement of

Muslim personal laws among Muslims.
211

A reading of the pertinent provisions of BP 129 and PD 1083 shows

that the former, a law of general application to civil courts, has no
application to, and does not repeal, the provisions found in PD 1083,
a special law, which only refers to Sharia courts.
A look at the scope of BP 129 clearly shows that Sharia courts were
not included in the reorganization of courts that were formerly
organized under RA 296. The pertinent provision in BP 129 states:
SECTION 2. Scope. The reorganization herein provided shall

include the Court of Appeals, the Court of First Instance, the Circuit
Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the
Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts,
and the Municipal Circuit Courts.
As correctly pointed out by private respondents in their Comment,31

BP 129 was enacted to reorganize only existing civil courts and is a
law of general application to the judiciary. In contrast, PD 1083 is a
special law that only applies to Sharia courts.
We have held that a general law and a special law on the same
subject are statutes in pari materia and should be read together and
harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both.32 In the
instant case, we apply the principle generalia specialibus non
derogant. A general law does not nullify a special law. The general
law will yield to the special law in the specific and particular subject
embraced in the latter.33 We must read and construe BP 129 and
PD 1083 together, then by taking PD 1083 as an exception to the
general law to reconcile the two laws. This is so since the legislature
has not made any express repeal or modification of PD 1083, and it
is well-settled that repeals of statutes by implication are not
favored.34 Implied repeals will not be declared unless the intent of
the legislators is manifest. Laws are assumed to be passed only after
212

careful deliberation and with knowledge of all existing ones on the

subject, and it follows that the legislature did not intend to interfere
with or abrogate a former law relating to the same subject matter.35
In order to give effect to both laws at hand, we must continue to

recognize the concurrent jurisdiction enjoyed by SDCs with that of
RTCs under PD 1083.1avvphi1
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the court below cannot be made to

depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss,
or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of
the complaint.36 Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
determined from the allegations of the complaint and the character
of the relief sought.37 In the instant case, private respondents
petition38 in Civil Case No. 102-97 sufficiently alleged the
concurrent original jurisdiction of the SDC.
While we recognize the concurrent jurisdiction of the SDCs and the

RTCs with respect to cases involving only Muslims, the SDC has
exclusive original jurisdiction over all actions arising from contracts
customary to Muslims39 to the exclusion of the RTCs, as the
exception under PD 1083, while both courts have concurrent original
jurisdiction over all other personal actions. Said jurisdictional
conferment, found in Art. 143 of PD 1083, is applicable solely when
both parties are Muslims and shall not be construed to operate to
the prejudice of a non-Muslim,40 who may be the opposing party
against a Muslim.
Given petitioners flawed arguments, we hold that the respondent

court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of
discretion is present when there is an arbitrary exercise of power
owing from passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; or a whimsical,
arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to a shirking
213

from or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at

all in contemplation of law. The abuse of discretion must be patent
and gross for the act to be held as one made with grave abuse of
discretion.41 We find respondent courts issuance of the assailed
orders justified and with no abuse of discretion. Its reliance on the
provisions of PD 1083 in asserting its jurisdiction was sound and
unassailable.
We close with the observation that what is involved here are not only
errors of law, but also the errors of a litigant and his lawyer. As may
have been noted, petitioner Tomawis counsel veritably filed two (2)
motions to dismiss, each predicated on the sole issue of jurisdiction.
The first may have been understandable. But the second motion was
something else, interposed as it was after the CA, by resolution,
denied Tomawis petition for certiorari for want of jurisdiction on the
part of the appellate court to review judgments or orders of the SDC.
The CA stated the observation, however, that Tomawis and his
counsel may repair to this Court while the Sharia Appellate Court
has yet to be organized. Petitioner waited two years after the CA
issued its denial before filing what virtually turned out to be his
second motion to dismiss, coming finally to this Court after the same
motion was denied. The Court must express disapproval of the
cunning effort of Tomawis and his counsel to use procedural rules to
the hilt to prolong the final disposition of this case. From Alonso v.
Villamor,42 almost a century-old decision, the Court has left no
doubt that it frowns on such unsporting practice. The rule is settled
that a question of jurisdiction, as here, may be raised at any time,
even on appeal, provided its application does not result in a mockery
of the basic tenets of fair play.43 Petitioners action at the later
stages of the proceedings below, doubtless taken upon counsels
advice, is less than fair and constitutes censurable conduct. Lawyers
and litigants must be brought to account for their improper conduct,
which trenches on the efficient dispensation of justice.
214

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner

Yahya "Jerry" Tomawis and Atty. Edgar A. Masorong are
ADMONISHED to refrain from engaging in activities tending to
frustrate the orderly and speedy administration of justice, with a
warning that repetition of the same or similar acts may result in the
imposition of a more severe sanction.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
215

Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
(On official leave)
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby

certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
216

Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 29-32.
2 Id. at 35.
3 Petitioner relies on Sec. 19 of BP 129 providing that the RTC shall

exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property exceeds twenty thousand
pesos (PhP 20,000) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, except
actions for forcibly entry, the original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
4 Rollo, p. 44.
5 BP 29, as amended by RA 7691, entitled "An Act Expanding the

Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose [BP
129]."
6 Rollo, p. 59.
7 Id. at 65.
217

8 Id. at 86-87. Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and

concurred in by Associate Justices Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores (now
retired) and Ramon R. Garcia.
9 PD 1083, Art. 145 provides, "The decision of the Sharia District

Courts whether on appeal from the Sharia Circuit Court or not shall
be final. Nothing herein contained shall affect the original and
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the
Constitution."
10 Sec. 9. Jurisdiction of the Shariah Appellate Court. The

Shariah Appellate Court shall:
(a) Exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,

prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus and other auxiliary writs and
processes only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; and,
(b) Exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases tried in the
Shariah district courts as established by law.
11 An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose
Republic Act No. 6734, Entitled "An Act Providing for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," as Amended.
12 Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao Organic Law (RA 6734),

as amended.
13 A.M. No. 99-4-66.
218

14 Batugan v. Balindong, G.R. No. 181384, March 13, 2009, 581

SCRA 473.
15 Rulona-Al Awadhi v. Astih, No. L-81969, September 26, 1988,

165 SCRA 771.
16 Bondagjy v. Artadi, G.R. No. 170406, August 11, 2008, 561 SCRA
633.
17 Montaer v. Sharia District Court, Fourth Sharia Judicial

District, Marawi City, G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA
746.
18 Musa v. Moson, G.R. No. 95574, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 715.
19 Rollo, p. 31.
20 Sec. 44.
21 G.R. No. 108208, March 11, 1994, 231 SCRA 211.
22 Sec. 16, Chap. 4, Book 11 of the Code.
23 Approved on March 25, 1994.
219

24 PICOP v. Samson, No. L-30175, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA

224.
25 Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., No. L-29791, January

10, 1978, 81 SCRA 75.
26 1 Paras, Rules of Court Annotated 37 (2nd ed.); citing Osborne v.

Fall River, 140 Mass. 508.
27 Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., supra.
28 G.R. No. 166837, November 27, 2006, 508 SCRA 265, 268; citing
Rules of Court, Rule 4, Sec. 2.
29 Mendizabel v. Apao, G.R. No. 143185, February 20, 2006, 482

SCRA 587, 604.
30 Supra note 15; citing Executive Order No. 442 dated December 23,
1974.
31 Rollo, p. 123.
32 Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, G.R. No. 141309,

June 19, 2007, 525 SCRA 11, 20-21.
33 Agpalo, Statutory Construction 415 (2003).
220

34 Id. at 411.
35 Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr., G.R. No. 156052, February

13, 2008, 545 SCRA 92.
36 Tamano v. Ortiz, G.R. No. 126603, June 29, 1998, 291 SCRA 584.
37 Villena v. Payoyo, G.R. No. 163021, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA
592.
38 Rollo, p. 30.
39 While PD 1083 does not define a customary contract, its Art. 175
of Title III: Customary Contracts states:
Article 175. How construed. Any transaction whereby one person

delivers to another any real estate, plantation, orchard or any fruitbearing property by virtue of sanda, sanla, arindao, or similar
customary contract, shall be construed as a mortgage (rihan) in
accordance with Muslim law.
40 PD 1083, Title II, Article 3. Conflict of provisions.
(1) In case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of
general application, the former shall prevail.
221

(2) Should the conflict be between any provision of this Code and
special laws or laws of local application, the latter shall be liberally
construed in order to carry out the former.
(3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims

and nothing herein shall be construed to operate to the prejudice of
a non-Muslim.
41 Badiola v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170691, April 23, 2008, 552
SCRA 562, 581.
42 16 Phil. 315 (1910).
43 Jimenez v. Patricia, Inc., G.R. No. 134651, September 18, 2000,

340 SCRA 525.
12. People vs. Ng Yik Bun, 639 SCRA 88, January 10, 2011
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 180452
January 10, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
222

vs.
NG YIK BUN, KWOK WAI CHENG, CHANG CHAUN SHI, CHUA
SHILOU HWAN, KAN SHUN MIN, AND RAYMOND S. TAN, AccusedAppellants.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the January 16, 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00485 entitled People of the
Philippines v. Ng Yik Bun, Kwok Wai Cheng, Chang Chaun Shi,
Chua Shilou Hwan, Kan Shun Min and Raymond S. Tan, which
affirmed the April 1, 2004 Decision in Criminal Case No. Q-01-99437
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 103 in Quezon City. The
RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. (RA) 6425 or the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The Facts
An Information indicted accused-appellants of the following:
That on or about the 24th day of August 2000, at Barangay Bignay II,
Municipality of Sariaya, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
223

another, did then and there knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and

feloniously transport, deliver and distribute, without authority of law,
on board an L-300 Mitsubishi van, bearing Plate No. UBU 827, and
have in their possession, custody, and control, without the
corresponding license or prescription, twenty-five (25) heat-sealed
transparent plastic bags containing Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug, each containing: 2.954
grams, 2.901 grams, 2.926 grams, 2.820 grams, 2.977 grams, 2.568
grams, 2.943 grams, 2.955 grams, 2.938 grams and 2.918 grams,
respectively, with a total weight of 72.707 kilos, and one hundred
forty seven (147) self-sealing transparent plastic bags likewise
containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), also a
regulated drug, with a total weight of 291.350 kilos, or with a grand
total weight of 364.057 kilos.
That the above acts were committed by a syndicate with the use of
two (2) motor vehicles, namely: L-300 Mitsubishi Van bearing Plate
No. UBU 827 and a Nissan Sentra Exalta car without Plate Number.
Contrary to law.1
As summarized in the appealed CA decision, the facts are as follows:
On August 24, 2000, at around 9:00 p.m., Capt. Danilo Ibon of Task
Force Aduana received information from an operative that there was
an ongoing shipment of contraband in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya,
Quezon Province. Upon instructions from his superior, Major Carlo
Magno Tabo, Capt. Ibon formed a team in coordination with a
Philippine National Police detachment, and, along with the operative,
224

the team then proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay

II, Sariaya.
The members of the team were able to observe the goings-on at the
resort from a distance of around 50 meters. They spotted six
Chinese-looking men loading bags containing a white substance into
a white van. Having been noticed, Capt. Ibon identified his team and
asked accused-appellant Chua Shilou Hwan (Hwan) what they were
loading on the van. Hwan replied that it was shabu and pointed,
when probed further, to accused-appellant Raymond Tan as the
leader. A total of 172 bags of suspected shabu were then confiscated.
Bundles of noodles (bihon) were also found on the premises.
A laboratory report prepared later by Police Inspector Mary Jean

Geronimo on samples of the 172 confiscated bags showed the white
substance to be shabu.
On January 10, 2001, an Amended Information for violation of Sec.

16, Article III of RA 6425 was filed against accused-appellants, who
entered a plea of not guilty upon re-arraignment.
Accused-appellants all maintained their innocence and presented the

following defenses:
(1) Accused-appellant Hwan testified that he was planning to buy

cheap goods at Villa Vicenta Resort on August 24, 2000, when he
saw a van full of bihon at the resort and inquired if it was for sale.
He went to relieve himself 15 meters away from the van. A group of
police officers arrested him upon his return.
225

(2) Accused-appellant Tan testified that he was a businessman

collecting a debt in Lucena City on August 24, 2000. He was at a
restaurant with his driver when three persons identified themselves
as police officers and forcibly brought him inside a car. He was
handcuffed, blindfolded, and badly beaten. He was later brought to a
beach and was ordered to hold some bags while being photographed
with five Chinese-looking men he saw for the first time. A tricycle
driver, Ricky Pineda, corroborated his story by testifying that he saw
Tan being forced into a white Nissan car on August 24, 2000.
(3) Accused-appellant Ng Yik Bun (Bun) testified that he arrived in

the Philippines as a tourist on August 22, 2000. On August 24, 2000,
he was at a beach with some companions when four armed men
arrested them. He was made to pose next to some plastic bags along
with other accused-appellants, whom he did not personally know. He
was then charged with illegal possession of drugs at the police
station. A friend of his, accused-appellant Kwok Wai Cheng (Cheng),
corroborated his story.
(4) Accused-appellant Kan Shun Min (Min) testified that he arrived in

the Philippines on July 1, 2000 for business and pleasure. On
August 24, 2000, he checked into a beach resort. While walking
there, he was suddenly accosted by four or five men who poked guns
at him. He was brought to a cottage where he saw some unfamiliar
Chinese-looking individuals. He likewise testified that he was made
to take out white packages from a van while being photographed. His
friend, accused-appellant Chang Chaun Shi (Shi), corroborated his
story.
The RTC convicted accused-appellants of the crime charged. The

dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
226

ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby renders judgment finding the six

(6) accused namely Ng Yik Bun, Kwok Wai Cheng, Chang Chaun Shi,
Chua Shilou Hwan, Kan Shun Min and Raymond S. Tan (some also
known by other names), GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 16 of RA 6425, as amended and each is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to
pay a fine of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) each.
The shabu involved in this case and their accompanying

paraphernalia are ordered disposed of in accordance with law, now
RA 9165. The two (2) vehicles are forfeited in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED.2
In questioning the RTC Decision before the CA, accused-appellants

Bun, Cheng, Shi, Min, and Tan raised the lone issue of: whether the
trial court erred in ruling that there was a valid search and arrest
despite the absence of a warrant.
On the other hand, accused-appellant Hwan sought an acquittal on

the basis of the following submissions:
The trial court erred when it held as valid the warrantless search,
seizure and subsequent arrest of the accused-appellants despite the
non-concurrence of the requisite circumstances that justify a
warrantless arrest as held in the case of People vs. [Cuizon].
II
227

The trial court violated Article III, Section 14 of the 1987

Constitution as well as Rule 115 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure when it heard the case at bench on June 26, 2001 at the
chemistry division of the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame,
Quezon City without the presence of both the herein accusedappellant and his counsel de parte.
III
The trial court erred when it issued and dictated in open hearing a
verbal order denying accuseds formal "Motion to Suppress Illegally
Procured Evidence" upon a [ratiocination] that is manifestly contrary
to law [and] jurisprudence set in the Cuizon case, supra.
IV
The trial court erred when with lack of the desired circumspection, it
sweepingly ruled the admission in evidence the 731 exhibits listed in
the prosecutions 43-page formal offer of evidence over the itemized
written objections of the defense in a terse verbal order (bereft of
reason for the denial of the raised objections) dictated in open
hearing which reads: "All the exhibits of the prosecution are hereby
admitted. The court believes that as far as the evidence submitted
goes, these exhibits of the prosecution consisting of several plastic
bags of shabu were not yet shown to be the fruit of a poisonous
plant." x x x
228

The trial court also erred in admitting the prosecutions photographs

(Exhibit "K" and "M," inclusive of their sub-markings), the
photographer who took the shots not having taken the witness stand
to declare, as required by the rules, the circumstances under which
the photographs were taken.
VI
The trial court erred when it tried and applied the provisions of R.A.
9165, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in the instant case even
though [the] crime charged took place on 24 August 2000.
VII
The trial court erred in finding conspiracy among the accused.3
The appellate court found accused-appellants contentions

unmeritorious as it consequently affirmed in toto the RTC Decision.
The CA ruled that, contrary to accused-appellants assertion, they

were first arrested before the seizure of the contraband was made.
The CA held that accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto
loading transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline
substance into an L-300 van which, thus, justified their arrests and
the seizure of the contraband. The CA agreed with the prosecution
that the urgency of the situation meant that the buy-bust team had
no time to secure a search warrant. Moreover, the CA also found that
the warrantless seizure of the transparent plastic bags can likewise
be sustained under the plain view doctrine.
229

The CA debunked accused-appellant Hwans arguments in seriatim.

First, the CA ruled that People v. Cuizon4 was not applicable to the
instant case, as, unlike in Cuizon, the apprehending officers
immediately acted on the information they had received about an
ongoing shipment of drugs.
Second, the CA also noted that accused-appellant Hwan effectively

waived his right to be present during the inspection of exhibits and
hearing, for the manifestation made by the prosecution that accusedappellant Hwan waived his right to be present was never raised in
issue before the trial court.
And third, the CA found accused-appellant Hwans other arguments

untenable. It held that the trial court correctly admitted Exhibits "K"
and "M" even if the photographer was not presented as a witness.
The CA based its ruling on Sison v. People,5 which held that
photographs can be identified either by the photographer or by any
other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and
accuracy. It agreed with the Solicitor General that accusedappellants were correctly tried and convicted by the trial court under
RA 6425 and not RA 9165, as can be gleaned from the fallo of the
RTC Decision. The CA likewise dismissed the argument that
conspiracy was not proved by the prosecution, noting that the
evidence presented established that accused-appellants were
performing "their respective task[s] with the objective of loading the
plastic bags of shabu into an L-300 van."6
The CA disposed of the appeal as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 1, 2004 of the Regional Trial

Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. Q-01-99437,
is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
230

SO ORDERED.7
On February 18, 2008, the Court, acting on the appeal of accusedappellants, required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they
so desired.
On March 27, 2008, accused-appellants Bun, Cheng, Shi, Min, and

Tan filed their Supplemental Brief on the sole issue that:
THERE WAS NO VALID SEARCH AND ARREST DUE TO ABSENCE

OF A WARRANT
On June 4, 2008, accused-appellant Hwan filed his Supplemental

Brief, raising the following errors, allegedly committed by the trial
court:
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED ARTICLE III, SECTION 14 OF THE

1987 CONSTITUTION AS WELL AS RULE 115 OF THE REVISED
RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WHEN IT CONDUCTED A
HEARING ON JUNE 26, 2001 AT THE CHEMISTRY DIVISION OF
THE PNP CRIME LABORATORY IN CAMP CRAME, QUEZON CITY
WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF BOTH THE HEREIN ACCUSEDAPPELLANT AND HIS COUNSEL IN SUCH VITAL [PROCEEDINGS].
II
231

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD AS VALID THE

WARRANTLESS SEARCH, SEIZURE AND SUBSEQUENT ARREST OF
THE HEREIN APPELLANT DESPITE THE NON-CONCURRENCE OF
THE REQUISITE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT JUSTIFY A
WARRANTLESS ARREST.
Essentially, accused-appellants claim that no valid in flagrante

delicto arrest was made prior to the seizure and that the police
officers placed accused-appellants under arrest even when there was
no evidence that an offense was being committed. Since there was no
warrant of arrest, they argue that the search sans a search warrant
subsequently made on them was illegal. They contend that a seizure
of any evidence as a result of an illegal search is inadmissible in any
proceeding for any purpose.
Accused-appellant Hwan additionally claims that he was deliberately

excluded when the trial court conducted a hearing on June 26, 2001
to identify 172 bags of shabu for trial purposes. He asserts that no
formal notice of the hearing was sent to him or his counsel, to his
prejudice.
The Courts Ruling
On the issue of warrantless arrest, it is apropos to mention what the

Bill of Rights under the present Constitution provides in part:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
232

may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched

and the persons or things to be seized.
A settled exception to the right guaranteed in the aforequoted

provision is that of an arrest made during the commission of a crime,
which does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is
considered reasonable and valid under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which states:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a

private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,

is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing proviso refers to arrest in flagrante delicto.8 In the

instant case, contrary to accused-appellants contention, there was
indeed a valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto. Consider the
circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of
accused-appellants: (1) the police officers received information from
an operative about an ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police
officers, with the operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in
Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the goings-on
at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they
spotted the six accused-appellants loading transparent bags
containing a white substance into a white L-300 van. The following
exchange between Capt. Ibon and the prosecutor sheds light on the
participation of all six accused-appellants:
Q: Upon arriving at Villa Vicenta Resort in Brgy. Bignay II, [in] what
specific area [did] you position yourselves?
233

A: Initially we [were] about three hundred meters away from Villa

Vicenta Resort, then we walked [stealthily] so as not to [be] [spotted]
until we were about fifty meters sir.
Q: So you [positioned] yourself about fifty meters away from the point
of Villa Vicenta Resort?
A: From the actual location we saw about six personnel walking

together loading contraband.
Q: You said you [were] about fifty meters away from these six
persons who were loading contraband, is that what you mean?
A: Yes sir.
Q: In that place where you [positioned] yourself, could you tell us,
what was the lighting condition in the place where you positioned
yourselves?
A: It was totally dark in our place sir.
Q: How about the position of the six persons who were loading
contraband?
A: They were well-lighted sir.
234

Q: Why do you say that they are well-lighted?
A: There were several [fluorescent] lamps sir.
Q: Where?
A: One search light placed near where they were loading the
shipment sir.
Q: How about the other?
A: About two fluorescent lamps at the house near the six persons
your honor.
COURT: Are these portable lamps:
A: Fixed lamps your honor.
Q: Where else?
A: Another at the right corner[.] There was also somewhat a multipurpose house and it [was] well-lighted your honor.
Q: This is a resort and that multi-purpose house that you are

referring to are the cottages of the resort?
235

A: Yes your honor.
FISCAL: You said you saw six persons who were loading goods[.] In
what vehicle [were they] transferring those things?
A: Into [an] L-300 van sir.
Q: What is the color of the van?
A: White sir.
Q: What did you see that these six persons [were] loading?
A: We saw [them] holding white plastic with white substance your

honor.
Q: What container [were they] loading?
A: Actually there were several checkered bags and other plastic

[bags] sir.
Q: How [were] they loading these bags?
A: [Manually] your honor.
Q: Will you please describe how they [were] loading it, Mr. Witness?
236

A: Actually the plastic bags [some were] repacked [into] checkered

[bags] while others [were] loading inside the checkered bag sir.
Q: Did they put that on their shoulder or what?
A: Holding and holding [sic] sir.
Q: Nobody carrying [it] on their back?
A: Nobody sir.
xxxx
Q: You said you saw these six persons, will you please look around
this courtroom and tell us if these six persons that you are referring
to are present?
COURT: Considering that there are many persons inside this

courtroom, will you please stand up and please [tap] the shoulder of
these six persons?
xxxx
INTERPRETER: Witness tapped the [shoulders] of six male persons

inside the courtroom.
237

xxxx
FISCAL: May we manifest your honor that when these six persons
stood up when their names [were] called on the basis [of] what [was]
written [on] the information [were] once tapped on their shoulder by
this witness.
The last question I have [is] how long you stayed in this position
watching these six persons loading those [products] in the L-300
van?
A: Ten to fifteen minutes sir.
Q: Within that period could you tell us what transpired?
A: I called Major Tabo to inform [him of] what I saw, I called Major
Tabo through the hand-held radio sir.
Q: What was the reply of major Tabo with respect to your

information?
A: He directed me to get closer to these six persons and find out if

really the contraband is shabu that was first reported sir.
Q: So did you in fact go closer?
A: Yes sir.
238

Q: How [close] were you [to] the six persons at the time?
A: When we were closing [in] somebody noticed us and they were

surprised, I immediately shouted "Freeze, dont move, we are Filipino
soldiers," we further identified [ourselves] sir.
Q: What was the reaction of the six persons when you shouted those
words?
A: They [froze] sir.
xxxx
Q: When you went closer and they [froze], what happened?
A: I asked them who among them are English-speaking?
Q: What was the reply given to you?
A: Somebody replied "tagalog lang."
Q: Who was that person who replied "tagalog lang?"
A: Chua Shilou Hwan sir.
239

Q: Will you please [identify] for us who answered that in [T]agalog?
COURT: Please [tap] his shoulder.
A: This man sir.
COURT: Witness tapped the shoulder of a man who identified himself

as Chua Shilou Hwan.
CHUA SHILOU HWAN: Opo.
FISCAL: After answering you [with] "tagalog lang," what happened?
A: I further asked them "Ano ang dala ninyo?"
Q: What was the reply?
A: Chua Shilou Hwan said shabu.
Q: So [what] did you do next?
A: I asked them who is their leader, sir.
Q: What was the reply?
240

A: He told me it was Raymond Tan, sir.
Q: Is he inside this courtroom now?
A: Yes sir.
COURT: Please tap [his] shoulder.
WITNESS: This man sir.
COURT: Ikaw ba Raymond Tan?
INTERPRETER: A man stood and [nodded] his head.
xxxx
FISCAL: Now after they [froze], what did you do?
A: I inspected the contraband and I found these bags and I

immediately called Major Tabo and informed [him of] the matter sir.
Q: How many bags were you able to confiscate in the scene?
A: All in all 172 your honor.
241

Q: That 172, one of them is the bag in front of you [which] you
identified earlier?
A: Yes sir.
Q: When you saw that bag could you tell us what particular
[contents] attracted you upon seeing these bags?
A: It was marked by the members (interrupted).
Q: No what attracted you?
A: Something crystalline white sir.
Q: Are you referring to all the bags?
A: All the bags sir.9 x x x
Evidently, the arresting police officers had probable cause to suspect

that accused-appellants were loading and transporting contraband,
more so when Hwan, upon being accosted, readily mentioned that
they were loading shabu and pointed to Tan as their leader. Thus,
the arrest of accused-appellantswho were caught in flagrante
delicto of possessing, and in the act of loading into a white L-300 van,
shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425, as amended--is valid.
In People v. Alunday, we held that when a police officer sees the

offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created
242

thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene, he may effect an arrest

without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, as the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within
his view.10 In the instant case, it can plausibly be argued that
accused-appellants were committing the offense of possessing shabu
and were in the act of loading them in a white van when the police
officers arrested them. As aptly noted by the appellate court, the
crime was committed in the presence of the police officers with the
contraband, inside transparent plastic containers, in plain view and
duly observed by the arresting officers. And to write finis to the issue
of any irregularity in their warrantless arrest, the Court notes, as it
has consistently held, that accused-appellants are deemed to have
waived their objections to their arrest for not raising the issue before
entering their plea.11
Moreover, present in the instant case are all the elements of illegal
possession of drugs: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession
is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possesses the said drug.12 Accused-appellants were positively
identified in court as the individuals caught loading and possessing
illegal drugs. They were found to be in possession of prohibited drugs
without proof that they were duly authorized by law to possess them.
Having been caught in flagrante delicto, there is, therefore, a prima
facie evidence of animus possidendi on the part of accusedappellants.13 There is, thus, no merit to the argument of the defense
that a warrant was needed to arrest accused-appellants.
Accused-appellants were not able to show that there was any truth
to their allegation of a frame-up in rebutting the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. They relied on mere denials, in contrast with
the testimony of Capt. Ibon, who testified that he and his team saw
accused-appellants loading plastic bags with a white crystalline
substance into an L-300 van at the Villa Vicenta Resort. Accusedappellants, except for Tan, claimed that they were ordered by the
243

police officers to act like they were loading bags onto the van.
Accused-appellant Tan told a different tale and claims he was
arrested inside a restaurant. But as the trial court found, the
persons who could have corroborated their version of events were not
presented in court. The only witness presented by Tan, a tricycle
driver whose testimony corroborated Tans alone, was not found by
the trial court to be credible.
As no ill motive can be imputed to the prosecutions witnesses, we

uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties and affirm the trial courts finding that the police officers
testimonies are deserving of full faith and credit. Appellate courts
generally will not disturb the trial courts assessment of a witness
credibility unless certain material facts and circumstances have been
overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded.14 We find no reason to deviate
from this rule in the instant case.
On the alleged lack of notice of hearing, it is now too late for

accused-appellant Hwan to claim a violation of his right to examine
the witnesses against him. The records show the following exchange
on June 26, 2001:
FISCAL LUGTO:
I would like to manifes[t] that Atty. Agoot, counsel of accused Chua

Shilou Hwan, waived his right to be present for todays trial for
purposes of identification of the alleged shabu.
ATTY SAVELLANO:
244

[Are] we made to understand that this hearing is for identification of

shabu only?
FISCAL LUGTO:
Yes despite the testimony of the Forensic Chemist, this is for

continuation with the direct testimony for purposes of identification
which was confiscated or seized by the joint operation of the Military
and the PNP at Sariaya, Quezon.
For the record, this [is] for the continuation of the direct testimony of
Forensic Chemist Mary Jean Geronimo.15
As the records confirm, accused-appellant Hwan and his counsel

were not present when the forensic chemist testified. The
prosecution made a manifestation to the effect that accusedappellant Hwan waived his right to be present at that hearing. Yet
Hwan did not question this before the trial court. No evidence of
deliberate exclusion was shown. If no notice of hearing were made
upon him and his counsel, they should have brought this in issue at
the trial, not at the late stage on appeal.1avvphi1
All told, we hold that the findings of both the RTC and the CA must
be affirmed. The trial courts determination as to the credibility of
witnesses and its findings of fact should be accorded great weight
and respect more so when affirmed by the appellate court. To
reiterate, a look at the records shows no facts of substance and value
that have been overlooked, which, if considered, might affect the
outcome of the instant appeal. Deference to the trial courts findings
must be made as it was in the position to easily detect whether a
witness is telling the truth or not.16
245

Penalty Imposed
Accused-appellants were each sentenced by the lower court to

reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of PhP 5,000,000. This is within
the range provided by RA 6425, as amended.17 We, therefore, affirm
the penalty imposed on accused-appellants.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R.

CR-H.C. No. 00485, finding accused-appellants Ng Yik Bun, Kwok
Wai Cheng, Chang Chaun Shi, Chua Shilou Hwan, Kan Shun Min,
and Raymond S. Tan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec.
16, Art. III of RA 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

Associate Justice
246

Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 5.
2 CA rollo, p. 46. Penned by Judge Jaime N. Salazar.
3 Id. at 124-125.
4 G.R. No. 109287, April 18, 1996, 256 SCRA 325.
247

5 G.R. Nos. 108280-83 & 114931-33, November 16, 1995, 250 SCRA
58, 75-76.
6 Rollo, p. 25.
7 Id. at 26. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and

concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and
Jose C. Mendoza (now a member of this Court).
8 People v. Alunday, G.R. No. 181546, September 3, 2008, 564 SCRA

135, 146; citing People v. Doria, G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999,
301 SCRA 668.
9 TSN, July 24, 2001, pp. 22-34.
10 Supra note 8, at 147; citing People v. Sucro, G.R. No. 93239,

March 18, 1991, 195 SCRA 388.
11 People v. Tidula, G.R. No. 123273, July 16, 1998, 292 SCRA 596,
611; People v. Montilla, G.R. No. 123872, January 30, 1998, 285
SCRA 703; People v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 112035, January 16, 1998,
284 SCRA 199, 210; People v. Mahusay, G.R. No. 91483, November
18, 1997, 282 SCRA 80, 87; People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 87187, June
29, 1995, 245 SCRA 421, 430; and People v. Lopez, Jr., G.R. No.
104662, June 16, 1995, 245 SCRA 95, 105.
12 People v. Sy, G.R. No. 147348, September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA
594, 604-605; citing Manalili v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113447,
October 9, 1997, 280 SCRA 400, 418.
248

13 People v. Pagkalinawan, G.R. No. 184805, March 3, 2010.
14 People v. Gregorio, Jr., G.R. No. 174474, May 25, 2007, 523
SCRA 216, 227; citing People v. Abao, G.R. No. 142728, January 23,
2002, 374 SCRA 431.
15 TSN, June 26, 2001, p. 1.
16 People v. Macabare, G.R. No. 179941, August 25, 2009, 597

SCRA 119, 132; citing People v. Mateo, G.R. No. 179036, July 28,
2008, 560 SCRA 375, 394.
17 Secs. 16 and 17 of RA 6425, as amended, provide:
Sec. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs.The penalty of

reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos [PhP 500,000] to ten million pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug
without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the
provisions of Section 20 hereof.
Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to
read as follows:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the

Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime.The penalties for offenses
under Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15
249

and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous

drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
xxxx
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
13. Yu vs. Reyes-Carpio, 652 SCRA 341, June 15, 2011

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 189207
ERIC U. YU, Petitioner,

vs.
June 15, 2011
250

HONORABLE JUDGE AGNES REYES-CARPIO, in her official

capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig-Branch
261; and CAROLINE T. YU, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to annul

and set aside the March 31, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 106878. The CA Decision affirmed the Orders
dated August 4, 20082 and October 24, 20083 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 261 in Pasig City.
The Facts
The instant petition stemmed from a petition for declaration of

nullity of marriage filed by petitioner Eric U. Yu against private
respondent Caroline T. Yu with the RTC in Pasig City. The case was
initially raffled to Branch 163.
On May 30, 2006, Judge Leili Cruz Suarez of the RTC-Branch 163
issued an Order, stating that petitioners Partial Offer of Evidence
dated April 18, 2006 would already be submitted for resolution after
certain exhibits of petitioner have been remarked. But the exhibits
were only relative to the issue of the nullity of marriage of the
parties.4
251

On September 12, 2006, private respondent moved to submit the

incident on the declaration of nullity of marriage for resolution of the
court, considering that the incidents on custody, support, and
property relations were mere consequences of the declaration of
nullity of the parties marriage.5
On September 28, 2006, petitioner opposed private respondents

Motion, claiming that the incident on the declaration of nullity of
marriage cannot be resolved without the presentation of evidence for
the incidents on custody, support, and property relations.6 Petitioner,
therefore, averred that the incident on nullity of marriage, on the one
hand, and the incidents on custody, support, and property relations,
on the other, should both proceed and be simultaneously resolved.
On March 21, 2007, RTC-Branch 163 issued an Order in favor of

petitioners opposition. Particularly, it stated that:
The Court agrees with the contention of the Petitioner that it would
be more in accord with the rules if the Parties were first allowed to
present their evidence relative to the issues of property relations,
custody and support to enable the Court to issue a comprehensive
decision thereon.7
Subsequently, private respondent was able to successfully cause the

inhibition of Judge Cruz Suarez of the RTC-Branch 163.
Consequently, the case was re-raffled to another branch of the Pasig
RTC, particularly Branch 261, presided by Judge Agnes ReyesCarpio.8
252

Thereafter, while the case was being heard by the RTC-Branch 261,
private respondent filed an Omnibus Motion on May 21, 2008. The
Omnibus Motion sought (1) the strict observation by the RTC-Branch
261 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages,
as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, in the subject proceedings; and
(2) that the incident on the declaration of nullity of marriage be
already submitted for resolution.9 Conversely, private respondent
prayed that the incident on the declaration of nullity of marriage be
resolved ahead of the incidents on custody, support, and property
relations, and not simultaneously.
Quite expectedly, petitioner opposed the Omnibus Motion, arguing

that the issues that were the subject of the Omnibus Motion had
already been resolved in the March 21, 2007 Order. Concurrently,
petitioner prayed that the incidents on nullity, custody, support, and
property relations of the spouses be resolved simultaneously.10
In its Order dated August 4, 2008, the RTC-Branch 261 granted the
Omnibus Motion. Judge Reyes-Carpio explained that:
At the outset, the parties are reminded that the main cause of action
in this case is the declaration of nullity of marriage of the parties and
the issues relating to property relations, custody and support are
merely ancillary incidents thereto.
xxxx
Consistent, therefore, with Section 19 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, the

Court finds it more prudent to rule first on the petitioners petition
and respondents counter-petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of each others psychological incapacity to
perform their respective marital obligations. If the Court eventually
253

finds that the parties respective petitions for declaration of nullity of

marriage is indeed meritorious on the basis of either or both of the
parties psychological incapacity, then the parties shall proceed to
comply with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code before a final
decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be issued. Pending such
ruling on the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage, the Court
finds no legal ground, at this stage, to proceed with the reception of
evidence in regard the issues on custody and property relations,
since these are mere incidents of the nullity of the parties
marriage.11
On August, 28, 2008, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the

August 4, 2008 Order. On October 24, 2008, Judge Reyes-Carpio
issued an Order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. In
denying the motion, Judge Reyes-Carpio reasoned:
x x x [I]t is very clear that what petitioner seeks to reconsider in the

Courts Order dated August 4, 2008 is the procedure regarding the
reception of evidence on the issues of property relations, custody and
support. He opposes the fact that the main issue on declaration of
nullity is submitted for decision when he has not yet presented
evidence on the issues on property relations, custody and support.
Considering that what he seeks to set aside is the procedural aspect

of the instanct case, i.e. the reception of evidence which is a matter
of procedure, there is no question that it is A.M. 02-11-[10]-SC which
should be followed and not the procedures provided in Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code. While it is true that the Family Code is a
substantive law and rule of procedure cannot alter a substantive law,
the provisions laid in Articles 50 and 51 relative to the liquidation
and dissolution of properties are by nature procedural, thus there
are no substantive rights which may be prejudiced or any vested
rights that may be impaired.
254

In fact, the Supreme Court in a number of cases has even held that
there are some provisions of the Family Code which are procedural
in nature, such as Article[s] 185 and 50 of the Family Code which
may be given retroactive effect to pending suits. Adopting such
rationale in the instant case, if the Court is to adopt the procedures
laid down in A.M. No. 02-11-[10]-SC, no vested or substantive right
will be impaired on the part of the petitioner or the respondent. Even
Section 17 of A.M. No. 02-11-[10]-SC allows the reception of evidence
to a commissioner in matters involving property relations of the
spouses.
xxxx
Lastly, it is the policy of the courts to give effect to both procedural

and substantive laws, as complementing each other, in the just and
speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. Moreover, as
previously stated, the Court finds it more prudent to rule first on the
petitioners petition and respondents counter-petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of each others psychological
incapacity to perform their respective marital obligations. If the
Court eventually finds that the parties respective petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage is indeed meritorious on the basis
of either or both of the parties psychological incapacity, then the
parties shall proceed to comply with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the
Family Code before a final decree of absolute nullity of marriage can
be issued.12
The Ruling of the Appellate Court
On January 8, 2009, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under

Rule 65 with the CA, assailing both the RTC Orders dated August 4,
255

2008 and October 24, 2008. The petition impleaded Judge ReyesCarpio as respondent and alleged that the latter committed grave
abuse of discretion in the issuance of the assailed orders.
On March 31, 2009, the CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court
and dismissed the petition. The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision reads:
All told, absent any arbitrary or despotic exercise of judicial power as

to amount to abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge in
issuing the assailed Orders, the instant petition for certiorari cannot
prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.13
The Issues
This appeal is, hence, before Us, with petitioner maintaining that the
CA committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the assailed
orders issued by the trial court and dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari. Particularly, petitioner brings forth the following issues:
A. Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding that a petition for
certiorari is not a proper remedy of the Petitioner
256

B. Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack [or excess] of jurisdiction in upholding the
Respondent Judge in submitting the main issue of nullity of
marriage for resolution ahead of the reception of evidence on custody,
support, and property relations
C. Whether or not the reception of evidence on custody, support and

property relations is necessary for a complete and comprehensive
adjudication of the parties respective claims and [defenses].14
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition without merit.
A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy in

assailing that a judge has committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court clearly sets forth when a petition for certiorari can be
used as a proper remedy:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or

officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs
as law and justice may require. (Emphasis Ours.)
257

The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act

of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of
discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction."15 The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
"evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility."16 Furthermore, the use of a petition for
certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the
act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void."17 From
the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been
done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly
show that such act was patent and gross.18 But this is not the case
here.
Nowhere in the petition was it shown that the acts being alleged to
have been exercised with grave abuse of discretion(1) the Orders of
the RTC deferring the presentation of evidence on custody, support,
and property relations; and (2) the appellate courts Decision of
upholding the Orderswere patent and gross that would warrant
striking down through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
At the very least, petitioner should prove and demonstrate that the
RTC Orders and the CA Decision were done in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment.19 This, however, has not been
shown in the petition.
It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or what are

alleged to have been exercised with grave abuse of discretion, are
interlocutory orders. An interlocutory order is one which "does not
finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Courts task of
adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights
258

and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that

other things remain to be done by the Court."20 To be clear,
certiorari under Rule 65 is appropriate to strike down an
interlocutory order only when the following requisites concur:
(1) when the tribunal issued such order without or in excess of

jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and
(2) when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and

the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious
relief.21
In this case, as We have discussed earlier, petitioner failed to prove

that the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion
and that those were patently erroneous. Considering that the
requisites that would justify certiorari as an appropriate remedy to
assail an interlocutory order have not been complied with, the proper
recourse for petitioner should have been an appeal in due course of
the judgment of the trial court on the merits, incorporating the
grounds for assailing the interlocutory orders.22 The appellate court,
thus, correctly cited Triplex Enterprises, Inc. v. PNB-Republic Bank
and Solid Builders, Inc., penned by Chief Justice Renato Corona,
which held:
Certiorari as a special civil action is proper when any tribunal, board

or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, and there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy at law. The writ may be issued only where it is
convincingly proved that the lower court committed grave abuse of
discretion, or an act too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act
in contemplation of law, or that the trial court exercised its power in
259

an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal

hostility.
While certiorari may be maintained as an appropriate remedy to

assail an interlocutory order in cases where the tribunal has issued
an order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, it does not lie to correct every controversial interlocutory
ruling. In this connection, we quote with approval the
pronouncement of the appellate court:
In this jurisdiction, there is an "erroneous impression that

interlocutory [orders] of trial courts on debatable legal points may be
assailed by certiorari. To correct that impression and to avoid
clogging the appellate court with future certiorari petitions it should
be underscored that the office of the writ of certiorari has been
reduced to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot
legally be used for any other purpose."
The writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases

wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly
void. Moreover, it is designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not
errors in judgment. The rationale of this rule is that, when a court
exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does
not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is
committed. Otherwise, every mistake made by a court will deprive it
of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment will be a void
judgment.
When the court has jurisdiction over the case and person of the
defendant, any mistake in the application of the law and the
appreciation of evidence committed by a court may be corrected only
by appeal. The determination made by the trial court regarding the
admissibility of evidence is but an exercise of its jurisdiction and
260

whatever fault it may have perpetrated in making such a

determination is an error in judgment, not of jurisdiction. Hence,
settled is the rule that rulings of the trial court on procedural
questions and on admissibility of evidence during the course of a
trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of a
separate appeal or review on certiorari. They must be assigned as
errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the decision
rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case.
Here, petitioner assails the order of the trial court disallowing the
admission in evidence of the testimony of Roque on the opinion of
the OGCC. By that fact alone, no grave abuse of discretion could be
imputed to the trial court. Furthermore, the said order was not an
error of jurisdiction. Even assuming that it was erroneous, the
mistake was an error in judgment not correctable by the writ of
certiorari.23
Be that as it may, even dwelling on the merits of the case just as the
CA has already done and clearly explicated, We still find no reason to
grant the petition.
It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow the

presentation of evidence on the incidents on custody, support, and
property relations. It is clear in the assailed orders that the trial
court judge merely deferred the reception of evidence relating to
custody, support, and property relations, to wit:
August 4, 2008 Order
Consistent, therefore, with Section 19 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, the

Court finds it more prudent to rule first on the petitioners petition
and respondents counter-petition for declaration of nullity of
261

marriage on the ground of each others psychological incapacity to

perform their respective marital obligations. If the Court eventually
finds that the parties respective petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage is indeed meritorious on the basis of either or both of the
parties psychological incapacity, then the parties shall proceed to
comply with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code before a final
decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be issued. Pending such
ruling on the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage, the Court
finds no legal ground, at this stage, to proceed with the reception of
evidence in regard the issues on custody and property relations,
since these are mere incidents of the nullity of the parties
marriage.24
October 24, 2008 Order
Lastly, it is the policy of the courts to give effect to both procedural

and substantive laws, as complementing each other, in the just and
speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. Moreover, as
previously stated, the Court finds it more prudent to rule first on the
petitioners petition and respondents counter-petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of each others psychological
incapacity to perform their respective marital obligations. If the
Court eventually finds that the parties respective petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage is indeed meritorious on the basis
of either or both of the parties psychological incapacity, then the
parties shall proceed to comply with Article (sic) 50 and 51 of the
Family Code before a final decree of absolute nullity of marriage can
be issued.25
And the trial judges decision was not without basis. Judge ReyesCarpio finds support in the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Particularly, Secs.
19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of evidence on
262

custody, support, and property relations after the trial court renders
a decision granting the petition, or upon entry of judgment granting
the petition:
Section 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the
petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or
decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
Distribution of Properties.
xxxx
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support

of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes. Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of
appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court
granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party,
shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, including custody, support of common
children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of evidence

on custody, support, and property relations but merely deferred it,
based on the existing rules issued by this Court, to a time when a
decision granting the petition is already at hand and before a final
decree is issued. Conversely, the trial court, or more particularly the
family court, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and
distribution, custody, support of common children, and delivery of
their presumptive legitimes upon entry of judgment granting the
petition. And following the pertinent provisions of the Court En Banc
263

Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly

consistent with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code, contrary to
what petitioner asserts. Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family
Code state:
Article 50. x x x
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the
custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in the previous judicial proceedings.
xxxx
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of

all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment
of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound
securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially
approved, had already provided for such matters. (Emphasis Ours.)
Finally, petitioner asserts that the deferment of the reception of

evidence on custody, support, and property relations would amount
to an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment on the main issue.26
This argument does not hold water. The Court En Banc Resolution in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations. Conversely,
the trial court may receive evidence on the subject incidents after a
judgment granting the petition but before the decree of nullity or
annulment of marriage is issued. And this is what Judge ReyesCarpio sought to comply with in issuing the assailed orders. As
correctly pointed out by the CA, petitioners assertion that ruling the
264

main issue without receiving evidence on the subject incidents would

result in an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment is certainly
speculative and, hence, contravenes the legal presumption that a
trial judge can fairly weigh and appraise the evidence submitted by
the parties.271wphi1
Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio acted in a

capricious and whimsical manner, much less in a way that is
patently gross and erroneous, when she issued the assailed orders
deferring the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property
relations. To reiterate, this decision is left to the trial courts wisdom
and legal soundness. Consequently, therefore, the CA cannot
likewise be said to have committed grave abuse of discretion in
upholding the Orders of Judge Reyes-Carpio and in ultimately
finding an absence of grave abuse of discretion on her part.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The CA Decision in CAG.R. SP No. 106878 finding that Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio did not
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Associate Justice
265

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Per Special Order No. 1003 dated June 8, 2011.
** Additional member per Special Order No. 1000 dated June 8, 2011.
266

1 Rollo, pp. 32-42. Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De

Leon and concurred in by Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas
Peralta and Ramon R. Garcia.
2 Id. at 47-50.
3 Id. at 51-53.
4 Id. at 33.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 46.
8 Id. at 33.
9 Id. at 34.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 49.
12 Id. at 52-53. (Emphasis Ours.)
267

13 Id. at 41.
14 Id. at 8.
15 Beluso v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180711, June 22,

2010, 621 SCRA 450, 456-457; citing De Vera v. De Vera, G.R. No.
172832, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 506, 514-15; Fajardo v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 157707, October 29, 2008, 570 SCRA 156, 163.
16 Id.; 2 Jose Y. Feria & Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Civil Procedure

Annotated 463 (2001).
17 J.L. Bernardo Construction v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105827,

January 31, 2000, 324 SCRA 24, 34.
18 Beluso v. Commission on Elections, supra note 15.
19 Id.; Deutsche Bank Manila v. Chua Yok See, G.R. No. 165606,
February 6, 2006, 481 SCRA 672, 692.
20 Philippine Business Bank v. Chua, G.R. No. 178899, November

15, 2010.
21 J.L. Bernardo Construction v. Court of Appeals, supra note 17, at

34.
268

22 Yamaoka v. Pescarich Manufacturing Corporation, G.R. No.

146079, July 20, 2001, 361 SCRA 672, 680-681; citing Go v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 128954, October 8, 1998, 297 SCRA 574, 581.
See also Deutsche Bank Manila v. Chua Yok See, supra note 19, at
694.
23 G.R. No. 151007, July 17, 2006, 495 SCRA 362, 365-367.
(Emphasis Ours.)
24 Rollo, p. 49. (Emphasis Ours.)
25 Id. at 52-53. (Emphasis Ours.)
26 Id. at 15-16.
27 Id. at 38; citing Jaylo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 111502-04,

November 22, 2001, 370 SCRA 170.
14. Bote vs. Veloso, 686 SCRA 758, December 03, 2012
THIRD DIVISION
269

G.R. No. 194270
December 3, 2012
LORETO BOTE, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES ROBERT VELOSO and GLORIA VELOSO, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court seeks to annul the May 17, 2010 Decision1 and October 22,
2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
69606 entitled Spouses Robert Veloso and Gloria Veloso v. Loreto
Bote and Carlos De Leon. The assailed CA Decision modified the
Decision dated December 8, 20003 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 273 in Marikina City (Marikina RTC) in Civil Case No. 96.282-MK entitled Spouses Robert Veloso and Gloria Veloso v. Loreto
Bote and Carlos De Leon which dismissed the case for lack of cause
of action.
The Facts
On September 21, 1951, Pedro T. Baello (Baello) and his sister,

Nicanora Baello-Rodrgiuez (Rodriguez), filed an application for
registration of their property in Caloocan City with the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal consisting of 147,972 square meters. On
270

November 2, 1953, the land was successfully registered under their

names under Original Certificate of Title No. (OCT) (804) 53839.4 On
July 27, 1971, the lot was subdivided into Lot A covering 98,648
square meters in favor of Baello and Lot B covering 49,324 square
meters in favor of Rodriguez.5 On December 3, 1971, Baello died
intestate leaving thirty two (32) surviving heirs while Rodriguez died
intestate on August 22, 1975 without issue.6
The subject property was included in the Dagat-Dagatan Project

launched in 1976 by the then First Lady Imelda R. Marcos.
Sometime thereafter, armed military personnel forcibly evicted the
caretaker of the heirs of Baello and Rodriguez from the property,
destroying the residential structure and the fishponds thereon.
Thereafter, the National Housing Authority (NHA), as the government
agency tasked to undertake the Dagat-Dagatan Project, took
possession of the property preparatory to its subdivision and
awarded the lots to chosen beneficiaries.
After the fall of the Marcos regime, the heirs of Baello executed, on
February 23, 1987, an extrajudicial partition of their share of the
property.
Then, on August 18, 1987, the NHA filed a complaint with the RTC of
Caloocan City, Branch 120 (Caloocan RTC), for the expropriation of
the subject land. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. C-169.
In the meantime, Lot A of OCT (804) 53839 was subdivided and on

August 7, 1989, TCTs 191069, 191070, 191071, 191072, 191073
and 191074 were issued in the name of Baello. While TCTs 191062,
191063, 191064, 191065,191066, 191067 and 191068 were issued
in the name of Rodriguez covering Lot B of OCT (804) 53839.7
271

Thereafter, the Baello and Rodriguez heirs filed separate motions to

dismiss Civil Case No. C-169 which the Caloocan RTC granted on the
grounds of res judicata and lack of cause of action.8 The NHA
appealed the ruling of the RTC to the CA which rendered a Decision
dated August 21, 19929 affirming the ruling of the trial court. The
case was elevated to this Court which denied due course to the
petition in a Resolution dated May 3, 1993.10 The Resolution
attained finality in an Entry of Judgment dated July 7, 1993.11
Unperturbed, on November 5, 1993, the NHA filed another complaint

against the Baello and Rodriguez heirs with another RTC of Caloocan,
this time for the declaration of nullity of OCT (804) 53839. The case
was eventually dismissed on the grounds of estoppel and res judicata.
The NHA appealed the case to the CA which affirmed the ruling of
the trial court. On August 24, 2004, this Court denied NHAs appeal
of the CA decision.12
In the meantime, on August 12, 1985, one Gloria Veloso (Gloria) was
awarded a residential lot at the Dagat-Dagatan Project for the price
of PhP 37,600 as evidenced by an Individual Notice of Award dated
August 12, 1985.13 The award was subject to the conditions that
Gloria commence construction of a residential house on the property
within six (6) months from the date of allocation and complete the
same within one (1) year from the commencement of construction,
and that she occupy the house also within one (1) year from
allocation.14
Thus, Gloria constructed a two (2)-storey house on the property

awarded to her and resided therein until 1991. In 1995, Gloria
leased the house to Loreto Bote (Bote) from October to December.15
On February 5, 1996, Bote executed a Promissory Note16
undertaking to pay Gloria Veloso and her husband Robert Veloso
(spouses Veloso) the amount of eight hundred fifty thousand pesos
(PhP 850,000) on or before March 31, 1996 as purchase price for
272

property. The Promissory Note effectively assigned to the spouses

Veloso, Botes credit with a certain Carlos De Leon who indicated his
conforme in the note. Bote failed to pay the purchase price indicated
in the Promissory Note. Thus, the spouses Veloso, through counsel,
issued a Demand Letter dated April 15, 199617 demanding the
payment of the purchase price of PhP 850,000. Despite such demand
letter, Bote still failed to pay the purchase price.
Thus, the spouses Veloso filed a Complaint dated June 3, 199618

against Bote for Sum of Money and/or Recovery of Possession of Real
Property with Damages. Notably, the case was filed at the Marikina
RTC, thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 96-282-MK and raffled to
Branch 273.
In his Answer dated November 21, 1996,19 Bote alleged, as

Special/Affirmative Defenses, that the Marikina RTC had no
territorial jurisdiction to try a case for recovery of possession of real
property located in Caloocan City and that the subject property is
not owned by the spouses Veloso but by Cynthia T. Baello (Cynthia)
as shown in TCT No. 290183 covering the subject property, an
alleged heir of Pedro Baello. He further alleged that he purchased the
property from Cynthia as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated May
9, 1996.20
It is noteworthy that, at the Pre-Trial Conference, and as reflected in

the Pre-Trial Order dated December 9, 1997,21 the parties agreed
that the complaint would only be one for sum of money and no
longer for recovery of possession of the subject property. The PreTrial Order reads:
STIPULATION OF FACTS
273

1) That the present action shall be treated as one for Sum of Money
and not for Recovery of Possession of Lot;
2) That defendant Loreto Bote is the one presently occupying the

house and lot; and
3) That plaintiffs are not the registered owners of the subject lot.
(Emphasis supplied.)22
Notably, during the hearing of the case, Cynthia testified before the
trial court claiming to be one of the heirs of Pedro Baello.23 Such
contention was never rebutted by the spouses Veloso.
After hearing, the RTC issued its Decision dated December 8,

2000,24 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

DISMISSING the complaint.
With Costs againt the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.
In the Decision, the trial court ruled that the spouses Veloso failed to
adduce evidence to show a rightful claim over the subject property.
Further, the RTC noted that the spouses Velosos reliance on the
award made by the NHA is misplaced, the expropriation case filed by
the NHA having been dismissed by the CA in a Decision dated
August 21, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 29042. This Court denied the
274

petition for review on certiorari filed by the NHA from the CA

Decision in a Resolution dated May 3, 1993. This Resolution, in turn,
attained finality as evidenced by an Entry of Judgment dated July 7,
1993. The trial court, thus, concluded that because the NHA failed to
expropriate the property, the spouses Veloso could not derive any
right from the award.
Thereafter, the spouses Veloso appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.
In their Appellants Brief dated May 23, 2001,25 they interposed for
the first time their status as builders in good faith and are, thus,
entitled to possession of the house that Gloria built.
Later, the CA issued its assailed Decision dated May 17, 2010, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED.

The assailed decision of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION that a proper determination of the value of the
controverted residential house constructed by the plaintiff-appellant
Gloria in the lot, now owned by the defendant-appellee shall be made.
In line with the doctrinal pronouncement in the cited Pecson v. Court

of Appeals, the present case is hereby REMANDED to the court a quo
for it to determine the current market value of the residential house
in the aforesaid lot. For this purpose, the parties shall be allowed to
adduce evidence on the current market value of the said residential
house. The value so determined shall be forthwith paid by the
defendant-appellee to the plaintiffs-appellants, otherwise, the latter
shall be restored to the possession of the said residential house until
payment of the required indemnity.
275

SO ORDERED.
The CA denied Botes Motion for Reconsideration in its October 22,

2010 Resolution.
Hence, We have this petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:
Whether or not Pecson v. CA et al. is applicable since that case is a

real action for recovery of possession of lot and apartments while
[sic] instant case is a personal action for Sum of Money.
II
Whether or not the prayer for PhP850,000.00 as full payment for

house and lot should be the controlling amount.
III
276

Whether or not the amount of PhP329,000.00 paid for the lot

should be deducted from the PhP850,000.00 promissory note.
IV
Whether or not the value of improvements on the house introduced

by petitioner-appellant should benefit respondent.26
Our Ruling
This petition is meritorious.
Anent the first issue, Botes argument is that:
Although the original Complaint in Civil Case No. 96-282-MK is

entitled: "For: Sum of Money and/or Recovery of Possession of Real
Property With Damages" the allegations and the prayer both do not
sustain the Recovery part of the title. It should, therefore, be ignored.
The allegations and the prayer of the Complaint only support the
Sum of Money case. Additionally, during the pre-trial of the case
before the RTC the parties stipulated to treat the case purely as a
sum of money.27 (Emphasis supplied.)
In essence, Bote claims that the spouses Veloso did not raise the
issue of their being builders in good faith before the trial court; thus,
they are precluded from raising the issue for the first time on appeal.
Pushing the point, Bote argues that the spouses Veloso, in fact,
stipulated in the Pre-Trial that the issue of possession was being
withdrawn from the complaint. Thus, Bote concludes, the CA erred
in considering and passing on the new issue.
277

We agree.
Section 15, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court limits the questions that
may be raised on appeal:
Section 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. Whether or

not the appellant has filed a motion for new trial in the court below,
he may include in his assignment of errors any question of law or
fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within the
issues framed by the parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,28 the Court

clarified this provision of the Rules of Court stating that, "It is settled
jurisprudence that an issue which was neither averred in the
complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the
basic rules of fair play, justice and due process."
This principle forbids the parties from changing their theory of the
case.
The "theory of the case" is defined in Blacks Law Dictionary as:
A comprehensive and orderly mental arrangement of principle and

facts, conceived and constructed for the purpose of securing a
judgment or decree of a court in favor of a litigant; the particular line
of reasoning of either party to a suit, the purpose being to bring
together certain facts of the case in a logical sequence and to
278

correlate them in a way that produces in the decision makers mind a

definite result or conclusion favored by the advocate.29
The same term is defined in Agpalos Legal Words and Phrases as:
It is the legal basis of the cause of action or defense, which a party is

not permitted to change on appeal. (San Agustin v. Barrios, 68 Phil.
475 [1939])
A party is bound by the theory he adopts and by the cause of action

he stands on and cannot be permitted after having lost thereon to
repudiate his theory and cause of action and adopt another and seek
to re-litigate the matter anew either in the same forum or on appeal.
(Arroyo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 246 SCRA
384 [1995)30
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation

(formerly Southern Energy Quezon, Inc.),31 the Court reiterated the
thrust of the theory-of-the-case principle in this wise:
It is already well-settled in this jurisdiction that a party may not

change his theory of the case on appeal. Such a rule has been
expressly adopted in Rule 44, Section 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides
SEC. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. Whether or not

the appellant has filed a motion for new trial in the court below, he
may include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact
that has been raised in the court below and which is within the
issues framed by the parties.
279

Thus, in Carantes v. Court of Appeals, this Court emphasized that
The settled rule is that defenses not pleaded in the answer may not
be raised for the first time on appeal. A party cannot, on appeal,
change fundamentally the nature of the issue in the case. When a
party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided
upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to
change the same on appeal, because to permit him to do so would be
unfair to the adverse party.
In the more recent case of Mon v. Court of Appeals, this Court again
pronounced that, in this jurisdiction, the settled rule is that a party
cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on appeal.
It affirms that "courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to
decide a question not in issue." Thus, a judgment that goes beyond
the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which the court
did not hear the parties, is not only irregular but also extrajudicial
and invalid. The rule rests on the fundamental tenets of fair
play.1wphi1 (Emphasis supplied.)
Nevertheless, such rule admits of an exception as enunciated in

Canlas v. Tubil,32 to wit:
As a rule, a change of theory cannot be allowed. However, when the

factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further
evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet
the issue raised in the new theory, as in this case, the Court may
give due course to the petition and resolve the principal issues raised
therein.
280

The instant case does not fall under this exception.
To stress, the issue of whether or not the spouses Veloso were

builders in good faith is a factual question that was never alleged, let
alone proven. And as aptly stated by the spouses Veloso themselves
in their Appellants Brief dated May 23, 2001,33 "under Article 527
of the Civil Code, good faith is even always presumed and upon him
who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of
proof."34 Thus, in order to refute the spouses Velosos contention
that they are builders in good faith, it is necessary that Bote present
evidence that they acted in bad faith.
Understandably, Bote did not present such evidence before the trial
court because good faith was not an issue then. It was only on
appeal that the spouses Veloso belatedly raised the issue that they
were builders in good faith. Justice and fair play dictate that the
spouses Velosos change of their theory of the case on appeal be
disallowed and the instant petition granted.
As such, the other issues raised in the petition need no longer be

discussed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 17, 2010 Decision

and October 22, 2010 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 69606
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated
December 8, 2000 of the RTC, Branch 273 in Marikina City in Civil
Case No. 96-282-MK is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
281


Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
DISODADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION

Associate Justice
Chairperson
282

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 20-36. Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino

and concurred in by Associate Justices Normandie B. Pizarro and
Ruben C. Ayson.
2 Id. at 37-38.
3 CA rollo; pp. 37-40. Penned by Judge Olga Palanca Enriquez.
4 Rollo, p. 21.
5 Records, p. 211.
6 National Housing Authority v. Baello, G.R. No. 143230, August 20,

2004, 437 SCRA 86, 91.
283

7 Records, pp. 212-213.
8 Rollo, p. 22.
9 Records, pp. 207-221.
10 Id. at 206.
11 Id. at 205.
12 Rollo, pp. 22-23.
13 Records, p. 164.
14 Rollo, pp. 23-24.
15 Id. at 24.
16 Records, p. 4.
17 Id. at 5.
18 Id. at 6-7.
284

19 Id. at 25-27.
20 Id. at 28-29.
21 Id. at 78-79.
22 Id. at 78.
23 Transcript of Stenographic Notes, February 15, 2000, p. 7.
24 Records, pp. 235-239.
25 CA rollo, pp. 19-36.
26 Rollo, p. 11.
27 Id. at 12.
28 G.R. No. 134068, June 25, 2001, 359 SCRA 480, 488.
29 BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1616 (9th ed.).
30 R.E. Agpalo, AGPALOS WORDS AND PHRASES 743 (1997).
31 G.R. No. 159593, October 12, 2006, 504 SCRA 484, 494-495.
285

32 G.R. No. 184285, September 25, 2009, 601 SCRA 147, 156.
33 CA rollo, pp. 19-36.
34 Id. at 30.
September 16, 2013.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 201760, September 16, 2013
286

LBL INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner, v. CITY OF LAPU-LAPU,

Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,

assailing and seeking the annulment of the Resolution of the Court
of Appeals (CA) dated July 11, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 05877 as well
as its Resolution dated April 19, 2012 denying reconsideration of the
first assailed issuance.
The Facts
Petitioner is the registered owner of a 40,634-square meter parcel of

land. Lot No. 4839, situated in Mactan, Lapu-Lapu City and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34555.
On January 25, 2006, respondent City of Lapu-Lapu (respondent)

filed a complaint1 before the Regional Trial Court seeking to
expropriate, among others, a 300-square meter portion of Lot No.
4839 for its road opening project from Saac II to Bag-ong Silingan,
Mactan, Lapu-Lapu City. Later, or on February 19, 2006, the
complaint was amended, captioned as "Second Amended Complaint,"
increasing the area sought to be appropriated to 2,750 sq.m.
287

Upon deposit of an amount equivalent to 15% of the fair market

value of the property based on the current tax declaration,
respondent took possession of and utilized the property. On
February 28, 2006, petitioner filed its Answer, accompanied by a
Secretary's Certificate, which states, in
part:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
That at the Special Meeting of the Board of the Corporation on
February 14, 2006, the following resolution had been adopted and
approved[.] to wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to authorize ELSIE TAN
MARIO [Mario], an officer of the corporation, to commence any
action for and in behalf of the corporation as she may deem fit and
necessary to do any and all acts that may be essential in the
prosecution and defense of the cases of the corporation[,] more
particularly involving and in connection with the Eminent Domain
case filed by the City of Lapu-Lapu[,] including the execution/signing
and verification of the Answer of other necessary pleadings[,] and do
such other acts necessary and proper in connection therewith."2
Meanwhile, petitioner interposed a Motion to Conduct Joint Survey
and Set Case for Pre-trial.
Later, or on March 3, 2006, petitioner filed its Answer to the

Amended and Second Amended Complaint.
Meantime, the RTC issued two Orders, dated July 10, 2006 and
March 28, 2007, directing the issuance of a writ of possession. The
branch clerk of court, however, failed to comply with any of the
orders.3cralawlibrary
A year later, or on January 25, 2008, petitioner moved for the

dismissal of the case on the ground that respondent failed to
288

prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time as provided for

under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. According to
petitioner, respondent has yet to move for the setting of the case for
pre-trial and it had done nothing to ensure compliance with the
Orders for the issuance of the writ of execution. Respondent opposed
the motion, explaining that the reason for the delay was that it is
awaiting the RTC's resolution on the motion filed by petitioner for the
conduct of a joint survey and for the setting of the case for pre-trial.
Petitioner filed a Reply to respondent's Opposition and Comment on
the Motion to Dismiss on February 14, 2008.
In its Order4 dated February 18, 2008 denying the motion to dismiss,
the RTC ruled that respondent cannot be faulted for the alleged delay
in prosecuting the case as, indeed, petitioner's motion for the
conduct of a joint survey and for the setting of the case for trial had
not yet been resolved. And as an additional reason for its action, the
RTC cited the non-observance of the three (3)-day notice rule noting
that the motion to dismiss was received by the plaintiff on January
31, 2008, but the motion was set for hearing on the following day, or
on February 1, 2008. The fallo of the Order
reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss is denied.
Plaintiff [respondent] is directed to prosecute this case within thirty

(30) days from receipt of this order.
Furnish copies of this order to counsels.
SO ORDERED.chanrob1esvirtualawlibrary
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the RTC's February 18,
2008 Order was likewise denied in that court's January 26, 2011
289

Order,5 the dispositive portion of which

states:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the motion for
reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
For the third time, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to
issue a writ of possession.
Furnish copy of this order to counsels.
SO ORDERED.
In the latter Order, the RTC attributed the fault to its branch clerk of
court for failing to comply with its twin orders directing the issuance
of a writ of possession.
On April 15, 2011, petitioner went to the CA on a Petition for

Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the said February 18, 2008 and
January 26, 2011 Orders of the trial court, the recourse docketed as
CA-G.R. SP. No. 05877. Attached to the petition is a Secretary's
Certificate executed on April 12, 2011, by Elsie T. Mario,
petitioner's assistant corporate secretary. Said certificate states,
among others, that at the special meeting of petitioner's board on
April 8, 2011, the following resolution was
adopted:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to authorize Mr. Roberto Z.
Sison [Sison] or Ms. Elsie T. Mario, to commence any action and. or
represent the corporation as he/she may deem fit and necessary and
to do any and all acts that may be essential in the prosecution and
defense of the cases of the corporation more particularly involving
the Complaint for Eminent Domain filed with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu
City, any proceedings for just compensation for its lots in Lapu-Lapu
290

City including the execution/signing and verification of the

necessary documents and do such other acts necessary and proper
in connection therewith.6
CA Ruling
The CA dismissed the petition in its July 11, 2011 Resolution7 owing
to the following infirmities, viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
a One Hundred and Fifty Peso (PhP 150) deficiency in docket fees;
the absence of the serial number, as well as the province or city of

commission of the Notary Public in the Notarial Certificate of the
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
lack of proper proof of service; and
absence of a board resolution evincing the authority of Roberto Sison,

petitioner's Chief Operating Officer, to represent it in the case.
The fallo of the CA's July 11, 2011 Resolution reads as
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In view of the foregoing premises, petitioners' Petition for Certiorari
dated April 11, 2011 is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
As regards the absence of a board resolution, the CA held that "the
Petition is subject to dismissal if a certification was submitted
unaccompanied by proof of the signatory's authority."8 Petitioner,
thus, moved for reconsideration, offering explanations for the defects
cited by the CA including the absence of the board resolution.
291

CA Ruling on Motion for Reconsideration
The appellate court, in its April 19, 2012 Resolution, accepted

petitioner's explanation as regards the first three (3) defects but
ruled that the person signing the petition lacked authority to do so
because the Secretary's Certificate appended to the petition is
insufficient proof of said authority. The CA ruled that the failure to
attach the Board Resolution for the filing of the Petition was fatal x x
x.9 In disposing of the case, the CA
stated:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration dated August 10, 2011, is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.10
The Issues
Petitioner now comes before this Court assailing the foregoing

Resolutions of the CA and raising the following issues, to
wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[WHETHER THE CA] SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
SECRETARY'S CERTIFICATE EXECUTED BY ASSISTANT
CORPORATE SECRETARY ELSIE T. MARIO AUTHORIZING
ROBERTO Z. SISON TO ACT FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE
PETITIONER CORPORATION IN FILING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI DOES NOT CONSTITUTE SUFFICIENT PROOF OF
[SISON'S] AUTHORITY TO REPRESENT THE CORPORATION.
[WHETHER THE CA] SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE

BASED ON A TECHNICALITY WHEN PETITIONER HAS
SUBSTANTIALLY RAISED VALID GROUNDS TO SET ASIDE THE
ORDERS OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION
292

TO DISMISS THE CASE FOR FAILURE OF THE RESPONDENT TO

PROSECUTE THE CASE FOR AN UNREASONABLE LENGTH OF
TIME.11
Accompanying the Petition is a copy of the April 8, 2011 Minutes of
the Special Meeting of the Board of Directors of petitioner authorizing
Sison to represent petitioner in the expropriation
case.12cralawlibrary
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
On the first issue, petitioner argues that the Secretary's Certificate

executed by Assistant Corporate Secretary Marinareflecting the
Board's resolution that authorized its Chief Operating Officer, Sison,
to file the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the CAis
sufficient proof of authority. We agree.
The Court, in several cases, has recognized the sufficiency of a

Secretary's Certificate as proof of authority for an individual named
in it to represent a corporation in a suit.13 In Vicar International
Construction, Inc. v. FEB Leasing and Finance Corp.,14 We
held:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, the petitioner had not
attached any proof that its resident manager was authorized to sign
the Verification and the non-forum shopping Certification, as a
consequence of which the Petition was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals. Subsequent to the dismissal, however, the petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, to which was already attached a
Certificate issued by its board secretary who stated that, prior to the
filing of the Petition, the resident manager had been authorized by
the board of directors to file the Petition.
293

Citing several cases excusing noncompliance with the requirement of

a certificate of non-forum shopping, the Court held that "with more
reason should x x x the instant petition [be allowed,] since petitioner
herein did submit a certification on non-forum shopping, failing only
to show proof that the signatory was authorized to do so." The Court
further said that the subsequent submission of the Secretary's
Certificate, attesting that the signatory to the certification was
authorized to file the action on behalf of petitioner, mitigated the
oversight. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
A simple perusal of the records shows that separate authorizing
board resolutions, as evidenced by the Secretary's Certificate, were
executed a few days prior to the filing of the Answer to the basic
complaint to expropriate and the petition for certiorari interposed
before the CA. The Answer was filed on February 28, 2006. Prior to
this date, the board of petitioner already authorized Mario "to do
any and all acts that may be essential in the prosecution and defense
of the cases of the corporation, more particularly involving and in
connection with the Eminent Domain case filed by the City of LapuLapu" during its February 14, 2006 special meeting. Similarly, the
Petition for Certiorari before the CA was filed on April 15, 2011,
accompanied by a secretary's certificate executed on April 12, 2011
by Mario, which states, among others, that the latter, as well as
Sison, was authorized by the Board on April 8, 2011 to represent
petitioner in said eminent domain case.
Clearly then, Sison, petitioner's representative, was duly authorized

to sign the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping and
that a Secretary's Certificate is sufficient proof of said authority, it
not being limited to the Board Resolution itself. Accordingly, We hold
that the CA erred in dismissing petitioner's certiorari petition and in
denying its motion for reconsideration.
294

This is not to say, however, that the petition before the CA is

meritorious. Taking into consideration the length of dormancy of
Civil Case No. 653 8-L and a review of the developments in said case
convinces Us that the issue of whether the denial of petitioner's
Motion to Dismiss by the RTC is proper, which issue the CA has yet
to resolve, should be resolved in respondent's favor. The Court
likewise finds it apt to settle said issue once and for all instead of
directing the appellate court to proceed with CA-G.R. SP. No. 05877
in order to avert further delays in its resolution.15 Thus, for practical
reasons and in the greater interest of justice, the Court shall now
address the issue of whether the RTC erred in denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss.
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in not dismissing the
case for respondent's failure to prosecute the case for an
unreasonable length of time in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 18 and Sec. 3,
Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.
Sec. 1, Rule 18 on Pre-Trial, reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Sec. 1. When conducted. - After the last pleading has been served
and filed, it shall be the duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex
parte that the case be set for pre-trial.chanrob1esvirtualawlibrary
Related to the above section is Sec. 3 of Rule 17, which
states:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. - If, for no justifiable cause,
the plaintiff fails x x x to prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time, x x x the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of
the defendant or upon the court's own motion x x
x.chanrob1esvirtualawlibrary
Sec. 1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court imposes upon the plaintiff the
duty to set the case for pre-trial after the last pleading is served and
filed. With this in mind, We have, in several cases,16 ruled that the
plaintiffs omission to promptly move that the case be set for pre-trial
295

is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint due to his fault,

particularly for failing to prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time, pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17.
The parties, as well as the courts below, however, failed to consider

that the afore-quoted Sec. 1 of Rule 18 had already been superseded
by A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC,17 which took effect on August 16, 2004,
Item 1.2 of which states:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I. PRE-TRIAL
A. Civil Cases
1. Within one day from receipt of the

complaint:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1.1. Summons shall be prepared and shall contain a reminder to

defendant to observe restraint in filing a motion to dismiss and
instead allege the grounds thereof as defences in the Answer, in
conformity with IBP-OCA Memorandum on Policy Guidelines dated
March 12, 2002. xxx.
1.2 x x x Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the
plaintiff must promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pretrial conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the
given period, the Branch [Clerk of Court] shall issue a notice of pretrial.
Thus, the present rule is that if the plaintiff fails to file a motion to
set the case for pre-trial within five (5) days from the filing of a reply,
the duty to set the case for pre-trial falls upon the branch clerk of
court. However, this does not relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to
prosecute the case diligently.
296

For a plaintiff, as herein respondent, to be excused from its burden

to promptly prosecute its case, it must convince the court that its
failure to do so was due to justifiable reasons. If the neglect is
justified, then a dismissal of the case on said ground is not
warranted.
In an attempt to convince Us that it was not remiss in its duty to

diligently prosecute its case, respondent proffered the following
reasons, to wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondent was constrained to await the trial court's resolution of
petitioner's Motion to Conduct Joint Survey and Set the Case for PreTrial, which the RTC has not yet resolved to this
date;18cralawlibrary
Respondent's right to due processi.e., the right to be given a

reasonable or ample opportunity to be heardis violated since the
RTC has not yet resolved said Motion to Conduct Joint
Survey;19cralawlibrary
Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss is a mere scrap of paper, petitioner

having violated the three-day notice rule under Sec. 4, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court;20 and
Respondent cannot be faulted for the alleged delay not only because
of the pendency of the resolution of said Motion and because of
petitioner's failure to strictly comply with the three-day notice rule,
but also because the branch clerk of court failed to comply with the
July 10, 2006 and March 28, 2007 directives of the RTC that a writ
of possession be issued.21
297

A consideration of the events that transpired in the said

expropriation case readily shows that the delay cannot solely be
attributed to respondent City of Lapu Lapu but is in fact due to the
failure of the branch clerk of court to set the case for pre-trial
pursuant to A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, as well as the trial court's delay in
resolving petitioner's Motion to Conduct Joint Survey and Set the
Case for Pre-Trial. We find good reason to believe respondent's
assertion that it acted in good faith when it did not move to set the
case for pre-trial, since petitioner already moved for the pre-trial
setting. Another motion from respondent can be simply repetitive of
petitioner's earlier motion.
The Court, however, is mindful of petitioner's predicament that the

delay in the resolution of the expropriation case and respondent's
continued occupation and enjoyment of the subject property for more
than half a decade is extremely disadvantageous and prejudicial to
said corporation without any payment of just compensation. To
prevent further damage to petitioner, the trial court is directed to
immediately resolve petitioner's Motion to Conduct Joint Survey, set
the case for pre-trial, and take all appropriate measures to expedite
the resolution of said case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing pronouncements, the petition

is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed CA Resolutions dated
July 11, 2011 and April 19, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 05877 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for the reason that petitioner's
representative was duly authorized to sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping.
The February 18, 2008 and January 26, 2011 Orders of the RTC are
hereby AFFIRMED. However, in the interest of substantial justice,
the RTC, Branch 27 in Lapu-Lapu City is hereby DIRECTED to take
immediate action on all pending matters in Civil Case No. 6538-L,
set the case for pre-trial, and expedite the resolution of said case.
298

SO ORDERED.
Del Castillo,*Abad, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
* Acting member per Special Order No. 1541 (Revised) dated

September 9. 2013.cranad
1 Docketed as Civil Case No. 6538-L before the RTC, Branch 27 in

Lapu-Lapu City, entitled City of Lapu-Lapu v. Sps. Lhullier, et al.
2Rollo p. 139.cranad
3 Id. at 172.cranad
4 Id. at 162.cranad
5 Id. at 172.cranad
6 Id. at 186.cranad
299

7 Id. at 32-34. Penned by Associate Justice Eduardo B. Peralta Jr.

and concurred in by Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarirrtbs and
Gabriel T. Ingles.cranad
8 Id. at 33.cranad
9 Id. at 37.cranad
10 Id. at 38.cranad
11 Id. at 14.cranad
12 Id. at 219.cranad
13Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, 404 Phil. 981 (2001);

Cebu Metro Pharmacy, Inc. v. Euro-Med Laboratories Philippines,
Inc., G.R. No. 164757, October 18, 2010, 633 SCRA 320; Mediserv,
Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 161368, April 5, 2010, 617 SCRA 284.cranad
14 496 Phil. 467, 475 (2005).cranad
15 See Golangco v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 771. 778 (1997). [The
next most logical step would then be for the Court to simply set aside
the challenged resolutions, remand the case to the CA and direct the
latter to resolve on the merits of the petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
58799. But that would further delay the case. Considering the issues
raised which can be resolved on the basis of the pleadings and
documents filed, and the fact that petitioner itself has asked the
Court to decide its petition on the merits, the Court deems it more
300

practical and in the greater interest of justice not to remand the case
to the CA but, instead, to resolve the controversy once and for all.]
16Olave v. Mistas, G.R. No. 155193, November 26, 2004, 444 SCRA
479; Samson v. Fiel-Macaraig, G.R. No. 166356, February 2, 2010,
611 SCRA 345; New Japan Motors, Inc. v. Pemcho, 165 Phil. 636
(1976).cranad
17 Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of

Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery
Measures.cranad
18Rollo, p. 151.cranad
21 Id. at 172.
301

CASE DIGEST
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Francisco Motors Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 505 SCRA 8,
October 23, 2006 (Page 302)
2. Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 513 SCRA 69, January 26, 2007
(Page 28)
3. Dalida vs. Naguit, 526 SCRA 172, June 29, 2007 (Page 53)
2007 (Page 60)
5. People vs. Capwa, 541 SCRA 516, December 27, 2007 (Page 89)
6. Laynesa vs. Uy, 547 SCRA 200, February 29, 2008 (Page 101)
7. Pactolin vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), 554 SCRA 136, May
20, 2008 (Page 126)
8. Bayot vs. Court of Appeals, 570 SCRA 472, November 07, 2008
(Page 139)
2009 (Page 169)
September 17, 2009 (Page 183)
11. Tomawis vs. Balindong, 614 SCRA 354, March 05, 2010 (Page
201)
12. People vs. Ng Yik Bun, 639 SCRA 88, January 10, 2011 (Page
222)
13. Yu vs. Reyes-Carpio, 652 SCRA 341, June 15, 2011 (Page 250)
14. Bote vs. Veloso, 686 SCRA 758, December 03, 2012 (Page 269)
September 16, 2013. (Page 286)
302

1. Francisco Motors Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 505 SCRA

8, October 23, 2006

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1

1. Francisco Motors Corporation vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

We reiterate the facts found by the Court of Appeals, in addition to

SO ORDERED.[10] (Emphasis supplied.)

This Decision became final and executory on July 13, 1981.[11]

On October 1, 1980, Raquiza filed with the trial court an Ex-Parte

On October 8, 1982, the trial court issued an Order granting

WHEREFORE, premises considered, and in accordance with the

On May 8, 1983, Trans-Resource Management and Development

On January 31, 1986, Raquiza filed with the lower court a

On February 5, 1986, the trial court, through Judge Eficio Acosta,

AS PRAYED FOR by Intervenor Antonio V. Raquiza in his

Title over said portion in the name of the intervenor Antonio V.

On February 14, 1986, Raquiza filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for

On March 10, 1986, Raquiza filed an Ex-Parte Motion praying that

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion to quash writ of

Motors Corporation is hereby denied and the Orders of this Court

On July 8, 1986, FMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said

On September 23, 1986, the lower court, through Judge Nicolas

opposed the motion. Meanwhile, the entire judiciary was reorganized.

On January 19, 1988, the lower court denied Raquizas Motion to

On February 11, 1988, Raquiza filed a Motion for Reconsideration

On June 21, 1988, Raquiza filed a Motion for Extension of Time to

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

FMCs Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its

The parties submitted the following issues for our consideration:

WHETHER OR NOT THE PROPER REMEDY

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN

WHETHER OR NOT THE ATTORNEYS FEES AWARDED TO PRIVATE

The Courts Ruling

We find the petition partly meritorious.

(1) Resort to Certiorari

Petitioner contends that Raquizas resort to certiorari is erroneous

Section 1, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a writ

its or his [/her] jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion

Although Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the

In this case, while private respondent had other legal remedies

We take special cognizance that when the CA issued the questioned

Technicalities should be disregarded if only to render to the

appeal, respondent appellate court may legally entertain the special

Petitioner FMC mistakenly pointed out that private respondent filed

(2) Enforcement of the Decision by Motion

There is no dispute that the judgment sought to be enforced by

Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court states:

SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action A final and

In Lancita v. Magbanua, we held that:

In computing the time limited for suing out of an execution, although

As pointed above, in computing the time limited for suing out an

where after a final judgment, the petitioner (obligor) moved to defer

Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case where the

The purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing

Revised Rules of Court does not apply.[58] In Jacinto v. Intermediate

Republic v. Court of Appeals summed it up as follows:

Subsequently, an order quashing the writ of execution was issued by

Private respondents claim on the property is based on the January

Philamlife under the Compromise Agreement of December 28, 1965.

Petitioner contends that when it acquired the property, there was

Private respondent argued that the reannotation of his claim could

In Spouses Po Lam v. Court of Appeals, we held that the filing of a

attorneys lien. Thus, petitioner FMC could not be considered a

Furthermore, private respondents right over the property is based on

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the